U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

The Department of Justice’s 

Terrorism Task Forces 

June 2005 

Report Number I-2005-007 
U.S. Department of Justice i

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks prompted the Department of 

Justice (Department) to redefine its mission, objectives, and priorities to focus 

its top priority on counterterrorism. As a result, the Attorney General 

elevated counterterrorism to the Department’s first strategic goal and shifted 

the Department’s resources to eliminating terrorist networks, preventing 

terrorist operations, and prosecuting perpetrators of terrorist acts. The 

Department also directed the formation or expansion of terrorism task forces 

and councils (with members from many federal, state, and local agencies and 

private industry) that coordinate and integrate intelligence and law 

enforcement functions to achieve the Department’s counterterrorism goal. 

In this review, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) assessed the 

role and operations of these terrorism task forces and councils. We examined 

whether the task forces and councils were achieving their purposes; whether 

gaps, duplication, and overlap existed in counterterrorism coverage; and how 

the performance of the task forces and councils is measured. We collected 

information through interviews of senior Department officials, task force and 

council managers and members, and state and local law enforcement 

officials; a survey of task force managers and members; document reviews; 

and direct observation of task force and council activities. 

Specifically, we reviewed the following task forces and councils: 

Deputy Attorney General’s National Security Coordination Council 

(NSCC): The NSCC, composed of senior Department officials with 

responsibility for national security matters, defines, coordinates, and 

enhances the Department’s counterterrorism strategy and resolves national 

security issues. 

U.S. Attorneys’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs): The purpose 

of ATACs is to 1) facilitate the exchange of information at the federal, state, 

and local levels and between the public and private sectors; 2) conduct 

counterterrorism training; and 3) coordinate terrorism prosecutorial and 

investigative strategies within the Department. The Attorney General directed 

that each of the 93 U.S. Attorneys operate an ATAC. The Counterterrorism 

Section (CTS) of the Department’s Criminal Division provides assistance to 

ATAC Coordinators in the development, coordination, and prosecution of 

terrorism cases. The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) provides 

administrative support to the ATACs. 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

(JTTFs): The JTTFs are operational units that conduct field investigations of 

actual or potential terrorism threats. Unlike the other entities reviewed in 

this report, the JTTFs existed before September 11, 2001. The FBI has 

established 103 JTTFs nationwide. 

FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF): The NJTTF 

provides administrative, logistical, and training support to the JTTFs. The 

NJTTF also coordinates special information and intelligence gathering 

initiatives assigned by FBI headquarters and synthesizes terrorism 

intelligence for use by the JTTFs, member agencies, and other agencies in the 

intelligence community. 

FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF): The FTTTF 

provides data to the JTTFs, NJTTF, and other government agencies that 

1) prevents terrorists and their supporters from entering the United States, 

2) locates those who are already present, and 3) facilitates the terrorism 

investigative process. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

PROGRESS MADE 

The Task Forces and Councils Contribute to the Department’s 

Counterterrorism Efforts. 

We found that the Department’s terrorism task forces and advisory 

councils generally function as intended, without significant duplication of 

effort, and they contribute to the Department’s goal to prevent terrorism and 

promote national security. The task forces and advisory councils provide 

distinct yet complementary forums for sharing terrorism-related information 

and intelligence and investigating terrorist threats. The task forces and 

councils also have strengthened the Department’s infrastructure devoted to 

counterterrorism and have developed a national network of representatives 

from federal, state, and local agencies, and private industry to work on 

terrorism prevention efforts. 

 

 In addition, the task forces have taken steps to ensure that a broader 

group of law enforcement officials have the security clearances needed to 

receive and share information about terrorism issues and that information is 

disseminated through meetings or electronic forums. The various federal, 

state, and local agency members are important “force multipliers” in the 

Department’s counterterrorism efforts. They have facilitated the development 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

of human assets to collect terrorism-related intelligence, and have assisted in 

investigations of leads against terrorist groups. 

Although the task forces and councils have aided the Department’s 

counterterrorism efforts, we believe that improvements to the operations of 

the task forces and councils can be made. 

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS 

 

The NSCC’S Role is Unclear for Long-Term Counterterrorism Planning, 

Centralizing and Coordinating Counterterrorism Policy and Operations, 

and Monitoring Policy Implementation by the Components. 

Current and former Deputy Attorneys General and NSCC members told 

us that the NSCC serves as a forum for Department agency heads to share 

counterterrorism information and advance the Department’s position on 

national security issues. However, the NSCC does not fully perform its longterm planning, policy, and monitoring functions, as established in Attorney 

General guidance. The NSCC members provided us with two examples of 

past or present policy coordination, but could not provide any examples of the 

NSCC’s role in centralizing counterterrorism policy and operations, 

conducting long-term counterterrorism planning, or monitoring the 

implementation of counterterrorism policy in the Department. 

The FBI, CTS, and EOUSA Have No National Training Plans for the Task 

Forces and Councils, Notification of Available Training Is Ad Hoc, and 

Non-FBI Task Force Members Believe That FBI Members Get Preferential 

Treatment for Training. 

The majority of task force and council members we interviewed or 

surveyed had no prior experience with counterterrorism before joining the 

task force or advisory council. Identifying terrorists and terrorist threats, 

conducting a terrorism investigation, developing sources, or planning for 

terrorist incidents were all new subjects for most of them. More than half 

(51 percent) of the survey respondents reported that they required training in 

counterterrorism to better perform their task force and council 

responsibilities. 

Although many training courses are available to task force and advisory 

council members, FBI, CTS, and EOUSA officials stated that they had not 

developed national training plans for members. Without national training 

plans, counterterrorism training for task force and council members has been 

determined locally and has varied widely. There are no training standards for 

task force members that define minimum mandatory training. The lack of 
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standards may affect the members’ receipt of training. Although the FBI has 

trained many task force members in counterterrorism, our survey results 

showed that 29 percent of all JTTF, NJTTF, and FTTTF members had not 

received any counterterrorism training since becoming members. Many of the 

non-FBI task force members we interviewed and surveyed stated that they 

received no notification of training and were unaware of what training was 

available. To make training information and courses more available to task 

force members, the FBI has now included training on its intranet website, 

which is accessible to all members. However, some non-FBI task force 

members believed that FBI agents were offered more opportunities for 

counterterrorism training or believed that training was available only to FBI 

members. 

The ATAC Coordinators we interviewed stated that they want guidance 

on the type of training that should be offered to ATAC members and on how 

to identify trainers. ATAC Coordinators stated that the provision of training, 

particularly training on terrorism prevention and planning, to law 

enforcement personnel and community members is a new responsibility for 

them. Therefore, the ATAC Coordinators need guidance and assistance from 

national leaders. 

The FBI Has No Structured, Systemwide Orientation Program for New 

Task Force Members and Has Not Defined the Roles and Responsibilities 

of its Task Force Members in Writing. 

Approximately 40 percent of both FBI and non-FBI JTTF, NJTTF, and 

FTTTF survey respondents did not receive an orientation to the task force. 

When an orientation was provided, the type of orientation varied widely and 

the content was inconsistent. Given the rapid pace with which the NJTTF, 

FTTTF, and many of the JTTFs started up after September 11, 2001, the lack 

of a formal orientation was understandable. However, three years later, a 

formal standardized orientation still does not exist for new JTTF and NJTTF 

task force members. In September 2004, the FTTTF developed an orientation 

for its members. 

We also found that the FBI does not have signed Memorandums of 

Understanding (MOUs) that define the roles, responsibilities, information 

sharing protocols, and length of commitment with all of the agencies 

participating on the JTTFs, FTTTF, and NJTTF. The FBI did not have MOUs 

with all of the agencies assigned to the pre-September 11 JTTFs, and those 

MOUs that existed were not updated to reflect the post-September 11 JTTF 

mission. Since November 2003, the FTTTF has had draft MOUs pending with 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and intelligence community 

participants. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The JTTFs and ATACs Have Not Coordinated Their Efforts to Fully 

Interact and Share Information With Law Enforcement Agencies and 

First Responders in Remote Areas. 

Although the FBI and ATACs have ongoing efforts to interact and share 

information with law enforcement agencies and first responders in remote 

areas, some ATACs and JTTFs have not used all their resources to reach 

remote agencies that do not have representatives on the task forces and 

councils. The state and local law enforcement agencies with members on a 

JTTF or ATAC were satisfied with the amount and type of terrorism 

information shared. In contrast, those law enforcement agencies that were 

outside of the metropolitan areas and that did not have task force or council 

members were not as satisfied. Most remote law enforcement agencies often 

do not have the resources or the distance is too far to commit representatives 

to a JTTF and ATAC, but they still need information on terrorism from the 

federal government as well as terrorism-related training. The JTTFs and 

ATACs do not have coordinated strategies with each other to address the gaps 

in information sharing and training. Because terrorism and the terrorism 

threat may be found throughout the country, remote areas cannot be 

overlooked.

The FBI Has Not Fully Developed Outcome-Oriented Performance 

Measures for All Task Forces or for the Individual Members. CTS and 

EOUSA Have No Performance Measures for the ATAC Program. 

The FBI has not developed performance measures for the NJTTF and 

FTTTF. Although the FBI has measures for the JTTFs as part of the field 

offices, many of the measures are output oriented rather than outcome 

oriented for the counterterrorism program. CTS and EOUSA have not 

developed performance measures for the ATAC program. Consequently, the 

FBI, CTS, and EOUSA do not have sufficient criteria to help assess their 

strategies, operations, and resources for the task forces and councils. 

We found no established or implemented performance measures for 

individual task force members, and only one ATAC Coordinator we 

interviewed had been directly given a set of performance measures. EOUSA 

distributed suggested performance measures for ATAC Coordinators to the 

USAOs; however, ATAC Coordinators we interviewed and surveyed told us 

that they did not have performance measures. Without performance 

measures, individuals do not have guidance for prioritizing and directing their 

work and measuring their own progress in meeting the mission of the task 

force or council. Our survey results showed that 75 percent of FTTTF, JTTF, 
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and NJTTF respondents did not receive performance measures; and 78 

percent of the ATAC Coordinators did not receive performance measures. 

Oversight and Management of the ATAC Program Has Been Fragmented 

and Coordinators Do Not Have Adequate Guidance on Their Roles or on 

Structuring and Managing ATACs. 

The roles of EOUSA and CTS in the ATAC program are not fully 

understood by the ATAC Coordinators, who are uncertain which component 

is in charge of the ATAC program. CTS, EOUSA, and the USAOs have 

responsibilities for parts of the ATAC program, but no one organization within 

the Department has responsibility for fully managing the program. 

Consequently, we found that neither CTS nor EOUSA adequately monitors 

and assesses the ATACs’ operations. Further, to determine additional 

funding requirements and needs, EOUSA did not strategically analyze and 

assess how each ATAC had spent its $100,000 allocation to purchase 

communications equipment and provide training for state and local law 

enforcement agencies, including first responders. 

In addition, CTS and EOUSA have not developed enough written 

guidance that clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities of the ATAC 

Coordinators. According to ATAC Coordinators that we interviewed, they do 

not receive sufficient guidance from the Department, CTS, or EOUSA on 

ATAC operations and structure. ATAC Coordinators told us they do not have 

a guide to use in identifying members and training opportunities, sponsoring 

terrorism exercises, preventing terrorism, or developing mechanisms to aid in 

the dissemination of information. As a result, operations of ATACs and their 

compliance with Department directives varied across judicial districts. 

The FBI Has Not Provided the FTTTF Stable Leadership or Adequate 

Resources and Has Assigned the FTTTF Responsibilities Outside Its 

Mission; As a Result, the FTTTF’s Database and Risk Assessment Work is 

Behind Schedule. 

The FTTTF’s leadership, organizational structure, and physical 

location changed repeatedly as the Department and the FBI were 

determining the FTTTF’s most appropriate organizational alignment. 

Some FTTTF members we interviewed stated that with each change in 

director and management oversight, the priorities changed, the 

supervision became more fragmented, and the mission more unclear. 

The FTTTF also is not staffed fully with adequate personnel from the 

FBI and other agencies. Further, the FTTTF was assigned additional 

responsibilities not directly related to its mission, such as setting up 

the Terrorist Screening Center, a separate organization from the FTTTF, 
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and screening foreign nationals seeking pilot certification (this 

responsibility was successfully transferred to the Department of 

Homeland Security in October 2004). 

As a result of instability in leadership and organizational structure, 

numerous relocations, inadequate staffing, and additional responsibilities, 

the FTTTF’s acquisition of government databases and development of risk 

assessment software is behind schedule and impairs the effectiveness and 

efficiency of analyses the task force is required to perform. To fulfill its 

mission, the FTTTF requires electronic access to large sets of data, including 

databases from many federal agencies, open source and private industry 

data, and access to the most sensitive materials from law enforcement and 

intelligence sources. The FTTTF’s initial goal was to obtain state-of-the-art 

information technology with sophisticated analytical tools to mine these 

databases for suspicious patterns and conduct risk assessments to identify 

high-risk individuals. However, the FTTTF still has not acquired the number 

and type of databases it needs and is almost a year behind in completing its 

risk assessment prototype. 

Although the FBI Has Reallocated Considerable Resources to 

Counterterrorism, the JTTFs Have Certain Staffing Shortages and 

Turnover in Leadership, and Some JTTFs Experience Problems With 

Space and Information Technology Connectivity.

We found that the JTTFs had inadequate administrative and analytical 

support, had high turnover in task force leadership, and exceeded their 

authorized staffing levels. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has expanded 

the number of JTTFs across the country (for a total of 103), and the FBI 

Director mandated that every terrorism lead must be addressed. The FBI 

reallocated special agent and support staff to the counterterrorism program; 

however, addressing every lead results in a demanding workload that is 

surpassing these resources available to the task forces. At all sites we visited, 

we found that the JTTFs were exceeding their authorized staffing levels for 

FBI agents by 75 to 125 percent by borrowing personnel from other FBI 

programs (such as drugs or white-collar crime) within the field or resident 

agency office. However, the number of support staff has not increased 

proportionately to the workload expansion. 

The FBI rotates managers in the field to provide opportunities for 

gaining varied experience. However, this frequent rotation affected the 

structure and stability of the JTTFs, terrorism investigations, and an 

important pilot information sharing project. Many JTTF members we 

interviewed stated that the lack of continuity in leadership created 
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inconsistencies in the JTTFs’ management, work prioritization, and 

operations. 

We found that some JTTF members were working in cramped 

conditions that hampered communication, slowed work processes, and 

limited the JTTFs’ ability to add additional members. Twenty-eight percent of 

the JTTF survey respondents rated the quality of their space as “poor” or 

“very poor.” The lack of adequate work space has caused some JTTFs to limit 

the number of their member agencies. The FBI stated that it has fulfilled the 

basic requested requirements of JTTFs and field offices and acquired 

additional office space in offsite locations. However, the acquisition of some 

offsite locations has been delayed. 

We also found that the JTTFs do not have adequate connectivity to 

information technology systems to support the members’ needs. NJTTF and 

JTTF members described the FBI’s computer systems and connectivity as 

“outdated” and “unreliable.” Further, most offices are ill-equipped to allow 

members access to the Internet and non-FBI JTTF members direct access 

their parent agencies’ databases and systems, which limits the amount of 

data searches that the JTTF members can complete onsite to assist 

investigations. Instead, non-FBI task force members must return to their 

parent agencies to perform data queries, which is time consuming and 

inefficient. 

Despite the Critical Link Between Drug Trafficking and Terrorism, the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Has Minimal Membership on 

the Task Forces. 

Although Congress, the DEA, and the Department’s leadership 

recognize the link between drug trafficking and terrorism (often called narcoterrorism), in comparison with other Department law enforcement 

components, the DEA has the lowest level of membership on the JTTFs. As of 

January 2005, the DEA has assigned only one full-time member to the JTTFs. 

Further, the DEA did not assign a permanent representative to the NJTTF 

until April 2004, approximately two years after the NJTTF’s inception. 

According to the NJTTF and JTTF members we interviewed, the DEA has 

been “noticeably absent” from the Department’s terrorism task force efforts. 

The DEA has a network of national and international sources, but the JTTF 

members’ access to and use of these sources is limited because the DEA is 

not an active JTTF member. The DEA has identified points of contact, 

instead of full-time members, in its field offices to serve as liaisons to the 

JTTFs. Additionally, the DEA field offices and the headquarters Special 

Coordination Unit share counterterrorism information directly with the 
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JTTFs. However, the points of contacts are unclear about their role in 

relation to the JTTF. 

DHS’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Has Not 

Provided its JTTF Members Needed Direction, Has Not Cross-Trained 

Supervisors in Their New Areas of Responsibility, and Has Not Provided 

Enough Staff to Perform Task Force Work. 

Many JTTF task force members from ICE told us that they received 

little direction from ICE or that the direction they did receive was 

contradictory. They also stated that the supervisors in the ICE field offices 

did not have functional knowledge to provide guidance to task force members. 

JTTF members stated that former immigration agents on the JTTFs were 

supervised by former customs staff that has not been cross-trained in 

immigration matters. The majority of JTTF members described the FBI 

supervision on the task force as positive, but they said that task force 

members also need guidance and supervision from their parent agencies on 

specific agency-related matters. 

Most JTTF and FTTTF members and supervisors also stated that 

additional ICE agents, particularly former immigration agents, are needed on 

both task forces since most international terrorism cases have some link to 

immigration. Even the ICE agents who were formerly customs agents 

emphasized the need for additional agents with immigration experience on 

the JTTFs and FTTTF. The NJTTF Director, at the request of the DHS ICE, 

conducted a staffing needs assessment by asking the JTTF field supervisors 

to determine how many ICE agents were needed on each of their task forces. 

The results of this assessment showed that in November 2003 there were 159 

full-time and 22 part-time ICE agents on 86 JTTFs. The JTTFs had requested 

an additional 138 full-time ICE agents. As of October 26, 2004, ICE had 269 

full-time members and 42 part-time members on JTTFs. However, it is not 

clear if this increase is a result of the NJTTF needs assessment submitted to 

DHS in November 2003, or as a result of the increase in the overall number of 

JTTFs. A former senior ICE representative on the FTTTF stated he personally 

contacted a high-ranking manager at DHS and asked for additional personnel 

for the FTTTF, but he did not receive a response. 
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OIG CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

We concluded that the task forces and councils have enhanced 

information sharing, partnerships, and investigative capabilities for the 

Department’s counterterrorism efforts. The task forces and councils have 

separate functions that generally are not duplicative, and they have 

strengthened the Department’s counterterrorism infrastructure and 

relationships with other federal, state, local, and private agencies. Although 

we recognize that the task forces and councils were established or expanded 

quickly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department has 

not ensured their organizational development or that all their functions have 

been accomplished. We believe some improvements to their operations could 

be made. For example, we concluded that the Department 1) does not use 

the NSCC for centralizing counterterrorism planning, policy, and operations, 

and monitoring policy implementation across the Department; 2) has not 

ensured that the JTTFs and ATACs have a coordinated strategy for sharing 

information with law enforcement agencies and first responders in remote 

areas; 3) has not clearly defined what organization has oversight authority for 

the ATAC program; 4) has not ensured the FTTTF’s timely acquisition of 

databases and development of its risk assessment tool for terrorist tracking; 

and 5) has not ensured sufficient task force membership from certain internal 

and external organizations to facilitate counterterrorism efforts. 

From an organizational development perspective, we concluded that the 

Department 1) has not ensured sufficient minimum training in 

counterterrorism, which is a new subject to many task force and council 

members; 2) has not ensured stability and continuity in task force leadership; 

3) has not addressed continuing problems with computer connectivity that 

interfere with task force work; and 4) has not fully developed adequate 

performance measures to determine the outcomes of the task forces and 

councils and the contributions of individual members. 

Our report contains 28 recommendations to help the Department 

improve the operations of the counterterrorism task forces and councils: 

• The Department should determine whether the NSCC is the most 

appropriate forum for performing long-term counterterrorism 

planning, centralizing and coordinating counterterrorism policy 

and operations, and monitoring policy implementation. 

• The FBI should develop a national training plan for each task force, 

and CTS and EOUSA should develop a national training plan for 

ATACs. 
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• The FBI should develop a formal standardized orientation program 

for all new JTTF and NJTTF members and provide it within 30 days 

of the new member’s start date. 

• The FBI should finalize MOUs with all agencies participating on the 

Department’s terrorism task forces. 

• The FBI, CTS, EOUSA, and USAOs should work jointly to develop a 

coordinated strategy to consistently reach out to remote areas. The 

USAOs also should work with state homeland security task forces 

to coordinate activities related to information sharing and training. 

• The FBI, CTS, and EOUSA should develop overall performance 

measures for their respective task forces and members and 

councils. 

• The Department should clarify what organization has oversight for 

the ATAC program, and CTS and EOUSA should provide guidance 

to their staff and the ATAC Coordinators on their roles and on 

structuring and managing ATACs. 

• The FBI should ensure long-term, stable leadership, organizational 

structure, and housing for the FTTTF, determine the appropriate 

level of resources for the FTTTF to accomplish its mission, and 

address obstacles encountered by the FTTTF in acquiring 

databases from other agencies. 

• The FBI should determine staffing requirements and allocations, 

ensure stability in JTTF leadership, and plan for activating new, 

and upgrading existing, JTTFs with adequate space and 

equipment. 

• The DEA should increase its membership on the JTTFs and work 

with the FBI to assess the optimum locations for new DEA 

members, and issue written guidance that defines the roles and 

responsibilities of the DEA’s JTTF members and points of contact. 

• The Deputy Attorney General should work jointly with DHS officials 

to ensure sufficient DHS membership on the Department’s task 

forces. 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................1

 Purpose........................................................................................1 

 

 Scope and Methodology ................................................................1 

 Report Organization and Content..................................................5 

 

BACKGROUND ..............................................................................6

 UNDERSTANDING THE TASK FORCES AND COUNCILS...............7 

 National Security Coordination Council...............................7 

 

 Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils ......................................11 

 Joint Terrorism Task Forces..............................................15 

 National Joint Terrorism Task Force..................................21 

 Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force ...............................25 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW ................................................................29 

PROGRESS MADE 

Task Forces and Councils Have Distinct Functions That 

are Generally Not Duplicative ............................................29 

Task Forces and Councils Have Improved the Sharing 

of Information ...................................................................32 

Task Forces and Councils Have Improved and Expanded 

Partnerships in the Field and Headquarters.......................50 
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The JTTFs are Implementing the FBI’s New 

Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy and the FBI 

has Improved Access to Automated and Investigative 

Information .......................................................................56 

NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS 

Department-Level Issues: 

The NSCC’s Role is Unclear for Long-term 

Counterterrorism Planning, and Centralizing and 

Coordinating in the Department ........................................59 

Recommendation .....................................................63 

No National Training Plans Exist for the Task Forces 

and Councils.....................................................................65 

Lack of Minimum Training Standards May Affect Task 

Force Members Receipt of Training....................................68 

Training Needs Assessments Were Either Outdated 

or Never Completed ...........................................................70 

Some Members Receive No Notification of Training ............72 

Non-FBI Task Force Members Perceive Inequities 

in Training Offered to FBI Members Versus 

Non-FBI Members .............................................................73 

Recommendations....................................................75 

The FBI Has Not Developed a Structured, Systemwide 

Orientation Program for New Task Force Members.............76 

The FBI Has Not Provided Written Guidance That 

Defines the Roles and Responsibilities of Task Force 

Members...........................................................................81 

Recommendations....................................................82 
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The JTTFs and ATACs Have Not Coordinated Their 

Efforts to Fully Reach Out to and Share Information 

with Remote Areas ............................................................84 

Recommendation .....................................................93 

The FBI, CTS, and EOUSA Have Not Fully Developed 

Performance Measures for the Task Forces and 

Councils or Individual Task Force Members ......................94 

Recommendations..................................................101 

ATAC-Specific Issues 

The Roles of CTS, EOUSA, and USAOs in the ATAC 

Program are Unclear, No One Entity has Full 

Responsibility for Program Management, and 

Oversight is Fragmented..................................................104 

EOUSA Does Not Strategically Analyze the ATACs’ 

Budget to Evaluate the Need for Additional Funding........106 

The Department, CTS, and EOUSA Have Not 

Provided Enough Guidance to ATAC Coordinators 

and Compliance With the Attorney General’s Mandate 

to Maintain an ATAC Varies Across Judicial Districts ......108 

Recommendations..................................................114 

FTTTF-Specific Issues 

The FBI Has Not Provided Stable Leadership, 

Organizational Structure, or Adequate Resources to the 

FTTTF. The FBI Has Assigned Responsibilities to the 

FTTTF Outside of Its Defined Mission ..............................115 

The FTTTF Is Behind Schedule in Its Acquisition of 

Databases and Development and Implementation of its 

Risk Assessment Tool......................................................124 

The FTTTF Has Not Adequately Marketed Its Services 

and Many JTTF and NJTTF Members Did Not Use Its 

Services to Aid Their Investigations ................................127 
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Recommendations..................................................128 

JTTF-Specific Issues 

The JTTFs Experience Certain Staffing Shortages and 

Turnover In Leadership ...................................................130 

Some JTTFs Have Experienced Problems with Space and 

Information Technology Connectivity...............................138 

Recommendations..................................................142 

External Factors 

DEA Has Minimal Membership on the JTTFs...................144 

Recommendations..................................................147 

ICE Has Not Provided Task Force Members Needed 

Direction, Has Not Cross-trained Supervisors or Agents 

in Their New Areas of Responsibility, and Has Not 

Provided a Sufficient Number of Members To 

Perform Task Force Work ................................................148 

ICE Assigns Non-JTTF Tasks to its Members on 

The JTTF.........................................................................155 

Recommendation ...................................................158 

Functions Performed by the States’ Homeland Security 

Task Forces Are Viewed as Duplicative to Those 

of the ATACs ...................................................................159 

Recommendation ...................................................160 

CONCLUSION....................................................................................161

APPENDIX I: Summary of Issues and Recommendations..........163 

APPENDIX II: Terrorism Task Forces and Councils....................170 

APPENDIX III: Electronic Systems Used by the Task Forces........174

APPENDIX IV: Survey Instrument and Results ...........................176 

APPENDIX V: NSCC Memorandum............................................237 

APPENDIX VI: ATAC Memorandums...........................................239 

APPENDIX VII: FTTTF Memorandums .........................................249 
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APPENDIX VIII: ODAG Response ..................................................255 

APPENDIX IX: OIG Analysis of the ODAG’s Response .................257 

APPENDIX X: CRM Response ....................................................259 

APPENDIX XI: OIG Analysis of the CRM’s Response....................267 

APPENDIX XII: EOUSA Response ................................................272 

APPENDIX XIII: OIG Analysis of EOUSA’s Response .....................283 

APPENDIX XIV: FBI Response ......................................................294 

APPENDIX XV: OIG Analysis of the FBI’s Response......................305 

APPENDIX XVI: DEA Response.....................................................315 

APPENDIX XVII: OIG Analysis of the DEA’s Response ....................318 

APPENDIX XVIII: DHS Response.....................................................321 

APPENDIX XIX: OIG Analysis of the DHS’s Response....................328 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 

ACS Automated Case Support System 

ADIC Assistant Director in Charge 

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

ATAC Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

ATTF Anti-Terrorism Task Force 

AUSA Assistant United States Attorney 

BOP Federal Bureau of Prisons 

CBP Customs and Border Protection, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIFA Counterintelligence Field Activity, 

Department of Defense 

CRM Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 

CTS Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

DOD U.S. Department of Defense 

EARS Evaluation and Review Staff, EOUSA 

EOUSA Executive Office for United States Attorneys 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

FTTTF Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

 U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

IDW Investigative Data Warehouse 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

JMD Justice Management Division 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 

LECC Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee 

LEO Law Enforcement Online 

LESC Law Enforcement Support Center 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

NJTTF National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

NLETS National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System 

NSCC National Security Coordination Council 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

NYPD New York City Police Department 

ODAG Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 

U.S. Department of Justice 

OIG Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice 

OIPR Office of Intelligence Policy and Review 

RAO Resident Agency Office 

RTTF Regional Terrorism Task Force 

SAC Special Agent in Charge 

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 

SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 

SSA Supervisory Special Agent 

TFOS Terrorist Financing Operations Section 

TSA Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

TSC Terrorist Screening Center 

TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

TURK Time Utilization and Recordkeeping System 

US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology 

USAO United States Attorney’s Office 

USMS U.S. Marshals Service 

VGTOF Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
U.S. Department of Justice 1 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

INTRODUCTION 

Purpose 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) assessed the role of the 

Department of Justice’s (Department) terrorism task forces and councils in 

achieving the Department’s strategic goal of preventing terrorism and 

promoting the nation’s security.1 

Scope and Methodology 

The review focused on the following Department task forces and 

councils:2

• The Deputy Attorney General’s National Security Coordination 

Council (NSCC); 

• The United States Attorneys’ Offices’ (USAOs) 93 AntiTerrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs) (formerly named the 

Anti-Terrorism Task Forces); and 

• The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 

o Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), 

o National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), and

 

o Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF). 

We examined how the task forces and councils address the 

Department’s strategic goal to prevent terrorism, whether their functions and 

operations are duplicative or overlap, the adequacy of the guidance and 

 

1 Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2003-2008, U.S. Department of Justice, p. 2.4. 

2 During our review, several other task forces and organizations with a terrorism 

focus were formed, such as the Terrorist Screening Center, the Terrorist Threat Integration 

Center, the Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council, the Treasury Department’s Office of 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and the Department of Homeland Security AntiTerrorism Task Force. An analysis of the similarities and differences between these new 

groups and the task forces and councils discussed in this report was beyond the scope of our 

evaluation. Another OIG review assessed the operations of the Terrorist Screening Center. 
U.S. Department of Justice 2 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

oversight provided to the task forces and councils, and how the performance 

of the task forces and councils is measured. 

Our fieldwork, conducted from June 2003 through January 2005, 

included interviews, document reviews, field site visits, a web-based survey, 

and observation through attendance at two training conferences and four 

meetings. 

Interviews: We conducted 278 interviews with senior Department and 

other government officials, task force managers and members, and 

individuals who were involved with, or affected by, the terrorism task forces’ 

or advisory councils’ operations. We interviewed 57 senior officials in the 

following Department components. 

Table 1: Senior Department Officials Interviewed 

Department Component Officials Interviewed 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General • United States Deputy Attorney General (current 

and former) 

• Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General 

• Senior Counsel for National Security Affairs 

• Chief of Staff (former) 

Criminal Division, Counterterrorism 

Section 

• Section Chief 

• National ATAC Coordinator 

• Regional ATAC Coordinators (4) 

Drug Enforcement Administration • Administrator 

• Chief of Operations 

Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys • Counsel to the Director’s Staff (former point of 

contact for ATACs) 

• Supervising Counsel to Director’s Staff (current 

point of contact for ATACs) 
U.S. Department of Justice 3 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Department Component Officials Interviewed 

Federal Bureau of Investigation • Director, FBI 

• Counterterrorism Division 

o Executive Assistant Director (current and 

former) 

o Deputy Assistant Director, Operational 

Support 

o Unit Chief, National Joint Terrorism Task 

Force 

o Director, Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task 

Force 

o Training Coordinators (2) 

• Assistant Director, Inspections Division 

• Training Division – 

o Assistant Director Training Academy 

o Dean of Academic Studies Training Academy 

(current and former) 

• Field Offices – 

o Special Agent in Charge (7) 

o Assistant Special Agent in Charge (9) 

Federal Bureau of Prisons • Director, Bureau of Prisons 

Office of Intelligence Policy and 

Review • Chief Counsel of Intelligence Policy 

United States Attorneys’ Offices • United States Attorneys (9) 

• Deputy United States Attorney 

United States Marshals Service • Director 

In addition to the Department’s senior officials identified above, we 

interviewed 186 ATAC, JTTF, NJTTF, and FTTTF supervisors, members, and 

coordinators. These 186 individuals represented federal, state, and local 

government; law enforcement; the intelligence community; private industry; 

and the military. We also interviewed 12 police executives (commissioners, 

chiefs, deputy chiefs, and sheriffs) who had direct contact with the task forces 

and councils, and 20 state and local law enforcement and first responders 

who were not represented on the task forces. We also interviewed the 

Assistant Secretary and the Chief of Operations for the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS ICE). 

Document Reviews: We reviewed Presidential Directives and Executive 

Orders, and Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General memorandums, 

directives, and guidance issued concerning the task forces and councils. We 

also reviewed documents provided by the FBI, Executive Office for U.S. 

Attorneys (EOUSA), USAOs, Counterterrorism Section (CTS) within the 

Criminal Division, and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General concerning 

the management of the task force and advisory council operations. 

Additionally, we reviewed Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, 
U.S. Department of Justice 4 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

congressional testimony, DHS Office of the Inspector General reports, and 

other related reports that impacted on, or were related to, the operation of the 

task forces and advisory councils. 

Field Site Visits: We completed 13 site visits to USAOs and the FBI’s 

field offices and resident agency offices (RAOs).3 We visited: 

• Sites from all four areas of the country (east, west, north, and 

south); 

 

• A range of large and small field offices and judicial districts; 

and 

• Sites with a JTTF and an ATAC, sites with a JTTF but no 

ATAC in close proximity, sites with an ATAC but no JTTF in 

close proximity, and sites with neither a JTTF or ATAC in 

close proximity.4 

Survey: To obtain information from a greater number of task force and 

council members, we prepared a web-based survey. We pretested it with 

members from a selected ATAC and JTTF as well as with previously 

interviewed FTTTF and NJTTF members. We made changes to the survey 

based upon the pretest results. In January 2004, we distributed survey 

passwords and instructions to a total of 1,810 ATAC, JTTF, FTTTF, and 

NJTTF members. Two hundred of the e-mail invitations were returned as 

undeliverable, reducing the total sample size to 1,610.5 Respondents were 

given three weeks to complete the survey. We received 704 completed 

surveys, an overall response rate of 44 percent. Appendix IV contains a copy 

of the survey instrument and results. 

 

3 RAOs are FBI satellite offices established to provide services throughout the 

jurisdiction of the field office. 

4 The sites visited were: New York City, New York; San Francisco, California 

(including Oakland); Anchorage, Alaska; Spokane, Washington; Coeur d’ Alene, Idaho (FBI 

office only); Salt Lake City, Utah; St. Louis, Missouri; Boston, Massachusetts; Portland, 

Maine; Oklahoma City, Woodward (FBI office only), and Enid, Oklahoma; and San Juan, 

Puerto Rico. 

 5 The NJTTF, EOUSA, and USAOs provided the e-mail addresses that we used in our 

survey. 
U.S. Department of Justice 5 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

In selecting our survey sample, we used a simple random sampling 

methodology for the ATACs (10 percent of the ATAC population).6 To ensure 

representation from Department members, we first selected all the non-FBI 

Department members on the JTTFs and then randomly selected the 

remaining members to equal a 10 percent sample. Because the FBI has a 

large number of employees on the JTTFs, we included them in the simple 

random selection. The NJTTF and FTTTF have small populations; therefore, 

we surveyed all participants of those task forces whom we had not 

interviewed. 

Observations: In September 2003, we attended the JTTF National 

Conference, which focused on topics such as terrorism investigations, 

information dissemination, asset recruitment, and law enforcement 

coordination. In March 2004, we attended the ATAC Coordinators and Crisis 

Management Coordinators Conference, which covered topics such as 

implementation of the Attorney General National Security Guidelines, FBI 

databases and resources, community outreach to Muslims, and Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) prosecution issues. 

We also attended two JTTF meetings (one Executive Board and one full 

membership), one NJTTF meeting, and one ATAC meeting to observe the 

interactions of the participants and the types of information shared. 

Report Organization and Content 

This report provides a summary of our findings and recommendations 

concerning the Department’s terrorism task forces and councils. The 

information is presented in three major sections: 1) background on the task 

forces’ and councils’ history, mission, functions, and structure; 2) the task 

forces’ and councils’ accomplishments; and 3) issues we concluded can be 

improved. The appendices provide additional information and details on 

information sharing systems, the OIG’s survey results, and Department 

memorandums relating to the task forces and councils. 

 

6 Simple random sampling allows individuals to be randomly chosen from the 

sampling frame such that everyone has an equal chance of being selected for participation in 

the survey. 
U.S. Department of Justice 6 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

BACKGROUND 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks prompted the Department to 

redefine its mission, objectives, and priorities to focus on counterterrorism. 

Attorney General Ashcroft elevated counterterrorism to the Department’s first 

strategic goal and stated that the Department will devote “all the resources 

necessary to disrupt, weaken, and eliminate terrorist networks, prevent or 

thwart terrorist operations, and to bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist 

acts.”7 

As part of these changes, Attorney General Ashcroft directed the 

formation or expansion of terrorism task forces and councils that coordinate 

and integrate intelligence and law enforcement efforts related to 

counterterrorism issues. These task forces included the Deputy Attorney 

General’s NSCC, the U.S. Attorneys’ ATACs; and the FBI’s JTTFs, NJTTF, and 

FTTTF. The following synopses describes the councils’ and task forces’ 

mission, history, functions and operations, membership and management, 

and budget. Appendix II consolidates this information in a table. 

 

7 FY 2001 Performance Report/FY 2002 Revised Final Performance Plan/FY 2003 

Performance Plan, U.S. Department of Justice, p.1. 
U.S. Department of Justice 7 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Facts in Brief 

History: Established by the Attorney 

General on March 5, 2002. 

Functions: Assists the Department’s 

leadership in defining, coordinating, and 

enhancing the Department’s 

counterterrorism strategy. Reviews and 

allocates the Department’s counterterrorism 

budget. Frames national security issues for 

the Attorney General’s resolution. 

Size: 1 headquarters-based council for 

Department of Justice executives. 

Membership: 10 permanent members, 

including the Deputy Attorney General, the 

Attorney General’s Chief of Staff, Assistant 

Attorneys General for the Criminal Division 

and Office of Justice Programs, the Counsel 

of the Office of Intelligence Policy and 

Review, and the heads of the Department’s 

components (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives, Bureau of 

Prisons, FBI, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, and the U.S. Marshals 

Service). 

Management Structure: Under the 

direction of the Deputy Attorney General, 

with support provided by his staff. 

Budget: FY 2003, $2 million (total). No 

separate line item after FY 2003. 

How to Join: Restricted to Department 

leadership; guests are invited periodically to 

attend. 

UNDERSTANDING THE TASK FORCES AND COUNCILS

The National Security Coordination Council (NSCC)

Mission: To ensure a more 

seamless coordination of all Department 

functions relating to national security, 

particularly its efforts to combat 

terrorism. 

History: The Attorney General 

announced the creation of the NSCC on 

March 5, 2002, to provide a more 

coordinated effort to combat terrorism 

and address other national security 

challenges, both within the Department 

and in the Department’s interaction with 

other law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies. 

Functions and Operations: By 

Attorney General Memorandum, the 

NSCC was formed to: 

• Centralize and coordinate 

policy, resource allocation, 

operations, and long-term 

planning of Department 

components regarding 

counterterrorism, 

counterespionage, and other 

major national security issues; 

• Monitor the implementation of 

Department policy to ensure 

that components are taking 

necessary and appropriate 

actions to prevent and disrupt 

the occurrence of terrorist 

attacks in the United States; 

• Provide an institutionalized Department forum for crises 

management; 
U.S. Department of Justice 8 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• Promote coordination and information-sharing within 

the Department, between the Department and other 

federal agencies and interagency bodies, and between 

the Department and state and local law enforcement 

authorities, to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 

terrorist attacks within the United States; 

 

• Frame national security issues for resolution by the 

Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney General; and 

• Ensure that positions advanced by the Deputy Attorney 

General on behalf of the Department at interagency 

meetings of the National Security Council, the 

Homeland Security Council, and other interagency 

forums reflect input from Department national security 

components.8 

Attorney General Ashcroft further stated that the NSCC would 

help the Department “develop, direct, and execute its 

counterterrorism strategy to eliminate terrorist threats before 

they develop into terrorist acts.”9 

Examples of work performed and projects undertaken by 

the NSCC relating to the coordination of national security issues 

include the following: 

• A sub-group of the NSCC coordinated an interagency planning 

process for post-conflict reconstruction activities prior to Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. This sub-group continues to coordinate the 

implementation of plans for the reconstruction of the justice, police, 

and corrections sectors of Iraq. A similar process exists under the 

NSCC for coordinating reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. 

• An NSCC working group, chaired by a member of the Deputy 

Attorney General’s staff, coordinated the Department’s contributions 

to and review of the publication of the DHS Interim National 

Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and the 

 

8 Establishment of the National Security Coordination Council, Memorandum for Heads 

of Department Components, U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft, 

March 2002. 

9 News Conference, National Security Coordination Council, Attorney General John 

Ashcroft, March 5, 2002. 
U.S. Department of Justice 9 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

National Response Plan, which are mandated by Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-5. 

• The NSCC coordinated a memorandum from the Attorney General 

regarding the response to a terrorist threat that delegated the 

authority for components to provide support to FBI offices around 

the country. 

Membership and Management: The Deputy Attorney General is the 

NSCC chairperson, and the NSCC’s permanent members include the following 

officials with responsibility for national security matters: 

• Chief of Staff to the Attorney General 

• Director, FBI (with appropriate participation by the FBI 

Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism/ 

Counterintelligence) 

• Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (with 

appropriate participation by the Counterterrorism Section, the 

Office of International Affairs, and other Division components) 

• Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs 

• Counsel, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) 

• Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

• Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) 

• Director, Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 

• Director, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) 

Other senior Department officials, as well as senior officials from the 

CIA and other government agencies are invited to attend NSCC meetings 

when appropriate. 

The NSCC receives staff support from attorneys and administrative 

personnel in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The NSCC 

incorporated the functions and personnel of the former Executive Office of 

National Security. 
U.S. Department of Justice 10 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Budget: In FY 2003, the NSCC was allocated $2 million. No separate 

line-item existed for the NSCC in FY 2004 or FY 2005. 
U.S. Department of Justice 11 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs) 

(formerly Anti-Terrorism Task Forces) 

Mission: To coordinate the 

dissemination of terrorism 

information and the development of 

investigative and prosecutive 

strategies throughout the United 

States. 

History: Immediately after 

September 11, 2001, the Attorney 

General directed all U.S. Attorneys 

to establish an Anti-Terrorism Task 

Force (ATTF) and appoint an 

experienced Assistant United States 

Attorney (AUSA) as the ATTF 

Coordinator in each district. In a 

September 17, 2001, memorandum, 

the Attorney General instructed 

each ATTF to coordinate the 

implementation of an operational 

plan for preventing terrorism, serve 

as the conduit of information about 

suspected terrorists between federal 

and local agencies, and coordinate 

the district’s response to a terrorist 

incident. The memorandum also 

required each ATTF Coordinator to 

work with the designated Regional 

Coordinator in CTS to ensure 

consistent application of terrorism 

prosecution strategies and to 

provide guidance to the task 

forces.10 

The ATTF Coordinators 

convened their first meetings on 

September 18, 2001. The Deputy 

 

10 Anti-terrorism Plan Memorandum for all U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, 

Attorney General John Ashcroft, September 17, 2001. 

Facts in Brief 

History: Created by the Attorney General on 

September 17, 2001, and renamed AntiTerrorism Advisory Councils on September 25, 

2003. 

Functions: Facilitate the exchange of 

information between its members and conduct 

counterterrorism training. Coordinate terrorism 

prosecutorial and investigative strategies among 

the CTS, the FBI’s JTTFs, and USAOs. 

Size: 93 task forces, one in each judicial district 

(the judicial districts for Guam and Northern 

Mariana Islands combined ATACs). 

Membership: Approximately 11,000 members, 

comprising federal, state, and local law 

enforcement; first responders; public health 

managers; utility companies; and private 

industry security. 

Management Structure: Each U.S. Attorney 

appoints a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney to 

coordinate the ATAC’s operations. Intelligence 

Research Specialists assist the Coordinator. 

EOUSA and CTS provide administrative support 

and operational oversight. 

Budget: FY 2002 – $9.3 million ($100,000 for 

each task force) for use until expended, but not 

later than September 2004. Three ATACs 

received extensions until December 2004 and 

three others until March 2005. 

FY 2004 – No further allocation for ATACs. 

 

How to Join: Requests made through the local 

USAO. Security clearance not required. 
U.S. Department of Justice 12 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Attorney General also issued further guidance to the ATTF Coordinators on 

membership, mission, and the relationship with the FBI and the JTTFs.11 

In September 2003, the Attorney General renamed the task forces the 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs) to better describe their activities.12 

The new name helped to clarify their mission and differentiate them from 

other terrorism-related task forces. 

Functions and Operations: The ATACs are responsible for coordinating 

the exchange of terrorism-related information, as well as providing or 

facilitating counterterrorism training, for all appropriate parties in a judicial 

district. The ATACs hold meetings, organize training sessions for members, 

and have purchased communication equipment for state and local law 

enforcement. The ATAC Coordinators also work jointly with the FBI and the 

JTTFs in terrorism investigations and prosecutions. 

Membership and Management: There are approximately 11,000 

members in the 93 ATACs across the country. Members include federal, 

state, and local law enforcement officers; first responders; private industry 

security personnel; and individuals from any other relevant organization that 

has a need for terrorism-related threat information. While JTTF membership 

is limited to law enforcement personnel with security clearances, the ATAC is 

open to a broader range of participants and does not require security 

clearances for its members. 

ATACs are coordinated by an experienced AUSA. Each USAO was given 

funds to hire an Intelligence Research Specialist, who provides support to the 

ATAC Coordinator and is often used to support the district’s JTTF. According 

to the Attorney General’s memorandum, each U.S. Attorney has the 

autonomy to operate the ATAC to fit the district’s needs. 

CTS appointed Regional ATAC Coordinators (located at the Criminal 

Division in Washington, D.C.) who provide assistance to ATAC Coordinators 

in the development, coordination, and prosecution of terrorism cases. 

 

CTS has established a National ATAC Coordinator position, filled 

annually on a rotating basis by a field ATAC Coordinator, to provide 

 

11 Guidance for Anti-terrorism Task Forces Memorandum, U.S. Department of Justice, 

Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, October 8, 2001. 

12 Responsibilities of Anti-terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs) Memorandum for all U.S. 

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft, September 24, 2003. 
U.S. Department of Justice 13 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

additional support to ATACs and to provide headquarters with a field 

perspective. 

EOUSA provides administrative support to the ATACs. One staff 

person in EOUSA is responsible for providing support to ATACs. 

Budget: The ATAC program received $9.3 million in FY 2002 to 

purchase communication equipment and organize anti-terrorism training for 

state and local law enforcement agencies. Each USAO received a onetime 

allocation of $100,000 to expend originally by December 2003 (extended to 

September 2004, and then to December 2004 for three ATACs and to March 

2005 for three other ATACs). Since FY 2002, the ATACs have not received 

any additional appropriations. EOUSA and CTS do not separately identify the 

funds used for ATAC duties. 
U.S. Department of Justice 14 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Figure 1: Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Locations 
U.S. Department of Justice 15 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) 

Mission: To detect and investigate terrorists and terrorist groups and 

prevent them from carrying out terrorist acts directed against the United 

States. 

History: In 1979, the New York 

City Police Department (NYPD) and 

the FBI’s New York City field office 

formed a task force to jointly 

investigate bank robberies that were 

affecting New York City’s financial 

community. The FBI and the NYPD 

each committed 11 members to start 

the task force. The FBI recognized 

the value of the task force concept in 

its investigative processes and 

subsequently applied the concept to 

the counterterrorism program. 

The FBI established the first 

JTTF in May 1980 in the New York 

City field office. The New York City 

JTTF grew to include additional NYPD 

members and members from other 

federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies. Each of the 

member agencies signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU) that identified the task force’s 

objectives as responding to and 

investigating terrorist incidents or 

terrorist-related criminal activities 

and investigating domestic and 

foreign terrorist groups.13 

The FBI expanded the terrorism task force concept to other field offices 

and by 1996 there were JTTFs in 11 of the FBI’s 56 field offices. 

 

13 An MOU is an agreement between two or more agencies that defines the roles, 

responsibilities, and length of commitment for each of the affected parties. 

Facts in Brief 

History: Started in 1979 as a concept to 

address bank robberies. The first JTTF was 

implemented in 1980 in the FBI’s New York 

City field office. The FBI subsequently applied 

the task force concept to its counterterrorism 

program in other field offices. 

Functions: Operational unit that conducts 

field investigations of actual or potential 

terrorism threats. 

Size: 35 task forces before September 11, 

2001, 103 task forces as of March 2005. 

Membership: 912 members before 

September 11, 2001. As of January 2005, 

5,085 federal, state, and local members from 

law enforcement, intelligence, the military, 

and other agencies. 

Management Structure: Housed in the FBI’s 

field and satellite offices, the members are 

assigned taskings and managed by an FBI 

Supervisory Special Agent. 

Budget: FY 2004, $286 million (total), FY 

2005, $375 million (total). 

How to Join: Requested through or invited by 

local FBI field office. Parent agency and the 

FBI sign an MOU. Members must obtain a 

Top Secret security clearance. 
U.S. Department of Justice 16 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Over the next several years, the number of terrorist incidents, 

suspected terrorist incidents, and terrorist preventions increased.14 The FBI 

subsequently activated JTTFs in additional field offices, bringing the total to 

35 JTTFs in FY 2000. After September 11, 2001, the FBI expanded its JTTF 

coverage to the remaining 21 field offices and began to create JTTF annexes 

in its resident agency offices (RAOs). A JTTF annex operates identical to a 

JTTF in a FBI field office. At the end of FY 2002, the FBI had 66 total JTTFs 

(56 field office JTTFs and 10 JTTF annexes). Since FY 2002, 37 additional 

JTTF annexes were established, bringing the total number of JTTFs to 103. 

Functions and Operations: The JTTFs are squads within the FBI’s field 

offices, and select RAOs, that focus primarily on addressing terrorism threats 

and preventing terrorist incidents. The JTTFs are the “operational” units 

within the Department’s counterterrorism initiative because they respond to 

terrorism leads and conduct terrorism investigations. The JTTFs also pool 

the resources and expertise of multiple agencies to collect and share 

counterterrorism intelligence. The JTTFs share classified and unclassified 

information with their federal, state, and local partners and hold meetings for 

their members and agency liaisons. 

Examples of some prominent cases the JTTFs participated in include: 

• 1997 – Conviction of Ramzi Yousef and Eyad Mahmoud Ismal 

for conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. 

• 1997 – Prevention of several domestic terrorism acts by 

members of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. 

• 2001 – Investigation of a Hizbollah cell through the arrests and 

convictions of 20 individuals in North Carolina. A related 

investigation by the Detroit JTTF has yielded 14 convictions. 

 

14 The FBI defines a terrorist incident as a “violent act or an act dangerous to human 

life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or of any state, to intimidate or 

coerce government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 

or social objectives. Suspected terrorist incident is a potential act of terrorism for which 

responsibility cannot be attributed to a known or suspected group. Terrorism prevention is a 

documented instance in which a violent act by a known or suspected terrorist group or 

individual with the means and a proven propensity for violence is successfully interdicted 

through investigative activity.” See: Terrorism in the United States 1999, FBI, 

Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, Counterterrorism Division, p. ii. 
U.S. Department of Justice 17 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

• 2001 - Dismantling of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 

Development, an organization that allegedly has links to 

Hamas. 

• 2003 – The Palestine Islamic Jihad, or PIJ, activities and 

capabilities in the U.S. were severely undercut by the arrests of 

the U.S. PIJ leader, Sami al-Arian, and three of his top 

lieutenants. There has been no indication of a new U.S. PIJ 

leadership since the arrest of al-Arian. 

• 2004 – In Virginia, Mohammed Ali al-Timini, the spiritual leader 

of the Virginia Jihad training group disrupted last year, was 

indicted for his involvement in the recruitment of U.S. citizens 

for extremist training and jihad preparation. On April 22, 2005, 

a Virginia jury convicted al-Timini on all ten counts of 

indictment. 

• 2004 – In New York, Yassin Muhiddin Aref was arrested on 

money laundering charges connected to a possible terrorist plot 

to kill a Pakistani diplomat. 

• 2004 –In Detroit, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani was indicted and 

convicted in the Eastern District of Michigan on one count of 

Conspiracy to provide material support to Hizballah. 

Additionally, the FBI uses the JTTFs to coordinate security measures 

for all national special events, such as the 2004 Democratic and Republican 

National Conventions, the 2004 Summer Olympics, the 2003 National 

Collegiate Athletic Association’s Division I Basketball and Hockey 

Tournaments, and the 2002 Winter Olympics. 

Membership and Management: The FBI reported the following 

numbers for JTTF membership in June 2004. 

Table 2: JTTF Membership 

Members Pre-9/11 FY 2004 

FBI 614 (67%) 1,844 (43%) 

Other Federal Agencies 155 (17%) 1,197 (28%) 

State and Local 143 (16%) 1,204 (29%) 

Total 912 (100%) 4,245 (100%) 

Sources: The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, issued 

June 2004. 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 18 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The JTTFs’ membership increased from its pre-September 11, 2001, number 

of 912 task force members to 5,085 members in January 2005. Members 

serve on the JTTFs either full time or part time and report to an FBI 

Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). The JTTFs’ operations in the field offices are 

managed directly by an FBI SSA who reports to an Assistant Special Agent in 

Charge (ASAC) at the division office. For JTTFs in RAOs, the SSA reports to 

the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) of 

the respective field office. 

The JTTFs are primarily divided into two major sections: international 

terrorism and domestic terrorism. FBI offices with larger JTTFs further divide 

their functions and create squads that focus on specific topics. 

JTTF members must obtain a Top Secret security clearance. Agency 

liaisons to the JTTF serve as “points of contact” and do not require security 

clearances. The JTTFs also develop partnerships among law enforcement; the 

intelligence community; the military; and federal, state, and local 

government. The JTTF members can include, but are not limited to: 

• Federal partners: 

o Central Intelligence Agency 

o U.S. Department of Commerce 

o U.S. Department of Defense: Naval Criminal Investigative 

Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Defense 

Criminal Investigative Service 

o U.S. Department of Energy 

o U.S. Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, U.S. Transportation Security Administration, U.S. 

Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service 

o U.S. Department of Justice: U.S. Marshals Service; Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Federal 

Bureau of Prisons 

o U.S. Department of Treasury: Treasury Inspector General 

for Tax Administration 

o Environmental Protection Agency 

o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

o U.S. Capitol Police 

o U.S. Park Police 

• State partners:

o State police

o State highway patrols 
U.S. Department of Justice 19 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

o Departments of public safety

o Transit administrations

o National Guard 

o State bureaus of investigation

o State attorneys’ offices

o State universities and colleges

o State departments of justice 

• Local and private industry partners:

o Police departments (city, county)

o Sheriff departments

o University police departments

o Transportation authorities (railroad, port, airport, and other 

law enforcement entities that support transportation)

o Utility companies 

Budget: In FY 2003, the FBI received $216 million to fund the JTTFs’ 

operations, and in FY 2004 the amount received increased to $285 million. 

The FY 2005 JTTF budget is $375.2 million. 
U.S. Department of Justice 20 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Figure 2: Joint Terrorism Task Force Locations 
U.S. Department of Justice 21 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Facts in Brief 

History: Established by the FBI Director in 

July 2002. 

Functions: Provides administrative, logistical, 

and training support to the JTTFs. 

Coordinates special information and 

intelligence gathering initiatives assigned from 

FBI headquarters. Assesses and combines 

intelligence into analytical products. 

Size: 1 headquarters-based task force. 

Membership: 62 members from 40 agencies, 

including federal, state, and local agency 

representatives from law enforcement, 

defense, diplomatic services, public safety, 

and homeland security. 

Management Structure: An FBI Unit Chief 

and DHS Deputy Unit Chief jointly manage its 

operations. Managed by the FBI’s 

Counterterrorism Division under the Deputy 

Assistant Director for Operations. 

Budget: FY 2004, $5.1 million (total), $2.8 

million (non-personnel). 

 

How to Join: Requested through or invited by 

the FBI. Parent agency and the FBI sign an 

MOU. Members must obtain and maintain a 

Top Secret security clearance. 

The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) 

Mission: To support the JTTFs and to enhance communication, 

coordination, and cooperation among federal, state, and local government 

agencies by providing a point of fusion for terrorism intelligence. 

History: The rapid postSeptember 11, 2001, growth in the 

number of JTTFs increased the need 

for coordination between the JTTFs 

and the FBI’s headquarters. In July 

2002, the FBI formed the NJTTF to 

coordinate the flow of information on 

threats and leads between the FBI 

headquarters and the JTTFs and to 

function as the “hub” of support for 

the JTTFs throughout the United 

States.15 

Functions and Operations: The 

NJTTF operates a multi-agency task 

force with staff from the intelligence, 

law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, 

public safety, and homeland security 

communities. The NJTTF provides 

administrative, logistical, policy, 

financial, and training support and 

guidance to the JTTFs. It works with 

other FBI headquarters units to 

identify tools that promote 

information sharing between state 

and local law enforcement and the 

JTTFs. 

According to the FBI the NJTTF 

serves as the “point of fusion” for 

terrorism intelligence for the JTTFs, member agencies, and others in the 

intelligence community. Using its access to databases provided by its 

members, the NJTTF conducts assessments of terrorism intelligence and 

combines them into analytical products. It also verifies terrorism information 

through the NJTTF members’ interaction and interpretation. 

 

15 Joint Terrorism Task Force Report to Congress, FBI, October 2003, p. 7. 
U.S. Department of Justice 22 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

During crisis situations, the NJTTF’s members support the FBI’s 

Strategic Intelligence Operations Center and provide information that 

addresses the crisis or terrorist act. 

The NJTTF coordinates terrorism projects that require JTTF intelligence 

gathering and consolidates the information received from the JTTFs into 

reports that are disseminated to the specific units in the Counterterrorism 

Division, JTTFs, FBI Legal Attaches (LEGATs) and other government agencies. 

Membership and Management: The NJTTF has 62 members (15 FBI 

and 47 representatives from other government agencies). The participating 

agencies are listed on the following page.16 All members must obtain a Top 

Secret security clearance. The NJTTF accepts members from state and local 

law enforcement agencies on a temporary basis through its Fellowship and 

Scholarship Programs. The NJTTF Fellowship Program accepts members 

from state and local law enforcement agencies for 6-month assignments. The 

NJTTF Scholarship Program targets the field office JTTF supervisors who are 

assigned to the NJTTF for two weeks. These programs allow the NJTTF to 

improve its liaisons with state and local law enforcement agencies and the 

JTTFs. 

 

16 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been a member of the NJTTF since 

inception, but its position on the task force was vacant in March 2005. 
U.S. Department of Justice 23 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Agencies Participating on the NJTTF 

• U.S. Department of Agriculture 

• U.S. Capitol Police

• U.S. Department of Energy

• U.S. Department of Defense

o Defense HUMINT Services

o Defense Intelligence Agency

o Defense Criminal Investigative 

Service

o U.S. Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations

o U.S. Army Criminal Investigative 

Division

o U.S. Army Military Intelligence

o Naval Criminal Investigative 

Service

o U.S. Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM)

o Joint Forces Command 

(NORTHCOM)

o Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency

• U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services

o U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services, headquarters 

component 

o U.S. Food and Drug 

Administration

• U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 

o U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection

o U.S. Coast Guard

o U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, headquarters 

component

o U.S. Federal Protective Service

o U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement

o U.S. Transportation Security 

Administration

o Federal Air Marshals

o U.S. Secret Service

• U.S. Department of the Interior

• U.S. Department of Justice 

o Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives

o Drug Enforcement 

Administration

o Federal Bureau of Investigation

o Federal Bureau of Prisons

o U.S. Marshals Service

• U.S. Department of State

• U.S. Department of Transportation

• U.S. Department of Treasury 

o Internal Revenue Service

o Treasury Inspector General for 

Tax Administration

• U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency 

• National Railroad Police

• New York City Police Department

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission

• U.S. Office of Personnel 

Management

• U.S. Postal Inspection Service 

• Washington, DC Metropolitan Police 

Department 

Budget: The NJTTF’s budget increased by approximately 97 percent from $2.6 

million in FY 2003 to $5.1 million in FY 2004. 
U.S. Department of Justice 24 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Figure 3: NJTTF Organization Chart 

Notes: IC = Intelligence Community, CTD = Counterterrorism Division, OGA = Other Government Agencies, TWIN = 

Threat Warnings and Indicator Notice, OLEC = Office of Law Enforcement Coordination; Operation Tripwire is a 

program whereby JTTFs collect intelligence and pursue leads to build an intelligence database and the FBI then 

analyzes the data collected to identify patterns.

