U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Review of 

ATF’s Project Gunrunner 

November 2010 

I-2011-001 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This review by the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) examined the impact of the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) implementation of Project 

Gunrunner on the illicit trafficking of guns from the United States to 

Mexico. 

Violence associated with organized crime and drug trafficking in 

Mexico is widespread, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. In part 

because Mexican law severely restricts gun ownership, drug traffickers have 

turned to the United States as a primary source of weapons, and these drug 

traffickers routinely smuggle guns from the United States into Mexico. The 

criminal organizations responsible for smuggling guns to Mexico are 

typically also involved in other criminal enterprises, such as drug 

trafficking, human trafficking, and cash smuggling. This requires ATF to 

work with other federal entities, as well as with state and local law 

enforcement partners, in sharing intelligence, coordinating law enforcement 

activities, and building cases that can be prosecuted. 

To help combat firearms trafficking into Mexico, ATF began Project 

Gunrunner as a pilot project in Laredo, Texas, in 2005 and expanded it as a 

national initiative in 2006. Project Gunrunner is also part of the 

Department’s broader Southwest Border Initiative, which seeks to reduce 

cross-border drug and firearms trafficking and the high level of violence 

associated with these activities on both sides of the border. 

In June 2007, ATF published a strategy document, Southwest Border 

Initiative: Project Gunrunner (Gunrunner strategy), outlining four key 

components to Project Gunrunner: the expansion of gun tracing in Mexico, 

international coordination, domestic activities, and intelligence. In 

implementing Project Gunrunner, ATF has focused resources in its four 

Southwest border field divisions. In addition, ATF has made firearms 

trafficking to Mexico a top ATF priority nationwide. 

The OIG conducted this review to evaluate the effectiveness of ATF’s 

implementation of Project Gunrunner. Our review examined ATF’s 

enforcement and regulatory programs related to the Southwest border and 

Mexico, ATF’s effectiveness in developing and sharing firearms trafficking 

intelligence and information, the number and prosecutorial outcomes of 

ATF’s Project Gunrunner investigations, ATF’s coordination with U.S. and 

Mexican law enforcement partners, ATF’s traces of Mexican “crime guns,” 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

i 
 

 

 

and challenges that ATF faces in coordinating efforts to combat firearms 

trafficking with Mexico.1 

RESULTS OF THE OIG REVIEW 

ATF’s Expanded Efforts in Support of Project Gunrunner 

To assess the impact of Project Gunrunner, we first examined data on 

ATF’s performance in tracing guns, conducting criminal investigations, 

conducting compliance inspections of gun dealers in the region, and 

referring leads to ATF’s criminal enforcement personnel for action. We 

compared data in these areas from fiscal year (FY) 2004 through FY 2006 

(3 years prior to ATF’s implementation of Project Gunrunner), with data 

from FY 2007 through FY 2009 (the initial 3 full years of Project 

Gunrunner). 

The data showed that since ATF’s implementation of Project 

Gunrunner, ATF has increased its: 

1. Traces of seized firearms from Mexico and from the Southwest 

border – Trace requests initiated in Mexico rose from 1 percent of 

all Mexico and U.S. trace requests prior to Project Gunrunner to 

8 percent during Project Gunrunner. 

2. Project Gunrunner cases initiated, cases referred for prosecution to 

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO), and defendants referred for 

prosecution for firearms trafficking-related offenses – ATF 

increased the number of Project Gunrunner cases it initiated by 

109 percent and increased the number of those cases it referred to 

USAOs by 54 percent.2 The number of defendants ATF referred for 

prosecution increased by 37 percent. 

1 According to ATF, crime guns are guns that were “recovered by law enforcement 

that were used in a crime, were suspected to have been used in a crime, or were recovered 

in relation to a crime.” Mark Kraft, “Firearms Trafficking 101 or Where Do Crime Guns 

Come From?,” United States Attorneys’ Bulletin (January 2002). 

2 ATF considers any investigation conducted nationwide to be a “Project Gunrunner 

case” if it involves firearms trafficking or violent crime and has a connection to the 

Southwest border. This could include cases also coded as gang-related or as another type 

of case. Our discussion of Project Gunrunner cases in this report is based on ATF data 

that meets this definition. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

ii 
3. Gun dealer compliance inspections conducted on the Southwest 

border, inspection hours worked by Southwest border field division 

inspectors, and inspection finding referrals made to ATF’s criminal 

enforcement personnel for subsequent action – ATF increased the 

number of gun dealer compliance inspections along the Southwest 

Border by 133 percent and increased the number of compliance 

inspection hours worked by 102 percent. The total number of 

referrals ATF Industry Operations personnel made to ATF criminal 

enforcement personnel increased by 47 percent. 

In addition to its increased program activities described above, ATF 

implemented a Gunrunner Impact Team initiative that increased the 

number of gun dealer compliance inspections conducted and cases initiated 

within the Houston Field Division area. Under this initiative, ATF deployed 

100 agents, investigators, and support staff to the Houston Field Division 

for 120 days. ATF reported that the team conducted over 1,000 inspections 

of gun dealers and generated investigative leads leading to the seizure of 

over 400 firearms. 

Despite the increased ATF activity associated with Project Gunrunner, 

we found that significant weaknesses in ATF’s implementation of Project 

Gunrunner undermine its effectiveness. 

ATF Firearms Trafficking Intelligence and Information 

We found that ATF does not systematically and consistently exchange 

intelligence with its Mexican and some U.S. partner agencies. In addition, 

some ATF field agents reported that they do not find investigative leads 

provided to them by ATF’s Field Intelligence Groups to be timely and usable. 

We also determined that intelligence personnel in ATF’s Southwest border 

field divisions do not routinely share firearms trafficking intelligence with 

each other. ATF could better implement its Border Liaison Program to 

improve information sharing and coordination between its U.S. and its 

Mexico personnel. 

The success of Project Gunrunner depends, in part, on ATF’s sharing 

intelligence with its Mexican and U.S. partner agencies, including the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Although 

ATF has shared some strategic intelligence products with each of its partner 

agencies, it is not doing so systematically and consistently. ATF does share 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

iii 
 

tactical intelligence regularly with the DEA and DHS’s Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP).3 However, ATF has not provided Mexican law enforcement 

with intelligence it requested on firearms trafficking patterns and trends, 

including trafficking routes and distribution points where guns are crossing 

into Mexico. 

We also found that while reports of multiple sales of handguns 

produce timely, actionable investigative leads for ATF, the lack of a reporting 

requirement for multiple sales of long guns – which have become the cartels’ 

weapons of choice – hinders ATF’s ability to disrupt the flow of illegal 

weapons into Mexico. 

In addition, when ATF obtains or generates intelligence, its Southwest 

border field divisions’ intelligence structure is not consistently using that 

information to provide effective investigative leads for field agents to pursue. 

Specifically, the Field Intelligence Groups of ATF’s Southwest border field 

divisions are not forwarding leads that are timely, that are developed beyond 

what field agents state they can do themselves or that contribute to 

investigations. Intelligence personnel in the Southwest border field 

divisions also lack a common understanding of how to develop and screen 

intelligence accurately to meet the requirements of enforcement groups. 

They do not operate under consistent guidelines or clear criteria that specify 

the most useful types of investigative leads. Additionally, ATF managers 

must rely on two separate ATF case management systems and do not have 

an automated process to track the status, monitor the outcomes, or 

evaluate the effectiveness of investigative leads provided to agents. 

We also found no routine sharing of firearms trafficking-related 

information and techniques between ATF intelligence personnel in 

Southwest border locations and in the ATF Mexico Country Office. 

Intelligence coordination, when it does happen, occurs at the supervisory 

level, but non-supervisory intelligence personnel lack a method to regularly 

share information, best practices, and analytical techniques that they told 

us would be useful to them. 

One illustration of the lack of information sharing is ATF’s weak 

implementation of its Border Liaison Program. ATF’s 2007 Gunrunner 

3 ATF defines tactical intelligence as information produced to support operations or 

that relates to the specific time, date, nature, and other details of events. Strategic 

intelligence is defined as information required for the formulation of policy and plans at the 

regional, national, and international levels. Strategic intelligence differs primarily from 

tactical intelligence in level of use but may also vary in scope and detail. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

iv 
 

 

 

strategy identifies ATF’s border liaisons as “the front line” of Project 

Gunrunner. However, we found that the border liaisons’ roles are not well 

defined and their activities in Mexico are not well coordinated. 

ATF Investigative Focus 

Firearms traffickers also participate in other criminal activity, such as 

drug trafficking, human trafficking, and cash smuggling. The complexity of 

their operations requires ATF to work closely with the government of Mexico, 

other U.S. federal agencies and departments, and state and local law 

enforcement partners. 

Yet, we found weaknesses in how ATF implemented Project 

Gunrunner as a multi-agency effort. Although, as noted above, ATF has 

increased some program activities during Project Gunrunner, ATF’s focus 

remains largely on inspections of gun dealers and investigations of straw 

purchasers, rather than on higher-level traffickers, smugglers, and the 

ultimate recipients of the trafficked guns.4 

For example, we found that 68 percent of Project Gunrunner cases 

are single-defendant cases, and some ATF managers discourage field 

personnel from conducting the types of complex conspiracy investigations 

that target higher-level members of trafficking rings. Federal prosecutors 

told us that directing the efforts of Project Gunrunner toward building 

larger, multi-defendant conspiracy cases would better disrupt trafficking 

organizations. 

Moreover, although ATF has had a long-stated intent to make fuller 

use of the resources of the Department’s Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program to conduct more complex 

conspiracy investigations, it has not done so. This is in part due to ATF’s 

focus on conducting fast investigations and also due to misunderstandings 

among ATF field personnel about what kinds of cases are eligible for 

OCDETF and whether OCDETF cases are counted as Project Gunrunner 

cases by ATF’s internal performance metrics. 

4 According to ATF, a “straw purchase” occurs when the actual buyer of a firearm 

uses another person, “the straw purchaser,” to execute the paperwork necessary to 

purchase a firearm from a gun dealer. The actual buyer is often prohibited from 

purchasing the gun. The straw purchaser violates federal law by making a false statement 

with respect to the information required to be kept in the gun dealer’s records. According 

to ATF, straw purchasing is one of the most frequent methods used to illegally acquire 

guns. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

v 
 

Because there is no federal firearms trafficking statute, ATF must use 

a wide variety of other statutes to combat firearms trafficking. However, 

cases brought under these statutes are difficult to prove and do not carry 

stringent penalties – particularly for straw purchasers of guns. As a result, 

we found that USAOs are less likely to accept and prosecute Project 

Gunrunner cases. And when these cases are prosecuted and convictions 

obtained, Federal Sentencing Guidelines categorize straw-purchasingrelated offenses as lesser crimes. 

Multi-Agency Coordination Issues 

We also found that ATF and ICE do not work together effectively on 

investigations of firearms trafficking to Mexico, and therefore ATF’s Project 

Gunrunner cases do not benefit from ICE’s intelligence and prosecutorial 

options. ATF and ICE rarely conduct joint investigations of firearms 

trafficking to Mexico, do not consistently notify each other of their firearms 

trafficking cases, and do not consistently coordinate their investigative work 

with each other. 

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by ATF and ICE in 

2009 sought to foster better coordination, but we found that ATF and ICE 

agents and supervisors misunderstood the intent of the MOU or were 

unaware of it. Consequently, adequate coordination between ATF and ICE 

is still lacking in those areas of concurrent jurisdiction that are described in 

the MOU. 

Mexican Crime Gun Tracing 

Despite the increased activity related to Project Gunrunner, ATF is not 

using intelligence effectively to identify and target firearms trafficking 

organizations operating along the Southwest border and in Mexico. 

Moreover, ATF’s expansion of its automated system (eTrace) to trace guns 

seized in Mexico has yielded very limited information of intelligence value. 

According to ATF’s June 2007 Gunrunner strategy, tracing guns 

seized in Mexico is the “cornerstone” of Project Gunrunner. Tracing seized 

guns to the gun dealer which sold the gun to the first retail purchaser is a 

crucial source of information in ATF’s investigations of firearms trafficking. 

Gun tracing also helps ATF identify firearm traffickers operating in the 

United States and in Mexico and can provide intelligence in the form of 

patterns and trends in gun smuggling. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

vi 
 

 

 

 

However, ATF has been unable to expand gun tracing throughout 

Mexico. A June 2009 Government Accountability Office report estimated 

that trace data was submitted to ATF on less than a quarter of the guns 

seized in Mexico. Further, most trace requests that are submitted to ATF 

from Mexico are considered “unsuccessful” because of missing or improperly 

entered gun data.5 Although ATF has provided Mexican law enforcement 

with training in firearms identification, we found the percentage of total 

trace requests that succeed has declined since the start of Project 

Gunrunner. Moreover, few of the traces that do succeed generate usable 

investigative leads because guns submitted for tracing often were seized by 

Mexican officials years before the trace requests were submitted. In such 

cases, the time at which a gun was transferred illegally may be outside the 

statute of limitations and charges cannot be brought against those 

responsible. 

We determined that Mexican law enforcement authorities do not view 

gun tracing as an important investigative tool for them. One reason for this 

is that ATF’s trace results do not include the detailed investigative 

information on U.S. citizens that Mexican officials have requested (such as 

the criminal histories of those who may be involved in firearms trafficking). 

This information must be requested separately from the trace results. Some 

ATF officials also told us that ATF has not adequately communicated the 

value of gun tracing to Mexican officials. Consequently, Mexican law 

enforcement officials view gun tracing as merely a tool that ATF uses to 

further its own investigations. The Mexican officials did not see the longterm benefits of gun tracing in reducing the flow of illegal guns to Mexico by 

targeting the sources of these guns and the organizations that traffic them 

on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. 

5 ATF stated that its common definition of a “successful trace” is a trace that 

provides any additional historical or identifying information concerning the firearm beyond 

the original information submitted in the trace request. However, ATF staff provided us 

different definitions of a successful trace, such as one that identifies the first purchaser. 

We define a successful trace as one that identifies the gun dealer who originally sold the 

weapon because that is the minimum result that can provide ATF with usable intelligence 

information. 

According to ATF National Tracing Center data, an invalid serial number was the 

most common reason for unsuccessful traces from Mexico. However, crime gun traces can 

be unsuccessful for many other reasons. For example, the requester may not have 

provided a manufacturer or importer, or the gun may have been manufactured prior to 

1968 when the Gun Control Act was enacted and thus no records were required. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

vii 
 

 

ATF Coordination Challenges in Mexico 

Resource and Coordination Difficulties 

Our review found that because of a lack of resources, ATF has been 

unable to fully meet Mexican government needs for support under Project 

Gunrunner. For example, ATF has been unable to provide key training and 

support requested by the government of Mexico. Further, the process of 

exchanging law enforcement investigative information between ATF and the 

government of Mexico is cumbersome, and ATF has a substantial backlog in 

responding to requests for information from Mexican authorities, which has 

hindered coordination between ATF and Mexican law enforcement. ATF also 

has been unable to recruit sufficient qualified staff to fill positions in the 

Mexico Country Office and does not offer incentives to attract and retain 

qualified staff there. 

U.S. officials told us they face multiple unique challenges in 

coordinating with Mexican law enforcement officials. For example, 

U.S. officials we interviewed in Mexico stated that there is a lack of 

coordination among various Mexican law enforcement agencies and that 

ATF has no single counterpart that it can interact with in coordinating 

firearms trafficking investigations. Internal coordination problems within 

the government of Mexico require that ATF deal separately with multiple 

agencies there, which has slowed information sharing. ATF’s effort to 

improve coordination by embedding a representative of the Mexico Attorney 

General’s office in ATF’s Phoenix Field Division on a trial basis has improved 

ATF’s access to Mexican law enforcement’s information. 

Lack of an Integrated Project Gunrunner Approach 

An overarching problem our review found was that ATF has not 

integrated the Project Gunrunner activities of its four Southwest border 

divisions and ATF’s Mexico Country Office into a coordinated approach. 

ATF’s Project Gunrunner strategies and plans do not effectively address 

coordination, joint operations and investigations, or information sharing 

across these units. We believe this has been a contributing factor in several 

other shortfalls addressed in this review, including the ineffective 

intelligence and information sharing within ATF, unclear roles for border 

liaison personnel, inadequate and disparate staffing in Mexico, failure to 

focus on complex conspiracy firearms trafficking investigations, and poor 

coordination with other U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

viii 
 

In September 2010, after our draft report was issued, ATF 

disseminated to field personnel and International Affairs Office staff a 

strategy, entitled “Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused Strategy,” that 

responds to many of the issues identified in this report. We refer to this 

strategy at various places in this report. However, it is not clear when, or 

how, this strategy will be fully implemented. 

Recommendations 

In this report, we make 15 recommendations to ATF to help improve 

its efforts in combating firearms trafficking from the United States to 

Mexico. For example, we recommend that ATF improve its generation of 

investigative leads to agents working on Project Gunrunner and improve its 

intelligence sharing within ATF and with its U.S. and Mexican partners, and 

that ATF focus on more complex conspiracy cases to dismantle firearms 

trafficking rings. To improve coordination between ATF and ICE, we 

recommend that ATF provide specific guidance to require better 

coordination with ICE in accordance with the agencies’ memorandum of 

understanding. We also recommend that ATF work with Mexican law 

enforcement officials to determine the causes of unsuccessful Mexican crime 

gun traces and to improve the rate of successful traces. We also 

recommend that ATF consider implementing incentives to attract qualified 

staff to its Mexico Country Office. In addition, to provide a coordinated 

approach to ATF’s implementation of Project Gunrunner, we recommend 

that ATF implement a plan to integrate the activities of the Mexico Country 

Office and Southwest Border field divisions. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

ix 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Background .........................................................................................1
 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the OIG Review ..........................19
 

Part I: ATF’s Expanded Efforts in Support of Project Gunrunner........22
 

Part II: ATF Firearms Trafficking Intelligence and Information ...........28
 

Part III: ATF Investigative Focus ........................................................51
 

Part IV: Multi-Agency Coordination Issues ........................................67
 

Part V: Mexican Crime Gun Tracing ..................................................73
 

Part VI: ATF Challenges in Coordinating in Mexico ............................81
 

Conclusion and Recommendations.....................................................93
 

Appendix I: Timeline of Key Project Gunrunner Events ......................96
 

Appendix II: Position Descriptions for ATF Staff.................................97
 

Appendix III: Interviews.....................................................................99
 

Appendix IV: ATF Southwest Border Field Divisions’ Firearms 

Trafficking Implementation Plans ................................................102
 

Appendix V: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives’ Amended Response ...................................................103
 

Appendix VI: OIG Analysis of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives’ Response .............................................118
 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

Introduction 

Mexican drug trafficking organizations (cartels) are a significant 

organized crime threat, both to the United States and in Mexico. According 

to the Department of Justice’s (Department) 2010 National Drug Threat 

Assessment, Mexican cartels present the single greatest drug trafficking 

threat to the United States and are active in every region of the 

United States. Mexican cartels use violence to control lucrative drug 

trafficking corridors along the Southwest border, through which drugs flow 

north into the United States, while guns and cash flow south to Mexico.6 

From December 2006 through July 2010, the Mexican government 

reported almost 30,000 deaths in Mexico resulting from organized crime and 

drug trafficking, with 9,635 murders in 2009 alone. In its fiscal year (FY) 

2010 to FY 2016 strategic plan, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (ATF) reported that Mexico’s drug traffickers have turned 

aggressively to the United States as a source of guns and routinely smuggle 

guns from the United States into Mexico. This is, in part, because Mexican 

law severely restricts gun ownership. 

In 2009, ATF reported to Congress that about 90 percent of the guns 

recovered in Mexico that ATF has traced were initially sold in the 

United States.7 The Southwest border states – Texas, California, Arizona, 

and to a lesser extent, New Mexico – are primary sources of guns used by 

Mexican drug cartels. The growing crime rate in Mexico, and fears that the 

violence will spill over into the United States, have led to efforts by U.S. and 

Mexican authorities to attempt to curb firearms trafficking. 

6 Congressional Research Service, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence, CRS Report 

R40582 (May 27, 2009). 

7 William McMahon, Deputy Assistant Director for Field Operations, ATF, before the 

Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 

Counterterrorism, U.S. House of Representatives, concerning “Combating Border Violence: 

The Role of Interagency Coordination in Investigations” (July 16, 2009), 

homeland.house.gov/Hearings/index.asp?ID=205 (accessed August 25, 2010). However, in 

September 2010, in response to a draft of this report ATF told the OIG that the 90-percent 

figure cited to Congress could be misleading because it applied only to the small portion of 

Mexican crime guns that are traced. ATF could not provide updated information on the 

percentage of traced Mexican crime guns that were sourced to (that is, found to be 

manufactured in or imported through) the United States. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

1 
 

 

 

 

ATF is one of the primary U.S. law enforcement agencies combating 

firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. ATF enforces federal 

firearms laws and also regulates the sale of guns by the firearms industry 

under the Gun Control Act of 1968. ATF is the only federal agency 

authorized to license and inspect gun dealers to ensure they comply with 

laws governing the sale, transfer, possession, and transport of guns.8 ATF 

is also responsible for tracing guns by researching manufacturer and gun 

dealer data to identify the original purchasers of guns that are subsequently 

“recovered by law enforcement that were used in a crime, were suspected to 

have been used in a crime, or were recovered in relation to a crime.”9 These 

guns are termed “crime guns.” 

Project Gunrunner 

Project Gunrunner, ATF’s national initiative to stem firearms 

trafficking to Mexico, is part of the Department’s broader Southwest Border 

Initiative, which combines the Department’s law enforcement components in 

a concerted effort to reduce cross-border drug and weapons trafficking and 

the high level of violence associated with these activities. ATF began Project 

Gunrunner in 2005 as a pilot project in Laredo, Texas, and expanded it into 

a national program in 2006.10 

ATF established five main objectives for Project Gunrunner: 

1. Investigate individuals responsible for illicit firearms trafficking 

along the Southwest border. 

2. Coordinate with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement along the 

border in firearms cases and violent crime. 

3. Train U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials to identify 

firearms traffickers. 

4. Provide outreach education to gun dealers. 

5. Trace all guns to identify firearms traffickers, trends, patterns, and 

networks. 

8 In this report, the term “gun dealers” refers to federal firearms licensees who are 

licensed through ATF to manufacture, import, or deal in guns. 

9 Mark Kraft, “Firearms Trafficking 101 or Where Do Crime Guns Come From?,” 

United States Attorneys’ Bulletin (January 2002). 

10 The exact inception date of Project Gunrunner is unclear. According to an 

April 28, 2009, ATF news release, Project Gunrunner began in 2005. However, ATF officials 

told us that they consider April 2006 the official implementation date of Project Gunrunner. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

2 
 

 

 ATF’s primary geographic focus for Project Gunrunner is in the four 

ATF field divisions that provide coverage for the almost 2,000-mile border 

with Mexico. These four field divisions are headquartered in Houston, 

Dallas, Phoenix, and Los Angeles. 

The first three of ATF’s five objectives listed above refer directly to 

Mexico or to the Southwest border. The remaining two objectives 

(Objectives 4 and 5) are more national in scope because the sources of 

firearms trafficked to Mexico are nationwide. 

Figure 1 illustrates the Southwest border region as defined by ATF.11 

Figure 1: The Southwest Border Region, as Defined by ATF 

Source: OIG. 

In June 2007, ATF published a strategy document, Southwest Border 

Initiative: Project Gunrunner (Gunrunner strategy), which outlined four key 

components: the expansion of ATF’s crime gun tracing system (eTrace), 

international strategy, domestic strategy, and intelligence. We briefly 

describe each of those key components below. 

Expansion of eTrace. ATF emphasized tracing crime guns as the 

“cornerstone” of Project Gunrunner and identified the expansion of eTrace 

into Mexico as an integral element of the project. The strategy incorporated 

ATF’s plan to deploy eTrace in Mexico and established key roles for ATF’s 

11 Although Oklahoma is a part of the Dallas Field Division, it is typically not 

considered a part of the Southwest border. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

3 
 

 

Mexico Country Office, National Tracing Center, and Violent Crime Analysis 

Branch in collecting and analyzing trace data from Mexico. We discuss 

eTrace further in the section, “Gun Tracing and eTrace,” below. 

International Component. The international component of the 

Gunrunner strategy addressed the coordination of ATF’s activities in 

Mexico, including with the Department of State and the government of 

Mexico, and coordination between ATF’s Mexico Country Office and its 

Southwest border divisions. Further, the document defined ATF’s roles in 

providing, or helping to provide, technologies, equipment, information, and 

training to Mexican federal law enforcement. 

Domestic Component. The domestic component of the strategy 

focused ATF resources in its four Southwest border field divisions. The 

strategy recognized a broader need to make firearms trafficking associated 

with crime guns seized along the Southwest border a top ATF priority 

nationwide. Additionally, the strategy document outlined ATF’s approach to 

using criminal investigations and regulatory inspections to target the illicit 

flow of firearms to the Southwest border and into Mexico. It also directed 

the expansion of ATF’s participation in other task force organizations, 

internal and external to the Department. 

Intelligence Component. ATF’s strategy document stated that Project 

Gunrunner intelligence must be “real time” to be effective, and it described 

how intelligence must flow within ATF and to and from its domestic and 

Mexican partners. The document also assigned responsibilities within ATF 

for oversight and coordination of ATF’s intelligence and information sharing 

activities. The strategy established ATF’s Gun Desk at the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) led El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) as 

ATF’s clearinghouse for intelligence and investigative information.12 

In its FY 2010 to FY 2016 strategic plan, ATF reiterated that Project 

Gunrunner is its primary enforcement initiative to stem the trafficking of 

illegal weapons across the U.S. border into Mexico and to reduce gun-driven 

violence on both sides of the border.13 

12 In addition to the DEA and ATF, 19 other agencies are represented at EPIC, 

including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and state and local law enforcement. See 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration’s El Paso Intelligence Center, Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2010-005 

(June 2010), for more information. 

13 Appendix I provides a timeline of key events related to Project Gunrunner. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

4 
 

 

 

Project Gunrunner Budget 

Initially, Project Gunrunner had no dedicated funding within ATF’s 

budget. ATF funded all of the initiative’s operations out of its general 

appropriation. As ATF expanded the initiative in response to the increased 

violence in Mexico and concern over firearms trafficking into Mexico, ATF 

began seeking dedicated funds for Project Gunrunner, starting with its 

FY 2008 budget request. In FY 2009, ATF received $21.9 million to support 

and expand Project Gunrunner. This included $5.9 million in ATF’s 

FY 2009 appropriation for Project Gunrunner, $10 million in March 2009 

from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), 

and an additional $6 million in June of that year. Under Public Law No. 

111-230 (2010), Emergency Border Security Supplemental Appropriations, 

ATF received an additional $37.5 million for the continued expansion of 

Project Gunrunner in FY 2010.14 

Project Gunrunner Staffing 

ATF Staffing on the Southwest Border. The number of ATF staff 

dedicated to Project Gunrunner in the four Southwest border field divisions 

has increased steadily since FY 2006, but most notably from FY 2008 

through FY 2009 (Figure 2).15 In 2006, ATF had 84 Special Agents assigned 

to Project Gunrunner. By June 2010, the number had increased 

167 percent to 224 agents. The number of Industry Operations 

Investigators increased even more sharply, from 15 in 2006 to 165 in 2010, 

a 1,000-percent increase. Project Gunrunner staff also includes individuals 

in other job categories, such as Intelligence Research Specialists and 

Investigative Analysts, depicted in Figure 2 as “other.” As of June 2010, the 

number of agents assigned to Project Gunrunner represented 50 percent of 

all agents in the four Southwest border field divisions, and the number of 

Industry Operations Investigators represented 92 percent of the 

14 Pub. L. No. 111-230 was signed into law on August 13, 2010. The bill provided 

$600 million in emergency supplemental appropriations for FY 2010 to secure the 

Southwest border and enhance federal border protection, law enforcement, and 

counternarcotics activities. The $37.5 million allocated to ATF was part of $196 million 

allocated to the Department. 

15 Because Project Gunrunner is a national initiative, additional personnel in 

locations beyond the Southwest border work Project Gunrunner cases. For example, a case 

involving firearms trafficking to Mexico that originates in the Midwest would be pursued by 

ATF agents there under Project Gunrunner. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

5 
 

 

 

 

 

investigators there.16 Appendix II provides a description of the general 

duties for ATF staff. 

Figure 2: Dedicated Project Gunrunner 

Southwest Border Staff in the United States, by Fiscal Year 

450
 

400
 

350
 

300
 

250
 

200
 

150
 

100
 

50 

0 

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

32 

25 

165 

142 

47 

15 36 

187 224 

103 148 

84 

Special Agents Industry Operations Investigators Other 

Note: ATF could not provide the numbers of staff in the “other”
 

category prior to 2008. 

Source: ATF data. 

ATF Staffing in Mexico. Project Gunrunner is also supported by ATF’s 

Mexico Country Office staff. The ATF Mexico Country Office is headed by an 

ATF Attaché and staffed by Assistant Attachés who are agents. At the time 

of our site visit in March 2010, the staff also included one Intelligence 

Research Specialist, one agent on temporary duty (TDY), and several Foreign 

Service Nationals (Mexican nationals employed by ATF). The staff of the 

Mexico Country Office coordinates with Mexican law enforcement agencies 

and facilitates information sharing; trains Mexican law enforcement 

personnel on subjects such as properly identifying and tracing weapons and 

conducting firearms trafficking and explosives investigations; and collects 

16 The most recent staffing increases were funded by several sources, including: 

(1) the Recovery Act, which provided 37 additional positions; (2) the President’s global war 

on terror funding; and (3) ATF’s FY 2009 appropriation. We described ATF’s allocation of 

those funds in the report entitled Interim Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, Evaluation and 

Inspections Report I-2009-006 (September 2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

6 
 

 

 

 

information on seized crime guns and explosives, which they forward to ATF 

personnel in the United States for investigation.17 

As of June 2010, ATF had 13 staff assigned to the Mexico Country 

Office. Seven worked in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and the other six 

worked in the U.S. Consulates in Monterrey (three), Tijuana (two), and 

Juarez (one).18 Of the 13 staff, 8 were on permanent assignments to 

Mexico, and 5 were on TDY. 

In its FY 2010 budget authorization, ATF received funding to increase 

the number of staff in Mexico. In September 2010, in response to a draft of 

this report, ATF stated that, since we completed fieldwork for this review, it 

had added 8 additional positions in Mexico – 3 in Mexico City, 2 each in 

Guadalajara and Hermosillo, and 1 in Merida, for a total of 18 authorized 

positions in Mexico. However, according to ATF, as of September 2010 only 

two of the eight new positions had been filled and recruitment and selection 

were under way for the remaining six positions. ATF also noted that even 

when it makes selections for personnel in Mexico, those personnel may not 

report to Mexico until their positions are “accredited” by the Mexican 

Secretariat of Foreign Relations, which had not occurred for the six open 

positions. Also, in September 2010 ATF reported that there were eight 

Foreign Service Nationals in the Mexico Country Office. 

ATF’s Enforcement, Regulatory, and Intelligence Functions 

As described below, Project Gunrunner involves the ATF firearms 

trafficking enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence functions. We also 

discuss laws governing firearms trafficking and the private sale of guns. 

Enforcement Function 

As part of its enforcement function, ATF agents investigate individuals 

and organizations that violate U.S. laws by illegally supplying guns to 

individuals prohibited from having them.19 ATF refers criminal violations to 

United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) or to state prosecutors for 

prosecution. 

17 ATF and other U.S. law enforcement agencies working in Mexico do not have 

authority to conduct investigations there, but they provide assistance and share 

information with Mexican agencies and their counterparts in the United States. 

18 All ATF personnel in Mexico are considered part of the Mexico Country Office, 

which is organizationally aligned under ATF’s Office of International Affairs. 

19 Categories of prohibited individuals are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

7 
 

 

 

 

ATF tracks the status of investigations and refers investigative leads 

within ATF using its automated case management system, N-Force. Project 

Gunrunner cases were not initially identified in N-Force, but after 2006 ATF 

created a specific N-Force code for Project Gunrunner cases and directed its 

personnel to begin using it. 

ATF considers any investigation conducted nationwide to be a “Project 

Gunrunner case” if it involves firearms trafficking or violent crime with a 

nexus to the Southwest border. This could include cases also coded as 

gang-related or as another type of case. Our discussion of Project 

Gunrunner cases in this report is based on ATF data that meets this 

definition. 

Laws Governing Firearms Trafficking and Private Sales of Guns 

There is no specific federal statute specifically prohibiting firearms 

trafficking. Consequently, when ATF agents identify trafficking operations 

and develop cases to refer to prosecutors, they use various federal and state 

charges. In addition, some existing federal regulations and statutes, such 

as those that require transaction records or background checks, do not 

apply to sales of guns between private individuals.20 

Project Gunrunner Federal Statutes Used by ATF 

ATF agents work with federal prosecutors to charge Project 

Gunrunner defendants under a wide range of federal statutes, not all of 

which directly cite firearms offenses, such as conspiracy charges and drug 

offenses. Between FY 2004 and FY 2009, ATF used 75 different statutes to 

seek federal prosecutions of Project Gunrunner defendants. These statutes 

prohibit activities associated with firearms trafficking – such as falsifying 

information when purchasing a gun and dealing guns without a license. 

Table 1 provides a list, in ascending order of statute number, of the 10 

statutes most frequently used in ATF’s Project Gunrunner referrals for 

prosecution during that period. We discuss ATF’s referrals and USAOs’ 

prosecutions of Project Gunrunner cases in Part III of this report. 

20 Some federal regulations and statutes do apply to the private sale of guns, such 

as the prohibition of transfers to known convicted felons. Additionally, some states have 

enacted laws regulating transfers of firearms between private individuals. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

8 
 

 

 

Table 1: Top 10 Statutes Used in Cases Referred for Prosecution 

of Project Gunrunner Defendants (FY 2004 through FY 2009) 

Statute Statute Definition 

18 U.S.C. § (2) Aiding and abetting 

18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to commit offense against the United States* 

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) Willfully engage in firearms business without a license 

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) Knowingly making a false statement in connection with a 

firearm purchase 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) Knowing possession of a firearm by an illegal alien 

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) Knowingly making a false statement 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Use of a firearm in a federal drug or violent crime 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) Manufacturer, distribution, or possession of a controlled 

substance 

21 U.S.C. § 846 Drug conspiracy 

* 18 U.S.C. § 371 does not relate specifically to crimes involving firearms. Rather, 

according to Executive Office for United States Attorneys, prosecutors use the charge when 

there are no other conspiracy charges applicable to a case, often as part of the plea 

bargaining process. 

Source: ATF data on federal statutes referred to USAOs for prosecution. 

Private Sales of Guns 

When an individual buys a gun from a licensed gun dealer, the 

purchaser must show proper identification to the gun dealer, fill out a 

federal Firearms Transaction Record (Form 4473), including personal 

information (such as name and address) and a short questionnaire to 

determine eligibility to purchase a gun, and submit to a National Instant 

Criminal Background Check System check.21 The gun dealer retains a copy 

21 Mandated by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and launched 

by the FBI on November 30, 1998, the National Instant Criminal Background Check 

System is used by gun dealers to instantly determine whether a prospective buyer is eligible 

to possess guns or explosives. Before completing the sale, a gun dealer employee calls the 

FBI or another designated agency to ensure that the customer does not have a criminal 

record or is not otherwise ineligible to possess a gun because, for example, the buyer has 

been adjudicated as mentally defective. More than 100 million such checks have been 

made in the last decade, leading to more than 700,000 denials, according to the FBI 

(www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics.htm). 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

9 
 

of the Form 4473 as a permanent record of the transfer of the weapon. This 

enables ATF to determine who originally purchased a gun if it is 

subsequently seized by law enforcement investigating a crime involving the 

gun. 

Individuals who buy guns from an unlicensed private seller in a 

“secondary market venue” (such as gun shows, flea markets, and Internet 

sites) are exempt from the requirements of federal law to show identification, 

complete the Form 4473, and undergo a National Instant Criminal 

Background Check System check. Therefore, according to ATF and other 

Department officials we interviewed, individuals prohibited by law from 

possessing guns can easily obtain them from private sellers and do so 

without any federal records of the transactions. According to these officials, 

gun shows are a primary source of weapons for Mexican drug cartels. 

Generally, ATF can most readily trace a gun to the individual who first 

purchased it from a gun dealer. ATF has limited ability to trace used 

firearms sold by gun dealers and generally cannot trace privately sold guns 

to the private purchaser. 

Regulatory Function 

ATF regulates the firearms industry through licensing and inspections 

of gun dealers. The objective of ATF’s application inspections is to ensure 

that only qualified individuals receive a license to sell guns. Also, ATF 

Industry Operations Investigators conduct periodic regulatory inspections of 

gun dealers by reviewing records, inventory, and the dealers’ conduct of 

business. During these inspections, ATF educates gun dealers about 

trafficking indicators and how to report suspicious behaviors to ATF. 

Through these activities, ATF seeks to deter the diversion of guns from 

lawful commerce into the illegal market, where, among other uses, they may 

be trafficked to Mexico. 

