No. 5 January 17, 2013 189

5353 Or Morgan v. Sisters School District #6 2013 January 17, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Mike MORGAN,

Petitioner on Review,

v.

SISTERS SCHOOL DISTRICT #6

and its Board of Directors,

Respondent on Review.

(CC 08-CV-0423AB; CA A142252; SC S059465)

 On review from the Court of Appeals.*

 Argued and submitted March 5, 2012.

 Ross A. Day of The Day Law Group, P.C., Portland, 

argued the cause and fi led the brief for petitioner on review.

 Peter R. Mersereau of Mersereau & Shannon, LLP, 

Portland, argued the cause and fi led the brief for respondent 

on review. With him on the brief was Thomas W. McPherson.

Before Balmer, Chief Justice, Kistler, Walters, Linder, 

and Landau, Justices, and Durham and De Muniz, Senior 

Judges, Justices pro tempore.**

 LANDAU, J.

 The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of 

the circuit court are affi rmed.

Plaintiff Morgan fi led suit under ORS 28.020, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief addressing certain fi nancial obligations assumed by defendants, Sisters 

School District #6 and its Board of Directors. Defendants sought dismissal of the 

suit, alleging that plaintiff lacked statutory standing. Plaintiff countered that he 

has standing in three ways: (1) as a voter, (2) as a taxpayer, and (3) under a hybrid 

voter-taxpayer theory. Held: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing as a voter because his 

complaint does not request relief that would have the practical effect of remedying 

the denial of his right to vote; (2) Plaintiff alleged injuries too speculative to support standing under a taxpayer theory or a potential hybrid theory.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are 

affi rmed.

______________

 ** Appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court, Alta Jean Brady, Judge. 241 

Or App 483, 251 P3d 207 (2011).

 ** Brewer and Baldwin, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or 

decision of this case.
190 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

LANDAU, J.

 At issue in this case is whether plaintiff has 

standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 

ORS 28.020, to seek a declaration that defendant Sisters 

School District #6 and its Board of Directors (board) lacked 

authority to enter into a particular form of fi nancing 

arrangement without a vote of the people. Plaintiff alleged 

that he has standing because his “status as a taxpayer and 

voter within the district will or may be adversely affected[.]” 

More specifi cally, plaintiff alleged that entering into the 

challenged form of fi nancing arrangement might, in some 

unspecifi ed way, “jeopardize the district[‘]s ability to provide 

for the daily operation of the district” and, if that should 

come to pass, increase the likelihood that the district will 

have to seek additional fi nancing to cover its obligations. 

 The trial court concluded that those allegations were 

insuffi cient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 28.020 that 

only persons “whose rights, status or other legal relations 

are affected” by the challenged ordinance have standing. 

The Court of Appeals likewise concluded that the harm that 

plaintiff alleges is too attenuated and speculative to satisfy 

the standing requirement of the Uniform Declaratory 

Judgments Act. Morgan v. Sisters School District #6, 241 

Or App 483, 251 P3d 207 (2011). We agree and affi rm.

 The relevant facts are uncontested. On March 12, 

2007, the board adopted Resolution No #FY 06-07-06, which 

authorized the issuance and negotiated sale of “Full Faith 

and Credit Obligations, Series 2007” in an amount not to 

exceed $2.1 million. The resolution stated that the obligations 

were to be issued as “certifi cates of participation” under 

ORS 271.390, which authorizes public bodies to issue that 

type of obligation to fund the acquisition or improvement of 

certain property, secured by any or all “lawfully available 

funds of the public body or council of governments”—in 

essence, the full faith and credit of the governmental unit. 

The stated purpose of the obligation was to fi nance the cost 

of improvements to district property, including classrooms, 

furniture, fi xtures, building system upgrades, and the like. 

On May 22, 2007, Wells Fargo Bank, acting as escrow 

agent, issued the certifi cates of participation for purchase 

by investors. 
Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 191

 One year later, in May 2008, plaintiff fi led a 

complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the 

district and the board. Plaintiff alleged that the obligations 

that had been denominated “certifi cates of participation” 

actually were bonds, which, under ORS 328.205 to 328.230, 

may be issued only after approval by a majority of the 

electors in the school district. Plaintiff alleged that his 

“status as a taxpayer and voter within the district will or 

may be adversely affected by the actions of the school district 

as alleged in paragraph 16(e) and 16(f)” of his complaint. In 

those paragraphs, he alleged:

 “(e) The issuance of ‘bonds’ without the approval of the 

electorate, may jeopardize the district[‘]s ability to provide 

for the daily operation of the district.

