1 

” 

Message from the Director, NSA 

Message from the Deputy Director, NSA 

The National Security Agency’s rich legacy of cryptologic success serves not only as a 

reminder of our past triumphs, but also as an inspiration for our future. 

Harry Truman, the man responsible for signing the legislation that brought our Agency 

into existence, was once quoted as saying, “There is nothing new in the world except the 

history you do not know.” Like all truisms, it is only partially accurate. Each generation of 

Americans must at some point deal with unforeseen problems and issues that transcend the 

status quo. Most would agree that the challenges faced by NSA in today’s war against terrorism 

are far different from those of World War II, Vietnam, or Desert Storm. Even so, President 

Truman was correct in his assertion that there is much to be learned from the past. 

The history of the National Security Agency has in many respects been based on and 

characterized by feats of intellectual brilliance. Pioneers like William Friedman, Frank Rowlett, 

Dr. Louis Tordella, and Agnes Meyer Driscoll, to name but a few, were able to build on past 

successes and do whatever was necessary to meet the challenges of their time. 

We should not forget, however, that NSA’s success is due not just to the efforts of the wellknown legends of the cryptologic past, but also to the dedicated work of thousands of men 

and women whose names will never be noted in any history book. History tells us that both 

genius and hard work are required to ensure success. Thankfully, as an Agency, we have been 

blessed with both in our past efforts to provide and protect America’s most important 

information. 

In conclusion, on the occasion of our golden anniversary, it is fitting and appropriate to 

remember and reflect on NSA’s half-century of exemplary service to our nation. By increasing 

our knowledge of our storied past, we will hopefully gain the inspiration required to inspire 

us in the future. Even though NSA has done the Nation’s work for 50 years, to paraphrase a 

Robert Frost poem, we “have promises to keep and miles to go before we sleep.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN 

Lieutenant General, USAF 

Director, NSA/Chief CSS 

We have a rich legacy of success. For five decades, the information edge provided by the 

world’s best cryptologic organization has played a substantial role in shaping our national 

enterprise. During the Cold War, NSA provided the transparency into the intentions of our 

adversaries and the secure communications needed to keep major power confrontations from 

escalating to nuclear conflict. In recent years it has provided an unprecedented battlefield 

advantage to U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan; helped shape the 

global security environment; and supported American diplomacy around the world. 

These achievements are the product of 50 years of sustained innovation. From Morse code 

to cyberspace, generations of cryptologists have worked at the forward edge of technology and 

expanded the art of the possible. The Nation is in their debt. 

Those who’ve worked at NSA one year or 40 are privileged to carry this work forward. As 

in the past, the need is great. As in the past, all depends on our ability as an organization to 

think our way past today’s limits, transform our technology and ourselves, and keep the edge. 

Our 50th Anniversary isn’t a milestone. It’s a starting line. 

WILLIAM B. BLACK, JR. 

Deputy Director, NSA 
2 

The understand the 

and 

gear that 

” 

(COMSEC), 

— 

_ 

❖ 

❖ A 

“Intelligence services 

They 

to give their countries 

competitive edge. 

Our traditional 

we wise 

1988-1992 

National Security Agency 

America’s Codemakers and Codebreakers 

Information Assurance 

The National Security Agency is the Nation’s cryptologic organization. NSA creates decisive U.S. strategic 

and tactical advantage by providing otherwise denied information to U.S. decision makers while at the same 

time denying access to U.S. information and 

information systems by America’s adversaries. 

ability to secret 

communications of our foreign adversaries while 

protecting our own communications – a 

capability in which the United States leads the 

world – gives our Nation a unique advantage. 

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Information Assurance (IA) complement each 

other. SIGINT gives the Nation an information 

advantage over its adversaries. IA prevents 

others from gaining advantage over us. Together the two missions promote a single goal: information 

superiority for America and its allies. 

Today’s complete reliance on critical information systems has fundamentally altered the Nation’s 

requirements for information systems security. The need to protect vital information has become essential. 

By using the most sophisticated networked information systems in the world, U.S. leaders and military are 

able to gather, understand, and use information better and faster than any potential adversary. This is the 

information advantage that must be protected. 

In the past, the Information Assurance Directorate of the National Security Agency produced “black 

boxes,” cryptographic secured point-to-point 

communication links and paper keying material to be used with 

them. Simply, security equated to “confidentiality, and systems 

were not interconnected. But technology evolved, and so did 

services, as NSA moved from Communications Security 

to Information Systems Security (INFOSEC), to 

Information Assurance (IA). The needs of today’s world are 

different, and so is IA. 

NSA protects information today with a mix of commercial and 

government solutions, based on a defense-in-depth strategy

multiple roadblocks between critical systems and the adversaries 

who would exploit them layers of security technologies and 

services within an information device, system, or infrastructure. 

This approach enables customers to use those security layers that 

are appropriate for their particular risk management profile and 

budgetary constraints. No longer are they forced to adopt the 

“one-size-fits-all” model from the past. 

This defense-in-depth strategy combines people, technology, 

and operations: 

People such as trained system administrators and users 

technology program that leverages developments in 

the commercial world 

throughout the world 

are in the process of 

reorganizing. 

are looking for ways 

adversaries as well as 

others covet secrets 

 are not 

enough to protect.” 

Admiral William O. 

Studeman, 

Director, NSA 
❖ Active defensive information operations to detect intrusions into our systems and respond to them. 

While we still need to guarantee confidentiality, today’s IA is broader, encompassing five dimensions: 

❖ Confidentiality - assurance against unauthorized or unintended disclosure 

❖ Data integrity - assurance that data has not been modified 

❖ User authentication - assurance that the legitimate party created or sent the data 

❖ Transaction non-repudiation - assurance that the party cannot later deny it 

❖ System availability - assurance of access to the data. 

NSA faces a major challenge in helping its IA customers keep pace with advances in technology. 

It supports research and partners with industry to give customers products that are better in every way. 

Signals Intelligence 


NSA has the mission to collect, process, and disseminate Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) information for 

foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes consistent with applicable U.S. laws and with full 

consideration of the rights of U.S. persons. Foreign intelligence is defined as information relating to the 

capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons. Counterintelligence is 

defined as information gathered and activities conducted to 

protect against espionage and other intelligence activities. 

The SIGINT mission is to provide the Nation with intelligence 

to ensure national defense and to advance U.S. global interests by 

collecting, processing, and disseminating SIGINT information on 

foreign powers, organizations, or persons, and international 

terrorists. NSA collects, processes, and disseminates intelligence 

reports on foreign targets in response to information needs levied 

by all departments and levels of the United States Executive 

Branch to include the Department of Defense. 

The SIGINT mission faces challenges in collecting, analyzing, 

and disseminating relevant, timely information for national 

policymakers and military commanders. In the information age, 

the volume of information grows daily, as does the velocity of 

change in telecommunications technologies and variety of means 

to transmit and store voice, data, and video. 

The relatively static Cold War environment has been replaced 

by an ever-changing telecommunications environment. Likewise, 

customer requirements and priorities shift rapidly in response to 

information needs related to foreign political, economic, military, 

and information needs. NSA targets’ use of modern 

telecommunications technology continues to pose significant 

challenges to NSA in the ways that communications are 

transmitted, to include the use of encryption. Likewise, target use 

of various languages and telecommunications applications requires NSA to maintain a wide variety of 

capabilities. 

