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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

MATURING DEFENSE SUPPORT

 OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 

AND THE DUAL STATUS COMMANDER 

ARRANGEMENT 

THROUGH THE LENS OF PROCESS 

IMPROVEMENT

Ryan Burke 

Sue McNeil

April 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

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be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

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ISBN 1-58487-673-5
v

FOREWORD

During large-scale emergencies or disasters, National Guard forces regularly operate alongside Active 

Component forces in response to requests from civil 

authorities. In an attempt to promote unity of effort 

between state-controlled National Guard and Active 

Component forces, states and the Department of Defense agreed to use dual status commanders—military 

commanders authorized by law to serve in both state 

and federal statuses simultaneously—as the primary 

command and control mechanism during unplanned 

incident response operations. This unique command 

arrangement was used for the first time in response 

to an unplanned incident during Hurricane Sandy in 

October 2012. Though the arrangement worked well 

in many ways, there are definitely opportunities for 

improvement. 

Using their recent Strategic Studies Institute study 

evaluating the use of dual status commanders during 

Hurricane Sandy, Mr. Ryan Burke and Professor Sue 

McNeil offer suggestions to mature dual status commander operations through the application of process 

improvement concepts. They take a unique approach 

to their analysis and propose a series of examples and 

recommendations intended to illustrate a new way of 

both diagnosing and improving operational performance during these complex missions.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

RYAN BURKE is currently a doctoral candidate at the 

University of Delaware with a research focus on defense support of civil authorities. Before starting his 

Ph.D., Mr. Burke was a captain and logistics officer 

in the U.S. Marine Corps where he served as a landing support platoon commander, operations officer, 

and company commander at Camp Lejeune, NC. He 

then served as the Deputy Marine Officer Instructor 

for the Philadelphia Naval ROTC Consortium at the 

University of Pennsylvania. After leaving the Marines, he worked as a Senior Consultant and Logistics 

Analyst for Booz Allen Hamilton supporting several 

Department of Defense projects both in the Pentagon 

and aboard Marine Corps Base at Quantico, VA. Mr. 

Burke attended Penn State University on an NROTC 

scholarship, graduating with a degree in crime, law, 

and justice, and a minor in military studies. He holds 

a master of science degree in homeland security from 

Saint Joseph’s University.

SUE MCNEIL is Professor of Civil and Environmental 

Engineering and Public Policy and Administration at 

the University of Delaware. She also directs the Graduate Program in Disaster Science and Management 

and is the former Director of the Disaster Research 

Center at the University of Delaware. Professor McNeil has extensive experience working with transportation organizations and agencies on multicriteria decisionmaking, performance measures, target setting, 

and asset management. Dr. McNeil has served as a 

member of the Executive Committee of the Transportation Research Board and a member of the Board on 

Infrastructure and the Constructed Environment. She 

chaired the Transportation Research Board’s Commit-
tee on Asset Management from 2004 to 2010 and is an 

Emeritus Member of the committee. She is a founding Associate Editor for the American Society of Civil 

Engineers’ Journal of Infrastructure Systems and became 

the Editor-in-Chief in July 2010. Professor McNeil is a 

registered professional engineer.

viii
ix

SUMMARY

The role of the military during homeland defense 

and civil support operations has significant strategic implications for U.S. national security efforts. 

Considerations for the future employment of Active 

Component forces during missions in the homeland have evolved into a major topic of conversation 

among policymakers and military strategists alike. In 

this context, there is a philosophical conflict between 

federalism and state sovereignty that continues to 

present itself as an impediment to success. Balancing 

the institutionally divergent approaches to achieve a 

unified, efficient, and effective response continues to 

prove problematic. The dual status commander (DSC) 

initiative offers a coordination mechanism intended to 

address the challenges of unity of effort between state 

and federal military response activities. However, 

there are numerous gaps in the available DSC guidance, which leads to increased complexity and confusion during domestic disaster response.

This monograph introduces process improvement 

strategies focusing on the DSC construct in New York 

during Hurricane Sandy. It builds on our previous 

Strategic Studies Institute monograph documenting 

the DSC-led response to Hurricane Sandy in New 

York. Using the data collected during the Sandy case 

study as a basis for analysis, the monograph discusses 

the potential role of process improvement techniques 

as a method for improving unity of effort between 

state and federal military forces under the DSC construct for no-notice/limited-notice incident response. 

As part of our argument, we assess the application 

and utility of various process improvement methods and present examples of how such methods can 
be used to improve civil support missions. Based on 

the recommendations from the Sandy case study, we 

conclude by presenting a brief description of three 

conceptual process models mapped to specific challenges of a DSC-led joint task force. These process 

models identify essential tasks and key requirements 

specific to a key process during a DSC operation. In 

doing so, the models provide examples—not fully developed models—of alternative methods to guide the 

progression of operational maturity during domestic 

disaster response. As such, organizations like the U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Army North, and U.S. 

Northern Command should consider integrating process improvement concepts and techniques into future 

DSC doctrine, policies, guidance, and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures. Using the concepts 

presented here as a method for improvement, we argue, will provide a practical tool for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of this critical coordination 

mechanism well into the future.

x
1

MATURING DEFENSE SUPPORT 

OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 

AND THE DUAL STATUS COMMANDER 

ARRANGEMENT 

THROUGH THE LENS OF PROCESS 

IMPROVEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Combat operations require swift decisionmaking, 

often with less information than is necessary to make 

an informed decision. For these reasons, military commanders and planners regularly rehearse, train, exercise, and simulate combat scenarios so they are better 

prepared to face such challenges in real-world situations. However, the U.S. military has an additional 

mission capability that regularly requires a similar 

sense of urgency to combat operations. Civil support 

operations in response to emergencies or disasters, 

while mostly lacking the inherent dangers of combat, 

present an equally challenging operational environment full of legal, financial, and even political barriers 

unique only to domestic missions. 

Known as Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

(DSCA), the U.S. military’s domestic disaster response 

capability is robust. During incidents of great magnitude or duration, when local and state authorities are 

overwhelmed or unable to respond as needed, civil 

authorities sometimes request assistance from the Department of Defense (DoD). These DSCA operations 

span a wide range of scenarios, including response to 

natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, 

terrorism, and other significant incidents. In the early 

stages of response operations, lives and property can 

be at risk, often requiring swift decisionmaking with 
2

limited information, similar to combat operations. 

However, while combat operations must be undertaken with consideration for the defined rules of engagement and laws of war, these are less restrictive, arguably, than the laws and policies governing the actions 

of U.S. military forces in a domestic capacity. 

DSCA operations occur within a complex web of 

local, state, and federal laws, policies, and regulations, 

many of which are rooted in the founding principles 

of this nation and its rich history. DSCA presents a 

challenging operational environment for military 

leaders requiring effective navigation of the aforementioned laws, policies, and in some cases, politics. 

While military leaders value the ability to maintain a 

flexible, adaptive, and agile response capability, there 

are, for better or worse, bureaucratic obstacles in the 

form of processes and procedures that must be considered when operating domestically in support of lead 

Federal civil authorities. As an added challenge, the 

incidents requiring Federal military assistance typically involve state and federal military responses from 

National Guard forces and Active Component forces. 

Despite similar operational capabilities, state National 

Guard forces and Active Component forces operate 

under distinctly different sets of laws and policies, 

which only serve to further complicate an already 

difficult mission. 

Throughout recent history, we have seen some of 

the challenges faced by National Guard and Active 

Component forces supporting civil authorities simultaneously. In 2004, during the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, 

Georgia, DoD and the states adapted a new command 

mechanism originally designed for blended units to 

improve unity of effort between National Guard and 

Active Component forces supporting civil authorities. 
3

Six years later, the Council of Governors facilitated a 

solution to a long-standing debate between state governors and DoD over domestic command and control 

of the Armed Forces when operating in their states: 

The governors and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 

agreed to utilize the dual status commander (DSC) 

for disaster responses. In addition, the governors 

and the SECDEF agreed to propose legislative language in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) codifying in law that the establishment of a 

dual status commander is the “usual and customary” 

command and control arrangement during the simultaneous employment of National Guard and Active 

Component forces in disaster response scenarios.1 A 

DSC is a “military commander who may, in accordance with the law, serve in two statuses, Federal and 

State, simultaneously while performing the duties of 

those statuses separately and distinctly.”2 Principally 

designed as an enhanced unity of effort mechanism, 

the DSC construct allows a single military commander 

to command both National Guard forces on behalf of 

a Governor, and Active Component forces on behalf 

of the President, the SECDEF, and a supported Combatant Commander, when both are supporting civil 

authorities simultaneously.

