PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-4057

_____________

LEONARD G. YOUNG, JR.,

Appellant

v.

JEFFREY MARTIN, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT 

GREENE SCI, in his official and individual capacity; LOUIS 

S. FOLINO, SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI, in his 

official and individual capacity; MAJOR LORINDA 

WINFIELD; CAPTAIN ANTHONY GUMBAREVIC, in his 

official and individual capacity; CO #1 MOODY, in his 

official and individual capacity

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 2-10-cv-00284)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy

_______________

Argued: October 29, 2014

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and 

KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.
2

(Filed: September 8, 2015)

_______________

Elizabeth F. Collura

Robert J. Ridge (Argued)

Clark Hill

301 Grant Street 

One Oxford Centre, 14th Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

 Counsel for Appellant

Sandra A. Kozlowski

Kemal A. Mericli (Argued)

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

564 Forbes Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

 Counsel for Appellees

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT 

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Leonard G. Young, Jr., a Pennsylvania prisoner with a 

long history of mental illness, filed suit alleging that 

Appellees-Defendants1 violated his Eighth Amendment rights 

 

1 Appellees-Defendants include Jeffrey Martin, Deputy 

Superintendent Greene SCI, in his official and individual 
3

by securing him in a four-point restraint chair, naked, for 

fourteen hours, although he did not pose a threat to himself or 

others. Because we agree with Young that the District Court 

erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 

against him, we will vacate the judgment and remand for 

further proceedings. 

I. Factual Background

For over six years, Young has been held in solitary 

confinement, housed in either the Restrictive Housing Unit 

(“RHU”) or the mental health unit of different Pennsylvania 

prisons because of his extensive disciplinary history and 

history of mental illness. Since childhood, Young has been 

diagnosed with various forms of mental illness, including 

bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder. However, since 

his detention over these past several years in solitary 

confinement, consisting of isolation for 23 hours per day and 

one hour of recreation time in a solitary pen on weekdays, 

Young’s symptoms of mental illness have intensified, 

including visual and auditory hallucinations, paranoid 

thoughts, throwing and smearing his own feces, episodes of 

self-harm, and suicidal impulses. Indeed, since living in these 

conditions of prolonged isolation, his numerous suicide 

attempts have included efforts to hang himself and to break 

his own neck by banging his head against the wall. 

 

capacity; Louis S. Folino, Superintendent Greene SCI, in his 

official and individual capacity; Major Lorinda Winfield; 

Captain Anthony Gumbarevic, in his official and individual 

capacity; CO #1 Moody, in his official and individual 

capacity, and referenced as “Defendants” throughout this 

opinion.
4

On the evening of September 20, 2009, while Young 

was confined in the RHU at State Correctional Institution 

(“SCI”)-Greene, his cell door was mistakenly unlocked and 

left open by a Corrections Officer (“CO”) in the control room. 

He exited his cell, walked up the stairs to the second tier of 

the RHU, and seated himself on an internal ledge above the 

law library. What next transpired was captured in the 

ordinary course by prison surveillance cameras and handheld 

video cameras operated by COs.2 

When other inmates saw Young on the roof they began 

calling to him from their cells. In the meantime, Lieutenant 

Kirby and a group of COs gathered on the floor below 

Young. From his perch, Young shouted that he was 

protesting for prisoners’ rights and for the return of some of 

his property. Two COs watching Young from the balcony 

chatted with each other and laughed as he talked. Young 

remained crouched on the roof voicing his complaints for 

approximately seven minutes before following the COs’ 

orders to step back onto the second tier and to close himself 

inside the shower. Once there, he again complied with 

orders, placed his hands behind his back, and pushed his 

forearms through the shower tray slot so the COs could 

handcuff and then remove him, secured, from the shower. As 

the COs escorted him to the stairs, Young passively refused to 

walk by laying down on the ground. His ankles then were 

 

2 The facts set forth here are drawn from the video and 

documentary evidence of record. In reviewing a grant of 

summary judgment, we must draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the nonmoving party; we therefore set forth the 

facts in the light most favorable to Young. See Tri-M Grp., 

LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).
5

shackled and the COs carried him down the stairs. Young 

again passively refused to walk when they reached the bottom 

of the staircase. At no time throughout this incident did 

Young verbally threaten or attempt to physically engage any 

of the COs.

After the COs carried Young to a nearby corridor and 

placed him face down on the ground with his hands and 

ankles cuffed, four COs stood over him and further restrained 

his limbs. Young remained motionless on the ground and did 

not struggle during this process. However, rather than asking 

Young to submit to a routine strip search and although he had 

not spit on anyone, the COs placed a spit mask on him and 

cut off Young’s clothes to perform a prone strip search.3 

Young complained but did not physically resist the search; no 

contraband was found. 

