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Review of the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons' Contraband Interdiction 

Efforts 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-05 June 2016 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY* 

Introduction 

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) faces the persistent problem of 

contraband smuggling. The introduction of contraband can pose grave dangers to 

BOP staff and the approximately 200,000 federal inmates in BOP custody, as well 

as to visitors and the public. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted 

this review to examine the BOP's security procedures to interdict contraband. We 

also interviewed representatives from selected state prison systems regarding their 

contraband interdiction strategies and staff search policies and procedures. 

Contraband is defined in 28 C.F.R. § SOO.l{h) as prohibited materials "which 

can reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or adversely affect the 

security, safety, or good order of the institution." Such items include weapons, 

drugs, currency, tobacco, telephones, and electronic devices. According to BOP 

data, cell phones were the most common type of contraband recovered from fiscal 

years (FY) 2012 through 2014. An inmate with a cell phone, particularly a 

smartphone, can carry out criminal activities undetected, including threatening and 

intimidating witnesses, victims, and public officials, and coordinate escape 

attempts. The BOP reports that over 8,700 cell phones were recovered during this 

period, 2,012 more than the next most common contraband type, weapons. The 

data shows that while cell phone recoveries decreased slightly during this period, 

recoveries of other contraband, such as weapons, narcotics, and tobacco, increased 

significantly. However, as described below, we have concerns about the 

completeness of the BOP's data. 

Results in Brief 

The BOP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Contraband Tracking Capability 

We found that the BOP lacks a comprehensive contraband tracking system, 

and current data collection methods impede its ability to effectively track 

contraband recoveries and analyze contraband trends. The BOP has taken steps to 

automate data collection on contraband recoveries, such as by implementing 

TRUINTEL, a data base for entering information associated with inmate 

investigations, including contraband recoveries. However, BOP staff told us 

TRUINTEL was not designed to be a comprehensive contraband tracking system. 

We found that TRUINTEL does not provide a complete picture of contraband 

recoveries because certain contraband may not be entered and multiple contraband 

items may be entered as only one item. We also found that automated log books 

used to document contraband recovered during unit searches are not linked to 

* The full version of this report contains information that the Federal Bureau of Prisons 

considered to be law enforcement sensitive, and therefore could not be publicly released. To create 

this public version of the report, the Office of the Inspector General redacted (blacked out) portions of 

the full report. 

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TRUINTEL. With regard to cell phones, TRUINTEL does not capture all data 

available through the other methods the BOP uses to track recovered cell phones, 

including both the BOP's unit log books and its "Cell Phones Recovered" reports. 

Unlike TRUINTEL, the "Cell Phones Recovered" reports include all phones 

confiscated, regard less of whether the phones are attributed to an inmate; 

however, these reports lack details that make duplicative entries in TRUINTEL 

unidentifiable. 

The BOP Did Not Effectively Implement Its 2013 Staff Search Policy to Deter Staff 

Introduction of Contraband 

In a January 2003 report, the OIG recommended that the BOP revise its staff 

search policy to require searches of staff and their property when entering 

institutions. After more than 10 years of negotiation with its union, the BOP 

implemented a new staff search policy in 2013. However, in June 2015, just prior 

to the completion of our fieldwork for this review, the Federal Labor Relations 

Authority ordered the BOP to cease and desist using the 2013 staff search policy 

following a union challenge to it. 1 The BOP then reinstated the policy on March 28, 

2016 with minor changes not relevant to this review. As a result, more than 13 

years after our 2003 report, the BOP still has no comprehensive and effective staff 

search policy. 

We found significant deficiencies with the 2013 policy and its implementation. 

The policy provided that all staff and their belongings could be searched randomly 

or based on reasonable suspicion when entering, reentering, or inside an institution 

or on its grounds. 2 However, the policy did not prescribe any required frequency 

for conducting random pat searches, resulting in what we found to be infrequent 

staff pat searches of varying duration. It also allowed staff to possess and use 

within institutions items, such as tobacco, that are prohibited for inmates. 

Additionally, despite the BOP concurring in 2003 with the OIG's recommendation 

that it restrict the size and content of personal property that staff may bring into 

institutions, the 2013 policy contained no· such restrictions. The policy further 

permitted staff to return to their vehicles to store contraband that had been 

identified during front lobby screening procedures, unless doing so would jeopardize 

the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or public safety. Finally, the 

policy did not ensure that only trained and supervised staff was assigned to front 

lobby positions, and we found that at some institutions entry-level Information 

Receptionists were assigned to these positions. Our research also indicated that 

the staff search policies governing state prison systems are often more strict in 

many of these areas. The safety and security of staff and inmates will continue to 

1 The results of this review are based on our analysis of activities and events prior to the 

BOP's June 30, 2015, cease and desist order affecting the 2013 staff search policy. 

2 As part of the BOP's staff entrance procedures, all staff must undergo daily electronic 

searches of their person (via walk-through or handheld metal detector) and their belongings (via x-ray 

screening). 

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be at risk until the BOP develops and implements a comprehensive and effective 

staff search policy. 

The BOP Has Deployed New Technologies to Detect Contraband, but More 

Operational Guidance and Training Are Needed to Maximize Security 

The BOP has installed and is piloting several new contraband interdiction 

devices throughout its institutions, including new walk-through metal detectors. 

However, we found that the BOP should improve the guidance it provides staff to 

ensure consistent operations of these devices. For example, the BOP is installing 

whole-body scanners, known as SecurPASS, which can detect objects concealed in 

anterior and posterior body cavities. However, we found that some institution staff 

are unclear about BOP olicies on the use of SecurPASS's 

Incorrect implementation of the when the officer and inmate are of different 

genders is particularly problematic because it can affect the BOP's compliance with 

the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. Further, we found that some operators of 

SecurPASS were unaware of the prohibition on inmates viewing their images, which 

can compromise security operations. We also found discrepancies in training 

materials provided to staff operating new contraband interdiction devices that could 

lead to procedural errors, such as improper scanning procedures. 

Deficiencies with the BOP's Cellular Telephone Laboratory Reports May Adversely 

Affect the Timeliness of Administrative Proceedings against Inmates 

The BOP's Cellular Telephone Laboratory (Lab) assists institution 

investigators in identifying inmates involved with contraband by conducting forensic 

examinations of recovered cell phones. We found that the BOP has taken steps to 

clarify the Lab's mission and improve its operations. However, we also found that 

the utility of the Lab's reports was often hampered by repetition - for some 

reports, repetitive entries made u.p as much as 40 percent of the report - and 

extensive technical jargon. Further, neither BOP managers nor Lab analysts knew 

how investigators use the Lab reports to further an investigation. 

Deficiencies within the BOP's Security Camera System Adversely Affect 

Administrative and Criminal Proceedings against Staff and Inmates 

video camera system, including 

blind spots known to 

inmates and staff. These deficiencies significantly limit the effectiveness of the 

system and a~t the safety and security of staff and inmates, as 

evidenced by-or complaints in 2013 and 2014 that the OIG was 

unable to pursue solely due to the absence These 

deficiencies also affect the BOP's ability to take administrative action against staff 

and inmates involved in contraband introduction, and further reduce the BOP's 

ability to deter contraband introductions. 

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Recommendations 

In this report, we make 11 recommendations to the BOP to improve its 

ability to interdict contraband introductions and to ensure the safety and security of 

staff, visitors, and inmates. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 

Background ........................................................................................ 1 

Prior OIG Report on BOP Contraband ...................................................... 7 

BOP Policy on Searching Staff for Contraband .......................................... 8 

Scope and Methodology of the OIG Review ............................................ 11 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW ............................................................................ 12 

The BOP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Contraband Tracking 

Capability ......................................................................................... 12 

The BOP Did Not Effectively Implement Its 2013 Staff Search Policy 

to Deter Staff Introduction of Contraband ............................................. 16 

The BOP has Deployed New Technologies to Detect Contraband, 

but More Operational Guidance and Training Are Needed to Enhance 

Security ........................................................................................... 31 

Deficiencies with the BOP's Cellular Telephone Laboratory 

Reports May Adversely Affect Timeliness of Administrative Proceedings 

against Inmates ................................................................................ 39 

Deficiencies within the BOP's Security Camera System 

Adversely Affect Administrative and Criminal Proceedings against 

Staff and Inmates .............................................................................. 42 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 45 

Conclusion ........................................................................................ 45 

Recommendations ............................................................................. 47 

APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW ....................................... 49 

Document Review .............................................................................. 49 

Data Analysis .................................................................................... 49 

Interviews ........................................................................................ 52 

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Site Visits and Demonstrations ............................................................ 52 

APPENDIX 2: BOP POLICIES GOVERNING SEARCHES OF VISITORS, 

INMATES, AND STAFF ............................................................ 53 

Visitor Searches ................................................................................ 53 

Inmate Searches ............................................................................... 55 

Staff Searches ................................................................................... 57 

APPENDIX 3: BOP CONTRABAND DETECTION DEVICES ................................. 59 

Walk-through Metal Detectors ............................................................. 59 

............................................ 61 

.................................................................... 62 

..................................................................... 63 

Managed Access System ..................................................................... 63 

APPENDIX 4: TRUINTEL DATABASE ENTRIES AND CELL PHONES RECOVERED 

REPORT EXAMPLES ................................................................ 67 

TRUINTEL Database Example .............................................................. 67 

Cell Phones Recovered Report Example ................................................. 68 

APPENDIX 5: THE BOP'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT .......................... 69 

APPENDIX 6: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP'S RESPONSE .................................. 73 

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INTRODUCTION 

Background 

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), like most prison systems, faces the 

persistent problem of contraband smuggling into its institutions.3 There are 

countless ways in which contraband items are smuggled into prisons, and strategies 

and methods are ever changing, with inmates seeking security vulnerabilities and 

adapting their criminal activities to exploit weaknesses. For example, a 2014 Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG) report on the BOP's use· of x-ray machines described 

an incident involving an inmate warehouse worker who attempted to introduce 

contraband concealed in cereal boxes into a high security institution.4 In addition, 

recent media reports involving state and federal prison systems have cited inmate 

workers, "throw-overs" (contraband items thrown over a prison fence), staff 

walking through an institution's front lobby with contraband hidden in or on their 

person or in a container, and even flying drones carrying contraband over prisons. 5 

The introduction of contraband into BOP institutions hinders the BOP's mission of 

providing a safe, secure environment and poses grave dangers to the 

approximately 200,000 federal inmates in BOP custody, as well as staff, visitors, 

and the public. 

We analyzed BOP contraband recoveries from fiscal years (FY) 2011 through 

2014, although as described below, in many instances we were able to obtain 

reliable data only for FYs 2012 through 2014; and we assessed BOP policies, 

procedures, and technologies for screening staff, visitors, and inmates for 

contraband at BOP-managed institutions. In the following sections, we describe 

contraband as defined in federal statute and BOP policy; discuss the particular 

threat of cell phones as dangerous contraband; describe previous OIG work related 

to contraband in BOP institutions; and explain BOP staff, visitor, and inmate search 

policies. 

3 "Institution" is defined in 28 CFR § 500.1(d) as a U.S. Penitentiary, Federal Correctional 

Institution, Federal Prison Camp, Federal Detention Center, Metropolitan Correctional Center, 

Metropolitan Detention Center, U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Federal Medical Center, or 

Federal Transportation Center. 

4 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' September 

2011 Procurement of X-ray Equipment under Contract GS-07F-0182T, Audit Report 14-27, Redacted 

for Public Release (June 2014). 

5 Examples: U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of Illinois, "Federal Inmate Pleads Guilty 

to Bribing Prison Guard," FBI Press Release, October 07, 2011; Harrison Cahill, "Drone Smuggling 

Prompts Thermal Surveillance Cameras at Columbia, S.C. Prison," Government Technology, 

December 12, 2014, http:/ jwww .govtech.com/public-safety/Drone-Smuggling-Prompts-ThermaiSurveillance-Cameras-at-Columbia-SC-.html (accessed November 25, 2015). 

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Defining Contraband 

Federal statute and regulations define contraband as "material prohibited by 

law, or by regulation, or material which can reasonably be expected to cause 

physical injury or adversely affect the security, safety, or good order of the 

institution. "6 "Prohibited objects" include weapons, explosives, drugs, intoxicants, 

currency, cameras, recording equipment, telephones, radios, pagers, electronic 

devices, and any other objects that violate criminal laws or are prohibited by 

federal regulations or BOP policies. 7 

Federal regulations and BOP policies further define different contraband types 

as "hard" or "dangerous" and "nuisance" or "soft." Hard contraband is "any item 

which poses a serious threat to the security of an institution and which ordinarily is 

not approved for possession by an inmate or for admission into the institution"; this 

includes weapons, intoxicants, and currency. 8 The BOP specifically defines tobacco 

products and paraphernalia as both "dangerous contraband" and "prohibited 

objects" due to their potential value to inmates who are prohibited from using them 

in BOP institutions. 9 Nuisance contraband is "any item other than hard contraband 

... whose possession is prohibited when it presents a threat to security or its 

condition or excessive quantities of it present a health, fire, or housekeeping 

hazard."10 Nuisance contraband includes inmate personal property that is not 

permitted into an institution or sold in the commissary, or has been altered. BOP 

policy describes permissible and non-permissible inmate personal property items 

and delegates to Wardens the authority to further define inmate personal 

property. 11 

Federal statutes prescribe criminal penalties for providing or possessing 

contraband in prison. 12 Federal statutes authorize BOP officers or staff to arrest an 

individual who provides, or attempts to provide, contraband to an inmate or who 

introduces contraband into an institution. However, BOP policy states that in 

6 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(h). 

7 Prohibited objects are defined in 28 C.F.R. § 511.12(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d)(1). 

"Prohibited activities," addressed in 28 C.F.R. § 511.11, include any activities that could jeopardize the 

BOP's ability to ensure the safety, security, and orderly operation of BOP facilities and to protect the 

public, whether or not such activities are criminal in nature. Prohibited activities include introducing, 

or attempting to introduce, prohibited objects. 

8 28 C.F.R. § 553.12(b)(1). 

9 BOP Program Statement 5510.15, Searching, Detaining, or Arresting Visitors to Bureau 

Grounds and Facilities (July 17, 2013), 5, and BOP Program Statement 3740.01, Staff Entrance and 

Search Procedures (July 17, 2013), 5. 

10 28 C.F.R. § 553.12(b)(2). 

11 BOP Program Statement 5580.08, Inmate Personal Property (August 22, 2011). 

12 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (contraband), 18 U.S.C. § 930 (firearms and dangerous weapons in 

fed era I facilities). 

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practice, such arrests occur only when dangerous contraband is involved and there 

must be a "deliberate attempt" to introduce contraband with the intent to provide it 

to an inmate. 13 

BOP Data on Contraband 

According to BOP data, cell phones were the most common hard contraband 

items recovered in BOP institutions from FY 2012 through FY 2014 (8,728 according 

to the BOP's "Cell Phones Recovered" report, 5, 734 according to the BOP's 

TRUINTEL database). 14 Also, weapons (6,716); narcotics, including marijuana, 

heroin, and cocaine (3,713); and tobacco (1,797) were among the hard contraband 

items most commonly recovered within BOP institutions. 15 BOP data also shows 

that weapons, narcotics, and tobacco recoveries have increased in recent years, 

while cell phone recoveries appear to have dropped. See Figure 1. 

13 BOP Program Statement 3740.01 (July 17, 2013), 23, reinstated with minor changes 

effective March 28, 2016. We discuss the reinstated policy in the \\BOP Policy on Searching Staff for 

Contraband" section below. 

14 The BOP uses two methods to track cell phones: \\Cell Phones Recovered" reports and its 

TRUINTEL database. The Cell Phones Recovered reports include all cell phones recovered on, in, or 

around secure and non-secure institutions. The BOP's TRUINTEL database includes those cell phones 

attributed to inmate investigations. The total number of cell phones recovered during this period is 

not cumulative; both methods represent separate cell phone recovered counts. We utilized both data 

sources because the BOP does not have a consolidated tracking system for all contraband recovered in 

its institutions. We discuss the BOP's tracking of contraband later in this report. 

15 TRUINTEL reflects both institutions and camps. On average, camps account for 24 percent 

of the top four contraband finds, according to BOP TRUINTEL data. 

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Figure 1 

Hard Contraband Recoveries, FY 2012 to FY 2014 

4,000 

3,500 

3,000 

2,500 

2,000 

1,500 

1,000 

500 

0 

± 

2012 2013 2014 

Narcotics 993 1,154 1,566 

---Tobacco 575 f 509 713 

Weapons 2,289 2,017 _I_ 2,410 >-

- Cell Phones (Recovered 3,506 2,860 

f 

2,362 l Report) 

- Cell Phones (TRUINTEL) 1,970 T 1,981 1,783 

Notes : The OIG did not attempt to verify the BOP's data in this figure. Additionally, we were unable 

to present FY 2011 data in this report because the numbers that the BOP provided to us did not 

reflect a complete year of BOP-wide data collection and were therefore artificially low. These low 

numbers of recovered contraband in FY 2011 were likely attributable to the BOP's beginning to 

replace its Automated Intelligence Management System with TRUINTEL in 2010 and the fact that not 

all institutions were utilizing TRUINTEL until FY 2011 or later. We discuss contraband recoveries from 

FY 2012 through FY 2014 later in this report. 

Sources: TRUINTEL data (cell phones, weapons, narcotics, tobacco) and Cell Phones Recovered 

reports (cell phone data only) from FY 2012 through FY 2014. 

According to BOP data as shown in Figure 1, recoveries of weapons increased 

by 121 since FY 2012, a 5.3 percent increase. Also, aggregate narcotic recoveries 

increased 57.7 percent, from a low of 993 in FY 2012 to a high of 1,566 in FY 2014. 

