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i 

20–067 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–115] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 22, 2016 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 3 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense; 

accompanied by Hon. Mike McCord, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Defense ................... 4 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ............... 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B. .................................................................................... 67 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr. ............................................................................ 104 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 65 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 123 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 128 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 129 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 127 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Takai .......................................................................................................... 129 

(1) 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 22, 2016. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

The committee meets today to receive testimony from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 

the national defense authorization budget request from the administration. 

Like last year, the committee has spent a number of weeks hearing from our military leaders, the Intelligence Community, and outside witnesses before asking the Secretary to testify on the current 

budget request. What we have heard over these weeks reaffirmed 

the fact that the U.S. faces a wider range of serious threats than 

at any time in our history. 

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] told our 

committee that, quote: ‘‘The world is far more complicated; it is far 

more destabilized; it is far more complex than at any time I have 

seen it.’’ 

Currently serving senior commanders have described the ability 

of the military we rely upon to face those threats as, quote, ‘‘minimally adequate.’’ Aviation units in the Marine Corps cannot meet 

training and mission requirements. With less than a third of Army 

forces at acceptable levels of readiness, the Army is not at a level 

that is appropriate for what the American people would expect to 

defend them. Those were quotes as well. 

Another is, less than half of the Air Force combat units are ready 

for a high-end fight. It is the smallest, oldest, and least-ready force 

across the full spectrum of operations in our history. Those 

snippets of testimony across the services is remarkably consistent, 

candid, and disturbing. Indeed, my own visits with service members recently leads me to suspect that even these assessments don’t 

tell the whole story. 

We often discuss readiness, but it is a vague term without concrete meaning for a lot of Americans. Recently, I have heard firsthand from service members who have looked me in the eye and 
2 

told of trying to cannibalize parts from a museum aircraft in order 

to get a current aircraft ready to fly an overseas mission; of getting 

aircraft that were sent to the boneyard in Arizona back and revitalized in order to fly missions; of pilots who were flying well below 

the minimum number of hours required for minimal proficiency 

and flying fewer training hours than those of adversaries that they 

were sent to meet. 

I have heard of not having enough senior enlisted people to train 

and supervise the younger ones, and those who remain working 

longer and longer hours. And I have even heard firsthand from 

service members who have to buy basic supplies like pins and 

cleaning supplies and paper towels out of their own pocket, because 

if they go through the military process, it will take 3 or 4 months, 

and for them, it is just not worth it. I expressed concern last week 

that there is a rise in class A mishaps, which may be another indicator of a readiness crisis. 

Last year, General Dempsey testified that the fiscal year 2016 

funding request was the lower, ragged edge that was necessary to 

execute the defense strategy and that we have no slack, no margin 

left for error or strategic surprise. Yet the budget request from the 

administration this year is $18 billion lower on meeting those basic 

requirement minimums, and it is less than the budget agreement 

of last December. 

It seems clear that the same strategy we assumed would have us 

out of Iraq and Afghanistan, where Russia would be a friend 

thanks to the reset, and where terrorism was confined to the JV 

[junior varsity] teams, does not continue to be valid. That is also 

the same strategy that has led us to cut troops, equipment, training, and bases. 

Both Congress and the administration are responsible for this 

state of affairs. Over the last 5 years, the President and Congress 

have cut over half a trillion dollars from defense, and these cuts 

come at a cost. It has increased risk that our troops will be killed 

or captured, that a mission will fail, or that we will lose a fight. 

What our hearings over these last few weeks have shown is that 

this risk is real, and there is evidence to prove it is growing. The 

military is strained to a breaking point. Our witnesses today are 

in a unique position to help our political leadership and the American people understand the state of affairs, and I would say we 

would all be derelict in our duty if we tried to sweep it under the 

rug. 

On a final note, this morning the news brought us, again, stories 

of tragedy in a terrorist attack in Europe. The administration’s 

budget request asks for more money to fight ISIS [Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria] in Iraq and Syria, and I think that is understandable and appropriate. 

What I do not understand is that the law required the administration provide Congress a written document laying out its strategy 

to fight ISIS. That document was due February 15, 2016. We have 

received nothing, and there is no indication that anything is on the 

way. 

The world is growing more dangerous. We have cut our military 

too much, and I believe it is up to the political leadership in this 

country to take the action necessary to enable our service men and 
3 

women to defend American lives and American interests. The men 

and women who serve and the Nation deserve better than we are 

now. 

I yield to the distinguished gentlelady of California, as the acting 

ranking member today, for any comments she would like to make. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member’s statement 

be entered into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Over the last several weeks, we have received testimony from combatant commanders, from our service chiefs, from 

service secretaries. And they all have given us their best military 

advice, and it could not be more clear: the threats, as the chairman 

has noted, we face are real and growing. 

Just this morning, attacks in Brussels claimed at least 26 lives, 

and dozens were injured. Our hearts certainly go out to the Belgian 

people as they recover from this horrific act of violence. 

Secretary Carter, you have emphasized that the President’s 

budget request centers on five key challenges: Deterring aggressive 

behavior on the part of a resurgent Russia and a rising China; containing the dangerous unpredictable North Korean regime; neutralizing Iran’s malign influence; and defeating ISIL [Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant] and other manifestations of violent extremism. 

Unfortunately, in the midst of these challenges, we are searching 

for budget workarounds instead of fixing the underlying problem. 

The Department of Defense [DOD] needs fiscal certainty to reliably 

perform critical missions and to maintain lasting superiority. 

Secretary Carter, you have asserted that the fiscal year 2017 

shortfall risk can be mitigated but that DOD needs a comprehensive long-term budgetary solution. We must remember the devastating harms inflicted by sequestration in the Budget Control Act 

caps. Years of budgetary standoffs leading to numerous threatened 

government shutdowns, one actual government shutdown, and congressional overreliance on continuing resolutions have combined to 

produce debilitating fiscal uncertainty. 

Although it is unclear whether the House will pass a budget resolution this year, the resolution passed last week by the House 

Budget Committee raises more questions than it answers. The committee-passed resolution is nominally BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act] 

compliant, but it would offer a net increase of roughly $18 billion 

to the defense base budget. It would do so by assuming that $23 

billion of overseas contingency operations—what we call OCO funding—would be used for base budget purposes, but it would not increase the BBA top line of $74 million for OCO funding. 

My first question is, which OCO beneficiary would end up paying 

the bill in this shuffle? Would the money come from the portion requested for DOD, that is, the warfighter? Would it come from the 

State Department, which also receives OCO funding to perform 
4 

vital functions in contingency operations? Or would it come from 

both? 

Chairman Price’s budget resolution also poses another openended question. It appears to allow the chairman of the House 

Budget Committee to adjust OCO funding levels going forward on 

the basis of new information, which means that, at some point, 

supplemental OCO funding could be used to circumvent BBA funding levels. 

The DOD, the Congress, has to make hard choices, especially 

when it comes to balancing force modernization with the very, very 

critical need that the chairman addressed: to sustain readiness. 

Would these issues become harder or easier if near-term OCO 

needs are supplemented by longer-term base budget requirements 

in fiscal year 2017? How would the DOD prioritize its needs if OCO 

funding levels are reduced within the BBA top line? 

And, most importantly, what poses the greatest risk to national 

security, providing funding for base budget requirements at the 

level requested by the President or providing funding for near-term 

OCO requirements at least initially at levels lower than requested? 

We need to carefully consider Chairman Price’s proposal and every 

other potential adjustment to the defense budget as we work to 

build this year’s defense authorization bill. 

We must also give the Department additional flexibility to reduce 

excess infrastructure and overhead, to phase out old platforms, and 

to adjust the healthcare and benefit structure. The President came 

to us with a budget that focuses on adapting to the threats that 

we face today and also one that follows the law by conforming to 

the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, including approximately $582.7 

billion in discretionary budget authority for the Department of Defense. So, now, we must uphold our end of the deal in Congress. 

Thank you all for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. 

And thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

The committee is pleased to welcome today the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, the Secretary of Defense; General Joseph Dunford, 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; as well as the Honorable 

Mike McCord, the Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer [CFO] 

of the Department. 

Gentlemen, again, welcome to the committee. Without objection, 

your full written statements will be made part of the record. 

And Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for any comments you 

would like to offer. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY 

HON. MIKE McCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

(COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry. 

Congresswoman Davis, thank you. 

Thanks, all the members of the committee. Thank you for hosting me here today. 
5 

I want to begin by condemning this morning’s bombings in Belgium. Our thoughts and our prayers are with those affected by this 

tragedy, the victims, their families, and survivors. And in the face 

of these acts of terrorism, the United States stands in strong solidarity with our ally Belgium. We are continuing to monitor the situation, including to ensure that all U.S. personnel and citizens are 

accounted for. We also stand ready to provide assistance to our 

friends and allies in Europe, as necessary. 

Brussels is an international city that has been host to NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to the European Union 

[EU] for decades. Together, we must and we will continue to do 

everything we can to protect our homelands and defeat terrorists 

wherever they threaten us. No attack—no attack—will affect our 

resolve to accelerate the defeat of ISIL. I will have more to say 

about this later in the testimony. 

Thank you again for hosting me today and for steadfastly supporting DOD’s men and women all over the world, military and civilian, who serve and defend us. I am pleased to be here with 

Chairman Dunford, Under Secretary McCord, to discuss President 

Obama’s 2017 defense budget, which marks a major inflection point 

for the Department of Defense. 

As I will describe in detail, the threat from terrorism is one of 

the five challenges, as has been noted, that the United States now 

faces and will in the future. In this budget, we are taking the long 

view. We have to, because even as we fight today’s fights, we must 

also be prepared for what might come 10, 20, or 30 years down the 

road. 

Last fall’s Bipartisan Budget Act gave us some much-needed stability after years of gridlock and turbulence. And I want to thank 

you and your colleagues for coming together to help pass it. That 

budget deal set the size of our budget, and with this degree of certainty, we focused on its shape, changing that shape in fundamental but carefully considered ways to adjust to a new strategic 

era and to seize opportunities for the future. 

Let me describe the strategic assessment that drove our budget 

decisions. First of all, it is evident that America is still today the 

world’s foremost leader, partner, and underwriter of stability and 

security in every region of the world, as we have been since World 

War II. That is thanks in large part to the unequivocal strength 

of the U.S. military. 

And as we continue to fulfill this enduring role, it is also evident 

that we are entering a new strategic era. Today’s security environment is dramatically different from the last 25 years, requiring 

new ways of investing and operating. Five evolving strategic challenges—namely, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism— 

are now driving DOD’s planning and budgeting, as reflected in this 

budget. 

I want to focus first on our ongoing fight against terrorism and 

especially ISIL, which as the attacks in Belgium today again remind us, we must and will deal a lasting defeat, most immediately 

in its parent tumor in Iraq and Syria but also where it is metastasizing, and all the while we are continuing to help protect our own 

homeland. 
6 

Let me give you a quick snapshot of what we are doing to pressure and destroy ISIL’s parent tumor in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, 

with our support, the Iraqi Security Forces retook Ramadi and are 

now reclaiming further ground in Anbar Province and are simultaneously shifting the weight of their effort towards Mosul in the 

north. 

With our advice and assistance, Iraqi and Kurdish security forces 

have begun the shaping and isolation phase of the operation to collapse ISIL’s control over Mosul. That was the mission Marine Staff 

Sergeant Louis Cardin was supporting when he gave his life over 

the weekend providing critical protection to Iraqi forces and coalition military advisers in northern Iraq. Our thoughts and prayers 

are with his family and with the other Marines injured in Saturday’s rocket attack. Their sacrifice will not be forgotten, and our 

global coalition will complete the mission they were supporting. 

In Syria, capable and motivated local forces supported by the 

United States in our global coalition have retaken the east Syrian 

town of Shaddadi. This town served as an important logistical and 

financial hub for ISIL and a key intersection between its Syria and 

Iraq operations. In fact, Shaddadi was so important to ISIL that 

its so-called minister of war was involved in ISIL’s defense of the 

town. We killed him while our local partners expelled ISIL from 

the town. In doing so, the coalition campaign severed the last 

major northern artery between Raqqa and Mosul and, therefore, 

between ISIL and Syria and ISIL and Iraq. And we are intent on 

further isolating and pressuring ISIL, including by cutting off its 

remaining lines of communication in southern Syria and into Turkey. 

In addition to local forces we are working with, 90 percent of our 

military and coalition partners from Europe, the Gulf, Asia, 26 

countries in all, including, by the way, our ally Belgium, have committed to increase their contributions to help accelerate the defeat 

of ISIL. 

We have increased strikes on ISIL-held cash depots, oil revenues, 

and sites associated with its ambitions to develop and use chemical 

weapons. And we are addressing ISIL’s metastases as well, having 

conducted targeted strikes against ISIL in Libya and Afghanistan. 

As we are accelerating our overall counter-ISIL campaign, we are 

backing it up with increased funding for 2017, as the chairman already noted, requesting 50 percent more than last year. 

Now, before I continue, I want to say a few words about Russia’s 

role in this. Russia said it was coming into Syria to fight ISIL, but 

that is not what it did. Instead, their military has only prolonged 

the civil war, propped up Assad, and as of now, we haven’t seen 

whether Russia has retained leverage over Assad to facilitate a diplomatic way forward, which is what the Syrian people need. 

One thing is clear, though: Russia’s entry into Syria didn’t impact our campaign against ISIL. Along with our coalition partners, 

we are intensifying our campaign against ISIL in both Iraq and 

Syria and will continue to do so until ISIL is dealt a lasting defeat. 

Two of the other four challenges reflect a return in some ways 

to great superpower competition. One is in Europe, where we are 

taking a strong and balanced approach to deter Russian aggression. We haven’t had to devote a significant portion of our defense 
7 

investment to this possibility for nearly a quarter century, but now 

we do. 

The other challenge is in the Asia-Pacific, where China is rising, 

which is fine, but behaving aggressively, which is not. There, we 

are continuing our rebalance to the region to maintain the stability 

we have underwritten for the past 70 years, enabling so many nations to rise and prosper in this, the single most consequential region for America’s future. 

Meanwhile, two other longstanding challenges pose threats in 

specific regions: North Korea is one. That is why our forces on the 

Korean Peninsula remain ready, as they say, to fight tonight; the 

other is Iran, because while the nuclear accord is a good deal for 

preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, we must still deter 

Iranian aggression and counter Iran’s malign influence against our 

regional friends and allies, especially Israel, to which we maintain 

an unwavering and unbreakable commitment. 

Now, addressing all of these five challenges requires new investments on our part, new posture in some regions, and also new and 

enhanced capabilities. For example, we know we must deal with 

these challenges across all domains and not just the usual air, 

land, and sea, but also especially in cyber, electronic warfare, and 

space, where our reliance on technology has given us great 

strengths and great opportunities but also led to vulnerabilities 

that our adversaries are eager to exploit. 

Key to our approach is being able to deter our most advanced 

competitors. We must have and we seem to have the ability to ensure that anyone who starts a conflict with us will regret doing so. 

In our budget, our capabilities, our readiness, and our actions, we 

must and will be prepared for a high-end enemy, what we call full 

spectrum. 

In this context, Russia and China are our most stressing competitors, as they have both developed and continue to advance military systems that seek to threaten our advantages in specific areas. 

We see them in the South China Sea and in Crimea and in Syria 

as well. In some cases, they are developing weapons and ways of 

war that seek to achieve their objectives rapidly before they think 

we can respond. Because of this, DOD has elevated their importance in our planning and budgeting. 

In my written testimony, I have detailed how our budget makes 

critical investments to help us better address these five evolving 

challenges. We are strengthening our deterrence posture in Europe 

by investing $3.4 billion for our European Reassurance Initiative 

[ERI], quadruple what we requested last year. 

We are prioritizing training and readiness for our ground forces, 

a very important matter emphasized very appropriately by the 

chairman, and reinvigorating the readiness and modernization of 

our fighter aircraft fleet. We are investing in innovative capabilities, like the B–21 Long Range Strike Bomber, micro-drone, and 

the arsenal plane, as well as advanced munitions of all sorts. 

In our Navy, we are emphasizing not just increasing the number 

of ships, which we are doing, but especially their lethality, with 

new weapons and high-end ships, and extending our commanding 

lead in undersea warfare, with new investments in unmanned 

undersea vehicles, for example, and more submarines with the ver-
8 

satile Virginia Payload Module that triples their strike capacity 

from 12 Tomahawks to 40. 

And we are doing more in cyber, electronic warfare, and space, investing in these three domains a combined total of $34 billion in 

2017. Among other things, this will help us build our cyber mission 

force, develop next-generation electronic jammers, and prepare for 

the possibility of a conflict that extends into space. In short, DOD 

will keep ensuring our dominance in all domains. 

As we do this, our budget also seizes opportunities for the future. 

That is a responsibility I have to all my successors, to ensure the 

military and the Defense Department they inherit is just as strong, 

if not stronger, than the one I have the privilege of leading today. 

That is why we are making increased investments in science and 

technology, innovating operationally, and building new bridges to 

the amazing American innovative system, as we always have, to 

stay ahead of future threats. That is why we are building what I 

have called the force of the future, because as good as our technology is, it is nothing compared to our people. 

And in the future, we must continue to recruit and retain the 

very best talent. Competing for good people, for an All-Volunteer 

Force, is a critical part of our military edge, and everyone should 

understand this need and my commitment to meeting it. 

And because we owe it to America’s taxpayers to spend our defense dollars as wisely and responsibly as possible, we are also 

pushing for needed reforms across the DOD enterprise, and we 

need your help with all of them. From further reducing overhead 

and excess infrastructure, to modernizing and simplifying TRICARE, to proposing new changes to the Goldwater-Nichols Act that 

defines much of our institutional organization, as I intend to do 

shortly, to continuously improving acquisitions. 

And on that subject, I want to commend this committee, and especially its leaders, for your continued dedication and strong partnership with DOD on acquisition reform. We have already taken 

important strides here, such as last year’s reforms to reduce redundant reporting requirements and documentation. And as you are 

looking to do more, so are we. 

Chairman Thornberry, I know you laid out new proposals on this 

last week. Some of what you are proposing would save us critical 

time in staying ahead of emerging threats. That is very important, 

and we appreciate that. It is extremely helpful. 

And I know this is just a draft, and I appreciate that you put 

it out there for discussion. In that regard, I have to say that, in 

the current draft, there are some things that are problematic for 

us, so I am also hopeful that we can continue to work with you on 

your proposals to ensure that DOD has the flexibility needed to 

apply the principles in your work to addressing all the diverse acquisition challenges we have to solve for our warfighters. 

