69–008 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 115–28 

RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY DIRECTING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO 

TRANSMIT CERTAIN DOCUMENTS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

RELATING TO THE FINANCIAL PRACTICES OF THE PRESIDENT 

MARCH 8, 2017.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

Mr. GOODLATTE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

ADVERSE REPORT 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H. Res. 111] 

[Including Committee Cost Estimate] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the resolution (H. Res. 111) of inquiry directing the Attorney General to 

transmit certain documents to the House of Representatives relating to the financial practices of the President, having considered 

the same, reports unfavorably thereon with an amendment and 

recommends that the resolution not be agreed to. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 2 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 5 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 5 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 5 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 8 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 9 

Committee Cost Estimate ....................................................................................... 9 

Duplication of Federal Programs ............................................................................ 9 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 9 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 9 

Advisory on Earmarks ............................................................................................. 9 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 9 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 9 


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The Amendment 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following: 

That the Attorney General of the United States is directed to transmit, to the extent that such information is in the possession of the Attorney General, (in a manner appropriate to classified information, if the Attorney General determines appropriate) to the House of Representatives, not later than 14 days after the date of the 

adoption of this resolution, copies of any document, record, memo, correspondence, 

or other communication of the Department of Justice, including the Office of Legal 

Counsel, or any portion of any such communication, that refers or relates to— 

(1) any criminal or counterintelligence investigation targeting President Donald J. Trump, National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, Carter 

Page, Roger Stone, or any employee of the Executive Office of the President; 

(2) any investment by any foreign government or agent of a foreign government in any entity owned in whole or in part by President Donald J. Trump; 

(3) President Trump’s proposal to maintain an interest in his business holdings, while turning over day-to-day operation of those interests to his sons Donald J. Trump, Jr., and Eric Trump; 

(4) President Trump’s plan to donate the profits of any foreign governments’ 

use of his hotels to the United States Treasury, including the decision to exclude other payments by foreign governments to any other business holdings of 

the Trump Organization from that arrangement; 

(5) the Foreign Emoluments Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 8) as it may 

pertain to President Donald J. Trump or any employee of the Executive Office 

of the President; and 

(6) any of the following Federal statutes governing conflicts of interest as they 

may pertain to President Donald J. Trump or any employee of the Executive 

Office of the President: 

(A) The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. app. 101 et seq.). 

(B) Section 3110 of title 5, United States Code (concerning employment 

of relatives). 

(C) Section 7342 of title 5, United States Code (concerning receipt and 

disposition of foreign gifts). 

(D) Section 7353 of title 5, United States Code (concerning gifts to federal 

employees). 

(E) Section 201 of title 18, United States Code (prohibiting bribery of public officials). 

(F) Section 208 of title 18, United States Code (prohibiting participation 

by government officials in matters affecting their personal financial interest). 

(G) Section 211 of title 18, United States Code (prohibiting acceptance or 

solicitation to obtain appointive public office). 

(H) Section 219 of title 18, United States Code (prohibiting federal officers and employees from acting as agents of foreign principals). 

(I) Section 1905 of title 18, United States Code (prohibiting disclosure of 

confidential information). 

Purpose and Summary 

On February 9, 2017, Representative Nadler introduced H. Res. 

111, a non-binding resolution of inquiry requesting that the Attorney General of the United States transmit certain documents to the 

House of Representatives related to the financial practices and 

other alleged activities of the President. 

Background and Need for the Legislation 

Resolutions of inquiry, if properly drafted, are given privileged 

parliamentary status in the House. This means that, under certain 

circumstances, a resolution of inquiry can be considered on the 

House floor even if the committee to which it was referred has not 

ordered the resolution reported and the majority party’s leadership 

has not scheduled it for consideration. Clause 7 of Rule XIII of the 

Rules of the House of Representatives requires the committee to 


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1Wm. Holmes Brown, et al., House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures 

of the House ch. 49, § 6, p. 834 (2011). 2 7 Deschler’s Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, H. Doc. No. 94–661, 

94th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 24, § 8. 3 A resolution that seeks more than factual information does not enjoy privileged status. 

Brown, supra note 1, at 833–34. 4 Christopher M. Davis, Congressional Research Service, Resolutions of Inquiry: An Analysis 

of Their Use in the House, 1947–2011 at i (2012). 5 Id. 

6 Id. 

which the resolution is referred to act on the resolution within 14 

legislative days, or a motion to discharge the committee from consideration is considered privileged on the floor of the House. In calculating the days available for committee consideration, the day of 

introduction and the day of discharge are not counted.1

Under the Rules and precedents of the House, a resolution of inquiry is a means by which the House requests information from the 

President of the United States or the head of one of the executive 

departments. According to Deschler’s Precedents, it is a ‘‘simple resolution making a direct request or demand of the President or the 

head of an executive department to furnish the House of Representatives with specific factual information in the possession of 

the executive branch.’’ 2 Such resolutions must ask for facts, documents, or specific information; they may not be used to request an 

opinion or require an investigation.3 Resolutions of inquiry are not 

akin to subpoenas; they have no legal force and thus compliance by 

the Executive Branch with the House’s request for information is 

purely voluntary. 

According to a study conducted by the Congressional Research 

Service (CRS), between 1947 and 2011, 290 resolutions of inquiry 

were introduced in the House.4 Within this period, CRS found that 

‘‘two periods in particular, 1971–1975 and 2003–2006, saw the 

highest levels of activity on resolutions of inquiry’’ and that the 

‘‘Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and the Judiciary 

have received the largest share of references.’’ 5 CRS further found 

that ‘‘in recent Congresses, such resolutions have overwhelmingly 

become a tool of the minority party in the House.’’ 6

A Committee has a number of choices after a resolution of inquiry is referred to it. It may vote on the resolution up or down 

as introduced or it may amend it, and it may report the resolution 

favorably, unfavorably, or with no recommendation. The fact that 

a committee reports a resolution of inquiry adversely does not necessarily mean that the committee opposes looking into the matter. 

In the past, resolutions of inquiry have frequently been reported 

adversely for several reasons. 

