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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

STRENGTHENING STATEHOOD 

CAPABILITIES FOR

SUCCESSFUL TRANSITIONS IN THE

MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA REGION

Mohammed El-Katiri

April 2015

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ISBN 1-58487-671-9
v

FOREWORD

The political transitions that followed revolutions 

in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are by no means complete. They have gone through challenging phases, 

characterized by political volatility and tension. These 

challenges and uncertainties have a profound impact on the three countries’ economies and the ability of their new political elites to build credibility and 

political legitimacy. 

Each of the three countries studied in this monograph has followed a distinct path, with its own opportunities and limitations. Policy reforms during 

each transition have reflected individual political, 

security, and social realities. However, one common 

lesson learned from their trajectories is that their challenges are exacerbated by a deficit of human and institutional capabilities to design and implement political 

and economic reforms. 

In this monograph, Dr. El-Katiri focuses on the 

variety of challenges that face reform attempts in the 

post revolution Arab countries. He examines underlying factors that have prevented new political elites 

and post-revolution institutions from successfully implementing essential reforms, and how these failures 

have affected the building of their political legitimacy. 

He concludes with a series of specific policy recommendations, with the aim of preventing further deterioration to the detriment of U.S. interests.
vi

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this analysis to provide readers with information for 

further debate on this topic.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI is a Director of MENA Insight, a political risk consultancy that focuses on the 

Middle East and North Africa, and a Senior Research 

Analyst at the United Kingdom’s (UK) Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC). Before joining CSRC, Dr. 

El-Katiri was a Research Fellow at the UK Defence 

Academy, and later served as a Political Risk Analyst 

at Eurasia Group and as a Senior Researcher at the 

Hague Institute for Global Justice. With more than 10 

years of regional experience, Dr. El-Katiri focuses his 

research interests on political and economic security 

in North Africa and the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) states, as well as on North African relations 

with the European Union and security policies around 

the Mediterranean. Dr. El-Katiri has published numerous internal and external UK Defence Academy 

reports, including reference papers on national and 

regional security issues in the GCC and the Mediterranean region, and a monograph on the Algerian 

national oil and gas company, Sonatrach. In addition, 

his publications include commentaries and research 

papers in a range of languages for research organizations in the UK and Europe, as well as various newspaper articles in and about the region. Dr. El-Katiri 

is a frequent media commentator, including for the 

British Broadcasting Company, the Financial Times, 

and Al-Jazeera.

ix

SUMMARY

Despite achievements made during the past 4 

years since Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya overthrew their 

former dictatorial rulers, these societies still face major 

governance, security, and economic challenges. These 

challenges vary from country to country depending 

on their specific circumstances, including the intensity and duration of the uprising, and the prevailing 

economic and political situations before and after the 

upheaval. Libya’s security and political situation in 

particular remain chaotic. Very limited progress has 

been made on rebuilding basic state institutions or 

solving legal problems related to restoring justice for 

individuals and communities. 

The inability of the new political elites to meet the 

political and economic expectations of their populations has undermined their political legitimacy which 

has had a significant impact on a variety of economic 

sectors in all three countries, and on their public finances. For instance, Tunisia’s and Egypt’s public 

finances have significantly worsened over the last 4 

years, resulting in large fiscal deficits. Lack of financial 

resources has limited the ability of both countries to 

tackle the structural problems of their economies. 

However, failures to implement reforms and resolve socio-economic problems cannot be attributed 

solely to lack of financial resources. The capacity of 

post-revolution political elites and institutions was 

constrained by a skills deficit among bureaucratic 

cadres. Politicians and civil servants have had to 

learn from scratch the complexity of the challenges 

that face their societies in the post-conflict era, in economic recovery, justice, security, and more. The new 

era requires innovative thinking to address economic 
x

difficulties, draft new legislation, and establish new 

institutions.

This monograph assesses the post-revolution challenges faced by these three countries, and measures 

progress made in reaching them. It reviews their implications for the broader region and for U.S. interests, 

and makes a number of policy recommendations for 

U.S. decisionmakers.
1

STRENGTHENING STATEHOOD

 CAPABILITIES FOR

SUCCESSFUL TRANSITIONS IN THE

MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA REGION

INTRODUCTION

Political transitions that follow revolutions or wars 

are inevitably challenging phases, characterized by 

political volatility and tensions. Transitions are periods that require the rebuilding of important political 

institutions and skillful handling of a variety of acute 

political, security and socio-economic challenges. 

Transitions are also phases that often entail the reform 

of security apparatuses, reform of the justice system, 

writing new or introducing substantial amendments 

to existing constitutions, and in some instances the 

re-engineering of the state governance system with 

the establishment of new structures to ensure the distribution of political power and wealth. On the economic side, governments have to launch policies to 

foster economic growth and regain the trust of local 

and international investors. It is a complex and long 

process. In addition, these policy areas often have to 

be tackled simultaneously, given their interconnectedness, particularly at a time when popular expectations 

are high and every move of the government is under 

intense scrutiny.

Several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have experienced all of these multiple challenges since 2011, following the overthrow of 

Arab leaders who had ruled their respective countries 

for decades. The triumph of protests in Tunisia and 

Egypt, deposing Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni 

Mubarak, inspired other popular revolts to force 
2

their authoritarian rulers out in Libya and Yemen, 

or to achieve greater political concessions in Algeria 

and Morocco. 

This monograph takes the case studies of Egypt, 

Tunisia, and Libya to examine the scope for ensuring successful political transitions in the MENA region’s current unsettled state. The post-revolution 

political elites in these three countries are struggling 

to strengthen their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and their attempts to gather support for the new 

political institutions and reforms have made limited 

progress. Despite their aspirations, the past 4 years 

have been characterized by political volatility and 

continuous instability. 

Rebuilding challenges differ from one country to 

another according to individual circumstances. Specific needs depend on the intensity and duration of 

the uprising, and the prevailing economic and political situations before and after the main upheaval. For 

instance, Libya, a country that experienced approximately 6 months of civil war, had the urgent matter of 

returning and restoring justice to displaced communities and individuals. The war caused massive displacement of communities and residents of cities both 

within Libya and abroad. Furthermore, in the specific 

case of Libya, the fall of the Qadhafi regime left the 

country without functioning security institutions but 

with dozens of rival armed groups, and politics and 

security thus became intertwined. In Egypt and Tunisia, the popular revolts were violent but did not escalate into civil war, and internal security has remained 

in the hands and under the control of the Ministries of 

Defense and of the Interior in both countries. 

Addressing these challenges requires a wide range 

of skills, knowledge, institutional capacity, and coor-
3

dination abilities at top echelons of government. These 

requirements hardly exist in any of the three countries 

analyzed in this article at this point in time. The rebuilding tasks are beyond their capacities alone, and 

experience of previous international transitions that 

followed conflict or revolutions shows that external 

assistance is essential. But at the same time, international aid has been reduced by the austerity policies in 

place in most developed economies. The cuts in government budgets across Western countries are affecting their willingness and ability to provide economic 

development, justice, and security assistance in places 

that need it most. 

This monograph does not aim to offer a comparative analysis between the three countries, but rather 

looks at their different trajectories in the ongoing 

transitional phase to build new political institutions 

and governance. The research builds on the author’s 

working experience with officials and academics from 

the region within a range of training and capacitybuilding projects. 

The first section will focus on why reforms are an 

inherent part of development in the post-revolution 

Arab countries. The second section looks at different 

reform attempts in key areas initiated over the past 3 

years which have failed to make any successful progress. The third section examines a range of factors that 

constrained progress on a number of reform projects 

across the three countries, and notes that the weaknesses of these governments cannot only be attributed to the current political context, but are instead an 

outcome of decades of bad staffing and recruitment 

in both the public and private sectors. The fourth 

section argues that capability building needs differ 

greatly between the three countries, and that tailored 
4

responses are required based on a thorough assessment of these needs. 

THE LOGIC OF REFORM IN TRANSITION

The upheavals that swept the MENA region after 

December 2010 were driven by an irrepressible desire 

for change in both the political and economic spheres 

and the restoration of justice. Millions across the Arab 

countries protested against rampant corruption, unfair economic conditions, and the lack of political freedoms and dignity. The calls for the departure of their 

respective leaders or regimes were a reflection of a desire for a prosperous future within inclusive economic 

and political systems. Thus, the new political elites 

and institutions had limited choice but to be responsive to the demands and aspirations of the broad base 

of their populations and adopt ambitious reforms. 