I appreciate your willingness to hear our ideas as well, including 

ways to make it easier for program managers to do their jobs, and 

involving the service chiefs more in acquisition decisionmaking and 

accountability. And I look forward to working together as we have 

before. 

Let me close on the broader shift reflected in this budget. The 

Defense Department doesn’t have the luxury of just one opponent 
9 

or the choice between fights, between future fights and current 

fights. We have to do it all. That is what this budget is designed 

to do, and we need your help to succeed. 

I thank this committee again for supporting the Bipartisan 

Budget Act that set the size of our budget. Our submission focuses 

on the budget shape, making changes that are necessary and consequential. We hope you approve it. 

I know some may be looking at the difference between what we 

indicated last year we would be asking for and what the budget 

deal gave us: a net total of about $11 billion less is provided by the 

Bipartisan Budget Act out of a total of almost $600 billion. But I 

want to reiterate that we have mitigated that difference and that 

this budget meets our needs. 

The budget deal was a good deal. It gave us stability. We are 

grateful for that. Our greatest risk, DOD’s greatest risk is losing 

that stability this year and having uncertainty and sequester return in future years. That is why, going forward, the biggest budget priority for us strategically is Congress averting the return of sequestration to prevent what would be $100 billion in looming automatic cuts so that we can maintain stability and sustain all these 

critical investments I have been speaking of. 

We have seen this before, and that same support coming together 

is essential today to address the security challenges we face and to 

seize the opportunities within our grasp. As long as we work together to do so, I know our national security will be on the right 

path and America’s military will continue to defend our country 

and help make a better world for generations to come. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DUNFORD. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman 

Davis, distinguished members of the committee, good morning and 

thanks for the opportunity to join Secretary Carter and Secretary 

McCord in appearing before you. 

I would like to begin by echoing Secretary Carter’s comments on 

the loss of Staff Sergeant Cardin; his family, the eight other Marines who were injured this weekend, and the victims of this morning’s attack in Brussels are in our thoughts and prayers. 

I am honored to represent the extraordinary men and women of 

the joint force. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civil 

servants remain our single most important competitive advantage. 

And thanks to your support, the United States military is the most 

capable fighting force in the world. 

I don’t believe we should ever send Americans into a fair fight. 

Rather, we must maintain a joint force that has the capability and 

credibility to assure our allies and partners, deter aggression, and 

overmatch any potential adversary. This requires us to continually 

improve our joint warfighting capabilities, restore full-spectrum 
10 

readiness, and develop the leaders who will serve as the foundation 

for the future. 

The United States is now confronted with challenges from both 

traditional state actors and non-state actors. The Department has 

identified five strategic challenges, and Secretary Carter has outlined those. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea continue to invest in military capabilities that reduce our competitive advantage. 

They are also advancing their interests through competition with 

a military dimension that falls short of traditional armed conflict 

and the threshold for traditional military response. Examples include Russian actions in Ukraine, Chinese activities in the South 

China Sea, and Iran’s malign influence across the Middle East. 

At the same time, non-state actors, such as ISIL and Al Qaeda, 

pose a threat to the homeland, the American people, our partners, 

and our allies. Given the opportunity, such extremist groups would 

fundamentally change our way of life. As we contend with the Department’s five strategic challenges, we recognize that successful 

execution of our defense strategy requires that we maintain credible nuclear and conventional capabilities. 

Our strategic nuclear deterrent remains effective, but it is aging 

and requires modernization. Therefore, we are prioritizing investments needed for a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. We 

are also making investments to maintain a competitive advantage 

in conventional capabilities, and we must further develop capabilities in vital and increasingly contested domains of space and cyber 

space. 

As the joint force acts to mitigate and respond to challenges, we 

do so in the context of a fiscal environment that has hampered our 

ability to plan and allocate resources most effectively. Despite partial relief by Congress from sequester-level funding, the Department has absorbed $800 billion in cuts and faces an additional 

$100 billion of sequestration-induced risk through fiscal year 2021. 

Absorbing significant cuts over the past 5 years has resulted in 

our underinvesting in critical capabilities. And unless we reverse 

sequestration, we will be unable to execute the current defense 

strategy and specifically to address the challenges that Secretary 

Carter outlined in his remarks. 

The fiscal year 2017 budget begins to address the most critical 

investments required to maintain our competitive advantage. To 

the extent possible, within the resources provided by the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, it addresses the Department’s five challenges. 

It does so by balancing three major areas: investment in high-end 

capabilities; the capability and capacity to meet our current operational demands; and the need to rebuild readiness after an extended period of war. In the years ahead, we will need adequate 

funding levels and predictability to fully recover from over a decade 

at war and delayed modernization. 

A bow wave of procurement requirements in the future include 

the Ohio-class replacement, continued cyber and space investments, and the Long Range Strike Bomber. It will also be several 

years before we fully restore full-spectrum readiness across the 

services and replenish our stocks of critical precision munitions. 

And I know the committee has heard from the service chiefs on the 

specifics of that readiness recovery. 
11 

In summary, I am satisfied that the fiscal year 2017 budget puts 

us on the right trajectory, but it will take your continued support 

to ensure the joint force has the depth, flexibility, readiness, and 

responsiveness that ensures our men and women never face a fair 

fight. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

this morning, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the 

Appendix on page 104.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. McCord, I understand you do not have an oral statement. Is 

that correct? 

Secretary MCCORD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate you being here today as well. 

Mr. Secretary, I think you are exactly right to condemn the attacks in Brussels, and you are exactly right to express sympathy 

for the victims. I think the question especially for this committee 

but for the American people is, okay, what are we going to do about 

it? 

And in last year’s bill, section 1222 asked the administration to 

provide a strategy for how we were actually going to implement the 

President’s stated desire to degrade and destroy ISIS [Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria]. And as I mentioned, it has been radio silent. 

We have heard not a word from anybody. 

Now, to be fair, it is not just a matter for the Department of Defense. It is not just the military who will defeat ISIS, and the requirement in law was not just directed to the Department of Defense. But do you have any idea when we might see a strategy on 

how to beat ISIS? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And you are right: the Brussels attacks reinforce our need to accelerate the defeat of ISIL. We have a strategy for doing so. I will 

describe it in a moment. The strategy document, the strategy report you are asking for, its delivery is imminent. It is a DOD-plusothers document, and we will get that to you. 

But the strategy in brief is this, and then I will connect it to the 

Brussels attacks. I was describing the campaign in Iraq and Syria, 

which we are accelerating, and, Mr. Chairman and members, we 

are looking for more opportunities to do so. We found opportunities. 

I expect us to find more opportunities in the future. 

We want to accelerate the defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Why? 

Because that is what I call the parent tumor of the cancer. That 

is where it started. And if we can expel ISIL from Raqqa and 

Mosul, that will show that there is no such thing as an Islamic 

State based upon this ideology. So that is necessary, but it is not 

sufficient. 

We also need to destroy ISIL in the places to which it has metastasized around the world. And to get to the Brussels attack, that 

reminds us—and the report will also, by the way—that important 

as the military effort is, essential as it is and committed as we are 

to that in the Department of Defense, the Chairman and I and everybody else, it is necessary, but it is not sufficient. 

We need the intelligence. We need the homeland security. We 

need the law enforcement. And so do our partners because of the 
12 

kind of thing you saw in Brussels this morning. So we have the 

strategy. We will produce the strategy—the report based on that. 

We need your help. 

And in that connection, finally, if I just may add a note, Mr. 

Chairman, an appeal, we have before this committee and three 

other committees some reprogramming requests that are relevant 

to our ability to carry out the campaign in both Iraq and Syria. 

And, as you know, according to the rules, if we are going to do 

a reprogramming, we have to ask the permission of this committee 

and three other committees. We have done so. So far, we have gotten different answers from everybody, which is fair enough, but if 

you can help us, we need to get across the finish line quickly. We 

have got to be agile in the defeat of ISIL, and that means we need 

to be agile in this matter of reprogramming as well. I appreciate 

your help in that regard. 

Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything about the 

overall strategy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, on the reprogramming, I think all 

of us would feel better about a reprogramming if we knew what direction we were going, which is why in last year’s bill, the request 

was: Okay, tell us how you are going to do this. And then, as you 

want to move money around and a variety of other things, I am 

sure there will be lots of support. But until there is some sort of 

coherent direction on how we are going to beat these guys, then I 

think it is harder to have that conversation. 

Let me just ask you one other thing because I know other members will want to continue to explore that topic. You were exactly 

right, as was Chairman Dunford, in expressing sympathy for the 

loss of the marine over the weekend. 

I am getting an increasing number of questions about the troop 

cap levels, which exist in both Iraq and Afghanistan, because, as 

I understand it, there are some people who are subject to the troop 

caps, and then there are some people who rotate in for a short 

amount of time that are not subject to the troop caps. 

And the argument is that if you are rotating people in every 30 

days, or whatever it is, to keep below the troop caps, then the people who are rotating in are not going to have time to get acclimated 

to the environment and may be at increased risk. The other argument I have heard is that when you have these artificial troop 

caps, you don’t bring in the force protection that you would in other 

situations where you are not subject to those troop caps. 

So, I guess, my question to you is, do you believe there is reason 

to be concerned that these artificial troop caps in Iraq and in Afghanistan lead to increased risk for our service members? 

Secretary CARTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, with respect to the troop cap numbers, there has 

been no change in that regard, and you are right: people who are 

temporarily assigned—and this has been true for here and in Afghanistan for some time—they, under the caps, are counted differently, as you well know. And I can’t go into it in detail here, 

where each and every unit is, but we do provide that to the committee and so you can have that, not in this setting. 

But to get to the substance of what you said about everybody— 

I will get the Chairman to comment on this too—everybody that is 
13 

in Iraq is properly trained for the mission, that included the Marines there. And to force protection, that was, in fact, their mission. 

What they were doing was helping to protect the staging area 

near Makhmur, where we are and our coalition partners are helping the Iraqi Security Forces, some of the brigades that will constitute the envelopment force of Mosul. So that is part of the preparation for operations against Mosul, and precisely what they were 

doing was protecting that position. 

That was a necessary task. We are very sorry about the loss of 

this member in accomplishing that necessary task, but it was necessary because we needed to position them there. And these Iraqi 

Security Forces, who in the end will be the force that both takes 

and holds Mosul, they need to be trained, and they need to be positioned near Makhmur. That is what was going on there. 

Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything. 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, to your specific question about 

have we compromised force protection or other critical capabilities 

as a result of the force cap, I can tell you we haven’t done that. 

And I have routinely engaged Lieutenant General McFarland and 

commanders on the ground and asked them, is there something 

else you need? In fact, I will see General McFarland again this 

afternoon, have the same conversation with him. 

To date, we haven’t had any requests that we have gone to the 

President with—and this is now over the last several months—for 

capabilities that has been denied. We are in the process right now 

of bringing forward recommendations for increased capability as a 

result of operations in Mosul, Raqqa, and elsewhere, so we can 

maintain a momentum and accelerate the campaign. 

But at this time, Chairman, I don’t have concerns that we have 

not put forces on the ground that have impacted either our force 

protection, CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] capability, or any of 

those things. We build a force from the bottom up with those in 

mind. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that, General. 

To me, it makes no sense to put artificial troop caps in any place. 

The question is, what does it take to do the mission? And I know, 

just as I trust you to continue to follow this question, it is something that the committee wants to continue to follow as well. 

Last question. General, you heard some of my comments earlier 

about the readiness issues. Let me just offer a handful of other 

quotes on the record. General Neller said our aviation units are 

currently unable to meet our training and mission requirements 

primarily due to ready basic aircraft shortfalls. 

General Milley and General Allen have testified, less than onethird of Army forces are at acceptable levels of readiness. The readiness of the United States Army is not at a level that is appropriate 

for what the American people would expect to defend them. 

Last week, Secretary James: Less than half our combat forces 

are ready for a high-end fight. And she later said: The Air Force 

is the smallest, oldest, and least-ready force across the full spectrum of operations in our history. 

Do you agree that we have a significant readiness problem across 

the services, especially for the wide variety of contingencies that we 

have got to face? 
14 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I do. And I think those are accurate reflections of the force as a whole. 

From my perspective, there are really three issues: there are the 

resources necessary to address the readiness issue; there is time; 

and then there is the operational tempo. And the readiness challenges that we are experiencing right now are really a result of several years of unstable fiscal environment as well as extraordinarily 

high operational tempo. And it is going to take us some years to 

get out of the trough that we are in right now. 

What I am satisfied with in this year’s budget, fiscal year 2017, 

is that we have met the requirements from a fiscal perspective that 

the services have identified for readiness. In other words, we can’t 

buy our way out of the problem in fiscal year 2017 with more 

money because of the aspect of time and operational tempo. 

I think the service chiefs probably also identified to you, Mr. 

Chairman, and the committee, that in the case of the Army, the 

Navy, and the Marine Corps, it will be sometime around fiscal year 

2020 before they address their current readiness challenges. And 

the Air Force is projecting horizon as late as fiscal year 2028 before 

they come out of the challenge. 

And part of that is, again, operational tempo and resources and 

time. And some of it is what you saw in your recent visit down in 

the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing where depot-level maintenance has 

been backlogged. What you saw in the Marine Corps, I think, reflects in some part what you will see in all the services, perhaps 

not to the same degree as Marine aviation, but that same dynamic 

exists in each one of the services and reflects in the comments that 

you heard before the committee. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will just say, I think it is important for us and 

for you all to continue to not only watch this issue but really understand down deeper what is happening. Statistics are one thing, 

but you talk to these folks eyeball to eyeball and the sense of frustration and concern is very evident. 

Thank you for your answers. I yield to Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you both for your extraordinary service to our country. 

I wanted to go back for a second to the questions that I raised 

in the opening statement because I think we grapple with that 

here. And I know that we are going to be talking about OCO funding down the line, overseas contingency, and the Bipartisan Budget 

Act as well. 

You stated, as you just did, equipment is one thing but welltrained personnel and leadership are quite another, and the latter 

do take time. And so we need to work this as best we can. In the 

statement I offered, what you have said quite, I think, clearly, that 

modernization and readiness of our force structure is where your 

tradeoffs are going in the budget process. And I am wondering, 

would the Department’s tradeoff choices become harder or easier if 

OCO needs are supplemented by base budget requirements within 

bipartisan budget compliant top line? Is that helpful? What poses 

the greatest risk really to our national security, providing funding 

for base budget requirements at the level requested by the Presi-
15 

dent or providing funding for near-term OCO requirements at least 

initially at levels lower than requested? 

One of the things that I was just going to say, Mr. Secretary, 

that I know you have said so well here is that under the best of 

all possible worlds, we would be funding the base budget at the 

level that we need, including OCO for very specific oversea contingencies. But that is not exactly where we are right now. And we 

have to be certain that other budget requirements, whether it is in 

the homeland security, whether it is in—wherever that may be are 

also working well within our budget as we move forward. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, you are right: generally speaking, the 

base and the OCO budgets have different managerial purposes. 

The base budget is for things that are enduring, meeting enduring 

requirements, and OCO is for the variable costs associated with urgent ongoing operations. That is still largely true, but it is not completely true. 

And to get to your question, one of the ways that we were able 

to mitigate the difference between what we last year planned in 

our 2017 budget and what the bipartisan budget agreement provided us, was to use some OCO, about $5 billion net. And that is 

one of the things that bought down that risk associated with that 

difference, but it is only one way that we did that. 

We also benefitted, by the way, from fuel costs, different inflation 

indices than we expected. And what we did with the remaining— 

to get to your point of what do we do to accommodate the Bipartisan Budget Act, that $11 billion change, we took it out of some 

procurement accounts, some aircraft, and some smaller programs. 

We took it out of MILCON [military construction]. 

Let me tell you what we didn’t do to accommodate that difference 

between the BBA and what we planned on last year. We didn’t 

take it out of military compensation, any of our service members’ 

compensation. We didn’t take it out of readiness, out of the readiness recovery plans that the Chairman has referred to. We didn’t 

take it out of any of our major acquisition programs, stop any of 

them, break any multiyear contracts. And we didn’t change any of 

our end-strength numbers, targets, as a result of that. 

So that is how we accommodated the $11 billion, and that is the 

reason why the Chairman and I say, that part we managed to mitigate and bring forward a budget that meets our needs. Our worry 

is in the future and with the $100 billion cuts that we face. And 

wherever they come from in the accounting, that is the biggest 

strategic risk to us. 

Mrs. DAVIS. General Dunford, did you want to—— 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, the thing I would probably 

add is, you talked about modernization over force structure. And, 

frankly, this year, as we focused on capability enhancements, it 

was really as a result of 3 or 4 years of not addressing those and 

realizing that we were losing our competitive advantage against 

the peer competitors that I mentioned, the Russias, the Chinas, 

and even in this case of North Korea and Iran. 

And we knew, were we not to make those capability investments 

this year, if you look out 3 to 4 or 5 years, we would not be where 

we needed to be. So, from my perspective, it isn’t so much force 

structure over modernization; it is trying to get within the top line 
16 

that we have the right balance between force structure and capability in today’s force, with sufficient investment in tomorrow’s 

force to make sure that the force that we have today that I am 

proudly able to say is the best in the world is the best in the world 

in 2021 and 2022. 

And that is why I think the Secretary directed us this year to 

make a slight course and speed correction in terms of how we were 

investing our funds to get better balance between today’s fight and 

tomorrow’s fight. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. And I think, Mr. McCord, as well, I think 

what may be understandable in terms of the defense budget isn’t 

necessarily understandable to folks that are looking at their budgets in other departments, and that is partly where the rub comes. 

Secretary MCCORD. I think that is correct, Mrs. Davis. 

And just one point on your earlier question. To get a marginal 

maybe increase in OCO this year without knowing if we could 

count on it in the future is pretty sub-optimal for us in terms of 

being able to plan and use that money as effectively as we might. 

If we knew that the requirement would be taken care of permanently, that is much better for us. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, I am going to take you in a different direction, totally different subject. I want to personally thank you and especially thank Secretary Robert Work. I spent 13 years of my life trying to clear the names of two Marine pilots who crashed a V–22 

Osprey in Marana, Arizona, on April 8 of the year 2000. 

Secretary Carter, I want to thank Secretary Work publicly because he did something that I could not get the Marine Corps to 

do, and that is to look openly and evaluate the information that we 

had put together working with experts. Many of those were Marine 

pilots themselves. There were aeronautical engineers who came to 

the aid of saying that at the time, if you remember, that Secretary 

of Defense Cheney wanted to scrap the V–22 program. There was 

a lot of pressure. There was a lot of push by the Marine Corps to 

make sure that the V–22 was their plane for the future. 