H. Res. 111 was introduced on February 9, 2017, by Representative Nadler. It requests that the Attorney General transmit documents to the House related to the financial practices of, and other 

unsubstantiated allegations regarding, the President. Pursuant to 

Rule XIII, the Judiciary Committee was required to act on the resolution within 14 legislative days of February 9th or the Committee 

could have been discharged from its referral of the resolution. Accordingly, the Committee scheduled the resolution for markup February 28, 2017—the Committee’s last scheduled markup within the 

14-day window—in order to preserve the Committee’s referral. 

By scheduling the resolution for consideration in committee, the 

Committee simply followed what has been the practice in the 


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7 Id. at 13. 8 Id. 

9 Committee on the Judiciary Authorization and Oversight Plan for the 115th Congress (February 15, 2017). 10 Id. 11This mishandling of classified information may be in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, 

which criminalizes communicating or transmitting ‘‘information relating to the national defense 

which . . . the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States 

or to the advantage of any foreign nation,’’ or a number of other Federal statutes. The leaking 

of intelligence information for political purposes represents a grotesque breach of the trust the 

American people put in their intelligence agencies and it deserves a robust response. 

House for the last 30 years regardless of which party has been in 

control. Indeed, over the last 30 years, 71 resolutions of inquiry 

have been introduced in the House.7 Of those 71, only two were 

considered on the House floor, but even those two resolutions were 

marked up in committee.8

The Committee reported this resolution of inquiry unfavorably to 

the House, because the resolution is unnecessary, premature, and 

not the best way for the Committee or the House to conduct oversight over the issues covered by the resolution. 

At the Committee’s February 15, 2017, markup, the Committee 

adopted its oversight plan. In that plan, the Committee stated that 

it will ‘‘conduct oversight into allegations of misconduct by Executive Branch officials [and] continue to conduct oversight into allegations of leaks of classified information as well as allegations of improper interference with our democratic institutions or efforts to 

improperly or illegally interfere with our elections.’’ 9 The Committee also pledged to ‘‘investigate any threat to independence or 

efficacy of the Office of Government Ethics.’’ 10 In other words, the 

Committee has committed itself to conduct robust and thorough 

oversight of the Executive Branch. 

In fact, the Committee has already taken action to address some 

of the issues raised in the resolution. For instance, Chairman 

Goodlatte and Oversight and Government Reform Chairman 

Chaffetz have asked the Justice Department’s Inspector General to 

examine allegations of mishandling of classified information.11 In 

addition, Chairman Goodlatte has asked the Justice Department to 

brief the Committee regarding Russia’s alleged interference in the 

U.S. election and any potential ties to President Trump’s campaign. 

The Committee has also sent a letter to the Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation requesting that the FBI proceed with investigations into any criminal conduct regarding these matters. 

Moreover, it is the Committee’s understanding that there is already an investigation underway by U.S. counterintelligence agencies into possible ties between the Russian government and associates of the President. Despite these facts, and the ongoing nature 

of these investigations, Democratic Members of Congress and the 

media continue to press for premature, broad-sweeping action, 

based largely on unfounded allegations. 

The Judiciary Committee strongly believes that these ongoing investigations by the Legislative and Executive Branches should be 

allowed to proceed, as warranted, without outside interference. If 

criminal activity is discovered, it should be investigated and prosecuted with the utmost rigor of the law. However, contrary to the 

intent of this resolution of inquiry, this Committee has long recognized that the FBI and the Justice Department generally do not 

confirm or deny the existence of an investigation and do not comVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:19 Mar 09, 2017 Jkt 069008 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR028.XXX HR028

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ment on ongoing investigations. Indeed, this Committee did not 

weigh in substantively on the FBI investigation of former Secretary 

Hillary Clinton until after FBI Director Comey announced his findings. In the present situation, it is not even clear what crimes have 

allegedly been committed. Rather, much of the basis of this resolution of inquiry seems to be little more than a politically-calculated, 

fishing expedition designed to delegitimize the President, who has 

been in office for all of 5 weeks. 

Furthermore, to be clear, this resolution would have no effect at 

all on the Attorney General’s obligation to produce documents to 

Congress. Resolutions of inquiry are not subpoenas—they have no 

legal force or effect. Rather, this resolution of inquiry if acted upon 

by the House would have no greater legal force than sending the 

Attorney General a letter requesting this information. This resolution is about politics, not information. It is part of a concerted attempt to delegitimize the President. This Committee’s oversight efforts can, and should, be better than that. 

The Judiciary Committee will investigate any credible allegations 

of misconduct by the Executive Branch to the extent such allegations fall within this Committee’s jurisdiction. However, the Committee will not do so through politically-charged resolutions of inquiry that could jeopardize the integrity of the very investigations 

the resolution presupposes. 

Hearings 

The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H. Res. 111. 

Committee Consideration 

On February 28, 2017, the Committee met in open session and 

ordered H. Res. 111 unfavorably reported, with an amendment, by 

a rollcall vote of 18 to 16, a quorum being present. 

Committee Votes 

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the following 

rollcall votes occurred during the Committee’s consideration of H. 

Res. 111. 

1. Amendment #1, offered by Mr. Deutch, to expand the scope of 

the resolution of inquiry to include applicable communications between employees in the Executive Office of the President and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation. The amendment was defeated by 

a rollcall vote of 15 to 18. 

ROLLCALL NO. 1 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) .....................................

Mr. Smith (TX) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) .............................................................. X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 1—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ......................................................

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Poe (TX) ............................................................... X 

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................

Mr. DeSantis (FL) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Roby (AL) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Gaetz (FL) ...........................................................

Mr. Johnson (LA) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Biggs (AZ) ........................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Deutch (FL) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Swalwell (CA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Lieu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Raskin (MD) ........................................................ X 

Ms. Jayapal (WA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Schneider (IL) ..................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 15 18 

2. Amendment #2, offered by Mr. Jeffries, to expand the scope of 

the resolution of inquiry to include information regarding disqualification arising from personal or political relationships as set forth 

in 28 CFR § 45.2. The amendment was defeated by a rollcall vote 

of 15 to 16. 

ROLLCALL NO. 2 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) .....................................

