JSOU Report 06-6 One Valley at a Time Adrian T. Bogart III
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

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Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, President

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education

The Apollinaire Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

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JSOU Report 06-9

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

Beyond Draining

the Swamp

Urban Development 

and Counterterrorism 

in Morocco

Stephen R. Dalzell
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2764; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of 

Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-08-3
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

USSOCOM, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Previous Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, September 2005, J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005, Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

Executive Report, JSOU First Annual Symposium (2–5 May 2006)

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton
Contents

Foreword ............................................................................. vii

About the Author .................................................................. ix

1. Introduction ...................................................................... 1

2. The Threats to Morocco ..................................................... 3

3. The Government’s Response .............................................. 9

4. Implications for United States Strategy 

 and Policy Within the Global War on Terror..................... 19

5. Conclusions .................................................................... 25

Endnotes ............................................................................. 27

vii

Foreword

I

n this paper civil affairs officer Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dalzell

discusses ways that the Kingdom of Morocco is addressing 

some of the fundamental social and physical needs of its growing population in order to preempt social unrest—and the potential 

for support to extremist groups. Morocco’s campaign against Islamic 

extremism merits study because of its importance for the global war 

on terrorism and the apparent linkages between urban conditions 

and domestic terrorist groups. 

Using interviews, government documents from Morocco and 

the United States, and other published sources, Lieutenant Colonel 

Dalzell sought to determine if and how the Moroccan strategy can 

serve as a model for other partners in the global war on terrorism. 

His analysis found that the Moroccan strategy offers an example of 

integrating socio-economic, ideological, political, and security-sector

reforms, particularly in the growing sophistication of Moroccan efforts 

to eliminate informal housing areas and to increase the government’s

capacity in urban policing. 

The author’s on-site research observes that establishing security in Moroccan housing areas means more than improving military 

capabilities or increasing the presence and performance of police. 

Threats to stability brought on by substandard living conditions and 

a general lack of opportunity in certain areas of Morocco need to be 

addressed using pluralistic approaches to improve security, enhance 

participatory local governance, and develop the physical and social 

infrastructure. His insightful assessment and observations certainly support the importance of fostering nonkinetic and indirect 

approaches to conducting the global war on terrorism. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

ix

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Dalzell has been affiliated with

Special Operations Forces (SOF) for 12 years, starting as a 

direct support team leader in the 425th Civil Affairs Battalion. 

As a branch chief in the Joint Staff J-3 Deputy Directorate for Special 

Operations, he was responsible for SOF input to joint doctrine, policy, 

strategic plans, and readiness monitoring. He also represented the 

SOF community on numerous study groups, including support for 

the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. He is currently assigned as 

deputy G3, 352nd Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, Maryland.

LTC Dalzell coauthored four reports as an Army Fellow at the 

RAND Corporation in 2002: 

a. Attracting Cutting-Edge Skills Through Reserve Component 

Participation

b. Installation Planning for WMD Preparedness

c. Past and Future: Insights for Reserve Component Use

d. Future Insurgency Threats. 

This monograph was written while LTC Dalzell was a Senior 

Service College Fellow at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, in 

2005‐06. During that time, he also won first place in the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff annual essay contest for his strategy article, 

“Where the Streets Have No Names: Looking Past Operation Iraqi 

Freedom to Future Urban Operations.” The article was published 

in Joint Force Quarterly, No. 43 (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University, 2006).

He has taught at the American University in Cairo and University 

of Maryland (Cairo campus) and presented papers at conferences of 

the Middle Eastern Studies Association and Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in 

International Relations from Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California; Master of Arts in National Security Studies from 

California State University, San Bernardino; and a Doctor of Political 

Science from the University of California, Santa Barbara. His dissertation was “Building Coalitions and Cementing Deals: Housing Policy 

Reform in Mubarak’s Egypt” (2006). 
MAURITANIA MALI

WESTERN

SAHARA

M O R O C C O

ALGERIA

S P A I N

PORTUGAL

Madeira

Canary Is.

Str. of Gibraltar

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

Dakhla

Rabat Oran

Casablanca

Lisbon

Madrid

Gibraltar

In Salah

Agadir

Meknes

Fes

Tangier

Marrakech

Morocco and Surrounding Area


Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

1. Introduction

When you’re up to your elbows in alligators, it’s tough to 

remember that your job was to drain the swamp. 

Alligators and swamps make a convenient metaphor for debates 

on how one can go about defeating an insurgency, terrorist 

group, or other non-state armed group—especially since the 

user can avoid specifying exactly who the alligators are or what the 

actual “swamp” is. Likewise, urban planners and policymakers often 

use military metaphors to describe their efforts—for example, the 

war on drugs and Morocco’s lutte contre les bidonvilles (“struggle 

against shanty towns”). In both cases, the metaphors assume that 

what comes next is inherently good, or at least that good options for 

the next phase will be available when the time comes.

What if instead of thinking of security as “the lack of terrorists 

on our streets,” we think of trusted, well-trained police officers and

communities creating an environment that doesn’t allow for terrorism? What if we didn’t think about wiping the city clear of shanty 

towns, but of ensuring that every 

citizen has a decent, affordable place 

to live, including a community that 

meets his or her social, intellectual, 

and physical needs?

This paper argues that such differences in orientation affect both the 

outputs and outcomes of policy and looks to Morocco for examples of 

creative steps in combating terrorism, steps that hold great promise 

for success and that other countries should study closely. The promises and risks of these tactics and strategies offer insights into how the 

global campaign against Islamist extremism is being fought and how 

the United States should be contributing to its success.

The current phase of Morocco’s conflict against Islamic extremism began on 16 May 2003, when 14 young Moroccan men attacked 

four targets in Casablanca with improvised explosive devices. The 

attacks targeted the Jewish Community Center, two restaurants 

and a hotel, killing a total of 33 people. The Casablanca Jewish 

What if we didn’t think about 

wiping the city clear of shanty 

towns, but of ensuring that 

every citizen has a decent, 

affordable place to live ...