After the search was complete, Young, naked, cuffed, 

and compliant, was hoisted to his knees and photographed for 

several minutes to record any injuries he may have sustained 

during the incident. While the pictures were taken, 

Lieutenant Kirby left the scene to obtain the requisite 

authorization for placing Young in a four-point restraint chair. 

Young repeatedly asked why he was going to be placed in a 

restraint chair, but received no answer.

4

 When the restraint 

 

3 As a matter of prison policy, a strip search is 

performed after an inmate escapes from his cell to ensure that 

he did not acquire any contraband. 

4

In a videotaped debriefing immediately following 

Young’s placement in the observation cell, Lieutenant Kirby 

acknowledged that Young was secured by the COs after 

Young stepped into the shower but went on to say that he was 
6

chair arrived, he was strapped into it, naked, and a smock was 

placed over his lap. Again, Young did not physically resist 

the COs but he did object to his treatment. He complained 

several times that the restraints were too tight and he cried out 

in pain while being strapped into the chair and again when he 

was wheeled to a psychiatric observation cell. Young also

repeatedly asked that the smock on his lap be adjusted to fully 

cover his genitals, but the COs refused to comply with his 

request.

At approximately 8:46 p.m., Young was wheeled into 

the air-conditioned cell and left naked, except for the smock

on his lap. Upon his arrival, a nurse determined that his 

straps were too tight and loosened them accordingly. As 

reflected in the reports generated over the time he spent in the 

psychiatric observation cell, medical personnel continued to 

 

placed in the restraint chair due to the seriousness of his 

actions. Written reports prepared after the incident also state 

that Young was placed in the restraint chair “due to his 

actions,” J.A. 314, and that “due to [the] seriousness of [his] 

actions and blatant disregard for potential injury to himself or 

staff that inmate Young would be [p]laced in the restraint 

chair to prevent him from harming himself or staff. This was 

authorized by the [s]hift commander prior to placement,” J.A. 

312. A different report states that “[d]ue to the serious[] 

nature of the inmate[’]s actions, and his continued refusal of 

orders, Capt. Gumbarevic determined that the inmate should 

be placed into the restraint chair for his protection. After 

conferring with Dep. Martin, and Act. Supt. Capozza, 

restraint chair placement was authorized.” J.A. 308. 
7

monitor Young’s condition. Around 11:00 p.m., Young told 

a nurse that he wanted to move his hands “a bit” and was 

“talkative and joking [with] staff in no distress” or pain. J.A. 

193. Young fell asleep in the chair sometime after 1:20 a.m. 

and woke up at 5:20 a.m., requesting “a shot in the ass” of 

pain medication. J.A. 193, 196. He was “cooperative,” 

agreed to see a psychiatrist and take medication, and 

lamented the “next time” he would be in the restraint chair 

because “that’s just how it is [with him].” J.A. 196.

Later in the morning, Young was still naked in the 

chair and became agitated because of his continued restraint. 

Upset, he told the COs that he would “act out” when released. 

J.A. 604. Because he was “loud” and “making demands,” 

prison officials declined to remove him from the restraint 

chair. J.A. 196. He was finally released a couple hours later 

once officials were satisfied that he had calmed down.

All told, Young was confined in the restraint chair 

from approximately 8:46 p.m. to approximately 10:30 a.m. 

the next morning—a nearly fourteen-hour period that 

significantly exceeded the two-hour maximum recommended 

by the chair’s manufacturer and the eight-hour maximum, 

absent special authorization, permitted by the prison’s 

regulations. See J.A. 180. Upon release, Young was shaking 

uncontrollably and repeatedly complained that he was “cold 

down to his bones” because of the air conditioning blowing 

on his naked body for fourteen hours. J.A. 287. His legs 

were so numb that he could not walk, and he had to be 

wheeled back to the RHU in the chair.5 As Defendants’ 

 

5 Young’s cell door was inadvertently opened again on 

September 22, 2009. From the surveillance video, it is 

unclear whether he fell out of his cell or ran out. Regardless, 
8

counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no evidence in the 

record that anyone provided the requisite authorization to 

exceed the prison’s eight-hour maximum. Oral Argument at 

44:01-49:49, available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral

argument/audio/13-4057Youngv.Martin,%20et.al.mp3.

II. Procedural Background

Young initiated suit in March 2010 and, in August 

2010, filed an amended complaint, claiming, among other 

things, that his placement in the restraint chair was purely 

punitive and constituted excessive force in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. The Defendants moved for summary 

judgment, arguing that their actions were justified by Young’s 

extensive disciplinary history. In addition, Young filed a 

motion to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of an 

investigative report by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 

regarding the treatment of mentally ill prisoners in the 

Pennsylvania prison system and also requested that the 

District Court provide him with funding for a mental health 

expert. 