ATF tracks the status and results of its gun dealer inspections using its 

automated N-Spect system. ATF considers any inspection conducted in the 

Southwest border states – California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas – as 

Project Gunrunner-related. In Part I of this report, we describe the number of 

inspections conducted by ATF before and during Project Gunrunner. 

Intelligence Function 

ATF collects, analyzes, and disseminates firearms trafficking-related 

intelligence and has developed specialized information and intelligence 

resources to provide direction and focus to its enforcement and regulatory 

functions. Under Project Gunrunner, ATF seeks to provide agents with 

comprehensive information to detect, investigate, apprehend, and refer for 

U.S. Department of Justice 10 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

prosecution individuals who illegally traffic guns. For example, ATF agents 

and intelligence personnel collect intelligence from gun dealers’ reports on 

the sales of multiple handguns. Similarly, Industry Operations 

Investigators use intelligence-based risk factors as a part of their process for 

determining which gun dealers to inspect. 

ATF’s intelligence structure consists of both headquarters-level and 

field entities, as described below: 

 ATF Headquarters. ATF’s Office of Strategic Intelligence and 

Information provides field personnel with intelligence to identify patterns and 

trends in firearms trafficking and related crime. In September 2008, this 

Office established a Field Intelligence Support Team dedicated to the 

Southwest border. Although ATF is not a recognized member of the national 

intelligence community, the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information 

interacts with national and international intelligence agencies. Included in 

the Office’s structure is ATF’s Gun Desk at EPIC, which is a central repository 

for weapons-related intelligence. The Violent Crime Analysis Branch, colocated with ATF’s National Tracing Center in Martinsburg, West Virginia, 

also falls under the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. 

Intelligence analysts at the Violent Crime Analysis Branch analyze and 

disseminate gun trace data and other intelligence to field personnel. 

ATF Field Divisions. Each of ATF’s 25 field divisions typically has a 

Field Intelligence Group, whose mission is to collect, evaluate, and 

disseminate tactical and strategic intelligence to the division’s field offices.22 

Although the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information provides 

strategic intelligence to all of ATF, each field division’s Field Intelligence 

Group is considered the main intelligence asset for that division. Field 

Intelligence Groups receive information from a variety of ATF and external 

sources (Figure 3). Staffing varies, but Field Intelligence Groups generally 

include a supervisor (an agent), one to two Intelligence Officers (also agents), 

one to two Industry Operations Intelligence Specialists, two to four 

Intelligence Research Specialists, one to two Investigative Analysts, and one 

secretary.23 

22 ATF defines tactical intelligence as information produced to support operations 

or that relates to the specific time, date, nature, and other details of events. Strategic 

intelligence is defined as information required for the formulation of policy and plans at the 

regional, national, and international levels. Strategic intelligence differs primarily from 

tactical intelligence in level of use but may also vary in scope and detail. 

23 The ATF Field Intelligence Group Supervisor’s Guide Book (September 2009) 

discusses the Field Intelligence Group composition and member responsibilities. 

U.S. Department of Justice 11 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

Figure 3: ATF Intelligence Sharing Process 

Note: The figure depicts a simplified version of ATF’s general process. 

Source: OIG. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

12 
 

 

 

 

Intelligence Collection Plan and ATF Intelligence Sharing Process. In 

2009, the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information distributed to all 

field divisions ATF’s first Intelligence Collection Plan for Project Gunrunner. 

ATF published the plan intending that each field division would tailor it to 

its own operational needs. The plan stated that “ATF must develop a 

‘bee-hive mentality’ whereby everyone works toward a common goal,” 

identifying intelligence gaps and collecting information that ultimately 

results in intelligence products to be acted upon.24 According to the plan, 

the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information is to share with Mexican 

law enforcement “real-time, actionable intelligence relating to firearms 

trafficking networks” operating in the United States and Mexico. To 

accomplish this goal, ATF Field Intelligence Group supervisors, Resident 

Agents in Charge, and other field supervisors are to determine and prioritize 

intelligence requirements. The plan also focuses on the continuous 

collection and reporting of information to EPIC, which the plan states is 

responsible for directing the intelligence collection effort. 

Additionally, the ATF Violent Crime Analysis Branch and the National 

Tracing Center disseminate gun trace data, information from reports on 

multiple sales of handguns, and other information to Field Intelligence 

Groups and field agents, who review the information to detect firearms 

trafficking patterns and to further their investigations. Industry Operations 

Investigators also make referrals to agents, through the Field Intelligence 

Group when they find potential evidence of firearms trafficking during gun 

dealer inspections. Local gun dealers and other law enforcement agencies 

provide intelligence directly to ATF agents, investigators, and the Field 

Intelligence Group. 

Gun Tracing and eTrace 

Gun tracing enables ATF to track a gun from its manufacturer or 

importer to a wholesaler and retail dealer, and then identify the gun’s 

original retail purchaser. U.S. law does not require the tracking of private 

sales of guns, except for weapons subject to the National Firearms Act.25 

24 ATF, Project Gunrunner Southwest Border Initiative Intelligence Collection Plan, 

Update FY 2010 (November 2009), 4. 

25 The National Firearms Act, enacted in 1934, limits the availability of machine 

guns, short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, sound suppressors (silencers), and 

other similar weapons that were often used by criminals during the Prohibition Era. The 

Gun Control Act of 1968 expanded the scope of the National Firearms Act to include 

destructive devices (for example, explosive and incendiary bombs, flash bang grenades, and 

weapons with a bore of greater than one-half inch in diameter), machine gun frames or 

receivers, and conversion kits for machine guns. 

U.S. Department of Justice 13 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

Tracing can help ATF identify trafficking corridors, patterns, schemes, 

traffickers, accomplices, and straw purchasers.26 

To initiate a gun trace, the law enforcement agency that recovers a 

crime gun provides ATF’s National Tracing Center with the gun’s serial 

number and other information required to identify it to the exclusion of all 

other firearms. The National Tracing Center responds with the gun’s 

purchase history and other information. Law enforcement agencies may 

submit a trace by facsimile, telephone, or through ATF’s Internet-based 

eTrace system. 

The eTrace system can be accessed directly by ATF personnel and 

other law enforcement agencies worldwide. It allows law enforcement 

agencies to submit gun trace requests electronically, to monitor the progress 

of the traces electronically, and to retrieve completed results of their own 

agency’s trace requests. Using eTrace, authorized law enforcement 

representatives can also access a historical database of their agency’s own 

trace-related data and generate analytical reports and investigative lead 

information. The representatives of one agency cannot access the results of 

other agencies’ trace requests at this time. However, according to ATF, 

system modifications are in development to allow agencies to share trace 

data with each other in accordance with, and subject to, new appropriations 

laws. 

To provide Mexican law enforcement authorities with direct access to 

gun tracing, ATF developed eTrace 4.0, also known as Spanish eTrace, 

which receives and provides trace results in Spanish. In December 2009, 

ATF piloted a program to deploy Spanish eTrace to, and to train Mexican 

officials in, the system’s use. Initially, ATF planned to provide Spanish 

eTrace to all federal and state police laboratories in Mexico. However, as of 

June 2010, ATF staff told us that Mexican state laboratories were not able 

to use Spanish eTrace because of objections from the Mexican federal 

government (discussed further in this report).27 The eTrace system is the 

primary source of investigative leads pertaining to guns trafficked to Mexico. 

26 According to ATF, a “straw purchase” occurs when the actual buyer of a firearm 

uses another person, “the straw purchaser,” to execute the paperwork necessary to 

purchase a firearm from a gun dealer. The actual buyer is often prohibited from 

purchasing the gun. The straw purchaser violates federal law by making a false statement 

with respect to the information required to be kept in the gun dealer’s records. According 

to ATF, straw purchasing is one of the most frequent methods used to illegally acquire 

guns. 

27 In September 2010, ATF told us that it had deployed Spanish eTrace to all 

Spanish-language eTrace users in March 2010, including to Mexican federal law 

Cont. 

U.S. Department of Justice 14 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) 

OCDETF is a Department of Justice program that seeks to combine 

resources and expertise of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 

to identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations responsible for drug 

trafficking.28 According to the OCDETF website, OCDETF targets not only 

the drug operations, but also the “tools of the trade” for these organizations, 

including money laundering and firearms trafficking. 

When a case has been designated as an OCDETF case, the costs of 

the investigation – including travel, wiretaps, confidential informant 

subsistence, and other evidence-gathering expenses – may be reimbursed by 

the OCDETF Program, depending on funding availability. To have a case 

approved as an OCDETF case, an agency presents it to other agencies 

involved in the program, including the USAO with jurisdiction in the area. 

Once the case is vetted by a federal prosecutor designated to support the 

OCDETF Program, it is presented to one of nine regional OCDETF 

committees, which must give final approval before the program’s resources 

are dedicated to the case. 

The OCDETF Program also establishes task forces (which it refers to 

as strike forces) to permanently co-locate representatives from federal law 

enforcement agencies, along with representatives of state and local law 

enforcement, in a city. The participating agencies, including ATF when it 

chooses to do so, work together to investigate trafficking organizations. 

OCDETF task forces are currently located in San Diego, Phoenix, El Paso, 

Houston (including satellite offices in Laredo and McAllen), Tampa, 

San Juan, Atlanta, New York, and Boston. ATF’s use of the OCDETF 

Program is discussed in Part III of this report. 

ATF’s Coordination with Other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 

To effectively implement Project Gunrunner, ATF must coordinate 

with other federal agencies within and outside of the Department of Justice 

enforcement. Yet, as noted above, in June 2010, we were informed that Mexican 

laboratories were not using Spanish e-trace. As a result of a September 2010 eTrace 

memorandum of understanding between ATF and the government of Mexico, ATF plans to 

begin redeployment of Spanish eTrace in Mexico in November 2010 and to offer training to 

Mexican personnel in all 31 states. 

28 Agencies represented in the OCDETF Program include ATF, the DEA, the FBI, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Internal Revenue 

Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard – in cooperation with the Department of Justice 

Criminal Division, the Tax Division, and the 94 USAOs, as well as with state and local law 

enforcement. 

U.S. Department of Justice 15 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

that are involved in monitoring and protecting the U.S. border with Mexico. 

As discussed below, some of those agencies have their own programs that 

target firearms trafficking, either directly or indirectly. 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

The DEA enforces controlled substance laws and regulations, and 

investigates organizations and individuals involved in the growing, 

manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances intended to be 

trafficked into the United States. Although DEA is primarily focused on 

drug trafficking enterprises, there is often a nexus between Mexican drug 

and firearms trafficking organizations. As a result, ATF and the DEA work 

together on various task forces in Southwest border locations and in 

Mexico. 

United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) 

The USAOs determine which federal cases to prosecute within their 

jurisdictions. Each USAO is led by a presidentially appointed United States 

Attorney, who serves as the chief federal law enforcement officer for the 

judicial district. Under Project Gunrunner, ATF agents work directly with 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSA) to develop firearms trafficking-related cases 

for prosecution. 

Department of State 

The Department of State, through its Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, provides training, operations, 

intelligence, and logistical support for foreign counternarcotics programs 

established by the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act.29 In the U.S. Embassy in 

Mexico City, a Department of State Narcotics Affairs Section provides 

counternarcotics policy and strategy guidance to Ambassadors and 

facilitates funding and other support for the government of Mexico. Under 

Project Gunrunner, ATF works with staff from the Narcotic Affairs Section to 

provide Mexican officials with equipment and training on gun tracing and 

identification, and investigations. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE, the largest 

investigative arm within DHS, investigates a wide range of domestic and 

international activities related to the illegal movement of people and goods 

29 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. 

U.S. Department of Justice 16 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
into, within, and out of the United States. ICE’s investigative 

responsibilities include narcotics, weapons, and human smuggling, and 

export enforcement issues. 

ATF’s Project Gunrunner and ICE’s Operation Armas Cruzadas both 

target firearms trafficking to Mexico, but the two initiatives target different 

points in the gun smuggling process. Launched in 2008 by ICE, Operation 

Armas Cruzadas is focused on trans-border weapons smuggling networks 

along the Southwest border. Project Gunrunner targets the trafficking of 

guns from the United States to Mexico through investigations of firearms 

found to have been trafficked into Mexico and related violent crime. 

In addition, ATF and ICE have worked together on investigations 

involving firearms trafficking to Mexico through ATF’s participation in 

several ICE-led, multi-agency Border Enforcement Security Task Forces. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The CBP inspects traffic 

entering the United States and, to a much lesser extent, traffic leaving the 

United States. The CBP seizes drugs, cash, guns, and other contraband as 

it is smuggled across the U.S. border. In Southwest border locations, ATF 

coordinates with the CBP regarding inspections of suspected firearms 

traffickers crossing the border. 

ATF’s Coordination with Mexican Agencies 

Attorney General of the Republic – Procuraduría General de la República 

(PGR) 

In Mexico, the Attorney General’s office investigates and prosecutes 

Mexican federal crimes, including all gun-related offenses. Its staff includes 

investigators and intelligence analysts. ATF works with the Mexico Attorney 

General’s office to obtain information used in gun tracing and for firearms 

trafficking investigations. 

National Center for Information, Analysis, and Planning in Order to Fight 

Crime – El Centro Nacional de Planeación, Análisis, e Información para el 

Combate a la Delincuencia (CENAPI) 

CENAPI, a unit of the Attorney General’s office, contains analysts who 

conduct information gathering, intelligence analysis, and data 

dissemination. CENAPI researches areas of organized crime, including the 

largest organized crime threat in Mexico, drug cartels, and builds databases 

containing this intelligence. ATF works with CENAPI because it is the 

primary Mexican agency responsible for deploying Spanish eTrace 

U.S. Department of Justice 17 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

(discussed later in this report) and for entering Mexican crime gun data into 

that system. 

Secretariat of Public Security – Secretaría de Seguridad Pública 

The Secretariat of Public Security is the Mexican law enforcement 

agency that has the authority to police and conduct investigations at a 

national level. According to U.S. law enforcement officials, the Secretariat of 

Public Security is being restructured and trained to better combat Mexican 

drug cartels and to form a force of “street cops” similar to its federal 

counterparts in the United States. ATF and other U.S. law enforcement 

agencies assist in the training of new officers and work with them on 

investigations. 

Secretary of National Defense/Mexican Military – La Secretaría de la 

Defensa Nacional 

The military in Mexico often supplements the efforts of law 

enforcement entities, giving it an important role in the conflict with the drug 

cartels and associated firearms trafficking activity. In areas of Mexico with 

particularly high levels of violent crime, the military has been assigned a 

public safety and policing role. The Mexican military is responsible for 

taking possession of and safeguarding guns and explosives seized in Mexico 

within a few days of being seized. 

U.S. Department of Justice 18 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW 

Purpose 

This review examined ATF’s implementation of Project Gunrunner’s 

mission to reduce firearms trafficking to Mexico and related violent crime.30 

We examined ATF’s execution of its enforcement and regulatory programs 

related to the Southwest border and Mexico, its effectiveness in developing 

and sharing intelligence, its traces of Mexican crime guns, its coordination 

with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement, and how ATF worked with USAOs 

to prosecute firearms traffickers. 

Scope 

We conducted our fieldwork from November 2009 through June 2010. 

We also gathered updated information from ATF through September 2010. 

In evaluating the impact of Project Gunrunner, we generally examined ATF 

activities from FY 2006, when the project became a national program, 

through FY 2009. When it was available, we also examined data from 

FY 2004 through FY 2009 to compare ATF’s operations for 3 years before 

and after its implementation of Project Gunrunner. 

This review is the second conducted by the Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) on Project Gunrunner since 2009. The first review examined 

ATF’s planning, hiring, staffing, and allocation of resources for Project 

Gunrunner, including its expenditure of $10 million in Recovery Act 

funds.31 This second Project Gunrunner review continued the examination 

of ATF’s procedures for coordinating among its Southwest border field 

divisions. 

Methodology 

In this review we conducted interviews; performance, trace, 

prosecutorial, and investigative data analyses; and document reviews. We 

also visited ATF’s National Tracing Center and Violent Crime Analysis 

30 Although our review included ATF’s efforts to reduce violent crime associated 

with firearms trafficking to Mexico, the causes of changes in the levels of violence along the 

border are numerous and are not attributable only to ATF’s implementation of Project 

Gunrunner. 

31 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Interim Review of 

ATF’s Project Gunrunner, Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2009-006 (September 2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 19 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

Branch in Martinsburg, West Virginia; ATF’s Dallas, Phoenix, and 

Los Angeles Field Divisions; and its Mexico Country Office in Mexico City.32 

Interviews 

We conducted 99 in-person and telephone interviews with personnel 

from ATF headquarters, ATF’s Dallas, Phoenix, and Los Angeles Field 

Divisions and selected offices, and the Mexico Country Office; the Executive 

Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) and USAOs in several Southwest 

border districts; the Department’s Criminal Division; the DEA; the 

U.S. Department of State; DHS, including its ICE and CBP components; and 

military and law enforcement officials of the Mexican government. 

Appendix III provides a list of all interviewees. 

Data Analysis 

We analyzed several types of ATF and USAO data that generally 

covered FY 2004 through FY 2009. The ATF data included gun trace results 

from the Southwest border and Mexico, Project Gunrunner cases initiated 

and referred to USAOs for federal prosecution, inspections of gun dealers in 

the Southwest border states, and statistics on active gun dealers and 

multiple sales of handguns. We also reviewed data from ATF’s case 

management system on Industry Operations Investigators’ generation and 

referral of investigative leads to ATF agents. Finally, we analyzed USAO 

data from its Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS), on 

declinations of ATF’s Project Gunrunner cases and of ATF-led joint cases 

that were referred to USAOs for prosecution. LIONS collects case 

information for federal criminal offenses, but does not track its cases as 

being Project Gunrunner cases. 

Document Review 

We reviewed ATF policies, guidelines, and plans relating to Project 

Gunrunner and firearms trafficking. These included operating plans, 

intelligence products, performance measures, directives and guidance to 

field personnel, and field office documents. We also reviewed ATF and 

EOUSA budget requests and resource justifications related to firearms 

trafficking and Southwest border operations. In addition, we reviewed 

EOUSA policies and guidelines related to the prosecution of ATF’s firearms 

trafficking-related Project Gunrunner cases. We reviewed ATF managers’ 

32 During the fieldwork for our previous report on Project Gunrunner, we also 

visited ATF’s Houston Field Division and its McAllen Field Office, as well as the Las Cruces 

Field Office of the Phoenix Field Division. Some of the information we obtained from those 

interviews contributed to our findings in this report. 

U.S. Department of Justice 20 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

testimony and statements to Congress, as well as congressional testimony 

by EOUSA, DHS, and Office of the Attorney General officials on firearms 

trafficking and Southwest border violence. 

Consistent with our standard practice, on September 3, 2010, we 

provided a working draft of this report to ATF and other components and 

agencies for their review and comment. In response to their comments, as 

well as a result of updated data and information provided by ATF, we made 

some changes to the working draft where appropriate. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

21 
 

 

 

PART I: ATF’S EXPANDED EFFORTS 

IN SUPPORT OF PROJECT GUNRUNNER 

Through Project Gunrunner, ATF has increased several of 

its program activities related to firearms trafficking, 

including the number of gun trace submissions, the number 

of investigations it initiated, the number of these 

investigations it subsequently referred for prosecution, and 

the number of defendants it referred for prosecution. ATF 

also increased the number of compliance inspections it 

conducted, the hours spent by its Southwest border field 

divisions on inspections, and the number of referrals 

Industry Operations made to Criminal Enforcement for 

investigation. 

ATF’s approach to combating firearms trafficking and related violence 

along the Southwest border, as articulated in its June 2007 Gunrunner 

strategy, has been to focus on key activities, including tracing guns to 

identify traffickers and patterns, conducting criminal investigations of 

traffickers, conducting compliance inspections of gun dealers in the region, 

and referring leads from Industry Operations to Criminal Enforcement. 

Relevant activities are tracked in ATF’s case management (N-Force) and 

inspections (N-Spect) databases, and its tracing system (eTrace). 

In the section below, we describe our analysis of seven categories of 

data from these databases to measure Project Gunrunner’s performance: 

 gun trace requests received from U.S. and Mexican locations, 

 Project Gunrunner cases initiated, 

 cases referred for prosecution, 

 defendants referred for prosecution, 

 completed gun dealer compliance inspections, 

 hours spent on gun dealer compliance inspections, and 

 referrals from Industry Operations to Criminal Enforcement.33
 

As stated in the Background section of this report, ATF considers any 

investigation conducted nationwide to be a Project Gunrunner case if it 

involves firearms trafficking or violent crime with a nexus to the Southwest 

33 ATF’s strategic plan for FY 2010 to FY 2016 included broad performance 

measures of firearms trafficking. Three of the performance measures were similar to those 

we analyzed: number of defendants referred for prosecution for violation of firearms 

trafficking laws, number of firearms trafficking investigations initiated, and number of 

traces submitted. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

22 
 

 

border. Throughout this report, any reference made to a Project Gunrunner 

case, to referrals of cases, or to referrals of defendants for prosecution uses 

ATF’s definition. 

For measures relating to trace submissions and Industry Operations 

inspections, we compared the 3-year period before ATF’s implementation of 

Project Gunrunner (FY 2004 through FY 2006) with the 3-year period after 

ATF’s initiation of Project Gunrunner (FY 2007 through FY 2009). For 

measures relating to Project Gunrunner cases, we examined only the period 

after the initiative began (FY 2007 through FY 2009).34 

We found that since implementing Project Gunrunner, ATF has 

increased its gun trace submissions from U.S. Southwest border locations 

and from Mexico, the number of investigations ATF initiated, the number of 

cases ATF subsequently referred for prosecution, and the number of 

defendants ATF referred for prosecution. ATF also increased the number of 

compliance inspections conducted in its Southwest border field divisions 

and the number of referrals Industry Operations made to Criminal 

Enforcement for investigation. These trends are depicted in Figure 4 (below) 

and discussed further below. We also found that ATF increased its efforts 

under Project Gunrunner through its Gun Runner Impact Team initiative, a 

targeted 120-day effort implemented in the Houston Field Division during 

summer 2009. 

The number of traces of U.S. and Mexican crime guns has increased 

since Project Gunrunner began. 

ATF’s June 2007 Gunrunner strategy describes tracing as an 

essential tool for identifying potential traffickers and the “cornerstone” of 

Project Gunrunner. We found that ATF has increased tracing along the 

Southwest border and in Mexico. From FY 2004 through FY 2006, the four 

Southwest border field divisions and Mexico traced, on average, 20 percent 

of all traces requested from the United States and Mexico (143,024 of 

714,472 traces).35 The number of such traces increased to 26 percent 

(207,609 of 804,136 traces) in FY 2007 through FY 2009. 

34 Although ATF initiated cases involving firearms trafficking and related violent 

crime prior to FY 2007, our attempt to analyze the 3-year period prior to ATF’s initiation of 

Project Gunrunner did not generate reliable results. ATF had not developed a program 

code to track these cases until after the initiative began in 2006, and ATF was unable to 

fully identify firearms trafficking and other cases from FY 2004 through FY 2006 that 

would be comparable to Project Gunrunner cases. Therefore, a comparison of firearms 

trafficking cases prior to FY 2007 would result in an overstatement of the increase in 

firearms trafficking cases that resulted from Project Gunrunner. 

35 Different ATF offices analyze trace data in different ways. The National Tracing 

Center typically reports annual trace numbers according to the date the trace was 

submitted. In comparison, the Violent Crime Analysis Branch bases its analyses on the 

Cont. 

U.S. Department of Justice 23 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

The largest percentage increase in traces during Project Gunrunner 

occurred in traces from Mexico. From FY 2004 through FY 2006, traces of 

Mexican crime guns accounted for only 1 percent of all traces (9,256 traces). 

Since the start of Project Gunrunner, in FY 2007 through FY 2009, Mexican 

traces increased to 8 percent of all traces (62,606 traces). The increase in 

traces of Mexican crime guns from FY 2004 through 2006 to FY 2007 

through 2009 was 576 percent. 

date a gun was recovered, but if no recovery date exists, it will use the trace date. This 

results in differences between the annual trace number reported by the National Tracing 

Center and the Violent Crime Analysis Branch because there are typically delays between 

when Mexican crime guns are recovered and when they are submitted for tracing. In this 

report, we base our analysis on data provided by the Violent Crime Analysis Branch. 

U.S. Department of Justice 24 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Figure 4: ATF Project Gunrunner Performance Measures 

Mexican Traces of Recovered Crime Guns 

30,000 

5,834 

1,518 1,904 

14,979 

25,901 

21,726 25,000
 

20,000
 

15,000
 

10,000
 

5,000
 

0
 

04 05 06 07 08 09 

Project Gunrunner Cases Initiated 

000
 

800
 

600
 

400
 

200
 

0
 

424 

538 

886 

07 08 09 

Project Gunrunner Cases and Defendants 

Referred to USAOs for Prosecution 

600 

177 

373 

220 

420 

272 

510 500 Cases 

400 Referred 

300 

200 Defendants 

100 Referred 

0
 

07 08 09 

Completed Compliance Inspections, 

Southwest Border 

3,500 

3,000 

2,500

2,000

1,500 

1,000

500 

0
 

723 662 

1,488 

1,764 1,980 

2,938 

04 05 06 07 08 09 

Compliance Inspection Hours, 

Southwest Border 

140,000 

33,317 40,229 

74,480 

87,613 95,037 

116,439 120,000
 

100,000
 

80,000
 

60,000
 

40,000
 

20,000
 

0
 

04 05 06 07 08 09 

Industry Operations Referrals to 

ATF Criminal Enforcement, Southwest Border 

1000
 

800
 

600

400 

200

0 

04 05 06 07 08 09 

307 

582 

826 814 851 854 

1

 

Note: Yellow indicates results before Project Gunrunner’s inception (FY 2004 through 

FY 2006), and blue indicates results since the project was implemented (FY 2007 through 

FY 2009). 

Sources: OIG analysis of ATF Violent Crime Analysis Branch and Office of Strategic 

Management data. 

U.S. Department of Justice 25 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

Cases initiated, referred for prosecution, and defendants referred for 

prosecution for firearms trafficking to Mexico or related violent crime 

also increased during Project Gunrunner. 

We also determined that ATF significantly increased the number of 

cases involving firearms trafficking or violent crime with a nexus to the 

Southwest border that it initiated after the implementation of Project 

Gunrunner in 2006. ATF initiated 424 such cases in FY 2007, 538 in 

FY 2008, and 886 in FY 2009, an increase of 109 percent in that period.36 

The number of cases involving firearms trafficking or violent crime 

with a nexus to the Southwest border that ATF referred to USAOs for 

prosecution also increased after Project Gunrunner began. ATF referred 

177 such cases for prosecution in FY 2007, 220 in FY 2008, and 272 in 

FY 2009, an increase of 54 percent. 

The number of defendants referred to USAOs for prosecution for 

firearms trafficking or violent crime with a nexus to the Southwest border 

also increased since the start of Project Gunrunner. ATF referred 373 

defendants for prosecution in FY 2007, 420 in FY 2008, and 510 in 

FY 2009, an increase of 37 percent. 

The numbers of gun dealer compliance inspections conducted, 

inspection hours, and inspection referrals to Criminal Enforcement 

increased during Project Gunrunner. 

Since Project Gunrunner began, ATF has increased the number of 

both gun dealer compliance inspections and the compliance inspection 

hours worked by the Southwest border field divisions. From FY 2004 

through FY 2006, ATF completed 2,873 compliance inspections in the 

region. During that period, ATF personnel worked a total of 148,026 hours 

on compliance inspections there. The number of compliance inspections 

increased 133 percent after Project Gunrunner began to 6,682 between 

FY 2007 and FY 2009. The number of compliance inspection hours worked 

also increased to 299,089 between FY 2007 and FY 2009, an increase of 

102 percent. 

Since FY 2004, the four ATF Southwest border field divisions have 

increased the number of Industry Operations referrals to law enforcement, 

which includes referrals handled within ATF and those sent to other federal, 

36 Although the data that ATF provided to the OIG showed that the number of 

Project Gunrunner cases initiated by ATF increased from FY 2007 through FY 2009, the 

total number of cases specifically related to firearms initiated by ATF nationwide decreased 

by 909 cases (5 percent) in the same time period, from 17,548 in FY 2007 to 16,639 in 

FY 2009. 

U.S. Department of Justice 26 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

state, and local law enforcement agencies. Industry Operations referrals are 

typically created during or after a gun dealer inspection. There are no 

minimum guidelines as to what triggers a referral, but Industry Operations 

Investigators are trained to identify potential illegal activity. 

To determine the number of referrals ATF made and their outcomes 

we analyzed all the inspection referrals to ATF Criminal Enforcement 

personnel contained in the data provided by ATF. Industry Operations staff 

made 1,715 referrals to ATF Criminal Enforcement from FY 2004 through 

FY 2006 in the four Southwest border field divisions. The number of such 

referrals increased 47 percent after Project Gunrunner began, to 2,519 from 

FY 2007 through FY 2009.37 

ATF used its temporary Gun Runner Impact Team initiative to increase 

inspections and case initiations in the Houston Field Division. 

ATF also increased its efforts under Project Gunrunner through its 

Gun Runner Impact Team initiative, a temporary deployment of 100 agents, 

Industry Operations Investigators, and support staff to the Houston Field 

Division during summer 2009. ATF deployed the personnel for 120 days to 

address a backlog in investigative leads and gun dealer inspections in the 

Houston Field Division and “aggressively target and disrupt groups and 

organizations responsible for trafficking firearms to Mexico.”38 

According to an October 2009 Department press release, the initiative 

involved investigating over 1,100 investigative leads, which resulted in 

opening 276 firearms trafficking cases involving the seizure of over 440 

illegal firearms and other contraband. In an internal assessment of the 

initiative’s outcome, ATF stated that several of these cases related directly to 

Mexican drug cartels and involved one or more individuals who had 

recruited several straw purchasers who purchased firearms that were then 

trafficked to Mexico. On the regulatory side, ATF reported that Industry 

Operations conducted over 1,000 gun dealer inspections, which led to 440 

violations. In September 2010, ATF announced the conclusion of another 

Gun Runner Impact Team initiative in the Phoenix Field Division, reporting 

that the Phoenix team had initiated 174 firearms trafficking cases, seized 

1,300 illegally trafficked firearms, and conducted over 800 gun dealer 

inspections. 

37 ATF Industry Operations staff also made 791 referrals to state and local law 

enforcement agencies and to other federal agencies such as ICE, the FBI, and the Internal 

Revenue Service. 

38 Department of Justice press release, Justice Department Announces Success in 

Battle Against Firearms Trafficking and Recovery Act Funds to Build on Project Gunrunner 

(October 1, 2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 27 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

PART II: ATF FIREARMS TRAFFICKING 

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 

Under Project Gunrunner, ATF does not systematically 

share strategic intelligence with its Mexican and 

U.S. partner agencies, and ATF Southwest border Field 

Intelligence Groups are not consistently providing 

actionable investigative leads to field agents. ATF also 

needs to better implement its Border Liaison Program to 

improve information sharing and coordination between 

ATF’s U.S. and Mexico elements. 

ATF and its Mexican and U.S. partner agencies are not systematically 

and consistently sharing strategic intelligence needed to combat 

firearms trafficking to Mexico. 

ATF’s partnerships with other U.S. agencies and the Mexican 

government are a critical component of Project Gunrunner. ATF’s Project 

Gunrunner strategy states that each ATF intelligence entity “must be 

diligent in its exercise of information flow to and from . . . other domestic 

and Mexican counterparts.”39 

However, we found that strategic intelligence on drug cartel firearms 

trafficking activity – including trends and patterns in their operations, the 

locations where they are operating, and the composition of their 

membership and associates – is not consistently shared between ATF and 

Mexican law enforcement, and between ATF, the CBP, DEA, and ICE. 

Although ATF has shared some strategic intelligence products with these 

agencies, it is not doing so systematically and regularly.40 

Mexican law enforcement reports that ATF’s exchange of strategic 

intelligence is incomplete. 

Although the government of Mexico has intensified its national efforts 

to counter the drug cartels, Mexican officials told us they have sought but 

not received strategic intelligence from ATF on patterns and trends of 

39 ATF, Southwest Border Initiative: Project Gunrunner (June 2007), 16. 

40 ATF has identified the need to improve intelligence sharing with Mexican and 

U.S. law enforcement partners and improve its understanding of intelligence gaps in a 

recent strategy document entitled “Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused Strategy” 

(September 2010, cartel strategy). In that document, ATF stated that its efforts to combat 

firearms trafficking “will require greater collaboration between ATF field divisions and other 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies.” 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

28 
 

 

 

firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. For example, in a 

November 2009 monthly U.S.-Mexico GC Armas meeting on firearms 

trafficking, Mexican officials asked ATF for additional information and 

intelligence concerning the routes, destinations, and Mexican nationals that 

might be involved in firearms trafficking activity.41 

Mexican officials reiterated the need for strategic intelligence on 

firearms trafficking during our interviews with them in March 2010. Senior 

Mexican law enforcement officials from the Mexico Attorney General’s office 

(PGR) and from that office’s intelligence unit (CENAPI) told us that it is 

important to their efforts to have more intelligence on how guns are being 

trafficked from the United States into Mexico. Mexican military 

representatives also said they could achieve better results interdicting guns 

if they had more intelligence on where and how guns are crossing the 

U.S. border into Mexico, including the routes used to traffic higher-caliber 

weapons into Mexico. As described below, we found that ATF has already 

developed intelligence products on these and other topics of interest to 

Mexican officials.42 

Further, PGR officials stated that PGR develops its own intelligence 

about firearms trafficking and Mexican drug cartels, but ATF has not 

requested it from PGR, and the two agencies have not shared such 

information. Mexican law enforcement officials told us that if there were 

more coordination with ATF in developing such intelligence, they would be 

able to help identify firearms trafficking trends and patterns on the U.S. side 

of the border to assist ATF in its domestic mission. 

Our review found that some of the information sought by Mexican 

officials has already been identified as strategic intelligence that ATF can 

share with the government of Mexico. For example, ATF’s November 2009 

Intelligence Collection Plan includes a list of the existing “actionable 

intelligence products” that ATF can share with Mexican law enforcement. 

We found that many of these items are the same strategic intelligence 

products that Mexican officials have requested but reported that they are 

41 GC Armas is a monthly meeting held at CENAPI headquarters in Mexico City that 

serves as the coordinating entity for joint U.S.-Mexico operations related to the detection, 

monitoring, and detention of arms trafficking suspects crossing the border. U.S. agencies 

that attend GC Armas are ATF, ICE, the DEA, Defense Attaché Office (Department of 

Defense), FBI, CBP, Narcotics Affairs Section, and Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(Department of the Treasury). Mexican law enforcement agencies in attendance are the 

PGR and the PGR’s CENAPI, the Mexican Foreign Ministry, Mexican Military, Mexican Navy, 

the Secretariat of Public Security, Customs, and the National Security and Investigation 

Center (intelligence agency). 

42 We reviewed other Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information products, 

including maps illustrating firearms trafficking corridors, analyses of gun source locations, 

and drug cartels’ weapons of choice. 

U.S. Department of Justice 29 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

not receiving, such as firearms trafficking routes, safe house locations, 

distribution points and destinations, lists of weapons and ammunition being 

trafficked, and other documents related to firearms trafficking. 

We asked ATF officials about the sharing of this type of information 

with Mexico. ATF responded that its Mexico Country Office has provided 

Mexican officials with strategic intelligence on firearms trafficking and has 

repeatedly presented the requested intelligence at various venues with 

Mexican officials, including at the GC Armas meetings, through EPIC, and 

through border liaison personnel detailed to the Office of Strategic 

Intelligence and Information. According to ATF, however, there have been 

internal coordination problems between government of Mexico agencies, 

which we also found through our fieldwork. 

We determined that much of the intelligence ATF cited as having 

exchanged with Mexican officials is tactical or investigative in nature, rather 

than strategic intelligence. Moreover, some of the exchanges occur 

informally, which reduces the utility and availability of the intelligence to 

ATF’s Mexican counterparts. For example, ATF cited a border liaison who 

provided strategic and tactical intelligence informally to Mexican 

counterparts at a local working group. While ATF’s informal information 

exchanges with Mexican officials are intended to improve its working 

relationship with the government of Mexico and contribute to investigations 

on both sides of the border, this process has not resulted in intended 

recipients in each Mexican agency receiving important strategic intelligence 

or ATF receiving strategic intelligence from Mexican agencies. 

ATF’s exchange of strategic intelligence with the DEA and ICE is 

inconsistent and lacking in some instances. 

ATF’s Gunrunner strategy states that ATF should work with the DEA 

and ICE to shut down firearms trafficking operations. We found that ATF 

does not consistently share strategic intelligence about firearms trafficking 

with the DEA and ICE. Consequently, ATF and these agencies may be 

targeting the same groups and individuals in an uncoordinated manner. 