To meet the challenges of the information age – its volume, variety, and velocity – NSA has embarked 

on a transformation path to ensure we have the right capability at the right time to meet the information 

needs of our customers. Transformation in people, systems, business processes, and use of technology will 

allow NSA to meet the challenges of the future. 

NSA plays a key role in national security by employing people, technology, and operations to provide 

America’s leaders with the critical information they need to save lives, defend democracy, and promote 

American values while protecting vital information through “cryptologic excellence — yesterday, today and 

tomorrow.” 

“When the fate of a


nation and the lives


of its soldiers are at


stake, gentlemen do


read each other’s mail


-- if they can get


their hands on it.”


Allen Dulles,


The Craft of


Intelligence, 1963


3 
4 

” 

odebreakers 

Cryptology - Past, Present & Future 

The cipher disk has a distinguished history. As invented in Italy sometime 

before 1470, it had similar concentric disks with the exception that one contained 

a “mixed” (scrambled) alphabet. Also, in some of the earlier versions, one of the 

two alphabets was composed of arbitrary symbols in lieu of conventional 

characters. 

The appeal of the disk lay in the fact that with it, encipherment and decipherment could be 

performed without carrying bulky or compromising written materials. 

The cipher disk came into large-scale use in the United States for the first time in the Civil War. The 

Federals’ chief signal officer patented a version of it, very similar to the Italian disk, for use in flag 

signaling. Since his flag stations were often within the view of Confederate signalmen, he prescribed 

frequent changes of setting. 

About half a century later, the U.S. Army adopted a simplified version in which one alphabet was 

“standard” and the other “reverse-standard. Although technically this was a step backward, there were 

compensating advantages since the regularity of the alphabets tended to reduce error. During World War I 

and for several years after, the Army issued the disk in this form to units that needed a cipher that could be 

carried and used easily and that would give a few hours’ protection to tactical messages. 

In terms of using this device, the two disks could be left in the same setting for an entire message, 

producing the simplest possible cryptogram, or their setting could be changed with every letter of the 

message. If the pattern of the settings were complex enough, an extremely secure cipher would result. 

In the beginning, people whispered. Others eavesdropped. And from these humble caveman origins 

have evolved one of the most powerful forms of intelligence and one of the most important forms of security 

in the world today. 

All of this has come about largely because communication has grown from person-to-person talk to 

satellite to Internet. This growth has provided even greater opportunities to gather information about what 

enemies, present and potential, are planning — information that has determined the fate of people and 

nations. A solved dispatch revealing German plans to join forces with Mexico in invading the United States 

so enraged America that it declared war on Germany in 1917, with all that has entailed. More recently, 

these new forms of communications and even new kinds of cryptography make it possible to transact 

business deals with the speed of light and with complete confidence in their security. 

The National Security Agency deals with these matters. It solves messages of hostile powers and 

organizations, and it helps keep American military and civil messages secure. It is not the only means of 

keeping Americans safe, but it is an important one. 

DAVID KAHN 

Author of The C
5 

The Beginnings 

“It may be 

doubted whether 

human ingenuity can 

of the kind which 

human ingenuity 

Edgar Allan Poe, 

Bug” 

Union soldiers during the first two years of the 

for communications 

George 

of 

and 

well 

construct an enigma 

may not, by proper 

application, resolve.” 

from the “The Gold 

Cryptology was of service to Americans even before the United States itself was born. During the 

Revolutionary period, American patriots often used ciphers to protect their communications. Occasionally 

during the Revolutionary War, encrypted British messages fell into American hands, and military officers, as well 

as several members of the Continental Congress, were called upon to solve them. 

In the American Civil War, the Industrial Revolution first became a close partner with warfare. Armies 

moved rapidly over rail, and communications had to keep up. Both the Union and the Confederacy 

depended on the newly invented telegraph to control their armies in distant theaters of war. Both sides 

adopted visual signal systems for field operations based on waving a single flag. Both types of 

communications were vulnerable to intercept, which put a premium on encryption to protect friendly 

messages and on cryptanalysis to read the enemy’s signals. Neither side had cipher systems that could 

withstand a concerted attack, and this new “communications intelligence” became a major source of 

information in Washington, Richmond, and many far-flung battlefields. In the long period of peace that 

followed the Civil War, the U.S. State Department and the military used codes or ciphers to protect sensitive 

communications, but the government did not conduct any organized cryptanalytic activities. 

Civil War relied entirely on the “wig-wag” system 

Washington had a keen 

appreciation for the need for intelligence, 

and it is well known today that he was 

skillful in using spies to gather data on 

British forces. He worried about the 

security his spies and concerned 

himself with ciphers for espionage use. 

He also employed cryptanalysis in the 

famous case of Dr. Benjamin Church, a 

Boston physician Washington’s 

director general of hospitals. Church was 

caught sending an enciphered message 

across the lines. Washington enlisted the 

aid of Elbridge Gerry (later vice president 

of the United States) and the Reverend 

Samuel West. Both broke the cipher, 

which cloaked a report to a British 

general about American military plans 

and capabilities. Church was imprisoned. 
6 

“Chapultepec was the 

monihours a day...because 

communihad been transmitted 

and it was very 

valuable.” 

I 

— to to

— and 

others, 

an 

A communications intelligence mobile collection 

Base on balls 

name of one of the stations that we

tored...tw enty-four 

they were

cating with stations in 

Germany. I understand that the material 

back to Washington 

Richard Egolf, 1976 

Pre-World War 

Intercept Operator 

World War I 

The invention of wireless radio at the turn of the century brought communications and cryptology into 

a new era. The new source, then termed “radio intelligence,” was adopted by the U.S. Navy and the Army, 

and was first used operationally during the Mexican border incursion of 1916, when the Army pursued 

Pancho Villa into northern Mexico. The U.S. 

commander, General Pershing, took with 

him mobile intercept vans — then known as 

“radio tractors” listen radio 

messages sent by Mexican government 

forces. This was the first mobile intercept 

station in American history; the use of these 

mobile units was later adopted by American 

forces when Pershing led U.S. forces to 

France in 1917. All the major combatants in 

World War I engaged in radio intercept — 

then known as “listening in” 

cryptanalysis of enemy messages. 

Pershing’s forces, like virtually all the 

were well outfitted for radio 

intelligence work. Army-level support came 

from Section 8 of the new Army intelligence 

service. In France, battlefield communications 

intelligence support was conducted by

organization entitled G2A6, with intercept 

sites at fixed locations and “radio tractors” 

following the troops at the front lines. 

Radio Tractor Unit 

unit on the Mexican border, 1916 

An Army intercept station in France, 1918 

In addition to their authorized codes, American Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War I 

occasionally employed various unauthorized codes of varying degrees of security. One of the codes used 

by the 52nd Infantry Brigade was a typically American one: 

Killed Strike out 

Seriously wounded 

Slightly wounded Hit by pitched ball 

Have taken (no.) prisoners Stolen bases (no.) 

Have lost (no.) prisoners Left on base (no.) 