This unique command arrangement has been used 

successfully since 2004 for planned national security 

special events such as national political conventions, 

international presidential summits, and the 2013 Super Bowl.3

 However, Hurricane Sandy in October 2012 

was the first use of National Guard and Active Component forces working under a DSC for a no-notice/

limited-notice4 incident.5 Sandy provided our first opportunity to witness the DSC construct in action during an unplanned response effort. As expected, there 
4

were several successes with this first time implementation that, in the minds of some, validated the concept 

and encouraged future use.6 Conversely, the response 

experienced some notable challenges. 

Each of the Armed Services have systematic ways 

of capturing lessons learned from training and operations in order to build on the past and improve operations in the future. These Lessons Learned programs 

are quite valuable. They offer insight to their respective 

service components to help improve future mission 

performance through concept and doctrinal changes 

and recommendations. Sometimes, however, these 

recommendations and changes are not integrated into 

future operations due to an ill-defined, or ineffective, 

method of doing so. Without a defined method to 

integrate these recommendations, there is no way to 

promote consistent and continuous improvement of 

these complex operational processes. There is a need, 

then, to develop a tool or method that can be used to 

consolidate recommended best practices into usable 

models able to guide future operational decisionmaking. One approach worth considering is to apply 

process improvement strategies to the complexities of 

DSCA in order to develop a model to improve DSC 

operations.7

Whereas military operations lack structured improvement methods, defense contracting and similar 

DoD business operations regularly employ process 

improvement strategies as a way to enhance their operational performance and accountability. Process improvement strategies are structured methods to assess 

processes in terms of both strengths and weaknesses. 

These strategies also guide users by helping them 

chart a path for addressing issues while preserving 

desirable qualities of a given process or system. Most 
5

process improvement strategies engage stakeholders 

and develop supporting documentation for accountability. With its rich history of research literature supporting its use and application within software engineering, software development, manufacturing, and 

business operations, process improvement is a proven 

approach to enhance and mature complex operations.8

DoD currently uses structured process improvement 

techniques and methods in a range of functions as a 

way to monitor performance, identify areas of weakness, and steer improvement efforts toward performance enhancement and maturity. 

While there are different approaches, in their most 

basic form, process improvement techniques focus on 

reducing waste and improving productivity through 

the identification and performance of consistent, repeatable, and predictable practices. By deconstructing 

complex processes into individual and related practices or actions, process improvement offers users a 

tool for modeling the complexities of their processes 

into workable goals and practices. Given the potential 

utility of process improvement coupled with the inherent complexities of DSCA operations under a dual 

status commander, these same process improvement 

techniques currently used and endorsed by DoD in 

nonoperational department activities can provide an 

ideal platform to launch a structured improvement 

plan aimed at maturing complex civil support operations under the DSC construct. 

COMPLEXITIES OF CIVIL SUPPORT

OPERATIONS 

The framers of the U.S. Constitution wrote it in such 

a way as to deter or restrict a single governing body 
6

from exercising unregulated control over its constituents. Whereas the 18th century English government 

used the military as a means of power projection over 

its citizenry, the architects of the Constitution, having 

declared their independence from an overriding governing body, sought to avoid similar abuse of governmental powers. As a result, the Constitution embraces 

a federalist construct with language articulating the 

separation of powers between three branches of government and shared powers with individual states. 

Per Article X of the Constitution, any such powers 

not given to the federal government under the Constitution are reserved to the states. Some of the key 

language in this regard outlines the powers and limitations governing the role of the military in domestic 

operations. As the supreme law of the United States, 

these constitutional authorities and restrictions must 

be understood as they provide the very foundation for 

the use of military forces on domestic soil. Such limitations and restrictions also serve to complicate domestic military operations by entrenching command 

decisionmaking in a complex set of laws, policies, and 

formal regulations, each of which must be considered 

during the conduct of DSCA and National Guard support to civil authorities. 

Under the federalist construct, states and the federal government are divided but share certain powers 

and authority. Among the many divisions of power 

and authority, the role of the military in domestic capacities is one of the most significant. The Constitution 

provides the basis for governing domestic state and 

federal military actions. It gives powers to the states to 

maintain a militia, or National Guard.9 It also allows 

the President to call state militias into federal service 

under specific circumstances.10 These declarations are 
7

upheld by specific laws in the U.S. Code and ensure 

a clear and distinct military line of authority between 

the states and the national government. Other laws 

further regulate domestic military action and must be 

considered during civil support operations. 

The Posse Comitatus Act specifically prohibits 

the Armed Forces from performing law enforcement 

activities on domestic soil, unless specifically authorized by Congress (e.g., supporting the Department of 

Justice in emergency situations involving weapons of 

mass destruction pursuant to section 382 of title 10, 

U.S. Code). However, this law does not apply to National Guard forces in State Active Duty or Title 32, 

U.S. Code (state controlled; federally funded), status. 

The Insurrection Act of 1807, however, authorizes the 

President to deploy the Armed Forces in a law enforcement capacity within the United States in order 

to suppress an insurrection, rebellion, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, or to repel 

an invasion. The Insurrection Act also authorizes the 

President to deploy the National Guard in a federal 

status in a similar manner. Beyond these notable laws, 

several additional laws and numerous other policies 

and regulatory guidelines also influence domestic 

military operations. Simply put, domestic Federal 

military actions are governed by a complex series of 

laws, policies, and procedures that often contribute to 

inefficient and ineffective operations during times of 

critical need. 

In recent years, the DSC concept has generated 

legislative and political momentum and has become 

the usual and customary command and control 

mechanism for simultaneous military state and federal response missions. Hurricane Sandy was the first 

opportunity to see the DSC concept used in response 
8

to a no-notice/limited-notice incident. The operation 

demonstrated some notable successes, but also encountered numerous challenges that process improvement techniques can help to address.

HURRICANE SANDY AND THE DUAL 

STATUS COMMANDER 

Hurricane Sandy made landfall near Brigantine, 

NJ, at approximately 11:30 p.m. on October 29, 2012.11

In response to governors’ requests, the DoD approved 

DSC authorizations for several states along the east 

coast. Of the five states authorized to use DSCs, only 

two DSCs were activated—New York and New Jersey—to command National Guard and Active military responders.12 Despite successful efforts to use a 

DSC during planned operations since 2004, as well as 

its recent adoption in the 2012 NDAA, the DSC had 

not been used during an unplanned disaster response 

prior to Hurricane Sandy.13 Both successes and previously anticipated areas of weakness marked the 

inaugural employment of the DSC construct during 

an unplanned incident. A report by the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) on October 26, 2012—10 

months after the approval of the 2012 NDAA and 4 

days before Hurricane Sandy’s landfall—addressed 

the notable gaps in homeland defense and civil support guidance with specific emphasis on the need 

to address dual status commander policies and 

procedures:

gaps in guidance remain because DOD has not yet 

developed comprehensive policies and procedures 

regarding the use and availability of dual-status commanders, including specific criteria and conditions for 

when and how a state governor and the Secretary of 
9

Defense would mutually appoint a commander. . . . As 

a result, DOD’s ability to adequately prepare for and 

effectively use dual-status commanders for a range of 

civil support events, including those affecting multiple states, may be hindered.14

As if foreshadowing future events, GAO’s comments issued days prior to Sandy offered an accurate 

prediction of the resulting state and federal military 

responses under the dual status commander. While 

there were several notable successes, the state and 

federal military responses to Sandy experienced numerous challenges. Aside from the first use of a DSC 

during an unplanned response, facilitating unity of effort between Active Component and National Guard 

forces during the Sandy response required a multistate coordination effort unlike anything previously 

encountered.15 This necessitated the establishment of a 

temporary multiservice, multicomposition Joint Task 

Force (JTF) in New York combining elements of the 

Active Components (Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and 

Air Force) and the National Guard (Army and Air). As 

a result of the complex JTF structure during Sandy, the 

DSC in New York dealt with coordination and communication issues, operational and tactical confusion, 

and significant management challenges throughout 

the duration of the 2-week response period. 