Unit Chief 

NJTTF

JTTF 

Program 

Management

Outreach, 

Liaison, and 

Administration

Operations 

Component

Tripwire 

Component

Intelligence 

Component

- Coordinate 

with IC 

- Identify 

Intelligence 

Gaps 

- Intelligencebased review 

of threats 

- NJTTF Daily 

Briefs 

- Maintain 

Websites 

- Production of 

National TWIN

- Oversee 

administration, 

budget, policy 

and logistics 

for all JTTFs 

- JTTF 

Standard 

Operating 

Procedure 

(SOP) project 

- MOU Project 

- On-site 

reviews 

- JTTF liaison 

issues 

- Maintain 

program 

records and 

statistics 

- Staff NJTTF 

duty desk at 

CT Watch 

- Direct OGA 

Liaison to CTD 

operational 

units 

- Enhance 

information 

sharing 

- OGA special 

taskings 

- OGA records 

checks 

- Manage 

leads 

Deputy Unit Chief 

(DHS)

- Tripwire 

advisories 

- Coordinate 

bulk data 

projects with 

FTTTF and 

CTD 

- Correctional 

Intelligence 

Initiative 

- Maritime 

Liaison 

Program 

- Support CTD 

OPS as 

required 

- Coordinate 

with OLEC 

and other FBI 

units 

- Space, 

clearance, and 

access issues 

- NJTTF 

training issues 

- Identify 

resources 

available to 

support Precrisis/threat 

periods 

- Fellowship 

Program 

- National 

Conferences 

- Briefing 

Production 
U.S. Department of Justice 25 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) 

Mission: To provide information that helps keep foreign terrorists and 

their supporters out of the United States or leads to their exclusion, removal, 

surveillance, or prosecution. 

History: On October 29, 2001, 

Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-2 required the Attorney 

General to create the FTTTF by 

November 1, 2001, with assistance 

from the Secretary of State, the 

Director of Central Intelligence, and 

other officers of the government, as 

appropriate. The FTTTF was originally 

created as an independent component 

within the Department of Justice, 

reporting to the Attorney General 

through the Deputy Attorney General. 

In August 2002, the FTTTF was placed 

within the FBI and is currently located 

within the FBI’s Counterterrorism 

Division with reporting responsibilities 

to the Deputy Attorney General and to 

the FBI Director. 

Functions and Operations: 

Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-2 requires the FTTTF to 

ensure that, to the maximum extent 

permitted by law, federal agencies 

coordinate programs to: 1) deny entry 

into the United States of aliens 

associated with, suspected of being 

engaged in, or supporting terrorist 

activity; and 2) locate, detain, 

prosecute, or deport any such aliens 

already present in the United States. 

The FTTTF has identified three core 

functions to carry out this directive: 

• Tracking – to locate and track suspected terrorists and their 

supporters within the United States by providing authorized 

personnel with information about their previous travels or 

Facts in Brief 

History: Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-2, issued on October 29, 2001, 

required the Department to create the FTTTF. 

The Department started the FTTTF on 

October 31, 2001. 

Functions: Uses technology, algorithms, and 

data sets to provide data to help prevent 

terrorists and their supporters from entering 

the United States and locate those that are 

already present. Also supports the FBI’s 

JTTFs, NJTTF, and the headquarter-level 

counterterrorism units by providing data to be 

used in terrorism investigations. 

Size: 1 headquarters-based task force. 

Membership: 138 members, the majority of 

whom are FBI personnel, information 

technology contractors, or intelligence 

contractors. 

Management Structure: Initially reported to 

the Attorney General through the Deputy 

Attorney General, but shifted to the FBI in 

August 2002. Led by an FBI senior manager, 

who reports to the Counterterrorism 

Division’s Deputy Assistant Director for 

Operations. 

Budget: FY 2004, $61.6 million, FY 2005, 

$52.3 million. 

How to Join: Requested through or invited by 

the FBI. Members must obtain a Top Secret 

clearance with Sensitive Compartmented 

Information (SCI) access. 
U.S. Department of Justice 26 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

current location in the United States. This service is intended 

to enhance ongoing investigations for the JTTFs, NJTTF, and 

other government agencies by providing information that 

supports prosecutions and removals of foreign terrorists and 

their supporters. 

• Detection - to identify previously unknown terrorists and their 

supporters within the United States, or those outside the United 

States using public, proprietary, and other government data 

through non-obvious relationship algorithms. 

• Risk Assessment - to develop an automated risk analysis 

software tool that will identify high-risk individuals when 

applied to government, public, and proprietary data and 

databases the FTTTF acquires. 

Examples of the work performed by the FTTTF include the following: 

• Identified a social security number found to be used by over 

100 foreign individuals of Asian and Middle Eastern descent 

living in the Norfolk, Virginia area. 

• Increased the amount of new information for certain cases by 

an average of 21 percent by checking names through the 

FTTTF’s compilation of databases. 

• Provided the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division a previously 

unknown social security number and a Brooklyn address for a 

subject of an investigation linked to Al-Qaeda terrorists wanting 

to use the subject’s textile business to import explosives. 

• Advised FBI Headquarters and the New York Field Office 

regarding a suspected terrorist trainer’s presence in the United 

States. Also identified aliases, social security numbers, 

addresses, phone numbers, and travel information for some of 

the nearly 50 foreign-based students of this trainer. 

Subsequently, the trainer and all of the students were added to 

the TIPOFF list.17

 

17 The TIPOFF system contains more than 100,000 names of potential terrorists that 

form the basis for both the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) [formerly known as the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)] and Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) databases. 

Although TIPOFF was originally operated by the U.S. Department of State, responsibility for 

maintaining it has been transferred to NCTC. 
U.S. Department of Justice 27 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Membership and Management: Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-2 directs that the FTTTF be staffed by expert personnel from the FBI, 

the Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now 

the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS), the 

Customs Service (now the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within 

DHS), the U.S. Secret Service, the intelligence community, military support 

components, and other federal agencies, as appropriate, to accomplish the 

FTTTF’s mission. 

As of November 2004, the FTTTF staffing complement consisted of 138 

employees and contractors from the following agencies: 

• FBI 

• U.S. Department of Justice (Chief Counsel) 

• U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) – Counterintelligence Field 

Activity (CIFA) 

• DHS/ICE 

• Office of Personnel Management 

• Contractors – with analysts funded by the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), and analysts and information technology staff 

funded by CIFA. 

Budget: The FY 2004 budget was $61.6 million, and the FY 2005 budget 

is $52.3 million. 
U.S. Department of Justice 28 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Figure 4: FTTTF Organization Chart 

Tracking and 

Detection Unit

Risk Assessment 

Unit 

FTTTF Director 

(FBI) 

Deputy Director 

(CIFA/DOD) 

Operations 

Support Unit

Security Officer Special Assistant 

Threat Processing 

and Assessment 

Unit
U.S. Department of Justice 29 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

PROGRESS MADE

The task forces and councils have distinct functions that are 

generally not duplicative. 

Although there was some concern that the task forces and councils may 

be duplicating efforts, we found that their functions are largely distinctive and 

complementary, and generally not duplicative. There is some overlap in 

information sharing with a few individuals who are members of and attend 

meetings of both an ATAC and a JTTF. However, the overlap is minimal. The 

following provides a brief description of the distinction between the various 

task forces and councils: 

 

NSCC

The NSCC, coordinated by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, is 

the Department’s executive level forum for the Deputy Attorney General and 

agency heads (FBI, DEA, USMS, OIPR, BOP, and others) to meet at least 

monthly and discuss issues related to counterterrorism and national security. 

The agency heads told us that the NSCC provides them with terrorism 

information that they would not receive ordinarily, and allows them to identify 

intelligence gathering capabilities that exist across agencies that could assist 

them in achieving their agencies’ missions. 

JTTF

The JTTFs, headed by the FBI, are the operational and investigative arm 

of the Department’s counterterrorism initiative. Consisting largely of federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agents in shared office space hosted by the 

FBI, the 103 JTTFs in FBI field offices and RAOs respond to reports of threats 

and conduct terrorism investigations on a daily basis in their respective 

jurisdictions. The JTTFs also host monthly executive meetings with local law 

enforcement officials and heads of partner agencies who have members on the 

JTTFs to share information on relevant terrorism topics. 

ATAC

The ATACs are based out of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in each of the 

judicial districts. Their primary mission is to share information and provide or 

coordinate terrorism-related training for their members, which can include 
U.S. Department of Justice 30 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

some JTTF members. The ATAC meetings also serve as a focal point to discuss 

local or regional vulnerabilities, and to identify resources and plan exercises 

and training to reduce those vulnerabilities. The ATAC Coordinators and 

Regional ATAC Coordinators work closely with the JTTFs by coordinating 

prosecutorial and investigative strategies across JTTFs to achieve nationwide 

consistency in investigating and prosecuting terrorism cases. 

NJTTF 

 

The NJTTF, headed by the FBI and located in Northern Virginia, provides 

administrative and strategic support to the 103 nationwide JTTFs. It also 

provides coordination on special information and intelligence gathering 

initiatives assigned from FBI Headquarters to the field JTTFs. The NJTTF does 

not conduct investigations but rather acts as a liaison and conduit of 

information on threats from FBI headquarters to the JTTFs and to the 40 

member agencies participating on the NJTTF. 

FTTTF

The FTTTF, headed by the FBI, also supports the JTTFs and other law 

enforcement agencies. Located in Northern Virginia, the FTTTF uses its data 

searching and data mining capabilities to respond to requests from the FBI, 

CIA, or other agencies to electronically locate and track known or suspected 

terrorists and generate leads that are then funneled through the NJTTF for 

JTTF follow-up. The information provided by the FTTTF enhances on-going 

terrorism investigations or contributes to the initiation of a new investigation. 

The FTTTF also is developing a risk assessment tool to proactively evaluate 

foreign individuals, who want to enter or remain in the United States, to 

determine the level of national security risk or criminal risk. 

JTTF and ATAC Duplication Issues 

Regarding duplication, a few of the JTTF and ATAC members we 

interviewed stated that information sharing by the JTTFs and ATACs was 

duplicative. This concern was raised primarily among those who were 

members of and attended meetings of both a JTTF and an ATAC. However, 

those who attend each other’s meetings are only a small percentage of the JTTF 

and ATAC membership. To the majority of JTTF and ATAC members, this 

information is not duplicative, especially to the ATAC members. The ATACs 

include a much broader membership who are not law enforcement officials and 

are thus not a part of the JTTF information sharing network. They include 

first responders, (fire, emergency medical services, state, local or federal public 

health officials, hospital staff, pharmaceutical companies, representatives from 

governor’s offices, district attorneys, public utility representatives (gas, water, 
U.S. Department of Justice 31 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

electric, pipelines, telecommunications), railroad police, Coast Guard, park 

rangers, tribal law enforcement, and the more remote police and sheriff’s offices 

that do not have the resources to commit a full-time officer to the JTTF or who 

do not have a JTTF in their jurisdiction. We asked ATAC and JTTF members if 

there was information they received that they no longer wanted to receive. The 

majority responded that they would rather continue to receive all information 

regardless of duplication, rather than receive too little information or none at 

all. 

In January 2004, language appeared in the Omnibus Appropriations Act 

for 2004 recommending that the U.S. Attorneys should continue to participate 

in the JTTFs rather than maintain a separate set of U.S. Attorney task forces. 

The OIG disagrees with this recommendation and believes that the U.S. 

Attorneys through the ATACs provide a distinct and vital role separate from the 

JTTFs. This role includes the development of an expanded information sharing 

network that reaches beyond law enforcement, the provision of training to this 

expanded network, opportunities for planning and conducting responder 

exercises, and coordination of investigative and prosecutive strategies for 

terrorism cases. All the U.S. Attorneys we interviewed believed so strongly in 

the mission and effectiveness of the ATACs, they stated they would still find a 

way to continue the functions even if they were ordered to disband the ATACs 

and merge with the JTTFs. The U.S. Attorneys believed that the benefits of the 

new partnerships forged as a result of the ATACs were invaluable to both the 

USAOs and to the ATAC members. 

The role of the JTTFs is primarily investigation oriented. Although the 

FBI field offices engage in information sharing, they meet primarily with law 

enforcement officials, and the information sharing is more narrowly focused 

than the information disseminated by the ATACs. The OIG believes that to 

assume the expanded role of the ATACs would divert scarce resources away 

from what the JTTFs are set up to do, investigating terrorism threats. When 

we asked the FBI field office managers their views on merging the ATACs and 

JTTFs, the response was mixed. Some believed that they could not assume 

this expanded role of information sharing and training for larger groups outside 

of those law enforcement officials that they meet with now, either because they 

do not have the time, staff, or resources, or they viewed this role as outside the 

mission of the JTTFs. Other managers stated that they would take on this role 

if required but only with additional staff, funding, and resources. 
U.S. Department of Justice 32 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Information Sharing Has Improved 

One of the main problems identified before 

September 11, 2001, was the lack of information 

sharing among federal agencies and state and local law 

enforcement agencies. However, through our 

interviews and survey we found that information 

sharing has improved as a result of the task forces and 

councils: 

• 77 percent of JTTF respondents rated “information 

sharing at meetings” as Good to Excellent.

• 77 percent of ATAC respondents rated 

“information sharing at meetings” as Good to 

Excellent.

• 88 percent of NJTTF respondents rated 

“information sharing at meetings” as Good to 

Excellent.

• All NSCC members told us that the NSCC 

meetings provide them with terrorism information 

not available to them prior to September 11, 2001. 

• The majority of state, local, and federal law 

enforcement officials we interviewed told us that 

they were more satisfied with the exchange of 

terrorism information since September 11, 2001. 

The establishment of the task forces and councils has 

facilitated sharing of information and expanding of 

partnerships with federal, state, and local law enforcement 

and other government agencies, and private industry. 

The Task Forces and Councils Have Improved the Sharing of Information 

We concluded that the terrorism task forces and advisory councils have 

created a foundation for improving information sharing among law 

enforcement, the intelligence community, and private industry by broadening 

the pool of individuals with security clearances and providing forums for 

information exchange about terrorism matters. 

A March 2003 report 

issued by the Police 

Executive Research Forum 

suggested that local police 

believed problems existed in 

information sharing between 

state and local law 

enforcement and the FBI.18 

In our interviews, we found 

this perception has 

changed, especially in 

metropolitan areas. For 

example, the 

commissioners, chiefs of 

police, or their designees for 

the cities of Chicago, Illinois; 

Los Angeles, California; 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; 

St. Louis, Missouri; and 

Washington, D.C. told us 

that information sharing 

with the FBI in their metropolitan areas has improved since September 11, 

2001, and that the FBI has worked hard to develop relationships with local law 

enforcement. One local police official stated that information sharing is “far, 

far better than it used to be,” that sharing of terrorism information is better 

coordinated, and that his department does not currently face obstacles in 

obtaining terrorism information needed from the FBI. Law enforcement 

 

18 Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, Volume1: Local-Federal Partnerships, The 

Police Executive Research Forum, March 2003, pp-8-9. The Department’s Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services provided support for this study. 
U.S. Department of Justice 33 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

officials in these metropolitan areas stated that they believed that the FBI 

provides them with the information they needed specific to the threats for their 

immediate areas.19 

Task Forces Have Expanded the Cadre of People With Security Clearances

We found that the task forces have taken steps to ensure that a broader 

group of law enforcement officers have the security clearances needed to 

receive and share information about terrorism issues to a larger group within 

the law enforcement community. Much of the terrorism information is 

classified and can only be shared with those holding appropriate security 

clearances. The level of security clearances required by task force, council, and 

type of member are: 

• Top Secret clearance required – NSCC, NJTTF, FTTTF, and JTTF 

participants working in an FBI office who are assigned leads, 

cases, and other terrorism investigative matters.20

• No clearance required – ATAC and JTTF liaisons who serve as 

an agency’s point of contact and do not work in an FBI office.21 

While not required to have a security clearance to access ATAC 

information, 20 percent of the ATAC survey respondents had a Secret clearance 

and 58 percent had clearances of Top Secret or Top Secret with Secure 

Compartmented Information (SCI) Access. These clearances give ATAC 

members access to a wider range of information if they have a “need to know.” 

 

19 One local official we interviewed was not as positive about the sharing of information 

by the FBI. A Sheriff in Virginia complained about the lack of information from the FBI 

pertaining to his county. He stated that the information he received was no different than what 

he saw in the media. However, although this Sheriff assigned one of his deputies as a liaison 

to the local JTTF, neither the Sheriff nor the liaison possess, or had applied for, Secret or Top 

Secret clearance. When asked why not, the Sheriff stated that he believed having to apply for 

and obtain a security clearance to receive information from the FBI was an insult to a veteran 

law enforcement official. 

20 “A Secret classification is used for information if its unauthorized disclosure could 

cause serious damage to national security. Top Secret classification is used for information if 

its unauthorized disclosure could cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.” 

Executive Order 12958, March 28, 2003. 

21 The FBI classifies “full-time” JTTF members as those who work in FBI office space on 

terrorism investigations, under the supervision of an FBI SSA. The FBI does accept some 

“part-time” JTTF members if an agency can not commit a representative on a full-time basis. A 

JTTF liaison is a point of contact for an agency to the JTTF to share information and may 

attend JTTF meetings, but does not participate on a part-time or full-time basis on the JTTF. 
U.S. Department of Justice 34 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

We found that some ATAC Coordinators can share classified information with 

those members that have appropriate clearances. 

The FBI conducts background investigations to obtain Top Secret 

security clearances for state and local law enforcement task force members to 

allow them to work in FBI office space and conduct terrorism investigations. It 

also obtains Secret security clearances for higher ranking state and local law 

enforcement personnel (e.g., chiefs or sheriffs) to facilitate greater information 

sharing between agencies. The following table shows the number of clearances 

processed by the FBI between September 11, 2001, and September 2004. 

Table 3: Security Clearances Processed by the FBI for 

 State and Local Officials and Task Force Members 

September 11, 2001 to September 2004

Applicants 

Clearance 

Requests 

Received 

Clearances 

Granted1

Undergoing 

Review 

Discontinued or 

Administratively 

Closed2

State and Local 

Law Enforcement 

Executives 

3,553 3,082 (87%) 344 (9.6%) 127 (3.5%)

Task Force 

Members 1,957 1,757 (90%) 200 (10%) 0

Total 5,510 4,839 (88%) 544 (9.8%) 127 (2.3%)

Source: FBI, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: The FBI’s Counterterrorism 

Program Since September 2001, April 14, 2004, p. 42 and data provided by the FBI to the OIG. 

Note 1: The “clearances granted” for law enforcement executives include 2,858 at the Secret level and 224 at the Top 

Secret level. The “clearances granted” for task force members include 1,710 at the Top Secret level and 47 at 

the Top Secret level with SCI access. 

Note 2: The clearance process is discontinued or administratively closed when applicants withdraw their applications, 

additional information from applicants is requested but is not provided, or applications are 

incomplete. 

The total number of state and local law enforcement members cleared 

and assigned on the JTTFs changes continually as members join or are 

reassigned by their parent agencies. Therefore, we requested a “snapshot” of 

JTTF members by clearance levels and agency, shown in the following table. 
U.S. Department of Justice 35 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Table 4: Clearance Levels of JTTF Members - State and 

Local Government and Private Industry 

April 2004

Type of Clearance Number of Full-Time 

Members 

Top Secret or Top Secret with SCI 566 (80%) 

Interim Top Secret or Interim Secret 37 (5%) 

Undergoing Review 108 (15%) 

Total 711 (100%) 

Source: NJTTF and the FBI’s Personnel Security Unit 

Note: In April 2004, the FBI also had 397 part-time JTTF members. 

The FBI has shortened the length of time taken to process security 

clearance applications. In February 2003, the FBI’s Security Division created 

the Initial Clearance and Access Unit - 2 (ICAU2) to process and adjudicate 

background investigations for non-FBI JTTF members, law enforcement 

executives, and elected officials who require access to classified information. 

The ICAU2 receives a clearance application from an FBI field office, assigns it 

to an adjudicator who reviews the application in accordance with the 

government-wide adjudicative standards and recommends whether to grant a 

security clearance. Provided that no derogatory information emerges during 

the background investigation, the ICAU2 estimated that it should take no more 

than or 180 to 270 days for non-FBI JTTF members to receive a Top Secret 

clearance and 30 to 45 days to receive a Secret clearance. If derogatory 

information arises in the clearance process, the ICAU2 works to resolve the 

matter, which can add time to the process. A GAO review found that between 

September 11, 2001, and March 2004, the FBI decreased the processing times 

for Top Secret clearances from an average of 244 to 36 days, and for Secret 

clearances from an average of 90 to 40 days.22 The GAO attributed the 

decrease in processing times to the guidance the FBI provided to its field offices 

and state and local law enforcement on the security clearance process and its 

modifications to the security clearance unit.23 

 

22 The FBI gave highest priority to processing Top Secret clearances, which could have 

affected the dramatic decrease in processing time. 

23 Security Clearances, FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law 

Enforcement Officials, Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-596, April 2004. 
U.S. Department of Justice 36 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Task Forces and Advisory Councils Provide Broad Audiences With 

Opportunities for Exchanging Information About Terrorism 

Each task force and council attracts a variety of members that have a 

need for terrorism-related information and shares this information with 

members through meetings or electronic forums. To increase ATAC 

membership, CTS and EOUSA advised the USAOs’ ATAC Coordinators to be as 

inclusive as possible when determining ATAC membership and to include any 

relevant organization that has a need for terrorism-related threat information.24 

Leaders of the NJTTF, JTTFs, FTTTF, and NSCC also share information with 

broad audiences by including chief executive officers from private agencies or 

non-law enforcement members in their information exchanges. At times, 

guests with expertise or interest in the information being discussed are invited 

by the ATACs, FTTTF, JTTFs, NJTTF, and NSCC to participate in a meeting. 

Meetings: Our interviews and survey of task force and council leaders 

and members showed that the primary purposes of the meetings are to share 

information and intelligence, provide updates on cases with a terrorism nexus, 

discuss threat assessments, and obtain member agency updates. The majority 

of ATAC, FTTTF, JTTF, and NJTTF members we surveyed characterized the 

task force and council meetings as “useful” in preparing them to plan for and 

respond to terrorism. Our survey showed that of those who were able to 

evaluate the task force or advisory council meetings, 90 percent of ATAC 

respondents, 75 percent of FTTTF respondents, 86 percent of JTTF 

respondents, and 100 percent of NJTTF respondents rated meetings as “useful” 

or “very useful.” 

Most of the task forces and councils hold regular meetings, although the 

frequency varies based on the mission and functions performed. NJTTF 

meetings are held daily, sometimes twice a day, depending on the threat and 

task force activity. Meetings include discussions of current threats, updates on 

special projects, and the sharing of information and intelligence. The FTTTF 

does not have a need for daily meetings; instead, the Director convenes all 

members at least once a month to discuss administrative issues and current 

projects. Also, since December 2003, the FTTTF meets monthly with liaisons 

from DHS components, international intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the El Paso 

Intelligence Center.25 The NSCC meets at least once a month, and sometimes 

twice a month, to share information across Department components. The 

 

24 ATAC/CMC Conference Issues Raised, U.S. Department of Justice, CTS, April 2004, 

page 8. 

25 NCTC was formerly called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). 
U.S. Department of Justice 37 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Deputy Attorney General sets the agenda based upon input received from the 

NSCC members, interagency councils, the DHS, and the President’s National 

Security Council. 

At the field level, the ATACs and JTTFs do not have standard meeting 

schedules, but rather adjust meeting frequency and type to respond to 

members’ needs, threats, cases, or special projects. We found most ATACs 

meet monthly to quarterly, and the topic and type of the meeting vary widely. 

Each USAO attempts to fit the ATAC meeting to the needs of its membership. 

ATAC members repeatedly stressed the need to have focused, useful meetings; 

one member stated: 

I do not think pro-forma, regular meetings enhance 

information flow or otherwise meaningfully contribute 

to improving anti-terrorism abilities. Those benefits 

come from maintaining and developing working 

relationships with law enforcement through working 

cases, through providing meaningful training, and 

through jointly participating in outreach activities in 

the community. Agents and officers know when a 

meeting is called for the sake of having a meeting, and 

do not seem to appreciate it. 

Often, ATAC meetings include an 

anti-terrorism training session. 

Approximately two-thirds of the 

ATACs have subcommittees that 

have specific focuses appropriate for 

that jurisdiction (e.g., Maritime 

Issues Subcommittee in districts 

with ports). 

Most JTTFs meet as an entire 

group, or as squads, on a regular 

basis to discuss case updates and 

administrative issues and to share 

information and intelligence. Also, 

the JTTFs individually host 

Executive Board meetings for 

agency heads and other top-level 

managers from participating organizations, including leaders from federal, 

state, and local law enforcement, to share information about upcoming events 

and to discuss administrative matters related to the task force’s operations. 

The JTTF Executive Board meeting we observed during one of our site visits 

Other Mechanisms for Information Sharing 

Information Sharing With Parent Agencies: Task 

force members, who work daily in FBI office space, 

also share information with their parent agencies 

in reports or e-mails, or by telephone. For 

example, one NJTTF member told us that he calls 

his supervisor to share relevant information from 

meetings and the daily FBI Director’s Briefing 

Book. 

Information Sharing Between Task Force Members:

To maximize the sharing of information and 

knowledge, the FTTTF, JTTFs, and NJTTF use an 

open office space design and co-locate members. 

The directors of these task forces stated that the 

open office design is as vital to information sharing 

as the members themselves because it allows for 

enhanced communication and immediate input on 

information or intelligence. 
U.S. Department of Justice 38 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

was well attended by federal, state, and local participating organizations on the 

JTTF, declassified information for the jurisdiction was shared, and the U.S. 

Attorney made a presentation. The frequency of Executive Board meetings 

varies across JTTFs, but they occur at least every quarter. 

 The following table outlines information we collected through interviews 

and surveys about task force and council meetings. 

Table 5: Meetings Held and the Members’ Ratings 

of the Quality of Information Shared 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 

Meeting Type(s) 

Meeting 

Frequency Quality of Information 

Shared in the Meetings Audiences 

Impact of the 

Meeting on 

Members 

Full Meeting 

Type(s) of 

Information 

Shared – Majority 

is specific to 

region or locale. 

Some national or 

international. 

Level(s) – Most 

unclassified, law 

enforcement 

sensitive by 

exception. 

Some ATACs 

have dual 

meetings that 

begin with a 

regular agenda 

for all members, 

those in law 

enforcement then 

stay on to receive 

any law 

enforcement 

sensitive 

information. 

Weekly – 0.4% 

Every two 

weeks – 3.5% 

Monthly – 

31.2% 

Quarterly – 

43.8% 

Other – 17.3% 

Percentage of 

respondents rating the 

following as “excellent” or 

“good” -

Information/intelligence 

sharing – 80% 

Member agency updates – 

73% 

Discussion of threat 

assessments – 72% 

Case updates – 61% 

Chaired by the AUSA/ 

ATAC Coordinator. 

Members - ATAC and 

JTTF members from 

local area or region, 

including law 

enforcement, first 

responders, private 

industry, intelligence 

community, military, 

and other federal 

agencies. Guests 

periodically attend. 

90% of 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as 

“very useful” or 

“useful” in 

preparing them 

to plan for or 

respond to 

terrorism. 

Only 7.8% 

rated the 

meeting as “not 

useful at all.” 
U.S. Department of Justice 39 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 

Meeting Type(s) 

Meeting 

Frequency Quality of Information 

Shared in the Meetings Audiences 

Impact of the 

Meeting on 

Members 

Subcommittee 

Meeting 

Type(s) of 

Information 

Shared – Topic 

specific to region 

or locale. 

Level(s) – Law 

enforcement 

sensitive or 

unclassified 

Weekly – 2.3% 

Every two 

weeks – 1.9% 

Monthly – 

11.9% 

Quarterly – 

11.1% 

Other – 24.5% 

Don’t have 

subcommittees

– 33.2% 

Percentage of 

respondents rating the 

following as “excellent” or 

“good” – 

Information/intelligence 

sharing – 82% 

Member agency updates – 

73% 

Threat assessments 

discussed – 70% 

Case updates – 70% 

Chair(s) appointed by 

the ATAC Coordinator. 

Members – ATAC 

members with expertise 

or interest in subject. 

61.7% of 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as 

“very useful” or 

“useful” in 

preparing them 

to plan for or 

respond to 

terrorism. 

Only 7.4% 

rated the 

meetings as 

“not useful at 

all.” 

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force 

Meeting Type(s) 

Meeting 

Frequency Quality of Information 

Shared in the Meetings Audiences 

Impact of the 

Meeting on 

Members 

Full Meeting 

Type(s) of 

Information 

Shared – Specific 

to FTTTF units or 

agencies; 

administrative 

matters 

discussed. 

Level(s) - Secret, 

Top Secret, or 

unclassified 

Staff meetings 

occur on at 

least a 

monthly 

basis.†

†This data came 

from interviews 

with FTTTF 

members. 

Percentage of 

respondents rating the 

following as “excellent” or 

“good” - 

Information/intelligence 

sharing – 69% 

Member agency updates – 

67% 

Threat assessments 

discussed – 50% 

Case updates - 56% 

Members – 

Headquarters-level law 

enforcement, 

intelligence community, 

military, and other 

federal agencies. 

Support staff and agents 

detailed to FTTTF from 

FBI field offices or 

functions. 

75% of 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as 

“useful” in 

preparing them 

to plan for or 

respond to 

terrorism. 

16% rated the 

meetings as 

“not useful at 

all.” 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

40 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

Meeting Type(s) 

Meeting 

Frequency 

(how often) 

Quality of Information 

Shared in the Meetings Audiences 

Impact of the 

Meeting on 

Members 

Full Meeting 

Type(s) of 

Information 

Shared – Specific 

to field office’s 

authority, 

national and 

international 

matters 

impacting office, 

and 

administrative 

issues. 

Level(s) – Secret, 

law enforcement 

sensitive, or 

unclassified 

Daily – 4.2% 

Weekly – 

22.8% 

Every two 

weeks – 12.7% 

Monthly – 

22.0% 

Quarterly – 

19.3% 

Other – 12.0% 

Percentage of 

respondents rating the 

following as “excellent” or 

“good” - 

Information/intelligence 

sharing - 79% 

Member agency updates - 

76% 

Threat assessments 

discussed - 81% 

Case updates – 75% 

Chaired by the ASAC or 

JTTF Supervisor with 

jurisdiction over JTTF 

squads. 

Members – Federal, state, 

and local law 

enforcement personnel, 

FBI agents, JTTF liaisons 

from local area or region, 

including law 

enforcement, first 

responders, private 

industry, intelligence 

community, military, and 

other federal agencies. 

Guests are periodically 

invited. 

85.9% of the 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as 

“very useful” or 

“useful” in 

preparing them 

to plan for or 

respond to 

terrorism. 

Only 8.8% of the 

respondents 

rated the 

meeting as “not 

useful at all.” 

Squad Meetings 

Type(s) of 

Information 

Shared – Specific 

to field office’s 

authority, local 

cases or leads, 

national and 

international 

matters 

impacting office, 

and 

administrative 

issues. 

Level(s) – Secret, 

law enforcement 

sensitive, or 

unclassified 

Daily – 3.9% 

Weekly – 

14.3% 

Every two 

weeks – 8.9% 

Monthly – 

19.7% 

Quarterly – 

7.7% 

Other – 10.4% 

Don’t have 

squads – 

32.3% 

Information/intelligence 

sharing – 83% 

Member agency updates - 

75% 

Threat assessments 

discussed – 79% 

Case updates – 78% 

Chaired by the JTTF’s 

Supervisory Special 

Agent(s). The SAC and 

ASAC may attend. 

Members - JTTF 

members from local area 

or region assigned to the 

particular squad (e.g., 

international terrorism, 

domestic terrorism, 

others). 

84.1% of the 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as 

“very useful” or 

“useful” in 

preparing them 

to plan for or 

respond to 

terrorism. 

Only 9.3% of 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as “not 

useful at all.” 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

41 

National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

Meeting Type(s) 

Meeting 

Frequency 

(how often) 

Quality of Information 

Shared in the Meetings Audiences 

Impact of the 

Meeting on 

Members 

NJTTF Meeting 

Type(s) of 

Information 

Shared -

Intelligence 

briefings, case 

updates, threats 

Level(s) – Top 

Secret, Secret, 

law enforcement 

sensitive, or 

unclassified 

Daily Percentage of respondents 

rating the following meeting 

activities as “excellent” or 

“good” - 

Information/intelligence 

sharing – 86% 

Member agency updates – 

69% 

Threat assessments 

discussed – 85% 

Case updates – 75% 

Chaired by the NJTTF 

Unit Chief or Deputy 

Chief. 

Members – 

Headquarters-level law 

enforcement, military, 

intelligence community, 

and other federal 

agencies, rotating state 

and local members. 

100% of the 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as 

“very useful” or 

“useful” in 

preparing them 

to plan for or 

respond to 

terrorism. 

No NJTTF 

respondents 

rated the 

meetings as “not 

useful at all.” 

National Security Coordination Council 

Meeting Type(s) 

Meeting 

Frequency Quality of Information 

Shared in the Meetings Audiences 

Impact of the 

Meeting on 

Members 

Full Meeting 

Type(s) of 

information 

shared – 

Threats, budget 

information 

related to 

national 

security, 

national security 

initiatives, 

requests for 

information, 

general briefings. 

Level(s) – Top 

Secret, Secret 

Every two 

weeks to 

once a 

month. 

NSCC members were not 

asked specifically about 

quality of information 

shared. 

Chaired by the Deputy 

Attorney General. 

Members – All DOJ 

agency heads, to 

include ATF, BOP, 

DEA, FBI, USMS; as 

well as the heads of 

CTS and OIPR; CIA, 

DHS, and other 

government agencies 

are invited to share 

information and 

coordinate on specific 

issues. 

All those 

members 

interviewed, 

stated the 

meetings were 

very useful in 

helping them 

plan and 

coordinate 

national security 

and 

counterterrorism 

initiatives, as 

well as share 

information. 

Source: Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, Office of the Inspector General, January 2004, and interviews. 

Notes: The “Meeting Type(s)” column presents responses to, “In the last year, how often did the entire task 

force/advisory council meet?” and “In the last year, how often did the entire task force’s squad or advisory 

council’s subcommittees meet?” The data is from survey respondents, but the table also includes data 

obtained through interviews and observations of meetings. The “Quality of Information Shared in the 

Meetings” column presents data that excludes those respondents answering don’t know or not applicable. The 

response choices to the survey question were excellent, good, average, poor, very poor, don’t know, and not 

applicable. The “Impact of the Meeting on Members” column presents data that excludes those respondents 

answering not able to evaluate. The response choices were very useful, useful, not at all useful, not able to 

evaluate, and no opinion. The data related to “meeting frequency” for the NJTTF came from interviews with 

NJTTF members. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

42 

We also found that task force and council leaders and most members 

participate in additional anti-terrorism meetings chaired by federal, state, or 

local officials. They attend these meetings as a form of outreach, to share 

information with other audiences, and to build relationships. The information 

gained through these meetings is then shared with the task forces and 

councils. The following table shows the types of meetings attended. 

Table 6: Other Meetings Attended 

Some Task Force or Advisory 

Council Members... May attend... 

ATAC 

JTTF meetings, local terrorism task 

force meetings, and where 

applicable, state homeland security 

task force meetings 

JTTF 

ATAC meetings, local terrorism 

task force meetings, and where 

applicable, state homeland security 

task force meetings 

NJTTF 

FBI’s daily Secure Video 

Teleconferencing System meetings, 

NCTC meetings 

FTTTF NCTC meetings, DHS, and/or CIA 

Counterterrorism Center meetings 

Electronic Systems: Task force and council members routinely use 

electronic data systems for quick, often real-time, exchange of information and 

intelligence related to terrorism issues. JTTF members stated that they use the 

following systems to receive and share information outside of the FBI: Law 

Enforcement Online (LEO), National Law Enforcement Telecommunications 

System (NLETS), and Regional Information Sharing System (RISS). The FBI 

has expanded its use of LEO by requiring all JTTF members to have LEO 

accounts, and by establishing Special Interest Groups for the NJTTF and 

JTTFs that law enforcement personnel can use to exchange terrorism 

information. The LEO system is interconnected with RISS and NLETS. 

Appendix III outlines the content of these systems. 

The NJTTF is developing other systems to increase its ability to share 

information. For example, the Guardian system was deployed in all JTTFs in 

August 2004. Guardian is a terrorism reporting management system used by 

the JTTFs to automate all terrorism complaints, document terrorist activity, 

and report suspicious activity and pre-operational surveillance incidents. 

When local and state law enforcement agencies call their local JTTF and report 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

43 

suspicious activity, the JTTF enters the information directly into Guardian. 

JTTF members from other government agencies also can access Guardian and 

share information with their agencies. 

The ATACs have invested in communications equipment to increase 

information sharing between state and local law enforcement, first responders, 

and the USAOs. When formed, each ATAC received an allocation of $100,000 

for improving the communication ability of state and local law enforcement or 

for training ATAC members. By December 2004, the ATACs had spent 

approximately $4.9 million (52 percent) of the $9.3 million they received for 

communication items. For example, the ATAC in West Virginia purchased 

computers for each sheriff and police department throughout the state. Many 

of these rural law enforcement agencies did not previously have computers or 

access to e-mail. Additionally, the Middle District of Alabama purchased 

computers and internet access, as well as radios that linked with an existing 

dispatch center, for those law enforcement agencies that did not have this 

equipment. The Connecticut ATAC purchased six transmitters to improve a 

communication system used by local agencies. 

CTS has increased information sharing in the field through the 

development and expansion of a CTS website available to ATAC Coordinators 

and USAO Intelligence Research Specialists. The CTS website includes the 

following: 

• CTS Daily Report – Each ATAC Coordinator is required to report 

to a CTS Regional ATAC Coordinator any information related to 

terrorism that may be occurring in the district, whether a case, 

prosecution, event, or threat. CTS compiles this information 

and produces a CTS Daily Report, which is posted on the 

website so that ATACs nationwide can see what is going on in 

other jurisdictions. CTS also provides this report to the 

Attorney General and the FBI. 

• Counterterrorism Resource Library – This library assists 

prosecutors working on terrorism-related matters by providing 

materials related to the investigation and prosecution of 

terrorism cases. It includes Department guidance, past 

indictments, sample pleadings, model jury instructions, and 

related materials. According to the User’s Guide, the resource 

library serves as a tool to enable prosecutors to share materials 

and draw on the experiences of others in terrorism-related 

cases. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

44 

• CTS Process Tracking Database – This database was created for 

use in the event of a national crisis to facilitate the tracking, 

issuance, and deconfliction of the criminal investigative process 

across multiple districts. AUSAs working on terrorism 

prosecutions can enter information used in subpoenas, court 

orders, and other investigative processes into this searchable 

database, which can reduce duplication and unintended 

conflicts in nationwide investigations. 

• Case Notification Forms – AUSAs can complete the case 

notification forms online and forward them electronically to CTS 

to advise of the opening of an international or domestic 

terrorism investigation or prosecution. These electronic forms 

promote additional information sharing and assist CTS in 

coordinating terrorism matters across the nation. Additionally, 

CTS can link intelligence information from investigative 

agencies to matters opened by terrorism prosecutors. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

45 

New York City’s Perception on Information Sharing 

During a March 2003 public hearing, Raymond Kelly, the Commissioner 

of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), noted that information sharing 

with the FBI had improved. He stated: 

I have been in law enforcement a long time, both on 

the federal and local level. And clearly there were 

some issues in the past with the flow of information. I 

can tell you that has changed significantly in the 

aftermath of September 11...There is a palpable 

difference in [the FBI and CIA’s] approach to doing 

business. They want to get that information out. They 

are getting it out.26 

One year later, during a March 2004 House Appropriations Committee 

hearing, Representative John Sweeney raised some concerns about information 

sharing between the FBI and state and local law enforcement. In this hearing, 

Congressman Sweeney directed the following comments to FBI Director 

Mueller: 

...There is a general perception beginning to develop 

out there that we’re slipping back into some old 

patterns. And, in particular, the sharing of 

information between state and local officials has been 

raised as a concern, and specifically raised as a 

concern by my friends in...New York City...Given the 

priority New York City is and the target that it is, that 

it possibly could be happening all over the country, 

and I think it’s a worry that we all have. Specifically, 

the complaint is once people receive top secret 

clearances, cooperation with the bureau has not been 

what the anticipation was there. 

 To assess concerns that the information sharing between the FBI and the 

state and local law enforcement may have diminished since the months 

immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, we returned to New York 

City in April 2004 and conducted additional interviews on this topic. Senior 

officials from the NYPD told us that the relationship between the FBI and NYPD 

 

26 FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, Report to the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, FBI, p. 38. See: Testimony of 

Commissioner Raymond Kelly before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, March 31, 2003. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

46 

was good and had improved since September 11, 2001. One official said that 

information sharing with the FBI had become “bigger and better.” According to 

these officials, the NYPD has a chief, captain, lieutenants, and detectives 

participating in every JTTF squad who partner with the JTTF special agents. 

They informed us that NYPD supervises its own officers on the JTTF, but the 

FBI and NYPD work together on the JTTF squads and are co-located.

NYPD officials stated that to some extent, information sharing and 

reporting between officers and their sergeants depends on the personalities 

involved and their relationships. NYPD officials said that in most cases if a 

NYPD detective on the JTTF obtains information or intelligence, the NYPD 

detective tells his FBI supervisor and NYPD Sergeant and each will share the 

information up though their chain of command. The JTTF members also share 

information either directly with the NYPD intelligence unit or with staff from 

the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism. If the need arises, the 

Police Commissioner also directly contacts the FBI Assistant Director in Charge 

(ADIC) of the New York City field office.27 

NYPD officials also acknowledged that due to their expanded presence on 

the New York City JTTF, they now have access to CIA and NSA information that 

they did not have prior to September 11, 2001. Officials stated that they also 

are pushing for full integration of the JTTF by requesting that an NYPD official 

be placed as a “Deputy” to the SAC to act as the number two person or comanager in charge of the JTTF. This, they believe, would further promote 

“real-time” information sharing. When asked if the NYPD supports placing FBI 

agents in its intelligence unit, the NYPD officials stated that they are interested 

in more aggressive interaction at the working level, not integration of the FBI in 

NYPD’s intelligence office. 

NYPD officials did complain that their NYPD officers on the JTTF can 

access only certain parts of the FBI’s Automated Case Support (ACS) system.28 

Specifically, NYPD believes it should have access to three automated screens in 

the system that included information on management of caseloads and 

assignments, management of leads, and confidential informants. NYPD 

 

27 A Special Agent in Charge oversees each FBI field office, except for the largest field 

offices (Washington, DC, Los Angeles, and New York City) which are headed by an Assistant 

Director in Charge. 

28 ACS is the system used by the FBI to maintain current and historical records on its 

cases. It consists of three components: Investigative Case Management, Universal Index, and 

the Electronic Case File. The Investigative Case Management component and the Lead Bucket 

Screen are used by the FBI to manage the case loads and work assignments of its agents. 

Information on confidential informants maintained in ACS cross references to another FBI data 

system that contains data on confidential informants. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

47 

officials stated that they are not always pleased with the information the FBI 

allows them to see and are not convinced they “see everything.” When asked 

how the lack of access to this information impacts their work, the NYPD 

officials said they could not state for certain that the lack of information 

impacts them, but they believe that they have a right to know and the FBI has 

an obligation to inform them. 

NYPD officials also expressed concern about the security levels of some 

FBI meetings. For example, there is a case being worked by a group of 

detectives from the NYPD intelligence unit who are not on the JTTF, but the 

detectives are not permitted to attend an FBI meeting about the case because 

they do not have SCI clearance. NYPD officials believed the security threshold 

of the meeting should be lowered (from SCI to Top Secret) to enable these 

detectives to participate. 

One NYPD official summarized his concern about the need for 

information: 

We need information because we are at the top of the 

target. As NYPD has increased its involvement, the 

greater the commitment made. Capabilities, interests, 

and needs have increased as our involvement has 

increased. We have 1,000 employees daily devoted to 

counterterrorism. We don’t know how the lack of 

information has impacted us because we don’t know 

what is out there. We have a right to know 

immediately about cases that tangentially are related 

to New York...The more we know about plots, plans, 

and events can influence what we do to protect our 

system. The more we know, the better our protective 

processes... We don’t have unlimited resources, so the 

more informed we are, the better decisions we can 

make on deploying people. The more details we know 

about a plot, this can influence what we do to protect 

that target. Generic information only helps you make 

generic deployment decisions. 

 

The FBI’s Perspective 

 We interviewed the FBI’s Acting SAC in New York City for her perspective 

on the state of information sharing with the NYPD. She told us that nothing 

had changed in the FBI’s relationship with NYPD since our first visit in July 

2003, and that the FBI’s door is wide open. The 14 JTTF squads in New York 

City are matched almost one for one with FBI agents and NYPD officers; that is, 
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for every FBI agent on the 14 squads, there is an NYPD detective. There is an 

NYPD sergeant assigned to every JTTF squad to supervise the detective(s). 

Additionally, the NYPD has officers assigned to the New York City FBI’s three 

surveillance squads. 

 The Acting SAC also noted that information sharing with NYPD occurs 

through the following additional methods: 

• NYPD JTTF members attend the FBI’s daily threat briefings for the 

(FBI’s) ADIC. The NYPD JTTF members then brief the NYPD 

Commissioner and his Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism. 

• NYPD JTTF members attend the FBI’s weekly “threat” meetings. 

• NYPD JTTF lieutenants “surf” through the FBI’s ACS system daily. 

• NYPD lieutenants read all CIA and NSA intelligence “traffic” daily in 

the FBI SCIF.29

• New York City FBI has threat briefings or meetings on specific cases 

(called a Principal’s Briefing) that the NYPD Commissioner or Deputy 

Commissioner for Counterterrorism may attend. 

• The FBI has a computer terminal with access to NYPD’s Orion 

database. All terrorism-related calls that come into NYPD’s 

intelligence unit are entered into NYPD’s Orion database. The NYPD 

detectives follow through on each call and their actions are entered 

into the Orion database. The FBI maintains an Orion terminal to 

show the NYPD that all calls have been addressed. 

 The Acting SAC told us that this level of information sharing means that 

anything an FBI agent on the JTTF has, the NYPD has. NYPD officers are cocase agents on almost every investigation the JTTF runs, and there is rarely a 

deployment overseas when NYPD does not accompany the FBI. She also 

informed us that the NYPD has made additional requests for an NYPD 

lieutenant for every three squads and to add a senior manager to the FBI New 

York City field office who would serve as a Deputy to the FBI’s SAC to facilitate 

information exchange. 

 

29 A sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) is an accredited area, room, 

group of rooms, buildings, or installation where SCI access information may be stored, 

used, discussed, and/or processed. 
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Regarding ACS system access, the Acting SAC stated that NYPD has full 

access to the screens in the ACS system that the FBI’s other JTTF members 

have: counterterrorism investigations, drug cases, and organized crime cases. 

They do not have full access to police/public corruption cases, white collar 

cases, or foreign counterintelligence cases. All JTTF members, including the 

FBI members, are blocked from access to these screens, but there are 

procedures to obtain this information through the FBI for those with an 

established “need to know.” 

The Acting SAC stated that NYPD complains that information sharing is 

not a two-way street, but she expressed concern that the New York City FBI 

does not receive any of NYPD’s intelligence. The FBI has made requests to 

NYPD’s Office of Intelligence for NYPD to disseminate information to the New 

York City field office so the FBI can review NYPD’s intelligence. Additionally, 

the New York City FBI has offered to place FBI agents in the NYPD intelligence 

unit but NYPD has declined. The Acting SAC stated that if the FBI is not able 

to review NYPD’s intelligence, links to terrorism may go undetected. She also 

stated that the FBI needs the intelligence from NYPD’s sources but is not 

receiving it. She said that the FBI “does not intentionally hold back 

information from the NYPD.” 
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“Partnership” is a Major Theme in the 

Department’s Strategic Plan 

“We are committed to continuing and 

strengthening collaborative efforts with 

other federal agencies, states and 

localities, tribal governments, community 

groups, foreign countries, and others. 

Since critical crime and justice issues 

transcend traditional jurisdictional and 

functional boundaries, effective 

partnerships are a key ingredient to 

achieving results. This is especially true 

with information-sharing among law 

enforcement and intelligence communities 

to prevent acts of terrorism against the 

United States.” 

Source: U.S. Department of Justice FY 2003-

2008 Strategic Plan 

Task Forces and Councils Have Improved and Expanded Partnerships in 

the Field and Headquarters 

The Task Forces and Councils Have Improved Partnerships

We found that, contrary to the conditions that existed before 

September 11, 2001, the federal (non-FBI), state, and local agency 

representatives assigned to the 

JTTFs, FTTTF, and NJTTF are 

given similar responsibilities and 

duties as FBI members on the task 

forces and actively contribute to 

the task forces’ missions. When 

describing pre-September 11, 

2001, partnerships in an April 

2004 National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States Staff Statement, Executive 

Director Philip Zelikow, stated that 

“state and local entities believed 

that they would gain little from 

having representatives on the 

JTTF. Detailees were there as 

liaisons rather than a full working 

member.” 30 

Our interviews and survey results indicate that the situation has 

changed since September 11, 2001. Agency representatives regularly lead 

cases, receive taskings in their areas of expertise, and participate in the initial 

stages of the investigative process. The following table provides our survey 

results. 

 

30 Staff Statement No. 9, Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection 

in the United States Prior to 9/11, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, April 13, 2004, page 10. 
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Table 7: Non-FBI Task Force Representatives’ Perceptions of the 

Work Performed and Assignments Received 

Survey Question: Considering your taskings for this task force, 

please rate the following statements: 

FTTTF respondents 

answering “strongly 

agree” or “agree” 

JTTF respondents 

answering “strongly 

agree” or “agree” 

NJTTF respondents 

answering “strongly 

agree” or “agree” 

I receive taskings in 

my area of 

expertise. 

86% 78% 79%

I am assigned as the 

lead investigator 

when appropriate. 

N/A 62% N/A

I am included in the 

initial stages of 

tasking. 

83% 71% 77%

I make worthwhile 

contributions to the 

task force’s mission. 

88% 86% 86%

Source: Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Survey, January 2004. 

Note: The data above excludes responses received from FBI staff assigned to the task forces and 

those respondents who provided answers of not applicable or unknown. The percentages 

shown above represent those respondents who selected strongly agree or agree from a scale 

that included strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree, not applicable, or

unknown. N/A = Not applicable. 

Within the Department, the task forces and councils also have improved 

partnerships between the FBI and the USAOs in the following ways: 

• FBI JTTF supervisors also are members of the ATACs and brief the 

ATAC members on the latest terrorism-related information and 

incidents nationwide or internationally that may have relevance or 

significance to that district. 

• Some ATAC Coordinators have assigned their Intelligence Research 

Specialists to work at the JTTF to facilitate the exchange of 

intelligence and case information. This arrangement has benefited 

both the JTTF and the ATAC Coordinator, because the Intelligence 

Research Specialist offers analytical assistance to the JTTF and 

shares information directly with the ATAC. 

 

• ATAC Coordinators and other AUSAs work with the JTTFs from the 

initial point of surveillance and investigation through prosecution and 

sentencing to ensure that appropriate legal requirements and 

strategies are followed. 
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The ATACs also have developed a closer partnership between the USAOs 

and CTS. The six Regional Coordinators assigned to CTS work with the ATAC 

Coordinators within a region to identify national trends or legal issues and 

develop investigative and prosecutive strategies to address those issues. 

Deputy Attorney General Comey told us that the U.S. Attorneys historically 

prided their independence, but now there is greater coordination and 

information sharing between the USAOs and the Criminal Division. 

To further promote this information sharing, Deputy Attorney General 

Comey issued a memorandum in January 2005 setting forth guidance on how 

the USAOs and CTS should coordinate on international and domestic terrorism 

matters.31 This memorandum provides interim guidance on information 

sharing between USAOs and CTS for terrorism-related topics and notification 

requirements that include CTS contact information. 

To further develop and coordinate investigative and prosecutive 

strategies in terrorism matters, CTS, with assistance from EOUSA, has 

provided training sessions to the ATACs and other AUSAs who prosecute these 

cases. Training has included such topics as Prosecuting Terrorism Hoaxes, 

and Fundamental Principles Governing Extraterritorial Prosecutions – 

Jurisdiction, Venue and Procedural Rights. Additionally, CTS has issued 

memoranda to the ATAC Coordinators providing guidance and advice on the 

applicability of charges stemming from situations such as using Ricin as a 

terrorist weapon, and hostage taking and bombing incidents involving schools 

or educational facilities. 

Regional training sessions, conferences, and several live teleconferences 

broadcast by satellite also have been provided by EOUSA’s Office of Legal 

Education with coordination and assistance from the FBI. Topics have 

included: 

• Handling of Classified Information, 

• Information Sharing, 

 

31 The guidance “will be implemented on a temporary basis for one year; at the 

conclusion of which the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee and the Assistant Attorney 

General for the Criminal Division will confer with the Deputy Attorney General and the 

Attorney General to determine whether these provisions, or any modifications, should be 

adopted on a permanent basis.” Memorandum for All United States Attorneys Anti-Terrorism 

Advisory Council Coordinators, U.S. Department of Justice, Deputy Attorney General James B. 

Comey, January 13, 2005. 
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Partnerships at Work 

While servicing a rear lavatory at approximately 11:30 p.m., 

on October 16, 2003, a Southwest Airlines maintenance 

technician in New Orleans discovered a plastic storage bag 

containing bleach, molding clay, box cutters, matches, and 

an anonymous note. At the same time, identical materials 

were found on a Southwest aircraft in Houston. 

The Federal Air Marshal notified the FBI’s Counterterrorism 

Watch Unit (CT Watch) of these incidences, and at 6:00 

a.m. on October 17, the NJTTF was informed of this matter. 

Because of its partnerships and co-location of its members, 

the NJTTF simultaneously notified the agencies needed to 

investigate these incidents and directed each agency to 

search its databases and notify the NJTTF of any potential 

leads or suspects. The NJTTF also held a meeting with all 

FBI SACs about the threat incidents and sought the field’s 

assistance in identifying potential leads. An NJTTF 

member from the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) searched the TSA’s databases and found that on 

September 15, 2003, Nathaniel T. Heatwole had sent an email to its Contact Center claiming that he had committed 

these acts, and he characterized his deed as an “act of civil 

disobedience with the aim of improving public safety.” 

Through the coordinated efforts of the NJTTF, Baltimore 

JTTF, CTS, TSA, and the Federal Air Marshals, Mr. 

Heatwole was apprehended by 2:00 p.m. that afternoon. 

Without the partnerships, a key FBI official estimated that 

it would have taken at least five days to solve this case. 

Mr. Heatwole was originally charged with a felony violation 

of Title 49 United States Code, Section 46505(b)(1), 

“carrying or attempting to carry a concealed dangerous 

weapon on an aircraft that is accessible to the individual in 

flight,” which carries a maximum sentence of ten years. 

Instead, Mr. Heatwole pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge 

of entering an airport area in violation of security 

requirements. On June 24, 2004, the U.S. District Court 

sentenced Mr. Heatwole to two years of supervised 

probation and a $1,000 fine. 

• Overview of AntiTerrorism Efforts, 

• Community Threat 

Assessments, 

• Attorney General 

Guidelines in 

Domestic Terrorism 

Investigations, 

• Anthrax 

Investigations, 

• Financial 

Investigations, 

• Methods of Operations 

by Al Qaeda; and 

• FBI intelligence 

briefings. 

CTS and EOUSA also 

have worked jointly to plan and 

provide annual training 

conferences for the ATAC 

Coordinators with sessions that 

focused on terrorism-related 

legal issues and guidance for 

prosecutors. 

The Task Forces and Councils 

Have Expanded Partnerships

We also found that the 

post-September 11, 2001, 

terrorism task forces and 

councils have expanded 

partnerships by including a wider range of participants. The task forces and 

councils now include members from law enforcement, the intelligence 

community, private business, and federal, state, and local governments. 

The JTTFs combine FBI personnel with hundreds of investigators from 

various federal, state, and local agencies, who are considered important “force 
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multipliers.”32 JTTFs increased 194 percent, from 35 task forces preSeptember 11, 2001, to 103 task forces in March 2005. The number of JTTF 

members has grown 458 percent, from 912 members pre-September 11, 2001, 

to 5,085 members in January 2005. 

The ATACs also have increased their membership. While the number of 

ATACs is fixed at one per USAO district (Guam and Northern Mariana Islands 

operate one joint ATAC), membership on ATACs increased by 83 percent from 

6,000 members in FY 2002 to approximately 11,000 members in FY 2005. 

The NJTTF expanded its number of member agencies from 30 in July 

2002 to 40 in January 2005, and its number of members from 55 to 62. It also 

increased its partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies by 

permanently accepting representatives from the District of Columbia’s and New 

York City’s police departments and by participating in the FBI’s Police 

Executives Fellowship Program.33 The program enables police officers from 

state and local law enforcement agencies nationwide to work at the NJTTF (and 

other FBI divisions) on a 6-month rotational basis to gain first-hand knowledge 

of how the FBI operates and to access FBI information. The two fellowship 

program representatives assigned to the NJTTF during our fieldwork told us 

that the program allowed their agencies to work together and provided valuable 

contacts for future coordination. The fellowship program representatives also 

worked on specific initiatives designed to improve state and local agencies’ 

abilities to detect and deter terrorism, such as: 

• Developing the Terrorism Quick Reference Card used by state and 

local law enforcement officers to spot the warning signs of potential 

terrorist threats, and 

• Increasing state and local law enforcement’s use of the LEO system. 

In July 2004, the NJTTF moved its operations to the Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center (TTIC), now known as the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC). The NJTTF now has direct access to the centralized intelligence 

generated by NCTC. The NJTTF Unit Chief stated that the move to NCTC 

increased the NJTTF’s workspace capacity from 40 to 82 members. 

 

32 Statement of John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and 

Counterintelligence, FBI, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, April 14, 2004. 

