J-S50035-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.I.L., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF J.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 732 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001289-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002627-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.J.G.-L., JR., 

A MINOR 

APPEAL OF J.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 736 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001291-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002628-2014
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IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.R.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 737 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001294-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002626-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.L., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF J.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 738 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001295-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002630-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.J.L, A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 739 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001305-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002629-2014
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BEFORE: PANELLA, MOULTON, and RANSOM, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 27, 2017

J.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees and orders dated and 

entered on January 20, 2017, granting the petitions filed by the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (“DHS” or the “Agency”), seeking to 

involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her six children, R.I.L. (“Child

1”), a female born in December of 20091; R.J.G.-L., Jr. (“Child 3”), a male 

born in April of 2011; Q.R.B. (“Child 4”), a female born in January of 2009;

Z.L. (“Child 5”), a female born in October of 2012; and Z.J.L. (“Child 6”), 

Child 5’s twin brother,2(collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and change 

the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.3 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 DHS also sought the termination Mother’s parental rights to Q.J.B.-L.

(“Child 2”) a female born in June of 2006, and a goal change to adoption for 

Child 2. Child 2 was reunified with her father, G.G., on October 20, 2016, 

however, so DHS withdrew its petitions at the evidentiary hearing on 

January 20, 2017. N.T., 1/20/17, at 4-11. Mother inadvertently filed an

appeal from the termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child 2 and the 

goal change for that child, which was assigned our Docket No. 735 EDA 

2017. On April 3, 2017, Mother filed a praecipe to discontinue the appeal, 

and this Court discontinued the appeal on that same date. A c c o r d i n g l y , 

this Memorandum will discuss Mother’s appeals with regard to her other five

children.

2 See N.T., 1/20/17, at 93-94.

3 On January 20, 2017, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the 

father of Child 4, A.F.B. At the hearing on January 20, 2017, R.J.G.-L., III 

a/k/a R.L., Sr. a/k/a R.L., consented to the voluntary termination of his 

parental rights to his children, Child 1, 3, 5, and 6. N.T., 1/20/17, at 105. 

In separate decrees entered on January 20, 2017, the trial court terminated 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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'

The trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history 

of this appeal as follows.

The family in this case became known to DHS on October 21,

2014, when DHS received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) 

report alleging that Mother was not appropriately supervising 

Children. The report alleged that Mother left Children

unattended home alone for over an hour; the [m]other admitted 

to leaving the children home alone at 3 pm that day while she

went to pick up paperwork; and that [C]hildren were seen

banging on a window in the home, so Philadelphia police were

called. The report also alleged that the police arrested Mother

upon her return home, and Children were taken to home of

Paternal Grandmother (“PGM”). On October 22, 2014, Mother

was arrested and charged with five counts of endangering the

welfare of children where a parent, guardian, or other

custodian commits the offense and recklessly endangers

another person. Mother pleaded guilty. The Honorable Patrick

Stack issued a stay-away order against Mother as to Child 1,

Child 3, Child 4, Child 5, and Child 6. Also on October 22,

2014, DHS visited PGM’s home and learned of her grandparent 

status to Child 1, Child 3, Child 5, and Child 6. DHS

implemented a Safety Plan to ensure that Children were safe,

with their needs being met; and PGM agreed to notify DHS if

Mother attempted to remove Children from the home. PGM

indicated that Children were unkempt when they came to her;

that Child 4 had been wearing underwear belonging to maternal

grandmother; that Child 3 had not been wearing any

underwear; and that Child 5 and Child 6 were not wearing 

diapers. PGM expressed interest in kinship care services[,]

and DHS completed clearances for her and her daughter,

paternal aunt. DHS also learned that Child 2 had been residing

with maternal great-aunt (“MGA”') at the time of the incident. 

A stay-away order had been issued against Mother as to

Children. On November 6, 2014, DHS visited Child 2 in MGA’s

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the parental rights of any unknown father of the Children. On March 10, 

2017, the trial court confirmed the consent of R.J.G.-L. to the termination of 

his parental rights. Neither A.F.B. nor R.J.G.-L., nor any unknown father has 

filed an appeal, nor is any such individual a party to the present appeal. 
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. home[,] and Child 2 appeared well and her needs were being

met. MGA requested temporary legal custody (“TLC”), after

which DHS conducted clearances of MGA and approved her as 

caregiver for Child [2]. On November 6, 2014, DHS also 

obtained an Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) for Children.

On November 7, 2014, a shelter care hearing was held during 

which the OPC was lifted and the temporary commitment to

DHS was ordered to stand. Mother was referred to the

Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for forthwith drug and alcohol 

screens and dual diagnosis assessment. On November 25,

2014, Children were adjudicated dependent and fully

committed to DHS. The [c]ourt ordered that a Single Case Plan 

(“SCP”) meeting be held within twenty days and Mother was

referred to the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) program 

for all appropriate services. Mother was also referred to the

CEU for assessment, a forthwith drug screen, and dual

diagnosis to include alcohol. The [ c ]ourt also ordered a Parent 

Locator Search (“PLS”) to be conducted as to fathers for Child 2

and Child 4. Mother tested positive at the CEU for 

tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”). On February 17, 2015, this

matter was continued. On March 5, 2015, the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha

(

[“]APM[”]) created an SCP for the family. Mother’s objectives 

were to attend ARC, to attend visitation with Children, and to

comply with [ c ] ourt orders and attend the CEU. On April 14,

2015, a permanency review hearing was held[,] at which the

[ c ] ourt ordered that Children remain committed to DHS. The

[ c ]ourt noted that Mother was substantially compliant with

the permanency plan. Mother was again referred to the CEU

for a forthwith drug screen, three random screens, and dual 

diagnosis assessment and monitoring. Mother tested positive

for barbiturates at the CEU. On July 8, 2015, this matter was

continued. At the permanency hearing on September 30, 2015, 

the Master noted that Mother was fully compliant with the 

permanency plan. Mother was ordered to comply with scheduled 

CEU assessments and to comply with all SCP objectives and 

recommendations. At a permanency hearing on November 24,

2015, the [ c ] ourt found that Mother was moderately 

compliant with the permanency plan and ordered that[,] if

Mother’s drug screens are negative, she may have weekly 

unsupervised visits at the agency. The [ c ] ourt also ordered 

that if Mother had any trace of illegal substances, she would 

only be allowed supervised weekly visits in the community. In
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addition, if Mother did not comply with her intake at Guadenzia,

visits would also change from unsupervised to supervised. At a

different permanency review hearing on February 23, 2016, the

[c]ourt found that Mother was substantially compliant with the

permanency plan and Mother was referred to the CEU for an

assessment, dual diagnosis, and a forthwith drug screen to

include five random drug screens and to ARC for job training. 

On May 27, 2016, this matter was continued. Mother was 

referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug screen, dual diagnosis

and three random drug screens before the next court date. On

June 6, 2016, APM revised Mother’s SCP to add appropriate 

housing. At a permanency hearing on August 30, 2016, Mother

was referred to the CEU for a dual diagnosis and forthwith screen

with three random drug screens and Mother was ordered to 

engage in a domestic violence program and to be referred to

ARC for services. Mother was also to have weekly supervised

visits with Children in the community. On October 27, 2016,

APM revised Mother’s SCP objectives which added that Mother 

was to attend weekly supervised visits with Children; to

continue to comply with mental health, behavioral health, and 

medical needs; to locate appropriate housing; to comply with

CEU orders; to make her whereabouts known to DHS; to

comply with CUA services and interventions, to attend ARC; and 

to comply with alcohol treatment at Guadenzia. At different 

permanency hearings, the trial court always found reasonable 

efforts on the part of DHS. Mother has been moderately 

compliant with the permanency plan and has not successfully 

completed her parental objectives.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 2-4 (citations omitted).

On December 28, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children and to change their permanency 

goal to adoption. On January 20, 2017, the trial court held an evidentiary 

hearing on the petitions for termination of parental rights and goal change. 

Following argument, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to 

Children, except Child 2, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b), and changed the goal to adoption.
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On January 23, 2017, the trial court granted Attorney Hayburn’s

motion to vacate his appointment as counsel for Mother, and appointed 

Attorney James Martin to represent Mother. On February 17, 2017, Mother 

filed a notice of appeal from the decrees entered on January 20, 2017 

terminating her parental rights to the Children, and the permanency review 

orders entered on January 20, 2017, changing the permanency goal for the 

Children to adoption, along with concise statements of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court, acting

sua sponte, consolidated Mother’s appeals on April 11, 2017.

In her brief on appeal, Mother raises two issues, as follows:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental 

rights of Appellant, Mother, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 

subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and § 2511(a)(8)?

2. Whether the Trial Court erred by finding, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b), that termination of Appellant's parental rights best 

serves the Children’s developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare?

Mother’s Brief, at 5.4

____________________________________________

4 Mother has waived any challenge to the change in the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 by failing to raise the 

issue in her concise statement and Statement of Questions Involved in her 

brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 

A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues 

that are not raised in both his concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal and the Statement of Questions Involved in his brief on appeal). 
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Mother argues that DHS presented insufficient evidence for the trial 

court to terminate her parental rights under section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

(8), and (b). Mother’s Brief, at 8. 

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 

608 Pa. 9, [19], 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual 

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. 

Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) 

(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also 

Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 

455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 

647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 

28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could 

support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 
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error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In 

re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). We will focus on section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide, in 

relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows.

As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds 

for termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by 

clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . . 

This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2): 

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, 

can seldom be more difficult than when termination is 

based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, 

however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded 

that a parent who is incapable of performing parental 

duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to 

perform the duties. 
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In re Adoption of J.J., [511 Pa. 599, 605,] 515 A.2d 883, 891 

(Pa. 1986) (quoting In re: William L., [477 Pa. 322, 345,] 383 

A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make 

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected 

as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

With regard to section 2511(a)(2), Mother argues that the trial court 

erred when it concluded that DHS presented clear and convincing evidence 

that she is presently incapable of providing proper care for the Children. 

Mother’s Brief, at 12. Mother asserts that she has remedied the conditions 

that brought the Children into care and that she is capable of parenting them 

at this time. Id. at 13.

The trial court provided the following analysis:

The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2). This section of the Adoption Act 

includes, as a ground for involuntary termination of parental 

rights, the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 

refusal of the parent that causes the child to be without essential 

parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being; and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent. This ground is not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. It may include acts of refusal to perform parental 

duties, but focuses more specifically on the needs of the child. 

Adoption of C.A.W., 683 A.2d 911, 914 (Pa. Super. 1996).
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The five Children were taken into DHS custody because Mother 

was unable to provide essential parental care: she was not 

properly supervising the Children and admitted to leaving them 

home alone for over an hour; she was then arrested and charged 

with endangering the welfare of children, to which she pleaded 

guilty; she had substance abuse problems; she did not have 

adequate housing for her and the Children; she was 

unemployed; and the Children were unkempt, Child 4 was 

wearing maternal grandmother’s underwear and Children 5 and 

6 were not wearing diapers when removed from Mother’s home. 

Mother did not successfully complete her SCP objectives. Mother 

has not completed a drug and alcohol program and only reenrolled with Gaudenzia in October 2016 after having been 

discharged for noncompliance during the summer of 2016. (N.T. 

1/20/17, pgs. 17, 19-20, 36, 42). Mother relapsed twice during 

the life of the case, testing positive for benzos, opiates, and 

more recently cocaine. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 17-18, 20, 92-93). 

Mother admitted that she suffers from depression, and also 

testified that she was not engaged in mental health treatment 

even though she was ordered to do so multiple times by the 

court. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 54, 86-87). Mother did obtain 

employment. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 39-40). Mother, however, 

testified that her new employment prevented her from appearing 

at recent court ordered CEU drug screens. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 

36-37, 51). Mother completed housing at ARC. Mother does not 

have appropriate housing, and has not made any efforts to 

obtain appropriate housing at any point during the life of the 

case. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 22, 36). Mother resides in a bedroom 

within a family friend’s house. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 22). Mother 

also completed parenting classes in March 2016. (N.T. 1/20/17, 

pgs. 38-40). However, the case manager testified that Mother 

cannot protect or properly care for the Children at this time. 

(N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 68). Mother’s visits with the Children have 

been sporadic; Mother attends approximately two out of four 

visits in a month. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 23, [42]). Mother had 

unsupervised visits at one time, but visits were changed to 

supervised when she tested positive on a CEU drug screen. 

(N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 22). Mother has failed to take affirmative 

steps to place herself in a position to parent the five Children. 

The five Children need permanency, which Mother cannot 

provide. Therefore, DHS met its burden under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511(a)(2)[,] and termination of Mother’s parental rights under 

this section was proper.
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Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 10-11.

After a careful review of the record, we find that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children was warranted pursuant to section 

2511(a)(2), as Mother clearly lacks parental capacity, and the evidence 

showed that she will be unable to remedy that situation within a reasonable 

period of time, if ever. As there is competent evidence in the record that 

supports the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, we would 

find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children under section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 

A.3d at 826-27.

Next, this Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental 

rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant 

to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 

(Pa. Super 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of 

termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as 

follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare 

of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

[533 Pa. 115, 121, 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court 

held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” 

requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the 

parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 
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discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

With regard to its analysis of the Children’s best interests and the 

effect of severing any bond between the Children and Mother, the trial court 

stated the following: 

The court heard testimony that none of the Children would suffer 

permanent or irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 29-30, 66-67). The Children 

have been in care for twenty-six months and need permanency. 

Child 4 is currently placed with MGA, who has cared for Child 4 

since coming into care. Child 4 is bonded with MGA and sees her 

as the primary parental figure. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 28-29). The 

court heard testimony that adoption of Child 4 by MGA is in Child 

4’s best interests. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 29). Children 1, 3, 5, and 

6 are currently placed with the paternal aunt who has cared for 

them for the last two years. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 64). These 

Children consider the paternal aunt as their mother and 

caregiver. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 64). The court heard testimony 

that adoption would be in the best interests of these Children. 

(N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 67-68). The conditions that led to all five 

Children’s removal from Mother’s care continue to exist as 

Mother failed to complete all her SCP objectives. The testimony 

of the DHS witness was unwavering and credible. Mother is not 

ready or able, as of the date of the termination trial, to parent 

the Children. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 68). The record contains clear 

and convincing evidence that termination was in the best 

interests of the Children[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 14-15.

After a careful review of the record, we find that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children was warranted pursuant to section 

2511(b), as the evidence showed that the Children’s developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare will best be met by the termination of 
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Mother’s parental rights. Further, the evidence showed that there is no bond 

between Mother and the Children that is worth preserving. 

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation 

and make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . 

where direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child 

is not necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this 

analysis: 

concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply 

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only 

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the 

dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be 

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, 

after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through 

the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . . 

Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between 

[the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, 

to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological 

aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the

development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional 

health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs 
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of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary 

termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where 

placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A] 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child 

is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s 

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted). It is well-settled that “we will 

not toll the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re 

Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 

732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on 

hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.”)).

As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial 

court’s findings and credibility determinations, we would find no abuse of the 

trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children 

under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. We, 

therefore, affirm the trial court’s decrees terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children, and the orders changing the Children’s permanency 

goal to adoption. 

Decrees and orders affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
J-S50035-17

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/27/2017