DNN Sentinel

in this issue:

Vol. I, No. 2

 defense by other means

u.s. department of energy (doe)

national nuclear security administration (nnsa)

defense nuclear nonproliferation (dnn) National Nuclear Security Administration 

3 U.S.–China Peaceful 

Nuclear Cooperation 

4 Yangshan Radiation 

Detection System 

Transitioned to China

5 LANL Hosts 5th DOE/

Euratom Joint Steering 

Committee Meeting

6 Innovation: Sandia’s 

Mobile Camera

7 Radiological Security 

Partnership

8 IAEA Co-hosts 25th 

International Nuclear 

Material Protection 

Course

9 Exercise Series 

Strengthens Rad 

Transportation Security 

Across U.S. 

10 NNSA Program Develops 

the Next Generation

12 DNN Expert Profile: 

Heather Dion

13 Mo-99: Industry Role in 

Meeting Nonproliferation 

Challenge

14 Country Profile: Jordan

16 FAQs: Reports Reflect 

the Evolving Nature of 

Nuclear Nonproliferation

ENERGY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

IL

3

0 0

Grand Total

Remaining

Volunteered

AR

AL GA

PR

As of June 4, 2015

124

44 59 21 LPI

3

5

1 4

1

1 0 0

0

2

1 1 0

VA

1

0 0 1

6

2 2 2

2

0 2 0

TN

1

0 1 0

5

2 2 1

1

0 0 1

3

1 2 0

2

2 0 0

2

0 2 0

OK

4

2 0 2

4

1 2 1

5

1 2 2

2

2 0 0

2

1 1 0

6

1 5 0

NC

4

1 1 2

4

2 2 0

3

0 3 0

2

1 1

2

1 1 0

4

2 1 1

LA

3

2 1 0

KS

1

0 1 0

1

0 1 0

8

3 2 3

1

1 0 0

1

0 1 0

4

0 4 0

6

5 0 1

FL

CT

1

0 1 0

CO

1

0 1 0

19

7 9 3

1

0 0 1

1

1 0 0

0 State OSRP Declined

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

IL

GA

IA

CA

TX

NE

NY

SAUDI

ARABIA

LEBANON

SYRIA IRAQ

West

Bank

ISRAEL

JORDAN

Golan

Heights

Gaza

Strip

EGYPT

Amman

Mediterranean 

Sea

Dead Sea

Gulf of Aqaba

Letter from 

the Deputy 

Administrator 

Summer is often a quieter time when we have a chance to catch our 

breath and prepare for a busy autumn, but this year has seen little 

slowing of activity in the nuclear nonproliferation and security worlds. 

Preparations continued for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) 

with the announcement of the 2016 Summit dates and location—March 

31–April 1 in Washington, D.C.—and a meeting of the Sherpa teams 

in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July. Building on the successful scenario-based 

policy discussion that was a highlight of the 2014 NSS hosted by The 

Netherlands, the use of these exercises is being expanded for 2016, 

including one at the ministerial level, which will be hosted by Secretary of 

Energy Moniz next January.

In addition, the IAEA held one of its largest technical conferences ever 

in July on the challenging and sensitive topic of cyber security. The 

“International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World” 

boasted over 700 participants from over 90 countries and featured 

technical demonstrations—including blended cyber and physical 

attacks—and five days of lively conversation. The United States was 

well-represented and we were very proud of the substantial contributions 

made by headquarters and laboratory experts to the conference organization and execution.

No less important was the summer meeting of the Institute of Nuclear 

Materials Management (INMM). This meeting is a one-of-a-kind 

opportunity for professionals from around the globe to exchange and 

discuss best practices, learn about the latest technical developments, 

and interact with colleagues. The 2015 Annual Meeting was held in Indian 

Wells, CA with more than 600 participants from dozens of countries. 

DNN and its extended “family” were major contributors of technical 

papers and posters, and as recipients of INMM service awards.
2

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DNN SENTINEL: 

DEFENSE BY OTHER MEANS

VOL. I, NO. 2

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/

ourprograms/nonproliferation-0

Editor-in-Chief

Anne Harrington

Editorial Board

Jaci Dickerson

Thomas Gray

Erika Hunsicker

Leah Kuchinsky

Daniel Mingrone

John Wengle

Editorial Advisors

Corey Hinderstein

Andrew Hood

Editor

Elaine Specht

Graphics 

Mike Crew

Sarah Kaukeinen

Visit us!

Letter from the Deputy Administrator – Continued

or email us at DNNOutreach@nnsa.doe.gov 

to request to be added to the mailing list.

Scan this code

Of course, this summer’s biggest news was the July 14 announcement of final 

agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear 

program. We are closely watching the Congressional discussions on the JCPOA, 

while also assessing and preparing for the impacts that its implementation will 

have on DNN. More to come on this front!

So without much of a pause, we are already well into the preparations for the 

September IAEA General Conference, which we will cover in the next edition.

Anne Harrington

Deputy Administrator

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

  DNN QUICK LINKS 

Follow the links below to learn more about DNN’s most recent activities. 

Press Releases

NNSA Supports IAEA Regional Training in Zambia on Management 

Practices for Uranium

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/iaeazambiauoc

Armenia Secures Dangerous Radioactive Sources in Cooperation with 

NNSA

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

armeniaradioactivesources032715

NNSA Conducts Experiment to Improve U.S. Ability to Detect Foreign 

Nuclear Explosions

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

foreignnuclearexplosiondetectionexperiments 

Blogs

Huizenga Leads Safety of Spent Fuel Management, Radioactive Waste 

Management Meeting in Vienna

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/huizenga-leads-safety-spent-fuel-managementradioactive-waste-management-meeting-vienna 

NNSA Contributes to International Efforts to Further Strengthen Detection 

of Nuclear Explosions

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-contributes-international-efforts-furtherstrengthen-detection-nuclear-explosions 

 National Nuclear Security Administration 
3

U.S.–China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation—

Looking to the Future

By Wayne Mei

DOE–China cooperation in the nuclear field represents 

a key strategic relationship for both countries. China’s 

robust civil nuclear energy sector is continuing to 

expand with more than 20 new nuclear reactors currently 

under construction, several of which use U.S. designs and 

technology. China also participates actively in the Nuclear 

Security Summits and continues to cooperate with DNN in a 

variety of nuclear security areas.