Fired on by machine guns Johnson using fast ball 

We were bombarded with gas Wagner singled 

We were under heavy bombardment Wagner knocked a home run 

Our artillery laid down a barrage Sent in a pinch hitter 

We bombarded heavily Cobb knocked a home run 

Commissioned officer Majors 

Enlisted men Minors 
7 

against 

this time 

was 

Stimson, 

Black Chamber, 

“The successful crypyears of experience 

call it cipher brains. 

... [for] men and 

cryptography [they] 

by a passion for the 

science and by symCertainly, no human 

his heart and brain 

1920s 

founder of MI-8, the “Black Chamber” 

At the conclusion of World War I, building on the wartime MI-8, the United States for the first time 

established a peacetime cryptanalytic organization, which was directed by Herbert O. Yardley. Yardley had 

been an important figure in the wartime 

operations enemy encrypted 

communications. After the war, the State and War 

Departments continued the task, 

targeted against foreign diplomatic cable traffic; 

Yardley was chosen to lead the effort. His most 

famous success came in 1923 during the 

Washington Naval Conference, which

seeking ways to prevent a postwar arms race. 

Under MI-8, Yardley broke Japanese diplomatic 

messages and sent the information to the State 

Department, which in turn used it to negotiate 

favorable provisions in the final agreements. In 

1930, however, a new Secretary of State, Henry 

withdrew the State Department’s 

funding from MI-8, causing its collapse. No 

longer in government service, Yardley wrote a 

“tell-all” book, The American 

which publicized MI-8’s achievements. Among 

other effects, it caused a number of countries to 

search for and adopt new encryption methods. 

tographer requires a 

type of mind difficult 

to describe. To excel, 

he not only needs 

but great originality 

and imagination of a 

particular type. We 

women to succeed at 

must be inspired both 

pathetic leadership. 

being would burn up 

without the latter. “ 

Herbert O. Yardley 

Herbert O. Yardley, 

Examples of messages related to the Washington 

Naval Conference decrypted and translated by 

Yardley’s MI-8 
8 

enemy messages in 

of 

equal 

Radio Intelligence 

could easily become 

Laurance 

1925 

at a 

1930, 

” whom gained their skills under his 

the he became 

SIS in the mid-1930s 

Coast Guard intercept/DF unit 

The Origins of Modern Services 

“All nations have 

learned the lessons of 

the World War and 

will probably make 

even greater efforts 

to intercept and read 

the future... In a 

war between nations 

approximately 

strength, 

the decisive factor.” 

Safford, 

With Yardley’s “Black Chamber” closed, the Army turned to an existing code-making organization 

under William Friedman, the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), to take on the job of both making and 

breaking codes. Friedman, arguably the leading cryptologist of his time, became known as the father of 

modern Army cryptology. William 

Friedman’s wife, Elizebeth, was his equal 

as a cryptologist. They met and married 

prior to World War I when both were 

employed private research 

foundation. After the war, William went 

into Army cryptography as a civilian 

consultant; Elizebeth went into the Coast 

Guard, where she founded its cryptologic 

effort. Her cryptanalytic efforts against 

rumrunners during Prohibition resulted 

in the incarceration of a number of 

criminals and brought her national recognition. In

William Friedman hired the Army’s first three civilian “junior 

cryptanalysts, all of 

tutelage. These men, Frank Rowlett, Abraham Sinkov, and 

Solomon Kullback, later joined by Japanese translator John 

Hurt, formed the core of Army cryptologic work in the 1930s 

and became principal figures in American cryptology over the 

next three decades. 

William F. Friedman, the dean of modern American cryptologists, 

pioneered the application of scientific principles to cryptology and laid 

the foundation for present-day cryptologic concepts. Born in Kishinev, 

Russia, on September 24, 1891, he was brought to the United States in 

1892. Following graduation from Cornell University in 1914 with a 

degree in genetics, he worked for Riverbank Laboratories, first as 

director of its Department of Genetics and then as director of the 

Department of Ciphers. After serving in World War I as a lieutenant 

with American Expeditionary Forces, chief 

cryptographer of the Signal Corps, then Director of Communications 

Research, Signal Intelligence Service (later Army Security Agency). After 

the end of World War II, Mr. Friedman served in various positions, 

including cryptologic consultant to the Army Security Agency, the 

Armed Forces Security Agency, and the National Security Agency. For his 

many contributions to the security of his country, Mr. Friedman 

received the War Department Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, 

the Presidential Medal for Merit, the Presidential National Security 

Medal, and a special congressional award of $100,000 for inventions and 

patents in cryptology. Mr. Friedman was the author of many books, 

brochures, technical treatises, and articles on cryptologic subjects. In 

addition, with his wife, Elizebeth Smith Friedman, he wrote The 

Shakespearean Ciphers Examined. Mr. Friedman died in Washington, 

D.C., on November 2, 1969. 
war. Laurance

including Joseph Wenger. 

Laurance Safford 

9 

mathematical analysis; the 

Members of the 

“On the Roof Gang” 

PURPLE Analog, the 

SIS-devised machine 

that read 

Japanese diplomatic 

messages beginning 

in 1940 

Bletchley Park 

The Navy established a communications intelligence 

(COMINT) organization in 1924, initially with the 

mission of training cryptologists to be ready in case of 

 Safford established the first Navy 

cryptologic organization, called the Research Desk, or 

OP-20-G, and led its activities for decades. Safford 

attracted many brilliant officers into the organization, 

The enlisted men trained in intercept skills inside a 

wooden shed atop the Navy building in Washington, 

D.C.; thereafter, this exclusive group was known as the 

“On the Roof Gang.” Friedman and his colleagues in SIS 

studied Japanese diplomatic machine-generated ciphers, 

the successor systems to those Yardley had been reading 

in the 1920s. SIS gave the highest level Japanese systems 

covernames from rainbow colors: RED, adopted in 1935, 

and PURPLE, adopted in 1939. These complicated 

ciphers were solved by

cryptanalysts never saw one of the original Japanese 

machines. In order to read PURPLE-based messages 

quickly enough, a young Army engineer named Leo 

Rosen designed an “analog” machine. Once the key to the 

message was broken, an operator could plug the machine 

 two typewriters, type the cipher text on one 

machine, and get plain text on the other. Designed by the 

Army, fabricated and partially funded by the Navy, the PURPLE was an early example 

From about 1940, even before the United States entered World War II, the U.S. and Great Britain began 

cautious sharing of scientific and technical information; eventually, this included sharing of cryptologic 

information. The U.S. told the British of its successes against Japanese diplomatic 

ciphers and provided the British with a PURPLE analog; the British, in turn, 

against their common enemies, they cooperated closely in solving and 

exploiting the communications of these enemy forces. 

into Joseph Wenger 

of interservice cooperation in cryptology. 

informed the U.S. of their ability to read 

German military messages enciphered on the 

ENIGMA machine and gave the Americans 

 decrypts of important messages. 

initial steps led to increased 

cooperation in cryptanalysis once the 

United States became engaged in the war. 