Project Gunrunner cases target many of the same cartel organizations 

that DEA and ICE enforcement operations target. Gaps and failures in the 

exchange of intelligence among these agencies create the potential for 

duplication of effort, inefficiency, and the risk of operational compromise. A 

2008 internal intelligence assessment of Project Gunrunner acknowledged 

that ATF’s information about Mexican cartels was “haphazard.”43 The 

assessment continued by stating that with more communication and 

43 ATF, 2008 Project Gunrunner Assessment, November 19, 2009. 

U.S. Department of Justice 30 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

collaboration with other federal law enforcement agencies, “this intelligence 

gap will shrink.” 

However, ATF’s Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information has 

not established a method to systematically share strategic intelligence with 

the DEA. The Office established intelligence liaisons at several federal 

agencies, including at the DEA, but the liaisons at the DEA are not assigned 

there for the purpose of exchanging strategic intelligence related to firearms 

trafficking. Rather, the ATF Chief of the Office’s Criminal Intelligence 

Division confirmed that the duties of the ATF’s liaisons assigned to the DEA 

are related to the Department’s international organized crime mission, not 

Project Gunrunner or the Southwest border. The ATF Chief told the OIG 

that it would be helpful if his agency had intelligence from the DEA on the 

cartels, especially identified cartel members and weapons they might 

possess. 

DEA officials told us they have compiled a large amount of intelligence 

on the drug cartels and that the exchange of this intelligence with ATF 

would be of great strategic value. However, an official of the DEA’s Mexico 

and Central America office, an office that targets drug cartels’ narcotics 

operations and complements Project Gunrunner, was unaware of the 

existence of a strategic intelligence counterpart organization at ATF’s Office 

of Strategic Intelligence and Information. Consequently, the DEA did not 

know with whom to coordinate and share information at ATF. The Chief of 

Strategic Intelligence added that the DEA needs a counterpart at ATF 

because “weapons are a necessary tool of drug traffickers in waging their 

wars and battles.” 

ICE officials stated that they would benefit from having ATF strategic 

intelligence, such as time-to-crime patterns, types of guns seized in Mexico, 

and methods used by traffickers to obtain guns from gun shows or through 

straw purchasers at gun dealers. One ICE Special Agent in Charge told us 

that this type of intelligence would help ICE better orient its efforts on 

smuggling investigations. ICE agents also said they would be able to use 

any intelligence ATF offered on trafficking organizations and their practices 

in ICE’s efforts to build complex conspiracy cases against firearm 

traffickers. ICE officials told us that in exchange, they could provide ATF 

with strategic intelligence developed on firearms trafficking to Mexico and on 

Mexican drug cartels and their activities. 

Officials from ATF’s Criminal Intelligence Division told us that the 

lack of an exchange of strategic intelligence not only hinders ATF’s 

effectiveness at gaining valuable intelligence on Project Gunrunner targets, 

but also inhibits ICE’s ability to conduct its closely related firearm 

interdiction missions. 

U.S. Department of Justice 31 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

We asked ATF officials why this strategic intelligence was not being 

shared with DEA and ICE officials and why they had not requested such 

intelligence from the DEA and ICE. ATF responded that it has shared 

strategic intelligence products on firearms trafficking with other U.S. law 

enforcement agencies, including the DEA and ICE. However, ATF’s strategic 

intelligence counterparts in both the DEA and ICE reported to us that they 

have not received this information. As with Mexican law enforcement 

officials, we believe that the strategic intelligence sharing process should be 

more systematic and that established counterparts in ATF, the DEA, and 

ICE should be identified to facilitate the two-way exchange of information in 

a timely manner. 

ATF shares some tactical intelligence with the DEA and CBP in support of 

their respective trafficking investigations, but the benefits have been limited. 

We found that ATF shares some tactical intelligence and coordinates 

well with the DEA and CBP in their field operations, but the frequency and 

effectiveness of the coordination varies by location. Coordination between 

ATF and the CBP has not resulted in significant numbers of seizures of 

guns going into Mexico. 

At locations across the Southwest border, ATF and DEA personnel 

both reported to us that when the DEA has a lead that pertains to firearms 

violations or trafficking, it passes the lead to ATF. For example, in McAllen, 

Texas, one ATF supervisor reported that his office receives so many leads 

resulting from DEA seizures that it has put a strain on ATF resources in 

that city. An ATF Special Agent in Charge of a Southwest border field 

division also told the OIG that even though the DEA has not traditionally 

done so there, it is beginning to provide ATF with tips related to firearms 

trafficking that its personnel hear from wiretaps and other intelligence 

sources. ATF had not provided as much of this intelligence to the DEA, 

although DEA field staff we interviewed said they were content with the level 

of support they were receiving from ATF, especially with ATF’s expertise in 

guns. 

An ATF Southwest border Special Agent in Charge told us he 

considers CBP staff to be counterparts with whom ATF works well on a 

shared mission. ATF intelligence staff in the field and at EPIC also post 

“lookouts” into the CBP’s database, which the CBP then uses to identify 

vehicles or individuals to search during southbound inspections. When 

CBP personnel seize weapons, they either notify ATF or ICE.44 

44 See Part VI of this report for additional information on CBP and ATF coordination 

on operations at the border. 

U.S. Department of Justice 32 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

Despite the cooperation, CBP has not seized significant numbers of 

guns going into Mexico. According to a Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report on firearms trafficking, although the CBP has increased its 

southbound inspections of vehicles to interdict contraband such as guns 

going into Mexico, the CBP has been unable to seize many weapons. In 

FY 2008, there were only 70 weapons interdicted as a part of southbound 

inspections.45 Similarly, an internal DHS report found that in the 9-month 

period spanning March 24 to December 28, 2009, the CBP seized only 93 

weapons being transported to Mexico through points of entry along the 

Southwest border. CBP officials we interviewed told us that gun seizures 

are typically the result of the CBP’s incidental inspections – such as random 

vehicle searches conducted because of officers’ instincts, canine usage, or 

targeted southbound inspections – rather than intelligence provided by ATF. 

CBP officials said that any information ATF collects on the activities of 

traffickers to transport guns across the border into Mexico could benefit the 

CBP’s implementation of its southbound inspection program. With more 

detailed intelligence from ATF on individuals, vehicles, or a large purchase 

of guns, the CBP could focus its enforcement operations at specific, relevant 

points along the border and interdict guns and other contraband being 

trafficked to Mexico. 

Is sum, it is crucial that ATF maintain close partnerships with other 

U.S. agencies and the government of Mexico to combat the flow of firearms 

to Mexican drug cartels. Although ATF has shared strategic intelligence 

products with Mexican and other U.S. agencies, it is not doing so 

consistently and systematically. For example, we found that ATF is not 

systematically sharing strategic intelligence on cartel firearms trafficking – 

including trends and patterns in their operations, where they are operating, 

and the composition of their membership and associates – with Mexican law 

enforcement, the DEA, or ICE. While ATF regularly shares tactical 

intelligence on firearms trafficking suspects and activities with the DEA and 

CBP, the benefits to CBP have been limited. We believe ATF could better 

combat firearms trafficking if it improved its sharing of strategic intelligence 

with its partner agencies. 

45 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to 

Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709 

(June 2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 33 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

Recommendation 

We recommend that ATF: 

1.	 Coordinate with the government of Mexico, the CBP, DEA, and 

ICE to ensure systematic and regular exchanges of strategic 

intelligence to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico. 

ATF Southwest border Field Intelligence Groups are not consistently 

providing actionable investigative leads to field agents. 

As discussed below, ATF personnel along the Southwest border told 

us that agents investigating Project Gunrunner cases are not consistently 

receiving timely, actionable intelligence from ATF’s Field Intelligence 

Groups.46 

Agents investigating Project Gunrunner cases say they are not receiving 

timely, actionable leads from their Field Intelligence Groups. 

In our field visits, ATF agents in Southwest border locations said that 

the investigative leads provided by ATF’s Field Intelligence Groups are not 

timely, well developed, or actionable.47 These complaints referred to leads 

developed by the Field Intelligence Group and to leads from developed by 

Industry Operations and forwarded by the Group. Field supervisors and 

agents told us they do not rely on their Group to generate investigative leads 

at all, opting instead to generate their own leads. 

The most commonly stated criticism of the investigative leads from 

Field Intelligence Groups was that they were too old to be of value to agents 

conducting investigations. For example, field supervisors in one Southwest 

border field division told us the primary problem with the Field Intelligence 

Group leads is that the information is stale; one field supervisor said the 

Group forwards leads involving a time-to-crime of 1 to 3 years, but the 

46 In addition to visiting the Phoenix, Dallas, and Los Angeles Field Divisions during 

this review, we visited the Houston Field Division in June 2009 as part of our interim 

review of Project Gunrunner. During that visit, agents from the Houston Field Division also 

reported that investigative leads were not well-developed or actionable, although some of 

the complaints related specifically to investigative leads generated for the Gun Runner 

Impact Team initiative, which was under way at that time. 

47 Field Intelligence Groups support field agents in two ways: responding to direct 

requests for information from agents to support their cases, and proactive intelligence 

gathering to generate investigative leads to be referred to field agents. The criticisms 

expressed to the OIG concern these investigative leads. Agents we interviewed told us that 

when they requested information from their Field Intelligence Group to support a current 

case, they received a timely and useful response. 

U.S. Department of Justice 34 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

agents should be focusing on incidents with a time-to-crime of 3 to 6 

months. Another field supervisor said the Field Intelligence Group will send 

him leads that can have a time-to-crime of up to 3 to 5 years. Although 

field personnel varied in what they considered a valuable time-to-crime, 

most cited a 1-year time-to-crime as the maximum threshold for a lead to be 

useful. 

ATF field supervisors told us that the impact of receiving leads with 

an outdated time-to-crime is that agents waste time investigating the leads. 

For example, one field supervisor estimated that of about 25 investigative 

leads that the Field Intelligence Group sent to his enforcement group during 

2009, only 1 or 2 warranted follow-up and neither of those leads resulted in 

any arrests or prosecutions. An agent in that enforcement group said that 

because the Field Intelligence Groups do not effectively screen leads, each 

lead that is assigned by a field supervisor requires an agent to spend time 

pursuing it and then to write a report in N-Force explaining that the lead 

did not pan out. 

Field supervisors and agents said that they rely more on selfgenerated investigative leads and information from other sources to detect 

firearms trafficking activity. For example, some agents were using the 

weekly compilation of raw data on Mexican crime gun recovery and multiple 

sales data provided to the field directly from the National Tracing Center to 

conduct their own screening and analysis instead of using the Field 

Intelligence Groups.48 ATF’s National Firearms Trafficking Implementation 

Plan directs supervisors to review the multiple sales data to identify 

potential firearms traffickers “even though the [Field Intelligence Group] 

analyzes the data for trafficking leads against locally established criteria.”49 

In September 2010, in response to a draft of this report, ATF told the OIG 

that field office personnel can quickly review the multiple sales data because 

they are more familiar with the local gun dealers, weapons of choice, and 

potential firearms trafficking suspects in their area, and they can request 

that Field Intelligence Group personnel conduct additional research. 

However, by generating their own investigative leads, agents may duplicate 

their Group’s efforts. Agents also may use information that is less effective 

because they do not have access to the multiple sources used by Groups, 

and they do not have the time to conduct additional research that Group 

members should do before sending investigative leads to agents. 

48 Agents in the Dallas, Los Angeles, and Phoenix Field Divisions also reported that 

in addition to analyzing some of the same sources that the Field Intelligence Group uses, a 

primary source of their investigative leads was local gun dealers who call them to report 

suspicious activity and confidential informants, a type of source to which Field Intelligence 

Groups would not have access. 

49 ATF National Firearms Trafficking Enforcement Implementation Plan (June 25, 

2009), 3. 

U.S. Department of Justice 35 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

ATF field agents also stated that some leads forwarded by a Field 

Intelligence Group as Project Gunrunner leads have no clear connection to 

firearms trafficking. A field supervisor provided the example of a Groupgenerated lead on a gang member in possession of one gun – which the 

supervisor does not consider to be a firearms trafficking offense – as a lead 

that was not useful. That supervisor said although there is no threshold for 

the number of guns associated with a purchaser, a useful investigative lead 

from the Group would involve a purchaser with at least two or three guns, 

or a suspect who illegally purchased guns with an out-of-state license. 

Another supervisor stated that the most useful intelligence for detecting 

firearms trafficking is information on the gun purchasers themselves – 

including the number and types of guns bought, the age and gender of the 

buyers, and background information indicating whether the buyers had the 

financial means to buy the guns. 

Reporting multiple sales of handguns produces timely, actionable leads for 

detecting firearms trafficking. 

The Gun Control Act requires that gun dealers report multiple sales of 

handguns (defined as two or more handguns sold at once or during any 

5 consecutive business days) to ATF.50 As discussed below, these multiple 

sales reports provide ATF with timely, actionable leads that can enable it to 

more quickly identify suspected firearms traffickers and disrupt their 

operations.51 However, gun dealers are not required to report multiple sales 

of long guns to ATF.52 Because long guns have become Mexican cartels’ 

weapons of choice, multiple sales reporting has become less viable as a 

source of intelligence to disrupt the illegal flow of weapons to Mexico. 

According to 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3), gun dealers must report multiple 

sales of handguns to their local ATF field office using a Report of Multiple 

Sales or Other Disposition of Pistols and Revolvers form (multiple sales 

report). Gun dealers must forward all multiple sales reports to the National 

Tracing Center by the close of business on the day that a reportable 

multiple sale occurs. The National Tracing Center enters the information on 

the multiple sales into ATF’s tracing database (the Firearms Tracing 

System), which is subsequently made available to ATF field offices through 

50 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3). 

51 For more information on potential indicators of trafficking by gun dealers, see 

Bruce Reinhart, “Implementing a Firearms Trafficking Strategy – Prosecuting Corrupt 

Federal Firearms Licensees,” United States Attorneys’ Bulletin (January 2002). 

52 Long guns include all variations of rifles and shotguns as defined in §§ 921(a)(5) 

to (8) of the Gun Control Act. 

U.S. Department of Justice 36 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

eTrace. If a trace request is matched to multiple sales report information, 

the trace can be completed in minutes rather than days or weeks.53 

The purchase of multiple guns within a short period of time by an 

individual who is not a gun dealer may indicate that the individual is 

engaged in firearms trafficking. For example, firearms trafficking indicators 

include: 

 multiple sales in which a purchaser also appears on one or more 

past gun traces; 

 multiple sales in which the purchaser was born outside the 

United States; 

 a multiple sale of five or more guns; 

 more than one multiple sale at the same gun dealer on the same 

day; 

 traces in which the recovered gun was purchased in a multiple 

sale; and 

 crime guns traced back to a multiple sale in a state other than 

where a gun was recovered. 

Additionally, ATF uses multiple sales reports to verify gun dealers’ 

records, to detect suspicious activity, and to generate investigative leads. 

ATF personnel we interviewed in Southwest border offices cited multiple 

handgun sales data as a valuable source of timely and actionable 

investigative leads for detecting firearms trafficking and said such leads 

have led to the prosecution of traffickers. 

Multiple sales reporting is a less viable source of intelligence on firearms 

traffickers because multiple sales of long guns are not reported. 

Multiple sales of long guns are not subject to the same reporting 

requirements as handguns. Yet, long guns have become the Mexican 

cartels’ weapons of choice. ATF reported in a statement to Congress last 

year: 

Until recently drug traffickers’ “weapon of choice” had been 

.38 caliber handguns. However, they now have developed a 

preference for higher quality, more powerful weapons, such as 

53 If a gun is not a part of a multiple sales report, then the National Tracing Center 

uses the gun identifying information (such as the serial number and model) to determine 

the manufacturer or importer of the gun. The manufacturer or importer then can provide 

the name of the licensed gun dealer the first sold the gun. The National Tracing Center 

contacts that licensed gun dealer who checks their records to determine who the gun was 

first sold to. According to National Tracing Center staff, the length of time this process 

takes varies widely, but is usually about 7 to 10 days. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

37 
 

 

 

.223 and 7.62x39mm caliber rifles, 5.7x28 caliber rifles and 

pistols, and .50 caliber rifles; each of these types of weapons 

has been seized by ATF in route to Mexico.54 

The OIG’s analysis of National Tracing Center data of Mexican crime 

guns recovered from FY 2004 through FY 2009 confirmed the increase in 

the use of long guns by Mexican drug cartels. During this time, 

the percentage of crime guns recovered in Mexico that were long guns 

steadily increased each year from 20 percent in FY 2004 to 48 percent in 

FY 2009. By contrast, handguns represent a steadily decreasing portion of 

crime guns recovered in Mexico, dropping from 79 percent in FY 2004 to 

50 percent in FY 2009. In FY 2009 long guns and handguns were recovered 

at almost the same rate. 

Our analysis also found that long guns tend to have a shorter time-tocrime than handguns, and shorter time-to-crime intervals generate more 

valuable leads for ATF. According to Mexican crime gun data provided by 

ATF, of Mexican crime guns that were both sold for the first time and traced 

between December 1, 2006, and December 31, 2009, 973 were rifles 

(77 percent) and 279 were handguns (23 percent). 

Evidence also indicates that Mexican cartels are obtaining long guns 

in multiple sales. The case study in the text box below demonstrates how 

high volumes of trafficked long guns can be obtained through multiple gun 

purchases. In that particular case, a trafficking ring purchased at least 336 

weapons, of which the OIG determined through ATF data that 251 

(75 percent) were long guns. Of the 251 long guns, all but 1 were 

purchased as a part of multiple sales, and these sales would have been 

reportable to ATF had they been handguns. According to ATF and other 

Department personnel, this case is one of many ATF cases involving 

multiple purchases of long guns. 

While long guns are increasingly the Mexican cartels’ preferred gun, 

there is no legal requirement in the United States to report multiple sales of 

these weapons. As a result, multiple sales reporting has become less viable 

to ATF as a source of intelligence to identify firearms trafficking 

organizations and disrupt the illegal flow of weapons to Mexico. For 

example, in the case described below, had there been a multiple sales 

reporting requirement on long guns, this case could have been initiated 

soon after March 13, 2006, when the first multiple purchase of a long gun 

took place (three AR-15 assault rifles along with two boxes of ammunition 

valued at $3,347). Instead, ATF did not initiate its investigation until mid54 William Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations, ATF, before the 

Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, U.S. Senate, concerning 

“Law Enforcement Responses to Mexican Drug Cartels” (March 17, 2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 38 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

2007, over 1 year later, when ATF Industry Operations Investigators 

identified the trafficking ring through the inspection of a gun dealer. 

A Case Study of a Firearms Trafficking Ring 

In a statement to Congress on March 4, 2010, ATF’s Deputy Director described a 

case in which straw purchasers bought and trafficked firearms for the Gulf Cartel in 

Mexico. The firearms trafficking ring consisted of 23 suspected traffickers who purchased 

guns and other gear out of Houston from March 13, 2006, to June 5, 2007. The ring 

purchased at least 336 firearms, of which 251 were long guns. These included .223, 7.62, 

and 5.7 caliber rifles. All but one of the long guns were purchased in multiple sales. For 

example, one of the suspects purchased 14 long guns, all weapons of choice, in 1 day from 

1 firearms dealer. Of those 14 long guns, 2 were recovered in Mexico with a time-to-crime 

of under 2.5 years. Table 2 provides additional facts about this case. 

Table 2: Impact of One Firearms Trafficking Ring 

Suspects 23 suspects 

Time frame March 13, 2006, to June 5, 2007; 15 months 

Purchases 96 purchases from 10 firearms dealers 

Value $367,419 total in merchandise, paid mostly in cash 

Sales Individual purchase totals ranged from $2,037 to $42,726 

Firearms 336, plus ammunition, scopes, and other gear 

Long guns 251 long guns purchased 

Mexico recoveries 91 of the 336 total; 87 were long guns 

Traces 21 of the 23 suspects have had traces linked to them 

Time-to-crime Median for the 87 long guns just under 1.5 years 

Shortest 26 days 

Longest 3 years 10 months 

Deaths 57, including 18 law enforcement officers and civilians, plus 39 

gunmen 

Source: ATF Houston Field Division. 

As of June 2010, ATF had shut down the firearms trafficking ring. Eleven of the 

traffickers had been convicted of various offenses, with sentences ranging from 3 months’ 

to 8 years’ imprisonment. The individual who was sentenced to 8 years had purchased 

firearms that were associated with eight murders in Mexico. 

If multiple sales reporting of long guns was required, ATF would have had 

investigative leads to identify the trafficking ring earlier. Such reports also would have 

flagged the buyers’ previous multiple purchases, and ATF could have sought cooperation 

from the straw purchasers to identify the Gulf Cartel members responsible. 

Because reporting multiple sales of handguns generates timely, 

actionable investigative leads for Project Gunrunner, and because long guns 

have become Mexican cartels’ weapons of choice, we believe that the 

reporting of multiple sales of long guns would assist ATF in identifying 

firearms trafficking suspects. Our analysis shows that many long guns 

seized in Mexico have a short time-to-crime and were often a part of a 

multiple purchase. We therefore believe that mandatory reporting of long 

U.S. Department of Justice 39 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
gun multiple sales could help ATF identify, investigate, and refer for 

prosecution individuals who illegally traffic long guns into Mexico. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that ATF: 

2.	 Work with the Department to explore options for seeking a 

requirement for reporting multiple sales of long guns. 

Field Intelligence Groups lack consistent criteria for developing leads and 

have limited capability to monitor lead outcomes. 

We examined how analysts in the Field Intelligence Groups process 

information to develop leads and how Group managers monitor the work of 

the analysts to assess the quality and usefulness of the leads they produce. 

As described in the following sections, there are no minimum national 

standards for Field Intelligence Groups to use in determining which leads to 

forward to agents, and the Groups in the four Southwest border field 

divisions vary in their development of localized standards for screening 

potential leads. Further, we found ATF’s management information systems 

do not enable Field Intelligence Group managers to readily assess the 

outcomes of the leads sent to the criminal investigators for action. 

ATF lacks clear criteria for Field Intelligence Groups to use in screening leads. 

ATF has not established general guidelines or thresholds for Field 

Intelligence Groups to screen investigative leads to ensure that ATF agents 

receive only relevant leads that do not require agents to conduct further 

research. ATF Order 3700.2A, “Criminal Enforcement Intelligence Program 

Standard Operating Policies and Procedures” (October 2004), provides 

general guidance on reporting, collecting, maintaining, and disseminating 

criminal law enforcement and national security information, as well as 

intelligence staff responsibilities. However, the Order does not provide any 

guidelines for field intelligence personnel to follow in determining how to 

develop, screen, and analyze information to create actionable investigative 

leads for agents. 

In February 2005 and again in February 2008, ATF issued criteria for 

referrals from Industry Operations and further required that management in 

each field division “meet and establish criteria for the type and scope of 

criminal information which is of interest to both ATF law enforcement and 

U.S. Department of Justice 40 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

the [USAO].”55 However, these criteria apply only to referrals generated by 

Industry Operations groups, not to referrals generated within the Field 

Intelligence Groups or by other entities. Similarly, ATF’s National Firearms 

Trafficking Implementation Plan does not establish criteria for referrals 

generated within the Groups. 

The most specific standards for investigative leads produced by Field 

Intelligence Groups are found in the ATF Field Intelligence Group 

Supervisor’s Guide Book. The Guide Book states that Intelligence Research 

Specialists assigned to Groups are to collect, evaluate, and analyze 

intelligence to produce “finished tactical and operational analytical 

products.”56 These products are defined as an “analytical product resulting 

from cognitive effort wherein the intelligence research specialist explains 

findings, discloses links, recognizes patterns of activity, and makes 

predictions or recommendations.” However, the Guide Book does not 

describe how field intelligence personnel are to do this. 

We discussed with Southwest border Field Intelligence Group 

employees and supervisors how they determine what leads are of potential 

value to field agents in the absence of agency criteria for them to use in 

determining how to handle leads. They use some type of threshold to 

determine whether a lead should be forwarded to field agents, or not 

forwarded, but the thresholds were primarily focused on Industry 

Operations referrals and were not tailored to the needs of the enforcement 

groups served by Field Intelligence Groups. Specifically: 

1. The Dallas Field Division established written criteria for screening 

referrals of information from Industry Operations in January 2006 

in response to ATF instruction to do so. 

2. The Phoenix Field Division established a written plan and criteria 

to screen referrals of information from Industry Operations In 

February 2009. 

3. The Houston Field Intelligence Group did not have written criteria 

for screening referrals of information from Industry Operations but 

reported using a list of six factors to determine which to refer to 

agents. 

4. The Los Angeles Field Division reported that it did not have criteria 

at the time of our site visit in January 2010, but subsequently 

developed “referral criteria” on the types of violations and 

55 Assistant Director, Enforcement Programs and Services, ATF memorandum to all 

Special Agents in Charge and all Directors, Industry Operations, Referrals of Information, 

February 22, 2005, and ATF Industry Operations Handbook, Handbook 5030.2C (February 

2008), 117. 

56 ATF, Field Intelligence Group Supervisor’s Guide Book (September 2009), 

Appendix. 

U.S. Department of Justice 41 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

information that must be referred to agents through the Field 

Intelligence Group. 

Only one Group (the Dallas Field Division) included criteria designed to 

screen out leads that did not meet the prosecutorial guidelines of the 

division’s USAOs. 

We concluded that the field divisions did not provide sufficient 

guidance to intelligence personnel about how to develop and screen 

intelligence to meet the requirements of the enforcement groups. Two field 

supervisors and Field Intelligence Group members we interviewed cited a 

variety of standards for determining whether particular pieces of 

information should be forwarded to enforcement groups as leads. For 

example, one Intelligence Research Specialist cited three criteria used by her 

Group to ensure that investigative leads sent to field offices are valuable, 

emphasizing that the goal is to forward only “actionable” intelligence, which 

she defined as “information that could help an agent in some way.” The 

criteria cited by that Intelligence Research Specialist were that leads be: 

(1) original, meaning not already under investigation by another office; 

(2) timely – so that the agent can be relatively assured that the suspect is 

still retrievable; and (3) of federal interest, with leads that are better suited 

for state and local law enforcement referred there rather than to ATF field 

offices. 

A member of a different Field Intelligence Group stated that the goal is 

to give agents as much information as possible about a suspect. That 

Group member said that he relies on his instincts and considers factors 

such as the time-to-crime of a gun trace. He also stated that if the time-tocrime is within 2 years he automatically sends the lead, but if it is older 

than 2 years, he may not. We noted that this is not consistent with the 

need for more recent time-to-crime leads generally described to us by 

agents. A Group supervisor in another division stated that the analysts are 

expected to use discretion when screening information to eliminate the 

“white noise” and provide the most relevant information to the field. 

Some Field Intelligence Group supervisors and members told us that 

they knew some leads they provided had no likely investigative value to 

agents. One supervisor commented, “A lot of times, the agents in the field 

can’t work that referral . . . most likely it won’t lead to a prosecution . . . .” 

That supervisor believed the information to be valuable nonetheless because 

it added to other information that the agents are receiving. Regarding the 

time-to-crime of a gun trace, the supervisor said the Group forwards 

investigative leads to the field on any gun recovered in Mexico with a timeto-crime of 1 year or less. An Intelligence Research Specialist assigned to 

that Group told us that referrals sent to field agents are often not adequate 

and have little investigative potential when the time-to-crime is longer than 

U.S. Department of Justice 42 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

1 year. Other Group members who said that some leads on Mexican crime 

guns had no investigative value stated that many of those leads were based 

on information that was outdated when the Group received it. 

Field Intelligence Group managers cannot effectively monitor the quality or 

status of Industry Operations leads referred to enforcement groups. 

In discussing the quality of leads with Field Intelligence Group 

supervisors, we found that they have limited capability to monitor the 

referrals they receive from Industry Operations and to obtain feedback on 

the results of leads their Groups provide to agents.57 ATF requires Field 

Intelligence Groups to monitor the timeliness of their processing of referrals 

they receive from Industry Operations, including whether they accept or 

reject each referral, and to provide quarterly reports on the status of 

referrals. The Groups are also required to monitor the status of referrals 

that are accepted and forwarded to enforcement groups. Enforcement 

groups receiving referrals from Field Intelligence Groups are required to 

annotate in N-Force, within 30 days, if no investigative activity has 

occurred. This is so that field offices, which have access to N-Force, can 

assess their effectiveness through performance measures such as how many 

referrals were made under which statute, the number of criminal cases 

initiated because of referrals, and case outcomes. ATF further emphasized 

the importance of referrals in the 2009 National Firearms Trafficking 

Implementation Plan by adding a performance measure to evaluate the 

quality of referrals sent to Criminal Enforcement. 

However, both Field Intelligence Group supervisors and Industry 

Operations Area Supervisors told us that tracking the disposition of 

referrals and providing feedback is cumbersome because ATF’s enforcement 

and industry operations databases (N-Force and N-Spect) are not integrated 

and because agents can access only N-Force and Industry Operations 

Investigators can access only N-Spect. The Chief of ATF’s Office of Strategic 

Management, which is responsible for ATF data management, stated that 

because the N-Spect and N-Force systems are not linked electronically, 

when Industry Operations makes a referral to Criminal Enforcement, the 

referral is made “off line” – by e-mail, hand delivery, or regular mail. After 

the referral is made, the N-Spect file is closed, and there is generally no 

reporting on the progress of the referral. 

Because the referral process is not automated, each referral is 

forwarded on a printed form, and Field Intelligence Group supervisors track 

57 ATF Order 3700.2A defines intelligence feedback as “interaction between 

consumers of finished intelligence and the producers to help intelligence managers evaluate 

the effectiveness of intelligence support, identify intelligence gaps, and focus more precisely 

on consumer needs.” 

U.S. Department of Justice 43 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
referrals using individually developed spreadsheets into which they enter 

information. This information includes the date of the lead, its source 

(Industry Operations or other), the enforcement group to which it was sent, 

and the status of the lead – that is, whether it was closed or an agent was 

assigned to it and pursued the lead. To obtain outcome data for the 

spreadsheets, the supervisors search N-Force and manually retrieve the 

data, which some said was time-consuming. For example, one Group 

supervisor told us that to produce the required quarterly status reports, he 

must search all “open” referrals in N-Force, update the disposition field for 

every active referral on his spreadsheet, and forward the updated 

spreadsheet to the Industry Operations Area Supervisor. That supervisor in 

turn must access N-Spect and update the disposition of each open referral 

in that system. 

In addition, we observed that the information in Field Intelligence 

Group supervisors’ spreadsheets did not contain feedback from enforcement 

groups about the utility of the investigative leads the Group provided, 

whether from Industry Operations or leads developed by the Field 

Intelligence Group itself. Agents enter information into N-Force using dropdown menus that contain generic reasons for closure of a lead. The agents 

can also provide specific feedback on the lead in an open comment field. 

However, we were told that agents did not often enter into N-Force the 

specific reasons that a lead was not useful, such as why it did not meet 

prosecutorial guidelines or how it could have been improved. Some field 

personnel told us that they may request specific feedback on their leads 

directly from agents and field supervisors, particularly in offices where the 

agents and Groups are co-located. Nonetheless, we concluded that tracked 

information was not effective in allowing the Group supervisors or members 

to assess the utility of the leads they provided to agents or to provide 

Industry Operations with specific feedback on their referrals. 

The difficulty of determining referral outcomes was demonstrated by 

the efforts ATF undertook to provide the OIG with a limited sample of the 

outcome of Industry Operations referrals to Criminal Enforcement through 

Field Intelligence Groups. In December 2009, we requested the number of 

Industry Operations referrals to Criminal Enforcement through Field 

Intelligence Groups from FY 2004 through FY 2009, and their outcomes 

(whether the referrals were accepted and how many resulted in a criminal 

investigation). In April 2010, ATF headquarters provided data that indicated 

5,106 referrals were made by the four field division Field Intelligence Groups 

in the stated period. We determined that 476 of those referrals were 

(1) firearms-related, (2) referred within ATF, and (3) shown as “accepted” in 

U.S. Department of Justice 44 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

N-Force.58 In May 2010, we asked the Office of Strategic Management to 

provide us the N-Force case management log entries for a random sample of 

213 cases. That data was finally provided on August 4, 2010. 

When asked why the process had taken so long, the Chief of ATF’s 

Office of Strategic Management, which is responsible for ATF data 

management, stated it took months to research and to document the 

specific referral outcomes because of limits in ATF’s case management 

system. Staff in ATF’s Field Operations Office had to research each 

individual referral to locate and document the outcome information. The 

Chief stated that ATF has annually sought funding needed to modernize its 

case management system, but that the requests have been disapproved.59 

Recommendations 

We recommend that ATF: 

3.	 Ensure that each Southwest border firearms trafficking 

enforcement group develops and regularly updates guidelines for 

their Field Intelligence Group that specify the most useful types 

of investigative leads. 

4.	 Develop an automated process that enables ATF managers to 

track and evaluate the usefulness of investigative leads provided 

to firearms trafficking enforcement groups. 

ATF intelligence personnel are not adequately sharing firearms 

trafficking information with each other to develop or enhance 

intelligence to further investigations. 

Despite the importance of intelligence to Project Gunrunner’s mission, 

we found that sharing of firearms trafficking-related information and 

techniques among intelligence personnel in Southwest border locations and 

in the Mexico Country Office is limited. 

58 We excluded referrals sent to other federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies as these entities are not required to provide ATF with status reports on the 

outcomes of the referrals. 

59 Budget documents show that ATF has requested funds to improve various 

N-Force and N-Spect capabilities since at least FY 2004. In its FY 2012 budget request, 

ATF requested $3.3 million for this purpose. Proposed improvements include providing a 

single entry point for all investigative and inspection information and reducing data 

redundancy. As of August 2010, ATF had not received funds to upgrade N-Force and 

N-Spect for this purpose. 

U.S. Department of Justice 45 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

Routine sharing of information among intelligence personnel is limited. 

ATF Order 3700.2A directs Intelligence Research Specialists to 

“routinely interact with their counterparts in other field divisions, and 

conduct liaison with analysts from other law enforcement agencies and the 

Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information.”60 The ATF Office of 

Strategic Intelligence and Information subsequently created an Intelligence 

Collection Plan to establish information collection and exchange procedures 

for Project Gunrunner, including intelligence that may be shared with 

Mexican officials. The Plan states that to develop “real-time, actionable 

intelligence relating to firearms trafficking networks operating in both the 

United States and Mexico,” ATF field offices will establish procedures to 

collect information from a variety of sources, including “exchanging 

information with other ATF field offices . . . .” ATF’s National Firearms 

Trafficking Enforcement Implementation Plan, sent from the Acting 

Assistant Director (Field Operations) to all Special Agents in Charge on 

June 25, 2009, mandated that the Intelligence Collection Plan be provided 

to, and “thoroughly reviewed by,” all Field Intelligence Group personnel by 

July 31, 2009. ATF also established the requirement for Field Intelligence 

Group communications in its June 2007 Gunrunner strategy, which stated, 

“ATF [Field Intelligence Groups] need to coordinate inter- and intra-division 

intelligence activities much like operational activities.”61 

During our fieldwork, we interviewed 11 intelligence personnel in 

Southwest border field divisions and Mexico City, as well as 4 of their 

supervisors. We determined through those interviews that routine 

communication between Field Intelligence Groups primarily occurs at the 

supervisory level. Southwest border Field Intelligence Group supervisors 

participate in quarterly teleconferences with their counterparts in the 

Western region and ATF headquarters intelligence personnel from the Office 

of Strategic Intelligence and Information to share information on 

investigations and trends related to firearms trafficking. The supervisors 

also told us that, although each Group pursues cases separately, the 

supervisors contact each other when they need to and share information 

pertaining to cases or investigative referrals with other Field Intelligence 

Groups. However, we determined that non-supervisory Group members do 

not participate in these exchanges. 

Non-supervisory intelligence personnel in these offices told us that 

they rarely receive information from their counterparts in other Southwest 

border field divisions and that they communicate with these counterparts 

60 ATF Order 3700.2A, “Criminal Enforcement Intelligence Program Standard 

Operating Policies and Procedures” (October 2004), 12. 

61 ATF, Southwest Border Initiative: Project Gunrunner (June 2007), I-13. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

46 
infrequently. In addition to the lack of communication across Field 

Intelligence Groups, non-supervisory staff members told us there is limited 

interaction and poor communication internal to the field division – both 

among Field Intelligence Group members and with non-Group members 

working on Project Gunrunner, such as agents and Industry Operations 

Investigators. In our interviews, we were told that intelligence personnel are 

typically excluded from meetings with agents. An Intelligence Research 

Specialist in one Field Intelligence Group said the Specialists are not 

included in meetings with agents and do not receive the information they 

need to effectively support the cases the agents are working on. This 

Specialist stated that the Intelligence Research Specialists should not be 

overlooked by agents as they perform additional research to supplement the 

information provided to agents to support their cases. 

An Intelligence Research Specialist in another Field Intelligence Group 

said that because personnel working on Project Gunrunner – including 

agents, Intelligence Research Specialists, and Industry Operations 

Investigators – do not all communicate, they do not understand each other’s 

responsibilities. Further, she said intelligence personnel were missing 

opportunities to regularly share firearms trafficking-related information and 

analytical techniques with their intelligence peers that they told us would be 

useful to them. 