In addition, despite the BOP's policy prohibiting inmate possession of tobacco in any 

form, tobacco and related product recoveries have also increased since FY 2012. 

Tobacco recoveries increased 24 percent, from a low of 575 in FY 2012 to a high of 

713 in FY 2014- a total of 1,797 recorded tobacco products recovered during that 

3-year period. However, as we discuss later in this report, the BOP data reflecting 

lower numbers of recovered contraband types may under-represent the true 

amount recovered, due in part to BOP policies and practices of inputting data into 

TRUINTEL. 

Contraband Cell Phones Present a Significant Threat inside and beyond BOP 

Institutions 

While the BOP's Cell Phones Recovered reports indicate a decrease in the 

number of cell phone recoveries from FYs 2011 through 2014 (discussed below), 

cell phones have remained, since FY 2012, one of the most prevalent dangerous 

contraband items the BOP recovers. An inmate's use of a contraband cell phone 

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can create security and safety concerns both within and beyond the institution's 

secure perimeter. An inmate with a cell phone, particularly a smartphone, can 

carry out criminal activities undetected, including threatening and intimidating 

witnesses, victims, and public officials and coordinating contraband smuggling and 

escape attempts. In February 2013, a BOP Correctional Officer at the Metropolitan 

Detention Center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, was shot and killed while driving home 

from the facility in what authorities believe was inmate-involved retaliation related 

to his investigations into cell phone smuggling. 16 Similar incidents have occurred in 

state prisons in recent years. 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that in the 

3 years prior to FY 2011, cell phones recovered in BOP institutions increased, from 

1,774 in FY 2008 to 3,684 in FY 2010. 17 BOP officials cited in the GAO's report 

attributed the increase in recovered contraband cell phones during that period to 

greater access to small, cheap phones; more stringent search procedures by staff; 

and better awareness and intelligence collection by staff. The GAO found that the 

BOP and selected states had taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in 

their facilities, but recommended that the BOP evaluate existing cell phone 

detection and disabling technologies. 18 The BOP's Cell Phones Recovered reports -

the same source used by the GAO - show that recovered cell phones at both 

secure institutions and camps declined in the 3 fiscal years following the GAO's 

report, from a high of 3,506 in 2012, to 2,362 in 2014 (see Figure 2). 19 As further 

illustrated in Figure 2, on average, cell phone recoveries from camps are nearly two 

times more likely than recoveries from higher security institutions. 

16 On January 28, 2015, a federal grand jury in the District of Puerto Rico returned a sixcount indictment against nine individuals for the murder of Correctional Officer (Lieutenant) Osvaldo 

Albarati-Casanas. United States v. Magaly Gonzalez-Montijo, Case No. 3:13-CR-166-01 (JAG) 

(D.P.R.); see also Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Juan Division, "Nine Individuals Indicted for 

the Murder of an Officer and Employee of the United States," Press Release, January 30, 2015, 

http://www. fbi .gov /sanjuan/press-releases/20 1 5/ni ne-i ndividuals-indicted-for-the-m urder-of-anofficer-and-employee-of-the-unjted-states (accessed December 10, 2015). 

17 The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 criminalized providing or possessing cell phones in 

prison, punishable by fine and up to 1-year imprisonment, and mandated that the GAO study related 

issues. 

18 GAO, Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone 

Detection, GAO 11-893 (September 2011). For the public version of this report, see GAO, Reports 

and Testimonies, http://www.gao.qoy/docsearch/repandtest.html (accessed December 10, 2015). 

19 According to the BOP, minimum security institutions, also known as camps, are work and 

program oriented, have a low staff-to-inmate ratio, and limited or no perimeter fencing. When 

compared to higher security institutions, camps have more open access to third parties. 

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4,000 

3,500 

3,000 

2,500 

2,000 

1,500 

1,000 

500 

0 

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Figure 2 

Cell Phones Recovered in BOP Institutions and Camps 

FYs 2011 to 2014 

3,506 

J,26I • Institutions 2,860 

2,423 2,362 • Camps 

2,050 Total 

1,649 

-,--L---

2011 2012 2013 2014 

Note: Institutions include those at the administrative, high, medium, and low security level 

institutions. Camps include federal prison camps (FPC) and satellite camps, which are minimum 

security institutions. The BOP has seven FPCs throughout the United States. 

Source: BOP Cell Phones Recovered reports for FYs 2011-2014. The figure does not include cell 

phone data from TRUINTEL as it is not as comprehensive as the Cell Phones Recovered reports. 

We discuss tracking cell phone data later in this report. 

Despite the recent decline, cell phones have remained, since FY 2012, one of 

the most prevalent dangerous contraband items the BOP recovers, according to 

BOP data. With 214,149 federal prisoners in FY 2014, this data shows that the BOP 

is recovering contraband cell phones equal to 1.1 percent of the total inmate 

population each year. We note that TRUINTEL and Cell Phones Recovered reports 

represent only contraband items that BOP staff has recovered within BOP 

institutions and recorded in one of the two databases. In fact, the actual number of 

overall contraband items, including cell phones in BOP institutions nationwide, is a 

larger, unknown number. BOP officials acknowledge that the BOP does not have a 

comprehensive contraband tracking system to effectively assess detection 

programs and interdiction methods, as we discuss further below. 

States Are Addressing Cell Phones as a Contraband Threat 

State prisons have begun addressing contraband cell phones through a 

variety of means, including cell phone detection canines; cell phone detection 

devices and metal detectors; increased searches of inmates, visitors, and staff; 

heavy-duty fence netting; thermal sensor cameras; and legislative solutions to 

invoke greater penalties for contraband cell phones. Additionally, some states have 

installed Managed Access Systems (MAS), which detect unauthorized cell phone 

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signals and prevent those phones from sending and receiving calls, data, and text 

messages. In 2010, Mississippi became the first prison to install a MAS, followed 

in subsequent years by South Carolina. California, Texas, and Maryland have also 

tested a MAS solution. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

reported that an 11-day test of its MAS in 2011 detected 2,593 unique wireless 

devices and blocked over 25,000 unauthorized communication attempts (calls, 

texts, emails, Internet connections), or on average 2,500 per day. The California 

Council on Science and Technology (Council), however, questioned the efficacy of 

the testing and MAS solution. 20 The Council cautioned that MAS technology testing 

has been limited in scope and scale that has not taken into account the 

complexities of interference from the prison environment or its surrounding 

locale. The Council recommended that alternative technical and non-technical 

options for mitigating contraband cell phones be considered. 

Prior OIG Report on BOP Contraband 

In January 2003, we issued a report detailing what the BOP could do better 

to stem the flow of illegal drugs into its institutions. 21 While the focus of that report 

was on interdicting drugs, many of those findings applied to the BOP's interdiction 

of all contraband types. For example, we found that the BOP had not taken 

adequate measures to prevent drug smuggling by its staff and had not used 

interdiction measures, such as searching staff and limiting the personal property 

staff may bring into the institution, a finding that would apply similarly to a wide 

range of contraband that could be smuggled into institutions. We made 

15 recommendations to improve the BOP's drug interdiction efforts. We continued 

to monitor the BOP's actions and eventually closed all the recommendations from 

our 2003 report except one concerning the searching of staff and their property. 22 

Also, in June 2014, the OIG issued an audit of the BOP's procurement of 

x-ray equipment to assess the effectiveness and use of the x-ray machines. 23 We 

ipentified a number of concerns, including the ability, of pallet x-ray machines to 

assist with scanning for and detecting contraband items prior to moving goods from 

the warehouse into secure areas of BOP institutions. In addition, while inmates are 

required to work if they are medically able, in doing so they can create areas of risk 

in the BOP's overall security process. For example, we found that inmate laborers 

20 The California Council on Science and Technology, The Efficacy of Managed Access Systems 

to Intercept Calls from Contraband Cell Phones in California Prisons (May 2012), 2. 

21 DOJ OIG, The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Drug Interdiction Activities, Evaluation and 

Inspections Report I-2003-002 (January 2003). 

22 DOJ OIG, Drug Interdiction Activities, p. 27, Recommendation 6 states: "The Director, 

BOP, should implement a policy requiring searches of staff and their property when entering 

institutions. In addition to manual searches, the BOP should consider using ion spectrometry and all 

other available technology when searching staff." 

23 DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' September 2011 Procurement of X-ray 

Equipment under Contract GS-07F-0182T, Audit Report 14-27 (June 2014). 

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could view the x-ray pallet monitors, thereby increasing the potential that they may 

identify and exploit scanning process weaknesses. We found similar deficiencies 

with BOP screening personnel actively showing inmates their scanned images, an 

issue we discuss in more detail later in this report. We made seven 

recommendations in that audit report to the BOP, including a recommendation 

related to the placement of detection technology monitors out of the view of 

inmates. In November 2013, before the audit report was published and prior to our 

initiation of this review, the BOP issued a memorandum mandating that units (x-ray 

machines) be positioned so that inmates cannot view keyboards, monitors, and the 

operator's station while the actual screening is taking place. 24 

BOP Policy on Searching Staff for Contraband 

In the 13 years since we issued our January 2003 report, the BOP has 

implemented a number of changes to its security protocols, policies, and 

contraband detection mechanisms. In November 2007, the BOP and its union 

agreed to begin requiring staff to successfully clear a metal detector device before 

entering a BOP institution. 25 Nearly 6 years later, in July 2013, the BOP issued a 

new staff search policy. 26 The policy provided that all staff and their belongings 

(including bags, boxes, vehicles, containers in vehicles, jackets or coats, etc.) could 

be searched before entering, reentering, and while inside BOP institutions or 

grounds. Such searches could occur randomly (i.e., not based on any particular 

suspicion that a staff member is attempting to bring a prohibited object into a BOP 

institution), or based on reasonable suspicion. The policy provided for electronic, 

pat, and visual searches as well as drug testing. Search procedures under the 2013 

policy differed by institution security level. 27 The BOP also installed new contraband 

24 Judi Simon Garrett, Assistant Director, Information, Policy, and Public Affairs Division; 

Frank Strada, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division (CPO); Newton Kendig, Assistant 

Director, Health Services Division; W.F. Dalius, Jr., Assistant Director, Administration Division, 

Memorandum for All Wardens, Guidance Regarding Use of Warehouse Pallet Scanners, November 8, 

2013. 

25 See Appendix 2 for more information on the 2007 agreement and associated guidance 

memoranda. 

26 BOP Program Statement 3740.01, Staff Entrance and Search Procedures (July 17, 2013). 

This policy is based on 28 C.F.R. Part 511, Subpart B, Searching and Detaining or Arresting NonInmates. "Non-inmates" are defined in Part 511 as all individuals who wish to enter, or are present 

inside a BOP facility or grounds, other than inmates in BOP custody. However, the BOP tailored its 

staff search policy to apply only to BOP employees and Public Health Service officers assigned to the 

BOP ("staff"). The BOP addresses search procedures for all other "non-inmates" in a separate visitor 

search policy, Program Statement 5510.15, Searching, Detaining, or Arresting Visitors to Bureau 

Grounds and Facilities (July 17, 2013). The issuance of the 2013 staff search policy effectively 

rescinded the 2007 agreement and associated 2008 memoranda. 

27 At low security and higher (including administrative) institutions, all staff and their 

belongings were required to clear the entrance procedures described below before entering. At 

minimum security institutions and non-secure confines of low security and higher institutions (e.g., 

buildings outside the secure confines), random entrance searches could be conducted as deemed 

necessary by the Warden or Camp Administrator. 

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detection devices such as enhanced walk-through metal detectors (WTMD) and 

SecurPASS and Millimeter Wave Scanner (MWS) whole body imaging devices 

(discussed later in this report). 

At the conclusion of our fieldwork for this review, we met with three BOP 

Assistant Directors to discuss our preliminary findings. During this meeting, the 

Assistant Directors informed us that in June 2014, the Council of Prison Locals had 

challenged five proposals within the BOP's 2013 staff search policy, including the 

use of staff random pat searches, as not having been "fully negotiated" prior to 

implementation.28 In April 2015, the Federal Labor Relations Authority upheld the 

union's challenge to the staff search policy and required the BOP to: (1) meet and 

bargain with the union over the policy; (2) cease and desist from enforcing or 

implementing the policy until negotiations are completed; (3) hold in abeyance any 

investigation or disciplinary actions until negotiations are complete; and ( 4) adjust 

certain language referencing the Code of Federal Regulations to more accurately 

reflect the scope of its negotiations with the union. 

In the wake of this ruling, on June 30, 2015, the BOP rescinded the 2013 

staff search policy and reinstated the 2007 agreement between the BOP and union, 

and three associated guidance memoranda while the policy was renegotiated. 

Then, in response to a working draft of this report, the BOP notified the OIG that 

re-negotiation of the policy was completed on February 12, 2016. On March 28, 

2016, the BOP reinstated the staff search policy with three minor changes not 

relevant to this review. 29 

The 2013 staff search policy addressed various search methods for staff and 

their belongings. Below we discuss each of the search types covered in the 2013 

policy. 

Electronic Searches 

The 2013 policy required that all staff members be electronically searched 

using a walk-through or handheld metal detector, and that their belongings pass 

through an x-ray screening device. 

28 In addition to random pat searches, the other four issues that were challenged and 

ultimately determined not to have been fully negotiated were those dealing with reasonable suspicion 

searches, ion spectrometry searches of staff using assistance devices, random vehicle searches, and 

radiation exposure badge issuance. 

29 BOP Program Statement 3740.02, Staff Entrance and Search Procedures (March 28, 2016). 

The three changes to the reinstated staff search policy were: (1) the word "non-inmate" was changed 

to "Bureau staff and/or Public Health Officer"; (2) standard language was added regarding institution 

supplements being appropriate only if local changes are made to implement the policy; and 

(3) language was added to clarify that radiation exposure badges should be used in accordance with 

national BOP policy. 

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The policy also required BOP screening staff to 

apply the "reasonable assurance" standard (see text 

box). Non-supervising screening staff may initially 

determine whether reasonable assurance exists in 

each situation; if so, entry is permitted without 

delay. Screening staff are to consult their supervisor 

only if they cannot discern, with reasonable 

assurance, the origin of the item causing a metal 

detector alert. Failure to clear the handheld metal 

detector could qualify as reasonable suspicion, 

warranting a "limited" pat or visual search (described 

below). 

Pat Searches 

The 2013 staff search policy provided that 

staff and their belongings could be pat searched 

either randomly or upon reasonable suspicion, but 

"Reasonable Assurance" 

Required 

"In every search situation, BOP 

screening staff must be reasonably 

assured that persons entering secure 

confines do not possess prohibited 

objects. 'Reasonably assured' does 

not mean 'absolutely certain.' 

Rather, it is a decision-making 

standard that realistically balances 

the need to preserve institution 

safety and security with the need to 

allow persons to enter secure 

confines as quickly as possible to 

perform their duties." 

Source: BOP Program Statement 

3740.01 

did not prescribe "any required frequency for conducting authorized random pat 

searches." Screening staff may determine that reasonable suspicion exists if, for 

example, a screened employee is unable to clear the metal detector. In such 

cases, a "limited" pat search of the alerting area may be conducted with the 

Warden's authorization. 30 Pat searches of a staff member's person or belongings 

are defined in the 2013 policy as a BOP screening person pressing his or her hands 

on the outer clothing or outer surface of belongings to determine whether 

prohibited objects are present. Pat searches of a staff member's person are to be 

conducted out of the view of others using privacy screens, and performed by sa megender screening staff whenever possible. 

Visual Searches 

. . 

Under the BOP's 2013 staff search policy, visual searches of staff members' 

persons were permitted if based on reasonable suspicion and authorized by the 

Warden or a designee. Under the policy, visual searches of a staff member's 

person must always be based on reasonable suspicion, authorized by the Warden or 

a designee, and conducted in a private screening area by a same-gender staff 

member. Visual searches of a staff member's person involve removing all articles 

of clothing, including religious headwear, to allow a visual (non-tactile) inspection of 

the person's body surfaces and cavities. With regard to staff members' belongings, 

under the BOP's 2013 staff search policy, visual searches could be conducted either 

randomly or with reasonable suspicion. A visual search of a person's belongings 

involves opening and exposing all contents for visual and manual inspection. 

30 Pat searches can be "limited," meaning that the pat search is limited to the alerting area as 

a result of failing to clear a metal detector or other concern raised by the screening staff officer. 

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We discuss the electronic, pat, and visual searches, as well as a BOP training 

video on how to conduct pat searches, in more detail later in this report. See 

Appendix 2 for more information about BOP policies and procedures for visitor, 

inmate, and staff searches to prevent contraband from entering BOP institutions. 

Scope and Methodology of the OIG Review 

This review examined the BOP's historical, existing, and planned policies, 

procedures, and devices for screening staff, visitors, and inmates for contraband at 

BOP-managed institutions. 31 Our fieldwork occurred from October 2014 through 

June 2015 and consisted of document reviews, data analysis, interviews, site visits, 

and observations. 32 We analyzed BOP contraband recoveries from fiscal years 

(FY) 2011 through 2014 and how the BOP collects and analyzes contraband data. 

We analyzed BOP-reported data on random pat searches conducted since 

implementation of the July 2013 policy. We also evaluated the BOP's use of 

contraband detection devices and focused on those devices installed in institutions' 

front lobby and receiving and discharge areas. We interviewed BOP officials in the 

Central Office, institution staff, and the BOP's Council of Prison Locals (the union); 

OIG Special Agents; and representatives from seven state prison systems about 

their contraband interdiction strategies, including staff searches, tobacco policies, 

and size and type restrictions of staff personal property. See Appendix 1 for more 

information about the OIG's methodology. 