Eventually, Americans were integrated 

into the operation at Bletchley Park, 

the wartime headquarters of the 

British cryptologic organization. Just 

as both nations drew closer in combat 

These 

access to

According to a family story, 

E l i z e b e t h F r i e d m a n ’ s 

mother gave her name this 

variant spelling in order to 

prevent anyone from nicknaming the child “Eliza.” 
10 

“The intelligence 

during this campaign has been of 

priceless value to 

me. It has simplified 

my task as commanhas saved thousands 

of British and 

American lives, and 

in no small way contributed to the speed 

with which the 

and eventually 

Dwight D. 

the 

the months 

JN-25. 

planning and messages 

as 

the 

Arlington Hall Station 

Naval Security Station 

which has emanated 

from you before and 

der enormously. It 

enemy was routed 

forced to surrender.” 

Eisenhower, 1945 

World War II 

The U.S. ability to exploit Japan’s diplomatic communications in the early 1940s gave it a distinct 

advantage in the negotiations of that period. However, by 1941 U.S. Army and Navy cryptanalysts had not 

solved the military code systems used by the Japanese. Thus, despite high-quality secret information about 

Japan, the U.S. did not learn in advance that a Japanese Navy task force had been sent to bomb American 

installations on Hawaii. The Japanese 

attack at Pearl Harbor and other 

installations on December 7, 1941, 

propelled United States into 

another world war. In

immediately after the Pearl Harbor 

disaster, the U.S. Navy made important 

breakthroughs in a high-level Japanese 

Navy code known to the Americans as 

The solution to this system 

enabled the U.S. to read Japanese 

operational 

throughout the Pacific War. With this inside 

knowledge, the U.S. was able to position itself 

to turn back a Japanese naval thrust into the 

Coral Sea near Australia, and, in May 1942, 

handed the Japanese Navy a resounding 

defeat at the island of Midway. 

In 1942, the Army’s Signal Intelligence 

Service (SIS) moved from cramped quarters 

at the Munitions Building on the Mall in 

Washington, D.C., to a recently purchased 

girls’ school in Arlington, Virginia, which 

became known Arlington Hall Station 

(AHS). SIS’s successes against Japanese code 

systems contributed to its rapid expansion 

from several people to several thousand. SIS 

supported operations against both Japanese 

and German communications. Much of the 

work at Arlington Hall was conducted by 

cleared personnel of Women’s Army 

Corps (WAC). 

General George S. Patton, the legendary commander of World War II, became an astute consumer 

of communications intelligence (COMINT); he learned its worth in the drive across Western Europe 

after D-Day and used it well. For example, in mid-August 1944, while Patton’s Third Army was located 

near the French city of Le Mans, the general and about 40 of his officers attended daily intelligence 

briefings. Here they would hear regular briefings by the G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 (Operations), 

situation reports, and a news report from radio broadcasts. Following each meeting, all but seven 

officers were dismissed, and the rest stayed for a briefing on the enemy situation as seen in COMINT. 

This source proved valuable for the Third Army: ULTRA (the codeword assigned to COMINT derived 

from decryption of high-level German ciphers) material alone predicted a drive by five German 

Panzer divisions against the Third Army at Avaranches. In another instance, when Third Army 

headquarters moved near Chalons, an ULTRA message arrived at 0100 hours showing the German 

order for an attack at 0300. Patton had described the U.S. troops in the attack areas as spread out as 

“thin as the skin on an egg.” He found means to alert the defending divisions without jeopardizing the 

security of ULTRA, and the German attack was repulsed. 

One member of Patton’s staff wrote about the value of ULTRA to Patton’s army stating that, “An 

army has never moved as fast and as far as the Third Army in its drive across France, and ULTRA was 

invaluable every mile of the way.” 
Like SIS, the Navy’s OP-20-G outgrew its quarters on the Mall in Washington, D.C., and in 1942 moved 

to a girls’ school at Ward Circle (later known as the Naval Security Station) in a northwest corner of the 

District of Columbia. OP-20-G coordinated cryptologic operations in support of American 

fighting forces and cooperated with the British cryptologic organization, but did so in official 

channels separate from the Army. 

In partnership with the British at Bletchley Park, the U.S. Navy mounted an effort against 

the German naval ENIGMA cipher machine. Naval cryptanalysts were able to read the enemy’s 

most secret messages by using a device known as the Bombe. This four-rotor diagnostic 

machine, which had components that emulated the fixtures on the ENIGMA, was based on a 

British version, redesigned by the U.S. Navy and built by National Cash Register Corporation at 

Dayton, Ohio. Virtually the entire U.S. effort to solve ENIGMA codes was staffed by Navy 

WAVES — the headquarters of OP-20-G had employed over 5,000 women at the height of the 

war. The ability to read German ENIGMA-based naval messages was of vital importance in the 

war in the Atlantic, particularly against German submarines. American military forces in all theaters of war Navy WAVE 

maintains the

received cryptologic support from the central organizations and theater centers through special ENIGMA- intelligence distribution arrangements. In addition, wartime brought rapid movement of forces, especially cracking Bombe during the “Dash across France” in 1944. Army cryptologists supported the front-line troops by solving 

low-level codes and ciphers on the spot, the World War II version of the radio tractor unit. 

During World War II, the United States had the best of both possible cryptologic worlds. In 

conjunction with their British ally, U.S. personnel had secret access to the wartime communications 

of enemy forces. At the same time, a joint Army-Navy project produced the best communications 

security device of World War II, the SIGABA. Of the major machine cipher systems of the wartime 

period, only the SIGABA, used for U.S. high-level communications, remained impenetrable to 

enemy cryptanalysis, a fact that was confirmed in postwar interrogations of German and Japanese 

cryptologists — it was the acme of wired rotor cryptography. 

Of all forms of communications, the human voice has been the most difficult to encrypt 

successfully. At the beginning of World War II, after several abortive attempts, Bell Laboratories 

produced the SIGSALY. Although successful in encrypting speech, it had limited application SIGSALY because of its size: SIGSALY consisted of forty-five racks of equipment, weighed fifty-five tons, occupied 

an entire room, and required thirteen technicians to operate. At $1 million per copy, it was produced for 

only a few strategic command centers between the U.S. and Great Britain, notably between the White 

House and Winston Churchill’s underground headquarters in London. 

On the front lines, both the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army used another very effective 

form of communications security: Native Americans speaking in a verbal code in their own 

languages to “encrypt” tactical voice communications. The Marines used Navajo “code talkers” 

exclusively, while the Army drew from the Comanche, Choctaw, Ojibwe, and Cherokee tribes. 

Cryptology did not win the war. The war was won by the brave soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

Marines who risked their lives in combat with the enemy. However, the ability to read the 

enemy’s most secret messages allowed American and British commanders to make wise 

decisions about the use of their troops; this shortened the time of war and saved countless 

thousands of Allied lives. The ironclad protection of U.S. high-level communications prevented 

the enemy’s intelligence personnel from exploiting these messages; this superior 

communications security effort also saved an untold number of lives and contributed greatly to 

the success of Allied operations. German soldiers 

using 

the ENIGMA in 

the field 

An Army COMINT intercept Code Talkers in the field


truck in France, 1944


11 
12 

“I believe 

for the invaluable 

under the plan...in 

far 

solving the 

NSA’s 

ment. At the beginning of NSA’s exishad to 

be done.” 

