No. 81-465 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 

RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

CLARK FORK LOGGING COMPANY, INC., 

et al., 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Sanders, The Honorable 

Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Gary L. Spaeth, Helena, Montana (Dept. of 

Natural Resources) 

For Respondents: 

Worden, Thane, Haines, Missoula, Montana 

Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, Montana 

-- - 

Submitted on Briefs: April 8, 1982 

~ecided: June 24, 1982 

Filed : 

JUN 2 4 1982 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 

(DNRC) appeals the March 19, 1980, summary judgment order 

dismissing Count I of its complaint against defendants, 

Clark Fork Logging Company (Clark Fork) and William Cuddy. 

We affirm. 

Clark Fork entered into a timber sale contract with 

the United States Forest Service to log an area in Sanders 

County near Indian Creek. Clark Fork then contracted with 

Cuddy to log the area. Cuddy subsequently entered into an 

agreement with Stanton Diehl to provide equipment and operators 

to perform the logging. 

On August 5, 1975, Dale Hotchkiss, an operator provided 

by Diehl, was starting a chainsaw, also provided by Diehl, 

when it backfired and ignited a fire. DNRC, performing 

under a contract with the United States Forest Service, 

suppressed and extinguished the fire at a cost of $126,721.80. 

On July 21, 1977, DNRC filed a complaint against Clark 

Fork, Cuddy and Diehl, seeking to recover the cost of extinguishing the fire. DNRC subsequently dismissed defendant Diehl. 

Count I of the complaint sought recovery under absolute 

liability pursuant to DNRC's interpretation of section 50- 

63-103, MCA; Count I1 sought recovery under the common law 

negligence theory. 

Defendant's initial motion for summary judgment on both 

counts was denied. However, after extensive briefing, the 

second motion for summary judgment on Count I was granted. 

Summary judgment on Count I1 was again denied and a trial 

ensued. The jury found no negligence on the part of defendants 

and returned a verdict against DNRC. No appeal is taken of 
that determination. 

The sole issue presented to us for review is whether 

the District Court Judge properly granted respondents' 

motion for summary judgment on the absolute liability portion 

of DNRC's complaint. We find that he did. 

Count I is predicated on section 50-63-103, MCA: 

"Liability of offender for damages and costs. 

Any person who shall upon any land within this 

state, whether on his own or on another's land, 

-- set or leave -- any fire that shall spread and 

damage or destroy property of any kind not his 

own shall be liable for all damages caused thereby, and any owner of property damaged or destroyed by such fire may maintain a civil suit for 

the purpose of recovering such damages. Any 

person who shall upon any land within this 

state, whether on his own or on another's land, 

-- set or leave any fire which threatens to spread 

and damage or destroy property shall be liable 

for all costs and expenses incurred by the state 

of Montana, by any forestry association, or by 

any person extinguishing or preventing the 

spread of such fire." (Emphasis added.) 

When ascertaining the meaning of a statute, we look to 

the purpose of the statute, not just to isolated words. In 

re Senate Bill No. 23 v. Lamoreaux (1975), 168 Mont. 102, 

540 P.2d 975. Consideration of the title of the Act through 

which the statute was introduced is a necessary first step 

in the search for the purpose and meaning of the statute. 

In re Senate Bill No. 23 v. Lamoreaux, supra. 

Section 50-63-103, MCA, was introduced in 1919 through 

an Act entitled: 

"An Act Providing a Closed Season for the Burning of Forest Material Without a Permit, Providing Penalties for Setting Fires Contrary to the 

Provisions of this Act, and Making it the Duty 

of the County Attorney to Prosecute Offenders, 

and Providing a Penalty for Failure to Prosecute." 

Ch. 170, L. 1919. 

It is clear from the title of the Act that its purpose is to 

control the burning of forest material through the issuance 

of permits. Thus, "setting a fire" in the context of this 
Act and statute refers to an intentional setting of a fire. 

At times when the legislature has wished to denote the 

accidental igniting of a fire, they have used the term 

"start a fire." See, for example section 76-13-124, MCA: 

"Throwing lighted materials. A person who 

throws or places any lighted cigarette, 

cigar, ashes, or other flaming or glowing 

substance that may start -- a fire in or near 

any forest material is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.) 

As they are used in section 50-63-103, MCA, the words 

"set or leave a fire" refer to the deliberate act of burning 

excess forest material. The statute does not apply to the 

instant situation. The fire was not deliberately ignited. 

Rather, it accidently started when a spark from the chain 

saw ignited a slash pile. Under these facts summary judgment 

on Count I was proper. 

Affirmed.