JSOU Report 06-9

Cemetery also was damaged, but apparently not intentionally. While 

the attacks were intended to be suicidal, only 12 bombers died.1 

This attack was only the most visible expression of what can 

be best labeled Jihadist Salafism. While not perfect, this term

appropriately incorporates both the historical, philosophical roots 

of the movement (salafism) and the current operational focus on

violently attacking those it defines as apostate or infidels.2 This paper 

evaluates this threat and Morocco’s response through four primary 

windows: socioeconomic development, ideology, politics, and security3 and closes with a discussion of lessons for the global war on 

terror. 
Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

2. The Threats to Morocco

Socioeconomic Development: Morocco’s Informal Housing Areas

The initial hypothesis of this study was that the critical battleground in Morocco’s campaign against Islamic extremists is the informal housing areas of its major cities. Generally speaking, “informal housing” describes one type of substandard housing 

in any metropolitan area, and it is often used interchangeably with 

“slum,” “shanty town,” “squatter” city, or local terms such as favela

(Brazil), bidonville (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), or ashwa’iyya

(Egypt). Researchers often choose to focus on either physical characteristics (quality and permanence of the housing, connections to 

infrastructure) or the legal status of property ownership and construction. 

Morocco’s urban areas have four types of housing that can fall 

into the United Nations (UN) category of “slums”: 

a. Medinas are old sections in pre-colonial cities.4

b. Intra-muros are neighborhoods built by squatters for selfoccupancy, without official permission and generally on

public land, inside current city limits

c. Peripheral slums are like intra-muros, but built around or 

outside current city limits. 

d. Illegal districts or clandestine neighborhoods are units built 

by contractors on private land but without official permits.5

Morocco’s informal housing areas are an important and growing 

part of the urban scene. In the biggest city, Casablanca, they house 

half a million people, 10 percent of the city’s total.6

Bidonville residents not only endure incredible squalor, they are 

cut off from much of the city’s broader political network. “There are 

no voluntary associations in Thomasville and no political activity,” 

Jean-Pierre Tuquoi writes. “People vote for a man and the promises 

he will never keep. With very few exceptions, politicians never set foot 

in the shanty towns. Mosques ... are the only focus of social life in 

the [Casablanca] shanty towns.” 7

When political participation fails to integrate society, informal 

housing areas are inherently hard for the government to control. 


JSOU Report 06-9

Streets are often narrow, winding, and unmarked; there is no way 

to link an individual to a home in a specific location; and the lack of

economic development means strangers rarely enter, and they are 

easily identified when they do. Anecdotally, this situation was compounded in Morocco by a perception within the government that a 

police presence is a “service,” to which bidonville residents were not 

entitled, rather than an imperative for the protection of the state. 

Ideology: The Struggle for Legitimacy

... We also stress to honest Muslims that they should move, 

incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation, amid such grave 

events and hot atmosphere so as to liberate themselves 

from those unjust and renegade ruling regimes, which 

are enslaved by the United States. They should also do so 

to establish the rule of God on earth. The most qualified 

regions for liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the land of the two holy mosques [Saudi Arabia], 

and Yemen.... 

— Osama bin Laden, February 2003 8

Osama bin Laden’s hopes for Morocco notwithstanding, the country 

stands out among Arab and Muslim nations for its broad range of 

thinking on the connections between Islam and political life. Among 

these are the Sufi orders, Justice and Development Party (PJD), and

Movement for Justice and Charity (MJC) with their representative 

leaders and groups. 

Like many Muslim countries, Morocco has a rich and varied experience with Sufi orders, the esoteric expression of traditional Islam.

Sufism has an innate sense of resistance to hierarchy, occasionally

threatening regimes, but also can provide an alternative to radical 

political Islam. The largest of the Moroccan orders, the Boutchichi, 

provides a “social cement” by attracting several hundred thousand 

followers from all sectors and classes.9 More important politically, 

a Boutchichi—Ahmed Toufiq—has been the Minister of Religious

Endowments and Islamic Affairs since 2002. This result gives hope 

to some that he can find a way to encourage the Sufi approach in

Moroccan mosque-state relations. 


Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

Founded by former resistance leader Dr. Abdelkrim Khatib in 

2000, the PJD recognizes the King’s role in Moroccan life and accepts 

democracy. While favoring restoration of Islamic law (sharia), the 

party condemned the Casablanca bombings and remains in dialogue 

with other political groups on issues such as women’s rights. 

The major Islam-oriented political organization least accommodating to the current regime yet still nonviolent is Sheikh 

Abdelsalaam Yassine’s al-Adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity). 

From 1973-1989, Sheikh Yassine published 15 works, offering a synthesis of Sufism and early Muslim Brotherhood thinking. He founded

the MJC in 1985 and refuses to accept elections or the legitimacy 

of the monarchy. The MJC remains officially banned but is allowed

to operate within tacitly negotiated parameters.

While Sheikh Yassine may not personally endorse violence, his 

critique of the status quo may nonetheless provide an ideological 

basis for those Moroccans who do. Yassine’s platform, as expressed 

in a memorandum sent to King Mohamed VI on 14 November 1999, 

calls on the King to correct the economic, social, and political inequities he inherited from his father. This could begin, Yassine proposes, 

by using the royal fortune to repay the government’s $20 billion debt 

and invest the remainder in education and infrastructure.10

Politics: Monarchy Without Monopoly

Morocco has a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy, with 

Mohamed VI succeeding his late father, Hassan II, on 30 July 1999. 

Both the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are appointed 

by the King. The numerous political parties can be divided into five

informal blocs, four of which gained at least 13 percent of seats in 

the 2002 Chamber of Representatives election. This is key—while 

other Arab countries have used one-party systems to maintain 

strong leaders in power, Morocco has dispersed participation into a 

spectrum of parties.

Security: The Threat from Jihadist Salafism

The PJD, MJC, and Sufi groups are not an immediate threat to the

regime. The real threat, the violent Islamist current in Morocco, hides 

its form behind a multitude of names. “Islamic Combatant Group,” 

“Moroccan Armed Group,” or “Armed Islamic Group” is one set of 


JSOU Report 06-9

closely related labels, but subsets of the same broad tendency have 

also been called the Jemaa Serat al-Mustaqin (“Right Way” Group), 

al-Hijra w’al-Takfir (translated various ways, including “Exodus and 

Excommunication” that refers to members’ intention to treat other 

Muslims as apostates), or Salafia Jihadia (which Pargeter states is 

more a current of thought and a lumping of various jihadist strands, 

rather than a specific group name11). Some experts argue that different labels describe either hierarchical levels of organization or functionally/geographically distinct organizations, but most concede that 

none of these distinctions are definitive.