The principal framework for cooperation is the Peaceful Uses 

of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement. In May 2015, the 

United States and China held the 10th Joint Coordinating 

Committee (JCC) meeting under the U.S.–China PUNT 

framework. Held periodically since 2002, the meeting 

locations alternate between the United States and China 

with the most recent meeting held in Chengdu, the capital 

of China’s Sichuan Province and a center of Chinese nuclear 

technology development activities.

The PUNT Agreement—signed in 1985 and entered into 

force in 1998—is the only formal government-to-government 

mechanism in place to facilitate U.S.–China bilateral technical 

cooperation in civil nuclear energy and nonproliferation. 

PUNT activities currently are organized into six working 

groups:

1. Nuclear Energy Technology

2. Nuclear Safeguards and Security

3. Environment and Nuclear Waste Management

4. Nuclear Emergency Management

5. Radioactive Source Security

6. Public and Stakeholder Outreach

“The significance of this 10th PUNT JCC meeting is not the 

meeting itself, but the growth of U.S.–China cooperation, 

which has been evident since the first JCC meeting in 

2002,” said DNN Deputy Administrator Anne Harrington, 

who was head of the U.S. delegation at the meeting. “It is 

important that we are continuing to explore new areas of 

mutually beneficial cooperation. The complexity of the topics 

being studied also is growing, which signals our mutual 

commitment to work together on the safe, secure, and 

peaceful use of nuclear technology.”

In response, Mr. Liu Baohua, Director General of the Nuclear 

Power Department of China’s National Energy Administration 

(NEA) and the Chinese head of delegation, acknowledged 

that U.S.–China cooperation in the peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy has made great progress in a wide range 

of pragmatic areas. He further recommended that “both 

sides should strengthen communication and interaction at 

all levels, advance the pace of cooperation on the basis of 

mutual respect, promote substantial collaboration in every 

area and jointly research and respond to global challenges so 

as to facilitate the development of China–U.S. nuclear energy 

cooperation in a broader, deeper and higher-level manner.”

In addition to DOE and NNSA, other U.S. agencies that have 

participated in the PUNT include the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission and the Departments of State and Commerce. 

The China NEA leads U.S.–China PUNT discussions for 

the People’s Republic of China and is supported by the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the China Atomic Energy Authority, 

the China Institute of Atomic Energy, and the Ministry of 

Environmental Protection. 

Read the NNSA press release about the meeting at 

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

10-us-china-punt

Wayne Mei, a member of DNN’s Office of Nonproliferation and Arms 

Control, helped coordinate the recent JCC meeting. 

DNN Deputy Administrator Anne Harrington (center) at the JCC 

meeting joined by (left to right) Edward McGinnis, DOE, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for International Nuclear Energy Policy and 

Cooperation; Shao Jun, DOE, China; Peter Lyons, DOE, former 

Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Florence Knauf, DOE/

NNSA, Office of Global Materials Security; and Ann Heinrich, 

DOE/NNSA, Office of International Emergency Management 

and Cooperation.
4

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Yangshan Radiation Detection System 

Transitioned to China

T

o enhance China’s capabilities to counter nuclear 

and radiological smuggling through the global 

maritime shipping system, DNN’s Nuclear Smuggling 

Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) Program installed 

a radiation detection system at the Port of Yangshan, 

a deepwater port that is part of the Port of Shanghai, 

currently the world’s busiest container port. In January 

2015, DNN transferred long-term responsibility for the 

system to the General Administration of Customs of China 

(GACC). Representing DNN at the event, DNN Principal 

Assistant Deputy Administrator David Huizenga said, 

“We applaud GACC’s commitment to combatting nuclear 

smuggling in the global maritime shipping system.” 

Installation of the radiation detection equipment, which 

was manufactured by the Chinese vendor, Nuctech, was 

completed in November 2011. In accordance with its 

standard approach, DNN provided GACC with three years 

of sustainability support. During this transition period, 

DNN and GACC worked toward enhancing GACC’s 

capabilities to operate and maintain the radiation detection 

system autonomously. The transition ceremony in January 

marked the end of this period and recognized the Chinese 

commitment to full ownership, operation, and sustainment of 

the system.

DNN and GACC plan to continue their cooperation with 

DNN providing technical support and advice as GACC 

procures and installs additional radiation detection 

equipment at Yangshan Port and a radiation detection 

system at a port in Tianjin. DNN Deputy Administrator Anne 

Harrington considers DNN’s work at the Port of Yangshan 

as a model partnership. “In this case, DNN worked to 

equip one port with a detection system as a pilot, which 

developed indigenous expertise and buy-in,” she says, 

“China has followed through by equipping other ports, with 

DNN providing only technical advice. The seriousness of the 

Chinese commitment to own this important responsibility 

has been key to its success.” 

DNN and GACC share a long history of collaborating to 

combat nuclear terrorism that includes jointly building a 

Radiation Detection Training Center in China modeled after 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s HAMMER Facility. 

DNN’s investment was $4.5M, and GACC’s investment 

was approximately $20M. The center has been used to 

deliver training in the best practices in the operation and 

management of radiation detection systems to hundreds of 

GACC officers deployed across China. 

Read the NNSA press release about the transfer 

of the radiation detection system at http://

nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

nnsa%E2%80%99s-second-line-defense.

Contributions of National 

Laboratories 

Several national laboratories have and will continue 

to lend their technical support for radiation detection 

systems at China seaports.

Los Alamos National Laboratory was instrumental 

in optimizing the detection equipment.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory led several tests of 

the Nuctech equipment to verify that it met NSDD’s 

specifications.

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

contributed to overall management of the project 

and development of the training curriculum for the 

Radiation Detection Training Center.