As one of the many examples of confusion less 

than a week into the response operation, the U.S. Marine Corps—at the request of a New York/New Jersey Port Authority official—deployed a detachment 

of Marines to Staten Island unbeknownst to the NY 

DSC.16 Since a civil authority specifically requested the 

Marines to come ashore, this technically authorized 

them to deploy without first informing the DSC or his 
10

staff.17 The Marines’ landing created confusion on the 

part of the DSC. According to multiple DoD after action reports, tactical Active Component military commanders were not initially aware that a DSC had been 

activated, nor did they know how to establish contact 

with his staff.18 The tactical confusion among Active 

Component military commanders points to the lack 

of process guidance for such actions during DSC-led 

responses. In addition, there were several additional 

instances of confusion with regard to the mission 

assignment process. 

In order to approve a funded mission assignment 

for Federal military support, requests for assistance 

must originate from a lead Federal civil authority 

such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), which, in accordance with the Stafford Act, 

acts on requests for support from a state. States request federal support from the lead federal agency 

(LFA) for the particular operation. If necessary, the 

LFA requests DoD support. DoD support, while inclusive of military force capability, is not limited to the 

Armed Forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 

the Defense Logistics Agency can provide support, as 

we saw during the Sandy response. Conceptually, this 

bottom-up process ensures that officials use all available local and state resources (including the National 

Guard) before requesting Federal support. In some 

cases during Sandy, this process was not followed as 

described. On November 2, for example, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) published a fragmentary order19 directing Active Component forces to: 

• Get missions;

• Do not wait for mission assignment paperwork; 

and,

• Apply total force capabilities to accomplish 

those missions.20
11

As part of most military operations, commanders 

at all levels develop and issue operations orders detailing specific items relevant to a particular operation. 

Most operational orders follow a basic five-paragraph 

format and include such sections as situation, mission, 

execution, administration/logistics, and communications. These orders provide the needed operational 

guidance and intent to allow commanders at all levels 

to guide their unit activities in a manner that contributes to the achievement of the tactical, operational, and 

strategic objectives of the operation. Fluid and dynamic situations often require modifications to published 

orders. In the case of Hurricane Sandy, NORTHCOM 

issued the above fragmentary order in response to a 

growing sense of urgency to integrate Federal military forces into the response operation. Normally, this 

aggressive top-down approach would not present an 

issue for a DSC. However, when military units provide response support outside of the command and 

control of the DSC—as they did during Sandy—it creates coordination challenges. The resulting actions of 

Active Component forces operating within the joint 

operations area but external to the DSC’s command 

and control, in this case led to increased confusion as 

the DSC had no way of tracking the actions of some 

Active Component forces.

If we use examples such as this and others that 

occurred during Sandy, we can analyze the state and 

federal military responses and develop a basis of 

knowledge for improving future missions through 

the lens of process improvement. Fortunately, there 

are numerous lessons learned from which we can base 

our future process improvement efforts. 
12

Post-Sandy Lessons Learned.

No matter the source, there is an apparent consensus across DoD that command, control, and management of forces presented one of the most challenging 

aspects of the Sandy DSCA operation.21 Despite the 

positive image portrayed in most media accounts of 

the military’s role during the storm response, actual 

military and government after action reports provide 

more objective, self-critical assessments of performance. These documents highlight the coordination 

issues between National Guard and Active Component forces, while addressing the apparent lack of 

familiarity regarding DSC arrangements.22 Outside of 

the military, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) produced a comprehensive post-Sandy assessment of DoD’s complex catastrophe planning. In their 

2013 review of the response to Hurricane Sandy, the 

GAO noted that “the roles and responsibilities of the 

dual status commander, joint coordinating element, 

and defense coordinating officer were unclear.”23 According to the report, this issue and others created 

confusion among the responding military forces that 

hindered the DSC’s ability to establish unity of effort, 

which is the principal intent of the DSC arrangement 

during such missions. 

The 2013 report affirms what the GAO previously reported in 2012 prior to Sandy: There is a lack of 

sufficient DSC policies and procedures that leads to 

questions and confusion during certain operational 

situations employing DSC architecture.24 Our Sandy 

monograph notes the insufficiencies of the military 

responses to Hurricane Sandy in New York.25 As part 

of this study, we provided a series of strategic, operational, tactical, legislative, and policy-specific recom-
13

mendations for consideration. Among the strategic 

and operational recommendations, we suggest:

1. Strategic changes to future DSCA operations 

through eliminating the Joint Coordinating Element 

(JCE), which was placed in command over the NY 

and NJ DSC and caused command and control issues. 

To further improve coordination, we also suggested 

appointing a Defense Coordinating Officer in Charge 

(DCOIC) when more than one Defense Coordinating 

Officer (DCO) is involved in a state response, as we 

saw in Sandy.

2. A predetermined Active Component force integration period when using a DSC, especially during a 

limited-notice event like a hurricane.

3. A mechanism similar to one in the Joint Staff Execution Order (EXORD)26 for authorizing the DSC to 

assume tactical control of Active Component forces in 

his/her area of operational responsibility (AOR)27 in 

order to promote unified efforts.

From a policy and legislative perspective, we 

argue for several changes:

1. Revise the current immediate response authority 

policy, including revising and clarifying the definition 

of “civil authority.”

2. Expansion of 10 U.S.C. § 12304a28 to include specific circumstances when the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve 

can be sourced for support during a disaster response.

3. Revision of 32 U.S.C. § 502f29 with more restrictive operational triggering criteria for civil support 

operations in order to avoid further abuses of this 

authority.
14

These recommendations, in addition to others 

noted in the Sandy monograph, illustrate the range of 

complexities involved in not only DSC-led response 

operations, but the larger DSCA and National Guard 

support operational landscape. Specifically to the argument here, the fluidity and uncertainty of DSC missions lends itself well to applying process improvement methods to enhance future missions. Using 

some of the recommendations noted in our previous 

case study, we demonstrate how process improvement can be used to incorporate the recommendations and generate noted improvements in future 

DSC-led missions. 

DUAL STATUS COMMANDERS: 

SUPPORT FOR NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS

Hurricane Sandy gave us an opportunity to test 

the DSC arrangement during a no-notice/limited 

notice incident in support of civil authorities. While 

some successes were evident, we believe there is room 

for improvement in the way the military executes 

DSCA operations under the DSC arrangement. In 

addition to its adoption as the usual and customary 

disaster response command arrangement via the 2012 

NDAA, many senior military commanders publically 

support the DSC concept. During the Sandy response, 

Generals Charles Jacoby and Frank Grass, NORTHCOM Commander and Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau (NGB), respectively, affirmed this in an article 

following the Sandy response: 

While this inaugural use of Dual-Status Commanders 

wasn’t flawless, in the end we can say with conviction 

that the concept works. It is simply the best command 
15

and control construct that exists for responding effectively and efficiently to complex disasters, because it 

can bring the full weight of the DoD response to the 

worst man-made or natural disasters while maintaining the authority of state and local governments.30

 As the Chief of the NGB during the response to 

Hurricane Katrina, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum 

(USA, Ret.), along with Lieutenant Colonel Kerry McIntyre (USA, Ret.) of the Maryland Army National 

Guard, noted the benefits of the DSC arrangement 

compared with the traditional parallel model of command and control in which state National Guard and 

Active Component forces operate simultaneously but 

under separate commands. In their 2012 study based 

largely on personal experience during Katrina which 

was published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 

the authors contended that the operational processes 

governing the military responses under a DSC work, 

but need to be improved: 

Dual status command works. It should be the rule, not 

the exception; and better methods must be developed 

for placing useful military capabilities under dual status command, when requested and if available, for 

homeland response.31

Based on the 2012 NDAA legislation and the endorsement of many senior military and DoD leaders, 

the DSC construct will remain a central focus of current and future efforts to improve domestic response 

capabilities of the U.S. military. There is a need, then, 

to mature this command construct in order to attain 

and maintain the level of proficiency and effectiveness expected in future response missions. However, 

improving such a complex mission capability under a 
16

seldom-used command arrangement is quite literally 

easier said than done. 