At the center of Jihadist Salafism’s concentric circles of supporters are the hard-core leaders, who tend to be well-educated and 

home-grown.12 Many of the initial leaders joined the active Islamist 

youth movement of the 1960s, then became radicalized.13 (This 

“first wave” may in turn have been influenced by the importation

of outside teachers from other countries during Morocco’s move to 

an Arabic-based educational system in the 1960s.)14 These former 

student Islamists fed the stream of Moroccans going to fight against

the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 

When that conflict ended, former student Islamists and former

“Afghan Arabs” formed the cadre of Jihadist Salafist groups and

began recruiting for the next circle, rank and file members.15 One 

branch was organized in the early 1990s in Sale16 and by 2002 

reportedly had 400 members. Most of the 94 individuals connected 

to the Casablanca bombings (those who either died 

as attackers or were arrested afterward) came from 

that city’s slums and were either unemployed, 

worked in the informal sector, or had small, traditional businesses.17

The final ring of support comes from the general public. While the Moroccan public generally 

condemns terrorism in principle, this may not be 

absolute. “The Islamist tendencies have ‘proximity 

work’ that is exceptional,” says Rabat urban specialist Mohammed 

Haddy. “When a breadwinner is sick, leaders come to the family with 

a doctor, take care of the family, and provide all that they need ..., 

creating a moral obligation on the part of the family to the leaders. 

They know some graduates are out of work ... so they give money 

to start businesses, on the condition that there is a secret contract 

Most of the 

94 individuals 

connected to 

the Casablanca 

bombings ... 

came from that 

city’s slums ...
Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

between them and the people who receive help. This network is so 

uncontrolled that it goes deeper and deeper into the social fabric of 

Morocco, into the poor sectors in particular.” In other cases, these 

networks can manage the flow of goods and cash, in Iran-Contratype circles of exchange.18

From 1998 to September 2001, Jihadist Salafist groups focused

on supporting Al Qaeda operatives transiting or living within 

Morocco.19 After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the Moroccan groups began shifting to domestic targets. Initially, these were 

dispersed and of low intensity, featuring attacks on unveiled women 

and other social targets.20

One remaining question relates to the connections between 

Moroccan Jihadist Salafism, Al Qaeda (narrowly defined as the global

leadership), and Al Qaeda-inspired groups. Most observers agree 

that Al Qaeda and the Algerian-based Group for Salafist Preaching

and Combat (GSPC), largely comprised of non-Moroccans, may move 

through Morocco and have contact with the Moroccan groups, but 

are fundamentally distinct. 

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

3. The Government’s Response

Socioeconomic Development:

Not Just Demolition but Rebuilding Community

While this analysis looks at Morocco’s urban policies in light of 

today’s terrorist threat, the Moroccan government and civil 

society have been concerned about the spread of informal 

housing and its potential for producing antiregime elements for many 

years. At the same time, the Casablanca attacks, in the context of 

the global effort against terrorism, helped hold attention on these 

urban programs.21

Globally, there are three general types of programs against informal housing: 

a. Upgrading is allowing the residents of an informal housing 

area to remain in place, while the state provides some or all 

of the missing infrastructure.22

b. Resettlement is relocating the inhabitants to new housing 

units built by the state. 

c. Sites and Services is a compromise that gives inhabitants 

new living space and connections to utilities, but not ready 

housing. 

Morocco followed and adapted all three of these paradigms over 

the decades. In fiscal years 1999-2001, the government addressed at

least 100 neighborhoods, affecting 64,691 families at a cost of 2.09 billion dirham (approximately $300 million at today’s exchange rate).23

How to improve these programs remains a topic of research and 

deliberation. UN-HABITAT notes that “Confidence in resettlement as

the perceived unique and best answer to the slum issue (in Morocco) 

has entirely ceased during the last 15 years,” adding that the only 

real hope is a combination of regularizing projects and overall provision of services.24 The government has encouraged critical analysis of 

its progress in this effort. For example, urban policy researcher Francoise Navez-Bouchanine’s evaluation of urban policies, sponsored by 

the Ministry of Housing in 1998, provided both baseline data and 

policy recommendations, including the integration of social programs 

into the process of upgrading slums or resettling inhabitants.25
10

JSOU Report 06-9

One recent innovation was using private enterprise to provide 

utilities in urban areas, starting with electricity.26 By increasing confidence in the ability of outsiders to provide services, such projects

can lead to similar ones for water and sanitation. Because contractors aim to reduce costs, they can push innovation—for example, 

because most bidonville streets do not have heavy vehicle traffic,

pipes running under them do not need to be buried as deeply as in 

other parts of the city.27

Another major step was taken when the Moroccan government 

joined the Cities Alliance, Cities Without Slums initiative. The Moroccan program, Villes sans Bidonvilles, calls for eliminating all bidonvilles with more than 200,000 families by 2010.28

While these efforts were underway before the Casablanca 

attacks, they have grown in prominence since then. King Mohamed 

VI went to Sidi Moumen 2 weeks after the attacks to officially launch

a series of development projects there.29 In 2004 one city was completely cleared of bidonvilles, three were “partly addressed,” and 13 

were still in progress.30 One high-profile project targets Sale’s largest

bidonville, Sehb el Caid, which comprises 13.5 hectares and 2,544 

families (Figure 1). There, the government is providing infrastructure 

upgrades for 1,239 households, while 1,305 families move to the new 

housing area of Said Hajji (Figure 2).31

Even more important than the material impact of these programs 

is that each component is now being evaluated in terms of social 

Figure 1. Sale’s largest bidonville, Sehb el Caid
11

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

factors. For example, building only one water meter per street in 

a bidonville not only simplifies the project but requires residents

to elect one of their own to monitor usage, determine each family’s bill, and collect the money, creating a culture of participation 

and accountability.32 Another component of the new campaigns is 

accompagnement social, whereby outside facilitators help the bidonville populace to determine their goals, priorities, and unacceptable 

outcomes from the housing program. Besides ensuring money is well 

spent, this approach builds citizens’ understanding of participation, 

skills at conflict-resolution, and a sense of ownership.