RADM Joseph 

time, 

Defense 

the 

and the CIA, 

senior 

finding unit in Korea 

ASA was responsible for supplying the 

Postwar Period 

firmly 

that had it not been 

experience we gained 

effect prior to the 

creation of AFSA 

and in the operation 

of the latter agency, 

we would have had 

more trouble 

early 

problems incident to 

establishtence, we at least 

knew what

Wenger, USN 

Despite the historic achievements of American cryptology during World War II, the Army and Navy 

emerged from the war as disunited rivals in the business. In 1947, the Air Force became a third competitor 

for funding, equipment, and personnel. At the same 

the technology of cryptology had become 

much more sophisticated through the use of 

powerful machines and rudimentary computers 

and, hence, much more expensive. Several forwardlooking leaders recognized the necessity to merge the 

efforts of both services to attack increasingly 

sophisticated targets. Joseph Wenger, one of 

Laurance Safford’s earliest recruits to OP-20-G, 

urged more cooperation with the Army. After several 

unsuccessful attempts to achieve economy and 

compatibility of operations through plans for 

coordination, in 1949 the Secretary of 

established a central cryptologic institution, 

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Under the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, AFSA was intended to be the 

unifying organization, but it lacked the enforcement 

powers to make it dominant. What resulted from 

good intentions was yet a fourth cryptologic 

contender, which had to compete with the other 

three service agencies for resources. 

AFSA’s considerable technical successes were 

overshadowed by its failure to truly unite the Service 

Cryptologic Agencies. The Korean War of 1950-53 

exposed a number of serious weaknesses in the postwar cryptologic community. While there was SIGINT 

support from AFSA and first-class support on the front lines, senior commanders were dissatisfied because 

this support never approached the level they had enjoyed during World War II. In addition, even this limited 

war in Korea exposed continuing problems in service cryptologic cooperation and areas of duplication of 

effort. At the same time, some of the civilian arms of 

the government, particularly the State Department 

were dissatisfied with the strong 

military character of the U.S. SIGINT effort. With 

both military and civilian leaders dissatisfied, albeit 

on different points, it became clear to

members of the U.S. government that changes in 

cryptologic organization had to be made. President 

Harry S. Truman commissioned a study in 1952. 

Army Security Agency mobile direction 

Army’s codes and ciphers. Here a soldier of 

the 3rd Infantry Division uses the 

World War II vintage M-209 cipher device 

in his foxhole message center. 
13 

was added in 1963. 

George A. Brownell 

signed the memorandum 

that created the National 

Security Agency in 1952 

” 

intelligence activities 

a 

October 27, 1952 

President Truman in 1952 impaneled a high-level committee chaired by George Brownell, a New York 

lawyer, after hearing reports from the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Walter Bedell Smith, and 

the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that AFSA was not working. The Brownell Committee, concluding 

that cryptology was a “national asset,” recommended that cryptology be taken from control of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and resubordinated to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary was made the Executive 

Agent for SIGINT for the government. Truman established NSA with nothing more than a signature in 

November 1952. 

AFSA, and subsequently NSA, were tenants at both the Naval Security Station and Arlington Hall 

Station, with by far the larger component located at AHS. This tenant status created management and 

personnel problems, but as early as 1951 plans were laid for a new headquarters. 

The original selection was Fort Knox, Kentucky, but this occasioned severe civilian dissatisfaction, and a 

hastily convened committee then selected Fort Meade, Maryland, about twenty-five miles from the center of 

Washington, D.C. The selection of Fort Meade was a compromise between the need to remove the new 

headquarters from potential atomic bomb blast damage and the reluctance of the cryptologic workforce to 

move to more remote locations. The move to Fort Meade occurred in stages, beginning with an interim 

move of advance elements to buildings that later became the military barracks, in 1955. The move was 

completed in 1957 with the opening of OPS1, a three-story structure. An additional, nine-story building 

The communications security components remained at the Ward Circle Naval Security Station 

until their own building was constructed on Fort Meade in 1968. Owing to rapid growth in the 1950s, 

the original building was too small even before NSA moved to Fort Meade in 1957. Desperate for 

more floor space, NSA began renting buildings at a new technical park being built outside what was 

then known as Friendship Airport (now Baltimore-Washington International). The facility quickly 

became known as FANX — Friendship Annex. 

The Creation of NSA 

President Harry Truman 

NSA’s new headquarters, 1957 

“COMINT is a national responsibility (as distinct from the 

responsibility of any particular Service, department or agency) 

and that as a consequence the activity must be so managed 

and organized as to exploit all available intelligence resources 

in the participating departments and agencies in order to 

obtain the optimum results for each and for the Government as 

a whole.

Brownell Committee Report 

“The communications 

of the United States 

are national 

responsibility.” 

Harry S. Truman 
14 

The Era of Cryptologic Expansion - 1952-1960 

had been as 

an individual as 

might have had to go 

[whole] thing might 

have fallen.” 

Solomon Kullback 

“I think, at the time 

NSA was formed, if 

the Director of NSA 

not 

strong and foreseeing 

General Canine, we 

through another reorganization [and] the 

As part of his attempt to unify the cryptologic business, the Secretary of Defense appointed Major 

General (later Lieutenant General) Ralph Canine, a no-nonsense former artillery officer for General George 

Patton, as NSA’s first director. It was practically Canine’s first exposure to intelligence, but he brought to the 

task a willingness to make tough decisions and a determination to force unification on the reluctant 

cryptologic services. General Canine presided over the greatest expansion of American cryptologic assets 

ever, both human and machine. He spurred research and development into the new field of computers, he 

began work on the fastest and most reliable communications network in the federal government, and he 

pushed the expansion of field sites (the number of field sites grew from 42 in 1952 to over 90 by 1956, 

Canine’s final year at NSA). Most of all, Canine cultivated a highly professional workforce; he enhanced 

internal training opportunities, began sending senior executives for external education, and strove to 

promote high performers to the most senior Civil Service grades. 

The United States and the Soviet Union were allies during World War II, but the spirit of harmony 

fostered by their victory over Nazi Germany lasted only a short time. The problems and rivalry encountered 

in seeking to settle the residual problems of seven years of war were only a harbinger of things to come. It 

soon became clear that the U.S. and USSR, as leaders of their respective blocs, were engaged in a new kind of 

conflict. A “cold war” began in the late 1940s, and it threatened to become actual combat at any time, a new 

war that could involve nuclear weapons. The USSR detonated its first atomic weapon in 1949, years ahead of 

American estimates. In the 1950s, Soviet advances in rocket science increased the possibility that the 

continental United States could become a nuclear battleground. However, little was known with certainty 

about the post-World War II Soviet military, and obtaining reliable information about the country or its 

military capabilities was difficult, if not impossible, through conventional intelligence methods. 

Soon after World War II ended, SIGINT provided evidence to the United States that the Soviet Union had 

inimical intentions. In 1946, cryptanalysts solved a system used by the Soviet espionage services during 

wartime, and, by reading about 2,000 espionage-related messages, learned that the USSR had penetrated 

many civil and military organizations during the war, including the White House, Treasury Department, 

Office of Strategic Services (predecessor of the CIA), and the Manhattan Project, which developed the atomic 

bomb. This secret information was passed to the FBI and resulted in the investigation of some Americans for 

espionage and the elimination of a number of espionage rings. 