When I reached out and found Secretary Work, he spent the time 

to meet with me and spent several hours, days, researching all the 

information that we had put together. A team of experts helped me 

to put it together. And then he came back with his evaluation that 

the record needed to be corrected, that it was unfair to Colonel 

John Brow, pilot, and Major Brooks Gruber, copilot, whose wife 

brought this to my attention in the year 2002. 

And I want to say today that you have brought peace—Secretary 

Work and you—have brought peace to the families of John Brow 

and Brooks Gruber. And I believe sincerely that John Brow and 

Brooks Gruber are now resting in their graves, and they are resting peacefully because of what you and Secretary Work have done. 

This has gotten national attention. And I have talked to Trish 

Brow, and I have talked to Connie Gruber. They are hearing from 

marines who are now retired. They are hearing from friends from 

years passed who have said ‘‘Hallelujah’’ that now the truth is 
17 

known and those two pilots will not take the blame for what was 

unfair at the time of the accident. 

So I want to thank you publicly and thank Deputy Secretary 

Robert Work, because the truth is now known that they were not 

responsible for that accident. It was a combination of many, many 

factors. So I will give you a chance to respond, and then I will yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you so much. I appreciate you saying 

that. I am glad that the families are able to be at peace now, and 

I will pass that on to Secretary Work, my excellent Deputy Secretary. I am pleased to hear you say that about him, but I am not 

surprised. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I think you have an obligation, certainly a right, 

to respond to something that former Deputy Director of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] said yesterday in response to a question. 

He said that ISIL is winning, and he said based on two assessments: one, although there is less caliphate territory, they seem to 

be spreading their influence beyond the caliphate territory; and 

then, of course, in direct reference to the attacks in Brussels. 

So I wanted to get your assessment about whether you think 

ISIL is winning, and if not, your assessment of the former Deputy 

Director of CIA’s comments. 

Secretary CARTER. I am not familiar with those comments. 

And as far as the campaign is concerned, I am confident that we 

will defeat ISIL and that we have the momentum of the campaign 

in Iraq and Syria. I gave you some of the details about that. And 

we are prepared to give you much more. We are doing more. We 

are actually looking to do yet more than that. And I am confident 

that that will result in the defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria. And 

as I said, that is necessary. It is not sufficient, as the attacks in 

Belgium suggest. 

And let me ask if the Chairman wants to add anything to that. 

But ISIL will be defeated. We have a strategy to do that. I am 

sorry the report hasn’t gotten to you but will shortly, and I am confident that strategy will succeed. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first, I am not complacent 

about the threat of ISIL. And I recognize the spread of ISIL particularly over the last 15, 18 months transregionally or globally. 

With regard to Syria and Iraq, in October I appeared before the 

committee, and at that time, I think it was fair to say that ISIL 

had the momentum. Since that time, they not only have less territory, they have less resources. They have less freedom of movement. We have reduced the number of foreign fighters that are actually able to flow back and forth. And, frankly, I think their narrative is less effective than it was some months ago. 

But this is a long fight. And I am confident in telling you that 

we have the momentum today. I am also confident in the end state 

that Secretary Carter identified. But this morning was another reminder that there is a long fight ahead, and it will require not only 

the military effort to deny sanctuary to the enemy in Syria and 
18 

Iraq, to limit their freedom of movement, to build the capacity of 

regional partners, which is what we are doing, but it will require 

a much greater cooperation amongst intelligence organizations 

from nations. 

There are over 100 nations that have foreign fighters in Syria 

and Iraq with over 30,000 foreign fighters. So the cooperation of all 

those countries and the intelligence organizations, law enforcement 

officials, as well as the military coalition that we put together in 

Iraq and Syria and conducting operations elsewhere, is all going to 

be critical. And it is going to take some time before we get there. 

But I am confident, at least today, that we have the momentum 

in Iraq and Syria. And we are increasingly taking actions outside 

of Iraq and Syria to make sure that we also keep pressure, as we 

have tried to keep pressure on Iraq, on the enemy simultaneously 

across both of those countries. It is going to be necessary that we 

do the same thing transregionally. 

Mr. LARSEN. I am going to move to the budget and talk about 

taking the long view. 

Unfortunately for you, you don’t get to be here for the implementation of the long view and to help us deal with the actual long 

view. And we have been having this debate a little bit, and Mrs. 

Davis touched upon it. And I am just wondering how you envision 

affording these incredibly expensive programs that we have outside, not just outside of this budget but outside of the 5 years and 

even 10. Nuclear modernization is one of those, but it is not the 

only one where we are going to be called upon, if we have the fortunate success of staying here, to resolve and solve. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we can afford all of those. We wouldn’t 

have started them if we didn’t think we could complete them. However, we are assuming when we do so that we will continue to have 

budget stability. If there is instability or sequester, as I said, and 

I think the Chairman just said, we are going to have to fundamentally reassess our ability to meet our needs, not only in the long 

run but in the short run. 

And you are right: it will be future Congresses and future administrations who carry that burden. I hope that they continue to give 

us budget stability as we have had now for 2 years. That is what 

the country needs. That is what our Department needs. That is 

what, by the way, what every department trying to administer programs needs. 

But if we snap back to the sequester cuts, we are going to have 

to reconsider all of these programs. We need them and therefore we 

need the stability. Chairman. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is fine. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you 

gentlemen for being here. 

General Dunford, it is always an honor to have the top uniformed officer in the United States before us, and so I am going 

to direct my questions to you since I only have 5 minutes. And I 

would like to first ask you a question we have been asking all of 

our officers before us. Did you submit your written remarks to any-
19 

one for approval or review other than someone under your direct 

command before you had to come before us? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I did submit my remarks to the 

Office of Secretary of Defense as well as Office of Management and 

Budget. No changes were made in my written remarks as a result 

of that review. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, one of the things that I heard you just say in 

response to the chairman was you said that your readiness concerns were based on an unstable fiscal environment. And one of the 

concerns I always have, we wrestle within this committee, is simply this: when we look at whether strategy is driving the budget, 

the President’s budget, or whether the President’s budget is driving 

strategy, the question is, which one of them are predominant? 

Is it the strategy that is predominant in driving the President’s 

budget, or is it the President’s budget that is predominant in driving the strategy? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think this year, it is fair to 

say that within the top line that we were given—— 

Mr. FORBES. No. For the last several years, just as a rule, is it 

the strategy that is more predominant in driving the budget or the 

budget that is more predominant in driving the strategy? 

General DUNFORD. I would say if you go back to the last few 

years and particularly look at sequestration in 2013, the fiscal environment has had a bigger impact than the budget. 

Mr. FORBES. So, then, when we have constantly asked people 

that have come in here, many people from the Pentagon, saying 

that the budgets are in line with the strategy, then what you are 

saying is basically that it has been the budget that has been driving our strategy? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, let me—if I can give you just 

a little bit of a nuanced answer, here what I am confident in saying. Today, we have a defense strategy that calls for us to defeat 

an enemy, to deny another adversary, to protect the homeland, as 

well as deal with violent extremism. I am confident in fiscal year 

2017 that we will be able to do that—— 

Mr. FORBES. All right. 

General DUNFORD [continuing]. With risk. 

Mr. FORBES. Let me ask you this. And I don’t mean to cut you 

off. I only have 3 minutes. I am looking at a document here that 

was signed by President Obama on January 3, 2012, for the Defense Guidance, and he says specifically in here: This guidance was 

requested to guide the spending over the coming decade. Then I 

have it signed on January 5, the Defense Guidance, by Secretary 

Panetta, and this is what over and over again people who have 

been coming in here pointing to and saying this has been directing 

their spending. And then we had, in 2014, the Quadrennial Defense Review. Over and over again, people have sat where you are 

sitting and have said that this has guided the spending of the Department of Defense. 

Has the Department of Defense been following the President’s 

guidelines and been basing their spending on these two documents? 

General DUNFORD. We have, Congressman, but what we have 

been doing is living year to year and deferring modernization that 

is going to cause a build in the out years, so—— 
20 

Mr. FORBES. And I understand that. Now, let me ask you this, 

because these documents are based on certain assumptions. Did either of these two documents account for the rise of ISIL? 

General DUNFORD. They did not. 

Mr. FORBES. Did either of these two documents assume that U.S. 

forces will no longer be in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. They did not. 

Mr. FORBES. And, in fact, we do have forces still in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Did either of these two documents assume that we would reset 

our relationship with Russia and that we would be able to cooperate with them? 

General DUNFORD. We did not foresee Russia’s current actions in 

those documents. 

Mr. FORBES. So the assumptions made for these two documents 

were not correct with the Russians, right? 

General DUNFORD. With regard to Russia, that is correct. 

Mr. FORBES. Did either of these two documents account for China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea? 

General DUNFORD. Not to the extent that we have seen it, Congressman. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, with that, wouldn’t it be fair to say if the assumptions that these assumptions were based upon were invalid or 

wrong, that the strategy would also have been invalid or wrong? 

General DUNFORD. The strategy needs to be refined, and we are 

in the process of doing that. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And, also, General Odierno, when I asked him that 

question right after these were put into place, he said: We struggle 

to even meet one major contingency operation. It depends on assumptions. And I believe some of the assumptions that were made 

are not good assumptions; they are unrealistic and very positive assumptions. 

Yet these are the two documents that helped guide the President’s budget in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. So wouldn’t it be fair, 

General, for us to say that, instead of just the unstable fiscal environment, that a big part of the reason we are in the current situation we are in is because the President’s strategies were based on 

faulty assumptions? 

General DUNFORD. This year, Congressman, we—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am talking about the last several years leading up 

to this. This year’s budget is not putting us in the situation that 

the chairman talked about. 

General DUNFORD. If you are asking, did we foresee the current 

conflict with ISIL and Russia—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am asking you, wouldn’t it be fair to say that rather than just fiscal instability, that the reason we are in the problem 

is because of a faulty strategy? 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, and I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to both witnesses for your service and your testimony today. I just have a couple quick questions. 
21 

And, Secretary Carter, Admiral Stavridis, retired admiral, Under 

Secretary Stackley, Secretary Mabus have all appeared over the 

last couple of weeks, and we have talked about this question of the 

long view of the undersea fleet, which Admiral Harris and General 

Breedlove said at this point are kind of playing zone defense out 

there because of what is happening in the Pacific and the North 

Atlantic. 

Again, this is a good budget in terms of investing, as you point 

out, in shipbuilding or submarine building, but down the road, you 

know, there is a possibility that we are going to see a dip at probably the worst possible time. And so I guess the question is, do you 

agree that this is an issue that we need to work on, as Secretary 

Stackley has promised, so that we, again, are able to keep our eyes 

focused on the long view in terms of that emerging challenge? 

Secretary CARTER. I do agree with that. Our undersea capability 

is a critical strength of the United States. We need to keep that 

strength and extend that strength. And I think the biggest issue 

we are going to face beginning in the 2020s is the beginning of the 

Ohio-class replacement, and that is the building, once again, of 

SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] as well as attack submarines, 

SSNs, which we are doing today. And we have been stressing now 

for several years we are going to need some consideration of the 

need to recapitalize our undersea nuclear deterrent, because that 

can’t be done at the expense of the rest of the undersea fleet or we 

will erode our dominance, so that is going to—that is a major issue 

that is looming in the 2020s. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. And, again, we think—you know, we 

have found some ways to use different authorities, multiyear procurement, et cetera, to try and, again, maximize every efficiency to 

help in that effort. And, again, Secretary Stackley emphasized that 

when he appeared before the committee. 

I would like to shift gears for a second. First of all, I want to 

thank you for your comments regarding what happened in Brussels 

yesterday, and also noting that Brussels is actually the home of 

NATO, and, you know, there is a lot of work that takes place in 

that city which is extremely important in terms of our national defense. Yesterday, the frontrunner for the Republican nomination 

told the Washington Post, NATO was set up at a different time; I 

think NATO as a concept is good, but it is not as good as it was 

when it first evolved. 

In your testimony, I counted three instances—the fight against 

ISIL, the continuing efforts in Afghanistan, and also the European 

Reassurance Initiative—where NATO is absolutely at the center of 

our military strategy and operations. Is NATO relevant today? I 

mean, I guess we need to ask that question, given what is out there 

in the public domain. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, let me begin by saying the following, 

and I have said this before, and I am going to say this again and 

again in the course of the year: I recognize that this is an election 

year. I will not speak to anything that is in the Presidential debate. 

I believe that our Department has a tradition of standing apart, 

and I very much value and respect that tradition, and so I am 

going to, with great respect, decline to answer any question that 
22 

is framed in those terms and, by the way, also not have General 

Dunford or any of our, especially of our uniformed officers—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. So I agree, and I respect that. And I guess the 

question I would ask, then, is that the European Reassurance Initiative, that funding, again, is going to flow through the NATO 

structure. I mean, that is not a, you know—— 

Secretary CARTER. It is. It is. It is. And securing our NATO partners from particularly Russian aggression is the principal purpose 

of the European Reassurance Initiative. 

With respect to the counter-ISIL fight, the NATO allies as individual countries are members of the coalition. The question has 

arisen whether NATO as a group should also be a member of the 

coalition, and that is being discussed right now with NATO. The 

reason for that being that NATO has some force generation capabilities that no individual country has, and that is the reason why 

the question arises whether it can play a role in the counter-ISIL 

fight. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you for those answers. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, looking back at the 2012–2014 Strategic Guidance and Defense Reviews, what specifically has changed in the 

geopolitical world? And based on those changes, is it safe to say 

that we need to look at—following on what Mr. Forbes said—recalibration or resizing of our current forces? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks. I would say that the 

most significant changes: one has been Russia; two has been the 

rise of ISIL. We talked about the behavior of China in the South 

China Sea, and certainly the capability development of North 

Korea have all been a concern. Iran remains a concern, but, quite 

frankly, the trajectory that they have been on was predictable even 

as those strategy documents were written, and so I think we accounted for Iran; but in the four other areas, we have seen either 

capability development or behavior or a combination of the two 

that have significantly changed the operating environment over the 

last few years. 

Mr. MILLER. And I do think it is important that the American 

people understand the guidance that was used to set the size and 

shape of the force, and the current guidance, as you have already 

stated, said to defeat a regional adversary and deny another aggressor in the another region. However, in your written statement, 

you stated that, quote, ‘‘The joint force will be challenged to respond to a major written contingency,’’ unquote, and that, quote, 

‘‘Capability and capacity shortfalls would be particularly acute if 

the force were called to respond to a second contingency on an overlapping timeline.’’ 

So I would think that this might suggest that there is a significant risk that the joint force wouldn’t even be able to execute a single major contingency operation. Is that true? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, our assessment is we can meet 

the requirements of a single contingency. There is significant risk 

in our ability to do that, certain capability areas would be particularly stressed, but we can accomplish the objectives, albeit with 

much more time and probably casualties than we would like. 
23 

Mr. MILLER. The guidance calls for sufficient forces to execute, 

as you just said, two contingency operations, defeating one aggressor and denying the other. So, you know, if you put it in a real 

world scenario, could the current force today defeat a North Korea 

and deny Russia while at the same time defending the homeland? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we would be challenged to do 

those three things. Our assessment is we can do that, again, but 

it would take more time, particularly in the case of North Korea. 

It would take more time, and we would see more casualties than 

we would want to have. 

Mr. MILLER. So the Department has cut the end strength and the 

force structure on the assumption that it did have the sufficient 

forces to carry out the assumptions that are there. So, given the 

current strategic environment, will the Department need to revisit 

the force size and guidance? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, just to be clear, in terms of cutting force structure, my perspective is, you know, force structure is 

one element, but what is most important is that the force structure 

that we have has the proper resourcing to be well trained and well 

equipped. And so what I believe we have done inside the budget 

is we have got the force structure that is affordable within the top 

line that we have, and we can achieve the balance between the 

training, the resourcing, the modernization, the infrastructure support, and the force structure, all those things have to be combined. 

And so, you know, my assessment is that we are trying to get the 

balance right as opposed to saying that the current force structure 

is absolutely the best force structure we could have. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome to our guests. It is always good to have you before 

us. And I think today’s tragic events in Brussels really are a stark 

reminder of the many challenges that you all deal with every day 

and that we are here to support you with. And I especially appreciated both your comments on the need for budget stability as you 

deal with the challenges of today, but also with the need to look 

forward, because as we all know, and I remember a previous chairman, Ike Skelton, always commenting upon, that we plan for today 

but we never quite know where the next challenge is going to come 

from. And in the world we live in today, it is clear that they can 

come from many, many different places. 

But, Secretary Carter, I also wanted to thank you for the emphasis that you have placed in this year’s budget on research and development, really knowing that it is key to maintaining our technological edge, that in this rapidly changing environment, we have 

got to maintain our investments. And as many on the committee 

know, defense-related research and development has faced a disproportionately large cut over the past several years, far more than 

has been required under the Budget Control Act. So I was especially encouraged to see that the Department will be investing in 

two new facilities at MIT’s [Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s] Lincoln Lab. As you know, the lab has provided the Department with breakthrough advancements for decades, and I thank 
24 

you for your support of the lab’s revitalization and the important 

role that it plays in the Massachusetts innovation ecosystem. It is 

part of something much larger. 

But I would like to turn to the issue of sexual assault prevention 

and response in the military. I have been troubled by a number of 

stories, including a series in the AP [Associated Press] and recent 

stories in the Washington Post, about senior officer sexual assault 

cases, which have called into question the transparency of the military justice system and the services’ willingness to pursue allegations against officers. I understand that the Military Justice Review Group’s proposal that was shared with this committee by the 

Department gives the Department 2 years to come up with a design for an online system of tracking cases and 2 years to implement that system. And I would encourage the Department to work 

with all speed to make the military justice system as transparent 

as possible. And I hope the Department will make the system open 

to survivors and the public as you move ahead. 

But we have all heard the troubling accounts of victims of military sexual assault who are later retaliated against, those who seek 

recourse through the system of justice. Some 62 percent of victims 

have experienced social or professional retaliation, according to the 

Department’s own survey data. And I have also read the Judicial 

Proceedings Panel recommendation to implement a standard retaliation reporting form. It is imperative to me that the Department 

track these incidents and hold those responsible accountable. It is 

key to maintaining the unit cohesion and all that is part of readiness as well. 