Fittingly, the Villes sans Bidonvilles program is itself being incorporated into the more comprehensive National Initiative for Human 

Development (INDH in French). Announced by the King in late 2005, 

this program focuses on coordinating construction of housing and 

infrastructure with new community centers, youth and gender programs, and sports.33

United States Support. Much of what is being done in this area comes 

with direct or indirect support of the U.S. Government. As early as the 

1980s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was 

using loan guarantees and other programs to encourage investment 

in housing, particularly the upgrading of clandestine neighborhoods. 

Figure 2. Homes in Said Hajji, development where about half of Sehb el 

Caid households will relocate
12

JSOU Report 06-9

Most USAID support for informal-housing programs is now channeled through more comprehensive programs, such as INDH. USAID 

provides technical support within communities, on specific subject

areas—for example, providing grants to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with expertise and helping develop Moroccan NGOs. 

USAID also gives small grants to community-based organizations for 

pilot projects, such as community centers and literacy programs.

Challenges. The first challenge to this program is the simple shortage

in personnel trained to conduct accompagnement social. One urban 

specialist estimated as many as 2,000 social workers could be needed 

in each major city.34

The second challenge is the tension between conducting accompagnement social and the desire to rapidly complete the Cities Without Slums program. One person involved in the program said that 

while the government sees accompagnement social as a way to get 

bidonville residents to accept the government plan, NGOs see it as a 

way to let inhabitants affect that plan before a decision is made. In 

fact, the existence of this discussion reflects the degree to which the

Moroccan government has already started seeing past today’s problems to sustainable solutions. 

The final challenge, one rarely mentioned by interview subjects, is

the most worrisome of all—the risk of rising expectations. A successful 

program of accompagnement social allows the public to better understand the causes and extent of their own dissatisfaction and gives 

them hope that grievances will be addressed. If the government fails to 

meet these hopes, the result will be increased urban instability.

Ideology: Taking Back the Pulpits

The government hopes to counter the ideological side of the Salafist

threat by better using the means of religious control at its disposal. 

Ahmed Toufiq (current Minister of Religious Endowments and Islamic

Affairs) brings with him a reputation for piety, while his predecessor 

was seen as a political figure.35 As Minister, Toufiq has promoted a

“comprehensive, multifaceted and integrated strategy ... to preserve 

the distinctive Moroccan identity, which is characterized by moderation and tolerance. This strategy involves restructuring the Ministry 

and reconsidering legislation on places of worship.”36
13

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

One part of Toufiq’s strategy is better use of the mass media

“to remedy the separation between religion and other issues of life.” 

As early as March 2003, he was promising radio and TV programs 

that would deal with contemporary questions, even “embarrassing 

issues.” 37 This included the creation of a government-sponsored religious radio station, able to reach all the country’s major cities. The 

initial programming included “programs to encourage moderation, 

such as debates for youth on contemporary issues and problems, as 

well as Koranic training programs in Arabic, French, and Berber.” 38

A second program was for the Ministry to offer toll-free phone 

numbers in eight call centers in the headquarters of the ulama (organized body of religious scholars), where Moroccans can call to ask 

questions on religion.39 In addition, a third line of approach is taking 

control of mosques and preachers. There are approximately 35,000 

recognized mosques in Morocco, each with an imam leading the five

daily prayers. Approximately 15,000 to 16,000 other individuals give 

Friday sermons. According to Toufiq, by early 2004, “the government

has shut down 270 improvised worship places in shanty towns that 

do not meet the basic requirements.” 40

United States Support. The Moroccan debate on the role of Islam in 

politics and society is an area where direct U.S. support for Rabat 

needs to be minimal and of low visibility when provided. In fact, the 

greatest U.S. role might be as recipient of indirect support. These 

programs should help us understand how Moroccans see the challenges of modernity, and this improved understanding should inform 

U.S. policies in the region. 

Challenges. The more closely the efforts of prominent religious leaders 

follow the positions of the government and/or the monarchy, the less 

credibility they will have in some circles. But the more frequently the 

religious establishment questions policies, the more they risk fueling 

the positions of those seeking to overthrow the regimes. Sticking to 

the middle path, “speaking truth to power” without challenging that 

power’s right to rule, is difficult. For the government, resisting the

temptation to force these religious leaders to toe that line can be even 

harder.
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Politics: Expanding Free Expression and “Impression”

One part of the government’s effort to counter the spread of violent Islam is a continued loosening of restrictions on peaceful 

political Islam. This two-dimensional process involves both the 

breadth of permitted viewpoints and the depth of their influence

on public policy—expression and impression. The PJD competes 

in local and national elections and has its own newspapers. While 

its share of the overall vote declined in the 2003 elections, several 

PJD members now lead local governments. Initial results reveal that 

they are doing no worse than other mayors and generally keeping 

their reputation for integrity.

Why the party’s support dropped in the 2003 elections remains 

the subject of debate—some say it is backlash from the Casablanca 

attacks,41 while others blame a back-room deal. PJD leader Mustapha 

Ramid claims the government forced 1,000 Islamic candidates to 

withdraw, and some party officials were demoted to prevent a more

direct government crackdown. “They had to find a way to make us

shut up,” he said. “Morocco was on the right track. Since the beginning of the 1990s, we were taking the right road toward more freedom 

and democracy. Since 16 May, there is no doubt we have witnessed 

a regression in this.” 42

In some ways, however, the PJD’s role is part of a much broader 

opening in the life of the country. Beyond the political sphere, “there 

was neglect in educating people for too long,” one subject observed. 

“They lost 50 years of human development.” In particular, he noted, 

the King has made trips to long-neglected areas such as the Mediterranean Coast, inspiring hope that things will change.43

United States Support. The U.S. Government is quietly supporting 

much of the grass-roots change occurring in Moroccan politics. 