 “(f) The issuance of the ‘bonds’ by the district without 

voter approval increases the likelihood that the district 

will have to seek voter approval of additional bonds 

either as local option bonds or general obligation bonds. 

ORS 328.205 et seq. is intended to initially require voter 

approval and thus avoid the prospect of spending too much 

money in the form of full faith and credit obligations and 

then seeking voter approval.”

 In his prayer for relief, plaintiff requested that the 

court declare that the certifi cates of participation at issue 

actually are bonds and that “the district wrongfully failed to 

obtain the approval of the voters within the school district” 

before issuing those bonds. Notably, plaintiff did not ask 

for a declaration that the certifi cates of participation are 

invalid. Nor did he request an order that the matter be put 

to a vote. He asked that the court prohibit the district from 

making any further payments on the obligations; that is, he 

requested that the court order the district simply to default 

on the obligations. 

 Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing 

that the certifi cates of participation issued by the district 

were bonds that should not have been issued without prior 

voter approval. 

 Defendants fi led their own motion for summary 

judgment that responded to plaintiff’s arguments on the 

merits, but they also requested dismissal of the action 
192 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

for want of justiciability. Pointing to the allegations of 

standing in paragraphs 16(e) and 16(f) of the complaint, 

defendants argued that, at best, plaintiff had alleged only 

a remote possibility that the issuance of the certifi cates of 

participation would affect him in any way. Such a remote 

possibility of harm, defendants argued, was not suffi cient 

to establish the concrete stake in the outcome of a case that 

the law requires. 

 Plaintiff responded that he need only allege a 

“potential impact” to proceed on a taxpayer standing 

theory and that he had made such an allegation by arguing 

“ultimate facts, which, if established, would demonstrate 

that plaintiff would be required to pay proportionately more 

taxes for the same or less educational services.” 

 The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, granted defendants’ motion, and 

entered judgment dismissing the case. In a memorandum 

opinion, the trial court explained that plaintiff lacks standing 

because the “potential impact” of the district’s actions that 

plaintiff had described is “attenuated and speculative.” 

 Plaintiff appealed, assigning error to the trial 

court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment and 

to the granting of defendants’ motion. He argued that the 

trial court had erred in concluding that he lacks standing 

and that the court should have ruled in his favor on the 

merits. On appeal, plaintiff’s arguments on standing were 

rather more elaborate than those advanced before the trial 

court. He argued that he has standing both as a voter and 

as a taxpayer. Regarding his standing as a voter, plaintiff 

argued that he alleged that he is a voter within the school 

district and that he had been deprived of the right to vote 

on the issuance of the fi nancial obligations that are at issue. 

That, he contended, is all that the law requires to establish 

standing. As for his standing as a taxpayer, he argued that 

documents in the summary judgment record show that the 

certifi cates of participation that the district issued require 

it to pay as much as $240,400 per year in principal and 

interest payments until 2022. According to plaintiff, “[i]f 

the district was unable to make its payments of principal 

and interest[,]” then the purchasers of those certifi cates of 
Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 193

participation “would have both the contractual and statutory 

right to force the district to levy a tax to pay the money due 

to them.” 

 In response, defendants argued fi rst that plaintiff 

had failed to preserve his contention that he has standing as 

a voter. According to defendants, plaintiff’s only argument 

to the trial court was that he has taxpayer standing, based 

on the potential fi nancial impact of a possible default on 

the fi nancial obligations. Regarding the issue of taxpayer 

standing, defendants argued that the trial court correctly 

concluded that the allegations of potential injury are simply 

too speculative to satisfy the more direct interest that the 

law requires. 

 The Court of Appeals affi rmed. The court began 

with plaintiff’s argument that he has standing as a voter, 

separate and distinct from his standing as a taxpayer. 

The court concluded that plaintiff had failed to raise that 

particular theory before the trial court and was therefore 

precluded from asserting it for the fi rst time on appeal. 