Each of the three countries described here has had 

its distinct path, opportunities, and limitations. Policy 

reforms during their transitions have reflected individual political, security, and social realities. While 

there was indisputable regime change in the case of 

Libya, the other two countries have seen more nuanced political scenarios. The 2011 revolutions in 

Egypt and Tunisia saw the ousting of key political 

figures and the fall of governments, but did not result 

in an uprooting of regimes. In both countries, the security apparatus that was an important pillar of the 

ousted regimes remained unchanged. The dismissing 

of senior officials in Tunisia did not result in a substantial change of loyalties, beliefs, and modi operandi of 

the security organizations.1 These organizations and 

their unofficial affiliations with established business 

networks constitute what became commonly known 
5

as the “deep state,” which has shaped political events 

during the transition. Although they were not perfect 

democracies, both of these countries had political parties and established bureaucracies, with levels of efficiency which were acceptable by regional standards. 

Libya, by contrast, represents a more complex 

and difficult environment. The country is plagued by 

continuous instability, and interim governments have 

lacked the capacity or commitment to exercise leadership in developing state institutions. Lack of qualified personnel in what is left of the Libyan bureaucracy, and a limited academic environment, constrain 

rapid and effective progress in the rebuilding of state 

institutions. 

Legitimacy and Constitution-Building.

The post-armed conflict or post-revolution governments of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya are confronted with 

a range of challenges which must be addressed in order to build their legitimacy and overcome the sequelae

of the instability that led to the political upheaval in 

the first place. This crucial transitional political phase 

requires the enactment of a variety of new laws and 

establishment of new institutions to deal with tasks 

which are specific to this period. This has been evident 

in all three countries, where the new governments 

have enacted new electoral laws and established special-purpose institutions to draft a new constitution, 

organize and oversee elections, or introduce reforms. 

Once constitutions are promulgated, parliaments and 

governments tend to establish a variety of structures 

and institutions to implement the constitutional provisions, and this undertaking in turn implies the design 

and regulation of further new institutional structures. 
6

Scholars of post-conflict societies deem the rewriting of the constitution to be an important step in laying the foundation for the country’s democratic transition to accountability, inclusive political participation, 

rule of law, and protection of human rights. Thus, all 

changes of government in the Arab countries over the 

last 4 years have dictated either the drafting of a new 

constitution where it has never existed, as was the 

case with Libya, or introducing substantial amendments to the existing ones in the cases of Tunisia 

and Egypt. 

The announcement of the drafting of a new constitution is regarded as a declaration by the new political 

elites of their intent to enshrine the protection of human rights, democracy, and rule of law principles and 

institutions. In the absence of a constitution, the interim Libyan National Transitional Council promulgated 

a Constitutional Declaration in August 2011, setting 

the governance structure for the transition phase until 

a new constitution is drafted.2

Drafting a new constitution is deemed paramount 

to building the credibility and legitimacy of new 

governments, and thus deserves to be prioritized. 

The drafting of a constitution is not an easy task in 

post-revolution or post-regime change contexts. It is 

a process that requires not only skillful handling of 

the content and wording of the constitution, but also 

deft management of the process. It is usually an undertaking that is fraught with risks and challenges, especially in a transition period characterized by weak 

political legitimacy and fierce completion among a variety of political groups. This too has been evident in 

the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. For instance, in 

Tunisia, which led the political upheaval in the Arab 

world, it took the National Constituent Assembly 2 
7

years and 3 months to complete the drafting of the 

new constitution which was approved on January 26, 

2014. The process of deliberation was neither smooth 

nor without controversy. The divergence of views 

between Islamist and secular parties on a variety of 

issues reached the level of political crisis on several 

occasions. The position of religion in political life has 

been one of the most controversial matters in all three 

countries, and one that has generated vigorous political debates within the constituent bodies and outside 

among political parties and civil society.3 However, 

the legal debate has to some extent only mirrored the 

competition in the political arena among political parties, and the limited trust they have in each other.4

 The 

debates, despite the tensions they sparked, provided 

opportunities to deepen understanding of a variety 

of ideals and what they mean to different social and 

ideological groups within Tunisia. 

The drafting of Egypt’s constitution under the 

Muslim Brotherhood’s rule was not without controversy either. Secular and leftist forces protested the 

dominant position Egyptian Islamists have in the 

Constituent Assembly, with their fears centered on 

the role of Islamic law, Sharia, as source of legislation.5

 In Libya, the unfortunate position society found 

itself in with weak or no vital state institutions, and 

no constitution or constitutional culture among its 

intelligentsia, complicated progress on drafting the 

constitution. The process of preparing the country’s 

first constitution since the end of monarchy in 1969 became the victim of the political and security chaos that 

has dominated Libya over the last 4 years.6 The power 

struggle between different ideological, regional, and 

ethnic armed groups hampered the process of electing 

a constituent assembly. The General National Con-
8

gress and different post-Qadhafi governments had to 

balance competing demands on the representation issue from ethnic minorities such as Amazigh, Touareg, 

and Tabu, as well as regions, secularists, and Islamists. 

The process of drafting is still at an early stage since 60 

members of the constituent assembly were elected in 

February 2014. 

The drafters of constitutions have to deal with a 

variety of vital themes ranging from identity matters 

to the organization of the state structure and the status 

of its vital political and economic institutions. For example, vital themes that are usually discussed include, 

but are not limited to, the change from a centralized to 

a federal state system, the structure and size of parliament, and the judiciary governance system. This is 

a fundamental project that requires careful study of 

each of the options and thorough discussion. 

Moving away from political aspects associated 

with constitution making, the process requires the 

availability of a wide range of resources and skills. 

Experts usually look at experiences of other countries 

that have gone through similar transitions and political transformations. But not all of these countries 

have had access to technical expertise, or were well 

informed about comparative constitutional literature 

and experiences. 

Restructuring the Security Sector.

Another fundamental area of reconstruction is reform of the security sector. The impetus and extent 

for reforming the security apparatus in post-regime 

change differs from one country to another. In some 

countries, the main driver is to remove remnants of 

the previous regime, either because of the fear of loy-
9

alty to the ousted regime or because of their involvement in abuses of human rights. In others, the reform 

is driven by a desire to change the culture of their institutions and subject them to more accountability and 

civilian oversight, which is an important condition for 

the transition to more representative political systems. 

In most cases, these reforms are responsive to popular demands, particularly where these security agencies have been the most visible and detested manifestation of the old authoritarian regimes. This is the case 

in the three countries studied in this monograph; the 

security agencies were involved for decades in a variety of repressive policies and events. 

Thus, part of the reform entails the adoption of 

regulations and other measures to introduce mechanisms for oversight of security organizations by the 

government and parliament or judiciary, as well as 

the provision of training to existing forces to change 

their working practices in line with the new accountability and respect for human rights. Other parts of 

the restructuring, discussed further, involve strengthening their capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively 

to deal effectively with a range of threats. 

Once again, the needs for reform differ across the 

three countries, depending on the political and security circumstances of each state. Libya remains an 

extreme case. The fall of the Qadhafi regime was accompanied by the fall of the state security institutions. 

The current government security institutions lack the 

capability to maintain order, protect citizens and the 

country’s borders, and critical facilities. The security 

landscape is further complicated by the existence of a 

variety of rival well-armed groups, which emerged as 

a result of the circumstances of the 2011 war. As predicted in an earlier monograph,7

 most military arse-
10

nals inherited from the Qadhafi regime and the subsequent civil war remain in their hands.8

 Thus, security 

sector reform in Libya entails not only the formation 

of new professional security institutions that are not 

based on regional, tribal, or ethnic allegiances, but 

also must include plans to demilitarize armed groups 

and help the reinsertion of combatants into civilian 

and security institutions. In fact, this has been a priority for the interim Libya governments since late 2011. 

The picture is less complicated in Egypt and Tunisia. Both countries have strong and functioning security apparatuses, with Egypt having the largest armed 

forces by number of personnel in the Arab world. 