Simultaneous DSCA and National Guard support 

of state civil authorities occurs within a complex decisionmaking environment that must integrate legal, 

political, financial, and bureaucratic considerations 

into nearly every command decision. We can continue 

to write and publish policies and laws in the hopes 

that our commanders will consider each appropriately prior to making command decisions during uncertain situations. However, disaster operations often 

require a sense of urgency in which bureaucracy only 

serves as a hindrance. In these cases, policies, and in 

some cases law, tend to be ignored, marginalized, or 

simply forgotten. It is a rare commander who will delay a needed operational decision in order to consult 

a manual or other lengthy reference publication. In 

light of this, what we need is a tool applicable to the 

urgency and complexity of no-notice/limited-notice 

operations that still offers commanders a valuable 

utility. Such a tool will distill the labyrinth of policies, 

procedures, doctrine, and law into a simplified map 

of mission-essential tasks worthy of the commander’s 

consideration. This can be achieved through the application of process improvement strategies. Using 

process improvement, we can build such a tool that 

provides commanders with the information necessary 

to ensure deference to the necessary laws and policies 

governing military civil support missions without sacrificing speed, efficiency, effectiveness, or urgency. 

Why Process Improvement?

Process improvement is “a program of activities 

designed to improve the performance and maturity 

of an organization’s processes, and the results of such 
17

a program.”32 Process improvement advocates argue 

that the quality of a product or service is proportional 

to the quality of the process.33 In the most basic sense, 

process improvement offers users a structured approach to move from ad hoc and immature processes 

to disciplined, mature processes and enhanced performance. In order to mature processes and improve 

product or service delivery, process improvement 

strategies emphasize identification and performance 

of consistent practices deemed essential to providing 

quality products or services. Business organizations 

that employ process improvement techniques do so 

in order to limit time spent performing unnecessary 

or wasteful practices, while ensuring essential tasks 

or practices are not only performed, but consistently 

and predictably repeated. Through the diagnosis and 

assessment of critical practices, process improvement 

is a modification for most business organizations. By 

identifying wasteful practices for removal, and essential tasks for consistency and repeatability, businesses are better able to improve the quality of their 

services and product delivery. Companies including 

Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, IBM, Booz Allen 

Hamilton, Federal Express (FedEx), and other industry leaders employ process improvement methods 

as a way to enhance product and service delivery.34

As such, there are several examples of the benefits 

of process improvement to support our argument. 

The next section offers a brief example of how FedEx 

used process improvement techniques to solve a service delivery issue and improve overall operational 

performance. This example is relevant to the current 

argument because it illustrates how an operationallyoriented service provider was able to apply similar 

concepts and techniques as presented in this analysis 
18

to improve a critical operational function and mature 

its delivery capabilities. While the circumstances and 

specifics are different, we believe this offers support to 

our argument and its potential application to military 

operations. 

FedEx and Process Improvement.

According to a senior executive at FedEx, one of 

the company’s top business priorities is to “always 

seek to improve our processes.”35 As a leader in global 

package delivery services, the complexities of FedEx’s 

day-to-day operations rival any in the service delivery industry. As a result, the company regularly looks 

for ways to maintain or improve its market share by 

improving processes and overall performance. FedEx 

employs a cadre of professional analysts whose primary role is to diagnose processes by identifying areas 

of weakness or inefficiency, as well as best practices. 

These analysts then apply a range of process improvement strategies to re-engineer critical processes aimed 

at improving efficiency and effectiveness of their 

parcel services.

In 2007, for example, FedEx analysts noted a sharp 

rise in service demand along with a growing trend 

among customers for greater access to package tracking and location services. After providing improved 

tracking capabilities, FedEx noted an increase in customer complaints regarding delivery delays, as their 

customers were able to see real-time status updates including arrival and departure times in various sorting 

facilities located along a shipment route. What was 

originally intended to be an enhancement in customer 

satisfaction resulted in a growing dissatisfaction over 

perceived delays and inefficiencies in package de-
19

livery times. In order to meet evolving customer demands for speed and efficiency, while also noting an 

insufficient data tracking capability, FedEx used process improvement methods to diagnose and enhance 

their critical sorting processes. In doing so, FedEx 

identified inefficiencies in its parcel tracking system 

related to increased volume and the system’s inability 

to effectively service growing requirements. As a solution, the company deployed a new internal operating 

system to enhance parcel tracking and data processing 

at its many sorting facilities. This improved operating 

system enhanced FedEx’s receiving and sorting processes for standard ground packages (nonpriority). As 

a result of this process improvement approach to meet 

a growing customer demand, FedEx Ground lowered 

its average parcel delivery time in over half of its network by nearly 24 hours over a 3-year period.36

Process Improvement in the Department 

of Defense.

FedEx is just one example of the many companies 

and organizations worldwide that employ process improvement strategies as a way to improve their business practices, operations, and profitability. While the 

private sector uses process improvement as a means 

to generate profit, process improvement can—and 

does—provide a benefit to government services as 

well. As the largest Federal department in terms of 

budget and personnel,37 DoD regularly requires improvement to its various processes and programs. 

As such, process improvement is not foreign to DoD. 

Military personnel in certain occupational specialties 

are familiar with process improvement methods and 

techniques including Lean Six Sigma (LSS) and Ca-
20

pability Maturity Models-Integrated (CMMI), among 

others. Recognizing the importance and utility of these 

methods, DoD, in 2007, established the Office of Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) and LSS within 

the Office of Business Transformation and housed it 

under Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. CPI/

LSS’ primary mission is to ensure the integration of 

process improvement methods into current business 

operations within DoD.38 By integrating process improvement methods into defense business operations, 

DoD has a vehicle for business process optimization 

through the identification and reduction of wasteful 

practices. Process improvement methods such as LSS 

and CMMI provide DoD with the necessary techniques to diagnose and improve critical business processes and meet mission requirements. As such, these 

techniques are used throughout DoD in a variety of 

capacities, albeit mostly administrative in nature. 

Other process improvement-based assessment 

practices like the Manager’s Internal Control Program, 

the Commander’s Evaluation Program, and similar 

continuous improvement approaches are regularly 

applied to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 

of business practices within DoD. Given the ongoing application of process improvement techniques 

to enhance administrative elements of DoD, as well 

as the proven application to private sector operations 

like FedEx, we argue that these same principles can be 

used to mature military operations. With a degree of 

creativity and flexibility, DoD can apply these proven 

techniques to their operational environment as a way 

to measure current performance and improve future 

performance. In order to identify the best process improvement technique for application to the complexities of military civil support operations, it is necessary 
21

to understand the key elements of process improvement and its many alternative approaches. 

Key Elements of Process Improvement. 

Since there are several process improvement alternatives—each with a specific concentration—it is helpful to discuss some of the most common approaches 

and the potential application to military operations. 

Early process improvement literature dates back to 

the 1930s and the work of Walter Shewhart. Shewhart, 

whose work emphasized quality control principles, 

is credited with creating the “Plan Do Check Act” 

concept—or the Shewhart Cycle—which is now used 

throughout managerial mediums as a simple means 

for improving procedures.39 Shewhart’s early work 

was expanded by modern process improvement scholars and has since evolved into a research area casting a 

wide scope across the performance management and 

engineering fields alike. Unlike performance management approaches that are focused on achieving predetermined measurable results or outcomes, process 

improvement—in contrast—emphasizes adherence to 

established steps or procedures to improve the quality 

of a product or service.40 In other words, “the quality of 

a system or product is highly influenced by the quality of the process used to develop and maintain it.”41

There are several methods for process improvement 

that have been applied to organizations seeking to improve the delivery of their products and/or services. 

Some of the more commonly used approaches include 

Total Quality Management,42 Lean,43 Six Sigma,44 the 

IDEAL Model,45 and maturity models.46
22

Table 1 presents some common process improvement methods in terms of the focus area, purpose, 

and features of the method. Each alternative brings a 

unique focus and approach to improving processes. 

Despite their differences, the strategies offer users a 

structured method to improve their processes, regardless of functional area. Some of the model-based 

strategies, like maturity models, facilitate the consolidation of best practices into a single medium for all 

users. Having a model that articulates user-defined 

best practices or essential tasks helps organizations 

work smarter, not harder, and with improved consistency. So, the applied benefit of process improvement 

is potentially significant. However, most of the above 

approaches are grounded in software engineering and 

other well-defined practices and are therefore best 

suited for the inherent predictability of such functions. 

This makes adapting process improvement concepts 

and techniques challenging for the operational uncertainty and fluidity of military operations. Despite 

these challenges, we argue that process improvement 

can be adapted for military operations and result in 

tangible enhancements.
23

Table 1. Variations in Process Improvement.

Adapting Process Improvement for 

Operational Contexts.

The use of DSCs during Hurricane Sandy highlighted the issues, gaps, and opportunities for improvement with regard to DSC arrangements during 

no-notice/limited-noticed incidents. There is an opportunity to learn from events like Hurricane Sandy 

and improve our knowledge and understanding of 

DSC structures and this critical mission-enhancing 

capability. Using process improvement techniques to 

guide these efforts is a unique approach worth considering. Given the systems and software engineering 

genesis of process improvement techniques, it is necessary to adapt them somewhat in order to maximize 

Process Improvement Alternatives

Method Total Quality 

Management Lean Six Sigma IDEAL Maturity Models

Focus Area -Management 

practices

-Production 

optimization 

(manufacturing)

-Process 

variability 

(minimize)

-Process 

definitions 

and activities

-Best 

practices

Purpose

-Continuous 

improvement of 

products/services

-Eliminate 

“waste” and 

enhance 

productivity

-Remove defects

-Increase 

repeatability/

parity

-Program

improvement

 -Process 

mapping 

Feature(s)

-Defined 

requirements and 

responsibilities

-Value driven 

practices

-Quantifiable 

performance 

targets

-Cyclical 

process of 

key activities

-Capability 

/Target 

profiles
24

the benefit when applied to a less-structured operational context such as a DSCA mission. 

The dynamic nature of DSCA operations requires 

mature capabilities representing information sharing, 

shared situational awareness, and social interaction; 

each of which must occur through both linear and 

vertical command hierarchies. The heterogeneous 

DSC construct involves several contributing elements, 

echelons, agencies, departments, and organizations 

in both state and federal operational chains of command. This requires an agile, coordinated response 

incorporating each entity and its respective capabilities. The DSC arrangement provides a command and 

coordination mechanism designed to help improve 

coordination processes across the federal-state authority boundary. Through enhanced information and 

knowledge sharing under the DSC construct, military 

commanders can achieve greater management effectiveness and governance. As a result, joint military 

operations seek to attain a network-centric and agile 

force structure during complex scenarios. The DSC 

construct is designed to facilitate such network-centric, agile operations involving multiple departments, 

agencies, and response organizations. 

Knowing the complexities involved with military 

operations, doctrine argues for a mission command 

approach to leadership.47 This approach, more reflective of the modern, post-Vietnam era military, values 

decentralized control and empowering small unit 

leaders. Through this approach, commanders can articulate what needs to be done to subordinates while 

leaving the how, or the tactical level decisionmaking, 

up to the small unit leader. This approach also serves 

to minimize bureaucratic and procedural obstacles 

and offers the needed autonomy and flexibility for 
25

subordinate leaders to make split-second decisions 

without the constant need for approval from higher 

authority. While flexibility and agility are necessary 

ingredients for speed and effectiveness, military civil 

support operations often encounter challenges that 

process improvement techniques can help address. 

As discussed previously, most process improvement approaches are designed to assess and improve 

the “assembly line” and predictable systems associated with software and systems engineering. These 

approaches focus on the identification of wasteful 

practices and direct their removal in order to improve 

system performance. The concept suggests that small 

changes or improvements in larger processes have a 

cascading effect on each subsequent process thereafter. This results in larger changes or improvements 

to predictable outcomes. Military operations of any 

kind are rarely predictable. While situations and scenarios can be anticipated with some accuracy, there is 

always a degree of uncertainty. As such, some process 

improvement techniques provide little utility for most 

military operations where flexibility and improvisation are highly valued. However, if we instead shift 

the focus of our improvement efforts to mapping 

the relevant processes and essential tasks associated, 

we can generate significant improvements in overall 

operational efficiency. 

BUILDING A PROCESS MODEL FOR 

DSCA OPERATIONS 

Military operations, especially DSCA missions, 

are unpredictable. The fluidity of an operational environment mandates flexibility, adaptation to the 

environment, and improvisation. With the inherent 

challenges in DSC-led DSCA operations, developing 
26

a process model as a tool to represent essential tasks 

and articulate relevant operational considerations 

would be a significant improvement. Since we know 

the DSC construct will be used again in future disaster response operations, we need to continue to learn 

from past operations and implement lessons learned. 

A DSC-led DSCA operation offers a semi-structured 

organizational arrangement to overcome some of the 

complexities associated with a multiauthority decision environment. Because of the organizational structure, there are repeatable tasks associated with a DSC, 

which, if performed consistently, will enhance operational performance in future missions. Improving 

the critical processes to execute DSC-led operations 

would further enhance the stability and predictability of interorganizational command, control, and coordination, and the ability of commanders to address 

a variety of environmental contingencies. With so 

many considerations and potential areas of challenge, 

identifying and documenting essential tasks for inclusion in a process model is a useful exercise aimed at 

improving complex military operational processes. 

Mission Essential Tasks and Process Mapping.

To determine what is necessary for a DSC-led 

JTF—in either state or federal status—to function at its 

highest potential level of operational maturity during 

a disaster response, we must identify those essential 

tasks that must be performed during the conduct of 

the response. Drawing from established DoD concepts, identifying and listing essential tasks for consideration is similar to developing a Mission Essential 

Task List (METL). In operational contexts, METLs are 

tools that help commanders prioritize training activi-
27

ties in preparation for combat operations. As described 

in the DoD METL Development Handbook, the premise centers on the identification of tasks that must be 

prioritized and performed in order to maximize the 

likelihood of accomplishing a given mission.48 Mission 

essential tasks are activities that, when performed, are 

linked with successful outcomes. Multiple mission essential tasks form a METL. In other words, a mission 

essential task is a critical function that must occur in 

order to ensure completion of a particular mission. 

While DSCA is a recognized mission capability of 

the U.S. military, few military units have core DSCA 

responsibilities. Beyond this, there are currently no 

DSCA-specific tasks listed in any joint METL within 

DoD.49 Since DSCA is a lower-level mission capability 

and priority for DoD, there is no basis from which we 

can develop such METLs. However, this is an important consideration for improving future civil support 

operations; especially those combined state and federal missions using the DSC arrangement. The development of a DSCA or DSC-specific process model is an 

approach worth considering for future improvement 

efforts. 

In order to determine appropriate METLs for inclusion in a process model, model creators seek industry or subject matter experts (SME) to provide input 

and recommendations through personal interviews 

and/or focus groups. SMEs help to identify the characteristics of effective processes and are therefore 

critical to the creation of a process model of this kind. 

As a DoD-endorsed and funded method of process 

improvement, a maturity model provides us with the 

ideal architecture to list DSC-specific METLs deemed 

necessary for a DSCA operation under a DSC. As opposed to other process improvement strategies gener-
28

ally focused on achieving quantifiable business goals 

and objectives, maturity models emphasize individual 

task performance within structured levels as a means 

to generate comprehensive enhancement. With so 

many uncertainties, a one-size-fits-all approach is not 

suitable for DSCA. Due to the variations in scenarios 

during disaster response, there can be no single quantifiable measure of success applicable to all support 

operations. Therefore, the ideal process improvement 

strategy is one that identifies critical tasks for completion and focuses on the structured performance of 

such tasks. Maturity models offer commanders exactly that: a structured way of identifying, listing, and 

guiding the performance of critical tasks without the 

need to identify and work toward quantifiable and 

often irrelevant objectives. 

Since maturity models emphasize specific practices 

or essential tasks, this process improvement strategy 

provides commanders with a singular comprehensive 

tool to view the complexities and the systematic interrelationships of a Federal JTF operation. The ability 

to view these tasks in a single tool gives commanders the benefit of having multiple task considerations 

in one location. Using a maturity model approach, 

we can build a DSC-led Federal JTF METL that will 

help commanders make more informed decisions by 

providing a structured list of tasks for consideration 

during the conduct of operations. In order to demonstrate the utility of such a tool, we use some of the proposed recommendations in our Sandy monograph as 

examples for guiding the development of simplified 

maturity models structured specifically for a DSC-led 

Federal JTF. The next section of this monograph uses 

three recommendations from our Sandy case study 

as examples to demonstrate the application of a basic 

maturity model for enhancing military operations. 
29

RECOMMENDED PROCESS AND EXAMPLES 

In order to scope, design, and populate a usable 

maturity model, developers first need to determine 

the focus or purpose of the model. For the purposes 

of this discussion, we explain the development of a 

model scoped specifically to DSC-led Federal JTF processes. Once the scope has been determined, model 

developers need to collect data for the eventual design and population of the model. Suggested data 

collection methods include individual interviews and 

focus group interviews.50 In this example, developers 

must identify subject matter experts in DSC-led Federal JTF operations and request interviews and/or 

focus groups. Because maturity models contain specific practices determined to be critical for mature processes, interviews should include questions designed 

to illicit discussion and identification of essential task 

requirements during the conduct of DSC-led response 

operations. The interviewer, in relation to the intended 

utility of the model, determines the type, order, and 

content of these questions. After completing the interviews, developers must analyze the interview data 

in order to design and populate the maturity model 

according to SME input. 

Most maturity models use a progressive scale—e.g., 

1-5—to represent increasing levels of maturity. Maturity levels should be labeled with a short, descriptive 

term relevant to the collection of tasks contained in 

the given level. Some models, such as CMMI models, 

also include process areas, or clusters of related practices, within each maturity level to add structure to 

more complex representations. After determining the 

appropriate number of maturity levels and whether 
30

to include process areas, developers need to populate 

the model with SME input contained in the interview 

data. Identification and placement of essential tasks 

within the model initially depends on the developer’s 

logic and rationale (content and placement is later validated by SME assessment with revisions performed 

as needed). If omitting process areas from the model, 

developers group the tasks so that they are representative of a sequenced, progressive process within each 

maturity level. After populating each maturity level 

and making revisions as needed based on SME input, 

the model can be tested in order to determine its suitability for future deployment. 

To provide tangible examples of such a model, we 

used recommendations from our previous SSI case 

study on Hurricane Sandy to develop three processspecific maturity models. The three simplified maturity models each represent a structured list of mission 

essential task considerations in a consolidated format. 

Since these are recommendations contained in our case 

study, they are not actual processes currently practiced by the U.S. military. Therefore, source data is not 

available to create an accurate model that represents 

these processes. The models are hypothetical depictions of simplified maturity models designed to provide examples to support our discussion. The intent is 

to present process improvement concepts as an option 

for consideration in future operational enhancement 

efforts. Therefore, these models are not representative 

of the necessary size and scope otherwise required to 

fully represent the complexities of a DSC-led Federal 

JTF and its associated support operations. Rather, 

they illustrate how a simplified maturity model can 

be developed and used to guide the performance of 

singular tasks during the conduct of DSC-led State 

and Federal military support operations. 
31

By using a maturity model structure containing 

documented best practices or essential tasks, commanders can improve operational maturity by progressing from an undefined, ad hoc process to a welldefined, mature process. In addition, maturity models 

can be used as a metric of performance, or a rubric of 

sorts, for post-operation evaluations and after-action 

reporting. Using the model as a guide, commanders 

and their staffs can assess their performance by determining which tasks were or were not performed. This 

will serve as a metric that will provide a structured 

improvement plan through noting which practices 

were not performed. Regardless of intended application, the basic design and concept of a maturity model 

offers military units a useful method of mapping complex processes and increasing operational maturity. 

Maturity Model Example 1: Designate a Defense 

Coordinating Officer in Charge. 

Using basic tenets of process improvement techniques (process mapping, metric identification, etc.), 

we can develop a simplified maturity model with 

sequenced essential task considerations representing 

the Defense Coordinating Officer in Charge (DCOIC) 

assignment and activation process.51 Table 2 illustrates what this model might look like during a federally declared disaster (multistate or severe impact) 

where a DSC-led Federal JTF has been or will soon 

be established and multiple DCOs are involved (as in 

Hurricane Sandy). While such tasks may be accomplished without the aid of a model, developing and 

maintaining a defined tool of this kind will ensure that 

commanders and other key personnel possess a structured list of the essential tasks needed to activate and 

effectively employ a DCOIC. 
32

Table 2. DCOIC Deployment Maturity Model.

The utility of the model is such that it provides a 

guided progression of activities from a reactive level 

of maturity—unplanned and ad hoc—to a collaborative maturity level. The different levels of maturity 

(Reactive, Integrated, Collaborative), suggest how the 

process can evolve from an ad hoc process to a unified process where necessary personnel, units, agencies, and organizations unify their efforts in order to 

achieve a common goal. In the example below, the 

military end-user achieves a collaborative maturity 

level 3 (most mature) by performing and documenting 

all listed tasks in Levels 1, 2, and 3. While the tasks do 

not necessarily have to be performed in order, Level 3 

tasks cannot be performed without first accomplishing those tasks listed in Levels 1 and 2. (Users employ 

the same maturity progression process described in 

Table 2 for all examples contained in this monograph). 

Level 1—Reactive Level 2—Integrated Level 3—Collaborative

R1: Identify and activate 

regional DCOs

I1: Locate the Joint Field Office 

(JFO) and Federal Coordinating 

Officer (FCO)

C1: DCO is integrated into State and 

Federal processes for requesting 

DoD Support

R2: Determine DCO 

geographical areas of 

responsibility

I2: Determine DCO hierarchy 

by 1) rank seniority or 2) billet 

seniority

C2: Deploy regional DCOs/

Departments of Civil Engineering 

(DCE) to pre-determined locations

R3: Establish DCE staff section 

for each DCO I3: Designate a DCOIC

C3: Establish communications link 

between regional DCOs, DSC JTF, 

and DCOIC Information Operations 

Technology (IOT) Mission 

Assignment (MA)

R4: Identify location for 

deployment of DCO/E staff 

sections

I4: Communicate DCOIC 

designation to DCO/E staff 

sections and DSC-led Federal 

JTF

C4: DCO/E located with key 

interagency organizations that they 

support, i.e. FEMA
33

Maturity Model Example 2: Establish an Initial 

Title 10 Integration Period.

In another example of maturity model application 

related to our Sandy case study recommendations, we 

model the essential task considerations needed to integrate the Armed Forces into the beginning stages of 

disaster response operations under a DSC-led Federal 

JTF.52 While understandably problematic considering 

the current tiered national response system described 

in the National Response Framework (NRF), this recommendation provides a DSC with a defined authority to request Title 10 forces prior to soliciting Title 32 

support, and only for a predetermined period of 72 

hours following the DSC’s activation to remain consistent with current policy associated with similar actions 

under Immediate Response Authority.53 Table 3 illustrates the conceptual model for preliminary Armed 

Forces integration under a DSC-led Federal JTF. This 

process is permitted up to 72 hours after DSC activation. The normal Request For Assistance (RFA) process begins at the conclusion of the proposed 72-hour 

integration period. 
34

Table 3. Temporary Title 10 Integration 

Maturity Model.

Maturity Model Example 3: Designate and 

Deploy a Title 10 Adaptive Task Force. 

Similar to the proposed initial Title 10 integration 

period discussed earlier, we also proposed the identification and inclusion of a Federal adaptive task force 

(A-TF) during future DSC-led support operations.54

The proposed A-TF, like the Title 10 integration period, is intended to minimize bureaucratic restrictions 

and maximize the DSC’s decisionmaking flexibility. 

Using the actions of Task Force (TF) Pump during 

Sandy as an example, we recommend designating—

where needed and appropriate—a single Federal TF 

to perform a defined set of missions based on capability requirements determined by the DSC-led Federal 

JTF, DCO, and requesting lead Federal civil authoriLevel 1—Reactive Level 2—Integrated Level 3—Collaborative

R1: DCO/DCOIC identifies 

and prioritizes civil authority 

requests for assistance (RFA) 

based on urgency of need, 

severity, and extent of required 

capability

I1: Establish communications 

link between DSC-led Federal 

JTF, DCO/DCOIC, and 

selected units of the Armed 

Forces for pending support

C1: DSC-led Federal JTF 

assumes tactical control 

of Armed Forces units and 

coordinates support activities

R2: Assess RFAs and flag 

specific tasks for DoD support

I2: DCO/DCOIC confirms 

capability requirements with 

requesting lead Federal civil 

authority

C2: DSC-led Federal JTF assigns 

forces missions based on 

RFAs though National Incident 

Management System process

R3: Coordinate with DSCled Federal JTF to determine 

appropriate DoD resources to 

fulfill RFAs

I3: SECDEF deploys units of 

the Armed Forces to DSC-led 

Federal JTF

C3: DSC-led Federal JTF 

integrates Title 10 forces into 

mission command structure 

and missions according to 

civilian priorities
35

ties. In Sandy, TF Pump provided the NY DSC with 

an easily identifiable unit with a focused capability (dewatering). TF Pump received most mission assignments related to dewatering in and around New 

York City during the Sandy response. According to 

the NY DSC, TF Pump offered a single decision point 

for dewatering missions that simplified matters and 

resulted in quicker response. The A-TF simply codifies this ad hoc model used during Sandy as a default 

requirement during future DSC response efforts. The 

maturity model for assigning and deploying an A-TF 

is illustrated in Table 4. 

Table 4. Title 10 Task Force

 Deployment Maturity Model.

Level 1—Reactive Level 2—Integrated Level 3—Collaborative

R1: Federal DCO coordinates with 

lead Federal civil authorities, FEMA, 

to identify major mission capability 

(ex. Dewatering)

I1: NORTHCOM identifies/

designates DSC-led Federal JTF 

and provides forces to JTF

C1: DSC-led Federal 

JTF task organizes 

military forces based on 

mission analysis, using 

either a functional or 

geographical model for 

subordinate JTF/TFs

R2: DSC-led Federal JTF 

communicates needed mission 

capability to NORTHCOM

I2: NORTHCOM issues prepare 

to deploy orders for requested 

military forces

C2: DSC-led Federal JTF 

integrates and activates 

A-TF and assumes 

tactical control of TF 

within AOR; assigns 

missions as needed 

R3: DSC-led Federal JTF assesses 

response requirement against 

available force capability in order to 

determine suitable unit

I3: DSC-led Federal JTF either 

deploys internal capability 

against a requirement or 

requests additional capability
36

CONCLUSION

The above models, although simplistic, offer an 

alternative method to plan for and execute military 

civil support operations under the DSC arrangement. 

Developing METLs is a familiar practice for most military planners and despite their similarities, maturity 

models are not. Due to the intricacy and uncertainty in 

most DSCA operations, scripting a mission from beginning to end is unrealistic as requirements and situations often change. Rather than attempting to plan 

for every possible scenario and burying themselves 

in detailed plans and orders, commanders and their 

staffs should instead emphasize the identification and 

execution of mission-essential tasks as a method for 

gaining operational maturity. As we have demonstrated, process improvement strategies can provide an alternative approach to enhancing performance during 

the uncertainty of DSCA response missions. By generating METLs and graphically depicting them in maturity models like the examples above, commanders 

can reference these tools as guides to effective practice 

without sacrificing decision-making flexibility. 

As discussed, process improvement methods are 

used extensively in nonoperational DoD business, 

and in many cases as a universal standard of performance or practice. Process improvement in general 

has proven to be effective in generating enhancements 

and contributions to DoD. With such extensive application and utility in DoD business operations, process improvement can and should be considered as a 

guided method for improving operational maturity as 

well. The DSC-led DSCA response to Hurricane Sandy demonstrated some of the areas in which process 

improvement could have been applied. 
37

While most process improvement strategies are 

ill-suited to the complexities of DSCA and DSC-led 

operations for reasons discussed, the maturity model 

concept offers a different approach to improve future 

mission execution. In order to achieve more mature 

DSCA operations under the DSC arrangement, we 

need mechanisms in place to help commanders and 

their staffs manipulate—to the extent possible—the 

various uncertainties represented in the complex decision environment present in most DSCA scenarios. 

The maturity model concept provides commanders 

with a method of limiting these uncertainties through 

a framework that identifies, standardizes, and codifies 

mission essential tasks in a DSC-led response environment. So, while DSCA operations cannot be scripted, 

they can be more structured and defined than they 

are currently. The maturity model concept provides 

a semi-structured framework for improving future 

DSCA mission execution. Therefore, DoD should 

consider the concepts addressed in this monograph 

and use them as a basis for maturity model development for future DSCA operations. These models can 

be presented as supplemental material in an appendix 

to various DoD reference publications, doctrine, directives, and guidance documents relevant to the DSCA 

mission capability. DoD should leverage the lessons 

learned from Hurricane Sandy and determine ways to 

integrate maturity model concepts into future DSCA 

and DSC training and real-world operations. 

To maintain operational effectiveness, DoD must 

ensure its ability to continually adapt to changing 

policy and legislation—such as the DSC initiative—

without sacrificing performance during domestic civil 

support operations. The DSC response to Hurricane 

Sandy was only the first attempt to use this unique 
38

coordination mechanism in response to a domestic disaster. There are numerous opportunities for improvement. Emphasizing task performance and processes is 

the proper approach to improve upon the challenges 

noted during Sandy. Process improvement strategies 

provide the foundation for generating such improvements and should be integrated into future dual status 

commander DSCA operations. Doing so will result in 

improved coordination between the National Guard 

and Federal military forces during disaster response, 

ultimately leading to more lives saved, fewer properties lost, and less suffering during the next significant 

incident requiring military support.

ENDNOTES

1. National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012, 

Public Law 112-81, H.R. 1540, Sec. 515, p. 98.

2. Department of Defense Instruction 3025.xx: Dual Status Commanders for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d. (draft).

3. William Prendergast, “Contingency Dual Status Commander: Balancing Title 10 and 32 Responsibilities,” Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, March 2011, pp. 1-24; Garrett Jensen, 

“DoD Disaster Response: Unity of Effort Versus Unity of Command,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 2007, pp. 1-22; 

Andy Hall, “Improving Military Response to Catastrophic Events 

within the United States,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

March 2009, pp. 1-26; Caroline Prosch, “Getting to One from Title 

10 + Title 32 Unity of Effort in the Homeland,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2011, pp. 1-133; Steven Blum 

and Kerry McIntyre, Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response 

Operations, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, April 2012; Ludwig Schumacher, “Dual Status Command for No-Notice Events: Integrating the Military Response to 

Domestic Disasters,” Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 4, February 2011, pp. 1-9; John Gereski and Chris Brown, “Two Hats 
39

Are Better than One: The Dual-Status Commander in Domestic 

Operations,” The Army Lawyer, June 2010, pp. 72-79. 

4. “No-notice/limited-notice” is the DoD accepted vernacular 

referring to incidents other than planned events of national significance (i.e., national security special events—Super Bowl, political 

conventions, etc.). According to DoD personnel, the no-notice/

limited-notice designation can often apply to hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, terrorism, etc. Currently, there is no doctrinal 

distinction between no-notice and limited-notice.