33 The Department funds the Police Executives Fellowship Program, which is managed 

by the FBI’s Office of Legal Education. As of June 2004, four local police departments had 

assigned representatives to the NJTTF: San Jose, California; Kansas City, Missouri; the City of 

Alexandria and Fairfax County, Virginia. 
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The FTTTF has a critical partnership with the DOD CIFA/Joint 

Counterintelligence Assessment Group that has assisted the FTTTF in its 

efforts. At the inception of FTTTF, DOD/CIFA provided financial resources, 

hardware, software, systems and procurement expertise, and office space to the 

task force. DOD/CIFA has a complementary mission to the FTTTF, as well as 

the technical expertise that assisted the FTTTF in development of a database 

warehouse and analytical tools. Additionally, the FTTTF has attempted to 

increase the number of its participating agencies, especially DHS components 

because of the importance of immigration and customs data to tracking and 

locating foreign terrorists. The DHS informed the FTTTF Director that they 

would look into adding more members, but indicated that a severe shortage of 

resources has limited its ability to do so as of January 2005. To attract more 

participants, the FTTTF Director holds monthly liaison meetings with a broad 

range of agencies, including DHS components, as well as international law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
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The JTTFs are implementing the FBI’s new 

counterterrorism investigative strategy that has provided 

them with increased capabilities to help the Department 

achieve its strategic goal of preventing terrorism and 

promoting the nation’s security. The FBI also has 

improved its agents’ access to automated investigative 

information.

During his February 24, 2004, congressional testimony, FBI Director 

Robert Mueller reported, “The Joint Terrorism Task Forces have played a 

central role in virtually every terrorism investigation, prevention, or interdiction 

within the United States over the past year.”34 The FBI reports that since 

2001 it has disrupted and dismantled multiple terrorist operations. 

Developing Intelligence 

Before September 11, 2001, the FBI classified its terrorism investigations 

as either criminal (265 file code) or intelligence (199 file code). Sharing of 

intelligence between the criminal and intelligence components of the FBI was 

difficult even when the subject of the criminal and intelligence investigations 

was the same person.35 Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has changed its 

counterterrorism investigative strategy from emphasizing criminal prosecutions 

to developing intelligence. It consolidated the former 199 and 265 file codes 

and initiated a new intelligence investigation (315) file code. With the 315s, the 

FBI defines the primary purpose of its counterterrorism investigations as 

“developing intelligence regarding the subject or the threat.” The work 

performed by the JTTFs focuses upon identifying terrorists, terrorists groups, 

and the efforts used by terrorists to support their operations such as financial, 

recruitment, communication, and other support networks. 

JTTF task force members, participating agency executives, and FBI 

headquarters managers stated that developing human assets (i.e., informants 

and sources) is an integral part of developing intelligence. The JTTFs focus on 

developing human assets and the FBI tracks the number of human assets 

developed by field offices. Although the numbers fluctuate as assets are 

opened and closed, the FBI reported that from August 30, 2001, through 

September 30, 2003, its international terrorism human assets increased by 

 

34 Testimony of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, Hearing on Worldwide Threats, The 

Senate Select Intelligence Committee, February 24, 2004. 

35 In July 2004, the OIG issued a report that examined the FBI’s handling of 

intelligence information prior to September 11, 2001: The Handling of Intelligence Information 

Prior to the September 11 Attacks, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 

July 2, 2004. 
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more than 60 percent and the domestic terrorism human assets increased by 

more than 40 percent.36 

Addressing All Leads and Threats 

The Director of the FBI requires that no counterterrorism leads or threats 

go unaddressed.37 To meet this mandate, the JTTFs use task force members 

and agents assigned to other squads in the FBI’s field offices to cover JTTF 

taskings. Some JTTFs (such as the New York City and Los Angeles JTTFs) 

assign specific squads to handle all incoming leads, perform preliminary 

checks of the information provided, and then assign the leads to the 

appropriate team. This helps to streamline the preliminary work performed by 

the JTTFs and minimizes the intervention needed from non-JTTF agents. The 

work performed by the members of the JTTF squad and other FBI agents 

temporarily assigned to support the squad is combined and reported by field 

offices in two categories: international terrorism and domestic terrorism. 

The JTTFs use the FBI’s Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy 

as a “blueprint” for conducting these intelligence driven and intelligence 

focused investigations. The JTTFs can use various techniques in international 

terrorism investigations to gather information on national security threats 

without opening a full or preliminary investigation.38

Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)

Our interviews and survey results showed that the majority of non-FBI 

task force members with clearances did not have direct or complete access to 

the ACS system, even though such access was permitted by policy, which 

caused delays in their investigations. However, subsequent to our site visits 

the FBI developed an information technology system, known as IDW, to 

enhance investigative information available to JTTF agents. From the IDW 

demonstration we observed, it appears that the IDW has the capability to 

resolve the ACS system access problems we encountered in the FBI field 

offices. 

The IDW is a “centralized, web-enabled repository for relevant intelligence 

and investigative data that allows users to query the information utilizing 

 

36 Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks: The FBI’s Counterterrorism 

Program Since 2001, FBI, April 14, 2004, p. 64. 

37 Counterterrorism Division Program Management, Electronic Communication #66FHQ-A1308701, FBI, Director Robert Mueller, December 25, 2002. 

38 The FBI’s Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy, FBI, July 15, 2003. 
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advanced software tools.”39 The IDW is not a case management system but 

rather a “pointer system” that allows a user to enter different search terms and 

conducts a “Google” search of a variety of FBI and non-FBI databases, 

including: ACS Electronic Case File, ICE arrival and departure information on 

non-immigrants (I-94) data, Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network data 

from the Department of Treasury, No Fly List, FBI Terrorist Watch List, Violent 

Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF), open source news (foreign and 

domestic), U.S. Department of State VISA fraud data, lost or stolen passport 

data, and other intelligence community information. Search results are 

displayed in a web format, and users can click directly on “links” to the 

highlighted documents as well as search within the results for a more focused 

analysis. Additionally, IDW can conduct “batch queries” where sets of data 

(such as names, phone numbers, or addresses) are run through all the 

databases in IDW. 

 As of April 2005, the IDW was populated with one billion records in a 

variety of databases, and the FBI estimates that within six months IDW will 

have access to one and a half billion records. There are approximately 7,000 

IDW users in the FBI, including JTTF members. The FBI plans to have onethird of all the field offices trained on IDW by the end of 2005. IDW allows FBI 

and non-FBI JTTF members access to a variety of information that enables 

them to conduct terrorism investigations in a more efficient manner because 

IDW queries multiple databases simultaneously. 

 

39 In November 2003, the Counterterrorism Division, along with the Terrorist Financing 

Operations Section (TFOS), in the FBI began a special project to augment the existing IDW 

system with new capabilities for use by FBI and non-FBI agents on the JTTFs. The FBI Office 

of Intelligence is the executive sponsor of the IDW. The IDW Special Projects Team was 

originally initiated for the 2004 Threat Task Force. 
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NSCC Functions 

The Attorney General established the NSCC with the principal 

mission of ensuring “a more seamless coordination of all 

functions of the Department relating to national security, 

particularly the Department’s efforts to combat terrorism 

directed against the United States,” and directed it to:

• Centralize and coordinate policy, resource allocation, 

operations, and long-term planning of Department 

components regarding counterterrorism, 

counterespionage, and other major national security 

issues; 

• Monitor the implementation of Department policy to 

ensure that components are taking necessary and 

appropriate actions to prevent and disrupt the 

occurrence of terrorist attacks in the United States; 

• Provide an institutionalized Department forum for crises 

management; 

• Promote coordination and information-sharing within 

the Department, between the Department and other 

federal agencies and interagency bodies, and between 

the Department and state and local law enforcement 

authorities, to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 

terrorist attacks within the United States; 

• Frame national security issues for resolution by the 

Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney General; and 

• Ensure that positions advanced by the Deputy Attorney 

General on behalf of the Department at interagency 

meetings of the National Security Council, the Homeland 

Security Council, and other interagency forums reflect 

input from Department national security components. 

NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS

Although the task forces and councils have facilitated the Department’s 

counterterrorism efforts, we believe there are areas in which their performance 

and effectiveness can be improved. We begin with issues that are Department 

level or commonly found across task forces and councils, followed by issues 

that are specific to an individual task force or council. 

National Security Coordination Council 

Although the National Security Coordination Council (NSCC) is 

an important and beneficial forum for Department leaders, the 

NSCC’s role is unclear for long-term counterterrorism 

planning, centralizing and coordinating counterterrorism 

policy and operations, and monitoring policy implementation 

by the components. 

In March 2002, the 

Attorney General established the 

NSCC and defined six functions 

for it to implement. We found 

that the NSCC does not fully 

perform two of these Attorney 

General mandated functions: 

1) centralizing and coordinating 

policy, operations, and long-term 

planning of DOJ components, 

and 2) monitoring 

implementation of Department 

policy regarding 

counterterrorism issues. The 

NSCC also has not delegated 

these responsibilities to another 

Department entity. We also 

found that no guidelines have 

been developed defining 

responsibilities of NSCC member 

in carrying out the NSCC’s 

functions. These functions may 

therefore be interpreted 

differently and some functions 

may not be carried out at all as 

the NSCC’s leadership and 

members change. 
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We also found during interviews that the members have differing views 

on the functions of the NSCC which may affect its performance of some 

mandated functions. When asked about two of the NSCC functions related to 

the Department’s counterterrorism policy monitoring and long-term planning, 

some NSCC members either could not explain how these occurred or did not 

see their role on the NSCC as carrying out these functions. As examples of the 

varied views on these functions, some of the members made the following 

comments when asked: “How does the NSCC monitor the implementation of 

the Department’s counterterrorism policies? What form of policy direction has 

the NSCC given to shape the agency’s counterterrorism operations?” 

• We don’t monitor them; we don’t hear feedback that 

something has happened. There is no policy 

direction as it relates to my agency. 

• I don’t know. This comes out of the Deputy 

Attorney General’s office. 

• The NSCC does not compartmentalize the 

Department’s counterterrorism operations into 

policies. 

• No one sits there and writes policy. Often times an 

issue comes up which will eventually become 

policy. Attorneys are there to share concerns on 

existing law - congressional folks are there. We’re 

framing policy in a general sense; we discuss 

advantages and disadvantages of issues that come 

up. 

Additionally, some members provided the following responses when asked: 

“What long-term planning has been carried out for the task forces through the 

NSCC?” 

• Not by the committee as a whole. We don’t push a 

certain direction as a group. 

• For most of the time, we were so reactive, it was 

hard to do long-term planning. Allocation of 

resources was discussed which has long-term 

implications, and a discussion of FISA. 
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• The NSCC has used the budget process to plan for 

the DOJ’s counterterrorism initiative. Terrorism 

task forces are part of the DOJ’s long-term plan; 

however, the NSCC doesn’t have a set mission 

statement. 

• There’s a general construct in which they operate – 

but we’re dealing with a shifting issue [terrorism]. 

Two years ago, there was a concentrated 

hierarchical structure in Afghanistan. Now we’re 

looking at the distributed mode (e.g., IMDs (or IADs) 

and the link between bombs that strike targets and 

those responsible. 

Some NSCC members, however, were able to provide us with 

examples of past or present policy coordination. One example was that 

the NSCC provided guidance to the Attorney General for defining the 

roles of the ATACs in relation to the JTTFs. In addition Deputy Attorney 

General Comey stated that the NSCC is planning to play a role in the 

development of policy through the Justice Intelligence Coordination 

Council, which will determine how law enforcement agencies share 

intelligence information.40 

On questions related to the remaining four functions, however, NSCC 

members were able to articulate clearly how the NSCC carried these out. These 

functions are: 

• coordination and information sharing within or 

between the Department and other federal state 

and local bodies; 

• centralizing and coordinating resource allocation; 

• framing national security issues for resolution by 

the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General; 

and 

• ensuring that positions advanced by the Deputy 

Attorney General at interagency meetings reflect 

 

40 Attorney General John Ashcroft created the Justice Intelligence Coordination 

Council on February 25, 2004, as a senior-level coordinating mechanism for all intelligence 

activities in the Department. The council was developed to improve integration of intelligence 

and provide consistency in the sharing of intelligence across the Department. 
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input from the Department national security 

components. 

Members described the positive role the NSCC played in carrying out these 

functions by: 

 

• keeping the DAG apprised of terrorism issues 

important to each component; 

• receiving briefings by outside agencies or other 

non-member components on national security or 

terrorism related issues; 

• providing an information sharing forum for senior 

DOJ officials who would not ordinarily meet w/one 

another; and 

• annually reviewing the DOJ’s budget submission 

and resources related to the department’s terrorism 

initiative. 

Based on these interviews, we concluded that the NSCC has not 

emphasized its role in centralizing and coordinating terrorism policy and 

operations, conducting long-term counterterrorism planning, or 

monitoring the implementation of counterterrorism policy in the 

Department. 

Although the NSCC members could not address all the NSCC’s 

functions, we found that the NSCC does serve as an effective forum for 

sharing counterterrorism information among its members. Comments 

from the former and current Deputy Attorneys General emphasized the 

NSCC’s coordination and information sharing functions: 

Former Deputy Attorney General Thompson

NSCC was created as a formal coordination 

mechanism within the DOJ to reinforce that 

prevention and disruption of terrorism is the 

Department’s first priority; and to ensure that 

information sharing and open discussions continue in 

a formal setting. The NSCC allows the component 

heads to get together and talk from a policy and 

procedural standpoint. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

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Deputy Attorney General Comey

[The NSCC’s purpose is] To bring together everyone in 

the Department that is touching on national 

intelligence and justice issues. To have people in the 

same room on a regular basis who don’t usually 

meet... 

In addition, all NSCC members informed us that the meetings are 

beneficial. They said that the NSCC discusses terrorism matters and 

threats, and reviews the Department’s annual budget for 

counterterrorism resource allocations. The NSCC also receives project 

status updates on various agency initiatives and national security issues 

such as a DEA briefing on terrorist operations in South America, a CIA 

briefing on foreign terrorist threats, or a BOP briefing on terrorism in the 

prisons. Additionally, the NSCC has a broader mission beyond our focus 

of the task forces: coordinating all Department functions relating to 

national security issues. Toward that end, sub-groups of the NSCC have 

undertaken coordination of several national security initiatives as 

described previously in the Background section of this report. 

CONCLUSION 

The NSCC has not fully performed the policy, operations, planning, and 

monitoring functions mandated by the Attorney General. We believe that if the 

NSCC performed all its functions, it could address larger or overarching issues 

unresolved at the task force level (which we have discussed in this report) as 

part of the Department’s counterterrorism efforts. These issues include: 

information sharing with law enforcement agencies and first responders in 

remote and rural areas; additional funding for the ATACs; FTTTF’s acquisition 

of databases from agencies outside the Department; DEA’s participation on the 

JTTFs; DHS’s participation on the JTTFs; and coordinating activities and 

information sharing between the ATACs, JTTFs, DHS, and the states’ homeland 

security task forces. 

Further, the NSCC has not developed guidelines to fully define for its 

members their responsibilities in implementing the functions of the NSCC. 

Therefore, as the NSCC’s leadership and members change, the functions may 

be interpreted differently or not fully performed. 

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Department should assess the counterterrorism functions outlined in 

the Attorney General’s memorandum establishing the NSCC and determine if 
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they are still appropriate for the NSCC. If they are, the Department should 

ensure that written guidance describes the responsibilities of the NSCC and 

that the NSCC carries out its assigned functions. If the functions are not 

appropriate for the NSCC, they should be assigned to another Department 

entity. 
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65 

The FBI has not developed a national training plan for the task 

forces, defined minimum training standards, or conducted a 

training needs assessment to determine the training needs of 

task force members. Similarly, neither EOUSA nor CTS has 

developed a training plan or conducted a training needs 

assessment for the ATAC Coordinators or members. 

Notification of available training is ad hoc, and non-FBI task 

force members believe that FBI members get preference for 

training notification and attendance. 

The majority of task force and council members we interviewed or 

surveyed had no prior experience with either domestic or international 

terrorism before joining the task force or advisory council. Identifying terrorists 

and terrorist threats, conducting a terrorism investigation, developing sources, 

or planning for terrorist incidents were all new subjects for a majority of those 

members. More than half (51 percent) of the survey respondents reported that 

they required training in counterterrorism. The prolific growth of the JTTFs 

and ATACs, combined with task force and council members’ widespread lack of 

experience and exposure to all facets of terrorism, has increased the need for 

additional training with a well-defined training plan and minimum training 

standards. 

 

No National Training Plan Exists for Task Forces or Advisory Councils 

 

Although training courses are available to task force and council 

members, neither FBI, CTS, nor EOUSA officials have developed national 

training plans for task force and council members.41 Without a national 

training plan, counterterrorism training for task force and council members is 

determined locally, varies widely, and results in training inequities. For 

example, some FBI field offices required their task force members to complete 

two FBI interactive multimedia instruction CD-ROMs entitled “Basic 

International Terrorism” and “Basic Domestic Terrorism.” Other field offices 

stated that they send their JTTF members to a basic counterterrorism course 

at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Others developed their own training 

and brought in speakers on topics such as identifying terrorist groups and 

their characteristics, cultural sensitivity, terrorism financing, and terrorism 

investigative strategies. Yet, other field offices told us they sometimes hold 

 

41 Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson issued a memorandum on 

December 24, 2002, requiring all Department lawyers (including ATAC Coordinators) and FBI 

special agents (including JTTF supervisors and JTTF members) working on foreign intelligence 

or counterintelligence to complete Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act/USA Patriot Act 

training. The Department has not mandated any training for the FTTTF and NJTTF 

participants. 
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their agents back from training due to the high workload of the task force and 

lack of resources. 

Some ATACs meet on a regular basis (either monthly, bi-monthly, or 

quarterly) and try to present speakers who address terrorism-related topics at 

each meeting, while others may not conduct meetings or training for almost a 

year. Some ATAC survey respondents told us they had never received training 

from the ATAC or needed more detailed training, and stated for example: 

• I have not received training due to no budget being 

provided. Recommend providing a budget for both 

basic and advanced training initiatives. 

• The limited training was provided in-house at 

quarterly meetings in the form of briefings. It all 

has value, but from my perspective as a member, I 

require more related information and training. 

FBI 

In the last three years, oversight for counterterrorism training in the FBI 

has changed three times, with no one assigned responsibility to develop a 

national training plan for the task forces. Immediately after 

September 11, 2001, the Counterintelligence Division at FBI headquarters had 

responsibility for counterterrorism training. In December 2002, the Training 

Division located at the FBI Training Academy in Quantico was given the 

responsibility of providing counterterrorism training to FBI employees as well 

as to state and local law enforcement personnel. One staff member from the 

Counterterrorism Division was loaned to the Training Division to assist with 

this large undertaking. While the FBI Counterterrorism Division worked with 

the FBI Academy Training Division to provide guidance and assistance on the 

type of training to be offered, Academy officials stated that due to their limited 

staff and resources (housing, space, and budget), they were not able to absorb 

a comprehensive counterterrorism curriculum for task force members 

nationwide into their existing program at the Academy. 

In October 2003, following a major restructuring of the Training Division, 

responsibility for counterterrorism training was given to the Counterterrorism 

Division at FBI headquarters. The Counterterrorism Division is now 

responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing all 

counterterrorism training for FBI personnel, both in field offices and FBI 

headquarters, and for JTTF members. Two SSAs initially were assigned to 

develop a new Counterterrorism Training Unit, and in May 2004 written 

approval was given to officially establish the unit. The Counterterrorism 
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Training Unit was staffed with two SSAs, two Intelligence Analysts, and a 

Secretary. As of November 2004, the two SSAs had transferred to other 

divisions and been replaced by two new SSAs.

Developments in FBI Counterterrorism Training: In January 2004, the FBI 

implemented a new training curriculum designed specifically for JTTF 

members entitled, “Counterterrorism: A Strategic and Tactical Approach.” The 

FBI contracted with Booz Allen Hamilton to design this 41⁄2 day course with 

input from subject matter experts from the FBI’s Counterterrorism and 

Training Divisions. The course covers approximately 20 topics, including “The 

Threat Based Approach to Counterterrorism,” “Developing Sources,” 

“Undercover Operations,” and “Working with Your Community.” The majority of 

those who had attended this course rated it very favorably on the course 

evaluation sheets, stating that it was valuable and informative; but they also 

commented that the course is needed by task force members shortly after they 

begin on the task force or within 90 days of their arrival to effectively perform 

their duties as soon as possible. 

The “Counterterrorism: A Strategic and Tactical Approach” course covers 

topics previously identified as needed by task force members. However, this 

course is not mandatory for task force members and selection for participation 

is left up to the task force supervisor’s discretion. The course has been 

provided to 258 JTTF members and analysts from January through October 

2004 with the goal of continuing to offer it until the majority of JTTF members 

have attended. While this is a positive development, because the course is 

offered monthly to only a small percentage of JTTF members from a few field 

offices, at the current rate it will take 14 years to train all 5,085 JTTF 

members. 

In addition to the “Counterterrorism: A Strategic and Tactical Approach” 

course, the FBI also has a Counterterrorism Training section on the FBI’s 

intranet. Task force members can access counterterrorism virtual training, 

CD-ROMs, the FBI and CIA’s course catalogues, and other online information 

resources on terrorism. The FBI also reported that it has other new terrorism 

related training initiatives under way for new and existing employees: 

 

• The expansion of time devoted to terrorism topics from 55 hours 

to 110 hours in the FBI New Agent Training course, and 
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68 

• The addition of in-service training courses such as 

“FISA/Patriot Act,” “Human Source Recruitment,” and language 

training.42 

Lack of Minimum Training Standards May Affect Some Task Force Members 

Receipt of Training 

Although many task force members had received some counterterrorism 

training, we found that a significant percentage had no basic introductory 

training on terrorism for months, and sometimes years, since becoming 

members of the task force Task force members are normally experienced 

criminal investigators, but as stated previously, most have no experience in the 

counterterrorism field. Our survey results showed that 29 percent of all task 

force members (JTTF, NJTTF, and FTTTF) have not received any terrorismrelated training since becoming members. Some respondents complained 

about this lack of training, stating for example: 

• Needs are known, training hasn’t been available. 

“Basic” training became available after 2+ years on 

the job. 

• I haven’t had any training regarding terrorism, 

counterterrorism or anything else regarding this 

task force. 

• There has been no training offered, other than how 

to deal with paperwork – of which there has been 

none. 

• I have never received any terrorism training. [I am] 

unsure of my role on the task force. 

The FBI had stated that by the end of 2003, basic counterterrorism 

training would be provided to every JTTF member, and it has made progress in 

its training efforts.43 However, we found that in January 2004, 16 percent of 

the JTTF survey respondents, 37 percent of the NJTTF survey respondents, 

and 38 percent of the FTTTF survey respondents still had not completed any 

terrorism training since becoming members. Of the 16 percent of JTTF 

 

42 Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks: The FBI’s Counterterrorism 

Program Since 2001, FBI, April 14, 2004. 

43 Testimony Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, FBI Director Robert Mueller, 

February 2003. 
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69 

members who reported no training, half had been members of the JTTF for 

more than a year (the time on the task force without training was a median of 

390 days for JTTF survey respondents). Two task force members had been on 

the JTTF for over 800 days without any counterterrorism training. 

Thirty-seven percent of the NJTTF survey respondents reported that they 

had received no training (the time on the task force without training was a 

median of 375 days for NJTTF survey respondents), although some NJTTF 

survey respondents had been on the task force as long as 600 days without 

training. Thirty-eight percent of the FTTTF survey respondents had received no 

training (the time on the task force without training was a median of 240 days 

for FTTTF survey respondents), some for as long as 540 to 810 days. The 

following figure shows the length of time task force survey respondents spent 

on a task force without training. 

7%

43% 43%

7%

17%

33% 33%

17%

50%

33%

17%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Percentage

JTTF NJTTF FTTTF

Figure 5: Length of Time on Task Force Without

Training

6 months or less

7 to 12 months

More than 12

months, less than

or equal to 2 years

More than 2 years

Source: OIG, Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 2004. 

We visited an FBI field office that had one of only three onsite training 

offices nationwide. Yet even this office had no minimum training standards or 

organized training plan for task force members. 
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EOUSA and CTS 

One of the main functions of the ATACs is to provide counterterrorism 

training to members. However, in our survey of ATAC members, 47 percent 

reported that there was training they needed or should have received but did 

not. Yet, EOUSA and CTS have not developed a national training plan, 

minimum training standards, or a training needs assessment for ATAC 

Coordinators and members. 

While CTS and EOUSA’s Office of Legal Education have provided training 

sessions for the ATAC Coordinators, the focus has primarily been on the legal 

and investigative aspects of terrorism-related cases to ensure a consistent and 

unified prosecutorial approach to these cases. However, the ATACs need 

training and guidance on the administrative aspects of managing the ATAC. 

The ATAC Coordinators we interviewed stated that they want guidance on the 

type of training that should be offered to ATAC members and on how to identify 

trainers. The ATAC Coordinators also said that the provision of training, 

particularly training on terrorism prevention and planning, to law enforcement 

personnel and community members is a new responsibility for which they have 

little or no experience. Therefore, the ATAC Coordinators need guidance and 

assistance from CTS and EOUSA. 

Training Needs Assessments Were Either Outdated or Never Completed 

The FBI Training Academy staff at Quantico told us that a JTTF training 

needs assessment was conducted in the spring of 2002. However, despite our 

repeated inquiries, they did not provide information on whether the results 

from this assessment were analyzed or applied to develop any courses for JTTF 

members.44 No training needs assessment has been conducted since that time 

even though the number of JTTFs has increased from 56 to 103, and the 

number of JTTF members also has increased. 

In lieu of a training needs assessment, we surveyed task force and 

council members to inquire how their training needs were determined at the 

task force and council level. Sixty percent of all task force and advisory council 

survey respondents indicated that their terrorism training needs were 

“undetermined,” “self-determined,” “determined without their input,” or they 

were “uncertain” of how their terrorism training needs were determined. 

 

44 We made repeated requests to the FBI’s Training Academy staff in Quantico, 

Virginia, to determine what happened to the 2002 training needs assessment, but the Training 

Academy has not responded. 
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Table 8: Task Force and Council Members’ Perceptions of 

How Training Needs Were Determined. 

Method Used ATAC FTTTF JTTF NJTTF 

Task force supervisor 

determined with my or my 

agency’s input. 

N/A 44% 29% 21%

ATAC Coordinator 

determined with my or my 

agency’s input. 

27% N/A N/A N/A

Task force supervisor 

determined without my or 

my agency’s input. 

1% 12% 11% 16%

ATAC Coordinator 

determined without my or 

my agency’s input. 

9% N/A N/A N/A

Self-determined 13% 19% 14% 5%

Not determined 18% 0% 16% 32%

Other method 13% 6% 7% 0%

Uncertain of method used 16% 19% 20% 26%

Source: OIG’s Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 2004. 

Notes: N/A = Not applicable 

Without a training needs assessment that is current and reflects the 

members’ needs, task force and council managers or training staff cannot 

gauge an individual’s or region’s training needs. While a majority of task force 

and council members had no terrorism experience prior to joining the task 

force, some do have terrorism experience and their training needs would 

therefore be different. Additionally, the nature of the terrorist threat varies by 

region and some regions such as the northwestern states may require more 

emphasis on domestic terrorism topics, such as eco-terrorism or white 

supremacist groups, than the northeastern states. 

 

More than half of the survey respondents stated that there is training 

they need or should receive, as evidenced by the following figure. 
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Source: Analysis of OIG’s Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 2004 

Note: Survey Question: “Is there counterterrorism training that you need or should receive that you have 

not taken?” 

Some Members Receive No Notification of Training 

Many of the non-FBI task force members we interviewed and surveyed 

stated that they received no notification of training, and they were unaware of 

what training was available. The following were among the comments we 

received from survey respondents indicating a lack of notification of training: 

JTTF 

• [I] don’t know what is out there to submit a list of 

what I think I need. 

• Don’t know but I am sure there is training that is 

offered and I don’t know about it. 

NJTTF

• I have not been aware of any training or training 

opportunities. 

47%

53% 54%

46%

74%

26%

51% 49%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Percentages

ATAC JTTF NJTTF FTTTF

Figure 6: Task Force and Council Members'

Terrorism Training Needs

Training

Needed

Training Not

Needed
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73 

• I assume there is training that could benefit me, but 

I am not aware of what it would be. 

FTTTF

• It [training] would have been useful. I would still like 

to go to anything available, very little is available. 

We don’t receive any notices of it. 

• I still lack access and training to systems/resources 

that will allow me to perform my job much better. 

• I would like to see what the FBI is doing [regarding 

terrorism training]. No one has shared what the FBI 

has for training. 

 ATAC

• We have received very little training.... Agencies 

need to do a better job of informing members of 

training availability. Lack of training has impacted 

my work on the task force, both the JTTF and the 

ATAC. 

The FBI informed us that to facilitate counterterrorism training it has 

included training information, training sources, and training courses on the 

Counterterrorism Division website on the FBI intranet. The FBI stated that 

each task force member has access to this website and is encouraged to take 

advantage of these training packages. 

Perceived Inequities in Training Offered to FBI Versus Non-FBI Task Force 

Members 

Some non-FBI task force members believe that FBI agents are offered 

more opportunities for counterterrorism training or believe that training is 

available only to FBI members. Several non-FBI task force members also 

informed us that they requested various training courses several times but had 

not been approved to go by the FBI.

An assessment of terrorism training equities between non-FBI and FBI 

task force members was beyond the scope of this review. However, our survey 

results show that only 11 percent of FBI agents reported that they had not 

completed any counterterrorism training since joining a task force, but 26 

percent of federal non-FBI agents and 21 percent of state and local agents 
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74 

reported that they had not completed any training. Additionally, a significantly 

higher percentage of federal (non-FBI) and state and local survey respondents, 

55 and 53 percent, respectively, did not review the FBI’s international terrorism 

CD-Rom. Only 29 percent of FBI survey respondents did not review the 

international terrorism CD-Rom. 

Survey respondents also commented on perceived inequities in training: 

JTTF

• Upon entering the JTTF 7 years ago, I fulfilled the 

background tasks to be selected to attend formal 

training. As a non-federal CT [counterterrorism] 

task force member, we are routinely overlooked for 

training positions. All of my experience has been on 

the job or research conducted on my own. 

FTTTF

• Occasional training is available but very few seats 

are available or the training is not available to all 

team members. 

We also found in our review of attendance rosters from two specific 

training courses that targeted JTTF and NJTTF members that differences in 

training participation existed in a few offices.45 While the majority of the field 

offices sent a mix of FBI and non-FBI JTTF members to one of the courses, 

three field offices sent only FBI members to fill the six slots each was allotted. 

CONCLUSION 

The lack of training notification and the perceived training inequities can 

undermine the concept of full partnership on the task forces and councils and 

impact work productivity. Without a national training plan that includes 

minimum training standards and a needs assessment to identify and address 

training deficiencies, actual and perceived training inequities and deficiencies 

will continue. 

 

45 The courses were the September 2003 National Joint Terrorism Task Force Training 

Conference and “Counterterrorism: A Strategic and Tactical Approach” course, which was 

presented multiple times during the period of March through June 2004.
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75 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

2. The FBI should develop a national training plan for each task force that 

includes: 

• Responsibility for developing and managing the training plan and 

program, 

• Initial needs assessment, 

• Frequency of future needs assessments, 

• Development of minimum mandatory training standards and time 

frames for completion of training, to include completion of the 

introductory training session within 90 days of joining the task force. 

• Required minimum annual training hours, 

• Target audience – training equities for FBI and non-FBI task force 

members, and 

• Responsibility for training notification to the field. 

3. EOUSA’s Office of Legal Education, along with CTS, should develop a 

national training plan for ATACs that includes: 

• Initial needs assessment of ATAC Coordinators, 

• How to manage and structure an ATAC (membership, frequency of 

meetings, methods and sources of communication, how to conduct an 

ATAC members’ needs assessment, identify trainers, and develop a local 

training plan), 

• Frequency of future needs assessments for ATAC Coordinators and 

ATACs, 

• Development of minimum mandatory training standards and time 

frames for completion of training for ATAC Coordinators, 

• Required minimum annual training hours for ATAC Coordinators, and 

• Responsibility for training notification to the ATAC Coordinators. 

4. The ATAC Coordinators should conduct training needs assessments and 

develop a training plan for ATAC members.
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76 

The FBI has not developed a structured, systemwide 

orientation program for new JTTF and NJTTF members. 

Additionally, the FBI has not provided written guidance that 

defines the roles and responsibilities of its task force 

members. 

The FBI Has Not Developed a Structured, Systemwide Orientation 

Program for New JTTF and NJTTF Members

We found that a significant number of both FBI and non-FBI members of 

the JTTFs and the NJTTF did not receive an orientation to the task force on 

which they served and when an orientation was provided the type varied and 

content was inconsistent. Given the rapid pace with which the NJTTF, FTTTF, 

and many of the JTTFs started up after September 11, 2001, the lack of a 

formal orientation was understandable. However, three years later, a more 

formal, standardized, and functional orientation for all new task force members 

to enable them to perform as efficiently as possible, as quickly as possible, still 

does not exist for JTTFs or the NJTTF. The FTTTF informed us that it began a 

formal orientation for all new members in September 2004; however the OIG 

completed its fieldwork for this report before having the opportunity to review 

the impact of the orientation. 

With 5,085 members, the JTTF program has the largest number of task 

force members. Approximately 55 percent of these task force members are 

from outside the FBI. They come from state, local, and other federal law 

enforcement agencies and therefore may be unfamiliar with FBI and JTTF 

policies and procedures. Orientation to JTTF and FBI procedures is needed to 

assist non-FBI law enforcement officers in shifting their focus from conducting 

criminal investigations to working intelligence cases. Because these career 

officers were trained previously to conduct criminal investigations culminating 

in an arrest as quickly as possible, they need orientation on working terrorism 

cases with the emphasis and end-goal of intelligence gathering, surveillance, 

and source development. Yet, we found through our survey that 38 percent of 

JTTF members received no orientation at all and the following table outlines 

our survey results. 
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Table 9: Orientation Completion by Task Force

Survey question: Upon joining the task force, were you given an 

orientation to the task force and the FBI’s policies and 

procedures? 

Response 

Agency 

Yes No Don’t Know 

JTTF 58% 38% 4% 

NJTTF 42% 42% 16% 

Source: OIG Counterterrorism Survey, January 2004. 

The following table shows that overall, 59 percent of the FBI, 60 percent 

of federal non-FBI, and 54 percent of state and local task force members that 

responded to our survey received an orientation when they joined their 

respective task forces. However, many described the orientation as 

“elementary,” consisting of one or more of the following activities: a brief or 

informal overview, a document review, an introduction to the staff and 

workspace, learning from other task force members, or on-the-job training. 

Table 10: Orientation Completion by Law Enforcement Agency 

Survey question: Upon joining the task force, were you given an 

orientation to the task force and the FBI’s policies and 

procedures?

Response 

Agency 

Yes No Don’t 

Know 

FBI 59% 36% 5% 

Federal/Non-FBI 60% 36% 5% 

State and Local 54% 40% 5% 

Source: OIG’s Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 2004. 

Note: Numbers are rounded and may not add to 100%. 

Similarly, there was no formalized orientation for NJTTF members. 

Orientation to the NJTTF consisted of an introduction to the FBI’s 

Counterterrorism Division, a one-day session in which a representative from 

each unit within the Counterterrorism Division gave an overview of their office 

functions. At the time of our field work, interviews, and survey, the content 

and provider of FTTTF orientation briefings varied for each member. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

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78 

 

We found that in the absence of any FBI headquarters-developed 

orientation program and no policy or directive requiring any orientation, 

orientation occurs sporadically and inconsistently for the FTTTF, JTTFs, and 

NJTTF. The majority of task force managers we interviewed believed that FBI 

headquarters should develop a standard orientation so that it is available 

consistently across all task forces. 

While FBI task force members stated that the lack of an orientation 

program did not affect their task force performance, the many non-FBI 

members believed otherwise. The following comments received from non-FBI 

JTTF members during interviews suggest that the lack of orientation had an 

impact on their ability to perform their duties efficiently: 

JTTF

From a 25-year veteran police officer: 

 

Everyone on the task force is a seasoned investigator. 

You have a preliminary foundation and bring tools 

with you when you arrive. ... You refer back to your 

own experience and then you ask [questions]. Federal 

procedures are very different – there are very specific 

guidelines in the federal system. I was a fish out of 

water. I wanted to know... what is your process? ...if 

there had been an orientation, the learning curve 

would have been much shorter. Even today, 10 

months later, there’s still a lot I don’t know. 

From an 18-year veteran police officer: 

If you have a question, you go to your supervisor. If 

he’s absent, you’re sunk. We have a lot of resources 

but haven’t got a clue how to use them. We need 

someone to let us know what all the resources are: we 

need an index or contact person from any 

organization, INS, CIA, Workman’s Comp... There 

should be training on 302s [interviews]; inserts [an 

insert is used to document non-testimonial information 

for an investigative file]; papers for statistical reports; 

use of the ACS program; Rapidstart; the difference 

between a criminal vs. intelligence investigation; a 

mini-academy – even 5 days just to learn the 

paperwork. They should have terrorism training in the 
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beginning also. When you’re working intelligence 

cases – there’s so much involved. There should be a 

packet for each instance, [referring to National 

Security Letters and FISAs] with the FBI guidelines. 

From a veteran Department non-FBI agent: 

A lot of training we had was on-the-job. It was 

frustrating in the beginning – the language was 

different. Orientation would be helpful – it was as if 

we were thrown into the aquarium. Is there a right 

way to do 302’s? We all shared the same frustration. 

We pushed for a class – the SSA saw we were 

committing so many errors on the paperwork ... But 

as long as there were some seasoned FBI agents along 

with the new, [the FBI thought] it was ok. The SSA 

created a template of: 1) an FD 302; 2) an Electronic 

Communication (EC). But if you don’t know what to 

put in the EC, it doesn’t matter what’s on the 

template. The language the FBI uses doesn’t translate 

to our agency; and, 3) an Insert – [an insert is used to 

document non-testimonial information for an 

investigative file]. It was very haphazard – you were 

thrown into a squad, administratively it was a 

nightmare – everyone had questions, no one knew the 

right answer... the way files were set up and the 

numbering system. If they had provided an informal 

class, flyers, or samples... an overview would have 

been terrific. 

The following are additional comments from task force survey 

respondents when asked about the impact of having no orientation to the 

task force: 

JTTF 

• It considerably hindered my ability to understand 

the JTTF organization, who to talk to about issues, 

have people know who I am, know how to use the 

systems such as ACS. 

• I did spend and continue to spend a major portion 

of my time researching appropriate procedures in 

order to send out communications. 
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• Most of what we did over the first nine months on 

the task force was wrong. We are still fixing 

paperwork from the first nine months to a year and 

we still aren’t always sure what is the right way to 

do things. 

• I was completely lost. Do not understand the I.T. 

[international terrorism] lingo, laws, etc. 

• Didn’t know what was expected, what we could and 

couldn’t do as far as information sharing. 

• Took me a while to understand role and mission – 

had to learn the system on my own by continually 

asking questions. It took me a longer time to get 

familiar with how things are done. 

• Orientation would have lessened the time necessary 

to become familiar with basic FBI specific report 

formats and computer systems. 

• Slowed me down some, and made it frustrating in 

trying to figure out what I should be doing. 

• Made life difficult. Hard to be a productive task 

force member without proper training. 

• I can’t do much until I get a handle on case opening 

procedures and access to the computer system. 

NJTTF 

• Not being able to assess what role I play within the 

FBI structure. 

 

• A lot of guess-work and halts to find out proper 

procedures. 
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FTTTF 

• It slowed my effectiveness. It took longer than it 

should have to figure out such things as passing 

clearances, chain of command, who the members of 

the FTTTF were. 

• ...[D]ue to the lack of information, I wasn’t aware of 

all the resources (provided through other units or 

agency members) that were available to assist me in 

my job.46

The FBI Has Not Provided Written Guidance That Defines the Roles and 

Responsibilities of Task Force Members 

The FBI still does not have written Memorandums of Understanding 

(MOUs) with all of the agencies participating on the FTTTF, JTTFs, and NJTTF. 

The NJTTF Unit Chief told us that post-September 11, 2001, “members were 

assigned to the [JTTF and NJTTF] to immediately address the crisis and the 

MOUs were supposed to follow.” The absence of MOUs was a problem that 

existed on the JTTFs before September 11, 2001. We found that the FBI did 

not have MOUs with all of the agencies assigned to the pre-September 11, 

2001, JTTFs, and those that existed have not been updated to reflect the postSeptember 11, 2001, JTTF mission. Since November 2003, the FTTTF has had 

draft MOUs pending with the DHS (only related to DHS databases) and 

intelligence community participants.47 As of November 2004, FTTTF has MOUs 

signed with CIFA, the Office of Personnel Management, and Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA). 

The impact of the lack of written guidance concerning the task force 

members’ roles and responsibilities differed. The non-FBI JTTF members and 

most NJTTF members we interviewed said they understood their task force 

roles and responsibilities in the absence of the MOUs. However, most of the 

 

46 These comments were provided prior to the FTTTF initiating an orientation in 

September 2004. 

47 As of February 2005, an MOU was signed between the FBI, the Department, and 

DHS for two of DHS’s databases, United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology (US-VISIT) and Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). US-VISIT is 

a program operated by the DHS where information on foreign visitors (including dates of 

arrival, departure, nationality, and biometric identifiers) is collected and electronically available 

to certain law enforcement entities. SEVIS, operated by ICE, is a web-based system for 

maintaining information on foreign students and exchange visitors in the United States. 
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non-FBI FTTTF members that we interviewed and surveyed were unclear of 

their roles and responsibilities and believed that an MOU for information 

sharing between the FBI and member agencies was needed. An FTTTF survey 

respondent stated that one of the FTTTF’s greatest challenges was “defining 

roles and responsibilities.” Another survey respondent stated: 

Supervisors need to understand their roles as well but 

they can’t do this until organizations higher than them 

understand their roles. Once roles are established, 

respected, and performed, supervisors will be able to 

give guidance and support to the rest of us... I have 

encountered several members who are lacking an 

overall picture of the game plan and the players that 

are involved. A complex diagram has been provided 

but I think some details seem to still be trying to work 

themselves out. 

The lack of role definition did not rest solely with the FBI’s FTTTF, JTTF, 

and NJTTF leaders; we also found that task force members received limited 

guidance from their parent agency concerning their task force membership. 

Many of the task force members described the impact of this lack of guidance 

as being “lost by the parent agency.” 

CONCLUSION 

 The lack of a formal orientation program for the JTTF and NJTTF 

members affected the efficiency and productivity of the task forces. Since a 

majority of task force members are not from the FBI and have not worked in 

counterterrorism previously, they struggle to understand their role and mission 

and how to operate in their new environment. State, local, and other federal 

law enforcement members would benefit from a timely, relevant, and 

comprehensive orientation to the FBI’s policies and procedures and task force 

mission, as well as defined roles and responsibilities of each task force 

member. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

5. The FBI should develop a formal, standardized orientation program for all 

new task force members and provide it within 30 days of the new member’s 

start date. Orientation should include: 

• FBI policies and procedures, 

• Access and use of the ACS system, IDW, and any other case 

management system, 
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• Intelligence gathering versus criminal investigations, 

• Definition of task force member roles and responsibilities, 

• Roles of other Department terrorism task forces and other FBI units, 

• Sources of information and contact information for other 

organizations frequently used by the terrorism task forces (e.g., DHS, 

Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, U.S. Postal 

Service), and 

• Information sharing protocols. 

6. The FBI should finalize MOUs with all agencies participating on the 

Department’s terrorism task forces. 
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The JTTFs and ATACs have not fully coordinated their efforts 

to reach out to and share information with law enforcement 

agencies, first responders, and other relevant organizations in 

remote areas. 

Although the FBI and a few ATACs have ongoing efforts to interact and 

share information with law enforcement agencies and first responders in 

remote areas within their jurisdictions, some ATACs and JTTFs have not 

coordinated their activities to target remote agencies that do not have 

representatives on the task forces and councils.48 The state and local law 

enforcement agencies that we interviewed with representatives on a JTTF or 

ATAC were satisfied with the amount and type of terrorism information shared. 

In contrast, those law enforcement agencies that were outside of the 

metropolitan areas where the JTTF or ATAC is located, and did not have task 

force or council members, were not as satisfied. 

Because terrorism and information about terrorism threats may be 

located throughout the country, remote areas should not be overlooked. Most 

remote law enforcement agencies do not have the financial resources to commit 

a full-time representative to the JTTF, but still need information on terrorism 

matters from the federal government and terrorism-related training. These 

remote law enforcement officials, as well as first responders and 

representatives of high-priority targets, are sometimes members of the ATAC 

and receive terrorism and threat-related information from the ATAC. However, 

communication with the remote agencies does not occur in every jurisdiction. 

The JTTFs and ATACs do not have coordinated strategies to address the gaps 

in information sharing, intelligence sharing, and training. 

Geography and Infrastructure Constraints Complicate Outreach Efforts of the 

ATACs and JTTFs and Limit Participation

Because some ATACs and JTTFs are responsible for providing coverage 

for the entire state or across multiple states, their outreach to remote areas is 

difficult. The ATACs and JTTFs operate within the traditional jurisdictional 

lines of the USAOs and the FBI’s field offices, and the areas covered are 

expansive.49 For example, because of the way judicial districts are drawn, 26 

 

48 “Remote” is defined in this discussion as an urban or rural area outside the vicinity of 

the physical location of the ATAC and JTTF. 

49 The FBI’s website states that the locations of its field divisions are based upon “crime 

trends, the need for regional geographic centralization, and the need to efficiently manage 

resources.” The judicial district’s boundaries are determined by Congress and alignment is 

determined through federal statutes. 
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of the 93 ATACs are responsible for the terrorism training, information sharing, 

and prosecutorial coordination for their entire state. 

 Some JTTFs also have problems due to the size of the area for which they 

are responsible. At the time of our fieldwork, six JTTFs were responsible for 

providing terrorism investigative coverage for more than one state. The FBI 

SAC we interviewed in Salt Lake City stated that communication with the state 

and local partners in Montana, Idaho, and the remote areas in Utah was both a 

geographical and technological challenge. 

Table 11: JTTFs Responsible for More Than One State 

The JTTF Located in ... Also has responsibility for ... 

Albany, New York Vermont 

Baltimore, Maryland Delaware 

Boston, Massachusetts Maine 

New Hampshire 

Denver, Colorado Wyoming 

Minneapolis, Minnesota North Dakota 

South Dakota 

Salt Lake City, Utah Montana 

Part of Idaho 

Note: Unlike other JTTFs listed above, the Albany, New York, and Denver, Colorado, 

JTTFs share terrorism coverage within their state with one or more JTTFs. As of 

September 2004, the FBI had approved JTTFs in Maine and Montana; and in 

March 2005, the FBI approved JTTFs in Bedford, New Hampshire; Boise, Idaho; 

and Wilmington, Delaware. 

In addition, some jurisdictional lines create anomalies. Two examples of 

jurisdictional lines not matching the region’s geographic realities are described 

below. 

• The Washington, D.C., national capital region includes the 

District of Columbia and the surrounding jurisdictions in the 

states of Maryland (Prince George’s and Montgomery) and 

Virginia (Alexandria City, Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince 

William). However, because of how the jurisdictional lines are 

drawn for the FBI’s field offices and the USAOs, the terrorism 

matters affecting this region are coordinated by two separate 

JTTFs and ATACs.50 In Maryland, both the JTTF and ATAC are 

based in Baltimore. These two offices cover the entire state of 

 

50 The USAOs for the District of Columbia and the Eastern District of Virginia 

consolidated their resources and formed one ATAC, although they received separate funding. 
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Maryland, including the two counties that border the District of 

Columbia (Prince George’s and Montgomery). The FBI’s 

Washington, D.C., field office covers the District of Columbia 

and the Northern Virginia jurisdictions that are in close 

proximity to the District of Columbia (Alexandria City, 

Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William). A law 

enforcement official told us that this arrangement does not take 

into account the commonality of the regions when the terrorism 

focus is coordinated by separate offices. 

• The state of Alaska has 33,904 miles of shoreline and 365 

million acres (one-fifth of the size of the lower contiguous 48 

states), of which only 160,000 acres are developed (less than 

1/20th of 1 percent). As a result, Alaska’s limited 

infrastructure and large undeveloped territory make it very 

difficult to provide counterterrorism coverage. JTTF members 

we interviewed told us that there are no roads that connect the 

entire state and some locations are only accessible by air, which 

during the winter months is problematic. The JTTF leadership 

also stated that due to infrastructure and budgetary constraints 

the JTTF was not effectively reaching the broader Alaska 

community. The ASAC for the Alaska Field Office told us that 

the FBI and JTTF members should be traveling to cities in 

various parts of Alaska proactively collecting intelligence. 

Unfortunately, lack of financial resources, as well as geographic 

and weather constraints, only allow these trips sporadically in 

the summer months. An ATAC member told us that the harsh 

weather and terrain posed a challenge to addressing Alaska’s 

vulnerabilities to terrorism. He believed that law enforcement 

in Alaska work together to minimize the vulnerabilities and 

were attempting to “harden” targets over a vast area with 

limited resources. 
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Figure 7: Combined JTTF and ATAC locations 
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Some JTTFs and ATACs Have Not Reached Out to Law Enforcement Officials, 

First Responders, and Other Relevant Organizations in Remote Areas

Some JTTFs and ATACs we visited have not made effective use of the 

U.S. Attorneys’ branch offices, FBI’s RAOs, and communication systems to 

conduct outreach to those in remote areas who need terrorism information and 

training.51 

We found that not all ATACs have included representatives from remote 

regions of their districts. Some state, local, or other federal law enforcement 

agencies or first responders in these regions were not members of and had no 

knowledge of the ATAC. They did not receive training, e-mails, faxes, or other 

forms of communication on terrorism issues from the USAO or ATAC. 

Similarly, we found that law enforcement agencies in the remote areas received 

limited or no terrorism information from the JTTFs or FBI. These remotely 

located agencies believed they had a need for counterterrorism training and 

information and stated that they could in return provide resources, 

information, or intelligence to the ATACs and the JTTFs. 

Through our site visits and review of the ATAC activity reports from 91 

USAOs, we found that the majority of the USAOs do not use their branch 

offices to provide terrorism coverage (i.e., counterterrorism training or 

information sharing) to remote areas.52 USAOs have a headquarters office and 

may have one or more branch offices in other cities in the judicial district. 

ATAC operations are run from the USAO headquarters offices and only 

sometimes are ATAC operations extended out to branch offices. During a site 

visit, we found that although a branch office of the Idaho USAO was located in 

Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, the ATAC operations were in the district’s headquarters 

office in Boise, Idaho, 400 miles away. The AUSA assigned to the Coeur 

d’Alene USAO branch office had no participation or involvement on the Idaho 

ATAC. 

In interviews during our site visits to remote areas in Oklahoma and 

Puerto Rico, we found that the state and local law enforcement officials who 

were not members of the JTTF interacted and communicated with the FBI 

through its RAOs, but received limited or no terrorism-related information. 

 

51 Remote areas visited by the OIG include Aguadilla, Puerto Rico; Enid, Oklahoma; 

and Woodward, Oklahoma. USAO branch offices are located in different geographic areas 

within the judicial district. 

52 We did not review reports from 2 of the 93 USAOs because the two judicial districts 

did not provide the summary reports of their districts’ activities. 
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Further, these remote areas received limited or no terrorism-related 

information from the ATACs. 

Oklahoma: The mayors, fire chiefs, local National Guard officials, 

military officials, security forces for the local universities, and 

airport managers in Enid and Woodward, Oklahoma, whom we 

interviewed never received terrorism-related information for their 

region from either the ATAC or the FBI. Further, the sheriffs in the 

counties that included these cities did not have any contact with 

the ATAC and did not receive terrorism information related to their 

region. Both sheriffs received only terrorism-related information 

from the FBI that addressed nationwide threats (e.g., the Golden 

Gate Bridge). Both sheriffs stated that they wanted more specific 

information regarding potential threats, especially domestic 

terrorism, in remote areas of Oklahoma. 

Puerto Rico: Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (approximately two hours west 

of San Juan), has 15 miles of unprotected shoreline that people 

use to enter Puerto Rico illegally. The Aguadilla law enforcement 

personnel we interviewed stated that for individuals entering 

Puerto Rico illegally, it would be easy to fly into the United States 

without a passport. Yet Aguadilla’s police officers do not have 

information and have not received training on what to look for or 

how to identify suspicious individuals in relation to terrorism. 

Although the FBI RAO in Aguadilla works with the city and the 

police department on drug enforcement, Aguadilla’s Mayor and 

Chief of Police told us that they never receive terrorism information 

from the FBI, but they need this information. They also stated that 

they received no information from the ATAC. When we visited San 

Juan in September 2003, the ATAC had no members outside of the 

San Juan metropolitan area and had not considered adding 

members from across the island. Subsequent to our visit, the 

ATAC Coordinator invited the Mayor of Aguadilla to the ATAC 

meetings and added him to an e-mail distribution list. 
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The FBI and Some ATACs Attempt to Reach Remote Areas 

FBI 

To address the remote areas, the FBI implemented different strategies, 

such as creating the (now defunct) Regional Terrorism Task Forces (RTTFs), 

expanding the number of JTTF annexes, developing local strategies to readily 

deploy law enforcement in response to a terrorism event, and consolidating 

task forces to expand its resources. 

RTTFs: Before the rapid expansion in the number of JTTFs, the 

FBI used its RTTFs to conduct investigations, share intelligence, provide 

training, and promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies that did 

not have a JTTF.53 The FBI reported in 2002 that RTTFs existed in six regions: 

inland northwest, south central, southeastern, south, northeast border, and 

the southwest. In June 2003, the NJTTF Unit Chief told us that the RTTFs had 

been absorbed into the then 66 JTTFs and that the RTTFs would informally act 

as liaisons to the ATACs and “pick up the slack” in rural areas where a JTTF 

did not exist. None of the SACs or ASACs we interviewed believed that the 

disbanding of the RTTFs adversely affected JTTF operations. For example, the 

Salt Lake City FBI SAC stated that “the Inland Northwest RTTF was the 

springboard for the Inland Northwest JTTF” and that disbanding the RTTF 

helped to “better define responsibilities for addressing terrorism.” An Inland 

Northwest JTTF member told us that the intelligence officers that formerly 

attended the RTTF monthly meetings were now attending the Tier 1 JTTF 

meetings.54 

JTTF Annexes: During FY 2002, the FBI approved 10 annexes in 

its RAOs to augment the 56 JTTFs in its field offices. The purpose of the 

annexes is to expand JTTFs to areas where the need for additional terrorism 

coverage has been justified by the FBI field office based on the threat 

assessment, domestic and international terrorism caseloads, staff utilization 

rates, and a statement of unaddressed or under addressed work. In addition, 

 

53 FBI field offices that used RTTFs to reach areas not covered by a JTTF were Inland 

Northwest – Salt Lake City and Seattle; Southeastern – Charlotte, Cola, Knoxville, Louisville, 

Norfolk, Richmond; South Central – Oklahoma City, New Orleans, Little Rock, Dallas, Houston, 

Kansas City, St. Louis, Memphis, and Jackson; Northeast Border – Albany, Buffalo, Boston, 

and Legat Ottawa; Southwest Border – Albuquerque, Phoenix, San Diego, San Antonio, and El 

Paso; Deep South Border – Birmingham, Atlanta, Jacksonville, Mobile, and Tampa. 

54 Some of the JTTFs and ATACs we visited had two forms of meetings for their law 

enforcement members with and without security clearances. The Inland Northwest JTTF used 

its Tier 1 meetings to share unclassified information with law enforcement officials who did not 

have a security clearance. 
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the field office must identify the geographic area that will be covered by the 

expansion, obtain full-time commitments to the expansion from participating 

agencies, develop a management plan and budget, and receive a statement of 

concurrence from the ATAC Coordinator in the affected region. All requests for 

JTTF annexes must be submitted through the NJTTF to the FBI 

Counterterrorism Division for approval. 

By the end of FY 2003 the FBI had activated 18 additional JTTF annexes 

in its RAOs, and by March 2005 it approved 19 additional annexes in the 

following locations: 

• Montgomery, Alabama • Grand Rapids, Michigan 

• Fayetteville, Arkansas • Helena, Montana 

• Fresno, California • Bedford, New Hampshire 

• Colorado Springs, Colorado • Erie, Pennsylvania 

• Wilmington, Delaware • Providence, Rhode Island 

• West Palm Beach, Florida • Lubbock, Texas 

• Boise, Idaho • Midland, Texas 

• Bloomington, Indiana • Plano, Texas 

• Covington, Kentucky • Everett, Washington 

• Portland, Maine 

During a January 2004 interview, John Pistole, the then FBI’s Executive 

Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, told us that 

one of the FBI’s greatest challenges is “reaching the rural areas covered by the 

field divisions.” He stated that the FBI hopes to have one JTTF deployed in 

each USAO judicial district by the end of FY 2004 to help provide additional 

coverage. As of March 2005, the FBI had either activated or approved the 

activation of 103 JTTFs. Sixty-eight of the 103 JTTFs are located jointly with 

an ATAC (or in the same city as the headquarters office of the USAO). 

Some FBI RAOs without JTTFs have taken measures to improve 

readiness in the event of terrorist incidents or investigations. When we visited 

Portland, Maine, in August 2003, we found that the FBI’s RAO established a 

program whereby approximately 30 state and local law enforcement personnel 

from across the state were deputized as federal marshals and were receiving 

terrorism training through the FBI. In the event of a terrorism incident or 

event, these deputized law enforcement personnel could become an ad hoc 

JTTF. The Portland RAO also was working to increase the number of 

participants in this program to 40 to ensure representation from the 

U.S./Canadian border area. The Boston FBI SAC told us that the RAOs in 

Rhode Island and New Hampshire were following the Portland, Maine, model. 

In July 2004, Portland, Maine, was approved as a JTTF annex. 
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Combined Resources: The FBI shares resources between its RAOs 

to provide coverage across state lines. For example, the FBI’s RAOs in Coeur 

d’Alene, Idaho, and Spokane, Washington, co-joined their JTTF operations. 

The Inland Northwest JTTF addresses terrorism threats for the entire state of 

Idaho and two-thirds of Washington State. The NJTTF Coordinator told us that 

as of August 2004, the Inland Northwest JTTF is the only JTTF made up of 

members from two RAOs and two FBI field offices. 

Technology and communication systems: The FBI provides an 

Intelligence Bulletin every week that reaches over 18,000 law enforcement 

agencies nationwide through the NLETs system. These bulletins are stored for 

retrieval on the LEO-online system (see Progress Made and Appendix III for 

discussion of these systems). The FBI states that it is working with the DHS to 

establish regional networks across the country that will allow SACs to contact 

law enforcement officials simultaneously using cell phones, pagers, and e-mail. 

However, we did not examine how the regional networks would address 

information gaps in remote areas. 

USAOs 

Some ATAC Coordinators we interviewed told us that they are exploring 

methods, such as rotating training and meetings to different locations and 

increasing the use of technology, to accommodate the needs of remote areas of 

the district. 

Branch offices: In a review of ATAC activity reports provided to us 

by the USAOs, we found nine of the USAOs include their branch offices or 

remote ATAC members in advisory council activities (meetings, trainings, 

information sharing systems). Maine, Nebraska, Montana, and Wyoming 

USAOs use either video or teleconferencing for ATAC meetings to include ATAC 

members in remote areas. The Massachusetts ATAC meeting includes 

representatives from each of its five USAO branch offices, who then share the 

information provided at regional group meetings with law enforcement officials. 

The Minnesota ATAC holds meetings in its three USAO branch offices. The 

Nevada ATAC Coordinator personally travels the state to meet with local law 

enforcement officials who cannot attend the ATAC meetings. The New Mexico 

USAO has AUSAs in each branch office assigned to the ATAC. The South 

Carolina ATAC identified all localities within its jurisdiction without an ATAC 

representative, visited these potential members, and ensured there were ATAC 

representatives from each area of the state. 