Through U.S.-based NGOs, USAID is helping Morocco develop the 

necessary “hardware” and “software” for democratic government, 

such as focused training for women interested in running for political office.44

Challenges. Effectively continuing this policy of “constructive engagement” with the PJD will require the government and the monarchy 

to retain the support of the broader political system, in spite of an 

ongoing debate over the proper role of Islamist parties in the country.
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Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

Some Moroccans remain skeptical of the Islamists’ commitment to 

long-term multiparty democracy and would favor restrictions on the 

latter’s participation.45 The majority of Moroccans interviewed for 

this project, however, are more concerned that repression of the PJD 

could trigger another Algeria-style civil war. 

Security: Bringing Order Back to the Bidonvilles

Nowhere is the Moroccan government’s acceptance of a positive philosophy for change more evident than in the area of urban security. 

There, the government has clearly attempted to balance near-term 

law-enforcement operations directed against identified threats and

longer-term structural reforms.

Starting soon after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the 

Moroccan government has made a series of arrests targeting Salafist

groups in Morocco. These have included capturing the alleged leader 

of al-Hijra wa al-Takfir in July 2002, 30 suspects linked to the Salafist GSPC in July 2005, and 17 people suspected of Al Qaeda connections in November 2005.46

But the government recognizes that such arrests are not enough. 

Waiting until groups have formed and started plotting cedes the 

initiative to the enemy, where the acceptable margin of error is 

razor-thin. To increase this margin, the government has taken two 

ambitious steps to end police neglect of the bidonvilles and improve 

the ability of security forces to take these alleyways back from budding terrorists: 

a. Postes de Police de Proximité (PPP) are new, stationary police 

positions that follow a similar model to the “neighborhood 

policing” concept that United States police departments 

rediscovered in recent years. As one semi-official journal

explained, “The objective is two-fold and clear: To be as close 

as possible to the citizen at the level of the quartier and to 

visibly express the presence of the State in view of reassuring 

that same citizen .... The unique thing is to operate within the 

social fabric.” By 2007, the government expects to have created 1,000 posts, with approximately 12,000 assigned officers throughout the kingdom.47

b. Groupes Urbains de Sécurité (GUS) are 196-man units that 

began forming on 17 October 2004 in Rabat, Casablanca, 
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JSOU Report 06-9

Marrakech, Oujda, Meknes, and Fes. By June 2005 they 

totaled 4,000 officers. In 2006, the GUS are expected to reach

6,000 officers in 33 groups.48

These initiatives are intended to complement the existing “special 

purpose” law-enforcement unit, the royal Gendarmerie. Moroccan 

gendarmes, unlike many of their counterparts in Europe or other 

former European colonies, are generally rural law enforcement officers. However, their ability to conduct both conventional police work 

and small-unit infantry tactics makes them a versatile weapon in the 

government arsenal.

United States Support. The U.S. Government has substantial programs 

assisting the Moroccan government to develop its law-enforcement 

capabilities. In 2004, for example, Moroccans received U.S. training 

for antiterrorism instruction, crisis response, installation security, 

and major case management. The U.S. also provided technical consultations on Police Academy Training and Border Patrol operations.49

Even though the Moroccan military does not now have a major 

role in domestic counterterrorism operations, the U.S. military continues engaging with its Moroccan counterparts to ensure they are 

ready to work together if required. In fiscal year 2004, the United

States European Command supported the training or military education of 119 Moroccan service members through $1,307,289 in Foreign 

Military Training funds.50

Challenges. One of the obvious challenges is that the Moroccan military 

is largely absent from domestic counterterrorism. It focuses on external threats, including border protection and preparing for potential 

conventional conflicts with neighbors such as Algeria. There is little

evidence that the Moroccan military is preparing to conduct urban 

combat operations, of the type that the U.S. and its allies have conducted in Iraq. While law-enforcement and paramilitary forces appear 

to be adequate at this time, if conditions in Morocco’s major cities 

deteriorate, heavier military forces may become necessary and may 

not have the necessary training or equipment to take back the cities. 

At the other end of the spectrum, there may be further hurdles 

ahead in getting the maximum effect out of the PPP program. Within 

U.S. community policing programs, having a familiar face patrolling 

the neighborhood is only a means to an end. The real objective is to 
17

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

create community participation in controlling crime.51 It remains to 

be seen whether Moroccan police officers can make this transition in

attitudes as quickly as they have made the structural change to PPP.

19

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

4. Implications for United States 

 Strategy and Policy Within the

 Global War on Terror

The analysis surfaces key issues regarding the global war on terror 

and how events in Morocco are opportunities for continued 

advanced study toward finding the keys to success in this

struggle. Some key areas of interest follow.

Results Without Progress?

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or 

losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing, 

or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than 

the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us? 

— Donald Rumsfeld , October 200352

One of the recurring challenges in the global war on terror is the 

question of how to measure success. While America’s ultimate goal—

the prevention of terrorist attacks against the U.S., its citizens, and 

assets—has been successful for more than 4 years, the Secretary of 

Defense was right to ask whether we think that record will continue. 

Short of seeing another U.S. city in flames, how would we know if we

are failing in the global war on terror?53

This same dilemma confronts all of our partners in this struggle.54 For Morocco, Kalpakian was optimistic about the imminent 

decline of the Salafist movement following the public support for the

government’s post-Casablanca actions,55 but arrests continue to be 

made, suggesting that terrorists have continued finding recruits in

Morocco since the attacks.56 Does this show success or failure in the 

campaign?

One way to think through these issues—at least to organize 

thinking on what is lacking—is to borrow from the vernacular of 

common business-oriented models. Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced 

Scorecard approach, for example, directs strategists to identify
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JSOU Report 06-9

“performance drivers” (also known as lead indicators) and outcome 

measures (lag indicators) and find a balance between the two.57 Before 

creating metrics, an organization needs to have a clear strategy and 

understand well the causal links between activities and results. 