Their main motivation is primarily a desire to restore 

the loss of credibility of the security forces in the eyes 

of the public. Thus, the main objective is to focus on 

strengthening governance and respect of human 

rights. In Egypt, the ideal main goal of reform would 

be to ensure gradual disengagement of the military 

from politics and economy. Over the last 6 decades, 

since the military coup in 1952 that saw the ousting of 

King Farouk, the military has expanded and consolidated its position in both the politics and the economy 

of Egypt.9 Egyptian presidents since that time have 

been military officers, including Mubarak. In Egypt, 

there is no civilian oversight over the management of 

defense affairs, and the Ministry of Defense is run by 

the military. Meanwhile in Tunisia, the reform of the 

Ministry of Interior’s security agencies is seen as an 

integral part of the wider democratic transition strategy. During the Ben Ali era, different security agencies 

which fell under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior were involved in assassination, torture, and other 

maltreatment for years. The reputation of the police 

and security forces deteriorated still further as a result 
11

of its brutality in quelling protests that led to the departure of Ben Ali, as well as during subsequent protests after January 2011.10 The gathering of thousands 

of Tunisian protestors at the time outside the Ministry 

headquarters in Tunis evidenced how it epitomized 

regime oppression.11

Given the vital role these security agencies play 

in the functioning of the state and its stability, reform 

decisions are deemed delicate, and they are rarely 

launched immediately in the aftermath of a government change. The new political elites might immediately signal the need to rehabilitate the security 

agencies, but leave any substantial reforms to later 

stage. Once launched, the reform process tends to be 

gradual. Pursuing deep reform at an early stage and 

in a comprehensive way runs the risk of demoralizing 

and alienating security officers and officials, and their 

political backers. Furthermore, any attempt to revisit 

the injustices caused by the security agencies over the 

years endangers the stability of the political transition. 

Economic Reform.

Socio-economic grievances played an important 

role in sparking the revolutions in these three countries. But the economic situation has deteriorated still 

further since December 2010. The troubled political 

transitions, characterized by demonstrations and security disorders, have caused significant economic 

losses and have brought the economies and public 

finances of Egypt and Tunisia near to collapse. Instability has affected economic growth, discouraged direct investors, and led to substantial falls in foreign 

reserves and the rise of budget deficits. In Libya, the 

19th largest oil producer in the world, the picture is no 
12

different. Oil exports were halted for months during 

the continued insecurity and thus deprived the Libyan state of its main source of revenues. Oil production 

and export facilities became the targets of armed rebel 

groups in their dispute with the Libyan government. 

The situation remains fluid as the intertwined security 

and political tensions remain unresolved. 

It is unsurprising that the post-revolution governments have opted for a set of policy reforms that attempted to revive the economy, improve the delivery 

of basic services to their population, and tackle issues 

of income inequality and regional development disparities. In order to placate public discontent and mark 

the start of a new political era, interim governments in 

Tunisia and Egypt introduced measures to promote 

youth employment and maintained subsidies for food 

and energy products. 

In addition, the interim rulers in the three countries 

launched initiatives to track billions of dollars stolen 

by the deposed rulers, their families, and entourage.12

These initiatives were deemed important for strengthening values of democracy and morality, as well as 

consolidating trust through demonstration of the discontinuity between the new rulers and deposed ones. 

The recovery of illegal assets has been prioritized because of its economic significance, particularly in the 

case of Egypt and Tunisia where the need for funds to 

shore up dwindling public finances, and the countries’ 

foreign currencies reserves is huge and immediate. 

LIMITED SUCCESS IN DEALING 

WITH CHALLENGES 

The political transition that followed the overthrow of the rulers in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia is still 

unfinished. No strong and legitimate government or 
13

leader has emerged in any of the three countries. The 

mere fact of holding a number of elections to choose 

temporary institutions to handle the transition has not 

led to any significant progress. The post-2011 governments have not yet consolidated their stance on the 

political scene. The three countries have not had stable 

governments; either there has been a major reshuffle 

or an entire change of government as happened in 

Egypt. Even Tunisia, which has been less politically 

turbulent compared to Egypt and Libya, experienced 

a severe political crisis that started early in 2013 and 

lasted for months. The source of tension was ideological between the ruling Islamist Ennahda party and its 

secular opposition. In December 2013, after monthslong arduous negotiations, a new apolitical government was announced.13

In Egypt, the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in 

the 2012 legislative and presidential elections did not 

yield any political stability. On the contrary, the tussle 

between the remnants of Mubarak regime, mainly 

from the security apparatus, and the ruling Islamists 

escalated and led to a military-backed coup in June 

2013.14 The ousting of the elected president, Mohamed 

Morsi, inaugurated a new phase of unrest that has not 

yet settled despite the organization of new presidential elections,15 which resulted in the election of a retired Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. At the time of 

this writing, sporadic clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and Egyptian forces of order are 

still taking place. 

Libya’s transition has seen dramatic cycles of political instability. Since the fall of the former regime, 

Libya has descended into an era of deep ideological, 

tribal, and regional tensions and continuous security 

threats. Following the ousting of the elected Libyan 
14

Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in March 2014, Libya entered a further period of institutional uncertainty that 

lasted for months. The election of Ahmed Maiteeg as 

successor was deemed unconstitutional by Libyan liberal political parties and their supporters, and led to 

a power rivalry between him and caretaker Abdullah 

al-Thini, who took office temporarily after Zeidan.16

Insecurity continues to prevail on the ground, with 

persistent clashes between a variety of armed groups 

and the assassination of security officers and targeting of politicians. The military operation initiated by 

renegade general Khalifa Haftar since mid-May 2014, 

with the advertised aim of defeating extremist groups 

and bringing stability, has further worsened the security situation and spread the fighting from Benghazi 

to Western parts of Libya, including Tripoli.17 After 

months of fighting, Khaifa Haftar’s military coalition 

has lost several battles and with them the control of 

Tripoli and Benghazi in August 2014, which are now 

controlled by Misrata-led forces and Islamists, respectively. At the time of this writing, the country continues to be unstable as fights between Khalifa Haftar’s 

forces and their adversaries have not ceased. The current military polarization is also reflected in the political realm. Libya again entered a period of political 

confusion in August 2014. The country now has two 

parliaments, one in the eastern city of Tobruk and 

another one in Tripoli, and each has named its own 

prime minister.18

What these political events reflect is the inability of 

the new political elites to win the trust of the great majority of their populations, or to engineer an inclusive 

transitional political process that enables different 

political parties to work together. To cultivate trust, 

the leaderships should articulate the aspirations of the 
15

people and the interests of key political stakeholders. 

This political element is vital for successful and peaceful transitions. But it is not the only factor. New governments also have to meet socio-economic goals. The 

change of regimes has to result in betterment of the 

lives of citizens in a sustainable way. 

Limited Tangible Deliverables.

The failures in rebuilding trust come as a result 

of limited success in improving the delivery of basic 

services. Over the last 3 years, no long-term policy 

has been launched to deal with the many structural 

challenges facing these countries. Their governments 

have been predominantly in fire-fighting mode, reacting to crises and not proactively launching policies to 

consolidate different aspects of their economies, particularly in areas with potentially major economic and 

political impact. No policies to reform health services, 

provide affordable housing, or tackle unemployment 

have been announced. There is a lack of any detailed 

plan to create new industries and strengthen their 

economic diversification, or amend energy and food 

subsidy systems to consolidate fiscal balances.

The opposite has happened; most of the programs 

announced have been short term, indicating a deficit 

of vision among the new leaders. The few populist 

initiatives which were adopted caused other secondary effects. In the absence of any structural plans, the 

governments resorted to increasing public spending 

to placate popular anger. For instance, the decision 

of the Tunisian government to increase the number 

of public sector jobs to absorb the number of unemployed graduates did not provide a structural solution to the unemployment issue. The Tunisian gov-
16

ernment created 34,000 jobs in public service and 

state-owned companies, an equivalent of fewer than 

5 percent of the total unemployed.19 Meanwhile, these 

new appointments have added more pressure on the 

public finances. 

Surprisingly, even in countries with a record of remarkable economic reforms such as Tunisia, the pace 

has slowed down. This is mainly attributed to the focus 

of the leadership on elections and constitutions. During this period, Tunisia experienced a high turnover 

of senior civil servants in key ministries and public 

owned companies. After government reshuffles, new 

ministers have tended to appoint their trustees in key 

ministerial departments and public companies.20 The 

constant replacements have impacted the capacity of 

bureaucracy to elaborate and implement complex reforms. These shortcomings have fed into the worries 

of international investors and lending organizations, 

and constrained the flow of international capital into 

Tunisia which has further complicated the country’s 

economic situation. 

Transitional Justice.

The establishment of transitional justice for past 

violations of human rights is important for building 

trust between the people and the state, as well as for 

strengthening the social fabric of the three transition 

countries. Transitional justice, in fact, has become one 

of the key demands of civil societies in the aftermath 

of 2011 revolutions for crimes that happened during 

the rule of ousted leaders or afterwards during the 

transition, particularly in Libya and Egypt. However, 

implementation has suffered from lack of capabilities 

and excessive politicization. In Libya, the National 
17

Transitional Council (NTC), acting under the influence of the revolutionary fervor of its own people 

and idealist advice of international human rights 

donors, enacted several regulations to tackle human 

rights abuses committed under the former regime and 

during the 2011 war. In 2011, the NTC enacted law 

17/2011, establishing a Fact Finding and Reconciliation Commission, a body with a mission to investigate 

human rights crimes but no mandate to punish them. 