Technology and communication systems: We found that 81 out of 

92 (88 percent) of the USAOs spent some or all of their initial ATAC allocation 

of $100,000 on communication and computer equipment to improve the 
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communication with state and local law enforcement. Only eleven of the 

ATACs chose to spend their allocation solely on training or other expenses, 

rather than on communication or computer equipment. Because of the way 

the ATACs reported their expenses in the quarterly budget reports submitted to 

EOUSA, we could only determine that approximately 20 of the ATACs spent 

funds on communication items directly for state and local law enforcement.55 

For example, the Northern District of West Virginia (USAO) purchased 

computers for each of the chiefs of police or sheriffs in its judicial district. 

These law enforcement executives were then able to access the Internet and 

receive e-mail alerts and threat information from the ATAC. Overall, the ATACs 

spent approximately 52 percent of the total $9.3 million allocated for their 

operations to provide communication and computer equipment. 

CONCLUSION 

Despite the FBI’s efforts to expand the number of JTTF annexes and cojoin JTTFs across state lines, some JTTFs remain responsible for addressing 

the terrorism matters for their entire state, as well as additional states. While 

some ATACs have included outreach to remote areas as part of their normal 

activities or strategic plan, the majority of ATACs have not included all remote 

and rural law enforcement, first responders, and other relevant organizations 

in ATAC meetings, trainings, and information sharing networks. The gaps in 

information sharing, intelligence sharing, and training may affect 

responsiveness to terrorism threats. 

RECOMMENDATION 

7. The FBI, CTS, EOUSA, and USAOs should work jointly to develop a 

coordinated strategy to consistently reach out to remote areas. 

 

55 The Needed Improvements – ATAC–Specific Issues section of this report contains a 

detailed discussion of the ATAC quarterly budget reports. 
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The FBI has not fully developed outcome-oriented performance 

measures that effectively determine the progress of the JTTFs, the 

NJTTF, and the FTTTF, or their individual members. CTS and 

EOUSA have not developed outcome-oriented performance measures 

for the ATAC program. 

 

Overall Task Force and Council Performance Measures

Traditionally, the FBI, like any law enforcement agency, measures 

performance with “hard” numbers, such as cases, arrests, and prosecutions. 

For counterterrorism efforts, the FBI officials and JTTF members we 

interviewed told us that these metrics are considered less useful and 

sometimes not valid because a case may never result in an arrest or a 

prosecution but instead may produce important intelligence or information that 

prevents a terrorist act. The quality of information generated by a source also 

may be more important in assessing task forces’ success rather than the 

number of sources. Additionally, a terrorism investigation may continue for a 

much longer period than a traditional criminal investigation and will not 

demonstrate immediate measurable results. ATAC Coordinators and members 

told us that the ATACs are for the most part responsible for activities such as 

training, information sharing, and communication that may be better 

measured through feedback from their participants. The managers and 

members of the NJTTF and FTTTF told us that their task forces are primarily 

support organizations that may be better measured by the customers served 

and their assessments of timeliness and quality of the customer support 

provided. 

In our survey, we asked how the task forces’ or advisory councils’ 

performance should be measured and many respondents told us that assessing 

quality is more important than quantity. Examples of some JTTF and NJTTF 

responses include: 

• Clearly the number of investigations performed is 

one measure of the performance, but it is also 

somewhat flawed. One could easily perform 

investigations that have no terrorism nexus [and] 

that merely ‘pad’ the stats for the agency. The mere 

collection of intelligence, subsequent analysis, and 

linking of the information obtained can often 

produce valuable insight to the operations of 

terrorists but will not produce a statistic that lends 

itself to a performance measure. In short, I feel that 

the liaison with state and local law enforcement and 
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other emergency first responders, coupled with 

public education, may produce an effective task 

force whose performance cannot be measured 

except by the "secure feelings" of the community in 

which they serve. This might be best achieved 

through a survey instrument such as this one. 

Arrest stats or case stats do not accurately reflect 

the amount of work being done. 

• [Performance should be measured in terms of] How 

each investigation/lead/threat assessment is 

conducted. A thoroughness of each investigation, 

not how many or if an arrest occurred, but how 

each investigation was conducted to either exclude 

or include subject(s) as threats. 

• I do not believe the FBI, Department, my parent 

agency, nor the press truly understand the role and 

function of intelligence operations. In theory, all 

recognize the function of disruption, yet all continue 

to be measured on a regular basis for performance 

on the traditional law enforcement measures. Intel 

is rarely sexy or headline grabbing. The MOST 

successful intel effort in this regard would be 

absolute disruption, making ‘effective’ extremely 

difficult to measure. 

FTTTF survey respondents answered: 

• Performance should be measured on the type and 

amount of intelligence a task force shares with other 

federal, state, and local agencies who have a valid 

mandate to receive that type of information. Also the 

value of the intelligence provided needs to be 

assessed to determine if it was timely and useful. 

Feedback from the investigating component is 

needed to ascertain whether the intelligence is 

“hitting the mark.” How was the information used? 

Did [it] help to identify other individuals or criminal 

activities? Did it aid in the prosecution of a 

terrorist? 

• ...[S]tatistical accomplishments do not provide a 

true measure of the work and value of the task 
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force, as it does not take into account the quality of 

life issues of a given community when a threat is 

removed from the area as that type of data is harder 

to quantify. 

• The task force’s performance should not be 

measured by metrics rather the quality of work. 

Quantity is not everything. 

Steve McCraw, former FTTTF Director and Chief of the FBI Inspections Review 

Division, told us that the FBI recognizes the importance of establishing 

performance measures for the FTTTF. However, he stated that quantifying the 

FTTTF’s accomplishments is one of the biggest challenges the FTTTF faces. He 

further stated, “The FBI expects performance goals. For $61 million [FY 2004 

FTTTF budget], we need to know we’re getting a bang for the buck.” A veteran 

FTTTF member told us: 

A Quality Assurance unit was set up [in 2003] but it 

didn’t work well because there was never a procedure 

set up to tell the value of our information. We provide 

information but we don’t know if it’s been used or if it 

was useful. The government spent a lot of money and 

they need to get their money’s worth – currently they 

are not. Operational accomplishments are difficult to 

enumerate. 

The ATAC respondents identified the importance of cooperation and 

coordination in prevention of terrorism and often mentioned how important it 

is for the participants to believe that they benefit from ATAC activities. Many 

ATAC members suggested that it also is important to tailor performance 

measures to the needs and circumstances of the district the ATAC is serving. 

ATAC survey respondents’ suggestions on how to measure the ATACs 

performance were: 

• [Performance should be measured] [b]y how well the 

state, local, and federal authorities work together, 

share information, and ensure a coordinated effort 

to prevent and disrupt terrorist activities in the 

region. 

• The Advisory Council in my district is a mechanism 

to disseminate information. It is not operational. As 

such, the performance should be measured based 

upon the effectiveness of the meetings, participation 
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of the members, and the quality of the information 

provided. 

• Each district should be required to draft a quarterly 

report to the [CTS] outlining the accomplishments of 

the Advisory Council to include—how many 

members are in the ATAC, what initiatives has the 

council produced, what is the ATAC actively doing to 

prevent terrorism, the mandate. No two districts are 

alike and the ATAC is value added for each USA, but 

I think those basics above can be used to measure 

all of us. 

• It would be difficult to get an exact quantitative 

measure of the success of the ATAC. However, I 

believe that surveys can be distributed to ATAC 

members asking their opinion of the program. Also, 

obtaining anecdotal feedback from the federal, state, 

and local ATAC members should be a fairly accurate 

gauge of the effectiveness of the program. 

Performance measures for the ATAC program have not been developed by 

CTS, EOUSA, or the USAOs. Some reporting requirements for USAOs and 

ATACs exist, but the criteria for evaluating the reported information has not 

been established. 

The FBI told us that it has developed performance measures for the 

Counterterrorism Division and the individual FBI field offices. To examine this 

issue, we reviewed the FBI Strategic Plan, Counterterrorism Division reports 

that contained data on counterterrorism investigations and operations, and 

various Annual Field Office Reports. 

In the FBI’s Strategic Plan, which the FBI says is a “high-level road map 

for the FBI to achieve its mission,” the Counterterrorism Division has created 

strategic objectives and accompanying performance goals. However, the goals 

for counterterrorism operations in the FBI do not include measurable criteria 

on which to base performance or accomplishments of the task forces. 

Additionally, the Counterterrorism Division prepares reports for FBI 

officials that contain data on counterterrorism operations and investigations 

(such as the number of investigations in each field office, number of assets and 

sources, and disruptions). While this data is important to collect, the FBI told 

us that the numbers alone do not present an accurate picture of the activities 
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of the task forces. Additionally, because the data is presented without any 

measurable criteria, it is not as useful for determining performance progress. 

Each FBI field office is required to submit an Annual Field Office Report 

to FBI headquarters that contains data on established performance measures 

for each field office in all investigative programs, including counterterrorism. 

The performance measures are a mix of quantitative and qualitative criteria for 

judging the status of field office resources and activities. The questions and 

criteria that a field office must address vary in relevance for meeting the FBI’s 

overall counterterrorism objectives and goals. Some questions and criteria are 

narrowly focused, such as whether agents have attended a specific type of 

training. Other questions and criteria are broader in nature and look to 

address substantive topics of counterterrorism such as building an intelligence 

base through informants and improving information sharing with FBI and nonFBI entities. However, collectively, many of the measures in the Annual Field 

Office Report appear oriented toward outputs for various aspects of field office 

activities rather than oriented toward outcomes for the counterterrorism 

program as a whole.56

Other than the overall Counterterrorism Division goals and objectives, 

the NJTTF and the FTTTF do not have measures on which to assess 

performance. 

Individual Task Force Members and ATAC Coordinators Performance Measures

We found no established or implemented performance measures for 

individual task force members, and only one ATAC Coordinator we interviewed 

was directly given a set of performance measures. EOUSA has developed a set 

of suggested “performance standards” for ATAC Coordinators. EOUSA told us 

they developed these standards in 2003 and posted them on the Personnel 

Page on the USANet (the webpage for USAOs). The Administrative Officers and 

Human Resource Officers in each USAO are supposed to check the Personnel 

Page regularly and pass on useful news to the USAO leadership. EOUSA told 

us that the performance standards were also mentioned to the ATAC 

Coordinators at the annual conference in 2004, although hard copies were not 

distributed. However, most ATAC Coordinators interviewed and surveyed 

stated they have no performance measures. 

Without performance measures, these task force members and ATAC 

Coordinators do not have standards for prioritizing and directing their work 

 

56 Outcomes are the measurable results of a project, the positive or negative changes 

that occur in conditions, people, and policies as a result of an organization’s or program’s 

inputs, activities, and outputs. Outputs are the tangible products of a project or program 

activities, for example the number of training sessions held for members. 
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and measuring their own progress in meeting the mission of the task force or 

council. Additionally, their supervisors do not have an effective means to 

adequately evaluate individual performance or make informed personnel 

management decisions. 

Some of the non-FBI task force members we interviewed had not received 

a performance evaluation since joining the task force and were uncertain as to 

how the FBI or their parent agency measured their task force involvement. Our 

survey results revealed that: 

• 75 percent of FTTTF, JTTF, and NJTTF respondents 

did not receive performance measures. 

• 78 percent of the ATAC Coordinator respondents did 

not receive performance measures. 

• 37 percent of FTTTF, JTTF, and NJTTF respondents 

were uncertain whether their parent agency measured 

their task force performance. 

• 67 percent of the FTTTF, JTTF, and NJTTF non-FBI 

respondents did not know whether the FBI reported 

their performance to their parent agency. 

Task Forces and Councils’ Strategies to Address the Lack of Performance 

Measurement 

Although the Department recognizes the need for new terrorism-related 

performance measures, until performance measures are completed, the FBI, 

CTS, and EOUSA rely on existing evaluation systems for assessing the task 

forces and councils’ performance as outlined below: 

JTTF: The NJTTF is responsible for conducting onsite reviews of all the 

JTTFs. In March 2004, the NJTTF completed a review of the Kansas City JTTF 

and from this experience compiled a list of “JTTF best practices.” The NJTTF 

also is developing a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the JTTFs and 

intends to distribute the SOP and the JTTF “best practices” to the field. 

Additionally, the FBI Inspections Division will include an evaluation of the 

JTTF in its standard review of an FBI field office. Additionally, each field office 

is required to submit an Annual Field Office Report that has some measurable 

criteria for counterterrorism operations. 
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NJTTF: Every quarter, NJTTF members submit a report to the NJTTF 

Unit Chief that lists their activities and accomplishments. An NJTTF manager 

compiles these submissions and prepares a report that the Unit Chief uses to 

review the NJTTF’s performance. There are no standard criteria for these 

summary reports; they are just a summation of activities. The FBI Inspections 

Division conducts cyclic evaluations of FBI offices and programs, including the 

NJTTF. 

FTTTF: The FBI Inspections Division conducted a review of the 

Counterterrorism Division, which included the FTTTF, in the fall of 2003. The 

FTTTF did draft a Quality Assurance Plan in February 2004 based on the task 

force’s mission, goals, and objectives. In April 2004, the FTTTF issued a 

Statement of Work to develop a performance measurement system and sought 

to contract with an organization to enhance, implement, and formalize the 

Quality Assurance Plan into a performance measurement plan using these 

categories: 

• Efficiency – measure the performance of the process 

(getting the work done); 

• Technical – availability, capacity, performance, 

redundancy, ease of use; 

• Quality – user and customer satisfaction; 

• Outcome –expected results were or were not produced 

by the work (both within the processes that exist in 

FTTTF but also those relating to organizations that use 

information provided by FTTTF).57

However, in November 2004, the FTTTF Director informed us that FBI 

headquarters denied the request to contract for development of a performance 

measurement system. The FTTTF will develop the measures internally. 

ATAC: EOUSA measures the ATACs’ performance through the cyclic 

USAO assessments conducted by the Evaluation and Review Staff (EARS). We 

reviewed the ATAC section of EARS’ reports from October 2001 to September 

2003 and found that EARS did not have specific measures to assess each 

ATAC, but rather presented broad descriptions of ATAC activities.58 We also 

 

57 Draft Statement of Work – Performance Measurement Support, FTTTF, FBI, 2004. 

 

58 The EARS was developed before September 11, 2001, and requires each USAO to be 

reviewed at least once every three years. The USAO conducts a self-evaluation and is then 
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reviewed the Instructions for Evaluator that list general factors the EARS 

evaluator should consider when reviewing an ATAC and the USAO’s antiterrorism efforts. The factors include the question, “How effective is the AntiTerrorism Advisory Council?” but provide no standards by which to evaluate 

effectiveness. The EARS relies on caseload data, workload charts, district 

performance reports, and USAO staff interviews, but does not include any 

interviews with ATAC members or data that reflects the actual work of the 

ATAC. The EARS reports we reviewed stated that most USAOs were successful 

in forming active and effective ATACs, meeting Department directives, and 

having appropriate memberships. The EARS reports did find a few specific 

issues or problems with certain ATACs, such as not reporting the time spent on 

anti-terrorism activities correctly on forms or not having information sharing 

protocols. 

Each USAO also submits annual performance reports to EOUSA that 

contain a narrative outlining the status and accomplishments of the ATACs. 

However, USAOs are “self-reporting” in these performance reports, meaning 

that they determine the accomplishments and rate themselves on their 

interaction and communication with the JTTFs. 

CONCLUSION 

The FBI, CTS, and EOUSA have not established performance measures 

for task force and council programs. The FBI does not have performance 

measures for the NJTTF and FTTTF and their members. Although, the FBI has 

established field office (includes the JTTFs) performance measures, which must 

be addressed in the Annual Field Office Report, the measures are mostly 

output oriented for various aspects of field office activities rather than outcome 

oriented for the counterterrorism program as a whole. However, the Annual 

Field Office Report can provide useful information about the status of a field 

office. The FBI does not have performance measures for its individual task 

force members. Without proper performance measures and assessments, the 

FBI, CTS, and EOUSA cannot adequately assess the strategies, operations, and 

resources for the task forces and councils. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

8. The FBI should ensure its performance measures provide an effective means 

for determining the qualitative and quantitative accomplishments of the task 

forces and their members in fulfilling the Department’s counterterrorism 

strategy. The measures for the task forces could include the following: 

 

reviewed on a set of criteria by a team of experienced AUSAs convened by EARS. We reviewed 

the ATAC section of the EARS reports for 56 of the judicial districts. 
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JTTF

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with member and 

outside agencies (such as, meetings, briefings, and feedback on 

information received) that furthered investigative efforts 

• Outreach efforts that resulted in improved information sharing and 

partnerships 

• Quality of intelligence collected and generated that furthered 

investigative efforts 

• Quality of intelligence/information analysis that furthered 

investigative efforts 

• Quality and number of human assets that furthered investigative 

efforts 

• Disruptions and dismantlements 

NJTTF

• Quality and number of products produced for JTTFs and other FBI units 

that furthered investigative efforts 

• Quality and timeliness of support provided to JTTFs that facilitated the 

JTTFs mission 

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with JTTFs and member 

agencies that furthered investigative efforts 

FTTTF 

(in addition to those performance measures already established) 

• Amount and usefulness of new information added to cases that furthered 

investigative efforts 

• Timeliness and number of products produced for JTTFs, other FBI 

units, and outside agencies that furthered investigative efforts 

• Acquisition of databases required for analysis that resulted in improved 

analytical products 

9. CTS and EOUSA should develop outcome-oriented performance measures 

for the ATAC program. The measures for the ATAC program could include the 

following: 

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with member and 

outside agencies that resulted in improved understanding of 

terrorism issues and improved prevention activities 

• Quality and timeliness of training for members that resulted in improved 

understanding of terrorism issues and improved prevention activities 
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• Outreach efforts that resulted in increasing targeted membership 

• Quality and currency of threat assessments that result in improved 

prevention activities. 
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ATAC Findings Presented 

Earlier in This Report 

• The JTTFs and ATACs have not 

fully coordinated their efforts to 

reach out to and share 

information with law 

enforcement agencies, first 

responders, and other relevant 

organizations in remote areas. 

• Neither EOUSA nor CTS has 

developed a national training 

plan or conducted a training 

needs assessment for the ATAC 

Coordinator or members. 

• CTS and EOUSA have not 

developed outcome-oriented 

performance standards for the 

ATAC program. 

 ATAC-SPECIFIC ISSUES 

The ATAC Coordinators are unclear about the roles of CTS, 

EOUSA, or the USAOs in the ATAC program. No one entity has 

full responsibility for ATAC program management, oversight is 

fragmented, and future ATAC funding requirements have not 

been evaluated. The Department, CTS, and EOUSA have not 

provided ATAC Coordinators enough guidance on their roles 

and responsibilities or on how to structure and manage an 

ATAC. Further, the USAOs’ level of compliance with the 

Attorney General mandate to establish and operate an ATAC 

varies across judicial districts. 

The ATAC Coordinators are Unclear About the Roles of CTS, EOUSA, or 

the USAOs in the ATAC Program, No One Entity has Full Responsibility for 

Program Management, and Oversight is Fragmented 

The roles of EOUSA and CTS in the ATAC program are not fully 

understood by the ATAC Coordinators, and it 

is not clear to the ATAC Coordinators which 

Department component has responsibility for 

management of the ATAC program. Because 

ATAC Coordinators did not know which office 

was responsible for the overall ATAC program, 

they routinely reported the same information 

to both EOUSA and CTS. Traditionally, 

EOUSA provides administrative support and 

CTS provides prosecutorial assistance to the 

USAOs. However, U.S. Attorneys have the 

autonomy and discretion to operate their 

ATACs as is appropriate for their judicial 

districts. EOUSA and CTS only have limited 

authority to direct a USAO’s ATAC operations. 

Although the CTS Chief told us that CTS and 

EOUSA share joint oversight of the ATAC 

program, we found that neither group fully 

monitors and assesses the ATACs’ operations. 

Prosecutive and investigative information is reported to CTS regularly, but 

information related to management or administration of the ATACs is not 

reported on a regular basis to CTS or EOUSA, and no standard is in place to 

ensure consistent reporting across ATACs. CTS, EOUSA, and the USAOs have 

responsibilities for partial pieces of the ATAC program, but no one organization 

within the Department has responsibility for fully managing the ATAC program. 
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The following describes how each entity views its role in the ATAC 

program: 

CTS: The CTS Regional ATAC Coordinators are not full-time managers or 

supervisors of ATAC operations, but rather are advisers on terrorism cases and 

coordinators of a national prevention strategy. They believe that each U.S. 

Attorney has the responsibility for overseeing his or her ATAC, with input and 

advice from the Regional ATAC Coordinators. The Regional ATAC Coordinators 

perform their functions as a collateral duty and estimate that they spend 15 to 

50 percent of their time on ATAC functions, depending on the scope of ATACrelated activities, active prosecutions, or the current threat. Regional ATAC 

Coordinators also are normally involved in lengthy litigation aside from their 

ATAC duties and devote considerable time to that function. Some Regional 

ATAC Coordinators told us that when they are litigating, they might not have 

time to address issues or inquiries from the ATACs in their regions. They said 

that another Regional ATAC Coordinator or the National ATAC Coordinator 

would handle their duties in the interim. During this review there were two 

incidences of turnover in the Regional ATAC Coordinator positions. 

The National ATAC Coordinator is responsible for ensuring the ATAC 

Coordinators are adequately communicating with Regional ATAC Coordinators, 

communicating with USAOs to solicit input on the ATAC program, and filling in 

for Regional ATAC Coordinators who are busy with other duties. CTS 

recognized the need for and created the position of “National ATAC 

Coordinator” in February 2004 and filled it with an experienced AUSA/ATAC 

Coordinator from the field on a 1-year detail. The position will be staffed on a 

rotating basis, possibly with other ATAC Coordinators from the field. The 

current National Coordinator believes it is valuable to fill this position with field 

ATAC Coordinators because they can bring a better understanding of the 

issues in the field to headquarters. 

EOUSA: The Supervising Counsel to the EOUSA Director’s staff, who is 

the EOUSA point of contact for ATACs, told us that she provides the field 

ATACs with guidance on administrative issues (training, budget) and performs 

troubleshooting as issues arise. She also stated that her role is more processoriented than operational. Similar to the CTS National ATAC Coordinator, the 

EOUSA point of contact for ATACs is serving in a rotational capacity, having 

been detailed from a particular USAO. EOUSA assigns additional duties to the 

point of contact for ATACs and she is not devoted solely to the ATAC program. 

EOUSA collects budget information in the ATAC Quarterly Reports (budget 

reports) and handles requests for reimbursements from the ATACs. The 

EOUSA EARS staff is responsible for periodically evaluating USAOs and 

includes a section on the USAOs’ ATACs in its reports. 
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USAO: Each USAO, through the ATAC Coordinator, independently 

determines ATAC membership, training topics, frequency of meetings, 

communication or information sharing methods, and how to spend the 

$100,000 ATAC allocation. The USAO ATAC Coordinators perform their 

functions as a collateral duty. Those that we interviewed estimated that they 

spend 15 to 50 percent of their time on ATAC functions, depending on ATAC 

activities or if they are prosecuting cases. 

EOUSA Does Not Strategically Analyze the ATACs’ Budget to Evaluate the 

Need for Additional Funding 

Although ATAC Coordinators told us that they needed further ATAC 

funding, EOUSA has not adequately assessed this need. Based on our review 

of the ATACs’ financial reports and the information we obtained through 

interviews, we found that the majority of ATACs have used their initial 

allocation of $100,000 each and the ATAC program has received no additional 

funding since FY 2002. Congress intended the funds for the purchase of 

communications equipment and the provision of training for state and local law 

enforcement agencies, including first responders.59 The U.S. Attorneys we 

interviewed stated they were committed to the ATAC program and were trying 

to continue with the same level of activity despite no identified future funding. 

These U.S. Attorneys believed the ATAC program has developed partnerships 

and information sharing that is vital to their districts. However there has not 

been a separate request for additional funding for allocation to the USAOs and 

those interviewed in CTS and EOUSA saw no future funding availability. 

EOUSA did establish procedures to monitor how the ATACs spent the 

total $9.3 million. Each ATAC must submit to EOUSA the ATAC Quarterly 

Report that lists the funds authorized, obligated, and projected for three budget 

categories (communication items, intelligence coordination, and task force 

infrastructure) and contains copies of its reimbursable agreements and a 

narrative report of accomplishments.60 However, EOUSA does not consolidate 

 

59 Originally, the districts had until September 30, 2003, to expend the money, but 

were allowed extensions until December 2003. Some ATACs requested, and received, 

extensions to spend the money by December 2004 or March 2005. 

60 The three budget categories are defined as: communication items - secure faxes, 

Secure Telephone Unit III telephones, telecommunications equipment, and/or computers and 

related software; intelligence coordination - training and technical assistance, overtime to 

attend ATTF/ATAC meetings or projects, and support services; and task force infrastructure - 

not defined in the guidance. 
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the financial information from the ATAC Quarterly Reports to systematically 

analyze how the $9.3 million allocation is spent.61 

Some USAOs now supplement their ATAC funding by using their general 

budgets or the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (LECC) allocations.62 

EOUSA and CTS personnel stated that ATAC Coordinators could tap into the 

LECC allocations available to each USAO, as well as federal and state DHS 

money to fund ATAC training. While this may be a viable option for some 

ATACs, it may not provide enough funding for active ATACs. For example, one 

ATAC Coordinator survey respondent stated: 

Given the LECC receives an annual stipend, it would 

follow that the ATAC should as well receive some 

annual funding to support bringing in speakers, 

providing printed material handouts to members at 

quarterly meetings, refreshments... With terrorism 

prevention the mandate, it is incumbent upon us in 

each ATAC to constantly foster vigilance in our 

membership... and we need what I see as minimal 

funding to best accomplish that goal. 

When asked in the survey what resources the ATAC needed that it did 

not have, 14 of the 22 respondents identifying themselves as ATAC 

Coordinators stated they needed one or more of the following: annual 

funding/financial resources, office and meeting space, and more staff dedicated 

to the ATAC. Additionally, the ATAC Coordinators we interviewed stated that 

they need funding to continue offering training to the ATAC members. A few 

complained of a lack of space large enough to hold meetings and the lack of an 

adequate staff assigned to complete the administrative duties of the ATAC. 

One U.S. Attorney said, “If the ATTF [now ATAC] had more funding, they could 

do more training and reach the law enforcement and public service agencies 

out in the hinterlands.” When asked what the impact of the lack of resources 

has had on the ATAC achieving its mission, two ATAC Coordinator survey 

respondents said: 

 

61 We reviewed a compilation of ATAC Quarterly Reports submitted by each ATAC from 

September 2002 through December 2004 and found that not all ATACs submitted reports each 

quarter, completed reports in the same manner, provided a narrative of accomplishments, or 

listed the items purchased in the correct categories. EOUSA officials told us they follow up 

with these ATACs to ensure proper accounting and submission of Quarterly Reports. 

62 In 1981, each USAO established an LECC with a membership of federal, state, and 

local law enforcement, and the mission to improve coordination and cooperation among these 

members. Each LECC receives an allocation for training of state and local law enforcement 

personnel. 
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• Lack of funding for training. 

• Need detached personnel to follow through with 

initiatives and/or initiative development (since all 

participants have many other duties, when meetings 

are over, [there is] little follow-up on ideas, because 

non-terrorism related agency duties intrude). 

In April 2005, ATAC Coordinators told us they were unable to attend 

terrorism-related training in different areas of their district or region due to a 

lack of available funds for ATAC mileage reimbursement. Similarly, the ATAC 

Coordinators were unable to hold regional meetings or conferences during FY 

2005 due to insufficient funds. 

Prevention of terrorism is the number one priority of the Department, 

and the ATAC program is a crucial component in this prevention initiative. 

Therefore, we believe EOUSA should strategically assess the need for future 

ATAC program funding. 

The Department, CTS, and EOUSA Have Not Provided Enough Guidance on 

ATAC Coordinator Roles and Responsibilities or on How to Structure and 

Manage an ATAC. Further, the Level of Compliance With the Attorney 

General’s Mandate to Establish and Maintain ATACs Varies Across Judicial 

Districts 

 Although the former Attorney General issued a memorandum 

establishing the ATAC and the former Deputy Attorney General issued initial 

guidance on how to set-up an ATAC, ATAC Coordinators we interviewed and 

surveyed told us they needed additional guidance from CTS and EOUSA.63 The 

ATAC Coordinators wanted guidance that clearly delineates the roles and 

responsibilities of the ATAC Coordinators and further guidance on ATAC 

operations and structure. ATAC Coordinators told us they do not have a guide 

to use in identifying members, training opportunities, sponsoring terrorism 

exercises, and developing mechanisms to aid in the dissemination of 

information, and therefore need additional guidance on their roles and duties. 

Further, this role of coordinator is a new one for most AUSAs, and many we 

 

63 On October 8, 2001, the Deputy Attorney General issued a memorandum, Guidance 

for Anti-Terrorism Task Forces, which discusses the ATAC role in preparedness planning and 

provides initial guidance on ATAC operations, membership, and the USAOs’ and FBI’s roles. 

The guidance contained in this memorandum is general and recognizes the variance in 

circumstances and practices for each judicial district. 
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interviewed told us they do not have much experience as managers or 

administrators. 

Lack of Adequate Guidance on ATAC Coordinator Roles and Responsibilities 

and How to Structure and Manage an ATAC

Some of the ATAC Coordinators we interviewed believed that while the 

Department has charged them with a new mission, it has not defined their role 

in the prevention of terrorism and is still not providing adequate guidance on 

operating an ATAC. 

One U.S. Attorney we interviewed stated: 

It was a daunting task to change your mission in 24 

hours [after 9/11], but people are committed to this 

[prevention of terrorism] in the USAOs. The USAO 

tried to build this intelligence function without the 

experience or tools from the Department. 

Two ATAC Coordinators told us: 

• The main obstacle the ATAC confronts is a lack of 

guidance and direction from [the Department]. 

There is not a chain of command and no one has 

grabbed hold of the program, and no one is 

examining these issues. 

• [I am] not entirely sure that everyone [in the field] 

knows what Washington expects or wants. There is 

not clear direction from D.C. 

Because they received limited guidance from the Department when the 

ATACs were established, some ATAC Coordinators informally polled their 

counterparts in other USAOs or polled the ATAC membership to determine the 

best way to implement the advisory council in their districts. An ATAC 

Coordinator told us: 

We assembled 35 or so different agencies and sat 

around the table and decided how to set it [the ATAC] 

up... If the ATTF [ATAC] had a motto it would be, “We 

are making it up as we go along,” but it seems as if the 

same thing is happening in HQ/DC; they are making it 

up as they go along. Why are we not getting more 

guidance? 
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ATAC Coordinators told us that they could benefit from additional 

guidance and direction from CTS and EOUSA on how to set up and operate the 

ATAC. They believed that they also could benefit from learning about the 

activities and operations of other ATACs to determine the applicability of these 

practices in their judicial district, and to gauge if they are “on target” based on 

what others are doing. The ATAC Coordinators we interviewed told us that 

EOUSA and CTS have not provided adequate opportunities for ATAC 

Coordinators to share “best practices.” 

The ATAC Coordinators have met for training in their regions and at the 

National Advocacy Center, but the sessions have emphasized investigative and 

prosecutorial issues and have not focused on ATAC management issues.64 

There have been limited opportunities to exchange ideas or discuss the 

successful initiatives of individual ATACs. The ATAC Coordinators joined the 

Crisis Management Coordinators (those responsible for crisis planning in 

USAOs) in a March 2004 conference, but the agenda only provided one 

breakout session for the ATAC Coordinators, despite specific requests directly 

from ATAC Coordinators to schedule a forum to discuss best practices.65 

Each ATAC Coordinator attended a breakout session organized by region, 

facilitated by the CTS Regional ATAC Coordinator. We observed two of these 

sessions and both of the Regional ATAC Coordinators who ran the sessions 

were new. One Regional ATAC Coordinator used the session to familiarize 

herself with the ATACs and ATAC Coordinators in her region, and to better 

understand how they were implementing the ATAC program. In the other 

session another new Regional ATAC Coordinator was confronted with a host of 

questions from ATAC Coordinators concerning the ATAC program that he was 

not able to answer. The main issues for ATAC Coordinators in this breakout 

session were the role of the USAOs and ATACs in relation to DHS and the state 

homeland security task forces, and the future existence or structure of ATACs. 

 

64 The National Advocacy Center is the Department’s training center located in 

Columbia, South Carolina. 

65 The following are topics from the ATAC portion of the ATAC Coordinators/Crisis 

Management Coordinators Conference in March 2004: CTS Update; FBI International Threat 

Assessment; Implementation of the Attorney General National Security Guidelines; FISA 

Prosecution Issues; DHS Update; ATAC Training and other issues; FBI Databases and 

Resources; Legal Issues in Extraterritorial Investigations; Practical/Tactical Issues in 

Extraterritorial Investigations; Remarks from EOUSA; Counterterrorism and Criminal 

Intelligence at the USAOs: The role of the Intelligence Research Specialist; Material Support 

Cases; Prevention/Disruption Issues; Immigration; Domestic Terrorism; CTS Website Overview; 

Ethics; Remarks from Chief Prosecutor, Paris Court, Paris, France; Northern Border Issues; 

Community Outreach to Muslims; Aviation/Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS); 

Bureau of Prisons Issues; and Information Center (Director of the Terrorist Screening Center). 
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While it is appropriate for new Regional ATAC Coordinators to use sessions to 

learn about ATACs in their regions, neither of the breakout sessions allowed for 

a detailed discussion of “ATAC best practices” or answered the questions posed 

by ATAC Coordinators related to ATAC operations and these sessions were the 

only time scheduled for such discussion. 

The Regional ATAC Coordinators have tried to provide training 

opportunities for ATACs by holding regional conferences. The ATAC 

Coordinators told us that regional meetings were effective and helpful, and 

provided counterterrorism training and some opportunities to discuss 

individual ATAC projects. However, these meetings are not required and have 

not occurred in every region. We reviewed the agendas for these regional 

conferences, and each had only one session scheduled for “task force 

operations” or “ATAC issues.” Most sessions concentrated on prosecutive or 

investigative topics. The CTS National ATAC Coordinator told us that some 

ATACs that share similar issues (such as port security) have organized 

meetings themselves on an ad hoc basis. 

In addition to the regional conferences, CTS developed a secure website 

available to ATAC Coordinators and other terrorism prosecutors and support 

personnel.66 The website contains a specific section for ATACs that includes 

links to ATAC documents, memorandums, contact lists, USA Patriot Act 

information, training information, and “best practices.” When the OIG 

observed this website in February 2004, CTS was conducting the pilot test with 

18 ATACs. The pilot was completed in two weeks, and as of March 2005, all 93 

judicial districts with ATACs had access to the website.67 Additionally, the 

Section Chiefs within the Criminal Division and 79 Intelligence Research 

Specialists have access to the website. 

The “Best Practices” link on the CTS website provides overviews of the 

activities for six ATACs.68 However, the ATAC Coordinators were unable to use 

 

66 Each judicial district received two accounts for accessing the website, which cost 

$45-50 for each access account. The website also can be used by federal prosecutors and 

support personnel. The website allows users to access and download law enforcement 

sensitive information like the CTS Daily Report, as well as to view and share information with 

other users. Users can link directly to a variety of terrorism-related websites or documents. 

67 The judicial districts of Guam and Northern Mariana Islands joined together to form 

one ATAC. Therefore there are 93 ATACs, but 94 judicial districts. 

68 The districts and subjects of their postings include: Maryland-the ATTF overview 

and Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center; Vermont - Anti-Terrorism Plan for the District 

of Vermont; Southern District of Texas - Strategies for an Effective District Anti-Terrorism Task 

Force; Eastern District of Pennsylvania (EDPA)- Slide Show Presentation of EDPA's ATTF 

program, Information Flow Chart, Incident Intake Sheet, Law Enforcement Questionnaire, and 
U.S. Department of Justice 112 

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the website to post bulletin board messages or use it as a forum for sharing 

best practices. The CTS webmaster told us that the program used to design 

and operate the website contains a bulletin board feature, but it was not as 

useful as CTS had hoped; therefore, in November 2004, CTS created an “ATAC 

E-mail Group” for all ATAC Coordinators and terrorism prosecutors in the 

USAOs to interact and communicate on terrorism-related issues. 

The USAOs’ Level of Compliance With the Attorney General Mandate to 

Establish and Maintain an ATAC Varies Across Judicial Districts 

We found that the USAOs’ level of compliance with the Attorney 

General’s mandate to establish and maintain an ATAC varied across judicial 

districts. Each USAO has the authority and autonomy to determine how best 

to operate the ATAC in its district, and we found that ATACs were not 

consistently operated because there are no standards or guidelines from the 

Department related to meeting frequency or training topics. Some varying 

levels of activity and compliance are to be expected, but the lack of guidance 

could negatively affect the further development of the terrorism prevention 

mission of the Department. 

We visited 13 sites across the country with ATACs and contacted all 93 

ATACs for rosters. We found that two of the ATACs we visited had joined with 

state homeland security task forces. One of these ATACs merged its activities 

and membership with the state homeland security task force, but the task 

force’s operations are managed by the state. The ATAC Coordinator does not 

have input into the meeting agendas, membership, structure, or functions, 

although he attends all meetings. The USAO acts more as a “silent partner” 

and had contributed financial resources to task force activities. The state 

homeland security task force, not the USAO, disseminates information to its 

members. Further, the overall membership of the task force is mostly private 

sector individuals, local first responders, and local law enforcement officers. 

The only federal representation is from the FBI and USAO, which is not full 

representation from other federal law enforcement components as suggested by 

the Attorney General’s memorandum establishing the ATACs. 

A second ATAC we visited also merged with the state homeland security 

task force, but the ATAC Coordinator continued to co-manage the activities of 

the joint task force/advisory council and maintained the title of co-coordinator. 

 

Law Enforcement Agency Registration; Eastern District of New York – Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) Outline and Corel Presentation WMD Slide Show; Eastern District of 

Missouri - Interagency OPSEC (Operations Security) Support Staff Terrorism Threat Handbook, 

Justice Television Network Training Materials, and Miscellaneous Information and Materials. 
U.S. Department of Justice 113 

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While it is not contrary to the Attorney General’s memorandum for an 

ATAC to join with a state homeland security task force to eliminate duplication 

of services and improve coordination, we question whether the first model 

described above adheres to the Attorney General’s plan for the ATAC program. 

The CTS Section Chief, when asked about a joint ATAC and state homeland 

security task force, stated, “it is not the best way to operate to only have the 

state leading and DOJ following. It is ok to partner, but the ATAC Coordinator 

should still be out there working.” We believe the Department should 

determine if the first ATAC model described above fulfills the Attorney 

General’s directive and achieves the goals of the ATAC program. 

 

The September 2001 guidance from the Deputy Attorney General 

required the ATACs to maintain “updated rosters of its members.” On two 

occasions, we requested rosters of all ATAC members listed by judicial district. 

We made the first request in June 2003 so that we could contact members to 

schedule interviews prior to our initial site visits, and the second request in 

November 2003 so that we could randomly select ATAC members for our 

survey sample. We found that neither EOUSA nor CTS maintained a national 

database of ATAC members. EOUSA eventually obtained the information from 

most of the ATACs, although ten did not respond as requested.69 

Many of the rosters we received were out of date (e.g., included names of 

individuals who were no longer ATAC members) or identified individuals who 

were never ATAC members. Of the 134 survey respondents who indicated that 

they were never members of any task force or advisory council, 103 (77 

percent) were individuals listed on ATAC rosters. 

 

We also found that because of a lack of standards and guidance, great 

variation exists in the frequency of ATAC meetings in the districts we visited. 

Meeting frequency ranged from monthly to once a year. Although the number 

of ATAC meetings could be different in each judicial district, without regularly 

scheduled meetings members tend to lose: 

• Understanding of the ATAC mission; 

• Opportunities for training; 

 

69 Eight districts did not submit the requested updated rosters in November 2003 and 

two districts submitted rosters after our survey sample was selected. The OIG used the rosters 

from the first request, originally submitted to us in June 2003, for these ten districts. One 

district did not submit a roster in June 2003 or in November 2003, and could not be included 

in the survey sample. 
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• Opportunities for networking and establishing valuable contacts; 

• Awareness of local, state, and federal resources; and 

• The ability to plan for and respond to terrorist incidences. 

 

Because of the lack of regular meetings and in some cases ineffective 

communication from the USAOs, we found that some ATAC members were 

unsure of the exact mission of the ATAC and did not fully understand their role 

or responsibility on the advisory council. If ATAC members are not able to see 

a benefit of the council or are not able to understand how they fit into the 

ATAC efforts, the advisory council may lose members and communication will 

be hampered further. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. The Department should clearly delineate the roles of CTS, EOUSA, and the 

USAO in the ATAC program, clarifying who has primary responsibility and 

authority for: 

• Oversight, 

• Monitoring ATAC operations, 

• Evaluating success of the ATAC program, and 

• Enforcing compliance. 

11. CTS and EOUSA should jointly issue written guidance defining their roles 

and responsibilities in the ATAC program, as well as the roles and 

responsibilities of the Regional ATAC Coordinators, the National ATAC 

Coordinator, and the EOUSA point of contact for ATACs. This written guidance 

should be communicated to the ATAC Coordinators. 

12. CTS or EOUSA should issue written guidance for ATAC Coordinators that 

includes a definition of roles, how to determine membership base, and how to 

structure and manage an ATAC. 

13. EOUSA should strategically analyze the ATAC budget to assess the need 

for future funding. 

14. ATAC Coordinators should regularly update and maintain accurate 

electronic rosters of the ATAC membership. 

15. ATACs should meet at least quarterly, and ATAC Coordinators should 

periodically review and communicate the ATAC mission to members. 
U.S. Department of Justice 115 

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FTTTF-SPECIFIC ISSUES 

The FBI has not provided stable leadership, organizational 

structure, or adequate resources to the FTTTF to fully meet its 

mission. In addition, the FBI has assigned responsibilities to 

the FTTTF outside of its defined mission. As a result, the 

FTTTF is behind schedule in its acquisition of databases and 

development and implementation of its risk assessment tool. 

Additionally, the FTTTF has not sufficiently marketed its 

services, and consequently many JTTF and NJTTF members 

were unaware of the FTTTF and did not use the FTTTF’s 

services to aid their investigations. 

The FBI Has Not Provided Stable Leadership, Organizational Structure, or 

Adequate Resources to the FTTTF to Fully Meet Its Mission and the FBI 

Assigned Responsibilities to the FTTTF Outside of Its Defined Mission 

The FTTTF’s leadership, organizational structure, and physical location 

changed multiple times as the Department 

and the FBI struggled to determine the 

FTTTF’s most appropriate organizational 

alignment. The FTTTF is not fully staffed with 

the necessary FBI personnel, or outside 

agency personnel. Further, the FTTTF was 

assigned responsibility for “standing up” the 

Presidentially mandated Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC), a separate organization from 

the FTTTF, and the flight training candidate 

check system. The lack of stability and 

resources, combined with responsibility for 

other missions, has affected the FTTTF’s 

operational effectiveness. 

Structure and Leadership Changed 

Frequently

Unlike the other task forces and councils, the FTTTF was created as an 

independent Department component with its own budget, personnel, and 

information technology authority. Since its inception, the FTTTF’s 

organizational chain of command changed four times, its immediate director 

changed four times, and its internal structure changed eight times. The FTTTF 

members believe that the current FTTTF Director now may provide the stability 

and skills to adequately define and direct the task force operations. However, 

FTTTF Findings Presented 

Earlier in This Report 

• The FBI had not developed written 

performance measures for the 

FTTTF or for the individual task 

force members. 

• The FBI has not developed a 

national training plan for the task 

forces, defined minimum training 

standards, or conducted training 

needs assessments of task force 

members. 

• The FBI has not provided written 

guidance that defines the roles and 

responsibilities of task force 

members. 
U.S. Department of Justice 116 

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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

the impact of the initial structural and management instability continues to 

affect the FTTTF’s effectiveness. 

The following timeline outlines the numerous changes in the FTTTF’s 

chain of command: 

• Initially in November 2001, the FTTTF reported to the Attorney 

General through the Deputy Attorney General. For the first 10 

months, an FBI Director and INS Deputy Director led FTTTF’s 

operations. 

• In August 2002, the Attorney General transferred the FTTTF to 

the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, with reporting 

responsibilities to the FBI Director and the Deputy Attorney 

General.70 

• In April 2003, Director Mueller approved the FTTTF’s transfer 

from the Counterterrorism Division to the FBI’s Office of 

Intelligence. 

• In October 2003, the FTTTF returned to the Counterterrorism 

Division because Congress did not approve its relocation to the 

Office of Intelligence. FTTTF remains in the Counterterrorism 

Division. 

The following timeline outlines the four changes in the FTTTF Director: 

• First Director served from November 2001 to June 2002, 

• Second Director served from June 2002 to October 2002, 

• Third Director served from October 2002 to May 2003, and 

• Fourth Director has served from May 2003 to the present. 

In 2002, former Deputy Attorney General Thompson required the 

Department’s Justice Management Division (JMD) to conduct a management 

review of the FTTTF’s mission and functions, organizational placement and 

structure, staffing, information resources, and administrative management. 

 

70 Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force Memorandum, Attorney General John Ashcroft, 

August 6, 2002. The memorandum states that Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 

requires the FTTTF to report to the Deputy Attorney General. 
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JMD’s November 2002 draft report addressed the need for stability in FTTTF 

leadership. Specifically, the report stated: 

The most critical leadership positions within the FTTTF are 

the Director, Deputy Director, and the CIO... [and] stable, 

sustained leadership is imperative for ensuring FTTTF’s 

effectiveness over the long term.71 

Even after the issuance of the JMD report, the FTTTF’s Director changed 

two additional times, and the Deputy Director’s position was vacated and not 

filled until 2005. Some FTTTF members we interviewed stated that with each 

change in director and management oversight, the priorities changed, the 

supervision became more fragmented, and the mission more unclear. 

An FBI FTTTF member further stated that while the FTTTF’s 

management oversight changed four times since 2001, another major obstacle 

was FTTTF’s eight internal reorganizations. Another internal reorganization 

occurred in October 2004 when the FTTTF transferred responsibility for 

operating its Flight Training Security Unit to the DHS.72 

Lack of Adequate Resources

Lack of Permanent Office Space: Because the FTTTF was in office space 

borrowed first from the INS, and then the Counterintelligence Field Activity 

(CIFA), it has moved its physical location five times since it was created in 

November 2001.73 The FTTTF Director told us that because CIFA controlled 

the space the task force used prior to November 2003, the FTTTF could not 

 

71 Draft White Paper: Management Review of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, November 13, 2002. (The review 

results were prepared and disseminated to the FBI and the Deputy Attorney General’s office; 

however, the report was never issued in final.)

 

72 The Flight Training Security Unit assists in denying entry of aliens into the United 

States associated with or suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity and aids in locating, 

detaining, prosecuting, or deporting any such aliens already present in the United States, 

through implementation of Section 113 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. This 

act mandates the screening of foreign nationals who seek Federal Aviation Administration 

certification to pilot certain types of aircraft. The H.R. 2115, "Vision 100 -- Century of Aviation 

Reauthorization Act" authorizing the Unit’s transfer to the DHS was signed into law on 

December 12, 2003, and amended title 49 of the U.S. Code. 

73 CIFA is a DOD field agency that develops systems to facilitate analytical support 

processes and data analysis. Its mission of critical infrastructure protection complements 

FTTTF’s mission of identifying and locating potential terrorists. CIFA provided to the FTTTF 

financial support, hardware, software, systems and procurement expertise, and shared office 

space. 
U.S. Department of Justice 118 

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restrict the number of times it was moved. While the FTTTF has viewed its 

partnership with CIFA as critical, FTTTF staff stated that the moves negatively 

impacted the FTTTF’s operations, consumed a substantial amount of time, and 

became the primary focus of staff meetings rather than operational issues. The 

FTTTF Director stated that hundreds of man-hours were diverted from 

sustaining critical operational tasks (such as data acquisition, desktop 

support, server operations, telecommunications, technology deployment, and 

data support to analysts) to make each new facility ready, move computers and 

other equipment, and set up after the move. Counterterrorism Division 

management acknowledged that the frequent moves of the FTTTF were 

disruptive and caused inefficiencies in information technology enhancements 

that the FTTTF requires for its analytical products. 

The following table shows the chronology of moves that occurred since 

the FTTTF’s inception: 

Table 12: Chronology of FTTTF’s Office Moves 

Date Location 

October 2001 FTTTF begins operations in INS Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

January 2002 FTTTF leaves INS and relocates to CIFA Headquarters in Northern 

Virginia, on the 9th and 12th floors of Building #1. 

April 2003 FTTTF units move from the 12th floor to the 2nd floor of Building #1. 

June 2003 FTTTF units move from the 9th floor to the 3rd floor of Building #1. 

November 2003 

FTTTF moves one block to Building #2 occupying the 5th and 4th

floors. The Flight Training Security Unit remains on the 3rd Floor of 

Building #1. 

December 2003 FTTTF activates TSC in a portion of its office space. 

January 2004 FTTTF vacates 3rd floor of Building #1 and relocates the Flight 

Training Security Unit to Building #2. 

February 2004 

FTTTF acquires lease to Building #3, awaits construction 

completion to move and house all of its operations in September 

2004. 

September 2004 

FTTTF partially vacates Building #2 and moves to Building #3. 

Some FTTTF staff and the data center remain at Building #2, but 

are scheduled to move to Building #3 by February 2005. 

Source: FTTTF. 
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Inadequate Staffing: The lack of adequate FBI personnel assigned full 

time to the FTTTF, combined with decreased outside agency participation, has 

hindered the FTTTF operations. In FY 2004, the FTTTF had a funded staffing 

level of 26 FBI personnel, and as of November 2004 had 23 FBI staff on board. 

In April 2003, the then FTTTF Director recommended in an FBI 

electronic communication that the FTTTF’s organizational structure be revised 

to improve its “efficiency and effectiveness.” Because the FBI is the only 

permanent member assigned to the FTTTF, the FTTTF Director proposed that 

the FBI’s funded staffing level include 5 special agents and 36 support 

positions (e.g., budget analysts, operations specialists, management analysts, 

administrative staff). The recommendations took into consideration the onboard non-FBI detailees and contract employees. The electronic 

communication further stated that excluding the FBI’s positions: 

• All other positions on the task force are detailees 

and as such are subject to re-assignment on short 

notice. It is incumbent on the FBI to provide the 

bulk of the staffing and ensure continuity in 

personnel assignments, given the fact that the 

FTTTF was placed within the FBI by the Attorney 

General. 

• It is vitally important that the staffing levels 

recommended herein be approved to ensure that the 

FBI can meet its responsibilities in the effective 

leadership and operation of the FTTTF.74 

The FBI did not adopt these staffing recommendations. The current 

FTTTF Director told us that the FTTTF is still understaffed. The FTTTF 

members told us that the task force needs analysts and administrative support 

staff. 

With the exception of its FBI staff, the FTTTF has functioned primarily 

with staff detailed from only a few of the agencies required by Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 2. When the FTTTF was established in October 

2001, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 directed the task force, 

“...to be staffed by expert personnel from the Department of State, the INS [now 

ICE], the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Customs Service [now CBP], the 

 

74 Organization Structure Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, EC 66F-HQA1355682, 66F-HQ-A1355682-D, FBI, April 17, 2003. 
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Intelligence Community, military support components, and other federal 

agencies as appropriate to accomplish the Task Force’s mission.” In November 

2002, the FTTTF reported that its membership included detailees from the 

following agencies: 

• FBI 

• Office of Personnel Management 

• INS 

• U.S. Customs Service 

• USMS 

• Department of State 

• Other Department of Justice 

• Social Security Administration 

• DOD-CIFA/Joint Counterintelligence Assessment Group 

• Intelligence Community 

• Local law enforcement 

• Royal Canadian Mounted Police 75 

The following table lists agencies that as of November 2004 had staff 

detailed to the FTTTF, agencies missing on the FTTTF according to the 

requirements of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2, and agencies the 

FTTTF would like to contribute full-time staff. 

 

75 Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force Power Point Presentation, presented by Grace 

Mastalli, ATTF Intelligence Research Specialist Conference, November 13, 2002. 
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Table 13: Agencies Detailed to the FTTTF, Agencies Missing 

From the FTTTF, and Additional Agencies Desired as New Members 

November 2004 

Agencies with Staff 

Detailed to FTTTF1

Agencies Missing, 

but Required by 

Homeland Security 

Presidential 

Directive-2 

Agencies FTTTF 

Would Like to Add as 

Full-Time Members2

• Department of 

Justice Criminal 

Division 

• Office of Personnel 

Management 

• ICE 

• Defense: CIFA 

• Intelligence 

Community 

• Department of 

State 

• U.S. Secret Service 

• CBP 

• DHS – ICE (more 

members), TSA 

• Federal Aviation 

Administration 

• DEA 

• Social Security 

Administration 

• Internal Revenue 

Service 

• Department of Labor 

Source: FTTTF documents 

Note 1: All agencies listed in this column are required to participate by Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-2 except for Office of Personnel Management and CRM, U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

Note 2: These agencies are in addition to those required by Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-2. 

A veteran FTTTF member told us that the FTTTF has the finances and 

equipment to perform its mission, but not the staff. He stated, “We don’t have 

enough government employees, there is a need for more analysts. No one has 

any customs expertise and the one person from ICE has minimal immigration 

background.” The FTTTF’s General Counsel added that the participating 

agencies also are being tapped to provide representatives to other task forces or 

agencies (such as the NCTC, TSA, and others). 

Several FTTTF survey respondents and interviewees reported that the 

inadequate numbers of personnel hurt FTTTF’s operations by: 

• [making] it difficult to conduct expeditious analysis 

on time-sensitive information and the analytical 

process is slowed down, 

• [preventing it] from responding to or setting leads, or 

• [inhibiting it] from conducting proactive searches 

and analyses. 
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FTTTF’s Functions 

• Tracking suspected 

terrorists and their 

supporters within the United 

States, 

• Detecting previously 

unknown foreign terrorists 

and their supporters within 

the United States, and 

 

• Conducting risk assessment 

of foreign nationals seeking 

visas who want to enter or 

remain in the United States. 

One critical impact of insufficient staffing, at the time of our December 2003 

interviews, was a three-month backlog in updating the TIPOFF portion of the 

Consolidated Tracking List. The FTTTF uses the Consolidated Tracking List to 

identify undetected terrorists that are already in the United States and to notify 

public sources of the need to alert the FTTTF when changes occur with specific 

persons (e.g., address changes, acquisition of public documents).76 The FTTTF 

used detailed staff to address the backlog. When asked about the status of the 

backlog, the FTTTF Director informed us that as of August 2004, it had been 

reduced to four weeks. However, FTTTF does not consider the four weeks a 

“backlog,” but rather a built-in time period to ensure the data is standardized, 

cleansed, and prepared for matching against the 

FTTTF datamart and a selected set of external 

commercial databases. 

Assignment of Additional Responsibilities 

 

Activation of the TSC Diverted FTTTF’s 

Resources: FTTTF members told us that the 

biggest disruption to the FTTTF’s mission was 

the activation of the TSC. In September 2003, 

the FBI delegated the responsibility for 

“standing up” the TSC by December 1, 2003, to 

the FTTTF. The TSC was mandated by the 

President as part of the national 

counterterrorism strategy. The FTTTF was 

specifically tasked with developing the 

information technology structure to integrate multiple agencies’ terrorist 

watchlists and to provide direct support for TSC’s operations.77 The FTTTF 

successfully carried out the start-up mission in 75 days. Successful 

completion of this mission, however, contributed to further disruption of FTTTF 

operations that were already impacted by the multiple leaders, multiple moves, 

and inadequate staffing. The FTTTF managers told us that the diversion of its 

 

76 The FTTTF maintains a Consolidated Tracking List that combines the Department of 

State’s TIPOFF System, the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File found in 

National Crime Information Center, and the FBI’s 22 Most Wanted Terrorists. The TIPOFF 

system contains more than 100,000 names of potential terrorists that form the basis for both 

the TTIC and TSC databases. Although TIPOFF was originally operated by the Department of 

State, responsibility for maintaining it has been transferred to TTIC, now known as NCTC. 

77 On September 16, 2003, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 established 

the TSC and required it to become operational by December 1, 2003. The TSC was created to 

consolidate terrorist watchlists from multiple agencies and provide 24/7 operational support 

for federal screeners and state and local law enforcement nationwide and worldwide. 
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technology resources delayed the development of critical profiles and other 

information technology enhancements required to conduct analyses and 

prepare analytical products. 

At the time of our December 2003 interviews, FTTTF information 

technology staff continued to provide support for TSC’s operations, but 

as of August 2004, the FTTTF Director informed us that no staff was 

being shared between the TSC and FTTTF. In addition, the FTTTF spent 

13 percent ($7.8 million) of its $61.6 million budget activating the TSC, 

but was eventually reimbursed. 

Flight Training Security Unit: The former Attorney General delegated the 

responsibility to screen foreign nationals seeking Federal Aviation 

Administration certification to pilot certain types of aircraft to the FTTTF. The 

FTTTF created the Flight Training Security Unit to perform this function. 

While some FTTTF members believed that this unit did not fit in with the 

FTTTF’s mission, others viewed the success of the unit as one of the FTTTF’s 

major accomplishments. In December 2003, Congress passed a bill 

transferring responsibility for flight training candidate checks to DHS.78 

FTTTF worked with the DHS to support this transition, which finally occurred 

in October 2004. As a result of this transfer, the FTTTF had to plan another 

internal reorganization and shift staff to other units. 

Threat Processing and Assessment Unit: In February 2005, the FBI 

Director established a permanent unit called the Threat Processing and 

Assessment Unit (TPAU) within the FTTTF to perform evaluations of large sets 

of data for identification of potential terrorists among foreign visitors. These 

types of evaluations were first conducted for the FBI’s 2004 Threat Task Force, 

which the FBI considered to be successful.79 Because the function was 

supported by and consistent with the functions of FTTTF, the decision was 

made to permanently house this new unit there. 

Funded staffing levels have not yet been allocated for the TPAU. In the 

interim, the TPAU is staffed predominantly with contractors and an insufficient 

number of personnel detailed from the FTTTF and other FBI divisions. 

According to the FTTTF Director, the TPAU requires many more permanent 

full-time staff to sufficiently maintain day-to-day operations. We believe that 

 

78 The H.R. 2115 “Vision 100 -- Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act” was signed 

into law on December 12, 2003. 

 

79 The Department assembled the 2004 Threat Task Force, headed by the FBI, to 

prepare for the various events occurring in the summer of 2004 and into 2005 that might be 

targets for terrorists, i.e., the Summer Olympics, the Presidential election and inauguration. 
U.S. Department of Justice 124 

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assignment of the TPAU duties to the FTTTF without sufficient staff may 

contribute to further delays in accomplishing other FTTTF mission critical 

functions. 