So my questions are, Secretary Carter, what is the Department 

doing to ensure service members who report sexual assault aren’t 

retaliated against? 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you very much for that question. And 

sexual assault is unacceptable anywhere in society, but it is particularly unacceptable in our military, and the reason is this: the 

profession of arms is based upon trust, and it is based upon honor, 

and sexual assault erodes both honor and trust and, for that reason, is completely unacceptable at any level. 

Moreover, to get to your point, as we study that question more 

and take more action—and I am not happy that there is sexual assault in the military, I am very pleased that we are taking it on 

frontally, and we need to do that, and we need to learn how to do 

better. The two issues you raised are places where we are learning 

how to do better. Retaliation, for example, was something that I 

don’t think—I think it is fair to say in our department, we did not 

appreciate the importance of that phenomenon until the last couple 

of years, and so we are having to take that on board. Retaliation 

creates additional victims to the victim of the sexual assault, and 

this can be peers, and it can be others who are part of giving the 

victim their care, their right—the options and the response that 

they deserve, and so it is an important new ingredient, and we are 

trying to get on top of that. 

And, finally, with respect to transparency, we are committed to 

that. You are right, we have made a commitment to you about 

greater transparency in this matter, and I intend for us to carry 

that through. Thank you for raising that. 
25 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. I have run out of time. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 

here today. 

With the attacks in Brussels, it is another reminder we are in 

a global war on terrorism, and it is continuing. And I just want you 

to know that I have faith in you, and we are counting on you to 

protect American families. And part of that is not forgetting 9/11. 

This is a continuing war; we will be in it for quite a while, but your 

service I know I appreciate as a grateful dad of four sons who have 

served in the military under you all’s command. 

General Dunford, as Chairman Thornberry has mentioned, we 

have serious concerns about the state of the Marine Corps aviation. 

Marine Corps aviators and maintainers at the Marine Corps Air 

Station in Beaufort, South Carolina, tell us how they have had to 

cannibalize parts from museum aircraft to get their current fleet in 

the air. They don’t have the parts. They don’t have the people. 

They are not getting the training. Furthermore, General Robert 

Neller has testified that there aren’t enough aircraft to even meet 

our training and mission requirements. I am very concerned that 

if they had to deploy tomorrow, they would be sent into a fight unprepared and ill equipped. 

How are we addressing this potential reality of an inability to respond to near-peer adversary or multi-adversary engagement? Beyond Marine Corps aviation, what else is at risk? 

Secretary CARTER. Before you answer that, can I just thank you 

very much. I acknowledge your comments. And especially thank 

you for your contribution of your sons. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, hey, we are in this together, but the 

American people need to know it is a global war on terrorism; 

9/11 must not be forgotten. So thank you. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, quickly, go back to how we got 

in the position we are in with Marine aviation, as well as, frankly, 

as I mentioned, across the joint force, there are similar stories that 

I could point out. Part of it was deferred modernization, so we are 

flying aircraft now that are very old. Part of it was, back in 2013, 

we went through sequestration. We had a backlog of depot-level 

maintenance that has caused the availability of ready basic aircraft 

and so forth. So these issues exist throughout the joint force. And 

part of what we are arguing for now is stability in funding, managing the operational tempo, and getting the appropriate resources 

is going to be what we need to get out of this trough, and it is 

going to take some years before we are able to do that. 

Mr. WILSON. And we will be working with you. 

And, Secretary Carter, last week, Admiral John Richardson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC] that Iran 

had violated international law earlier this year by boarding sovereign U.S. vessels, detaining 10 U.S. sailors, and seizing an estimated 13,000 pages worth of information from laptops, GPS [Global Positioning System] devices, and maps. 

Would you agree with Admiral Richardson’s assessment? If so, 

would you please let us know what subsequent action has been 

taken to rectify this brazen defiance of international law? 
26 

Secretary CARTER. I absolutely agree with Admiral Richardson. 

The actions of the Iranians with respect to our sailors was unprofessional; it was outrageous. And I just caution you all, since Admiral Richardson is looking into the circumstances of this matter, but 

when you see something on television, you are looking through the 

lens of Iranian TV and Iranian propaganda. Those sailors didn’t deserve that. That is—we would never treat people in that manner. 

And to get to your question, I can’t say much about it, but at the 

time, we were preparing to protect our people as soon as they were 

seized, and we only stood down that effort when we were assured 

that they were going to be returned to us safely, but it was outrageous treatment. I think Admiral Richardson has stressed that, 

and I would second that, but also I want to commend him on the 

treatment of the sailors. They are back home. The Navy did what 

it needed to do, which is, first of all, take care of their health and 

welfare, and is now learning the full circumstances of that. 

He has not completed his review of that, so I don’t know what 

his consequences are from that, but this much we know, which is 

that is not behavior that we would have exhibited in the reverse 

circumstance. 

Mr. WILSON. I also want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your 

efforts to promote public-private cooperation in cybersecurity, but 

a challenge we have is recruiting and training. What are we doing 

to prepare for the continuing cyber war? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you for that question. You are absolutely right. The critical thing in cyber is people, good people. We 

are spending more money on it, we are making big investments in 

it, but that is not the key. The key is, are we able to get the good 

people to flesh out our 133 cyber mission force teams, which, as you 

know, is what we are building up at CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] and all the other service components. The key is people. And 

we are doing better at attracting and retaining skilled technical 

people. I will be up at a physics class at West Point, as it happens, 

tomorrow, seeing some of our wonderful people who are being technically trained in their cyber center there. But, in addition, let me 

say that building bridges, which I am trying to do, we are all trying 

to do, between our department and the technology community is 

critical. 

Historically, the United States has drawn upon the great 

strength of this Nation, whether it is satellites or missiles or the 

Internet itself, and we need to keep doing that, and I am committed to doing that, because that is part of the future. 

And the last thing I will say is just a pitch for the role of the 

National Guard and Reserve Component in this regard. I was up 

in Washington State a couple of weeks ago. There is a Reserve unit 

up there that consists of people who work at topnotch companies 

like Microsoft all day on network defense, and then, in their Guard 

duty, they are defending our networks. It doesn’t get any better 

than that, a citizen soldier coming in in cyber. 

So there are lots of ways we are trying to make sure we have 

good people, but we are able to, but that is the key, is good people 

in cyber. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Takai. 
27 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carter, I would like to talk about the Rim of the Pacific exercises, or RIMPAC. In your letter last year to Senators 

McCain and Reid, you stated that you believe that China’s participation in RIMPAC would advance cooperative approaches to common security challenges, increase transparency and mutual understanding, and integrate China into a cooperative forum. You also 

say that you may modify our defense engagement decisions based 

on evolving circumstances. 

My question is, have you recently evaluated China, and have you 

made any changes to the invitation to the PLA [People’s Liberation 

Army] navy to participate in this year’s RIMPAC? 

Secretary CARTER. We are constantly evaluating our relationship 

with China and China’s behavior, including in the South China 

Sea, where I emphasize we have very serious concerns about their 

aggressive militarization there. 

They have an invitation to RIMPAC, and we will continue to review that, but you might say, what is the logic for having them 

there in the first place? Our strategy in the Asia-Pacific is not to 

exclude anyone, but to keep the security architecture going there 

in which everyone participates, and that is what has led over 50 

years to the rise of Japan, then South Korea, then Taiwan, then 

Southeast Asia, and now, yes, China and India. We are not excluding China from that security architecture, in which America plays 

the pivotal role, and we intend to keep playing that pivotal role. 

That is what the rebalance is all about. 

China is, however, self-isolating. Its behavior is isolating itself in 

the region. That is why all these partners are coming to us and 

saying: Can you do more with us? So not just big exercises with 

lots of parties, like RIMPAC, but we have the Japanese investing 

more, the Australians investing more, the Philippines just inviting 

us, once again, to work with them more closely, even Vietnam, 

India. So Chinese behavior is self-isolating and driving many countries to want to do more with us and are doing more with us, but 

that is not the way China is going to continue to benefit, as it has 

now for several decades, from the security system and the open 

system that we, the United States, have underwritten now for 

many decades. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay. So if China builds a runway on Scarborough 

Shoal reef, PACOM [Pacific Command] Commander Admiral Harris assesses that Beijing will have total access across the South 

China Seas. 

Secretary Carter, is China conducting or preparing to conduct 

reclamation at the Scarborough Shoals, which is only 120 miles 

from Subic Bay in the Philippines where our Navy regularly operates? And would you say that this behavior is consistent with U.S. 

objectives and the regional security environment? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, Congressman, we are concerned about 

that prospect. And is it consistent? No, it is not consistent. It is the 

kind of behavior that we will react to in our own military posture 

and deployments, and all the regional partners will react to. So it 

will be self-defeating and self-isolating for China, so I hope they 

don’t do that, but we are prepared for that eventuality should it 
28 

occur. But, no, it is not a good thing for them to do that, and they 

shouldn’t. 

And by the way, I would just say just to be fair about it, that 

our policy is that no one ought to be militarizing these features. 

There are these disputes over maritime claims in the South China 

Sea. Our view isn’t to take sides on them. Our view is that everybody ought to resolve those peacefully and not militarize those features, China and anyone else who has done that, but China has 

done it far more than anybody else. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you. And I do agree, it is not consistent with 

U.S. objectives, and like you say, no one should be militarizing that 

area. 

So my question, then, is why, then, should we reward China with 

their aggressive behavior by including them in an event meant for 

allies and partners? China’s behavior is the polar opposite, as you 

mentioned, of U.S. objectives in the region, and that is why I submitted a proposal to the NDAA [National Defense Authorization 

Act] that would prohibit China’s participation in RIMPAC this 

year. I hope you and your department will reassess this situation 

and follow suit. Do you have any comment? Briefly. We have 10 

seconds. 

Secretary CARTER. No. We are constantly reassessing that. I gave 

you the logic for the invitation in the first place and will continue 

to reassess it in accordance with your letter. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last week, General Milley stated before the committee, quote, 

that less than one-third of the Army forces are at acceptable readiness levels to conduct sustained ground combat in a full-spectrum 

environment against a highly lethal hybrid threat or near-peer adversary. Obviously, this statistic is undoubtedly alarming and illustrates that the risk associated with a less-than-ready military force 

is unacceptable. 

All too often, we speak about military risk in terms of numbers 

and percentages as opposed to more real and tangible consequences. When asked a similar question last year about risk, then 

Chief of Staff, Army, General Ray Odierno, made clear that direct 

correlation existed between increased risk and loss of lives on the 

battlefield. Quite plainly, Odierno stated that people would die. 

While I apologize for my frankness, it is critically important that 

our colleagues in Congress and the general public clearly understand what is meant when you say ‘‘risk.’’ We are currently in the 

throes of our debate on the budget, and there are those who continue to say: We can accept increased risks; we can lower the costs; 

we can continue to accept sequestration or cuts. 

General Dunford, would you please help us better understand 

what you mean when you say ‘‘risk’’? Is there a direct correlation 

between risk and loss of lives on the battlefield? And, also, is there 

a direct correlation between risk and winning, knowing that we 

now have issues with Russia, China, North Korea, and certainly 

ISIS? Could you give us an understanding of how the word ‘‘risk’’ 

translates? 
29 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I can. First of all, there is a 

correlation between risk and casualties. And when I talk about risk 

against our objectives, I am talking about how long it will take and 

how many casualties we will suffer. Those are the two elements of 

risk that I refer to. 

You mentioned sequestration, and I will tell you what the risk 

of sequestration is. The risk of sequestration—and I am talking 

now the $100 billion that still looms out there—means that we 

would have to go back and actually rewrite our strategy, and I am 

talking about the ends of our strategy. So when you talk about winning, there is a correlation also between our ability to win against 

the current adversaries that we have identified, the peer competitors that we have identified, and sequestration. And my assessment is that we will not be able to deal with the five challenges 

that Secretary Carter and I outlined in our opening remarks, the 

Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism. Were we 

to go to sequester-level funding, I can’t imagine us being able to 

satisfactorily deal with those five challenges and, by the way, the 

challenges that we can’t foresee. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Carter, when you were here last year, one 

of the things that you said was that it would be so important to 

get a 2-year budget deal. Many of us in Congress, including myself, 

who voted for it, believed we had a 2-year budget deal. We believed 

that we would be looking this year at the budgetary process with 

a fairly firm 574 commitment to base budget funding, which would 

result in stopping the cuts that the Department of Defense has 

been put to, but when we received the President’s budget, the 

President indicated that there were increased overseas contingency 

operations funding that he would need for his operations, $3.4 billion for Europe, additional dollars for ISIS. And rather than putting those on top, meaning that they are additional things that the 

President would need to do, he took that out of the base funding 

of the Department of Defense. Now, we are having in Congress the 

debate putting those dollars back. And, again, it was unexpected, 

because that was not part of the 2-year budget deal that you advocated for and that we voted for and that we all thought we were 

operating under. 

Could you please tell us what the consequences are of the cuts 

that will happen to the base budget of the Department of Defense 

if we accept the President’s budget, because clearly there are 

things that you are going to have to not do that you will get to do 

if we put that money back. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the President’s budget reflects the bipartisan budget agreement. The numbers in the budget are the numbers in the BBA. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Carter, I know you know that we completely disagree with you. I mean, Congress’ expectation is that you 

had a base budget of 574. I don’t think you would have supported 

a 2-year budget deal that would have had a cut to the base budget 

in year 2017. And my question is not really, what is the deal? My 

question is, what are you losing? Because you are obviously losing 

something from 574 with the reduction that the President has 

taken of about $13 billion out of the base budget for OCO operations. 
30 

Secretary CARTER. We are going to have to agree to disagree 

about that, about whether we budgeted to BBA, because we believe 

we did. However, to answer what I gather is part of your question, 

namely what did we do about the difference between what we said 

last year we intended to request this year and what we requested 

this year. I addressed that earlier. That was a $22 billion difference 

that, because of OCO and some other economic adjustments that 

went our way, like fuel prices and so forth, ended up being a net 

of $11 billion. And I explained exactly what we did to adjust and 

mitigate risk associated with that $11 billion. We cut a lot of minor 

procurement programs. We scaled back some of our aircraft buys. 

We took it out of MILCON. That is how we accommodated the $11 

billion. We can tell you in detail how that was done. 

And I also explained what we didn’t do. We didn’t go into military pay to make up that difference. We didn’t go into the readiness recovery plans that the Chairman has described and that are 

so critical to restore our readiness, including full-spectrum readiness for the Army and the other services. We didn’t cancel any 

multiyear procurements or other major acquisition programs. And 

we didn’t change any of our force structure targets, number of 

ships, Army end strength, or anything like that. We did what we 

did. We have described what it is. We believe that we were able 

to mitigate that risk, and that is what we did. 

Our biggest risk going forward—I will just say it again; we have 

said it many times—the biggest risk to us strategically in our defense is a return to sequestration, a collapse of the bipartisan budget agreement, and that is our biggest concern. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, last week, we were able to listen to testimony 

from Acting Secretary of the Army Murphy and General Milley. 

And Secretary Murphy said, to continue this line of questioning on 

risk begun by Mr. Turner, said something to the effect of this budget places the Army at high risk. And prior to that, General Milley 

had made that connection explicit between risk and the loss of the 

service members’ lives who we will put in harm’s way. We reduce 

risk, we reduce that loss of life. So there couldn’t be anything more 

serious or grave for us to make a decision on. 

My question for you is, is that level of risk comparable in the 

other service branches? And what is your guidance to us as a committee going into the NDAA as a Congress that might look in the 

near future at supplemental funding to further mitigate that risk 

in this upcoming budget year? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, first of all, let me completely associate 

myself with what Acting Secretary Murphy and General Milley 

said. That is our highest priority for the Army in this budget, is 

readiness. They both made that clear, I concurred in that, and that 

is why the Army’s readiness recovery plan is fully funded in the 

budget. 

Now, what does that consist of? It gets back to the question earlier about full spectrum. In order to recover full spectrum—remember where we are coming from here is an Army that was working 

extremely hard in Iraq and Afghanistan to meet the rotational 

needs of a counterinsurgency battle, and they were being trained 
31 

for that. Now they are trying to restore their training to full spectrum for the other problems that we highlighted among the five 

that we are highlighting in this budget. To do that, they need to 

pass through their training ranges, and those high-level training 

ranges have a certain capacity. We are building that capacity, but 

it is going to take some time for them to come out of it. And it is 

not going to just take time; it is going to take budget stability. That 

is why I keep coming back to the need for budget stability. 

And then the last thing in your question, the other services have 

comparable readiness issues. They are all different, but they are 

comparable in the following sense: all are trying to make long-term 

plans to get better in readiness. In the Marine Corps, it is particularly aviation, as the Chairman has pointed out. In the Navy, it is 

principally a maintenance issue, and they are working very hard 

on that. In the Air Force, it is, very importantly, and I think the 

Air Force leadership has indicated this and the chairman mentioned this as well, the very high OPTEMPO [operational tempo]. 

The Air Force is trying to train for high readiness. At the same 

time, we are working them very hard in the counter-ISIL fight and 

elsewhere. So it is a little bit different in each service, but there 

is a challenge in each case, and that challenge—and we have plans 

to improve readiness, but they can’t be executed if we are returned 

to budget—to sequester levels. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Let me ask two followup questions to clarify. 

One, are we doing all we can do within this budget request to mitigate that risk? If not, what do we need to do? I would be happy 

to join my colleagues and you in making the necessary changes too. 

My understanding is that risk is a term of art in terms of what the 

service chief submits to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And 

what I would like to know, is what we heard from the Acting Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army reflected in the other 

service branches? Yes or no, if we have less risk in those others, 

are there more resources to pull to address the high risk, which I 

understand is a term of art, that was disclosed to us in the hearing 

last week? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, with respect to the first part, we have 

in this budget for 2017 done everything that the Army wanted to 

do. I completely support them to get on the path to restoring readiness. It can’t be done overnight—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. This is as much as we can do. 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. As I described. And so it is not 

a money issue. It is a money stability issue for the Army, and we 

have got to have that. 

And with respect to, ‘‘does that translate into risk,’’ yes. Does it 

translate into risk for the other services? Yes, it does. And is that 

reflected in how the Chairman and I and the rest of the Joint 

Chiefs and the service secretaries deal with risk in each service 

contribution to joint war plans and across joint war plans? Absolutely, it does. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. I am out of time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
32 

Mr. Secretary, what priority do you assign to the Department’s 

nuclear deterrence mission? 