Morgan, 241 Or App at 488. In any event, the court noted, 

under existing case law, voter standing is limited to those 

cases in which it is alleged that the deprivation of the right 

to vote would have affected the outcome of the election at 

issue, and no such allegation had been made in this case. Id. 

at 487-88.

 Turning to taxpayer standing, the court concluded 

that the connection between the approval of the certifi cates 

of participation and any possible harm to plaintiff was too 

speculative to demonstrate that his rights are “affected” 

for purposes of ORS 28.020. The court explained that a 

long chain of uncertain events would have to occur before 

plaintiff would experience actual harm as a result of the 

issuance of the certifi cates of participation:

“First, the district must fi nd itself unable to pay back the 

principal and interest on the [certifi cates of participation] 

from available revenues. Second, some authoritative 

tribunal must determine that the district has no discretion 

in deciding how to remedy the default on its own: it must 

raise taxes by fl oating a bond (instead of, for example, 

declaring bankruptcy or liquidating assets). Third, the bond 
194 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

issue must pass. Fourth, plaintiff must still be a resident 

of the district when the bond issue passes. Fifth, plaintiff 

must have resources that are affected by the bond issue.” 

Id. at 490. 

 Before this court, plaintiff contends that the Court 

of Appeals erred in concluding that he lacks standing. As he 

argued before that court, he now argues on review that he 

has standing both because he is a voter who has alleged the 

loss of the right to vote and because he is a taxpayer who 

may be adversely affected should the district be unable to 

pay its obligations. In addition, he advances a new argument 

that he denominates “hybrid” standing; that is, even if he 

lacks standing as a voter or a taxpayer, he still has standing 

because of the combination of both those interests.

 “Standing” is a term of art that is used to describe 

when a party “possesses a status or qualifi cation necessary 

for the assertion, enforcement, or adjudication of legal rights 

or duties.” Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471, 476-

77, 145 P3d 139 (2006). Whether a plaintiff has standing 

depends on the particular requirements of the statute under 

which he or she is seeking relief. Local No. 290 v. Dept. of 

Environ. Quality, 323 Or 559, 566, 919 P2d 1168 (1996). 

 In this case, plaintiff seeks declaratory relief under 

the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.020, 

and also injunctive relief. We begin with his request for 

declaratory relief under ORS 28.020, which provides:

 “Any person interested under a deed, will, written 

contract or other writing constituting a contract, or 

whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected 

by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, 

contract or franchise may have determined any question of 

construction or validity arising under any such instrument, 

constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, 

contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, 

status or other legal relations thereunder.”

Thus, to seek relief under the Uniform Declaratory 

Judgments Act, a plaintiff must establish that his or her 

“rights, status, or other legal relations” are “affected by” the 

relevant instrument. This court’s prior cases have variously 
Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 195

described the test for establishing that a plaintiff’s rights 

are affected under that provision. We draw from those cases 

three related but separate considerations. 

 The fi rst consideration is that there must be “some 

injury or other impact upon a legally recognized interest 

beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the 

validity of a law.” League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 

334 Or 645, 658, 56 P3d 892 (2002). It is not suffi cient that 

a party thinks an enactment or a decision of a government 

entity to be unlawful. The standing requirements of ORS 

28.020 require that the challenged law must affect that 

party’s rights, status, or legal relations.

 Thus, for example, in Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 

121, 333 P2d 741 (1958), the plaintiffs initiated an action 

under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, requesting 

a declaration that the Governor lacked the constitutional 

authority to commute the sentence of death that had been 

imposed on the defendant, who had been convicted of 

murdering their son. This court affi rmed the dismissal of 

the action for want of standing. The court explained that

“[t]he wrong of which they complain—if there be a wrong—

is public in character. The complaint discloses no special 

injury affecting the plaintiffs differently from other citizens.” 

Id. at 124. “There is no case for declaratory relief,” the court 

concluded, “where the plaintiff seeks merely to vindicate a 

public right to have the laws of the state properly enforced 

and administered.” Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). See also League of Oregon Cities, 334 Or at 658 

(plaintiff must show “ ‘some injury or other impact upon a 

legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in 

the correct application or the validity of a law’ ”); Cummings 

Constr. v. School District No. 9, 242 Or 106, 110, 408 P2d 

80 (1965) (construction contractors lacked standing to 

challenge school district construction bidding practices 

when they did not bid for school district construction work).