The FTTTF Is Behind Schedule in Its Acquisition of Databases and 

Development and Implementation of Its Risk Assessment Tool 

Acquisition of Databases 

As a result of instability in leadership and organizational structure, 

inadequate resources, and additional responsibilities, the FTTTF’s 

acquisition of government databases is behind schedule, which affects 

the effectiveness and efficiency of the analyses the FTTTF performs. To 

fulfill its mission, the FTTTF requires electronic access to large sets of 

data, including databases from many federal agencies, open source and 

private industry data, and access to sensitive materials from law 

enforcement and intelligence sources. The FTTTF’s initial goal was to 

obtain a state-of-the-art information technology infrastructure with a 

suite of sophisticated analytical tools to mine these databases for 

suspicious patterns and conduct unique risk assessments to identify 

high-risk individuals. The FTTTF also intended to use the unified watch 

list to conduct periodic “batch” searches of a series of government and 

public databases. However, as described below, the FTTTF still has not 

fully acquired the number and type of databases it needs. 

Previous Database Requirements: In April 2002, the former Attorney 

General issued a memorandum directing the FTTTF to identify the agency 

databases needed to fulfill its mission.80 In June 2002, the FTTTF submitted a 

memorandum to the former Attorney General identifying approximately 85 

databases. We found that as of July 2004, 50 of these requested databases 

had not been acquired, and some that had been acquired were not kept up to 

date. FTTTF survey respondents reported that missing or incomplete data 

caused the analytical process to be slow and incomplete. 

 

80 Coordination of Information Relating to Terrorism Memorandum, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft, April 11, 2002. The memorandum also directed all 

Department investigative components to establish procedures to provide on a regular basis and 

in electronic format the names, photographs, and other identifying data of all known or 

suspected terrorists for inclusion in their own databases. It further directed each agency to 

provide to the FTTTF unfiltered, timely, and electronic access to the information systems and 

data sets deemed relevant by the FTTTF Director, subject to any legal restrictions on the 

sharing of such information. 
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When we initially interviewed the FTTTF’s Director in June 2003, he had 

been in the position for only one month and was unaware of the existence of 

the June 2002 list of 85 required databases developed by the previous FTTTF 

Director. During subsequent interviews in May and August 2004, the Director 

said he believed that the original list was primarily “brainstorming” and a 

“wish list,” which was in constant evolution, and some of the databases placed 

on it were a result of one-time requests in response to a particular threat or 

project. 

Current Database Requirements: In August 2004, the FTTTF Director 

provided us with a new list of 30 FTTTF database requirements, 17 of which 

belong to the DHS. He informed us that the FTTTF Requirements Team had 

taken the lead in defining current data requirements and had recently added 

two new staff, including a data librarian, to focus on obtaining the latest data 

and to ensure existing data is refreshed. Additionally, he stated, as the risk 

assessment tool is implemented, it will help the FTTTF to evaluate which 

databases it needs. 

In August 2004, the Homeland Security Council advised the DHS to 

provide certain databases to the FTTTF.81 The FTTTF Director stated that 

although his staff had made repeated requests, both informal and formal, for 

many of the remaining databases, numerous factors affect the acquisition 

process. For example, he said the acquisition of each database must be 

negotiated with the parent agency and documented in an MOU, each database 

is unique, and each requires staff to “cleanse” and evaluate the data and 

ensure that it is in a form recognized by the FTTTF’s analytical tools. 

Additionally, the FTTTF Director stated that: 

There is limited time and personnel available to 

negotiate agreements and resolve technical issues 

related to transferring data. There is an impact to 

FTTTF (FBI) as well as the other organizations. For 

example, the mandate to provide full access for the FBI 

to US-VISIT and SEVIS data was made during July 

[2004] by the Homeland Security Council. The first 

transfer of “pilot” data occurred on 1/18/05 with a 

plan of 30 days to resolve technical issues...Regular 

 

81 The DHS was mandated by the Homeland Security Council to provide the FBI “full 

access” to US-VISIT and SEVIS data, and an MOU regarding such access was signed on 

February 10, 2005. Although the transfer of data was originally stalled according to the FTTTF 

Director, the pilot data sharing of approximately 100,000 records from US-VISIT and SEVIS 

was completed on February 18, 2005. The Director stated that all technical and operational 

issues were resolved and the FTTTF began receiving an “historical load” of data in May 2005, 

which will be followed by regular periodic updates. 
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transfer of data [is set to begin] in April 

[2005]...Transferring data is much easier said than 

done. 

When we asked the FTTTF Director for a timetable for acquiring the 

remaining databases, he responded: 

FTTTF is currently performing its mission as defined in 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, with 

tangible results. A multitude of government and 

commercial datasets and analytical tools are currently 

used by FTTTF to generate leads on potential terrorist 

threats. The primary data query tool in use can 

simultaneously search many disparate data sets. 

Acquiring additional data sets, specifically the ones 

mentioned above, will significantly enhance analysts’ 

ability to perform link analysis and identify nonobvious relationships that would not otherwise be 

available. 

Some of the data sets mentioned above can be 

accessed from a stand-alone terminal. FTTTF’s 

production system eliminates the stove-pipes created 

by these stand-alone systems. Ingesting the data in 

its entirety (into the FTTTF data mart) or accessed 

through automated channels would add real value to 

the analyst. Such capabilities are pursued within 

existing capabilities, priorities, and funding 

constraints. 

The FTTTF Director could not estimate what could have been 

accomplished since June 2002 with access to the databases. He stated that he 

believes, however, that the additional data combined with the available 

analytical tools will have a positive impact on the FTTTF’s ability to locate, 

identify, and track terrorists. The FTTTF Director stated that as of November 

2004, the FTTTF has acquired 9 of the 30 databases. 

We also found that the FTTTF had difficulty obtaining requested datasets 

from some units within the FBI. For example, since July 2004, the TSC 

stopped providing the FTTTF with the Terrorist Watch List. Efforts by the 

FTTTF to resume receiving this list have been unsuccessful. 
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Risk Assessment Tool 

Since FY 2002, the FTTTF has been developing complex risk assessment 

profiles that will assist in identifying a terrorist by prioritizing an individual’s 

risk through the assignment of threat scores. However, this project is at least 

seven months behind schedule. In FTTTF’s October 29, 2003, briefing for the 

House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 

the FTTTF Director testified that the risk assessment prototype would be 

completed by October 31, 2003, with a projected start date of April 1, 2004. 

The FTTTF contracted with two outside vendors to create a series of algorithms 

to perform automated risk assessments or analyses of an individual or group. 

There were also delays in securing properly cleared contractor staff to support 

the classified portion of the risk assessment tool. 

In May 2004, the FTTTF Director told us that the FTTTF would receive its 

risk assessment tool and begin testing it in August 2004. The Director said the 

project’s delay was caused by the FTTTF’s responsibility for activating the TSC, 

which diverted both contractor and FTTTF staff from the risk assessment tool, 

and the complexity of the tool was greater than initially anticipated. In August 

2004, the Director informed us that the results of the testing were positive, and 

the first operational version of the prototype software would begin validation 

testing by September 2004. In November 2004, the Director further informed 

us that the FTTTF has worked with the contractors to finalize the tool’s 

integration and complete the test plan. 

The FTTTF Has Not Adequately Marketed Its Services, and Many JTTF 

and NJTTF Members Were Unaware of the FTTTF and Did Not Use the 

FTTTF’s Services to Aid Their Investigations

Our interviews with task force members showed that most JTTF and 

NJTTF members had no knowledge of the FTTTF’s role, mission, or functions. 

JTTF supervisors stated often that they either had no contact with the FTTTF 

or had heard of the FTTTF, but were unfamiliar with what functions it 

performed. Many FTTTF members and supervisors who we interviewed or 

surveyed stated that the FTTTF needs to market its services. Additionally, an 

intelligence agency representative said that it is important for the FTTTF to 

educate others on how it fits into the intelligence community and the fight 

against terrorism. This would help the FTTTF better integrate into the 

intelligence community and ensure an open exchange of information. 

Some FTTTF members acknowledged the marketing problem. They 

stated that requests they receive are sometimes inappropriately directed and 

assigned to the FTTTF because of the lack of knowledge that the JTTFs, NJTTF, 

DHS, and other government agencies have about the FTTTF’s services. The 

FTTTF Director told us in May 2004 that he became aware of the level of 
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unfamiliarity with the FTTTF during his recent visits to two JTTFs in Baltimore 

and Houston. He stated, “It was pretty enlightening as to how much they don’t 

know what we do.” The Director stated that educating “customers” on what the 

FTTTF does and how to use its services is one of the challenges he faces. To 

address this issue, he said he is visiting FBI field offices and attending JTTF 

conferences to give presentations on FTTTF mission and functions. The FTTTF 

previously sent e-mails and electronic communications to the field, but he 

believes the task force members are so overwhelmed with information that the 

message just did not “sink in.” The Director also briefs the SACs when they 

rotate into the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters, and he has 

briefed a group of FBI ASACs. However, the lack of resources and assignment 

of projects outside of the FTTTF’s mission has affected the Director’s ability to 

fully market the FTTTF’s services. 

While FTTTF members stated that they are eager to have their task 

force’s mission and services understood, they expressed serious concern that 

marketing the FTTTF will result in additional work that it will not be able to 

perform without sufficient staff and analytical capability. 

CONCLUSION 

 

 The FTTTF performs a unique and innovative service that can add great 

value to various agency inquiries in support of the Department’s mission to 

prevent terrorism. However, the lack of stable leadership and resources has 

resulted in delays in the acquisition of databases and development and 

implementation of a risk assessment tool, which prevents the FTTTF from 

providing the full complement of services to FBI terrorism task forces and 

outside law enforcement agencies with a terrorism-related mission. The FTTTF 

has not adequately marketed its services and, as a result, JTTFs and the larger 

law enforcement and intelligence community are not taking full advantage of 

the FTTTF’s analytical capabilities. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

16. The FTTTF should develop a plan to acquire and regularly update 

the required databases from other agencies. 

17. The FBI should identify and address the obstacles the FTTTF 

encounters in securing and regularly updating required databases from 

other agencies. 

18. The FBI should identify and address the FTTTF’s unmet resource 

requirements for staff (FBI and other government agencies), space, and 

equipment. 
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19. The FBI should ensure long-term, stable leadership, organizational 

structure, and housing for the FTTTF. 

20. The FTTTF should develop and implement a plan to improve awareness 

and understanding of its services.
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JTTF Findings Presented 

Earlier in This Report 

• The JTTFs and ATACs have not fully 

coordinated their efforts to reach out to and 

share information with law enforcement 

agencies, first responders, and other relevant 

organizations in remote areas. 

 

• The FBI had not fully developed outcomeoriented performance measures for the JTTFs, 

or for the individual task force members. 

• The FBI has not developed a national training 

plan for the task forces, defined minimum 

training standards, or conducted training 

needs assessments of task force members. 

Notification of available training is ad hoc and 

non-FBI JTTF members believe that FBI 

members get preference for training 

notification and attendance. 

• The FBI has not developed a structured, 

systemwide orientation program for new JTTF 

members. The FBI has not provided written 

guidance that defines the roles and 

responsibilities of task force members. 

JTTF-SPECIFIC ISSUES 

Although the FBI has reallocated considerable resources to the 

counterterrorism program, the JTTFs still experience certain 

staffing shortages and turnover in leadership. Some JTTFs 

experience space and information technology connectivity 

problems.

The FBI Has Reallocated Considerable Resources to the Counterterrorism 

Program but the JTTFs Still Experience Certain Staffing Shortages and 

Turnover in Leadership 

Our review found that the JTTFs had inadequate administrative and 

analytical support, were exceeding their authorized staffing levels, and had 

high turnover in leadership. Since 

September 11, 2001, the FBI has 

expanded the number of JTTFs 

across the country (to a total of 103), 

and the FBI Director mandated that 

every terrorism lead be addressed. 

Even though the FBI reallocated 

special agent and support staff 

resources to the counterterrorism 

program, the number of support staff 

has not increased proportionately to 

the workload expansion. 

Lack of Analytical and Administrative 

Support 

Many JTTF members we 

interviewed and surveyed stated that 

they had inadequate administrative 

and analytical support.82 For 

example, at the time of our 2003 

interviews of JTTF managers and 

members, administrative staffing 

deficiencies on the New York City 

 

82 The FBI has recognized the need for additional intelligence analysts and has initiated 

an intensive recruitment and training program for intelligence analysts. Concurrent with this 

counterterrorism task force review, the OIG was conducting a review of the FBI’s intelligence 

analyst recruitment program and released the final report in May 2005; The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation's Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts, DOJ-OIG, May 2005. 
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JTTF caused a 6-month backlog in the uploading of lead status information 

(i.e., leads assigned, covered, or closed) in the ACS system. Thus, when a task 

force agent anywhere in the country retrieves ACS data on a New York City 

case or subject of investigation, the case record could contain outdated or 

inadequate information. This could compromise investigative processes 

nationwide if task force members are unable to access all current and known 

information on a subject or case. When we interviewed New York City JTTF 

managers in April 2004, the acting FBI SAC stated that these staffing 

deficiencies and a backlog still existed. 

We also found through our survey and interviews that in the absence of 

adequate numbers of support staff, JTTF members spend significant amounts 

of time completing administrative tasks. The JTTF members commented: 

• Investigative agents are being tasked with 

administrative, analytical, and record keeping tasks 

that take away substantially from the investigative 

efforts of the initiative. 

• Lack of support personnel has slowed most of our 

investigations. The case agent not only investigates 

but also does 90 percent of the support work. 

• We are not accomplishing nearly as much as we 

need to be. Morale suffers when you aren’t able to 

stay on top of the work that you know is being 

neglected. Agents/TFOs [Task Force 

Officers]/Analysts are being pulled away from 

investigative work to handle administrative matters. 

Analyst is called upon to relieve [the switchboard 

operator] on a rotating basis, [along] with other 

support personnel. 

• An unreasonable amount of time is spent on 

administrative, and paper related issues that could 

be spent on actual investigative duties. 

JTTF members also told us that the JTTFs need additional analysts: 

• There are not enough analysts to review bank 

records, telephone records, etc. so that analytical 

reports can be completed for investigators to review 

and use. 
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• Our task force has too little analytical support. The 

analysts we have are good, but there are simply not 

enough of them to do much good. 

• It takes a few days/weeks to get back simple 

background and financial checks... [I] cannot 

conduct an investigation unless I have the 

intelligence to interview a subject. In the case of 

New York, a backlog existed in uploading lead 

status (i.e., assigned, covered, closed) into the ACS 

system. 

• [There is] not enough analytical support available to 

even come close to conducting a thorough and 

complete investigation. 

• Lack of professional analysts hampers every aspect 

of our investigations. 

• Poor analytical support at the field level. 

• Agents are performing analyst work 30 percent of 

their day ... 

• Need more analysts [because] analysts should be 

assigned to the JTTF and not assigned out of the 

main office. Experience counts with analysts – they 

are often our sole repositories of institutional 

knowledge of the subject matter. We need financial 

analysts and data entry clerks so that when we do 

gather the information, we have help organizing it. 

We need consistent and professional help in the 

area of confidential file maintenance. 

The FBI’s Rotation of Field Office JTTF Leadership

 

Although the FBI often rotates managers in the field to provide 

opportunities to gain varied experience, we found this frequent rotation 

negatively affected the structure and stability of the JTTF, and terrorism 

investigations, as well as an important pilot information sharing project. 

The JTTFs existed before September 11, 2001, but doubled in number in 

the three years since then. Along with this increase in task forces and 
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members comes a need for stability and structure, especially in task force 

management. The JTTF and terrorism investigations are often new experiences 

for both FBI and non-FBI task force members, and members benefit from 

stable, consistent, experienced management of the task force. A former JTTF 

supervisor with many years of experience in the counterintelligence and 

counterterrorism programs in the FBI told us: 

The FBI must recognize the difference between the 

“criminal” side and the “intelligence” side. The 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence [program] 

requires more stability and continuity. It is vital to 

have continuity [in leadership] because of the nature of 

counterterrorism work.

Some of the JTTF members we interviewed commented that the lack of 

continuity in leadership created inconsistencies in the JTTF’s management, 

work prioritization, and operations. For example, members stated: 

• The lack of continuity in the JTTF supervisors has 

had a negative effect: there was no direction and 

the team did not maintain cohesion. At some point, 

one part of the JTTF did not know what the other 

part was doing; there was a breakdown in 

communication. 

• Turnover has been a problem at the JTTF. You 

need continuity in a leader and they have to have an 

interest in [the work]. With every new leader comes 

a new management design. There was a lack of 

leadership and direction on the JTTF. 

• The impact of the changes in supervision [is] 

strained communication and a lack of continuity in 

direction. 

• There has been lots of turnover in the supervision of 

the JTTF. It affects the leadership, makes everyone 

nervous if you don’t have continuity, especially if 

you don’t have someone with experience. 

• We’re on our sixth supervisor... We have never had 

one [supervisor] for very long. I’ve had no direction. 
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We found that instability in the FBI field office leadership affected some 

terrorism investigations. For example, in an 18-month period, the FBI’s 

St. Louis Field Office had three different SACs, two different counterterrorism 

ASACs, and six different JTTF SSAs. Prior to the JTTF supervisor currently 

assigned, the members told us they had no direction, continuity of leadership, 

or squad meetings. The squad meetings are important methods of 

communication and coordination for JTTF members, and without this forum, 

we were told it was difficult to update case information, or receive direction and 

assignments. One St. Louis JTTF member described the lack of supervision as 

the biggest obstacle and stated: 

The turnover has impacted us negatively. That’s my 

single biggest complaint. There’s a lack of supervision. 

We just continue doing what we do – through initiative 

of the task force members. ...if there was a structure 

or a game plan – we’d know what to expect. With the 

new supervisor we’ve had a few meetings. We have 29 

people – we need to have meetings to go around the 

table to see what everyone’s working on – they may be 

connected. But we don’t have them [meetings] 

regularly or nearly enough. It’s like a bunch of wasps 

flying around – but no one’s telling us what to do. 

The instability in leadership in the St. Louis FBI Field Office also affected 

the external law enforcement community by significantly delaying the 

development and pilot testing of the Gateway Information Sharing Initiative 

(ISI). Originally conceived by local and state law enforcement agencies in and 

around St. Louis, Missouri, in 1999, the ISI was intended to be a multi-agency 

regional information sharing network to merge investigative data from federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies into a single, searchable database.83 

The database, housed in the FBI’s St. Louis Field Office, marked the first time 

the FBI entered records into a database containing investigative data from state 

and local law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement officials who contribute 

to the database would be able to search it by names, addresses, phrases, 

vehicle makes, weapons data, scars, tattoos, and other factors to retrieve 

information from other cases that might be relevant to a case they are 

 

83 Developed in 1999, the project began as the St. Louis Intelligence Center, better 

known as SLIC, to address drug trafficking and violent crime and was originally sponsored by 

the St. Louis Metropolitan Police, St. Louis County Police, Missouri State Highway Patrol, 

Illinois State Police, and the St. Louis FBI (including the JTTF). The project has since 

expanded to include the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Office, Collinsville Police, Southern Illinois 

Police Chiefs Association, and the United States Attorneys’ Offices of the Southern District of 

Illinois and Eastern District of Missouri. 
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investigating. Investigators could then export the retrieved data to analytical 

software that could identify and graphically depict relationships among people, 

weapons, phone numbers and other components of the crime. The ISI system 

would allow for link analysis and geo-spatial mapping of the data by members 

of JTTFs in other cities who planned to launch similar pilot projects: Norfolk, 

Virginia; San Diego, California; Seattle/Portland, Washington; and Baltimore, 

Maryland. 

 

During October 2002, the Attorney General issued a news release that 

stated ISI was to be fully operational within 60 days.84 He stated: 

Information that was previously fragmented and would 

take analysts months to collate will be connected 

within seconds. This revolutionary system will enable 

investigators to identify intelligence gaps and to see 

tangible links between seemingly unrelated 

investigations. 

If successful, the project would serve as a model for a nationwide informationsharing initiative. However, according to federal officials we interviewed in 

St. Louis in November 2003, ISI was stalled due to the frequent turnover in the 

St. Louis FBI leadership leading to developmental delays. A supervisor in the 

St. Louis FBI Field Office informed us that although ISI was to be operational 

by December 2002, it was still in the planning stages at the time of our 

November 2003 interviews. Other federal law enforcement officials we 

interviewed in St. Louis stated to us that this delay caused frustration and 

anger within the local law enforcement community who were counting on the 

FBI to take the lead in this project. 

According to a recent information update from the St. Louis FBI field 

office in January 2005, contracting issues resulted in the dismissal of the 

original and succeeding vendors. After several months of inactivity, another 

vendor was awarded a contract by FBI headquarters to complete the project. 

The name of the project also was changed from the Gateway Information 

Sharing Initiative, to the Multi-Agency Information Sharing Initiative (MISI), to 

the Regional Data Exchange (RDEx). The beginning stages of RDEx will 

include regional databases from such areas as St. Louis, Seattle, San Diego, 

and Norfolk. According to the FBI, once these areas become operational within 

their own regional databases, RDEx will move to an inter-regional approach. 

This approach will link the operating regional databases, so that queries can be 

made in a wider scope. 

 

84 “Attorney General John Ashcroft Unveils Gateway Information Sharing Pilot Project in 

St. Louis, Missouri,” U.S. Department of Justice News Release, October 9, 2002.
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The JTTF staff we interviewed indicated that the St. Louis field office’s 

management team in place at the time of our August 2003 visit had made 

noticeable changes and there was improvement in the JTTF’s management and 

guidance that also improved task force operations. For example, one JTTF 

member told us that the new JTTF supervisor had initiated regular task force 

meetings where everyone discussed their cases. During one of these meetings 

he learned that he and another JTTF member were conducting surveillance on 

houses very near each other, and their suspects had a relationship. He turned 

over ten months worth of surveillance and intelligence information to the other 

JTTF member, and they expected an indictment within a month. The JTTF 

member we interviewed estimated that without the shared information, it 

would have taken another year to get an indictment: 

He [the other JTTF member] was in week two of the 

investigation; we put him in week 50. We had a lot of 

people working on the same case and didn’t know it. 

Even though there were evident improvements, each of the managers had been 

in place for less than one year (e.g., SAC - ten months, ASAC – one month, SSA 

– one month as JTTF supervisor). Therefore, we could not measure the longterm impact of their changes. As of October 2004, the ASAC had been 

transferred back to FBI headquarters in Washington D.C. and in January 2005 

the SAC also was transferred to FBI headquarters. The St. Louis field office 

had yet another new SAC and ASAC. 

In addition to the transfers of supervisors, some of the JTTF members we 

interviewed and surveyed commented that frequent transfers of the FBI JTTF 

agents, sooner than the standard rotation, also can have an impact on the 

investigations. For example a non-FBI JTTF member commented, “I had a case 

to work on with an FBI agent and have gone through 5 agents on the same 

case.” 

JTTF Staffing Levels

The FBI’s investigative strategy that requires the JTTFs to cover every 

terrorism lead results in a demanding workload that is surpassing the 

resources available to the task forces. At all the sites we visited, we found that 

the JTTFs were exceeding their authorized staffing levels for FBI agents by 75 

to 125 percent by borrowing from other FBI programs (such as drugs or whitecollar crime).85 

 

85 The “authorized staffing level” is the number of staff allocated to the JTTF. 
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Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has permanently reassigned some of 

its field agent resources from traditional criminal programs (such as violent 

crime, white collar crime, and drugs) to meet the workload demands of the 

counterterrorism and counterintelligence programs. Additionally, the FBI 

realigned its priorities, and to “protect the U.S. from terrorist attack” became 

the number one priority. In September 2004 the OIG completed a follow-up 

audit of the FBI’s casework and human resource allocation. The OIG report 

stated that the FBI “generally shifted its allocation [of field agents] to reflect its 

new priorities.”86 Additionally, the OIG reported that the FBI allocated a larger 

number of agent resources to counterterrorism matters in FY 2003 than in 

FY 2000 and reduced the number of positions allocated to traditional crime 

programs during the same time period. However, the FBI used 845 more 

agents than it had allocated for terrorism matters, while it used 879 fewer 

agents than planned in traditional criminal programs in FY 2003. 

The FBI monitors the staffing utilization rates of its agents through its 

Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system.87 Before March 2004, the 

FBI did not include the non-FBI task force members in the TURK system, 

which underrepresented the number of man hours devoted to JTTF work. A 

senior FBI official told us that the non-FBI agents were now included in the 

TURK system to enable the FBI to assess the overall staffing levels and needs of 

its task forces. 

The JTTF members we interviewed and surveyed described the impact of 

insufficient staffing as follows: 

• With such an important and time consuming 

mission it is easy for JTTF members including FBI 

agents to be over-worked and over loaded. The 

JTTF members work long hours and many, many 

weekends and holidays at the sacrifice of their 

families. Most work without complaint or desire of 

recognition, however, working at an unrelenting 

pace can cause burn out. 

 

86 The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization, U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, September 2004, Audit Report No. 04-

39. 

87 The FBI’s TURK system is used to record the percentage of time spent by field agents 

on different types of investigations (e.g., counterterrorism, white-collar crime, drugs). 
U.S. Department of Justice 138 

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• Without the commitment of manpower, cases 

remain under-assigned and the intelligence 

capabilities are limited. 

• Every person on the task force is overburdened with 

too much work which I believe leads to the quality 

[of] investigations that are there not getting done 

right [sic]. 

• Other than slowing the mission, resource problems 

have tended to bring down [the] morale of the unit... 

• Case loads has [sic] led to very long hours ... Many 

non-FBI task force members are being over tasked. 

• The complete lack of resources is a daily hindrance 

to the terrorism investigations the field offices are 

attempting to conduct. It takes ten times as long to 

complete a task that should take less than a day. 

Some JTTFs Experienced Space and Information Technology Connectivity 

Problems 

Space Is Inadequate for Some JTTFs

Although the majority of JTTF members surveyed and interviewed were 

satisfied with their task force office space, we found through our site visits that 

various JTTF members were working in cramped conditions that hampered 

communication, slowed work processes, and limited the JTTF’s ability to add 

members. In addition, JTTF leadership and members told us they needed more 

space to accommodate additional members or to improve the existing members’ 

working conditions. 

Several of the JTTF members we interviewed believed that their working 

conditions were undesirable. The following table shows how survey 

respondents rated office space. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Table 14: JTTF Members’ Ratings of 

Task Force Office Space 

Survey Question: How would you rate the task force’s space? 

Responses Task Force

Excellent Good Average Poor Very Poor 

JTTF 17% 24% 31% 18% 10%

Source: Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 

2004. 

Note: The respondents who replied “not applicable” were excluded. 

JTTF members commented that: 

• Lack of space has made it difficult to coordinate 

activities with other squad members. 

• Lack of space prohibits additional full-time 

members. 

• Meeting space is very cramped and located in a 

common area. Issues are difficult to discuss with 

other agency personnel continually walking through 

the meeting space. The meeting area is often times 

too small to accommodate all of the attending 

personnel. 

• There has been a negative impact on the task force 

due to the lack of space. Currently the task force 

officers are spread among the entire office. 

• The space is too small and cramped. Bigger space 

coming, we have been promised, over and over and 

over and over and ... 

• [The] working conditions [are] so incredibly poor, 

adversely impacts efficiency. 

• We are presently in a basement with no circulation, 

no cleaning, no computers and outdated equipment, 

making morale poor. 

• Space is a major issue. We have a very good and 

large group of agencies but with the lack of space 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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and parking for the members, it becomes a 

deterrent. They do not work in the FBI office due to 

lack of space which means their databases are not 

readily available and they need to return to their 

office to conduct investigations. There would be a 

greater combination of intel together in one office 

with space availability. 

• Without office space, communication and 

coordination cannot occur. Until then, cases and 

targets will not be efficiently worked. 

At the time of our visits the San Francisco, St. Louis, and Salt Lake City 

JTTFs could not accept additional members due to the lack of available office 

space. The ASAC for the FBI’s St. Louis Field Office told us that additional 

member agencies approached the FBI about joining the JTTF, but he had not 

accepted their offers because he required additional space. Similar concerns 

were raised by the San Francisco and Salt Lake City JTTF leaders. In 

San Francisco, the SSA told us that he wanted to accept the National Security 

Agency’s offer to join the JTTF but did not have space to accommodate any 

additional members. 

The FBI has explored alternatives to improving space and working 

conditions for JTTF members through acquiring additional office space in 

offsite locations. The FBI told us that “every basic [reasonable] request 

requirement has been fulfilled.” However, we found that the acquisition of 

some offsite locations has been delayed and poorly coordinated. 

For example, when we visited the Inland Northwest JTTF (in Spokane, 

Washington, and Coeur d’Alene, Idaho) we found that for 15 months the JTTF 

was paying a lease for space that it did not occupy. The Inland Northwest 

JTTF leadership told us that the space was not habitable because the required 

security upgrades were not complete. Two FBI Special Agents from the JTTF 

were assigned to plan for the space, acquire the space, and handle all the 

contracting issues. The staff assigned to prepare for the move had requested, 

but not received, adequate direction from the FBI on how to move a JTTF to an 

offsite location. They received conflicting information from FBI Headquarters 

staff on the procedures used to move an operation offsite. One of the JTTF 

survey respondents shared the same concerns raised by the Inland Northwest 

JTTF leaders: 

[The] efficiency of the operations and cohesiveness of 

the JTTF is hampered by the lack of sufficient office 

space. The designation of and security upgrades on 
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an offsite have been pending for an unreasonable 

amount of time. This is a budgetary, FBI Space 

Management, and GSA bureaucratic shortcoming. 

The move was further complicated because two separate FBI field offices 

(Seattle, Washington, and Salt Lake City, Utah) had oversight for the Spokane 

and Coeur d’Alene RAOs, but neither was identified as “the” office responsible 

for the move. In September 2003, the Inland Northwest JTTF finally moved to 

its space. 

A senior FBI official shared the following perspective on why problems 

exist concerning the JTTFs’ moves. 

Even though the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division has 

made counterterrorism the number one priority, the 

FBI’s administrative support divisions have not 

changed their procedures to support the operational 

needs of the Counterterrorism Division. 

As another example, in July 2003, the New York City FBI field office 

received $20 million from Congress to move its JTTF to an offsite location. 

However, the FBI SAC told us that the move of the New York City JTTF had 

been delayed because of the manner in which it was funded. He stated that 

the New York City JTTF received the $20 million over multiple fiscal years and 

received only enough funding each fiscal year to acquire the space floor by 

floor. As of February 2005 the New York City JTTF had moved into one floor in 

their new space and expected to complete the move to two additional floors in 

late summer 2005. 

Information Technology Systems Connectivity Does Not Meet the Needs of 

Some JTTFs 

While the FBI has issued 1,300 new desktops to the JTTFs, we found 

that there are information technology connectivity problems in some field 

offices. FBI Counterterrorism Division officials told us all information 

technology equipment requests received from JTTFs have been approved, but 

many JTTFs still work in older offices that do not have the adequate 

connectivity technology to support task force members’ needs. Some of the 

offices are too ill-equipped to allow JTTF members direct access to their parent 

agencies’ databases and systems, which limits the data searches that the 

JTTFs can complete on site. Task force members are forced to return to their 

parent agencies to perform data runs which is inefficient and time consuming 

and a survey respondent commented that, “Communications connectivity is a 

major obstacle in communicating info[rmation].” 
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JTTF members we interviewed were frustrated with the FBI’s computer 

systems and connectivity. They described these systems as “outdated” and 

“unreliable,” which negatively affected the operations. Survey respondents 

stated that: 

• Lack of adequate printer connections, analog 

computer lines, and similar technical problems at 

times chill the momentum of the work flow. 

• We have to go down five floors to get dial-up internet 

access which makes no sense in the 21st century. 

• It is frustrating that the secure [I]nternet is not 

always available to task force members without 

leaving their office space. 

• Lack of high-speed [Internet] access to conduct 

research makes it take a great deal of time to do 

investigative work. 

JTTF members cannot access the Internet from their desktops. Instead, 

JTTF members can only access the Internet on the one or two dedicated 

terminals available to each squad. Similarly, the NJTTF members did not have 

access to the Internet from their desktops for three years. However, in 

September 2004, the NJTTF moved from FBI Headquarters to Northern Virginia 

co-located with TTIC (now known as NCTC), and all members gained access to 

the Internet at their desks. The JTTF and NJTTF members we interviewed 

believed that the access problem was disruptive to the work process and 

affected their productivity. 

CONCLUSION 

 The FBI needs to ensure that sufficient staffing, space, and information 

technology connectivity is available to fully support the task forces’ efforts. The 

FBI also needs to recognize that the frequent rotation of JTTF leadership has a 

negative impact on the task force structure and work. After the initial 

expansion of JTTFs in a crisis environment, the FBI now needs to plan for 

appropriate office space and equipment for new and existing JTTFs. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

21. The FBI should determine and allocate sufficient staff to effectively support 

the terrorism task forces. 
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22. The FBI should seek more stability in JTTF leadership. 

23. The FBI should develop a plan and issue written guidance for the JTTFs on 

how to activate new JTTFs and move existing JTTFs to offsite locations. 

24. The FBI should ensure sufficient information technology connectivity 

needed to effectively support the terrorism task forces. 
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EXTERNAL FACTORS 

Some factors external to the terrorism task forces and advisory councils 

affect their overall operations. We found that the DEA has limited membership 

on some task forces. We also found that the DHS does not provide sufficient 

numbers of members to the Department’s task forces, and for those members it 

does provide, DHS guidance and direction is inconsistent. In addition, some 

ATAC members viewed the functions of the state homeland security task forces 

as duplicative of those performed by the ATACs.

Although Congress, the DEA, and the Department leadership 

recognize the critical link between drug trafficking and 

terrorism, the DEA has minimal membership on the JTTFs and 

did not assign a permanent representative to the NJTTF until 

April 2004. 

Despite the DEA’s recognition of links between drug trafficking and 

terrorism (often called narco-terrorism), we found that as of January 2005 the 

DEA has only assigned one full-time member to the JTTFs.88 The DEA also did 

not assign a permanent representative to the NJTTF until April 2004, 

approximately two years after the NJTTF’s inception. In comparison with other 

Department law enforcement components, the DEA has the lowest level of 

membership on the JTTFs.89 According to the NJTTF and JTTF members we 

interviewed, the DEA was “noticeably absent” from the Department’s terrorism 

task forces. 

Since September 11, 2001, law enforcement, and particularly the DEA, 

has been concerned about the link between terrorism and drug trafficking. In 

May 2003, the DEA’s former Assistant Administrator for Intelligence told the 

Senate Committee on the Judiciary that: 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the law enforcement 

community typically addressed drug trafficking and 

terrorist activities as separate issues... these two 

criminal activities are visibly intertwined... 

 

88 The DEA defines a narco-terrorist organization as “an organized group that is 

complicit in the activities of drug trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, 

politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets with the intention to 

influence a government or group of people.” See testimony of Steven Casteel, former DEA 

Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 20, 2003. 

89 By contrast, as of March 2005 the ATF had 65 members and the USMS had 51 

members on JTTFs across the country. 
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investigating the link between drugs and terrorism has 

taken on renewed importance.90 

During a speech in March 2004, the DEA Administrator reinforced these 

statements when she stated that: 

DEA investigations have identified links between 

groups and individuals under investigation for drug 

violations and terrorist organizations...As of February 

2004, DEA had 51 open Priority Target Organization 

[PTO] cases with links to terrorist 

organizations...DEA’s intelligence program is working 

very closely with law enforcement and the intelligence 

community to identify and anticipate emerging threats 

posed by the links between drugs and terrorism.91 

In addition, DEA officials told us that the DEA is skilled in recruiting and 

developing intelligence sources (human assets) and that the DEA has a 

network of national and international sources. JTTF survey respondents, as 

well as JTTF leadership and members interviewed, identified asset development 

as essential to JTTF terrorism investigations. DEA officials also stated that 

they excel in surveillance and analyst programs, and that its intelligence 

program is second to none. Yet, the JTTFs’ access to and use of DEA 

informants and other expertise are limited because the DEA does not assign 

enough full-time members to the JTTFs. 

Further, the DEA ASAC who supervised the only full-time DEA agent on 

a JTTF told us that he believes that JTTFs are more effective at investigations

because they can use the expertise of the FBI, DEA and other law enforcement 

agencies. For example, using the drug expertise of DEA agents as members of 

the task force, a suspected terrorist’s or supporter’s links to drugs or drug 

trafficking could be more readily identified and the suspect charged and 

convicted of drug crimes, which may be less difficult to prosecute than a 

terrorism charge. He further stated that the DEA benefits from its presence on 

the JTTF through an enhanced exchange of information and a better 

relationship with the FBI. 

 

90 Testimony of Steven Casteel, former DEA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, 

Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 20, 2003. 

91 Testimony of DEA Administrator Karen Tandy before the United States House of 

Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, 

the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, March 24, 2004. 
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When we asked officials at FBI headquarters about the need for DEA’s 

presence on the JTTFs, they stated that they would welcome DEA on the task 

forces and agreed that the JTTFs could benefit from enhanced access to 

intelligence sources and information sharing through DEA membership. They 

said that increased DEA membership on JTTFs would ensure that the JTTFs 

consistently receive timely information on narco-terrorism cases. 

However, despite these benefits, DEA membership on the JTTFs is 

minimal, and actually has declined over time. We reviewed JTTF member 

rosters and found that in June 2003 the DEA had 14 members on 11 JTTFs, 

and in May 2004 had decreased its participation to 12 members on 10 JTTFs. 

As of January 2005, its participation was reduced to one full-time JTTF 

member from the DEA’s Field Office in San Francisco, and 105 JTTF “points of 

contact.” 

In response, DEA officials from the Special Operations and Intelligence 

Divisions stated that the DEA is fully responsive to the FBI’s requests for 

assistance. They stated that in addition to DEA “points of contact,” each time 

the threat level increases, DEA temporarily assigns full-time members to the 

JTTFs where needed. One DEA SAC in the field informed us that after 

September 11, 2001, he offered full-time DEA members to his local JTTF but 

his offer was never acted upon. 

The DEA managers we interviewed at headquarters and in the field 

offices also told us that decisions to assign DEA agents to a JTTF are 

determined locally by the DEA SAC. The DEA has a designated headquarters 

group, the Special Coordination Unit, to ensure counterterrorism-related 

information is shared with appropriate organizations outside of DEA.92 

 When asked in August 2004 about the DEA’s JTTF membership, the 

DEA Administrator told us that the JTTFs are sometimes in locations that the 

DEA is not, drugs and terrorism are not interconnected in every area where the 

DEA and a JTTF exist together, and the DEA’s resources are stretched. She 

further stated that the DEA’s membership on the JTTFs is “isolated and 

specific” to the threat for a particular area and that the DEA identified “points 

 

92 In December 2001, DEA established the Special Coordination Unit in the Special Operations

Division to respond to classified information requests related to terrorism from other law enforcement

organizations and the intelligence community. In October 2002, DEA Headquarters established within the

Office of Domestic Operations an ad hoc counterterrorism unit for the purpose of tracking information 

about terrorism investigations and leads provided by its field offices, and sharing terrorism information 

between appropriate elements within DEA, as well as with outside law enforcement agencies and intelligence

agencies with a need to know. In January 2004, the ad hoc unit was merged into the Special Coordination

Unit in the Special Operations Division to centralize all the terrorist related investigations and information

within DEA. 

 
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of contact” in its field offices to serve as liaisons to the JTTFs where the DEA 

was not represented. 

We compared the lists of the DEA’s domestic field offices with the FBI’s 

JTTF locations and found that the DEA has offices in 83 of the existing 103 

JTTF locations. The DEA is not represented on the JTTFs in high threat areas 

such as New York City, Washington, DC, Los Angeles, or along the southwest 

border where the propensity for narco-terrorism may be higher. 

We also found that the DEA did not define the role of its JTTF points of 

contact. We interviewed DEA points of contact during three of our site visits 

who told us that they had not received any policies or guidance from the DEA 

headquarters on their liaison role. One of the three could not identify who he 

was supposed to contact on the JTTF. In addition, in September 2004, the 

DEA’s NJTTF representative stated that he did not receive guidance from the 

DEA on his role. He also stated he would like to know more about the JTTFs. 

DEA informed us that they had sent several cables to the field describing 

protocols for information sharing. In 2002, two DEA cables instructed field 

offices to identify investigations with a potential nexus to terrorism and to send 

that information to DEA headquarters for review. In 2004, two cables 

instructed field offices to share terrorism related information with DEA 

headquarters and simultaneously with the FBI and JTTFs. However, the 

cables do not provide instructions to the JTTF points of contact and DEA did 

not provide other documents that address the scope of responsibilities of the 

points of contact. 

CONCLUSION 

The DEA does not have enough full-time members on the JTTFs. During 

our site visits, the few points of contact DEA assigned to the JTTFs and the 

NJTTF member told us they had limited guidance about their roles. The JTTFs 

would benefit from more and better informed DEA members, who could share 

their expertise on developing human assets, surveillance and analytical skills, 

and provide DEA information and resources that could help the JTTFs. We 

believe the DEA should reconsider its limited membership on JTTFs. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

25. The DEA should increase its full-time membership on the JTTFs and work 

with the FBI to assess the optimum locations for new DEA members. 

 

26. The DEA should issue written guidance that defines the roles and 

responsibilities of its JTTF and NJTTF members and points of contact. 
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Merging Immigration and Customs Functions 

On March 1, 2003, approximately 180,000 personnel 

from 22 different organizations were merged under the 

newly created Department of Homeland Security, with 

responsibility to manage major domestic incidents by 

establishing a single, comprehensive national incident 

management system. Two of these 22 organizations, 

formerly known as the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS) from the Department of Justice and the 

United States Customs Service (Customs) from the 

Department of the Treasury, each had vital roles in the 

war on terrorism and thus play a significant role on the 

Department’s terrorism task forces and advisory councils. 

The inspection functions of INS, U.S. Customs Service, 

and the U.S. Department of Agriculture were transferred 

to the DHS and combined into one agency called Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) to control the nation’s 

borders and to prevent illegal entry. The enforcement and 

investigative functions of INS, U.S. Customs Service, the 

Federal Protective Service, and the Federal Air Marshals 

Service were combined to create another new DHS agency 

called Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 

which is responsible for identifying and shutting down 

vulnerabilities in the nation’s border, economic, 

transportation, and infrastructure security. 

Source: http://www.ice.gov/graphics/about/index.htm

Many of the DHS ICE task force members told us that ICE has 

not provided them needed direction, has not cross-trained 

supervisors or agents in their new areas of responsibility, and 

has not provided a sufficient number of ICE representatives to 

perform task force work. As a result, the FBI does not have 

adequate access to immigration and customs expertise and 

information systems to assist its investigative efforts. We also 

were told that the ICE did not always understand the roles of 

its task force members, leading to assignment of non-JTTF 

tasks to its members on the JTTFs. 

Both of DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 

Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) divisions are considered 

critical members of the 

Department terrorism task forces 

because almost all terrorism cases 

have an immigration or customs 

nexus.93 Moreover, the DHS and 

the FBI agree that the task forces 

do not operate as effectively 

without ICE and CBP agents and 

analysts who have the expertise in 

immigration and customs. 

The DHS reports that it is 

the largest contributor of 

personnel to the JTTFs nationwide 

and ICE is the largest contributor 

of personnel (311) among DHS 

components. ICE also has 

personnel assigned to other task 

 

93 Three agencies comprise ICE: 1) Office of Investigations, whose mission is, “to focus 

on national security , financial and smuggling violations including illegal arms exports, 

financial crimes, commercial fraud, human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, child 

pornography/exploitation, and immigration fraud,” 2) Federal Air Marshal Service, whose 

mission is, “to be responsible for and protect air security and promote public confidence in our 

nations’ civil aviation system through the effective deployment of Federal Air Marshals in order 

to detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. carriers, airports, passengers, and crews, 

and 3) Federal Protective Service, whose mission is, “to provide law enforcement and security 

services to over one million tenants and daily visitors to all federally owned and leased facilities 

nationwide.” See: ICE Comments to the DOJ OIG Report on DOJ Terrorism Task Forces, Michael 

J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary ICE, May 18, 2005. 
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forces in the Department including the FTTTF, ITOS, TFOS, and the 

NJTTF. However, despite these numbers, according to both FBI and 

DHS ICE task force members, the DHS ICE has not provided sufficient 

support to the task forces. 

DHS ICE Has Not Provided Its JTTF Members Needed Direction

Throughout the country, many of the ICE task force members we 

interviewed described disorganization and lack of guidance from ICE 

headquarters that has affected task force efficiency. They told us they receive 

little direction from the ICE, the direction they receive is contradictory, and the 

supervisors in the ICE field offices are ill-equipped to provide guidance to task 

force members. 

For example, an ICE agent (formerly an INS agent) told us: 

• Everything is still up in the air with this new agency. We 

still have no badges or credentials. We had to 

electronically convert all our criminal cases over to the 

Treasury Enforcement Communications System 

database, which is not classified, and we never got any 

training in it. The quality of guidance and direction from 

ICE is extremely poor – no one knows what to do and 

there is no flow of information. I don’t know if my bosses 

were just not filtering information down to the agents or 

my bosses are just not getting any information. 

Other ICE agents (formerly a Customs agents) told us: 

• The direction [from Customs] is limited. It would be nice 

to have a little more guidance from my agency, more 

from a national standpoint and what my agency expects. 

I don’t know if what I do here is the same as everyone 

else. 

• I don’t go to the ICE supervisor for guidance. With 

Customs, we’re having a little bit of confusion – they’re 

confused as to what DHS headquarters is going to do. 

Customs is not going to handle any terrorism cases. 

There was a questionnaire that came out from DHS 

headquarters as to what the role is of a Special Agent 

from Customs on the JTTF. I also got a questionnaire 

from the FBI on my role. 

An October 2004 GAO report on immigration programs in DHS supports 

these concerns. The report noted that ICE officials told GAO that ICE had been 

“slow to establish uniform operational policies and procedures, causing 
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confusion and some delay in the creation of a new, unified ICE culture.”94 

Additionally, the report states: 

Officials [in CBP, CIS, and ICE offices] noted that in 

some cases, unresolved disagreements and confusion 

regarding the roles and responsibilities of the DHS 

immigration bureaus related to investigative techniques 

and other operational issues has the potential for 

serious consequences. 

 The GAO report further stated: 

One SAC official said that a lack of unified operational 

procedures had in some cases resulted in confusion or 

the establishment of local policies. Other SAC officials 

told us this can be problematic if investigators working 

together are relying upon different policies and 

procedures to carry out their investigative work. 

An example of the contradictory guidance the DHS ICE provided to its 

task force members occurred in June 2003. An ICE Program Manager, 

(referred to as a JTTF Regional Coordinator at that time) from DHS 

headquarters used an outdated 1999 MOU between the former INS and the 

JTTF to prohibit ICE agents on the St. Louis, Kansas City, and San Antonio 

JTTFs from working on intelligence cases. This ICE Program Manager sent an 

e-mail on June 4, 2003 to St. Louis, Kansas City, and San Antonio ICE field 

offices referring to the outdated 1999 MOU that stated that FBI supervisors will 

not assign INS agents to conduct routine intelligence cases. Although the three 

ICE agents on the task forces and their supervisors agreed to comply with the 

restriction in the outdated memorandum, only the ICE agent on the St. Louis 

JTTF complied.95 

Since many JTTF members work primarily on intelligence cases, the 

St. Louis ICE JTTF agent told us that he closed out the majority of his cases 

and the JTTF supervisor had to reassign them to other JTTF members, 

including agents from other DHS components such as the U.S. Secret Service 

and Federal Protective Service who were not affected by this memorandum. He 

 

94 Homeland Security, Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration 

Programs, GAO-05-81, U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2004. 

95 The FBI was not made aware of the DHS’s ICE restriction and therefore did not 

enforce it elsewhere in that region. We interviewed the FBI JTTF supervisors from Kansas City 

and San Antonio and found that ICE never notified them of this restriction. 
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stated the quality of his assignments suffered because he could no longer be 

assigned as a lead investigator on JTTF cases. 

According to a St. Louis ICE JTTF agent, three months later, in 

September 2003 this restriction was lifted, when Michael Garcia, Assistant 

Secretary, ICE, addressed a conference of ICE JTTF agents in Baltimore, 

Maryland, and stated to the participants he was unaware of this e-mail (from 

the ICE Program Manager) and that it was never his intention to remove ICE 

JTTF agents from intelligence cases. 

Several ICE agents on other JTTFs also told us that they were aware of 

friction between the DHS and the FBI regarding intelligence cases, but they 

continued to work these cases. Another ICE agent (formerly a Customs agent) 

on a JTTF told us that his supervisor informed him that Customs JTTF 

representatives would not be “handling any terrorism cases,” but this was 

never enforced. 

 

ICE JTTF Agents Expressed Concern About the Lack of Cross-Training in 

Immigration and Customs Matters 

We were told by ICE agents who were members of JTTFs and ATACs that 

many former INS agents on the JTTFs are now supervised by former Customs 

staff who have not been cross-trained in immigration matters and are therefore 

unprepared to provide adequate guidance and supervision to their JTTF 

members. The majority of JTTF members we surveyed and interviewed 

described the FBI supervision on the task force as positive. However, task 

force members also need guidance and supervision from their parent agency on 

their own agency-related matters. 

For example, a JTTF agent (formerly a Customs agent) told us that he 

needed training in immigration policies and procedures because other JTTF 

members frequently approached him regarding these issues. He said that he 

had only cursory knowledge of immigration issues. His agency supervisor had 

training only in immigration issues and did not have the expertise to guide him 

on customs issues. 

An ICE Resident Agent-in-Charge (formerly a Customs agent), who is an 

ATAC member, expressed frustration about the lack of direction and training 

from DHS ICE. He stated that even though he is in charge of an office that 

combined INS and Customs staff and functions, he received no training in 

immigration issues and therefore is unaware of what legal or other authority he 

has related to immigration arrests. He also was unaware that an ICE agent 

(formerly an INS agent) under his supervision was assigned to the local JTTF 
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Enhancing ICE Participation on JTTFs 

The JTTF Enhancement Act of 2003 directed 

that the Secretary of Homeland Security, “from 

amounts made available, shall increase the 

number of law enforcement agents of the 

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 

services and (make) available for participation 

in the joint terrorism task force program.” 

Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-2 issued in 2001 directed that a 

“multi-year plan be developed and 

implemented to enhance the investigative and 

intelligence analysis capabilities of the INS and 

Customs, which should significantly increase 

the number of Customs and INS special agents 

assigned to the JTTFs.” 

References: The JTTF Enhancement Act of 2003, 

H.R. 3439, November 4, 2003, Section 3, and 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2, October 

29, 2001. A.2. 

because, at the time of our interview, former INS and Customs offices were 

located separately. 

This lack of cross-training also led to confusion regarding the assignment 

of ICE agents to JTTFs. After INS and Customs agencies merged to form ICE, 

some former Customs supervisors questioned why there was a need to assign 

an ICE agent (with customs expertise) to a JTTF when an ICE agent (with 

immigration expertise) was already assigned. JTTFs need ICE agents with 

expertise in both customs and immigration operations and databases. 

However, all ICE agents have not been cross-trained in both functions. 

The October 2004 GAO report cited steps taken by DHS toward 

integrating former INS and Customs investigative workforces. According to the 

report, ICE headquarters issued a cross-training curriculum to all SAC offices 

in January 2004 with a deadline for all investigators to complete cross-training 

by September 20, 2004, although there was no deadline for group supervisors 

or senior managers.96 According to the GAO report, in late August 2004, 2,175 

out of approximately 5,400 former INS and Customs investigators had taken 

and passed at least one of nine exams, including 1,210 former INS and 

Customs investigators who had fully 

completed cross-training. ICE reports 

that as of March 15, 2005, 4,900 ICE 

special agents have completed crosstraining, which it states represents all 

non-supervisory special agents in the 

field and a majority of supervisory and 

headquarters special agents. 

Insufficient ICE Staff Detailed to the 

JTTFs and FTTTF 

JTTF: Most JTTF members and 

supervisors stated that additional ICE 

agents, particularly former INS agents, 

are needed on the JTTFs, since 

virtually all international terrorism 

cases have some link to immigration. 

ICE task force members, including 

 

96 Investigators must pass, with a score of 70 percent or higher, a series of nine written 

tests in order to be certified as cross-trained. Homeland Security, Management Challenges 

Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs, GAO-05-81, U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, October 2004. 
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former Customs agents, emphasized to us the need for additional ICE agents 

with immigration experience on the JTTFs. They stated: 

• Omaha could always use more people. I suggest at 

least two immigration people. 

• Not enough bodies from ICE. Every case involves an 

ICE component. 

• Should have a full-time Immigration investigative 

assistant to locate ICE (legacy INS) immigration 

records and [files]. 

• More ICE members from legacy INS. 

Similarly, other ICE task force members we interviewed and surveyed indicated 

a need for additional ICE members with customs expertise. For example, one 

ICE task force member (formerly Customs) stated: 

I get called by customs people constantly. I play a support 

role to a large number of people. The calls are all day from 

border stations in four states. I’m currently working on 15 

(FBI) taskings but others come in on a daily basis. Eight to 

ten of them involve me having to visit and interview. I 

coordinate whatever they need from a customs standpoint, 

TECS [Treasury Enforcement Communication System] 

database checks, travel itineraries, etc. FBI asks me to look 

up customs information that’s not terrorism related. I could 

really use another customs person here but it’s unlikely 

because they (DHS) look at it as we already have four people 

here, but three are [former] INS. 

The NJTTF Director informed us that at the request of DHS, he 

conducted a critical needs assessment by querying the JTTF field supervisors 

on how many ICE agents were needed on each of the task forces. The results 

of this assessment showed that there were 159 full-time and 22 part-time ICE 

agents on 86 JTTFs in November 2003. However, the field JTTFs requested an 

additional 138 full-time ICE agents from the DHS. In March 2005, NJTTF 

officials informed us that as of October 26, 2004, ICE had 311 members 

assigned to the JTTFs. This represents 269 full-time members and 42 parttime positions, an increase of 110 full-time and 20 part-time personnel. Part of 

this increase is attributed to the 58 Federal Air Marshals who were already 

JTTF members (then under TSA) but were subsequently assimilated into the 

DHS ICE. Because the number of JTTFs increased from 86 to 100 during this 
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time frame, the FBI could not verify whether the remainder of the DHS ICE 

staff increases (72) resulted from the overall increase in the number of JTTFs 

or the NJTTF’s needs assessment that was submitted to the DHS ICE in 

November 2003, requesting 138 additional positions for the JTTFs. 

FTTTF: According to the FTTTF Director and the majority of FTTTF 

members interviewed and surveyed, the lack of DHS ICE analysts and agents 

assigned to the FTTTF is detrimental to the operation’s efficiency. The FTTTF 

receives results of data inquiries from immigration and customs databases and 

must rely on ICE task force members to analyze the information. According to 

the FTTTF Director and members we interviewed, the one ICE agent and one 

ICE analyst assigned to the FTTTF are overburdened with analysis requests, 

and the task force needs additional analytical support from ICE and an analyst 

familiar with customs data.97 A former ICE employee told us that the one ICE 

analyst assigned had been employed by the INS only briefly before being 

detailed to the FTTTF and the analyst’s knowledge of immigration databases 

and procedures was limited. 

One FTTTF task force member stated that the lack of analysts makes it 

difficult to conduct expeditious analyses on time-sensitive information. 

Because only one ICE person has access to all ICE immigration data systems, 

that person is inundated with work, and it often takes up to a week for task 

force members to get answers, which in turn delays analytical products. 

Another member stated that the FTTTF is dependent on ICE for much of the 

information used in its analyses. He previously used the ICE representative in 

his unit to run checks on immigration databases to assist in his analyses. 

However, there was no longer ICE staff in his unit, which made it cumbersome 

to request these checks. He stated that it often takes weeks to receive an 

answer, and it would be more efficient if the FTTTF members had direct access 

to the DHS data systems. 

We also were informed that although initially supportive, the immigration 

and inspections function of CBP ceased providing support to the FTTTF after 

January 2003. This is important because CBP staff members are the most 

knowledgeable on databases with airport entry data. A former senior ICE 

representative on the FTTTF stated he personally contacted a high-ranking 

manager at DHS and asked for additional personnel, but he did not receive a 

response. 

 

97 Previously, the DHS had seven ICE FTTTF members (six with immigration experience 

and one with customs experience). As of January 2005, there are no ICE FTTTF members with 

customs experience. 
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As stated earlier in this report, a senior-level official from the INS served 

as the FTTTF’s Deputy Director from its inception in October 2001 until 

November 2002. The FTTTF Director stated that he made several requests to 

the DHS to fill this position, and DHS verbally agreed to do so. JMD’s 

November 2002 management review of the FTTTF had recommended that the 

“FTTTF Deputy Director be a senior level INS official who commits to a two-year 

tenure and who has access to the [then] INS Commissioner and field units 

when circumstances/information dictate action by INS.”98 The report cited the 

importance of maintaining strong INS leadership and significant staff presence 

to ensure the FTTTF’s access to immigration information needed to identify 

known or potential terrorists, engage appropriate INS enforcement officials 

when appropriate, and communicate through INS channels information aimed 

at denying entry as articulated in the mission. The report further noted that if 

the INS was to be integrated into the DHS, the FBI should work with the DHS 

to continue having the FTTTF Deputy Director’s position filled by the DHS. 

This recommendation for a DHS FTTTF Deputy Director still appears 

valid. However, as of August 2004 the DHS ICE had declined to fill the 

position, and DOD/CIFA agreed to fill the position of Deputy Director. 

ICE Assigns Non-JTTF Tasks to Its Members on the JTTFs 

Several ICE JTTF members, particularly those who formerly were INS 

agents, told us that their ICE supervisors did not understand their roles on the 

task force and their reporting responsibilities within the FBI’s chain of 

command. They said this led to the ICE referring taskings with a terrorism 

nexus directly to their members on the JTTF rather than referring directly to 

the FBI ASAC for the JTTF. The ICE agents believed all ICE referrals should go 

directly to the FBI to allow the JTTFs to properly vet cases, make 

determinations as to whether a terrorism nexus exists, and assign cases to the 

appropriate JTTF squads. These agents, however, did not want to complain to 

their ICE supervisors because they enjoyed their work on the JTTF and were 

concerned that if they did not perform these additional assignments, it might 

jeopardize their continued placement on the JTTF. For example, an ICE JTTF 

told us: 

INS cases assigned are an obstacle to performing work 

on the JTTF. You should have one road on terrorism 

related issues. If INS comes across intelligence that’s 

terrorism related, it should be given to the FBI. 

 

98 Draft White Paper: Management Review of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, November 13, 2002. (Not officially 

published.) 
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Sometimes, we get stuff from the NSU [National 

Security Unit at the DHS] that the FBI is clearly not 

aware of. NSU got information on a business from 

NY... so they task us [JTTF representatives from ICE]. 

NSU should have dealt solely with the FBI and taken 

INS out of the loop. A supervisor here [FBI] should 

look at a case and rule out terrorism and assign the 

case accordingly – but not to a JTTF/INS member 

assigned by NSU. There was a period of overtasking 

from INS that had nothing to do with our [work]. 

ICE task force members also commented in our interviews and survey 

that ICE overtasks its JTTF agents with ICE cases that do not have a terrorism 

nexus. For example, two ICE JTTF survey respondents stated: 

• Despite being designated as “full-time,” my agency 

continues to require my time on investigations other 

than JTTF. As my agency is small and received no 

compensation for my participation in the JTTF, my 

future here is in question. Also, there is the 

problem of receiving credit for my efforts on the 

JTTF. Unfortunately, my agency tends to assess my 

participation on a quid pro quo basis. This results 

in a scenario where my own personal career is 

jeopardized by my full-time participation. 

• My parent agency still assigns me daily work and 

expects notification of ALL my activities. The FBI 

expects me to be a task force member and conduct 

the work of the task force, not what my parent 

agency deems necessary. 