Mr. Smith (TX) .......................................................... X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 2—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................

Mr. Issa (CA) .............................................................. X 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ......................................................

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Poe (TX) ............................................................... X 

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................

Mr. DeSantis (FL) .....................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Roby (AL) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Gaetz (FL) ........................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (LA) .......................................................

Mr. Biggs (AZ) ........................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Deutch (FL) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Swalwell (CA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Lieu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Raskin (MD) ........................................................ X 

Ms. Jayapal (WA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Schneider (IL) ..................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 15 16 

3. Motion to report H. Res. 111 unfavorably to the House. Approved 18 to 16. 

ROLLCALL NO. 3 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) ..................................... X 

Mr. Smith (TX) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 3—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Issa (CA) .............................................................. X 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ......................................................

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Poe (TX) ............................................................... X 

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................

Mr. DeSantis (FL) .....................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Roby (AL) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Gaetz (FL) ........................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (LA) .......................................................

Mr. Biggs (AZ) ........................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Deutch (FL) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Swalwell (CA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Lieu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Raskin (MD) ........................................................ X 

Ms. Jayapal (WA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Schneider (IL) ..................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 18 16 

Committee Oversight Findings 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 


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New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures 

Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this resolution does not provide new 

budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 

Committee Cost Estimate 

In compliance with clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that implementing this non-binding resolution would not result in any significant costs. The Congressional Budget Office did not provide a cost 

estimate for the resolution. 

Duplication of Federal Programs 

No provision of H. Res. 111 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report 

from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to 

section 21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings 

The Committee estimates that H. Res. 111 specifically directs to 

be completed no specific rule makings within the meaning of 5 

U.S.C. § 551. 

Performance Goals and Objectives 

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H. Res. 111 requests 

that the Attorney General transmit certain documents to the House 

of Representatives relating to the financial practices and other alleged activities of the President. 

Advisory on Earmarks 

In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 111 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of Rule XXI. 

Section-by-Section Analysis 

The following discussion describes the resolution as reported by 

the Committee. 

H. Res. 111, a non-binding resolution of inquiry, directs the Attorney General of the United States to transmit certain documents 

and communications to the House of Representatives related to the 

the President. 

Dissenting Views 

To date, the Majority refuses to conduct even basic oversight on 

President Donald J. Trump’s pervasive conflicts of interest, or to 

examine extensive and apparently ongoing ties between the Russian government and the President’s advisers. H. Res. 111 directs 


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1 Christopher M. Davis, Resolutions of Inquiry: An Analysis of Their Use in the House, 1947– 

2011, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, May 15, 2012 (R40879). 2 Id. at 2. 3 House Rule XIII, clause 7. 

4Davis, supra note 1, at 1. 

the Attorney General to provide the House of Representatives with 

information related to these matters so that interested Members 

can conduct their official responsibilities even if the Majority will 

not. By rejecting this resolution, the Majority has abdicated its responsibility to ensure that the White House is not beholden to private interests or a foreign adversary. 

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

Under the rules and precedents of the House, a resolution of inquiry is used to obtain information from the executive branch. A 

resolution of inquiry is directed at the President of the United 

States or the head of a Cabinet-level agency, requesting facts within the control of the executive branch.1 As a ‘‘simple resolution,’’ 

designated by ‘‘H. Res.,’’ a resolution of inquiry does not carry the 

force of law. ‘‘Compliance by the executive branch with the House’s 

request is voluntary, resting largely on a sense of comity between 

co-equal branches of government and a recognition of the necessity 

for Congress to be well-informed as it legislates.’’ 2

House Rules afford resolutions of inquiry a privileged parliamentary status. A Member files a resolution of inquiry like any other 

legislation. The resolution is then referred to the proper committee 

of jurisdiction. If the committee does not report the resolution to 

the House within 14 legislative days of its introduction, however, 

a motion to discharge the resolution from committee can be made 

on the House floor.3 In practice, even when the Majority opposes 

a resolution of inquiry, a committee may mark it up and report it— 

perhaps adversely—to prevent its sponsor from making a privileged 

motion to call up the legislation on the House floor.4

II. SECTION-BY-SECTION EXPLANATION OF H. RES. 111

Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced H. Res. 111 on February 

9, 2017. The resolution directs the Attorney General to transmit to 

the House, not later than 14 days after enactment of the resolution, 

copies of any document, record, memo, correspondence, or other 

communication of the Department of Justice, including the Office 

of Legal Counsel, that refers or relates to: 

(1) Any criminal or counterintelligence investigation targeting 

President Trump, former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, Carter Page, Roger Stone, or 

any employee of the Executive Office of the President; 

(2) Any investment by any foreign government or agent of a 

foreign government in any entity owned in whole or in part 

by President Trump; 

(3) President Trump’s proposal to maintain an interest in his 

business holdings, while turning over day-to-day operation 

of those interests to his sons Donald J. Trump, Jr., and 

Eric Trump; 


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5 Unofficial Tr. of Markup of H.R. 372; H.R. 1215; and H. Res. 111 before the H. Comm. on 

the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Feb. 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) [hereinafter Markup Tr.]. 

(4) President Trump’s plan to donate the profits of any foreign 

governments’ use of his hotels to the United States Treasury, including the decision to exclude other payments by 

foreign governments to any other business holdings of the 

Trump Organization from that arrangement; 

(5) The Foreign Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 

as it may pertain to President Trump or any employee of 

the Executive Office of the President; and 

(6) Any of several Federal statutes governing conflicts of interest as they may pertain to President Trump or any employee of the Executive Office of the President. 

H. Res. 111 expressly permits the Attorney General to transmit 

this information in a classified format if necessary. 

III. NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

H. Res. 111 is a simple request for information from the Department of Justice. By its nature, a resolution of inquiry cannot draw 

conclusions about the Trump Administration. It can only help the 

House of Representatives to obtain documents, correspondence, and 

other communications related to matters properly within the purview of our constitutional mandate to exercise oversight of the executive branch. 