The results of this review are based on our analysis of activities and events 

prior to the BOP's June 30, 2015, cease and desist order affecting the 2013 staff 

search policy and subsequent reinstatement of the policy on March 28, 2016. 

31 We did not evaluate policies and procedures for screening staff, visitors, and inmates for 

contraband at privately owned contract prisons or non-secure BOP institutions (i.e., prison camps), 

although our data analysis includes cell phones found at prison camps. Additional information about 

BOP policies on visitor and inmate searches is contained in Appendix 2. 

32 As part of our continued monitoring of the actions the BOP took in response to the 

recommendations in our 2003 report, we conducted research into the staff search policies of selected 

state prisons as well. 

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RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

The BOP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Contraband Tracking Capability 

Despite the BOP's use of TRUINTEL starting in FY 2010 and other BOP efforts 

involving tracking contraband recoveries, we found that the BOP does not have a 

comprehensive data collection capability that reliably accounts for all contraband 

recovered. To the contrary, we found that the BOP does not accurately track 

recovered contraband items within its institutions for several reasons. Below we 

present the contraband data the BOP was able to provide from FYs 2012 to 2014, 

followed by a discussion of some of the shortcomings in the BOP's practices for 

tracking contraband recoveries that led us to question the reliability of this data. 

BOP Contraband Recovery Data 

BOP contraband data provided to us focused on nine types of hard, or 

dangerous, contraband items recovered in BOP institutions between FYs 2012 and 

2014. 33 According to the BOP's TRUINTEL data, these nine contraband types 

accounted for over 21,000 items recovered in BOP institutions during that time (see 

Table 1). Recorded recoveries of these nine contraband types from FY 2012 to 

FY 2014 increased nearly 9 percent, for an annual average of 7,009 items. 

Table 1 

Contraband Recovered in BOP Institutions 

As Reflected in Its TRUINTEL Database, FY 2012 to FY 2014 

Types FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 

Electronic Devices (includes 

cell phones) 2 381 2,340 

Weapons 2,289 2,017 

Narcotics 993 1,154 

Tobacco 575 509 

Alcohol 436 325 

Tools 216 171 

Currency 35 37 

Ammunition 8 9 

Firearms 1 3 

Total 6,934 6,565 

Note: The OIG did not attempt to verify the BOP's data in this table. 

Source: The BOP's TRUINTEL database 

2 181 

2.410 

1,566 

713 

391 

220 

32 

11 

3 

7.527 

Totals 

6,902 

6,716 

3,713 

1,797 

1,152 

607 

104 

28 

7 

21,026 

33 The BOP classifies contraband into multiple types and related sub-types for tracking 

purposes. We focused our analysis on these nine types of contraband due to their dangerous nature. 

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BOP officials told us that the increase in the numbers of contraband 

recovered within BOP institutions could be attributed to a number of factors. For 

example, the Assistant Director for the Program Review Division (PRO) said that in 

FY 2010, the BOP began replacing its Automated Intelligence Management System 

with TRUINTEL- a database available to all BOP institutions into which staff enters 

recovered contraband items associated with inmates for use in furthering 

investigative actions - and staff members are entering more contraband 

recoveries. 34 Additionally, two BOP Assistant Directors attributed the increase to 

sound correctional techniques, such as consistent inmate cell and unit searches, 

and also cited new and improved detection technologies such as SecurPASS. 

BOP officials told us that TRUINTEL was not designed to be a comprehensive 

contraband tracking system, though they stated that it enables institution staff to 

see related incidents, including contraband-related incidents at BOP institutions. 

TRUINTEL also has a feature called 

The BOP Does Not Accurately Track Recovered Contraband 

Variations in the BOP's data collection methods impede its ability to 

effectively track contraband. For example, neither federal regulations nor BOP 

policies differentiate contraband categories based on an institution's security level 

or where in the institution the item was recovered, yet we found considerable 

variation in and tice on how such recoveries were entered into 

TRUINTEL. 

TRUINTEL. BOP Intelligence management officials 

told us that institution SIS officers have discretion over how to classify contraband 

items based on where they were found, and whether to enter certain contraband 

items into NTEL. For exam when items are recovered in 

there is no established and 

consistently followed policy on how SIS officers are to enter the contraband into the 

34 Although the BOP initiated TRUINTEL in FY 2010, BOP officials told us that not all 

institutions were utilizing TRUINTEL until FY 2011 or later. Our review did not assess TRUINTEL prior 

to FY 2011, and we did not assess procedures associated with the BOP's Automated Intelligence 

Management System. Accordingly, we did not present FY 2011 data in this report. 

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TRUINTEL database. 37 Although one Central Office official told us that the BOP 

considers cell hones to be hard contraband 

might be categorized instead as 

stated, cell phones discovered in would most likel be classified as 

hard contraband, but some cell phones recovered in 

could be considered nuisance contraband and therefore may not be recorded in 

TRUINTEL. This discrepancy would result in an underreporting of recovered 

contraband in TRUINTEL. 

. Of the seven institutions in our sample, 

staff at only four told us they enter both hard and nuisance contraband recoveries 

into the TRUINTEL data~ether the contraband is attributed to 

an inmate or recovered-· 

During our review of the TRUINTEL database, we found contraband 

incorrectly tracked under other su item listin s. 39 For example, we found cell 

phones entered under the sub-type and not the 

specific applicable sub-type item within the item 

type. Additionally, BOP Intelligence staff told us that when multiple items are 

recovered together, they would enter all items into a single category under one 

TRUINTEL line item. For example, an officer who finds a cell phone charger, 

subscriber identity module (SIM) card, sharp metal stake, and tobacco product at 

the same location may combine them as one entry into any one of the several item 

types and sub-types. Therefore, in this example, the BOP would not have an 

accurate accounting of all contraband recovered by type. 

We also found confusing and incomplete data entries in TRUINTEL with 

inconsistent references to where and by whom contraband was recovered. Some 

entries do not identify where in the institution the item was recovered, but rather 

the location from which the item was subsequ~ed fo~sing. 

Other entries also did not accurately list the"-' or"-" 

source or sometimes these data fields were left blank. For example, in one~' 

the data field was blank; however, when we reviewed the"-

data field, it listed the inmate's name, Federal Register Number, and 

noted that the contraband item was hidden in an inmate's locker. Adding to the 

37 

38 In response to a working draft of this report, the BOP stated that this statement does not 

reflect the position of the agency and that they will issue guidance to staff regarding data collection for 

all contraband at all security levels, . 

39 

Narcotics. 

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and 
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confusion, this entry further stated that the contraband was recovered from the 

Lieutenant's office. 

To track contraband cell phone recoveries, the BOP uses two methods: 

TRUINTEL and Cell Phones Recovered reports (see Appendix 4 for examples). 

While both TRUINTEL and the reports track 

cell phone recoveries, only TRUINTEL lists the 

additional details surrounding each recovery, 

such as where and who recovered a cell 

phone within the institution. While this may 

help institutions to target their detection 

efforts, the Cell Phones Recovered reports 

provide a more complete count of the 

number of contraband cell ones because 

th 

However, the 

reports lack details about the recoveries that 

make duplicative entries in TRUINTEL 

unidentifiable. When comparing cell phone 

data contained in each source, TRUINTEL 

identified 5, 734 cell phones recovered from 

FY 2012 through FY 2014. However, the Cell 

Phones Recovered reports over the same 

Tracking Contraband Cell Phones 

The BOP uses two methods to 

track cell phones: Cell Phones 

Recovered reports and its TRUINTEL 

database. The Cell Phones Recovered 

include all 

The BOP's 

TRUINTEL database includes only 

those cell phones attributed to inmate 

investigations. The total number of 

cell phones recovered during this 

period is not cumulative; both 

methods represent separate cell phone 

recovered counts. We utilized both 

data sources because the BOP does 

not have a consolidated tracking 

system for all contraband recovered in 

its institutions. 

Source: OIG analysis 

3-year period revealed 8,728 cell phones recovered within BOP institutions- a 

difference of more than 41 percent over the data reported in TRUINTEL. 

the BOP automated its 

but did not link the au~"r""'~ ~"..ot"' 

I Programs Division (CPO) 

confirmed that. will use to document contraband 

recoveries. However, intelligence management officials stated that the BOP did not 

link to TRUINTEL because its contractor warned that doing so could 

compromise the data. So lon as remain unlinked to TRUINTEL, the 

risk exists that contraband will not subsequently 

be entered into TRUINTEL, resulting in undercounting of contraband recoveries. 

Finally and more broadly, TRUINTEL and Cell Phones Recovered reports 

represent only contraband items that BOP staff has recovered within BOP 

institutions. In fact, the actual number of overall contraband items, including cell 

phones in BOP institutions nationwide, is a larger, unknown number. For example, 

the BOP Cellular Telephone Laboratory's (Lab) analyses of recovered cell phones 

show that inmates, each using their own SIM card, regularly share cell phones. 

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BOP officials acknowledge that the BOP does not have a comprehensive 

contraband tracking system to effectively assess detection programs and 

interdiction methods. Managers told us that although they are using TRUINTEL to 

collect and track contraband recoveries, it was not designed to be a comprehensive 

contraband tracking system. Without a reliable method to ascertain the full amount 

of contraband and the efficacy of its detection and interdiction efforts, the BOP 

cannot fully address threats to safety and security in its institutions. We therefore 

believe the BOP should either develop TRUINTEL for this purpose or devise another 

data collection capability that consistently tracks all contraband recovered, 

regardless of where it was discovered or the institution's security level. To ensure 

uniformity and completeness of contraband data, the BOP should provide guidelines 

and requirements for comprehensively identifying and inputting data on recovered 

contraband into TRUINTEL or an alternative database. 

The BOP Did Not Effectively Implement Its 2013 Staff Search Policy to 

Deter Staff Introduction of Contraband 

In this review, we evaluated the BOP's efforts to implement the 2013 staff 

search policy, and the effects thereof, prior to the Federal Labor Relations 

Authority's decision and the BOP's subsequent rescission of that policy on June 30, 

2015, and the BOP's subsequent reinstatement of the policy on March 28, 2016. 

As described below, we found that the 2013 policy resulted in infrequent pat 

search events of varying durations and contained inconsistent and ambiguous 

language that limited its effectiveness in reducing contraband introduced into BOP 

institutions. Specifically, the policy permitted staff to possess and use "prohibited 

objects," such as tobacco, within institutions. In addition, the policy permitted the 

use of large containers and unrestricted personal property, which facilitates the 

introduction of contraband and requires more time-consuming inspections that slow 

the clearing of staff through security procedures. Furthermore, the policy permitted 

potentially corrupt staff who intended to introduce contraband into institutions to 

avoid more severe disciplinary action by returning identified contraband to their 

vehicles. While we found institutions we visited staffed front lobby officer positions 

in accordance with the policy, some institutions selected inexperienced and junior 

personnel for these important positions. We also found that training for front lobby 

officers was inadequate and oversight of institutions' front lobbies was poor when 

officers were not present. 

In response to preliminary findings from this report, BOP officials agreed with 

several OIG concerns related to staff and property searches, and generally that 

random pat search events implemented under the 2013 policy were not conducted 

with enough frequency to be an aggressive and effective deterrent for staff 

introduction of contraband. However, despite these preliminary acknowledgments, 

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the BOP is limited in executing corrective actions, since any new policy or changes 

to existing policies would require additional union negotiations. Below, we discuss 

in more detail our relevant findings related to the BOP's implementation of the 2013 

staff search policy from October 2014 through June 2015. 

Random Staff Pat Search Events Conducted under the 2013 Policy Occurred 

Infrequently and with Varying Durations 

In response to the OIG's 2003 report recommendation that the BOP 

implement a policy requiring searches of staff and their property when entering 

institutions, the BOP issued a memorandum to the OIG on May 8, 2006, stating that 

"on at least a monthly basis, at all facilities, staff entering on each shift will be 

randomly selected to be searched. We anticipate searching 5 percent of the staff on 

each shift."40 Despite BOP management's willingness to implement a policy with a 

specified staff search frequency, the policy was never implemented following union 

negotiations and acceptance of the 2007 agreement or the 2013 staff search policy. 

The BOP's 2013 policy stated that BOP staff and their belongings may be searched 

randomly or based on reasonable suspicion before entering and while inside BOP 

institutions, but did not prescribe any required frequency or duration of random pat 

search events. 41 

In lieu of a required frequency for conducting random pat search events, the 

2013 staff search policy allowed each Warden to predetermine a timeframe for 

conducting random searches. We found a range of search protocols across the 

institutions under the 2013 policy. For example, one Warden told us that he would 

designate random pat search events twice a week during peak hours, whereas an 

Associate Warden from another institution told us that his institution conducted only 

a 30-minute random pat search event once a month. 42 

To assess how the BOP was utilizing random pat searches of staff, we first 

analyzed data on the number of random pat search events conducted by BOP 

institutions in the 9 months following the July 2013 staff search policy 

implementation. Table 2 shows the number of random pat search events 

conducted, by security level, from January through September 2014. 

40 Michael W. Garrett, Senior Deputy Assistant Director, Program Review Division, BOP, 

memorandum to Paul A. Price, Assistant Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections, OIG, 

Update Regarding Recommendation 6 in OIG's Final Report: The Federal Bureau of Prison's Drug 

Interdiction Activities, May 8, 2006. 

41 For purposes of this report, random pat search "events" constitute a window of time during 

which pat searches may have been conducted during the 9-month span from January through 

September 2014. A random pat search is the actual one-on-one officer to employee search. 

42 Peak hours for the front lobby are high-traffic periods characterized by staff either entering 

or leaving the institution at the start of or end of their respective shifts. There is no standard time for 

this since Wardens are given discretion to designate peak periods in their institution. 

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Table 2 

Random Pat Search Events Conducted by Security Level, 

January- September 2014 

Institution Number of Random Average Number of 

Security Level Pat Search Events Number of Institutions Random Pat Search 

Events per Institution 

Administrative 68 19 

Low 126 27 

Medium 186 47 

High 54 16 

Total 434 109 .. Note: Table 2 1s based on BOP data from 109 inst1tut1ons and does not mclude mm1mum secunty 

prison camps, which reported that they did not conduct random pat searches. 

Source: OIG analysis of the BOP's random pat search data 

3.6 

4.7 

4.0 

3.4 

4.0 

As shown in Table 2, our analysis of the BOP data in our sample indicates 

that 109 institutions conducted a total of 434 random pat search events from 

January through September 2014. Collectively, each institution, on average, 

conducted only four random pat search events during this 9-month period, or one 

random pat search event every 2 months. Low security institutions averaged 

4. 7 random pat search events each, the most over this period of time. Conversely, 

high security institutions averaged the least amount, at 3.4 search events each, or 

1 search event every 3 months. We also found that at three high security 

institutions there was only one random pat search event conducted from January to 

September 2014. 

We also analyzed BOP data on the duration of 408 random pat search events 

conducted by all institutions from January to September 2014. 43 To better 

understand how long a typical pat search should last, we reviewed a national 

training video that the BOP developed and disseminated to institution staff after 

implementing the 2013 staff search policy. 44 The video featured both slow-motion 

and rea 1-time demonstrations of the pat search procedure for both male and female 

employees. Although the actual length of any pat search may depend on a number 

of factors, the BOP training video demonstrated that real-time pat searches 

conducted on both male and female officers last approximately 2 minutes per 

person. 45 Our subsequent analysis of BOP data, as shown in Table 3 below, 

43 Of the 434 random pat search events conducted from January through September 2014, 

the BOP data for 26 search events did not include a duration. Therefore, our analysis of durations is 

based on the remaining 408 random pat search events. 

44 The BOP did not provide us with data on the number of staff searched during each 

institution's random pat search event, or how long it took for each staff member to be searched. 

45 The 2-minute pat search procedure demonstrated in the video commenced with a searched 

officer stating that his pockets were empty and concluded when the searching officer notified him that 

the search had ended. 

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indicates that the average duration of a random pat search event for BOP 

institutions at all security levels ranged from 34 to 40 minutes. 

Table 3 

Average Durations of Random Pat Search Events by Security Level 

January - September 2014 

Minutes Spent on Number of Random Average Duration of 

Security Level Random Pat Search Pat Search Events Random Pat Search 

Events Event (in Minutes) 

Administrative 2,514 67 37 

Low 3,927 115 34 

Medium 7,420 185 40 

High 1,460 41 36 

Total 15,321 408 38* 

Note: Th1s is the average, not total, duration of random pat search events (in minutes) for all security 

levels. 

*The number "38" is the total Average Duration of Random Pat Search Events (in Minutes) for all 

security level total Minutes Spent on Random Pat Search Events (15,321) divided by the total Number 

of Random Pat Search Events ( 408). 

Source: OIG analysis of the BOP's random pat search data 

Our analysis also found that the durations of random pat search events 

varied among institutions, ranging from 1 minute to 4 hours. 46 As Figure 3 shows, 

of 408 events, 129 (32 percent) lasted less than 30 minutes, 134 (33 percent) 

lasted 30 minutes, 122 (30 percent) lasted between 31 and 60 minutes, and only 

23 (6 percent) went beyond 1 hour. Moreover, of the 129 random pat search 

events that were less than 30 minutes, 102 (79 percent) lasted just 15 minutes or 

less, including 12 that lasted no more than 5 minutes. Furthermore, we found that 

8 of the 16 high security institutions in our sample conducted random pat search 

events lasting only 15 minutes. 

46 We note that a random pat search event lasting 1 minute does not afford enough time to 

conduct even one pat search in accordance with the 2-minute pat search model procedure that the 

BOP demonstrated in its national training video. 