Secretary CARTER. It is the bedrock of our defense. It is not in 

the news every day, thank goodness, but it is the bedrock of our 

defense. So having a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent is 

bedrock priority, and we give it the highest priority, and that is 

both in operating the force currently, and the subject was raised 

earlier about the need to keep a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear 

deterrent. The particular issue being raised was the submarine 

force. In the future, we will change out the Ohio for the Ohio-class 

replacement. That is a necessary evolution. It is a very expensive 

evolution, but we have to do it, because we have to retain a safe, 

secure, and reliable nuclear force as a bedrock. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, that leads me to my second question. Do you 

see the recapitalization of the nuclear deterrent as affordable in 

this budget environment? 

Secretary CARTER. As I said earlier, particularly you can see it 

right now that the submarine recapitalization in the decades of the 

2020s cannot be taken out of the rest of the Navy’s shipbuilding 

budget without seriously crippling that shipbuilding budget. So we 

are going to need to make room for that. We have been saying that 

now for several years. You can see it. It gets nearer every year, but 

sure as shooting, we have to do that, and the reason is that the 

Trident submarines are aging out. It has to do with the stress on 

the hulls of submerging and coming up so many times. And they 

are going to have to be replaced. And that is the survivable part 

of our triad. It is absolutely essential. We are going to need to recapitalize it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

General Dunford, are the Joint Chiefs convinced and unanimous 

that we must modernize the triad? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I am. I have not talked to the 

current group of Chiefs collectively, but previously, when I was the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and we met with General 

Dempsey, my predecessor, the Joint Chiefs unanimously subscribed 

to modernization of the triad. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

General, your predecessor undertook an assessment of the Russian violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] 

Treaty. He concluded it posed a risk to the United States itself as 

well as to the security of our allies in Europe. Do you agree? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Congressman. In fact, it reflected in the 

budget our capabilities to deal with just that threat. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, we have been waiting over a year to be 

briefed on the military options that you have in response to that. 

Can you assure me we will get that for my staff, me and the ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, within the next 

3 or 4 weeks? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I or my staff will come over 

and see you soonest. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time to 

my friend and colleague from Minnesota, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 
33 

General Dunford, a couple of years ago, I was in Afghanistan, 

and you were the senior American commander there, and we had 

significantly more than 10,000 U.S. forces. In January, I was back 

in Afghanistan, and General Campbell was the commander there, 

and it was operating under a force management level of 9,800 

troops. Now General Nicholson is on the ground there, and he is 

currently undertaking a review of the situation there to make his 

recommendations. 

If he were to come back after completing his review with a recommendation to change the force management level—I don’t know 

who invented that term, by the way, but it bothers me a lot, because it is a strategy by political numbers—but if he were to come 

back and say, ‘‘We need to increase that FML by some unspecified 

number, 1,000, 2,000 or something like that,’’ and if he were to 

come back and say, ‘‘We need to lift the restrictions that we are operating under that says I can’t train and advise and assist below 

the Afghan corps level,’’ and if he were to come back and say, ‘‘I 

need the authority to unilaterally target the Taliban and the 

Haqqani network,’’ would you support those recommendations 

going to the President? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first of all, General Nicholson 

is going to provide recommendations, and I know what the President has articulated as the end state, and I can assure you my recommendation, which will forward any recommendation that General Nicholson will make, will be benchmarked against my assessment of our ability to meet our objectives. That is exactly what I 

did when I was a commander on the ground and exactly what I 

would do in my current position. 

Mr. KLINE. So you don’t know whether or not you would support 

General Nicholson’s recommendations if he came back with those 

that I just suggested? 

General DUNFORD. What I would make clear to the President in 

making a recommendation is whatever capabilities I believe are 

necessary, and I can’t speculate as to whether General Nicholson 

will ask for an increase right now, Congressman, but what I would 

say is if he came in and said, ‘‘These are the capabilities we need 

to accomplish the mission,’’ and I agreed with General Nicholson’s 

assessment, I would forward to the Secretary a recommendation 

that would include whatever capabilities are necessary for us to 

achieve the end state. Of that, I am clear. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Secretary CARTER. Let me just second that. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

Secretary CARTER. That is the way it works. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning and for your 

service. 

Secretary Carter and General Dunford, both of you talked about 

the threat of North Korea in your opening remarks. And I appreciate your leadership in maintaining the Department’s focus both 

on current and emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific. I think North 

Korea’s launch of their short-range missiles demonstrated just yesterday how serious and important this threat is, which must re-
34 

main at the forefront as we look at how and where we are placing 

and investing our defense resources. Obviously, representing Hawaii, this is something that we are keenly aware of, as the threat 

from North Korea continues with their increased capabilities, as 

well as people on the West Coast who find themselves within range 

of their ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. 

Secretary Carter, you discussed the ongoing consultations with 

South Korea’s hosting a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] system. Can you give us an update on those talks and can 

you also share the Department’s commitment to continuing to increase and enhance our missile defense capabilities of the homeland? In particular, in Hawaii we have a test site for the Aegis 

Ashore at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, and I and others here 

on the committee are pushing toward operationalizing that to increase that protection. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you. And thank you for the role 

that the Hawaiian facilities do play in allowing us to develop and 

test our missile defenses. And we are doing a number of things to 

react to and protect ourselves and our people from the North Korean missile threat. 

Let me just back up a minute and say, you know, I talked about 

‘‘fight tonight’’ on the Korean peninsula. We are absolutely committed to that. The Chairman and I pay attention to that every 

day. Again, that is not something that is in the newspapers every 

day, but our contribution to the defense of South Korea is very, 

very important and rock solid. 

On the missile defense front, we are doing things at all ranges. 

You mentioned Aegis Ashore, THAAD. And just to answer your 

question about THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, we are discussing 

that with the Koreans; we have an agreement in principle to do 

that. And I should say the reason for that, the reason for that is 

to be able to protect the entirety of the peninsula against North 

Korean missiles of greater range. That is why we want to add 

THAAD to what already exists there, which is Patriot, both South 

Korean and U.S. Patriot. 

Finally, to the homeland, it is with the possibility of North Korea 

having the capability to range the United States with ICBMs that 

we began several years ago to increase both the number of our 

ground-based interceptor system and also its capability. So we are 

increasing the number of those interceptors from 30 to 44. We are 

improving the kill vehicle on the front end, and we are adding radars to that. So we are doing a great deal. But, unfortunately, we 

have to, because we see, as you mentioned yesterday, the action of 

North Korea. 

Let me see if the Chairman wants to add anything to that. 

Ms. GABBARD. I would like to shift to both of your comments as 

well with regard to Ukraine and Russia. Much of the $3.4 billion 

for the European Reassurance Initiative goes towards military 

funding and training and so on and so forth. In particular in the 

Ukraine, obviously, there are many challenges that they are facing 

kind of in their whole of government, but specifically within the 

military, we have seen time and time again how there is no tankto-tank competition possible as Ukraine faces different threats coming from Russia. But can you speak to what kind of training we 
35 

are assisting them with with regards to unconventional or special 

forces tactics and guerilla warfare, which can take a toll on what 

Russia is doing there? 

Secretary CARTER. We are doing that. That is part of the support 

that we give to the Ukrainian forces, both against what you might 

call symmetrical or traditional kinds of combat operations, and also 

helping them with this unique brand, but I am afraid to say a 

here-to-stay brand of hybrid warfare that we have seen in Eastern 

Ukraine. 

Let me ask the Chairman to elaborate. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, on that issue specifically, we 

have currently five conventional Ukrainian battalions going 

through training and one special operations unit going through 

training. Their training cycle will complete in September. I recently 

received an update probably assessed as some of the best, most effective training we have provided to the Ukrainians to date, and 

that is both the Ukrainian and U.S. perspective. Much of that 

training is informed by Russian behavior over the last few years 

and lessons learned in terms of integrating unconventional warfare, information operations, cyber capabilities, conventional capabilities. So I believe we are addressing that in our training program 

right now that is taking place with Ukrainian forces. And this is 

Ministry of Defense forces. Heretofore, we had trained just Ministry of Interior forces. This is the first cycle now of Ministry of Defense forces trained in these areas. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. General Austin, CENTCOM [Central Command] commander, said to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee that additional capabilities are going to be necessary to take Raqqa and Mosul, including additional U.S. personnel, intelligence, logistics, other advise-and-assist teams. 

Do you agree with General Austin on the assessment that additional U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq and Syria are going to be 

necessary to take Mosul and Raqqa, and will you personally support that—— 

Secretary CARTER. I do. We already have. I expect us to do more, 

because we are looking for opportunities to do more. So General 

Austin is right. And, of course, all this is in support of the Iraqi 

Security Forces, but it includes support to the Iraqi Army, support 

to Sunni tribal forces, support for police training. By the way, it is 

not just U.S., but I have been getting coalition contributions as 

well. And as we assemble the forces to move on Mosul, we will be 

doing more. And when we have taken those requests to the President, as the Chairman said earlier, he has consistently granted 

those requests. And I expect there to be more in the future, because we want to get Mosul; we want to defeat ISIL in Iraq. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, we have got to have Raqqa as well. ABC is 

reporting that the—— 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, Raqqa as well. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Brussels came out of Raqqa. 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely. 
36 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me pivot to something that is a little more 

mundane, but nevertheless important, and that is auditing. 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I worry that—oh, by the way, Michael McCord, 

thank you for the report from your group on where everything 

stands right now. I don’t necessarily want to go into the details of 

that, but thanks for getting that over to the committee in response 

to the NDAA. 

Can you talk to us about transition to a new civilian leadership 

team next year and the impact that might have on the affordable 

minimum with respect to getting this audit process done by the 

deadlines? I worry that the impact from, you know—Leon Panetta 

started this deal; Hagel kept it up. Secretary Carter, you are full 

throated in favor of it. Are there risks that a new civilian team 

might not have the same emphasis? 

And, General Dunford, will you comment on the military’s side 

of that issue as well? 

Secretary CARTER. I am absolutely fully in support of it, and I 

thank you very much for your persistence and your leadership in 

inducing us to do this. And I also want to thank Mike McCord and 

his whole team for their role in it. 

You asked about the future. My guess is that this will continue, 

because the logic is quite clear. The necessity is quite clear, so I 

think that will be clear to people who come after myself and the 

Chairman. I am pretty confident that it will. It certainly should, 

and of course, you will have a role in helping remind them of this. 

There is a whole team behind this in all of our components, and 

I think they will—they are committed to this work. They will remain committed to this work. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I could speak from both my 

current perspective and as a former service chief. I mean, I would 

tell you I really do believe that it is now part of our culture. And 

as you know, we have been at this now 4 or 5 years and worked 

pretty hard at it. And, frankly, I think the uniformed personnel 

that are involved in the audit process and the civil servants involved in the audit process are fully committed to actually coming 

back over here and laying on the table a clean audit. I mean, that 

is a bar they have set for themselves. And, again, I don’t think the 

civilian transition that will take place this year is going to change 

the objective of the individuals who have been working so hard. 

Again, most of the folks that are doing the heavy lifting, they 

aren’t going anywhere, and they are pretty clear about in their 

commitment to get this thing done. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I appreciate that. And I hope our Senate colleagues during the confirmation process, whoever is doing that next 

time, will make that clear. 

And just to be sure, the resources necessary to move this forward 

are in this budget, the requests? 

Secretary CARTER. They are. 

Mr. CONAWAY. General Dunford, did you want to comment on the 

need for additional U.S. troops to counter ISIL and actually defeat 

them in Mosul and in Raqqa? 
37 

General DUNFORD. Yes. Congressman, I fully support the comments that General Austin has made and that the Secretary has 

endorsed. We have from the very beginning said that we would recommend whatever capabilities are necessary to maintain momentum and achieve the end state. And I do assess that to be successful in both Raqqa and Mosul and beyond, we are going to need additional capabilities. And at the right time, we will be prepared to 

provide that recommendation to the President. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCord, let me warn you, I promised Mr. 

Conaway, we are going to do a briefing or hearing on the audit 

issue, and it will be talking with you and the other folks about 

dates for that, but it is something that Mr. Conaway is going to 

stay on our case till we see it all the way through, and I think—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. A lot of us are committed to doing 

that. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

As a representative from the Asia-Pacific area, I would like to 

start off by expressing my sincere sympathy for the people of Belgium and for the family of the marine killed this weekend in Iraq. 

I do know that Representative Takai already spoke on China and 

Representative Gabbard referenced North Korea. So, on Guam, we 

are considered the tip of the spear in the Asia-Pacific region, and 

I know the budget request contains nearly $250 million for fiscal 

year 2017 military construction projects. We are seeing tangible development, such as facility construction, take place. So I am asking, 

Secretary Carter, what role the administration sees for Guam in 

the broader strategy; should Congress continue moving forward 

with construction on Guam? And, additionally, it is often said that 

budgets reflect priorities, and you spoke to the Senate Armed Services Committee last week about continuing to support the Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy. So would you say that this strategy continues to be a priority of the administration? 

Secretary CARTER. I can. And the Asia-Pacific is where half of 

humanity lives. It is where half of the economic activity of the 

globe is. It is the single region of greatest consequence for America’s future. We can’t forget that. And thank you for everything 

Guam does with us and for us and as part of us out there. 

Guam is a critical part of the posture improvements and 

strengthenings we are doing in the Asia-Pacific. I mentioned the 

part that we are doing unilaterally. That is very important. Guam 

is a part of that. We do a lot with partners as well, and there is 

so much momentum out there. Now, part of that momentum is 

caused, as I mentioned earlier, by Chinese aggression. But we are 

determined to meet it, and Guam is an important part of that. So 

thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You’ve 

done so much for us. I thank you for your contributions. 

Also, I have another question for either yourself or Secretary 

McCord. It is estimated that the Defense Department spends nearly twice as much on service contractors as it does on civilian per-
38 

sonnel, even though they are often doing the same work. Nevertheless, the Department’s budget request seeks to cut civilian personnel and increase spending on service contracts. 

In this extremely constrained fiscal environment, can we expect 

to see the Department leverage the clear cost savings found in civilian personnel versus contractors? Are we still waiting for a complete accounting of all service contracts that was mandated back in 

2008, but we have still not received the report? 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you. I will just say at the beginning, 

then turn it over to Under Secretary McCord, we are committed to 

reducing the strength particularly of headquarter staffs, both civilian and contractor, and for that matter, military. That is where 

those numbers come from. 

And are we getting better at understanding how we are doing 

the spend for services contracting? Yes, we are getting better at 

that. The Deputy Chief Management Officer [DCMO] of the Department along with Mr. McCord work on that, and we are committed to meeting those targets. They are part of our budget outlook. If we don’t keep working on tail, we are not going to be able 

to invest in the tooth. So it is an essential thing to do. 

And I ask if Under Secretary McCord wants to add anything. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The contract. 

Secretary MCCORD. I would just add, as the Secretary said, we 

have the instructions both internal and from the Congress to hold 

down civilian and to keep commensurate with the drawdown of the 

military, and we recognize that mandate. 

And as he said also, we are looking hard at service contractors. 

The DCMO, Mr. Levine, is leading an effort. In fact, my turn is 

coming, I think, within the week to report to him within my own 

office, just like everybody else has to do, on what we are doing to 

review all of our service contracts to make sure they are still justified. And history has shown that just the sunlight of looking at 

that drives the cost down. You relook whether you really need 

everything that you are doing, and that is an important part of our 

efficiency effort for this budget. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I only have a few seconds left. 

We still haven’t received the report. Will we receive a report of 

some kind? This has been due since 2008. 

Secretary MCCORD. We will have to get back to you for the 

record on the exact status of the report. I don’t have it at my fingertips. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 123.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carter, General Dunford, Mr. McCord, thanks so much 

for joining us today. 

General Dunford, in the previous hearings that the House Armed 

Services Committee has held, there has been a lot of discussion 

about readiness. And, obviously, for all of us, the concern about returning to full-spectrum readiness is at the very top of our list. I 
39 

think General Milley put it best. He said: Readiness doesn’t have 

a constituency. And I think that is why it is critical for members 

of the House Armed Services to make sure that we are the constituency for military readiness for our men and women in uniform. 

Tell me where we are with the current budget situation with 

where we project to be with the proposal in fiscal year 2017 on the 

path to restore readiness. We are right now just at the point of setting conditions to restore readiness. Tell us how far away we are 

and what milestones you expect to achieve in restoring full-spectrum readiness. 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman. 

With regard to 2017, we took inputs from all the services as to 

what they needed in fiscal year 2017 along their path to restore 

readiness, as you’ve outlined. And that was a priority for the Secretary. And so we fully resourced the service plans for readiness 

restoration. Keeping in mind that we knew we couldn’t get to 

where we needed to be in 2017 because of the other elements associated with readiness recovery: One, operational tempo; the other 

the aspect of time. 

So with regard to where are we relative to where we need to be, 

three of the services have indicated that fiscal year 2020 or 2021 

would be where they would get to if we are not sequestered and 

we actually received the resources we project to receive. 

The Air Force is a little bit outside of that because of the unique 

challenges they have, and I think some of the numbers I have seen 

are as long as 2028, somewhere between 2024 and 2028. So three 

of the services probably about 5 years away; one of the services 

may be 7 or 8 years away from full restoration of readiness. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Gotcha. 

Let me get your perspective on one of the elements of that readiness restoration, and that is aviation readiness. And when you 

paint the picture about full-spectrum readiness it is across the 

service branches. But one of the areas that really concerns me is 

the assessments that we are hearing about aviation readiness, and 

it starts with the Marine Corps and what they are trying to do to 

restore. And Lieutenant General Davis, I think, is doing all that he 

can. 

It is a pipeline issue; how much can we do, and how fast can we 

do it just based on capacity? But give me your perspective about 

where we are with aviation readiness across the service branches, 

and what can we do in the context of full-spectrum readiness to get 

there as soon as possible also? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman. 

There are two issues: One is the state of the current aircraft that 

we have. And, again, we had some difficulty with depot-level maintenance and so forth associated with the last few years. And so we 

are in a trough with regard to the readiness of the platforms that 

are in the inventory right now, what we call ready basic aircraft. 

And although the Marine Corps perhaps is the most extreme, 

each of the services has similar challenges with regard to the ready 

basic aircraft for deployability, particularly those units that are in 

home station. We are confident that those units that are forward 

deployed have what they need. But those units that are at home 

station have a shortfall of ready basic aircraft. 
40 

The path to address the maintenance issue, of course, is stable 

funding in the future, both for our depot-level and also for our 

local-level maintenance. The other issue is the modernization piece. 

Much of the reason we are where we are is we deferred modernization, and so the aircraft that we are flying is in the inventory 

longer than it needs to be. So there is really two pieces of this that 

are not unrelated, but they both come together. 