In May 2012, NTC issued Law 38, granting amnesty 

to revolutionaries who had committed criminal acts 

which were dictated by the circumstances of the 2011 

war.21 This law attracted criticism from international 

human rights organizations and experts as giving a 

blanket amnesty to all criminals, including perpetuators of crimes against humanity and war crimes.22

The enactment of these two laws highlights two 

main shortcomings. First, it showed an absolute miscomprehension of the sensitivity of such political initiatives and the conditions that they require for success. 

The implementation of a mechanism of transitional 

justice in a political context characterized by continuing tensions among a variety of regional and ideological rival groups could further exacerbate conflict. The 

laws were enacted in the absence of even basic state 

institutions to oversee and enforce their application. 

Second, these laws were criticized for being incomplete and lacking specific elements for its application. 

For instance, Law 17/2011 did not specify the period 

and type of crimes to be covered by the Commission’s 

investigation work. Article 1 of the law opted for an 

elastic approach by stating that the investigation will 

cover all infringements of human rights. The commission also lacked the equipment and skilled officials to conduct its mission, such as forensic experts 

and materials. 
18

The laws were adopted with no accompanying 

strategy to update the country’s criminal code and 

procedures to be able to deal with war crimes, or to 

provide training to the Libyan judges and prosecutors, most of whom lacked any knowledge or experience of how to deal with the atrocities of the previous 

regime.23 Given these shortcomings, the Libyan government, with the assistance of subject-matter experts 

and international organizations, had to issue a new 

comprehensive law which was promulgated by the 

General National Congress in December 2013. Law 

29/2013, on transitional justice, abrogated the previous texts and established a new Fact Finding Commission with a specific mandate, and detailed regulation of its functioning and relations with other state 

institutions.24

The promulgation of the Political Exclusion Law 

in May 2013, which disqualifies officials and officers 

who served under the former regime from playing 

any role in the new political and public institutions, 

is another example of chaotic approach to transitional 

justice adopted by Libyan interim governments.25 The 

law disqualifies all people associated with former regime, even if they did not commit any criminal act 

while serving under Qadhafi rule. The exclusion of 

the process from any judicial review undermines efforts to build a new political regime that is based on 

rule of law. The law was unpopular not only among 

the former civil servants who are affected by it, but 

also among civil society and political activists. This 

lustration has undermined what is already a fragile 

political scene, and is depriving the state of thousands 

of experienced professionals such as the military 

officers, ministers, and judges.26
19

Disarmament and Reintegration of Militias. 

Another vital policy area that has failed to achieve 

its main goals is the disarmament, demobilization 

and reintegration (DDR) of Libyan rebels. The DDR 

program was badly designed and executed, leading 

to a debacle which has contributed to the continuing 

instability in Libya. The Libyan authorities, with their 

international advisors, lacked detailed mapping of the 

ideological, political, and economic motives of different armed militias. The planning process did not pay 

attention to the difficult context in which some of their 

programs would be implemented. As a result, the efforts of the Commission for Warriors’ Affairs (CWA) 

to reintegrate rebels into civilian life or in the police 

and defense forces achieved limited success. A considerable number of large militias and their members did 

not join the DDR programs. They are still unwilling 

to hand over their weapons or enroll into official state 

security structures. The incentives and programs for 

reintegration have simply not been attractive, or even 

suitable for the majority of rebels. 

Besides pursuing political goals, large militias are 

generating substantial income for themselves from 

the provision of protection to state-owned and private 

assets. Some are involved in the smuggling of goods, 

drugs, weapons, and people across neighboring borders. In some ways, the formation of a national army 

and police forces are able to provide security across 

the Libyan cities and regions, as well as protect its borders, would be contrary to their interests. This also explains a series of murders and assassination attempts 

against key senior military officers struggling to build 

a national army. The lack of a diversified or functioning economy that is able to offer real employment 
20

opportunities has also impeded sustainable reintegration of ex-fighters into civil life. With the scarcity of 

employment opportunities, it is likely that some beneficiaries of the reintegration program will eventually 

be recruited back into armed militias. 

The absence of well-paid job opportunities offered 

by the private sector has further limited the ability of 

the Libyan authorities to convince rebels to hand over 

their weapons. The education level of many rebels 

does not qualify them to take over civil service jobs 

or work in state-owned companies, but those jobs in 

the private sector which do not require a high level 

of skill are filled by foreign workers. The government 

remains the main employer of Libyan nationals, and 

there is a limit to what it can absorb. 

Programs to promote entrepreneurship among 

armed militiamen, through the provision of training 

and funds to create micro and small enterprises, were 

doomed to fail because of continued violence and the 

absence of a suitable business environment. One of 

the few successful programs launched by CWA has 

been a scholarship program for post-graduate studies 

abroad, which is intended to benefit 18,000 ex-fighters 

by 2015.27

ROOTS OF TRANSITION DEBACLES 

The transition phase in the three countries has 

been characterized by fragility, which hampered 

progress on a variety of essential reforms. This was a 

period marked by intense political jockeying between 

different parties over power, and the type and scope 

of possible reform. The new leaderships have been 

confronted with a complex chessboard to manage in 

order to avoid a return to violent instability, or at least 
21

mitigate its intensity when it arrives. The three countries have gone through periods of violent riots, assassinations, and terrorist attacks to varying degrees. 

The tense political environment has diverted valuable 

resources and distracted attention from much-needed reforms and institutional rebuilding initiatives. 

Naturally, the more politically sensitive reforms are 

even more influenced by the power balance between 

political stakeholders. 

The difficulty of implementing police reform in 

Egypt during the Muslim Brotherhood rule is a case in 

point. Attempts at gradual reform of the police forces 

were faced with resistance from officers. In early-2013, 

hundreds of police forces went on strike in different 

Egyptian cities, asking for the ousting of Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim and his appointees in the 

Ministry of Interior.28 Meanwhile, in Libya, the unsettled security and political situation has influenced the 

pace of rebuilding the country’s armed forces as well 

as limiting the type of schemes which can be adopted 

to achieve this goal. The Libyan authorities have tried 

a range of approaches, from co-opting armed militias 

through paying them wages from the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior, to creating new security institutions and sending their recruits for training abroad. 

Even the training of defense forces in several North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, 

which was the subject of high hopes, is expected to 

make limited change despite all efforts to harmonize 

the training program among the host NATO partners. 

Ana Gomez, European Parliament Standing Rapporteur for Libya, observed after her visit to Tripoli 

during the first week of October 2013: 
22

The rebuilding of capable armed forces and police 

in Libya requires a sustained and coordinated international effort of assistance that will demand several 

years and commitment from Libya and its partners. 

That assistance requires training of forces in the country and not just token offers of training abroad, as offered by some EU MS [member states].29

The outcome of this hybrid strategy was a disappointing failure, and came at a high cost for Libyan 

elected politicians in terms of financial costs and credibility.30 The incapacity of the government was palpable when it failed in November 2013 to respond to citizens’ demands to force or negotiate a retreat of armed 

militias. Tripoli then witnessed general strikes and 

daily marches of Libyan citizens calling for the government’s military and police to take over the security 

of the capital.31 The difficulty the Libyan government 

experiences in trying to mobilize what military forces 

are left is due to the politicization of the military command. Senior Libyan generals have taken sides in the 

power tussle between Islamist and non-Islamist actors 

in the parliament and government. 

Difficulties in Political Crisis-Management.

Lack of progress cannot, however, be attributed 

only to fragile political and security factors; other influencing factors have been in play. Lack of knowledge and experience among the new political leaders 

in dealing with the complications of transition, and a 

shortage of experienced professionals and financial 

resources remain the main drivers of difficult and disorderly political trajectories. 

The course of events over the last 4 years shows 

that these societies were institutionally unprepared 
23

to deal with sudden and complex change. The largely 

unplanned protests and ousting of presidents took 

everyone by surprise, both in the MENA region and 

internationally. The protests were driven mainly by 

youth and without any ideological underpinning. The 

interim and newly-elected governments had no plans 

and no understanding of how to deal with a sudden 

change of the political scene, with all the specific challenges that comes with it. The situation was further 

complicated by a dearth of think tanks or academia 

to provide intellectual assistance and professional advice on developing a vision to govern the transition or 

refine some of its key elements. 