Field Intelligence Group supervisors, Office of Strategic Intelligence 

and Information staff, and Mexico Country Office personnel also told us that 

they believed there is a need for more communication between Field 

Intelligence Groups. For example, a Southwest border Group supervisor 

stated that it would be beneficial to have one-on-one meetings between Field 

Intelligence Group supervisors and the Intelligence Research Specialists 

working on Project Gunrunner cases to discuss the available information 

and to coordinate with each other. Similarly, Office of Strategic Intelligence 

and Information officials told us that Field Intelligence Groups are 

responsible for communication and deconfliction across divisions and 

therefore the Groups need to increase the information flow between them. 

An Assistant Attaché in ATF’s Mexico Country Office also stated that 

communication between Southwest border Field Intelligence Group 

personnel needed to be improved to increase the flow of information to 

Mexico. 

We were told by Southwest border intelligence personnel that nonsupervisory intelligence personnel have not been included in cross-division 

Field Intelligence Group conferences. Intelligence Research Specialists we 

interviewed stated that attending such conferences would enable them to, 

for example, identify regional and national needs, inform ATF managers 

what resources the intelligence personnel need to accomplish their job, and 

allow the personnel to share best practices. Several Group members stated 

U.S. Department of Justice 47 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

 

that this type of collaboration with each other would help the Groups to 

operate more efficiently and to better support agents’ needs. 

ATF officials told us of two recent conferences held by the Office of 

Strategic Intelligence and Information. The first was a national Field 

Intelligence Group conference in August 2009 with an agenda that included 

intelligence requirements and analysis of firearms trafficking. However, that 

conference was limited to Group supervisors, Assistant Special Agents in 

Charge, and Special Agents in Charge. Non-supervisory intelligence 

personnel were excluded. The second national Field Intelligence Group 

conference, held in August 2010, included non-supervisory intelligence 

personnel, but ATF officials told us the conference was not focused on 

Project Gunrunner or Southwest border issues. 

ATF border liaisons are not effectively coordinating with ATF’s Mexico 

Country Office. 

The Border Liaison Program is a key element of Project Gunrunner’s 

information sharing strategy. ATF’s June 2007 Project Gunrunner strategy 

states that each Southwest border field division will assign a special agent 

to act as border liaison in the respective division area of operation. The 

strategy states that border liaisons “will be the front line of [the Project 

Gunrunner] initiative, attacking the issues on the ground level. In their 

areas of operation, they will be responsible for driving the collection and 

subsequent dissemination of actionable investigative intelligence through 

the Project Gunrunner structure.”62 

Designated border liaisons in each Southwest border field division are 

required by ATF’s Intelligence Collection Plan to share firearms trafficking 

intelligence with both EPIC and the Mexico Country Office. Further, ATF’s 

Gunrunner strategy states that all ATF activities in Mexico should be 

coordinated through the Mexico Country Office at the U.S. Embassy in 

Mexico City. The Gunrunner strategy states that “failure to coordinate all 

ATF official activities can cause serious problems for all personnel in 

country and for TDY personnel requiring country clearance or other 

diplomatic assistance.”63 Mexico Country Office staff also stated that it is 

vital for them to be aware of all discussions and agreements between border 

liaisons and Mexican officials so that ATF’s position and response are 

uniform. 

However, we found the border liaisons were not effectively 

coordinating with the ATF Mexico Country Office. Staff in the Mexico 

62 ATF, Southwest Border Initiative: Project Gunrunner (June 2007), 12. 

63 ATF, Southwest Border Initiative: Project Gunrunner (June 2007), 5. 

U.S. Department of Justice 48 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

Country Office told us that border liaisons had frequently been traveling 

back and forth to Mexico and holding discussions with Mexican officials 

without the required coordination.64 We were told that key firearms 

trafficking intelligence collected by border liaisons and outcomes of 

meetings between border liaisons and Mexican officials were not 

consistently shared with the ATF Mexico Country Office, which created 

problems. For example, border liaisons told Mexican officials that ATF 

would be able to provide them with requested training, but the Office was 

unaware of the obligation and unable to provide the training. Mexico 

Country Office staff told us, “We want to make sure we can deliver what’s 

promised to the Mexicans. It’s a coordination issue.”65 

Another ATF Assistant Attaché described the border liaison process as 

“disjointed” and informal. He noted that the Border Liaison Program is new 

for ATF and that ATF officials “need to work the kinks out.” Although he 

explained that the border liaisons contact him when they need something, 

he told us that some field divisions’ liaisons are more proactive than others. 

Yet another Assistant Attaché told us he does not even know who the border 

liaisons are in ATF or what they are doing and he “never hears from them.” 

ATF Mexico Country Office officials told us that they believe the 

problems stemmed from a lack of direction governing the information 

exchange and communication protocols for border liaisons. One Assistant 

Attaché said he has tried on multiple occasions to convene a meeting with 

all border liaisons to devise a strategy for intelligence exchange between the 

border liaisons and the Mexico Country Office, but has not been successful. 

That Assistant Attaché said, “[Mexico Country Office] has an overall strategy 

in Mexico and would like to have an overall strategy ATF-wide . . . then 

[border liaisons] would fit within that strategy.” According to the Mexico 

Country Office, a coordinated approach has been difficult to develop 

because the liaisons report to their respective field divisions, while the 

Mexico Country Office is organizationally aligned under the International 

Affairs Office at ATF headquarters. 

64 Border liaisons told us they often coordinate with the Mexico Country Office 

representative at the location closest to them. For example, the border liaison in the 

San Diego Field Office might contact the Assistant Attaché assigned to the consulate in 

Tijuana, Mexico. 

65 During our site visit in March 2010, Mexico Country Office staff indicated that 

ATF created rules requiring border liaisons to contact Mexico City in advance of any travel 

to Mexico and that since the rules were established, communications have improved. 

However, when we inquired about those rules, the Chief of ATF’s International Affairs Office 

reported that ATF does not currently have a directive addressing border liaisons but that 

border liaisons will be addressed in a Foreign Operations Order, which was still being 

drafted as of July 2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 49 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
We examined the direction given to the border liaisons and found that 

one reason for the lack of coordination may be that the duties of the border 

liaison position have not been well defined. Only the Phoenix Field Division 

has established a written description of qualifications and responsibilities 

for its border liaisons. According to that description, prior to any meetings 

in Mexico the border liaisons were to advise their supervisors of the 

intended travel and receive prior approval from their Assistant Special Agent 

in Charge or Special Agent in Charge. The description states that it is the 

Phoenix Field Division’s responsibility to ensure that the Mexico Country 

Office is made aware of any significant liaison activities in Mexico prior to 

assistance being rendered. The description also requires liaisons to 

document their activities in N-Force at the end of each month for review and 

to forward the information to the Mexico Country Office and International 

Affairs Office (at ATF headquarters). ATF provided us no additional 

information on the roles or responsibilities of its border liaison personnel at 

other Southwest border field divisions. 

In sum, we found that ATF has not established minimum 

expectations for border liaisons’ information sharing role with the 

government of Mexico, the ATF Mexico Country Office, or within their own 

field divisions. While variation in the role of liaisons in different field 

divisions is to be expected, we believe that ATF should establish minimum 

expectations for the border liaisons to ensure that they effectively coordinate 

their actions in Mexico with ATF’s Mexico Country Office. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that ATF: 

5.	 Develop and implement procedures for Southwest border 

intelligence personnel to routinely exchange intelligence-related 

information in accordance with ATF Order 3700.2A and the 

Intelligence Collection Plan. 

6.	 Develop a method for Southwest border intelligence personnel to 

regularly share analytical techniques and best practices 

pertaining to Project Gunrunner. 

7.	 Formalize a position description that establishes minimum 

expectations regarding the roles and responsibilities of border 

liaisons. 

U.S. Department of Justice 50 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
PART III: ATF INVESTIGATIVE FOCUS 

ATF has not focused its enforcement efforts on complex 

conspiracy investigations with multiple defendants, which 

are the type of cases that can best disrupt firearms 

trafficking rings. Further, ATF is not fully utilizing the 

OCDETF Program to investigate complex conspiracy 

firearms trafficking-related Project Gunrunner cases. 

Because firearms trafficking is not specifically prohibited 

by any federal statute, when ATF does identify trafficking 

operations, it must use other charges – such as providing 

false information on a federal form – that may be difficult 

to prove, result in fewer prosecutions by USAOs, or carry 

low penalties. As a result, USAOs often decline ATF’s cases 

that are based on the most commonly used statutes at a 

higher rate than other Project Gunrunner cases. 

Project Gunrunner’s focus has remained on gun dealer inspections and 

straw purchaser investigations rather than targeting higher-level 

traffickers, smugglers, and recipients of firearms. 

As in other types of organized crime, leaders of firearms trafficking 

rings typically conspire to commit a series of crimes and deploy lower-level 

members to carry out those crimes. Although Project Gunrunner has 

initiated and referred more individual cases for prosecution, as discussed in 

Part I of this report, those cases mostly involve straw purchasers and 

corrupt gun dealers, not those who organize and command the trafficking 

operations. ATF does not measure the number of complex conspiracy cases 

it initiates or refers for prosecution, but our analysis found that 68 percent 

of Project Gunrunner cases referred to USAOs for prosecution through the 

end of FY 2009 were single defendant cases. ATF personnel in one field 

division told us that they felt that their management discouraged them from 

conducting the kinds of complex conspiracy cases that can target higherlevel members of trafficking rings. 

Firearms trafficking conspiracies can involve multiple violations of U.S. law. 

Although no federal law specifically prohibits firearms trafficking, the 

members of trafficking rings typically violate federal firearms and export 

laws when obtaining and smuggling guns to Mexico. Straw purchasers 

commit a criminal act by lying on the federal Firearms Transaction Record 

(Form 4473), which requires purchasers to certify that they are not buying 

the guns on behalf of others before a gun dealer can sell them the guns. 

“Prohibited persons” commit criminal acts by obtaining weapons at gun 

U.S. Department of Justice 51 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

shows that they are not allowed to possess because, for example, they have 

criminal convictions or are illegal or nonimmigrant aliens.66 The act of 

paying others to illegally purchase and supply guns also is a violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), which is one of the most common statutes under 

which ATF’s Project Gunrunner cases are prosecuted, as discussed later in 

this Part of the report. Smuggling illegally obtained guns across the border 

into Mexico is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554, a statute under which ICE 

cases are typically prosecuted.67 And while the violent criminal activities of 

the cartels in Mexico do not fall under U.S. law, the United States can 

extradite traffickers from Mexico and prosecute them for any crimes they 

have committed in the United States. 

Although the members of firearms trafficking rings typically conspire 

to commit crimes in the United States when obtaining and smuggling guns 

to Mexico, we found that Project Gunrunner is aimed primarily at the initial 

sellers and purchasers of guns, not at those who direct and most profit from 

the trafficking. USAO and ATF personnel we interviewed stated that Project 

Gunrunner cases rarely pursue those who request and pay for the guns. 

Although typically these cases pursue one or two suspects, others – 

including those orchestrating the conspiracy – usually escape prosecution. 

This low-level investigative focus is discussed in ATF’s 2009 National 

Firearms Trafficking Enforcement Strategy and the accompanying 

Implementation Plan, which emphasize investigations of gun dealers with 

firearms trafficking indicators, gun shows, flea markets, unlicensed dealers, 

and straw purchasers. 

ATF has not focused enforcement efforts on complex conspiracy cases 

involving multiple defendants. 

The OIG’s analysis of all Project Gunrunner cases that ATF referred to 

USAOs for prosecution from FY 2004 through FY 2009 found that the 

majority (68 percent) involved only 1 defendant (see Table 3). Only 

5 percent of the cases had more than 6 defendants, and 2 percent had more 

than 10 defendants. Overall, the average number of defendants per case 

was 2.03. 

66 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) lists nine categories of prohibited persons. 

67 18 U.S.C. § 554 states that whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends 

from the United States, or attempts to export or send from the United States, any 

merchandise, article, or object contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, or 

receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, 

concealment, or sale of such merchandise, article or object, prior to exportation, knowing 

the same to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or regulation of the 

United States, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 

U.S. Department of Justice 52 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Table 3: ATF Project Gunrunner Cases and Defendants 

Number 

of Cases 

Percentage

of Cases 

Cases with 1 defendant 693 68% 

Cases with 2 defendants 150 15% 

Cases with 3-5 defendants 118 12% 

Cases with 6-10 defendants 35 3% 

Cases with more than 10 defendants 19 2% 

Totals 1,015 100% 

Source: ATF N-Force data. 

AUSAs in Southwest border locations told us that directing the efforts 

of Project Gunrunner toward building larger, multi-defendant conspiracy 

cases would better disrupt the trafficking organizations. For example, one 

AUSA discussed the benefit of pursuing the top of the trafficking 

organizations, although he said he did not receive many of those cases from 

ATF. He stated: 

Are there 15 or 20 guys told to go out and buy 1 gun [each] 

which are [then] collected at one point? Can we find that 

collector, the one who is actually gathering up the stuff? Where 

is the money coming from? . . . If you answer those questions, 

then you can start making some progress in terms of fighting 

guns going south. 

Other AUSAs told the OIG that they also had a strong preference for larger, 

complex conspiracy cases. 

In our interviews with agents in one Southwest border field division, 

we found that a contributing factor to ATF’s lack of multi-defendant cases 

was the approach of field supervisors. ATF staff in this field division told us 

they felt discouraged from conducting complex conspiracy cases. Agents we 

interviewed told us that after investigating the lower ranking members of a 

firearms trafficking ring, cases are often closed and referred for prosecution. 

These agents stated that they believe this practice limited their ability to 

pursue higher level cases and resulted in cases being opened and closed 

quickly, with less regard to the significance or outcome of the cases. 

We asked the ATF Special Agent in Charge of that field division about 

pursuing these higher level cases. He acknowledged that he preferred his 

agents to initiate cases that could be completed within 1 month rather than 

cases that involve surveillance, wiretaps, and other investigative methods 

typical of complex conspiracy cases. 

U.S. Department of Justice 53 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

One Field Intelligence Group supervisor told us that Project 

Gunrunner is not seeking information to conduct proactive investigations 

and producing complex conspiracy cases for prosecution. According to this 

supervisor, ATF should conduct its investigations “with the mindset of not 

only ‘you [the suspects] are guilty of this,’ but ‘Where did you get that gun?’” 

He went on to say, “If we know that specific individuals . . . are hiring straw 

purchasers . . . we can target them, do surveillance on them, build a 

conspiracy case, and go after them.” 

After we provided a draft of this report to ATF, ATF issued a strategy 

document, entitled “Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused Strategy” 

(September 2010 cartel strategy), to revise its approach to combating 

firearms trafficking to Mexico and related violence. ATF distributed the 

strategy document to ATF field personnel and International Affairs Office 

staff on September 16, 2010. In this document ATF acknowledged the 

limitations of ATF’s historical investigative focus on straw purchasers and 

corrupt gun dealers and stated that ATF would “place greater emphasis on 

multi-defendant conspiracy cases that focus on persons who organize, 

direct, and finance cartel-related firearms and explosives trafficking 

operations.”68 

Recommendation 

We recommend that ATF: 

8.	 Focus on developing more complex conspiracy cases against 

higher level gun traffickers and gun trafficking conspirators. 

Project Gunrunner has not made full use of the OCDETF Program’s 

resources to conduct more complex conspiracy investigations. 

ATF’s Project Gunrunner investigations generally have not been 

conducted in coordination with the Department’s multi-agency Organized 

Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program, which often 

targets drug organizations. Although ATF has achieved some good results 

when coordinating with OCDETF, we found that ATF’s focus on fast 

investigations as well as management and staff misunderstandings about 

how the OCDETF Program works have created barriers to greater 

coordination. 

The OIG’s analysis of ATF case data illustrated ATF’s underutilization 

of the OCDETF Program. Of the 374 Project Gunrunner cases that ATF 

68 ATF, “Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused Strategy” (September 2010), 4. 

U.S. Department of Justice 54 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

closed in FY 2009, only 8 percent (30 cases) were designated as OCDETF.69 

We also found that when ATF referred OCDETF cases to USAOs for 

prosecution, the cases resulted in much longer sentences than 

non-OCDETF cases. The 30 Project Gunrunner cases designated as 

OCDETF resulted in an average sentence of 80 months. In comparison, the 

average sentence for all Project Gunrunner cases from FY 2004 through 

FY 2009 was 33 months. Similarly, the average number of defendants 

differed sharply. While the average number of defendants for the 30 

OCDETF cases was 6, the average number of defendants for all Project 

Gunrunner cases was just 2. 

ATF previously has directed staff to use the OCDETF Program, and the 

Department now requires that the OCEDETF Program be used for cases 

involving Mexican drug cartels. 

ATF policy has directed field staff to use the OCDETF Program since 

at least July 2005, and in ATF’s June 2007 Gunrunner strategy, ATF 

emphasized using OCDETF for appropriate firearms trafficking cases.70 

According to the Gunrunner strategy, “OCDETF assets will be sought at the 

earliest possible time once a qualifying nexus to a known [drug trafficking 

organization] is documented.”71 Further, in April 2009, the Associate 

Deputy Attorney General serving as the Director of the OCDETF Program 

issued a memorandum stating that firearms trafficking cases are eligible for 

the OCDETF Program. He stated: 

Investigations principally targeting firearms trafficking, rather 

than the underlying drug trafficking, are eligible for OCDETF 

designation if there is a sufficient nexus between the firearms 

and a major Mexican drug trafficking organization, provided the 

investigation otherwise meets OCDETF case standards.72 

Despite this emphasis, in the 15-month period following the memorandum, 

ATF reported that it has opened only 11 OCDETF cases related to the 

firearms trafficking activities of Mexican drug cartels. 

69 ATF was the lead agency in 21 percent (768 of 3,671) of all OCDETF cases in 

which ATF participated from FY 2004 through FY 2009. 

70 ATF Order 3530.3, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program (July 

2005), and ATF Southwest Border Initiative Project Gunrunner (June 2007). 

71 ATF, Southwest Border Initiative: Project Gunrunner (June 2007), 12. 

72 Stuart G. Nash, Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of OCDETF, 

memorandum to OCDETF Regional Agency and AUSA Coordinators, Lead Task Force 

Attorneys, Executive Assistants, and Washington Agency Representatives Group, 

Guidelines for Consideration of OCDETF Designation for Firearms Trafficking Cases 

Related to Mexican Drug Cartels, April 27, 2009. 

U.S. Department of Justice 55 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

In January 2010, the Deputy Attorney General required ATF and 

other Department components to use the OCDETF Program for all activities 

targeting the Mexican cartels as part of the Department’s strategy for 

combating the cartels (cartel strategy). The cartel strategy specifically 

identified combating firearms trafficking as a key objective, named Project 

Gunrunner as the primary ATF initiative in achieving that objective, and 

stated that “increasingly close collaboration between ATF and the efforts of 

the multi-agency drug task forces along the border, including, most 

particularly, the OCDETF co-located Strike Forces, ensures that scarce ATF 

resources are directed at the most important targets.”73 

ATF’s use of the OCDETF Program is limited by ATF’s focus on fast 

investigations, misunderstandings about the program, and low numbers of 

ATF staff assigned to OCDETF task forces. 

We found that three factors have limited ATF’s use of the OCDETF 

Program in the past – ATF’s focus on fast investigations, misunderstandings 

about how the OCDETF Program operates, and ATF supervisors assigning 

few or no staff to OCDETF task forces. 

The same ATF agents in the Southwest border field division who 

reported that they felt discouraged from pursuing complex conspiracy cases 

told us that field supervisors generally discouraged OCDETF cases because 

the supervisors favored faster investigations. For example, an agent we 

interviewed from a firearms trafficking enforcement group described “taking 

a lot of heat” for having taken a case to the OCDETF Program. The agent 

said that ATF field management had previously turned down a number of 

cases that might have been proposed for OCDETF consideration. The agent 

said that not using the OCDETF Program has resulted in agents not 

pursuing the “higher people in the food chain” of the trafficking rings. 

The OIG asked an ATF official responsible for coordinating ATF’s 

participation in the OCDETF Program why ATF field staff were reluctant to 

use the program. The official expressed concern that staff across the 

Southwest border, especially managers, incorrectly believed that a case 

could be counted as a Project Gunrunner or an OCDETF case for the 

purposes of ATF’s performance measures, but not both. As a result, 

managers were reluctant to take cases to OCDETF. The official said the 

reluctance was continuing despite the Deputy Attorney General’s 2010 

cartel strategy and 2009 direction from the OCDETF Executive Council to 

use OCDETF against drug cartels’ firearms trafficking. 

73 David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, memorandum to heads of 

Department components and all United States Attorneys, Strategy for Combating the 

Mexican Cartels, January 7, 2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 56 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

We also found that some ATF agents misunderstood the requirements 

of the OCDETF Program in ways that may have contributed to the low 

number of OCDETF-Gunrunner cases. In September 2010, ATF told the 

OIG that, prior to the April 2009 OCDETF Director’s memorandum, ATF 

firearms trafficking investigations with no significant drug trafficking nexus 

were frequently refused by the OCDETF Program. However, our review 

found that even after the April 2009 memorandum, some agents still 

believed that OCDETF cases must be brought mainly against persons and 

organizations on the Department’s priority drug target list.74 Other ATF 

agents indicated that they did not believe that AUSAs would be interested in 

OCDETF cases involving firearms trafficking, rather than drug trafficking. 

For example, one field supervisor said he believed that to present an 

OCDETF case, ATF agents “better have a DEA guy or an ICE guy sitting next 

to them.” ATF agents said that ATF senior management needed to send a 

clarification to all field staff instructing them to fully implement the Deputy 

Attorney General’s cartel strategy. 

We also noted that in some locations, ATF supervisors have assigned 

few or no staff to OCDETF task forces operating in their areas. For example, 

in McAllen, Texas – a center of firearms trafficking activity where ATF has 

two enforcement groups, including one dedicated to Project Gunrunner – 

ATF has only two agents in the OCDETF satellite office. In San Diego, 

where ATF has three enforcement teams, one of which is dedicated to 

Project Gunrunner, only one agent is assigned to the OCDETF task force. 

In Laredo, Texas, ATF has no agents assigned to the OCDETF task force. 

In contrast, ATF’s Phoenix Field Division has an enforcement group 

(up to 10 agents) assigned to and co-located with the Phoenix OCDETF task 

force. Through one ongoing case from that task force, the ATF agents 

indicted four people and identified a suspect in Mexico as the head of the 

trafficking ring. The supervisor of that enforcement group said, “If it is a 

bigger case that’s going to [succeed] on the border, there is a good chance 

you are going to spend some money,” and that OCDETF was an important 

way to obtain the resources needed for complex conspiracy investigations. 

Other ATF staff we interviewed told us that through OCDETF task forces 

they can obtain intelligence from other agencies, particularly the DEA, on 

drug cartels’ firearms trafficking activity, helping ATF to investigate firearms 

trafficking rings, not just straw purchasers. 

We asked ATF officials why they had not assigned more staff to 

OCDETF task forces. ATF responded that it makes decisions based on 

74 The Department maintains a unified list of international “command and control” 

drug traffickers and money launderers called the Consolidated Priority Organization Target 

list. 

U.S. Department of Justice 57 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

where it sees “cases of firearms trafficking or violations of other federal 

firearm laws more pronounced and where they can maximize results of 

affecting violent crime. 75” 

According to an ATF official responsible for ATF’s participation in the 

OCDETF Program, in the past, ATF has consistently requested more funding 

from the OCDETF Program to cover additional agents that ATF assigns to 

OCDETF cases. However, the official said that the requests have been 

rejected by the Department’s Justice Management Division or the White 

House Office of Management and Budget. 

In its September 2010 cartel strategy document, ATF emphasized the 

advantages of using OCDETF as a part of its efforts to impede firearms 

trafficking to Mexico. The memorandum that accompanied the strategy 

document stated, “At the heart of our increased emphasis on cartel focused 

investigations is greater use of the [OCDETF] program” and the strategy 

itself directed all field offices to “consider assigning a complement of special 

agents” to the OCDETF task forces.76 

Recommendation 

We recommend that ATF: 

9.	 Send guidance to field management, agents, and intelligence staff 

encouraging them to participate in and exploit the resources and 

tools of the OCDETF Program, as directed in the Deputy Attorney 

General’s Cartel Strategy. 

Statutes used to combat firearms trafficking do not have strong 

penalties. 

There is no federal statute specifically prohibiting firearms trafficking 

or straw purchases. Consequently, ATF agents and federal prosecutors use 

other criminal statutes to charge individuals involved in firearms trafficking 

crimes. These statutes carry relatively low sentences, particularly for straw 

purchasers of guns. The Sentencing Guidelines also provide short 

sentences for firearms trafficking-related crimes. As a result, individuals 

75 As of September 2010, ATF reported that, in addition to the task force in 

Phoenix, it had an enforcement group (12 personnel) assigned to the Houston OCDETF task 

force and 1 agent each assigned to OCDETF task forces in El Paso, Texas, and Tucson, 

Arizona. 

76 Mark R. Chait, Assistant Director for Field Operations, memorandum to all 

Assistant Directors and Field Operations Personnel, Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused 

Strategy, September 8, 2010, and ATF, “Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused Strategy” 

(September 2010), 10. 

U.S. Department of Justice 58 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

 

convicted under these statutes generally receive lower penalties than 

persons convicted of other types of trafficking. 

In the absence of a specific federal statute, ATF uses a wide variety of 

statutes to address criminal firearms trafficking activities. 

According to ATF guidelines for implementing the Gun Control Act, the 

statutes that are most useful in investigating illegal firearms trafficking 

activities include 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924.77 These statutes include 

subsections that address falsifying information when purchasing a gun. 

Neither statute specifically prohibits firearms trafficking or straw 

purchasing.78 

We analyzed ATF data on all Project Gunrunner cases referred to 

USAOs for prosecution between FY 2004 and FY 2009 and identified the 

most frequently used statutes and the average sentences given in cases that 

were prosecuted federally.79 ATF used 75 different statutes to obtain federal 

prosecutions of Project Gunrunner cases during that period.80 We 

determined through our interviews of ATF personnel and analysis of ATF 

cases referred to USAOs for prosecution that four of the statutes are most 

often used to build cases against firearms traffickers: 

1. Knowingly making a false statement – 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) – 

ATF commonly uses this charge for straw purchasers who 

knowingly made false statements to gun dealers or in the records 

that gun dealers are required to maintain (Form 4473); 

2. Knowingly making a false statement in connection with a firearm 

purchase – 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) – ATF commonly uses this charge 

when individuals make false statements that affect the legality of 

sales;81 

77 ATF Order 3310.4B, Firearms Enforcement Program (February 1989), 109. 

78 In fact, the term “trafficking” appears in the Gun Control Act only in §§ 924(c)(1), 

924(g), and 929, and in those places it refers to the use of a gun during drug trafficking. 

79 We noted that ATF used 25 different statutes to refer Project Gunrunner cases to 

state prosecutors. 

80 Table 1 (in the Background section of this report) provides the top 10 statutes 

used for prosecution of Project Gunrunner cases during that period. 

81 The difference between 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) pertains 

to whether the false statement in question affected the legality of the gun sale. Defendants 

can be charged with 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) if, for example, they lied about their ages because 

they were under 18 or lied about their state residency because they were from another 

Cont. 

U.S. Department of Justice 59 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

3. Knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon – 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) – ATF uses this charge for convicted criminals 

who qualify as “prohibited persons” under the Gun Control Act and 

can be prosecuted for being in possession of a firearm; and 

4. Willfully engaging in firearms business without a license – 

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) – ATF commonly uses this charge when 

individuals deal in guns as a regular course of trade or business. 

Those who make occasional gun sales cannot be charged under 

this statute. 

Statutes used to prosecute firearms traffickers carry relatively low 

sentences, particularly for straw purchasers of guns. 

According to our analysis of ATF data, the penalties imposed for 

violations of the four statutes that ATF most frequently used to combat 

firearms trafficking with Project Gunrunner cases are lower than penalties 

for violations of statutes on other types of Project Gunrunner cases. The 

difference is especially acute when compared to penalties imposed for 

violations with a drug nexus. However, criminal defendants are often 

charged with criminal statutes that include firearms trafficking offenses and 

other crimes which carry longer sentences. For drug conspiracy violations, 

the penalties imposed average almost 10 years. In comparison, although 

straw purchasing is one of the most frequent methods used to divert guns 

out of lawful commerce according to ATF, we found defendants convicted of 

offenses related to only this criminal activity are generally sentenced to less 

than 1 year in prison. Figure 5 compares sentences of defendants convicted 

only under each of the statutes used in Project Gunrunner firearms 

trafficking cases with sentences for violations of drug-related statutes. 

state. A defendant’s false statement in a § 922(a)(6) prosecution must concern a fact 

material to the lawfulness of the firearms transaction. Conversely, prosecutions for 18 

U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) do not need to prove the defendant intended to affect the legality of the 

sale. Rather, this statute requires: “(1) the defendant knowingly made a false statement; 

and (2) the statement pertained to information that the law requires [a gun dealer] to keep.” 

U.S. Department of Justice 60 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Figure 5: Average Prison Sentences in Months for 

Project Gunrunner Cases by Statute, FY 2004 through FY 2009 

117

91

48

18

14

12

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 

Drug conspiracy 

Manufacturer, distribution, or 

possession of a controlled 

substance 

Knowing possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon 

Willfully engaging in firearms 

business without a license 

Knowingly makes a false 

statement 

Knowingly makes a false 

statement in connection with 

firearm purchase 

Axis Title

Source: OIG analysis of N-Force data. 

Figure 6 shows the average prison sentences for defendants charged 

with sole violations of the four statutes that ATF most used on Project 

Gunrunner firearms trafficking cases between FY 2004 and FY 2009 

compared with the maximum penalties. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

61 
 

 

 

Figure 6: Average Prison Sentences for Project Gunrunner Cases 

and Maximum Allowable Sentences, FY 2004 through FY 2009 

0 

20 

40 

60 

80 

100 

120 

Knowingly makes 

a false statement 

Willfully engaging 

in firearms 

business without 

a license 

Knowing 

possession of a 

firearm by a 

convicted felon 

Knowingly makes 

a false statement 

in connection with 

a firearms 

purchase 

14 18 

48 

12 

60 60 

120 120 

Months 

Average Prison Sentence Statutory Maximum 

Source: OIG analysis of N-Force data. 

Sentencing Guidelines provide short sentences for firearms trafficking 

violations. 

We examined the Sentencing Guidelines for the statutes that ATF 

most frequently used in charging defendants with firearms trafficking.82 

Under the Guidelines, straw purchasing-related offenses are categorized as 

lesser crimes, punishable by 10 to 16 months in prison. This is because 

these crimes are assigned low “offense levels” and because to legally 

purchase a gun, by definition, a gun purchaser must have had no prior 

felony convictions. The OIG’s analysis of ATF’s case data found that 

40 percent of all defendants who were charged and convicted of “knowingly 

82 The guidelines, established by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, “provide federal 

judges with fair and consistent sentencing ranges to consult at sentencing” and, among 

other things, are “designed to incorporate the purposes of sentencing (i.e., just punishment, 

deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).” U.S. Sentencing Commission, “An 

Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission” (June 2009), www.ussc.gov/general 

/USSC_Overview_200906.pdf (accessed July 2010). In United States v. Booker 375 F.3d 

508 (04-104) 543 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that binding sentencing guidelines 

are unconstitutional and that the guidelines were no longer binding. 

U.S. Department of Justice 62 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

making a false statement in connection with firearm purchase” (18 U.S.C. § 

922(a)(6)) – one of the primary charges associated with straw purchasing – 

received only probation. 

USAOs often decline Project Gunrunner cases that are based on the 

most commonly used statutes. 

USAOs are less likely to accept and to prosecute ATF’s Project 

Gunrunner cases for several reasons, including the lower penalties 

described above. We found that AUSAs often decline Project Gunrunner 

cases because they believe it is difficult to obtain convictions on the 

violations established in the four statutes that ATF typically uses for 

firearms trafficking and because they believe it is difficult to obtain evidence 

from Mexico. We also found that USAOs decline to prosecute ATF Project 

Gunrunner cases that are based on the four statutes at a much higher rate 

than Project Gunrunner cases citing violations of other statutes. 

We examined the reasons for the declinations of Project Gunrunner 

cases recorded in the Executive Office for United States Attorneys’ case 

management system, Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS).83 

Of the 125 cases recorded as declined in N-Force, there were 45 cases for 

which declination reasons were recorded in LIONS.84 For those 45 cases, 

USAOs gave 12 different reasons for declination in LIONS. The most 

common reasons USAOs declined these cases were a “lack of evidence of 

criminal intent” or “weak or insufficient admissible evidence,” accounting for 

a combined 38 percent (17 of 45 cases). Other reasons USAOs cited for 

declining Project Gunrunner cases were resource-related, such as “lack of 

investigative resources” or “lack of prosecutorial resources,” a combined 

11 percent (5 of 45). In addition, ATF agents told us that they do not refer 

cases to the USAOs that they assume would be rejected. 

83 In response to an OIG recommendation made in our review on the Department’s 

efforts to prevent staff sexual abuse of inmates (Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2009­

004), in a November 24, 2009, memorandum to all USAOs, the EOUSA Director required 

that all declinations of cases be entered into LIONS, whether an investigative agency 

presents the referral in writing and the USAO immediately declines it (“immediate 

declination”), or a matter is opened in LIONS and the USAO later decides to close the 

matter without filing charges (“later declination”). However, EOUSA officials noted that 

many declinations occur informally, such as over the telephone, in which case the reasons 

for the declination have not been recorded in LIONS in the past. In June 2010, EOUSA 

reported to the OIG that it was still considering revising its policy to require the recording of 

all declinations. 

84 As a part of this review, we did not examine the reasons for the decisions by 

USAOs to decline Project Gunrunner cases referred to them for prosecution by ATF. 

U.S. Department of Justice 63 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

AUSAs believe ATF’s Project Gunrunner cases are difficult to prosecute. 

In discussions with the OIG, Department and USAO attorneys 

explained that proving the elements necessary to obtain convictions under 

the statutes used to combat firearms trafficking is difficult. For example, a 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General who was a former AUSA told the OIG 

that willfully engaging in a firearms business without a license is a very 

difficult charge to prove because the government has to prove that an 

individual was acting in a business capacity. To do that, ATF must 

establish that the sale was not a private transaction but was part of a 

revenue earning enterprise. In practice, this means ATF must get the 

suspect to admit or acknowledge selling guns “willfully,” as specified in the 

statute.85 According to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, many 

suspects can avoid prosecution simply by claiming they were selling guns 

from their private collection, which is not a crime. 

We also found that some of the reluctance of prosecutors to accept 

ATF’s Project Gunrunner cases appeared to be because of concerns over 

difficulties in obtaining evidence from Mexico. For example, building a case 

against a firearms trafficker may require the prosecutor to obtain evidence 

from Mexico to prove that the gun seized in Mexico is the same one 

purchased by an individual in the United States. Several AUSAs we 

interviewed told us that because they believed that the process for obtaining 

this evidence is cumbersome and time consuming, they had never 

attempted to obtain evidence from Mexico. In contrast, ATF personnel in 

Mexico City who are familiar with evidentiary matters told us that the 

process of obtaining this evidence was straightforward and undemanding, 

although underused. 

Similarly, some prosecutors were unsure how to establish that a case 

has a nexus to gun trafficking to Mexico and were unaware that a gun trace 

can prove a gun acquired by a straw purchaser ended up in Mexico. This 

lack of understanding is important because five out of six AUSAs we spoke 

with told us that proving that a case has a nexus to Mexico is key to their 

decision to accept the case. 

85 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) states, “It shall be unlawful for any person except a licensed 

importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing, 

manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, 

or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce; or except a licensed importer or 

licensed manufacturer, to engage in the business of importing or manufacturing 

ammunition, or in the course of such business, to ship, transport, or receive any 

ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce.” 

U.S. Department of Justice 64 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
AUSAs decline more ATF Project Gunrunner cases involving firearms 

trafficking than Project Gunrunner cases not involving firearms trafficking. 

We examined ATF data regarding referrals of 607 cases from FY 2004 

through FY 2009 that cited at least one of the four statutes most used by 

ATF to charge firearms traffickers. According to ATF’s case management 

system, 29 percent of the referrals to USAOs were pending a decision as of 

April 2010. Of the referrals that had been responded to by USAOs, the 

referrals based on the statute knowingly making a false statement in 

connection with a gun purchase were declined by USAOs 32 percent of the 

time, and those based on the statute knowingly making a false statement 

were declined 21 percent of the time. Referrals based on the statute 

willfully engaging in a firearms business without a license were declined 

24 percent of the time and those based on knowing possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon were declined less frequently – 12 percent of the time. 

In contrast, AUSAs declined Project Gunrunner referrals that were not 

directly related to firearms much less frequently during FY 2004 through 

FY 2009. For example, when ATF pursued the statute “manufacturer, 

distribution, or possession of a controlled substance” (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) 

in a Project Gunrunner case, it was declined only 7 percent of the time and 

“drug conspiracy” (21 U.S.C. § 846) was declined 9 percent of the time. 