 The second consideration is that the injury must 

be real or probable, not hypothetical or speculative. As this 

court explained in TVKO v. Howland, 335 Or 527, 534, 

73 P3d 905 (2003), “This court consistently has held that 

courts cannot issue declaratory judgments in a vacuum; 
196 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

they must resolve an actual or justiciable controversy. To 

be justiciable, a controversy must involve a dispute based 

on present facts rather than on contingent or hypothetical 

events.” (Citations omitted.) 

Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District, 285 Or 3, 588 

P2d 1281 (1979), illustrates that principle. In that case, the 

plaintiff initiated an action for a declaration that a contract 

between the municipal health district and a physician was 

unlawful. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of 

standing. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he had 

standing as a taxpayer, entitled to challenge actions of 

the municipal health district that amounted to a misuse of 

public funds. This court rejected the argument, explaining 

that the plaintiff had failed to describe how the actions of 

the municipal health district led to any “actual or potential 

adverse fi scal consequences” as to him personally. Id. at 8. 

“When the potential fi scal implications of a public contract 

are not apparent on its face,” the court explained, “they 

should not be left to judicial speculation; they need to be 

asserted, if a plaintiff relies on his interest as a taxpayer” to 

proceed under ORS 28.020. Id. at 9. 

Savage v. Munn, 317 Or 283, 856 P2d 298 

(1993), also is instructive. In that case, the plaintiffs 

initiated a declaratory judgment action, challenging the 

constitutionality of a property tax limitation enacted in 1990 

as Ballot Measure 5. Plaintiffs alleged that the measure 

would have the effect of making them pay proportionally 

more for the same services than others who owned similar 

properties. The defendants argued that the case should 

be dismissed for want of standing because the plaintiffs’ 

claims were based on the hypothetical operation of the 

ballot measure and because they had failed to demonstrate 

a “direct effect” of the challenged law on their personal 

tax bills. The court rejected the argument, explaining that 

the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claim in that case was not 

the unconstitutionality of the amount of their taxes, but 

rather the manner in which taxes were capped under Ballot 

Measure 5, which, the court stated, “are ‘present facts,’ 

not simply possible future events.” Id. at 292. Under those 

circumstances, the court explained, specifying how the 
Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 197

law would affect the amount of plaintiffs’ tax bills was not 

required. Id.

 The third and fi nal consideration is that the court’s 

decision must have a practical effect on the rights that the 

plaintiff is seeking to vindicate. Kellas, 341 Or at 484-85 

(discussing practical effects requirement of ORS 28.020). 

That is to say, a connection must exist between the rights 

that a plaintiff seeks to vindicate and the relief requested. 

The relief that the plaintiff seeks, if granted, must redress 

the injury that is the subject of the declaratory judgment 

action. As this court explained in Cummings Constr., 242 

Or at 110, there must be “a real and substantial controversy 

admitting of specifi c relief through a decree of conclusive 

character.” Otherwise, the court’s decision will amount to 

no more than an advisory opinion. 

 Thus, for example, in Hazell v. Brown, 352 Or 

455, 467, 287 P3d 1079 (2012), the plaintiffs initiated an 

action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 

challenging the Secretary of State’s determination that a 

voter-approved ballot measure was “dormant” and had not 

yet gone into effect. On appeal, they also asked the court to 

declare specifi c provisions of the measure unconstitutional. 

This court declined to do that. The court began by noting 

that the parties had standing to challenge whether the 

statute had gone into effect; they alleged the requisite 

interest and sought a remedy to effectuate that interest. 

Id. But, the court noted, they had neglected “to seek any 

specifi c relief connected to the application or nonapplication 

of the individual provisions in question.” Id. Consequently, 

their complaint was insuffi cient “to allege a justiciable 

controversy under the declaratory judgment act, as to 

the individual provisions” of the ballot measure. Id. An 

opinion on the constitutionality of the individual provisions, 

the court concluded, would amount to an impermissible 

advisory opinion. Id. at 468. See also Strunk v. PERB, 338 

Or 145, 153, 108 P3d 1058 (2005) (standing requires “some 

practical effect on [a] party’s rights”); Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 

321 Or 174, 188, 895 P2d 765 (1995) (declaratory relief is 

available “only when it can affect * * * some rights between 

the parties”); Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449, 
198 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

648 P2d 1289 (1982) (“A justiciable controversy results in 

specifi c relief through a binding decree as opposed to an 

advisory opinion[.]”); Gortmaker v. Seaton, 252 Or 440, 

443, 450 P2d 547 (1969) (plaintiff lacked standing under 

Declaratory Judgments Act because a decision would not 

affect his rights).