Sandia National Laboratories provided extensive 

consultations on the network and communications 

systems.

The 17 radiation portal monitors installed at the Port of Yangshan 

will scan 100% of export containers. 
5

LANL Hosts 5th DOE/Euratom Joint Steering 

Committee Meeting 

Photos by Richard Robinson, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

In July 2015, Los Alamos 

National Laboratory 

(LANL) hosted the 

5th Joint Steering 

Committee (JSC) Meeting 

between DOE and the 

European Atomic Energy 

Community (Euratom) 

represented by the 

European Commission 

(EC). JSC meetings 

provide an opportunity to 

reinforce commitments, 

expand technical 

cooperation, and advance 

mutual nuclear security 

and nonproliferation 

objectives.

LANL chemist Rob Steiner (not pictured) explains how 

the ionization process works for thermal ionization mass 

spectrometry to tour participants. 

Peter Santi, LANL’s Safeguards Technology Training Coordinator, 

leads a tour of LANL’s Nonproliferation and National Security Center 

Nondestructive Assay Training Area, where classes are held for IAEA 

inspectors and many others throughout the year.

LANL scientist Andy Nelson briefs DNN’s Anne Harrington and Elly Melamed along with European 

representatives in LANL’s Fuels Research facilities on the laboratory’s diverse suite of capabilities 

focused on the synthesis and characterization of actinide materials.
6

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

innovation: Sandia’s Mobile Camera Takes Aim 

at Detecting Nuclear Proliferation

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed 

an important new capability needed for detecting 

nuclear proliferation: the Mobile Imager of Neutrons 

for Emergency Responders (MINER) system, a tool that can 

rapidly distinguish between threatening and non-threatening 

radiation sources. DNN Research and Development 

(DNN R&D) funded the work as part of its support to 

NNSA’s broader nuclear security mission, which includes 

requirements for developing a variety of radiation detection 

technologies.

MINER is essentially a portable neutron scatter camera, 

which locates the source of fast neutrons coming from 

special nuclear material (SNM), even at significant distances 

and through shielding. MINER has improved on the original 

neutron scatter camera, reducing weight from 180 to 90 

pounds, reducing height from 5 to 3 feet, and operating on 

batteries instead of requiring externally supplied power. 

MINER consists of 16 proton-rich liquid scintillator cells 

arranged inside a large cylinder. The “scattering” comes 

into play when neutrons travel through the scintillator cells 

and bounce off protons like billiard balls. Those interactions 

enable the instrument to determine the direction of the 

radioactive source that emitted the neutrons.

As a neutron scatter camera, MINER has several advantages 

over other types of detectors, including the ability to 

discriminate the target signature from background radiation 

and measure the energy spectrum of the target’s neutrons, 

which allows it to distinguish plutonium, for example, from 

other common commercial sources of neutrons.

In 2014, DNN R&D sponsored a successful demonstration 

of MINER where the capability was tested and verified for 

use as a homeland security application. Since then, SNL 

has been looking at other techniques to enable MINER to 

provide additional information, such as the mass of fissile 

material. The manager of the SNL department responsible 

for the development of MINER, Craig Tewell, explains, 

“When used as a neutron scatter camera, MINER is 

closed. But the system can be opened to gather additional 

information about the source by exploiting the timing 

distribution between correlated pairs of gamma rays and 

neutrons.”

These exciting developments, advanced by SNL’s expert 

physicists, will further enhance the measurement capabilities 

of MINER and increase its value to the proliferation detection 

mission. 

Example of a MINER setup (left) and a rendering of the image it 

would generate (right) if a neutron source, such as SNM located in 

the area of the star, was detected in a shipping container. 

SNL physicists Mark Gerling (left) and John Goldsmith with 

the MINER detection system opened to show the 16 liquid 

scintillator detector cells. Photo by Dino Vournas
7

Radiological Security Partnership: 

Secure Your Business, Your 

Community, and Your Country

By Kristina Hatcher 

DNN has launched a targeted 

outreach campaign to prompt 

U.S. sites with Category 1 

radioactive sources to volunteer 

to enhance their security beyond 

regulatory requirements. The outreach 

campaign, titled the “Radiological 

Security Partnership,” includes email 

outreach, phone calls, webinars, and 

an online portal (http://nnsa.energy.

gov/RSP). 

In the United States there are roughly 

450 buildings that house Category 

1 radiological materials. As defined 

by the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on 

the Safety and Security of Radioactive 

Sources, Category 1 sources are those 

that pose the greatest potential health 

risks if not handled properly, such as 

cobalt-60 and strontium-90. DNN’s 

Radiological Security program has 

been working with Category 1 and 

2 licensees since 2008 to enhance 

security beyond their regulatory 

requirements and to date has secured 

300 of 450 buildings. 

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security 

Summit (NSS), the United States and 

23 other countries agreed to a set 

of actions—termed a “gift basket” 

—to secure all Category 1 radioactive 

sources within their territory by 2016. 

Toward that end, Congress has 

provided additional funding to DNN 

this year specifically set aside for U.S. 

Category 1 license holders to meet 

the goals set forth at the NSS and to 

demonstrate the U.S. commitment to 

global partners. While U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission requirements 

IL

3

0 0

Grand Total

Remaining

Volunteered

AR

AL GA

PR

As of June 4, 2015

124

44 59 21 LPI

3

5

1 4

1

1 0 0

0

2

1 1 0

VA

1

0 0 1

6

2 2 2

2

0 2 0

TN

1

0 1 0

5

2 2 1

1

0 0 1

3

1 2 0

2

2 0 0

2

0 2 0

OK

4

2 0 2

4

1 2 1

5

1 2 2

2

2 0 0

2

1 1 0

6

1 5 0

NC

4

1 1 2

4

2 2 0

3

0 3 0

2

1 1

2

1 1 0

4

2 1 1

LA

3

2 1 0

KS

1

0 1 0

1

0 1 0

8

3 2 3

1

1 0 0

1

0 1 0

4

0 4 0

6

5 0 1

FL

CT

1

0 1 0

CO

1

0 1 0

19

7 9 3

1

0 0 1

1

1 0 0

0 State OSRP Declined

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

IL

GA

IA

CA

TX

NE

NY

Progress toward enhancing security at 153 additional facilities across the 

United States that house Category 1 radioactive sources.