LTG Ralph J. Canine, USA 

Noted for his on-the-spot inspections, General Ralph Canine, 

the first director of NSA, once visited the Naval Security Station 

on Nebraska Avenue in Washington, D.C.,“just to see what went 

on there.” It was a hot, humid morning in July 1953, and one of 

the rooms General Canine looked in had only a window and a 

transom for ventilation. A transom fan had been requested, but 

delivery had not yet been made. As General Canine walked into 

the room, he asked the all-female group how they were doing. 

One of the women, who had never learned to recognize military 

rank insignia, bluntly responded,“We’d be doing a helluva lot 

better, Sergeant, if we could get someone to put a fan in that 

transom.” Everyone in the room, including the military supervisor, sat in stunned silence, awaiting a display of indignation 

from General Canine, but it never came. He just smiled, sympathized with the plight of the workers, and left, saying, “I’ll see 

what I can do about it.” He never let on who he was. As soon as 

the general had departed, the woman was given quick instruction on military ranks — and within a few minutes a crew 

arrived to install the transom fan. 
The Air Force aircraft for COMINT 

reconnaissance in the 1950s 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

concerned about Soviet strategic 

capabilities, cast about for 

information regarding this threat. 

Until CIA U-2s began flying in 1956, 

virtually nothing definite was available 

about the USSR except from SIGINT. 

In fact, a panel in 1954 judged that 90 

percent of America’s warning 

information would come from 

SIGINT. Under the Eisenhower 

administration, NSA began expanding 

and enhancing its capabilities. 

Worried about timely warning, the 

president supported development of 

communications for critical 

information. In the early 1950s, 

SIGINT sites began sprouting up in 

Europe to warn the U.S. and NATO of 

a possible Soviet attack. 

As one facet of the energized 

collection effort, a program of aerial 

reconnaissance around the periphery 

of the Soviet Union was begun in the 

1940s and expanded in the 1950s, 

carried out by the U.S. Air Force and 

the Navy. In the postwar period, the 

services at first used standard military 

aircraft, such as B-17s, for these flights. 

A converted B-29 bomber, the RB-50, 

served as the first strategic COMINT 

In the late 1950s, the Air Force switched to the McDonnell collection platform. Increasingly, the 

Douglas RC-130 services outfitted reconnaissance 

versions of other military aircraft — 

the C-130, for example, became the RC-130 for reconnaissance purposes. This was a dangerous but 

necessary activity; during the Cold War period of 1945-1977, a total of more than 40 reconnaissance aircraft 

were shot down. Of the 152 cryptologists who lost their lives since World War II, 64 were engaged in aerial 

reconnaissance. For example, on September 2, 1958, an RC-130 on its initial flight out of Adana, Turkey, 

strayed over the border into Soviet Armenia and was shot down with the loss of all seventeen airmen 

aboard. It became one of the most celebrated incidents of the Cold War. As need required, aerial 

reconnaissance was conducted in other areas of the world, including support to American forces in the 

Vietnam War. Some of these flights also resulted in downed aircraft and loss of life, e.g., the shootdown of 

the Navy EC-121 in the Sea of Japan on April 15, 1969, and loss of Army aircraft in Indochina. 

EC - 121 

15 
In 

the 

of 

16 

“...Cryptography and 

cryptanalysis 

sent the obverse and 

same single coin...If 

face of his coin become 

superior in size, comthe enemy.” 

Adlai Stevenson, UN ambassador during the Kennedy/Johnson 

President Ronald Reagan using a STU-III 

the 1950s, NSA pioneered new point-to-point communications 

security. The KW-26, adopted throughout the Defense Department, was 

composed partly of tubes and partly of solid state electronics. It was used 

wherever the U.S. needed the high-grade cryptography at large, fixed-site 

communications centers. By the time NSA designed a successor to the KW26, cryptography had gone entirely to solid state designs. The KG-84, much 

lighter and easier to maintain than earlier cryptography, was first deployed 

in the 1980s to communications centers around the world. 

The most successful voice system through the 1960s was the KY-3, 

developed by Bell Laboratories to replace existing, and marginally adequate, 

voice security systems. Using wideband technology, the KY-3 offered highquality secure voice with excellent security. It was eventually teamed with other equipment into

Autosevocom worldwide secure voice system. But the crypto gear resided in a safe, and the initial expense 

limited the number of users. Developed for battlefield use, the Vinson (KY-57/58) equipment was smaller 

and lighter than earlier voice encryption. It was the first secure unit that could be remotely keyed, an 

important capability in wartime, when units using secure voice systems could be overrun. Voice encryption 

continued to represent the biggest problem in information security. The known Soviet exploitation of U.S. 

unenciphered telephone calls in the 1970s 

spurred the search for a small, cheap, userfriendly secure telephone. NSA engineers 

developed a public key algorithm and mated it 

with a desk telephone — the STU-III. It did 

away with the requirement for a safe full of 

equipment, needed only annual rekeying, cost 

only $2,000 per set, and was made by three 

commercial contractors. Hundreds 

thousands of units were manufactured. The 

STU-III proved itself as a vital security device 

for the military during Operations DESERT 

SHIELD and DESERT STORM. 

reprereverse faces of the 

[an officer] lets either 

dull from indifference, 

carelessness, or ignorance, he will almost 

surely lose the battle, 

even if his forces are 

pared with those of 

William F. Friedman 

Securing U.S. Communications 

administration, using the KY-3 (device is in the cabinet). 

Inset photo shows a KY-3. 

KW-26 
17 

“I think the Cuban 

Crisis experience in 

to take advantage of 

-

my in the 

Agency the 

by my 

experience 

time.” 

Juanita Moody 

The , a Navy COMINT collection vessel 

The Cuban Missile Crisis 

the Agency allowed us 

everything that we 

had learned during 

World War II and post

World War I...and...I 

felt that every day of 

career 

from 

Cuban Crisis on...was 

affected 

at that 

Former NSA Senior 

Soviet strategic missile sites under construction in Cuba 

Oxford

A U-2 flight on October 14, 1962, discovered the presence of Soviet offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. 

Although photography provided the early information, all intelligence sources, including SIGINT, were 

tasked to find more information. NSA’s most effective response was to send a SIGINT collection vessel, 

the Oxford, to Cuban waters to monitor Cuban and Soviet communications. During the tense moments 

following President Kennedy’s imposition of a naval quarantine around Cuba, SIGINT provided the first 

indication that Soviet vessels had stopped in the mid-Atlantic, awaiting further instructions. It was the 

first clue that the Soviets might not challenge the American forces arrayed around the island. SIGINT also 

provided indications when the Soviets ended the period of crisis. Although photographic intelligence 

raised the initial warning, SIGINT provided much of the operational intelligence to President Kennedy 

and other military and civilian decision-makers during the crisis. 
18 

“...the 509th Radio 

vided 

enemy radio communiduring the 

General Bruce 

a C-47. called 

The 

tactical 

” 

thousands of 

located outside Saigon 

A Marine COMINT unit at 

Khe Sanh (under fire) 

RU-21 aircraft, used by ASA for ARDF 

Vietnam and Desert Storm 

Research Group (an 

element of the Army 

Security Agency)...prooutstanding 

support in intercepting and interpreting 

cations 

Vietnam conflict.” 