 

most of the reports of the incident state that he “lunged” at 

Officer Biagini, who was just outside the cell, J.A. 404, and 

that Officer Biagini was not harmed by Young. Following 

the incident, Young was strip searched and returned to his 

cell. Young’s Eighth Amendment claim is not based on this 

incident. He references it to demonstrate that the COs’

response on September 20th involved the use of excessive 

force because, following the arguably more serious event on 

September 22nd, he was not placed in the restraint chair and 

instead was returned to his cell in the RHU.
9

The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, denied Young’s motion to stay, and 

declined to allocate funds for an expert. Focusing on 

Young’s “paramount claim” that “Defendants violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a prolonged 

period of strict mechanical restraint in the restraint chair,” the 

District Court concluded that the “Defendants acted 

professionally and within constitutional parameters in 

subduing and placing Plaintiff in a restraint chair for about 

fourteen hours . . . .” Young v. Beard, Civ. No. 10-0284, 

2013 WL 5230796, at *8, *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2013). 

Specifically, the District Court found that Young was 

“agitated” and the Defendants brought him “under control 

using minimal force” especially since he indicated he would 

“act out” when released and he was “violence-prone,” 

mentally ill, and suicidal. Id. at *11. The District Court also 

found the record lacked evidence that Young suffered “actual 

harm,” let alone “any risk of ‘serious’ harm, considering not 

only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood 

that the harm will actually occur, but any evidence that 

unwilling exposure to that risk violate[d] contemporary 

standards of decency.” Id. at *12. The District Court 

therefore concluded that the Defendants did not use excessive 

force and granted the Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. Young timely appealed. 
10

III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331.6 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 

order granting summary judgment, applying the same 

standard as the district court. See Tri-M Grp., 638 F.3d at 

415. We will affirm only if “drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ruehl v. Viacom, 

Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); 

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If, on the other hand, 

“reasonable minds could differ . . . [then] an issue of material 

fact remains . . . for the trier of fact, and the grant of summary 

judgment . . . must be reversed.” J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. 

Fid. Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations 

omitted).

IV. Analysis

The main issue presented on appeal is whether the 

District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor 

of the Defendants by concluding that they did not violate 

Young’s Eighth Amendment rights when they strapped him 

in a restraint chair, naked, for fourteen hours, in the absence 

of any imminent threat of bodily harm to himself or others. 

Young argues that his placement in the restraint chair 

constituted use of “excessive force,” relying on the Supreme 

 

6 The parties consented to the Magistrate Judge’s 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). For ease of 

reference, we refer to the District Court throughout. 
11

Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).7 

Appellant’s Br. 31. The Defendants argue that we should 

analyze this as a “conditions of confinement” case under 

Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2000). For the 

reasons set forth below, we conclude that the District Court 

erred in granting summary judgment because it did not 

analyze the case under Hope and failed to draw all reasonable 

inferences from the facts in Young’s favor. 

A. The Applicable Eighth Amendment Framework

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of 

“cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986). The 

Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition both to bar

prison officials from using excessive force against inmates, 

see Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992), and to 

impose affirmative duties on prison officials to “provide 

humane conditions of confinement,” see Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Depending on which of these

Eighth Amendment claims a plaintiff seeks to pursue, 

different elements must be proven and different lines of cases 

applied. While claims of use of excessive force require 

consideration of “the need for the application of force, the 

relationship between the need and the amount of force that 

 

7 He also relies on Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 

326-27 (3d Cir. 2009), where we reversed a grant of summary 

judgment on a prisoner’s claim of excessive force. While

Giles also analyzes the use of force on a prisoner who was 

already subdued, it is of limited applicability as it does not 

address Hope or the use of restraint chairs or other 

mechanical restraints. 
12

was used, and the extent of injury inflicted,” Whitley, 475 

U.S. at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 

claims concerning conditions of confinement require a 

plaintiff to show that the prison conditions “pos[ed] a 

substantial risk of serious harm” and that the prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to that risk, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

834.

The parties dispute whether Young’s claims regarding 

the use of the four-point restraint chair, i.e., a mechanical 

restraint, fall into the category of excessive force or 

conditions of confinement, and, as one district court has 

observed, our “[c]ase law does not provide a clear answer for 

which analysis applies.” Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F. 

Supp. 2d 226, 248 (M.D. Pa. 2009). We last addressed the 

issue of whether the use of a restraint chair constituted an 

Eighth Amendment violation in Fuentes. However, that case, 

decided before Hope, is distinguishable on its facts and left 

open the issue of whether the use of mechanical restraints 

should be analyzed under the Supreme Court’s excessive 

force or conditions of confinement jurisprudence. 