The deposed ruling elites lacked detailed contingency plans to deal with some of the political challenges that Egypt and Tunisia faced after their revolutions and Libya after its civil war in 2011, such as 

constitutional changes and economic reforms to 

strengthen budget balances and ensure better distribution of wealth. Even if such plans existed, they 

were likely kept in the possession of a tight circle of 

trusted collaborators in Egypt and Tunisia. This was 

certainly the case in Libya, where the ideas for political and economic reforms which were promoted by 

Qadhafi’s son, Seif Al-Islam, were unlikely to have 

reached a comprehensive or advanced stage.32 The 

newly elected Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia 

had no experience of being in power and were not 

acquainted with the subtleties of governing a state. 

In many instances they were not able to evaluate the 

advice they received from international organizations 

and consultants related to post-conflict issues. 

Neither did history provide guidance to the current rulers in tackling the challenges they are facing. After independence from European colonialism, 
24

the political leaders of these countries had certainly 

overcome hurdles to assert their leadership and build 

their state institutions, but the political and security 

environments in which this was achieved were far less 

complex than those of today. Political elites then did 

not have to act in an environment dominated by the 

internet, social media, and rising popular expectations 

that are difficult to meet. 

The lack of experience was manifested in the reluctance of governments to initiate reforms. In some instances, the politicians’ insecurity was reflected in not 

making decisions. In many instances, their reactions 

were the opposite of what the times of extraordinary 

crisis, in fact, required. This was the predicament of 

elected Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who was 

widely considered weak and lacking charisma to assert his authority.33 Successful transition requires a decisive and strong government to push through difficult 

reforms and attempt to break up vested interests. All 

the previously mentioned limitations constrained the 

performance of these post-revolution governments, 

and their ability to rebuild a new political order and 

meet the expectations of their voters. 

Insufficient progress during transition cannot be 

attributed solely to elected ministers; instead, it reflects a wider failure to develop quality human capital over previous decades. This issue also concerns 

other elements of these MENA societies. The shortage 

of talented bureaucrats, professionals, and businessmen remains the main constraint that has limited the 

ability of the new political leadership to design new 

economic and political governance, in a context that 

is characterized by political volatility. Presidential 

and ministerial cabinets did not have well-established 

experts with the skills and experience to develop and 
25

oversee the implementation of strategies in a variety 

of policy areas, including in primary areas such as 

economic and foreign policy. 

It goes without saying that the quality of the economic and bureaucratic intelligentsia remains a decisive factor that determines the success of a transition country in adapting to and shaping challenging 

events. But those qualified and experienced individuals who might have been able to advise new governments had generally been ousted as part of each new 

government’s policy to cut out key figures from former regimes. The parallel option of drawing more 

on qualified nationals in academia, industry, or from 

abroad, is typically not used either, as the decades of 

closed-circle political elitist culture in these countries 

renders the outreach to a skilled citizenry intrinsically 

difficult even for new political parties. With typically 

no existing expertise of their own within the government’s underlying bureaucratic layers, these newly 

elected governments hence took office armed with 

little more than vaguely formulated goals of doing everything differently from the previous regimes, and 

little practical planning and implementation capacity. 

Learning Politics from Scratch.

The post-revolution and war eras have showed a 

deficit in the skills of the bureaucracy cadres across the 

region. Politicians and civil servants have had to learn 

from scratch the complexity of challenges that face 

their societies in a post-conflict era in areas of economic recovery, justice, and security. The new era requires 

new legislations to tackle issues of transitional justice, 

the drafting and negotiations of constitutions, and 

training for judges to deal with crimes that were com-
26

mitted in the very special circumstances of civil war. 

It requires innovative thinking to address economic 

difficulties. In Libya, for instance, judges investigating human rights violations were constrained by lack 

of legal texts, and most importantly lack of experience 

of how to deal with such cases either as prosecutors or 

judges. Another example is the lack of procedures or 

expertise for tracing the wealth and properties of former rulers in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. After the fall 

of the three regimes in 2011, investigators were constrained by their lack of experience in understanding 

complex legal and financial structures in international 

investments.34

Furthermore, there are other causes that are structural and emanate from decades of poor management 

of human capital, nepotism, and corruption. The failure of education systems to provide young generations with skills or entrepreneurial abilities relevant 

to the labor market has jeopardized attempts to placate public anger. There are variations in population 

sizes among the three countries—Egypt is the most 

populous country in the Arab world with more than 

80 million people—but one shared characteristic is the 

large proportion of their citizenry which is made up of 

young people. Lack of skills and abilities is preventing 

a significant portion of the population from benefiting 

from the existing economic opportunities. In countries 

like Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, there are plenty 

of opportunities for micro and small enterprises in the 

tourism and agriculture sectors that have not been 

seized by young people. 

It follows that when the governments of these 

three countries attempt to diversify their economies 

into new industries and markets, they will face further constraints. Moving to new industries requires 
27

specific knowledge and management skills which are 

scarce in the current labor market. But it is not only 

a lack of specific business education and training 

that has led to a deficit of entrepreneurial initiative. 

Other challenges which inhibit the creation of new 

businesses include an inability to access finance, lack 

of business networks, and prohibitively expensive 

commercial properties. 

Inability to Resolve Structural Economic Problems.

The problems with high youth unemployment in 

these countries are significant and will have a persistent impact on their societies’ stability and prosperity, if not addressed. Given that unemployment has 

always been an economic challenge in these countries, 

the next logical question would be what is different 

now. In fact, other socio-economic developments over 

the last few years have worsened the situation. First, 

the number of unemployed youth with degrees has 

increased without any concurrent significant expansion in job opportunities. Second, the role of families 

in supporting young members is waning as a consequence of inflationary pressures that have weakened 

their abilities to provide assistance. Third, lifestyle 

change and the spread of consumerism are adding 

more pressures onto the societies of these three countries and widening the gap between rich and poor. 

The unavailability to these governments of financial resources to fund development projects and policy reforms has presented a major challenge to their 

ambitious reform programs. This is especially the case 

for Egypt and Tunisia, which do not have the levels 

of revenues enjoyed by neighboring hydrocarbon-rich 

countries. The paucity of public finances has hampered 
28

their ability to increase wages, maintain subsidies for 

basic products, or embark on major infrastructure projects. These states all have urgent needs to launch major economic reforms either to diversify their sources 

of energy, or build other physical infrastructures that 

are essential to increase the competitiveness of their 

economies and to attract more direct investments. But 

the large-scale investments that these projects require 

are not available locally. 

The only available solution is to approach international private and public sources of financing and 

create investment and financial schemes on a projectby-project basis. This path does not come without its 

political complexities and expenses. The engineering 

and negotiation of complex investment and financial schemes is time-consuming, and require highly 

skilled experts to manage them on the part of the 

governments. The experience of Egypt’s negotiations 

with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain 

a loan of U.S.$4.8 billion illustrates the laboriousness 

of dealing with international financiers. At the time of 

writing, negotiations have lasted almost 3 years with 

no conclusion, as a result of disagreement over conditions proposed by IMF officials who requested a range 

of reform measures to reduce the budget deficit, including reduction of subsidies and increased taxation. 

Successive Egyptian governments have found the IMF 

measures politically nonviable at this fragile political 

and economic juncture.35
29

SHAPING RESPONSES TO THE 

CAPABILITIES CHALLENGE 

The three countries have been weakened by the 

2011 revolutions and the continuous instability that 

has dominated their political scenes since then. The 

adverse repercussions of the unstable political and security situation on the economies and fiscal balances 

of these countries are now well documented.36 It has 

hindered the recovery of tourism in Egypt and Tunisia and led to a significant drop in oil production 

and export in Libya. To restore peace and prosperity, 

the three countries all need to build trust in their new 

governments. This predominantly entails enabling the 

different states to perform their vital functions as providers of basic services to their citizens, including the 

provision of security and justice, and also to play an 

important role in reviving the economy. 

There are wide variations in capability deficit between the three countries. Common features that exist 

should not mislead us into assuming that their needs 

are identical. Each nation has its unique features and 

circumstances, and needs vary across the three countries depending on their current levels of political stability, economic development, and political history. 

Some countries are in a more precarious situation than 

others. For instance, Libya is a country with almost 

no functioning state institutions. “One size fits all” 

therefore is not a viable approach to deliver successful 

capacity-building assistance. No single solution will 

fit all these countries or even a specific sector across 

the region. Solutions have to be individualized and 

tailored to respond to the needs of each country, or 

each sector within one country. Thus, there is no substitute for conducting thorough needs assessments for 
30

each country to identify ways and means to improve 

the capabilities of existing institutions and structures, 

and to build new ones. 

Capabilities development is a broad concept covering a wide range of activities intended to strengthen 

the ability of people and organizations in a variety of 

sectors across government, private sector, and business to run their affairs effectively. This can be a 

complex and lengthy process. This monograph is primarily concerned with the institutions and areas that 

are of highest impact on the entire process of institutional rebuilding during transition, and which in the 

cases of the three countries under review need to be 

prioritized without delay. 