If getting metrics right is a challenge for businesses, where so 

many actions can be quantified in terms of easily understood input

and outputs, it is vastly more difficult to use in the global war on

terror or any similar public enterprise. However, one can expect that 

a government that starts with an objective 

of reducing the number of terrorists will 

devise a different strategy and set of metrics than one that begins with a goal of 

ensuring human and physical security in 

its cities. As Perl warns, “antiterrorism 

actions might be undertaken for a wide 

range of reasons without being clearly 

linked to previously defined antiterror

goals; in such circumstances, caution 

would likely be warranted before characterizing results as progress.” 58

The Moroccan Interior Ministry has released figures showing that

after the creation of the GUS, the numbers of attacks on people and 

attacks on goods declined, while the number of crime-scene investigations and attacks on public order increased.59 But how much 

does this example mean? Even a high number of plots interrupted or 

“terrorists” arrested may be good because it shows effective policing 

capacity, or bad because it shows groups are still able to recruit. On 

the political side, if electoral support for an Islamic party such as 

the PJD declines, is that proof that society really does have a secular 

bias, or bad because it may indicate Islamists are resorting to more 

extreme channels? 

Given these doubts about designing effective outcome indicators, 

what about appropriate performance drivers? This assumes that a 

group has correctly identified the causal links between its actions

and the desired outcomes. The Moroccan government’s apparent 

focus on achievable outputs—including police officers in urban

areas, increasingly free and fair elections (which they can control), 

and improved urban housing for the poor—seem well designed for 

achieving desired outcomes. 

... a government that 

starts with an objective 

of reducing the number 

of terrorists will devise a 

different strategy and set 

of metrics than one that 

begins with a goal of ensuring human and physical security in its cities.
21

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

Measuring success is one area where the U.S. has the intellectual capital to assist. Deciding to focus on helping allies measure 

success would not only allow the U.S. to better evaluate the global 

war on terror but also guide all involved countries toward programs 

with the best chances for creating stability and reducing the likelihood of terrorist attacks.

Socioeconomic Development: 

The Role of “Designated Listeners”

Oneunexpected finding is the importance of explicitly including “social

advocates” in any program attempting to redirect civil interactions. 

In the Moroccan case, this means creating teams to provide accompagnement social and facilitate the implementation of urban policy 

by engaging in dialogue with bidonville residents. This approach is 

remarkably similar to the way the U.S. military has maintained dedicated Civil Affairs units, with the explicit purpose of providing teams 

trained to understand the requirements of civilians within the area 

of military operations. These teams then use their understanding of 

the civilians to guide the use of other specialties toward achievement 

of the commander’s objectives. In the era of operations Iraqi Freedom 

and Enduring Freedom, when maneuver commanders are becoming 

accustomed to seeing themselves as both combat commanders and 

military governors, the advantages of maintaining dedicated Civil 

Affairs forces may be underestimated. Morocco’s experience suggests that such a system needs to be maintained, as it ensures that 

someone remains focused on social factors and the long-term end 

state of sustainable communities.

The essential feature of Villes sans Bidonvilles and the National 

Initiative for Human Development is that they avoid reducing root 

causes of terrorism to poverty or slum housing. Instead, they focus 

on changing those aspects of urban life that take away young adults’ 

hope for achieving their goals through accepted means and turn 

them against the regime and society.

The Moroccan government seems to be ahead of those in most 

Middle Eastern countries in realizing the importance of these social 

functions. Since the U.S. is already actively supporting these efforts 

in Morocco, it is positioned to help other countries follow the model. 

The same NGOs who are working today in Morocco—and even the 
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JSOU Report 06-9

same individuals gaining field experience with them—should be

encouraged to continue this work in other countries. One positive 

step toward this view would be encouraging development work as a 

profession, with accepted certification and employment standards,

so that young graduates choosing this career could have more confidence in their long-term economic security.

Politics: Is Political Islam Zero-sum or Self-reinforcing?

The most profound question for the ultimate success of the global war 

on terror, as it is being waged in the countries of the Muslim world, 

is whether the potential for national activity is a zero-sum game for 

Islamists, so that anything channeled into legal parties undercuts 

the appeal of more radical groups. Or does giving Islamic parties a 

chance to participate in government merely add to the total strength 

of the Islamic movement in society? 

Unfortunately, it is too early for the Moroccan case to provide 

definitive answers. Because no further terrorist attacks have occurred

and the PJD has continued making electoral advances, at least in 

some municipalities, one could hypothesize that some would-be 

terrorists are channeling their ambitions into peaceful, partisan politics. Additionally, because the PJD has never become the governing 

party at the national level, the continued existence of alleged terrorist plotters in Morocco does not refute this hypothesis.

For the U.S. the tentative lesson would be to keep an open mind 

about the ability of Islamists to participate in democratic parties. 

Encouraging other governments to follow a Moroccan model of permitting Islamists success on the local level, when warranted by democratic processes, can go a long way toward building legitimacy of 

friendly governments while not handing over the keys to the palace.

Security: Are Gendarmerie and Special Police Units Enough to 

Defeat a Dedicated Jihadist Salafist Threat?

Following the explosion in peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, 

many have been looking for ways to develop paramilitary forces that 

might be more suited to securing urban areas during stability operations. “The benefits of employing constabulary forces rather than

individual police officers or military units are many,” one report

noted. “Under normal circumstances they can deploy rapidly with 
23

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

much of their own transport, communications, and logistical support. They usually can respond to situations requiring greater use 

of force than civil police, such as crowd control and area security. 

They also serve as a bridge between military and civil police forces 

and assume the tasks that do not clearly belong to either group.” 

Gendarmes, caribineri, and other paramilitary forces are one tool 

currently not in the U.S. kit, but are a common sight in both Europe 

and former European colonies.60

The Moroccan government is using its traditional gendarmes and 

the newly created GUS and PPP to ensure control of urban areas. Providing urban security within stability and support operations has been 

a recurring challenge for the U.S. and its allies in all their recent campaigns, including the Balkans, Somalia, and Iraq. Researchers should 

be closely following the Moroccan effort to determine the success of its 

models and their applicability to other countries and situations. 

25

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

5. Conclusions

First, the initial hypothesis that “informal housing areas” are 

critical in Morocco’s campaign against Islamic extremists is 

supported by both the government’s actions and the analysis 

of outside observers. This premise does not mean all terrorists come 

from bidonvilles, but that bidonvilles uniquely provide “grunts” and 

hospitable environments for Jihadist Salafist groups. Addressing the

numerous, intertwined problems of bidonvilles would largely reduce 

the Salafist threat to small numbers of dissatisfied Islamists looking

for followers. 