So my assessment of what we need to do is, one, we need to fully 

fund our depot-level maintenance and sustain the aircraft that are 

in the inventory; and, number two, we need to stay on path for the 

modernization plan we have to address the long-term issue, which 

we really see manifest itself out in 2021, 2022, and beyond. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I want to get perspective from both you and Secretary Carter as far as the concept of readiness restoration and 

looking at, how do we get to the point that we need to be? And you 

bring up, I think, an extraordinarily important point. Readiness as 

a term of art has traditionally represented training, operation, and 

maintenance. But I believe it also should reflect the element of 

modernization, because I think that is directly tied to readiness. 

I want to get your perspective on where you see modernization 

as part of the list of elements that must be attained in restoring 

readiness. 

Secretary CARTER. For my part, you are absolutely right: training, maintenance are important parts of readiness. But in some 

forces, and you mentioned aviation, the real answer is the replacement of an aircraft that is now so old that it has cost too much to 

maintain, or we are simply not able to maintain them at the levels 

that—so the guys don’t have aircraft to fly. We are seeing that with 

respect to the CH–53 in the Marine Corps. I am sure you are familiar with that. That is an example of it. Also, to take another Marine Corps example, the F–18s in the Marine Corps, the older 

versions of those. So modernization is a key part of restoring readiness. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. I will be very quick. I think I am out of time, 

Congressman. But what I would say is this: I have talked about fiscal year 2017 as being sufficient. It is not everything we needed, 

and I subscribed to what the service chiefs have said when they 

came in. But my greatest challenge as I look in the budget in the 

future is the bow wave of modernization that is going to come in 

2019, 2020, 2021. We talked about the nuclear enterprise, but, 

frankly, it is the whole inventory of joint capabilities. 

And we have had 4 or 5 years of deferred modernization right 

now. We have done the best we can to start to rebalance that in 

fiscal year 2017. It took us years to get to where we are. It will 

take us years to get out of where we are. 

But this modernization issue is tomorrow’s readiness. I equate it 

to health and wellness. So today we are not as healthy as we would 

want to be, but we can get the job done. We are not investing in 

the health of the organization today, which will result in some 

wellness challenges down the road, which will read readiness. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Duckworth. 
41 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I just want to take a moment to also express my deep condolences and solidarity with our allies in Belgium, across NATO, and 

across the European Union. This morning’s cowardly terrorist attacks were not only an attack on the people of Brussels but an attack against Europe and civilized people everywhere who condone 

such horrific acts of terror. 

Secretary Carter, in your written testimony, you lay out five 

evolving challenges that are driving the Department’s planning and 

budget. And I want to focus on the fifth challenge: countering terrorism overseas and protecting our homeland. In your written testimony, you also outline three military objectives to defeat ISIL, and 

you say the third is the most important to protect the homeland 

again. 

With that in mind, please provide the specific steps the Department is taking to coordinate with its interagency partners to protect the homeland and what actions Congress needs to take to bolster those initiatives, funding, legislative. 

Additionally, you mentioned the development of DOD’s transregional counterterrorism strategy. Could you describe the pillars of 

that strategy and how it complements current efforts to deny terrorists a safe haven from which they can train, plan, operate, and 

launch these kind of attacks, for example, here in the homeland? 

Secretary CARTER. Certainly. And thank you for the question. 

I will start and then ask the Chairman to reinforce. You are 

right: our mission of protecting the homeland, which we need to do 

at the same time we fight overseas to defeat ISIL, is one we share 

with the Intelligence Community, with law enforcement at all levels, and also with Homeland Security. And we work very closely 

with them. 

Through NORTHCOM [Northern Command], we have a command that actually has precisely that mission, which is to protect 

the homeland by working with other interagency partners. We do 

that. We have plans to reinforce them if they request it. In an incident, we support them all the time with equipment, technology, intelligence, and so forth. And it is a two-way street. We work with 

them. It is a very smooth working relationship, and the Chairman 

can elaborate more on that. 

One thing I want to particularly ask him to elaborate on is your 

second point about transregional. One of the things that I am looking at in connection with the so-called Goldwater-Nichols issue is 

strengthening the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman in precisely this way, the transregional coordination. We have 

combatant commanders. They are excellent, but they are focused 

on particular regions. 

I look to the Chairman—and he does an excellent job of this— 

of balancing resources and making sure that the different COCOMs 

[combatant commands] are cooperating, both in NORTHCOM and 

the other combatant commanders. Let me ask him to elaborate. 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, to be specific, what we did 

back in November, we asked the Special Operations Command to 

take the lead, not from a special operations perspective but because 

they did have connective tissue in each one of our combatant commands, and they were capable of doing this. 
42 

To begin the development of a transregional terrorism plan and 

countering violent extremism writ large, we have been working at 

that now for a couple months. We most recently had a meeting in 

The Tank on Friday afternoon where I convened the Joint Chiefs 

and all of our combatant commands to look at this. 

Critical to that is having a common operational picture and a 

common intel picture across all of our combatant commands, so 

that is the first part. The second thing is having an assessment 

process that integrates what all the combatant commanders see 

transregionally into a single vision that the Secretary of Defense 

can see. 

And then, as the Secretary alluded to at the end of his comments, a process to make recommendations for the prioritization 

and allocation of resources across all the combatant commands so 

that, much like we are trying to provide pressure across ISIL in 

Iraq and Syria, we are trying to do that transregionally at the 

same time. So we are very focused on that. 

You asked a specific question about, what are we doing to improve our interagency, and I would add to that interagency and international cooperation, which is very critical. Within the interagency, we meet routinely now and the Secretary and Secretary 

Kerry lead the effort. We meet routinely to do deep dives on issues 

like resourcing or foreign fighters or intelligence sharing. 

And with regard to our partners, we have a very promising initiative in Jordan right now where we have, I think we are up to 

15 nations that participate in an information and intelligence exchange to help us just on the problem of foreign fighters. And so 

those kind of collaborative processes are really necessary. 

And to be honest with you, there is a lot of walls for us to break 

down in order for us to be effective. And that is what we are in 

the process of doing. And our transregional plan is designed not 

only to integrate our capabilities across the combatant commands 

but also with our coalition partners, and this plan will be borne 

with a coalition perspective in mind. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. I am very interested in the Jordan 

initiative, and perhaps I will have my staff follow up with your office, if that is possible. 

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panelists. 

The attack this morning reminds us we are still at war with an 

evil, determined enemy that must be defeated. 

And earlier in the testimony today, we had discussion about restoring deterrence as well, peace through strength. And I am interested in hearing first from General Dunford. The RAND Corporation has published a study, Limiting Regret: Building the Army We 

Will Need, and here we are talking about the ERI [European Reassurance Initiative] initiative. 

And RAND concludes that we are going to need three armored 

brigade combat teams and associated forces to restore a credible 

deterrence. I am interested to know whether or not you agree with 

that assessment, and if you don’t, then what you think is necessary 

to restore that credible deterrence. 
43 

And then, for both the Secretary and for the Chief, I have a bill, 

a bipartisan bill, over 40 cosponsors now, the POSTURE Act, which 

stops the drawdown for the Army and the Marine Corps. That is 

the total Army, the Army, the National Guard, the Army Reserve, 

and the Active Duty Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve. 

Assuming that that would come with the necessary resources for 

operations so that we don’t hollow out the force and the complement of modernization that goes with it, I am interested in your 

assessment on how that would impact the risk that we currently 

have, given the fact that earlier in your testimony today, Mr. Secretary, you talked about where we are today was based on a series 

of assumptions which have changed. 

So how would this POSTURE Act, if enacted with the necessary 

resources so we don’t hollow out the force, how do you assess that 

would impact the risk, and how might these additional land forces 

be arrayed to deal with things, such as the ERI? 

Secretary CARTER. I will start. On the two issues, first, with the 

armored brigade combat teams, the Chairman can elaborate, and 

I don’t want to go into our operational plans here. But we are developing our operational plans for the defense of NATO territory 

against both ordinary attack and what I called earlier hybrid warfare, and we are developing those plans and the requirements that 

come from them. 

I am not familiar with the particular report that you cite, but 

that is now a necessity as a consequence of Russian behavior, as 

I said in my opening statement. 

With respect to Army and Marine Corps end strength, the Chairman can speak to that also, and I am sure the chiefs have as well. 

But I will just, both in the Army and the Marine Corps, their emphasis to me in the preparation of this budget has been on readiness. And they have end-strength plans to come down from the levels that they were previously, and their priority is the readiness of 

the force not changing those end-strength goals. I concur with that. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we have made a down payment. You talk about what do we need in Europe, and, of course, 

it is not just about Army forces; it is the aggregate of joint capability. In the ERI, I think you know that we have an armored 

BCT’s [brigade combat team’s] worth of equipment at division 

headquarters, engineering equipment on other units that are part 

of our prepositioned stocks. 

We also pay for a constant presence of another brigade combat 

team that will be over there for exercises and assurance for our 

partners as well as deterrence. What the overall number is that we 

may have a year or 2 or 3 years down the road I couldn’t speculate. 

I don’t think the RAND study is wildly off base, but, again, to me, 

it is a function of not just looking at Army presence in isolation but 

looking at the aggregate of joint capability that will do what we 

need it to do, which is assure our partners as well as deter. 

With regard to the end-strength issue, Congressman, my greatest 

concern is, in fact, that we have balance in the force, and we have 

not only the right force structure, but we have the right capability. 

And you hit it exactly right: if we are going to grow the force, we 

need to make sure that the infrastructure supports that; we need 
44 

to make sure that the manpower supports that; we need to make 

sure the equipment modernization supports that; and then the operations, the maintenance dollars that will allow us to train that 

force as well. 

So all of those levers have to be adjusted at the same time. Otherwise, the force gets out of balance. And that is why our focus this 

year was on capability over capacity. The reason is we felt like we 

were getting out of balance where we didn’t actually have the right 

amount of training, the right amount of equipment in place to 

make sure the units that we had were at the highest level of readiness possible. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thank you, General. 

And let me just say for my colleagues and for the American people watching at home for the record that we are on path to draw 

down our land forces to pre-World War II levels. We had General 

Milley here last week, and he describes the array and the mission 

set, and given the changes to the assumption as high risk and 

given the fact that when you turn this off, it takes 3 to 4 years to 

actually get the combat readiness restored, I think this bipartisan 

bill, we need to summon the will, get the resources, and get it enacted. 

And, with that, I know my time has expired. Thank you, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. 

General Dunford, your statement warns of an expanding Iranian 

malign influence and increasing capability in the region. In your 

assessment, is Iran more or less capable today, militarily speaking, 

than they were the day the nuclear deal was signed? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I believe that Iran was spreading malign influences. They were capable of doing that before the 

agreement, and I think they are capable of doing it after the agreement. I haven’t seen any measurable increase in their capabilities. 

But, again, I am under no illusion about what Iran’s intent is, what 

their capabilities are, or what the current level of activity is across 

the Middle East. 

Mr. SCOTT. Have you seen any change in their behavior? 

General DUNFORD. I have not seen any specific change in their 

behavior, Congressman, with the caveat that they were spreading 

malign influence before the agreement, and they continue to do so. 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely, now they have $150 billion to help them 

spread it. And if there has been no change in the behavior, then 

certainly my concern is that the world is not more safe but less 

safe with them having that money. 

Just a couple of quotes from the President, if I may: Today, after 

2 years of negotiations, the United States, together with our international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has not, a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that will 

prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction, a different path, one of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict. 
45 

Another quote, September 10 of 2015: This is a victory for democracy, for American national security, and the safety and security of 

the world. 

And then the budget that was presented, and I agree with the 

budget statement: Iran’s malign activities in pursuit of missile 

technology continue to pose a threat to our interests and allies in 

the region. To combat those threats the budget continues efforts to 

hold Iran accountable for its destabilizing behavior by advancing 

preparations, posture, regional partnerships, and planning to preserve the President’s options for any contingency. 

So one statement September, a budget statement 5 months later. 

Secretary Hagel—what is the Defense Department doing to mitigate what is a clearly growing risk from the Iranian ballistic missile program? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you for that. 

And you are right: the nuclear deal with Iran was about their 

nuclear weapons program and, if implemented—and we will know 

whether it is implemented or not—will keep them from having a 

nuclear weapon. That doesn’t stop them from having other capabilities and exhibiting other behavior that concerns us. 

One of those is ballistic missiles. That is why we are strengthening our ballistic missile defenses in the region, in Europe, to defend our friends and allies there, our own forces there that are deployed there. That is why we have Aegis Afloat. That is why we 

have Aegis Ashore. That is why our other partners procured those 

same missile defenses from us, and that is why we help Israel with 

its defense against short-range rockets, both the Iron Dome system 

and the David’s Sling system. 

They are also, by the way, developing the Arrow system against 

longer range missiles. We help them with that too. So we are doing 

a great deal in the missile defense area in that region. 

Chairman, if you have anything. 

Mr. SCOTT. If I can quote James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, what he said to SASC [Senate Armed Services 

Committee] on February 9: Iran probably views the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a means to remove sanctions while 

preserving nuclear capabilities. 

General Austin, March 8, 2016: We have not seen any indication 

that they—meaning the Iranians—intend to pursue a different 

path. 

Now, I think he is talking about with regard to their malign activities, not specifically with nuclear, with regard to General Austin’s statement there. 

But just a few things that they have done since then: Aside from 

what they did to our sailors, they have continued to test ballistic 

missiles. October 11, 2015, they tested a new generation of surfaceto-surface missiles. The U.N. [United Nations] stated this test violated U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929. 

On November 21, 2015, they launched another medium-range 

missile. On March 8 of this year, Iran launched several missiles 

from multiple sites around the country. The Iranian general who 

commands the program stated: Revolutionary Guard Corps does 

not give in to threats. 

Secretary Carter. 
46 

Secretary CARTER. The nuclear agreement, and I said at the time 

that it was struck, hasn’t changed our commitments in the Department of Defense at all. We remain postured and committed to defending our friends and allies, our own interests in the region, and 

countering Iran’s malign influence in all of these areas. 

It is good if it is implemented, which it is being so far, at eliminating the nuclear danger. But for everything else, we remain full 

speed ahead and on course for what we were doing last year, the 

year before. And those programs are just building. I will see if the 

Chairman wants to add anything, but we have a major commitment there. 

Mr. SCOTT. My time has expired. But I just don’t understand 

why we wouldn’t have included other threats in any type of deal 

that gave them $150 billion. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to, if we could for a second, talk about our current 

rules of engagement in our theaters of operation. I have service 

members who are leaving the military, and they are coming to me 

saying that this is dangerous. We are not able to engage in a way 

that will allow us to defeat our enemy. 

And I understand the need to try and keep down civilian casualties. I get that completely. But I have a concern that we are protecting our enemies more than we are those that we are sacrificing 

to try and save. And that is the real concern. 

Throughout our history, we have people that have given their 

lives so that others can live. And with what we see taking place, 

my concern is that every time we let an enemy go, because of our 

very restrictive rules of engagement, hundreds if not thousands of 

more innocents are killed. They become fatalities because of genocide. Are we really winning? 

And so I would like you to address our rules of engagement that 

I am hearing so many complaints about from our service members. 

Secretary CARTER. We assess and reassess them all the time, including on a strike-by-strike basis. So your question is very apt, 

very appropriate, and we try to balance those things. We do it 

every day, and we do it in a very practical way. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Secretary, when was the last time we 

changed them? 

Secretary CARTER. Geez, we modify them all the time. Let me 

ask the Chairman to explain. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Sure. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would like to distinguish between rules of engagement and collateral damage. Those have been 

conflated a bit in some of the discussion. I have heard the same 

thing you have. And I want to make it clear on the rules of engagement, those are enduring. 

And any time one of our young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is in harm’s way, and it is a hostile intent and that you can 

positively identify an enemy, they can engage. That hasn’t changed. 

There is no restriction on our ability to do what must be done to 

protect themselves. 
47 

With regard to collateral damage, we make an assessment virtually every time we engage. And right now, we start with a baseline of zero civilians. But I am here to tell you, if we have a target 

that justifies an expanded view of collateral damage in a particular 

case, we will make that adjustment. 

So to your question, when was the last time we changed, I can’t 

assure you that it was this morning, but I can assure you it was 

probably sometime in the last couple days where General Austin 

made a decision to expand the number of civilian casualties that 

might be incurred in a particular target given the importance of 

that target. 

What we have tried not to do is make enemies of the very people 

that we are trying to protect in places like Iraq and Syria. And we 

also try to make sure that, at the end of the day, we don’t become 

the enemy. We are fighting with our values. And at the end of the 

day, 5, 10 years from now when this war is over, it will be because 

we won the war of values and the war of ideas, not because we 

dropped a bomb in one place or another. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I understand that is a very fine balance. I personally would give my life so my family could live, if that is what 

it came down to. 

My other concern comes to, are we in any way, shape, or form 

trying to work out an international or system of justice for those 

that we detain? We are not dealing with a Timothy McVeigh here 

with domestic terror, and we are not dealing with a World War II 

situation where at the end of the war we sign a peace treaty and 

return our POWs [prisoners of war]. We are releasing people from 

Guantanamo. Some are returning to the fight. 

Do we really have a formal system of justice? We are a country 

of laws, and we have a system of justice, and I think that is an 

expectation. And I haven’t seen us going in that direction. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you. 

We have various possibilities for detention if we take a prisoner. 

There is law-of-war detention. There is detention by transfer to another country. We did that, for example, in the case of the Umm 

Sayyaf raid and Abu Sayyaf raid, where the custody became the 

Government of Iraq. And then we have the possibility of criminal 

prosecution in Article III courts, which has also been exercised by 

the United States, a number of convictions. 

With respect to Guantanamo, what you say is the reason why we 

are looking for—and I personally support this—a place to detain 

those people who are in Guantanamo Bay. Let me be clear about 

this. There are people in GTMO [Guantanamo Bay] that it will not 

be safe to transfer to another location. I won’t sign off on their 

transfer to another location for just the reason you described. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I appreciate it. 

Secretary CARTER. So that is why we need an alternative detention facility for law-of-war detainees. We need to be extremely careful about that, and that is why I would like to find an alternative 

location. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, I would also like to see a more clear system 

of justice rather than we could do one, two, or three things. 

But my time has expired. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 
48 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the committee today. We certainly all greatly appreciate your service to the 

Nation and over the course of your very distinguished career, so we 

thank you for your service. 

Secretary Carter and General Dunford, over the past decade, the 

Department has had to reconcile the reality of a reemerging great 

power competition with the size and composition of our own military today. 

Secretary, I highly commend and am very supportive of your vision for the third offset strategy and look forward to seeing how 

that unfolds and look forward to being supportive as we make that 

transformation. 

Beyond that, as we evaluate the architecture of our future fighting force, what should the balance between the forward-deployed 

power and sufficient surge Ready Reserve capacity look like across 

the services? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, first of all, thank you for your support 

for our technology efforts, third offset, and so forth. It is an important part of planning for the future. I said, this is a budget that 

tries to turn a corner and, while dealing with today’s threats, also 

look ahead 10, 20, 30 years from now, and particularly to high-end 

potential opponents that we haven’t had to worry about as much 

in recent years. So thank you for your support for that. 

And I am sorry; the second part of your question? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Sure. Just saying that as we evaluate the architecture of our fighting force, what should the balance between a 

forward-deployed power and sufficient surge Ready Reserve capacity look like across the services? 

Secretary CARTER. I will start and then maybe the Chairman can 

pitch in. 

It is important to have forward forces because they are the first 

edge of the response to a crisis, number one; number two, their 

being there is a way of working with friends and allies so we don’t 

have to do everything ourselves. So it is an important part of our 

building partner capacity capability. 

But what deters is the full weight of the American military that 

would arrive on the scene after those initial forces had engaged. 

And I think that is what we—when we talk about deterring opponents, what deters them is not just what is right there in front of 

them; what deters them is the full weight of the American military 

that will arise. 

And so our surge forces are a critical part of the deterrent. And 

no one should measure our deterrent capability by what we have 

forward presence. That is an indication, but it is not the whole 

story. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, getting that balance right is 

dynamic. And to assure you, every year, we gather up all the combatant commanders’ requirements for both the crisis response and 

assurance mission as well as what they need for major, major operations plan contingency. 

And so we make adjustments annually to make sure that we get 

that balance right between those forces that have forward de-
49 

ployed, forward engaged on a day-to-day basis, providing us access, 

making sure that we are prepared to respond to crisis, and also 

making sure that the residual capabilities and capacities on the 

bench, if you will, are prepared for a major contingency. 

So when you ask what is the right balance, it is a constant process of evaluation to make sure we do exactly what you are suggesting we should do, which is get that balance right. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, both of you. 

Going back to the third offset strategy—and, again, very supportive of that—and the technology game changing, and it is going 

to help provide us with the advantages that we need, especially on 

cybersecurity, which I have been a strong proponent on and other 

technologies. 

But, Secretary, how do you believe we can best direct our investments and our policies to ensure that the progress that we made 

toward achieving a third offset strategy is sustained into the next 

administration? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I think in this and in other matters, the 

strategic logic behind our investments this year, behind this 2017 

budget, is intended to point the direction toward the future. So we 

have crafted it carefully. And I think that both—it is the needs it 

highlights in terms of the five challenges and what we have put in 

motion, especially including these technology efforts are so compelling that I am confident that they will continue into the future. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And Secretary Carter, I have been one of the biggest proponents of cybersecurity as a critical warfighting domain 

during my time in Congress. And I believe it is imperative that the 

services understand the cybersecurity requirements laid before 

them when it comes to much-needed DOD programs and weapons 

systems in order to avoid serious cost impacts and schedule delays. 

How are we managing cybersecurity at an enterprise level and 

incorporating cyber technologies into program requirements sooner? And I guess, we will have to answer that one for the record. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary, if you would, please. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. And I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mrs. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, for being here. 

Mr. Secretary, just following up on Representative Wenstrup’s 

question, but are you aware of any discussions to close the naval 

station at Guantanamo Bay or transfer it to Cuba? 

Secretary CARTER. I am not, no. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. General Dunford, same question for you. Are 

you aware of any discussions to close the naval station at Guantanamo Bay or transfer it to Cuba? 

General DUNFORD. I am not, Congresswoman. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Mr. Secretary, your department delivered a 

product in February entitled ‘‘Plan for Closing the Guantanamo 

Bay Detention Facility.’’ However, this document failed to address 

the specific elements required by the fiscal year 2016 NDAA. 
50 

Therefore, as this committee has previously stated, the requirement has not been met. 

In this document, there were three options outlined for handling 

future detainees. They were on a case-by-case basis: number one 

was prosecution of the military commission system or in Federal 

court; two, transfer to another country for an appropriate disposition there; or, three, law-of-war detention. 

Yet, in recent testimony, senior Department of Defense officials 

testified that—and I am referencing this article in Stars and 

Stripes—they testified there is a requirement for a long-term detention but, quote, ‘‘they do not know where long-term prisoners 

would be housed,’’ which, I think this is very troubling testimony, 

Mr. Secretary, considering we currently do have a location. 

So my question is, prior to conducting an operation where capturing individuals is either intended or possible, do you have to determine which of these three options is appropriate? 

Secretary CARTER. Generally speaking, we do and have and that 

has worked out. And with respect to the report, if I can just respond to that—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Sure. 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. And the question of location. We 

were not specific about a location, and the reason for that is this: 

The optimal location for a law-of-war detention facility will depend 

upon several things that we don’t know right now. For example, we 

don’t know whether the Congress is going to respond to this idea. 

If we can do it quickly, then we will probably pick an existing facility and try to build on that. If we have—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. An existing facility in this country or—— 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. And if we have a longer period of time, 

we may build a new facility from scratch. It will depend upon the 

number of detainees that we have and that we plan for. It will depend upon the structure of the military commissions process, which 

is something which is set in statute, by the way. 

So the very reason that we have to discuss this with the Congress—and we submitted this plan. Because let me be clear, it is 

forbidden by law to do this now, so we need your concurrence—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Oh, I understand. I am very familiar with the 

law. 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. About that. And the reason that 

the plan calls for a dialogue between us and the Hill is that we 

can’t select the optimal design and, therefore, the optimal location 

and, therefore, fully do the costing until that conversation has been 

had, because you guys have a say—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I understand. 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. In the design parameters of the 

ultimate facility. 

But I hope you will give it consideration. I have said—and I believe this—I think it would be good to put this on a path to being 

dealt with by the time the administrations change. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I understand. And I apologize for interrupting. 

I guess, two things. You and I have talked about this for months. 

But two things: I think the American people look at this, as I do, 

as a very dangerous precedent; that we are looking at potentially 

bringing these terrorists with blood on their hands that have al-
51 

ready killed Americans back to this soil, which I think is reprehensible. 

But, secondly, we were just reminded again with this bombing 

this morning in Brussels that there is an active war on terror. And 

I have been sitting here 3 hours, and the first question the chairman asked was about strategy and things that were supposed to 

be handed over to the Congress in February, and they still haven’t. 

And I look at this kind of as the same thing, that we are still waiting for some kind of a detailed plan that the President said would 

be made available and you have too. 

My question is this: Is it possible that, due to such factors as bureaucratic obstacles, delays in timing, inability to negotiate with 

another country, that an opportunity to conduct a capture operation would be lost? Or, in other words, would this issue of not 

being able to have a place for future detainees—because of the 

President’s desire to close Guantanamo and bring those terrorists 

here—ever inhibit a question on these attacks that we are doing 

with ISIL and engaging with them the issue of, like, let’s not go 

there because we don’t know, and we don’t want these long-term 

prisoners? 

Secretary CARTER. That has not occurred in my observation. Let 

me ask the Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. No, Congresswoman. And, frankly, that would 

be one of the first things that I would ask if we were asked to do 

something is—that is going to be part of the decision making to go 

after an individual—is, what is going to be the disposition of that 

individual? 

Mrs. WALORSKI. And what if the answer comes back? Because we 

know there are long-term situations now engaging. What if the answer comes back and says: We simply don’t know? Or GTMO, because GTMO is an operation right now that is there? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, obviously, we are here on a day of tragedy, tragedy for the Belgians, tragedy for the world. ISIS is now taking responsibility for the murders this morning. We had a marine that 

was killed last weekend in Iraq. I know you feel that personally. 

We have a law that we passed called the National Defense Authorization Act. It required you to submit to the Congress by February 

the 15th a plan for defeating these people. 

I know you told the chairman that it was imminent. The statute 

says you shall do it by February the 15th. You are in violation of 

the law. When an average American is in violation of the law, 

there are consequences. Would you care to explain to the committee 

why there shouldn’t be consequences for your failure to follow a 

law that was signed by your President? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I already explained that that report will 

be in front of you imminently. With respect to the larger question—— 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Secretary, that is not my question. The statute 

says you shall do it by February the 15th. Do you not agree that 

you are in violation of that law? 
52 

Secretary CARTER. We are going to submit that report. It has 

taken some time. It is not just a department—— 

Mr. BYRNE. I am going to ask you again. Do you not agree that 

you are in violation of the law? 

Secretary CARTER. We will have that report to you shortly, Congressman. 

Mr. BYRNE. I don’t think that is a satisfactory response. When 

we pass a law around here, it means something. Now, people’s lives 

are at stake. You know that better than any of the rest of us. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the people’s lives aren’t at stake over a 

report. 

Mr. BYRNE. Excuse me for a minute, Mr. Secretary. It is not too 

much to ask that you comply with the laws that we pass and the 

President signs. 

Secretary CARTER. As the Chairman—— 

Mr. BYRNE. So it is not sufficient for you to say it is imminent. 

You need to give us a plan now. 

Let me ask you about another report. You are also required to 

submit when the President puts forth his budget a 30-year ship 

plan for the Navy. You didn’t do that either. That is a statutory 

requirement. Why didn’t you submit a 30-year ship plan? 

Secretary CARTER. I don’t know about the 30-year ship plan. We 

have a number of these statutory plans. We work on them very 

hard. There are many, many, many of them, Congressman. 

Let me ask Mr. McCord if he knows the status of that particular 

one, the second one that the Congressman raised. 

Secretary MCCORD. I believe it is in process also and is nearing 

completion. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, under the law, that was supposed to be submitted with the President’s budget request. Now, the existing ship 

plan we have got calls for 52 littoral combat ships [LCS]. You have 

not amended that plan. You have requested 40. The Secretary of 

the Navy has told us in this room he needs 52. He has told us 

there is no study to change that. Mr. Stackley, his Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions, says there is no Navy study or analysis 

that would change that. You have no 30-year ship plan to change 

that, yet you’ve tried to unilaterally change it in the budget. What 

is your basis, if you have no 30-year ship plan that updates the 52 

request, when there is no Navy analysis, what is your basis for reducing the ship request from 52 to 40 on the LCS? 

Secretary CARTER. The basis is this, and this is something that 

we decided all jointly, and that the joint requirement—that we 

were going to buy 40 and not 52 littoral combat ships. The littoral 

combat ship is successful. It is good at what it does. It is better 

than the mine countermeasure ships it replaces. It is better than 

the coastal patrol craft it replaces. But 40 is enough. 

And the reason we made that decision is that we thought—we 

believe and were convinced that the money is better spent on ships 

that are more capable. We are looking for more capable and lethal 

ships as well as more ships in the Navy. And we also added—— 

Mr. BYRNE. If the Navy has no analysis on that, where’s your 

analysis? Do you have a report? 

Secretary CARTER. We did an analysis in the course of—— 

Mr. BYRNE. Where is it? 
53 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. Of preparing the budget. We did 

a lot over the course of the last summer, and we can provide that 

to you. 

Mr. BYRNE. Shouldn’t it be in that ship plan? 

Secretary CARTER. We can provide that to you. But the point I 

am making is a very important strategic one, which is we need 

ships that are more capable and more lethal and more high end. 

That is one of the themes of this whole budget. So exactly the point 

you are raising is one of the very themes—— 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Secretary, if that is so important, why wouldn’t 

you give us a new ship plan? Because your old ship plan, the 

one—— 

Secretary CARTER. I am sure the shipbuilding plan will reflect 

that. 

Mr. BYRNE. You were supposed to give it to us when the President’s budget was submitted. Now, you and your staff may not 

think these laws are important, but they are. 

People wonder why the people of America are angry right now. 

They are angry because people in Washington feel like they are 

above the law. And none of us, Mr. Secretary, I am not above the 

law, and you are not above the law. Give us a plan for the Middle 

East and give us some sort of analysis that is different from the 

Navy’s analysis on reducing the LCS request from 52 to 40. 

And I yield back. 

Secretary CARTER. We will provide those reports. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen. 

Secretary Carter, could you just prioritize—I know you have a lot 

of choices to make and priorities to make—low, medium, or high, 

the fight against ISIS, the military fight against ISIS in the next 

5 years? 

Secretary CARTER. Oh, that is extremely high. 

Ms. MCSALLY. How about the priority of ensuring that if we do 

send our troops into harm’s way, that they have the best capability 

overhead for close air support should they come under fire? 

Secretary CARTER. Close air support is a critical part of the joint 

capability. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So high as well? Great. 

How about if we have an American who has to eject or is shot 

down or an isolated personnel and they need the best capabilities 

overhead for combat search and rescue to be able to get them out 

of there. Low, medium, or high? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, combat search and rescue is a must 

have everywhere we have forces deployed. 

Let me ask the Chairman if he has—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Just in general. That is just the context. I think 

you would agree high, right? 

General DUNFORD [continuing]. Right—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So I am pleased to see that you are choosing not 

to mothball any A–10s in this fiscal year, but I am deeply concerned about the 5-year plan based on you sharing that those priorities are all high. We have mothballed the equivalent of four A–10 
54 

squadrons since 2012. We have only nine remaining, and there are 

actually less airplanes in them than they used to have. 

The squadron I commanded used to have 24, and now they are 

down to 18. They are currently in three theaters, South Korea, Europe, and in the fight against ISIS. And I think you saw that firsthand. 

I am confused about some statements and really contradictions 

in the 5-year plan, so I just want to see if I can figure this out. 

The F–35 requirements document says that the A–10 will be replaced by the F–35. The F–35 is supposed to replace the A–10. 

That is part of the requirements document. 

We have highlighted over the last year—I have—in many hearings concerns about shortfalls. We need a fifth-generation fighter. 

But when it comes to close air support, the F–35 having shortfalls 

in loiter time, lethality, weapons load, the ability to take a direct 

hit, the ability to fly close combat and be able to survive, and their 

night capability and their digital targeting capability. 

Because of that, your [office of] Operation[al] Test and Evaluation has agreed to do a fly-off between the F–35 and the A–10 as 

part of the evaluation of the F–35, which we were glad to see, because we are concerned that this space is going to have increased 

risk until we see if there is a proven replacement. 

But in your budget, you say that the A–10s will be replaced 

squadron by squadron by the F–35s. So that seems to me that the 

outcome is being predetermined. That is my first concern. We are 

yet to have a fly-off. We think that is going to happen in fiscal year 

2018 or 2019, yet you are saying that we are predetermining the 

outcome that the A–10s will be replaced squadron by squadron by 

the F–35. 

Similarly, we have the Air Force leadership, when asked in a 

March 3 hearing—and then I followed up last week—basically said 

the F–35 is really not going to replace the A–10. That is going to 

be more the F–16 and the F–15E, which contradicts the requirements doc and contradicts your own statement. 

If you look at the Air Force’s 5-year plan, they are going to put 

49 A–10s in the boneyard in fiscal year 2019, another 49 in fiscal 

year 2020, 64 the year after that, 96 the year after that. Basically, 

they are getting rid of the A–10. But the fly-off isn’t going to happen until at least fiscal year 2018. We won’t be able to see the outcome of whether we are going to have a decrease in capabilities 

until at least a couple years down the line. 

So I am just concerned about these contradictions. The Air Force 

recently is saying that manning is their challenge, that this is their 

newest excuse as to why they need to be starting to put the A–10 

in the boneyard, talking about how they just don’t have the manning. 

And yet last we looked at, we have got hundreds of people that 

are playing the tuba and the clarinet wearing the uniform as opposed to core military capabilities. If we really had a manning crisis, from my perspective, we would tell people to put down the tuba 

and pick up a wrench or a gun, but we are not at that place. 

So I am just concerned with where we are right now in these 

conflicting statements. So I just ask you, General Dunford, do you 

think that if we put the A–10 in the boneyard before we have a 
55 

proven tested replacement for these high-priority missions, will 

there be a risk to American lives? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, what we need in the joint 

force is the ability to deliver close air support effectively. That is, 

as you know, it is not just a flat formation; it is a training issue 

and so forth. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

General DUNFORD. So as the advocate for close air support and 

joint capabilities, I absolutely believe that we need a transition 

plan, and there needs to be a replacement for the A–10 before it 

goes away. There is no question. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So that means you don’t agree with us putting it 

in the boneyard before we even assess whether the F–35 would replace it? 

General DUNFORD. What I don’t agree with is getting rid of a capability without replacing it. And what I can tell you, without 

going into great length, is we recently met with all the chiefs— 

General Welsh was there—to take a look at the issue of close air 

support as a whole and to make sure that we are looking carefully 

at the platforms that are being introduced, what capability gaps 

will exist, how do we mitigate those gaps, and from that, if we can’t 

mitigate the gap, how does that inform the program in the future. 

So I can tell you that the interest that Congress has generated 

quite a bit of interest inside the Department. And again, as the 

proponent for joint capabilities, I can assure you I will look at this 

from a close air support perspective to make sure the joint force 

has the close air support capability that it needs to have. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. My time has expired, but I just want to 

say, I believe we need a conditional-based replacement not a timebased replacement; that we shouldn’t be putting any more of these 

in the boneyard until the fly-off is done and A–X [A–10 replacement aircraft] is developed; and we make sure that we are not putting more American lives at risk. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, General Dunford, first of all, thank 

you all for your service to our country. 

General Dunford, how would you assess our combined arms capability today that we have been involved in counterinsurgency warfare for quite some time, although we are more to an advise and 

assist role. But I am concerned about just the fact that we haven’t 

trained for some time. And how would you make that assessment? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there is no question that over 

the course of almost a decade involved in primarily counterinsurgency operations, the joint force’s ability to integrate combined 

arms at the high end eroded. We are probably about 21⁄2 years or 

3 years into focusing on that once again. 

Are we where we need to be? No, we are not. And that is exactly 

why we are focused on both restoring full-spectrum readiness as 

well as making sure our exercises regenerate the kind of capability 

that we had some 10 or 15 years ago, that we are all confident that 

we had 10 or 15 years ago. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 
56 

Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, I am concerned that—I 

would hope respectively that we would take a harder look at shifting more capability to the Guard and Reserve and also not allowing 

them to lapse into being a strategic reserve and to somehow maintain them as an operational reserve. 

Now, take a look at their training requirements, take a look at 

potentially mobilizing them on a periodic basis even in a peacetime 

role to maintain their effectiveness. But I think that we are not 

taking a hard enough look prospectively at being able to more costeffectively maintain our capability but to utilize the Guard and Reserve more. And I wonder if both of you could comment on that. 