Priority for Security.

There may be no area that should be given more 

priority than the rebuilding and capability strengthening of the security apparatuses in the three countries 

to ensure that order and respect for law are preconditions for any other political and economic reforms. 

The post-revolution security landscape within the 

three countries has transformed to an extent which 

only a handful of analysts previously would have 

thought credible. 

Tunisia and Egypt remain more stable than Libya 

and retain functioning military institutions. But an increased threat of terrorism has been evidenced by an 

escalation in attacks, and also an increase in the number of their nationals participating in Jihadist activity 

in the Levant and Iraq. 

In addition, the deterioration of the situation within Libya, and the inability of the Libyan armed forces 

to control the country’s vast borders, have added to 
31

the security concerns of its neighbors. Spillover has included dramatic expansion in cross-border trafficking 

of weapons, humans, and other illicit products. The 

proliferation of arms in the border areas has increased 

the number of terrorist attacks in Libya’s neighboring countries. The renewal of fighting in July 2014 

once again led to destabilizing flows of refugees and 

smuggling into Libya’s neighbors. The new wave of 

refugees from Libya has become a particular source 

of concern to the Tunisian government. The financial 

repercussions of the huge influx of refugees, who are 

adding further pressure on Tunisia’s public finances,37

have forced the government to call on the international community for economic support to cover the costs 

associated with humanitarian assistance, and have 

increased demand for subsidized products and pressure on the health sector. Other negative spillovers include damaging the reputation of the country as a safe 

destination for tourists and investors. 

Instability in Libya currently dominates regional 

discussions. Egypt and Tunisia, with other neighboring countries, have held several security meetings at 

ministerial levels to discuss appropriate measures to 

handle the cross-border security impact. So far, limited progress has been made in formulating a response 

to tackle various dimensions of this regional security 

problem, including within Libya. To complicate matters further, the North African and Sahel regions’ potentials for mutual security support are undermined 

by the continuous disagreement and distrust that 

characterize relations between its two most militarily 

capable countries, Algeria and Morocco.
32

Institution Building.

Another area which requires prioritization is 

equipping the three governments, preferably at the 

level of prime ministers or presidential cabinets, with 

an institutional capability that is able to originate and 

develop large-scale development projects. This is a capability that is needed to develop visions and provide 

high quality advice and expertise on a variety of governance, security, and economic development matters, as well as oversee the implementation of critical 

initiatives for the stability and prosperity of their respective societies. This requires a cadre of well-trained 

strategists and diplomats from among existing senior 

civil servants who are able to respond to the change 

of circumstances within their countries and beyond. 

This corps must be able to adapt to the new environments characterized by scarcity of resources and high 

competition, and to pursue new avenues to find innovative solutions to pressing social, legal and political 

issues, as well as opening new markets and sources of 

financing for their economies. 

It adds to the misfortunes of these societies that 

their transitions come at a time of major shifts in the 

world economic and political orders. The developed 

world is going through deep economic adjustments 

that have affected its ability and willingness to engage in the stabilization and reconstruction of other 

countries. Most donors from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries have 

adopted austerity budgets which involve significant 

spending cuts on international development. There 

is a change both of attitude and of perception among 

citizens of major donor countries. Public opinion is 

less supportive of increased or ineffective spending 
33

abroad at the same time as cuts reduce the services 

offered at home.38

Governments and non-governmental organizations from developed nations at first had shown 

readiness to assist Tunisia and Egypt with their political and economic reforms. An initiative baptized the 

“Deauville Partnership” was launched in May 2011 

during the annual G8 summit held in the French city 

of Deauville. The main component of the initiative 

was a package of multibillion dollar loans offered to 

several Arab countries including Tunisia, Libya, and 

Egypt between 2011-13.39

Three years after the launch of the Deauville Partnership, little progress has been made in alleviating 

the economic pressures on both the governments and 

the peoples of Egypt and Tunisia. One of the criticisms leveled at the international financial institutions 

involved in the channeling of these loans concerned 

their inability to adapt their procedures to provide innovative ideas that were suited to the specific socioeconomic contexts of the transition countries. The proposed conditions to accompany the loans remained 

unchanged from those in place over the previous 3 decades. International financial institutions did provide 

funds for major infrastructure projects in electricity 

generation, and funds to finance small and medium 

enterprises, which will contribute to the long-term 

growth of the Egyptian and Tunisian economies. However, there has been a dearth of initiatives launched or 

sponsored by these multilateral lending institutions 

which are aimed at improving living standards and 

reducing social discontent. Greater priority should be 

given to reforms that will strengthen the legitimacy 

of the government as a provider of services and producer of opportunities to all its citizens, including the 

most vulnerable members of society.
34

The current situation demands severe rationalization of development expenditure. It follows that improved institutional capability at the top echelons of 

power in these countries in transition is all the more 

essential, in order to ensure superior coordination of 

rebuilding efforts and initiatives at a national level, as 

well as to make better use of the limited assistance offered by international development partners. In addition, one of the shortcomings of reconstruction efforts 

to date has been a lack of coordination between different policy fields so as to ensure that policy responses 

are comprehensive. Improved capacity will thus also 

enhance the ability of these governments to embark 

on a variety of urgent political and economic reforms 

without delay. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Progress in stabilization, reform, and building new 

institutions in the three MENA countries under review has certainly not been spectacular. But while the 

political situation remains tense in all three states, the 

achievements and debacles vary from one country to 

another. Tunisia has made substantial progress on the 

political front compared to other countries affected by 

the Arab Spring upheavals. But at the same time, there 

has been slow progress in addressing the original 

economic causes of the upheavals. The political and 

economic transition in Egypt remains fragile, and the 

new government still has a long way to consolidate its 

legitimacy and restore sustainable economic stability. 

In Libya, the transition has been chaotic, marked by 

continuing conflict among rival armed groups which 

has severely impeded the rebuilding of state institutions and the economy and widened dividing lines 
35

within society, making Libya a country at serious risk 

of failure. The renewal of heavy fighting between militias in Tripoli and Benghazi since May 2014 is drawing 

the country once more to the brink of civil war. 

The needs of these societies are various, complex, 

and interdependent. They range from holding elections, rearranging the justice and security sectors, 

to reconstructing the economy. Addressing these 

tremendous tasks is beyond the capability of a state 

alone, even if it had its own ample financial resources. 

It follows that efforts to promote post-conflict institutional rebuilding require the collaboration of a range 

of different governmental and nongovernmental national and international actors. In other words, for 

these countries to build their legitimacy and achieve 

sustainable political stability, international partners 

must provide assistance to enable the new governments to meet their pressing obligations in the short 

term. This is an investment in the future stability of 

the entire region. 

Trust can dwindle quickly, as has been demonstrated on several occasions over the last 3 years. Failure to 

deliver on services and to ensure social justice—which 

entails creating employment and fairer distribution 

of the country’s wealth—has caused riots in all these 

countries. People were demanding immediate solutions to their grievances. In Tunisia, President Moncef 

Marzouki has been greeted with the same slogans that 

were used during the protests that led to the ousting 

of Ben Ali; “get out” or “people want the fall of the regime.” In 2012, the second anniversary of the incident 

in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid that sparked the 

revolution in December 2010 saw residents showing 

their anger and disappointment by attacking politicians with tomatoes and stones.40 This incident encap-
36

sulated the disenchantment with the slow progress 

that Tunisia had experienced almost 2 years after the 

ousting of Ben Ali. 

The chronic failure of Libya’s elected governments 

to build security institutions and exercise effective authority across the entire territory of the nation is affecting the security of the Maghreb and Sahel regions 

as a whole. The inability of Libyan government armed 

forces to control the country’s borders is unquestionably a threat to the regional stability, not only in the 

Maghreb but also beyond. The situation is further 

aggravated by the absence of regional cooperation 

mechanisms and responses. The Maghreb countries 

have not yet managed to build a regional security cooperation forum, partly because of the rivalry between 

Algeria and Morocco regarding regional leadership; 

but also because, with the exception of Algeria, these 

countries have limited human and material resources 

to carry out intelligence gathering, border patrols, or 

deploy forces into Libya. This is another reason for international partners, in particular the United States, to 

maintain and increase engagement with support security sector reform and capability development, in order to reduce further risks of instability and terrorism.

Assisting economic recovery during transition can 

be highly effective, and reduce the risk of renewed political chaos. Strong economic growth will bolster the 

nascent political elites’ legitimacy by meeting the expectations of a large number of their citizens, and thus 

stabilize the country. Linkages between unemployment, political discontent, and instability are well documented, and repeated rioting in all three countries 

over the last 3 years occurs when it becomes evident 

to the populace that the authorities are unable to meet 

their expectations for a dignified standard of living. 
37

Similarly, a lack of political stability during transitions frequently coincides with a lack of economic 

opportunity, which generates a vicious cycle in which 

religion, ethnicity, or tribe reassumes a pivotal role in 

people’s daily lives as a means of ensuring access to 

economic means. The reconstruction of a functioning 

private sector has received little attention in the past 

3 years from the international community, which has 

damaged the ability of these conflict-torn societies to 

rebuild the sort of economic stability which would 

foster sustainable political stability and peace.

Given the shared interest in maintaining social order and ensuring smooth transitions toward stability 

in the region, international and local authorities should 

engage in designing public policies that respond to 

private sector concerns and encourage investment. It 

is essential to understand all factors that hinder the 

flow of investments and provide a set of measures 

to mitigate these risks and encourage investments in 

all sectors, rather than limiting the focus to lucrative 

natural resources and physical infrastructure markets. 

More attention should be given to the potential of mobilizing the small and medium sized companies that 

are currently constrained by lack of resources and expertise. Small and medium sized companies are often 

unable to handle the complexities and challenges involved in investing capital in high-risk environments. 

This will not only require regulatory and financial 

support, but also institutional support to guide and 

accompany business investments. 
38

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

The MENA region is strategically important to the 

United States and developed countries in political, 

economic, and security terms. It follows that profound 

instability in the region continues to pose a challenge 

to U.S. interests in all of these fields. Resolving this 

instability requires not only sustained effort and political wisdom from within the region, but also assistance and facilitation from the United States and 

other partners. 

Stability in the Middle East and North Africa is a 

matter that goes beyond the sole competency of the 

region’s own states and organizations to deal with; it 

is an international matter. The importance of stability and democracy in the region is not only limited 

to economic reasons, but also assuring that there are 

no radical political forces holding power in the country, including, but not limited to, Islamists. Furthermore, more than one of the countries under discussion 

commands a strategically important location in the 

Mediterranean. 

Strengthening the capabilities of transitional governments and institutions in Arab countries that experienced abrupt change of leadership should continue 

to be an important part of U.S. Government engagement in the region. U.S. governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the U.S. military, 

should continue to prioritize assistance to build capability and strong institutions. 

Lessons from the recent past suggest that failure to 

support political and societal transition effectively increases the vulnerability of internal instability as well 

as regional and international peace. Such instability can further affect U.S. economic and geostrategic 
39

interests in these countries in transition and beyond. 

But the potential impact on future U.S. security interests of continued instability can be mitigated by leveraging and applying U.S. experience in stabilization, 

state-building, and institution building, including 

security sector reform with the assistance of the U.S. 

Army. These security sector reforms, which constitute 

an important part of strengthening the new political 

regimes, also continue to offer excellent cooperation 

and development opportunities to the U.S. Army, 

with the potential for establishing and bolstering 

long-term beneficial relationships with key regional 

security actors. 

The U.S. Government, jointly with other international donors, should accelerate public sector human 

resource and institutional development in the three 

countries, through tailored sustainable capacity building initiatives. The core aim is to equip these societies with future cadre of leaders in a variety of policy 

areas to achieve an expeditious transition. Development of skills should be linked simultaneously with 

strengthening institutional capabilities—through the 

establishment of procedures, systems, and provision 

of equipment—to ensure sustainable retaining of 

expertise, skills, and knowledge. 

Recent events demonstrate that the stability of 

Libya is vital for the security of the entire Maghreb 

and Sahel, and for the security of U.S. allies on both 

shores of the Mediterranean. The U.S. Army can assist other international forces in stabilizing Libya in 

order to strengthen confidence among legitimate political factions, and thus contribute to the institutional 

development. 

Libya needs effective security institutions, including professional and well-equipped armed forces. 
40

The troubled transition that Libya has experienced 

was due in large extent to the absence of an effective 

and nonpoliticized security apparatus. In June 2013, 

a handful of NATO countries agreed to host Libyan 

soldiers for training for a few months. Thus, the U.S. 

military with other international allies have an important role to play in training and equipping the Libyan 

armed forces far beyond that program so as to foster 

enduring security sector reform and stability. Any 

such international engagement should be systematic, 

comprehensive, and take place on Libyan soil in order 

to achieve sustainable results. By contrast, the sporadic engagements of U.S. forces to train and assist 

the nascent Libyan armed forces over the last 2 years 

remain fruitless and far from achieving the rebuilding 

of an effective Libyan military force. 

There are significant obstacles to further U.S. involvement in security sector reform and military 

training in-country. In addition to the current chaotic 

situation in Libya, the United States is challenged by 

multiple engagements on other important fronts, and 

a potential deficit of political will for further engagement in degraded security environments. However, 

this should be balanced against the perception within 

the region of a moral obligation on the part of the United States to be involved in stabilization after its (albeit 

limited) involvement in operations to remove the previous regime. Put another way, if European and Arab 

states were to take on the burden of training and support without U.S. involvement, this would bolster negative perceptions of the United States as an irresponsible and hostile actor, both in Libya and in the region 

more broadly. At a bare minimum, the United States 

could coordinate international support, assist with 

equipping the armed forces, and provide more places 
41

for Libyan servicemen in U.S. defense training and 

education facilities.

Libya also is in need of nonmilitary security rebuilding programs. The U.S. foreign policy and development institutions could increase their engagement 

with rebuilding effective police and judicial institutions, as these sectors of statehood are crucial for the 

re-establishment of rule of law and strengthening the 

credibility of the state in the eyes of its institutions. 

In light of increased terrorist threats posed by 

domestic and regional radical groups, the Tunisian 

and Egyptian security forces are also in need of further U.S. military assistance in order to strengthen 

and adapt their existing capabilities to asymmetrical 

threats. Prolonging U.S. intelligence sharing agreements, coupled with increased training programs and 

the supply of intelligence gathering materials, will reinforce the capability of each country to confront terrorist threats. The Egyptian and Tunisian transitions 

remain fragile. A further deterioration of security in 

either or both countries will further complicate their 

economic recovery and political transition, with likely 

instability spillovers beyond their borders.

The struggles of the Arab transition countries cannot entirely be attributed to lack of financial resources. 

A deficit of vision among the new leaders and a lack 

of capability to comprehend the current challenges 

and respond with timely and effective solutions, remain the main handicap to successful transitions. The 

United States should support and facilitate the establishment of an institutional capability in the countries 

under discussion, comprised of senior officials who 

can coordinate and prioritize steps toward achieving 

transition goals. A body of this kind would not only 

play a coordinating role, but also provide insightful 
42

advice on how to deal with the challenges that the 

respective governments face now and will face in 

the future.

ENDNOTES

1. “Tunisie: Lutter Contre L’Impunite, Restaurer La Securite,” 

(“Tunisia: Combatting Impunity, Restoring Security”), Middle 

East/North Africa Report No. 123, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, May 9, 2012. 

2. Jason Gluck, “Extending Libya’s Transitional Period: Capitalizing on the Constitutional Moment,” Peace Brief, Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 1, 2011, available 

from www.usip.org/publications/extending-libyas-transitional-periodcapitalizing-the-constitutional-moment.

3. Hajer Jeridi, “Tunisie, la place de l’Islam dans la constitution fait débat,” (“Tunisia, the Position of Islam within the 

Constitution Generates Debate”), Le Monde, March 1, 2013, available from www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2012/03/01/tunisiela-place-de-l-islam-dans-laconstitution-fait-debat_1649916_3210.html. 

Yadh Ben Achour, “Religion, révolution et constitution: spécialement d’après l’exemple tunisien,” (“Religion, Revolution, and 

Constitution: The Case of Tunisia”), Leaders, November 13, 2012, 

available from www.leaders.com.tn/article/religion-revolution-etconstitution-specialement-d-apres-l-exemple-tunisien?id=9831. 

4. Mohammed El-Katiri, Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprising: Implications for the Region and Beyond, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

July 2014.

5. Sherif Tarik and Hatem Maher, “Egypt’s Constituent 

Assembly Unveiled Amid Fears Over Islamist Dominance,” 

Ahramonline, June 13, 2012, available from english.ahram.org.

eg/NewsContent/1/64/44716/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-ConstituentAssembly-unveiled-amid-fears-ov.aspx. 
43

6. Mohamed Eljarh, “One Step Closer to a New Libyan Constitution,” Foreign Policy, September 26, 2013, available from transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/26/one_step_closer_to_a_new_

libyan_constitution. 

7. Mohammed El-Katiri, State-Building Challenges in a PostRevolution Libya, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, October 2012.

8. “Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1972 (2011) Concerning Libya,” S/2014/106, 

New York: United Nations Security Council, February 19, 2014, 

available from www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_106.pdf. 

9. Zeinab Abul-Magd, “The Egyptian Military in Politics and 

the Economy: Recent History and Current Status,” CMI Insight, 

Christopher Michelsen Institute, No. 2, October 2013. 

10. “Report of Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan E. 

Méndez: Mission to Tunisia,” A/HRC/19/61/Add.1, New York: 

United Nations General Assembly, February 2, 2012, available 

from www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/tunisia_unsrt_2012_report.pdf.

11. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Tunisia Leader Flees and Prime 

Minister Claims Power,” The New York Times, January 14, 2011, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15tunis.

html?pagewanted=all. 

12. “Report of the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery,” Arab Forum on Asset Recovery, September 11-13, 2012, available from 

star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/report_arab_forum_on_asset_

recovery.pdf. 

13. “En Tunisie, le nouveau gouvernement obtient la confiance” (“In Tunisia, the New Government Gets the Approval”), 

Le Monde, January 30, 2014, available from www.lemonde.fr/

tunisie/article/2014/01/29/tunisie-confiance-du-parlement-aunouveau-gouvernement_4356033_1466522.html. 
44

14. Azmi Bishara, “Revolution against Revolution, the 

Street against the People, and Counter-Revolution,” Research 

Paper, Doha, Qatar: Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, September 2013, available from english.dohainstitute.org/file/

get/789010dd-4e5a-4902-8610-cbf77ea22f46.pdf. 

15. Mohamed Morsi was elected in June 2012 after what is 

considered the first free presidential election following the January 25, 2011, revolution. Under his rule, the country experienced 

continuous protests and political crises as result of the failure of 

his government to address the people’s demands, and win the 

trust and backing of the bureaucracy, secular parties, and business elites. Egypt’s economy reached critical position as consequence of constant political tensions and instability, with dwindling foreign reserves, and mounting budget deficit. For detailed 

discussion of the difficulties of Muslim Brotherhood during their 

rule of Egypt, see Mohammed El-Katiri, Revival of Political Islam 

in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprising: Implications for the Region and 

Beyond, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, July 2014. 

16. Suliman Ali Zway and Kareem Fahim, “Libya Leader 

Finally Picked but is Quickly Challenged,” The New York Times, 

May 4, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/world/

middleeast/libya-leader-finally-picked-but-is-quickly-challenged.

html?_r=0. 

17. Borzou Daragahi, “Voices from Libya’s Armed Struggle,” Financial Times, July 27, 2014, available from www.

ft.com/cms/s/0/88ca2da4-1585-11e4-ae2e-00144feabdc0.

html#axzz38rH2rXYy. 

18. Feras Bosalum and Ulf Leassing, “Rival Second Libyan 

Assembly Chooses Own PM as Chaos Spreads,” Reuters, August 

26, 2014, available from uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/26/uk-libyasecurity-idUKKBN0GP0NX20140826.

19. Karim Mejri, “Unemployment in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia: The Public Sector, Object of Desire,” Nawat, September 20, 

2012, available from nawaat.org/portail/2012/09/20/special-reportunemployment-in-post-revolutionary-tunisia-part-2-the-public-sectorobject-of-desire/. 
45

20. “Tunis: Fièvre des nominations, avant le départ des ministers” (“Tunisia: Nominations Fever before the Departure of Ministers”), African Manager, March 3, 2013, available from www.africanmanager.com/147975.html?pmv_nid=1Il. 

21. “Report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations 

Support Mission in Libya,” S/2012/675, New York: United Nations Security Council, August 30, 2012, available from unsmil.

unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/SGReport30August2012.

pdf. 

22. Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Amend New Special Procedures Law,” News Release, May 11, 2012, available from www.hrw.

org/news/2012/05/11/libya-amend-new-special-procedures-law. 

23. Interviews conducted by the author with six Libyan judges and prosecutors in June 2013 during their participation in a 

training course on transitional justice in The Hague, Netherlands. 

24. “Law 29/2013 about Transitional Justice,” Tripoli, Libya: 

General National Congress, available from www.aladel.gov.ly/

main/uploads/sections/459_Transitional_Justice_Law.pdf. 

25. Sami Zaptia, “Political Isolation Law Passed Overwhelmingly,” Libya Herald, May 5, 2013, available from www.libyaherald.

com/2013/05/05/political-isolation-law-passed-overwhelmingly/.

26. Mohamed Eljarh, “Isolation Law Harms Libya’s Democratic Transition,” Foreign Policy, May 8, 2013, available from 

transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/08/isolation_law_harms_

libya_s_democratic_transition. 

27. Said Farhat, “Libya Tursilu 18 ‘alf mina Thuwar lidirsa fi 

lkharij” (“Libya sends 18 Thousand of Revolutionary fighters to 

Study Abroad”), Alarab, April 17, 2014, available from www.alarab.

co.uk/?p=28788. 

28. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Angry at Public and Officials, Security Forces Strike in Egypt,” The New York Times, March 7, 2013, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/world/middleeast/

angry-at-public-and-officials-police-strike-in-egypt.html?_r=0. 
46

29. European Parliament Standing Rapporteur for Libya, “Report on my Latest Visit to Tripoli, Libya: 4-7 October 2013,” available from www.anagomes.eu/PublicDocs/3832ce4c-06f8-430e-ad00-

65306af36bfb.pdf. 

30. An intervention by Abdul Rahman Al-Ageli, Security File 

Coordinator in the Prime Minister’s Office, in a virtual seminar 

organized by Centre for Security Governance. See “Libya: Dealing with the Militias and Advancing Security Sector Reform,” 

eSeminar Summary report, No. 1, Centre for Security Governance, 

January 2014, available from www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/

uploads/2014/01/eSeminar-1-Summary-Report-08-Jan-14.pdf.

31. Ghaith Shennib, “Tripoli’s Leaders Call for anti-Militia 

Protests,” Reuters, November 17, 2013, available from uk.reuters.

com/article/2013/11/17/uk-libya-militias-idUKBRE9AG04F20131117. 

32. George Joffee, “Saif al-Islam: the Whole (Libyan) World 

is in his Hands?,” Sada, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, January 13, 2010, available from carnegieendowment.org/2010/01/13/saif-al-islam-whole-libyan-world-inhis-hands/6bal. 

33. Informal interviews conducted by the author with a group 

of Libyan lawyers and academics in Tripoli, Libya, September 21-

26, 2013. 

34. Robert F. Worth, “Obstacles Mar Quest for Arab Dictators’ 

Assets,” The New York Times, June 7, 2012, available from www.

nytimes.com/2012/06/08/world/middleeast/libya-egypt-and-tunisiatry-to-recover-assets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 

35. Rebecca M. Nelson and Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt and IMF: 

Overview and Issues for the Congress,” Report for the Congress, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Report, April 29, 2013, 

available from fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43053.pdf. 

36. “Arab Countries in Transition: An Update on Economic 

Outlook and Key Challenges,” Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, April 9, 2014, available from www.imf.org/

external/np/pp/eng/2014/040914.pdf. 
47

37. Raouf Khalsi, “La Tunisie seule, face une perile libyen” 

(“Tunisia Alone Faces the Libyan Peril”), Le Temps, July 31, 2014, 

available from www.letemps.com.tn/article/85048/la-tunisie-seuleface-au-péril-libyen. 

38. In a study published by the Overseas Development Institute based on research conducted across the United Kingdom in 

2012 has shown that British taxpayers after years of post-2008 austerity budgets are less enthusiastic about scaling up aid volumes, 

and calling for better ways to spend aid money. See Alex Glennie, 

Will Straw, and Leni Wild, “Understanding Public Attitudes to 

Aid and Development,” London, UK: Institute for public Policy 

Research and Overseas Development Institute, June 2012, available from www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/7708.pdf. 

39. George Parker and Stanly Pignal, “G8 Offers $20bn to Aid 

Arab Democracies,” Financial Times, May 27, 2011, available from 

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aa9e92ca-884e-11e0-a1c3-00144feabdc0.html.

40. Nadia Omrane, “Tunisie: Marzouki et Ben Jaâfar sous 

l’insulte, Jebali sous la coquette” (“Tunisia: Marzouki and Ben 

Jaafar Insulted, Jebali under the Duvet”), Kapitalis, December 19, 

2012, available from www.kapitalis.com/tribune/13456-tunisie-marzouki-et-ben-jaafar-sous-l-insulte-jebali-sous-la-couette.html. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil