COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Humphreys 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

WAYNE RUSH MEADOWS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0543-00-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 APRIL 17, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 Charles L. Weber, Jr., for appellant. 

 Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Wayne Rush Meadows appeals his conviction, after a jury 

trial, of two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.1 The 

sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing 

the Commonwealth to admit testimony of an oral statement given by 

appellant to investigators, even though the statement had not been 

provided in written form to appellant during pretrial discovery. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions. 

 1

 The first firearm charge was set forth in the indictment 

as having occurred on or about October 19, 1998. The second 

firearm charge was set forth as having occurred several weeks 

later, on or about November 24, 1998. Appellant was also charged 

with two counts of statutory burglary and two counts of grand 

larceny. Appellant was tried for these charges in a separate 

trial, and they are not a subject of this appeal. 
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I. Background

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the prevailing party below, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). 

So viewed, the evidence established that the home of Ronald Wise 

was burglarized on October 19, 1998, while he was away at work. 

Upon returning, Wise found his home "ransacked" and found that 

eleven firearms and a police scanner were missing. The screen 

to the living room window was out of place and the front door 

was locked, as it had been when he left for work that morning. 

There was also a bow, still leaning against the front door, 

where it had been left that morning. 

 The following day, Ron Meadows, appellant's brother, told 

Wise he had found Wise's .45 caliber Ruger pistol and a police 

scanner in a shed on his property. Appellant lived with Meadows 

at that time and also knew Wise and had spent time at Wise's 

home. 

 On or about October 20, 1998, Orange County Investigator 

Danny Call arrested appellant on unrelated charges. After 

administering Miranda warnings to appellant, Call asked appellant 

if he would speak to him about his knowledge concerning the 

burglary. Appellant agreed. However, Call was called away to 
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assist in recovering the Ruger and the police scanner. While 

Call was gone, appellant provided a written statement to Captain 

Brooks. In the statement, appellant stated that he saw an 

individual named Dennis Booth coming out of Wise's home on the 

day of the burglary, holding an armload of weapons. Appellant 

said that he told Booth he would keep silent about the burglary 

if Booth would agree to give him "half the money [sic]." Booth 

ultimately gave appellant the Ruger, the police scanner and a 

rifle. Appellant stated, "I did not touch the guns because I'm 

a felon, I only touched the .45 caliber with a rag." 

 Investigator Call testified that when he returned to the 

police station, he re-advised appellant of his rights and 

continued to question him. At that time, appellant told Call he 

had seen Booth enter Wise's house through a window and leave 

through the front door, carrying the guns. Call questioned 

appellant about what was inside the house, and appellant told him 

there was a bow leaning against the front door. Appellant said 

Wise told him about the bow. Call then telephoned Wise, who 

informed him he had not mentioned the bow to appellant. Call 

then confronted appellant with this information, and appellant 

became angry and accused Call of "tricking him." 

 Appellant objected to the questioning of Call concerning 

these statements. Appellant claimed he had requested all 

statements during discovery, pursuant to Rule 3A:11, and that 
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the statement had not been provided. The Commonwealth responded 

that they had indeed provided the substance of the statement to 

appellant's counsel during oral discussions prior to trial but 

agreed the statement had not been reduced to writing. Appellant 

conceded there was some discussion of inconsistencies in 

Meadows' initial statement but appellant's counsel indicated he 

could recall few details of that conversation with the 

prosecutor, except with regard to the inconsistencies concerning 

the location of the bow. The trial court overruled the 

objection, finding that the Commonwealth had sufficiently 

complied with Rule 3A:11 in supplying the information to 

appellant orally. 

II. Analysis

 "There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a 

criminal case." Henshaw v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 338, 342, 

451 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1994) (citation omitted). Rule 

3A:11(b)(1), which governs the discovery of statements by the 

accused in criminal cases, provides: 

Upon written motion of an accused a court 

shall order the Commonwealth's attorney to 

permit the accused to inspect and copy or 

photograph any relevant (i) written or 

recorded statements or confessions made by 

the accused, or copies thereof, or the 

substance of any oral statements or 

confessions made by the accused to any law 

enforcement officer, the existence of which 

is known to the attorney for the 

Commonwealth, and (ii) written reports of 

autopsies, ballistic tests, fingerprint 
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analyses, handwriting analyses, blood, urine 

and breath tests, other scientific reports, 

and written reports of a physical or mental 

examination of the accused or the alleged 

victim made in connection with the 

particular case, or copies thereof, that are 

known by the Commonwealth's attorney to be 

within the possession, custody or control of 

the Commonwealth. 

 The issue of whether Rule 3A:11(b)(1) requires the 

Commonwealth to reduce the substance of an oral statement to 

writing is one of first impression. Rule 3A:11(b)(1) allows the 

accused to "inspect and copy or photograph" the items described 

thereafter. The term "inspect" is defined as "to view closely 

and critically," Webster's Third New International Dictionary

1170 (1993); "[a] careful examination of something," Black's Law 

Dictionary 799 (7th ed. 1999). This term clearly modifies the 

phrase requiring the Commonwealth to furnish the accused with 

the "substance of any oral statements or confessions made by the 

accused to any law enforcement officer." Thus, while 

recognizing potential difficulties in "critically analyzing" 

what amounts to a paraphrase of a statement made by a defendant, 

we hold that Rule 3A:11(b)(1) requires the Commonwealth to 

reduce the substance of oral statements to writing, so they can 

be properly inspected, copied or photographed by the accused, as 

provided for in the Rule. Nevertheless, "[i]n Virginia, 

non-constitutional error is harmless '[w]hen it plainly appears

from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the 
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parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial 

justice has been reached.'" Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991) (citation omitted) 

(emphasis in original). Consequently, a criminal conviction 

will not be reversed if "it plainly appears from the record and 

the evidence given at the trial that the error did not affect 

the verdict. An error does not affect a verdict if a reviewing 

court can conclude, without usurping the [finder of fact's] fact 

finding function, that, had the error not occurred, the verdict 

would have been the same." Id. (citation omitted). 

 Insofar as is relevant here, to prove a violation of Code 

§ 18.2-308.2, the Commonwealth must establish that the accused 

was a convicted felon, that the accused possessed an object 

manufactured for the purpose of expelling a projectile by an 

explosion, and that the object was operational as a firearm or 

was readily capable of being made operational. See Gregory v. 

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 393, 400, 504 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1998); 

see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 796, 806-07, 537 

S.E.2d 21, 26 (2000). In his original written statement, which 

had been provided to appellant in discovery and which was 

received into evidence with no objection from appellant, 

appellant conceded he was a convicted felon, that he possessed 

the firearm, and, further, that he knew his status as a 
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convicted felon barred him from doing so.2 Thus, the testimony 

concerning the oral statement made to Call was inconsequential 

to appellant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon. 

 Accordingly, we find that any potential error in admitting 

the testimony of Call pertaining to appellant's oral statement 

was harmless, and we affirm the judgment. See Galbraith v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 734, 742, 446 S.E.2d 633, 638 (1994) 

(harmless error in a trial does not require reversal of the 

judgment).3

 Affirmed. 

 2

 Appellant raises no argument concerning the operability of 

the Ruger pistol. 

3

 In light of our finding of harmless error, we need not 

address whether substantial compliance by the Commonwealth in 

conveying the statement orally to defense counsel, while not 

reducing it to writing, would necessarily require that a trial 

court invoke any of the potential sanctions for discovery 

violations.