Two areas of concern merit immediate investigation by the Committee. First, President Trump and some of his closest associates 

are tangled in a bizarre set of relationships with the Russian government. Second, President Trump has failed to remove himself 

from his business interests in any meaningful way, likely subjecting himself to liability under a long list of Federal statutes and 

the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the Constitution. H. Res. 111 

would have helped the Committee to begin its investigation of 

these matters. 

As Rep. Nadler stated to the Committee: ‘‘It is unfortunate that 

we must resort to a resolution of inquiry to learn the truth about 

these serious issues; however, the House has, so far, abnegated its 

constitutional responsibility to provide meaningful oversight to the 

Trump administration, and it is time we do our duty.’’ 5 By voting 

to report the resolution unfavorably, the Majority has refused to 

conduct meaningful oversight of President Trump. 

A. President Trump’s connections to the Russian government merit 

immediate investigation. 

H. Res. 111 directs the Attorney General to transmit to the 

House information related to ‘‘any criminal or counterintelligence 

investigation targeting President Donald J. Trump, National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, Paul Manafort, Carter Page, Roger 

Stone, or any employee of the Executive Office of the President.’’ 

The resolution also asks for any information the Department of 

Justice has related to ‘‘any investment by any foreign government 

or agent of a foreign government in any entity owned in whole or 

in part by President Donald J. Trump.’’ These two lines of inquiry 


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6Press Release, Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence on Election Security, Dept. of Homeland Security, Oct. 7, 2016. 7 Background to ‘‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections’’: The 

Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, Office of the Director of Nat’l. Intelligence, Jan. 

6, 2017. 8Markup Tr. (statement of Rep. Steve King). 

9Michael S. Schmidt et al., Trump Campaign Aides Had Repeated Contacts with Russian Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2017. 10 Adam Entous et al., Justice Department warned White House that Flynn could be vulnerable 

to Russian blackmail, officials say, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2017. 11 Id. 12Greg Miller et al., National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian ambassador, despite denials, officials say, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2017. 13Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Flynn Resigns as National Security Adviser, N.Y. TIMES, 

Feb. 13, 2017. 

are designed to help Members further examine one of the more 

troubling aspects of the Trump Administration: the persistent and 

pervasive connections between President Trump and the government of Vladimir Putin. 

1. Trump campaign advisers had repeated contact with Russia—and denied it until they got caught. 

It has been extensively reported that, in the months leading up 

to the recent election, senior Russian officials authorized ‘‘compromises of emails from U.S. persons and institutions,’’ including 

the Democratic National Committee.6 The intelligence community 

has since reached the unanimous conclusion that these actions 

were part of a massive effort to influence the election on behalf of 

President Trump.7

During markup, Rep. Steve King (R-IA) suggested that Members 

should discount this unanimous conclusion because it was reached 

by ‘‘the Obama intelligence community.’’ 8 We note only that President Trump has been in office since January 20, 2017, and that not 

one of the intelligence community components that took part in the 

initial review has since retracted, amended, or otherwise conditioned its assessment of the evidence. 

It has also been reported that senior members of President 

Trump’s presidential campaign have had repeated contacts with 

the Russian government.9 On December 29, 2016, the same day 

that President Obama imposed sanctions on certain Russian officials in response to Russian interference in the presidential campaign, former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn spoke with 

the Russian ambassador to the United States about lifting those 

sanctions once Mr. Trump took office.10 Acting Attorney General 

Sally Yates advised the White House of the content of these conversations before leaving office in January 2017.11

In public—and apparently also in private conversations with Vice 

President Mike Pence—Mr. Flynn flatly denied having any such 

discussions. On February 9, 2017, The Washington Post reported 

that Mr. Flynn had, in fact, discussed lifting sanctions in his conversations with the Russian ambassador.12 Three weeks after the 

White House learned of this duplicity, Mr. Flynn resigned.13 His 

24-day tenure as National Security Adviser is the shortest in the 

history of the office. 

In a separate matter, the Army is investigating whether Mr. 

Flynn received money from the Russian government during a trip 

he took to Moscow in 2015. That payment might violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits 


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13 

14 Id.; see also letter from Ranking Member Elijah Cummings, H. Comm. on Oversight and 

Gov’t. Reform, et al., to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Feb. 1, 2017. 15 Amber Philips, Paul Manafort’s complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, WASH. POST, Aug. 

19, 2016. 16 Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP’s anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, WASH. POST, July 

18, 2016. 17Kenneth P. Vogel et al., Manafort faced blackmail attempt, hacks suggest, POLITICO, Feb. 

23, 2016. 18Ken Dilanian et al., FBI Making Inquiry into Ex-Trump Campaign Manager’s Foreign Ties, 

NBC NEWS, Nov. 1, 2016. 19Michael Isikoff, U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump advisor and Kremlin, YAHOO! 

NEWS, Sept. 24, 2016. 20Former Trump adviser says he had no Russian meetings in the past year, PBS NEWS HOUR, Feb. 15, 2017. 21Steve Reilly, Exclusive: Two other Trump advisers also spoke with Russian envoy during 

GOP convention, USA TODAY, Mar. 2, 2017. 22 ‘‘I am not going to do deny that I talked him. I will say I never met him anywhere outside 

of Cleveland.’’ All in with Chris Hayes, MSNBC, broadcast Mar. 2, 2017 (interview with Carter 

Page). 23Michael S. Schmidt, Intercepted Russian Communications Part of Inquiry into Trump Associates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017. 24 Alexa Ard, Donald Trump ally Roger Stone admits ‘‘back-channel’’ tie to WikiLeaks, 

MCCLATCHY, Oct. 12, 2016. 25Marina Fang, Former Trump Advisor Roger Stone Admits Collusion with WikiLeaks, Then 

Deletes It, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2017. 

retired military officers from receiving payments from a foreign 

government.14

Former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort once worked as 

a pro-Kremlin political consultant in Ukraine.15 He reportedly 

oversaw the softening of the Republican National Committee’s platform on Russia.16 While working for the Trump campaign, he appears to have been the target of a blackmail attempt by a Ukrainian politician—who claimed to have ‘‘bulletproof’’ evidence related 

to certain financial arrangements between Mr. Manafort and 

Ukraine’s former president, pro-Russian strongman Viktor 

Yanukovych.17 The FBI has been investigating his business dealings in Russia and Ukraine for some time.18

According to reports, the FBI has also questioned Carter Page, 

a foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign, for his frequent 

trips to Moscow and alleged contacts with Russian officials subject 

to U.S. sanctions.19 In an interview on February 15, 2017, Mr. 

Page claimed that he had participated in ‘‘no meetings’’ with Russian officials in the past year.20 On March 2, 2017, USA Today reported that both Mr. Page and J.D. Gordon, director of the national 

security advisory committee for the Trump campaign, met with the 

Russian ambassador at the Republican National Convention in 

July 2016.21 Mr. Page admitted his earlier misstatement in an 

interview broadcast later that evening.22

Trump campaign advisor Roger Stone has also been swept into 

these investigations.23 During the campaign, he bragged about 

‘‘back-channel’’ communications with WikiLeaks and appeared to 

know that WikiLeaks would publish emails from Clinton campaign 

chairman John Podesta—emails exfiltrated from the Democratic 

National Committee by Russian state actors—months before those 

emails became public.24 On March 4, 2017, Mr. Stone again 

claimed a ‘‘perfectly legal back channel’’ to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange—and then deleted the statement from Twitter.25

U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions was one of the earliest elected officials to support the candidacy of President Trump. For 

months, Democrats and Republicans alike have called for his 

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26See, e.g., Melanie Mason, GOP Rep. Darrell Issa tells Bill Maher a special prosecutor should 

investigate Russian election interference, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2017. 27See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2. 28Markup Tr. (statement of Chairman Bob Goodlatte). 29 Adam Entous et al., Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he later 

did not disclose, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2017. 30Karoun Demirjian et al., Attorney General Jeff Sessions will recuse himself from any probe 

related to 2016 presidential campaign, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2016. 31Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of 

Trump Associates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2017. 32 Julia Ioffe, The Mystery of the Ukraine Peace Plan, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 20, 2017. 33Michael S. Schmidt et al., Trump Campaign Aides Had Repeated Contacts with Russian Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2017. 34 Jim Sciutto et al., FBI refused White House request to knock down recent Trump-Russia stories, CNN, Feb. 24, 2017. 

tion’s ties to the Russian government.26 At the markup of H. Res. 

111, Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) offered an amendment that 

would have directed the Department of Justice to turn over information related to the regulations governing when it is appropriate 

for the Attorney General to recuse himself.27 Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) spoke in opposition to the amendment, arguing that 

‘‘this is based on nothing more than a supposition that there may 

be something improper there, which could be used to damage the 

administration politically.’’ 28

One day later, The Washington Post reported that then-Senator 

Jeff Sessions ‘‘spoke twice last year with Russia’s ambassador to 

the United States, . . . encounters he did not disclose when asked 

about possible contacts between members of President Trump’s 

campaign and representatives of Moscow’’ during his confirmation 

hearings.29 One day after that, Attorney General Sessions recused 

himself from ‘‘any existing or future investigation involving President Trump’s 2016 campaign.’’ 30 The scope of that recusal may or 

may not be sufficient to address the Attorney General’s personal 

and political ties to the Trump campaign—but the amendment offered by Rep. Jeffries was clearly based on more than just a ‘‘supposition.’’ 

2. Contacts with the Russian government still preoccupy the 

White House. 

Although some of the Trump advisers named in H. Res. 111 have 

been at least temporarily removed from the President’s immediate 

orbit, the Administration’s relationships with the Russian government still preoccupy the White House. For example, Michael D. 

Cohen, President Trump’s private attorney, and Felix Sater, a business associate of the President, are working to bring ‘‘peace’’ to 

Ukraine through a Ukrainian lawmaker associated with former 

campaign manager Paul Manafort.31 The peace plan, which Mr. 

Cohen reportedly hand-delivered to Michael Flynn in the days before his resignation, appears to turn on lifting sanctions on the 

Russian government and recognizing Crimea as part of Russia— 

both to the obvious gain of Vladimir Putin.32

The White House is apparently uncomfortable with reports of 

this nature becoming public. On February 14, 2017, The New York 

Times reported that Trump campaign aides ‘‘had repeated contacts 

with senior Russian intelligence officials in the year before the election.’’ 33 White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus then called FBI 

Director James Comey and FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe 

to ask the Bureau to dispute the report.34 Director Comey rejected 


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35 Id. 36Mike Allen, Exclusive: Spicer arranged CIA, GOP intelligence push-back, AXIOS, Feb. 27, 

2017. 37 Remarks by the Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States, U.S. Dept. of 

Justice, Sept. 6, 1978. 38See Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Communications with the White 

House and Congress, U.S. Dept. of Justice, May 11, 2009. 39 Id. (emphasis added). 40Markup Tr. (statement of Chairman Bob Goodlatte). 41Max Boot, Trump’s Opposition Research Firm: Russia’s Intelligence Agencies, L.A. TIMES, 

July 25, 2016. 

that request, ‘‘because the alleged communications between Trump 

associates and Russians known to US intelligence are the subject 

of an ongoing investigation.’’ 35 It also appears that White House 

Press Secretary Sean Spicer asked both Senator Richard Burr (RNC), Chair of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, and Rep. 

Devin Nunes (R-CA), Chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to discredit these reports.36

At the markup of H. Res. 111, Rep. Ted Deutch (D-FL) offered 

an amendment that would have directed the Department of Justice 

to transmit information related to such communications between 

the White House and the FBI. Every Department of Justice since 

the Carter Administration has had guidelines in place to restrict 

communications between the White House and career investigators 

and prosecutors, ‘‘to insure, to the extent possible, that improper 

considerations will not enter into our legal judgments.’’ 37 Rep. 

Deutch’s amendment makes explicit reference to the standing guidance on this topic, issued on May 11, 2009.38 The sitting Attorney 

General is free to revise or replace this guidance—but Attorney 

General Sessions has not yet done so. 

The 2009 memorandum states: ‘‘The Justice Department will advise the White House concerning any pending or contemplated 

criminal or civil investigations on cases when, but only when, it is 

important for the performance of the President’s duties and appropriate from a law enforcement perspective.’’ 39 Communications between the White House Chief of Staff and the FBI about a pending 

investigation are clearly covered by this guidance. Communications 

between the White House Chief of Staff and the FBI about a pending investigation targeted at associates of the President are inappropriate in almost any circumstance. 

Speaking in opposition to Rep. Deutch’s amendment, Chairman 

Goodlatte argued that the amendment merely attempts to cast ‘‘an 

even wider net in hopes of discovering illicit activity.’’ 40 But Rep. 

Deutch’s amendment was a response to illicit activity—and to behavior that the Majority continues to ignore. By rejecting this 

measure, the Majority joins Attorney General Sessions in refusing 

to take action to preserve the independence and integrity of the Department of Justice. 

3. President Trump appears to have direct and personal connections to the regime of Vladimir Putin. 

Although President Trump denies having any business dealings 

in Russia, multiple news outlets have reported that he ‘‘sought and 

received funding from Russian investors for his business ventures, 

especially after most American banks stopped lending to him following his multiple bankruptcies.’’ 41 Prior to his election, the 

President boasted about meeting with Russian financiers close to 


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42 Jeff Nesbit, Donald Trump’s Many, Many, Many, Many Ties to Russia, TIME, Aug. 2, 2016. 43 Executive Talk: Donald Trump Jr. Bullish on Russia and Few Emerging Markets, ETURBONEWS, Sept. 15, 2016. 44 Aaron Blake, The first Trump-Clinton presidential debate transcript, annotated, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2016. 45Morning Joe, MSNBC, broadcast Dec. 18, 2015. 46 Bill O’Reilly Interviews Trump before Super Bowl LI on FOX, FOXNEWS, broadcast Feb. 5, 

2017. 47 Robin Abcarian, South of the border, Mexicans are puzzled by Trump’s relentless and pointless antagonism, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2017. 48Greg Miller & Philip Rucker, ‘‘This was the worst call by far’’: Trump badgered, bragged, 

and abruptly ended phone call with Australian leader, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2017. 49 Christina Anderson & Sewell Chan, Clashes in Stockholm Suburb Draw Attention to 

Trump’s Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2017. 

Vladimir Putin—stating after one trip to Moscow, ‘‘I have a great 

relationship with many Russians, and almost all of the oligarchs 

were in the room.’’ 42 Donald Trump, Jr., who now runs day-to-day 

business operations for his father’s companies, has discussed the 

organization’s reliance on this source of funding: ‘‘Russians make 

up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets. We 

see a lot of money pouring in from Russia.’’ 43

Throughout the campaign and into his first month of office, 

President Trump has sought to downplay Russian aggression and 

praise Vladimir Putin. For months, even after repeated briefings on 

the subject, the President denied that Russia had attempted to 

hack the Democratic National Committee or influence the election: 

I don’t think anybody knows it was Russia that broke into 

the DNC. [Clinton is] saying Russia, Russia, Russia, but I 

don’t—maybe it was. I mean, it could be Russia, but it 

could also be China. It could also be lots of other people. 

It could also be somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 

400 pounds, okay? 44

In a December 2015 interview with talk show host Joe Scarborough, he defended Putin’s killing of dissident journalists: ‘‘at 

least he’s a leader, unlike what we have in this country.’’ 45 Asked 

a similar question by talk show host Bill O’Reilly in 2017, the 

President responded: ‘‘There are a lot of killers. We have a lot of 

killers. Well, you think our country is so innocent?’’ 46 This odd 

predilection for the Russian autocrat is even more baffling given 

President Trump’s willingness to antagonize longtime allies—like 

Mexico,47 Australia,48 and Sweden 49—for little or no discernable 

reason. 

The President’s erratic statements, his foreign business interests, 

and his decision to surround himself with advisors who have come 

into repeated contact with the Russian government all warrant 

closer examination. H. Res. 111 would have enabled the Committee 

to begin its investigation of these matters in earnest. By rejecting 

the resolution, the Majority has abdicated its responsibility to ensure that the White House is not beholden to a foreign adversary. 

B. President Trump has failed to address his conflicts of interest. 

H. Res. 111 also directs the Attorney General to produce information related to President Trump’s ongoing conflict-of-interest 

problem. The legislation asks for documents and communications 

related to foreign investment in the President’s business interests; 

his proposal to maintain a stake in his business holdings while 

turning over operation of the Trump Organization to his children; 


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50Donald Trump’s New York Times Interview: Full Transcript, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2016. 51 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2017). 52Memorandum, Conflict of Interest and ‘‘Ethics’’ Provisions that May Apply to the President, 

Cong. Research Service, Nov. 22, 2016; see also Letter from Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr., 

H. Comm. on the Judiciary, et al., to Chairman Bob Goodlatte, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 

30, 2016. 53Memorandum for Hon. Kenneth A. Lazarus, Assoc. Counsel to the President, Re: Applicability of 3 C.F.R. Part 100 to the President and Vice President, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 

Dept. of Justice, Dec. 19, 1974, at 3. 54 Id. 55Donald Trump’s News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2016. 56 Id. 57 Jill Disis et al., Trump Organization documents say he has resigned from more than 400 

businesses, CNN MONEY, Jan. 23, 2017. 

his plan to donate the profits of any foreign governments’ use of his 

hotels to the United States Treasury, but not other payments he 

receives from foreign countries; and any discussion or analysis by 

the Department with respect to the Foreign Emoluments Clause or 

a long list of Federal ethics statutes. 

For months, President Trump has argued that ‘‘the president 

can’t have a conflict of interest.’’ 50 Even when read in a favorable 

light, this claim is deeply inaccurate. It is true that Congress has 

exempted the President and the Vice President from one criminal 

statute that otherwise prohibits executive branch employees from 

working on matters in which they might have a financial interest.51 It is also true, however, that a long list of ethics and conflictof-interest laws apply to the office of the President. The Congressional Research Service identified each of the statutes outlined in 

H. Res. 111 as conflict-of-interest rules that apply to President 

Trump.52

Even the mere appearance that the President bases his decisions 

on his own financial interest, rather than on the best interest of 

the nation, erodes the public’s trust in government—whether or not 

the President’s conduct is prohibited by statute. As then-Assistant 

Attorney General Antonin Scalia wrote for the Office of Legal 

Counsel in 1974, although certain ethics rules may not technically 

bind the White House, ‘‘it would obviously be undesirable as a matter of policy for the President’’ to engage in unethical conduct.53 He 

warned: ‘‘Failure to observe these standards will furnish a simple 

basis for damaging criticism.’’ 54

At a January 2017 press conference, President Trump announced: ‘‘I could actually run my business and run government at 

the same time . . . I would be the only one to be able to do that.’’ 55

Nevertheless, the President has handed day-to-day operation of the 

Trump Organization over to his two adult sons, Donald Trump, Jr. 

and Eric Trump. To address concerns about foreign governments 

currying favor with the Administration by doing business with the 

Trump Organization, he plans to donate the profits from the use 

of his hotels by foreign dignitaries to the U.S. Treasury.56 A few 

days later, it was reported that President Trump resigned from the 

management of ‘‘more than 400’’ business entities.57

These attempts to address the President’s conflicts of interest are 

simply inadequate. They do nothing to change his financial interest 

in his businesses, to limit his ability to advise them, or to prevent 

other interests from currying favor with the White House by doing 

business with companies that might benefit the President’s bottom 

line. 


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58 Richard Painter & Norman Eisen, Just when you thought the Trump ethics disaster couldn’t 

get worse, it did, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2017. 59Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Director, U.S. Office of Gov’t. Ethics, Remarks at the Brookings Institution, Jan. 11, 2017. 60Letter from Chairman Jason Chaffetz, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t. Reform, to Walter 

M. Shaub, Jr., Director, U.S. Office of Gov’t. Ethics, Jan. 12, 2017. 61This Week with George Stephanopoulos, ABC NEWS, broadcast Jan. 15, 2017 (remarks of 

Reince Priebus). 62See David J. Barron, Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and 

Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2009). 63 Norman L. Eisen et al., The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and Application to Donald J. Trump, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, Dec. 16, 2016, at 13. 

We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. Richard Painter 

and Norman Eisen, former ethics counsels to Presidents George W. 

Bush and Barack Obama, respectively, describe the President’s ethics plan as ‘‘porous and insufficient.’’ With respect to the plan to 

donate foreign profits from his hotels, they ask: 

[W]hy only hotels? What about foreign sovereign payments 

to buy his condos or apartments, for use of his office buildings or his golf courses, not to mention his massive foreign 

government bank loans, and other benefits? And why only 

profits, when the Justice Department has long held that 

the emoluments clause covers any revenue from foreign 

governments—not simply profits? 58

Director Walter M. Shaub, Jr., head of the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, has expressed similar concerns. Evaluating President 

Trump’s proposal to distance himself from his business holdings, 

Director Shaub concluded that ‘‘the plan does not comport with the 

tradition of our Presidents over the past 40 years’’ and risks ‘‘creating the perception that government leaders would use their official positions for profit.’’ 59

Some in the Majority reacted poorly to this criticism. Rep. Jason 

Chaffetz (R-UT), Chairman of the House Committee on Government and Oversight Reform, accused Director Shaub of ‘‘blurring 

the line between public relations and official ethics guidance,’’ hinting at a congressional investigation into his conduct and threatening to shut down the Office of Government Ethics.60 White 

House chief of staff Reince Preibus later appeared on national television to warn Director Shaub to ‘‘be careful’’ with his comments.61

Director Shaub has served presidents of both parties with distinction for nearly twenty years. We ought to listen to his advice, not 

threaten his office or disparage his reputation. 

As Director Shaub and others have cautioned, President Trump’s 

continued insistence that ethics norms and laws do not apply to his 

office presents a liability to the entire Administration. First among 

these laws is the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the President from receiving anything of 

value from any foreign government without Congressional consent.62 The Foreign Emoluments Clause is a strict and absolute 

rule—it ‘‘operates categorically, governing transactions even when 

they would not necessarily lead to corruption, and establishing a 

clear baseline of unacceptable conduct.’’ 63

Because he has failed to step away from his business holdings in 

any meaningful way, President Trump may have been in violation 

of the Foreign Emoluments Clause from the moment he took his 

oath of office. For example, President Trump sought and received 


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64Franklin Foer, Putin’s Puppet, SLATE, July 4, 2016; Tom Hamburger et al., Inside Trump’s 

Financial Ties to Russia and His Unusual Flattery of Vladimir Putin, WASH. POST, June 17, 

2016. 65 Caleb Melby et al., When Chinese Bank’s Trump Lease Ends, Potential Conflict Begins, 

FORBES, Nov. 28, 2016. 66 Id. 67 Jonathan O’Connell, Conservative groups, foreign leaders flock to Trump’s D.C. hotel, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2016. 68Paulina Firozi, Report: Embassy of Kuwait moves major event to Trump’s DC hotel, THE

HILL, Dec. 12, 2016. 69 Eisen, supra note 63. 70Letter from Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr., H. Comm. on the Judiciary, et al., to Chairman Bob Goodlatte, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 30, 2016. 

funding for his business from Russian financiers.64 This fact would 

be cause for concern in any respect, given the conclusion of the intelligence community that Russia worked to sway the recent election in President Trump’s favor. If still ongoing, these financial ties 

also represent foreign emoluments. 

The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China—which is owned 

by the People’s Republic of China—is the largest tenant in Trump 

Tower.65 It is also a major lender to the Trump Organization. Its 

lease is slated to end in October 2019.66 The bank’s rental payments, its ongoing extension of credit to the President’s business, 

and any financial benefit that may accrue to President Trump during renegotiation of the lease also constitute foreign emoluments. 

Foreign diplomats and other representatives of foreign governments have moved their business to the President’s Washington, 

D.C. hotel.67 At least one report suggests that a foreign embassy 

was pressured to move their event to the Trump property.68 Even 

without an element of coercion, payments by foreign diplomats for 

lodging, meeting space, and food at the hotel are also emoluments 

received in violation of the Constitution. 

In the context of private business, these transactions may be entirely legitimate. For the President of the United States, however, 

they present an inescapable conflict of interest—shading many of 

his decisions with questions about personal enrichment and foreign 

entanglement. This erosion of trust ‘‘is exactly what the Emoluments Clause is meant to head off at the pass.’’ 69

The Framers of the Constitution created an explicit role for Congress in the enforcement of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Our 

Committee oversees the Ethics in Government Act, the Office of 

Government Ethics, and matters of criminal and constitutional law. 

It is our responsibility to investigate the President’s apparent conflicts of interest. H. Res. 111 would have helped us to obtain basic 

information related to these troubling reports. By voting to dispose 

of the resolution, the Majority has failed in its responsibilities in 

this area as well. 

C. The Majority has refused to conduct even basic oversight of 

President Trump. 

It is not surprising that the Majority voted to adversely report 

this simple request for information. 

On November 30, 2016, every Democratic Member of the House 

Judiciary Committee wrote to Chairman Goodlatte to request hearings on ‘‘the federal conflict-of-interest and ethics provisions that 

may apply to the President of the United States.’’ 70 We took note 

of President Trump’s repeated insistence that the President cannot 

have a conflict of interest—and enclosed a long list of Federal ethVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:19 Mar 09, 2017 Jkt 069008 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR028.XXX HR028

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71 Id. at 2. 72Letter from Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr., H. Comm. on the Judiciary, et al., to Chairman Robert Goodlatte, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2017. 73 Id. at 2. 74 Unofficial Tr. of Markup of Authorization and Oversight Plan; H.R. 985; H.R. 906,before the 

H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 15, 2017 (statement of Chairman Robert Goodlatte). 75 Id. 76 Id. (amendment offered by Rep. Jamie Raskin). 77 Id. (amendment offered by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee). 78 Id. (amendment offered by Rep. Eric Swalwell). 79Markup Tr. (statement of Chairman Bob Goodlatte). 80 Id. (remarks of Rep. Darrell Issa). 81 Id. (remarks of Chairman Bob Goodlatte). 

ics and conflict-of-interest statutes that, in fact, apply to the President.71 To date, we have received no reply to this letter. 

On January 24, 2017, every Democratic Member of the House Judiciary Committee again wrote to the Chairman, insisting that ‘‘the 

Committee hold hearings on President Trump’s conflicts of interest, 

at home and abroad, in possible violation of federal law.’’ 72 Citing 

to the analysis of legal experts across the political spectrum, we 

showed that ‘‘[t]he Administration’s attempts to address its ongoing 

conflict of interests are, so far, wholly inadequate.’’ 73 To date, we 

have received no reply to this letter either. 

On February 15, 2017, at a markup of the Committee’s annual 

oversight plan, Chairman Goodlatte announced that he had ‘‘requested, for the benefit of the full committee, a briefing by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the 

matter involving Mr. Flynn in the White House, both what took 

place and how that that was leaked.’’ 74 To date, no such briefing 

has been scheduled. 

At that same February 15 meeting, the Committee considered 

several amendments to the Committee’s annual oversight plan. 

One amendment offered by Chairman Goodlatte, as subsequently 

amended by Rep. David Cicilline (D-RI), stated the Committee’s intention to conduct oversight into allegations of misconduct by executive branch officials and to continue oversight into allegations of 

foreign interference with Federal elections.75 We took this initial 

step as a positive sign. The Majority then proceeded to reject 

amendments that would have focused the Committee’s attention on 

a number of urgent matters—including enforcement of the Foreign 

Emoluments Clause,76 allegations of contact between the Russian 

government and the Trump campaign,77 and the specific conclusion 

of the intelligence community that the Russian government engaged in a massive effort to influence the presidential election in 

favor of President Trump.78

At the markup of H. Res. 111, Chairman Goodlatte argued that 

he planned to send, ‘‘along with any willing members of this committee, a letter requesting that the Attorney General proceed with 

investigations into any criminal conduct involving these matters.’’ 79 Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA) argued that, although he could 

not support the resolution, ‘‘there is a letter that is in draft form 

that I have already looked at and made comments on that asks for 

information and cooperation by the Attorney General.’’ 80 As more 

in the Majority indicated their support for this letter, the Chairman assured the Committee that he would send the letter ‘‘this 

week.’’ 81 To date, no such letter has been shared with the Minority 

or sent to the Department of Justice. 


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82 Id. (remarks of Rep. Matthew Gaetz). 83 Id. (remarks of Rep. David Cicilline). 

IV. CONCLUSION

In debate over H. Res. 111, Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) suggested 

that the resolution was unnecessary because ‘‘[w]e have already, as 

the Judiciary Committee, amended our oversight plan to include a 

thorough review of that which is under our jurisdiction relating to 

the executive branch.’’ 82 As Rep. Cicilline pointed out, ‘‘the adoption of that oversight plan mandates that we begin the work of 

doing oversight, and this resolution of inquiry is the first step: to 

gather information, to ask questions.’’ 83

The Committee must begin the work of doing oversight. We have 

reasoned with our colleagues in the Majority, we have written letters, and we have offered H. Res. 111. We are not deterred by the 

Majority’s reluctance to do the hard work of holding this Administration accountable for its actions. We will look for every opportunity to persuade them to join us in our efforts. 

Nevertheless, when given the opportunity to ask the Department 

of Justice for information about the Trump Administration’s ties to 

Russia and the President’s refusal to address his conflicts of interest, the Majority has looked the other way. These matters have the 

potential to do real and lasting harm to our democracy. If the crisis 

comes, when the damage is done, the Majority will be every bit as 

complicit as President Trump. 

MR. CONYERS, JR. MR. NADLER. 

MS. LOFGREN. 

MS. JACKSON LEE. 

MR. COHEN. 

MR. JOHNSON, JR. 

MR. DEUTCH. 

MR. GUTIERREZ. 

MS. BASS. 

MR. RICHMOND. 

MR. JEFFRIES. 

MR. CICILLINE. 

MR. SWALWELL

MR. LIEU

MR. RASKIN

MS. JAYAPAL

Æ 


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