Significantly, the statute “use of a communication device in furtherance of 

drug trafficking” (21 U.S.C. § 843(b)) was never declined by federal 

prosecutors. We also found that USAOs responded more promptly to ATF 

Project Gunrunner referrals not directly related to firearms. ATF’s case 

management system reflected that only 5 percent of the referrals that were 

not directly related to firearms trafficking were awaiting a response from a 

USAO, compared to 29 percent of firearms-related referrals. 

AUSAs stated they were less likely to prosecute ATF’s firearms traffickingrelated Project Gunrunner cases. 

Overall, our interviews with AUSAs in Southwest border districts 

indicated that the factors cited above make USAOs less likely to dedicate 

their resources to ATF’s firearms trafficking-related Project Gunrunner 

cases than to other types of cases. Our interviews with AUSAs found that 

the lack of long sentences is also a key factor in their decisions about 

whether to accept these Project Gunrunner cases. As one AUSA stated, “If 

there were more penalties for firearms trafficking cases, you would see a lot 

more interest [from USAOs] in pursuing [those cases].” AUSAs told us that 

the limited prosecutions and low penalties reduce their ability to use the 

threat of prosecution to induce suspects to cooperate and provide evidence 

against their co-conspirators. 

U.S. Department of Justice 65 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

To improve the USAOs’ support for and understanding of firearms 

trafficking-related Project Gunrunner cases, in June 2009 ATF’s Assistant 

Director for Field Operations directed all ATF field divisions to meet with 

their respective U.S. Attorneys to convey the importance of firearms 

trafficking.86 However, three AUSAs and some ATF agents told the OIG that 

much more communication is needed. 

Some ATF agents are reluctant to refer cases because they believe the cases 

will not be accepted for prosecution. 

In addition to the high USAO declination rate for Project Gunrunner 

cases focused on firearms traffickers, ATF agents told us that they do not 

refer many cases to the USAOs that they assume would be rejected because 

of criteria set by individual USAOs. For example, ATF agents told us that 

the USAO in one Southwest Border district will not seek to indict a suspect 

for willfully engaging in a firearms business without a license unless the 

suspect was given an official “cease and desist” letter and then was caught 

committing the same crime again. This burden of proof, according to ATF 

agents, means that many agents do not bother to present such cases to 

USAOs for prosecution. 

Similarly, straw purchasing cases, in which a suspect obtains one or 

more guns on behalf of a prohibited person, were also identified by ATF as 

likely to be declined by USAOs. In fact, one AUSA stated that he declines 

straw purchasing cases because they lack “jury appeal” and result in light 

sentences. The Deputy Assistant Attorney General also stated that because 

straw purchasers’ crime is essentially lying on a federal form, many judges 

and defense attorneys treat the crime as “paperwork violations.” 

Consequently, agents told us, they may not even refer straw purchasing 

cases for prosecutorial consideration. Like AUSAs, ATF agents in Southwest 

border field divisions also told us that the lesser penalties and infrequent 

prosecution of trafficking offenses reduce their ability to use prosecution as 

a lever to obtain cooperation from defendants when they are arrested, which 

is important in investigating firearms trafficking rings. 

86 ATF National Firearms Trafficking Enforcement Implementation Plan (June 25, 

2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 66 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

PART IV: MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION ISSUES 

ATF coordinates well with the DEA and CBP on firearms 

trafficking cases, but ATF and ICE do not consistently work 

together effectively on investigations of firearms trafficking 

to Mexico despite the memorandum of understanding these 

two agencies signed in 2009. 

ATF coordinates well with the DEA and CBP, but ATF and ICE are not 

working together effectively on investigations. 

ATF cites its coordination with other U.S. agencies – in particular, the 

DEA, CBP, and ICE – as an integral aspect of ATF’s efforts to stem the flow 

of guns to Mexico under Project Gunrunner.87 

ATF works well with the DEA and CBP in operations and investigations. 

The DEA’s counternarcotics mission parallels ATF’s Project 

Gunrunner, as the two organizations are targeting the same organizations 

and often the same individuals. We found that the DEA and ATF support 

each other’s investigations, and the DEA lends resources to ATF through 

multi-agency OCDETF task forces and other field operations. The CBP, in 

its role in securing the border into Mexico, also complements Project 

Gunrunner. 

Regarding the DEA, OCDETF task forces provide an opportunity for 

ATF and the DEA to share information in building cases to the benefit of 

both agencies. In addition, in Mexico itself, where the DEA has 

approximately 100 staff in 11 different cities, the DEA assists ATF with 

gathering information on seized guns. The DEA Attaché to Mexico is 

currently allowing ATF to assign an agent to the DEA’s Sensitive 

Investigations Unit, composed of U.S.-vetted and trained Mexican law 

enforcement personnel, and ATF uses the unit in gun-related investigations. 

ATF plans to assign one supervisor permanently to this unit. 

Similarly, ATF reported that when it “develops credible information 

that firearms, explosives, and ammunition are approaching a border 

crossing, ATF provides information to CBP to support southbound 

87 Although ATF also seeks to coordinate, as necessary, with other federal agencies, 

including the FBI, the Secret Service, and the Internal Revenue Service, we limited our 

review to the agencies with which ATF has the most frequent contact under Project 

Gunrunner – the DEA, CBP, and ICE. 

U.S. Department of Justice 67 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

interdiction stops.” Our interviews with ATF officials and documents they 

supplied provided numerous examples of this. 

ATF and ICE are not collaborating effectively on investigations of firearms 

trafficking to Mexico. 

ATF and ICE have overlapping authorities and responsibilities for 

investigating firearms trafficking to Mexico. ATF’s Project Gunrunner and 

ICE’s Operation Armas Cruzadas separately focus on firearms trafficking 

from the United States to Mexico. Project Gunrunner implements a range of 

ATF enforcement and Memorandum of Understanding regulatory activities, as Between ATF and ICE, June 2009 

discussed in this report, while  Recognizes the relevant jurisdiction of each agency 

Operation Armas Cruzadas and the legal authority granting each its respective 

targets firearms trafficking as a jurisdiction. 

smuggling violation. ATF 	 Instructs ATF and ICE to share intelligence that 

cannot effectively combat relates to the jurisdiction of the other agency “in a 

timely manner.” firearms trafficking to Mexico 

without border and smuggling  Acknowledges that gun dealer inspections are within 

the “sole purview” of ATF and investigations enforcement by ICE, and ICE concerning ports of entry and borders must be 

cannot always investigate coordinated through ICE. 

smugglers without  States that the resolution of any interagency conflicts 

investigating the source of will begin at the lowest level possible. 

these guns (gun dealers and  Instructs ATF and ICE that when it becomes apparent 

gun shows). Despite this, we that an investigation leads into an area of concurrent 

jurisdiction, the agencies must “coordinate all found that ATF and ICE have pertinent and necessary information concerning that not worked well together in investigation and do so at the local level.” 

their respective firearms 

trafficking investigations. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between 

ATF and ICE, which was updated in June 2009 to address firearms 

trafficking investigations and related activities, has not significantly 

improved coordination between the two agencies.88 

The MOU between ATF and ICE states, “The Agencies recognize the 

inherent and shared responsibility to operate collaboratively in order to 

ensure the mutual success of the activities of both agencies . . . .” The 

agreement further directs the two agencies to “coordinate all pertinent and 

necessary information concerning firearms/explosives investigations 

implicating both ATF’s and ICE’s authorities.” 

88 The MOU between ICE and ATF was signed by the Acting Director of ATF and the 

Assistant Secretary of ICE on June 30, 2009, updated from a previous version. The 

agreement was made in response to the GAO’s report, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to 

Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709 

(June 2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 68 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
We found that some field staff do not know what the MOU requires of 

them, while other agents were reluctant to implement its provisions. Many 

ATF and ICE field personnel we interviewed misinterpreted the intent of the 

MOU as being to keep everyone “in their own lanes,” meaning to keep ICE 

from conducting investigations at the source of firearms trafficking and ATF 

from investigations that involve smuggling, rather than “to strengthen the 

partnership between the agencies,” as the MOU states. 

One supervisor stated that he viewed the purpose of the MOU as 

being to keep the other agency from “screwing things up.” Another 

supervisor, referring to one specific field office as “a loose cannon,” told the 

OIG that if everyone would “stay in their lane, we would all work together 

better.” Yet another supervisor told the OIG that he had no problems with 

the other agency precisely because those agents stay in their lanes. A 

different supervisor said the MOU had not changed anything, particularly in 

jurisdictional overlap, despite what he described as the two agencies’ 

“mutual dependency.” Another conceded to the OIG that he was unfamiliar 

with the contents of the MOU. 

ATF and ICE field personnel described to us incidents in which one 

provision of the MOU, which stated that all ICE operations at gun dealers 

must be coordinated with ATF, was not adhered to. For example, one ATF 

field supervisor told us that ICE tried to assign an undercover agent to a 

gun dealer without coordinating with ATF. According to the ATF supervisor, 

the ICE agent involved said he had never read the MOU and did not realize 

the MOU required notification to ATF. 

Another area of concern expressed by ATF personnel is ICE’s criminal 

enforcement activities at gun shows. ICE agents reported to us that ICE’s 

gun show operations, which began in early 2009, are a key component of 

ICE’s Operation Armas Cruzadas. As a part of this Operation, ICE agents 

may act on information from an informant or other intelligence source, 

which may involve investigating suspicious straw purchase activity at gun 

shows. ATF officials cited several concerns about whether ICE had 

adequate justification for some of the enforcement activities it conducted at 

gun shows; that ICE’s interaction with sellers at gun shows may be 

erroneously viewed by gun dealers as an ATF Industry Operations 

compliance inspection, which by law can occur only once a year for each 

gun dealer; and, that ATF’s relationships with gun dealers, a primary source 

of ATF investigative leads, may be harmed by ICE’s actions at gun shows. 

ATF supervisors also expressed concern about ICE’s use of eTrace. 

The MOU states that ICE must inform ATF when ICE initiates an 

investigation as the result of a gun trace. This provision of the MOU seeks 

to deconflict agency activities. However, ICE and ATF personnel we 

interviewed told us that these notifications are not always made. For 

U.S. Department of Justice 69 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

example, one ICE field office supervisor stated his agents do not necessarily 

inform ATF when they initiate an investigation based on trace results. Our 

analysis of gun trace data shows that in calendar year 2009, ICE submitted 

84 Mexican crime guns traced to gun dealers in that Southwest border ICE 

supervisor’s jurisdictional area, 19 of which had a time-to-crime of less than 

a year. However, according to ATF field supervisors in Mexico, ICE had 

notified ATF of only one or two investigations it initiated based on these 

traces. 

We also found some instances of ATF personnel not fully complying 

with provisions of the MOU. In one field office, ATF routinely failed to notify 

ICE of ongoing investigations with a direct link to the border. Additionally, 

an ICE field supervisor sought to assign an ICE agent to two different ATF 

firearms trafficking groups to foster coordination and encourage the sharing 

of resources and information. However, ICE personnel told us that the offer 

was rejected by the supervisors of both ATF firearms trafficking groups. 

According to the ICE supervisor, one of these ATF supervisors stated, “What 

can ICE do for me?” That ATF supervisor later said the same thing to the 

OIG. 

Another ATF supervisor told us that neither agency involves the other 

in an investigation until the case is “firm,” rather than involving the other 

agency early on. A senior ATF intelligence official told us, “We are in a 

constant struggle with ICE about stepping into each other’s jurisdiction and 

sharing information.” 

Agents are not routinely sharing information and intelligence. 

The number of joint firearms trafficking investigations involving ATF and 

ICE has increased since Project Gunrunner began. According to data from 

ATF’s N-Force system, the number of joint investigations related to Project 

Gunrunner increased from 17 in FY 2005 to 53 in FY 2008, although the 

number dropped to 35 in FY 2009.89 Despite the increase in joint 

investigations, we found that coordination problems remain. The MOU 

mandates that each agency is to notify the other “in a timely manner” of 

intelligence relating to the other’s jurisdiction. That is, ICE must provide to 

ATF intelligence relating to a gun dealer and ATF must provide to ICE 

intelligence on illegal exports, including guns, crossing the U.S. border. 

89 On October 1, 2010, in response to a draft of this report, ICE provided the OIG 

with a list of 113 instances in which ICE and ATF jointly investigated between June 2009 

and September 24, 2010. According to ICE, only 37 (33 percent) of these joint investigative 

efforts specifically addressed firearms trafficking to Mexico. Moreover, we do not believe 

that a list of examples of cases which ICE and ATF jointly investigated undermines the 

underlying findings in this section of the report. As we note, ATF initiated over 1,800 

Project Gunrunner cases between FY 2007 and FY 2009, only 105 (6 percent) of which are 

shown to be joint investigations in ATF’s case management system. 

U.S. Department of Justice 70 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

According to our interviews, this is often not occurring. For example, one ICE 

agent working on Operation Armas Cruzadas told the OIG that his team never 

receives notification about cases involving firearms trafficking to Mexico, 

despite several large ATF investigations in that field office. An ICE supervisor 

we interviewed characterized this type of notification as occurring “to a pretty 

limited degree,” creating “a missed opportunity for [ATF].” 

We also found that many of the problems between ATF and ICE 

personnel arise out of a lack of knowledge of the other agency’s jurisdiction 

and operations. ATF has a well-developed specialty in firearms and 

explosives investigations. ATF’s eTrace system and multiple sales of 

handgun information can provide investigative leads and intelligence of use 

to both agencies. ICE has a specialty in cross-border and smuggling crimes. 

Although ATF has always conducted firearms trafficking cases that include 

international trafficking, ICE agents have extensive experience in these 

types of cases. Some ICE agents stated that they feel they are not being 

used as experts on export violations and that ATF does not fully understand 

these types of investigations. One ICE Special Agent in Charge told us, “ATF 

needs to recognize that [when] anything crosses that border in either 

direction, we [ICE] have jurisdiction.” Another ICE agent referred to a 

specific case in which ATF hoped to charge a suspect with smuggling 

violations in an upcoming trial, but ICE had to decline the case referral from 

ATF because the process of establishing smuggling violations takes much 

longer than the time ATF allotted. He opined that, had ICE been involved 

earlier, the smuggling case could have been developed and prosecuted. 

ATF has rarely used ICE’s smuggling charges against gun traffickers, which 

can yield longer sentences than firearm charges. 

We found that despite the longer sentence prosecutors could obtain 

from convicting a defendant of smuggling charges, ATF has not frequently 

used 18 U.S.C. § 554, which makes smuggling contraband from the 

United States a federal offense. Although ICE has primary jurisdiction to 

enforce 18 U.S.C. § 554, coordination with ICE could allow ATF’s Project 

Gunrunner defendants to be charged under this statute and could result in 

lengthier sentences than under the four charges most commonly used by 

ATF in firearms trafficking cases. 

However, we found that from FY 2004 through FY 2009, only seven 

defendants in Project Gunrunner cases were convicted of smuggling.90 As 

Figure 7 illustrates, our analysis found that the average sentence for 

90 Of the seven defendants in ATF cases convicted of smuggling charges, we were 

able to verify that six of the seven were trafficking guns to Mexico or Guatemala. In 

addition to “smuggling goods from the United States,” these defendants were convicted of 

additional violations such as “willfully engaging in firearms business without a license,” 

which added to their sentences. 

U.S. Department of Justice 71 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

smuggling violations was 5 years (60 months), several times longer than the 

average sentences for the types of convictions frequently made from ATF 

investigations. 

Figure 7: Average Prison Sentences for Project Gunrunner Cases 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

60 

48 

18 

14 12 

Smuggling Knowing Willfully Knowingly Knowingly 

goods from possession of engaging in makes a false makes a false 

the United a firearm by a firearms statement statement in 

States convicted business connection 

felon without a with firearm 

license purchase 

 Source: OIG analysis of N-Force data. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that ATF: 

10. Provide guidance to ATF field supervisors and agents to better 

coordinate with ICE, including direction on how to “coordinate all 

pertinent and necessary information” in areas of “concurrent 

jurisdiction,” as defined in the memorandum of understanding. 

U.S. Department of Justice 72 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

PART V: MEXICAN CRIME GUN TRACING 

ATF’s attempts to expand gun tracing in Mexico have been 

unsuccessful. Although the number of trace requests from 

Mexico has increased since FY 2006, most seized guns in 

Mexico are not traced. Moreover, most trace requests from 

Mexico do not succeed in identifying the gun dealer who 

originally sold the gun, and the rate of successful traces has 

declined since the start of Project Gunrunner. Most 

Mexican crime gun trace requests that were successful were 

untimely and of limited use for generating investigative 

leads. Senior Mexican law enforcement authorities we 

interviewed do not view gun tracing as an important 

investigative tool because of limitations in the information 

tracing typically provides and because ATF has not 

adequately communicated the value of gun tracing to 

Mexican officials. 

Despite ATF’s efforts to increase the tracing of guns seized in Mexico, 

traces are not producing usable investigative leads. 

Gun tracing can help ATF identify firearm traffickers operating in the 

United States and in Mexico. Gun tracing can also provide intelligence 

regarding patterns and trends in gun trafficking. 

In its June 2007 Project Gunrunner strategy, ATF established the 

implementation of eTrace in Mexico and improvements in its intelligence 

capabilities as two of the four key operational elements of Project 

Gunrunner. Further, the Project Gunrunner strategy states, “In order for 

intelligence relating to [Project Gunrunner] to be of value, it must be ‘real 

time’ in nature.” 

Yet, we found that most crime guns seized in Mexico are not traced 

and trace requests often cannot be completed because of missing or 

improperly entered gun data. Further, Mexican trace requests often are not 

submitted on a timely basis. As a result, most Mexican crime guns that can 

be traced were initially sold too long ago to yield useful investigative leads.91 

91 ATF stated that its common definition of a “successful trace” is a trace that 

provides any additional historical or identifying information concerning the firearm beyond 

the original information submitted in the trace request. However, some ATF staff provided 

different definitions of a successful trace, such as one that identifies the first purchaser. 

We define a successful trace as one that identifies the gun dealer who originally sold the 

weapon because that is the minimum result that can provide ATF with usable intelligence 

Cont. 

U.S. Department of Justice 73 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

Therefore, few investigative leads and intelligence were developed from 

Mexican crime gun traces. 

ATF’s attempts to expand tracing in Mexico have been unsuccessful. 

ATF considers Mexican law enforcement’s participation in tracing 

crime guns – by obtaining seized guns and entering the required information 

into eTrace – vital to the success of Project Gunrunner. Because ATF and 

other U.S. law enforcement agencies have no authority to conduct their own 

investigations in Mexico, ATF relies on Mexican officials to collect accurate 

crime gun information. 

Under Project Gunrunner, ATF had intended to deploy a new Spanish 

language eTrace to all 31 state crime laboratories in Mexico to expand gun 

tracing. ATF reported that after its Spanish eTrace pilot program in 

December 2009, ATF deployed Spanish eTrace to all Spanish-language 

users in March 2010. However, as of June 2010, ATF Mexican federal 

authorities still had not agreed to deploy Spanish eTrace to the state 

laboratories. We asked officials from the Mexico Attorney General’s office 

and the Secretariat of Public Security why they were unwilling to provide 

Mexican state police laboratories with access to Spanish eTrace. They 

stated that illegal possession of guns is a federal offense in Mexico and not 

within the jurisdiction of the Mexican states. They said all gun-related 

investigative and intelligence activity, including tracing, should be 

centralized at the national level. The officials told us that they fear 

decentralizing gun tracing would lead to duplication of effort between federal 

and state governments, an increased rate of errors by state officials who are 

untrained and inexperienced, and operational confusion. 

ATF has continued its efforts to promote eTrace use among Mexican 

officials, with the ultimate goal of Mexican officials independently 

conducting comprehensive gun tracing. Following a September 2010 eTrace 

memorandum of understanding between ATF and the government of Mexico, 

ATF told us it plans to provide Spanish eTrace and firearms identification 

training to approximately 300 Mexican Attorney General staff located in 

Mexico City and all 31 states beginning in November 2010. ATF plans to 

provide eTrace user accounts to the PGR staff who received the training. 

information. Trace requests that cannot be completed because of missing or improperly 

entered gun data are considered “unsuccessful traces.” 

U.S. Department of Justice 74 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

The number of trace requests from Mexico has increased since FY 2006, but 

most seized guns are not traced. 

Mexican crime gun trace requests to ATF have increased since Project 

Gunrunner was established. The number of traces of Mexican crime guns 

increased from 5,834 in FY 2004 to almost 22,000 in FY 2009. 

Yet, in a June 2009 report, the GAO estimated that less than a 

quarter of crime guns transferred to the Mexican Attorney General’s office in 

2008 were submitted to ATF for tracing.92 ATF Mexico Country Office staff 

said that CENAPI traces only weapons from high-profile seizures. Although 

ATF provided CENAPI with 10 laptops and trained CENAPI staff on how to 

submit traces through eTrace, ATF Mexico Country Office staff reported that 

Mexican officials are not entering many trace requests. Specifically, ATF 

reported that from FY 2007 through FY 2009, only about 6 percent of 

Mexican crime gun traces were entered into eTrace by CENAPI personnel. 

The remaining 94 percent of traces were entered by ATF personnel on behalf 

of CENAPI. Consequently, ATF Mexico Country Office personnel told us 

that, whenever they can, they respond to the scene of the seizures and 

initiate trace requests themselves on behalf of CENAPI. 

However, if ATF or CENAPI does not collect tracing information 

quickly, it becomes unavailable. In accordance with Mexican law, all guns 

seized by the Mexican government must be surrendered to the Mexican 

military, generally within 48 hours. We determined that after the Mexican 

military obtains custody of the guns, ATF or CENAPI is unlikely to gain 

timely access to them to gather the information needed to initiate traces. 

Mexican military officials we interviewed said their role is to safeguard the 

weapons and that they have no specific authority to assist in trafficking 

investigations. Officially, these weapons are the property of the Mexican 

court. 

To gain access to the weapons, ATF officials told us that they must 

make a formal request to the Mexico Attorney General’s office for each gun, 

(1) citing a specific reason that access is needed, (2) demonstrating that the 

requested information is related to a Mexican criminal investigation, and (3) 

providing a description of the gun with the serial number. Yet, if ATF had 

the gun description and serial number, ATF officials would not need to 

request access to the gun. Due to these barriers, ATF and wider 

Department efforts to gain access to weapons in Mexican military custody 

have not been successful. Because many weapons are transferred to the 

military before basic information is collected, and many weapons for which 

92 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to 

Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709 

(June 2009). 

U.S. Department of Justice 75 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
information is available are not traced, the majority of seized Mexican crime 

guns are not traced. 

Most trace requests from Mexico have not been successful, and the success 

rate has declined since the start of Project Gunrunner. 

Deployment of eTrace is only one barrier to ATF’s successful 

development of intelligence through tracing of Mexican crime guns. 

Although requests from Mexico increased from FY 2005 through FY 2009, 

most traces were unsuccessful. Further, the success rate of Mexican crime 

gun trace requests has declined since the start of Project Gunrunner. As 

illustrated in Figure 8, in FY 2005, 44 percent (661 of 1,518) of Mexican 

crime gun traces were successful. The success rate fell to 27 percent (4,059 

of 14,979 in FY 2007 and remained only at 31 percent (6,664 of 21,726) in 

FY 2009. We found that the rate of successful traces was far lower for 

traces initiated in Mexico than for those initiated in the United States. By 

comparison, successful traces from within the vicinity of ATF’s Houston 

Field Division ranged from 64 percent in FY 2005 to 68 percent in FY 2009. 

Figure 8: Total Number of Mexican Crime Gun Traces and Number of 

Successful Traces, by Fiscal Year 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

Number of Unsucessful 

Traces 857 1,063 10,920 19,541 15,062 

0 

5,000 

10,000 

15,000 

20,000 

25,000 

Number of Successful 

Traces 661 841 4,059 6,360 6,664 

30,000 

Source: OIG analysis of ATF data. 

Many of the reasons trace requests from Mexico were unsuccessful 

are attributable to preventable human error. According to the National 

Tracing Center and our own data analysis, an invalid serial number was the 

U.S. Department of Justice 76 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

 

most common reason for unsuccessful traces from Mexico. The number of 

trace requests from Mexico that failed because of serial number errors more 

than doubled since Project Gunrunner began, increasing from 11 percent in 

FY 2005 to 26 percent in FY 2009. Crime gun traces can be unsuccessful 

for many other reasons. For example, a trace request may be unsuccessful 

if no manufacturer or importer is identified, if the gun predates the start of 

ATF’s tracing program in 1969, or if the necessary gun dealer records are 

not obtainable. ATF staff in Mexico City told the OIG that they had noted 

these types of errors on incoming requests and that these errors could be 

prevented through training Mexican law enforcement personnel. 

However, we found that the training of Mexican law enforcement in 

firearms identification has not resulted in accurate trace submissions by 

Mexican law enforcement. ATF reported that between calendar years 2007 

and 2009, it had trained 961 Mexican law enforcement personnel in 

firearms identification and tracing. In discussions with the OIG, ATF and 

Mexican authorities stated that further training is needed. The poor quality 

of the tracing data and the resulting high rate of unsuccessful traces 

suggest that either the training is insufficient, training has been provided to 

the wrong people, or there are other unidentified problems with Mexican law 

enforcement’s crime gun tracing. 

Most successful Mexican crime gun trace requests were nonetheless 

untimely and of limited use for generating investigative leads. 

Many ATF field and intelligence personnel told us that trace 

information they received from successful traces on Mexican crime guns 

was of limited use because the time-to-crime interval was too long.93 

According to ATF staff, many successful traces of Mexican crime guns are 

not worth acting upon because few federal prosecutors will accept cases 

with a time-to-crime of over 3 years, and some will not accept a case with a 

time-to-crime of over a year.94 The large majority of crime guns that are 

93 ATF defines time-to-crime as “the period of time (measured in days) between a 

gun’s acquisition from a retail market and law enforcement’s recovery of that gun during 

use, or suspected use, in a crime.” See ATF Order 3310.4B, Firearms Enforcement 

Program (February 1989), 110. However, the time-to-crime data for Mexican crime guns is 

not always based on the actual recovery date because, according to ATF personnel, when a 

recovery date is unknown, ATF uses the trace request date to calculate the time-to-crime. 

ATF personnel also said time-to-crime statistics for Mexican crime guns are skewed 

because of a large amount of crime gun data the government of Mexico provided to ATF in 

2009 regarding guns seized years before. 

94 The statute of limitations for straw purchasing-related crimes is 5 years. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3282. Notwithstanding the 5-year statute of limitations, we found that many 

Southwest border USAOs establish much shorter thresholds for the prosecution of these 

types of cases. For example, the Northern District of Texas (encompassing ATF’s Dallas 

Field Division) typically will not accept ATF straw purchasing-related cases with a time-toCont. 

U.S. Department of Justice 77 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

recovered in Mexico and traced – over 75 percent – have a time-to-crime of 

over 5 years. Only 18.2 percent of recovered crime guns have a time-tocrime of less than 3 years. Further, the long time-to-crime interval has 

been exacerbated because ATF has been unable to gain timely access to the 

guns seized by Mexican law enforcement. 

ATF officials told us that some gun trace requests submitted to ATF 

by Mexican officials in 2009 were of guns that had been held in Mexican 

federal storage for 3 years or longer prior to being submitted for tracing. In 

one particularly large volume trace request from Mexican officials to ATF, 

very few of the guns had been seized by Mexican law enforcement within the 

year previous to the submission of the trace request. Consequently, this 

information provided to ATF was of limited use for identifying ongoing 

trafficking conspiracies. 

Mexican law enforcement authorities do not view gun tracing as an 

important investigative tool. 

We examined why Mexican law enforcement authorities do not 

consistently submit guns for tracing or delay their submissions. In 

interviews with us, Mexican law enforcement officials indicated a lack of 

interest in tracing. One Mexican official stated that U.S. officials talk of 

eTrace as if it is a “panacea” but that it does nothing for Mexican law 

enforcement. An official in the Mexico Attorney General’s office told us he 

felt eTrace is “some kind of bad joke.” 

Mexican officials told us that they are not satisfied with the details of 

the information they receive on U.S. citizens and gun dealers from crime 

gun trace requests they submit to ATF. The officials cited this as a reason 

why they do not believe eTrace has benefit for Mexican law enforcement. 

However, we found that the information that Mexican officials are seeking 

extends beyond the information provided in trace results. 95 We asked 

Department attorneys about the legal restrictions on ATF for sharing 

investigative information about suspected firearms traffickers with the 

government of Mexico. The attorneys stated that ATF may provide Mexican 

law enforcement with most of the information that is returned in a typical 

response to an eTrace request generated by Mexican officials. It is the 

criminal history of suspected firearms traffickers that Mexican law 

enforcement is seeking which is not a part of this typical eTrace response. 

crime of more than 1 year, while the Southern District of Texas (encompassing the Houston 

Field Division) established a threshold of less than 3 years for these cases. 

95 There is a memorandum of understanding between ATF and the Mexico Attorney 

General’s office (including the office’s intelligence unit, CENAPI) governing Mexico’s use of 

eTrace. The MOU does not state that Mexican eTrace users are to be provided any less 

information than would U.S. law enforcement eTrace users. 

U.S. Department of Justice 78 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
However, if an investigation results in an arrest, ATF will provide 

information regarding the arrestee in response to an official request from 

Mexico. 

ATF officials asserted that providing Mexican law enforcement 

agencies with information on U.S. purchasers and gun dealers would be of 

little use to Mexican authorities, whom cannot conduct investigations in the 

United States. Rather, it is ATF’s responsibility to pursue crime gun trace 

leads in the United States. ATF noted that firearms tracing is not designed 

to “pinpoint the date, time, and place a firearm” crossed the border. ATF 

further noted that even if additional, detailed information might contribute 

to an investigation in Mexico, it would be unlikely to result in a prosecution 

there, as less than 3 percent of Mexican investigations are brought to trial. 

We found that Mexican officials’ perception is that ATF does not 

reciprocate information sharing with them. This remains an impediment to 

reciprocity in coordination between ATF and Mexican law enforcement. 

Several ATF officials told us they are aware of the Mexican officials’ 

concerns and acknowledged that ATF has not adequately communicated the 

value of tracing in generating leads from Mexican crime guns that can 

ultimately serve to reduce firearms trafficking into Mexico and its associated 

violence. For example, one ATF Special Agent in Charge stated, “Those guys 

want to know what [the] information they are providing is doing, they want 

to see results and I don’t think we [ATF] are doing that.” Another Southwest 

border Special Agent in Charge told us, “One of the things we [ATF] do not 

do well is take credit for what we do. The Mexicans say ‘Ok, you want us to 

trace your guns, but the guns are already here. So what is it that tracing 

does for us?’ We need to show them through training and success. We 

don’t do that well in ATF.” 

We concluded that because ATF has not been able to communicate 

the value of gun tracing to Mexican law enforcement officials, they are less 

likely to prioritize their efforts to obtain tracing information from seized 

crime guns and enter it into eTrace. This hinders ATF’s plans to deploy 

Spanish eTrace throughout Mexico. Because the expansion of tracing in 

Mexico is the “cornerstone” of Project Gunrunner, this presents a significant 

barrier to the successful implementation of ATF’s Gunrunner strategy. 

U.S. Department of Justice 79 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Recommendations 

To gain better cooperation of Mexican law enforcement in tracing, and 

to increase the timeliness of trace submissions from Mexico, we recommend 

that ATF: 

11.	 Work with the government of Mexico to determine the causes of 

unsuccessful traces and develop actions to improve the rate of 

successful traces. 

12.	 Regularly and more effectively communicate ATF’s Project 

Gunrunner strategy to Mexican law enforcement authorities, 

including the value of gun tracing and the successes involving 

information or tracing information provided by Mexican 

agencies. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

80 
PART VI: ATF CHALLENGES IN COORDINATING IN MEXICO
 

ATF has been unable to respond to many training and 

support requests from Mexican government agencies, and 

ATF’s backlog of requests for information from Mexican 

authorities has hindered coordination between ATF and 

Mexican law enforcement. In addition, ATF has not staffed 

or structured its Mexico Country Office to fully implement 

Project Gunrunner’s missions in Mexico. ATF faces 

challenges in coordinating with Mexican law enforcement 

authorities. There is no straightforward mechanism to 

facilitate the exchange of law enforcement information 

between ATF and a comparable Mexican law enforcement 

agency. Finally, ATF has not integrated the Project 

Gunrunner activities of its Southwest Border field divisions 

and its Mexico Country Office in a coordinated approach to 

reduce firearms trafficking from the United States to 

Mexico. 

ATF has been unable to fully meet Mexican government requests 

for support under Project Gunrunner. 

ATF’s Mexico Country Office is unable to fully meet the workload 

associated with coordinating with Mexico due in part to a lack of resources. 

Training in firearms trafficking enables Mexican law enforcement agencies 

to become more effective partners for ATF, but ATF has been unable to 

respond to many key requests for training. Assigning ATF personnel to 

work directly with Mexican law enforcement is another way to enhance 

coordination, but ATF has not been able to assign such staff for this 

purpose. Additionally, we found that official requests to ATF from the 

government of Mexico for information on gun traffickers are backlogged at 

ATF’s Mexico Country Office. 

ATF is not able to respond to many training requests from Mexico. 

ATF has provided training to help build Mexico’s capacity to conduct 

its own operations to reduce firearms trafficking. In addition to the 961 

Mexican law enforcement personnel that ATF trained in firearms 

identification and tracing between calendar years 2007 and 2009, ATF also 

trained 337 Mexican law enforcement personnel in firearms trafficking 

investigations. However, Mexican officials have sought additional training 

that ATF has not been able to provide. The Department of State’s Narcotics 

Affairs Section, which facilitates funding for ATF to train Mexican law 

enforcement, has funded this training. However, although the Department 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

81 
 

 

of State has access to funds to enable the training of Mexican law 

enforcement, ATF has lacked the staff to provide additional requested 

training on basic firearms investigations, weapons handling, and firearms 

identification. For example, ATF has not been able to provide training at the 

new Secretariat of Public Security Academy, a commitment ATF made as a 

part of a wider Department plan to assist in training newly hired Mexican 

law enforcement officers. ATF had planned to teach, at a minimum, 

interrogation techniques there. Similarly, ATF has had to deny requests 

from Mexican state and local law enforcement for training in weapons 

handling and firearms identification and to deny CENAPI intelligence 

analysts training in analytical intelligence techniques. 

Mexican law enforcement officials said they were disappointed that 

ATF has not provided more training, although officials we interviewed were 

appreciative of the training they have received so far. The Chief of CENAPI 

said that more training is needed to develop institutional knowledge that 

can be passed onto newer staff. A senior official from the Mexico Attorney 

General’s office told us that the increased efforts in Mexican firearms 

investigations meant that the corresponding training from ATF must be 

expanded, noting specifically the need for firearms investigation and 

intelligence training. We concluded that ATF’s inability to respond to 

training requests has hindered the development of better Mexican law 

enforcement capabilities that would support the goals of Project Gunrunner. 

ATF’s backlog of requests from Mexican authorities for information impedes 

coordination between ATF and Mexican law enforcement. 

ATF’s coordination with Mexican law enforcement is complicated by 

the differences between the U.S. and Mexican legal systems. The Mutual 

Legal Assistance Treaty with Mexico governs criminal justice interaction 

between the two countries.96 The treaty mandates that except in urgent 

cases and in informal exchanges, requests for assistance should take place 

in writing and include certain information, such as the purpose for which 

the evidence, information, or other assistance is sought. The Mutual Legal 

Assistance Treaty states that both countries should “promptly comply with 

the requests or, when appropriate, shall transmit them to other competent 

authorities to do so.” 

In accordance with Article 4 of the treaty, Mexican law enforcement 

officials send such requests in official communications called officios to ATF 

in Spanish, thus requiring translation before ATF can take action. Some of 

the most common requests in officios are criminal histories on gun 

purchasers and detainees, and information from ATF interviews on 

96 Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United 

Mexican States for Mutual Legal Assistance, Article 2, December 1987. 

U.S. Department of Justice 82 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

individuals linked to a multiple handgun sale in the United States. Mexican 

officials can use this information to generate an investigation in Mexico. 

ATF must translate the reply into Spanish (the language of the requesting 

government) before sending the information back to the requester. 

ATF has a backlog of officios that is hindering Mexico’s ability to 

conduct criminal cases and is affecting the relationship between ATF and 

Mexican law enforcement. As of June 2010, Mexico Country Office staff told 

us that about 200 outstanding officios from Mexico are awaiting responses, 

with 15 to 20 arriving every week. A Mexico Country Office official 

estimated that even if no more officios were to arrive, it would still take staff 

members assigned to that duty several months to process the current 

backlog. 

In their discussions with us, Mexican law enforcement officials noted 

the impact of these delays. Of particular concern to them was that Mexican 

authorities would arrest suspects and send an officio to ATF for needed 

information, but by the time ATF responded the Mexican authorities had 

released the suspect due to lack of evidence. In addition, the lack of timely 

support in this area made Mexican law enforcement officials question ATF’s 

commitment to Project Gunrunner and to ATF’s Mexican law enforcement 

partners. 