In Fuentes, the inmate began kicking his cell door and 

yelling for a CO, while complaining that another inmate 

urinated in his cell. 206 F.3d at 339. The COs cuffed 

Fuentes through his food slot and entered his cell to conduct a 

search. Id. A struggle ensued, and the COs eventually 

wrestled Fuentes to the floor. Id. Fuentes continued to yell 

while one CO held him on the ground as another cuffed his 

legs. Id. At the same time, the Assistant Warden authorized 

use of the restraint chair for eight hours, in accord with the 

prison’s regulations. Id. at 339, 340. Fuentes argued that use 

of the restraint chair was purely punitive and violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights because he was no longer a threat 
13

once he was restrained. Id. at 340, 343-44. Because it was 

“undisputed that the prison policy for the use of the restraint 

chair was followed,” we concluded that the prison officials 

were not deliberately indifferent to Fuentes’s health or wellbeing, consistent with a conditions of confinement analysis. 

Id. at 345. We also concluded that the prison officials did not 

place Fuentes in the chair “maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm,” consistent with an excessive force analysis. Id.

at 345-46. 

Despite some facial similarities to Young’s case, the 

facts of Fuentes are sufficiently different that its holding is of 

limited applicability here for three reasons. First, Fuentes’ 

placement in the restraint chair occurred contemporaneously 

with the physical altercation with the COs. That is, the chair 

was an instrument used by prison officials to subdue an 

actively combative prisoner. In contrast, Young never 

engaged in a physical altercation and was placed in the 

restraint chair while entirely docile. 

Second, Fuentes’ placement in the restraint chair was 

in accord with prison regulations, as he posed an immediate 

threat to the COs, and he was released after eight hours. 

Young, on the other hand, was not an immediate threat to 

himself or others, as he was shackled and face down on the 

ground, and there is no evidence that any prison official 

authorized Young’s confinement in the restraint chair in 

excess of the eight-hour maximum otherwise permitted under 

the prison regulations. See Oral Argument at 44:01-49:49, 

available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/

audio/13-4057Youngv.Martin,%20et.al.mp3.

Finally, Fuentes does not answer the question of what 

legal framework applies in the face of a claim that the use of 
14

mechanical restraints violated a prisoner’s Eighth 

Amendment rights. See Zimmerman, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 249 

(“The Third Circuit has not since considered the 

constitutionality of mechanical constraints, but to the extent 

that Fuentes . . . conflict[s] with Hope, the Supreme Court 

case is binding authority.”). The Supreme Court’s more 

recent decision in Hope, however, does. 

In Hope, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the 

issue of whether the use of mechanical restraints constituted 

cruel and unusual punishment. Larry Hope, an Alabama 

prisoner, fell asleep during a “morning bus ride to [his] chain 

gang’s worksite.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 734. He “was less than 

prompt in responding to an order to get off the bus” and 

eventually got into a “wrestling match with a guard.” Id. 

Hope was handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and transported 

back to the prison where he was cuffed on a “hitching post.” 

Id. “The guards made him take off his shirt, and he remained 

shirtless all day while the sun burned his skin.” Id. at 734-35. 

He was chained to the post for seven hours and was given 

water only once, denied bathroom breaks, and taunted by the 

guards. Id. at 735.

After noting that “unnecessary and wanton inflictions 

of pain are those that are totally without penological 

justification,” the Supreme Court concluded that, on the facts 

alleged by Hope, “the Eighth Amendment violation is 

obvious.” Id. at 737-38 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The Court explained: 

Any safety concerns had long since 

abated by the time petitioner was handcuffed to 

the hitching post because Hope had already 

been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, 
15

and transported back to the prison. He was 

separated from his work squad and not given 

the opportunity to return to work. Despite the 

clear lack of an emergency situation, the 

respondents knowingly subjected him to a 

substantial risk of physical harm, to 

unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and 

the restricted position of confinement for a 7-

hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat 

of the sun, to prolonged thirst and taunting, and 

to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created 

a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation. 

The use of the hitching post under these 

circumstances violated the “basic concept 

underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is 

nothing less than the dignity of man.” Trop v. 

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). This punitive 

treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction of 

“wanton and unnecessary” pain that our 

precedent clearly prohibits.

Id. at 738 (footnote omitted). 

The Defendants do not dispute that Hope controls as to 

which Eighth Amendment test applies to analyze the use of 

mechanical restraints. See Zimmerman, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 

249 (Hope is the controlling case on the “constitutionality of 

mechanical restraints”). They contend, however, that the 

Supreme Court in Hope “applied the conditions of 

confinement/deliberate indifference test of Farmer v. 