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Figure 3 

Range of Durations for 408 Random Pat Search Events 

January- September 2014 

Events 

12 

134 Events 

• less than 5 minutes 

6-14 minutes 

• less than 30 minutes 

30 minutes 

• 31-60 minutes 

more than 60 minutes 

Source: OIG analysis of the BOP's random pat search data 

• 15 minutes 

16-29 minutes 

Because the BOP's 2013 policy did not prescribe any required frequency or 

duration for conducting either random pat search events or the searches 

them~e lv es, each institution devised its own search protqcols. Our analysis of 

random pat search events conducted in the 9 months following the BOP's 

implementation of its 2013 policy found that search events occurred infrequently 

and with varying search durations. As Table 4 shows, we also found that the 

percentage of shifts during which the search events occurred was less than 

1 percent at institutions of all security levels. 47 This fell well below the searching 

threshold of 5 percent of staff entering on each shift at least monthly that the BOP 

described in its May 2006 memorandum to the OIG. Furthermore, even if, for 

example, the 434 random pat search events had been concentrated on ly during 

morning shifts, these search events would have covered only 1.5 percent of the 

total morning shifts from January through September 2014. 

4 7 For the purposes of this analysis, we designated the morning shift as 8: 15a.m. to 

4 :00p.m., the evening shift as 4:15p.m. to 12:00 a.m., and the late-night shift as 12:15 a.m. to 

8:00a.m. We explain this further in the Methodology in Appendix 1. 

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Table 4 

Shifts during Which Random Pat Search Events Occurred 

January - September 2014 

Percentage of 

Estimated Total Number of Shifts During 

Security Level Number of Number of Shifts Random Pat Which Random 

Institutions Pat Search Search Events Events 

Occurred 

Administrative 19 15,561 68 0.44°/o 

Low 27 22,113 126 0.57°/o 

Medium 47 38,493 186 0.48°/o 

High 16 13,104 54 0.41°/o 

Total 109 89,271 434 0.490/o 

Note: We calculated the estimated total number of shifts by multiplying the number of institutions 

(109) by 3, which corresponds to the general 8-hour morning, evening, and late night shifts of a BOP 

institution workday (exact times vary by institution). We then multiplied the resulting product (327) 

by 273, which Is the number of days from January to September 2014. We then used the BOP 

institutions' reported random pat search event start times to calculate the percentage of shifts during 

which random pat search events occurred. 

Source: OIG analysis of the BOP's random pat search data 

As indicated in Table 4, there were an estimated 89,271 total shifts at 

109 BOP institutions from January to September 2014. Using the reported random 

pat search event start times for 408 search events, we determined that, at best, 

the BOP conducted search events during 434 shifts, or 0.49 percent of the 

89,271 total shifts.48 Conversely, in 99.5 percent (88,837 shifts) of the shifts from 

January through September 2014, no reported random pat searches occurred. Of 

the 408 shifts where institutions provided search event times, 275 (67.4 percent) 

occurred during the morning shift, 100 (24.5 percent) occurred during the late 

· night shift, and 33 (8.1 percent) occurred during "the evening shift. In light of the 

overall infrequency of random pat search events discussed above, we believe these 

figures represent a particular vulnerability in the evening shift, which could be 

exploited by potential contraband smugglers. 

We asked BOP executive staff whether they thought random pat search 

events were being conducted with enough frequency and duration to deter the 

introduction of contraband. The Assistant Director for the CPD told us that he 

believed that imposing a minimum frequency for conducting random pat search 

events would reduce the randomness of the searches. However, he agreed that 

48 Of the 434 random pat search events conducted from January to September 2014, 26 did 

not report duration. Therefore, only 408 (95 percent) search events were timed. However, for the 

purpose of this analysis, the OIG assumed that each of the 26 events with no reported duration 

occurred during its own shift, which would be consistent with the pattern of the other 95 percent of 

random pat search events we assessed. 

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conducting the equivalent of one random staff pat search event every 3 months, as 

our analysis found was the case at high security institutions, was low and 

ineffective. Both Assistant Directors for the CPO and PRO acknowledged the BOP's 

need to develop a more effective policy, although they emphasized that, like all 

policy changes, it would require negotiations with the union. 

To enhance the effectiveness of random pat searches as a tool for deterring 

the introduction of contraband by staff, we believe that the BOP's staff search policy 

should establish a minimum frequency and duration for search events across all 

institutions. Establishing such minimum thresholds will ensure that each institution 

conducts enough searches of staff on each shift, with sufficient duration, to deter 

staff from attempting to introduce contraband. The BOP could implement this 

change even if it retains Wardens' discretion to establish the predetermined 

timeframes for conducting random searches as the 2013 staff search policy stated. 

BOP Institution Management and Staff Believe that Random Pat Searches Are an 

Effective Deterrent 

Quantifying the effectiveness of the BOP's staff search policy was not 

possible because the BOP did not maintain a consolidated record of contraband 

recovered from staff prior to the 2013 policy and institution management told us 

they had not recovered any contraband items solely attributed to random pat 

searches of staff.49 We therefore solicited the views of BOP management and staff 

on the deterrent effect of random pat searches. We found that both management 

and staff viewed random pat searches as an effective deterrent to contraband 

introduction and that it had been a generally accepted practice within the 

institutions. We also note that random pat searches are more likely to detect nonmetallic and organic contraband, such as tobacco and narcotics, which cannot be 

detected by metal detectors. 

Officials from five of seven institutions in our sample reported that they 

believe that random pat searches were a'deterrent and served as another aspect of 

the BOP's layered approach for interdicting contraband. In addition, officials from 

five institutions that we visited told us that, after the issuance and implementation 

of the 2013 staff search policy, staff began to understand the importance of random 

pat searches, and have since become more accustomed to and accepting of them. 

Union officials, however, told us that only a small percentage of staff engages in 

illegal activities and emphasized that random pat searches subject the rest of the 

rule-abiding staff to harassment, intimidation, and coercion by institution 

management. 50 Union officials stated that they would support random staff pat 

49 We note, however, that in light of the BOP's infrequent application of random pat search 

events and other related issues described in this report, the absence of contraband recoveries may not 

constitute an accurate performance measure. 

5

° For purposes of this review, union officials include the union President and a Regional Vice 

President. The BOP's Office of Internal Affairs acknowledged that staff misconduct with a contraband 

nexus is a low-frequency behavior that generally comprises 4 to 5 percent of their caseload. The 

(Cont'd.) 

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searches conducted upon reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, including possession 

of prohibited objects. 

State Prisons That Conduct Random Pat Searches on Staff Report that the 

Practice Effectively Deters Contraband Introduction 

We interviewed correctional officials and staff from California, Florida, 

Georgia, New York, and Texas prisons to better understand random pat search 

practices in their facilities. 51 Specifically, we discussed whether the searches were 

conducted, what personnel were present, and what deterrent effect they had. 52 We 

found that Florida, Georgia, New York, and Texas use random pat searches as part 

of their general security procedures. 53 Florida was the only state that prescribed a 

minimum frequency for such searches- prison officials there told us that their 

policy requires that random pat searches be conducted on at least 25 percent of its 

correctional staff and that the monthly minimum is usually exceeded because 

prisons also initiate random pat search events every 24 hours and search staff 

based on their order of entry into the institution. Also, representatives from each 

of the four states that conduct staff pat searches told us that they are a useful 

deterrent to the introduction of contraband into their prisons. For example, an 

official from one state said random pat searches make staff think twice before 

attempting to introduce contraband into their prisons. A second official from 

another state said that any type of search, including random pat searches, will have 

a deterrent effect. 

BOP Policy Does Not Regulate Staff Possession and Use of Tobacco, a Prohibited 

Object for Inmates within BOP Institutions 

Prior to April 15, 2006, BOP commissaries sold tobacco products and both 

staff and inmates were permitted to use lighted tobacco products within BOP 

institutions. On August 8, 2005, the BOP published a memorandum discontinuing 

the sale of tobacco products within the BOP:s commissaries effective April 15, 

2006. 54 Additionally, by April 15, 2006, all institutions had implemented a provision 

DIG's Investigations Data Management System indicated that a total of 134 BOP staff (less than 

1 percent of the approximately 40,000 BOP employees) were implicated in 99 substantiated 

contraband-related investigations over a 2-year period (July 17, 2012, to July 17, 2014). 

51 We selected these states because they are among the largest in prison population and, with 

the exception of Texas, have some degree of involvement from their local union. See Appendix 1 for 

more information. 

52 This review did not consider states• security procedures, technology, and staffing ratios to 

further clarify their use of random searches. 

53 Of those five state prison systems, only California has no current policy on random pat 

searches. However, representatives from California told us that random visual inspections occur as a 

compromise negotiated with the state's union. 

54 BOP Smoke-Free Policy and Inventory Trust Fund Message: 57-05, August 8, 2005; the 

BOP discontinued sale of all tobacco products in commissaries on or before April 15, 2006. 

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in the 2004 smoking program statement eliminating smoking areas for general 

inmate use at institutions.55 On May 12, 2006, the BOP published in the Federal 

Register a proposed rule that prohibited inmate possession of smoking apparatus 

and tobacco in any form. 56 However, the proposed and final rule did not affect BOP 

staff, who may possess and use tobacco products inside BOP institutions: staff are 

authorized to bring tobacco into BOP institutions "in reasonable quantities for 

personal use during work hours."57 According to the BOP's 2013 staff search policy, 

tobacco products and related paraphernalia are considered prohibited objects in 

quantities beyond "reasonable quantities" that staff would personally use during 

work hours due to their potential value to inmates, though the BOP does not further 

define what it considers a "reasonable quantity."58 

We discussed defining "reasonable quantities" for staff possession of tobacco 

with BOP executive staff. BOP officials could not specify what a reasonable quantity 

would be and added that any policy changes or amendments would require union 

negotiations. The officials told us that the BOP allows staff to bring in amounts 

they consider enough for their daily personal use and that the front lobby officer 

should exercise proper judgment in deciding appropriate quantities of tobacco for 

daily use. One official told us that imposing a tobacco ban on staff could be 

possible. However, several officials told us that they do not believe that a tobacco 

ban on staff would prevail in front of the union, citing the union's stance on staff 

morale. Additionally, the BOP officials said that reversing the smoking prohibitions 

for inmates would not be feasible or fiscally responsible due to health ramifications 

and attendant healthcare costs. The BOP union President told us that he does not 

suggest a tobacco ban that includes the staff; however, he told us that the union 

would entertain further tobacco reduction policy discussions with the BOP if they 

were to permit nicotine patch use by staff. 

By contrast, during our interviews with state prison officials, we found that 

five of the seven (71 percent) sampled state prison institutions banned tobacco use 

55 BOP Program Statement 1640.04, Smoking/No Smoking Areas, March 15, 2004, stated 

that all indoor smoking was prohibited, with limited exceptions pertaining to staff-occupied areas. It 

further stated that Wardens may designate outdoor areas for general inmate use (not part of an 

authorized religious activity). By not designating or removing previously designated outdoor smoking 

areas for inmates, Wardens, through the authority of the program statement, essentially prohibited 

inmates from using smoking products for general uses within the institutions. 

56 Smoking/No Smoking Areas, 71 Fed. Reg. 92, 27652 (May 12, 2006). The BOP told us that 

it enforced the proposed rule discontinuing inmate use of tobacco as of 2006, though the rule was not 

finalized until 2014. See 79 Fed. Reg. 235, 72545 (December 8, 2014). 

57 A Federal Service Impasses Panel order states: "Indoor smoking shall be permitted only in 

perimeter towers and perimeter patrol vehicles when occupied by one person." Additionally, the panel 

directed that "the employer shall designate outdoor smoking areas which (a) are reasonably accessible 

to employees and (b) provide a measure of protection from the elements. The designated outdoor 

smoking areas shall only be used by employees." Federal Service Impasses Panel, case No. 01 FSIP 

184, November 8, 2001. 

58 BOP Program Statement 3740.01, 4. 

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and possession within their prison systems. 59 Additionally, during our reviews of 

publicly available state prison policies, we found an additional 22 states (27 states 

in total (54 percent)) with policies declaring a "tobacco free" prison system. Only 

nine states in total (16 percent), including two from our sample, had no policies 

banning tobacco use or possession within their prison system. 60 

Unrestricted tobacco possession by BOP staff, and the perception among 

some that penalties for providing tobacco to inmates are not a deterrent, could be 

contributing to the continued contraband tobacco recoveries in BOP institutions and 

tobacco-related cases against BOP staff. According to BOP data, the BOP 

experienced a 24 percent increase in tobacco recoveries from inmates during 

FYs 2012 through 2014. In the 2-year period from July 2012 to July 2014, 

institution staff recovered 1,062 tobacco products from inmates or common areas. 61 

During this 24-month period, the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs sustained 44 cases 

involving staff introductions of cigarettes and tobacco. Additionally, OIG Special 

Agents substantiated 38 cases against BOP staff members that involved tobacco, 

according to the OIG's Investigation Division databases. BOP officials and 

institution staff, as well as state prison officials, told us those staff willing to 

introduce tobacco products into an institution do so because they consider it low 

risk. A Captain at one BOP institution, as well as a state official, said that staff 

members know that it is unlikely they will face prosecution from tobacco 

introduction and they can make just as much money selling tobacco to inmates as 

they can selling them drugs. A BOP intelligence management official stated that 

there is insufficient deterrent for staff giving tobacco to inmates because they 

typically are not prosecuted and can resign before being terminated. 

BOP Policy Does Not Address the Possession and Use of Electronic Cigarettes 

At the time of our fieldwork, we found that the BOP did not have a uniform 

policy addressing staff and inmate possession or use of electronic cigarettes. 62 We 

found that local policies and practices regarding the possession and use of 

electronic cigarettes varied among the institutions we visited. At one institution, 

the Warden specifically prohibited all electronic cigarettes and related 

paraphernalia. However, at another BOP institution, there were no prohibitions 

regarding their possession and use. A front lobby officer at that institution told us 

59 States that declared "banned tobacco use or possession" or "tobacco free" policies within 

their prison systems apply the prohibition equally to staff, inmates, and visitors. 

60 Of the remaining 14 states, policies were either not posted to the state's website or policy 

was not clear to us in defining whether tobacco was or was not permitted within their prison system. 

61 To compare the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs and the OIG's investigative data to 

recovered tobacco contraband, we used a 24-month sample (July 17, 2012, to July 17, 2014) from the 

BOP's TRUINTEL database on recovered tobacco contraband. 

62 An electronic cigarette ( e-cig or "vape") is a battery-powered vaporizer that does not 

produce smoke but rather an aerosol mist known as vapor. The heating element vaporizes a liquid 

solution of several chemicals and, if desired, flavoring. 

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that officers use electronic cigarettes during slow periods while assigned to the 

front lobby post. In response to a working draft of this report, the BOP reported 

that on October 14, 2015, the BOP published an operational memorandum focused 

on the use of electronic cigarettes. 63 

During our interviews with state prison officials, we found that the possession 

and use of electronic cigarettes has emerged as a trend in several state prison 

systems. Specifically, three of the seven state officials (43 percent) we interviewed 

stated they have a prohibition on the use and possession of electronic cigarettes 

and related paraphernalia within their prisons. Of the four states that have not 

prohibited the use and possession of electronic cigarettes, only one affirmatively 

permits the use of electronic cigarettes in its prisons; the remaining three are 

reviewing policies. Several state officials cited reasons for prohibiting electronic 

cigarettes related to inmates infusing drugs into the apparatus's liquid solution and 

manipulating the heating element. 

Staff Possession of Large Containers and Unrestricted Personal Property Enable 

Contraband Introduction and Increase Staff Entrance Processing Time 

In our 2003 BOP drug interdiction report, we found that BOP staff was 

permitted to bring into institutions items in any size container, including duffle 

bags, briefcases, and large and small coolers. According to interviews during that 

review, BOP staff said that restrictions on the type and amount of personal property 

staff may bring into an institution would help deter smuggling. Senior national and 

local union representatives interviewed for that review told us they were not 

opposed to placing limited restrictions on staff personal property. Accordingly, we 

recommended in our 2003 report that the BOP implement a policy restricting the 

size and content of property staff members bring into its institutions. In September 

2004, the BOP notified the OIG that the BOP Director signed a revised Standards of 

Employee Conduct policy that restricted the size of all personal containers brought 

into institutions. 64 Mowever, in April 2015, we learned that because th~ revised 

policy was not a final, union-cleared policy, the language regarding the size 

restriction of personal containers was not added to the final Standards of Employee 

Conduct policy issued to BOP institutions in December 2013. 

In response to our 2003 report, the BOP told us that it was considering 

restrictions for visitors on the nature and size of personal containers similar to 

those in place at some state prisons. 65 In 2006, the BOP amended its Visiting 

63 BOP Operational Memorandum 006-2015: Electronic Cigarettes (October 14, 2015). 

64 The proposed revised BOP Standards of Employee Conduct (circa September 2004) 

included language that restricted the size of all personal bags to no larger than 18 x 10 x 10 inches. 

However, this proposed revised draft was never cleared by the union or finalized and the BOP never 

enforced the personal container size restriction. Personal container restrictions were never part of the 

2007 staff search agreement or the 2013 staff search policy. 

65 BOP, Response to OIG Reference Recommendation #6, December 28, 2005. 

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Regulations program statement to require that all authorized items entering the 

visiting room to be carried in a clear plastic container or bag, and it allows 

individual institutions to determine the size and quantity of the container or bag. 66 

Prior to the rescission of the 2013 staff search policy, some BOP officials told 

us that the size of personal property and containers was not a concern because all 

staff personal items were automaticall su ect to electronic search the x-ra 

machine. 