 The October 2004 GAO report on management challenges also 

addressed the topic of DHS agents assigned collateral duties, and reported that 

both DHS inspectors and investigators “have been assigned administrative 

functions full-time or as a collateral duty,” and “they are not spending all of 

their time on duties needed to accomplish the program’s mission.” 

Response to ICE Issues 

NJTTF Response

Both the NJTTF Director and former Deputy Director (an ICE employee) 

stated that they would like to see some type of national plan or policy issued by 
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the DHS regarding ICE representation on the JTTFs. Both also agreed that

updated policies and MOUs defining the ICE roles on the JTTFs as well as 

providing a strategy on agent assignments to the JTTFs would be useful. 

The NJTTF Unit Chief told us during our May 2004 interview that he is 

aware of some problems in the field with the DHS ICE and the JTTFs (such as 

confusion resulting from a former Customs or INS supervisor who does not 

understand the role of the ICE JTTF member, the number of agents assigned to 

the JTTFs, and the non-JTTF taskings assigned). He stated that he is 

monitoring these matters. 

DHS/ICE Response

In March 2004, the Assistant Secretary and the Chief of Operations for 

ICE at the DHS told us that they believe that DHS headquarters had increased 

guidance and communication to the field since ICE was created. The DHS 

coordinates its counterterrorism initiatives with the Department through 

1) MOUs and written procedures that define the relationships between the two 

organizations at the field level; 2) ICE participation on the JTTFs, NJTTF, 

FTTTF, and Terrorist Financing Operations Section, 3) ICE’s and the FBI’s 

agreement to assign senior-level managers at each other’s agencies; and 

4) briefings on cases they work jointly.99 They said that the role of ICE on the 

task forces is to bring its expertise and knowledge about tools in law 

enforcement that the JTTFs can use. Additionally, we were told that law 

enforcement powers and authority available to ICE officers relating to 

enforcement, detention, or arrest of individuals for violation of immigration or 

customs laws were not available to FBI or JTTF agents previously. The JTTFs, 

through their ICE members, can now use these laws to detain or deport a 

terrorist or terrorist supporter. The ICE officials informed us that it is crosstraining ICE members on the JTTFs in both customs and immigration issues to 

increase their knowledge base. 

The Assistant Secretary said he believes that the task forces are effective 

tools and the task force model works well. He also informed us that he 

requested an analysis of ICE’s participation on the terrorism task forces to 

determine where and how many personnel are currently assigned, and where 

ICE will gain the most benefit.100 

 

99 Terrorist Financing Operations Support (TFOS) is a unit within the FBI that 

identifies ties to terrorism and terrorist financing. ICE and TFOS are coordinating investigative 

initiatives that will enable ICE to identify financial systemic vulnerabilities and which will 

enable TFOS to identify ties to terrorism and terrorist financing. 

100 As mentioned previously in this report, the Unit Chief of the NJTTF told us the DHS 

requested an analysis of ICE participation on JTTFs. The NJTTF submitted the results of this 

analysis to the DHS in November 2003. 
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CONCLUSION 

Both the FBI and DHS recognize that the terrorism task forces cannot 

operate effectively without ICE agents and analysts who have knowledge of 

immigration and customs operations. However, task force members and 

managers repeatedly expressed the need for additional trained staff to provide 

expert representation from ICE. An adequate number of sufficiently trained 

representatives from ICE will contribute to more complete and timely 

counterterrorism investigations. Additionally, ICE task force members 

complained about a lack of cross-trained supervisors and insufficient guidance 

from their parent agencies concerning their task force duties. ICE task force 

members told us that ICE supervisors overtask their JTTF agents with ICE 

cases that do not have a terrorism nexus. These task force members also told 

us that ICE has at times referred taskings with a terrorism nexus directly to its 

JTTF members rather than through the FBI for assignment. This detracts from 

the FBI’s ability to properly manage and coordinate the work of the JTTFs. 

RECOMMENDATION 

27. The Deputy Attorney General should work jointly with DHS officials to 

ensure: 

• Sufficient DHS participation on the Department’s task forces, 

• Sufficiently trained ICE members on the task force and their 

supervisory chain of command, 

• Non-task force-related assignments to DHS members are 

minimized, and 

• Updated MOUs defining roles and information sharing 

responsibilities between the FBI and DHS. 
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Functions Performed by the States’ Homeland Security Task 

Forces are Viewed as Duplicative to Those Performed by the 

ATACs. 

 

State homeland security task forces hold meetings, share threat related 

information and conduct anti-terrorism training, which could be duplicative of 

the ATACs efforts. ATAC Coordinators, as well as ATAC members, told us that 

they viewed the activities of the state homeland security task forces and the 

ATAC as duplicative. Several ATAC members stated that they receive the same 

information from both the state homeland security task forces and the ATACs, 

but would rather receive more information than no information. While they do 

not view this information sharing duplication as a problem, those who were 

members of both a state homeland security task force and an ATAC expressed 

concern with the time expended attending dual meetings and trainings. In 

addition, many ATAC Coordinators told the OIG that the states’ offices of 

homeland security did not regularly coordinate or communicate with the 

USAOs. 

Immediately after September 11, 2001, many states established an Office 

of Homeland Security to mirror the federal Office of Homeland Security (now 

DHS). In July 2002, the President called on each Governor to establish a state 

homeland security task force to serve as a “primary coordinating body with the 

federal government...” and “...provide a collaborative, cost-effective structure 

for effectively communicating to all organizations and citizens.”101 In response, 

each state created a homeland security task force made up of federal, state, 

and local law enforcement; first responders; private industry security officials; 

and other government representatives. The mission of these state task forces 

is to prepare for a coordinated response to a terrorist event or incident and to 

aid in the prevention of terrorism. 

Often, the ATAC and the state homeland security task force consist of 

the same membership and address similar issues. In some states, there may 

be more than one judicial district, and therefore more than one ATAC. State 

homeland security task forces are headquartered in the state capital, while 

ATACs are headquartered in judicial districts, which may or may not be in the 

state capital. If the state homeland security task force and ATAC are in 

different cities, the opportunity for duplication or gaps in information sharing 

and training activities is increased and coordination between the two entities 

becomes vital. 

 

101 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, Office of the 

President of the United States, July 2002, page 14. 
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We found that some states were working jointly with USAOs to 

coordinate activities and reduce duplication in information sharing and 

training. For example, the ATAC and state homeland security task force in 

Alaska have joined together to form one task force. The coordinators from each 

are now co-coordinators of the joint task force and together host meetings and 

training. According to U.S. Attorney Timothy M. Burgess (Alaska), the purpose 

of the task force is to “protect the state’s citizens, resources and 

infrastructure,” and the merger will “facilitate communication, avoid 

duplication of effort and ensure adequate and timely responses to prevent any 

future terrorist incidents in the state.”102 We found in other sites that the 

ATAC and the state homeland security task force have no interaction or only 

communicated occasionally. 

 

CONCLUSION 

While some ATACs have established successful partnerships or 

communication links with the state homeland security task forces, others have 

no information sharing or established relationships. This results in duplication 

of, or gaps in, information sharing and training activities that target the same 

audience. 

RECOMMENDATION 

28. The ATAC Coordinators should work jointly with the state offices of 

homeland security and the state homeland security task forces to coordinate 

activities and to minimize duplication and gaps in terrorism-related 

information sharing and training. 

 

102 New Anti-Terrorism Task Force Emerges, Alaska Department of Military and 

Veteran’s Affairs, Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, August 4, 2003. 
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CONCLUSION 

We concluded that the task forces and councils have enhanced 

information sharing, partnerships, and investigative capabilities for the 

Department’s counterterrorism efforts. The task forces and councils have 

separate functions that generally are not duplicative, and they strengthen the 

Department’s counterterrorism infrastructure and relationships with other 

federal, state, local, and private agencies. However, although we recognize that 

the task forces and councils were established or expanded quickly after the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we found that the Department has not 

ensured their organizational development or that all their functions have been 

accomplished. We concluded that the Department: 

 

• Does not use the NSCC for centralizing counterterrorism 

planning, policy development, and monitoring policy 

implementation across the Department; 

• Has not ensured that the JTTFs and ATACs have a coordinated 

strategy for sharing information with law enforcement agencies 

and first responders in remote areas; 

• Has not clearly defined what organization has oversight 

authority for the ATAC program; 

• has not ensured the FTTTF’s timely acquisition of databases 

and development of its risk assessment tool for terrorist 

tracking; and 

• Has not ensured sufficient task force membership from certain 

internal and external organizations to facilitate 

counterterrorism efforts. 

From an organizational development perspective, we concluded that the 

Department: 

• Has not ensured minimum training requirements in 

counterterrorism, which is a new subject to many task force 

and council members; 

• Has not ensured stability and continuity in task force 

leadership to minimize work disruption; 
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• Has not adequately addressed continuing problems with 

information technology connectivity that interfere with task 

force work; and 

• Has not fully developed relevant performance measures to 

determine the outcomes of the task forces and councils, and the 

contributions of individual members. 

To aid in the improvement of the task forces’ and councils’ operations, we 

made 28 recommendations some of which include Department-wide issues, 

others of which address individual task forces and councils. Appendix I 

contains a complete list of the issues and recommendations. We believe that if 

the Department pursues these recommendations, its counterterrorism 

capabilities will be enhanced. 
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APPENDIX I: SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

PROGRESS MADE 

The task forces and councils have distinct functions that are generally 

not duplicative. 

The establishment of the task forces and councils has facilitated sharing 

of information and expanding of partnerships with federal, state, and local 

law enforcement and other government agencies, and private industry. 

The JTTFs are implementing the FBI’s new counterterrorism investigative 

strategy that has provided them with increased capabilities to help the 

Department achieve its strategic goal of preventing terrorism and 

promoting the nation’s security. The FBI also has improved its agents’ 

access to automated investigative information.

NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS 

Although the National Security Coordination Council (NSCC) is an 

important and beneficial forum for Department leaders, the NSCC’s role is 

unclear for long-term counterterrorism planning, centralizing and 

coordinating counterterrorism policy and operations, and monitoring 

policy implementation by the components. 

1. The Department should assess the counterterrorism functions outlined in 

the Attorney General’s memorandum establishing the NSCC and determine if 

they are still appropriate for the NSCC. If they are, the Department should 

ensure that written guidance describes the responsibilities of the NSCC and 

that the NSCC carries out its assigned functions. If the functions are not 

appropriate for the NSCC, they should be assigned to another Department 

entity. 

The FBI has not developed a national training plan for the task forces, 

defined minimum training standards, or conducted a training needs 

assessment to determine the training needs of task force members. 

Similarly, neither EOUSA nor CTS has developed a training plan or 

conducted a training needs assessment for the ATAC Coordinators or 

members. Notification of available training is ad hoc, and non-FBI task 

force members believe that FBI members get preference for training 

notification and attendance. 
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2. The FBI should develop a national training plan for each task force that 

includes: 

• Responsibility for developing and managing the training plan and 

program, 

• Initial needs assessment, 

• Frequency of future needs assessments, 

• Development of minimum mandatory training standards and time 

frames for completion of training, to include completion of the 

introductory training session within 90 days of joining the task force. 

• Required minimum annual training hours, 

• Target audience – training equities for FBI and non-FBI task force 

members, and 

• Responsibility for training notification to the field. 

3. EOUSA’s Office of Legal Education, along with CTS, should develop a 

national training plan for ATACs that includes: 

• Initial needs assessment of ATAC Coordinators, 

• How to manage and structure an ATAC (membership, frequency of 

meetings, methods and sources of communication, how to conduct an 

ATAC members’ needs assessment, identify trainers, and develop a local 

training plan), 

• Frequency of future needs assessments for ATAC Coordinators and 

ATACs, 

• Development of minimum mandatory training standards and time 

frames for completion of training for ATAC Coordinators, 

• Required minimum annual training hours for ATAC Coordinators, and 

• Responsibility for training notification to the ATAC Coordinators. 

4. The ATAC Coordinators should conduct training needs assessments and 

develop a training plan for ATAC members.

The FBI has not developed a structured, systemwide orientation program 

for new JTTF and NJTTF members. Additionally, the FBI has not 

provided written guidance that defines the roles and responsibilities of its 

task force members. 

5. The FBI should develop a formal, standardized orientation program for all 

new task force members and provide it within 30 days of the new member’s 

start date. Orientation should include: 

• FBI policies and procedures, 
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• Access and use of the ACS system, IDW, and any other case 

management system, 

• Intelligence gathering versus criminal investigations, 

• Definition of task force member roles and responsibilities, 

• Roles of other Department terrorism task forces and other FBI units, 

• Sources of information and contact information for other 

organizations frequently used by the terrorism task forces (e.g., DHS, 

Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, U.S. Postal 

Service), and 

• Information sharing protocols. 

6. The FBI should finalize MOUs with all agencies participating on the 

Department’s terrorism task forces. 

The JTTFs and ATACs have not fully coordinated their efforts to reach out 

to and share information with law enforcement agencies, first responders, 

and other relevant organizations in remote areas.

7. The FBI, CTS, EOUSA, and USAOs should work jointly to develop a 

coordinated strategy to consistently reach out to remote areas. 

The FBI has not fully developed outcome-oriented performance measures 

that effectively determine the progress of the JTTFs, the NJTTF, and the 

FTTTF, or their individual members. CTS and EOUSA have not developed 

outcome-oriented performance measures for the ATAC program. 

8. The FBI should ensure its performance measures provide an effective means 

for determining the qualitative and quantitative accomplishments of the task 

forces and their members in fulfilling the Department’s counterterrorism 

strategy. The measures for the task forces could include the following: 

JTTF

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with member and 

outside agencies (such as, meetings, briefings, and feedback on 

information received) that furthered investigative efforts; 

• Outreach efforts that resulted in improved information sharing and 

partnerships; 

• Quality of intelligence collected and generated that furthered 

investigative efforts; 

• Quality of intelligence/information analysis that furthered 

investigative efforts; 

• Quality and number of human assets that furthered investigative 

efforts; and 
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• Disruptions and dismantlements. 

NJTTF

• Quality and number of products produced for JTTFs and other FBI units 

that furthered investigative efforts; 

• Quality and timeliness of support provided to JTTFs that facilitated the 

JTTFs mission; and 

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with JTTFs and member 

agencies that furthered investigative efforts. 

FTTTF 

(in addition to those performance measures already established) 

• Amount and usefulness of new information added to cases that furthered 

investigative efforts; 

• Timeliness and number of products produced for JTTFs, other FBI 

units, and outside agencies that furthered investigative efforts; and 

• Acquisition of databases required for analysis that resulted in improved 

analytical products. 

9. CTS and EOUSA should develop outcome-oriented performance measures 

for the ATAC program. The measures for the ATAC program could include the 

following: 

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with member and 

outside agencies that resulted in improved understanding of 

terrorism issues and improved prevention activities; 

• Quality and timeliness of training for members that resulted in improved 

understanding of terrorism issues and improved prevention activities; 

• Outreach efforts that resulted in increasing targeted membership; and 

• Quality and currency of threat assessments that result in improved 

prevention activities. 
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The ATAC Coordinators are unclear about the roles of CTS, EOUSA, or the 

USAOs in the ATAC program. No one entity has full responsibility for 

ATAC program management and oversight is fragmented. The 

Department, CTS, and EOUSA have not provided ATAC Coordinators 

adequate guidance on their roles and responsibilities or on how to 

structure and manage an ATAC. Further, the USAOs’ level of compliance 

with the Attorney General mandate to establish and operate an ATAC 

varies across judicial districts. 

10. The Department should clearly delineate the roles of CTS, EOUSA, and the 

USAO in the ATAC program, clarifying who has primary responsibility and 

authority for: 

• Oversight, 

• Monitoring ATAC operations, 

• Evaluating success of the ATAC program, and 

• Enforcing compliance. 

11. CTS and EOUSA should jointly issue written guidance defining their roles 

and responsibilities in the ATAC program, as well as the roles and 

responsibilities of the Regional ATAC Coordinators, the National ATAC 

Coordinator, and the EOUSA point of contact for ATACs. This written guidance 

should be communicated to the ATAC Coordinators. 

12. CTS or EOUSA should issue written guidance for ATAC Coordinators that 

includes a definition of roles, how to determine membership base, and how to 

structure and manage an ATAC. 

13. EOUSA should strategically analyze the ATAC budget to assess the need 

for future funding. 

14. ATAC Coordinators should regularly update and maintain accurate 

electronic rosters of the ATAC membership. 

15. ATACs should meet at least quarterly, and ATAC Coordinators should 

periodically review and communicate the ATAC mission to members. 
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The FBI has not provided stable leadership, organizational structure, or 

adequate resources to the FTTTF to fully meet its mission. In addition, 

the FBI has assigned responsibilities to the FTTTF outside of its defined 

mission. As a result, the FTTTF is behind schedule in its acquisition of 

databases and development and implementation of its risk assessment 

tool. Additionally, the FTTTF has not sufficiently marketed its services, 

and consequently many JTTF and NJTTF members were unaware of the 

FTTTF and did not use the FTTTF’s services to aid their investigations. 

16. The FTTTF should develop a plan to acquire and regularly update 

the required databases from other agencies. 

17. The FBI should identify and address the obstacles the FTTTF 

encounters in securing and regularly updating required databases from 

other agencies. 

18. The FBI should identify and address the FTTTF’s unmet resource 

requirements for staff (FBI and other government agencies), space, and 

equipment. 

19. The FBI should ensure long-term, stable leadership, organizational 

structure, and housing for the FTTTF. 

20. The FTTTF should develop and implement a plan to improve awareness 

and understanding of its services.

Although the FBI has reallocated considerable resources to the 

counterterrorism program, the JTTFs still experience certain staffing 

shortages and turnover in leadership. Some JTTFs experience space and 

information technology connectivity problems. 

21. The FBI should determine and allocate sufficient staff to effectively support 

the terrorism task forces. 

22. The FBI should seek more stability in JTTF leadership. 

23. The FBI should develop a plan and issue written guidance for the JTTFs on 

how to activate new JTTFs and move existing JTTFs to offsite locations. 

24. The FBI should ensure sufficient information technology connectivity 

needed to effectively support the terrorism task forces. 
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Although Congress, the DEA, and the Department leadership recognize 

the critical link between drug trafficking and terrorism, the DEA has 

minimal membership on the JTTFs and did not assign a permanent 

representative to the NJTTF until April 2004. 

25. The DEA should increase its full-time membership on the JTTFs and work 

with the FBI to assess the optimum locations for new DEA members. 

 

26. The DEA should issue written guidance that defines the roles and 

responsibilities of its JTTF and NJTTF members and points of contact. 

Many of the ICE task force members told us that ICE has not provided 

them needed direction, has not cross-trained supervisors or agents in 

their new areas of responsibility, and has not provided a sufficient 

number of representatives to perform task force work. As a result, the 

FBI does not have adequate access to immigration and customs expertise 

and information systems to assist its investigative efforts. We also were 

told that ICE did not always understand the roles of its task force 

members, leading to assignment of non-JTTF tasks to its members on the 

JTTFs. 

27. The Deputy Attorney General should work jointly with DHS officials to 

ensure: 

• Sufficient DHS participation on the Department’s task forces, 

• Sufficiently trained ICE members on the task force and their 

supervisory chain of command, 

• Non-task force-related assignments to DHS members are 

minimized, and 

• Updated MOUs defining roles and information sharing 

responsibilities between the FBI and DHS. 

Functions Performed by the States’ Homeland Security Task Forces are 

Viewed as Duplicative to Those Performed by the ATACs. 

28. The ATAC Coordinators should work jointly with the state offices of 

homeland security and the state homeland security task forces to coordinate 

activities and to minimize duplication and gaps in terrorism-related 

information sharing and training. 
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170

APPENDIX II: TERRORISM TASK FORCES AND COUNCILS 

AntiTerrorism 

Advisory 

Councils 

(ATAC) 

Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(JTTF) 

National Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(NJTTF) 

Foreign 

Terrorist 

Tracking Task 

Force (FTTTF) 

National 

Security 

Coordination 

Council 

(NSCC) 

Mission “To coordinate 

the 

dissemination of 

information and 

the development 

of investigative 

and prosecutive 

strategy 

throughout the 

United States.” 

“To detect, 

prevent, and 

investigate 

individuals or 

groups carrying 

out terrorists 

acts directed 

against the 

United States.” 

“To enhance 

communication, 

coordination, 

and cooperation 

between federal, 

state, and local 

government 

agencies by 

providing a point 

of fusion for 

terrorism 

intelligence and 

supporting the 

JTTFs.” 

“To provide 

information that 

helps keep 

foreign terrorists 

and their 

supporters out of 

the United States 

or leads to their 

exclusion, 

removal, 

surveillance, or 

prosecution.” 

To promote the 

“seamless 

coordination of 

all [DOJ] 

functions 

relating to 

national 

security, 

particularly 

[its] efforts to 

combat 

terrorism.” 

History Established by 

the Attorney 

General 

September 17, 

2001 as AntiTerrorism Task 

Forces 

September 25, 

2003 

(renamed to AntiTerrorism 

Advisory 

Councils) 

Established in 

May 1980 in the 

FBI’s New York 

Field Office. 

Established by 

the FBI Director 

in 

July 2002. 

Mandated by 

Presidential 

Directive-2 

issued on 

October 29, 

2001. 

 

Started in DOJ 

on October 31, 

2001. 

Established by 

the Attorney 

General 

March 5, 

2002. 

Functions • Coordinates 

anti-terrorism 

initiatives 

• Initiates 

training 

programs 

•Facilitates 

information 

sharing. 

• Works with 

JTTF 

• Investigates 

actual and 

perceived 

domestic and 

international 

terrorism acts 

that occur in or 

affect the 

United States 

• Acts as a 

“force 

multiplier” by 

maintaining a 

multi-agency 

taskforce with 

state, federal, 

and local 

participants. 

•Shares 

intelligence 

information 

• Operates an 

interagency 

taskforce that 

fully utilizes 

expertise offered 

by each 

representative. 

• Establishes and 

maintains 

liaisons with 

intelligence, law 

enforcement and 

federal partners 

with a terrorism 

focus. 

• Assesses 

terrorism 

intelligence to 

de-conflict 

information and 

minimize the 

• Responds to 

requests received 

from the 

Counterterrorism 

Division’s 

operational units, 

the CIA and the 

JTTFs to perform 

data runs against 

public, 

proprietary, and 

government data 

systems. 

• Maintains the 

Consolidated 

Terrorist List that 

combines the 

FBI’s Violent 

Gang and 

Terrorist 

• Serves as a 

forum for 

DOJ’s 

component/ 

agency leaders 

to meet biweekly to 

discuss 

terrorism 

issues, 

• Coordinates 

DOJ’s 

terrorism 

policy, 

planning, and 

operations, 

• Frames 

national 

security issues 

for the 

Attorney 
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AntiTerrorism 

Advisory 

Councils 

(ATAC) 

Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(JTTF) 

National Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(NJTTF) 

Foreign 

Terrorist 

Tracking Task 

Force (FTTTF) 

National 

Security 

Coordination 

Council 

(NSCC) 

Functions with task force 

members and 

agency contacts 

that are 

properly cleared 

and have a 

“need to know.” 

•Declassifies 

intelligence and 

shares with law 

enforcement 

and others. 

•Detects and 

prevents 

terrorist acts 

•Apprehends 

terrorism 

suspects 

•Develops 

human assets, 

•Coordinates 

federal, state, 

and local law 

enforcement’s 

response to a 

terrorist act. 

duplication of 

effort, 

•Promotes 

information 

sharing between 

participating 

agencies, 

• Conducts 

special studies 

on terrorism 

matters, 

• Coordinates 

with FTTTF, 

FBI’s 

Counterterrorism 

Division’s 

Operational 

Units, Terrorist 

Threat 

Integration 

Center, and the 

Strategic 

Intelligence 

Operations 

Center, and 

• Administrative 

support to the 

JTTFs. 

 

Organization File 

(VGTOF) and 22 

Most Wanted 

with the 

Department of 

State’s TIPOFF. 

• Acquires data 

federal agencies 

and private 

industries data 

sets to improve 

its search 

capabilities. 

• Conducts risk 

assessments on 

flight training 

candidates, and 

persons 

requesting 

changes to their 

VISA status. 

General’s and 

Deputy 

Attorney 

General’s 

consideration 

• Reviews 

DOJ’s 

resource 

allocations for 

terrorism 

matters, 

• Oversees the 

operations of 

the Joint 

Intelligence 

Coordinating 

Council, 

• Provides 

input into the 

DOJ’s position 

on terrorism 

matters and 

presents this 

position to 

other agencies. 

Budget FY 2002 - $9.3 

million 

$100,000 for each 

of the 93 judicial 

districts, no 

additional funding 

since FY 2002 

FY 2004 - $286 

million (total) 

FY 2005 - $375 

million (total)

FY 2004 - $5.1 

million (total), 

$2.8 million 

(non-personnel)

FY 2004 - $61.6 

million 

FY 2005 - $52.3 

million 

FY 2003 - $2 

million 

Now Funded out 

of Office of the 

Deputy Attorney 

General budget.

Total Number 

of Groups 

93* 

* One ATAC for 

each judicial 

district, except 

Guam and 

Northern Mariana 

Islands are 

combined into 

one. 

Pre 9/11 – 35 

JTTFs 

As of March 

2005 – 103 

JTTFs 

 

1 1 1 

Field/ 

Headquarters 

Field and 

Headquarters 

Field Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters 

Size/Total 

Number of 

Members 

11,000 

members 

(approximately) 

5,085 members 

 

62 total members 

representing 40 

agencies 

 

138 total 

members

10 Permanent 

Members, 

Invited Guests 

as needed 
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AntiTerrorism 

Advisory 

Councils 

(ATAC) 

Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(JTTF) 

National Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(NJTTF) 

Foreign 

Terrorist 

Tracking Task 

Force (FTTTF) 

National 

Security 

Coordination 

Council 

(NSCC) 

Types of 

Members 

Private 

industry, 

federal, state, 

and local law 

enforcement, 

intelligence 

community, 

federal agencies 

FBI agents and 

analysts, other 

government 

agencies, 

federal, state, 

and local law 

enforcement 

Federal, state, 

and local law 

enforcement, 

intelligence 

community 

members, FBI 

agents and FBI 

intelligence 

operations 

support. 

FBI agents and 

analysts, federal 

and military 

members from 

the intelligence 

community, and 

members from 

other federal 

agencies. 

 

Senior DOJ 

leadership 

including the: 

• Deputy 

Attorney 

General 

• Chief of Staff 

to the 

Attorney 

General 

• FBI, Director 

• AAG 

Criminal 

Division 

• AAG Office of 

Justice 

Programs 

• Counsel, 

OIPR 

• DEA, 

Administrator 

• USMS, 

Director 

•ATF, Director 

•BOP, Director 

•Senior 

Counsel 

National 

Security 

Matters 
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AntiTerrorism 

Advisory 

Councils 

(ATAC) 

Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(JTTF) 

National Joint 

Terrorism 

Task Force 

(NJTTF) 

Foreign 

Terrorist 

Tracking Task 

Force (FTTTF) 

National 

Security 

Coordination 

Council 

(NSCC) 

Management 

Structure 

Headquarters 

Administrative 

oversight 

provided by the 

Eloisa’s ATAC 

Coordinator and 

six Regional 

ATAC 

Coordinator 

from the 

Criminal 

Division’s 

Counterterrorism 

Section. 

Field 

Chaired by the 

United States 

Attorney in each 

judicial district. 

A senior 

Assistant U.S. 

Attorney serves 

as the district’s 

ATAC 

Coordinator and 

is assisted by 

an Intelligence 

Research 

Specialist. 

Headquarters 

Administrative 

oversight 

provided by the 

National Joint 

Terrorism Task 

Force and the 

FBI’s Counterterrorism

Division. 

Field 

Divided into 

International 

Terrorism and 

Domestic 

Terrorism. 

Operational 

oversight 

provided by a 

Supervisory 

Special agent 

with the 

approval of the 

Assistant 

Special Agent in 

Charge and 

Special Agent in 

Charge. 

Headquarters 

Headed by an 

FBI Unit Chief 

and a DHS 

Deputy Unit 

Chief. Reports 

directly to the 

Deputy Assistant 

Director for the 

Operations 

Support Branch 

of the 

Counterterrorism 

Division. Has 4 

FBI Supervisory 

Special Agents 

that assist in 

managing the 

NJTTF’s 

operations. 

Headquarters 

Originally, 

FTTTF’s Director 

reported to the 

U.S. Deputy 

Attorney General 

and served as a 

liaison to the 

then 

Commissioner of 

the Immigration 

and 

Naturalization 

Service and a 

Senior Advisor to 

the President’s 

Assistant for 

Homeland 

Security. 

 

In August 6, 

2002, the 

Attorney General 

mandated that 

FTTTF’s reporting 

responsibility 

shift to the FBI’s 

Counterterrorism 

Division. 

Headquarters 

Chaired by the 

United States 

Deputy 

Attorney 

General. Staff 

from the 

Deputy 

Attorney 

General’s 

Office support 

its operations. 
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APPENDIX III: ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS USED BY THE TASK 

FORCES: LEO, RISS, AND NLETS 

Communication 

System Content and Services Organization Users 

LEO • Contains Law Enforcement 

Online Special Interest 

Groups that provide access 

for members of specialized 

organizations and law 

enforcement disciplines 

• Capability to send and receive 

e-mail between LEO users 

and unsecured Internet email 

addresses 

• Bulletin boards for posting 

information events from local, 

state, and federal law 

enforcement, criminal justice, 

and public safety agencies 

• Concise information on 

various topics and news briefs 

• Contains “chat” features for 

users to communicate 

electronically in a secure 

environment in real time 

• Electronic calendar used to 

post upcoming dates for 

conferences meetings, training 

courses, seminars, and other 

dates 

• Library containing broad 

range of publications, 

documents, studies, and 

research 

• Learning modules 

• 32,500 members (2/3 are 

state and local, 1/3 are 

federal, and some 

international users) 

• Started in 1995 

• Operates as a Virtual 

Private Network (VPN) 

with secure access 

through the Internet 

• Connected to Riss.net 

• JTTF 

• NJTTF 

• ATAC 

Coordinators 

(to 

communicate 

with law 

enforcement) 
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Communication 

System Content and Services Organization Users 

RISS • Information sharing (bulletin 

boards, contact lists, national 

gang database, publications) 

• 6 regional criminal intelligence 

databases available for 

simultaneous query 

• Data analysis (telephone toll 

case, financial, computer 

forensics, and criminal activity 

analyses) 

• Telecommunications (long 

distance telephone service) 

• Investigative Support (some 

financial support available for 

multi-jurisdictional 

investigations) 

• Equipment Sharing 

(investigative equipment 

available for loan to members) 

• Training (coordinated or 

conducted by staff) 

• Nearly 6,000 local, state, 

and federal law 

enforcement agencies are 

members 

• First center opened in 

1974 

• Objective is to enhance 

the ability of law 

enforcement to identify, 

target, and remove 

criminal conspiracies that 

may span jurisdictions, 

including international 

• Comprised of 6 regional 

centers, operates in all 50 

states, D.C., U.S. 

territories, Canada, 

England, and Australia. 

• A secure network utilizing 

Web-based technology 

• Received $24.9 million 

from Congress in 2001 

• JTTF 

•ATAC 

Coordinators 

(to 

communicate 

with law 

enforcement 

and 

members) 

NLETS • Links together state, local, and 

federal law enforcement and 

justice agencies for information 

exchange 

• Acts primarily as a network 

provider 

• Also acts as a data warehouse 

to justice community 

• Contains links to member 

agencies, state, and other 

related websites 

• Shares driver’s license 

information 

• International computer 

based message switching 

system 

• Operates in a secure 

environment 

• User population includes 

all states/territories, 

selected international 

agencies, and all federal 

agencies with a justice 

component 

• A 501(c)(3), not for profit 

agency 

• Representatives from each 

state elect a Board of 

Directors and Officers 

• Membership dues are 

primary source of income 

• Supported by a central 

computer system at the 

Arizona Department of 

Public Safety 

• JTTF 
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APPENDIX IV: SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND RESULTS 

DOJ's TERRORISM TASK FORCES 

Thank you for your participation in our survey. 

The Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General is conducting a nationwide 

evaluation of the Department's Counterterrorism Task Forces [i.e., National Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Anti-Terrorism 

Advisory Council (ATAC) formerly the Anti-Terrorism Task Force, and Foreign Terrorist 

Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)] and we need your help. You have been identified as a 

contributor to this effort and we need your candid responses to the questions that follow. 

We obtained your name from the FBI's or the United States Attorneys' Office for your 

area. Your responses will not identify you individually. The information that you provide 

us will be consolidated with information received from respondents in other jurisdictions 

and used to assess the functions, accomplishments, and challenges of the terrorism 

task forces. Whether you are a new member, a former member, or have served on the 

task force since its inception, your input is very important to us; so please share your 

thoughts and experiences. If you are not a member of a Terrorism Task Force, please 

indicate as such on the survey provided. While participation is strictly voluntary, we are 

counting on you to respond openly to the questions provided. Please save your 

responses by selecting the "Finish" button. Note: If you exit the survey without selecting 

"Finish", your responses will not be saved. 

If you have any questions or concerns please don't hesitate to contact Jennifer La Point 

in the Office of the Inspector General's Evaluation and Inspections Division on (202) 

616-4620. 

MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION AND EXPERIENCE 

Are you or have you ever been a member of a Department of Justice Terrorism Task 

Force or Advisory Council? 

[ ] I am currently a member. 

[ ] I am no longer a member but have been a member within the last 12 months. 

[ ] I was a member more than 12 months ago. 

[ ] No, I have never been a member of the DOJ's Terrorism Task Forces. 

1. Which of the following describes your current involvement on a Department of Justice 

Terrorism Task Force or Advisory Council. Please choose the statement that describes 

your main level of participation. 
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[ ] I am a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism Task Force 

(JTTF). 

(Only select this option if you work as a Task Force Officer/Agent who actively conducts 

JTTF investigations at the FBI's direction.) 

[ ] I am a member of the United States Attorneys Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 

(ATAC). *(See note below) 

[ ] I am a member of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) 

[ ] I am a member of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) 

* On 9/25/03, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the nation's 93 Anti-Terrorism Task Forces 

(ATTF) will be reconstituted as Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC). Therefore any mention of the 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) in this survey refers to the previously known Anti-Terrorism Task 

Force (ATTF)*. Throughout this survey, you will see the term TASK FORCE/ADVISORY COUNCIL. This 

term means that you are either a Terrorism Task Force (FTTTF, JTTF, NJTTF) or Advisory Council 

(ATAC) member, so please respond accordingly. 

2. When did you join this Terrorism Task Force or Advisory Council? 

Month 

[ ] January [ ] February [ ] March [ ] April [ ] May [ ] June [ ] July [ ] August [ ] September 

[ ] October [ ] November [ ] December 

Year (yyyy) [ ] 

2a. How were you selected to serve on this task force or advisory council? (check all 

that apply) 

[ ] Applied for the position [ ] Selected by management without applying 

[ ] Volunteered [ ] Already performing related functions [ ] Prior Task Force experience 

[ ] Don't know 

2b. Are you a full-time or part-time member? 

[ ] Full time [ ] Part time 

How many hours do you spend on this Task Force per week? [ ] 

FORMER MEMBER 

1. Which of the following statements identifies your former Task Force/Advisory Council 

involvement? 
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[ ] I was a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism Task Force 

(JTTF) 

[ ] I was a remember of the United States Attorneys Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 

(formerly know 

as the Anti-Terrorism Task Force) (ATTF/ATAC). 

[ ] I was a member of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) 

[ ] I was a member of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF). 

2. When did you join? 

Month 

[ ] January [ ] February [ ] March [ ] April [ ] May [ ] June [ ] July [ ] August [ ] September 

[ ] October [ ] November [ ] December 

Year (yyyy) [ ] 

3. When did you leave? 

Month 

[ ] January [ ] February [ ] March [ ] April [ ] May [ ] June [ ] July [ ] August [ ] September 

[ ] October [ ] November [ ] December 

Year (yyyy) [ ] 

4. Why did you leave? 

5. How should the task force's/advisory council's performance be measured? 

6. How should the task force/advisory council be improved? 

7. We are interested in knowing more about your task force experiences. Please 

complete the questions which follow based upon your task force involvement. The 

questions are written in a manner which suggests that you are still a member of this 

task force. Do you wish to proceed? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No 

3. Approximately how many years do you anticipate remaining on this task force? (write 

in number) 

[ ] Don't know [ ] 

4. Please identify your years of professional work experience in the following categories: 

Law Enforcement Investigations [ ] 

Domestic Terrorism [ ] 
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International Terrorism [ ] 

Counterintelligence [ ] 

Intelligence [ ] 

Other Investigations [ ] 

5. What level of security clearance do you have? 

[ ] Interim Clearance [ ] Secret [ ] Top Secret [ ] Top Secret with SCI access 

[ ] Don't know [ ] None 

How does it impact your ability to do your job? 

5a. When did you receive this clearance? 

Month 

[ ] January [ ] February [ ] March [ ] April [ ] May [ ] June [ ] July [ ] August [ ] September 

[ ] October [ ] November [ ] December 

Year (yyyy) [ ] Don't know [ ] 

5b. Was it before or after joining the task force? 

[ ] Before [ ] After 

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

6. Are you a supervisor, coordinator, or task force/advisory council member? 

[ ] Member [ ] Coordinator [ ] Supervisor 

6a. When did you assume this position? 

Month 

[ ] January [ ] February [ ] March [ ] April [ ] May [ ] June [ ] July [ ] August [ ] September 

[ ] October [ ] November [ ] December 

Year (yyyy) [ ] 

6b. How long did your predecessor serve in this position? 

[ ] No Predecessor [ ] 1 month [ ] 2 months [ ] 3 months [ ] 4 months [ ] 5 months 

[ ] 6 or more months 

7. Briefly describe your role on the Task Force/Advisory Council. 

8. What percentage of your work on the task force is devoted to (this should equal 

100%): 
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% Domestic Terrorism [ ] % International Terrorism [ ] % Terrorism Support (Intelligence 

Analysis, Electronic Surveillance, etc.) [ ] % Other [ ] 

9. Do you have written policies, procedures, and/or objectives that address your role as 

a Task Force/Advisory Council participant? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

9c. How does the lack of defined policies, procedures, and/or objectives that address 

your role on the Task Force/Advisory Council impact your ability to carry-out your role? 

9a. What are the written policies, procedures and/or objectives that address your role on 

the task force/advisory council? 

9b. Where did these policies, procedures and/or objectives originate? (check all that 

apply) 

[ ] Federal Bureau of Investigation [ ] Parent Agency [ ] United States Attorneys Office [ ] 

Self-generated 

10. Please respond to the following statements regarding your role on the task 

force/advisory council. 

The FBI defined my role on the task force/advisory council. 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Applicable 

The U.S. Attorney/U.S. Attorneys' Office defined my role on the taskforce/advisory 

council. 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Applicable 

The U.S. Attorney General defined my role on the taskforce/advisory council. 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Applicable 

My parent agency defined my role on the task force/advisory council. 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Applicable 

I defined my role of the task force/advisory council. 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Applicable 

My role on the task force/advisory council has not been determined. 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Applicable 

10a. Do conflicts exist between the expectations of your parent agency and those of the 

task force leadership concerning your role? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No 
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Please describe these conflicts and how it has impacted your work on the Task Force. 

PERFORMANCE 

11. Did you receive a list of performance standards that apply to your role as a member 

of the task force/advisory council? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No 

11a. Please list these performance standards. 

11 b. How would you rate these standards in assisting you in your job performance on 

the task force/advisory council? 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

11c. Where did these performance standards originate? 

[ ] Federal Bureau of Investigation [ ] Parent Agency [ ] United States Attorneys Office 

[ ] Self-generated 

12. Is your performance on this task force.... 

Routinely measured by your parent agency? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know [ ] Not Applicable 

Routinely measured by the FBI 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't Know [ ] Not Applicable 

Reported by the FBI to your supervisor at your parent agency? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know [ ] Not Applicable 

13. Is the overall performance of this task force/advisory council measured? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

How is the overall performance of this task force/advisory council measured? 

13a. In your opinion, how should the task force's/advisory council's performance be 

measured? 

MEETINGS 

14. In the last year, how often did the entire task force/advisory council meet? 
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[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Every two weeks [ ] Once a month [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

[ ] Other 

How have the lack of meetings (full, squad, or sub-committee) impacted the 

performance of the task force/advisory council? 

Please specify meeting frequency. 

14a. At these meetings of the entire task force/advisory council, please rate how the 

following are accomplished: 

Information/Intelligence shared 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Training planned 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Training conducted 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Taskings assigned 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Cases updated 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Administrative issues discussed 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Agency updates are provided 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Threat assessments discussed 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

14b. How would you rate the usefulness of these meetings in preparing you to plan for 

and respond to terrorism? 
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[ ] Very Useful [ ] Useful [ ] Not at all useful [ ] Not able to evaluate [ ] No opinion 

14c. How can the task force/advisory council meetings be improved? 

15. In the last year, how often did the task force's squad or advisory council's subcommittees meet? 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Every two weeks [ ] Once a month [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

[ ] Other [ ] We don't have any squad or subcommittees on our task force/advisory 

council. 

Please specify frequency. 

How have the lack of meetings (full, squad, or sub-committee) impacted the 

performance of the task force/advisory council? 

15a. At these squad or sub-committee meetings, please rate how the following are 

accomplished: 

Information/Intelligence shared 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Training conducted 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Taskings assigned 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Cases updated 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Administrative issues discussed 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Training planned 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Agency updates are provided 
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[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Threat assessments discussed 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Don't Know 

[ ] Not Applicable 

15b. How would you rate the usefulness of these squad or sub-committee meetings in 

preparing you to plan for and respond to terrorism? 

[ ] Very Useful [ ] Useful [ ] Not at all useful [ ] Not able to evaluate [ ] No opinion 

15c. How can the squad or sub-committee meetings be improved? 

15d. How would these improvements impact your role on this task force/advisory 

council? 

15d. How would these improvements impact your role on this task force/advisory 

council? 

TRAINING 

16. How were your terrorism training needs determined? 

[ ] Task Force Supervisor determined with my/my agency's input 

[ ] ATAC Coordinator determined with my/my agency's input 

[ ] Task Force Supervisor determined without my/my agency's input 

[ ] ATAC Coordinator determined without my/my agency's input 

[ ] I alone determined my training needs [ ] Needs not determined 

[ ] Other [ ] Don't know 

Please explain 

17. Since becoming a task force/advisory council participant, have you completed any 

terrorism training? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No 

17a. The following is a list of terrorism related training courses sponsored by either the 

FBI or the United States Attorneys Office. Please complete the information which 

follows for each course. 

International Terrorism CD 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 
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Domestic Terrorism CD 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

Identifying Terrorist Groups/Characteristics 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

Terrorism/Incident Response 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

Terrorism/Investigative Strategies 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

Cultural Sensitivity 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

FISA/USA Patriot ACT 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

NJTTF Conference 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

Terrorism Financing 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

Other 

[ ] Useful [ ] Not Useful [ ] Did not complete 

Please specify other course titles [ ] 

18. Overall, how has all of the training you have received impacted your work on the 

task force or advisory council? 

19. Is there counterterrorism training that you need or should receive that you have not 

taken? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No 

19a. Please explain: 

RESOURCES 

20. How would you rate the task force's/advisory council's resources? 

Number of Staff 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Not Applicable 

Equipment 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Not Applicable 
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Space 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Not Applicable 

Staff Skills 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Not Applicable 

Overall Rating 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Not Applicable 

20a. What impact has the problem(s) with resources had on the task force/advisory 

council achieving its mission? 

21. Briefly describe what resources the task force/advisory council needs that it doesn't 

have. 

22. The Congress has drafted legislation suggesting that the United States Attorneys 

should continue to participate in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces rather than maintaining 

a separate set of U.S. Attorney Task Forces. If this legislation is adopted, how will it 

impact the counterterrorism coverage in your area? 

[ ] Favorably impact [ ] Unfavorably impact [ ] No impact [ ] Not sure of impact 

[ ] Other 

Please explain. 

SUPERVISION AND GUIDANCE 

23. Upon joining the task force, were you given an orientation to the and the FBI's 

policies and procedures? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

Briefly describe the orientation process. 

How did the lack of an orientation process impact your work on the task force? 

24. The next list of statements applies to the supervision, direction, and support that you 

receive as a task force participant. Please rate the statements that characterize the 

quality of supervision and guidance that you receive on the with the scale provided. 

The chain of command for this task force is well defined. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

There is stability in the management structure of this task force 
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[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

I have the authority I need to perform my job on this task force. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

My task force supervisor provides the guidance I need. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

My task force supervisor provides the support I need. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

My task force supervisor encourages my input in decisions affecting my work. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

My supervisor from my parent agency provides me with the guidance I need to 

effectively represent my agency. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

24a. How can the quality of the supervision and support that you receive be improved? 

24b. How does the quality of guidance your receive from the FBI and/or your parent 

agency impact your work on the task force? 

TASKINGS 

25. Please identify how many taskings you are currently working on in each category 

listed below. 

I am currently not working on any taskings. [ ] 

International Terrorism [ ] 

Domestic Terrorism [ ] 

Counterintelligence [ ] 

Terrorism Financing [ ] 

Weapons of Mass Destruction [ ] 

* Other [ ] 

* Please identify the categories and quantities for these Other taskings. [ ] 

26. Considering your taskings for this task force, please rate the following statements: 

The taskings I receive are in my area of expertise. 
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[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

The taskings I receive are assigned to other members/agencies for completion. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

When appropriate, I am assigned as the lead investigator on cases that are in my areas 

of expertise. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

I am normally included in the initial stages of a tasking where my expertise is most 

useful. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

The contributions I make to this task force are worthwhile to the mission of this task 

force. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

An FBI Special Agent is usually assigned as the lead agent on all IT cases. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

 

An FBI Special Agent is usually assigned as the lead agent on all DT cases. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Don't Know 

27. Do you receive non- taskings? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No 

27a. How often do you receive these assignments? 

[ ] Seldom [ ] Occasionally [ ] Frequently 

28. How have these non- taskings impacted your role on this task force? (check all that 

apply) 

[ ] I am not assigned to complex investigations. 

[ ] I am not assigned to lead investigations. 

[ ] I primarily support the work of other task force members/agents. 

[ ] My task force cases remain open for extended periods of time. 

[ ] My task force cases are unresolved. 

[ ] I work longer hours to complete my work. [ ] No impact. 

[ ] Other 
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Please explain: 

29. Do you have complete access to the following sources of FBI information? 

Automated Case System (ACS) 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

FBI databases 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

FBI records 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

Other sources of information from the FBI 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

29a. How has the limited access to FBI information impacted your work on the task 

force? 

30. At the worksite, do you have access to....? 

parent agency's databases 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

parent agency's contacts 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

parent agency's intelligence 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

parent agency's email 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

Internet/www 

[ ] Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know 

30a. How has this limited access impacted your work on the task force? 

INFORMATION SHARING 

31. Which of the following describes your information sharing responsibilities on this 

task force? 

My responsibility is to share information with my parent agency supervisor. 
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[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

My responsibility is to share information with my FBI supervisor. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

My responsibility is to share information directly with my agency head. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

My responsibility is to share information that I receive from the participating agencies on 

the task force. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

My responsibility is to share information that I receive from other agencies that are not 

task force members. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

My responsibility is to share information from my parent agency with the task force. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

My responsibility is to share information with other task forces. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

I don't share any information with the task force. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neither Agree Nor Disagree 

[ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

31.a. Where are your task force information sharing responsibilities defined? (check all 

that apply) 

[ ] Policy from my agency [ ] FBI Policy [ ] Memorandum of Understanding (FBI and My 

Agency) [ ] Attorney General's Guidelines [ ] Good Management Practice 

[ ] They aren't defined [ ] Other [ ] Don't know 

32. From which of the following sources do you receive information on this Task Force? 

(check all that apply) 

[ ] National Joint Terrorism Task Force [ ] Local JTTF 
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[ ] FBI's weekly Intelligence Bulletin 

[ ] Secure Video Teleconferencing System (SVTS) 

[ ] National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) 

[ ] National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) Watch Lists 

[ ] Regional Information Sharing Systems Law 

[ ] ATAC Coordinator's Electronic Messages 

[ ] Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 

[ ] Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) [ ] Other 

32a. Considering the sources of information that you identified how would you rate the: 

Quality 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Unknown 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Timeliness 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Unknown 

[ ] Not Applicable 

Relevance to your work on the task force 

[ ] Excellent [ ] Good [ ] Average [ ] Poor [ ] Very Poor [ ] Unknown 

[ ] Not Applicable 

23. Which of the following describes your information sharing responsibilities on this 

task force? 

I share information from my parent agency with ATAC members. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

I share information from the ATAC meetings with my parent agency. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

I share information that I receive from other agencies with the ATAC members. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

I do not share information with the ATAC members. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 

[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

I do not share any information from the ATAC with my parent agency or any other 

agency. 

[ ] Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Neutral [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree 
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[ ] Not Applicable [ ] Unknown 

24. Where are your task force information sharing responsibilities defined? 

[ ] Policy from my agency [ ] Attorney General's Guidelines [ ] Good Management 

Practice [ ] They aren't defined [ ] Other [ ] Don't know 

25. How does the ATAC Coordinator/United States Attorneys' Office share information 

outside of scheduled meetings? (check all that apply) 

[ ] Electronic Mail (email) [ ] Alert System [ ] Telephone Calls [ ] Other 

[ ] Information not shared outside of meetings. 

Please explain: 

26 As a result of your membership on the ATAC, do you get the information you need in 

order to effectively perform your terrorism related job duties at your parent agency? 

[ ] Yes [ ] No 

27. How has this impacted your ability to perform your terrorism related job duties at 

your parent agency? 

28. On a scale of 1-5 with (1 being the most important and 5 being the least important) 

how would you rank order the following ATAC priorities? 

[ ] Training for ATAC members [ ] Information Sharing 

[ ] Coordination of Counterterrorism Related Initiatives 

[ ] Coordination of Prosecutions [ ] Promoting Community Awareness 

How has the change from an Anti-Terrorism Task Force to an Anti-Terrorism Advisory 

Council impacted your role on this task force? 

What types of training have you conducted or provided? (check all that apply) 

[ ] Identifying Terrorist Groups/Characteristics 

[ ] Terrorism/Incident Response 

[ ] Terrorism Investigative Strategies [ ] Cultural Sensitivity 

[ ] FISA/USA PATRIOT ACT [ ] Terrorism Financing [ ] Other 

Please identify other training coordinated or provided: 

33. On a scale of 1-5 with (1 being the most important and 5 being the least important), 

how would you rank order the following JTTF priorities? 

[ ] Investigate Terrorist Threats [ ] Coordinate Special Events 

[ ] Provide Counterterrorism Training [ ] Information Sharing and Coordination 
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[ ] Community Partnerships 

33. On a scale of 1-5 with (1 being the most important and 5 being the least important) 

how would you rank order the following NJTTF priorities? 

[ ] Point of fusion for information sharing (receipt and exchange) 

[ ] Provide guidance to the field JTTF members from my agency 

[ ] Respond to threats within my area of expertise. 

[ ] Conduct special studies to determine a terrorism nexus 

[ ] Community Awareness 

34. How often do you interact with NJTTF members? (interactions can be in person, by 

telephone, email, etc.) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Every two weeks [ ] Once a month [ ] As needed [ ] Never 

[ ] Other 

34a. Which of the following describes the reasons for your interactions with NJTTF 

members? (check all that apply) 

[ ] To receive guidance and direction [ ] To respond to inquiries 

[ ] To discuss agency specific needs [ ] To complete taskings 

[ ] To share information /intelligence 

34b. How often do you interact with FTTTF members ? 

(interactions can be in person, by telephone, email, etc.) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Every two weeks [ ] Once a month 

[ ] Never [ ] Other [ ] As needed 

34c.Which of the following describes the reasons for your interactions with FTTTF? 

(check all that apply) 

[ ] To receive guidance and direction [ ] To respond to inquiries 

[ ] To discuss agency specific needs [ ] To complete taskings 

[ ] To obtain information [ ] To request analysis 

35. The FBI plans to move the NJTTF's operations to the Terrorism Threat Integration 

Center. How will this planned move impact the NJTTF's operations? 

[ ] Improve the NJTTF's operations 

[ ] No change in the NJTTF's operations 

[ ] Adversely impact the NJTTF's operations 

[ ] Not sure of the impact [ ] Other 
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35a. Please explain: 

34. How often do you interact with JTTF members? (interactions can be in person, by 

telephone, email, etc.) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Every two weeks [ ] Once a month [ ] As needed 

[ ] Never [ ] Other 

34a. Which of the following describes the reasons for your interactions with JTTF 

members? (check all that apply) 

[ ] To receive guidance and direction [ ] To respond to inquiries 

[ ] To discuss agency specific needs [ ] To complete taskings 

[ ] To share information /intelligence 

34b. How often do you interact with FTTTF members ? 

(interactions can be in person, by telephone, email, etc.) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Every two weeks [ ] Once a month [ ] Never 

[ ] Other [ ] As needed 

34c.Which of the following describes the reasons for your interactions with FTTTF? 

(check all that apply) 

[ ] To receive guidance and direction [ ] To respond to inquiries 

[ ] To discuss agency specific needs [ ] To complete taskings 

[ ] To obtain information [ ] To request analysis 

35. The FBI plans to move the NJTTF's operations to the Terrorism Threat Integration 

Center. How will this planned move impact the NJTTF's operations? 

[ ] Improve the NJTTF's operations 

[ ] No change in the NJTTF's operations 

[ ] Adversely impact the NJTTF's operations 

[ ] Not sure of the impact [ ] Other 

33. On a scale of 1-5 with (1 being the most important and 5 being the least important) 

how would you rank order the following FTTTF priorities? 

[ ] Conduct data searches 

[ ] Conduct special studies to determine a terrorism nexus 

[ ] Maintain terrorist watch lists [ ] Conduct risk assessments 

[ ] Maintain multidisciplinary databases 
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35. How often do you interact with members of the following groups? (interactions can 

be in person, by telephone, email, etc.) 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC) 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

United States Attorneys Office 

[ ] Daily [ ] Weekly [ ] Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ] Never 

36. Which of the following describes the reasons for these interactions? (check all that 

apply) 

[ ] To give guidance and direction 

[ ] To receive guidance and direction [ ] To respond to inquiries 

[ ] To share information [ ] To discuss agency specific needs 

[ ] To obtain information to complete taskings from my agency [ ] Other 

36a. Please explain: 

What have been the task force's/advisory council's greatest accomplishments? 

What have been the task force's/advisory council's greatest challenges? 

Is there anything else that you would like to share about the task force/advisory council? 

What is your current job title? 
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[ ] Assistant Chief [ ] Assistant Special Agent In Charge [ ] Assistant United States 

Attorney [ ] Deputy U.S. Marshall [ ] Captain [ ] Chief [ ] Deputy Commissioner [ ] 

Detective [ ] Director [ ] Federal Air Marshal [ ] Intelligence Analyst [ ] Intelligence 

Research Specialist [ ] Investigator [ ] Lieutenant [ ] Manager [ ] Officer [ ] Resident 

Agent In Charge [ ] Sergeant [ ] Special Agent 

[ ] Special Agent in Charge [ ] Supervisory Special Agent [ ] Sheriff [ ] Other 

If not provided above, please provide your current job title. 

Agency Affiliation 

[ ] Local Government/Agency 

[ ] State Government/Agency 

[ ] Private Business (Utilities, Transportation, Private Security, Pharmaceutical, etc.) 

[ ] Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 

[ ] Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) 

[ ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

[ ] Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

[ ] Executive Office of United States Attorneys (EOUSA) 

[ ] Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 

[ ] Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 

[ ] Federal Protective Service (FPS) 

[ ] Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

[ ] National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) 

[ ] National Security Agency (NSA) 

[ ] Office of Special Investigations (OSI) 

[ ] Military Intelligence Unit (Air Force, Army, Naval) 

[ ] Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

[ ] United States Attorneys Office 

[ ] United States Marshals Service (USM) 

[ ] United States Secret Service (USS) 

[ ] Other Federal Government Agency 

Geographic Region 

[ ] Northeast (CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT) 

[ ] Midwest (IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI) 

[ ] South (AR, AL, DE, District of Columbia, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, 

TX, VA, WV) 

[ ] West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY) 

Please press the finish button to save your responses. Thank you for your time and 

cooperation. We appreciate your help. 
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COUNTERTERRORISM TASK FORCE SURVEY RESULTS 

Are you or have you ever been a member of a DOJ Terrorism Task Force or Advisory Council? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

I am currently a member 531 75.4 75.4 75.4 

 I am no longer a member, 

but have been a member 

w/in the last 12 months 

30 4.3 4.3 79.7 

 I was a member more than 

12 months ago 9 1.3 1.3 81.0 

 I have never been a 

member 134 19.0 19.0 100.0 

 Total 704 100.0 100.0 

Which of the following statements describes your current involvement on a DOJ Terrorism Task Force or Advisory 

Council? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid JTTF 266 37.8 46.6 46.6 

 ATAC 270 38.4 47.3 93.9 

 NJTTF 19 2.7 3.3 97.2 

 FTTTF 16 2.3 2.8 100.0 

 TOTAL 571 81.1 100.0 

Missing System 133 18.9 

Total 704 100.0 

Are you a full-time or part-time member? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Full time 213 30.3 72.0 72.0 

 Part time 83 11.8 28.0 100.0 

 TOTAL 296 42.0 100.0 

Missing System 408 58.0 

Total 704 100.0 

Which of the following statements identifies your former Task Force/Advisory Council involvement? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid JTTF 26 3.7 63.4 63.4 

 ATAC 13 1.8 31.7 95.1 

 FTTTF 2 .3 4.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 41 5.8 100.0 

Missing System 663 94.2 

Total 704 100.0 
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What level of security clearance do you have? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Interim Clearance 7 1.0 1.3 1.3 

 Secret 59 8.4 10.6 11.9 

 Top Secret 204 29.0 36.7 48.6 

 Top Secret w/ SCI 

access 176 25.0 31.7 80.2 

 Don't know 67 9.5 12.1 92.3 

 None 43 6.1 7.7 100.0 

 TOTAL 556 79.0 100.0 

Missing System 148 21.0 

Total 704 100.0 

Are you a supervisor, coordinator, or task force/advisory council member? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Member 461 65.5 82.9 82.9 

 Coordinator 44 6.3 7.9 90.8 

 Supervisor 51 7.2 9.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 556 79.0 100.0 

Missing System 148 21.0 

Total 704 100.0 

Do you have policies, procedures, and/or objectives that address your role as a Task Force/Advisory Council participant? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 233 33.1 42.0 42.0 

 No 201 28.6 36.2 78.2 

 Don't know 121 17.2 21.8 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 
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Where did these policies, procedures, and/or objectives originate? 