ATF has not been able to assign personnel to work alongside Mexican law 

enforcement. 

ATF has not been able to assign personnel to work directly with 

Mexican law enforcement agencies, as it planned. In its 2010 Operations 

Plan, ATF’s Mexico Country Office stated that it planned to embed ATF 

personnel with their Mexican counterparts, including assigning an 

intelligence analyst with CENAPI, one agent at the Secretariat of Public 

Security’s headquarters, one agent in the Mexico Attorney General’s office’s 

headquarters, and an ATF supervisor with the DEA’s Sensitive 

Investigations Unit.97 ATF staff told us that embedding ATF personnel with 

Mexican law enforcement is the best way to facilitate coordination and 

enable Mexican law enforcement to conduct firearms trafficking 

investigations. This method of coordination also has the full support of 

Mexican law enforcement. The head of CENAPI, for example, told us he 

supported the idea of embedding ATF personnel because he felt this would 

help train his staff in firearms trafficking investigations to make his agency 

more effective and would help facilitate the exchange of information. 

97 The DEA’s Sensitive Investigations Unit is the vetted unit of Mexican law 

enforcement officers overseen by the DEA. 

U.S. Department of Justice 83 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

However, as of June 2010, ATF has not yet been able to deploy any of 

these personnel. ATF personnel in Mexico City also said they have been 

unable to participate in several joint meetings, trainings, and exercises with 

the Secretariat of Public Security, Mexico Attorney General’s office, and 

other Mexican law enforcement agencies because of the lack of available 

staff. 

One example of the impact of ATF’s inability to embed its staff with 

Mexican law enforcement is the temporary deactivation of the Combined 

Explosives Investigation Team, an ATF-initiated U.S.-Mexican group 

composed of staff from the Mexican military, the Mexico Attorney General’s 

office, Secretariat of Public Security, and an ATF Certified Explosive 

Specialist and Explosives Enforcement Officer.98 This unit works 

throughout Mexico responding to scenes where explosives were seized. 

According to ATF and Mexican officials, this unit is highly regarded not only 

by other ATF staff, but also by other U.S. law enforcement authorities and 

especially Mexican law enforcement authorities. Beyond the individual 

successes of the program, ATF staff who participated in the group told us 

that they were able to work alongside their Mexican counterparts, which 

enhanced ATF’s relationships with Mexican law enforcement. Despite the 

successes of the unit and the progress it made in enhancing ATF’s 

relationship with Mexican law enforcement officials, ATF Assistant Attachés 

told us the group was deactivated in December 2009 over the objection of 

Mexican law enforcement because the ATF Explosives Enforcement Officer 

and Certified Explosive Specialist transferred out of Mexico. In March 2010, 

ATF reactivated the team with newly assigned staff, augmented by Mexican 

personnel. 

ATF is unable to recruit sufficient qualified staff to fill positions in Mexico. 

ATF has experienced difficulties in recruiting qualified staff for its 

Mexico Country Office, which hinders ATF’s ability to execute its already 

challenging duties in Mexico. Given the small number of Spanish-speaking 

employees throughout ATF, the fact that moving to Mexico is often a 

hardship for staff and their families, and the lack of incentives for staff to 

take this assignment, ATF has had difficulty attracting candidates for the 

positions in Mexico. ATF officials reiterated that it does not have sufficient 

number of Spanish-speaking agents to mandate Spanish language ability 

for positions in Mexico. With the escalation of cartel-related violence and 

the emphasis of Project Gunrunner, the need for ATF staff in Mexico has 

risen (Figure 9). The number of staff as of June 2010 was more than four 

98 Certified Explosives Specialists are ATF agents who investigate violations of 

federal explosives laws. Explosives Enforcement Officers specialize in explosives and bomb 

disposal, provide explosives device determinations for criminal prosecutions, and conduct 

explosives threat assessments of vulnerable buildings, airports, and national monuments. 

U.S. Department of Justice 84 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

times what it was before Project Gunrunner in 2007, and ATF has plans to 

assign more staff to Mexico. 

Figure 9: ATF Permanent Staff Assigned in Mexico, 

FY 2001 through 2010
 

Number of ATF Staff in Mexico 

9 

8 

7 

6 

5 

4 

3 

2 

1 

0 

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

8 

5 5 

3 3 

2 2 2 2 2 

Note: Number of permanent staff at the end of each fiscal year (as of 

June 2010). 

Source: ATF International Affairs Office. 

Yet, in response to recruiting difficulties, ATF has been relying on 

temporary duty (TDY) personnel in Mexico rather than permanent staff. As 

of June 2010, ATF had 13 permanent or TDY staff assigned in Mexico, of 

which 5 were on TDY status. ATF permanent staff in the Mexico Country 

Office told the OIG that although they appreciated the assistance of the TDY 

staff, permanent staff were more effective because they would be in Mexico 

long enough to build effective relationships with Mexican counterparts and 

learn the culture. The ATF staff in the Mexico Country Office also said that 

it takes time for personnel to adjust and settle into living in Mexico, and the 

cost of sending TDY staff to Mexico is much higher than that of a permanent 

posting. 

Building working relationships with Mexican law enforcement and 

government officials is important to the success of Project Gunrunner. 

When ATF personnel are assigned to Mexico for less than a year, it makes 

building effective relationships very difficult. The impact of the lack of 

stability of ATF permanent staff in Mexico is compounded by the often high 

turnover rate of Mexican law enforcement personnel. As an anti-corruption 

measure, many Mexican law enforcement positions rotate personnel 

frequently, as often as every 6 months. ATF officials told us this also affects 

their relationship with Mexican law enforcement. 

U.S. Department of Justice 85 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

ATF staff in Mexico that we interviewed suggested several incentives 

that would encourage qualified ATF staff to come to Mexico. They 

suggested, for example, reclassifying the positions in Mexico. ATF Assistant 

Attachés in Mexico City are GS-14s. In the United States, a GS-14 ATF 

agent is a supervisor of an enforcement group (Group Supervisor or 

Resident Agent in Charge). In ATF, serving as a supervisor is required for 

promotion to the GS-15 level. However, assignment as a GS-14 Assistant 

Attaché in Mexico does not count as a supervisory position. One Assistant 

Attaché in Mexico cited this as being the primary reason he had decided to 

transfer back to the United States. Similarly, time spent in Mexico does not 

count as “headquarters time,” which also helps in advancing within ATF, 

according to agents we interviewed. ATF agents suggested that Mexico 

assignments should count as a supervisory assignment or a headquarters 

assignment, or both. 

In response to a draft of this report, in September 2010 ATF reported 

that all permanent positions in Mexico receive “headquarters credit” for 

their tour of duty in Mexico. Further, ATF reported that it will upgrade the 

Attaché position to the Senior Executive Service level to provide that 

position with greater influence in interactions within ATF, and with 

U.S. Embassy staff and the government of Mexico. 

Bonuses are another incentive that could help attract staff to Mexico. 

Currently, DEA and FBI personnel qualify for, and receive, “Danger Pay,” 

which provides increased compensation when assigned to one of several 

cities in Mexico and other locations throughout the world.99 This incentive 

is also used by the Department of State and other government agencies with 

staff in areas eligible for Danger Pay. However, at the time of our site visit 

to Mexico City in March 2010, ATF staff in Mexico were not receiving Danger 

Pay. 

In response to a draft of this report, ATF informed us that in March 

2010, the U.S. Department of State authorized Danger Pay of 15 percent for 

ATF staff assigned to Monterrey, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juarez. ATF reported 

that staff in those locations began receiving the pay effective March 14, 

2010. Additionally, ATF reported that, as an incentive, all ATF staff 

assigned to Mexico began receiving “Difficult to Staff Incentive Pay” of 

15 percent in December 2009. 

Also, ATF staff in Mexico noted that the current 3-year tour of duty in 

Mexico is an onerous obligation. The potential of violence in Mexico creates 

99 According to the U.S. Department of State, Danger Pay is additional 

compensation above basic compensation for service at designated Danger Pay posts where 

civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or imminent danger 

to all U.S. government civilian employees. 

U.S. Department of Justice 86 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
a higher burden on ATF personnel and their families than other posts. ATF 

and Department officials told us that other federal agencies often send staff 

on 2-year tours, which can be extended a year. 

ATF’s Mexico Country Office requires stronger intelligence collection, 

analysis, and dissemination capabilities. 

ATF’s Mexico Country Office does not currently have the capability to 

collect, analyze, and disseminate all available intelligence from weapons 

seizures occurring in Mexico. ATF personnel in the Mexico Country Office 

focus their efforts on responding directly to seizure incidents in Mexico, 

collecting crime gun information in conjunction with Mexican officials, 

initiating traces, and receiving intelligence on suspected traffickers from 

Mexican law enforcement. According to ATF officials, there are usually 

about 120 to 150 gun seizures in Mexico per month. However, the small 

staff in ATF’s Mexico Country Office is unable to respond to all seizures and 

keep up with the analysis of intelligence and information. 

ATF’s process of collecting and analyzing information on weapons 

seizures in Mexico is insufficient to develop intelligence to support firearms 

trafficking investigations. When Mexico Country Office personnel receive 

firearms seizure data from Mexican officials, the staff enters the data into 

eTrace. Office staff attempts to enhance this intelligence with additional 

information from Mexican law enforcement. However, this effort is limited 

to ATF staff because the Foreign Service Nationals assigned to the Mexico 

Country Office are not authorized to access ATF databases and therefore 

have limited ability to assist with analyzing intelligence for dissemination 

within ATF. Consequently, Office staff cannot collect information on many 

firearms seizures in Mexico. ATF representatives at EPIC also collect 

Mexican crime gun information from open sources such as Mexican 

newspapers and reports. Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information’s 

Southwest Border Field Intelligence Support Team links EPIC’s information 

with additional intelligence and, when appropriate, sends the intelligence to 

agents in the field as investigative leads. However, information collected by 

EPIC often duplicates information already known by the Mexico Country 

Office. 

In its Operations Plan for 2010, the ATF Mexico Country Office 

identified a strategic goal to improve coordination, communication, and 

information sharing on firearms seizures between U.S. and Mexican 

agencies. To meet this goal, the Operations Plan identified a requirement to 

assign a new, full-time ATF analyst to work with the Mexico City Intelligence 

Community Group, a multi-agency intelligence group located at the 

U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Although the DEA has full-time 

representation in this group, no one from ATF’s Mexico Country Office 

participates as a full-time member of the group. We believe that the 

U.S. Department of Justice 87 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
development of better intelligence and information collection, analysis, and 

dissemination capability at the Mexico Country Office would respond 

directly to information sharing concerns expressed to us by officials in 

Mexico. 

ATF faces difficulty in coordinating with Mexican law enforcement 

officials to implement Project Gunrunner. 

Despite ATF’s efforts with Project Gunrunner, lack of coordination 

within the government of Mexico is hindering the success of Project 

Gunrunner. However, we found that a pilot program of assigning a Mexico 

Attorney General’s office representative to the Phoenix Field Division has 

helped communication and information sharing between ATF and Mexican 

officials. 

Mexican officials are not well informed about Project Gunrunner. 

We found that senior Mexican law enforcement officials were often not 

fully aware of Project Gunrunner’s goals, the results it has achieved, and 

how the program can help reduce firearms trafficking into Mexico. For 

example, some Mexican officials we interviewed were not aware of Project 

Gunrunner’s successes or of the databases and information systems used to 

support the project. One Mexican official asked the OIG, “What is it [Project 

Gunrunner] exactly? Is eTrace part of it?” He complained that Project 

Gunrunner is a term used as a “political reference point” but that he 

“cannot see the effects of it.” ATF officials agreed that ATF is having 

problems communicating its strategy and success stories to Mexican law 

enforcement officials. The ATF Attaché in Mexico City noted the challenge 

in measuring the impact of Project Gunrunner and that it is impossible to 

quantify the number of guns that ATF prevented from entering Mexico as a 

result of enforcement and regulatory programs. Other ATF officials 

acknowledged that ATF has not adequately communicated about Project 

Gunrunner with Mexican law enforcement officials. One Southwest border 

Special Agent in Charge said, “I don’t think they [Mexican law enforcement] 

really understand what we do.” He stated: 

We as an agency have failed to show them our success stories. 

‘For the information you gave, this is what it has actually 

resulted in.’ . . . I think if we did a better job on our part, it 

would help. Those guys want to know what that information 

they are providing is doing, they want to see results, and I don’t 

think we [ATF] are doing that. . . . They would show some 

gratification and satisfaction and say, ‘Hey, that worked. We 

stopped this guy from running guns.’ 

U.S. Department of Justice 88 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Internal coordination problems within the government of Mexico require ATF 

to deal with multiple agencies and can slow information sharing. 

U.S. officials we interviewed also referred to problems in coordination 

among the various Mexican law enforcement agencies responsible for 

combating firearms trafficking. U.S. officials described being asked to serve 

as intermediaries and to mediate disputes between Mexican agencies. 

Because there is no equivalent to ATF in Mexico (a federal agency with 

jurisdiction over firearms crimes), several different Mexican law enforcement 

agencies work on these crimes, including the Mexico Attorney General’s 

office, its intelligence branch CENAPI, the Mexican military, and the 

Secretariat of Public Security. While noting that the lack of coordination 

among Mexican law enforcement continues to be a problem, U.S. officials 

also told us that there recently has been significant progress in getting 

Mexican law enforcement agencies to work together, especially at meetings 

like GC Armas. 

We found that that the monthly U.S.-Mexican GC Armas meetings 

have to some extent improved information sharing between ATF and the 

government of Mexico. The meetings are intended to coordinate joint U.S.­

Mexico operations related to the detection, monitoring, and detention of 

firearms trafficking suspects crossing the border. According to U.S. and 

Mexican law enforcement officials, the meetings have become an important 

tool for agencies to share information. At the meetings, agency 

representatives discuss their ongoing investigations and significant events. 

They also frequently make requests and discuss planning for training and 

intelligence needs. The Mexico Attorney General’s office also provides ATF 

with a report of gun seizure information to be entered into eTrace. 

According to officials from the Department of State and ATF, although 

there are problems with trust, and reservations about sharing information, 

the U.S.-Mexican GC Armas meetings are developing into an effective venue 

for sharing intelligence and information. 

Information sharing between Mexican law enforcement and ATF could be 

improved by embedding a Mexico Attorney General’s representative in each 

of the ATF’s Southwest border field divisions. 

Beyond the ad hoc relationships formed by border liaisons, the Mexico 

Country Office’s reliance on the formal officios process, or information 

obtained from GC Armas meetings, ATF does not have a direct way to gain 

information from Mexican law enforcement on firearms trafficking suspects. 

However, in a pilot program in the Phoenix Field Division, a representative 

from the Mexico Attorney General’s office is assigned to that division. This 

representative is a bilingual prosecutor who works for the Mexico Attorney 

General’s office’s intelligence branch, CENAPI, and has experience in 

U.S. Department of Justice 89 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

firearms trafficking cases. He primarily responds to requests from the 

Phoenix Field Division by querying Mexican databases on information about 

suspects and other leads. He also educates ATF personnel on Mexican law 

enforcement and educates Mexican law enforcement personnel on ATF. 

The representative told us, however, that he has been frustrated that 

ATF has not been able to reciprocate the information sharing. Like his 

counterparts in Mexico’s statements to us, the representative also cited the 

need for more detailed information on suspected firearms traffickers who 

are U.S. citizens. In July 2010, ATF headquarters staff told us that ATF is 

drafting a Foreign Operations order that will address information sharing 

protocols with the government of Mexico. 

According to the Phoenix Special Agent in Charge, the Mexico 

Attorney General’s office representative has shown “the benefit to each 

country of being able to have someone who will positively impact the illegal 

flow of guns to Mexico.” One example that staff from the Phoenix Field 

Division provided was proving the nexus of cases to Mexico, either through 

sharing seizure information or information on a suspect in Mexico. 

According to an Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Phoenix, this has 

made the USAO more likely to accept cases that have such a nexus. The 

representative also can provide information on interviews of suspects in 

Mexico and other personal information such as criminal history and known 

associates. 

The Phoenix Assistant Special Agent in Charge said he endorsed the 

idea of having a Mexico Attorney General’s office representative in each of 

ATF’s Southwest border field divisions. A senior official from that agency 

agreed the arrangement is beneficial and supported sending additional 

representatives. 

ATF has not integrated the Project Gunrunner activities of its four 

Southwest border field divisions and its Mexico Country Office in a 

coordinated approach. 

To assess Project Gunrunner’s overall strategy, we reviewed ATF’s 

June 2007 Gunrunner strategy, its 2009 National Firearms Trafficking 

Enforcement Strategy and Implementation Plan, the 2009 firearms 

trafficking implementation plans of ATF’s Southwest border field divisions, 

and ATF’s Mexico Country Office 2010 Operations Plan.100 We found that 

100 We reviewed the Phoenix, Dallas, and Los Angeles Field Divisions’ 

implementation plans. The Houston Field Division did not provide any implementation 

plan, as of July 2010. The Mexico Country Office is not considered a field division and, 

accordingly, did not publish a firearms trafficking implementation plan. Rather, the Office 

published a separate 2010 Operations Plan which addresses its role as a country team 

Cont. 

U.S. Department of Justice 90 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

these strategies and plans do not effectively address U.S.-Mexico 

coordination, joint operations and activities, or intelligence sharing between 

the field divisions and the Mexico Country Office. We believe this lack of 

coordinated planning has contributed to various weaknesses in Project 

Gunrunner, including unclear roles for border liaison personnel, inadequate 

and disparate staffing in the Mexico Country Office, failure to focus on 

complex conspiracy firearms trafficking investigations, and poor 

coordination with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies on both sides 

of the border. 

For example, ATF’s June 2007 Gunrunner strategy specifically 

identified the need for a Project Gunrunner strategy that would unite the 

efforts of the four Southwest border field divisions and the Mexico Country 

Office to “affect firearms and ammunition trafficking to Mexican-based 

criminal organizations in both the U.S. and Mexico” and to “coordinate 

intelligence and information-sharing packages with the Mexico Country 

Office.” However, none of the plans that ATF provided to us fulfilled this 

requirement, or explained how the Southwest border divisions and the 

Mexico Country Office would work together. 

We found that Special Agents in Charge of the Southwest border field 

divisions we visited did develop internal plans to guide their respective 

Project Gunrunner regulatory and enforcement activities in their field 

divisions. However, these plans did not address coordination with the ATF 

Mexico Country Office. That Office is only briefly mentioned in one 

Southwest border division’s firearms trafficking implementation plans and 

the plan does not specify how or under what circumstances division staff 

are to coordinate with the Office. Additionally, although the Mexico Country 

Office’s 2010 Operations Plan states that the Office will assist in the 

interdiction of illegal arms being trafficked to Mexico, the plan makes no 

reference to Project Gunrunner.101 

Further, the majority (20 of 33) of the Southwest border field division 

agents, intelligence personnel, and supervisors we interviewed told us they 

had never heard of ATF’s 2009 National Firearms Trafficking Enforcement 

Strategy and Implementation Plan, or that they had heard of the Strategy or 

Plan but believed they had no impact. Staff of the ATF’s Mexico Country 

Office also expressed concerns about ATF’s lack of an integrated strategy 

and stated that the Southwest border field divisions communicated poorly 

with them and each other. One Mexico Country Office official we 

member at the U.S. Embassy. ATF Mexico Country Office Operations Plan for 2010, 

“Benefits to Mission” (undated). 

101 Appendix IV provides an overview of the implementations plans provided us by 

ATF’s Phoenix, Dallas, and Los Angeles field divisions. 

U.S. Department of Justice 91 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

interviewed stated, “ATF has no strategy . . . . The Southwest border field 

divisions don’t talk to each other. There is no exchange of information. 

Right now, the system [to exchange information] is broken.” 

ATF has drafted a new strategy relating to Project Gunrunner. 

In September 2010, after we provided ATF with a draft of this report, 

ATF issued a revised strategy for combating firearms trafficking to Mexico 

and related violence. ATF’s new strategy included 13 key elements of a 

revised approach to combating cartels, such as closer coordination with 

other law enforcement agencies, particularly related to intelligence on drug 

cartels; the need to improve intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis 

and the prioritization of leads; improved coordination with Southwest border 

field divisions and the Mexico Country Office, including the use of Border 

Liaison Officers; focusing investigations on complex conspiracy cases and 

entire trafficking rings; greater use of the OCDETF Program; and improved 

investigative coordination and intelligence sharing with Mexican law 

enforcement, including on gun tracing. 

ATF’s strategy document recognizes the need to address many of the 

shortfalls we found in our review. However, the strategy document does not 

provide detailed information on how ATF will implement and monitor efforts 

to improve operations in the key areas it identified. We believe ATF’s 

development of an implementation plan – with defined goals, specific 

actions, and resources – is essential to the successful implementation of 

improvements discussed in the September 2010 cartel strategy and also to 

ATF’s overall effort to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that ATF: 

13. Develop better information sharing and intelligence analysis 

capability at its Mexico Country Office. 

14. In coordination with the Mexico Attorney General’s office, 

evaluate the mutual benefits, roles, and information sharing 

protocols of the Mexico Attorney General’s office representative 

pilot program to determine whether to expand the program to 

each of ATF’s Southwest border field divisions. 

15. Ensure that the reforms discussed in ATF’s September 2010 

document entitled “Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused 

Strategy” are fully and expeditiously implemented. 

U.S. Department of Justice 92 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

In implementing Project Gunrunner, ATF has increased several of its 

key investigative and inspection program activities, such as the numbers of 

cases referred for prosecution involving firearms trafficking to Mexico that is 

fueling deadly violence along the Southwest border, traces of firearms from 

Mexico, and gun dealer compliance inspections along the Southwest Border. 

However, we found significant weaknesses in ATF’s implementation of 

Project Gunrunner that undermine its effectiveness. 

ATF does not use intelligence effectively to identify and target firearms 

trafficking organizations on both sides of the border. ATF could improve in 

four intelligence-related areas. 

For example, we concluded that ATF needs to better coordinate and 

share strategic intelligence with the government of Mexico and with its 

U.S. law enforcement partners. In this effort, ATF should develop processes 

to systematically exchange timely and relevant intelligence with these 

agencies on both sides of the border. 

ATF also needs to improve its own internal processes for collecting, 

analyzing and disseminating intelligence sent to field agents. ATF Field 

Intelligence Groups should work with their respective Southwest border 

enforcement groups to develop guidelines for the production of timely and 

relevant investigative leads. ATF managers need an automated system to 

track, monitor the outcome of, and evaluate the usefulness of, investigative 

leads. 

In addition, ATF needs to improve its sharing of firearms-trafficking 

related information and techniques within its intelligence structure. ATF 

Southwest border intelligence personnel need to more routinely exchange 

information, analytical techniques, and best practices within and across 

field divisions. 

ATF also needs to revisit its implementation of a key component of 

Project Gunrunner – the Border Liaison Program. We found that the 

liaisons need to coordinate their cross-border activities between their own 

field divisions and ATF’s Mexico Country Office and need their roles more 

clearly defined. 

Project Gunrunner’s investigative focus has largely remained on gun 

dealer inspections and straw purchaser investigations, rather than targeting 

higher-level traffickers and smugglers. As a result, ATF has not made full 

use of the intelligence, technological, and prosecutorial resources that can 

help ATF’s investigations reach into the higher levels of trafficking rings. 

U.S. Department of Justice 93 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
ATF also needs to make better use of the OCDETF Program, to target the 

higher levels of firearms trafficking rings. 

ATF did not effectively implement Project Gunrunner as a multiagency program. Despite the existence of an MOU between ATF and ICE, 

collaboration between the agencies, which share jurisdiction over firearms 

trafficking, must be improved. ATF needs to provide supplemental guidance 

to field supervisors on the coordination of pertinent and necessary 

information in areas of concurrent jurisdiction between ATF and ICE. 

ATF is unable to generate timely, actionable intelligence on suspected 

firearms traffickers, in part because it cannot obtain accurate crime gun 

trace data from Mexico. Many crime guns seized in Mexico are not traced, 

and the percentage of traces successfully conducted is low and declining. 

Even when traces succeed, the results are often untimely and cannot be 

used to generate investigative leads. ATF needs to more effectively 

communicate ATF’s Project Gunrunner strategy and the successes from 

tracing information provided by Mexican agencies, to Mexican law 

enforcement authorities. 

ATF has been unable to respond to many training, support and 

information requests from government of Mexico agencies, and does not 

have the staff it requires at its Mexico Country Office to fully do so. Nor has 

ATF fully integrated the activities of its Southwest border field divisions and 

the Mexico Country Office. ATF needs a better information sharing and 

intelligence capability in its Mexico Country Office and to integrate activities 

with the Southwest border field divisions. 

In this report, we make 15 recommendations to ATF to help improve 

their efforts to combat firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. 

Specifically, we recommend that ATF: 

1.	 Coordinate with the government of Mexico, the CBP, DEA and 

ICE to ensure systematic and regular exchanges of strategic 

intelligence to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico. 

2.	 Work with the Department to explore options for seeking a 

requirement for reporting multiple sales of long guns. 

3.	 Ensure that each Southwest border firearms trafficking 

enforcement group develops and regularly updates general 

guidelines for their Field Intelligence Group to follow that specify 

the most useful types of investigative leads. 

4.	 Develop an automated process that enables ATF managers to 

track and evaluate the usefulness of investigative leads provided 

to firearms trafficking enforcement groups. 

U.S. Department of Justice 94 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
5.	 Develop and implement procedures for Southwest border 

intelligence personnel to routinely exchange intelligence-related 

information in accordance with ATF Order 3700.2A and the 

Intelligence Collection Plan. 

6.	 Develop a method for Southwest border intelligence personnel to 

regularly share analytical techniques and best practices 

pertaining to Project Gunrunner. 

7.	 Formalize a position description that establishes minimum 

expectations regarding the roles and responsibilities of border 

liaisons. 

8.	 Focus on developing more complex conspiracy cases against 

higher level gun traffickers and gun trafficking conspirators. 

9.	 Send guidance to field management, agents, and intelligence staff 

encouraging them to participate in and exploit the resources and 

tools of the OCDETF Program, as directed in the Deputy Attorney 

General’s cartel strategy. 

10.	 Provide guidance to ATF field supervisors and agents to better 

coordinate with ICE, including direction on how to “coordinate all 

pertinent and necessary information” in areas of “concurrent 

jurisdiction,” as defined in the memorandum of understanding. 

11.	 Work with the government of Mexico to determine the causes of 

unsuccessful traces and develop actions to improve the rate of 

successful traces. 

12.	 Regularly and more effectively communicate ATF’s Project 

Gunrunner strategy to Mexican law enforcement authorities, 

including the value of gun tracing and the successes involving 

information or tracing information provided by Mexican agencies. 

13.	 Develop better information sharing and intelligence analysis 

capability at its Mexico Country Office. 

14.	 In coordination with the Mexico Attorney General’s office, 

evaluate the mutual benefits, roles, and information sharing 

protocols of the Mexico Attorney General’s office representative 

pilot program to determine whether to expand the program to 

each of ATF’s Southwest border field divisions. 

15.	 Ensure that the reforms discussed in ATF’s September 2010 

“Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused Strategy” are fully and 

expeditiously implemented. 

U.S. Department of Justice 95 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX I: TIMELINE OF KEY PROJECT GUNRUNNER EVENTS 

Year Month Activity 

2005 June Project Gunrunner pilot project in Laredo, Texas. 

2006 April Project Gunrunner official launch date. 

2008 January Expanded Project Gunrunner by adding 58 staff to the 

Southwest border field divisions, 3 additional staff to EPIC, and 

deploying eTrace to all U.S. consulates in Mexico. 

June Merida Initiative signed into law, allocated $2 million to expand 

Spanish eTrace throughout Mexico and Central America. 

2009 February The Recovery Act signed into law, allocated $10 million to ATF 

for Project Gunrunner. 

March White House announced enhanced action at the Southwest 

border and the relocation of 100 personnel to the Southwest 

border for 120 days via Gun Runner Impact Teams. 

June Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009 allocated an 

additional $6 million to ATF for Project Gunrunner. 

September New Gunrunner Teams established in El Centro, California; 

McAllen, Texas; and Las Cruces and Roswell, New Mexico. 

December Spanish eTrace piloted in Mexico. 

2010 June 

(In progress) 

Deploy Spanish eTrace to Mexican state police laboratories. 

August Emergency Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 

2010 allocated $37.5 million to ATF for Project Gunrunner. 

September 

(Anticipated) 

Hiring of 37 new staff with Recovery Act funds to be completed 

(89% complete as of June 2010). 

New ATF offices in the U.S. consulates in Tijuana and Juarez 

(75% complete as of June 2010). 

U.S. Department of Justice 96 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
APPENDIX II: POSITION DESCRIPTIONS FOR ATF STAFF 

The information below was obtained from ATF’s official position 

descriptions and interviews with ATF staff. 

Special Agent (agent) federal law enforcement officers who generally 

investigates criminal violations of federal laws that fall under the 

jurisdiction of ATF such as arson and explosive cases, convicted felon in 

possession of a gun, alcohol and tobacco crimes, and firearms trafficking. 

They contribute to Project Gunrunner by investigating crimes linked to 

firearms trafficking to Mexico, securing indictments from the Assistant 

United States Attorneys, and arresting the individuals. Such crimes include 

guns acquired by straw purchasers, corrupt gun dealers, and conspiracy 

firearms trafficking cases. 

Industry Operations Investigator generally conducts inspections of new 

gun dealers and federal explosives licensees by reviewing records, inventory, 

and the licensee’s conduct of business. They are also responsible for 

training gun dealers on the relevant laws as well as detecting and 

preventing firearms trafficking by noticing indicators and suspicious 

behaviors. Industry Operations Investigators have an important role in 

Project Gunrunner to educate gun dealers to avoid selling guns to suspected 

firearms traffickers, provide intelligence and make referrals to ATF agents 

when suspected firearms trafficking activity is taking place, and assist with 

the analysis of gun dealers and the records they keep. 

Intelligence Research Specialist performs in-depth intelligence analyses 

in support of ATF operations. They provide intelligence products such as 

link analyses, visual investigative analyses, and telephone toll record 

analyses to provide ATF staff with information about ongoing or emerging 

investigations. Intelligence Research Specialists also act in liaison and 

coordination functions both within ATF (with headquarters and other field 

offices) as well as with external partners, such as other federal law 

enforcement. 

Investigative Analyst functions in an investigative and research support 

position for ATF which includes compiling information from ATF databases 

on criminal leads and compiling reports for the use of ATF staff. 

Investigative Analysts also perform many of the administrative functions for 

an enforcement group or field office. 

Area Supervisor typically manages a group of about 10 Industry Operations 

Investigators, although these Industry Operations Investigators are 

frequently dispersed throughout satellite offices. In addition to managing, 

U.S. Department of Justice 97 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

hiring, and training, an area supervisor assigns Industry Operations 

Investigators to inspect gun dealers as well as explosive dealers and, when 

needed, receives referrals for criminal investigations from Industry 

Operations Investigators and passes them on to the intelligence group. 

Group Supervisor typically manages a group of about 10 agents who 

comprise an enforcement group. He or she provides guidance and 

supervision for criminal investigations and distributes work to these agents, 

often based on referrals from intelligence and industry operations. A group 

supervisor can also be called a “resident agent in charge” when the head of 

an enforcement group located in a city that is not the field division 

headquarters. 

Director of Industry Operations is in charge of all the Industry Operations 

Investigators and area supervisors within a field division. He or she 

determines where to locate staff within the field division and decides which 

gun dealers are inspected, usually based on the time since the last 

compliance inspection. 

U.S. Department of Justice 98 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

APPENDIX III: INTERVIEWS 

Organization/Division Position 

ATF Interviews 

ATF Headquarters Chief, Firearms Programs Division, Office of Field 

Operations 

Chief, Firearms Operations Division, Office of Field 

Operations 

Chief, Criminal Intelligence Division, OSII 

Field Intelligence Support Branch, Criminal Intelligence 

Division, OSII (x4) 

Program Manager, N-FOCIS Branch 

Chief, Office of International Affairs 

Chief of Staff, Office of Training and Professional 

Development 

Staff member, Special Operations Division 

Deputy Assistant Director, Field Operations (West) 

National Tracing Center Chief, and Deputy Chief, National Tracing Center 

Branch Chief, Law Enforcement Support Branch 

Supervisory Analyst, Information Systems Analysis 

Group 

Branch Chief, Industry Records Branch 

Program Analyst, Firearms Tracing Branch, 

International Trace Section 

Violent Crime Analysis Branch Branch Chief 

Los Angeles Field Division Special Agent in Charge 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge (x2) 

Director of Industry Operations 

Area Supervisor 

Industry Operations Investigator 

Field Intelligence Group Supervisor 

Intelligence Research Specialist 

Industry Operations Intelligence Specialist 

Tracing Specialist, Regional Crime Gun Center 

Group Supervisor, Glendale 

Resident Agent in Charge, San Diego 

Resident Agent in Charge, El Centro 

Special Agent, Glendale 

Special Agent, San Diego 

Border Liaison Officer 

Phoenix Field Division Special Agent in Charge 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge (x2) 

Director of Industry Operations 

Area Supervisor (x2) 

Field Intelligence Group Supervisor 

Intelligence Research Specialist/e-Trace Coordinator 

Intelligence Agent, Field Intelligence Group 

Group Supervisor 

Special Agent (x2) 

Dallas Field Division Special Agent in Charge 

U.S. Department of Justice 99 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

 

Organization/Division Position 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge (x2) 

Director of Industry Operations 

Area Supervisor 

Field Intelligence Group Supervisor 

Intelligence Research Specialist 

Industry Operations Intelligence Specialist 

Group Supervisor, Dallas 

Group Supervisor, Fort Worth 

Special Agent (x4) 

Mexico Country Office Attaché to Mexico 

Assistant Attaché (x2) 

Special Agent 

Intelligence Research Specialist 

Foreign Service National (x4) 

Non-ATF Interviews 

Drug Enforcement 

Administration 

Staff Coordinator, Operations Division, Office of Global 

Enforcement, Mexico and Central America Section 

Mexico-Central America Intelligence Unit Chief, DEA 

Office of Strategic Intelligence 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Los Angeles Field 

Division 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field 

Division 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Dallas Field Division 

Regional Director, Mexico and Central America 

Division, Mexico City, Mexico 

Immigration and Custom 

Enforcement Headquarters 

Chief, Office of Investigations, Contraband Smuggling 

Unit; Program Manager, Operation Armas Cruzadas 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Los Angeles Field 

Division 

Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field Division 

Special Agent, Dallas Field Division 

Deputy Attaché, Mexico City, Mexico 

Customs and Border Protection 

Headquarters 

Director, International Affairs Office; International 

Affairs Officer, International Affairs Office; Program 

Manager, Office of Field Operations; Assistant Chief, 

Southwest Border Division, Office of Border Patrol; 

Officer, Office of Border Patrol; Policy Advisor, Office of 

Policy and Planning; Liaison, Office of Air and Marine; 

Liaison, Office of International Affairs; Liaison, Office of 

Border Patrol; Liaison, Office of Training and 

Development 

Acting Assistant Director, Border Security, Los Angeles 

Field Office 

Lead Border Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, Marfa 

Sector Intelligence, Sierra Blanca, Texas 

Special Operations Supervisor, Canine Unit, El Paso, 

Texas 

Assistant Director for Border Security, U.S. Customs 

and Border Patrol, Tucson, Arizona 

Yuma Sector Chief, U.S. Border Patrol 

U.S. Department of Justice 100 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

Organization/Division Position 

Attaché and Assistant Attaché to Mexico 

Executive Office for United 

States Attorneys 

Project Safe Neighborhoods National Coordinator 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

Central District of California 

Project Safe Neighborhood/Assistant United States 

Attorney; Assistant United States Attorney 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

Northern District of Texas 

Deputy Criminal Chief 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

Eastern District of Texas 

Assistant United States Attorney 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for 

Arizona 

United States Attorney for Arizona and Assistant 

United States Attorney 

Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

International Affairs Office Department of Justice Attaché to Mexico 

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 

Development, Assistance, and 

Training 

Chief and Deputy Chief 

Department of State U.S. Ambassador to Mexico; Deputy Chief of Mission, 

U.S. Embassy in Mexico City 

Merida Coordinator, Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs 

Deputy Director and Drug Interdiction Program 

Coordinator, Narcotics Affairs Section, Mexico City, 

Mexico 

Assistant Regional Security Officer, Mexico City, Mexico 

Government Accountability 

Office 

GAO Analyst-In-Charge, International Affairs Section, 

Washington DC 

Mexican Government Interviews 

Mexican Military Senior Officers 

PGR Assistant Attorney General for Special Investigations 

and Organized Crime, representatives from the Special 

Unit for Investigation into Crimes Against Health and 

the Special Unit for Investigation of Terrorism, Arms 

Stockpiling and Trafficking. 

PGR-CENAPI Director of CENAPI along with representatives from the 

General Analysis Against Crime, Office of International 

Analysis, Office of Weapons and Armed Groups, Office 

of Information against Kidnappings and other Crimes, 

Directorate of Firearms and Explosives. 

