J-S40040-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

THOMAS EARL BECKER 

 Appellant No. 64 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 2, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002306-2012 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014 

 Appellant, Thomas Earl Becker, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of 32 years and nine months to 60 years’ imprisonment for rape of a child1

and related charges entered August 2, 2013, by the Honorable Dennis E. 

Reinaker, Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. On appeal, Becker 

raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm. 

 On May 15, 2013, following a jury trial, Becker was convicted of one 

count of Rape of a Child, two counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault of a 

Child,2

 three counts of Indecent Assault,3 and three counts of Corruption of 

Minors.4

 The convictions stemmed from Becker’s continued sexual abuse of 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(b). 

3

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7). 

4

 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1). 
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his two step-granddaughters and his granddaughter at his home in 

Lancaster County. Following a hearing on August 2, 2013, Becker was 

classified as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under the Registration of 

Sexual Offenders Act (commonly known as “Megan’s Law”), 42 

PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. §§ 9791-9799.7, and sentenced to an aggregate term of 

32 years and 9 months to 66 years’ incarceration. On August 12, 2013, 

Becker filed a post-trial motion to modify sentence, which the trial court 

denied. This timely appeal followed.5

 

 On appeal, Becker raises the following issue for our review: 

Was an aggregate sentence of thirty-two years and nine months 

to sixty-six years[’] incarceration clearly unreasonable under the

circumstances of this case, imposed for the improper reason of 

punishment for choosing trial, in violation of Mr. Becker’s 

constitutional rights, and did it improperly constitute a virtual life 

sentence? 

Appellant’s Brief at 8. 

 Our standard when reviewing sentencing matters is as follows: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

Sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

____________________________________________ 

5 Becker’s initial direct appeal to this Court was quashed as untimely; 

however, on December 27, 2013, the lower court reinstated Becker’s direct 

appeal rights nunc pro tunc. 
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Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc) (citation omitted). 

“A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a 

claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citation omitted). When challenging the discretionary aspects 

of the sentence imposed, an appellant must present a substantial question 

as to the inappropriateness of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. 

Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Two requirements must be 

met before we will review this challenge on its merits.” McAfee, 849 A.2d 

at 274. “First, an appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of 

the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. “Second, the appellant must show 

that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Id. That is, “the sentence violates 

either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the 

Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing 

process.” Tirado, 870 A.2d at 365. We examine an appellant’s Rule 

2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.6 See 

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6

 Rule 2119 provides the following, in pertinent part: 

 ...

(f) Discretionary aspects of sentence. An appellant who 

challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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id. “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, 

in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to 

decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. 

In the present case, Becker’s appellate brief contains the requisite Rule 

2119(f) concise statement, and, as such, is in technical compliance with the 

requirements to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Becker 

argues in his Rule 2119(f) statement “the trial court’s cumulative sentence ... 

was clearly unreasonable, and so manifestly excessive as to constitute an 

abuse of discretion, and that it was a virtual life sentence.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 14. Becker additionally argues that the trial court imposed a severe 

sentence in order to punish him for choosing to go to trial rather than 

pleading guilty. See id. at 15. These claims raise substantial questions for 

our review. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive such that it constitutes 

too severe a punishment raises a substantial question for our review); 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied 

upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects 

of a sentence. The statement shall immediately precede the argument 

on the merits with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence. 

 

Pa.R.A.P., Rule 2119(f), 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. 
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(allegation that trial court relied upon defendant’s decision to go to trial 

rather than accept a plea bargain constitutes a substantial question). 

Preliminarily, we note that Becker did not object at sentencing or in his 

post-sentence motion to the trial court’s alleged reliance upon his decision to 

stand trial rather than negotiate a plea deal. “Objections to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not 

raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence 

imposed.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we are 

constrained to find Becker’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence on that basis waived. 

We proceed to address Becker’s claim that the cumulative sentence 

imposed by the trial court constituted too severe a punishment. Specifically, 

Becker posits that the sentence of 32 years and 9 months to 66 years’ 

incarceration is a virtual life sentence,7

“despite the fact that Mr. Becker had 

no prior criminal record, and had a significant work history.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 19. 

Regarding Becker’s challenge to the cumulative nature of his sentence, 

we note that “the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, 

sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme 

circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, 

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7

 Becker was 54 years old when sentenced. 
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considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” 

Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). Here, Becker does not dispute that the individual 

sentences imposed are within the guideline range, notwithstanding the trial 

court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Given the trial court’s 

consideration of the serious nature of the crimes committed in this case, 

which included rape of a child and aggravated indecent assault, Becker’s 

designation as a sexually violent predator, and of the pre-sentence 

investigation report8 prepared in this matter, we do not believe Becker’s 

sentence appears, on its face, manifestly excessive. Further, the record is 

devoid of any evidence that the trial court imposed a more severe sentence 

due to Becker’s decision to go to trial. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the sentence imposed by the trial court. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

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8

“Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation 

report, we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotes and citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013). 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/7/2014