“Gift Basket” 

to Secure 

Category 1 Sources

The signatories to the 2014 

Nuclear Security Summit gift 

basket on Category 1 radioactive 

sources agreed to secure their 

materials consistent with the IAEA 

Code of Conduct, which calls for 

each signatory to: 

1. Support an independent 

regulatory body

2. Establish a comprehensive 

lifecycle management plan

3. Develop a comprehensive plan 

for sources out of regulatory 

control

4. Assess the domestic threat 

and develop a national 

response plan

5. Implement site level security 

measures

6. Provide rapid response to 

unauthorized attempts to 

access radioactive material

In addition, the gift basket text 

recommends that states institute 

additional security best practices 

such as: multifaceted access 

controls; active involvement 

of off-site response including 

law enforcement during a 

nuclear security event; a holistic 

framework that governs secure 

transportation, possession, and 

disposition; monitoring systems 

with defense in depth; and 

enhancements to increase the 

amount of time required to remove 

a source from its authorized 

location.
8

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

for license holders are consistent with the IAEA Code of 

Conduct, the NSS commitment highlights the opportunity 

for licensees to develop additional best practices by 

volunteering for security enhancements provided by 

DNN’s Radiological Security program.

The 150 remaining sites for enhanced security are 

located throughout the United States and consist of large 

cobalt-60 gamma irradiation facilities, aerospace research 

companies, cancer treatment facilities, and hospitals. 

Since December 2014, 44 sites have volunteered for the 

program. DNN is working aggressively in the lead up to 

the next Nuclear Security Summit to target the remaining 

Category 1 licensees.

Under the Radiological Security Partnership, security 

experts provide assessments, share observations 

and make recommendations for enhancing material 

security. When appropriate, DNN funds the installation 

of agreed upon security enhancements. Typical security 

enhancements include: automated access control; motion 

sensors; radiation sensors; electronic seals; alarm control 

and display systems; remote monitoring of licensee 

facilities at off-site response locations; enhanced security 

force communications and protection equipment; delay 

elements; and transportation security enhancements, 

when appropriate. DNN also provides cost-free alarm 

response training for law enforcement and site personnel 

at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. 

In addition to offering voluntary security enhancements, 

DNN helps licensees dispose of unwanted material 

through the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP). 

OSRP has a mission to remove excess, unwanted, 

abandoned, or orphan radioactive sealed sources that 

pose a potential risk to health, safety, and national 

security.

Kristina Hatcher manages the Office of Radiological Security’s 

Domestic Radiological Security Program.

DNN Promotes Radiological Security Partnership Campaign – Continued

Anne Harrington, DNN Deputy Administrator, addresses the media on 

April 20, 2015, during welcoming ceremonies for the 25th International 

Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 

Facilities. Looking on are Sandia National Laboratories Director Paul 

Hommert (left), who has since retired, and Denis Flory, Deputy Director 

General for Nuclear Security at the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Denis Flory and Anne Harrington examine sensors used in 

detecting the failure of nuclear reactors during a tour with 

Dept. 6230 Senior Manager Susan Pickering at Sandia’s 

Training and Technology Demonstration Area as part of the 

welcoming ceremony for the 25th International Training 

Course. 

IAEA Co-hosts 25th International Nuclear Material 

Protection Course at Sandia National Laboratories

Photos by Randy Montoya, Sandia National Laboratories
9

Exercise Series 

Strengthens Rad 

Transportation Security 

Across U.S. 

By Mark West and Todd Cannan 

While the preceding event may appear as if it was 

“ripped from the headlines,” in reality it was a 

fictitious scenario used during a radiological 

transportation security table top exercise (TTX) sponsored by 

DNN’s Office of Radiological Security (ORS). Events involving 

the theft of radioactive material in transit actually occurred 

in Mexico in 2014 and 2015, and radiography cameras are 

stolen regularly in the United States. DNN’s Radiological 

Security (RS) program has partnered with the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) to jointly sponsor a series of radiological 

transportation security TTXs in the United States. The target 

audience of these exercises is federal, state, and local 

first responders; public health personnel; and radiological 

shippers and carriers. The series is designed to provide 

these organizations with:

•	 Increased situational awareness regarding security 

incidents involving the transport of radiological materials

•	 Relationship building between first responders and the 

companies that transport these materials

•	 A venue to exercise security and response plans and 

procedures with the agencies/organizations that would 

be involved in a real-world incident

The TTX series is designed to enhance security awareness 

and response through the one-day exercises where 

participants work through a notional scenario focusing on 

a malicious event involving high-consequence radiological 

material in transit. ORS, in direct coordination with FBI’s 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Nuclear 

and Radiological Countermeasures Unit (NRCU), plans, 

develops, and facilitates the TTXs. NRCU also coordinates 

FBI’s participation, at both the headquarters and local field 

office levels, for each TTX.

The concept behind the TTX series is to build on the 

ongoing work of ORS and the FBI to familiarize first 

responders and industry personnel with potential security 

vulnerabilities associated with radiological material transport. 

One of the main goals of the series is to promote crosssector communication and cooperation among federal, 

state, local, and private industry stakeholders when dealing 

with a security-related incident or event involving radioactive 

material in transit. The TTX scenarios and discussion, 

which include preventative actions and en-route measures, 

primarily focus on crisis management and also address 

initial actions for consequence management, such as 

immediate post-event recovery efforts. Each scenario is 

tailored specifically to the exercise location and features local 

threat information and response assets to ensure the TTX is 

credible and relevant to the participants.

At the conclusion of each TTX, ORS conducts a postexercise debrief to capture lessons learned and follow-up 

issues for an after-action report. 

To date, exercises have been conducted in Wytheville, 

Virginia; Oriskany, New York; and Buffalo, New York. 

Future exercises for FY 2015 are scheduled for Little Rock, 

Arkansas; Detroit, Michigan; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and 

Columbia, South Carolina.

Mark West is the federal manager for transportation tabletops 

within the Office of Radiological Security. Todd Cannan is a Senior 

Exercise Specialist and Principal with Summit Exercises and 

Training. He has conducted exercises and workshops for DNN’s 

Office of Global Material Security and NNSA since 2009.

Exercise players consider response options during the TTX held 

at the New York State Preparedness Training Center in Oriskany. 

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL HIJACKED

April 10, 2014 – Two trucks carrying highlyradioactive material were hijacked by a group of 

armed assailants from a truck stop located several 

miles outside a major metropolitan area. The 

trucks were last seen getting on the highway; the 

current whereabouts of the assailants is unknown.
10

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

You hear about it all the time—organizations 

acknowledging their staff members as their greatest 

asset. What you do not hear about as often are the 

investments to cultivate that asset. One of the ways NNSA 

is fostering the next generation of nuclear security experts is 

through its NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP).

NGFP offers its Fellows an exceptional career development 

opportunity through hands-on experience supporting NNSA 

mission areas across policy and technology disciplines. This 

program has grown from its inception in 1995 as a small 

program in DNN with 3 graduate students, to an NNSA-wide 

program with more than 40 Fellows in the class of 2015. 

The one-year fellowships give tomorrow’s leaders in 

global nuclear security and nonproliferation unparalleled 

exposure to NNSA and the National Laboratories through 

assignments to program offices across NNSA. Although 

originally a nonproliferation program, expanding the program 

in recent years has allowed Fellows to contribute to a wide 

range of projects supporting DNN such as developing a 

framework for engaging national nuclear forensics libraries 

to support outreach with international partners, coordinating 

an interagency working group on export controls, assisting 

with the U.S. delegation to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency General 

Conference, 

assisting with 

the DNN Cyber 

Task Force 

to strengthen 

cybersecurity 

protection for 

nonproliferation 

activities, and 

co-leading 

interagency 

collaborations 

between DNN and 

the Department of 

Homeland Security 

on alternative technologies. 

NGFP is managed under NNSA’s Office of Management and 

Budget and administered by the Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory (PNNL). Together, NGFP’s federal and PNNL 

program managers develop and implement an outreach 

strategy based on program objectives, the results of an 

annual NNSA hiring needs assessment, partnerships with 

NNSA offices requesting Fellows, and engagement with 

universities and professional societies. 

As NNSA missions evolve and technical 

challenges grow increasingly complex, 

the NGFP recruiting responds. For 

example, for the outgoing NGFP class, 

the program recruited 34% more technical 

applicants than in previous years. NGFP 

also broadened its mission impact for the 

incoming class with two of the Fellows 

assigned to the U.S. Department of State.

The fellowships begin in June with 

orientations at PNNL in Richland, 

Washington, and NNSA Headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. Other events include 

DOE leadership and national laboratory 

roundtables, briefings with various 

congressional committees, and alumni 

networking events to bring the current 

NNSA Program Develops the Next Generation 

of Nuclear Security Experts 

By Cornelia Brim and Maren Disney

With 62% of NGFP alumni employed in 

the DOE/NNSA complex, the program is 

developing the next generation of nuclear 

security experts.

Placement of NGFP Alumni

Earlier this year, DNN Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator David Huizenga 

moderated the NGFP Alumni Forum with NGFP Alumni (left to right) Lauren Lafaro 

(2008), Courtney Stewart (2007), Claudio Gariazzo (2002), and Peter Sprunger (2011).
11

Fellows together with former Fellows 

and other leaders from the nuclear 

security complex.

Recruitment for the 2016 class is 

under way. The application system 

opened in May and will close October 

19, 2015. Interviewing and hiring 

will begin in the fall. Outreach and 

recruitment activities span the country, 

with recruiters visiting dozens of 

top-tier universities both in person 

and virtually. More information on the 

program, recruitment and applications 

process is available by visiting 

http://ngfp.pnnl.gov.

The invaluable experiences and 

networking opportunities afforded 

by the NGFP are helping to build the 

workforce of the present and future: 

62% of alumni are employed in the 

DOE/NNSA complex, and more than 

80% of alumni overall are employed 

in various positions supported by the 

U.S. Government.

“As this program moves forward, I’m 

thrilled to see it continue to grow and 

recruit the top talent in nuclear security 

policy, science, and engineering. The 

breadth and impact of the NNSA 

Graduate Fellowship Program is clearly 

evident, and its future potential seems 

unlimited,” said Madelyn Creedon, 

NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator, 

who recently spoke at the NGFP 

Alumni Forum. 

See NNSA’s recent blogs on the outgoing 

and incoming Fellows at: 

• http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/pnnl-hostsnnsa%E2%80%99s-graduate-fellowshipprogram-closing-ceremony 

• http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsagraduate-fellowship-program-class-2016 

Cornelia Brim and Maren Disney are senior 

communications specialists at PNNL. 

NGFP Alumna Personifies Success of 

Program for Fellows and Their Future 

Employers 

Joyce Connery, 

an alumna of the 

NNSA Graduate 

Fellowship 

Program, can 

testify to the 

impact of this 

program on 

a young professional’s career 

and to the infusion of enthusiasm 

and energy Fellows bring to their 

current and future employers. 

“The on-the-job training I got in 

Kazakhstan pushed me into the field 

of nonproliferation. I would be doing 

something completely different if it 

weren’t for NGFP.” Fortunately she 

embraced the opportunity and the 

nation has benefitted from her service 

to the nonproliferation mission ever 

since. 

Connery currently serves as Director 

of Nuclear Energy Policy within the 

Office of International Economics on 

the National Security Council in the 

White House, a position she has held 

since 2012. In this role she develops 

policy among agencies and aligns 

and coordinates programs covering 

nuclear safety, security, and nuclear 

trade. She recently was nominated 

by the White House to become the 

chair of the Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board.

As part of her one-year NGFP 

fellowship, Connery (Class of 1999), 

served in Kazakhstan with Argonne 

National Laboratory-East, leading 

nonproliferation efforts including 

export control and industrial 

outreach. This assignment brought 

her back to a part of the world where 

she had worked before, as a Peace 

Corps volunteer.

Connery stayed in Kazakhstan after 

her fellowship, working for Argonne 

National Laboratory-West, overseeing 

the decommissioning of the BN-350 

fast breeder reactor. Since then, she 

served in various capacities within 

NNSA and in the National Security 

Council under the Obama and Bush 

administrations. Over the course of 

her career her exemplary service has 

been recognized; she received the 

NNSA’s Silver Medal, the Secretary 

of Energy’s Distinguished Service 

Award, and a Presidential Citation 

from the American Nuclear Society.

Reflecting on her NGFP experience, 

Connery offered the following advice 

to the current NGFP class: “Get the 

most of your experience by working 

with your ‘cohort’ (fellow NGFPers) 

to find out what they are doing to 

get a broader perspective. Do not 

limit yourselves to the narrow job 

description, but branch out to get 

involved in other issues in which 

you are interested. Network—not 

with any particular goal in mind, but 

to meet new people with different 

perspectives.” 

And Connery also encourages NNSA 

and interagency program managers 

to support and work with NGFP 

Fellows: “This is the future of the 

Department. Your Fellows may not 

stay in your organization but they 

will be forever connected to your 

organization after they leave and will 

be able to recommend folks to you 

and vice versa. They will be able to 

work better through the interagency 

because of their understanding of 

what you do. They are young and 

enthusiastic and can bring a whole 

different vibe to your organization.”

NGFP Continues to Foster Future 

Nuclear Security Experts – Continued
12

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DNN Expert Profile: Heather Dion 

Nuclear forensics came to the forefront of the national stage 

through the Nuclear Security Summit of 2010. Dr. Dion 

explains, “Before the Summit, the vast majority of nuclear 

forensics work was being conducted by the weapons states, 

however, after the Summit, we had the backing of all the 

participating heads of state to move forward on developing 

capabilities in nuclear forensics for a much larger audience.” 

What was then a manageable scope of work, mushroomed 

overnight and DNN’s small program was inundated with 

requests for nuclear forensics assistance and technical 

cooperation. 

Dion has spent much of her time on the road and 

routinely spends more time out of the office than in. 

This dedication has paid off and what started as a small 

effort to establish a nuclear forensics outreach program, 

formerly the International Nuclear Forensics Cooperation 

program under DNN’s Office of Nonproliferation and Arms 

Control Office (NPAC), has increased into an internationally 

recognized effort to support countries in their refinement and 

development of an integrated nuclear forensics capability. 

The program is now part of DNN’s Office of Global Material 

Security Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence 

(NSDD) Program. Dion prides herself in helping international 

partners understand the importance of nuclear forensics 

in supporting law enforcement, uncovering the origin of 

interdicted nuclear or radioactive materials, and encouraging 

better safeguards and security practices around existing 

nuclear facilities.

One specific example is Dion’s contribution to the U.S.–

Japan Nuclear Security Working Group, a White House-led 

activity established in 2011 to support the Nuclear Security 

Summit process. Dion serves as the U.S. chair for two 

working groups: one to advance the technical aspects of 

nuclear forensics and the other to develop a coordinated 

national response for using nuclear forensic assets. This 

type of high-level government-to-government interaction 

invigorates Dion. She is a self-proclaimed challenge seeker 

and finds the interface between the technical and policy 

world as constantly pushing her to be innovative and 

strategic in her actions. 

The Nuclear Security Summit may have brought nuclear 

forensics onto the international stage, but without the 

support of implementation focused organizations, little 

progress at a national level would be made. Dion recognized 

this need and supports a number of efforts focused on 

reaching the working-level community. Her frequent role 

as subject matter expert to the Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the IAEA helps move nuclear 

forensics forward on both the global and national agendas. 

She recently served on the organizing committee for the 

IAEA’s first International Advances in Nuclear Forensics 

Conference held in July 2014 at the IAEA’s Headquarters in 

Vienna and often serves as a facilitator at GICNT events.

The nuclear nonproliferation mission requires access to scientific and technical 

expertise that often is not available at Headquarters. When DNN decided to develop a 

focused program on international nuclear forensics it sought out a laboratory specialist 

with the right balance of technical background and policy awareness to help define 

the mission, vision, and scope of the fledgling program. In 2010, Dr. Heather Dion 

was identified as the right fit for the job, and was detailed from Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) to join the DNN team. To support the rapidly growing international 

program and take maximum advantage of Dr. Dion’s expertise, DNN decided to shift 

her to working through an Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) agreement, which 

allows her to function with the decision-making authority of a federal employee.

The Intergovernmental Personnel Act Mobility 

Program provides for the temporary assignment of 

personnel between the federal government and state 

and local governments, colleges and universities, 

Indian tribal governments, federally funded research 

and development centers, and other eligible 

organizations. 

To learn more, go to https://www.opm.gov/

policy-data-oversight/hiring-authorities/

intergovernment-personnel-act/#url=Overview. 
13

Mo-99: Industry 

Role in Meeting the 

Nonproliferation 

Challenge of Medical 

Isotope Production

By Savannah Fitzwater 

What do you do when a medical isotope that is used 

in over 50,000 medical procedures in the United 

States each day is 100% supplied by foreign 

vendors, most of which use highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

in the production process? As part of NNSA’s efforts to 

minimize the use of HEU in civilian applications, the Material 

Management and Minimization Office (M3) is working with 

commercial partners to accelerate the establishment of a 

reliable supply of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) in the United 

States, produced without HEU. The decay product of 

Mo-99, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), is used to diagnose heart 

disease and cancer, to study organ structure and function, 

and to perform other important medical applications. For 

example, patients undergoing a common procedure—the 

cardiac “stress test”—likely have benefited from Tc-99m.

Today Mo-99 is produced mainly in aging research reactors 

that in recent years have experienced an increased 

frequency of unplanned outages. Some of these outages 

have caused global Mo-99 supply shortages, in some cases 

forcing hospitals to delay critical patient treatment. With the 

planned shutdown of Canada’s NRU reactor—historically 

the United States’ largest supplier—in late 2016, NNSA 

has been working since 2009 to accelerate commercial 

production of Mo-99 in the United States by supporting a 

variety of innovative technologies that do not use HEU. 

NNSA is using cooperative agreements that provide up 

to $25 million in matching funds, based on a 50/50 costshare between NNSA and the U.S. commercial partners, 

to support the development of non-HEU-based Mo-99 

production. NNSA currently has cooperative agreements 

for three projects with two partners: Northstar Medical 

Radioisotopes and SHINE Medical Technologies. A key pillar 

of the program is NNSA’s technology-neutral approach, 

which recognizes that a successful solution to prevent a 

shortage of Mo-99 is more likely to be found through the 

parallel development of several production technologies. 

Northstar Medical Radioisotopes is developing both neutron 

capture and accelerator-based technologies, which will 

utilize NorthStar’s RadioGenixTM Tc-99m Generating System. 

NorthStar’s neutron capture technology will be based at 

the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) in 

Columbia, Missouri and will use molybdenum-98 (Mo-98) 

to capture neutrons produced in MURR. The additional 

neutrons create Mo-99 from Mo-98, as the atomic weight 

increases. 

Neutron Capture Technology

NorthStar’s accelerator-based technology will be based in 

Beloit, Wisconsin and will use an accelerator to bombard 

molybdenum-100 (Mo-100) with electrons, causing the 

Mo-100 to lose a neutron and become Mo-99. 

Accelerator-Based Mo-100 Technology

SHINE Medical Technologies is developing an accelerator 

technology with low enriched uranium (LEU) fission. SHINE’s 

accelerator technology hits a neutron against a uranium-235 

nucleus to break out Mo-99, among other fission products. 

SHINE’s accelerator technology is based in Janesville, 

Wisconsin.

Accelerator-Based LEU Fission Technology

Savannah Fitzwater was an NNSA Graduate Fellow in the 

Mo-99 program with DNN’s Office of Material Management and 

Minimization.

Neutron

The neutron is 

captured by a 

Uranium -235

nucleus.

 Neutrons and fission products are ejected,

Mo-99 is 6% of the fission products produced.

1

n

99Mo

Other Fission

Products

1

n

235U

4

He

2

H 3H

Deuterium Tritium

Deuterium and tritium ions are accelerated to 

produce a fusion reaction which ejects a 

neutron.
14

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Building Capacity to Support 

a Secure Nuclear Future

J

ordan is a key partner for the United States and DOE in reducing nuclear 

security risks in the Middle East. With Iraq and Iran to the east; Israel 

and Egypt to the west; Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey to the north; and 

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf of Aqaba to the south, Jordan sits at the center of 

Middle East geopolitical dynamics. Historically, Jordan has been a crossroads 

for trade and transit, putting it on the frontline for combatting illicit trafficking in 

the region. As a country that must import the majority of its energy resources, 

Jordan is including nuclear energy as part of a long-term solution to energy 

demands. Jordan is already well on its way to begin operations at its new 

research reactor by the end of 2015. 

DNN has cooperated with Jordan in building its capabilities in nuclear and 

radiological security for the past 10 years. This includes improving physical 

security measures at multiple facilities and deploying radiation detection 

systems at seaport and border crossing sites. DNN also has provided training 

courses and workshops for Jordanian participants both within the United 

States and in Jordan, covering topics such as physical protection of nuclear 

materials and nuclear facilities, drafting safeguards regulations, and handling 

samples and categorizing materials in the early stages of a nuclear forensics 

investigation.

Keep reading to learn more about specific collaborative activities where DNN 

has shared its expertise to help Jordan prevent nuclear proliferation and 

become a regional leader in nuclear security.

Commodity Identification Training and Tabletop Exercise

Jordanian border enforcement agencies understand the importance of 

recognizing legitimate commercial equipment and materials that also can be 

used in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—so-called 

dual-use items—as well as specific chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and explosives (CBRNe)-related commodities that can be used in improvised 

WMD devices. Recently, two NNSA programs worked collaboratively with the 

Government of Jordan to combine a Commodities Identification Training (CIT) 

workshop and a WMD counterterrorism tabletop exercise (TTX) into a training 

course, which was held in April 2015 at the Middle East Scientific Institute for 

Security (MESIS). Jordan Customs Department and other Jordanian security 

organizations, including the Armed Forces, Public Security Directorate, and 

General Intelligence Service, participated.

DNN’s Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, in coordination with the 

U.S. Department of State’s Office of Export Control Cooperation, began this 

combined training with its CBRNe version of the CIT training curriculum. 

country profile: jordan

Safeguards agreement 

in place with the 

International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA)

Additional Protocol in 

place with IAEA

Jordan Atomic Energy 

Commission (JAEC) 

established and 

charged with moving 

Jordan from a net 

energy importer to a 

net exporter 

Jordan Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission 

(JNRC) established

JNRC merged into 

the Energy and 

Minerals Regulatory 

Commission (EMRC) 

An IAEA review 

conducted upon 

Jordan’s invitation 

reported favorably 

on the country’s 

preparations for 

nuclear power

Anticipated completion 

of research and 

training reactor at 

Jordan University for 

Science & Technology; 

the reactor also will 

be used to produce 

medical isotopes

1978

1998

2007

2014

2015

Jordan’s 

Nuclear 

History 

in Brief

SAUDI

ARABIA

LEBANON

SYRIA IRAQ

West

Bank

ISRAEL

JORDAN

Golan

Heights

Gaza

Strip

EGYPT

Amman

Mediterranean Sea

Dead Sea

Gulf of Aqaba
15

CBRNe CIT workshops enhance law enforcement officials’ 

capacity to detect and interdict CBRNe commodities to 

prevent their use, particularly by non-state actors and 

terrorist organizations. Through technical presentations 

tailored for airport, seaport, and land border officers, subject 

matter experts from the Oak Ridge, Savannah River, and 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratories taught Jordanian 

officials to visually recognize material, equipment, and 

components required to develop and use CBRNe-based 

improvised devices. 

NNSA’s Office of Counterterrorism Policy and Cooperation 

led the second part of the course—the “Jordan Discovery” 

TTX. The TTX began with a review of the international 

and regional WMD terrorism threat and relevant national 

laws and international frameworks used to counter that 

threat. The TTX’s fictitious scenario involved three distinct 

“moves” of commodities covered in the CBRNe CIT 

workshop. Participants were challenged to identify “red 

flags” indicating illegal transport activity, recognize what 

was being transported, discuss agency lines of authority 

and interagency communication, and identify the country’s 

standard operating procedures to be followed during the 

interruption of a CBRNe-related terrorist plot. Participants 

appreciated that the workshop and TTX focused on 

preventing the assembly and use of an improvised WMD 

device, rather than how to respond after a detonation or 

harmful release has occurred.

Strengthening Jordan’s Regulatory Structure 

for Nuclear Security

In March 2015, DNN’s Nuclear Smuggling 

Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) 

Program and its Jordanian partners 

held a joint workshop to assess and 

strengthen Jordan’s regulatory framework 

with respect to material out of regulatory 

control (MORC). Participants represented 

multiple Jordanian agencies, including 

the Energy and Minerals Regulatory 

Commission (EMRC), Ministry of Interior, 

General Intelligence Directorate, the 

Jordan Atomic Energy Agency, Civil 

Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 

Public Security, as well as the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The workshop’s discussions and exercises focused on a 

cooperative approach to implementing the IAEA Nuclear 

Security Series guidance related to MORC. Sessions 

explained all IAEA Member States’ responsibilities to 

establish, implement, maintain, and sustain a nuclear 

security regime to protect persons, property, society, and the 

environment from the harmful consequences of a nuclear 

security event. Further emphasis centered on regulatory 

provisions that would provide competent authorities with 

administrative and enforcement powers, as well as sufficient 

and sustainable resources. 

Throughout the workshop, NSDD representatives 

emphasized the concept of a sustainable regulatory 

structure as a key component to any state’s nuclear 

security approach. Representatives from EMRC presented 

on Jordan’s regulatory framework and status of detection 

systems. Further conversations focused on having 

appropriate memoranda of understanding between the 

competent Jordanian authorities that define clear roles, 

responsibilities, and communications. Finally, smaller groups 

worked on identifying potential gaps in regulatory structures, 

enhancing interagency communications and coordination, 

and using available tools to evaluate regulations and conduct 

a gap analysis.

Contributions to this article were provided by Troy Wright, Shayne 

VanDyke, Kelly Bray, Laurel Cotton, and staff writers.

Participants in the working group meeting with Jordan, IAEA, and DOE/NNSA to 

strengthen Jordan’s regulatory framework for detection and response to materials out of 

regulatory control.

Country Profile: Jordan – Continued
16

FAQs: Reports Reflect the Evolving Nature of 

Nuclear Nonproliferation 

March 2015 saw the release of two reports focusing 

on DNN and its future challenges: Prevent, Counter, 

and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global 

Nuclear Threats (FY 2016–FY 2020), was released March 

23, and the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Report of 

the Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation was released on 

March 31. They are available through the NNSA and DOE 

websites at:

•	 http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/dnn/npcr

•	 http://energy.gov/seab/secretary-energy-advisoryboard-seab-task-force-nuclear-nonproliferation

The answers below address several of the frequently asked 

questions about the two reports.

Prevent, Counter, and Respond

Why is the document referred to as the NPCR Report? 

The report describes, in one document, the strategic 

approach and program activities that NNSA is taking to 

reduce global nuclear dangers. The “N” is used to show that 

this is an NNSA report. P-C-R is short-hand for “Prevent, 

Counter, and Respond,” the three strategic pathways 

that NNSA is using to organize and direct its nuclear 

nonproliferation and counter terrorism program planning.

What does Prevent, Counter, and Respond mean? 

The three missions describe the breadth of the NNSA 

approach to addressing nuclear threats across the nuclear 

threat spectrum:

1. Prevent non-state actors and additional countries from 

developing nuclear weapons or acquiring weaponsusable nuclear materials, equipment, technology, and 

expertise; and prevent non-state actors from acquiring 

radiological materials for a radiological threat device. 

2. Counter the efforts of both proliferant states and 

non-state actors to steal, acquire, develop, disseminate, 

transport, or deliver the materials, expertise, or 

components necessary for a nuclear or radiological 

threat device or the devices themselves.

3. Respond to nuclear or 

radiological terrorist acts, 

or accidental/unintentional 

incidents, by searching for 

and rendering safe threat 

devices, components, 

and/or radiological and 

nuclear materials, and by 

conducting consequence 

management actions 

following an event to save lives, protect property and 

the environment, and enable the provision of emergency 

services.

Was this report required by Congress? 

No, the report responds to Secretary of Energy Moniz’s 

request (as recommended by the Secretary of Energy 

Advisory Board’s Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation) for 

NNSA to articulate for the first time, in a single document, 

the NNSA program activities to reduce the threat of nuclear 

proliferation and nuclear terrorism. As such, the NPCR 

report serves as a companion piece to the DOE/NNSA 

annual Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which 

describes in detail the programs within the NNSA’s Weapons 

Activities appropriation account.

Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Report

What actions is DNN taking to address the 

recommendations in the final report?

For those recommendations focused on DNN activities, 

DNN has already responded to a number, such as:

•	 Creating the Prevent, Counter, and Respond report; 

•	 Establishing the DNN Science Council to improve 

integration of the National Labs, plants, and sites into 

DNN policy and planning; and 

•	 Standing up a Strategic Planning and Integration Office 

as part of the DNN office realignment implemented in 

January 2015, to manage the DNN-wide strategic planning and analysis that will allow DNN to better anticipate, 

and prepare for, evolving and emerging threats to 

nuclear nonproliferation and security.