Secretary CARTER. I concur with you that we need to do more 

thinking. We are doing more thinking. I think that the simple dichotomy between an operational reserve and a strategic reserve 

made sense in the Cold War. I think the Reserve Component 

proved its versatility in the course of the years of war in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and is proving uniquely valuable in some particular 

areas. 

I mentioned cyber earlier. That is very important. That is not a 

niche. It is not exotic. It is a critical part of our future. And so I 

think being creative and effective about the use of the Reserve 

Component for strategic effect, not as a strategic reserve in the old 

Cold War sense, absolutely. We are thinking that way, and we 

need to continue to think that way. 

Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, one of my responsibilities on 

behalf of the Secretary is global force management. And I can assure you right now in virtually every place where we are, the joint 

force, the Guard and Reserve are fully integrated into that. And, 

of course, as you know, the difference between a strategic reserve 

and the operational reserve is that we wouldn’t typically be using 

them to meet the kind of requirements that we are meeting today. 

But you can go to South America today. I was there last week. 

Guard and Reserve are down there doing partnership capacity. You 

can go to Africa. You can go to Asia. You can look at BCTs [brigade 

combat teams] that are being mobilized to participate in operations, elements of BCTs to participate in operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

So I would tell you today the Guard and Reserve are fully integrated in meeting all the commitments that the joint force has. 

And I would envision that to be the case in the future, not just because it helps to maintain effective Guard and Reserve but because 

we actually can’t meet our requirements without fully integrating 

the Guard and Reserve into our overall force management processes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

I do think that there are—when I look at the personnel cost differences between an Active Duty soldier and Guard and Reserve 

member, nondeployed, that they are fairly extraordinary. And so 

whatever we can do, I think, to be able to save money but maintain 

capability I think we really need to take a look at going forward. 

I think the last question, in your view, this attack in Belgium, 

is it a result of the fact that we are making gains in Iraq and Syria 

in terms of rolling back ISIS and ISIS needs to maintain the nar-
57 

rative of being ascendant in order to attract recruits and money 

from across the radical Islamic world in that this is a way to maintain that narrative by striking outside their territory? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I can’t say whether this particular attack is a result of that, but we have always said, and we 

anticipate, that as we put increased pressure on the enemy in Iraq 

and Syria and their narrative begins to erode because their freedom of movement erodes, the resources erode and so forth, that 

they are going to lash out and conduct terrorist attacks. 

And so we would expect the kinds of things we saw in Belgium 

to be a result of pressure that they feel in other places. There is 

no question about it. They will balance conventional tactics, which 

we have seen from the enemy, with guerilla tactics in places like 

Syria and Iraq when they are not as successful, with terrorist attacks around the world to maintain relevance and to continue to 

jihad. There is no question about it. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

If you all will allow me, I have got just a couple issues I want 

to touch on right quick. 

Mr. McCord, we have talked a lot about readiness and training 

and maintenance. It is true, is it not, that virtually all the money 

for training, for maintenance of aircraft and so forth, is in the base 

part of the budget? 

Secretary MCCORD. That is correct. The vast majority is, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. 

Secondly, my understanding is, as you all were putting together your budget request, over $5 billion of that request, $5 billion 

worth, was savings, inflation and especially fuel savings. Now, obviously, the price of oil goes up and down, and you have a very long 

period when you have to formulate your budget. 

My question is, as you look at it today, how do your assumptions 

on the price of fuel measure against the reality of today? 

Secretary MCCORD. For—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Is it better or worse than you assumed? 

Secretary MCCORD. It is better today. Are you talking most about 

fiscal year 2016 or 2017? 

The CHAIRMAN. 2017. 

Secretary MCCORD. For 2017. The prices that we were directed 

to assume are higher than what are prevailing today. As you note, 

that fiscal year hasn’t even started and won’t start for some time, 

and it will go a year after that. So there is a long time for these 

prices to have to hold before such savings would actually be realizable. But, yes, they are lower today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I just am a little concerned that there are 

assumptions built in the budget. And nobody knows what the price 

of oil is going to be, although it has been going up some in recent 

days. But as you point out, this doesn’t even start until October 1. 

I was just wondering how it measured up. 

10 U.S.C. 153 requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

provide a risk assessment to Congress by February 15. We heard 

from the service chiefs that they have provided that input to the 
58 

Chairman. My understanding is it has been done, and it is sitting 

in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] somewhere. Do you all 

have any clue about when this might be coming? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that. We did 

complete it some time ago. What we wanted to do was bring the 

chiefs together in The Tank to discuss it with the Secretary. We 

did that a week ago Monday. And so we now have that to the Secretary and that should be coming over right away. I mean, it is 

complete. 

We worked on it pretty hard this time, Mr. Chairman. And what 

you will see is a different organizational construct. We tried to take 

a look at each of the five challenges we have spoken about and 

really get after in a meaningful way the risks associated with each 

one of those five challenges and then what I would call a crosscutting risk of the joint force. 

So while it has been a couple weeks late now, I hope you will 

find it worth it. And, again, one of the reasons why we kept it a 

little bit longer was so we could have an opportunity to do a faceto-face with the chiefs and the Secretary, and we did complete that 

last Monday. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do think this is important, and so I look 

forward to it. It is significant for the committee. 

If I can just make an offer again to both of you, it has been one 

of my goals—and I have certainly not been as successful as I wanted to—to reduce the paperwork burdens that Congress puts on the 

Department, so fewer reports, if a briefing can be done, a one-time 

report rather than a recurring report. 

I would offer, again, if you all want to submit to us reports that 

you think are superfluous or overly burdensome, not worth the 

time and effort, get me that. And I will definitely look at it, because I want to continue to reduce the unnecessary or less-thannecessary paperwork burdens that Congress puts on the Department. 

At the same time, as you have heard today, what is left we are 

serious about. And so time is important. Again, we talked about 

the ISIS report, come up with reprogramming requests. We don’t 

have a strategy on where it is happening. So I am trying to have 

fewer things but be serious about the ones that we have. 

Please tell me and get it to me about things you think are unnecessary. But at the same time, as you have heard some of today, I 

think there is frustration when the law is not complied with. 

Finally, General Dunford, I saw an open letter—I don’t know— 

signed by several dozen retired military, other notable names, that 

the time was right to relook at Goldwater-Nichols of 30 years ago 

and that we needed to be serious that significant changes were in 

order, although they did not detail what those changes should be, 

by the way, in the letter. 

So I want to ask you your view. I know there is a fair amount 

of interest about examining and perhaps modifying the GoldwaterNichols requirements. Please tell me where you think we are on 

that, if it needs to happen, and then suggestions you may have. 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Chairman. 

First of all, I do think there is an imperative for reform at this 

time, and I think it is a result of a change in the character of war. 
59 

The basic nature of war, in my estimation, doesn’t change. The 

character of war has changed. And by that specifically, I mean that 

most of the crises and contingencies that we have today, immediately transregional; they cut across multiple combatant commands. They are multidomain: sea, air, space, cyberspace, undersea. And they are multifunctional: ballistic missile defense, special 

operations, strike capabilities, and so forth. And that has changed 

the nature of integration of the joint force and, frankly, the requirements for the Secretary to make timely decisions in a transregional, multidomain, multifunctional fight. 

So I think the more fundamental areas that we need to look at 

for change with regard to Goldwater-Nichols is, number one, making sure that the Secretary does have the ability to make decisions 

in a timely manner and making sure he does have the ability to 

integrate the joint force in that transregional, multidomain, multifunctional fight. 

It also requires, in my estimation, the Joint Staff to take a different approach to strategy and to ensure that we write strategies 

for, for example, the problem sets we spoke about today. So it isn’t 

just an aggregation of operations plans if you are dealing with a 

Russia or a China, but you have a strategic framework within 

which those operations plans are met. And I think the National 

Military Strategy needs to be refined in order to provide that 

framework within which OPLANs [operations plans] are developed. 

And then the final piece of that in execution is the Secretary’s 

ability to prioritize and allocate resources in a timely manner for 

a fight that is ongoing in multiple combatant commands at the 

same time. So, from my perspective, as we think about reform, we 

should focus on the character of war and what reforms are necessary to make sure we can fight in the 21st century. 

And what I have alluded to are some fundamental changes in 

warfighting in the 21st century that I think we can reinforce and 

optimize the joint force’s ability to meet with some very fundamental changes. And I am prepared to make those recommendations to you, Chairman. 

Secretary CARTER. And may I just second that. That is exactly 

along the lines that we are thinking, Chairman, as I alluded to earlier. Obviously, we will need your support if any of that requires 

statutory change, but those are the dimensions to which I am looking to the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and especially 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, given the changed nature 

of warfare. We would like to strengthen that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am anxious to see what you suggest, even 

if it is not all the reforms that some of these other folks are pursuing. But, obviously, with markup basically for this committee 

about a month away, for us to have time to look at it, we will want 

to see it promptly. 

Secretary CARTER. I am planning that, to do that quite soon, and 

it will involve the capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Chairman, while preserving the independent military advice that 

they provide to me and the President. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Good. Thank you. Thank you, all three, for 

being here today. The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 22, 2016 

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MARCH 22, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 22, 2016 

(123) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Mr. MCCORD. During the House Armed Services Committee hearing on March 22, 

2016, you asked about a report which was requested in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181). A member of your staff, 

Mr. Jason McMahon, confirmed section 807 as the item of interest to you. The Department produced section 807 reports for FY2009, and every subsequent year up 

to and including the report for FY2014. The reports and accompanying data are 

posted on the Department’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) public 

webpage: 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/acquisition_of_services_policy.html 

The files are large, because they contain the report and the inventory listing of 

service contracts. The inventory data for FY2015 is posted, but the report is not yet 

finished. The reports are usually finished in July or August for the previous year’s 

data. 

Every year when complete, these reports and the corresponding inventory listings 

are sent to the defense committees, the Speaker of the House and President of the 

Senate. They are then posted on the website above. A Federal Register notice is also 

published to notify the public of the update. [See page 38.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 22, 2016 

(127) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. The Director of National Intelligence recently testified to Congress 

that ‘‘Russia and China continue to pursue weapon systems capable of destroying 

satellites on orbit, placing U.S. satellites at greater risk in the next few years.’’ 1. 

Please describe the foreign counterspace threat. 2. Can you confirm that Russia and 

China both have or have tested ASAT weapons launched by ballistic missiles? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. You said in a recent speech in San Francisco that ‘‘DOD must now 

prepare for and seek to prevent the possibility of a conflict that extends into space, 

and we are.’’ What exactly is the Department doing to prepare for such a conflict, 

from resourcing and training to developing operational capabilities? What is at risk 

if we lose our space capabilities early in a conflict, and how will this affect our ability to fight and win wars? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Secetary Carter said in a recent speech in San Francisco that 

‘‘DOD must now prepare for and seek to prevent the possibility of a conflict that 

extends into space, and we are.’’ What exactly is the Department doing to prepare 

for such a conflict, from resourcing and training to developing operational capabilities? What is at risk if we lose our space capabilities early in a conflict, and how 

will this affect our ability to fight and win wars? 

General DUNFORD. Space is essential to the defense of the homeland, allies, and 

interests abroad. Space-based capabilities such as positioning, navigation, and timing signals; protected and secured communications; and strategic and theater missile warning underpin Joint Force operations. Our space systems increase our Joint 

Force’s overall efficiency and effectiveness while helping to reduce risk and limit 

losses. The Department is working to ensure that the United States does not cede 

the space domain and that we maintain our access to, and freedom of action with, 

space-borne capabilities. Initiatives include the development of Joint doctrine for 

space operations, and ways to increase space system and architecture resiliency and 

survivability. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. How does DOD intend to ensure notifications of released sex offenders reach the appropriate local law enforcement jurisdiction personnel where that 

offender intends to reside? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. How will the Director of Emergency Services (DES) or Provost Marshals Office account for sex offenders on post? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. How do you plan to track offenders who served no confinement time? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. How do you intend to track offenders in States that do not utilize 

the SORNA Exchange Portal? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. How do you plan to comply with International Meagan’s Law (IML) 

as it applies to sending dependents overseas that are convicted sex offenders? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. For purposes of uniformity and continuity, it makes the most sense 

to have a universal set of policies/practices across all services that is managed by 

OSD and not the service component heads. Can you explain to the committee why 

DOD has chosen to maintain differentiating regulations, policies, and practices in 

each of the service branches? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 
128 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Secretary Carter recently stated, ‘‘We don’t want a draft . . . We 

don’t want people chosen for us. We want to pick people. That’s what the All-Volunteer Force is all about. That’s why the All-Volunteer Force is so excellent.’’ He also 

recently noted that one-third of Americans aren’t eligible for military service for various reasons. Given the quality and the success of the All-Volunteer Force, do you 

believe maintaining the selective service system in its current form is necessary as 

a matter of defense policy? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000 combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities or traumatic brain 

injury for misconduct. These discharges have significant impact on those veterans’ 

eligibility for benefits and services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its 

discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members suffering 

from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the cracks, and thousands 

more were discharged prior to the Department’s changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed services, not just to the Army. From the DOD 

perspective, do you believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly 

to veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if so, do 

you have any specific proposals? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve forces are 

disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact that the services can decline to provide them 

separation physicals, which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do 

you believe that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard 

members and reservists of all branches of service if they’d like a physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How do you ensure that Guard and 

Reserve members’ service-connected injuries are documented? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000 combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities or traumatic brain 

injury for misconduct. These discharges have significant impact on those veterans’ 

eligibility for benefits and services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its 

discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members suffering 

from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the cracks, and thousands 

more were discharged prior to the Department’s changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed services, not just to the Army. From the DOD 

perspective, do you believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly 

to veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if so, do 

you have any specific proposals? 

General DUNFORD. The Department is committed to ensuring that Service members who experience mental health issues are accurately diagnosed, receive the 

treatment, benefits, and follow-on care and benefits commensurate with their characterization of service, and are not unfairly stigmatized or inappropriately subjected 

to negative administrative or punitive action. The Military Department Review 

Boards, including the Discharge Review Boards, have robust procedures and responsive personnel in place to ensure full and fair reviews of requests from members 

and former members of the Armed Forces to change the characterization of their 

discharges or seek other relief based upon a diagnosed mental health condition. 

The law requires the Military Departments to conduct a health assessment sufficient to evaluate the health of all members at the time of separation. This assessment determines if existing medical conditions were incurred during active duty 

service, provides a baseline for future care, completes a member’s military record, 

and provides a final opportunity to document health concerns, exposures, or risk factors associated with active duty service, prior to separation. It is DOD policy that 

the Service Review Boards considering post-traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury cases include a physician, clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Each Military 

Department has assigned at least one physician on a permanent, full-time basis to 

the Military Department Review Boards Agency, usually the Offices of the Surgeons 

General, where such expertise is resident. These assigned physicians provide each 

Board with the expertise and guidance necessary to assess any medical issues, to 

include mental health-related matters, in their deliberations over requests for 

records corrections. 
129 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve forces are 

disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact that the services can decline to provide them 

separation physicals, which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do 

you believe that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard 

members and reservists of all branches of service if they’d like a physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How do you ensure that Guard and 

Reserve members’ service-connected injuries are documented? 

General DUNFORD. Current Department of Defense policy requires all Reserve 

Component (RC) members serving 180 days or more on active duty or more than 

30 days in support of a contingency operation to have a Separation Health Physical 

Exam (SHPE). All Services and the National Guard Bureau are fully committed to 

meeting this requirement to ensure any service related injury or disability is properly identified, evaluated, and documented prior to separation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000 combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities or traumatic brain 

injury for misconduct. These discharges have significant impact on those veterans’ 

eligibility for benefits and services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its 

discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members suffering 

from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the cracks, and thousands 

more were discharged prior to the Department’s changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed services, not just to the Army. From the DOD 

perspective, do you believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly 

to veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if so, do 

you have any specific proposals? 

Mr. MCCORD. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve forces are 

disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact that the services can decline to provide them 

separation physicals, which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do 

you believe that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard 

members and reservists of all branches of service if they’d like a physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How do you ensure that Guard and 

Reserve members’ service-connected injuries are documented? 

Mr. MCCORD. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. During the hearing, General Dunford indicated there were still 

interagency barriers that limit the effectiveness of the DOD’s transregional terrorism plan. Please provide a detailed list, along with an accompanying explanation 

of each, of what those barriers are, indicating where appropriate, what, if any statutory impediments are limiting your efforts and where congressional action is required. 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. During the hearing, General Dunford indicated there were still 

interagency barriers that limit the effectiveness of the DOD’s transregional terrorism plan. Please provide a detailed list, along with an accompanying explanation 

of each, of what those barriers are, indicating where appropriate, what, if any statutory impediments are limiting your efforts and where congressional action is required. 

General DUNFORD. We are working with Interagency and international partners 

to implement a comprehensive approach designed to counter threat networks operating across our various Geographic Combatant Command boundaries. The Joint 

Force lacks sufficiently flexible transregional fiscal authorities or appropriation language that would allow for streamlined movement of resources between Combatant 

Command regional boundaries. 

While we have not identified specific statutory impediments that are limiting our 

current approach, we are undertaking a holistic look at this issue and will be prepared to seek Congressional action as appropriate in the future. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI 

Mr. TAKAI. In regard to the ‘‘pivot to Asia’’ strategy—the Department has been 

on the Hill to do notifications for the Maritime Security Initiative money in FY16. 

You are currently looking to execute funding mostly for the Philippines and some 
130 

for Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. I have heard big ideas about the foreign military sales and financing being provided under a rubric of ‘‘sense, share, and contribute.’’ Please provide information about FY16 funding, and what you plan on 

doing with the $60 million FY17 request? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TAKAI. North Korea is developing its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic 

missile programs in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Alarmingly, this 

year North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and last month, launched a satellite into orbit using long-range ballistic missile technology. While U.N. resolutions 

requiring member states to inspect all cargo in and out of North Korea for illicit 

goods and arms are helpful, and I applaud the administration for stepping up its 

sanctions policy to freeze North Korean government property in America, and ban 

U.S. exports to, or investment in, North Korea, I have to ask this question. If the 

U.S. is so concerned that North Korea may develop the ability to place a bomb on 

a long-range ballistic missile that could reach the U.S. West Coast, WHEN are we 

going to convert the Aegis missile defense test site in Hawaii into a combat-ready 

facility to help protect the U.S. mainland? 

Secretary CARTER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Æ