Of course, as the Assistant Director for 

the CPO noted, should the BOP choose to develop policy that limits the use of such 

containers, it would require negotiations with the union as do all other similar policy 

changes. 

In comparison, we found that at least seven state prison systems recognize 

that excessive personal property and large containers represent a threat to safety 

and security and have implemented varying forms of restrictions. Some of these 

restrictions include requiring that persona I items be placed in clear containers. 

Others limit the size of containers that staff may bring into a secure facility. For 

example, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas require 

staff to place food and other personal items into a clear bag or clear plastic 

container. Additionally, North Carolina and Minnesota require food purchased 

outside of a prison and brought inside to be in the original wrapping. The food 

items are subject to being opened and searched upon presentation to the screening 

staff. In addition, at least four states also specify the size of a·container either by 

capacity, such as a backpack or a 10-quart cooler, or by dimension, such as a 12 x 

18-inch container. 

The BOP Does Not Track Repeated Incidents of Staff Who Fail to Identify 

Unauthorized Items during Entry Screening Procedures 

We found that the BOP's policy does not track repeated incidents of staff who 

continuously fail to remove items that are not able to clear front lobby screening 

66 BOP Program Statement 5267.08, Visiting Regulations (May 11, 2006). 

67 A signed November 2007 agreement between the BOP and its union, The Electronic 

Searches of Bureau Prison Staff, replaced the 2013 staff search policy in June 2015. The agreement 

states, "It is the responsibility of the employee to clear the metal detector by either passing all items 

through the metal detector or by placing all items on an available x-ray machine for screening." 

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devices. Furthermore, policy permits staff to return certain detected unauthorized 

items to their vehicles without being documented. The 2013 staff search policy 

required staff and their belongings to be searched electronically and to clear front 

lobby detection technologies before gaining access to the secure confines of an 

institution. The policy also stated that, "Persons are allowed to take any item not 

able to clear the metal detector or x-ray machine to their vehicle, unless doing so 

would jeopardize the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or protection 

of the public."68 

Five of the seven BOP institutions in our sample allowed staff to return items 

to their vehicles per the 2013 policy. A Captain from one of these five institutions 

told us that staff are permitted to return to their vehicles because nothing in the 

BOP's policy denies employees that opportunity. However, a Captain from another 

one of these institutions said this practice takes away the policy's "teeth" and 

undermines the deterrent effect. One of the seven institutions in our sample did 

prohibit staff from returning to their vehicles after contraband was discovered 

during an entry screen. 69 The Warden from this institution told us that once the 

detection device in the front lobby - in this case a body scanner - registers a 

positive detection, the subject is prohibited from leaving and will be searched 

immediately. 

We also found that management expectations regarding staff not being 

permitted to return contraband items to their vehicles are not always met by front 

lobby officers, which results in inconsistent application of the practice. For 

example, a Warden told us that all contraband detected electronically - even 

"accidental" items- would result in an investigation. However, a front lobby 

officer at this Warden's institution told us that he allows staff three opportunities to 

clear the detection devices after contraband is detected. That officer stated his 

primary job was to process staff through the search point as quickly and efficiently 

as possible. He went on to state that he would allow staff who have contraband 

iterns not able to clear the metal detector, including aq::idental items such as a cell 

phone or excessive amounts of tobacco, to return those items to their vehicles. 

In contrast to the BOP, we found that some state prison systems employ 

more stringent measures to deter the introduction of contraband. With varying 

levels of discretion, officials from all seven state prisons with whom we spoke told 

us that they generally prohibit staff from returning to their vehicle once a banned 

item is discovered during entry screening. One official added that contraband, 

regardless of type, will be confiscated and the employee will be reported to the 

68 The November 2007 agreement between the BOP and its union that was reinstated in 2015 

contains essentially the same provision allowing staff to return items to their vehicles. 

69 We did not query one of the seven institutions in our sample about whether staff are 

permitted to return detected contraband items to their vehicles because it was not a focus of our 

review at that time. This issue was not brought to our attention until our later interviews at BOP 

institutions. 

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Warden. We also found that some state prison front lobby searches employ a 

"point-of-no-return" concept at which staff entering a prison have an opportunity to 

declare contraband before entering the screening process. Once a staff member 

declares that he or she has no prohibited items and the screening process begins, if 

an item is detected, the staff member is prohibited from taking the item back to his 

or her vehicle. We were told that in these circumstances, unlike the BOP, all 

contraband discovered, regardless of type or the nature of its concealment, is 

tracked and documented. Some state prison systems recognize repeated failures 

by staff to remove contraband items in their possession prior to screening, even if 

accidentally, as potential smuggling attempts. When this occurs, they apply 

corrective actions ranging from counseling to termination. 

The BOP's Assistant Directors for the CPO and the PRO told us that 

documenting routinely "forgotten" items would be burdensome to the front lobby 

officers. The Assistant Director for the CPO added that incidents will vary and that 

Wardens need to be able to exercise discretion when determining whether to take 

administrative action. Also, the Assistant Director for the PRO told us that, in order 

for the BOP to develop a concept for declaring contraband, it would need to define 

more specifically where the secure confines of an institution begin. 70 She stated 

that some institutions consider the front lobby screening area as starting point of 

the secure perimeter whereas others consider it to be the sally port. 71 We believe 

that the BOP must establish procedures whereby all post-declaration items 

discovered during staff screening procedures are documented, along with the 

identity of the staff member involved, and that the BOP must develop more explicit 

guidelines for when the items should be confiscated and when such instances or a 

series of them should be referred for investigation and corrective action. 

Inconsistent Procedures and Guidelines for Selecting, Training, and Overseeing 

Front Lobby Officers Hamper the BOP's Contraband Interdiction Capabilities 

Front lobby officers are tasked with multiple assignments, including operating 

detection equipment, instructing people on proper entry procedures, identifying 

contraband, and making on-the-spot determinations of whether a person is clear to 

enter the secure perimeter. According to a union Regional Vice President, front 

lobby positions require experienced and trained staff because they serve in high 

profile posts that ensure the safety and security of an institution. The 2013 staff 

search policy requires that a second screening staff member be available to 

expedite the front lobby screening process during peak periods. At each institution 

we visited, the BOP supplemented the front lobby officer with additional personnel, 

such as Security Supervisors and Lieutenants, during shift changes and high traffic 

periods. 

70 "Secure confines" means a secured inner perimeter." BOP Program Statement 3740.01, 

Staff Entrance and Search Procedures, July 17, 2013, 5. 

71 A sally port is a secure, controlled entryway to an institution. The institution's control 

center monitors and operates the entrance and exit process. 

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However, we found that some institutions select inexperienced and junior 

personnel as front lobby officers. Among the seven BOP institutions we visited, six 

selected their front lobby officers through a rotating bid assignment based on 

seniority of bargaining unit employees. 72 Yet, one institution hired an entry-level 

GL-04 Information Receptionist to staff the front lobby position, and a second 

institution also staffed this position in the same way before later changing the 

requirements for the position as described below. Moreover, the job announcement 

for the Information Receptionist position at the first facility did not require a prior 

background in corrections but rather successful completion of 2 years of education 

beyond high school. The Warden of the institution with the current position stated 

that the practice allows incumbents to gain experience for promotions by providing 

an incentive to conduct thorough entry screenings. However, both BOP and union 

officials we interviewed expressed concerns over such practices. The Assistant 

Director for the CPD told us that expecting Information Receptionists to oversee 

front lobbies is not a sound practice since they are not trained to operate 

contraband detection devices. The Warden who abolished the Information 

Receptionist position did so following an incident in which a probationary 

Information Receptionist accepted a prohibited outside food item from an inmate's 

visitor. The Warden told us that he decided it would be better to have a more 

experienced staff member assigned to the front lobby, so he established a 

GL-05/06/07 CO position and added the front lobby post to the Correctional 

Services biddable roster. Union officials we interviewed told us that receptionists 

lack the proper training to respond to an emergency and, therefore, should perform 

only clerical duties. 

We also found that inadequate physical controls over unmanned front lobby 

areas can contribute to poor screeni ractices and rovide a otential avenue for 

the introduction of contraband. 

We recognize that staffing the front lobby of every BOP institution with a CO 

during non-business hours may not be feasible. However, we believe that the BOP 

should evaluate and standardize the selection method for front lobby officers across 

BOP institutions to ensure qualified and appropriately trained officers serve in these 

critical positions. We also believe that im rovements in the BOP's secu camera 

system, would 

reduce the risk of contraband introduction through unmanned front lobby areas. 

72 Normal rotations are 90 days, and the incumbent can bid for additional terms. 

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We discuss deficiencies we found in the BOP's security camera system later in this 

report. 

The BOP Has Deployed New Technologies to Detect Contraband, but More 

Operational Guidance and Training Are Needed to Enhance Security 

The BOP employs several contraband detection technologies, such as x-ray 

machines for personal and pallet-size items, walk-through and handheld metal 

detectors, and ion spectrometry devices. In an effort to combat the ever-evolving 

methods of contraband introduction, the BOP continues to research, test, and install 

new contraband detection technologies at its institutions to enhance its layered 

physical and technical security posture. The BOP has recently installed several new 

detection devices, and installation of additional devices continued through 2015. 

Also, the BOP is piloting new detection technologies at selected institutions. Below 

we describe the contraband interdiction technologies we observed, reviewed, or 

discussed with BOP officials during this review. See Appendix 3 for more 

information on these and other contraband interdiction devices. 

• Walk-through Metal Detector 

has u rchased and installed 

• SecurPASS Whole-Bo'!L!canner. Also for inmate screening, the BOP has 

purchased and installed .. SecurPASS Scanners, which can detect objects 

concealed in anterior and posterior body cavities. 

• Millimeter Wave Scanner (MWS). In September 2014, the BOP began a 

1-year pilot project at six institutions to install an MWS in the front lobby for 

mandatory use by all staff and visitors (no longer used for staff per the BOP's 

June 30, 2015, memorandum). An MWS is a whole-body im device that 

detects o concealed underneath a erson's clothin 

Thermal fencing provides surveillance and alarm 

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• Managed Access System (MAS). In 2014, the BOP conducted a 60-day 

MAS pilot evaluation to determine MAS effica 

BOP institution. 

The MAS network transmits a signal that causes all 

cell phones within the covered area to connect to the MAS rather the carrier's 

network first. The MAS prevents unauthorized cell phones from sending and 

receiving calls, text messages, and data. 74 

Staff told us that these technologies add an extra layer of security, enhance 

the BOP's ability to detect contraband items, and deter attempted contraband 

introductions. However, as described below, we identified certain weaknesses in 

BOP guidan~ation procedures for these technologies -

particularly--that limited their efficacy in detecting 

contraband. While institution staff told us about an increase in contraband 

recovered in various areas of institutions using - we found that the BOP 

must vide clear guidance for- operations. We determined that 

raters rna not be aware of the BOP's requirements for using the 

or the prohibition against showing inmates 

their scanned images. Regarding the technology, we found that training for 

those staff who operate the scanners is needed to enhance institution security. 

Staff in -institutions we visited misunderstood ca bilities ex ressed 

mixed reviews on the ca abil 

Unclear SecurPASS System Guidance Potentially Affects the BOP's Compliance with 

Prison Rape Elimination Act Cross-gender Viewing and Compromises Security 

Operations 

Institution Wardens and executive staff we interviewed described the 

SecurPASS as a" milestone in the facility," "money well spent," "worth its weight in 

gold," and "a good enhancement for security." Since the initial installation of the 

73 In 2015, the BOP reported to Congress that its pilot was successful, with 26 civilian arrests 

for attempted introduction of contraband and trespassing, and 60 contraband cell phone interdictions. 

As a result, the BOP expanded the pilot to two additional institutions, one in December 2012 and the 

other in FY 2014. We did not observe or review the BOP's thermal fencing technology. 

74 In 2015, the BOP reported to Congress that the MAS could assist in limiting cell phone use 

but is expensive to install (about $1 million for installation at one institution), could not block all calls, 

and was not fully effective in remaining within the identified coverage zones. We did not directly 

observe or evaluate MAS technologies during this review. While we recognize that the MAS will 

continue to evolve in capability and cost, we encourage the BOP to continue working with industry 

experts to develop an effective and affordable MAS solution for future BOP applications. 

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system in October 2013, three institutions from our sample have documented or 

observed successful inmate contraband detections or deterrent effects. Staff from 

two of the three institutions orted that their SecurPASS system had detected • 

Staff at the third 

as inmates discarded contraband prior to being screened 

by the SecurPASS system. Despite the successes BOP staff reported regarding the 

SecurPASS, we found that the staff who operate these technologies need clear 

guidance for SecurPASS operations to enhance institution security, as discussed 

below. 

Based on our observation of a SecurPASS system in operation and interviews 

with institution staff, we found confusion among some staff regarding policies on 

the for cross- nder viewing. In October 2014, the BOP modified its 

memorandum to uire use of 

Although the software was added as an 

enhancement to the SecurPASS system, during interviews we found that staff at 

four of five institutions in our sample with SecurPASS ms (80 percent) were 

unaware of the existence or use of the des ite it bei listed in 

ated memorandum. 

Staff at two other 

institutions had no understanding of what the was or how to use it. Staff at 

only one institution understood the appropriate use of the - and correctly cited 

the BOP's SecurPASS memorandum and the Prison Rape Elimination Act concerns it 

addressed. 

In addition to staff confusion related to the- we also found contradictory 

language within the BOP's initial Secu rPASS governing documents relating to crossgender viewing. As described in the Background section of this report, with limited 

exceptions, BOP staff may not perform visual searches on inmates of the opposite 

sex. 75 According to OST staff the BOP views the SecurPASS device as a visual 

search method. 

75 Exceptions to this policy include circumstances in which a "delay would mean the likely loss 

of contraband"; in addition, all cross-gender searches must be documented. 

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Inmate Viewing of Images 

rather than in its own section, clearly 

citing the prohibition and addressing security concerns. 

We also observed that the SecurPASS workstation (keyboard, monitor, 

operating system) was not blocked or restricted from viewing by inmates or other 

unauthorized personnel. The R&D intake area we observed had multiple stations 

76 The SecurPASS operates at less than 0.25 microsieverts (uSv) per scan. The average 

exposure from all (natural) radiation sources for a member of the public is aeproximatelv 0.26 uSv per 

iihofliuiiiri. IOinillelclhlesltilxii-rlliialllviiisileflisluiiiiviiialleiiinlt ltoil4ii00 SecurPASS scans. • •• • • 

• • Digital X-ray Specialists, Frequently Asked Questions, 

http://www.dxsinc.com/security/securpass-faq (accessed December 16, 2015); Radiation for 

Beginners, http://www.benlovejoy.com/journeys/chernobyl/radiation (accessed December 16, 2015). 

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that included the SecurPASS screening area, 

and holding cells, all of which were within a confined space. A lack of adequate 

barriers around the SecurPASS workstation allows inmate viewing and observation 

of screening operations that can create risks in the BOP's overall security process. 78 

A Lack of Comprehensive Training Impeded the Effectiveness of MWS Screening 

In September 2014, the BOP began a 1-year pilot project at six institutions 

to install MWS in the front lobby for mandatory use for all staff and visitors entering 

the institutions. 79 During site visits and interviews with mana ement and staff at 

the six MWS institutions we learned of 

78 The DOJ OIG Audit Report 14-27, Procurement of X-ray Equipment, also identified security 

concerns about inmate laborers working within close and continued proximity to screens/monitors of 

detection technologies. Over time, inmates could develop methods to conceal contraband. The BOP 

concurred with the recommendation and issued a memorandum to all Wardens requiring the unit to be 

positioned so that inmates cannot view monitors or the operator's station during screening operations. 

79 Because we made these observations during the first 4 months of the BOP's 12-month 

MWS Pilot Program, we recognize that staff at the institutions were learning to integrate the MWS into 

their security operations and were newly trained on the devices and their new protocols. Therefore, 

our recommendations reflect the observations and findings from early in the pilot program and are 

m t t . d I th BOP' I t' d d . . k. I I b t h t th MWS I 

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In addition, as part of its assessment role in the 

MWS Pilot Program, the OST told us that it is planning to try to replicate the 

problems to help determine their causes. 

80 Increased processing times raises concerns under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, some 

BOP institution staff we interviewed told us. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, an amendment to the 

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262), clarifies that certain activities are generally 

not compensable working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In particular, the Portal-to-Portal 

Act excludes from mandatory compensation the time an employee spends traveling to or from the 

place of principal activities and time spent on incidental activities before or after the employee's 

principal activities. 

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Lack of Comprehensive Training on Operation of the MWS Device 

Based on our interviews with institution management, front lobby officers, 

and OST personnel, as well as our review of MWS training materials, we believe 

~tial 

that some of the procedural 

and subsequent 

operator 

training. 

errors 

In 

as 

accordance 

described to 

with 

us are 

theI~ 

-the MWS manufacturer and BOP Central Office personnel initially 

provided MWS training to all staff involved in entrance screening at each institution 

prior to system installation and operation. 82 Selected staff instructors at each 

institution received "Training for Trainers" so they could train the remainder of the 

institution's staff. According to staff we interviewed, training consisted of on-site 

classroom and hands-on application sessions. OST staff told us that training 

materials provided to each instructor included an operations document and a 

PowerPoint presentation for MWS operators and supervisors. Although staff at each 

institution commented on a positive or adequate training experience, we found 

sharp contrasts between the OST staff's descriptions to us of proper MWS 

procedures and those provided by the MWS institution staff. Specificall durin 

our interview with OST staff ersonnel the described in detail 

In our review of the MWS training materials, we also found a significantly 

less prescri rocess than the detailed rocess OST staff had 

described. 

