U.S.DepartmentofJustice

Office oftheInspectorGeneral

Office of the Inspector General

August 2003

UNCLASSIFIED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A Review of the FBI’s Performance

in Deterring, Detecting, and

Investigating the Espionage Activities

of Robert Philip Hanssen
UNCLASSIFIED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

I. Introduction 

In this report, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) examines the performance of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) in deterring, detecting, and investigating the espionage 

of Robert Philip Hanssen, a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Hanssen's 

espionage began in November 1979 − three years after he joined the FBI − and 

continued intermittently until his arrest in February 2001, just two months 

before his mandatory retirement date. In addition to its management 

responsibility to detect espionage among its employees, the FBI is the lead 

agency for detecting and investigating espionage committed in the United 

States. 

Hanssen became an FBI agent in 1976. During his 25-year FBI career, 

he principally served in Soviet counterintelligence assignments in New York 

City and Washington, D.C. In the 1980s and 1990s, Hanssen held positions at 

FBI Headquarters and the State Department that gave him access to a broad 

range of highly sensitive counterintelligence and military information. On 

February 18, 2001, after a three-month investigation of Hanssen, he was 

arrested and charged with committing espionage on behalf of the KGB 

(Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the intelligence service of the former 

Soviet Union) and its successors. On July 6, 2001, Hanssen pled guilty to 

espionage charges pursuant to a plea agreement in which he agreed to 

cooperate with the U.S. government and submit to debriefings. On May 10, 

2002, Hanssen was sentenced to life imprisonment. 

Hanssen's espionage spanned three separate time periods: 1979-81, 

1985-91, and 1999-2001. Over more than 20 years, Hanssen compromised 

some of this nation's most important counterintelligence and military secrets, 

including the identities of dozens of human sources, at least three of whom

were executed. Hanssen gave the KGB thousands of pages of highly classified 

documents and dozens of computer disks detailing U.S. strategies in the event 

of nuclear war, major developments in military weapons technologies, 

information on active espionage cases, and many other aspects of the U.S. 

Intelligence Community's Soviet counterintelligence program. 

Shortly after Hanssen's arrest, the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence (SSCI) and the Attorney General asked the OIG to review the 

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FBI's performance in connection with the Hanssen case. This report details the 

results of the OIG's investigation. 

II. Summary of the OIG Investigation and Structure of the Report 

The OIG assembled a team of three Special Investigative Counsel, a 

project director, three OIG Special Agents, two analysts, and a consultant to 

conduct this review. The team reported directly to the Inspector General. 

The team obtained, reviewed, and analyzed more than 368,000 pages of 

material from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Justice 

Department, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the State Department. 

The team also conducted more than 200 interviews in 12 states and the District 

of Columbia. We interviewed Hanssen's former colleagues and supervisors at 

the FBI and State Department, as well as family, friends, and acquaintances 

who knew Hanssen throughout his life. We interviewed much of the 

operational hierarchy of the FBI's Intelligence/National Security Division 

(NSD) during the 1979 to 2001 period. In addition, we interviewed CIA and 

Justice Department personnel who had substantial involvement with the FBI 

regarding "penetration" matters − that is, investigating whether a foreign 

intelligence service has infiltrated or recruited agents within U.S. 

organizations. The team also interviewed Hanssen extensively. 

Our full 674-page report is classified at the Top Secret/Codeword level 

because it contains extremely sensitive classified information regarding sources 

involved in the Hanssen case and FBI counterintelligence activities. We also 

produced a 383-page report, classified at the Secret level, which does not 

contain the detailed information on the sensitive sources that is included in the 

Top Secret/Codeword version. In addition, we produced this 31-page 

unclassified executive summary to provide a public summary of the main 

findings in the more extensive classified reports. We previously provided a 

copy of all three reports to the FBI for its comments on their factual accuracy 

and classification, and we made changes where appropriate. 

In our reports, we divide Hanssen's FBI career into three phases that 

roughly correspond with the three periods of his espionage and with key FBI 

penetration-related efforts. One chapter is devoted to each phase, and within 

each chapter there are three parts: Hanssen's career, Hanssen's espionage, and 

the FBI's penetration efforts. 

Chapter One covers the time period between 1976, when Hanssen joined 

the FBI, and 1985, when he completed his first tour in the Soviet Analytical 

Unit at FBI Headquarters. This chapter also includes background information 

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concerning Hanssen's childhood, education, and employment prior to 

becoming an FBI agent. Hanssen's first espionage – conducted on behalf of the 

GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye, the Soviet Union's military 

intelligence arm) – took place between 1979 and 1981. The FBI's investigation 

of Soviet-related penetration leads during this time period was minimal. 

Chapter Two covers the time period between 1985 – when Hanssen 

became the supervisor of an FBI technical surveillance squad in New York and 

volunteered to the KGB – and 1992. Hanssen's FBI career progressed 

normally during these years, which also constituted his most active period of 

espionage. With respect to the penetration issue, both the CIA and the FBI 

suffered catastrophic and unprecedented losses of Soviet intelligence assets in 

1985 and 1986, which suggested that a mole was at work in the Intelligence 

Community. The FBI conducted several analytical efforts – including a major 

joint project with the CIA – that were unsuccessful at determining the cause of 

these compromises. 

Chapter Three begins in 1992 and ends with Hanssen's arrest in February 

2001. In January 1992, Hanssen became the Chief of the National Security 

Threat List Unit at FBI Headquarters, the highest ranking position he held at 

the FBI. Hanssen's failings as a supervisor and his inability to properly handle 

classified information led the FBI to remove Hanssen from his Unit Chief 

position, and he was subsequently detailed to the State Department as the FBI 

liaison to the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). He served for six years in the 

OFM, until shortly before his arrest. With respect to espionage, Hanssen made

a clumsy and aborted approach to the GRU in 1993 and then successfully revolunteered to the KGB in 1999. Hanssen's espionage – which during this 

period relied heavily on his improper use of the FBI's Automated Case Support 

(ACS) computer system − continued until his arrest in February 2001. 

The FBI's penetration-related investigations increased dramatically in the 

1992 to 2001 period. The FBI substantially increased the resources it devoted 

to the penetration issue and successfully identified and prosecuted several 

individuals who spied for Russia, including CIA officer Aldrich Ames. The 

most significant espionage investigation that the FBI pursued after the 1994 

arrest of Ames, however, was the search for the penetration of the U.S. 

Intelligence Community who was later determined to be Hanssen. The FBI 

believed early on that the mole worked at the CIA and subsequently pursued a 

lengthy investigation of a CIA employee. We now know that from the outset 

the FBI was focused on the wrong suspect at the wrong agency. 

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Chapter Four of our report examines deficiencies in the FBI's internal 

security that were apparent during our investigation of the Hanssen matter. 

This chapter discusses how flaws and deficiencies in the FBI's programs and 

policies concerning background reinvestigations, financial disclosures, 

polygraph examinations, computer security, classified document handling, and 

procedures for reporting and documenting security violations made it easier for 

Hanssen to commit espionage and more difficult for the FBI to detect him. It 

also describes the changes that have been made, or not made, to the FBI's 

internal security program since Hanssen's arrest in 2001. 

Lastly, Chapter Five summarizes our principal factual findings and sets 

forth our recommendations for changes in the FBI's counterintelligence and 

security programs. 

III. Principal Findings of the OIG Investigation 

In the following paragraphs, we summarize the report's principal findings 

concerning Hanssen's career at the FBI, his espionage, and the FBI's 

penetration-related efforts from 1978 to 2001. 

A. Hanssen's FBI Career 

During his 25 years with the FBI, Hanssen was a mediocre agent who 

exhibited strong technical abilities but had weak managerial and interpersonal 

skills. Despite his failings as a supervisor, Hanssen was on the FBI's 

promotional track for much of his FBI career, and he generally received 

average to favorable performance evaluations. While Hanssen's day-to-day 

behavior did not suggest that he was engaged in espionage, he continually 

demonstrated an unwillingness to properly handle classified information. His 

indiscretions and security violations were largely ignored and wholly 

undocumented, however, and he was allowed to remain in positions offering 

him broad access to highly sensitive counterintelligence information. 

Ultimately, Hanssen's inability to effectively interact with subordinates and 

colleagues derailed his FBI career. 

Hanssen received minimal supervision in most of his positions, was not 

required to produce significant work product, and had ample time to plan and 

commit espionage while on duty. Hanssen also encountered few security 

checks at the FBI. He was never asked to submit to a polygraph examination 

or to complete a financial disclosure form, and he received only one 

background reinvestigation during his 25-year FBI career. 

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To his FBI co-workers, Hanssen's personal life appeared completely 

inconsistent with that of a spy. He was married with six children, and appeared 

to be a devout Catholic who attended mass every day and who was actively 

involved in Opus Dei, a conservative Catholic lay organization. He also 

espoused politically conservative and anti-Communist views. Hanssen had no 

alcohol, drug, or gambling problems, and did not engage in ostentatious 

spending. 

Hanssen was an only child whose father, a lieutenant in the Chicago 

Police Department, emotionally abused him throughout his life. Starting from

a young age, Hanssen enjoyed spy-related entertainment, especially James 

Bond books and movies, collected items associated with espionage, such as a 

Walther PPK pistol, a Leica camera, a shortwave radio, and opened a Swiss 

bank account. Hanssen was an average student in college, majoring in 

chemistry. He drifted through dental school and business school − and became 

a certified public accountant − before joining the Chicago Police Department. 

After four years, Hanssen left the police department to join the FBI in January 

1976. 

Hanssen appeared to be an appropriate candidate for the FBI, in light of 

his college education, master's degree in business administration, experience as 

a certified public accountant, and service in the Chicago Police Department. 

The FBI's initial background investigation and interviews did not indicate that 

Hanssen was likely to commit espionage. While Hanssen came to the FBI with 

serious personal insecurities, low self-esteem, and a fascination with espionage, 

these characteristics did not emerge during the application process. 

Once in the FBI, Hanssen's personality traits set him apart from his FBI 

colleagues. He had poor interpersonal skills and a dour demeanor, and was an 

awkward and uncommunicative loner who conveyed a sense of intellectual 

superiority that alienated many of his co-workers. Early in his career, 

however, Hanssen demonstrated significant initiative and organizational skills, 

developing, for example, a case prioritization system that remains in use today 

at the FBI. He also had an interest in and aptitude for computer work that was 

highly unusual at the time, and a number of his early supervisors regarded him

as smart, technically proficient, and analytical. 

After graduation from the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, Hanssen 

served an initial two-year tour as a Special Agent in Gary, Indiana. While 

Hanssen sought out counterintelligence assignments in Gary, there was little 

such work available. At the end of his tour, Hanssen requested a transfer to the 

FBI's New York Office. Within six months of his arrival in New York, 

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Hanssen arranged to be transferred from a Criminal Division squad to Soviet 

counterintelligence work, which remained his assignment for most of his FBI 

career. Hanssen quickly began exploiting weaknesses in the FBI's internal 

information security. While still assigned to a Criminal Division squad in the 

FBI's New York Office, Hanssen took advantage of the unrestricted and 

unmonitored access to the closed file room and spent hours reading Soviet 

espionage files – without any conceivable "need to know" – managing to 

identify some of the FBI's most significant Soviet sources in the process. 

Hanssen − who appeared to have little aptitude for operational work −

demonstrated a strong interest in computers and in administrative assignments, 

and was given responsibility for managing the New York Office's

counterintelligence database, a position that put him at the center of the 

information flow. 

In the early 1980s, Hanssen served in the Budget Unit and in the Soviet 

Analytical Unit at FBI Headquarters − positions that provided him with broad 

access to sensitive information and an opportunity to use his technical and 

computer skills, but did not require operational work. Because the Budget Unit 

was responsible for preparing materials justifying the FBI's budget requests to 

Congress, Hanssen obtained access to sensitive information from all 

components of the Intelligence Division, and worked closely with the NSA and 

the CIA to secure joint funding for certain projects. In the Soviet Analytical 

Unit, Hanssen gained access to the FBI's most sensitive human assets and 

technical operations against the Soviet Union. He also began a noticeable 

pattern of mishandling classified information, primarily by disclosing the 

existence of Soviet sources and investigations to people with no "need to 

know," such as FBI employees in other divisions and personnel from other 

agencies. While Hanssen's tours in the Budget and Soviet Analytical Units 

showed that he was an intelligent, analytical agent with significant computer 

skills, his performance also revealed that he lacked the interpersonal skills to 

communicate effectively and perform supervisory duties. Nonetheless, 

Hanssen's career at the FBI continued to advance. 

In 1985, Hanssen returned to the New York Office as the supervisor of a 

technical surveillance squad. Hanssen was a lackadaisical manager who did 

not interact effectively with his subordinates. Because the squad largely "ran 

itself," however, Hanssen's limited interpersonal skills did not become a 

significant issue. Similarly, Hanssen's mishandling of classified information 

was obvious to his subordinates but was not brought to the attention of his 

superiors. 

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In 1987, Hanssen returned to the Soviet Analytical Unit in FBI 

Headquarters as a supervisor, a position that he told the OIG he found 

"overwhelmingly attractive" because of the extremely broad access to sensitive 

information it offered. Although Hanssen received very favorable performance 

evaluations during his second tour in the Unit, his supervisor regarded him as 

the "strangest person" he had ever worked with in the FBI − a "kind of cipher 

who was rigid, dour, and a religious zealot." As was the case during his first 

tour in the Unit, Hanssen produced little work product, and his subordinates 

regarded him as distant and arrogant. Shortly after his return to the Unit, 

Hanssen committed a serious security breach by disclosing sensitive 

information to a Soviet defector he was debriefing. Hanssen's colleagues 

recognized that he could not be trusted with highly sensitive information and 

informally attempted to restrict his access. Although this security breach was 

reported to an FBI supervisor, it was not documented, and no formal action 

was taken against Hanssen, whose access to sensitive information remained 

largely unchecked. 

In 1990, Hanssen became an Inspector's Aide in the Inspection Division, 

a position that was considered a prerequisite for advancement at the FBI. In 

this position, Hanssen traveled to FBI field offices to help rate their overall 

performance. In June 1991, Hanssen became a program manager in the Soviet 

Section at FBI Headquarters, where he supervised operational programs 

designed to counter Soviet efforts to acquire scientific and technical 

information. This assignment was brief and uneventful. 

In January 1992, Hanssen became chief of the National Security Threat 

List (NSTL) Unit, a new unit at FBI Headquarters that dealt with economic 

espionage, theft of trade secrets and critical technologies, and nuclear 

proliferation. This position required significant management skills and an 

ability to work effectively with the FBI's field offices, and Hanssen's 

deficiencies in these areas quickly became apparent. Hanssen's subordinates 

found him disinterested in the Unit's work and were frustrated by his failure to 

provide guidance and direction. Rather than engage in the daily work of the 

Unit, Hanssen frequently sat in his office listening to foreign language tapes for 

hours at a time. Hanssen also had poor relations with the FBI's field offices, 

which complained that he rejected an inordinately high percentage of their 

proposals for investigations. 

While in the NSTL Unit, Hanssen committed two serious and flagrant 

security breaches. First, he hacked into the FBI's computer system and 

accessed highly sensitive Soviet counterintelligence documents located on the 

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hard drives of his colleagues and supervisors in the National Security Division. 

Hanssen grew nervous about what he had done and decided to report it to FBI 

management in the guise of revealing a flaw in the FBI's computer security. 

Hanssen's ruse succeeded, and no one questioned his breach of computer 

security. Hanssen's second significant breach occurred when, in direct 

contravention of a decision made by FBI management, he disclosed to the 

British intelligence service information about a highly sensitive FBI 

investigation. At about this time, Hanssen also came under investigation by the 

FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility because of a physical altercation 

with a female FBI support employee. The investigation resulted in a letter of 

censure and a five-day suspension. The physical altercation, the improper 

disclosure to British intelligence, and Hanssen's poor performance in the NSTL 

Unit doomed his chances for further advancement at the Bureau. 

As part of an FBI-wide program in which Headquarters personnel were 

reassigned to FBI field offices, Hanssen was involuntarily removed from his 

position as NSTL Unit Chief in April 1994 and transferred to the FBI's 

Washington Field Office (WFO), where he was assigned to a computer squad 

in a non-supervisory capacity. While not an official demotion, Hanssen was no 

longer on the management track for higher supervisory positions at the Bureau. 

Hanssen largely ignored his new assignment in the field office and soon began 

seeking work at FBI Headquarters. For several months, Hanssen worked on 

computer-related projects for senior NSD officials. 

In late 1994, FBI management began considering Hanssen as a candidate 

to fill an FBI position in the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) at the State 

Department. OFM regulates selected activities of foreign missions in the

United States to protect U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, and 

also helps foreign missions protect their diplomats and facilities. Hanssen's 

FBI superiors saw the OFM liaison position as a good "out of the mainstream" 

job for Hanssen, a supervisory agent who had proven incapable of supervising 

others. Hanssen started at OFM in February 1995 and remained at the State 

Department for the next six years. 

Hanssen's work responsibilities at OFM consumed no more than a few 

hours a day, and he was wholly unsupervised by either State Department or 

FBI personnel. The job carried no significant operational or managerial 

responsibilities, and once Hanssen was at OFM, FBI management largely 

forgot about him. No one checked on him or his work – or even ensured that 

he was at work. No performance evaluations concerning Hanssen were 

completed during the entire six years that he served at OFM. Hanssen took full

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advantage of the light workload and complete lack of supervision, spending 

hours each day out of the office, surfing the Internet and watching movies on 

his personal laptop computer, and visiting friends and acquaintances. 

During Hanssen's detail to the State Department, the FBI provided him 

with a desktop computer that was connected to the FBI's ACS computer 

system. The ACS system gave Hanssen access to thousands of internal FBI 

classified documents for which he had no "need to know." To determine 

whether he was under investigation by the FBI, Hanssen also frequently 

searched the ACS system for references to his own name and address. In 

addition, he successfully mined the system for information concerning the 

FBI's most sensitive espionage investigations. While the ACS system had 

audit capability, Hanssen's improper searches went undetected because the FBI 

did not conduct audit trail reviews absent an allegation of wrongdoing. 

Hanssen continued to commit security violations while at the State 

Department. He improperly disclosed classified information to others – 

including NSA and State Department employees, close friends, and members 

of the press. Hanssen's most egregious security breach at OFM – an attempt to 

install password breaker software on his FBI computer – was discovered by the 

FBI's computer specialists, who documented the incident and referred it to the 

FBI's Security Programs Manager. Hanssen told the Security Programs 

Manager that he had installed the hacking program in order to connect to a 

color printer, however, and he suffered no negative consequences as a result of 

this misconduct. As with Hanssen's other security violations, nothing about the 

matter was recorded in either his personnel or security file. 

In late 2000, after the FBI received information identifying Hanssen as a 

Russian mole, the FBI offered him a Senior Executive Service position at FBI 

Headquarters, where he could be closely monitored. Hanssen was arrested on 

February 18, 2001. 

B. Hanssen's Espionage 

Hanssen was the most damaging spy in FBI history, and he betrayed 

some of this nation's most important counterintelligence and military secrets, 

including the identities of dozens of human assets, at least three of whom were 

executed. Hanssen committed espionage intermittently, starting and stopping 

several times during his 25-year FBI career. He engaged in three discrete 

periods of espionage − 1979-81, 1985-91, and 1999-2001 − and unsuccessfully

attempted to renew his espionage on behalf of the GRU in 1993. The reasons 

why Hanssen initially began committing espionage, and repeatedly returned to 

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it, are complex and, as we explain below, changed over time. Many of the 

factors that have motivated or influenced traitors in the past − such as greed, 

ideology, career disappointments and resentment, and drug and alcohol abuse −

do not apply to Hanssen or do not fully explain his conduct. 

Our review of the Hanssen case revealed that there was essentially no 

deterrence to espionage at the FBI during the 1979 to 2001 time period and that 

the FBI's personnel and information security programs presented few obstacles 

to Hanssen's espionage. His removal of hundreds of classified documents from

the FBI − including original and numbered Top Secret documents − and 

improper searches of the Bureau's computer system for references to himself 

and to the Bureau's most sensitive espionage investigations went unnoticed. 

Because of lax supervision, Hanssen felt free to conduct many of his 

espionage-related activities while on duty, including creating encryption 

devices for communicating with the Russians, servicing dead drops, and 

counting his cash payments from the Russians. These deficiencies in 

deterrence, detection, and supervision played a major role in Hanssen's 

willingness and ability to commit espionage over a more than 20-year period. 

1. First Period of Espionage: 1979 – 1981 

Hanssen first began spying for the Soviets in November 1979, just eight 

months after he transferred to a counterintelligence squad in the FBI's 

New York Office. While on duty, Hanssen volunteered his services to the 

GRU by delivering a package to a GRU officer at a Soviet trade organization. 

In his correspondence with the GRU, Hanssen revealed that he was an FBI 

agent, but offered no other identifying information. Over the next year and a 

half, Hanssen conducted clandestine exchanges with the GRU, receiving cash 

payments totaling at least $21,000. 

Hanssen's initial decision to commit espionage arose from a complex 

blend of factors, including low self-esteem and a desire to demonstrate 

intellectual superiority, a lack of conventional moral restraints, a feeling that he 

was above the law, a lifelong fascination with espionage and its trappings and a 

desire to become a "player" in that world, the financial rewards he would 

receive, and the lack of deterrence – a conviction that he could "get away with 

it." We believe that the personality flaws and background that Hanssen 

brought with him into the FBI likely played a more significant role in his 

decision to commit espionage than anything that happened to him after he 

became an agent. 

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Hanssen's first period of espionage ended in the spring of 1981, when his 

wife Bonnie inadvertently discovered him reviewing a GRU communication in 

the basement of their home. Although Hanssen minimized his espionage in 

discussions with his wife, he says that he confessed his espionage to an Opus 

Dei priest within days of Bonnie's discovery. According to Hanssen, the priest 

granted him absolution and told him that he did not have to turn himself in, but 

suggested that he donate the money he had received from the GRU to charity. 

Hanssen said that he broke off contact with the GRU and made multiple $1,000 

donations to Mother Teresa's "Little Sisters of the Poor." 

The most significant information that Hanssen passed during this period 

concerned the identity of a long-time FBI asset in the GRU. Hanssen's first 

period of espionage was less damaging to the U.S. intelligence effort than his 

next two periods of espionage. 

2. Second Period of Espionage: 1985 – 1991 

Hanssen remained a dormant spy from 1981 until October 1985, when he 

volunteered to the KGB, the Soviet Union's principal intelligence service. In 

his letter to the KGB's Washington Residency, Hanssen was careful to 

maintain his anonymity and did not disclose his prior espionage on behalf of 

the GRU. Using the alias "Ramon" or "Ramon Garcia," Hanssen provided the 

KGB with information concerning the Intelligence Community's most 

important Soviet counterintelligence and military secrets, much of which he 

had learned while assigned to the Soviet Analytical Unit. Although Hanssen 

was working in New York from September 1985 to August 1987, all of his 

operational espionage activity during this period took place in the Washington 

area. According to Hanssen, he chose to volunteer to the KGB because he 

believed it was more professional, had a longer-term outlook, and paid more 

money than the GRU. 

We believe that Hanssen's decision to resume espionage was motivated 

by many of the same factors at play in 1979. His obsession with espionage 

(which he referred to as an "addiction"), his lack of self-esteem and desire for 

recognition, his belief that he could commit espionage without being detected, 

and the lack of effective deterrence all played a role. The fact that Hanssen had 

done it before made it easier for him to do it again. Hanssen's return to 

espionage also was likely fueled by his knowledge that he had successfully 

evaded detection in the past and was in a position to demand a large payment 

from the Russians for the highly sensitive information he had obtained in the 

Soviet Analytical Unit. 

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During the next six years − the last stages of the Cold War − Hanssen 

delivered thousands of pages of highly classified documents and dozens of 

computer disks to the KGB detailing U.S. strategies in the event of nuclear 

war, major developments in military weapons technologies, identities of active 

and historical U.S. assets in the Soviet intelligence services, the locations of 

KGB defectors in the United States, analytical products from across the 

Intelligence Community, comprehensive budget and policy documents, and 

many other aspects of the Soviet counterintelligence program. He passed some 

of the most damaging information within his first two months of espionage, 

including the true names of the FBI's most significant Soviet sources at the 

time, KGB officers Sergey Motorin and Valeriy Martynov. Other significant 

operations that Hanssen compromised during this period included the FBI's 

espionage investigation of Felix Bloch, a senior State Department official 

suspected of providing information to the KGB, and an FBI analytical report 

regarding possible Soviet penetrations. 

Toward the end of Hanssen's second period of espionage, he became 

increasingly careless, passing documents that clearly marked him as an FBI 

employee. For example, when he was assigned to the Inspection Division, he 

gave the KGB FBI inspection reports and documents that he took from field 

offices while on inspection assignments. Hanssen also compromised Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap applications prepared by the FBI. 

In a particularly reckless move, Hanssen suggested to the KGB that it attempt 

to recruit Jack Hoschouer, Hanssen's closest friend, who was then serving as a 

military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn. 

Hanssen's second period of espionage contributed to the execution of at 

least three human sources − including Motorin and Martynov – and caused 

hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage to U.S. intelligence programs. 

In return, the KGB gave Hanssen cash payments of at least $500,000, as well 

as three diamonds. He stored the cash, as much as $100,000 at a time, in a 

gym bag in his bedroom closet. He also deposited large amounts of the KGB's 

money into a passbook savings account in his own name at a bank located a 

block from FBI Headquarters. While Hanssen has not accounted for much of 

the money he received from the KGB, it is clear that he spent some of it on an 

addition to his home, cars, tuition payments for his children's private schools, 

gifts, a loan to his brother-in-law, and at strip clubs. In late 1989, Hanssen 

began a year-long relationship with a stripper, Pricillia Sue Galey. Hanssen 

paid for Galey to accompany him on an FBI Inspection Division trip to Hong 

Kong, bought her a Mercedes Benz, provided her with an American Express 

card, and gave her jewels, cash, and other gifts. 

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In August 1990, Hanssen's brother-in-law, FBI Special Agent Mark 

Wauck, heard that Hanssen's wife Bonnie had found $5,000 in unexplained 

cash in Hanssen's dresser drawer. Wauck reported this and other incidents he 

found suspicious to a supervisor in the FBI's Chicago Field Office. Although 

Wauck and the supervisor now have significantly different recollections of 

their conversation, we believe that Wauck provided the supervisor with enough 

information to warrant some follow up. Instead, the supervisor readily 

dismissed Wauck's concerns, in part because there was no policy or procedure 

mandating that he pass the information on for analysis and possible 

investigation. This incident highlights deficiencies in the FBI's protocol for the 

receipt and investigation of derogatory information about an agent. There was 

no standard procedure for reporting and collecting such information, nor was 

there a central repository at the FBI responsible for collecting this information. 

After picking up a $12,000 KGB payment in December 1991, Hanssen 

again broke off contact with the Soviets. Hanssen told us that he took this 

action because of his increasing guilt and after confessing his espionage to 

Catholic priests. We are skeptical of this explanation, however, because 

Hanssen's decision to halt his espionage coincided with the fall of the Soviet 

Union, as well as with the initiation of a new FBI/CIA molehunt effort that 

Hanssen knew about. Both events increased the risk that Hanssen's espionage 

would be detected or disclosed. 

3. Unsuccessful Approach to the GRU: 1993 

A year and a half after breaking off contact with the KGB in late 1991, 

Hanssen made an awkward and unsuccessful attempt to reestablish contact 

with the GRU. The risks Hanssen took in approaching the GRU in 1993 far 

outweighed any he had taken during his first two periods of espionage. In 

July 1993, Hanssen approached a GRU officer in the garage of the officer's 

apartment building. Hanssen identified himself as an FBI agent, explained that 

he had worked for the KGB under the name Ramon Garcia, and tried to give 

the officer a package containing summaries of double agent cases that the FBI 

was running against the GRU. The GRU officer refused to accept the package, 

and then reported the approach to his superiors. The Russians filed a protest 

with the U.S. government − apparently believing that the approach had been an 

officially sanctioned provocation − and the FBI opened an investigation. 

Although Hanssen's approach to the GRU officer was reckless in a variety of 

ways, the FBI's investigation of this incident – which Hanssen monitored 

through the FBI's computer system − was unsuccessful. 

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Hanssen claimed that two factors motivated this approach to the GRU. 

First, he wanted an explanation as to why the GRU was still running double 

agent cases that he had previously compromised to the KGB. Second, he "felt 

pity" for the GRU and wanted to ensure that it knew which of its sources were 

actually double agents. Although Hanssen denied that this approach was 

motivated by a need for money, he sought funds from a wide variety of sources 

at about this time. Indeed, the day of the failed approach, Hanssen asked his 

mother for $10,000. In addition, even though Hanssen made this approach the 

day after his father died, he claimed not to remember the proximity of these 

two events during his debriefings and OIG interviews. 

Hanssen's 1993 approach to the GRU was remarkable for its recklessness 

and self-destructive quality. Unlike his prior periods of espionage, Hanssen 

had face-to-face contact with a Russian intelligence officer, asked other FBI 

employees to conduct computer searches concerning this officer, and 

demonstrated virtually no regard for his personal security. Hanssen told the 

OIG that when the approach failed, it "shocked [him] back out of that mental 

state." 

4. Third Period of Espionage: 1999 – 2001 

In 1999, Hanssen revolunteered to the KGB. Over the next two years, 

Hanssen provided the Russians with information concerning some of the FBI's 

most significant KGB sources and most sensitive espionage investigations. 

Hanssen had obtained most of this information from improper searches of the 

FBI's ACS computer system. As with his second period of espionage, Hanssen 

used the pseudonym "Ramon Garcia" and communicated through dead drop 

exchanges, but passed many documents that were unmistakably FBI products. 

Hanssen's decision to resume espionage in 1999 was driven by two factors: 

(1) his discovery – through the ACS system – of the FBI's effort to identify a 

significant KGB mole believed to be a CIA officer; and (2) his deteriorating 

finances. 

While searching the ACS system in the spring of 1999, Hanssen 

stumbled upon the FBI's most significant ongoing Russian espionage 

investigation. This case was a search for the KGB mole who turned out to be 

Hanssen. At the time, however, the FBI's investigation was focused on a CIA 

officer. Although the FBI did not intend for documents related to this highly 

sensitive investigation to be uploaded into the ACS system − because of 

widespread concerns about the system's security − many such documents were 

uploaded due to failures in training, simple human error, and insufficient 

14 
concern about maintaining operational security. Within a day of discovering 

the existence of the investigation, Hanssen obtained the CIA suspect's true 

name. Hanssen decided to warn the KGB about the investigation and thereby 

"save" the CIA suspect. Hanssen also stated that the case offered him all of the 

"excitement" and "stimulation" from espionage that he craved. 

At the same time, Hanssen's financial situation was the worst it had ever 

been. Although Hanssen was close to the top of the FBI pay scale, his 

spending continually outstripped his income. He had significant credit card 

debts, car loans, bank loans, and tuition payments for his children. While 

Hanssen's mother had previously supplemented his income, giving him more 

than $94,000 in the mid-1990s, she told Hanssen in 1997 that she was running 

out of money. Hanssen claimed that he set a goal of obtaining approximately 

$100,000 from the KGB, believing that this amount would stabilize his 

finances, at least until he retired from the FBI and entered the private sector. 

When Hanssen reestablished contact with the KGB in July 1999, he did 

so as "Ramon Garcia." Hanssen indicated that he needed money and provided 

a communications plan using a drop site from his second period of espionage. 

In August 1999, the KGB paid Hanssen $50,000. Over the next year, Hanssen 

made several attempts to pass information through dead drop exchanges, but 

the KGB failed to retrieve his packages. Accordingly, Hanssen resorted to 

mailing the KGB a disk and a letter which provided the true names of several 

individuals under investigation for espionage, as well as information 

concerning two FBI assets in the Russian intelligence services and two 

significant FBI technical operations. Hanssen's last successful dead drop 

exchange occurred in November 2000, when he gave the KGB a large stack of 

classified documents from the ACS system that he had been collecting for over 

a year. 

In late 2000, the FBI identified Hanssen as a spy and lured him back to 

FBI Headquarters – where he could be more easily monitored − with the offer 

of a temporary Senior Executive Service position involving computer security. 

Hanssen began his new position on January 13, 2001. On February 12, 2001, 

the FBI discovered a package containing $50,000 that the KGB had left for 

Hanssen in a dead drop site. Six days later, on February 18, 2001, after 

Hanssen had left a package for the KGB in a different dead drop site, he was 

arrested and charged with espionage offenses. 

Although Hanssen escaped detection for more than 20 years, this was not 

because he was a "master spy." While Hanssen took some important steps to 

maintain his security − such as refusing to reveal his identity to his Russian 

15 
handlers − and used his knowledge of the FBI's counterintelligence practices 

and poor internal security to his advantage, much of Hanssen's conduct when 

committing espionage was reckless. For example, Hanssen (1) set up an FBI 

camera on a drop site he used for exchanges with the GRU during his first

period of espionage; (2) used an FBI telephone line and answering machine for 

communications with the KGB in 1986; (3) deposited much of the KGB's cash 

directly into a passbook savings account in his name in the late 1980s; 

(4) suggested to his Russian handlers in 1991 that they attempt to recruit Jack 

Hoschouer, his best friend; (5) directly approached a GRU officer in 1993 and 

revealed that he was an FBI agent who had previously committed espionage for 

the KGB – an approach that led to a diplomatic protest from the Russians and 

an FBI investigation that could have identified Hanssen as a mole; and 

(6) searched the FBI's computer system, during his last period of espionage, for 

references to his own name, address, and drop and signal sites – conduct that 

would have been difficult to explain if the FBI had utilized the computer 

system's audit feature. In sum, Hanssen escaped detection not because he was

extraordinarily clever and crafty, but because of longstanding systemic 

problems in the FBI's counterintelligence program and a deeply flawed FBI 

internal security program. 

C. FBI Analytical and Investigative Penetration Efforts: 1978 −

2001 

The FBI's penetration efforts in the late 1970s and 1980s suffered from a 

lack of cooperation with the CIA and from inattention on the part of senior 

management. In 1985 and 1986, the CIA and FBI lost nearly every significant 

human asset then operating against the Soviet Union. These losses were 

unprecedented in scope, quantity, significance, and timing, yet the FBI 

undertook no sustained effort to determine their cause. Senior management 

was almost entirely unaware of the scope and significance of these losses, and 

throughout the 1980s the FBI failed to work cooperatively with the CIA to 

resolve the cause of these losses or to thoroughly investigate whether an FBI 

mole could be responsible for these setbacks. We now know that Hanssen 

compromised many of the assets and operations lost during the mid-1980s. 

The early 1990s saw significant improvement in FBI/CIA cooperation, 

with the two agencies undertaking a joint investigation concerning the cause of 

the 1985-86 asset losses. The FBI drastically increased the number of squads 

and personnel devoted to espionage investigations, and the FBI's senior 

management took a much more active role in supervising penetration 

investigations. The energized penetration efforts led to successful espionage 

16 
prosecutions of CIA officers Aldrich Ames and Harold Nicholson, FBI Special 

Agent Earl Pitts, and NSA detailee David Boone. While the FBI worked 

closely with the CIA's Special Investigations Unit (SIU) on most of these 

cases, the SIU was not an equal partner. The FBI's failure to keep the CIA 

apprised of information concerning non-CIA espionage investigations – such 

as the case involving FBI agent Earl Pitts – undermined the effort to identify 

Hanssen. 

In attempting to identify the mole who turned out to be Hanssen, the FBI 

intensively pursued a CIA suspect. This investigation culminated in the 

submission of a report to the Justice Department that appeared to seek the 

prosecution of that CIA suspect, despite the fact that some senior FBI 

managers had serious reservations about the conclusions of the report and 

doubted whether the officer – who has since been exonerated by the FBI − was 

the correct target. 

Although the FBI pursued penetration leads in the 1990s that we now 

know related to Hanssen, he received no investigative scrutiny until late 2000. 

Indeed, the FBI never opened even a preliminary inquiry on any FBI employee 

in connection with the search for the mole ultimately identified as Hanssen. 

This was true even though the FBI had access to information suggesting that 

the mole might be an FBI employee, and believed that the mole had 

compromised certain FBI assets and operations. 

Longstanding systemic problems in the FBI's counterintelligence 

program played an important role in the FBI's failure to uncover Hanssen. 

Most importantly, the FBI demonstrated a reluctance to consider itself as a 

possible source for a penetration in the absence of leads identifying a specific 

FBI target. Thus, the FBI maintained a focus on the CIA as the mole's

employer despite information indicating that the mole might be an FBI 

employee. 

Ineffective oversight by FBI management and poor coordination with the 

Justice Department also contributed to the length of the FBI's investigation of 

the wrong suspect and the failure to pursue alternative avenues. The FBI 

managers with supervisory authority over the investigation often deferred to 

line personnel – even when the managers harbored serious doubts about the 

progress of the investigation – resulting in a tacit endorsement of erroneous 

analysis and conclusions. This problem was compounded by the FBI's poor 

coordination with the Justice Department components responsible for 

overseeing intelligence investigations − the Office of Intelligence Policy and 

Review (OIPR) and the Criminal Division's Internal Security Section (ISS). 

17 
Because the FBI did not provide the Justice Department with complete 

information about its investigation – omitting crucial information about 

weaknesses in proof and investigative setbacks – the Justice Department could 

not properly evaluate the strength of the FBI's case against the CIA suspect. 

1. Ad Hoc Analytical and Investigative Efforts from the 1970s 

to 1993 

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the FBI investigated several source reports 

of Soviet penetrations of the FBI and CIA. None of the leads from this time 

period appears to have any connection to Hanssen's espionage. 

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the FBI's response to learning that an 

important FBI Soviet asset was compromised or to receiving information 

indicating that a human penetration was at work was often to create an ad hoc 

team to examine the issue. These efforts were typically analytical rather than 

investigative. While each study considered the possibility of an FBI mole, 

none involved an actual investigation of this issue, and none resulted in an 

investigation being opened on a specific FBI employee. Likewise, none of 

these efforts concluded that a penetration of the FBI was responsible for the 

ongoing compromises that the FBI's Soviet program experienced from the mid1980s to early 1990s. 

In late 1986, the FBI learned that its two most significant Soviet assets – 

KGB officers Motorin and Martynov – had been arrested for espionage within 

the previous year. This appears to be the first notice the FBI received 

concerning compromises attributable to Hanssen, who we now know 

compromised both assets in October 1985, confirming information that CIA 

officer Aldrich Ames had provided to the KGB in June 1985.

After learning that its two most important KGB assets had been arrested, 

the FBI formed a six-person task force to determine how they had been 

compromised and whether an FBI mole was responsible. In the course of its 

review, the Task Force discovered that because of poor document controls and 

violations of the "need to know" principle it was impossible to determine who 

within the FBI had had access to the Motorin and Martynov cases. 

Accordingly, no FBI employee with knowledge of these assets was 

investigated. Nonetheless, in September 1987 the Task Force issued a final 

report stating that there was no evidence of a Soviet spy in the FBI. The Task 

Force, however, did not resolve how the assets had been compromised. 

During the Task Force effort, the FBI learned that the CIA had likewise 

suffered catastrophic and unprecedented losses in its Soviet program. Yet, the 

18 
FBI failed to work cooperatively with the CIA to resolve the cause of these 

losses. 

Between 1987 and 1991, the FBI suffered continuing losses of Soviet 

human assets and technical operations that it could not explain. During this 

period, the FBI conducted two analytical studies that considered the 

penetration issue, but neither study led the FBI to investigate the possibility of 

an FBI mole. The first study was a two-year effort aimed at resolving 

historical allegations of an FBI penetration. The project proceeded 

chronologically, and by late 1988 the team had analyzed leads only from the 

1950s and 1960s. In an interim report, the team concluded that two 

penetrations of the FBI existed before 1964, but the team never reached the 

time period relevant to the FBI's more recent and unprecedented losses. The 

project was abandoned in the summer of 1989. 

The second study systematically examined more than 50 FBI operations 

that had been compromised since 1986, including human assets, technical 

operations, double agent programs, and recruitment operations. The final 

report, issued in November 1988, described the continuing, across-the-board 

problems within the FBI's Soviet operations, but was equivocal with respect to 

the possibility of an FBI mole. The report suggested that a CIA penetration 

was a more likely explanation for the FBI's losses. We now know that Hanssen 

compromised most of the significant operations discussed in the report. 

In 1991, the FBI and the CIA formed the SIU, which was directed to 

analyze the numerous FBI and CIA cases lost after 1985 and to prepare a list of 

suspects who could account for the losses. Simultaneously, the FBI created a 

new investigative squad at WFO to pursue investigative leads generated by the 

SIU and, in the meantime, to reanalyze many of the same FBI compromises 

and penetration leads considered during the FBI's earlier analytical efforts. By 

the end of 1992, after reviewing numerous FBI and CIA historical 

compromises without any investigative progress, the squad began to disband 

while awaiting new leads from the SIU. 

While the SIU obtained compelling evidence that CIA officer Aldrich 

Ames was a Russian mole and was likely responsible for many of the 

compromises at issue, the team's March 1993 final report merely stated that 

there was a KGB penetration in the CIA who began his espionage in 1985. 

The report failed to highlight Ames as a suspect worthy of special investigative 

attention. Instead, Ames was presented simply as one of 40 CIA employees 

who had access to the Soviet operations compromised in the 1985-86 period. 

The report did not include a comparable list of FBI employees. Although the 

19 
SIU's final report raised the possibility of a KGB penetration of the FBI, the 

team did not undertake or recommend any meaningful action concerning this 

possibility. 

2. Penetration Investigations and the Search for Hanssen: 

1993 − 2001 

The years between 1993 and 2001 marked one of the most active and 

productive periods for espionage investigations in the FBI's history. The FBI 

greatly expanded its counterespionage effort and successfully apprehended a 

number of significant Russian spies. This period was dominated, however, by 

the search for a KGB mole who was reportedly more damaging than Ames. 

The FBI poured enormous resources into this search. The FBI believed early 

on, however, that the mole was a CIA employee and did not change that view. 

We now know that the FBI was on the wrong track from the beginning, 

because the mole the FBI was looking for was Hanssen, an FBI employee. 

As the investigation unfolded, the FBI focused on a specific CIA 

employee. Given the information it had at the time, the FBI's initial selection 

of this CIA employee as the lead suspect was understandable. Although an 

extensive investigation of this CIA suspect failed to yield any conclusive 

evidence of espionage, the FBI became convinced that he was a KGB mole. 

This was due in part to the suspect's ambiguous and sometimes suspicious 

behavior and in part to a belief that this individual had emerged as the lead 

suspect as the result of an objective and scientific process. Despite its lack of 

success in the investigation, the FBI, in a 70-page Investigative Report, 

informed the Justice Department that the CIA suspect was a significant KGB 

mole, and sought an opinion as to whether he could be prosecuted for 

espionage. 

The FBI should have seriously questioned its conclusion that the CIA 

suspect was a KGB spy and considered opening different lines of investigation. 

The squad responsible for the case, however, was so committed to the belief 

that the CIA suspect was a mole that it lost a measure of objectivity and failed 

to give adequate consideration to other possibilities. In addition, while FBI 

management pressed for the investigation to be completed, it did not question 

the factual premises underlying it. Similarly, the CIA's SIU did not serve as an 

effective counterbalance to the FBI, because it was not an equal partner in the 

molehunt. 

The supervisory failures in connection with the espionage investigation 

of the CIA suspect are most apparent in the context of the Investigative Report 

20 
that the FBI presented to the Justice Department. Although several senior FBI 

managers had serious doubts that the CIA suspect was the correct target, and 

expected the Justice Department to decline prosecution for a lack of evidence, 

the Investigative Report was written as if the FBI had no doubt that the CIA 

suspect was a KGB mole who was the most damaging spy since Ames. 

Fortunately, the Justice Department never brought charges against the 

CIA suspect, because while prosecutors were reviewing the case the FBI 

determined that Hanssen was in fact the KGB mole. In late 2000, the FBI 

opened an investigation of Hanssen, and on February 18, 2001, he was arrested 

for espionage. The FBI later exonerated the CIA suspect. 

IV. Summary of the FBI's Security Programs During Hanssen's Career 

The Hanssen case highlighted significant, longstanding deficiencies in 

the FBI's internal security program, many of which were brought to the 

attention of FBI management over the years but were not corrected. 

Historically, the FBI has not been in compliance with Executive Orders, Justice 

Department regulations, and Intelligence Community standards regarding 

internal security. Although we found that the FBI has taken many important 

steps to improve its internal security program since Hanssen's arrest −

including the implementation of a counterintelligence-focused polygraph 

examination program, the development of a financial disclosure program, and 

the creation of a Security Division − some of the most serious weaknesses still 

have not been fully remedied. These weaknesses expose the FBI to the risk of 

future serious compromises by another mole. 

Before Hanssen's arrest, the FBI's security program was based on trust. 

Rather than taking the sort of proactive steps adopted by other Intelligence 

Community components – such as requiring regular counterintelligence 

polygraph examinations, financial disclosures, and meaningful background 

reinvestigations, and utilizing audit functions regarding computer usage – the 

FBI trusted that its employees would remain loyal throughout their careers. 

The Hanssen case shows the danger of that approach. 

In our review, we observed serious deficiencies in nearly every aspect of 

the FBI's internal security program, from personnel security, to computer 

security, document security, and security training and compliance. These 

deficiencies led to the absence of effective deterrence to espionage at the FBI 

and undermined the FBI's ability to detect an FBI mole. Moreover, the absence 

of deterrence played a significant role in Hanssen's decision to commit 

espionage. As he explained during debriefings: "[I]f I had thought that the risk 

21 
of detection was very great, I would never have done it." Hanssen also 

exploited many of these weaknesses – particularly in document and computer 

security – to pass sensitive information to the KGB. 

With respect to personnel security, Hanssen was never subject to a wide 

variety of basic security techniques and procedures that could have deterred or 

perhaps uncovered his espionage. For example, Hanssen was never asked to 

submit to a polygraph examination during his 25-year FBI career, despite his 

extraordinarily broad access to extremely sensitive human and technical 

intelligence information from across the Intelligence Community. After 

Ames's 1994 arrest, FBI National Security Division managers argued for an 

aperiodic, random polygraph program, but the FBI's most senior management 

rejected that request, largely because of concerns regarding false positives. 

Hanssen's arrest in 2001 finally prodded the FBI to make a polygraph 

examination part of the standard five-year background reinvestigation. 

According to the FBI, by June 2003 it had also expanded its polygraph 

program by implementing aperiodic, random polygraph examinations. 

Hanssen likewise was never asked to complete a detailed financial 

disclosure form during his FBI career. During our interviews, Hanssen 

identified meaningful financial disclosure as the security technique that would 

have provided the greatest deterrence to his espionage. As it was, Hanssen felt 

comfortable depositing thousands of dollars of the KGB's cash in a passbook 

savings account – listed in his own name – at a bank located a block away from

FBI Headquarters. He also safely invented stories about family wealth and 

successful investments to explain his spending. The FBI reported in July 2003 

that a financial disclosure program "will be implemented within the next 

month." Given that financial gain is often an important motive for committing 

espionage, developing a credible financial disclosure program is a critical 

element in improving the FBI's personnel security with respect to both 

deterrence and detection. 

Hanssen received his first – and only – background reinvestigation in 

1996, 20 years after he had joined the FBI. The FBI has conceded that a 

number of "red flags" emerged during Hanssen's reinvestigation that were not 

resolved. The FBI's perfunctory background reinvestigation of Hanssen was 

not atypical, however. The system in place for background reinvestigations 

discouraged thoroughness. The principal investigators were not given access 

to the necessary source materials, such as the employee's personnel file, 

security file, and credit reports, and they primarily interviewed references 

supplied by the employee. They did not interview the employee. Moreover, 

22 
the principal investigators merely collected information; they were not required 

to provide analysis or to make investigative recommendations. As a result, 

information developed through background reinvestigations received little 

analysis. 

In committing espionage, Hanssen exploited serious weaknesses in the 

FBI's document and information security. His access to classified national 

security information – for both hard copies and computer files – was subject to 

little control or monitoring throughout his FBI career. As a result, he walked 

out of the FBI with copies and originals of some of the U.S. government's most 

sensitive classified material – including numbered Top Secret documents – 

with little fear of being stopped or detected. The FBI's inability to account for 

its most sensitive documents and failure to limit this information to those with 

a "need to know" has been noted both by the OIG and by the FBI's internal 

reviews in the past, but remains uncorrected. This deficiency is significant 

with respect to both deterrence and detection, because the FBI's inability to 

account for its most sensitive documents makes an access-based investigation 

for an FBI mole extremely difficult to pursue. The starting point for any such 

investigation is a list of those employees who had access to a compromised 

operation; at the FBI, that determination is often impossible to make. 

During his last period of espionage, Hanssen used the FBI's ACS 

computer system to track the FBI's most sensitive espionage investigations – 

including the investigation that was looking for him. Hanssen also routinely 

searched the system for references to his own name and home address, and to 

the signal and drop sites that he used, to assure himself that he was not under 

investigation. Hanssen conducted thousands of searches for highly sensitive 

information that he had no conceivable "need to know," without fear that a 

computer audit would reveal his misconduct. As with his record of cash 

deposits, it would have been difficult for Hanssen to invent an innocent

explanation for his repeated searches regarding his name, address, and signal 

and drop sites. Even more significantly, an audit of Hanssen's ACS activity 

would have identified him as someone worthy of investigation. 

The serious security flaws in the FBI's ACS system – which have been 

discussed in prior OIG reviews and internal FBI inspection reports – have been 

apparent since the system's inception in 1995, but have not been remedied. 

Access restrictions are subject to ready override by Headquarters personnel 

who, like Hanssen, have no "need to know" about the sensitive operations the 

access restrictions are designed to protect. The system is likewise prone to 

human error, with documents concerning highly sensitive operations – such as 

23 
the Hanssen investigation – being made available to any curious user because 

of improper uploading or inadequate restriction codes. The ACS system's audit 

function, mandated by Justice Department regulations and a principal tool 

against unauthorized usage as well as espionage, was rarely utilized before 

Hanssen's arrest. 

Today, more than two years after Hanssen's arrest, the ACS system

remains insecure and vulnerable to misuse. The current audit program relies 

on case agent review rather than third-party auditing. Moreover, the program

has only retroactive effect; case agents do not receive real-time notice when 

someone seeks unauthorized access to their cases. The "need to know" 

principle is not adequately applied in the computer context within the 

Counterintelligence Division; all Headquarters Counterintelligence Division 

agents have access to all cases in the Division whether or not their section or 

unit is connected to the case. Finally, the system's susceptibility to human 

error has not been remedied. In response to the OIG's findings regarding the 

ACS system, the FBI reported in July 2003 that "attempting technical changes 

to improve ACS security would not be a smart business decision" in light of 

plans to implement a new automated case system known as the Virtual Case 

File (VCF). The FBI stated that the first delivery of VCF is scheduled for 

December 2003. In developing and implementing VCF, it is vital for the FBI 

to rectify the types of security flaws that have been evident in the ACS system 

for many years. 

The FBI's lax approach to personnel and information security also was 

apparent in its handling of security violations. Hanssen's career was replete 

with security breaches, none of which were documented in his personnel or 

security file or (with one exception) reported to the FBI's Office of 

Professional Responsibility, the Security Programs Manager, the NSD's 

Security Countermeasures Section, the Justice Department Security Officer, or 

any other central location for review and consideration of appropriate 

disciplinary action. While these security breaches did not necessarily show 

that Hanssen was engaged in, or was predisposed to engage in, espionage, they 

demonstrated that he was unfit to have access to sensitive information. Our 

review revealed unwillingness within the FBI to report security violations and 

take them seriously, even when highly sensitive information was involved. 

The Hanssen case also highlighted the absence of a centralized reporting 

program for security violations at the FBI, as well as the absence of a unit at 

FBI Headquarters responsible for collecting derogatory information concerning 

FBI employees, particularly in the counterintelligence context. In July 2003, 

the FBI reported that a security incident program had been instituted that will 

24 
be managed by a new Security Compliance Unit. According to the FBI, the 

Security Division and the Counterintelligence Division will meet on a monthly 

basis to discuss counterintelligence-related issues. 

Many of the security issues that emerged from our review of the Hanssen 

case stem from deficiencies in training. For example, FBI personnel specialists 

responsible for employee background reinvestigations did not have the 

necessary analytical training to assess issues that commonly arise during 

background investigations. FBI employees using the ACS system did not have 

sufficient knowledge and training to use the security controls that were built 

into the system to regulate access to sensitive cases. FBI employees were not 

knowledgeable regarding the requirements for handling classified materials, 

particularly at the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level. And 

employees and supervisors were not properly trained in how to report and 

document security violations. We believe that the FBI will not see significant 

improvement in its internal security until its employees are better trained on 

security issues. 

In sum, the absence of adequate security controls at the FBI made 

espionage too easy for Hanssen to commit. Because of inadequate document 

security, he felt comfortable removing thousands of pages of classified 

documents from FBI offices. Because of lax controls over even the most 

sensitive information and violations of the "need to know" principle, he knew 

that he could compromise the FBI's most important Soviet/Russian assets and 

operations with little risk that the loss of these cases would be traced to him. 

Because of inadequate computer security, he felt free to conduct thousands of 

searches on the ACS system for references to himself and for information 

concerning the FBI's most sensitive counterintelligence cases. Because of the 

absence of financial disclosure, he felt comfortable depositing thousands of 

dollars in espionage proceeds into his bank accounts. Because of the absence 

of polygraph examinations for onboard employees, he never had to confront 

the issue of what would happen when he failed polygraph questions aimed at 

determining whether he was or had ever been an agent of a foreign power. 

And because of a flawed and inadequate background reinvestigation program, 

he never had to fear that the FBI would uncover spending and other behavior 

inconsistent with his position at the FBI. 

The defects in the FBI's security program were the product of decades of 

neglect. Historically, FBI management did not allot sufficient resources to 

security and rejected internal recommendations – for example, in the polygraph 

area – to make necessary improvements to the program. As a consequence, 

25 
following Hanssen's arrest, the FBI faced enormous challenges in the areas of 

personnel, computer, and document security. While the FBI has made progress 

in many of these areas, in others – particularly computer security – problems

have not been fully remedied and significant work still needs to be done. The 

FBI's Security Division must receive appropriate resources and support to 

ensure that the security program is significantly improved. 

V. The Failure to Deter and Detect Hanssen's Espionage 

The FBI's failure to deter and detect Hanssen's espionage over a more 

than 20-year period cannot be attributed to any individual FBI employee or 

small group of FBI supervisors. In addition, it is important to note that the 

agents and analysts who conducted the FBI's penetration investigations were 

extremely dedicated and hard-working, and demonstrated an impressive 

commitment to the counterintelligence mission. Their work produced many 

successes. 

At the same time, we found overarching problems in the FBI's internal 

security efforts. Most of the deficiencies discussed in our report are of 

longstanding vintage and reflect the cumulative decisions of many FBI 

employees, including the Directors and senior managers who failed to remedy 

serious flaws in the FBI's personnel, document, and information security

programs; the Directors and senior managers who failed to devote sufficient 

resources and attention to the penetration issue in the 1980s and early 1990s, 

and failed to resolve how important FBI human sources and operations had 

been compromised; the unwillingness of line personnel working on the 

espionage investigation of the CIA suspect to reconsider initial conclusions and 

judgments in the face of investigative failures, and senior managers' failure to 

insist that they be revisited; the failure of senior managers to ensure that 

accurate information was supplied to the Justice Department concerning the 

investigation of the CIA suspect; the supervisors and colleagues who ignored 

Hanssen's pattern of security violations and his obvious lack of suitability for 

handling sensitive information; and the managers who provided such lax 

supervision of Hanssen that he was able to spend much of his time on nonwork related matters, or worse, committing espionage. These were widespread 

failings. 

We believe that what is needed at the FBI is a wholesale change in 

mindset and approach to internal security. The FBI must recognize and take 

steps to account for the fact that FBI employees have committed espionage in 

the past and will likely do so in the future. A unit at the FBI must be 

responsible for asking every day whether there is evidence that the FBI has 

26 
been penetrated, and the FBI's internal security program must shift from a 

program relying on trust to a program based on deterrence and detection. The 

following 21 recommendations are concrete steps the FBI should take to 

improve its internal security and ability to deter and detect espionage in its 

midst.

VI. Recommendations 

A. Improving the FBI's Performance in Detecting an FBI 

Penetration 

Recommendation No. 1: New Penetration Unit at FBI Headquarters

A specialized permanent unit should be created within the Counterespionage 

Section at FBI Headquarters dedicated to determining whether the FBI has 

been penetrated. This Unit would be responsible for, among other things, 

analyzing relevant source information, resolving how compromised assets and 

operations were lost, and reviewing operations that lost their productivity or 

effectiveness for no apparent reason, all with a view towards determining 

whether the Bureau has been penetrated. 

Recommendation No. 2: Senior Operational Post for Intelligence 

Community Representative in FBI Counterespionage Section

The FBI should create a senior operational position in the Counterespionage 

Section at FBI Headquarters that will be filled – on a rotating basis − by senior 

executives from the CIA and other components of the Intelligence Community. 

B. Improving Coordination with the Justice Department 

Recommendation No. 3: Criminal Division Involvement in

Counterintelligence Investigations

Department of Justice Criminal Division personnel should be full participants 

in counterintelligence investigations once suspicion has focused on a specific 

individual. 

Recommendation No. 4: More Substantive Role for OIPR Attorneys

OIPR attorneys should have a larger oversight role in ensuring the accuracy 

and fairness of factual assertions in FISA applications and have direct access to 

the case agent and the source information relied on in the application. 

27 
C. Improving Source Recruitment, Security, and Handling 

Recommendation No. 5: Greater Emphasis on and Resources for New

Source Recruitment

The FBI should place greater emphasis on and provide more resources for 

targeting and recruiting intelligence officers in hostile intelligence services 

who are likely to have knowledge of penetrations of the Intelligence 

Community. 

Recommendation No. 6: Stricter Standards for Handling and Tracking 

Sensitive Information from Significant Human Sources

The FBI should adopt stricter standards for handling and tracking sensitive 

information from significant human sources and should enforce the "need to 

know" policy in disseminating information from such sources. The FBI should 

also adopt special handling techniques to better account for dissemination of 

such information. 

Recommendation No. 7: Guidelines for Handling Recruitments-inPlace/Defectors

The FBI should adopt guidelines for handling active recruitments-in-place and 

recent defectors that, among other things, limit the disclosure of sensitive 

information, such as details of ongoing espionage investigations, to such 

individuals. 

D. Security Improvements 

Recommendation No. 8: Central Repository for Derogatory Information

The FBI should create a central repository for the receipt, collection, storage, 

and analysis of derogatory information concerning FBI employees with access 

to sensitive information. This repository should be directly accessible to 

Counterespionage Section personnel responsible for determining whether the 

FBI has been penetrated. The FBI should mandate that information or 

allegations that reflect on the integrity, suitability, or trustworthiness of an 

employee be documented and transmitted to this central repository for analysis. 

The FBI should also train employees in recognizing the types of behavior that 

should be reported. 

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Recommendation No. 9: Documentation of Security Violations

The FBI should create policies and procedures designed to ensure that security 

violations are reported, documented in an employee's security file, and 

properly investigated and resolved. A database should be created to track 

security violations by employees and identify patterns and trends. The FBI 

should conduct regular security awareness training of its personnel, and this 

training should include clear instructions regarding the reporting of security 

violations. 

Recommendation No. 10: Meaningful Background Reinvestigations

The FBI should adopt new procedures to ensure that background 

reinvestigations are thorough, meaningful, and timely. Responsibility for this 

program should be consolidated within the Security Division, and an 

automated case management system should be installed that captures, stores, 

and facilitates the analysis of personnel security information. 

Recommendation No. 11: Financial Disclosure

The FBI should implement an annual, computer-based financial disclosure 

program for employees with access to sensitive information. The program – 

which should include disclosure of all accounts held by the employee and 

immediate family members in financial institutions − should be designed to 

detect unusual fluctuations in assets and cash flow as well as extraordinary 

levels of debt, and should involve both collection of information and analysis. 

Recommendation No. 12: Random Counterintelligence Polygraph 

Program

The FBI should fully implement a counterintelligence polygraph program for 

employees with access to sensitive information and develop a 

counterintelligence polygraph program for non-FBI personnel who are given 

access to sensitive information. 

Recommendation No. 13: Enhanced Security Measures for FBI

Employees with Unusually Broad Access to Sensitive Information

The FBI should consider enhanced security measures – for example, more 

frequent polygraph examinations, more frequent and thorough background 

reinvestigations, and more detailed financial disclosures – for employees who 

enjoy unusually broad access to sensitive information. 

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Recommendation No. 14: Detecting Improper Computer Usage and 

Enforcing "Need to Know"

The FBI should implement measures to improve computer security, including 

(a) an audit program to detect and give notice of unauthorized access to 

sensitive cases on a real-time basis; (b) an audit program designed to detect 

whether employees or contractors are using the FBI's computer systems to 

determine whether they are under investigation; (c) procedures designed to 

enforce the "need to know" principle in the context of computer usage; and 

(d) a program designed to ensure that restricted information cannot be 

improperly accessed through the use of security overrides or other means. 

Recommendation No. 15: Tracking Classified Information

The FBI should create and implement a program enabling it to account for and 

track hard copy documents and electronic media containing sensitive 

information. This program should also be designed to prevent the unauthorized 

removal of sensitive information from FBI facilities, either through the use of 

technology that "tags" classified documents and computer media or through 

other means. The FBI should likewise develop a program to prevent the 

improper copying of classified information. 

Recommendation No. 16: Security Compliance Program

The FBI should implement a security inspection program that ensures that 

deficiencies in security are detected and remedied within a reasonable time. 

Compliance with recommendations from internal audits and inspection 

reviews, as well as from external oversight reviews, should be tracked and 

monitored until resolution. 

Recommendation No. 17: Improving Security Education and Awareness

The FBI should make implementation of an FBI-wide security education and 

awareness program a top management priority. In addition, the FBI should 

track and regularly monitor the status of employee security training. 

E. Management and Administrative Improvements 

Recommendation No. 18: Exercise of Managerial Authority over

Espionage Investigations

FBI supervisors must guard against excessively deferring to line personnel 

when supervising significant espionage investigations and must ensure that the 

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Department of Justice is properly briefed on the strengths and weaknesses of 

potential espionage prosecutions. 

Recommendation No. 19: Damage Assessments for FBI Spies 

Damage assessments concerning FBI employees who have committed 

significant acts of espionage should be led by experienced counterintelligence 

personnel and be conducted by an Intelligence Community entity, such as the 

National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). 

Recommendation No. 20: Recusal Procedures for FBI Employees 

The FBI should adopt written policies and procedures for recusal of FBI 

employees and supervisors who may be suspects in an espionage investigation. 

Recommendation No. 21: Supervision of FBI Detailees 

The FBI should ensure that FBI detailees serving in other Intelligence 

Community components and elsewhere are properly supervised and receive 

regular performance evaluations. 

___________________________ 

 Glenn A. Fine

August 2003 Inspector General 

OlG Investigative Team

Scott M. Barden 

Kevin F. Becks 

Paul G. Gardephe 

Stephen D. Kelly 

Mei Lin Kwan-Gett 

Jeffrey D. Long 

Jeffrey K. Vasey 

Dominic N. Russoli 

L. Susan Woodside 

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