Second, socioeconomic development is a key to combating terrorism, but the emphasis needs to be on the “socio.” Building new, sustainable communities and individual livelihoods is more important 

than development in easily programmed and measured programs 

such as building apartments or providing jobs. At the same time, 

programs to develop communities only build dissatisfaction if they 

are not accompanied by adequate investment in physical infrastructure. Morocco’s use of distinct organizations to focus on physical and 

social infrastructure appears to be a sound method to ensure a balanced approach. This model goes beyond “peacetime” development 

to how military forces need to envision their strategies for stability 

operations. 

Third, the “war of ideas” can be won, but not by simply silencing 

alternative voices. Effective ideological warfare needs to recognize 

that alternative voices find an audience because they are providing

answers that the “official” and legal perspectives do not. Instead of

bewailing how opponents use 21st Century technology to build support, moderate, liberal governments need to see how the Internet and 

other technologies give them unprecedented means for understanding their people and finding messages that work.

Fourth, there seems to be room for legal participation of Islamic 

parties within Arab countries. To date, there are more examples 

of terrorism resulting from efforts to force salafism underground

than from Islamist parties assuming responsibility through competitive elections. Pluralistic experiences (such as those of Morocco) 

can guide the development of models for how regimes can increase 

their religious legitimacy without violating human or civil rights of 
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JSOU Report 06-9

minorities. In particular, allowing Islamist parties to assume offices

in city governments, as in Casablanca, lets local politics function as 

the “laboratory of democracy” and gives opposition groups a role in 

developing a more open, yet stable, political system.

Finally, “security” must mean much more than improving the military capabilities of friendly and neutral governments. Until it reaches 

the point of state failure, most governments can do much more to 

improve security by improving the presence and performance of 

police on the street and quick reaction forces than by obtaining highend military hardware. Not every city will solve its urban security 

problems by copying Morocco’s PPP and GUS, but Morocco’s ability 

to rapidly assess the problem and implement a solution has set a 

standard for how countries need to approach this challenge.

Morocco’s campaign to defeat its domestic Islamist extremists 

is headed in the right direction because it is implementing all these 

concepts. It attempts to untangle the complex linkages between “root 

causes,” immediate terrorist threats, and alternatives to terrorism 

and address them through complementary, coordinated actions. For 

this reason, there are grounds to hope that the lessons learned in 

the bidonvilles will serve as a model for more timely and effective 

counterterrorism strategies in other “at risk” countries around the 

world. 
27

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

Endnotes

The author wishes to thank the JSOU and U.S. Army Reserve for 

funding the field research in Morocco.

1. Jack Kalpakian, “Building the Human Bomb: The Case of the 16 May 

2003 Attacks in Casablanca,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28 

(2005), pp. 116-117.

2. Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” 

Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 56-81, especially 

69-71.

3. This approach tailors the current compressive model, “DIMEFIL” (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and 

Law Enforcement) to a domestic situation. See Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism

(Washington, DC, 1 February 2006), pp. 34-35.

4. A particularly interesting discussion of low-quality housing in these 

old cities is found in Jamila Bargach, “‘Walls Hit Me’: Urbanites on the 

Margin,” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2005); 

available from www.bepress.com/mwjhr/vol2/iss1/art8/ [accessed 

19 September 2006].

5. United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), The 

Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements, 2003 (Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 2003), pp. 224-25. 

6. Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, “Bombings lift the lid on ‘other Casablanca,’” Manchester Guardian Weekly, 4 June 2003, p. 29. Same estimate found in 

Roger Milne, “Poor serviced; Many of Casablanca’s citizens are without 

basic utility connections,” Utility Week, 29 October 2004, p. 20.

7. Ibid., p. 29.

8. “Bin Laden tape: Text,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 12 February 2003, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_

east/2751019.stm [accessed 23 February 2006]. 

9. Daoud Casewits (Executive Secretary, Moroccan-American Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange), interview by author, 

Rabat, 18 January 2006. See also www.tariqa.org/qadiriya/index.

html [accessed 26 September 2006].

10. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Islamism, Moroccan-Style: The Ideas of 

Sheikh Yassine,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 2003), 

available from www.meforum.org/article/519 [accessed 20 December 

2005]. Original document is Abdessalaam Yassine, Memorandum to 

him who is concerned, available from www.radioislam.org/yassine/

meng.htm [accessed 20 December 2005]. 

11. Alison Pargeter, “The Islamist Movement in Morocco,” The Terrorism 

Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 10 (19 May 2005), p. 8, available from www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369700 (accessed 19

September 2006).
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JSOU Report 06-9

12. Kalpakian, pp. 119-20.

13. Mohamed Darif, Mohamed Darif, The Moroccan Combatant Group (ARI), Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estrategicos (Elcano Royal 

Institute of International and Strategic Studies), (Madrid, ARI N�� 51

30 March 2004); available from www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/465.asp [accessed 13 March 2006].

14. Mounir Zouiten, interview by author, Harhoura, Morocco, 20 January 

2006.

15. Rollie Lal, “The Maghrib,” The Muslim World After 9/11 (San Monica: 

Rand Corporation Project Air Force, 2004), p. 162.

16. Andrew Hussey, “A country on the edge,” New Statesman, 17 March 

2003, available from http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-

2753157/A-country-on-the-edge.html [accessed 18 September 2006].

17. Kalpakian, p. 120-121.

18. Mohammed Haddy (director, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Sur Le 

Developpement Local, translation is Center for Studies and Research 

on Local Development, interview by the author, Rabat, 20 January 

2006.

19. Darif, The Moroccan Combatant Group.

20. Hussey, “A country on the edge” implies this was attributable to Jihadist Salafist (does not explicitly state).

21. Eickleman, Dale F., “Islam, Modernity, and Public Diplomacy in the 

Arab World: A Moroccan Snapshot,” in A Practical Guide to Winning 

the War on Terrorism, ed. Adam Garfinkle (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2004), pp. 63-75, available from http://media.hoover.org/

documents/0817945423_63.pdf#search=%22Eickelman%20Islam%2

0Modernity%20Public%20Diplomacy%20%22

22. UN-HABITAT, The Challenge of Slums, p. 225.

23. Date taken from charts “Habitat non reglementaire,” “Programme 

d’urgence,” and “Operations de resorption des bidonvilles” (Informal 

housing, Urgent Program, Slum Reduction Operations) at www.seh.

gov.ma/ (Ministry of Housing and Urbanism). Unfortunately, these 

tables do not clearly align with the types of interventions discussed 

here.