(1 = FBI, 2 = Parent Agency, 3 = USAO, 4 = Self-generated) 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid 473 67.2 67.2 67.2 

 "1," 77 10.9 10.9 78.1 

 "1,2" 2 .3 .3 78.4 

 "1,2," 32 4.5 4.5 83.0 

 "1,2,3," 11 1.6 1.6 84.5 

 "1,2,3,4," 1 .1 .1 84.7 

 "1,2,4," 4 .6 .6 85.2 

 "1,3," 19 2.7 2.7 87.9 

 "1,3,4," 3 .4 .4 88.4 

 "1,4," 7 1.0 1.0 89.3 

 "2" 2 .3 .3 89.6 

 "2," 28 4.0 4.0 93.6 

 "2,3," 2 .3 .3 93.9 

 "2,3,4," 3 .4 .4 94.3 

 "2,4," 3 .4 .4 94.7 

 "3," 28 4.0 4.0 98.7 

 "3,4," 4 .6 .6 99.3 

 "4," 5 .7 .7 100.0 

 Total 704 100.0 100.0 

 

Please respond to the following statements regarding your role on the 

task force/advisory council: 

The FBI defined my role on the task force/advisory council. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 258 36.6 46.5 46.5 

 No 224 31.8 40.4 86.8 

 Not applicable 73 10.4 13.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

 The U.S. Attorney’s Office defined my role on the task force/advisory council. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 201 28.6 36.2 36.2 

 No 252 35.8 45.4 81.6 

 Not applicable 102 14.5 18.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 
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The U.S. Attorney General defined my role on the task force/advisory council. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 131 18.6 23.6 23.6 

 No 299 42.5 53.9 77.5 

 Not applicable 125 17.8 22.5 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

My parent agency defined my role on the task force/advisory council. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 297 42.2 53.5 53.5 

 No 163 23.2 29.4 82.9 

 Not applicable 95 13.5 17.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

I defined my role on the task force/advisory council. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 207 29.4 37.4 37.4 

 No 247 35.1 44.6 81.9 

 Not applicable 100 14.2 18.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 554 78.7 100.0 

Missing System 150 21.3 

Total 704 100.0 

My role on the task force/advisory council has not been determined. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 55 7.8 9.9 9.9 

 No 226 32.1 40.8 50.7 

 Not applicable 273 38.8 49.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 554 78.7 100.0 

Missing System 150 21.3 

Total 704 100.0 
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Do conflicts exist between the expectations of your parent agency and those of the 

task force leadership concerning your role? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 65 9.2 11.7 11.7 

 No 490 69.6 88.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Did you receive a list of performance standards that apply to your role as a member 

of the task force/advisory council? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 92 13.1 16.6 16.6 

 No 463 65.8 83.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

How would you rate these standards in assisting you in your job performance on 

the task force/advisory council? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 29 4.1 31.2 31.2 

 Good 41 5.8 44.1 75.3 

 Average 14 2.0 15.1 90.3 

 Poor 2 .3 2.2 92.5 

 Very Poor 2 .3 2.2 94.6 

 Don't know 1 .1 1.1 95.7 

 Not applicable 4 .6 4.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 93 13.2 100.0 

Missing System 611 86.8 

Total 704 100.0 

Is your performance on the task force routinely measured by your parent agency? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 150 21.3 51.0 51.0 

 No 58 8.2 19.7 70.7 

 Don't know 29 4.1 9.9 80.6 

 Not applicable 57 8.1 19.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 
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 Is your performance on this task force routinely measured by the FBI? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 171 24.3 58.2 58.2 

 No 47 6.7 16.0 74.1 

 Don't know 68 9.7 23.1 97.3 

 Not applicable 8 1.1 2.7 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Is your performance on this task force reported by the FBI to your supervisor at your parent agency? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 73 10.4 24.8 24.8 

 No 72 10.2 24.5 49.3 

 Don't know 67 9.5 22.8 72.1 

 Not applicable 82 11.6 27.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Is the performance of this task force/advisory council measured? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 142 20.2 25.6 25.6 

 No 62 8.8 11.2 36.8 

 Don't know 351 49.9 63.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

In the last year, how often did the entire task force/advisory council meet? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 23 3.3 4.2 4.2 

 Weekly 62 8.8 11.2 15.3 

 Every 2 weeks 42 6.0 7.6 22.9 

 Once a month 145 20.6 26.2 49.1 

 Quarterly 168 23.9 30.3 79.4 

 Never 30 4.3 5.4 84.8 

 Other 84 11.9 15.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 554 78.7 100.0 

Missing System 150 21.3 

Total 704 100.0 
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At these meetings of the entire task force/advisory council, please rate how the following are accomplished: 

Information/Intelligence shared 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 198 28.1 37.8 37.8 

 Good 203 28.8 38.7 76.5 

 Average 72 10.2 13.7 90.3 

 Poor 24 3.4 4.6 94.8 

 Very Poor 7 1.0 1.3 96.2 

 Don't know 11 1.6 2.1 98.3 

 Not applicable 9 1.3 1.7 100.0 

 TOTAL 524 74.4 100.0 

Missing System 180 25.6 

Total 704 100.0 

Training Planned 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 77 10.9 14.7 14.7 

 Good 199 28.3 38.0 52.7 

 Average 125 17.8 23.9 76.5 

 Poor 32 4.5 6.1 82.6 

 Very Poor 9 1.3 1.7 84.4 

 Don't know 34 4.8 6.5 90.8 

 Not applicable 48 6.8 9.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 524 74.4 100.0 

Missin

g 

System 180 25.6 

Total 704 100.0 

Training Conducted 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 94 13.4 17.9 17.9 

 Good 176 25.0 33.5 51.4 

 Average 121 17.2 23.0 74.5 

 Poor 36 5.1 6.9 81.3 

 Very Poor 10 1.4 1.9 83.2 

 Don't know 36 5.1 6.9 90.1 

 Not applicable 52 7.4 9.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 525 74.6 100.0 

Missing System 179 25.4 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

204

Taskings assigned 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 69 9.8 13.1 13.1 

 Good 181 25.7 34.5 47.6 

 Average 116 16.5 22.1 69.7 

 Poor 34 4.8 6.5 76.2 

 Very Poor 11 1.6 2.1 78.3 

 Don't know 45 6.4 8.6 86.9 

 Not applicable 69 9.8 13.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 525 74.6 100.0 

Missing System 179 25.4 

Total 704 100.0 

Cases updated 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 103 14.6 19.7 19.7 

 Good 176 25.0 33.6 53.2 

 Average 89 12.6 17.0 70.2 

 Poor 31 4.4 5.9 76.1 

 Very Poor 8 1.1 1.5 77.7 

 Don't know 44 6.3 8.4 86.1 

 Not applicable 73 10.4 13.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 524 74.4 100.0 

Missing System 180 25.6 

Total 704 100.0 

Administrative issues discussed 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 112 15.9 21.3 21.3 

 Good 215 30.5 41.0 62.3 

 Average 114 16.2 21.7 84.0 

 Poor 20 2.8 3.8 87.8 

 Very Poor 4 .6 .8 88.6 

 Don't know 32 4.5 6.1 94.7 

 Not applicable 28 4.0 5.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 525 74.6 100.0 

Missing System 179 25.4 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

205

Agency updates are provided 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 146 20.7 27.8 27.8 

 Good 213 30.3 40.6 68.4 

 Average 87 12.4 16.6 85.0 

 Poor 27 3.8 5.1 90.1 

 Very Poor 9 1.3 1.7 91.8 

 Don't know 25 3.6 4.8 96.6 

 Not applicable 18 2.6 3.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 525 74.6 100.0 

Missing System 179 25.4 

Total 704 100.0 

Threat assessments discussed 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 163 23.2 31.0 31.0 

 Good 205 29.1 39.0 70.1 

 Average 78 11.1 14.9 85.0 

 Poor 23 3.3 4.4 89.3 

 Very Poor 13 1.8 2.5 91.8 

 Don't know 23 3.3 4.4 96.2 

 Not applicable 20 2.8 3.8 100.0 

 TOTAL 525 74.6 100.0 

Missing System 179 25.4 

Total 704 100.0 

How would you rate the usefulness of these meetings in preparing you to plan 

for and respond to terrorism? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Very useful 159 22.6 30.3 30.3 

 Useful 270 38.4 51.5 81.9 

 Not at all useful 40 5.7 7.6 89.5 

 Not able to evaluate 38 5.4 7.3 96.8 

 No opinion 17 2.4 3.2 100.0 

 Total 524 74.4 100.0 

Missing System 180 25.6 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

206

In the last year, how often did the task force’s squad or advisory council’s sub-committees meet? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 14 2.0 2.5 2.5 

 Weekly 51 7.2 9.2 11.7 

 Every 2 weeks 29 4.1 5.2 16.9 

 Once a month 85 12.1 15.3 32.3 

 Quarterly 50 7.1 9.0 41.3 

 Never 20 2.8 3.6 44.9 

 Other 99 14.1 17.8 62.7 

 We don't have 

squads/sub-committees 207 29.4 37.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

At these squad or sub-committee meetings please rate how the following are accomplished: 

Information/Intelligence shared 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 97 13.8 30.1 30.1 

 Good 93 13.2 28.9 59.0 

 Average 29 4.1 9.0 68.0 

 Poor 7 1.0 2.2 70.2 

 Very Poor 4 .6 1.2 71.4 

 Don't know 60 8.5 18.6 90.1 

 Not applicable 32 4.5 9.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 322 45.7 100.0 

Missing System 382 54.3 

Total 704 100.0 

Training conducted 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 43 6.1 13.4 13.4 

 Good 83 11.8 25.8 39.1 

 Average 53 7.5 16.5 55.6 

 Poor 14 2.0 4.3 59.9 

 Very Poor 4 .6 1.2 61.2 

 Don't know 60 8.5 18.6 79.8 

 Not applicable 65 9.2 20.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 322 45.7 100.0 

Missing System 382 54.3 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

207

Taskings assigned 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 57 8.1 17.8 17.8 

 Good 94 13.4 29.3 47.0 

 Average 47 6.7 14.6 61.7 

 Poor 10 1.4 3.1 64.8 

 Very Poor 6 .9 1.9 66.7 

 Don't know 61 8.7 19.0 85.7 

 Not applicable 46 6.5 14.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 321 45.6 100.0 

Missing System 383 54.4 

Total 704 100.0 

Cases updated 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 62 8.8 19.3 19.3 

 Good 94 13.4 29.3 48.6 

 Average 36 5.1 11.2 59.8 

 Poor 11 1.6 3.4 63.2 

 Very Poor 6 .9 1.9 65.1 

 Don't know 63 8.9 19.6 84.7 

 Not applicable 49 7.0 15.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 321 45.6 100.0 

Missing System 383 54.4 

Total 704 100.0 

Administrative issues discussed 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 75 10.7 23.3 23.3 

 Good 102 14.5 31.7 55.0 

 Average 41 5.8 12.7 67.7 

 Poor 6 .9 1.9 69.6 

 Very Poor 2 .3 .6 70.2 

 Don't know 61 8.7 18.9 89.1 

 Not applicable 35 5.0 10.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 322 45.7 100.0 

Missin

g 

System 382 54.3 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

208

Training planned 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 47 6.7 14.7 14.7 

 Good 79 11.2 24.7 39.4 

 Average 52 7.4 16.3 55.6 

 Poor 19 2.7 5.9 61.6 

 Very Poor 5 .7 1.6 63.1 

 Don't know 62 8.8 19.4 82.5 

 Not applicable 56 8.0 17.5 100.0 

 TOTAL 320 45.5 100.0 

Missing System 384 54.5 

Total 704 100.0 

Agency updates are provided 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 67 9.5 20.9 20.9 

 Good 101 14.3 31.5 52.3 

 Average 42 6.0 13.1 65.4 

 Poor 11 1.6 3.4 68.8 

 Very Poor 7 1.0 2.2 71.0 

 Don't know 60 8.5 18.7 89.7 

 Not applicable 33 4.7 10.3 100.0 

 Total 321 45.6 100.0 

Missing System 383 54.4 

Total 704 100.0 

Threat assessments discussed 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 77 10.9 24.1 24.1 

 Good 91 12.9 28.5 52.7 

 Average 40 5.7 12.5 65.2 

 Poor 8 1.1 2.5 67.7 

 Very Poor 7 1.0 2.2 69.9 

 Don't know 59 8.4 18.5 88.4 

 Not applicable 37 5.3 11.6 100.0 

 TOTAL 319 45.3 100.0 

Missing System 385 54.7 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

209

How would you rate the usefulness of these squad or sub-committee meetings in preparing 

you to plan for and respond to terrorism? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Very useful 79 11.2 24.3 24.3 

 Useful 120 17.0 36.9 61.2 

 Not at all useful 23 3.3 7.1 68.3 

 Not able to evaluate 62 8.8 19.1 87.4 

 No opinion 41 5.8 12.6 100.0 

 TOTAL 325 46.2 100.0 

Missing System 379 53.8 

Total 704 100.0 

How were your terrorism training needs determined? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid TF Supervisor determined 

w/ my agency’s input 94 13.4 17.1 17.1 

 ATAC Coordinator 

determined w/ my 

agency’s input 74 10.5 13.4 30.5 

 TF Supervisor determined 

w/out my agency’s input 37 5.3 6.7 37.2 

 ATAC Coordinator 

determined w/out my 

agency’s input 26 3.7 4.7 41.9 

 I alone determined my 

needs 74 10.5 13.4 55.4 

 Needs not determined 94 13.4 17.1 72.4 

 Other 52 7.4 9.4 81.9 

 Don’t know 100 14.2 18.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 551 78.3 100.0 

Missing System 153 21.7 

Total 704 100.0 

Since becoming a task force/advisory council participant, have you completed any terrorism training? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 429 60.9 77.3 77.3 

 No 126 17.9 22.7 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

210

The following is a list of terrorism related training courses sponsored by either the FBI or the Unites States Attorneys 

Office. Please complete the information which follows for each course. 

International Terrorism CD 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 211 30.0 49.0 49.0 

 Not useful 11 1.6 2.6 51.5 

 Did not complete 209 29.7 48.5 100.0 

 TOTAL 431 61.2 100.0 

Missing System 273 38.8 

Total 704 100.0 

Domestic Terrorism CD 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 178 25.3 41.3 41.3 

 Not useful 5 .7 1.2 42.5 

 Did not complete 248 35.2 57.5 100.0 

 TOTAL 431 61.2 100.0 

Missing System 273 38.8 

Total 704 100.0 

Identifying Terrorist Groups/Characteristics 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 200 28.4 46.3 46.3 

 Not useful 3 .4 .7 47.0 

 Did not complete 229 32.5 53.0 100.0 

 TOTAL 432 61.4 100.0 

Missing System 272 38.6 

Total 704 100.0 

Terrorism/Incident Response 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 156 22.2 36.1 36.1 

 Not useful 3 .4 .7 36.8 

 Did not complete 273 38.8 63.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 432 61.4 100.0 

Missing System 272 38.6 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

211

Terrorism/Investigative Strategies 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 135 19.2 31.3 31.3 

 Not useful 1 .1 .2 31.5 

 Did not complete 296 42.0 68.5 100.0 

 TOTAL 432 61.4 100.0 

Missing System 272 38.6 

Total 704 100.0 

Cultural Sensitivity 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 166 23.6 38.4 38.4 

 Not useful 9 1.3 2.1 40.5 

 Did not complete 257 36.5 59.5 100.0 

 TOTAL 432 61.4 100.0 

Missing System 272 38.6 

Total 704 100.0 

FISA/USA PATRIOT ACT 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 225 32.0 52.1 52.1 

 Not useful 13 1.8 3.0 55.1 

 Did not complete 194 27.6 44.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 432 61.4 100.0 

Missing System 272 38.6 

Total 704 100.0 

NJTTF Conference 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 72 10.2 16.7 16.7 

 Not useful 5 .7 1.2 17.8 

 Did not complete 355 50.4 82.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 432 61.4 100.0 

Missing System 272 38.6 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

212

Terrorism Financing 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 98 13.9 22.7 22.7 

 Not useful 10 1.4 2.3 25.0 

 Did not complete 324 46.0 75.0 100.0 

 TOTAL 432 61.4 100.0 

Missing System 272 38.6 

Total 704 100.0 

Other 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Useful 119 16.9 37.0 37.0 

 Not useful 2 .3 .6 37.6 

 Did not complete 201 28.6 62.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 322 45.7 100.0 

Missin

g 

System 382 54.3 

Total 704 100.0 

Is there counterterrorism training that you need or should receive that you have not taken? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 284 40.3 51.4 51.4 

 No 269 38.2 48.6 100.0 

 TOTAL 553 78.6 100.0 

Missing System 151 21.4 

Total 704 100.0 

How would you rate the task force’s/advisory council’s resources? 

Number of staff 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 118 16.8 21.3 21.3 

 Good 236 33.5 42.5 63.8 

 Average 112 15.9 20.2 84.0 

 Poor 38 5.4 6.8 90.8 

 Very Poor 11 1.6 2.0 92.8 

 Not applicable 40 5.7 7.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

213

Equipment 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 75 10.7 13.5 13.5 

 Good 173 24.6 31.2 44.8 

 Average 155 22.0 28.0 72.7 

 Poor 45 6.4 8.1 80.9 

 Very Poor 15 2.1 2.7 83.6 

 Not Applicable 91 12.9 16.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 554 78.7 100.0 

Missing System 150 21.3 

Total 704 100.0 

Space 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 94 13.4 16.9 16.9 

 Good 154 21.9 27.7 44.7 

 Average 145 20.6 26.1 70.8 

 Poor 61 8.7 11.0 81.8 

 Very Poor 29 4.1 5.2 87.0 

 Not Applicable 72 10.2 13.0 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Staff skills 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 166 23.6 29.9 29.9 

 Good 239 33.9 43.1 73.0 

 Average 82 11.6 14.8 87.7 

 Poor 18 2.6 3.2 91.0 

 Very Poor 2 .3 .4 91.4 

 Not Applicable 48 6.8 8.6 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

214

Overall rating 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Excellent 94 13.4 16.9 16.9 

 Good 264 37.5 47.6 64.5 

 Average 131 18.6 23.6 88.1 

 Poor 24 3.4 4.3 92.4 

 Very Poor 4 .6 .7 93.2 

 Not Applicable 38 5.4 6.8 100.0 

 TOTAL 555 78.8 100.0 

Missing System 149 21.2 

Total 704 100.0 

The Congress has drafted legislation suggesting that the United States Attorneys should continue to participate in the 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces rather than maintaining a separate set of U.S. Attorney task forces. If this legislation is 

adopted, how will it impact the counterterrorism coverage in your area? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Favorably impact 194 27.6 35.0 35.0 

 Unfavorably impact 55 7.8 9.9 44.9 

 No impact 89 12.6 16.1 61.0 

 Not sure of impact 213 30.3 38.4 99.5 

 Other 3 .4 .5 100.0 

 TOTAL 554 78.7 100.0 

Missing System 150 21.3 

Total 704 100.0 

Upon joining the task force, were you given an orientation to the FBI and the FBI’s policies and procedures? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 171 24.3 58.0 58.0 

 No 109 15.5 36.9 94.9 

 Don't know 15 2.1 5.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 295 41.9 100.0 

Missing System 409 58.1 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

215

The next list of statements applies to the supervision, direction, and support that you receive as a task force participant. 

Please rate the statements that characterize the quality of supervision and guidance you receive with the scale provided. 

The chain of command for this task force is well-defined. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 123 17.5 41.8 41.8 

 Agree 118 16.8 40.1 82.0 

 Neutral 24 3.4 8.2 90.1 

 Disagree 14 2.0 4.8 94.9 

 Strongly disagree 7 1.0 2.4 97.3 

 Not applicable 1 .1 .3 97.6 

 Don't know 7 1.0 2.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

There is stability in the management structure of this task force. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 87 12.4 29.6 29.6

 Agree 122 17.3 41.5 71.1

 Neutral 41 5.8 13.9 85.0

 Disagree 28 4.0 9.5 94.6

 Strongly disagree 9 1.3 3.1 97.6

 Not applicable 1 .1 .3 98.0

 Don't know 6 .9 2.0 100.0

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

I have the authority I need to perform my job on this task force. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 93 13.2 31.6 31.6

 Agree 141 20.0 48.0 79.6

 Neutral 30 4.3 10.2 89.8

 Disagree 14 2.0 4.8 94.6

 Strongly disagree 7 1.0 2.4 96.9

 Not applicable 3 .4 1.0 98.0

 Don't know 6 .9 2.0 100.0

 Total 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

216

My task force supervisor provides the guidance I need. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 104 14.8 35.4 35.4

 Agree 110 15.6 37.4 72.8

 Neutral 41 5.8 13.9 86.7

 Disagree 13 1.8 4.4 91.2

 Strongly disagree 8 1.1 2.7 93.9

 Not applicable 12 1.7 4.1 98.0

 Don't know 6 .9 2.0 100.0

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

My task force supervisor provides the support I need. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 109 15.5 37.1 37.1

 Agree 108 15.3 36.7 73.8

 Neutral 42 6.0 14.3 88.1

 Disagree 16 2.3 5.4 93.5

 Strongly disagree 4 .6 1.4 94.9

 Not applicable 9 1.3 3.1 98.0

 Don't know 6 .9 2.0 100.0

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

My task force supervisor encourages my input in decision affecting my work. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 118 16.8 40.3 40.3

 Agree 113 16.1 38.6 78.8

 Neutral 32 4.5 10.9 89.8

 Disagree 12 1.7 4.1 93.9

 Strongly disagree 3 .4 1.0 94.9

 Not applicable 10 1.4 3.4 98.3

 Don't know 5 .7 1.7 100.0

 TOTAL 293 41.6 100.0 

Missing System 411 58.4 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

217

My supervisor from my parent agency provides me with the guidance I need to effectively represent my agency. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 78 11.1 26.5 26.5

 Agree 83 11.8 28.2 54.8

 Neutral 37 5.3 12.6 67.3

 Disagree 16 2.3 5.4 72.8

 Strongly disagree 7 1.0 2.4 75.2

 Not applicable 66 9.4 22.4 97.6

 Don't know 7 1.0 2.4 100.0

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

I am currently not working on any taskings. 

 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Ǿ 636 90.3 90.3 90.3 

"1" 68 9.7 9.7 100.0 

Valid 

TOTAL 704 100.0 100.0 

Note: Ǿ - indicates those respondents that did not type anything in response to the question. 

The table shows that 68 respondents indicated they were not currently working on any taskings.

Considering your taskings for this task force, please rate the following statements: 

The taskings I receive are in my area of expertise. 

Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 77 10.9 26.9 26.9

 Agree 131 18.6 45.8 72.7

 Neutral 39 5.5 13.6 86.4

 Disagree 4 .6 1.4 87.8

 Strongly disagree 6 .9 2.1 89.9

 Not applicable 26 3.7 9.1 99.0

 Don't know 3 .4 1.0 100.0

 TOTAL 286 40.6 100.0 

Missing System 418 59.4 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

218

The taskings I receive are assigned to other members/agencies for completion. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 10 1.4 3.5 3.5

 Agree 38 5.4 13.4 16.9

 Neutral 32 4.5 11.3 28.2

 Disagree 99 14.1 34.9 63.0

 Strongly disagree 33 4.7 11.6 74.6

 Not applicable 61 8.7 21.5 96.1

 Don't know 11 1.6 3.9 100.0

 TOTAL 284 40.3 100.0 

Missing System 420 59.7 

Total 704 100.0 

When appropriate, I am assigned as the lead investigator on cases that are in my areas of expertise. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 58 8.2 20.4 20.4

 Agree 93 13.2 32.6 53.0

 Neutral 37 5.3 13.0 66.0

 Disagree 13 1.8 4.6 70.5

 Strongly disagree 8 1.1 2.8 73.3

 Not applicable 71 10.1 24.9 98.2

 Don't know 5 .7 1.8 100.0

 TOTAL 285 40.5 100.0 

Missing System 419 59.5 

Total 704 100.0 

I am normally included in the initial stages of a tasking where my expertise is most useful. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 77 10.9 26.9 26.9

 Agree 107 15.2 37.4 64.3

 Neutral 41 5.8 14.3 78.7

 Disagree 15 2.1 5.2 83.9

 Strongly disagree 6 .9 2.1 86.0

 Not applicable 37 5.3 12.9 99.0

 Don't know 3 .4 1.0 100.0

 TOTAL 286 40.6 100.0 

Missing System 418 59.4 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

219

The contributions I make to this task force are worthwhile to the mission of the task force. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 107 15.2 37.4 37.4

 Agree 117 16.6 40.9 78.3

 Neutral 24 3.4 8.4 86.7

 Disagree 10 1.4 3.5 90.2

 Strongly disagree 3 .4 1.0 91.3

 Not applicable 19 2.7 6.6 97.9

 Don't know 6 .9 2.1 100.0

 TOTAL 286 40.6 100.0 

Missing System 418 59.4 

Total 704 100.0 

An FBI Special Agent is usually assigned as the lead agent on all IT cases. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 59 8.4 20.6 20.6

 Agree 68 9.7 23.8 44.4

 Neutral 25 3.6 8.7 53.1

 Disagree 53 7.5 18.5 71.7

 Strongly disagree 10 1.4 3.5 75.2

 Not applicable 37 5.3 12.9 88.1

 Don't know 34 4.8 11.9 100.0

 TOTAL 286 40.6 100.0 

Missing System 418 59.4 

Total 704 100.0 

An FBI Special Agent is usually assigned as the lead agent on all DT cases. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 51 7.2 17.8 17.8

 Agree 68 9.7 23.8 41.6

 Neutral 27 3.8 9.4 51.0

 Disagree 46 6.5 16.1 67.1

 Strongly disagree 9 1.3 3.1 70.3

 Not applicable 42 6.0 14.7 85.0

 Don't know 43 6.1 15.0 100.0

 TOTAL 286 40.6 100.0 

Missing System 418 59.4 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

220

Do you receive non-JTTF related taskings? 

 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Yes 132 18.8 45.2 45.2 

No 160 22.7 54.8 100.0 

Valid 

TOTAL 292 41.5 100.0 

Missing System 412 58.5 

Total 704 100.0 

How often do you receive these assignments? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Seldom 34 4.8 25.8 25.8 

 Occasionally 62 8.8 47.0 72.7 

 Frequently 36 5.1 27.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 132 18.8 100.0 

Missing System 572 81.3 

Total 704 100.0 

Do you have complete access to the following sources of FBI information? 

Automated Case System 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 187 26.6 63.6 63.6 

 No 83 11.8 28.2 91.8 

 Don't know 24 3.4 8.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

FBI databases 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 177 25.1 60.2 60.2 

 No 84 11.9 28.6 88.8 

 Don't know 33 4.7 11.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

221

FBI records 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 184 26.1 62.6 62.6 

 No 76 10.8 25.9 88.4 

 Don't know 34 4.8 11.6 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Other sources of information from the FBI 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 189 26.8 64.5 64.5 

 No 58 8.2 19.8 84.3 

 Don't know 46 6.5 15.7 100.0 

 TOTAL 293 41.6 100.0 

Missing System 411 58.4 

Total 704 100.0 

At the worksite, do you have access to . . . ? 

Parent agency’s databases 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 160 22.7 54.4 54.4 

 No 105 14.9 35.7 90.1 

 Don't know 29 4.1 9.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Parent agency’s contacts 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 210 29.8 71.4 71.4 

 No 54 7.7 18.4 89.8 

 Don't know 30 4.3 10.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

222

Parent agency’s intelligence 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 178 25.3 60.5 60.5 

 No 83 11.8 28.2 88.8 

 Don't know 33 4.7 11.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Parent agency’s e-mail 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 159 22.6 54.1 54.1 

 No 101 14.3 34.4 88.4 

 Don't know 34 4.8 11.6 100.0 

 TOTAL 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Internet/WWW 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Yes 221 31.4 75.2 75.2 

 No 45 6.4 15.3 90.5 

 Don't know 28 4.0 9.5 100.0 

 Total 294 41.8 100.0 

Missing System 410 58.2 

Total 704 100.0 

Which of the following describes your information sharing responsibilities? 

My responsibility is to share information with my parent agency supervisor. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 91 12.9 31.3 31.3

 Agree 101 14.3 34.7 66.0

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 20 2.8 6.9 72.9

 Disagree 10 1.4 3.4 76.3

 Strongly disagree 3 .4 1.0 77.3

 Not applicable 61 8.7 21.0 98.3

 Don't know 5 .7 1.7 100.0

 TOTAL 291 41.3 100.0 

Missing System 413 58.7 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

223

My responsibility is to share information with my FBI supervisor. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 132 18.8 45.5 45.5 

 Agree 114 16.2 39.3 84.8 

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 16 2.3 5.5 90.3 

 Disagree 7 1.0 2.4 92.8 

 Not applicable 15 2.1 5.2 97.9 

 Don't know 6 .9 2.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 290 41.2 100.0 

Missing System 414 58.8 

Total 704 100.0 

My responsibility is to share information directly with my agency head. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 51 7.2 17.7 17.7

 Agree 62 8.8 21.5 39.2

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 57 8.1 19.8 59.0

 Disagree 44 6.3 15.3 74.3

 Strongly disagree 16 2.3 5.6 79.9

 Not applicable 53 7.5 18.4 98.3

 Don't know 5 .7 1.7 100.0

 TOTAL 288 40.9 100.0 

Missing System 416 59.1 

Total 704 100.0 

My responsibility is to share information that I receive from the participating agencies on the task force. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 89 12.6 30.8 30.8

 Agree 125 17.8 43.3 74.0

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 32 4.5 11.1 85.1

 Disagree 7 1.0 2.4 87.5

 Strongly disagree 3 .4 1.0 88.6

 Not applicable 26 3.7 9.0 97.6

 Don't know 7 1.0 2.4 100.0

 TOTAL 289 41.1 100.0 

Missing System 415 58.9 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

224

My responsibility is to share information I receive from other agencies that are no task force members. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 67 9.5 23.2 23.2

 Agree 112 15.9 38.8 61.9

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 39 5.5 13.5 75.4

 Disagree 24 3.4 8.3 83.7

 Strongly disagree 7 1.0 2.4 86.2

 Not applicable 33 4.7 11.4 97.6

 Don't know 7 1.0 2.4 100.0

 TOTAL 289 41.1 100.0 

Missing System 415 58.9 

Total 704 100.0 

My responsibility is to share information from my parent agency with the task force. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 91 12.9 31.5 31.5

 Agree 120 17.0 41.5 73.0

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 27 3.8 9.3 82.4

 Disagree 1 .1 .3 82.7

 Strongly disagree 2 .3 .7 83.4

 Not applicable 44 6.3 15.2 98.6

 Don't know 4 .6 1.4 100.0

 TOTAL 289 41.1 100.0 

Missing System 415 58.9 

Total 704 100.0 

My responsibility is to share information with other task forces. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 63 8.9 22.2 22.2

 Agree 104 14.8 36.6 58.8

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 51 7.2 18.0 76.8

 Disagree 20 2.8 7.0 83.8

 Strongly disagree 9 1.3 3.2 87.0

 Not applicable 30 4.3 10.6 97.5

 Don't know 7 1.0 2.5 100.0

 TOTAL 284 40.3 100.0 

Missing System 420 59.7 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

225

I don’t share any information with the task force. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 1 .1 .3 .3

 Agree 2 .3 .7 1.0

 Neither agree nor 

disagree 8 1.1 2.8 3.8

 Disagree 70 9.9 24.5 28.3

 Strongly disagree 148 21.0 51.7 80.1

 Not applicable 48 6.8 16.8 96.9

 Don't know 9 1.3 3.1 100.0

 TOTAL 286 40.6 100.0 

Missing System 418 59.4 

Total 704 100.0 

Where are your task force information sharing responsibilities defined? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid 414 58.8 58.8 58.8 

 "1" 1 .1 .1 58.9 

 "1," 7 1.0 1.0 59.9 

 "1,2," 10 1.4 1.4 61.4 

 "1,2,3," 7 1.0 1.0 62.4 

 "1,2,3,4," 12 1.7 1.7 64.1 

 "1,2,3,4,5" 1 .1 .1 64.2 

 "1,2,3,4,5," 10 1.4 1.4 65.6 

 "1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8," 1 .1 .1 65.8 

 "1,2,3,5," 4 .6 .6 66.3 

 "1,2,3,5,6," 1 .1 .1 66.5 

 "1,2,4," 4 .6 .6 67.0 

 "1,2,4,5," 2 .3 .3 67.3 

 "1,2,5," 7 1.0 1.0 68.3 

 "1,3" 1 .1 .1 68.5 

 "1,3," 6 .9 .9 69.3 

 "1,3,4," 1 .1 .1 69.5 

 "1,3,5," 3 .4 .4 69.9 

 "1,3,6,8," 1 .1 .1 70.0 

 "1,5," 6 .9 .9 70.9 

 "1,6," 2 .3 .3 71.2 

 "1,7," 1 .1 .1 71.3 

 "2," 34 4.8 4.8 76.1 

 "2,3," 11 1.6 1.6 77.7 

 "2,3,4," 9 1.3 1.3 79.0 

 "2,3,4,5," 5 .7 .7 79.7 

 "2,3,5," 1 .1 .1 79.8 

 "2,3,7," 1 .1 .1 80.0 

 "2,4," 18 2.6 2.6 82.5 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

226

 "2,4,5," 3 .4 .4 83.0 

 "2,4,5,7," 2 .3 .3 83.2 

 "2,5," 8 1.1 1.1 84.4 

 "2,6," 1 .1 .1 84.5 

 "3" 1 .1 .1 84.7 

 "3," 16 2.3 2.3 86.9 

 "3,4," 2 .3 .3 87.2 

 "3,4,5," 1 .1 .1 87.4 

 "3,5," 3 .4 .4 87.8 

 "3,6," 1 .1 .1 87.9 

 "3,7," 1 .1 .1 88.1 

 "4," 6 .9 .9 88.9 

 "4,5," 3 .4 .4 89.3 

 "5," 10 1.4 1.4 90.8 

 "5,6," 3 .4 .4 91.2 

 "6" 1 .1 .1 91.3 

 "6," 22 3.1 3.1 94.5 

 "6,8," 2 .3 .3 94.7 

 "7," 1 .1 .1 94.9 

 "8," 36 5.1 5.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 704 100.0 100.0 

 1 = Policy from my agency, 2 = FBI Policy, 3 = MOU between FBI and my parent agency, 

 4 = Attorney General’s Guidelines, 5 = Good management practice, 6 = They aren’t defined, 

7 = Other, 8 = Don’t know 

The following 10 questions were only directed to ATAC respondents: 

Which of the following describes your information sharing responsibilities on this task force? 

I share information from my parent agency with ATAC members. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 125 17.8 48.3 48.3

 Agree 92 13.1 35.5 83.8

 Neutral 18 2.6 6.9 90.7

 Disagree 3 .4 1.2 91.9

 Strongly disagree 1 .1 .4 92.3

 Not applicable 17 2.4 6.6 98.8

 Don't know 3 .4 1.2 100.0

 TOTAL 259 36.8 100.0 

Missing System 445 63.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

227

I share information from the ATAC meetings with my parent agency. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 123 17.5 47.3 47.3

 Agree 93 13.2 35.8 83.1

 Neutral 18 2.6 6.9 90.0

 Disagree 2 .3 .8 90.8

 Strongly disagree 1 .1 .4 91.2

 Not applicable 20 2.8 7.7 98.8

 Don't know 3 .4 1.2 100.0

 TOTAL 260 36.9 100.0 

Missing System 444 63.1 

Total 704 100.0 

I share information that I receive from other agencies with the ATAC members. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 98 13.9 38.0 38.0

 Agree 101 14.3 39.1 77.1

 Neutral 29 4.1 11.2 88.4

 Disagree 8 1.1 3.1 91.5

 Strongly disagree 1 .1 .4 91.9

 Not applicable 16 2.3 6.2 98.1

 Don't know 5 .7 1.9 100.0

 TOTAL 258 36.6 100.0 

Missing System 446 63.4 

Total 704 100.0 

I do not share information with the ATAC members. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 2 .3 .8 .8

 Agree 7 1.0 2.8 3.6

 Neutral 19 2.7 7.7 11.3

 Disagree 82 11.6 33.1 44.4

 Strongly disagree 104 14.8 41.9 86.3

 Not applicable 26 3.7 10.5 96.8

 Don't know 8 1.1 3.2 100.0

 TOTAL 248 35.2 100.0 

Missing System 456 64.8 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

228

I do not share any information from the ATAC with my parent agency or any other agency. 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Strongly agree 1 .1 .4 .4

 Agree 3 .4 1.2 1.6

 Neutral 8 1.1 3.2 4.9

 Disagree 89 12.6 36.0 40.9

 Strongly disagree 113 16.1 45.7 86.6

 Not applicable 26 3.7 10.5 97.2

 Don't know 7 1.0 2.8 100.0

 TOTAL 247 35.1 100.0 

Missing System 457 64.9 

Total 704 100.0 

Where are your advisory council information sharing responsibilities defined? 

 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

 443 62.9 62.9 62.9 

"1," 42 6.0 6.0 68.9 

"1,4," 3 .4 .4 69.3 

"1,4,5," 10 1.4 1.4 70.7 

"1,5," 8 1.1 1.1 71.9 

"1,5,6," 1 .1 .1 72.0 

"1,7," 1 .1 .1 72.2 

"1,8," 1 .1 .1 72.3 

"4," 30 4.3 4.3 76.6 

"4,5," 3 .4 .4 77.0 

"4,5,6," 2 .3 .3 77.3 

"4,7," 1 .1 .1 77.4 

"4,8," 3 .4 .4 77.8 

"5," 39 5.5 5.5 83.4 

"5,6," 3 .4 .4 83.8 

"5,7," 1 .1 .1 83.9 

"6," 80 11.4 11.4 95.3 

"7," 2 .3 .3 95.6 

"8," 30 4.3 4.3 99.9 

5 1 .1 .1 100.0 

Valid 

TOTAL 704 100.0 100.0 

1 = Policy from my agency, 2 = Attorney General’s Guidelines, 3 = Good management practice, 4 = They aren’t defined, 5 = Other,

6 = Don’t know 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

229

How does the ATAC Coordinator/U.S. Attorney’s Office share information outside of scheduled meetings? 

 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid 444 63.1 63.1 63.1 

 "1," 120 17.0 17.0 80.1 

 "1,2," 16 2.3 2.3 82.4 

 "1,2,3," 23 3.3 3.3 85.7 

 "1,2,3,4

," 3 .4 .4 86.1 

 "1,3," 49 7.0 7.0 93.0 

 "1,3,4," 17 2.4 2.4 95.5 

 "1,3,5," 1 .1 .1 95.6 

 "1,4," 8 1.1 1.1 96.7 

 "3," 3 .4 .4 97.2 

 "3,4," 1 .1 .1 97.3 

 "3,5," 1 .1 .1 97.4 

 "4," 5 .7 .7 98.2 

 "5," 13 1.8 1.8 100.0 

 TOTAL 704 100.0 100.0 

1 = Electronic mail (email), 2 = Alert System, 3 = Telephone calls, 4 = Other, 5 = Information not shared outside meetings 

As a result of your membership on the ATAC, do you get the information you need in order to effectively 

perform your terrorism related job duties at your parent agency? 

Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Yes 221 31.4 86.0 86.0 

No 36 5.1 14.0 100.0 

Valid 

TOTAL 257 36.5 100.0 

Missing System 447 63.5 

Total 704 100.0 

The following 4 questions were directed only to JTTF respondents: 

How often do you interact w/ NJTTF members? (interactions can be in person, by telephone, email, etc.) 

Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 30 4.3 11.6 11.6 

 Weekly 25 3.6 9.7 21.2 

 Every 2 weeks 5 .7 1.9 23.2 

 Once a month 8 1.1 3.1 26.3 

 As needed 108 15.3 41.7 68.0 

 Never 78 11.1 30.1 98.1 

 Other 5 .7 1.9 100.0 

 TOTAL 259 36.8 100.0 

Missing System 445 63.2 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

230

Which of the following describes the reasons for your interactions with the NJTTF members? 

 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

 520 73.9 73.9 73.9 

"1," 7 1.0 1.0 74.9 

"1,2," 1 .1 .1 75.0 

"1,2,3" 1 .1 .1 75.1 

"1,2,3," 1 .1 .1 75.3 

"1,2,3,4," 2 .3 .3 75.6 

"1,2,3,4,5," 24 3.4 3.4 79.0 

"1,2,4," 2 .3 .3 79.3 

"1,2,4,5," 11 1.6 1.6 80.8 

"1,2,5," 2 .3 .3 81.1 

"1,3,4," 1 .1 .1 81.3 

"1,4,5," 1 .1 .1 81.4 

"1,5," 7 1.0 1.0 82.4 

"2," 21 3.0 3.0 85.4 

"2,3," 2 .3 .3 85.7 

"2,3,4,5," 4 .6 .6 86.2 

"2,3,5," 5 .7 .7 86.9 

"2,4," 6 .9 .9 87.8 

"2,4,5," 16 2.3 2.3 90.1 

"2,5" 1 .1 .1 90.2 

"2,5," 8 1.1 1.1 91.3 

"3," 7 1.0 1.0 92.3 

"3,4,5," 3 .4 .4 92.8 

"3,5," 1 .1 .1 92.9 

"4," 11 1.6 1.6 94.5 

"4,5," 7 1.0 1.0 95.5 

"5," 32 4.5 4.5 100.0 

Valid 

TOTAL 704 100.0 100.0 

1 = To receive guidance and direction, 2 = To respond to inquiries, 3 = To discuss agency specific needs, 

4 = To complete taskings, 5 = To share information/intelligence 

How often do you interact w/ FTTTF members? 

Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 11 1.6 4.3 4.3 

 Weekly 9 1.3 3.5 7.8 

 Every 2 weeks 2 .3 .8 8.6 

 Once a month 4 .6 1.6 10.2 

 As needed 104 14.8 40.8 51.0 

 Never 123 17.5 48.2 99.2 

 Other 2 .3 .8 100.0 

 Total 255 36.2 100.0 

Missing System 449 63.8 

TOTAL 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

231

The FBI plans to move the NJTTF’s operations to the Terrorism Threat Integration Center. How will this planned move 

impact the NJTTF’s operations? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Improve NJTTF 

operations 36 5.1 14.0 14.0

 No change in the 

NJTTF operations 14 2.0 5.4 19.4

 Not sure of the impact 208 29.5 80.6 100.0

 TOTAL 258 36.6 100.0 

Missing System 446 63.4 

Total 704 100.0 

The following 5 questions were only directed to NJTTF respondents: 

How often do you interact w/ JTTF members? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 10 1.4 52.6 52.6 

 Weekly 1 .1 5.3 57.9 

 As needed 7 1.0 36.8 94.7 

 Never 1 .1 5.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 19 2.7 100.0 

Missing System 685 97.3 

Total 704 100.0 

Which of the following describes the reasons for your interactions with JTTF members? 

 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

 686 97.4 97.4 97.4 

1,2,3,4,5 2 .3 .3 97.7 

1,2,3,5 2 .3 .3 98.0 

1,2,4,5 1 .1 .1 98.2 

1,2,5 1 .1 .1 98.3 

1,3,5, 1 .1 .1 98.4 

2,3,4,5 1 .1 .1 98.6 

2,3,5 1 .1 .1 98.7 

2,4, 1 .1 .1 98.9 

2,4,5 2 .3 .3 99.1 

2,5 2 .3 .3 99.4 

5 4 .6 .6 100.0 

Valid 

TOTAL 704 100.0 100.0 

1 = To receive guidance and direction, 2 = To respond to inquiries, 3 = To discuss agency specific needs, 

4 = To complete taskings, 5 = To share information/intelligence 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

232

How often do you interact with FTTTF members (interactions can be in person, by telephone, email, etc.)? 

Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 1 .1 5.3 5.3 

 Every 2 weeks 1 .1 5.3 10.5 

 As needed 9 1.3 47.4 57.9 

 Never 8 1.1 42.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 19 2.7 100.0 

Missing System 685 97.3 

Total 704 100.0 

Which of the following describes the reasons for your interactions with FTTTF? 

 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

 693 98.4 98.4 98.4 

"1,3,5," 1 .1 .1 98.6 

"2," 1 .1 .1 98.7 

"2,4,5,6," 1 .1 .1 98.9 

"2,5," 2 .3 .3 99.1 

"3,5," 1 .1 .1 99.3 

"5," 3 .4 .4 99.7 

"5,6," 2 .3 .3 100.0 

Valid 

TOTAL 704 100.0 100.0 

1 = To receive guidance and direction, 2 = To respond to inquiries, 3 = To discuss agency specific needs, 

4 = to complete taskings, 5 = To obtain information, 6 = To request analysis 

The FBI plans to move the NJTTF’s operations to the Terrorism Threat Integration Center. 

How will this planned move impact the NJTTF’s operations? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Improve the NJTTF 

operations 6 .9 31.6 31.6 

 No change in NJTTF 

operations 1 .1 5.3 36.8 

 Not sure of impact 12 1.7 63.2 100.0 

 TOTAL 19 2.7 100.0 

Missing System 685 97.3 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

233

The following 8 questions were only directed to FTTTF respondents: 

How often do you interact with members of the following groups? 

(interactions can be in person, by telephone, email, etc.) 

JTTF members 

Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 1 .1 6.7 6.7 

 Quarterly 1 .1 6.7 13.3 

 Never 13 1.8 86.7 100.0 

 TOTAL 15 2.1 100.0 

Missing System 689 97.9 

Total 704 100.0 

Department of Homeland Security 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 5 .7 31.3 31.3 

 Weekly 3 .4 18.8 50.0 

 Monthly 2 .3 12.5 62.5 

 Quarterly 1 .1 6.3 68.8 

 Never 5 .7 31.3 100.0 

 Total 16 2.3 100.0 

Missing System 688 97.7 

Total 704 100.0 

Executive Office of the United States Attorneys (EOUSA) 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Quarterly 1 .1 6.7 6.7 

 Never 14 2.0 93.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 15 2.1 100.0 

Missing System 689 97.9 

Total 704 100.0 

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Weekly 1 .1 6.7 6.7 

 Monthly 2 .3 13.3 20.0 

 Quarterly 2 .3 13.3 33.3 

 Never 10 1.4 66.7 100.0 

 TOTAL 15 2.1 100.0 

Missing System 689 97.9 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

234

National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 1 .1 6.7 6.7 

 Weekly 2 .3 13.3 20.0 

 Monthly 1 .1 6.7 26.7 

 Quarterly 1 .1 6.7 33.3 

 Never 10 1.4 66.7 100.0 

 Total 15 2.1 100.0 

Missing System 689 97.9 

Total 704 100.0 

Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 2 .3 13.3 13.3 

 Weekly 3 .4 20.0 33.3 

 Monthly 1 .1 6.7 40.0 

 Never 9 1.3 60.0 100.0 

 TOTAL 15 2.1 100.0 

Missing System 689 97.9 

Total 704 100.0 

Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC) 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 1 .1 7.1 7.1 

 Weekly 3 .4 21.4 28.6 

 Monthly 1 .1 7.1 35.7 

 Quarterly 1 .1 7.1 42.9 

 Never 8 1.1 57.1 100.0 

 TOTAL 14 2.0 100.0 

Missing System 690 98.0 

Total 704 100.0 

United States Attorneys Office (USAO) 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Daily 1 .1 7.1 7.1 

 Weekly 2 .3 14.3 21.4 

 Never 11 1.6 78.6 100.0 

 TOTAL 14 2.0 100.0 

Missing System 690 98.0 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

235

What is your current job title? 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Assistant Chief 21 3.0 3.1 3.1 

 ASAC 7 1.0 1.0 4.1 

 AUSA 26 3.7 3.8 7.9 

 Deputy USM 18 2.6 2.6 10.5 

 Captain 21 3.0 3.1 13.5 

 Chief 57 8.1 8.3 21.8 

 Deputy 

Commissioner 1 .1 .1 22.0 

 Detective 16 2.3 2.3 24.3 

 Director 23 3.3 3.3 27.7 

 Federal Air Marshal 3 .4 .4 28.1 

 Intell Analyst 20 2.8 2.9 31.0 

 IRS 15 2.1 2.2 33.2 

 Investigator 29 4.1 4.2 37.4 

 Lieutenant 32 4.5 4.7 42.1 

 Manager 14 2.0 2.0 44.1 

 Officer 11 1.6 1.6 45.7 

 RAC 11 1.6 1.6 47.3 

 Sergeant 16 2.3 2.3 49.6 

 Special Agent 172 24.4 25.0 74.7 

 SAC 9 1.3 1.3 76.0 

 SSA 32 4.5 4.7 80.6 

 Sheriff 11 1.6 1.6 82.2 

 Other 122 17.3 17.8 100.0 

 TOTAL 687 97.6 100.0 

Missing System 17 2.4 

Total 704 100.0 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

236

Agency Affiliation 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid ATF 31 4.4 4.5 4.5 

 DEA 5 .7 .7 5.2 

 FBI 109 15.5 15.9 21.1 

 BOP 7 1.0 1.0 22.2 

 BICE 28 4.0 4.1 26.2 

 CIA 12 1.7 1.7 28.0 

 FPS 7 1.0 1.0 29.0 

 TSA 9 1.3 1.3 30.3 

 EOUSA 1 .1 .1 30.5 

 USSS 7 1.0 1.0 31.5 

 IRS 14 2.0 2.0 33.5 

 OSI 4 .6 .6 34.1 

 USAO 47 6.7 6.9 41.0 

 USMS 29 4.1 4.2 45.2 

 Military Intelligence 

Unit 5 .7 .7 45.9 

 State govt./agency 87 12.4 12.7 58.6 

 Local govt./agency 170 24.1 24.8 83.4 

 Private Business 22 3.1 3.2 86.6 

 Other Federal Agency 92 13.1 13.4 100.0 

 TOTAL 686 97.4 100.0 

Missing System 18 2.6 

Total 704 100.0 

Geographic Region 

 Frequency Percent 

Valid 

Percent 

Cumulative 

Percent 

Valid Northeast 129 18.3 18.6 18.6 

 Midwest 150 21.3 21.6 40.3 

 South 287 40.8 41.4 81.7 

 West 127 18.0 18.3 100.0 

 TOTAL 693 98.4 100.0 

Missing System 11 1.6 

Total 704 100.0 
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APPENDIX V: NSCC MEMORANDUM 
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APPENDIX VI: ATAC MEMORANDUMS 
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APPENDIX VII: FTTTF MEMORANDUMS 
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APPENDIX VIII: THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY 

GENERAL’S RESPONSE 
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APPENDIX IX: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S RESPONSE 

The OIG sent copies of the draft report to the Office of the Deputy 

Attorney General (ODAG) with a request for written comments on 

Recommendations 1, 10, and 27. The ODAG responded to the OIG in a 

memorandum dated May 27, 2005, concurring with all of the 

recommendations. The ODAG agreed to review the functions of the NSCC, 

issue additional guidance to the ATACs, and work with the DHS to ensure 

sufficient DHS participation on the terrorism task forces. Our analysis of the 

ODAG’s response follows. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: Resolved – Open. The Department should assess 

the counterterrorism functions outlined in the Attorney General’s 

memorandum establishing the NSCC and determine if they are still appropriate 

for the NSCC. If they are, the Department should ensure that written guidance 

describes the responsibilities of the NSCC and that the NSCC carries out its 

assigned functions. If the functions are not appropriate for the NSCC, they 

should be assigned to another Department entity. 

Summary of the ODAG’s Response. The ODAG concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that as part of a larger review of the Department’s 

national security responsibilities, the ODAG has “begun to examine more 

closely the best approach to the coordination of counterterrorism functions 

within the greater national security umbrella.” 

The OIG’s Analysis. The review of the Department’s national security 

responsibilities planned by the ODAG is responsive to the recommendation. By 

October 31, 2005, please provide us the results of this review and the ODAG’s 

recommendations regarding whether the NSCC or another entity should carry 

out its assigned counterterrorism functions. 

Recommendation 10: Resolved – Open. The Department should 

clearly delineate the roles of CTS, EOUSA, and the USAO in the ATAC program, 

clarifying who has primary responsibility and authority for: 

• Oversight, 

• Monitoring ATAC operations, 

• Evaluating success of the ATAC program, and 

• Enforcing compliance. 
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Summary of the ODAG’s Response. The ODAG concurred with the 

recommendation (incorrectly numbered as 2 in the ODAG’s response) and 

stated that issuing additional guidance and adopting best practices to address 

operational, training, and membership issues for the ATACs are helpful 

suggestions. The ODAG has formed a working group to develop and issue the 

guidance by the end of the year. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The ODAG’s working group and its plan to issue 

additional ATAC guidance is responsive to the recommendation. By October 

31, 2005, please provide us copies of any guidance, recommendations, or 

written materials developed by the working group. 

Recommendation 27: Resolved – Open. The Deputy Attorney General 

should work jointly with DHS officials to ensure: 

• Sufficient DHS participation on the Department’s task forces, 

• Sufficiently trained ICE members on the task forces and their 

supervisory chain of command, 

• Non-task-force related assignments to DHS members are minimized, 

and 

• Updated MOUs defining roles and information sharing responsibilities 

between the FBI and DHS. 

Summary of the ODAG’s Response. The ODAG concurred with the 

recommendation and agreed to work with its colleagues at the DHS to ensure 

effective participation of DHS components on the JTTFs. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The ODAG’s plan to work with the DHS is 

responsive to the recommendation. By October 31, 2005, please provide us 

with examples of the ODAG’s coordination with the DHS to ensure effective 

participation on the JTTFs. 
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APPENDIX X: THE CRIMINAL DIVISION’S RESPONSE 
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APPENDIX XI: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL DIVISION’S 

RESPONSE 

The OIG sent the draft report to the Criminal Division (CRM) with a 

request for written comments on Recommendations 3, 7, 9, 11, and 12. The 

CRM responded to the OIG in a memorandum dated May 18, 2005. The CRM 

concurred with all of the recommendations and agreed, through the 

Counterterrorism Section (CTS), to continue to work with EOUSA and the 

USAOs to develop a national training plan for the ATACs, a strategy for 

reaching remote areas, performance measures for the ATAC program, and 

guidance to ATAC Coordinators on roles, responsibilities, and management of 

an ATAC. Our analysis of the CRM’s response follows. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 3: Resolved – Open. EOUSA’s Office of Legal 

Education, along with CTS, should develop a national training plan for ATACs 

that includes: 

• Initial needs assessment of ATAC Coordinators, 

• How to manage and structure an ATAC (membership, frequency 

of meetings, methods and sources of communication, how to 

conduct an ATAC members’ needs assessment, identify trainers, 

and develop a local training plan), 

• Frequency of future needs assessments for ATAC Coordinators 

and ATACs, 

• Development of minimum mandatory training standards and 

time frames for completion of training for ATAC Coordinators, 

• Required minimum annual training hours for ATAC 

Coordinators, and 

• Responsibility for training notification to the ATAC 

Coordinators. 

Summary of the CRM’s Response. The CRM concurred with the 

recommendation. The CRM stated that although significant training for 

terrorism prosecutors already has occurred, CTS will work with EOUSA’s Office 

of Legal Education to develop a national training plan and provide subject 

matter experts where appropriate. CTS, EOUSA, and the USAOs have formed 

an ATAC Training Committee (referred to as the National ATAC Training 

Working Group in EOUSA’s response) comprising the CTS Deputy Chief, two 

CTS attorneys (who formerly were ATAC Coordinators), the CTS National ATAC 

Coordinator, the Deputy Counsel to EOUSA’s Director, the Assistant Director of 
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EOUSA’s Office of Legal Education, and 10 current ATAC Coordinators from 

different regions of the country. The Committee held an initial strategy meeting 

in May 2005, to address the recommendations in the OIG report and agreed to 

formulate a survey to assess the training needs of ATAC Coordinators and 

ATAC members. Additionally, the Committee agreed that ATAC Coordinators 

need assistance in determining the type of training to provide to their ATAC 

members. The Committee will continue meeting to develop a national training 

plan that addresses the identified needs of ATAC Coordinators and ATAC 

members. The Committee plans to consider an accelerated course of training 

for newly appointed ATAC Coordinators who may not be experienced in the 

subject matter of terrorism. However, CTS stated that setting minimum and 

mandatory annual training hours for ATAC Coordinators would not assist the 

ATAC program and would require additional funding. CTS also stated that, 

once the ATAC national training plan is established, EOUSA can monitor 

compliance with the plan, assess frequency and suitability of training, and 

determine whether additional measures are needed to achieve the goals of the 

ATAC program. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The CRM’s plan for CTS to develop a national ATAC 

training plan with EOUSA is responsive to the recommendation. The OIG 

believes that the ATAC Training Committee can aid the development of the 

training plan with input from all parties involved in the ATAC program. 

Although the majority of ATAC Coordinators we interviewed and surveyed were 

satisfied with prosecutive and investigative training, they indicated a need for 

more training on the operation of ATACs. The CRM stated that the ATAC 

national training plan will include an initial needs assessment of ATAC 

Coordinators, guidance on how to manage and structure an ATAC, and 

standards and time frames for completing ATAC Coordinator training. The OIG 

believes that this action will ensure that ATAC Coordinators receive training on 

ATAC operational issues. We have requested that EOUSA provide us a copy of 

the ATAC national training plan by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 7: Resolved – Open. The FBI, CTS, EOUSA, and the 

USAOs should work jointly to develop a coordinated strategy to consistently 

reach out to remote areas. 

Summary of the CRM’s Response. The CRM agreed that all agencies 

should work together to draft a coordinated strategy to consistently reach 

remote areas. The CRM stated that many ATAC Coordinators and Intelligence 

Research Specialists already are making progress toward communicating with 

rural areas of their districts. ATACs exist in every judicial district and 24 

states have two or more ATACs to further communication. Further, most 

ATACs spent part of their terrorism funds on communication equipment to 

improve information sharing. The CRM provided six additional examples of 
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ATACs that effectively use such equipment. The CRM also stated that CTS will 

work with the FBI and the USAOs to address the gaps in communication 

coverage with remote areas as identified in the OIG report. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The CRM’s plan for CTS to develop an outreach 

strategy with the FBI and the USAOs is responsive to the recommendation. We 

request that when CTS, EOUSA, the FBI, and the USAOs develop a coordinated 

strategy to reach remote areas, they designate one agency to provide us a copy 

of the coordinated strategy by October 31, 2005. We believe this strategy 

should define the roles and responsibilities of each entity in implementing the 

strategy. 

Recommendation 9: Resolved – Open. CTS and EOUSA should 

develop outcome-oriented performance measures for the ATAC program. The 

measures for the ATAC program could include the following: 

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with member and 

outside agencies that resulted in improved understanding of 

terrorism issues and improved prevention activities, 

• Quality and timeliness of training for members that resulted in 

improved understanding of terrorism issues and improved prevention 

activities, 

• Outreach efforts that resulted in increasing targeted membership, and 

• Quality and currency of threat assessments that result in improved 

prevention activities. 

Summary of the CRM’s Response. The CRM concurred with the 

recommendation that performance measures should be developed for the ATAC 

program. CTS will assist EOUSA in establishing performance measures for 

ATAC members, drawing as appropriate on the existing performance measures 

for the National and Regional ATAC Coordinators within CTS. CTS stated that 

it would be difficult to have one standard to measure the success of the ATAC 

program given the great number of differences in judicial districts. CTS 

recommended that ATAC performance measures be developed to fit the needs 

in each district as determined by a survey of ATAC members. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The CRM’s plan for CTS to assist EOUSA in 

establishing performance measures for the ATAC program is responsive to the 

recommendation. However, the OIG believes that EOUSA and CTS should 

develop standard performance elements across ATACs to measure the 

effectiveness of the ATAC program nationwide. We believe certain elements of 

the ATAC program should be consistent across USAOs, while the particular 

criteria used to measure each USAO’s success on these elements could be 

different based on the various ATAC activities and how the program is operated 
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in each judicial district. The OIG requests that EOUSA provide us the jointly 

developed standard performance elements and measures for the ATAC program 

by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 11: Resolved – Open. CTS and EOUSA should 

jointly issue written guidance defining their roles and responsibilities in the 

ATAC program, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the Regional ATAC 

Coordinators, the National ATAC Coordinator, and the EOUSA point-of-contact 

for ATACs. This written guidance should be communicated to the ATAC 

Coordinators. 