Palmer, Jr., USA 

As in America’s previous wars, U.S. SIGINT capabilities 

supported American troops during combat operations in the 

field during the Vietnam War — but not without tragic 

losses. Davis Station, first occupied in 1961, was named for 

SP4 James T. Davis, who arrived with the first Army Security 

Agency (ASA) contingent to Vietnam. Davis was on a 

direction finding (DF) mission when his truck was ambushed 

by Viet Cong south of Saigon. Ten of the eleven on the truck, 

including Davis, were killed. Davis was the first American 

serviceman killed in action during the Vietnam conflict. 

Airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) was 

the most successful SIGINT technique used 

during the war. It became a primary targeting 

tool for American forces. The first ARDF aircraft 

was introduced into the country by the ASA in 

1962 as a way to lessen the danger of DF missions 

like the one that Davis had been on. Designed by 

an Army engineer, it was rushed to Vietnam and 

became an instant success. 

The Air Force entered the ARDF business 

with converted Originally 

PHYLLIS ANN, the Air Force program did not 

become operational until 1966, but eventually 

provided a rapid fix capability. 

ARDF program endured its share of 

losses: two Army helicopters, one RU-21 twinengine ARDF aircraft, and six Air Force EC-47s went down in 

Vietnam. U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT personnel supported 

the forces marooned by enemy fire at Khe Sanh during the 

winter and spring of 1968. Throughout the war, 

SIGINT was a critical intelligence resource. 

Vietnam was not the last war in which cryptology 

supported American forces. In a visit to NSA after DESERT 

STORM, the desert campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi 

aggression, President George Bush expressed his appreciation 

for cryptologic support. He called the dedicated cryptologists 

“unsung heroes. Although the story of American 

cryptology has had to remain secret for decades, the 

ability to protect U.S. official communications and 

the ability to exploit the communications of enemies 

or potential enemies helped keep the United States 

out of war, shortened the time of war when combat 

was inevitable, and saved tens of 

American and Allied lives. 

Entrance to ASA’s first station, Davis Station, 

The Air Force ARDF platform: an EC-47 
19 

“...the skills and 

competence of [NSA 

to 

ness and willingness 

to take risks keep us 

business.” 

organization have significantly advanced the 

business worlds. 

Thanks to the people in the 

NSA has made ground-breaking 

developments in semiconductor 

National Security Operations Center work 

around the clock to keep U.S. decision-makers 

affecting the national interest. 

employees] are second 

none...forward 

thinking innovativeat the forefront of our 

from the “National 

Cryptologic Strategy 

for the 21st Century” 

Most NSA employees, both civilian and military, are headquartered at Fort George G. Meade, 

Maryland, approximately halfway between Washington and Baltimore. NSA’s workforce represents 

an unusual combination of specialties, including analysts, engineers, physicists, mathematicians, 

linguists, computer scientists, researchers, customer relations specialists, security officers, data 

flow experts, managers, and administrative and clerical assistants, to name just a few. 

It is said that NSA is the largest employer of mathematicians in the United States and perhaps 

the world. Mathematicians at NSA contribute directly to the two missions of the Agency: some help 

design cipher systems that will protect the integrity of U.S. information systems, while others 

search for weaknesses in adversaries’ codes. 

Technology and the world change rapidly, and NSA places great emphasis on its employees’ 

staying ahead of these changes by providing employee training and development programs. The 

National Cryptologic School addresses the professional and technical development of NSA 

employees and provides the unique training needed by both the NSA work force and several 

elements throughout the Department of Defense. NSA sponsors employees for bachelor and 

graduate-level study at the Nation’s top universities and colleges; selected Agency employees attend 

the various war colleges of the U.S. Armed Forces. 

The efforts of NSA’s Research & Engineering 

state of the art in both the scientific and 

Special Processing Laboratory, 

technology. 

Military and civilian personnel in the 

informed about significant developments 

NSA & Its People 
20 

and 

subsequent 

used 

a 

be 

for 

of 

“For NSA, technoloupon which all of our 

an option.” 

Hayden, USAF 

2002 

The NSA and Technology 

About the time of World War I, commercial and government inventors began experimenting with and 

developing electro-mechanical machines to encipher and decipher messages. All major combatants in World 

War II adopted sophisticated cipher machines for at least some of their communications. Great Britain and 

the United States developed machines of increasing power and complexity for solving their enemies’ 

cryptomachine systems. 

When the German military adopted the ENIGMA, a high-grade cipher machine, the Polish Cipher 

Bureau invented a cryptanalytic machine, codenamed the Bombe, to aid cryptanalysis. The British and U.S. 

cryptanalysts made adaptations to the Bombe, and used banks of Bombes to good effect against the German 

Navy. 

The Germans had cipher devices even more sophisticated than the ENIGMA. The TUNNY was one such 

high-grade cryptomachine. In 1943, capitalizing on human error in the use of TUNNY, British cryptanalysts 

solved the system in theory. In practice, individual TUNNY messages required too much processing time 

for use in military operations. To enable timely exploitation, British engineers and cryptanalysts invented a 

device known as COLOSSUS, which had many characteristics associated with modern computers. 

By 1945, U.S. Army and Navy cryptologists had considerable experience devising or using specialpurpose computing devices. The challenge was to transfer that knowledge to the design of a general-purpose 

computer capable of multiple applications. The Army and Navy continued in-house and outside research to 

develop computers. This dual research track continued as American cryptology was centralized under the 

National Security Agency. 

By late 1950, government and industry working together produced the general-purpose computer 

ATLAS. The ATLAS 

computing 

systems innovative 

input and storage devices — 

drum storage, then later tape 

drives; transistor technology; 

remote job access; and chip 

technology. 

NSA and a contractor 

developed system, 

nicknamed HARVEST, that 

remained in service from 

1962 to 1976, a long timespan for a computer system. 

HARVEST proved to

difficult to program and 

slower than planned, but its 

development and use was a 

profitable experience

those involved in developing 

future generations 

computers. 

Today, NSA conducts one of the U.S. Government’s leading research and development programs. The 

Agency’s R&D projects have significantly advanced the state of the art in the scientific and business worlds. 

Early interest in cryptanalytic research led to the first large-scale computer and the first solid-state computer, 

predecessors to the modern computer. NSA pioneered efforts in flexible storage capabilities, which led to the 

development of the tape cassette. The Agency also made ground-breaking developments in semiconductor 

technology, developed the first optical “transistor,” and was involved in early face recognition technology. 

NSA remains a world leader in many technology fields, employing that technological advantage to 

protect our data and communications while providing our Nation’s leaders with critical intelligence 

information. 

gy is the foundation 

processes rest; it is not 

Lt Gen Michael V. 

Director, NSA 
21

Central Security Service

The Central Security Service (CSS) was established by Presidential Directive in 1972 to promote a full

partnership between NSA and the cryptologic elements of the Armed Forces, or service cryptologic elements

(SCEs). By combining NSA and CSS, a more unified Department of Defense cryptologic effort emerged.