5. Previous to Sandy, there were five past incidents in which 

a DSC was activated to lead the response: Hurricane Irene, two 

for Hurricane Isaac, one for the 2012 CA wildfires, and one for the 

CO (Waldo Canyon) wildfire. None of these incidents received 

Title 10 forces—only National Guard forces, so the DSCs were 

dissolved quickly. 

6. Charles Jacoby and Frank Grass, “Dual Status, Single Purpose: A Unified Military Response to Hurricane Sandy,” pp. 1-2, 

available from www.ang.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123339975, accessed October 11, 2013. 

7. The military now has a Joint Lessons Learned Information 

System (JLLIS) which all services can use and provide lessons 

learned input, but it is only as good or valuable as the units inputting the data and/or using JLLIS as a source for future operational 

improvements.

8. Mary Beth Chrissis, Mike Conrad, and Sandy Shrum, 

CMMI Second Edition: Guidelines for Process Integration and Product Improvement, Boston, MA: Pearson, 2007; Suzanne Garcia 

and Richard Turner, CMMI Survival Guide: Just Enough Process 

Improvement, Boston, MA: Pearson, 2007; Dennis Ahern, Aaron 

Clouse, and Richard Turner, CMMI Distilled: A Practical Introduction to Integrated Process Improvement, Upper Saddle River, NJ: 

Addison-Wesley, 2008.

9. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sect. 8. 

10. Ibid., Art. II, Sect. 2.
40

11. For details, see 2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season, p. 4, available from www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/summary_atlc_2012.pdf.

12. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees, January-March 2014. For details, also see “The Department of Defense Prepares for Hurricane Sandy,” Release No: 

854-12, October 27, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/releases/

release.aspx?releaseid=15646.

13. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers 

who participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some 

capacity, January-March 2014; Jacoby and Grass, p. 2.

14. “Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support Guidance,” Report to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

#13-128, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office (USGAO), October 2012, p. 1.

15. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was a multistate response effort. However, while proposed at the time, a DSC was not used 

during the response.

16. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers 

who participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy.

17. DoD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 

discusses DoD policy for Immediate Response Authority (IRA), 

Washington, DC: DoD, Sect. 4, subsect. g, p. 4. The current IRA 

policy reads: 

In response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, 

under imminently serious conditions and if time does not 

permit approval from higher authority, DoD officials may 

provide an immediate response by temporarily employing 

the resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives, 

prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the United States.
41

18. Various DoD after action reports provided to the authors 

suggest Title 10 unit commanders were unaware of the DSC construct or how federal military forces were to integrate into the 

joint structure. 

19. “Fragmentary Order” is defined by Joint Publication (JP) 

1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Associated Military Terms

as “An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed 

after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.” JP 1-2, Washington, DC: 

USGAO, 2014, p. 105.

20. Copied material from NORTHCOM guidance (fragmentary order) of November 2, 2012.

21. “Hurricane Sandy Disaster Response Active Collection 

Lessons Learned,” United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), 

February 22, 2013; “Hurricane Sandy Response,” United States 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 2012, pp. 22-23; Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) NEXT, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 

“Lessons Learned from Hurricane Sandy,” Spring 2013, pp.10-14; 

“Hurricane Sandy Response Hotwash After Action Report,” Naval Warfare Development Command, November 30, 2012, pp. 16-

21; Office of the Secretary of Defense After Action Review—Hurricane Sandy, January 10, 2013, p. 32; Interviews conducted by 

the author with various DoD employees, including those within 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs, and United States Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM), January-March 2014.

22. Ibid. 

23. “Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DoD’s 

Planning for a Complex Catastrophe,” Report to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, #13-763, 

Washington, DC: USGAO, September 2013, p. 20.

24. Government Accountability Office, #13-128, 2012.

25. Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, Toward a Unified Response: 

Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, forthcoming.
42

26. An Execute (or execution) Order (EXORD) is simply an 

order issued to initiate military operations as directed by the President of the United States. There are numerous EXORDs originating from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 

cover a variety of military operations. 

27. According to JP 1-02, an area of responsibility (AOR) is a 

geographical area associated with a combatant command within 

which the geographic combatant commander has authority to 

plan and conduct operations. Washington, DC: USGAO, 2014, p. 

19. As the tactical commander on the ground during a domestic 

disaster response, the DSC represents the combatant command 

(USNORTHCOM) and its commander. 

28. 10 U.S.C § 12304a, “Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine 

Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve: order to active duty to provide assistance in response to a major disaster or emergency.”

29. 32 U.S.C. § 502: “Required drills and field exercises.” Subsection f states that members of the National Guard may: “be ordered to perform training or other duty . . . (2) that may include

 . . . (A) support of operations or missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense.”

30. Jacoby and Grass, p. 2.

31. Blum and McIntyre, p. 31.

32. Chrissis, Conrad, and Shrum, p. 628. 

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., pp. 119-148; Garcia and Turner; Ahern, Clouse, and 

Turner; as well as the author’s personal experience working for 

and discussions with personnel in some of the noted companies.

35. Interview conducted by the author with a FedEx executive, June 2014. 

36. Ibid. For more, also see “FedEx Ground Meets Rising Customer Expectations by Shortening Its Package Processing Cycle,” 

pp. 1-4, 2007, available from ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/software/solutions/pdfs/ODC00297-USEN-00.pdf.
43

37. More about DoD is available from www.defense.gov/about/. 

38. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, DoD-Wide 

Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) / Lean Six Sigma (LSS), 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 30, 2007, pp. 1-2; 

Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 5010.43: Implementation 

and Management of the DoD-Wide Continuous Process Improvement/

Lean Six Sigma (CPI/LSS) Program, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 17, 2009, p. 1-21.

39. Bill Curtis, William Hefley, and Sally Miller, People Capability Maturity Model (P-CMM) Version 2.0, Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute, 2001, p. 8; 

Chrissis, Conrad, and Shrum, pp. 5-8.

40. Curtis, Hefley, and Miller; Ahern, Clouse, and Turner; 

Chrissis, Conrad, and Shrum; Garcia and Turner.

41. Chrissis, Conrad, and Shrum, p. 5. 

42. Brian Mansir and Nicholas Schacht, Total Quality Management: A Guide to Implementation. Defense Technical Information Center Report AD-A232 070, Bethesda, MD: Department of 

Defense, Logistics Management Institute, 1989. 

43. John Davis, Lean Manufacturing: Implementation Strategies that Work: A Roadmap to Quick and Lasting Success, New York: 

Industrial Press, 2009.

44. Peter Pande, Robert Neuman, and Roland Cavanagh, The 

Six Sigma Way: How GE, Motorola, and Other Top Companies are 

Honing Their Performance, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000.

45. The IDEAL Model, Pittsburgh, PA: Software Engineering 

Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 2009, available from resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Presentation/2001_017_001_23277.pdf. 

46. Chrissis, Conrad, and Shrum.

47. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Department 

of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and 

Control, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Octo-
44

ber 1996, pp. 79-81; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army 

Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, Mission Command, Washington 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2012, pp. 2-1 - 2-17.

48. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Mission 

Essential Task List Development Handbook, Washington DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, September 2002. 

49. Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities 

for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents, Before 

Disaster Strikes: Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities, Report to the Secretary of Defense and Committees on Armed Services, Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 

September 15, 2010, p. 21. 

50. Tonia De Bruin, Ronald Freeze, Uday Kaulkarni, and 

Michael Rosemann, “Understanding the Main Phases of Developing a Maturity Assessment Model,” paper presented at the 

Queensland University of Technology, “16th Australasian Conference on Information Systems,” Sydney, Australia, November 

29-December 2, 2005, pp. 6-8. 

51. Burke and McNeil, pp. 62-63. 

52. Ibid., pp. 63-66.

53. DoD Directive 3025.18 outlines the policy for conducting 

IRA. This policy authorizes federal military commanders to provide immediate response at the request of a civil authority and 

without prior approval for up to 72 hours. 

54. Burke and McNeil, pp. 68-69. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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