 With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to 

the parties’ arguments about plaintiff’s standing in this 

case, beginning with plaintiff’s contention that he has 

standing as a voter who has been denied the right to vote 

on the fi nancial obligations that the district issued. As we 

have noted, defendants argue—and the Court of Appeals 

agreed—that plaintiff failed to preserve that particular 

theory of standing. Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals 

erred in concluding that he failed to preserve that theory 

of standing. He contends that, by alleging in his complaint 

that his “status as a taxpayer and voter” was adversely 

affected, he alerted the trial court and defendants that he 

was relying on voter standing. 

 We are doubtful that the bare allegation in the 

complaint that plaintiff was adversely affected as a voter, 

without more, suffi ces to preserve his current contention 

that he has standing as a voter who was deprived of the 

right to vote. See, e.g., Gruber, 285 Or at 7-8 (“[A] complaint 

under this section [ORS 28.020] must show how plaintiff’s 

‘rights, status, or other legal relations are affected’ by an 

instrument or enactment.” (Emphasis added.)). Indeed, 

although the complaint does allege that plaintiff’s rights as 

a voter were adversely affected, the only allegation as to 

the nature of that adverse effect was the fact that he might 

suffer fi nancial harm should the district be unable to meet 

its obligations. And, consistently with that allegation, the 

only argument that plaintiff made to the trial court was 

that he has standing because of that potential fi scal impact 

on him as a taxpayer. 

 Even assuming for the sake of argument that 

plaintiff adequately preserved his contention that he has 

voter standing based on the loss of his right to vote on the 

resolution approving the certifi cates of participation, the 

contention ultimately fails. At the outset, we note that this 
Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 199

court has recognized that the denial of the right to vote can 

satisfy the personal injury requirement that the Uniform 

Declaratory Judgments Act makes a prerequisite to 

standing. In Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3, 188 Or 324, 

215 P2d 368 (1950), a voter brought a declaratory judgment 

action, seeking to set aside the results of an election in which 

he had been denied the right to vote. The particular election 

involved two school districts that had voted to consolidate. 

The consolidation proposal had been approved by a margin 

of a single vote. In challenging the validity of the election, 

the plaintiff noted that, had he been permitted to vote, 

the outcome of the election would have been different. The 

defendant school districts sought dismissal of the action on 

the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing. This court 

disagreed, holding that the complaint clearly set out the 

denial of his right to vote, followed by “an appropriate prayer 

in that regard.” Id. at 331. It bears some emphasis that the 

court’s decision was based not only on the allegation of a 

denial of the right to vote, but also on the existence of an 

“appropriate prayer,” that is, one that, if granted, would 

have remedied the injury of which the plaintiff complained. 

The court also noted that the plaintiff had alleged that, 

had he been permitted to vote, the outcome of the election 

would have been different. But it is not entirely clear from 

the court’s opinion how much difference that made in its 

analysis. 

 In this case, plaintiff did allege in his complaint 

that he was a voter who had been denied the right to vote. 

But, unlike the plaintiff in Webb, plaintiff in this case seeks 

no relief that could remedy the denial of his right to vote. 

His complaint does not ask for an order compelling the 

district to hold an election. It simply asks for a declaration 

that the district should have held one. Such a declaration 

would have no practical effect on plaintiff’s voting rights and 

would amount to a purely advisory opinion. We therefore 

conclude that his allegation that he is a voter who has been 

denied the right to vote is inadequate to satisfy the standing 

requirements of ORS 28.020.

 In reaching that conclusion, we emphasize that 

we are not holding that plaintiff lacks standing because he 
200 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

merely asks for a declaration that his rights had been violated. 