PGR-CENAPI Representative to ATF Phoenix Field 

Division 

Secretariat of Public Security Representative from the International Affairs Office (x2) 

Mexican Secretariat of Foreign 

Affairs 

Representative from the Directorate of North America 

(x2) 

U.S. Department of Justice 101 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

 

APPENDIX IV: ATF SOUTHWEST BORDER FIELD DIVISIONS’ 

FIREARMS TRAFFICKING IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 

Phoenix  Developed a strategy of intelligence-lead policing whereby the 

Field Intelligence Group will analyze and disseminate leads, as 

the point of contact for other field divisions and agencies. 

 Two agents each dedicated full time to the Phoenix and Tucson 

OCDETF. 

 Border liaison officers in Phoenix, Tucson, and Yuma, Arizona. 

 Embedded a representative from the Mexico Attorney General’s 

office (CENAPI).* 

 Conducted a conference call with Los Angeles and San Francisco 

Field Divisions. 

 Industry Operations would target high-risk gun dealers for 

inspections based on risk factors found through intelligence. 

Dallas  Field Intelligence Group will coordinate trafficking intelligence to 

appropriate field offices, within ATF including the Mexico Country 

Office and Southwest border Field Intelligence Groups, and other 

law enforcement. 

 Field Intelligence Group will be the conduit between law 

enforcement and Industry Operations, with regular collaboration 

between the two. 

 Border liaison officer in El Paso, Texas. 

 Due to close proximity to the border, agents work closely with 

other federal agencies (DEA and ICE) and local police. 

 Train and coordinate U.S. Attorneys and local prosecutors, to 

ensure that cases are successfully prosecuted. 

 Industry Operations will conduct focused inspections on gun 

dealers who show indicators of firearms trafficking. 

Los Angeles  Field Intelligence Group will analyze information and leads to 

assign to field offices for investigation. 

 Conference calls will be conducted between the Los Angeles, San 

Francisco, and Phoenix field divisions for coordination and 

information sharing between field divisions. 

 Border liaison officer in San Diego, California. 

 Firearms trafficking group (San Diego I) works with local law 

enforcement, ICE, the FBI, and through the border liaison, 

Mexican law enforcement 

 Will coordinate with U.S. Attorneys and county District Attorneys 

to address issues in cases so fast and successful prosecutions 

can occur 

* The representative from the Mexico Attorney General’s office was a pilot program that was 

to be evaluated in summer 2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 102 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Mr. Michael D. Gulledge 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Frreanns and Explosives 

Office of the Director 

Washia.SlOn. DC 20226 

October21 ,2010 

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

United States Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

1425 New York Avenue, NW 

Suite 6100 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Mr. Gullcdge: 

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) appreciates the opportunity to 

review and comment on the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) formal draft report entitled 

"Review of A TF's Project Gunrunner." While the OIG's review identified several areas for 

improvement, it also found a number of significant accomplishments as a result of ATF's Project 

Gunrunner, including the increased number of investigations initiated, the number of eases and 

defendants referred to United States Attorney's Offices (USA Os), the number of gun dealer 

compliance inspections along the Southwest Border, the number of compliance inspection hours 

worked, and ATF Industry Operations referrals made to ATF criminal investigators. It is worth 

noting that these advances were made at the same time A IT faced significant challcnges to the 

expansion of Project Gunrunner. We are committed to building on these successes and 

improving Ute program in the areas identified by the 01G. 

As the OIG review reports, Project Gunrunner has increased the number of investigations 

initiated by 109%, the number of cases and defendants referrcd to United States Attorney's 

Offices (USA Os) by 54%, the number of gun dealer compliance inspections along the Southwest 

Border by 133%, thc number of compliance inspection hours worked by 102%, and the number 

of ATF Industry Operations referrals made to ATF criminal investigators by 47%. These 

statistics represent only part of the accomplishments achieved under Project Gunrunner. 

FY 2006 through FY 2009: 

When all of the data is considered, including cases Utat were investigated and developed by ATF. 

then refcrred to state and local courts for prosecution, thc rcsults show that: 

APPENDIX V: THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND 

EXPLOSIVES’ AMENDED RESPONSE 

U.S. Department of Justice 103 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
-2-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

• 1,256 defendants have been recommended for prosecution. 

• 5,457 firearms and 535,262 rounds of ammunition that are not in Mexico or being used in 

crimes of violence because they are in ATF evidence vaults. 

• 608 defendants are serving an average of 94 months in prison and an additional 198 are 

under the supervision of the court for an average of 41 months. 

• 233 defendants have been convicted and await their sentence. 

• 789 defendants (63 percent of all defendants recommended for prosecution) faced 

cbarges related to ftreanns trafficking. 

• ATF conducted 6.676 compliance inspections. 

• ATF investigators identified 49,625 firearms that Federal Fireanns Licensees could not 

locate in inventory or account for by sale or other disposition. By working with industry 

members. Industry Operations Investigators (lOis) located either the firearms or the 

records to confirm the disposition of 43.249. or 87% of the missing firearms. 

• ATF's lOIs reviewed over I million firearm transaction records to both validate their 

correct and accurate completion as well as glean investigative leads regarding pauems of 

purchases. 

(please see attachment entitled: "PROJECT GUNRUNNER CASES AND DEFENDANTS 

RECOMMENDED FOR PROSECUTION FY 2006 THROUGH FY 2009") 

Review of the Gunrunner program requires in-depth knowledge and understanding of the context 

in which the Gunrunner program resides, the available resources, and the limitations imposed on 

the program. Although we believe the OIG review covered significant portions of the program, 

we believe some of those areas would have benefitted from a more comprehensive review and 

analysis. For example, the absence of substantive interviews of the current or fonner Assistant 

Director for Field Operations, the Assistant Director for Strategic Intelligence and Information 

(OSI!). the Deputy Assistant Director with responsibility for Project Guruunner (including the 

four Southwest Border field divisions, and ATF's Office of International Affairs), or the Deputy 

Assistant Director for Industry Operations limits the completeness of the OIG review. These 

interviews would have provided an important historical perspective, put Project Gunrunner in its 

proper context within A TFt s overall strategy for combating gun crime and described ATP's 

plans for the program. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

104 
 

-3-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

Project Gunrunner is a focused subset of ATF's broader fireanns enforcement program to reduce 

violent crime by stemming the flow of firearms from lcgal to illegal commerce on a national and 

international level. The OIG suggests the absence of a strategic approach to Project Gunrunner. 

This is belied by the existence of the many documents referred to in the review including A TF's 

cartel strategy. Contrary to the ~IG's statement that A TF's cartel strategy was developed as a 

response to their working draft report, it was in fact developed over several months to 

communicate further refined Project Gunrunner enforcement slJategies to the entire A TF 

organization. 

While the OIG report reflects the amount and approximate timing of the appropriated funds 

received to support Project Gunrunner, it fails to provide the full funding context of the 

implementation of Project GuoruMer. In particular, we note that because ATF first received 

funding for Project GuoruMer on March 3, 2009, and this review was initiated 48 working days 

later, the ~IG's review was premarure. To be clcar, ATF initiated Project Guruunner as an 

emerging priority beginning in 2006. From 2006 through March of2009, across three flat fiscal 

year budgets, A TF redirected base budget resourees and 54 special agent and 32 industry 

operations investigator personnel to Project Gunrunner absent any new funding. In the early 

days of Project GuoruMer, A TF prioririz.cd its limited resouroes on achieving an immediate 

operational impact and placed agents and lOIs on the border as a primary means to stem the flow 

of firearms to Mexico. In the absence of new funding, the needed administrative and intelligence 

support positions were deferred and the significant expense of placing additional personnel in 

Mexico on a permanent basis was simply not possible. 

From the ~IG'. presentation of the Project Gunrunner budge~ and the expansion of domestic, 

and intemational stalflDg, one might infer that A TF had full access to unconStrained resources 

and that there are and were no challenges in the expansion of Project Gunrunner. In contrast, 

new personnel resources and funding were provided in increments over time, raising the related 

challenges of transferring existing personnel or quickly hiring, training, and placing new 

government pexsonnei in newly created offices, in order to begin to expand A TF's impact. In 

fact, in March of2009, ATF received fundiog ood authorilAtion for only seven of the 23 

personnel required to expand ATF's intelligence and information sharing capabilities both 

domestically and internationally. The remaining 16 positions wcre not authorized or funded 

before FY 2010. 

In mooy sections of the review, the DIG review tends to lose sight of the complete purpose of 

Project Gunrunner. In Parts II and 1Il of the review the orG focuses only on the firearms 

trafficking elements of Project Gunrunner, to the exclusion of discussing the equally important 

and intimately related purpose of reducing the high level of violence associated with cross border 

dmg and firearms trafficking. This is evideot in the discussion of single defendant versus 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

105 
-4-

Assi_t Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

complex cases and the comparative penalties m:eived for drug trafficking versus firearms 

. trafficking cases. In both situations, the focus is on firearms trafficking related offenses. The 

OIG does not address the substantial and important work (including many single defendant 

cases) undertaken to reduce violent crime. 

Further, in their review, the OIG evaluated the number of criminal cases initiated under Project 

Gunrunner, but did not address the many intelligence cases A TF developed in support of Project 

Gunnuwer 10 docwnent seizures of fireanns in Mexico andlor leads developed in the United 

States. We believc this omission uudmtates the A TF's proactive efforts in addressing the 

intelligence requirements of Project Gunrunner. While much of the infonmation in these 

intelligence eases is derived from open source seizure infonnation from Mexico. this inCannation 

often provides the who, what, when, where, and why surrounding a fucarms seizure that is 

frequently omitted from a trace request. By entering this infonmation into N-Force, any ATf 

intelligence analyst at Headquarters, El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), or in the field can 

monitor and query this dats. Once trace data is entered into cTrace, A TF analysts can bsclcfill 

the N-Fon:e data where applicable and notify the field of any links to on-going Project 

Gunrunner investigstions. In this way, Mexican data, including DTO affiliation, can be added to 

fireanns trace data, to support on·going investigations or to generate Dew investigative leads. 

In genera1, A TF is concerned that this review docs not adequately rellect the challenges that the 

United States and MexiCan governments face in trying to reduce violence, gun trafficking and 

drug trafficking along and across the border. Specifically, there have been significant challenges 

given the differences between the Mexican and United States legal systems, the investigative 

capabilities and resoun:es, and the culture and laws relating to fireanms possession. 

ATF bss a distinct and proud heritage of sharing infonmation with State and local police officers 

with the sole goal of reducing violent crime. This is no difference with our mission in Mexico. 

We are currently operating in an unprecedented capacity in Mexico and provide more assistance 

regarding firearms trafficking and explosives investigations than ever before. Our work in 

Mexico has not been without challenges, including effective sharing of information. 

AccoCdingly, these very dynamic circumstaoces create infonmation sharing challenges that ATF 

and the Government of Mexico are diligently collaborating to overcome. 

During FY 2010 A TF developed an internal publication entitled, "Project Gnnrunner - A Cartel 

Focused Strategy." Ali the OIG notes in their review, this strategy addresses most of the 

recommendations contained in the OIG review. AccoCdingly, ATF believes that many of the 

recommendations made below have already been addressed and the OIG should note this in their 

review. Nonetheless, ATF's response to the OIO's specific recommendations follows: 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

106 
 

-5-

AssiJIant 1nspeetcr Geneml for Evaluation and Inspections 

Micllael D, OuIIedge 

ATF's Respo1fle to die O[G RecommendfllWn$ 

1_ Coonllntlte with tile government ofMexko, 'he CB', DEA lind ICE to enlure systematic 

BIId reguhu exchBllges oJ I1mtegle intelligence to com6at /lI'etfI'mS tM/fdlng to MexIcr!, 

A TF concurs, A TF bas been and will eonlillue tomduate and refine protocols for sharing 

strategic; intelligence with the Government of Mexico md our domestic partners. For example, 

A TF's National Ounnlllller Coordinator md osn recently initiated eonrdinstion with ICE md 

CBP. ATF's National Coordinator attended the DHS "BEST" conference in San Diego in 

August 2010 where he inteJ:faeod with program level personnel, The National Coon.linstor 

continues to co-cl!air with m ICE representative the development and implementation of the 

ONDCPSouthwest Border COllIltermIreoties Strategy, Chapter 7, Weapons, In September 2010, 

ATF's Criminsl IlIwUigenee Division Chief, md the Gunrunner National Coordlnstor initiated 

m.eeQngs with ICE md CBP Southwest Border coordinators in Headquarters, Another 

eoordinstion meeting is scheduled for October 2010 in Sm Diego. 

In October 2010, ATFparticipated in II bilatera1joint MexicolUnited States conference basted by 

the United States Ambassador in Mexico City that focused on dismIIlItling the toob or . 

lnI/lSllational crime. The Arms Trafficking workshop was chaired by the A TF Deputy Director 

and the Direetor of CENAPI, The principal topies of discussion included the eTrac:e 

implementation plan, the mellllS md milliner of the transportation of fiRarms into Mexico, md 

. strategic and tactical information sharing, 

Owing the workshop, A TF agreed to aeoeIerate e Trace training to pre-identified POR personnel 

located in each of the states in Mexico md provide them access to the system to aid in the thuely 

input of trace requests of seized fireamIs. A TF also offered CENAPl to place a representative at 

EPIC in ATFs Firearms and Elqllosives Intelligence Team to improve the facilitation and 

sharing of real time actionable information. A TF also ngreed 10 provide regular intelligenee 

bullelills, recently ueated by A TF at EPIC that eontain aggregate trace information that among . 

other things will assist with identifYing firearms trafficking treods. These bulletins also contain 

information regarding A TF investigations including defendmlS, seizure, md other investigative 

information. 

ATF also eoeouraged Mexico to make use of A TFs explosives expertise through the Combined 

Explosives Investigations T esro for response to signifiCllllt explosives seizures or bombings to 

assist with explosives identification and post blast investigation. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

107 
-6-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

2. Work wilh the Department to up/on options for seeking a requirement for reporting 0/ 

multiple sales o[long guns. 

A IF concurs, but notes that this may require a change to the Gun Control Act which is beyond 

ATF's and the Department's authority. ATF will explore the full range of options to seek 

information regarding multiple sales anong guns. 

J. Ensure IhQJ each SoUlllwesl borde,. jifeanm trajJ1I:klng eliforcement group develops and 

reguiarly updIltes general gu/delint!Sfor their Field [nldl/gence Group to 'oHow II,at specify 

tlJe most useful types of investigative leaf's. 

ATF concurs. KIT's Headquarters bas communicated and will continue to reinforce the 

guidance previously provided to FIGs tIuough the Southwest Border Collection Plan, the FIG 

Group Supervisor Guidebooks, ~ational training conferences. and policy documents. These 

materials and training include guidance related to coordination between FiGs and the respective 

field offices in the development of local guidelines for the referral of investigative leads. 

Additionally, a firearms trafficking coordinator (Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC» 

from eacb division attended the August 2010 FIG national training conference in Washington, 

DC. 

In August 20 I 0, Directors of IndustJy Operations (DIOs) in the Southwest Border field divisions 

were asked for assistance in identifying and updating the indicators of firearms trafficking and 

straw pW'Chasing. lIDs information will be collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the field, for 

incorporation into the licensee risk assessment process for the inspection plans and the 

subsequent compliance inspections. This information will also support the enhancement of 

referrals generated from compliance inspections. 

Finally, ATF has scheduled a Project Gwuunner coordination conference at EPIC in December 

2010, for all SACs, ASACs, DIOs, RACs, GSs, and FIG supervisors for field divisions/field 

offices with designated Gunrunner groups, border liaison agents, and members of the 

International Affairs Office, the MCO, and the OSU Criminal Intelligence Division, Southwest 

Border Field Intelligence Support Team (FIS1), and ATF EPIC stalf. 

4. DnelDp an auiomoted process that elllwies ATF managers to tmek and evaluate tire 

usefulness of illW!Stiga/iw leads provided to fU'eanns trafficiUng enforcement groups. 

A TF concurs. In September 2010, A TF awarded a contract to begin business process 

reengineering (BPR) of its case management and related business processes. This BPR effort 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

108 
-7-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

, will eXllllline the flow of information thrnugbOUl A TF, acknowledging the close relationship of 

our regulatory mission and our law enforcement mission and the need for information, including 

referrals of information and investigative leads, to be exchanged seamlessly across those 

missions. 

The BPR will also address the need for better integration between our case' management 

system(s) and our firearms information systems, including eTrace and the Firearms Trw:ing 

System, to streamline processes and eliminate duplication of data entry. Completion of the BPR 

effort is expected by mid FY 2012. The BPR will produce as its deliverable, a set of 

reengineercd b1l!iness processes and requirements for ATF's next·genemtion case management 

system. Completing a BPR is a recognized best prw:tice prior to completing requirements for a 

new system or identifying a technical solution. 

A TF will use the results of the BPR and the requirements developed from it to identify the best 

solution. There are no credible estimates of the cost of a replacement system pending the 

outcome of the BPR and no fUnding stream has been identified. A TF does not contemplate 

identifying, aoquiring, and implementing an automated solution in order to resolve this 

recommendation before FY 2014. 

While awaiting necessary fUnding and system enhancements to automate the tracking and 

evaluation of investigative leads, A TF will assess existing guidance regarding the "manual" 

exchange and documentation of referrals between industry operations, FIGs, and criminal 

enforcement field offices. If opportunities for increased efficiency and effectiveness are 

identified, A TF will issue revised guidance to field personnel. 

S. D...rop IJlIIi Implemenl proctdJtrts for So.,hllltSl Border inlelligence personnello 

routinely txt:hange inkUigence-rtl4kd infomuulon, ln accordance witlr ATF Order 3700.2A 

and Ihe [nltUlgence Colhcllon Plan. 

A TF concurs. As discossed in its response to recommendation number I, A TF luis been and will 

continue to ensure systematic exchanges of information. A TF will also further review A TF 

Order 3700.2A for poteotial revisions responsive to the OlG's recommendations. 

6. DeVIIlop a metlrodfar SouthllltSl barder inltlJlgence persqnnello regularly share analytical 

lechni4uts and bal practkes pertaining 10 Project Gunrunner. 

ATF concurs. ATF has taken and will continue to take steps to improve in this area as noted in 

response to recommendations numbers 3 and 5. In addition, FIG persoanel perticipate in 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

109 
-8-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

periodic conference calls involving their respective FIST and regional FIGs, during which 

analytical techniques and best practices may be discussed. There is a FIST dedicated to the 

Southwest Border field divisions. 

7. ForllUllize a posidon description tl,at establisl,es minimum expectations regarding the roles 

and responsibilities 0/ border liaisons. 

A TF concurs in the recommendation to provide a more detailed description of the roles and 

responsibilities of border liaisons, but does not believe that a unique position description is 

necessary. The general duties and role of the BLO were addressed within ATF's "Project 

Gunrunner - A Cartel Focused Strategy," which was disseminated to Field Operations personnel 

in September 2010. ATF will further document the roles and responsibilities ofBLOs in an ATF 

order addressing international operations. The order will include details such as qualifications; 

selection; role, responsibilities, and authorities; area of responsibility; coordination with and 

between the field division and the respective country office; training and development; and 

administrative matters such as passports, country clearances, expenses and equipment. 

8. Focus on developing more complex conspiracy cases against higher level gun traffICkers 

and gun trafficking c()nspiriltors. 

A TF concurs. ATF bas and will continue to develop complex conspiracy cases. A TF will 

reinforce previously issued guidance including the National Firearms Trafficking Enforcement· 

Strategy and Implementation Plan and "Project Gunrunner - A Cartel Focused Strategy." A TF 

is working with the Department of Justice, Criminal Division and United States Attorney's 

Offices to bring prosecutors and agents from both sides of the border together to work on . 

enhancing this effort. 

9. Send guidance to field nianagemen4 agents, and inteUigence staff encouraging them to 

participate in and exploit the resources and tools o/the OCDETF Program, as directed in the 

Deputy Attorney General's Cartel Strategy. 

ATF concurs. ATF has prioritized multi-defendant complex investigations related to Southwest 

Borderfirea.nn!i: trafficking and violence during monthly management conference calls, 

management meetings and other venues and will continue to do so. To more formally 

communicate this priority and targeting strategy, during FY 2010 Field Operations developed an 

internal publication entitled, "Project Gunrunner - A Cartel Focused Strategy." Portions of the 

strategy highlight participation in the OCDETF Program. A TF will develop a mandatory roll 

call training package related to the OCDETF Program for all special agents in the field. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

110 
Assistant Inspeetor General for Evatuatiollud InspectiOllS 

Michael D. Gulledge 

The April 2009 memo from the ADAGIDirector ofOCDETF stated that firearms trafficking 

eases with a nexus to Mexlcu DTOs are eligible for the OCDETF program. Guidance regarding 

increased emphasis on OCDETF program participation was commtmicated to the field by 

memorandum dated September 15,2009. A TF notes thllt prior to this OCDETF policy guidance.. 

A TF efforts to utili1.e the OCDETF Program for investigatiolls principally wgeting firearms 

trafficking to DTOs :frequently met negative results if significant Title 21 violations.larpIS. ud 

agencies with Title 2] authority were not involved. A TF also notes that we worked olosely with 

the Department of Justice (DO}) ud OCDETF in development of the DOJ certel strategy, as 

well as ONDCP in the development of its .June 2009 Southwest Border Countemarcotics 

Slratesy. which for the first time reco~ the significance of firearms trafficking and devoted 

a chapter to southbound weapons enforcement initistives. 

Finally, ATF submits that A TF's participation within the OCDETF PrOgram, including multiagency OCDETF investigations led or co-sponsored by ATF, as well as ATF's participation and 

lead on OCDETF strike forces, has been increasing and is substantial in relation to the OCDrn 

fiIlldina Ihet ATF receives. For example, in FY 2009, A TF received SII.436M and 54 F'TE for 

OCDrn, but actually utilized 130 PTE toward OCDrn, resulting in an over bum of76 FTE. 

In 2010, ATF OCDETF funding increased. providing for 11 additional PTE, which will increase 

ATF participation in OCDETF strike forces, DBA Special Operstions Division, ud the 

OCDrn Fusion Center. OCDETF also awardedATF $IM for Southwest Border activities and, 

. based upon ATF's OOIltinued superior performance in aCDrn T·1Il investigations. received II 

5500,000 OCDETF case funding lIugmenlation to lIUpport investigations in the field. ATF plans 

to co-lQQate new GuMlnner gmups in El Paso and Atlanta within the Strike Forces. 

1(}' PrtwJde guitlance to AU jleld supemso,s and agenls to belt" coordinate with ICE, 

inc1utlJnr dinctIofl on how to "CtJtJfdlttate fill ptlrtitllmt and neceS8ary tn/OI7IfllIibn" ifl aret16 01 

"conclII'rttnt jurisdiction, ,. as defined ifI tlltl memorand"m 01 understand;flg. 

A TF concurs. ATF is implementing this recommendation lis discussed in respollSes to . recommendations n1.llIlbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9. . 

In addition, the following text, evidencing the perspective of the Deputy Director of ICE on the 

working reIstionship between ATF and ICE has been provided to the Ola by ICE: 

"In early Oetober 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) lIUbmitted It 

lengthy and detailed account of its successful interaction with the Bureau of Alcohol 

Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (BATFE), between June 2009 and September 2010. 

The document included general coUaborstive efforts in which ICE and SA TFE have 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

111 
-10-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

engaged to ensure continuous collaboration and integration of efforts to address 

enforcement of the various laws in which both agencies' enforcement responsibilities 

intersect. However, the document also provided specific information regar~ng 113 

investigations in which ICE and BATFE have coordinated efforts to pursue investigative 

leads related to a variety of violations, which include the smuggling of weapons, 

ammunition, explosives and cigarettes, as well as prohibited possessor violations. Of 

these 113joint investigations, 37 specifically address the smuggling of weapons, 

explosives, ammunition, and components from the United States to Mexico. The most 

relevant cumulative enforcement results derived from these 37 investigations include, but 

are not limited to, the following: 

COMMODITY SEIZED QUANTITY SEIZED 

ARRESTS: 119 

FIREARMS: 756 

INERT GRENADES: 114 

DETONATING FUSES: 114 

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES: 304 

AMMUNITION 32,510 ROUNDS 

WEAPON COMPONENTS: 12 

WEAPON MAGAZINES: 118 

BALLISTIC VESTS: 11 

VEHICLES SEIZED: 12 

MARIJUANA SEIZED: 4,917KGS 

HEROIN SEIZED: 17.8 KGS 

METHAMPHETAMINE SEIZED: 20.4KGS 

Although the challenge before us is of great magnitude, ICE and BA TFE have 

undoubtedly proven a strong willingness and a proactive approach to integrating efforts 

·that address existing shortcomings to enhance the U.S. government's ability to identify 

and target those who violate our weapon related laws." 

11. Work with the government of Mexico to determine tl,e causes of unsuccessful traces and 

develop actions to improve ti,e rilte of successful traces. 

A TF concurs. ATF has and will continue to work with the Government of Mexico to increase 

the rate of successful traces, through comprehensive deployment of Spanish eTrace and relevant 

training. Additionally, with funding from the U.S. State Department, Narcotics Affairs Section 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

112 
·11· 

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael O. Gulledge 

(NAS), ATF will be providing 64 computers to Mexico; two for each of the 31 Mexican States 

and the Federal District. These computers will be dedicated for e-Trace to ensure that POR can 

successfully access Spanish e-Tr'8te to enter, monitor, and retrieve trace data for their recovered 

firearms. The A 1F MeO, in conjunction with ATF International Training Branch and with 

funding from NAS, will provide Spanish e-Trace training for approximately 31 POR Delegados 

and their designees. Additionally. A TF's National Tracing Center wiU conduct periodic reviews 

orGOM e-Trace entries for completcnes::s and accuracy. 

12. Regularly and more effectively communicate ATF's Project Gunrunner strattgy to 

Muican law enforcement authormes, including the value of gun tracing QlJd the successes 

involving In/omuzJion or tracln, in/onnation provided 6y Mexican agencies. 

ATF concurs. As ATF noted in our response to recommendation number II, efforts are 

underway to increase access and training for Mexico's Federal DeJegados and their POR staffs in 

all 31 Mexican Slates and the FederaJ District. 

The total number of authorized ATF positions in Mexico is now 18, and there are currently 8 

FSNs supporting A TF's work.. As discussed in response 10 recommendation number 7. A IF will 

establish and communicale the roles and responsibilities ofBLOs to affected SACs, designated 

specia1agents. and personnel assigned to applicable. COWltry offices. A TF's increased staffing 

and improvements to the BLO program will enhance the communications, responsiveness. and 

relationships between A TF and Mexican law enforcement officials, and promote increased 

understanding and support of A 1F's Project Gunrunner, including the value of and successes 

resulting from tracing of firearms recovered in Mexico. To further cnhance A TF's capabilities in 

the U.S. Southwest Border region, and in recognition of ATF's ongoing significant commitment 

and priority on bilateraJ investigations of the criminal pOssession, trafficking, and use offirearms 

and explosives in MEOOCO, AlF will establish an ES·t"811, Country Attache, in Mexico City. 

13. D~/op bdler in/ormation sharing and Intelligence analysis capability at Its Mccico 

Co.ntry OfJla. 

A TF concurs. As noted in ATF's response to recommendation ntoDber 12. to enhance A TF's 

overall capabilities in the U.S. Southwest Border region, and in recognition of A TF's ongoing 

sign1ficant comrtliunent and priority on bilateral investigations of the criminal possession, 

trafficking, and use of.6.reanns and explosives in Mexico, ATF wiU establish an ES·1811, 

CountJy Attache, in Mexico City. 

ATF's Attache in Mexico City will act as ATf's principal advisor to the Government on all 

matters relating to the control of illicit traffic in firearms and explosivcs in Mexico; represent 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

113 
-12-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

Michael D. Gulledge 

ATF on the U.S. Ambassador's staffas an integral part of the U.S. Country Team within the host 

country; serve as principal advisor to the U.S. Ambassador on international firearms and 

explosives trafficking matters; plan. organi7..e. and oversee ATF programs in Mexico; conduct 

and support complex. multi·agcncy investigations involving international conspiracies; provide 

direction. leadership, and training to law enforcement agencies within the bost country; assist in 

persuading these agencies to assume greater responsibility in controlling illicit traffic; provide 

criminal investigative expertise and guidance to these agencies in support of their enforcement 

efforts; and provide direction on legislative changes required to develop adequate fireanns and 

explosives extradition treaties and other laws for the effective enforcement and control of illicit 

fireanns and explosives traffic. 

14. In coordination with the Mexico Attorney General's office, evaluate the mutual benefits, 

rolu, turd Information sharing protocols of tl .. Mexico Attorney General's office 

""rosen/alive pilot program to tkt.,miJre whether to expand the program to each af ATF's 

Southwest Bord., freld divisions. 

ATF concurs. In coordination with the Mexico Attorney General's office, ATF will evaluate the 

mutual benefits, roles, and information sharing protocols of the Mexico Attorney General's 

office representative pilot program to determine whether to expand the program to each of ATF's 

SouthweSt Border field divisions. ATF also offered CENAPI to place a representative at EPIC in 

ATF's Fireanns and Explosives Intelligence Team to improve the facilitation and sharing ofreal 

·time actionable information as outlined in our response to recommendation 1. 

15. Ensur. /hal ~h. ,eforms discussed in A TF's S.plLmbtr 2010 "Project Gunrunner-A 

Cartel Focused Strate/fJI" orefrUly and expeditiously implemenled. 

ATF concurs. The Cartel Strategy document, a transmittal memorandum, and a series of 

PowerPoint slides containing N-Force screen shots related to enhanced coding insln1ctions for 

Southwest border and cartel-related investigations Were transmitted to all field special agents in 

charge and affected Field Operations headquarters division chiefs via e-mail on september 16, 

2010. The SACs were directed to review and intema!ly disseminate this material, and on 

. Scptember 23, 2010, the documents were posted to ATF Intraweb. These materials have been 

designated as the topic for mandatory roll call training for alilieid special agents in October 

2010. 

.

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

114 
-13-

Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections 

. Michael D. Gulledge 

Should you bave any questions regarding this response, please contact Melanie Stinnett, 

Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibiliiy and Security Operations at (202) 

648-7500. 

Sincerely yours, 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Deputy Director 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

115 
ATTACHMENT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

116 
PROJECT GUNRUNNER CASES AND DEFENDANTS RECOMMENDED FOR 

PROSECUTION FY 2006 THROUGH FY 2009 

(Judicial Status as of April 2009) Number 

Cases Reconunended for Prosecution 853 

Cases Accepted for Prosecution 

Cases Declined 

576 

129 

Cases Pendin~ A Prosecutorial Decision 148 

Cases With Arrests 617 

Cases With Indictments 558 

Cases With Convictions 422 

Cases With Sentencin~ 375 

Defendants Recommended for Prosecution 1,802 

Defendants Accepted for Prosecution 1,256 

Defendants Declined 250 

Defendants Pending A Prosecutorial Decision 296 

Defendants Arrested 1,306 

Defendants Indicted 1,213 

Defendants Convicted 841 

Defendants Sentenced to Prison 608 

Total Prison Months Sentenced 56,943 

Average Defendants Sentence (In Months) 94 

Defendants Sentenced to Probation 198 

Total Probation Months Sentenced 8,115 

Average Probation Sentence (In Months) 41 

Fireanns Trafficking Cases Recommended for Prosecution 

Fireanns Trafficking Cases as a Percent of All Cases Recommended 

429 

50% 

Fireanns Trafficking Defendant Recommended 

Firearms Trafficking Defendant Convicted 

789 

512 

Estimated Number of Guns Trafficked 13,481 

Gang Related Cases Recommended for Prosecution 

Gang Related Defendants Recommended for Prosecution 

Gang Related Defendant Convicted 

Firearms Taken Into Evidence 

Ammunition Taken Into Evidence 

260 

777 

841 

5,457 

535,262 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

117 
APPENDIX VI: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, 

TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES’ RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General provided a draft of this report to 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for its 

comment. ATF’s response is included in Appendix V to this report. The 

OIG’s analysis of ATF’s response and the actions necessary to close the 

recommendations are discussed below. 

In its response, ATF commented on several aspects of the review and 

provided some new data pertaining to Project Gunrunner. Further, 

although ATF concurred with all of our recommendations, the proposed 

corrective actions in many cases did not adequately address how ATF would 

implement the corrective action or address the deficiencies that the OIG 

report identified in ATF’s implementation of Project Gunrunner. 

In this analysis, we first address the general comments in ATF’s 

response, and then we provide our specific analysis of ATF’s response to 

each recommendation. 

Project Gunrunner Data 

In its response, ATF provided some new data regarding the 

accomplishments it said it has achieved under Project Gunrunner from 

FY 2006 through FY 2009. ATF provided data on defendants recommended 

for prosecution, convicted, and the judicial outcomes; firearms and 

ammunition in ATF evidence vaults; compliance inspections conducted; and 

statistics on the actions and outcomes of those compliance inspections. 

ATF also provided an attachment that contains data on 31 different Project 

Gunrunner program elements. 

When we first received ATF’s response, we questioned ATF about 

apparent errors in the new data, and ATF then provided some revised data. 

The analysis in this appendix applies to ATF’s revised response. 

Notwithstanding ATF’s revisions, we still found significant portions of 

ATF’s data to be questionable. After reviewing ATF’s methodology for 

deriving the new statistics and obtaining clarification from ATF on its 

Project Gunrunner data, we determined that the revised data still contained 

many discrepancies that resulted in incorrect data being provided to the 

OIG. Those discrepancies were caused by incomplete data in ATF’s N-Force 

and N-Spect databases, inconsistent coding of work activities by ATF, errors 

in ATF’s description of the data, unsupportable data entries by ATF, and 

variations in the time frame covered by ATF’s data. Also, in some cases ATF 

U.S. Department of Justice 118 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

 

included data in its analyses regarding activities that the OIG found to be of 

limited value for assessing the effectiveness of Project Gunrunner. 

For example, we found that an ATF manager provided the OIG data in 

which he had categorized hundreds of defendants as having been referred 

for prosecution in state courts without knowing whether that information 

was correct. Specifically, ATF stated in its response that, from FY 2006 

through FY 2009, 1,256 defendants were recommended for prosecution in 

federal, state, and local courts.102 However, when we examined the number 

of defendants referred to each level of courts, using the same April 2010 

ATF data set that ATF used, we found there were 1,110 defendants 

recommended to federal, state, and local courts for prosecution. When we 

asked ATF to explain this discrepancy, the Acting Chief of Staff responsible 

for the data analysis stated that for 344 entries that had not been 

designated as having been referred to either federal or state courts for 

prosecution, he assigned all the entries the code “state,” despite no 

information to verify this. We believe this significantly undermines the 

validity of ATF’s data. 

Other examples where ATF’s data and its analyses of its data were 

questionable include: 

	 Most of the numbers in the attachment to ATF’s comments were 

different from those previously provided by ATF to the OIG in 

response to our initial data request in April 2010, even though 

ATF’s response was described as being based on that same data. 

	 ATF stated in the response that 789 defendants, constituting 

63 percent of all defendants referred for prosecution, “faced 

charges related to firearms trafficking.” However, when we 

requested clarification, ATF stated that this number included all 

individuals charged in a case where firearms had been trafficked, 

even if firearms trafficking charges were not filed. 

	 The data provided by ATF lack any context to demonstrate how 

those accomplishments contributed to Project Gunrunner, or even 

to allow for a comparative analysis of trends over time. 

Moreover, it is important to note that throughout this review, we 

encountered discrepancies between our analyses of ATF’s data and those 

completed by ATF, which were caused by various factors, including 

102 Page 2 of ATF’s response describes the 1,256 defendants as having been 

“recommended” for prosecution. However, the attachment accompanying ATF’s response 

described the 1,256 defendants as having been “accepted” for prosecution. The second 

designation is correct, and the description on page 2 of ATF’s response is incorrect. 

U.S. Department of Justice 119 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
deficiencies in ATF’s data management system. We worked with ATF to 

obtain clarification regarding these discrepancies and to make adjustments 

to the report when appropriate. However, we did not make adjustments 

based on the new data provided by ATF because the validity of that data 

was questionable. The major cause of the inconsistent data is ATF’s lack of 

a comprehensive data management system, and we are concerned that the 

lack of reliable, consistent data hinders ATF’s ability to track and accurately 

report on the performance of its programs. 

Context of Project Gunrunner and ATF Interviews 

ATF also argued in its response that a review of Project Gunrunner 

requires in-depth knowledge and understanding of the program’s context, 

the available resources, and the limitations imposed on the program, and 

that while the OIG review covered significant portions of the program, some 

of these areas would have benefitted from a more comprehensive review. As 

an example, ATF stated that the OIG did not conduct interviews of certain 

senior ATF headquarters officials, which ATF asserted would have provided 

an important historical perspective, put Project Gunrunner in its proper 

context within ATF’s overall strategy, and conveyed ATF’s plans for the 

program. 