Brennan.” Appellees’ Br. 34-35. We disagree because the 

language and reasoning of the opinion reflect that the Court, 

in fact, was applying the excessive force test. 
16

After reciting the facts, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 

that “unnecessary and wanton infliction[s] of pain . . . 

constitute[ ] cruel and unusual punishment,” including those 

that are “totally without penological justification.” Hope, 536 

U.S. at 737 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 and Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Court referred to Farmer briefly but its 

analysis of whether the use of mechanical restraints violated 

the Eighth Amendment indisputably began and ended in 

terms drawn from its excessive force jurisprudence, i.e., 

Whitley, because it held that Hope’s “punitive treatment” 

amounted to the “gratuitous infliction of ‘wanton and 

unnecessary’ pain” that was “clearly prohibit[ed].” Id. at 738. 

Thus, in Hope, the Supreme Court applied its excessive force 

jurisprudence for the first time to a prisoner’s allegation that 

his placement in mechanical restraints was unconstitutional.

We conclude, under Hope, that Young’s claims should 

be analyzed under the excessive force test and that such 

analysis demonstrates that the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment was in error. We now turn to the task of 

applying this test to the record before us.8

 

8 While we conclude that the particular claims here 

concerning the use of mechanical restraints are properly 

analyzed under the excessive force test, we note that the 

record in this case, reflecting Young’s detention in solitary 

confinement for over six years, and the DOJ investigative 

report, detailing prolonged solitary confinement at SCIGreene and five other Pennsylvania prisons, raises serious 

concerns under the Eighth Amendment’s conditions of 

confinement test. As Justice Kennedy recently observed, 

“[y]ears on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.” 
17

B. Application of the Excessive Force Test In 

Light Of Hope

The District Court concluded that there was no Eighth 

Amendment violation because Young was “known-to-be 

violent,” was exposed to “minimal force,” promised to “act 

out if released,” and was not punched, kicked or “otherwise 

manhandl[ed]” by the COs. Young, 2013 WL 5230796, at 

*13. We conclude from our independent review of the 

videotape and record evidence that the District Court failed to 

draw all reasonable inferences in Young’s favor and that,

when those inferences are properly drawn, there are genuine 

disputes of material fact as to whether the Defendants’ use of

the restraint chair in this case violated the Eighth 

Amendment. 

Force that is used “maliciously and sadistically for the 

very purpose of causing harm” violates the Eighth 

 

Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 

concurring) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of 

Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 325 (2006) 

(noting the common side-effects of solitary confinement, such 

as panic, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and suicidal 

behaviors)); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 

(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “it is well 

documented that . . . prolonged solitary confinement produces 

numerous deleterious harms”). The record in this case, 

including details of Young’s visual and auditory 

hallucinations and his numerous suicide attempts, makes 

palpable “[t]he human toll wrought by extended terms of 

isolation.” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2209 (Kennedy, J., 

concurring). 
18

Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). While not every 

“malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 

cause of action,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, the “[a]pplication of 

force by . . . prison guards exceeding that which is reasonable 

and necessary under the circumstances” may be actionable,

Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 827 (3d Cir. 1984). See

also Giles, 571 F.3d at 326 (an officer “may not . . . use 

gratuitous force against an inmate who has been subdued”). 

As applied to mechanical restraints, the Supreme Court 

in Hope identified particular criteria relevant to the use of 

excessive force test, holding that (1) where the inmate had 

“already been subdued, handcuffed, [and] placed in leg 

irons,” and (2) there was a “clear lack of an emergency 

situation” such that “[a]ny safety concerns had long since 

abated,” then (3) subjecting the inmate to “substantial risk of 

physical harm” and “unnecessary pain” serves no penological 

justification. Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; see also Rhodes, 452 

U.S. at 346 (“Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of 

pain are those that are ‘totally without penological 

justification.’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 

(1976)). Measured by this yardstick, Young has raised 

genuine disputes of material fact for a jury to ascertain

whether he suffered an Eighth Amendment violation.

First, like the inmate in Hope, it appears that Young

was already subdued when subjected to mechanical restraint. 

He was not violent, combative, or self-destructive at any point 

during the incident leading up to his prolonged confinement 

in the restraint chair. On the contrary, he was safely secured 

and shackled after voluntarily complying with the COs’ 

instructions to step into the shower. And immediately prior to 

being placed in the restraint chair, he was naked and subdued, 
19

face down on the ground and held by four COs, with his 

hands and legs cuffed. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; see also 

Giles, 571 F.3d at 327 (“striking and kicking a subdued, 

nonresisting inmate in the side” was not “reasonable or 

necessary under established law”). Given these facts, 

“reasonable minds could differ” as to whether Young posed a 

risk to himself or others when he was placed in the restraint 

chair. See J.E. Mamiye, 813 F.2d at 617 (citations omitted).