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Finally, we found that at least one institution developed its own MWS 

operators' manual for use in training new front lobby screening staff. The manual 

was based on one front lobby officer's experience using the MWS. However, we 

found that the officer was misinformed as to the system's capabilities and 

limitations incorrect! believin - and teachi other operators -

This officer, who started in the 

assignment after the system's installation, told us she had never received formal 

training on how to operate the detection devices in the front lobby, including the 

MWS; she described her MWS knowledge as "self-driven." 

Lack of an Effective Evaluation Process Affects the BOP's Ability to Assess the 

Operational Capability of the MWS 

Also, 

assessing safety and security when comparing the MWS to existing staff search 

procedures, including the contraband detection technologies described above 

difficult iven the different ca bilities and s of each technol 

Staff at three of the six institutions told us the MWS was a deterrent. 

However, staff at two of these three institutions also stated it was the machine's 

physical presence that constituted the deterrence factor, not the actual detection of 

contraband. Although Wardens and staff observed visitors returning to their 

vehicles upon noticing the MWS, they also told us that the MWS's physical presence 

alone will not stop contraband from entering BOP institutions. 

(Cont'd.) 

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an immediate concern about 

these institutions' and 

considered the institutions' initial reported -

too early to assess given the ongoing pilot, we found 

MWS Impact on Staff Morale 

The BOP indicated that one measure for 

evaluating the MWS would focus on "employee 

morale when compared to other search procedures." 

Despite early complaints and concerns, BOP 

management at pilot sites told us during our 

fieldwork that staff had accepted the MWS as a 

routine part of their daily process. However, we 

found that the MWS also had negative effects on 

staff morale, especially with the added clearing 

process time and associated requirements. Staff 

complaints regarding the use of the MWS included: 

Deficiencies with the BOP's Cellular Telephone Laboratory Reports May 

Adversely Affect Timeliness of Administrative Proceedings against Inmates 

The BOP created the Cellular Telephone Laboratory (Lab) in December 2010 

to assist institution investigators by conducting forensic examinations of confiscated 

cell phones to identify in mates who used the phones and hold them accountable 

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h the BOP's inmate misconduct rocesses. 86 

The Lab's 

workload increased significantly since its inception, and a backlog has accrued of 

cell phones awaiting examination. Although the BOP has taken steps to clarify the 

Lab's mission and improve its operations, we found that neither BOP managers nor 

Lab analysts knew how institution investigators use Lab reports to further an 

investigation. We also found the reports were difficult to read, lacked relevance to 

institution investigators, and contained substantial repetitive entries, all of which 

could adversely affect the timeliness of administrative actions against inmates using 

contraband cell phones, and potentially even investigations into related criminal 

activity. 

Increasing Numbers of Cell Phones Recovered and Operational Issues Created 

Backlogs at the Lab 

We found that the Lab's overall workload and the number of cell phones 

awaiting examination (backlog) have significantly increased since its inception in 

2010. The cell phone workload - based on the Lab's separate database of phones 

recovered by institutions and sent to the Lab - increased by 486 percent, from 

318 examinations in calendar year (CY) 2009 to 1,864 in CY 2013. The cell phone 

backlog has also increased over 4,275 percent, from 16 phones in CY 2011 to an 

estimated 700 at the end of CY 2014, according to Lab staff. Lab staff attributed 

the backlog to staff shortages and the October 2013 government furlough. BOP 

management attributed the Lab's backlog to staff shortages, the furlough, and 

examiners spending too much time using multiple analytical tools on one phone and 

performing administrative duties. BOP management also told us that the cell phone 

backlog and delays in publishing reports resulted in a general loss of faith among 

institution investigators about the Lab's capabilities. 

Because of the growing backlog and investigator concerns, BOP management 

took a number of steps to improve the Lab's operations and to clarify its mission. 

First, the BOP increased the Lab's staff. Until December 2014, the Lab operated 

with two forensic analysts who were responsible for conducting forensic exams of 

all cell phones, as well as the administrative functions of the Lab. In December 

2014, the BOP added a forensic technician to the Lab's staff. 87 With the new hire, 

86 The BOP initiated a Pilot Cell Phone Program in 2008. In December 2010, the pilot was 

made permanent when the Lab was established under the Intelligence Section of the Correctional 

Services Branch, CPO. Whereas the BOP investigates allegations of inmate misconduct at each 

institution, its Office of Internal Affairs investigates allegations of contraband-related and other 

misconduct involving BOP staff. 

87 According to BOP management, the technician is primarily responsible for administrative 

functions, which enables Lab analysts to concentrate on phone analysis, thereby reducing the Lab's 

backlog. The new hire is also part of the Lab's long-term succession plan and eventually may become 

a forensics analyst through on-the-job and formal training. 

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the Lab also instituted a new forensics database to better track incoming and 

outgoing cell phones and to identify the forensics tools used on each phone to 

expedite future examinations of similar devices. Second, in February 2015, the 

BOP developed Operating Procedures to help expedite the receipt and analysis of 

recovered phones by Lab personnel and to document the Lab's internal process. 88 

These procedures also streamlined operations by directing the use of one tool for 

initial analysis, developing priorities based on immediate needs to further assist the 

Lab's focus and work schedule, and directing the Lab to issue analytical reports 

within 48 hours of creation. According to BOP management, the Operating 

Procedures were to assist in reducing the Lab's cell phone backlog. Finally, the BOP 

purchased an additional forensic tool to allow for more simultaneous examinations 

of recovered cell phones. And, as of April 2015, the BOP has identified a location 

for a planned expansion of the Lab's physical space. BOP management told us that 

they believe these improvements will reduce the cell phone backlog and help 

restore investigators' faith in the Lab. 

Lab Reports Are Difficult to Read and Lack Relevance to Institution Investigators 

Although BOP management told us that all new institution investi 

receive trainin on how to interpret Lab reports -

-lab ana were unsure to 

Lab analysts also told us that it is difficult for 

investigators to interpret the analysis to correctly pinpoint the criminal activity 

reflected in the reports. We also found neither the Lab managers nor analysts 

knew how the investigators actually use the Lab reports to further their 

investigations. Analysts stated that the only feedback they receive from 

investigators are questions about how to interpret the reports' analyses. 

88 Also in February 2015, the BOP issued Contraband Cellular Telephone Procedures for 

Institution Investigators, which provided guidance to institution investigators on properly submitting 

recovered cell phones to the Lab. Specifically, the Telephone Procedures provided directions on 

proper labeling and shipping of cell phones designated for either destruction or investigation. 

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Notwithstanding the Lab's need 

to understand how investigators use the 

reports and whether targeted training is 

needed - particularly for those 

investigators who did not receive the 

new employee training - we found the 

reports difficult to read and lacking 

relevance to investigators. In reviewing 

a sample of Lab reports, we found them 

to be in excess of hundreds, and 

sometimes thousands, of pages that 

contain technical language and 

substantial duplication. We did find 

information such as 

OIG Analysis of a 931-page Lab Report 

In one Lab Extraction Report containing 

the contents of a contraband cell phone, we 

found 701 pages (75 percent) that contained 

information an investigator could 

However, within these 701 pages, 

we found that 529 pages (76 percent) of the 

useful information contained technical 

language or included photos and images -

such as commercial pornographic material -

that would not assist in an investigation. 

Additionally, within these 701 pages, we 

found 164 pages (23 percent) that 

essentially duplicated previously presented 

data. 

Source: OIG analysis 

However, this information was intermixed with technical language that 

made searching for and deciphering the relevant data more difficult and timeconsuming (see text box). According to Lab analysts, the report formats are 

developed by the forensics software developer and any changes would require 

extensive reformatting and additional time to produce a tailored report. Despite 

the BOP's efforts to streamline the Lab's mission, we believe the existing lengthy, 

unfocused reports do not provide institution investigators with the relevant and 

clear information they need to conduct a timely, targeted investigation. 

Deficiencies within the BOP's Security Camera System Adversely Affect 

Administrative and Criminal Proceedings against Staff and Inmates 

The BOP employs an extensive security camera system as part of its 

contraband detection efforts. However, BOP staff expressed to us concerns with 

the BOP's secu camera system. These concerns include 

blind s known to inmates and 

We discuss these deficiencies further 

below. Also, deficiencies within the BOP's security camera system have affected 

the OIG's ability to secure prosecutions of staff and inmates in BOP contraband 

introduction cases, and these same problems adversely impact the availability of 

critical evidence to support administrative or disciplinary action against staff and 

inmates . 

• 

whom we consulted had mixed views on the 

BOP's camera system. Staff from several institutions described the quality of 

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their camera system as adequate, with some noting that the quality has 

improved in the past 10-15 years. Other BOP staff, including the Warden of 

one institution, told us the camera system is in need of upgrading. 

• Known Blind Spots. BOP staff from several institutions told us about 

cameras with blinds incl din those located within 

• BOP staff raised concerns about an 

staff told us that there are 

• 

• 

To further illustrate concerns with the BOP's security camera systems and 

the ability to investigate and prosecute BOP staff misconduct, we determined that 

the OIG was unable to pursue-that were investigated in 2013 and 2014, 

covering incidents that occurred from October 1, 2011, throu h Janua 23 2015 

solely due to lack of - or poor quality - video footage. 

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We found that BOP Central Office staff and union reRresentatives agree that 

the BOP's security camera system is in need of upgrades. -staff said security 

cameras should also be integrated into the BOP's Central Office, allowing the BOP 

to view institution footage as needed.92 When we asked whether the OST had 

considered researching or testing new camera technology, we were told of one 

institution's lot ct involvin a so histicated hi h-definition audiovisual sem 

used by - staff also said that body cameras may have possible applications at high security 

institutions. Although OST staff mentioned that they have several body camera 

devices available for testing, they have not received approval to conduct a pilot 

project. Also resentatives told us that the BOP's camera stem needs 

enhanced 

They 

added that BOP video surveillance should serve the same purpose as body 

cameras- to protect staff and the public when an allegation is made, not to catch 

staff doing something wrong. 

The BOP also reported that a Department-wide 

workgroup on video management is to review and potentially develop standards for video surveillance, 

distribution, and storage. 

92 The BOP's Office of Information Systems is the approval authority for installing systems, 

including security cameras, on the BOP's network. 

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Conclusion 

During our review, from October 2014 through June 2015, the BOP took 

steps to improve its contraband detection and interdiction efforts, including 

automating contraband data collection and deploying new technologies. A 2013 

staff search policy, recently reinstated in all respects relevant to this review, also 

established new search requirements for staff; but the policy lacked effective 

deterrence against staff introducing contraband. In this report, we concluded that 

the BOP must make additional improvements to further deter contraband 

introduction and make its institutions safer for inmates, staff, and the public. We 

identified several areas affecting the BOP's ability to effectively deter contraband 

introductions. 

Despite the BOP's use of TRUINTEL starting in FY 2010 and its efforts to 

automate its contraband tracking, the BOP lacks a comprehensive data collection 

capability that reliably accounts for all contraband recovered within its institutions. 

TRUINTEL, a database for entering initial inmate-related evidence, contains 

confusing and incomplete data and allows staff discretion over how to classify and 

enter contraband, resulting in incomplete data on contraband recoveries. The BOP 

also uses multiple systems for reporting recovered cell phones. The BOP's current 

data collection methods, coupled with the lack of established policies and guidance 

to accurately and consistently document recovered contraband, impede its ability to 

effectively track contraband recoveries and analyze contraband trends. 

We believe that the BOP must continue to engage with its union to seriously 

consider the deficiencies of the reinstated 2013 policy discussed in this report, as 

well as the policies and practices employed by state corrections systems. Careful 

consideration of both areas can help the BOP craft a policy that will more effectively 

deter the introduction of contraband by staff and ensure the safety of BOP 

institutions for staff, visitors, and inmates. Specifically, we found that institutions 

randomly pat searched very few staff and did so infrequently. The 2013 policy also 

allowed staff to possess and use tobacco, which the BOP considers both dangerous 

contraband and a prohibited object for inmates, in undefined "reasonable quantities 

for personal use during work hours." Further, despite our recommendation a dozen 

years ago, the BOP still does not restrict the size or content of staff personal 

property entering its institutions. We reported in 2003 that unrestricted property 

and large personal containers are among the significant methods for introducing 

contraband. In light of the fact that it took over 10 years after the OIG 

recommended that the BOP implement a staff and property search policy for the 

BOP to issue a revised policy in July 2013, we believe the BOP must make this issue 

a priority with the goal of much more timely corrective action to improve the safety 

of BOP institutions. 

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We also found varied hiring practices for front lobby officers and 

vulnerabilities related to institution front entrances, including one institution that 

utilized an Information Receptionist with no experience in corrections as its front 

lobby officer. 

In contrast to the BOP, we found that state prison systems employ more 

stringent measures to deter contraband introductions. For example, some of the 

largest state prisons systems, including California, Florida, Georgia, New York, and 

Texas, utilize random staff pat searches as part of general security procedures. 

Representatives from each state characterized staff pat searches as a useful 

deterrent that prevents the introduction of contraband inside their prisons. Also, 

several states have imposed restrictions on the size of personal containers allowed 

into prisons and have prohibited tobacco and tobacco-related products. In addition, 

unlike BOP staff, state prison staff generally may not return to their vehicles once a 

banned item is discovered during an entry screening procedure. 

The BOP employs several contraband detection technologies to combat the 

ever-changing methods of contraband introduction, and it continues to research, 

test, and install new technologies. However, technology is ineffectual without clear 

guidance and staff trained to properly operate these technologies. We found 

several areas in which the BOP should improve guidance to staff to ensure 

consistent operations of select BOP contraband inter~. Improved 

guidance is needed regarding use of the SecurPASS -, crossgender viewing, and preventing inmates from viewin their scanned images. In 

addition we determined that the 

Although BOP management took steps to improve the Cellular Telephone 

Laboratory's (Lab) mission and operations, and to address its growing backlog, we 

found some of the Lab reports to be in excess of hundreds, and sometimes 

thousands, of pages that contain technical language and duplication. Neither BOP 

managers nor Lab analysts knew how investigators use the Lab reports to further 

an investigation. We believe that the Lab should provide a report that is more 

focused on helping investigators quickly highlight and interpret the most relevant 

information from each phone. 

nd pursue appropriate actions. For example, we identified 

conducted in 2013 and 2014 that were impaired by lack of or 

poor quality of video footage. 

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Recommendations 

To ensure that the BOP can accurately record and track contraband 

recovered within its institutions, we recommend that the BOP: 

1. Develop TRUI NTEL as a comprehensive data collection 

capability that consistently accounts for all contraband recovered, regardless 

of where it was discovered or the institution's security level. 

2. Provide institution staff, both corrections and Special Investigative 

Supervisors, with data collection guidelines and requirements for 

comprehen~ng and inputting recovered contraband into 

TRUINTELIIIIIIIIIIII. 

We recommend that the BOP develop and propose implementation of policies 

that effectively deter the introduction of contraband by staff into BOP institutions, 

including that it: 

3. Develop uniform guidelines and criteria for conducting random staff pat 

searches across all institutions that require a minimum frequency and 

duration for search events to ensure that appropriate numbers of staff on 

each shift are searched with appropriate frequency. 

4. Define what quantities, if any, of tobacco and related tobacco products 

should be authorized for staff to bring into institutions for personal use. 

5. Restrict the size and content of personal property that staff may bring into 

BOP institutions. 

6. Establish procedures whereby all post-declaration items discovered during 

staff screening procedures are documented, along with the identity of the 

staff member involved, as well as more explicit guidelines for when the items 

should be confiscated and when such instances or a series of them should be 

referred for investigation and corrective action. 

7. Evaluate and standardize the selection method for front lobby officers across 

BOP institutions to ensure that qualified and appropriately trained officers 

serve in these critical positions. 

To ensure the effective and efficient operation of new contraband detection 

technologies, we recommend that the BOP: 

8. Review all SecurPASS guida nee to ensure that requirements for cross-gender 

viewing of scanned images are clear and consistent and that inmates are 

prohibited from viewing scanned images, and revise the instructions for staff 

to clarify that the latter prohibition is not limited to cross-gender screening. 

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9. 

To ensure that the Cellular Telephone Laboratory reports and the BOP's 

security camera system effectively assist in the investigation of inmates and staff 

who introduce and/or possess contraband, we recommend that the BOP: 

10. Assess the needs and requirements for Cellular Telephone Laboratory reports 

and implement changes to ensure their usefulness in contraband 

investigations. 

11. Evaluate the existi 

•. to ensure 

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APPENDIX 1 

METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW 

This review examined the BOP's historical, existing, and planned policies, 

procedures, and devices for screening staff, visitors, and inmates for contraband at 

BOP-managed institutions. We also reviewed contraband detection procedures 

employed by selected state prisons and interviewed representatives from seven 

state prison systems about their contraband interdiction strategies, including staff 

searches, tobacco policies, and size and type restrictions of staff persona I property. 

Our fieldwork for this review, which we conducted from October 2014 through April 

2015, included document reviews, data analysis, interviews, site visits, and 

observations. The following provides additional information related to our review 

methodology. 

Full evaluations of the efficacy of each BOP contraband detection device were 

not possible as installation of newer devices was ongoing during our review. 

Rather, we utilized observations; site visits; interviews with BOP Central Office 

staff, as well as institution staff operating the devices; and reviews of operating 

instructions, training materials, policies, and institution guidance in making our 

findings and forming our resulting recommendations regarding the evolving types 

and use of the technologies at issue. 