In fact, during the course of our review, the OIG interviewed 64 ATF 

officials, including the Deputy Assistant Director with responsibility for 

Project Gunrunner; division and branch Chiefs at ATF headquarters; 

Southwest border Special Agents in Charge, including the one now 

appointed as the new Mexico Country Office Attaché at the Senior Executive 

Service level; Assistant and Resident Special Agents in Charge; Directors of 

Industry Operations; Group and Area supervisors; agents; Intelligence 

Research Specialists; Industry Operations Investigators; and other field 

personnel. Through these extensive interviews, we obtained both historical 

perspective and a context for the implementation of Project Gunrunner from 

those who are responsible for the hands-on execution of the program. 

In addition, throughout this review we repeatedly requested 

information from ATF about the program’s plans – including revised policies, 

documents, conferences, training, and other matters. These requests were 

generally coordinated through ATF’s Office of Inspections at headquarters. 

However, at no time during our review did ATF indicate that the officials it 

now names in its response would be better suited to address our inquiries 

or that we should interview them. Nor did ATF ever suggest at the entrance 

conference or during the review that we should interview additional ATF 

officials. Rather, during our review we were directed to the many officials 

who we did interview. In short, we believe through our extensive interviews, 

we obtained a clear understanding of the program, and ATF did not state 

U.S. Department of Justice 120 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
specifically what these new individuals it named would have told us that 

would have changed our findings. 

Strategic Approach to Project Gunrunner 

ATF asserted that the existence of many documents referred to in the 

report, including ATF’s September 2010 cartel strategy, “belied” the report’s 

finding that ATF lacks a strategic approach to Project Gunrunner. We 

disagree. First, we do not believe that the documents referred to in our 

report demonstrate that ATF had a strategic approach to Project 

Gunrunner. To assess the program’s overall strategy, we reviewed ATF’s 

June 2007 Gunrunner strategy, its 2009 National Firearms Trafficking 

Enforcement Strategy and Implementation Plan, the 2009 firearms 

trafficking implementation plans of ATF’s Southwest border field divisions, 

and ATF’s Mexico Country Office 2010 Operations Plan. We compared those 

plans with the actual operations in the field. We found that these strategies 

and plans did not effectively address U.S.-Mexico coordination, joint 

operations and activities, or intelligence sharing between the Southwest 

border field divisions and the Mexico Country Office. 

Further, the majority (20 of 33) of the Southwest border field division 

agents, intelligence personnel, and supervisors we interviewed told us they 

had never heard of ATF’s 2009 National Firearms Trafficking Enforcement 

Strategy and Implementation Plan, or that they had heard of the Strategy or 

Plan but believed they had no impact. We concluded that despite the 

existence of these documents, the actual performance of ATF does not 

reflect a strategic approach to combating firearms trafficking. 

With regard to the new September 2010 cartel strategy, that 

document was issued very recently, after we had provided our report to ATF. 

ATF’s response stated that, contrary to the OIG’s statement that ATF 

developed the cartel strategy in response to the working draft of the OIG’s 

report, ATF had developed the strategy over several months. Yet, we note 

that despite our frequent contact with ATF officials during this review, no 

one at ATF mentioned the development of the cartel strategy to the OIG 

until after we provided our draft report to ATF on September 3, 2010. 

During our review, we had corresponded with ATF headquarters personnel 

in over 240 documented communications (e-mail, telephone, and in person) 

through September 2010. The first time ATF mentioned the existence of its 

new strategy was on September 13, 2010, in its technical comments to the 

OIG’s September 3, 2010, draft report. On September 16, 2010, the OIG 

asked ATF when the strategy was drafted, and ATF did not respond. 

Nevertheless, we included information about the September 2010 

cartel strategy in our report. However, the September 2010 cartel strategy 

does not adequately address how ATF will implement this strategy. Thus, 

U.S. Department of Justice 121 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
we do not believe the fact that ATF has issued its September 2010 cartel 

strategy undermines our conclusion that ATF still needs to improve its 

implementation of Project Gunrunner in several key program areas. We also 

believe, as stated in the report, that ATF’s development of an 

implementation plan for its new cartel strategy – with defined goals, specific 

actions, and resources – is essential to the success of the strategy and also 

to ATF’s overall effort to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico. 

Project Gunrunner Funding 

ATF’s response stated that the OIG failed to provide the full funding 

context for Project Gunrunner’s implementation and that ATF did not 

initially receive all the funding it needed to support the program. The 

response stated that, as a result, ATF prioritized its limited resources to 

achieve an immediate operational impact and deferred needed 

administrative and intelligence support positions. ATF’s response also 

stated that one might infer from the OIG’s report that ATF had full access to 

unconstrained resources and that there are and were no challenges in 

expanding Project Gunrunner. 

We recognize the significant challenges, including limitations on 

funding and personnel that ATF has faced in supporting and expanding 

Project Gunrunner. The Background section of our report describes how 

ATF created Project Gunrunner and states that the initiative did not have 

dedicated funding within ATF’s budget until FY 2009. 

However, many of our findings pertain to needed improvements within 

ATF’s existing program areas that are unrelated to these funding challenges 

and are not attributable to hiring, transferring, and training personnel using 

new resources. For example, ATF needs more systematic, regular 

exchanges of strategic intelligence with its partner agencies; guidelines for 

Field Intelligence Groups in generating investigative leads; procedures for 

intelligence personnel to routinely exchange information; and a method for 

intelligence personnel to regularly share analytical techniques and best 

practices. These are not predominantly personnel or resource issues. 

Further, dedicated funding is not required to establish a position 

description for border liaisons, to focus on more complex conspiracy cases 

against traffickers, to make greater use of the OCDETF Program, or to 

provide guidance for better coordination with ICE on firearms trafficking 

along the Southwest border. 

Scope of Project Gunrunner 

ATF stated that the report does not reflect the complete purpose of 

Project Gunrunner and focuses only on the firearms trafficking elements of 

the program, excluding the purpose of reducing the high level of violence 

associated with cross-border drug and firearms trafficking. Specifically, ATF 

U.S. Department of Justice 122 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
cited our discussion in Parts II and III of the report regarding single 

defendant versus complex cases, and the comparative penalties received for 

drug trafficking cases versus firearms trafficking cases, as not addressing 

the work ATF has undertaken to reduce violent crime. 

We disagree that the report does not acknowledge that Project 

Gunrunner also seeks to reduce violent crime along the border. At the same 

time, stemming the flow of guns into Mexico is integral to Project 

Gunrunner’s mission, and the main purpose of our review was to examine 

ATF’s implementation of the Project Gunrunner mission to reduce firearms 

trafficking to Mexico. 

However, in Part I of the report we present our analysis of seven 

categories of ATF data that illustrate the program’s performance, using 

ATF’s own definition of a “Project Gunrunner case” as one that involves 

firearms trafficking or violent crime with a nexus to the Southwest border. 

Moreover, because our analysis included all ATF investigations designated 

as Project Gunrunner cases, we did include those related to violent crime, to 

the extent they exist. 

Our findings in Part II of the report are based on our detailed 

examination of intelligence and information sharing under Project 

Gunrunner, internal ATF coordination, and ATF’s coordination with 

Mexican and U.S. partner agencies. Although we describe this as 

intelligence and information pertaining to firearms trafficking to Mexico, we 

did not find any distinctions between that and other types of intelligence 

pertaining to associated violent crime. Further, both ATF field personnel 

and U.S. and Mexican agency officials we interviewed specified that more 

intelligence and information on firearms trafficking to Mexico was needed. 

Also, contrary to ATF’s statement, our findings in Part III of the report 

were based on the broader “Project Gunrunner case” data, which included 

the associated violent crime. We also recognize that ATF has undertaken 

significant work, including single defendant cases, to attempt to reduce 

violent crime. However, as our analysis shows, these actions have not 

resulted in the targeting of higher-level firearms traffickers, smugglers, and 

recipients. 

Intelligence Cases 

ATF’s response stated that our report evaluated the number of 

criminal cases initiated under Project Gunrunner but did not address the 

many intelligence cases (intelligence files) ATF developed in support of the 

program to document gun seizures in Mexico and leads developed in the 

U.S. Department of Justice 123 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

United States.103 ATF stated that it believes this omission understates its 

proactive efforts in addressing the intelligence requirements of Project 

Gunrunner. 

In our discussion of ATF’s performance measures under Project 

Gunrunner, we did not include in our analysis of the number of criminal 

investigations (cases) initiated by ATF the 2,271 intelligence files that ATF 

opened. In fact, as ATF’s response acknowledges, the intelligence files to 

which ATF is referring were derived from open source seizure information in 

Mexico. Most (97 percent) involved ATF personnel at EPIC translating 

Spanish language newspaper articles into English and entering the 

information into N-Force. Such information, together with gun trace and 

descriptive information surrounding a seizure, may provide the foundation 

for future investigative leads and may result in the initiation of Project 

Gunrunner cases. However if that happened, the intelligence file is 

converted into a criminal case and would be included in our analysis. The 

intelligence files cited by ATF have, by definition, not had such a result. 

We agree that monitoring open source information is proactive 

intelligence work, but we do not believe that it should be counted as the 

equivalent of a criminal investigation or that it represents a major outcome 

for ATF’s Project Gunrunner. We believe that including such data as ATF 

suggests would be misleading as an indicator of Project Gunrunner’s impact 

on the initiation of investigative cases, and we have not done so. 

Challenges Facing the U.S. and Mexican Governments 

ATF’s response stated that ATF is concerned that the OIG’s review 

does not adequately reflect the challenges that the U.S. and Mexican 

governments face in trying to reduce violence and gun and drug trafficking 

along and across the Southwest border. ATF noted that there have been 

significant challenges, given the difference between the U.S. and Mexican 

legal systems, the investigative capabilities and resources, and the culture 

and laws relating to firearms possession. ATF stated that it is currently 

operating in an unprecedented capacity in Mexico and that it provides more 

assistance regarding firearms trafficking and explosives investigations than 

ever before. 

We agree that ATF and other U.S. agencies face significant challenges 

in trying to reduce violence, gun trafficking, and drug trafficking along and 

across the border. In our report, we explain that these challenges are 

compounded by the many differences between Mexico’s government 

103 Although ATF’s response refers to intelligence “cases,” they are not cases in the 

traditional sense of a criminal investigation. We refer to them as intelligence files, which we 

believe is a more accurate description. 

U.S. Department of Justice 124 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
structure and that of the United States. We carefully considered these 

issues when drafting the report findings and recommendations. Where 

applicable we augmented the report to include ATF’s comments on these 

challenges. Further, our report acknowledges ATF’s assistance and training 

efforts in Mexico. 

Nonetheless, our review evaluated ATF’s implementation of Project 

Gunrunner in the face of these challenges. In some cases, the causes of the 

problems are outside of ATF’s control and occur within the context of 

broader cross-governmental challenges. Yet, as described in the report, we 

believe that many deficiencies related to the implementation of Project 

Gunrunner are within ATF’s control and that ATF should take aggressive 

action to implement improvements. 

ATF’s September 2010 Cartel Strategy 

Finally, ATF stated that its new September 2010 cartel strategy 

addresses most of our recommendations. Although ATF concurred with 

each of our recommendations and provided specific responses to them, ATF 

stated that the OIG should note that it had already addressed many of the 

recommendations. 

As noted above, we reviewed ATF’s September 2010 cartel strategy 

and incorporated elements of it into applicable portions of the report. We 

also believe that the strategy recognizes and reinforces many of our key 

findings. 

More important, dissemination of the strategy does not in itself ensure 

its effective implementation throughout ATF. As our report noted, the 

strategy does not provide detailed information on how ATF will implement 

and monitor efforts to improve operations in the key areas identified in the 

strategy. As we also describe in our responses to the specific 

recommendations below, we believe ATF’s development of an 

implementation plan – with defined goals, specific actions, and resources – 

is essential to the successful implementation of improvements discussed in 

the September 2010 cartel strategy and also to ATF’s overall effort to combat 

firearms trafficking to Mexico. 

OIG’S ANALYSIS OF ATF’S RESPONSE TO EACH RECOMMENDATION 

Recommendation 1. Coordinate with the government of Mexico, the CBP, 

DEA, and ICE to ensure systematic and regular exchanges of strategic 

intelligence to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

U.S. Department of Justice 125 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with our 

recommendation. ATF stated that it has been and will continue to evaluate 

and refine protocols for sharing strategic intelligence with its partner 

agencies. It listed several examples, including recently initiated meetings 

with ICE and the CBP by ATF’s National Gunrunner Coordinator and the 

Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. Other examples included 

two additional roles played by the National Gunrunner Coordinator that 

involve coordinating with other federal law enforcement agencies. ATF also 

referred to an October 2010 Mexico and U.S. conference co-chaired by ATF’s 

Deputy Director and CENAPI’s Director that focused on dismantling the 

tools of transnational crime. ATF stated that this meeting resulted in ATF 

agreeing to accelerate eTrace training, ATF inviting CENAPI to join its unit 

at EPIC, and ATF agreeing to provide regular intelligence bulletins 

containing aggregated gun trace and investigative information. ATF stated 

that it is encouraging Mexican law enforcement officials to make use of its 

expertise through the Combined Explosives Investigations Team. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are partially responsive to 

the recommendation, and ATF has taken some actions to improve 

coordination with its partner agencies. However, we believe that the actions 

ATF described will not fully ensure systematic and regular exchanges of 

strategic intelligence with all of its partner agencies. 

Regarding ATF’s exchange of strategic intelligence with Mexican law 

enforcement, we believe the regular sharing of ATF’s recently developed 

intelligence bulletins with CENAPI can improve the exchange of strategic 

intelligence between both agencies. The agreements made at the 

October 2010 bilateral meeting can help ATF establish a foundation to 

improve the regular exchange of strategic intelligence with Mexican officials. 

The assignment of a CENAPI representative to EPIC can also improve 

information sharing, but the roles and information sharing responsibilities 

for this position have not been defined, and the position has not been filled 

as of October 2010. In addition, ATF’s agreement to accelerate eTrace 

training and ATF’s encouraging Mexican officials to make use of the 

Combined Explosives Investigations Team is a positive development, but 

ATF’s response does not indicate how it will ensure systematic and regular 

exchanges of strategic intelligence between ATF and the government of 

Mexico. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide (a) copies of all newly developed 

intelligence bulletins disseminated to Mexican officials between October 31, 

2010, and January 31, 2011, and (b) a list of all recipients of these 

intelligence bulletins. 

Regarding ATF’s exchange of strategic intelligence with the CBP and 

ICE, we believe that the meetings between ATF and those agencies also can 

U.S. Department of Justice 126 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
 

improve the exchange of strategic intelligence. Our review found that ICE, 

an agency with a parallel mission to ATF’s of combating firearms trafficking 

to Mexico, would benefit from receiving the same strategic intelligence 

products that ATF field agents told us are useful, including those produced 

by the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information’s Southwest Border 

Field Intelligence Support Team, the Violent Crime Analysis Branch, and 

other ATF intelligence entities. However, ATF’s response did not indicate 

how these meetings would be used to promote the regular exchange of such 

strategic intelligence or whether information exchange protocols were 

established at the meetings that have already been held. In addition, while 

ATF described a coordination meeting scheduled in San Diego in October 

2010, ATF did not indicate whether additional meetings would occur. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide (a) a list of the meetings held 

between October 31, 2010, and January 31, 2011, (b) copies of the meeting 

agendas, (c) a list of the attendees at each of the meetings, and (d) a 

description of the information exchanged or agreed to be exchanged. 

ATF’s response did not mention the DEA. During our review, we 

found that the systematic and regular exchange of strategic intelligence was 

not occurring between ATF and the DEA, despite officials from both agencies 

recognizing that such intelligence sharing is beneficial to their missions. As 

stated in the report, the DEA has a significant amount of strategic 

intelligence on drug cartels that ATF officials stated would benefit Project 

Gunrunner, especially in the cartel-focused strategy that ATF will be 

adopting pursuant to its new emphasis on larger cases tied to specific drug 

cartels. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide a detailed description of ATF’s 

establishment of regular exchanges of strategic intelligence with the DEA, 

including (a) a list of any meetings held between October 31, 2010, and 

January 31, 2011, or the dates of any planned meetings, (b) copies of the 

meeting agendas, (c) a list of the attendees at each of the meetings, and (d) a 

description of the information exchanged or agreed to be exchanged. 

Recommendation 2. Work with the Department to explore options for 

seeking a requirement for reporting multiple sales of long guns. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation, but noted that it may require a change to the Gun Control 

Act, which is beyond ATF’s and the Department’s authority. ATF stated that 

it would explore the full range of options to seek information regarding 

multiple sales of long guns. 

U.S. Department of Justice 127 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are responsive to our 

recommendation. Although some of the options for addressing this issue 

would require legislation, responsive actions may be possible within the 

authority already legally granted to ATF. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide the OIG with an update on the 

options considered and the results obtained for improving ATF’s oversight of 

multiple sales of long guns. 

Recommendation 3. Ensure that each Southwest border firearms 

trafficking enforcement group develops and regularly updates general 

guidelines for their Field Intelligence Group to follow that specify the most 

useful types of investigative leads. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation. ATF stated that it has communicated and will continue to 

reinforce guidance previously provided to Field Intelligence Groups through 

the Southwest Border Collection Plan, the Field Intelligence Group 

Supervisor’s Guide Book, national training conferences, and policy 

documents. ATF stated that these materials and training include guidance 

on coordination between Field Intelligence Groups and the respective field 

offices in the development of local guidelines for the referral of investigative 

leads. ATF said that a firearms trafficking coordinator from each division 

attended the August 2010 Field Intelligence Group national training 

conference in Washington, D.C. ATF also stated that it recently (August 

2010) initiated an effort to update its firearms trafficking indicators, which 

would support the enhancement of referrals generated from compliance 

inspections. In addition, ATF stated that it has scheduled a Project 

Gunrunner coordination conference at EPIC in December 2010 for various 

field personnel, including those with Gunrunner groups. 

OIG Analysis. We believe that the actions planned by ATF are not 

responsive to the recommendation. Although ATF concurred with the 

recommendation, the actions it described do not provide sufficient details 

regarding how firearms trafficking enforcement groups will develop and 

regularly update general guidelines for their Field Intelligence Groups. Our 

review found that despite the existence of the documents cited by ATF’s 

response, ATF did not have minimum national standards for Field 

Intelligence Groups to use in determining which leads to forward to agents. 

We found that the Field Intelligence Groups in the four Southwest border 

field divisions varied in their development of localized standards for 

screening potential leads, and many of the local standards were not useful 

to agents. Further, the Southwest Border Collection Plan and the Field 

Intelligence Group Supervisor’s Guide Book are broader scoped documents 

U.S. Department of Justice 128 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
that do not provide specific guidance tailored to the needs of each 

enforcement group. 

Regarding the conferences that ATF reported it has conducted or will 

conduct, ATF did not indicate whether Field Intelligence Group guidelines 

were, or will be, discussed at those conferences. Also, we question whether 

the attendees at these conferences are the appropriate individuals to 

identify and update guidelines specific to each of the firearms trafficking 

enforcement groups. Further, any updated firearms trafficking and straw 

purchasing indicators may enhance referrals generated from compliance 

inspections but will not assist Field Intelligence Groups in screening 

investigative leads. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide the OIG with copies of 

guidelines developed or updated by each Southwest border firearms 

trafficking enforcement group. 

Recommendation 4. Develop an automated process that enables ATF 

managers to track and evaluate the usefulness of investigative leads 

provided to firearms trafficking enforcement groups. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation. ATF stated that it had awarded a contract to begin 

business process reengineering of its case management and related 

business processes in September 2010. ATF stated that the reengineering 

project will examine the flow of information throughout ATF, including 

referrals of information and investigative leads. The reengineering project 

will also address the need for better integration between ATF’s case 

management systems and its firearms information systems and assist ATF 

in developing the best technical solution. ATF stated that it expects 

completion of the reengineering project by mid FY 2012, although ATF does 

not contemplate identifying, acquiring, and implementing an automated 

solution to resolve this recommendation before FY 2014. ATF stated that in 

the interim it will assess existing guidance regarding the “manual” exchange 

and documentation of referrals between industry operations, Field 

Intelligence Groups, and criminal enforcement field offices. If opportunities 

for increased efficiency and effectiveness are identified, ATF will issue 

revised guidance to field personnel. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are partially responsive to 

the recommendation. We recognize that the business process reengineering 

will not be complete until mid FY 2012 and that identification of the best 

technical solution may not occur before FY 2014 and is dependent upon 

adequate funding. However, ATF’s interim plan to assess existing guidance 

U.S. Department of Justice 129 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
on the “manual” exchange and documentation of referrals between industry 

operations, Field Intelligence Groups, and criminal enforcement field offices 

did not include any details on how it would accomplish this assessment, 

such as whether ATF would collect and disseminate best practices across 

field divisions, or any timeline for accomplishments. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide the OIG with (a) the timeline 

and scope of work to be performed in the business process reengineering; 

(b) the results of ATF’s assessment of the “manual” exchange and 

documentation of referrals between industry operations, Field Intelligence 

Groups, and criminal enforcement field offices; and (c) a list of the 

improvements to be implemented. 

Recommendation 5. Develop and implement procedures for Southwest 

border intelligence personnel to routinely exchange intelligence-related 

information in accordance with ATF Order 3700.2A and the Intelligence 

Collection Plan. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation. ATF referred to its response to Recommendation 1 and 

stated that it has and will continue to ensure systematic exchanges of 

information. ATF stated that it will also further review ATF Order 3700.2A 

for potential revisions responsive to the OIG’s recommendations. 

OIG Analysis. We believe the actions identified by ATF are not 

responsive to the recommendation. Although ATF concurred with the 

recommendation, it stated only that it “has been and will continue to ensure 

systematic exchanges of information.” Our review found that there was not 

systematic exchange of information between Southwest border intelligence 

personnel below the supervisory level. Further, the OIG’s review did not 

identify deficiencies in the guidance contained in Order 3700.2A, and it is 

unclear how revising this document would fulfill the need for Southwest 

border intelligence personnel to routinely exchange intelligence-related 

information. Regarding the information in ATF’s response to 

Recommendation 1, those actions address ATF’s sharing of strategic 

intelligence with Mexican and U.S. partner agencies, not procedures for 

internally exchanging information among Southwest border intelligence 

personnel. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide the OIG with copies of the 

information exchange procedures issued by ATF or a status report on their 

development. 

U.S. Department of Justice 130 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Recommendation 6. Develop a method for Southwest border intelligence 

personnel to regularly share analytical techniques and best practices 

pertaining to Project Gunrunner. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation. ATF stated that it has taken and will continue to take 

steps to improve in this area as noted in its responses to Recommendations 

3 and 5. In addition, ATF stated that Field Intelligence Group personnel 

participate in periodic conference calls involving their respective Field 

Intelligence Support Teams and regional Field Intelligence Groups during 

which analytical techniques and best practices may be discussed. ATF 

noted that it has a Field Intelligence Support Team dedicated to the 

Southwest border field divisions. 

OIG Analysis. The information provided by ATF is not responsive to 

the recommendation because it only indicates that ATF will continue 

operating as it has in the past. As described in Part II of this report, we 

found that ATF’s current processes have not ensured that Southwest border 

intelligence personnel regularly share analytical techniques and best 

practices and that the conference calls with Field Intelligence Group 

personnel were limited to supervisors. Regarding the August 2010 Field 

Intelligence Group conference and a planned December 2010 Project 

Gunrunner coordinator conference, ATF did not indicate whether these 

conferences covered the topics of sharing analytical techniques and best 

practices. ATF also did not indicate in its response whether the conference 

calls it described would serve as the method for sharing analytical 

techniques and best practices pertaining to Project Gunrunner. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide (a) the topics covered in the 

conference calls, (b) documentation of the Field Intelligence Group nonsupervisory intelligence personnel who participate in the aforementioned 

periodic conference calls, (c) the dates of the calls, (d) whether the 

conferences ATF referred to in its response to Recommendation 3 included 

analytical techniques and best practices, and (e) a description of any other 

methods used to facilitate the regular sharing of analytical techniques and 

best practices between Southwest border intelligence personnel. 

Recommendation 7. Formalize a position description that establishes 

minimum expectations regarding the roles and responsibilities of border 

liaisons. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

U.S. Department of Justice 131 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with the 

recommendation to provide a more detailed description of the roles and 

responsibilities of border liaisons, but stated that it did not believe that a 

unique position description is necessary. ATF noted that the general duties 

and roles of the border liaisons were addressed within ATF’s September 

2010 cartel strategy. ATF stated that it will further document the roles and 

responsibilities of border liaisons in an ATF order addressing international 

operations. ATF described the details that the planned order will include, 

such as qualifications; selection; role, responsibilities, and authorities; area 

of responsibility; coordination with and between the field division and the 

respective country office; training and development; and administrative 

matters such as passports, country clearances, expenses and equipment. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are responsive to our 

recommendation. By February 15, 2011, please provide the OIG with a 

copy of the ATF order, or a status report on its development. 

Recommendation 8. Focus on developing more complex conspiracy cases 

against higher level gun traffickers and gun trafficking conspirators. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation, adding that it “has and will continue to” develop complex 

conspiracy cases. ATF stated it will reinforce its National Firearms 

Trafficking Enforcement Strategy and Implementation Plan, as well as its 

September 2010 cartel strategy. It also stated that it is working with the 

Department, the Criminal Division, and the USAOs to bring agents and 

prosecutors from Mexico and the United States together to work on 

enhancing this effort. Additionally, in its response to Recommendation 9 

below, ATF stated it has prioritized complex investigations related to 

firearms trafficking during monthly management conference calls and other 

venues. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are partially responsive to 

the recommendation. ATF’s plan to work with the Department, Criminal 

Division, and the USAOs to improve the focus of its investigations is 

responsive to the recommendation. However, ATF’s statement that it “has 

and will continue to develop complex conspiracy cases” ignores the data and 

other information we developed in this review demonstrating that ATF has 

not sufficiently focused on multi-defendant cases that target higher-level 

traffickers. Also, ATF’s September 2010 cartel strategy recognizes the need 

for increased emphasis on “targeting the persons with greater responsibility 

for the trafficking schemes” by attempting to “conduct investigations 

focusing greater attention on the cartels that finance and direct these 

trafficking operations.” 

U.S. Department of Justice 132 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
By February 15, 2011, please provide specific information regarding 

the efforts to emphasize complex conspiracy cases in accordance with the 

September 2010 cartel strategy. 

Recommendation 9. Send guidance to field management, agents, and 

intelligence staff encouraging them to participate in and exploit the 

resources and tools of the OCDETF Program, as directed in the Deputy 

Attorney General’s cartel strategy. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation. ATF stated that in addition to prioritizing multi-defendant 

complex investigations related to Southwest border firearms trafficking and 

violence during its monthly management conference calls, meetings, and 

other venues, its September 2010 cartel strategy highlights increased 

participation in the OCDETF Program. ATF also stated that it will develop a 

mandatory roll call training package related to the OCDETF Program for all 

field agents. ATF stated that after the April 2009 memorandum from the 

OCDETF Program Director on the eligibility of firearms trafficking cases with 

a nexus to Mexican [cartels], ATF communicated guidance to the field on 

September 15, 2009, regarding increased emphasis on the OCDETF 

Program. ATF noted that prior to the April 2009 memorandum, its efforts to 

utilize the OCDETF Program for these types of cases frequently met negative 

results if Title 21 (drug-related) violations, targets, and agencies with 

Title 21 authority were not involved. ATF stated that its participation in the 

OCDETF Program has been increasing, that its participation is substantial 

in relation to the OCDETF funding that it receives, that it dedicates more 

resources to the OCDETF Program than it receives funding for, and that in 

2010 its OCDETF funding increased. ATF also plans to co-locate new 

Gunrunner groups with El Paso and Atlanta OCDETF task forces. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are partially responsive to 

the recommendation. Like ATF’s June 2007 Gunrunner strategy, the 

September 2010 cartel strategy is an affirmation of the importance of using 

the OCDETF Program. Regarding ATF’s statement on the April 2009 

OCDETF Director’s memorandum, our report states that ATF told us that 

firearms trafficking investigations with no significant drug trafficking nexus 

were frequently refused by the OCDETF Program. We also found that even 

after the April 2009 guidance was issued, ATF underutilized the OCDETF 

Program for several reasons, including a focus on fast investigations, 

misunderstandings about the program, and low numbers of ATF staff 

assigned to OCDETF task forces. 

U.S. Department of Justice 133 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
By February 15, 2011, please provide (a) a copy of the roll call training 

package on the OCDETF Program; (b) the September 15, 2009, 

memorandum to field staff regarding increased emphasis on the OCDETF 

Program; (c) a status report on ATF’s plans to co-locate new Gunrunner 

groups with El Paso and Atlanta OCDETF task forces; and (d) information 

on how ATF plans to monitor the field divisions’ use of the OCDETF 

Program. 

Recommendation 10. Provide guidance to ATF field supervisors and 

agents to better coordinate with ICE, including direction on how to 

“coordinate all pertinent and necessary information” in areas of “concurrent 

jurisdiction,” as defined in the memorandum of understanding. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation and stated that it is implementing the recommendation as 

discussed in its responses to Recommendations 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9. ATF’s 

response also provided excerpts from a document sent by ICE to the OIG in 

October 2010 that described collaborative investigative efforts between ATF 

and ICE during June 2009 and September 2010. That document described 

113 joint ATF/ICE collaborative efforts, 37 of which ICE stated specifically 

address the trafficking of weapons, explosives, ammunition, and 

components from the United States into Mexico. The document provided 

some statistics on the results of these cases, including 119 arrests and 756 

firearms seized, and a statement that ICE and ATF “have undoubtedly 

proven a strong willingness and a proactive approach to integrating efforts 

that address existing shortcomings to enhance the U.S. government’s ability 

to identify and target those who violate our weapon related laws.” 

OIG Analysis. The information provided by ATF is not responsive to 

the recommendation. ATF did not indicate that it has provided, or plans to 

provide, guidance to field supervisors and agents regarding coordination 

with ICE. Our review found that many field supervisors and agents from 

both ICE and ATF do not coordinate with each other, as required, and do 

not understand the contents of the memorandum of understanding signed 

by the two agencies over a year ago. 

Regarding the information that ICE provided to the OIG on its 113 

joint collaborative efforts with ATF, ICE described only 37 (33 percent) as 

related to firearms trafficking to Mexico. Although we noted an increase in 

ATF/ICE joint investigations in our report, we found that 105 of 1,800 

(6 percent) Project Gunrunner cases between FY 2007 and FY 2009 were 

joint ATF/ICE investigations. These numbers, in our view, do not show “a 

strong willingness and proactive approach to integrating efforts,” as stated 

by ICE. 

U.S. Department of Justice 134 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
By February 15, 2011, please provide a copy of the guidance issued to 

field supervisors and agents implementing the memorandum of 

understanding’s provisions for coordination with ICE. 

Recommendation 11. Work with the government of Mexico to determine 

the causes of unsuccessful traces and develop actions to improve the rate of 

successful traces. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation. ATF stated that it has and will continue to work with the 

government of Mexico to increase the rate of successful traces through 

comprehensive Spanish eTrace deployment and relevant training. In 

addition, ATF stated that it will use funding from the Department of State’s 

Narcotics Affairs Section to provide 64 computers to Mexico – 2 for each of 

the PGR offices located in 31 Mexican states and the Federal District – to 

ensure that PGR can successfully access Spanish eTrace to enter, monitor, 

and retrieve trace data for its recovered firearms. ATF also stated that it will 

provide training to PGR officials on Spanish eTrace and that ATF’s National 

Tracing Center will conduct periodic reviews of Mexican eTrace entries for 

completeness and accuracy. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are responsive to the 

recommendation. By February 15, 2011, please provide (a) copies of the 

training agenda provided to Mexican law enforcement, (b) the frequency of 

the National Tracing Center’s planned periodic reviews of Mexican eTrace 

entries, and (c) how ATF will use the results of these reviews to improve the 

rate of successful traces. 

Recommendation 12. Regularly and more effectively communicate ATF’s 

Project Gunrunner strategy to Mexican law enforcement authorities, 

including the value of gun tracing and the successes involving information 

or tracing information provided by Mexican agencies. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation and repeated that it plans to increase eTrace access and 

training to Mexican law enforcement. ATF also stated that it will increase 

its positions in Mexico to 18 ATF positions and 8 Foreign Service Nationals, 

as well as establish and communicate the roles and responsibilities of 

border liaisons. ATF stated that this will enhance the communications, 

responsiveness, and relationships between ATF and Mexican law 

enforcement officials, and promote increased understanding and support of 

ATF's Project Gunrunner, including the value of and successes resulting 

U.S. Department of Justice 135 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
from tracing of firearms recovered in Mexico. ATF also stated that it will 

establish a Country Attaché position at the Senior Executive Service level to 

further enhance its capabilities in the U.S. Southwest border region. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are partially responsive to 

the recommendation. Although more staff can make it easier for ATF to 

convey the value of firearms tracing to Mexican law enforcement, to 

effectively respond to this issue ATF should develop a more defined 

approach that includes regularly informing Mexican law enforcement when 

a gun trace results in an investigation and when a trace leads to a 

successful prosecution. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide (a) a description of ATF’s plan to 

regularly convey to Mexican law enforcement authorities its overall Project 

Gunrunner strategy, including the value of gun tracing and the successes 

involving information or tracing information provided by Mexican agencies; 

and (b) what specifically has been communicated to Mexican authorities and 

through which venues. 

Recommendation 13. Develop better information sharing and intelligence 

analysis capability at its Mexico Country Office. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. In its response, ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that it will establish a Country Attaché position 

at the Senior Executive Service level to further enhance its capabilities in 

the U.S. Southwest border region and in recognition of ATF’s commitment to 

impeding firearms trafficking to Mexico. ATF stated that the Attaché’s 

duties will include serving as ATF’s principal adviser to the government of 

Mexico and the U.S. Ambassador; planning, organizing, and overseeing ATF 

programs in Mexico; conducting and supporting complex, multi-agency 

investigations involving international conspiracies; and persuading Mexican 

agencies to increase efforts on firearms trafficking. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are not responsive to the 

recommendation. Although the Country Attaché and the increased staff 

that ATF described in its response to Recommendation 12 may enhance 

capabilities at its Mexico Country Office, these actions do not address how 

ATF will improve information sharing and intelligence analysis. Our report 

found that the Mexico Country Office lacks a sufficient capability to collect, 

analyze, and disseminate all available intelligence to support firearms 

trafficking investigations. Specifically, we found that the small staff in ATF’s 

Mexico Country Office is unable to respond to all seizures and keep up with 

the analysis of intelligence and information. Enhancing its information 

sharing and intelligence analysis capability should allow the Mexico Country 

U.S. Department of Justice 136 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
Office to achieve its strategic goal of improving coordination, 

communication, and information sharing on firearms seizures between 

U.S. and Mexican agencies. 

By February 15, 2011, please describe (a) what specific actions ATF 

will take to improve information sharing and intelligence analysis capability 

at the Mexico Country Office and (b) how ATF will measure its 

improvements. 

Recommendation 14. In coordination with the Mexico Attorney General’s 

office, evaluate the mutual benefits, roles, and information sharing protocols 

of the Mexico Attorney General’s office representative pilot program to 

determine whether to expand the program to each of ATF’s Southwest 

border field divisions. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation and agreed to evaluate the pilot program and to determine 

whether to expand it. As in its response to Recommendation 1, ATF stated 

that it has invited CENAPI to send a representative to ATF’s Firearms and 

Explosives Intelligence Team at EPIC to improve information sharing on 

investigations. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are responsive to the 

recommendation. A representative from CENAPI at the Firearms and 

Explosives Intelligence Team at EPIC will further support the objective of 

this recommendation. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide the OIG with a copy of the 

assessment of the pilot program, conducted in coordination with the Mexico 

Attorney General’s office, or a status report on its development. 

Recommendation 15. Ensure that the reforms discussed in ATF’s 

September 2010 document entitled “Project Gunrunner – A Cartel Focused 

Strategy” are fully and expeditiously implemented. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of ATF Response. ATF concurred with this 

recommendation and stated that it disseminated to the field its September 

2010 cartel strategy, a transmittal memorandum, and a series of slides with 

N-Force screen shots related to enhanced coding for Southwest border 

investigations. ATF stated that it posted these documents to its Intranet on 

September 23, 2010. ATF also stated that the strategy would be part of the 

mandatory roll call training for all field agents in October 2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 137 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
OIG Analysis. The actions planned by ATF are not responsive to the 

recommendation. Although ATF has created and disseminated the new 

cartel strategy to the field and plans to conduct roll call training for all field 

agents on the new cartel strategy, ATF did not indicate that it will create a 

detailed implementation plan or specific performance measures to ensure 

that the new strategy is fully and expeditiously implemented. The 

implementation plan and performance measures should address all of the 

areas outlined in the 2010 strategy and provide defined goals, specific 

actions, resources, and all other elements needed to ensure the strategy is 

executed through Project Gunrunner operations. 

By February 15, 2011, please provide a copy of the full 

implementation plan or the performance measures ATF has established. 

U.S. Department of Justice 138 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division