The Director of NSA is also the Chief of the CSS, and he is assisted in this role by his Deputy, CSS, a Major

General or Rear Admiral (upper half). The CSS also includes a jointly staffed headquarters. Army, Navy and

Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard operating elements, and such other subordinate elements and

facilities as may be assigned to the CSS by the Secretary of Defense. The SCEs are the U.S. Army Intelligence

and Security Command (INSCOM); the Naval Security Group Command (NAVSECGRU or NSG),

including the Marine Support Battalion; the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA); and the Coast Guard Intelligence

Directorate. The SCEs, on behalf of their services, are both consumers and producers of intelligence

information. They advocate cryptologic requirements of their services within the crytologic enterprise, and

they provide forces and capabilities to NSA/CSS organizations at NSA headquarters and in the field. The

SCEs also provide tactical units and personnel assigned to military commands. These units and personnel

directly support and take tasking from their commanders, but rely on the SCE headquarters for technical

support and other assistance. The CSS and SCEs originally focused on SIGINT but now have

responsibilities in Information Assurance as well.

“Our relationship

with the Service

Cryptologic Elements

is essential. We cannot accomplish our

part in this Nation’s

defense unless it is

close, continual, and

effective.”

Lt Gen Michael V.

Hayden, USAF

Director, NSA

1999
22 

The 

honor and 

” 

in other 

“For without belittling the courage 

with which men have 

courage with which 

men have lived.” 

Adj

honor those 

missions 

National Security 

Agency/Central Security 

Service Cryptologic Memorial 

is intended to

remember those who have 

given their lives, “serving in 

silence, in the line of duty 

since World War II. The names 

listed include Army, Navy, Air 

Force, Marine, and civilian 

cryptologists who have made 

the ultimate sacrifice in hostile 

action, under fire in peacetime 

activities, and 

tragedies. It is hoped that this 

memorial will serve as an 

important reminder both of 

the crucial role that cryptology 

plays in keeping the United States secure and of the courage of these individuals to carry out their mission at such a 

dear price. 

The memorial is a black granite wall, 12 feet wide and 8 feet high, centered with a triangle. The words 

THEY SERVED IN SILENCE, etched into the polished stone at the cap of the triangle, recognize that 

cryptologic service has always been a silent service — secretive by its very nature. Below these words, the 

NSA seal and the names of the 152 military and civilian cryptologists who have given their lives in service 

to their country are carved into the granite. The names are at the base of the triangle because these 

cryptologists and their ideals — dedication to mission, dedication to workmate, and dedication to country 

— form the foundation for cryptologic service. 

The striking memorial was designed by an NSA employee. It is housed in the NSA Headquarters 

complex at Fort Meade, MD. A replica of the memorial is on display at the National Cryptologic Museum. 

Remembering Those Who Made the Ultimate Sacrifice 

died, we should not 

forget those acts of 

John F. Kennedy 

acent to the National Cryptologic Museum and 

accessible by a modest walking path is the National 

Vigilance Park. Dedicated on September 2, 1997, the 

park and its Aerial Reconnaissance Memorial stand to 

“silent warriors” who risked their lives 

performing airborne signals intelligence

during the Cold War. 

The centerpiece of the memorial is a C-130 aircraft, 

refurbished to resemble the reconnaissance-configured 

RC-130 that was downed by Soviet fighters over Soviet 

Armenia on September 2, 1958. The backdrop for the 

aircraft is a semi-circle of 18 trees, each representing the 

various types of aircraft downed during U.S. aerial 

reconnaissance missions. 

Rounding out the park is an RU-8D Seminole, 

paying tribute to the service and sacrifice of Army 

soldiers assigned to perform aerial reconnaissance and 

cryptologic intelligence gathering missions during the 

Vietnam War. 
23 

the public; 

Philosopher 

Located at NSA Headquarters, Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland, the National Cryptologic Museum 

collection contains thousands of artifacts that collectively serve to sustain the history of the cryptologic 

profession. Ranging from rare books hundreds of years old to computers that are barely obsolete, the 

collection neglects no aspect of cryptology. 

Because many cryptologic principles are timeless, many of the earliest and most important artifacts now 

held by the museum were originally obtained as training aids. The rare books mentioned above are an 

excellent example. Although dating back as early as 1518, these books bear library circulation marks that 

show that they were part of the Signals Intelligence Service library prior to World War II. Other artifacts, 

such as the 1930s-vintage Hebern machine, were acquired to test their security for possible use in United 

States military and diplomatic correspondence. 

World War II saw dramatic increases in the use of machines in all aspects of cryptology. Many of these 

are also an integral part of the Agency’s collection. One example, the now famous German ENIGMA, stands 

as a silent reminder of the consequences of poor communications security. At the same time, the machine 

used to read the equally well-known Japanese PURPLE cipher clearly illustrates the resourcefulness of 

American cryptanalysts. 

Following World War II, a concerted effort was made from around the world. The intent was to provide 

a base of study for engineers of the Armed Forces Security Agency (NSA’s forerunner) in the development 

in the next generation of cryptologic machinery. This was done, and thanks to the foresight of some of those 

involved, a true museum collection was born. Today, the National Cryptologic Museum continues the dual 

role of educating the work force and documenting America’s cryptologic heritage. 

The National Cryptologic Museum is located on Colony 7 Road just off Maryland Route 32 and adjacent 

to the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. The museum is open to school groups and civic 

organizations are welcome. Appointments are required for large groups or for special occasions. 

For more information, call the museum at 301-688-5849. 

The National Cryptologic Museum 

“Those who cannot 

remember the past are 

doomed to repeat it.” 

George Santayana 
24 

National Security Agency Insignia 

In 1965, LTG Marshall S. Carter, USA, Director NSA, directed a device be designed to represent the 

National Security Agency. 

The device created is described as: an insignia which shall be a circle bordered white. In the chief 

semicircle border, the words National Security Agency. In the base semicircle border, the words United States 

of America, separated on either side by a five pointed star, silver; in a field, blue, an American eagle displayed, 

wings inverted, all proper. The dexter and sinister talons clutching a key, silver. On the breast of the eagle, the 

escutcheon, chief blue, supported by paleways of thirteen pieces red and white. 

In heraldry, the eagle is a symbol of courage, supreme power, and authority. Use of the eagle in the NSA 

insignia symbolizes the national scope of the mission of the Agency. The escutcheon, or shield, placed on the 

breast of the eagle is a very ancient mode of bearing. A description of the escutcheon, taken from that of the 

Great Seal of the United States, explains that “the escutcheon is composed of the chief and pale, the two most 

honorable ordinaries (common figures). The pieces, paly, represent the several states all joined in one solid 

compact entire, supporting a chief, which unites the whole and represents Congress.” The key in the eagle’s 

talons, representing the key to security, evolves from the emblem of St. Peter the Apostle, and his power to loose 

and to bind. The shape of the insignia, a circle, represents perpetuity of its continuance, the symbol of eternity. 
For more information, please contact us. 

National Security Agency 

Public and Media Affairs Office 

9800 Savage Road 

Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6272 

Phone 301-688-6524 

Fax 301-688-6191 

Visit the NSA Homepage http://www/nsa/gov 

NSA Creative Imaging-533728