To the contrary, in appropriate cases, such a declaration is 

adequate to satisfy the practical effect requirement that this 

court’s cases have described. In cases involving disputed 

provisions of a contract or insurance policy, for example, 

a declaration of the parties’ rights under that contract or 

policy can have a concrete effect on the parties to it. See, 

e.g., Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 342 Or 530, 532-33, 157 

P3d 775 (2007) (action for declaration as to enforceability 

of provisions in loan agreement); North Pacifi c Ins. Co. v. 

Hamilton, 332 Or 20, 22-23, 22 P3d 739 (2001) (action for 

declaration as to insurer’s liability under a policy of liability 

insurance). Or, for another example, in cases involving a 

recurring action, a declaration of the lawfulness of that 

action can have a practical effect in establishing the basis 

for further relief, such as an injunction, see, e.g., State ex 

rel Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Sams, 298 Or 329, 333, 692 

P2d 116 (1984) (suggesting that “the appropriate remedy for 

challenging a recurring practice that is believed to be illegal 

is by declaratory judgment”), or monetary damages, see, e.g., 

Ken Leahy Construction, Inc. v. Cascade General, Inc., 329 

Or 566, 573-74, 994 P2d 112 (1999); Lowe v. Harmon, 167 Or 

128, 136, 115 P2d 297 (1941) (relief under the Declaratory 

Judgments Act “may include an assessment of damages”). 

In this case, however, plaintiff has offered no explanation as 

to how the issuance of the judicial declaration that he seeks 

would have any practical effect on his voting rights, and we 

are aware of none. 

 We turn then to plaintiff’s contention that he 

nevertheless has adequately alleged taxpayer standing 

based on the potential fi nancial impact of the issuance of the 

certifi cates of participation. As we have described, plaintiff 

alleged that the issuance of the certifi cates of participation 

“may jeopardize the district[’]s ability to provide for the daily 

operation of the district.” His complaint, however, does not 

explain why the issuance of those obligations might have 

that effect. Moreover, he does not allege that the district’s 

potential inability to provide for its daily operations affects 

him in any way. He also alleged that the issuance of the 

obligations “increases the likelihood” that the district will 

have to seek additional funds from taxpayers like himself. 
Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 201

The problem is that such a “likelihood” is “increased” only 

in the event that the district fi nds itself unable to pay its 

obligations, and even then, only if the voters were to approve 

a district request for additional funding, and further, only 

if plaintiff remains a resident of the district when those 

other events occur. Thus, plaintiff’s allegations that the 

issuance of the certifi cations of participation will affect him 

are predicated on a series of hypothetical contingencies, not 

on present facts. As such, they are inadequate to satisfy the 

requirements of standing under the Uniform Declaratory 

Judgments Act.

 That leaves plaintiff’s proposed “hybrid” standing 

argument: That is, even if he lacks standing as a voter and 

a taxpayer, he should be held to possess standing as a voter 

who has not only been denied the right to vote, but who also 

has suffered (or will suffer) fi nancial loss as a taxpayer. Even 

assuming for the sake of argument that it is permissible for 

plaintiff to advance such an argument at this late stage, the 

argument is unavailing. The fact remains that a declaratory 

judgment in this case will not remedy any injury to plaintiff’s 

voting rights. And adding to the inquiry his allegations of 

purely contingent, hypothetical fi scal harm does not alter 

that fact.

 Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, specifi cally, 

an order that the district not continue to pay on the 

certifi cates of participation. As this court observed in Eckles 

v. State of Oregon, 306 Or 380, 386, 760 P2d 846 (1988), 

no statute governs the issue of standing to seek injunctive 

relief. Nevertheless, the court explained, it has long 

applied essentially the same standing requirements that 

ordinarily apply in declaratory judgment actions. Id. In 

fact, in a number of the cases that we have described above 

concerning the three requirements of standing under the 

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the plaintiffs sought 

both declaratory and injunctive relief, and the court did 

not distinguish between the forms of relief in assessing the 

issue of standing. See, e.g., Hazell, 352 Or at 467-68; League 

of Oregon Cities, 334 Or at 657-62; Barcik, 321 Or at 179. In 

light of the fact that the same standing standards apply to 

plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief, we 
202 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

conclude that, for the reasons that we have described with 

respect to his request for declaratory relief, his claim for 

injunctive relief also fails for lack of standing. 

 The decision of the Court of Appeals and the 

judgment of the circuit court are affi rmed.