While the District Court found that Young’s threats of 

future harm were sufficient to justify his extended placement 

in the restraint chair, the record, when drawing all inferences 

in Young’s favor, supports a contrary interpretation. Video 

recording reflects that after being strapped in the chair for 

nearly eight hours, Young did comment that he would likely 

be placed back in the restraint chair because “that’s just how 

it is,” J.A. 196, and that, following the stress of nearly 

fourteen hours of confinement, he was agitated and told two 

COs he would “act out” when released, J.A. 604. When 

considered on the whole, however, any number of reasonable 

inferences could be drawn in Young’s favor from these 

statements, not the least of which being (1) that the 

Defendants had consistently used the chair to punish Young, 

and (2) that Young was upset and angry about an unjustified, 

punitive confinement.

Second, there is ample evidence that the events of 

September 20th did not rise to the level of an “emergency 

situation,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, despite the District Court’s 

characterization of “a highly energized situation,” Young, 

2013 WL 5230796, at *5 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Young only left his cell because a CO 

inadvertently opened his cell door—far from a prison break; 

the incident lasted a mere seven minutes, during which two 
20

COs chatted and laughed while they watched the scene 

unfold; and Young voluntarily complied with the COs’ 

instructions within that short time frame. The COs then 

removed Young, shackled and subdued, from the common 

area and subjected him in a more controlled space to a prone 

strip search without resistance. By this point, a reasonable 

jury could find that “[a]ny safety concerns had long since 

abated.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 738.

Finally, there is a dispute of fact as to whether, despite 

the lack of an emergency situation and the evidence that 

Young was already subdued, the prison officials exposed 

Young to a “substantial risk of physical harm” and 

“unnecessary pain” by placing him in the restraint chair. See

id. The prison’s own regulations authorize use of the restraint 

chair only for “protection of self or others,” J.A. 626, to 

“prevent an inmate from injuring [himself] or other persons,” 

J.A. 629, and to “safely restrain a combative or selfdestructive person,” id. Yet the COs and prison officials not 

only placed Young in the restraint chair but did so for nearly 

fourteen hours, far exceeding the eight-hour maximum

permitted without special authorization. See Hope, 536 U.S. 

at 738. 

At the outset, Young’s restraints were so tight that he 

cried out in pain, and during the extended period he remained 

in the restraint chair, Young was naked, with his genitals 

partially exposed and an air conditioner blowing cold air on 

him. When he was finally released from this extreme 

confinement, Young was shaking uncontrollably and 

complained that he was “cold down to his bones.” J.A. 287. 

His legs, numb from the restricted position his body was 

forced to endure over fourteen hours, could no longer hold his 

weight and he had to be wheeled back to the RHU. On this 
21

record, Young is entitled to have a jury determine whether he 

was subjected to “a substantial risk of physical harm” without

penological justification and whether the Defendants thus

“violated the basic concept underlying the Eighth 

Amendment.” See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (quoting Trop, 356 

U.S. at 100) (quotation marks omitted).

In sum, applying the use of excessive force test, 

analyzing the record under the criteria identified in Hope, and 

drawing all inferences in favor of Young as the nonmoving 

party, we cannot say that “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

C. The Issue of Qualified Immunity

The Defendants also ask us—in a single sentence—to 

affirm on the ground of qualified immunity. The District 

Court did not reach the issue and the availability of the 

defense was not briefed on appeal. In Hope, the Supreme 

Court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified 

immunity because their actions violated “clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.” 536 U.S. at 739 (quoting Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (quotation marks 

omitted). We will leave this issue for the District Court to 

address in the first instance on remand, considering (1) 

whether “the state of the law” in 2009, including Hope, gave 

the Defendants “fair warning that their alleged treatment of 

[Young] was unconstitutional,” 536 U.S. at 741, and (2) 

whether Young’s confinement in the restraint chair violated 

prison regulations of which the Defendants were aware, see, 

e.g., id. at 743-44 (prison officials’ violation of Department of 

Corrections’ regulations for restraining inmates at a hitching 
22

post was relevant to the question of fair warning); Treats v. 

Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Prison 

regulations governing the conduct of correctional officers are 

. . . relevant in determining whether an inmate’s right was 

clearly established.”). Cf. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. 

Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (observing that “an

officer act[ing] contrary to her training . . . does not itself 

negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise be 

warranted”). 

D. Young’s Remaining Arguments

Young also argues that the District Court abused its 

discretion by refusing to stay the summary judgment 

proceedings pending the issuance of the DOJ’s final 

investigative report and erred in refusing to allocate funds for 

him to retain a mental health expert. We review for abuse of 

discretion the District Court’s denial of Young’s motion to 

stay and its refusal to allocate funds for an expert. See 

Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 

544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1976) (a district court may stay 

proceedings “[i]n the exercise of its sound discretion”); see 

also Fed. R. Evid. 706 (giving trial judge broad discretion to 

appoint expert). 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied Young’s motion to stay the proceedings.9 At that 

 

9 Young argues that the factors set forth in Golden 

Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, 

Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1980), weighed in favor of 

granting a stay: 
23

time, the only issue remaining in the case, by Young’s 

 

(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in 

proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or 

any particular aspect of it, and the potential 

prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden 

which any particular aspect of the proceedings 

may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience 

of the court in the management of its cases, and 

the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the 

interests of persons not parties to the civil 

litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in 

the pending civil and criminal litigation.

Id. at 56.

While these factors provide a useful analytical 

framework when deciding whether to stay a civil case 

pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, Young does 

not cite, and we have not found, any authority applying them 

in the context of a motion for stay pending an agency’s 

investigative report. See, e.g., id. at 55 (denying stay because 

there was “no basis in law for the notion that defendants in a 

criminal prosecution, antitrust or otherwise, have a due 

process right to stay proceedings in related civil actions lest 

they be forced to defend themselves on two legal fronts 

simultaneously”). Indeed, all of the authority cited by Young 

is in the context of parallel criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,

SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 

1980); Walsh Secs., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. 

Supp. 2d 523, 527, 529 (D.N.J. 1998). Given the very 

different issues and interests implicated by such parallel 

proceedings, we decline to import that framework here. 
24

admission, was “his Eighth Amendment, excessive force 

challenge to [his] fourteen hour restraint in a restrictive 

movement chair” at SCI-Greene. J.A. 829 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court 

properly concluded that the DOJ’s preliminary investigative 

report regarding SCI-Cresson was “irrelevant and immaterial 

to that sole claim” and that Young effectively requested an 

“indefinite” stay because there was no indication when the 

DOJ’s final report would be issued. Id. at 829, 839. While 

this appeal was pending, however, the DOJ issued its final 

investigative report, detailing the “dehumanizing and cruel” 

conditions that attend the Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections’ (“DOC”) use of solitary confinement at six

prison facilities, including SCI-Greene, where prisoners are 

reportedly confined to a cell, less than 100 square feet, for 

twenty-three hours a day, exposed to unsanitary and 

inhospitable conditions, and subjected to the excessive use of 

restraints. Investigation of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr. Use of 

Solitary Confinement on Prisoners with Serious Mental 

Illness and/or Intellectual Disabilities, Appellant’s Br., Ex. C, 

at 4, 9-11.10 The report observes that solitary confinement 

commonly includes the “[u]nnecessary and excessive use of 

 

10 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation 

concerning a similar report relied upon by the Eighth Circuit 

in Hope, we take judicial notice of the DOJ’s final 

investigative report here. 536 U.S. at 737 n.7 (observing that 

the DOJ report was not before the District Court but the 

Eleventh Circuit took judicial notice and referenced it several 

times in its decision); see also id. at 737 (noting that “the 

court relied on . . . the results of a [DOJ] report that found 

Alabama’s systematic use of the hitching post to be improper 

corporal punishment.”).
25

[full-body] restraints . . . as a means to discipline prisoners by 

causing discomfort or pain,” id. at 11, and concludes that the 

long-term use of solitary confinement on mentally ill 

prisoners “violate[s] the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 

against ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” id. at 3.

Young argues on appeal that the final DOJ report is 

both relevant and admissible. The report reflects, among 

other things, that rather than providing mental health 

treatment, “staff members routinely respond to [a] prisoner 

exhibiting symptoms of . . . mental illness by making his 

living conditions even more inhospitable,” including 24/7 

confinement; denying the prisoner bedding material, clothing, 

and running water; restricting prisoners to even smaller cells; 

and subjecting them to the “excessive use of restraints.” Id. at 

10-11. It also describes that during their solitary

confinement, the prisoners’ senses are assaulted with foul 

smells from the “inadequate sanitation and ventilation”—

including the stench of human excrement that mentally ill 

prisoners smear on the wall and which might remain for 

days—and loud noises from the “yelling and banging of 

neighboring prisoners.” Id. at 9-10. According to the report, 

most cells have no windows, depriving prisoners of any 

natural light, though they never enjoy a respite, even at night, 

from the relentless overhead lighting within their cells. Id. at 

9. Five days a week, those who are willing to submit to a 

strip search are “led by tether,” “arms and legs shackled,” to 

“an empty and caged outdoor pen” for a single hour. Id. at 9-

10. Solitary confinement includes a total restriction on 

contact visitations, id. at 10, which means that the only 

human touch these inmates experience is from the COs 

shackling them, and a restriction to a single monthly noncontact visitation, id., which means that, but for an hour a 
26

month, their only human interactions are limited to the same 

COs. 

According to the report, the use of solitary 

confinement on mentally ill prisoners “exacerbates their 

mental illness and leads to serious psychological and 

physiological harms,” “including psychosis, trauma, severe 

depression, serious self-injury, and suicide,” id. at 3, 7, and as 

a result of their prolonged isolation, the prisoners express an 

inability “to conform their conduct to the prison’s rules in a 

way that would allow them out of their isolation cell” and 

“accumulate[] years of disciplinary time . . . fear[ing] they 

[will] never be returned to general population,” id. at 8. 

Having been denied mental health services, and with their 

mental illness exacerbated by prolonged solitary confinement, 

the prisoners are reportedly subjected to excessive restraints 

as a form of punishment, with “more than 260 full-body 

restraint incidents” over eighteen months, of which “almost 

75% lasted longer than 7 hours, and 15% lasted longer than 

12 hours.” Id. at 11. 

Young notes the many parallels between the findings 

in the final report and his own experience, pointing out that 

not only was he subjected to excessive restraint, lasting 

almost fourteen hours, but also that he suffers from many 

forms of serious mental illness,

11 that his mental illness has 

 

11 The DOC defines “serious mental illness” as “a 

substantial disorder of thought or mood that significantly 

impairs judgment, behavior, [or] capacity to recognize reality 

or cope with the ordinary demands of life.” Appellant’s Br. 

Ex. C at 4-5 (quoting Pa. Dep’t Corr., Access to Mental 

Health Care, Policy 13.8.1, Section 2-Delivery of Mental 
27

been exacerbated by his prolonged solitary confinement, and 

that his extensive disciplinary history cannot be considered in 

isolation from his history of mental illness, rendering the final 

report highly relevant. He also argues that the final report 

should be deemed admissible, pursuant to the hearsay 

exception for public records. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (a 

“record or statement of a public office” is admissible “in a 

civil case” if it sets out “factual findings from a legally 

authorized investigation” and “the opponent does not show 

that the source of information nor other circumstances 

indicate a lack of trustworthiness”). Young cites our decision 

in Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 669-70 (3d 

Cir. 2002), as authority for admitting a trustworthy public 

report containing legal conclusions into evidence pursuant to 

Rule 803(8). 

The Defendants do not dispute that the report is a 

public document nor do they challenge its trustworthiness, but 

they argue that it makes “general” and “inadmissible” legal 

conclusions. Appellees’ Br. 29. The Defendants also argue 

that admission of the DOJ’s “opinion” that “restraint chair 

confinement ‘often’ is punitive for severely mentally ill RHU 

inmates held elsewhere” would be “unduly prejudicial in the 

most fundamental sense.” Id. at 29-30.

Because the District Court did not address any 

evidentiary issues pertaining to the final report in deciding 

Young’s motion to stay, it should do so on remand, 

considering whether the report here, to the extent it contains 

relevant findings and conclusions, constitutes a trustworthy 

 

Health Services § A.1.a.(2) (2013)) (alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).
28

public report admissible pursuant to Rule 803(8) and whether 

the admission of some or all of the report is not merely 

prejudicial to the Defendants, but “unfairly prejudicial,” as 

that is the touchstone for exclusion. Goodman, 293 F.3d at 

670. The parties may renew their evidentiary arguments on 

remand. 

Finally, we agree with the Defendants that the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s request 

to appoint a mental health expert pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Evidence 706 because a court does not have the power to tilt 

the scales in favor of one litigant by funding its expert 

witnesses under that Rule. Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 

468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987). However, the District Court could 

appoint an expert for the purpose of assisting the Court, and

the rule is clear that an expert so appointed should be paid 

either from “funds provided by law”12 or “by the parties in 

such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and 

thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.” Young, 59 

F.3d at 1169-70 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 706(b)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Boring, 833 F.2d at 474.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court 

improvidently granted summary judgment in favor of the 

Defendants by failing to apply the Supreme Court’s 

 

12 The Western District maintains a “fund to cover 

reasonable costs” incurred in pro bono civil rights 

representations. See Pro Bono Counsel in Prisoner Civil 

Rights Cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania, 

http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Pages/ProBonoPC.htm (last 

accessed August 24, 2015). 
29

controlling precedent in Hope and failing to draw all 

reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of Young. The 

District Court’s order of summary judgment will be vacated

and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.