UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4180

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAVON RICHARD CALDWELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. 

(1:12-cr-00248-RDB-1)

Submitted: April 17, 2014 Decided: April 29, 2014

Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Steven H. Levin, LEVIN & CURLETT LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Paul E. 

Budlow, P. Michael Cunningham, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

On what would have been the fourth day of a jury 

trial, Lavon Richard Caldwell pled guilty to bank fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), and four counts of 

aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced Caldwell to 

ninety-six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Caldwell contends 

that the district court impermissibly engaged in plea 

negotiations by insisting that he relinquish his right to file a 

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request as a condition to 

the court accepting his guilty plea. Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) prohibits 

the district court from participating in plea negotiations. 

This prohibition “serv[es] three principal interests: it 

diminishes the possibility of judicial coercion of a guilty 

plea; it protects against unfairness and partiality in the 

judicial process; and it eliminates the misleading impression

that the judge is an advocate for the agreement rather than a 

neutral arbiter.” United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460 

(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because Caldwell did not make this objection in the 

district court or attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we review 

for plain error. Id. at 462. To prevail on his claim that the 
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district court improperly participated in plea negotiations, 

Caldwell must demonstrate that the court’s participation was 

error, that the error was plain, that the error affected his 

substantial rights, and “that a refusal to notice the error 

would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.; see Henderson v. 

United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013) (discussing plain 

error standard). 

Assuming, without deciding, that the district court 

impermissibly participated in plea negotiations by conditioning 

its acceptance of Caldwell’s guilty plea on his waiver of his 

FOIA rights and, thus, committed plain error, we conclude that 

Caldwell has failed to demonstrate that the court’s error 

affected his substantial rights. A defendant’s substantial 

rights are affected if we determine that the error “influenced 

[his] decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to 

evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting 

criminal responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 

402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate 

that he would not have pled guilty but for the district court’s 

error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 

2009). 
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Here, Caldwell asserts only that his substantial 

rights were affected by the district court’s error because, but 

for the court’s insistence that he waive his FOIA rights, he 

“would have been permitted to file such a request.” He does 

not, however, assert on appeal that he would not have entered 

his guilty plea but for the error, nor is there any indication 

in the district court’s record that he would not have pled 

guilty but for the error. Thus, Caldwell is not entitled to 

relief. 

Accordingly, we deny Caldwell’s motion to file a pro 

se supplemental brief and affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED