J-S40040- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. THOMAS EARL BECKER Appellant No. 64 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 2 , 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

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- CR -0002306-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014 Appellant, Thomas Earl Becker, appeals from the judg ment of sentence of 32 years and nine months to 60 years’ imprisonment f or rape of a child 1 and related charges entered August 2, 2013, by the H onorable Dennis E. Reinaker, Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. On appeal, Becker raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sente nce. We affirm. On May 15, 2013, following a jury trial, Becker was convicted of one count of Rape of a Child, two counts of Aggravated Ind ecent Assault of a Child, 2 three counts of Indecent Assault, 3 and three counts of Corruption of
Minors. 4 The convictions stemmed from Becker’s continued sexual abu se of

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c). 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(b). 3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7). 4 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1).J-S40040- 14

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his two step-granddaughters and his granddaughter at hi s home in Lancaster County. Following a hearing on August 2, 2013, Becker was classified as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under the Registration of Sexual Offenders Act (commonly known as “Megan’s Law”), 4 2
P A .C ONS .S TAT .A NN . §§ 9791-9799.7, and sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years and 9 months to 66 years’ incarceration. On Au gust 12, 2013, Becker filed a post-trial motion to modify sentence, wh ich the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed. 5 On appeal, Becker raises the following issue for our re view: Was an aggregate sentence of thirty-two years and nine months to sixty- six years[’] incarceration clearly unreasonable under the circumstances of this case, imposed for the improper reason of punishment for choosing trial, in violation of Mr. Be cker’s constitutional rights, and did it improperly constitute a virtual life sentence? Appellant’s Brief at 8. Our standard when reviewing sentencing matters is as fo llows: Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the Sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbe d on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgme nt. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law , exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, preju dice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

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5 Becker’s initial direct appeal to this Court was quashed as untimely; however, on December 27, 2013, the lower court reinsta ted Becker’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc

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Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh , 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the r ight to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee , 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). When challenging th e discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, an appellant must present a subst antial question as to the inappropriateness of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Tirado , 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Two require ments must be met before we will review this challenge on its merits. ” McAfee , 849 A.2d at 274. “First, an appellant must set forth in his brie f a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id . “Second, the appellant must show that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Id . That is, “the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set fo rth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental norm und erlying the sentencing process.” Tirado , 870 A.2d at 365. We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial q uestion exists. 6 See

____________________________________________ 6 Rule 2119 provides the following, in pertinent part :

... (f) Discretionary aspects of sentence

. An appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a crimi nal matter (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-S40040- 14

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id . “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id

. In the present case, Becker’s appellate brief contains the requisite Rule 2119(f) concise statement, and, as such, is in technical compliance with the requirements to challenge the discretionary aspects of a se ntence. Becker argues in his Rule 2119(f) statement “the trial court’s cumulative sentence ... was clearly unreasonable, and so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion, and that it was a virtual life sent ence.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. Becker additionally argues that the trial cour t imposed a severe sentence in order to punish him for choosing to go to tr ial rather than pleading guilty. See id . at 15. These claims raise substantial questions for
our review. See Commonwealth v. Kelly , 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011) (claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive such t hat it constitutes too severe a punishment raises a substantial question f or our review); Commonwealth v. Moury , 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the r easons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discre tionary aspects of a sentence. The statement shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence. Pa.R.A.P., Rule 2119(f), 42 P A .C ONS .S TAT .A NN
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(allegation that trial cou rt relied upon defendant’s decision to go to trial rather than accept a plea bargain constitutes a substan tial question). Preliminarily, we note that Becker did not object at sentencing or in his post- sentence motion to the trial court’s alleged reliance upon his decision to stand trial rather than negotiate a plea deal. “ Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to mo dify the sentence imposed.” Moury , 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted). Accordingly, w e are constrained to find Becker’s challenge to the discretionar y aspects of his sentence on that basis waived. We proceed to address Becker’s claim that the cumulative se ntence imposed by the trial court constituted too severe a puni shment. Specifically, Becker posits that the sentence of 32 years and 9 months t o 66 years’ incarceration is a virtual life sentence, 7 “despite the fact that Mr. Becker had no prior criminal record, and had a significant work hi s tory.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Regarding Becker’s challenge to the cumulative nature o f his sentence, we note that “the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only the mo st extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is undul y harsh,

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7 Becker was 54 years old when sentenced.J-S40040- 14

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considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda , 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2012) ( en banc ) (citation omitted). Here, Becker does not dispute th at the individual sentences imposed are within the guideline range, notwi thstanding the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Given the tr ial court’s consideration of the serious nature of the crimes committe d in this case, which included rape of a child and aggravated indecent assault, Becker’s designation as a sexually violent predator, and of the pre-sentence investigation report 8 prepared in this matter, we do not believe Becker’s sentence appears, on its face, manifestly excessive. Furth er, the record is devoid of any evidence that the trial court imposed a more severe sentence due to Becker’s decision to go to trial. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed by the trial court. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________ 8 “ Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a present ence investigation report, we can assume the sentencing court was aware of re levant information regarding the defendant's character and w eighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. ” Commonwealth v. Griffin , 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quot es and citation omitted), appeal denied , 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013).J-S40040- 14

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/7/2014