Document Review 

We reviewed documents from the BOP, selected state prisons, and open 

sources. From the BOP, we reviewed search-related program statements, policies, 

memoranda, forms, and manuals. For existing and pilot program evaluations, we 

reviewed cost estimates, budget justifications, purchase orders, and operating 

manuals relating to BOP's contraband interdiction technologies. We also reviewed 

selected BOP position descriptions and performance work plans and BOP Cellular 

Telephone Laboratory procedures, output reports, and guidance to institutions. 

From the selected state prisons, we reviewed staff search procedures, tobacco 

policies, and restrictions on the size and type of personal property that staff may 

bring into a prison. We also reviewed state Managed Access System (MAS) 

contracts. From open sources, we reviewed articles and information on MAS and 

other contraband detection technologies and relevant federal and state legislation. 

Data Ana lysis 

BOP Data 

To understand trends in the amount and types of contraband recovered from 

BOP institutions, we requested data covering FY 2011 through FY 2014. We 

analyzed data cove ring that time period from two BOP sources - one for 

contraband associated with inmate investigations (TRUINTEL) and one specifically 

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for contraband cell phones reported by institutions ("Cell Phones Recovered" 

reports). We utilized both data sources because the BOP does not have a 

consolidated tracking system for all contraband recovered in its institutions. (See 

the BOP's contraband tracking section on page 12 of this report for discussion of 

the BOP's contraband tracking capabilities.) 

TRUINTEL contains recoverable contraband 

with inmate investigations 

potentially related to an inmate investigation. To develop trends and assess 

tracking methods, we specifically reviewed TRUINTEL data entries from 9 of the 

20 "hard" contraband item types as listed in TRUINTEL. 94 However, after reviewing 

the TRUINTEL data and learning from BOP officials that not all institutions were 

utilizing TRUINTEL until FY 2011 or later, and because the numbers of recovered 

contraband in FY 2011 were artificially low due to the incomplete data, we did not 

include any TRUINTEL data pertaining to FY 2011. 

For this reason, the reports reflect more accurate, 

complete numbers of recovered cell phones than does TRUINTEL, according to BOP 

Central Office staff. The reports are based on regional offices' compilations of 

institutions' monthly reporting of cell phones found. However the re do not 

contain the same details about recovered cell phones, 

as TRUINTEL does. In this report, we present 

the BOP's Cell Phones Recovered report data for FYs 2011 through 2014. 

We also analyzed BOP data on 434 random pat searches conducted since the 

July 2013 policy, as reported by 109 BOP institutions. Our analysis was based on 

random pat search events conducted from January through September 2014 (the 

BOP did not provide search statistics from the remainder of calendar year 2014). 95 

94 Selected contraband types: Alcohol, Ammunition, Currency, Electronic Devices, Firearms, 

Narcotics, Tobacco, Tools, and Weapons. The remaining 11 types include Crime Scene; 

Communications; Escape; Explosives and Chemicals; Gambling; and property including PersonalInmate, Institution; Institution-Issued; Outside-Person; and Staff. 

95 We requested data for a 15-month period; specifically, on October 23, 2014, we requested 

data from July 17, 2013 (issuance of Program Statement 3740.01) through October 17, 2014. 

However, the BOP provided data for only the 9-month period from January through September 2014, 

after, we understand, the 2013 policy was fully implemented at all BOP institutions. 

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Specifically, we analyzed the parameters of the searches, including the duration of 

each search event; the dates and times of the search events; search events 

conducted by institution security level (administrative, low, medium, and high); and 

the specific shifts wherein a random pat search event occurred. 96 To analyze the 

shifts during which a random pat search event occurred, we grouped the reported 

search times into three 8-hour shifts for staff (specific times of each 8-hour shift 

vary by institution). We used 15-minute increments to avoid double counting 

search events that began and ended at the same time: 

1. 8:15 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. for the morning shift, 

2. 4:15p.m. to 12:00 a.m. for the evening shift, and 

3. 12:15 a.m. to 8:00a.m. for the late night shift. 

We then cross-referenced the random pat search data against the BOP's Cell 

Phones Recovered reports and TRUINTEL data to determine whether there were any 

correlations between random pat search frequency and institutions with high 

contraband finds. 

Additionally, we analyzed 329 contraband-related misconduct cases against 

BOP staff based on data provided by the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs from 

FYs 2011 through 2014. Specifically, we analyzed the allegations and suballegations of the cases, the disciplinary actions for each allegation type, the 

investigating agency, and the employee type involved in each case. 

OIG Data 

We reviewed OIG and BOP data on BOP contraband-related complaints, as 

well as substantiated cases against BOP staff, and their outcomes. 97 We utilized 

OIG case management data to determine the nature of the charges involved in BOP 

cases investigated by the OIG. We focused on contraband-related employee 

offense codes of OIG investigations of BOP staff from July 17, 2012, through 

July 17, 2014. 98 Over the 2-year period, the OIG's Investigations Division 

conducted 99 investigations wherein at least 1 employee's contraband-related 

misconduct allegation was substantiated. 99 

96 Of the 434 random pat search events that BOP institutions reported conducting from 

January through September 2014, data for 26 of those events did not include a duration. Therefore, 

our analysis of pat search durations is based on the remaining 408 random pat search events. 

97 Substantiated cases are allegations of BOP staff misconduct for which the OIG opened an 

investigation and found the material facts supported, without regard to whether criminal charges were 

prosecuted or the BOP took disciplinary action. 

98 This 2-year period encapsulates the 1-year period before and after implementation of the 

BOP's 2013 staff search policy. 

99 From July 17, 2012, through July 17, 2014, the OIG opened a total of 444 investigations 

alleging BOP staff misconduct. Of the 444, 194 were substantiated. Of the 194 substantiated 

investigations, we determined that 99 were contraband related. These 99 substantiated investigations 

that suggested a contraband nexus are the 2-year sample of OIG case data that we analyzed. 

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To further assess the effect of the lack of- or poor quality - video footage, 

we gathered information about OIG investigations involving such issues for the 

period of October 1, 2011, through January 23, 2015. 

Interviews 

At the BOP's Central Office, we interviewed officials from the Information, 

Policy, and Public Affairs Division's Offices of Security Technology and Research and 

Evaluation; the Correctional Programs Division's Intelligence Section and Cellular 

Telephone Laboratory; and the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs. At the conclusion of 

our fieldwork, we interviewed the BOP's Assistant Directors for Information, Policy, 

and Public Affairs; the Correctional Programs Division; and the Program Review 

Division for additional information and clarification pertaining to the BOP's search 

policies. We also provided the selected BOP executives with preliminary findings to 

solicit their feedback. 

In BOP institutions, we interviewed staff from the six sites undergoing the 

Millimeter Wave Scanner (MWS) pilot. We conducted video teleconference 

interviews with the Warden and select staff 

we conducted individual and group in-person interviews, which 

included the Warden and Associate Wardens and Captains, Special Investigative 

Supervisors and Lieutenants, front lobby officers, Unit Managers, Counselors, Case 

Management Coordinators, and Case Managers. We also observed existing and 

new contraband interdiction technologies at these two institutions. 

Outside of the BOP, we interviewed corrections officials from California, 

Texas, Florida, Georgia, New York, Mississippi, and Maryland state prisons. The 

purpose of these interviews was to understand the history as to why the state 

implemented a policy and to identify any impacts associated with the policy 

implementation. Our overall goal was to compare and assess potential application 

of state policies with the BOP. We also interviewed selected vendors of MAS 

equipment. We spoke with officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 

Corruption Unit and the OIG's Investigations Division and Cyber Investigations 

Office. We interviewed OIG Special Agents to discuss the impact of problems with 

video camera systems on OIG investigations. Finally, we interviewed 

representatives from the BOP's union, the American Federation of Government 

Employees, Council of Prison Locals 33. 

Site Visits and Demonstrations 

We conducted in-person site visits at 

where we observed several existing and piloted contraband 

interdiction technologies. We also observed a demonstration by the Office of 

Security Technology of some of this equipment at the BOP. 

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APPENDIX 2 

BOP POLICIES GOVERNING SEARCHES OF VISITORS, INMATES, 

AND STAFF 

This appendix contains a brief description of the legal requirements, 

implemented through the BOP's policies for visitor, inmate, and staff searches, to 

prevent the introduction of contraband into BOP institutions. Regarding staff search 

policies, we describe those policies that the BOP reinstated following the Federal 

Labor Relations Authority's cease and desist order and the BOP's June 30, 2015, 

rescission of its 2013 staff search policy, which it reinstated on March 28, 2016. 

Visitor Searches 

BOP Program Statement 5510.15, Searching, Detaining, or Arresting Visitors to 

Bureau Grounds and Facilities (Visitor Search Policy, July 17, 2013) 

This policy provides staff procedures and guidance for searching inmate 

visitors, official visitors, contractors, and volunteers entering BOP grounds and 

facilities, to maintain the safety, security, and orderly operation of those facilities 

and to protect the public. It also provides staff procedures and guidance for 

detaining and arresting visitors pursuant to BOP statutory arrest authority, 

18 U.S.C. § 3050, and involving local and federal law enforcement agencies in 

detention and arrest situations. The policy requires that the BOP post easily 

readable signs at all institution entrances stating that everyone is subject to a 

search of their person and belongings and that entering or attempting to enter BOP 

grounds implies consent to being searched. The signs must define prohibited 

activities and objects and state that violators may be detained or arrested. The 

BOP posts its visitor search policy on its website, along with inmate visiting 

information, which includes its required dress co de and rules on visit duration, 

general behavior, and physical contact. The BOP preapproves all inmate visitors 

using a screening process; inmates are required to place all visitors on their visiting 

list, subject to BOP approval, prior to their visit to an institution. 

Visitor searches may occur randomly or based on reasonable suspicion. 

Whereas random staff searches include searching all staff during a predetermined 

timeframe established by the Warden, random visitor searches include either 

searching all visitors entering at a given time or searching visitors according to a 

predetermined selection method that is established and documented daily. 

Different random selection methods may be used for different visitor types, but 

visitors may not be searched out of the predetermined random selection order 

without reasonable suspicion. The policy provides examples of possible situations 

involving reasonable suspicion of visitors. 

The visitor search policy requires the same general types of authorized 

search methods as those for staff (electronic, pat, visual, and drug screening), with 

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some variations by institution security level. At minimum security institutions, 

random electronic searches and random searches of belongings may be conducted 

at the Camp Administrator's or Warden's discretion. Conversely, at institutions of 

all other security levels, all visitors must clear a metal detector and all their 

belongings are visually searched before they enter. We describe each visitor search 

type below. 

Electronic Searches 

All visitors are searched electronically, either by walk-through or handheld 

metal detector, and their belongings are screened by x-ray. At the six pilot 

institutions where Millimeter Wave Scanners are installed, visitors are still required 

to pass through the scanners before entering BOP institutions. 100 The visitor search 

policy allows randomly searching visitors using ion spectrometry .

101 X-ray 

screening devices may be used routinely, or in addition to, visual searching of 

personal containers and belongings. Visitors fa iii ng to clear a walk-through metal 

detector (WTMD) are searched using a handheld metal detector. Failure to clear 

the handheld metal detector may qualify as reasonable suspicion to perform a 

further pat or visual search. 

Pat Searches 

All visitors are randomly pat searched according to the day's random 

method: either searching all visitors entering at a given time or searching visitors 

according to one of the predetermined selection methods described above. 

Whenever possible, visitor pat searches must be conducted by same-gender 

screening staff and out of the view of others. 

Visual Searches 

Visual searches of a visitor's belongings, which involve opening and exposing 

all contents for visual and manual inspection, may be conducted either as part of a 

random search or with reasonable suspicion and may be done with an x-ray 

screening device. Visual searches of a visitor's person, which involve a non-tactile 

inspection of the body surfaces and cavities after the visitor removes all articles of 

clothing, including religious headwear, may be conducted only when authorized by 

101 BOP Program Statement 5522.01, Ion Spectrometry Device Program (February 24, 2005). 

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the Warden and upon reasonable suspicion (not randomly). Random visual 

searches of visitors' vehicles and vehicle containers are permitted. Visitor vehicle 

searches must be conducted by at least two staff members, and the driver must be 

present, at least 20 feet away from the vehicle, under the direct supervision of one 

staff member; the other staff member visually searches reasonably accessible areas 

of the vehicle. The driver must provide keys to locked compartments or containers. 

Drug Screening 

The BOP's visitor search policy allows drug screening of visitors only when 

authorized by the Warden or a designee upon reasonable suspicion that the visitor 

is under the influence of an intoxicating substance. 

Inmate Searches 

BOP Program Statement 5521.05, Searches of Housing Units, Inmates, and Inmate 

Work Areas (Inmate Search Policy, June 30, 1997) 

BOP institutions are authorized by federal statute and BOP policy to conduct 

searches of inmates and inmate housing and work areas to locate contraband and 

deter its introduction and movement. 102 In addition to screening all new inmates 

upon their arrival at an institution, the BOP conducts routine and random electronic, 

pat, visual, and digital or simple instrument searches of inmates as described 

below. 

Electronic Searches 

The BOP screens inmates, their clothing, and their personal effects with 

electronic devices such as walk-through and handheld metal detectors, whole body 

scanners, and ion spectrometry. Inmates are not required to remove clothing 

during electronic searches. When using the handheld metal detector, staff must 

closely check inmates' body cavity areas for contraband. In Appendix 3, we 

describe the capabilities of the BOP's new WTMDs and whole-body scanners for 

inmates. 

Pat Searches 

Inmate pat searches are inspections of an inmate, inmate's clothing, and 

inmate's personal effects using the hands. Inmates are not required to remove 

clothing during a pat search. A metal detector search may be done in addition to 

102 28 C.F.R. Part 552, Subpart B, Searches of Housing Units, Inmates, and Inmate Work 

Areas; BOP Program Statement 5521.05, Searches of Housing Units, Inmates, and Inmate Work Areas 

(June 30, 1997); and BOP Program Statement 5500.11, CN-1, Correctional Services Manual 

(August 29, 2014). 

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the pat search. Wardens have discretion to determine when and where inmate pat 

searches are to be conducted. 

Visual Searches 

Visual searches of an inmate are non-tactile inspections of all body surfaces 

and body cavities in a manner designed to ensure as much privacy to the inmate as 

practicable. BOP staff must search every article of inmates' clothing and personal 

property, including shoes and other potential contraband hiding places. Under 

28 C.F.R. Part 552, the BOP may visually search an inmate when there is 

"reasonable belief" that contraband may be concealed on the person or a good 

opportunity for concealment has occurred. The BOP further requires that inmates 

reentering the institution after any of these scenarios undergo both a visual search 

and a metal detector screening. The BOP's inmate search policy also requires that 

inmates undergo a visual search when leaving the institution for any reason and in 

other situations, such as when returning from work details. The policy exempts 

minimum security institutions from this requirement. Minimum security institutions 

must establish search procedures for inmate work details and community-based 

programs. Except in emergency situations, a staff member of the same gender as 

the inmate must conduct a visual search. 

Digital or Simple Instrument Searches 

Digital or simple instrument searches are inspections for contraband or any 

other foreign item in an inmate's body cavity by use of fingers or simple 

instruments, such as an otoscope, tongue blade, short nasal speculum, and simple 

forceps. Only designated, qualified BOP health personnel (e.g., physicians, 

physician's assistants, and nurses) may perform these searches, with the Warden 

or Acting Warden's approval and upon reasonable belief that an inmate is 

concealing contraband in or on his or her person. Health personnel must also 

thoroughly examine or x-ray any bandages or casts on an inmate. Medical staff 

may immediately remove any contraband or foreign item if such removal can easily 

be effected by use of fingers or simple instruments. Staff must document all digital 

and simple instrument searches and the reasons for the searches. 

BOP Program Statement 5580.08, Inmate Personal Property (August 22, 2011) 

The purpose of this policy is to enhance an institution's safety and security by 

defining property that inmates are permitted to possess throughout their 

incarceration. These items, subject to staff approval, are primarily pre-owned 

possessions that an inmate retains upon admission into an institution or purchases 

in the commissary. The policy defines contraband into two types: hard and 

nuisance. Hard contraband comprises items such as weapons and narcotics that 

pose a serious threat to an institution's security. Nuisance contraband comprises 

items that may be authorized for inmate possession but present a security threat 

when altered or accu mutated in excessive amounts. These nuisance items include 

publications, food, and government-issued items. The policy also outlines 

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procedures for properly handling contraband confiscated from inmates. All seized 

contraband will be disposed of unless it is needed as evidence for disciplinary action 

or criminal prosecution. In such cases, it will be documented and retained until it is 

not needed for prosecution and will, therefore, be destroyed. 

BOP Program Statement 5522.01, Ion Spectrometry Device Program (February 24, 

2005) 

This policy outlines procedures for using a minimally intrusive screening 

technology, known as ion spectrometry, to reduce the amount of illegal substances 

inside BOP institutions. The policy applies only to visitors and inmates, not to staff. 

All visitors, save for a few exceptions, are subject to ion spectrometry testing 

whether through random selection or due to reasonable suspicion. 103 Sta~ 

select visitors random in an im rtial and nondiscriminatory method - -

. Once selected, participants receive an 

explanation of the testing process and are given an opportunity to refuse the test 

and exit the institution. A handheld device is then passed over the person's hands, 

pants pockets, waist, shoe area, and identification card. Visitors with negative 

results are allowed to enter the institution, while those with positive results are 

given a second test to confirm the presence of an illegal substance. Confirmed 

positive test results may warrant more intrusive searches such as pat downs and 

visual searches. Furthermore, the person's visitation rights may be suspended, 

with the incident documented by institutional staff. 

Ion spectrometry may also be used to test for the presence of illegal 

substances on inmates, their personal belongings, housing units, and work areas. 

Initial positive test results cannot be the sole basis for inmate disciplinary 

proceedings but may be supplemented with other evidence. 

Staff Searches 

On June 30, 2015, in response to a Federal Labor Relations Authority cease 

and desist order, the BOP rescinded its 2013 policy (BOP Program Statement 

3740.01) and reinstated a previously approved 2007 agreement and three 

associated memoranda while the policy was renegotiated. 104 On March 28, 2016, 

the BOP reinstated the policy (BOP Program Statement 3740.02) with minor 

changes not related to this review. 

103 Visitors, including contractors and volunteers, are subject to an ion spectrometry test. 

However, DOJ employees, state law enforcement, Members of Congress, and members of the Judicial 

Branch are exempted and are not screened by the device. 

104 The 2007 agreement and three associated memoranda are rescinded with the March 28, 

2016, reinstatement of the 2013 staff search policy. 

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Electronic Searches of Bureau of Prisons Staff, Agreement (November 8, 2007) 

The agreement requires all staff to clear a metal detection device, either 

walk-through or a handheld, prior to gaining access to the secure confines of an 

institution. The agreement prohibits all random searches of staff, including random 

pat searches, random visual searches of staff belongings, and random searches of 

staff vehicles. Inmates and visitors may not be in the same area or allowed to view 

staff screening procedures. Staff may generally return to their vehicles any items 

unable to clear the metal detectors or x-ray machine. Staff members who leave 

the institution during their shifts are required to clear metal detection upon reentry. 

The agreement directs that staff operating x-ray or metal detectors will receive 

appropriate training prior to operating the devices. It also provides guidance for 

staff with medical conditions that disallow them to pass through an electronic 

screening device. 

Clarification of New Search Procedures, Memorandum (January 11, 2008) 

The memorandum provides clarification to two points of the BOP's amended 

search procedures. First, inmates' visitors under 18 years old should not be 

randomly pat searched as part of daily routine, but may be searched if reasonable 

suspicion indicates they are involved in prohibited activities. Second, other visitors 

such as law enforcement, inmate attorneys, contractors, volunteers, and other 

official visitors should not ordinarily be subject to routine random pat searches. 

However, they all must clear the same electronic search procedures as staff, 

including metal detection for their persons and x-ray of their belongings. 

Staff Entrance Procedures- Additional Guidance, Memorandum (January 28, 2008) 

The memorandum restates that it is the responsibility of the employee to 

clear the metal detector, either by passing all items through the metal detector or 

by placing all items on an available x-ray machine for screening. Staff conducting 

searches must be reasonably assured that staff entering the institution does not 

possess prohibited objects; the screening staff member is responsible for initially 

determining whether reasonable assurance exists. Supervisors are consulted only 

after the origin of the item causing an alert cannot be initially resolved with 

reasonable assurance by the screening officer. The memorandum describes the 

role of the supervising staff and provides additional guidance on determining 

whether reasonable suspicion exists to conduct a limited pat or visual search of the 

alerting area. 

Confiscation and Storage of Firearms Discovered during Entrance Search 

Procedures (July 15, 2008) 

This memorandum provides staff guidance for confiscating and storing 

firearms and weapons or dangerous objects other than firearms, discovered during 

entrance searches at all institution entry points and during authorized vehicle 

searches. 

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APPENDIX 3 

BOP CONTRABAND DETECTION DEVICES 

Walk-through Metal Detectors 

The BOP began screening all staff, visitors, and inmates using CEIA 601 

walk-through metal detectors (WTMD) in January 2008, when it determined that 

WTMDs are the best method to prevent weapons and other dangerous metal 

contraband from bein introduced into or moved within an institution. 105 

105 Prior to January 2008, the BOP screened visitors and inmates with older model WTMDs. 

106 The - mission includes identifying and screening new security equipment and 

technology with potential for BOP use and conducting operational evaluations (analyses of a specific 

technology or system to determine whether it should be adopted for BOP use) of potential technology 

solutions to BOP security issues. The .. also establishes initial BOP-wide standards for use of new 

technology systems. BOP Program Statement 1150.06, Office of Security Technology (April 5, 2013), 

Section 2, Responsibilities. 

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Managed Access System 

Among the contraband interdiction technologies used or piloted by the BOP, 

the Managed Access System (MAS) -which prevents unauthorized cell phones 

from sending and receiving calls, data, and text messages -addresses contraband 

already inside institutions rather than preventing the items from entering. Despite 

the recent installations of the MAS by some state prison systems that we described 

in the Introduction section, the BOP is not planning to purchase or install current 

MAS technology. The BOP's decision is based on the results of a 60-day pilot 

evaluation it conducted in 2014 to determine the effectiveness of the MAS in a 

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typical BOP (medium security) environment. The pilot was limited to a subset of 

cell phone frequencies and involved one housing unit. 112 

In response to a congressional request for a cost estimate to implement a 

cell phone detection solution at a "representative BOP facility," the BOP provided 

various cost estimates for implementing the MAS at three types of BOP institutions: 

rural, light urban, and metropolitan. The BOP's report to Congress included current 

estimated costs in these three contexts, ranging from $1.795 million for a rural site 

to $3.08 million for a metropolitan site. However, the BOP emphasized that it is 

premature to estimate costs to implement a nationwide MAS program at all federal 

prisons because the technology continues to evolve and improve. 

The technology works by intercepting and rerouting calls attempted from 

unauthorized phones while permitting approved and emergency numbers. Although 

signal-jamming devices are illegal under the Communications Act of 1934, the 

Federal Communications Commission considers the MAS legal because it intercepts, 

not jams, cell phone signals. 

112 Accardi to various sou 

The 

BOP's 2014 MAS pilot was limited to 2G and 3G devices, according to 

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APPENDIX 4 

TRUINTEL DATABASE ENTRIES AND CELL PHONES RECOVERED 

REPORT EXAMPLES 

TRUINTEL Database Example 

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Cell Phones Recovered Report Example 

Source: Cell Phones Recovered report, FY 2014 

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APPENDIX 5 

THE BOP'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

Jtt I l-1 

E:!bit L 

: i IS: . .. 

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F'l • : 'Ti 1 J\ 1 I II. r , , " r In~ '· r• ;..or 

r t 

ReeoJ~~M~ndAt•ona 

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Reeponoes 'I'he BOP agrees wi::l: this reco:o.:r.endati.on, and ~.-ill develop 

a~ alterna~ive c~prehens~ve data collection capability trwt 

consistently acco~nts !or all contraband recovered. 

Recommendation 2. Provide institution sta!f, both corrections and 

SIS officero, with data collection guidelinea and requirements for 

comprehensively identifying and inputting recovered contraband into 

TRUINTEt, •••••• 

Responoe a The BOP a9rees with this recommendation, and will provide 

institution otar:f with data collection guidelines and requirements 

!or co~prehens:.•tely identifying and inputt.ing reco•tered contraband. 

We recomnend that the BOP develoF and propoae ~mplernentation 

o! pollcles trAt effectively deter the tn~roduct.ion of contraband 

by staff into ~P inst:tutions. incl~ding ~r~t it: 

Reco:nmend4tion 3. Devc:op u:n form guidelines 4t~d criteria for 

conduct!.ng rando~ staff pa~ searches across all ins:itutions ~r.at 

req.Jire a minim'.lrr. freq.1ency and d:.ualion !or oearch even~s to ensure 

that appropriate n~bers of staff on Qac~: shift are searched with 

appropr~ate frequency. 

Response: The BOP agrees with thin 1·ecommendation, and will develop 

and propose changes to the staff search pol icy that includes a minimum 

frequency and duration requirement for randomly pat aearching staff. 

Recommendation 4. Define what quantit1es, if any, of tobacco and 

related tobacco products sho•Jld hE~ authon.zed for staff to bring into 

inDtitutions for personal use. 

Responae: The BOP agrees with thul recommendatlon, and will develop 

and propose cr~nges to the appropriate policy(iesl to define what 

q.:tmtit~es, if any. o! tobacco and r~lated ~obacco prodacts are 

authori:ed for staff to bring into instltutions for persondl use. 

Recommendation 5. Restrict the :uze and con~ent. of personal property 

that Rtaff may bring into BOP inatitationa 

Roaponoo: The BOP ag1:cca with thiu n:co!T.mendation, and will develop 

and propose changes to the appropriate policy(iesl to restrict the 

oize and content of personal property that staff may bring into BOP 

i.not:ltutions. 

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Recommendation 6. Eotablish procedureD whereby all post-declaration 

i~ems discovered during staff screening procedures are documented, 

along ·.-ith the ident1ty of the staff member ~nvolved, and guidelineo 

for when the :tema should be confiscated, and when such inatancen 

or a series o! them shou!.d be referred ~or im·eatigation a::d 

corrective action. 

Response: The BOP ag1·ees with this recor.'lmendation, and w-ill develop 

and establish procedures for documenting post-declaration iterw 

diacovered during ota!f screening procedu1ca, including the identity 

of the statf member. Additionally, BO? will develop and establish 

procedures for determining when itemo ohould be confiscated, and when 

incidents should he referred for inventigat.ion and corrective 

action. 

Recommendation ·1. Evaluate and standardize the selection mett.od for 

!rent lcbby o!f icers across BOP i:u;t itut ions to enst;re qualified ilnd 

appropn.ately trained officers &erve in these critical po:~ition.!i. 

Response: BOP agrees witt t.tis rec~r.encao:ion, a:-.d will evaluate 

and standardize the selection ~thod for ensuring qualified and 

appropriately t.ra1ned staff serve in !ront lobby officer posit..ionn. 

To ensure the effective and effic1ent operation o! new 

contraband detectlon technologies, we recommend that the BOP: 

Recommendation 8. Revie•,.r all SecurPM!i guidance to ensure that 

reqt;irement~ for cross-gender viewing of ~canned images are clear 

and consistent, and t.r..at :.n."Tlates are proh>..bited from viewir.g scanned 

inages, a..'1d revise tr.e inst.ructl.ons for staff to clarify thrlt the 

latter prohibit", ion is not .l.irni ted to croos -gender scre<:ni ng. 

Response: BOP agrees ,,,.ith this z-eco':l'lmendat.l.cn. and will re·:lew all 

SecurPASS guidar.ce to ensure clarity and consistency of :..nstruct.ion 

that inmaten are prohibited froT viewing a:l scanned it:\agec, 

including both their own, and crooo -gende.r screening ima9c8. 

Recommendation 9. Re~ise existing Millimeter wave Scanner training 

materialo to ensure that it addresses 

Response' '!he BOP agrees with th1 n recc~anenda-::: ion. and w1ll enh&"lce 

existing Millimeter ftave Sca~'1~r train~ng materlals to er~ure tr~t 

t.hey identify 

) 

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To ensure the Cellular Telephone Laboratory reports and the 

BOP's security camera system effectively aoaiot in the investigation 

of inmateo ond staff who introduce and/or posseao contraband, we 

recommend that the BOP: 

Recommendation 10. Assess the needs and requirements for Cellular 

Telephone Laboratory reports and implement changes to enaure their 

use!ulneos in contraband investigations. 

Respocao a The BOP agrees vit.."l this recOI"'lTlendation, and will assess 

the needD and requireme.!'lt for Cellular Telephone Laboratory reports 

and implement changes to ensure their usefulness in contraband 

investigations. 

Recommendation 11. Evaluate the existing oecurity camera system to 

identify needed upgrades, including to 

Reaponoot The BOP agrees with this recommendation, and will 

evaluate the existing security camera oyotem to identify needed 

upgrades, to include ensuring.lllllllllilllllllllllllllllllllllll 

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APPENDIX 6 

OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP'S RESPONSE 

The OIG provided a draft of this report to the BOP. The BOP's response is 

included in Appendix 5 above. Below, we discuss the OIG analysis of the BOP's 

response and actions necessary to close the recommendations. 

Recommendation 1: Develop TRUINTEL as a comprehensive 

data collection capability that consistently accounts for all contraband recov:ered, 

regardless of where it was discovered or the institution's security level. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will develop an alternative comprehensive data collection capability that 

consistently accounts for all contraband recovered. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please describe an alternative data collection ca bili that 

will consistent! account for all contraband recovered includin 

Recommendation 2: Provide institution staff, both corrections and Special 

Investigative Supervisors, with data collection guidelines and requirements for 

liiliili~ively identifying and inputting recovered contraband into TRUINTEL. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will provide institution staff with data collection guidelines and requirements 

for comprehensively identifying and inputting recovered contraband. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please provide a copy of guidelines and requirements for 

identifying and logging recovered contraband into the BOP's data collection system. 

Also, please describe how the BOP will rectify the tracking and accounting 

discrepancies identified in the OIG report. 

Recommendation 3: Develop uniform guidelines and criteria for conducting 

random staff pat searches across all institutions that require a minimum frequency 

and duration for search events to ensure that appropriate numbers of staff on each 

shift are searched with appropriate frequency. 

Status: Resolved. 

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BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will develop and propose changes to the staff search policy to include a 

minimum frequency and duration requirement for randomly pat searching staff. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please provide developed or proposed changes to the BOP's 

staff search policy to include a minimum frequency and duration requirement for 

randomly pat searching staff. 

Recommendation 4: Define what quantities, if any, of tobacco and related 

tobacco products should be authorized for staff to bring into institutions for 

personal use. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will develop and propose changes to the appropriate policy(ies) to define 

what quantities, if any, of tobacco and related tobacco products are authorized for 

staff to bring into institutions for personal use. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please provide developed or proposed policy changes to 

define what quantities, if any, of tobacco and related tobacco products staff is 

authorized to bring into institutions for personal use. Also, please describe 

guidance for authorized staff allowances, possession, and use of smoke and 

smokeless tobacco and related tobacco products. 

Recommendation 5: Restrict the size and content of personal property 

that staff may bring into BOP institutions. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will develop and propose changes to the appropriate policy(ies) to restrict 

the size and content of persona I property that staff may bring into BOP institutions. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please provide developed or proposed policy changes to 

restrict the size and content of personal property that staff may bring into BOP 

institutions. Also, please describe guidance that defines a maximum size limit of 

personal containers and bags and identifies personal property items that staff may 

bring into BOP institutions. 

Recommendation 6: Establish procedures whereby all post-declaration 

items discovered during staff screening procedures are documented, along with the 

identity of the staff member involved, as well as more explicit guidelines for when 

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the items should be confiscated and when such instances or a series of them should 

be referred for investigation and corrective action. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will develop and establish procedures for documenting post-declaration items 

discovered during staff screening procedures, including the identity of the staff 

member. The BOP will also develop and establish procedures for determining when 

items should be confiscated and when incidents should be referred for investigation 

and corrective action. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please provide procedures for documenting post-declaration 

items discovered during staff screening procedures, including the identity of the 

staff member, as well as procedures for when items should be confiscated and 

when incidents should be referred for investigation and corrective action. 

Recommendation 7: Evaluate and standardize the selection method for 

front lobby officers across BOP institutions to ensure that qualified and 

appropriately trained officers serve in these critical positions. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will evaluate and standardize the selection method for ensuring that qualified 

and appropriately trained staff serve in front lobby officer positions. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please describe how the BOP will evaluate and select front 

lobby officers (screening staff) and provide front lobby officer minimum 

qualifications and formal and on-the-job training requirements. 

Recommendation 8: Review all SecurPASS guidance to ensure that 

requirements for cross-gender viewing of scanned images are clear and consistent 

and that inmates are prohibited from viewing scanned images, and revise the 

instructions for staff to clarify that the latter prohibition is not limited to crossgender screening. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will review all SecurPASS guidance to ensure clarity and consistency of 

instruction that inmates are prohibited from viewing all scanned images, including 

their own and cross-gender scan ned images. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please provide updated documentation to include, but not be 

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limited to, updated that clearly and 

consistently articulate staff guidance on cross-gender scanning and viewing of 

images, as well as all detection technology manuals, memoranda, handbooks, and 

policies that clearly establish that inmates are not to be shown any scanned images 

or other output data that could be used to circumvent or defeat detection 

capabilities. 

Recommendation 9: 

materials to ensure that the 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will enhance existin Millimeter Wave Scanner traini materials to ensure 

that th iden 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please provide copies of all u ated Millimeter Wave Scanner 

traini materials and instructional manuals 

Also, please 

provide the BOP's strategy for how it will train new and re-train existing screening 

staff personnel on the Millimeter Wave Scanner. 

Recommendation 10: Assess the needs and requirements for Cellular 

Telephone Laboratory reports and implement changes to ensure their usefulness in 

contraband investigations. 

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will assess the needs and requirements for Cellular Telephone Laboratory 

reports and implement changes to ensure their usefulness in contraband 

investigations. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please describe how the BOP's plan will assess the needs and 

requirements for Cellular Telephone Laboratory reports and how the BOP will 

implement changes to make the reports more useful in contraband investigations. 

Status: Resolved. 

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BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will evaluate the existin to iden needed 

... to include ensuring 

OIG Analysis: The BOP's planned actions are responsive to our request. By 

September 30, 2016, please describe how the BOP will evaluate the current 

security camera system to identify needed upgrades. As part of the plan, please 

outline the BOP's status for u rades rovide an estimated completion date 

for upgrades at and describe how the BOP will 

ensure 

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The Department of Justice Office of the I nspector General 

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity 

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, 

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and 

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department's 

operations. I nformation may be reported to the DOJ 

OIG's hotline at www.justice.gov/ oig/ hotline or 

(800) 869-4499. 

Offi ce of the Inspect or General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

www .justice .gov/oig 

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