24. UN-HABITAT, The Challenge of Slums, p. 224.

25. Francoise Navez-Bouchanine, interview by author, Rabat, 16 January 

2006. 

26. “Water: Redal - New reservoirs of investment,” Quest Economics Database, MEED [Middle East Economic Digest] Weekly Special Report, 

27 August 2004, p. 29, available from www.meed.com to those who 

subscribe.

27. Milne [see endnote 6], p. 20.

28. Mohamed Najib Lahlou, “Cities Without Slums National Program to 

Fight Against the Unhealthy Habitat” (paper presented at the City 
29

Dalzell: Beyond Draining the Swamp

Development Strategies from Vision to Growth and Poverty Reduction 

conference, Hanoi, Vietnam, 24-26 November 2004), p. 2.

29. Craig Whitlock, “Moroccans Gain Prominence in Terror Groups,” 

Washington Post, 14 October 2004, p. 1. Referenced less precisely.

 30. Lahlou, p. 4. 30. Lahlou, p. 4.

31. Fliers from the Est régional d’aménagement et de constrution de la 

région Nord-Ouest (Northwest Regional Organization for Construction Regional Organizatio Organization for Construction n for Construction 

Management), presente presented as current information as of January 2006, d as current information as of January 2006, t information as of January 2006, y 2006, 

available from www.eracno.org.ma/. m www.eracno.org.ma/.

 32. Milne, p. 20. 32. Milne, p. 20.

33. Tahar Berrada (U.S. Agency for International Development), interview 

by author, Rabat, 16 January 2006.

34. Mounir Zouiten, interview by author. Zouiten had heard that 1,600 

young “agents” were being trained as the first group, but the author

was unable to confirm this figure.

35. Casewits, interview by author.

	 36.	 Ahmed Toufiq, Statement on Moroccan-Spanish relations and Morocco’s

war on terrorism, Federal News Service (Abu Dhabi), 10 May 2004. 

37. “Morocco: Minister Outlines Bold Religious Communication Approach,” 

Maghreb Arabe Presse, translated and quoted in Global News Wire - 

Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 

26 March 2003. 

38. “Mohammad VI launches Koranic Radio Station,” Al-Bawaba, 18 October 2004, was available from www.albawaba.com/en/main/177190/

&searchWords=toufiq [link no longer valid].

39. “Morocco: Minister Outlines”

	 40.	 Toufiq.

41. Kalpakian, p. 122. 

42. Whitlock, p.1. 

43. Christian Arandel (Research Triangle Institute), interview by author, 

Rabat, 19 January 2006. 

44. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Morocco (1 January 2002), www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1397_ma_women.pdf. 

The June 2005 update is available at “NDI Worldwide: Middle East 

and North Africa: Morocco,” www.ndi.org/worldwide/mena/morocco/

morocco.asp. 

45. Guilain Denoeux, pp. 71-81. This is not unique to the debate within 

Morocco. Denoeux expresses deep discomfort with those who assume 

the West can isolate and encourage a liberal, moderate “Islamism” 

without giving more radical factions the opportunity to hijack the 

political process and seize power.

46. “Morocco arrests 17 suspected Al Qaeda activists,” Reuters, 20 

November 2005, summary available from http://siteinstitute.biz/bin/

articles.cgi?ID=news137605&Category=news&Subcategory=0 [originallink, which is referenced there, was accessed 3 December 2005].
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 47. Abdelatif Agnouche and Aziz Samel, “La Réforme Qui S’impose” (The 47. Abdelatif Agnouche and Aziz Samel, “La Réforme Qui S’impose” (The 

Reform that is Imposed), t is Imposed), s Imposed Imposed), Police Magazine (Morocco Morocco), February 2005, ), February 2005, Februar February 2005, y 2005,

p. 18.

 48. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 

49. U.S. Department of State, The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report 

to Congress for Fiscal Year 2004, Publication 11226 (Washington, DC, 

February 2005). 

50. U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State Joint Report to 

Congress Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, Vol. 

I (Washington, DC, April 2005), p. iv-195. Due to security classification, some training events may not be included in these totals. 

51. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action, Monograph NCJ 

148457 (Washington, DC, August 1994), p. 13. 

52. Donald Rumsfeld, memorandum to then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff General Richard Myers, et al. (Washington, DC, 16 October 

2003), available from www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm [accessed 23 February 2006].

53. This dilemma is discussed much more comprehensively in Raphael 

Perl, Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness, 

Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress), Report No. 

RL33160, 23 November 2005, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

terror/RL33160.pdf [accessed 5 March 2006]. 

54. Comprehensive data regarding the activities of the Moroccan military 

and security forces, including data regarding all individuals arrested or 

investigated in relation to terrorist or insurgent activities, is not available to a foreign researcher intending to publish unclassified findings.

One might suspect that even a Moroccan government researcher with 

a “need to know” might have trouble gaining access to all desired information. Each individual interviewed for this research project was asked 

to offer objective, publicly accessible metrics that could be used to measure success in the Moroccan context, and no one was successful. 

55. Kalpakian, p. 125. 

56. “Morocco arrests 17 suspected Al Qaeda activists” 

57. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 

1996), p. 32. 

 58. Perl [see endnote 53], p. 3. 58. Perl [see endnote 53], p. 3. 

59. “La Police en Chiffres: Bilan des Groupes Urbains de Sécurité” (The 

Police in Figures: Account Accounts of the Urban Security Groups), s of the Urban Security Groups), Urban Security Groups), Police 

Magazine (Morocco Morocco), Vol. 10, November 2005, pp. 70-71. ), Vol. 10, ), Vol. 10, November 2005, pp. 70-71. Novembe November 2005, pp. 70-71. r 2005, pp. 70-71. 

 60. Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, “Creating a Force for Peace 60. Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, “Creating a Force for Peace 

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