Summary of the CRM’s Response. The CRM concurred with the 

recommendation. CTS has issued written guidance on the roles and 

responsibilities of CTS staff working in the ATAC program, the National ATAC 

Coordinator, and the Regional ATAC Coordinators. CTS will assist EOUSA in 

drafting and issuing similar guidance. If the Deputy Attorney General 

determines that additional clarification of roles and responsibilities of CTS and 

EOUSA in the ATAC program is needed, CTS has agreed to work with EOUSA 

on this guidance. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The CRM’s plan for CTS to work with EOUSA on 

developing guidance about their roles and responsibilities for the ATAC 

program is responsive to the recommendation. We also note that the Deputy 

Attorney General has formed a working group to develop guidance that clarifies 

the roles and responsibilities of CTS, EOUSA, and the USAOs in the ATAC 

program with regard to oversight, monitoring, evaluating success, and 

enforcing compliance (see the ODAG’s response to Recommendation 10, which 

it labeled “2”). The OIG requests that EOUSA provide us a copy of the joint 

EOUSA-CTS written guidance to the ATAC Coordinators by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 12: Resolved – Open. CTS or EOUSA should issue 

written guidance for ATAC Coordinators that includes a definition of roles, how 

to determine membership base, and how to structure and manage an ATAC. 

Summary of the CRM’s Response. The CRM concurred with the 

recommendation but stated that guidance to ATAC Coordinators on the 

definition of roles, how to determine membership, and how to structure and 

manage an ATAC should come from EOUSA consistent with its responsibility 

for oversight and monitoring of the ATAC program. CTS has agreed to assist 

EOUSA and the USAOs in developing this written guidance. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The CRM’s plan for CTS to assist EOUSA and the 

USAOs in developing guidance for the ATACs is responsive to the 

recommendation. The OIG requests that EOUSA provide us a copy of the 
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written guidance to the ATAC Coordinators on roles and ATAC membership, 

structure, and management by October 31, 2005. 
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APPENDIX XII: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES 

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APPENDIX XIII: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE 

FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ RESPONSE 

The OIG sent copies of the draft report to EOUSA with a request for 

written comments on Recommendations 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 28. 

EOUSA responded to the OIG in a memorandum dated May 17, 2005. 

Although EOUSA believed that the draft report did not adequately present the 

challenges faced by EOUSA, USAOs, and CTS since September 11, 2001, and 

credit their achievements, EOUSA concurred with all of the recommendations. 

EOUSA agreed to develop a national training plan for the ATAC Coordinators, 

assist the ATAC Coordinators in developing a training plan for ATAC members, 

develop a coordinated strategy with the FBI for reaching remote areas, develop 

performance measures for the ATAC program, and provide guidance to ATAC 

Coordinators on roles, responsibilities, and management of an ATAC. EOUSA 

presented general comments on four issues and then addressed each 

recommendation. Our analysis of EOUSA’s response follows. 

GENERAL COMMENTS 

Shared Responsibilities. EOUSA stated that the report did not 

adequately reflect the shared responsibilities between EOUSA, CTS, and the 

USAOs for the oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the ATAC program. 

EOUSA stated that the U.S. Attorneys have primary responsibility for 

implementing and coordinating the ATACs in their judicial districts. CTS 

assists in coordinating the ATAC program and has primary responsibility for 

coordinating terrorism cases and investigations across the USAOs. EOUSA 

provides support for the USAOs, has responsibility for training Department 

employees (which includes ATAC Coordinators), and serves as a liaison 

between the USAOs and the Department. EOUSA cited a January 13, 2005, 

memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to the U.S. Attorneys and the 

ATAC Coordinators as the most recent guidance on the roles of CTS and the 

USAOs regarding international and domestic terrorism cases. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The OIG believes the report adequately outlined the 

shared responsibilities for the ATAC program. However, we encountered a lack 

of understanding on the part of ATAC Coordinators regarding these shared 

responsibilities. The ATAC Coordinators we interviewed and surveyed were 

unsure to which entity to report activities, ask questions, or get direction about 

ATAC operations (including information sharing, meetings, and training, but 

not prosecutions). The Deputy Attorney General’s January 13, 2005, 

memorandum cited by EOUSA only defines roles of CTS and the USAOs in 

relation to terrorism prosecutions and investigations, not ATAC operations. 
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When we interviewed the former and current EOUSA points of contact for the 

ATACs, they both stated that EOUSA provided training and budgetary 

administrative support to the ATACs, the same administrative support it 

traditionally provides to the USAOs in all programs. EOUSA at that time did 

not view its’ role as one of oversight to the ATAC program. Both EOUSA and 

CTS now seem clear on their roles and responsibilities in the ATAC program, 

but these roles and responsibilities have not been adequately communicated to 

the USAOs or the ATAC Coordinators. For example, most ATAC Coordinators 

expected the CTS Regional ATAC Coordinators to provide guidance, not only on 

terrorism prosecutive and investigative strategies but also on ATAC operations, 

which is an EOUSA responsibility. 

Training. EOUSA stated that the report did not adequately recognize the 

number and quality of counterterrorism training provided by EOUSA to ATAC 

members and ATAC Coordinators since the inception of the ATAC program. 

EOUSA outlined a variety of training sessions that have been provided to ATAC 

Coordinators and members. 

 The OIG’s Analysis. The OIG recognizes that EOUSA, with assistance 

from CTS, has developed and provided a significant number of training 

sessions for the ATAC Coordinators. In fact, we did not receive complaints 

about training on prosecutive and investigative issues. However, we found in 

our interviews and survey that ATAC Coordinators wanted additional, more 

extensive training on day-to-day operations of the ATAC, a topic that the 

Coordinators said received minimal coverage during any training sessions they 

attended. 

The OIG reviewed the syllabi of the conferences and training listed by 

EOUSA in its response, and we attended the 2004 ATAC Coordinator National 

Conference. We found that the majority of these training sessions had only 30 

minutes devoted to management or operations of the ATAC, and only a few of 

the conferences had more than 30 minutes devoted to these issues. When 

asked for suggested topics for the annual ATAC Coordinator conference, some 

ATAC Coordinators specifically requested sessions devoted to the management 

of an ATAC and ATAC best practices. However, the ATAC Coordinators 

believed that the amount of time ultimately allocated to these matters was 

inadequate. 

Compliance. EOUSA stated that its Evaluation and Review Staff (EARS) 

can effectively determine whether a USAO complies with the Attorney General’s 

policies for ATACs. Additionally, EOUSA stated that the ATAC program has the 

flexibility to fit the needs of individual judicial districts because the USAOs, not 

EOUSA or CTS, manage ATACs. EOUSA stated that our report did not 

recognize the flexibility in this approach because the report implied that 
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merging an ATAC with the state homeland security task force did not comply 

with the Attorney General’s memorandum establishing the ATAC program. 

The OIG’s Analysis. We agree that the EARS can be used as a 

mechanism to assess ATACs’ compliance with the Attorney General’s 

guidelines. However, without a determination from the Department on what 

constitutes “compliance” or ATAC program standards, the EARS cannot 

sufficiently assess if an ATAC is adequate or is meeting the intent of the 

program. The Deputy Attorney General has assembled a working group to 

develop materials and guidance on who has responsibility for oversight, 

monitoring, evaluation, and enforcing compliance for the ATAC program. The 

working group expects to develop its guidance by the end of 2005. EOUSA and 

CTS also agreed in their responses to Recommendation 9 to develop 

performance measures for the ATAC program. 

Funding Analysis. EOUSA disagreed with the report’s finding that 

EOUSA has not recognized, analyzed, or attempted to address funding needs 

for the ATAC program. EOUSA stated that in fiscal year (FY) 2002, the 

Department received supplemental funding in the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Bill of $56,370,000 for increased personnel in the USAOs to 

address anti-terrorism investigative and prosecutorial needs. This funding 

provided for 468 attorney and support positions in the USAOs as well as 

recurring funds for travel and supplies. EOUSA stated that one AUSA position 

in each USAO was designated an ATAC Coordinator and each district received 

an Intelligence Research Specialist position. EOUSA further stated that in FY 

2002, the Department allocated $100,000 on a one-time basis to each ATAC 

from funds originally provided to the U.S. Attorneys for increasing the USAOs’ 

capacity to fight terrorism. The Department directed the USAOs to use the 

$100,000 for communication and intelligence coordination, communication 

equipment, overtime for ATAC meetings, support services, and 

counterterrorism training or technical assistance for state and local entities. 

EOUSA stated that since FY 2002, the USAOs became fully staffed and 

the one-time funds provided to state and local entities were required in 

subsequent years for salaries and expenses of those hired in the USAOs to 

increase counterterrorism capacity. EOUSA stated that the 

FY 2005 appropriation included an enhancement for terrorism prevention and 

EOUSA is exploring options to use that funding to supplement the ATAC 

program. EOUSA further stated that it will continue to request funds in FYs 

2006 and 2007 to support the ATAC program. 

 The OIG’s Analysis. The OIG believes that EOUSA has not strategically 

or sufficiently analyzed the ATAC budget to assess future funding needs. Our 

recommendation that EOUSA should conduct more strategic analysis of the 
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ATAC budget to assess the need for future funding specifically was directed at 

funding used for ATAC operations, including information sharing, 

communication items, and training for state and local entities, not funding for 

USAOs to increase their prosecutive capacity. We considered the salaries and 

expenses for additional personnel devoted to terrorism prosecutions and 

investigations separate from the one-time allocation of $100,000 to each USAO 

for improving the communication between the Department and state and local 

law enforcement entities. For example, during FY 2005, ATAC Coordinators 

have been unable to attend terrorism-related training and meetings in some 

locations within their judicial districts due to insufficient travel funds. 

To plan adequately for the ATACs’ future funding needs or to direct the 

ATAC program, we believe that EOUSA should analyze the expenditures of each 

USAO’s $100,000 and determine if the expenditures achieved their purpose to 

improve federal communication with state and local law enforcement. 

Additionally, EOUSA should solicit information from the ATACs on their 

funding requirements for improving information sharing, procuring 

communication equipment, conducting training, and attending terrorismrelated meetings. Because the USAOs have competing priorities, strategic 

analysis of the ATAC program and its budget is critical. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 3: Resolved – Open. EOUSA’s Office of Legal 

Education, along with CTS, should develop a national training plan for ATACs 

that includes: 

• Initial needs assessment of ATAC Coordinators, 

• How to manage and structure an ATAC (membership, frequency 

of meetings, methods and sources of communication, how to 

conduct an ATAC members’ needs assessment, identify trainers, 

and develop a local training plan), 

• Frequency of future needs assessments for ATAC Coordinators 

and ATACs, 

• Development of minimum mandatory training standards and 

time frames for completion of training for ATAC Coordinators, 

• Required minimum annual training hours for ATAC 

Coordinators, and 

• Responsibility for training notification to the ATAC 

Coordinators. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred with the 

recommendation to develop a national training plan for the ATACs and that 

EOUSA’s Office of Legal Education should have primary responsibility for this 
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development. EOUSA, with CTS, has convened a National ATAC Training 

Working Group (referred to as the ATAC Training Committee in the CRM 

response) consisting of representatives from EOUSA and CTS, as well as ATAC 

Coordinators and Intelligence Research Specialists from several USAOs. The 

Working Group has held one meeting and will continue to meet and work on a 

national training plan that may include an initial needs assessment of ATAC 

Coordinators, guidance on how to manage and structure an ATAC, suggested 

standards and time frames for completing ATAC Coordinator training, and 

guidance on appropriate training hours. EOUSA does not believe that 

minimum mandatory training standards and time frames for completion of 

training should be established for the ATAC members. EOUSA believes that it 

is appropriate for each new ATAC Coordinator to receive some type of 

orientation – in-person training, a Justice Television Network program, or a 

review of self-study materials from EOUSA. EOUSA suggested that each 

judicial district be given the flexibility to design its own ATAC training plan to 

fit the local needs. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s training working group and plan to issue a 

national ATAC training plan are responsive to the recommendation. The OIG 

believes that the National ATAC Training Working Group can aid development 

of a national training plan and will help EOUSA and the USAOs provide the 

most appropriate training to ATAC Coordinators and ATAC members. The OIG 

also believes the accelerated orientation for newly appointed ATAC 

Coordinators can assist implementation of the ATAC program. 

The OIG did not recommend that EOUSA establish minimum training 

standards for ATAC members, but rather for ATAC Coordinators. The training 

for ATAC members should be determined by individual USAOs through the 

ATAC training needs assessments and balanced by available resources. The 

majority of ATAC Coordinators that we interviewed and surveyed indicated 

satisfaction with prosecutive and investigative training but indicated a need for 

more training on the operations of an ATAC. The OIG recommended the 

development of minimum training hours for ATAC Coordinators to ensure these 

operational issues were covered in training. However, a national training plan 

that includes an appropriate amount of training on operational issues for ATAC 

Coordinators, as determined by the ATAC Coordinators themselves, would be 

responsive to the recommendation. Please provide us a copy of the national 

ATAC training plan by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 4: Resolved – Open. The ATAC Coordinators should 

conduct training needs assessments and develop a training plan for ATAC 

members.
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Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred with the 

recommendation and through the National ATAC Training Working Group 

plans to conduct a training needs assessment for ATAC Coordinators. In 

addition, the working group plans to assist the ATAC Coordinators in 

conducting needs assessments for the members of their individual ATACs, and 

assist the ATAC Coordinators in developing training plans for members. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s planned actions to conduct a training 

needs assessment for ATAC Coordinators and assist ATAC Coordinators with 

assessing and meeting the training needs of members are responsive to the 

recommendation. Please provide us a copy of the results of the training needs 

assessment for ATAC Coordinators by October 31, 2005. Additionally, please 

provide us a copy of EOUSA’s plan for assisting the ATAC Coordinators in 

developing training needs assessments and training plans for the ATAC 

members by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 7: Resolved – Open. The FBI, CTS, EOUSA, and the 

USAOs should work jointly to develop a coordinated strategy to consistently 

reach out to remote areas. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred with the 

recommendation and agreed to “work to provide additional guidance and best 

practices to better reach remote areas through the national training plan for 

USAOs.” However, EOUSA stated that the OIG report underestimates the 

USAOs’ efforts in communicating terrorism and threat information to law 

enforcement and other agencies in rural areas of their districts. EOUSA 

outlined the extensive efforts that ATACs in Oklahoma and Alaska have made 

to share information and provide training to local law enforcement agencies in 

their districts. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s proposal to improve ATACs’ 

communication with remote areas through the national ATAC training plan is 

partially responsive to the recommendation. Our recommendation intended 

that a coordinated outreach strategy among the FBI, CTS, EOUSA, and the 

USAOs be developed to ensure communication with state and local law 

enforcement personnel who are not members of an ATAC or another 

Department terrorism task force. It is unclear how the ATAC national training 

plan will fulfill the recommendation’s intent. 

Also, in the report the OIG recognized the efforts of many ATACs to reach 

out and communicate with remote areas within the judicial districts, and we 

summarized the innovative efforts of some USAOs. The OIG found that the 

majority of ATAC members were satisfied with the information sharing and 

training received, but we found the opposite when we interviewed state and 
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local law enforcement personnel who were not members of the ATAC or another 

Department counterterrorism task force. These non-members were 

overwhelmingly dissatisfied with information sharing or training provided by 

the Department and often had no knowledge of the ATAC or ATAC 

communication and training efforts in their area. Additionally, the 

counterterrorism communication and outreach efforts to remote areas often 

were not coordinated between the USAO and the FBI’s JTTF or resident agency 

office. 

While the ATAC in Oklahoma is conducting information sharing and 

various training sessions, the OIG found gaps in these efforts, especially with 

respect to remotely located state and local entities that were not members of 

the ATAC. We have corrected the report on page 91 to reflect that it was the 

sheriffs, not the police chiefs, who specifically told us they did not have contact 

with the ATAC in Oklahoma City, did not receive terrorism-related information 

from the ATAC, and stated they wanted more specific information on potential 

threats related to Oklahoma, and especially Enid and Woodward, Oklahoma. 

The OIG agrees that the ATAC in Alaska was coordinating efforts with the 

FBI, and had successfully merged with the state homeland security task force 

to minimize gaps and duplication. The example of Alaska demonstrates the 

extensive geographic barriers which the ATAC and the FBI must overcome to 

reach remote areas, an effort that requires coordination of resources. 

We request that when CTS, EOUSA, the FBI, and the USAOs develop a 

coordinated strategy to reach remote areas, they designate one agency to 

provide us a copy of the coordinated strategy by October 31, 2005. We believe 

this strategy should define the roles and responsibilities of each entity in 

implementing the strategy.

Recommendation 9: Resolved – Open. CTS and EOUSA should 

develop outcome-oriented performance measures for the ATAC program. The 

measures for the ATAC program could include the following: 

• Quality and timeliness of information shared with member and 

outside agencies that resulted in improved understanding of 

terrorism issues and improved prevention activities, 

• Quality and timeliness of training for members that resulted in 

improved understanding of terrorism issues and improved prevention 

activities, 

• Outreach efforts that resulted in increasing targeted membership, and 

• Quality and currency of threat assessments that resulted in improved 

prevention activities. 
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Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred that performance 

measures for the ATAC program would help the ATAC Coordinators ensure 

consistency and effectiveness in the quality of information sharing and training 

provided. However, EOUSA stated that performance measures should be 

developed by and tailored to the needs of each judicial district because it would 

be ineffective to use one standard measure for all ATACs to evaluate the 

success of the ATAC program. EOUSA recommended that ATAC performance 

measures be developed in each district as a part of the individual district’s 

training plan. The National ATAC Training Working Group will provide 

guidance to the ATAC Coordinators on suggested survey questions, including 

the factors recommended by the OIG, for use in evaluating the effectiveness of 

the ATAC program. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s plans for each USAO to develop its 

individual performance measures and for the National ATAC Training Working 

Group to develop evaluation questions are partially responsive to the 

recommendation. The OIG believes that EOUSA and CTS should develop 

standard performance elements across ATACs to measure the effectiveness of 

the ATAC program nationwide. While certain elements of the ATAC program 

should be consistent across USAOs, the particular criteria used to measure 

each USAO’s success on these elements could be different based on the various 

ATAC activities and how the program is operated in each judicial district. 

Please provide us the standard ATAC performance elements or measures by 

October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 11: Resolved – Open. CTS and EOUSA should 

jointly issue written guidance defining their roles and responsibilities in the 

ATAC program, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the Regional ATAC 

Coordinators, the National ATAC Coordinator, and the EOUSA point of contact 

for ATACs. This written guidance should be communicated to the ATAC 

Coordinators. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred with the 

recommendation. EOUSA and CTS will work together to develop guidance on 

the roles and responsibilities of CTS, EOUSA, and the EOUSA point of contact 

for ATACs. EOUSA plans to provide this guidance to all ATAC Coordinators. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s plan to work with CTS and develop 

guidance on roles and responsibilities is responsive to the recommendation. 

The Deputy Attorney General has formed a working group to develop guidance 

to clarify the roles and responsibilities of CTS, EOUSA, and the USAOs in the 

ATAC program with regard to oversight, monitoring, evaluating success, and 

enforcing compliance (see the ODAG’s response to Recommendation 10, which 
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the ODAG labeled “2”). Please provide us a copy of the joint EOUSA-CTS 

written guidance to the ATAC Coordinators by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 12: Resolved – Open. CTS or EOUSA should issue 

written guidance for ATAC Coordinators that includes a definition of roles, how 

to determine membership base, and how to structure and manage an ATAC. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred with the 

recommendation. EOUSA stated that each USAO should have flexibility in 

defining the role of the ATAC Coordinator and structuring and managing the 

ATAC to fit the needs of each district. EOUSA developed performance 

measures for the position of ATAC Coordinator and a copy of these measures 

will be sent to the U.S. Attorneys and ATAC Coordinators. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s plan for reviewing, revising, and issuing 

ATAC Coordinator performance standards to the USAOs and ATAC 

Coordinators is partially responsive to the recommendation. The updated 

performance standards should tie directly into the standard elements used to 

measure the overall ATAC program. Further, ATAC Coordinators need 

additional guidance on determining ATAC membership and structuring and 

managing an ATAC. EOUSA’s response did not address developing this 

guidance. Please provide us a copy of any revised ATAC Coordinator 

performance standards by 

October 31, 2005. Additionally, please provide us a copy of the written 

guidance to the ATAC Coordinators on membership, structure, and 

management for ATACs by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 13: Resolved – Open. EOUSA should strategically 

analyze the ATAC budget to assess the need for future funding. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that it will continue to strategically analyze the 

ATAC budget to assess the need for future funding as noted in EOUSA’s 

general comments on the report. In those comments, EOUSA stated that the 

FY 2005 appropriation included an enhancement for terrorism prevention and 

EOUSA is exploring options to use that funding to supplement the ATAC 

program. EOUSA further stated that it will continue to request funds in FYs 

2006 and 2007 to support the ATAC program. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s planned actions to potentially use FY 2005 

counterterrorism funds to supplement the ATAC program and to request ATAC 

funding in FYs 2006 and 2007 are partially responsive to the recommendation. 

To plan adequately for the ATACs’ future funding needs or to direct the ATAC 

program, the OIG believes that EOUSA should analyze the expenditures of each 
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USAO’s one-time allocation of $100,000 and whether the expenditures 

achieved their purposes, and solicit information from the ATACs on their 

funding requirements for improving information sharing, procuring 

communication items, conducting training, and attending terrorism-related 

meetings. Please provide us EOUSA’s plan for analyzing future ATAC funding 

needs by 

October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 14: Resolved – Open. ATAC Coordinators should 

regularly update and maintain accurate electronic rosters of the ATAC 

membership. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred with the 

recommendation and will request an electronic roster of ATAC members from 

each judicial district. EOUSA also will request that each USAO continue to 

maintain the roster. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s plan to request updated electronic rosters 

of ATACs’ members and continual maintenance of the rosters is responsive to 

the recommendation. Please provide us confirmation of EOUSA’s receipt of 

updated electronic rosters from each ATAC by October 31, 2005. Also, please 

provide us a copy of EOUSA’s plan for ensuring that the USAOs maintain 

updated electronic rosters of ATAC members by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 15: Resolved – Open. ATACs should meet at least 

quarterly, and ATAC Coordinators should periodically review and communicate 

the ATAC mission to members. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred that the USAOs 

should conduct ATAC meetings and periodically review and communicate the 

ATAC mission to members, but EOUSA did not agree that ATACs should meet 

at least quarterly. EOUSA stated that each USAO should determine, in its 

local ATAC training plan, the appropriate number of ATAC meetings as well as 

the most effective way to conduct the ATAC meetings. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s plan for individual USAOs to determine the 

frequency of and method for conducting ATAC meetings in their district 

training plans is responsive to the recommendation. The ATAC Coordinators’ 

individual training needs assessments of members could be used to determine 

the type and frequency of meetings and training. The intent of the 

recommendation to meet at least quarterly was to ensure that the USAOs were 

responsive to the communication requirements of ATAC members, but the 

suggested frequency was not a firm requirement. Please provide us copies of 
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the portion of each USAO’s ATAC training plan that addresses frequency of 

ATAC meetings by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 28: Resolved – Open. The ATAC Coordinators 

should work jointly with the state offices of homeland security and the state 

homeland security task forces to coordinate activities and to minimize 

duplication and gaps in terrorism-related information sharing and training. 

Summary of EOUSA’s Response: EOUSA concurred that the ATAC 

Coordinators should work jointly with the DHS to coordinate activities and to 

minimize duplication in information sharing and training. EOUSA stated that 

ATACs and Intelligence Research Specialists are making efforts to coordinate 

with the DHS. 

The OIG’s Analysis: EOUSA’s statement that outreach efforts are 

ongoing with the DHS is partially responsive to the recommendation. The 

recommendation is directed toward coordination of activities with the states. 

Please provide us a description of each ATAC’s efforts to coordinate activities 

with the state offices of homeland security by October 31, 2005. 
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APPENDIX XIV: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 

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APPENDIX XV: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION’S RESPONSE 

The OIG sent copies of the draft report to the FBI with a request for 

written comments on Recommendations 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 16 through 24. The 

FBI responded to the OIG in a memorandum dated May 17, 2005. The FBI 

concurred with all the recommendations and agreed to develop a national task 

force training plan and orientation program; finalize MOUs defining task force 

members’ roles and responsibilities; develop performance measures for the task 

forces and members; ensure adequate staffing, stable leadership, and other 

required resources for the task forces; assist the FTTTF in acquiring databases 

from other agencies; and develop a coordinated strategy with the USAOs to 

reach remote areas. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 2: Resolved – Open. The FBI should develop a 

national training plan for each task force that includes: 

 

• Responsibility for developing and managing the training plan and 

program, 

• Initial needs assessment, 

• Frequency of future needs assessments, 

• Development of minimum mandatory training standards and time 

frames for completion of training, including completion of the 

introductory training session within 90 days of joining the task force, 

• Required minimum annual training hours, 

• Target audience – training equities for FBI and non-FBI task force 

members, and 

• Responsibility for training notification to the field. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation that a national training plan should be developed for each 

task force. The FBI acknowledged that it does not currently have a training 

curriculum to ensure a standardized, minimum training program. 

The FBI stated that its Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and Training and 

Development Division offer various types of counterterrorism training and basic 

core function training, and that they have sponsored numerous JTTF national 

and regional working conferences. The FBI reported that in the past 21⁄2 years, 

approximately 3,000 JTTF personnel received FBI-sponsored training. The FBI 

also reported that it recently formed a unit within the CTD to identify and 
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assess the training and professional development needs of the CTD as well as 

to provide training on the skills and techniques needed to investigate terrorism 

successfully.103 The unit will be responsible for developing, executing, and 

monitoring a national training plan for the JTTFs and the NJTTF. The FBI 

anticipates that it will complete a draft national training plan for the JTTFs and 

NJTTF by September 2005. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The actions planned by the FBI to develop a national 

training plan with minimum training standards are responsive to the 

recommendation. Please provide us a copy of the final draft of the national 

training plan for the JTTFs, NJTTF, and FTTTF by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 5: Resolved – Open. The FBI should develop a 

formal, standardized orientation program for all new task force members and 

provide it within 30 days of the new member’s start date. Orientation should 

include: 

• FBI policies and procedures; 

• Access and use of the ACS system, IDW, and any other case 

management system; 

• Intelligence gathering versus criminal investigations; 

• Definition of task force member roles and responsibilities; 

• Roles of other Department terrorism task forces and other FBI units; 

• Sources of information and contact information for other 

organizations frequently used by the terrorism task forces (e.g., DHS, 

Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, U.S. Postal 

Service); and 

• Information sharing protocols. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation to develop a formal, standardized orientation program for all 

new task force members and to provide it within 30 days of a new member’s 

start date. The FBI reported that it has developed a short-term/immediate and 

mid-range plan for addressing orientation and training for newly appointed 

JTTF members. The FBI stated that on April 20, 2005, pending 

implementation of a formal national standardized orientation and training 

program, the CTD directed all JTTFs to immediately provide orientation and 

training to newly appointed task force members within their first year of 

 

103 The FBI reported that it modified the mission of the CTD training unit, originally 

formed in March 2004, and renamed the unit the Continuing Education and Professional 

Development Unit in April 2005. 
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service. Implementation of the structured orientation program is planned for 

early FY 2006. 

 

The OIG’s Analysis. The action planned by the FBI to develop a national 

standardized orientation program is responsive to the recommendation. Please 

provide us a copy of the program syllabus by October 31, 2005.

Recommendation 6: Resolved – Open. The FBI should finalize MOUs 

with all agencies participating on the Department’s terrorism task forces. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation to finalize MOUs with all agencies participating on the 

Department’s terrorism task forces. The FBI stated that since 1980, it has 

maintained MOUs with all state and local agencies that participate on the 

JTTFs and that currently it maintains 311 MOUs with these agencies. The FBI 

stated that it also established 13 MOUs with other federal agencies prior to 

September 2001. The CTD is currently updating all NJTTF and JTTF MOUs, 

which will incorporate post-September 11, 2001, issues such as polygraph 

requirements, information sharing policies, and length of commitment 

agreements. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The action planned by the FBI to update or finalize 

all MOUs is responsive to the recommendation. Please provide us a copy of the 

updated MOUs with all federal agencies participating on the JTTFs, NJTTF, 

and the FTTTF by October 31, 2005. Please provide written verification (in lieu 

of actual copies) of updated MOUs with all other state, local, and participating 

agencies on the task forces, by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 7: Resolved – Open. The FBI, CTS, EOUSA, and the 

USAOs should work jointly to develop a coordinated strategy to consistently 

reach remote areas. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation that the FBI, EOUSA, and the USAOs should work jointly to 

develop the coordinated strategy to consistently reach remote areas. The FBI 

stated that information sharing is one of its highest priorities. The FBI 

reported that it has already implemented several mechanisms as part of an 

overall strategy to ensure effective information sharing with all state and local 

law enforcement agencies and has additional initiatives in final development. 

The FBI also stated that the CTD is coordinating with the Directorate of 

Intelligence to produce a weekly FBI National Report that will be the “primary 

terrorism threat outreach bulletin” for law enforcement at the “for official use 

only/Law Enforcement Sensitive” classification level. The FBI also proposed 

using various law enforcement online services to deliver training and suggested 
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the continued use of LECC allocations to the USAOs and federal and state DHS 

money to fund coordinated outreach to remote law enforcement entities. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The information sharing with law enforcement in 

remote and rural areas already undertaken or planned by the FBI is partially 

responsive to the recommendation. We agree that information and intelligence 

sharing through online services, as well as liaison among the FBI field offices 

and resident agency offices and other government and law enforcement 

agencies within their jurisdictions, can be effective outreach efforts. However, 

as described in our report, outreach and information sharing efforts are not as 

effective or consistent in all jurisdictions, leaving some remote and rural areas 

without terrorism related information and training. The FBI’s response did not 

include methods on how to share information with smaller, rural local law 

enforcement agencies that have limited or no Internet access. 

We request that when CTS, EOUSA, the FBI, and the USAOs develop a 

coordinated strategy to reach remote areas, they designate one agency to 

provide us a copy of the coordinated strategy by October 31, 2005. We believe 

this strategy should define the roles and responsibilities of each entity in 

implementing the strategy.

Recommendation 8: Resolved – Open. The FBI should ensure its 

performance measures provide an effective means for determining the 

qualitative and quantitative accomplishments of the task forces and their 

members in fulfilling the Department’s counterterrorism strategy. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation. The FBI stated that the NJTTF already has presented a list 

of JTTF best practices to the JTTFs and that some of these practices are 

documented in FBI policy communications, thus making them mandatory. The 

FBI stated that it also is developing a web-based strategic management tool 

called the Comprehensive Operational Management Plan Advancing Specific 

Strategies (COMPASS). This application will provide information on specific 

goals, objectives, and performance outcomes for each FBI division at 

headquarters and in the field, and will track and collect progress on all 

objectives. Senior management will be able to access this information online at 

any time. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The actions taken or planned by the FBI – 

developing a JTTF best practices list and a strategic management tool 

(COMPASS) that monitors progress on all objectives – is partially responsive to 

the recommendation. We believe that the FBI needs to take additional steps to 

translate JTTF best practices into outcome-oriented performance measures 

that would determine the qualitative and quantitative accomplishments of the 
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task forces and their members in fulfilling the Department’s counterterrorism 

strategy. Once developed, the performance measures and the web-based 

application called COMPASS should enable the FBI to measure and track its 

progress in fulfilling the Department’s counterterrorism strategy. Please 

provide us a copy of the performance measures for the JTTFs, NJTTF, and 

FTTTF by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 16: Resolved – Open. The FTTTF should develop a 

plan to acquire and regularly update the required databases from other 

agencies. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation, stating that while it presently has a plan to identify and 

acquire datasets from other agencies, the need to establish MOUs and each 

agency’s limited resources affect the timing for receipt of the datasets and 

updates. The FBI also stated that it will continue to work toward obtaining full 

access to other agencies’ databases. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The action planned by the FBI toward obtaining full 

access to other agencies’ databases is partially responsive to the 

recommendation. The OIG found that the FTTTF has not acquired some 

needed datasets from outside agencies since 2002 and these acquisitions may 

require intervention by CTD executive staff. We also found that the FTTTF had 

difficulty obtaining requested datasets from some units within the FBI. For 

example, since July 2004, the TSC stopped providing the FTTTF with the 

Terrorist Watch List. Efforts by the FTTTF to resume receiving this list have 

been unsuccessful, and therefore the FTTTF requires assistance from CTD 

executive staff. Please provide us a copy of the plan to identify and acquire 

the datasets and updates that the FTTTF requires from other agencies and 

other FBI units by August 30, 2005. This plan should include strategies for 

overcoming identified obstacles to acquisition of datasets and the 

responsibilities of CTD (not FTTTF) executive staff for facilitating the 

acquisitions and updates. 

Recommendation 17: Resolved – Open. The FBI should identify and 

address the obstacles the FTTTF encounters in securing and regularly updating 

required databases from other agencies. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation, stating that where obstacles exist, they have been identified 

and are being addressed. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The FBI response that it has identified and 

addressed obstacles where they exist is partially responsive to the 
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recommendation. By August 30, 2005, please identify and list the specific 

obstacles in acquiring each dataset and the actions taken by CTD executive 

staff (not FTTTF staff) to overcome these obstacles in obtaining datasets from 

other agencies and from other FBI units. 

Recommendation 18: Resolved – Open. The FBI should identify and 

address the FTTTF’s unmet resource requirements for staff (FBI and other 

government agencies), space, and equipment. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation. The FBI acknowledged the unmet staff resource 

requirements for the FTTTF; however, it stated that previously unmet space 

and equipment requirements have been met since the FTTTF completed its 

move to its permanent location in 2005. The FBI stated that the current 

facility provides access to other agency participants’ home data networks, 

access to the FBINET for all cleared personnel with a need for access, and a 

modern data center to service the network and application requirements of the 

FTTTF.104 Additionally, the FBI has approved a proposal for a project that will 

provide secure access to the FTTTF data mart and analytical tools from any 

FBINET workstation. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The stated actions of meeting space and equipment 

requirements for the FTTTF are generally responsive to the recommendation. 

The FTTTF Director told the OIG that the FTTTF’s space and equipment 

requirements have been met with the move to its present location. However, 

since its inception, the FTTTF has been understaffed in terms of full-time 

personnel from the FBI and other government agencies. Please provide us the 

plan for meeting the additional staffing requirements of the FTTTF by August 

30, 2005. 

Recommendation 19: Resolved – Open. The FBI should ensure longterm, stable leadership, organizational structure, and housing for the FTTTF. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation. The FBI acknowledged instability in these areas during the 

FTTTF’s first 2 years of existence, but according to the FBI, it has addressed 

these problems. The FTTTF completed its move into its current facility in 2005 

and has no plans to relocate. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The action taken by the FBI in ensuring long-term, 

stable leadership, organizational structure, and housing for the FTTTF is 

 

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partially responsive to the recommendation. Although the current FTTTF 

Director has served for approximately 2 years, the longest serving of its four 

Directors, past instability in leadership directly affected the FTTTF’s mission. 

Future leadership stability must be assured due to the unique mission and 

functions of the FTTTF and its technology complexities. Please provide us a 

succession plan for ensuring long-term stable leadership of the FTTTF by 

August 30, 2005. 

Recommendation 20: Resolved – Open. The FTTTF should develop 

and implement a plan to improve awareness and understanding of its services. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation and reported that the FTTTF has taken steps to implement 

such a plan. The FTTTF currently provides briefings to visiting SACs and 

ASACs, and briefs new SACs, Legats, new assignees, NJTTF conference 

attendees, and outside law enforcement agencies. It is also scheduled to brief 

the Homeland Security and Information Sharing Conference in New Orleans in 

June 2005. The FTTTF has established a website on the FBI Intranet that will 

be replicated in part on SIPRNET.105 Also, the FBI has published an Executive 

Guide to provide a concise synopsis of FTTTF’s capabilities and how to request 

FTTTF’s support. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The actions of providing briefings, establishing a 

FTTTF website on the FBI Intranet, and publishing an Executive Guide are 

responsive to the recommendation. Please provide us a copy of the plan that 

the FTTTF is implementing (to include how often the briefings occur), the 

FTTTF’s website pages on the FBI Intranet, and the Executive Guide (including 

to whom the Executive Guide is issued) by August 30, 2005. 

Recommendation 21: Resolved – Open. The FBI should determine 

and allocate sufficient staff to effectively support the terrorism task forces. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI did not state whether it 

concurred with the recommendation. The FBI stated that it has “engaged in 

the determination and allocation of sufficient staff to effectively support the 

terrorism task forces.” The ADICs or SACs of the field offices are directly 

responsible for managing and allocating JTTF officers to effectively support the 

FBI’s counterterrorism mission. The ADICs or SACs annually report their 

staffing and operational requirements to FBI headquarters. In FY 2005, 

additional Special Agent resources were allocated to field offices and FBI 

headquarters. 

 

105 SIPRNET is the DOD’s Secret level classified information network. 
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Regarding analytical support, the FBI reported that all FBI field offices 

operate a Field Intelligence Group, primarily staffed with FBI Intelligence 

Analysts whose mission is to provide direct operational and strategic analytical 

support to JTTF officers. The FBI stated that on March 25, 2004, FBI 

headquarters established mandatory coordination requirements among all 

Field Intelligence Groups and the JTTFs. The ADICs or SACs of the field offices 

are directly responsible for managing and allocating Field Intelligence Groups 

to effectively support the FBI’s counterterrorism mission. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The intent of the recommendation is to promote 

sufficient analytical and administrative support staff to the JTTFs. The action 

taken by the FBI’s allocation of analytical support through the Field 

Intelligence Groups is responsive to the portion of the recommendation 

addressing analytical support. However, the FBI’s response does not address 

the lack of administrative support staff, which has resulted in task force 

officers being diverted from investigative duties to perform administrative 

tasks. Please provide us a response addressing how the FBI will ensure that 

JTTFs have adequate administrative support staff by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 22: Resolved – Open. The FBI should seek more 

stability in JTTF leadership. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation that it should seek stability in JTTF leadership but stated 

that the OIG report focused on FBI management staff rather than specifically 

on JTTF management staff. Regarding the report’s mention of the frequent 

rotation of some JTTF agents, the FBI stated that all FBI personnel, no matter 

what program, view the importance of following through on investigations as a 

priority. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The FBI is partially responsive to the 

recommendation in that it agreed to seek stability in JTTF leadership. 

However, the FBI did not state what actions it will take or how it plans to seek 

the stability. Additionally, the FBI erroneously concluded that the OIG report 

focused on various levels of FBI management but did not focus specifically on 

JTTF management such as JTTF SSAs and JTTF ASACs. 

 

To the contrary, this section of the report focused solely on the JTTFs’ 

management positions. All supervisory interviews conducted at the FBI field 

offices consisted of the entire JTTF chain of command: the JTTF SSAs, JTTF 

ASACs, and SACs. 

Some JTTF members told us of problems stemming from the turnover in 

JTTF leadership, including hampered communication, lack of direction, and 
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lack of coordination within the task force. Further, the St. Louis example cited 

in the report specifically identified JTTF leadership instability with six different 

JTTF SSAs, two JTTF ASACs, and three SACs in an 18-month period. The 

report described the negative effect that the frequent turnover in the St. Louis 

JTTF leadership had on JTTF investigations and operations. Please provide us 

a plan to ensure more stability in JTTF leadership by October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 23: Resolved – Open. The FBI should develop a 

plan and issue written guidance for the JTTFs on how to activate new JTTFs 

and move existing JTTFs to off-site locations. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI stated that it issued written 

guidance on January 30, 2001, and May 27, 2003, to all FBI field offices for 

submitting proposals for the formation of JTTFs. The FBI stated that the May 

27, 2003, guidance established an 11-point criterion for the activation of new 

JTTFs. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The FBI did not state whether it concurred with the 

recommendation. The intent of the recommendation was to address the FBI’s 

need for guidance to plan for and activate off-site locations for new and existing 

JTTFs. The May 27, 2003, guidance provides FBI field offices with guidelines 

akin to application guidelines. However, after the FBI approves a JTTF and the 

JTTF is moved to an off-site location (not in the field office or resident agency 

office space), there are no instructions or guidelines for activation of the new 

office space such as security requirements, information technology 

requirements, or infrastructure requirements. Consequently, significant delays 

in activating an off-site JTTF location can result. For example, because of the 

lack of written guidance on the necessary security equipment and other 

procedural requirements, the Spokane, Washington/Coeur d’ Alene, Idaho, 

JTTF paid 15 months rent for unoccupied office space. Please provide us a 

copy of the written guidance to plan and activate off-site locations for JTTFs by 

October 31, 2005. 

Recommendation 24: Resolved – Open. The FBI should ensure 

sufficient information technology connectivity needed to effectively support the 

terrorism task forces. 

Summary of the FBI’s Response. The FBI concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that the CTD supports JTTF funding requests for 

technology requirements such as Internet access, analog phone/computer 

lines, DSL, computers, and other supplies. The FBI stated that in September 

2004, all NJTTF members gained Internet access at their workstations. 

Additionally, the FBI stated that Internet connectivity is presently being 

addressed through the Office of Information Technology Program Management 
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and is being redesigned to produce a more stable network that will serve the 

JTTFs’ long-term operational needs. 

The FBI also listed various technology training sessions that it provided 

to JTTF members and included plans for providing access to new databases 

and systems. The FBI further stated that the creation of IDW and investment 

in iMap and Guardian were large steps forward in providing the JTTFs with the 

tools needed to complete its mission.106

The OIG’s Analysis. The actions taken by the FBI are partially 

responsive to the recommendation. While the FBI has made some technology 

advancements, including IDW, Guardian, and iMap, significant technology 

improvements are still needed. Moreover, the intent of this recommendation 

was to address the lack of information technology connectivity or upgraded 

information technology infrastructure available in JTTF work space. For 

example, JTTF members did not have Internet access at their desktops and 

had to perform investigative searches at the few workstations available with 

Internet access, thus disrupting their work and affecting productivity. 

Additionally, many task force members could not access their parent agencies’ 

databases from the task forces’ offices, requiring members to return to their 

parent agencies for database information, again disrupting work and affecting 

productivity. Please provide us a plan addressing how the FBI will improve 

information technology connectivity or information technology infrastructure 

available in JTTF work space by October 31, 2005. 

 

106 iMAP is a geospatial analytical tool used by JTTFs. 
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APPENDIX XVI: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT 

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APPENDIX XVII: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT 

ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE 

 The OIG sent copies of the draft report to the DEA with a request for 

written comments on Recommendations 25 and 26. The DEA responded to the 

OIG in a memorandum dated May 12, 2005. The DEA concurred with both 

recommendations and agreed to evaluate requests from the FBI for full-time 

participation on the JTTFs and to issue guidance to DEA agents who serve as 

members on or points-of-contact to the NJTTF and JTTFs. The DEA presented 

general comments about its support to the Department’s terrorism task forces 

and then addressed the recommendations. Our analysis of the DEA’s response 

follows. 

GENERAL COMMENTS 

Summary of the DEA’s Comments. The DEA stated that it works with 

the FBI and other law enforcement agencies domestically and internationally to 

identify and anticipate threats posed by the links between drugs and terrorism. 

The DEA also stated that, when requested by the Attorney General, it 

participates in the Department’s efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and cited 

the example of DEA’s participation during the 2004 election. 

 Specifically concerning the JTTFs, the DEA stated that it assigned fulltime members to selected JTTFs after September 11, 2001. However, over time 

the workload did not support the DEA’s full-time membership on the JTTFs. 

The DEA believed that it could meet the JTTFs’ requirements by assigning DEA 

agents as liaisons to the JTTFs, while allowing the same agents to conduct 

DEA’s drug-related investigations. The DEA stated that its agents, intelligence 

analysts, and other personnel are available to the JTTFs when needed. 

 The DEA further stated that it has consistently offered or responded to 

the FBI’s requests for assistance, and believed that the DEA’s temporary 

assignment of personnel to meet specific situations has been adequate. As 

evidence of its support, the DEA cited the absence of any examples in the OIG’s 

report of unresponsiveness by the DEA to the JTTFs. The DEA also stated that 

its Special Coordination Unit meets the needs of the counterterrorism 

investigative community by disseminating terrorism-related information to 

appropriate organizations outside of the DEA. 

 The DEA stated that it recognizes its investigative expertise benefits 

counterterrorism efforts, but that the DEA’s available resources must be 

balanced against the JTTFs’ requirements. Therefore, the DEA responded that 

it will continue to work with the FBI to determine optimal placement of 
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available full-time DEA personnel on JTTFs. However, at JTTF locations where 

drugs and terrorism are not linked or the DEA does not have sufficient 

resources to devote full-time personnel, the use of DEA liaisons to the JTTFs 

will continue. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The OIG believes that the DEA’s “liaison” approach 

does not adequately fulfill its long-term obligation to support the Department’s 

counterterrorism efforts through active membership on JTTFs. 

Notwithstanding the DEA’s stated responsiveness to specific requests for 

assistance from the FBI or the Attorney General, the absence of the DEA’s 

proactive daily presence on JTTFs is contrary to the Department’s vision for the 

task forces. The Department, in its Strategic Plan, views the JTTFs as forums 

that integrate law enforcement expertise from Department components and 

those of other federal, state, and local agencies. The JTTFs are critical 

elements of the Department’s strategy to prevent terrorism and investigate 

individuals who have committed, or intend to commit, terrorist acts in the 

United States.107 For prevention, the strategy is to “Multiply preventive efforts 

through increased representation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).” For 

investigation, the strategy is to “Utilize regional expertise in terrorism 

investigations with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.” Both strategies 

stress that “JTTF members are force multipliers in the war against terrorism” 

and “JTTFs bring the resources of multiple counterterrorism partners under 

one roof to investigate potential terrorist activities.” 

The DEA has withdrawn from membership on all but one JTTF. In 

contrast, the USMS and ATF have significantly increased their membership 

during the same period in keeping with the Department’s anti-terrorism 

strategies. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has devoted fulltime personnel to serve on JTTFs and other terrorism task forces. Like the 

DEA, all these organizations have limited resources, yet they have devoted fulltime resources to the Department’s terrorism task forces. The OIG believes 

that the DEA must do the same. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Recommendation 25: Resolved – Open. The DEA should increase its 

full-time membership on the JTTFs and work with the FBI to assess the 

optimum locations for new DEA members. 

 Summary of the DEA’s Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that “Should the FBI determine that it would be 

 

107 Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2003-2008, U.S. Department of Justice , Goal I, Prevent 

Terrorism and Promote the Nation’s Security, pages 2.10, 2.11, 2.14, and 2.15. 
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appropriate for DEA Special Agents or other personnel be assigned full time to 

work at JTTFs, the FBI should notify the DEA of that request, including the 

location and number of personnel requested.” The DEA agreed to “carefully 

evaluate any specific FBI requests for additional personnel in conjunction with 

the affected field offices as to the DEA resources available and the feasibility of 

full time assignment at the designated locations.” 

 The OIG’s Analysis. The DEA’s planned action to work with the FBI in 

determining placement of full-time DEA members on JTTFs is partially 

responsive to the recommendation. In its 2003-2008 Strategic Plan, the 

Department already has determined that DEA membership on JTTFs is 

required. Furthermore, as indicated in our report, the FBI has expressed a 

strong desire for the DEA to provide full-time members on the JTTFs. The FBI 

stated that DEA’s membership would enhance intelligence sources and 

information sharing and ensure that the JTTFs consistently receive timely 

information on drug cases with links to terrorism. Liaisons from the DEA, the 

FBI told us, are not the same as task force members who work side-by-side 

with other JTTF members on cases, providing immediate access to members’ 

expertise and parent agencies’ databases. The OIG recommends that the DEA 

coordinate with the FBI to develop a joint plan to increase DEA full-time 

membership on terrorism task forces. We ask the DEA to provide us that joint 

plan by August 30, 2005. 

Recommendation 26: Resolved – Open. The DEA should issue 

written guidance that defines the roles and responsibilities of its JTTF and 

NJTTF members and points of contact. 

 Summary of the DEA’s Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that the “DEA will prepare and transmit a teletype 

that defines the established role and responsibilities of DEA Special Agents 

assigned as full-time members or points-of-contact to the JTTFs and the 

NJTTF. Guidance will also be included in the teletype that indicates DEA 

Special Agents assigned to JTTF’s [sic] as full-time members or points-ofcontact are responsible for having up to date contact information for other 

members of their respective task forces.” 

The OIG’s Analysis. The DEA’s planned action to transmit a teletype 

defining the role and responsibilities of DEA task force members and points of 

contact is responsive to the recommendation. We believe that prior to 

issuance, the DEA should coordinate its teletype with the FBI to ensure that it 

adequately reflects the roles and responsibilities of full-time JTTF members. 

Please provide us a copy of the teletype by August 30, 2005. 
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APPENDIX XVIII: THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY’S RESPONSE 
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APPENDIX XIX: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY’S RESPONSE 

The OIG sent copies of the draft report to the Department of Homeland 

Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS ICE) with a request for 

written comments on Recommendation 27, which concerns the DHS but is 

directed to the Deputy Attorney General for action. Although the report 

addressed issues related to the management and operations of the Department 

of Justice’s task forces and advisory councils, a variety of issues regarding the 

DHS ICE were implicated by our review. Therefore, the OIG provided the DHS 

ICE a copy of the draft report for its review. The DHS ICE responded to the 

OIG in a memorandum dated May 18, 2005. The DHS ICE did not state 

whether it concurred with Recommendation 27, but provided extensive 

comments about its significant resource contributions to the task forces. 

GENERAL COMMENTS 

The DHS ICE stated that the draft report highlighted important 

coordination issues and other areas where improvements should be made. 

However, the DHS ICE expressed concern that the report relied on outdated or 

inaccurate information and requested that several areas in the report be 

modified to reflect the significant resources provided by the DHS ICE to 

support the Department’s terrorism task forces and the related logistical and 

financial challenges. 

Mission Statements. The DHS ICE requested that the OIG reword the 

mission statements for several DHS ICE components. 

 The OIG’s Analysis. The OIG has revised the mission statements for the 

DHS ICE agencies using the requested language. 

GAO Report. The DHS ICE requested that the OIG remove excerpts 

from a GAO report “Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in 

Transforming Immigration Programs.” The DHS ICE stated that it has made 

significant changes since the GAO issued that report and that the GAO report 

did not refer to the DHS ICE’s direction to the DHS ICE JTTF agents. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The GAO report was one source in support of the 

OIG’s conclusion that the DHS ICE did not provide DHS ICE JTTF members 

with needed direction. Our conclusion was based on interviews with DHS ICE 

JTTF agents and supervisors and survey results from randomly selected JTTF 

members that included DHS ICE agents. 
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The GAO’s findings were based on interviews with officials in CBP, CIS, 

and DHS ICE field offices nationwide and included interviews with managers, 

supervisory investigators, and investigators in the DHS ICE. The GAO report 

assessed the status of three areas within DHS, one being the integration of 

immigration and customs investigators in the DHS ICE. Some of the findings 

in the GAO’s report included: confusion about roles and responsibilities, lack of 

uniform policies and procedures, and inappropriate administrative 

assignments. While the GAO report did not specifically address direction to 

DHS ICE JTTF agents, the same agents who conduct immigration or customs 

investigations serve on the JTTFs. Therefore, the GAO findings have affected 

all agents within the DHS ICE field offices, including those DHS ICE agents 

assigned to JTTFs. 

DHS stated that it has made significant changes since the GAO report 

was issued in October 2004. If true, these changes should aid DHS ICE JTTF 

agents. However, we believe that that the report accurately describes the 

conditions that existed at the time of our field work. 

Contradictory Guidance to DHS ICE JTTF Members. The DHS ICE 

requested that we delete the example of the DHS ICE agent on the St. Louis 

JTTF who was pulled off all intelligence cases for 3 months based on an 

outdated 1999 MOU prohibiting such casework. The DHS ICE stated that the 

incident occurred 2 years ago, was a one-time incident, and should therefore 

not be used as an example of contradictory guidance being sent to DHS ICE 

JTTF agents. The DHS ICE also stated that it has no record of a June 2003 

memorandum forbidding DHS ICE agents from working on intelligence cases. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The report’s St. Louis example was the most vivid of 

several examples cited to us by DHS ICE JTTF agents regarding confusion and 

lack of direction from DHS ICE management. The example demonstrated the 

effect such lack of guidance can have on a DHS ICE agent’s work and the 

JTTF’s investigations. The e-mail (not memorandum) in question, written by a 

DHS ICE Program Manager, referred to as the JTTF Regional Coordinator 

(working title), was sent to two DHS ICE officials on June 4, 2003, with a copy 

to the DHS ICE JTTF agents effected. The e-mail was listed as “Priority: 

Urgent” and states as follows: 

Date: 6/4/2003 

Sender: [ICE JTTF Regional Coordinator - name omitted] 

To: [2 ICE NSU/HQ officials – names omitted] 

cc: [3 JTTF ICE Agents – names omitted] 

Priority: Urgent 

Subject 199 cases 
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. . . I have personally spoken to JTTF agents/supervisors at St. 

Louis, Kansas City and San Antonio regarding the existing MOU 

between the FBI and us, and bullet point number 3 contained 

therein relative to Intelligence cases (199) . . . . [A]ll have reviewed 

the MOU and indicated that they will make the appropriate 

adjustments in order to fully comply . . . . [A]dditionally, I have 

offered my assistance if any issues arise from the host agency in 

making these adjustments . . . . .108

regards 

 

 [initials of ICE JTTF Regional Coordinator omitted] 

While the position of DHS ICE JTTF Regional Coordinator no longer 

exists, a DHS ICE employee informed us that all JTTF members in the Central 

Region of the country (there were three regions at the time) reported to the DHS 

ICE JTTF Central Regional Coordinator who authored the e-mail. The DHS ICE 

JTTF member stated, “When the Regional Coordinator sent something, you had 

to comply.” 

While the example we cited involved only one agent in one office, the 

effect on terrorism investigations can be felt nationwide when an agency 

provides confusing and contradictory managerial direction to JTTF members. 

This direction from a DHS ICE Regional Manager – sent in writing to DHS ICE 

JTTF agents in three states prohibiting their participation on intelligence cases 

– was followed by a DHS ICE headquarters executive stating it was never the 

agency’s intention to prohibit DHS ICE JTTF agents from participating on 

intelligence cases. Further, the citing of this outdated 1999 MOU between the 

INS and the FBI also supports the case for updating all JTTF MOUs to reflect 

post-September 2001 changes. 

Lack of Cross-Training for DHS ICE in Immigration and Customs 

Matters. The DHS ICE stated that the section of the report on cross-training 

DHS ICE personnel in immigration and customs matters should be removed 

because the August 2004 data is outdated. The DHS ICE has increased its 

number of Special Agents and Supervisors who have been cross-trained since 

that time. 

 

108 Bullet point number 3 referred to in the e-mail states as follows: “FBI supervisors 

will not assign INS agents to conduct routine FBI intelligence (199) cases.” The bullet point is 

from an ICE/INS document titled “Policy Highlights of the [1999] JTTF Memorandum of 

Understanding Between the INS and the FBI.” 
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The OIG’s Analysis. The OIG has retained this section of the report and 

updated the training statistics for DHS ICE agents and supervisors who were 

provided cross-training to reflect March 2005 statistics. 

Insufficient DHS ICE Staff Detailed to the JTTFs and the FTTTF. 

The DHS ICE requested that this section of the report be reworded to more 

accurately reflect the significant support provided by the DHS ICE to the 

Department of Justice’s task forces. The DHS ICE stated that most of the 

agents in any office would argue that more personnel, resources, and 

equipment are needed, but they are not always aware of competing resource 

demands. The DHS ICE also stated that there were only five open DHS ICE 

JTTF cases at the Omaha ICE Resident Agent-in-Charge’s office, which 

indicates that the number of DHS ICE personnel assigned to the Omaha JTTF 

is more than sufficient to cover the caseload. 

The DHS ICE also stated that the OIG erred in partially attributing the 

increase in DHS ICE JTTF agents to the addition of the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) to DHS ICE because the FPS joined DHS ICE prior to November 

2003. 

The DHS ICE stated that the OIG report did not recognize its significant 

support to the FTTTF. The DHS ICE stated that the Law Enforcement Support 

Center’s (LESC) temporary duty assignments to the FTTTF ended because the 

data searches required by the FTTTF can be more efficiently and effectively 

conducted by Law Enforcement Technicians from the LESC in Vermont, and 

that the FTTTF was informed it could contact the LESC directly for any queries 

and investigative support. The DHS ICE further stated that the FTTTF 

continues to have 24-hour direct access to all DHS immigration data systems 

through the LESC, whose information and turn-around time would be the 

same as if the LESC’s Law Enforcement Technicians were onsite at the FTTTF. 

Additionally, the DHS ICE summarized the LESC’s accomplishments in 

support of the JTTFs and the FBI, and cited the system the DHS ICE provided 

recently to the FTTTF that enables FTTTF members to directly access the USVISIT and SEVIS databases. 

The OIG’s Analysis. We revised the report to reflect the DHS ICE’s 

increased membership on the JTTFs, and have deleted reference to the lack of 

support from the LESC. Regarding the increases in the number of DHS ICE 

positions on the JTTFs, the OIG report stated that the increase of 110 full-time 

and 20 part-time DHS ICE positions to the JTTFs between November 2003 and 

October 2004 could be partially attributed to the Federal Air Marshals (58) and 

the Federal Protective Service (30) who were already JTTF members at the time 

these two agencies were assimilated into the DHS ICE. We obtained this 

information directly from DHS ICE. However, the DHS ICE stated that because 
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the Federal Protective Service joined DHS ICE in March 2003, its personnel 

should be removed from this figure. The OIG has revised this section of the 

report to state that the increase of 130 DHS ICE positions was partially 

attributable to 58 Federal Air Marshals who were already JTTF members (then 

under TSA) at the time the agency was assimilated into the DHS ICE. Because 

the number of JTTFs increased from 86 to 100 JTTFs during this time frame, 

the FBI could not verify whether the remainder of the DHS ICE staff increases 

(72) resulted from the overall increase in the number of JTTFs or the 138 

additional positions requested in the NJTTF’s needs assessment submitted to 

the DHS ICE in November 2003. 

Regarding DHS ICE’s statement that the small number of open DHS ICE 

JTTF cases in Omaha justifies the number of DHS ICE personnel assigned to 

the Omaha JTTF, the number of open cases is not fully reflective of the amount 

or type of work that DHS ICE agents perform daily on the JTTFs. Since 

information provided during our review indicated that many terrorism cases or 

queries have an immigration nexus, we found that DHS ICE agents receive 

numerous daily requests for information directed to DHS ICE agents, which 

required that they devote hours searching databases, receiving and making 

numerous phone calls to obtain information, or interpreting immigration/DHS 

ICE regulations and procedures for other task force members. Additionally, 

DHS ICE agents may be assigned to interview subjects before a case becomes 

“open,” and in some situations may never become “open.” 

 

Assignment of Non-JTTF Tasks to DHS ICE JTTF Members. The 

DHS ICE agreed that all agencies should make reasonable efforts to ensure 

that their JTTF members are not assigned non-JTTF tasks, but stated that this 

recommendation should be addressed to all agencies participating on the 

JTTFs. 

The OIG’s Analysis. While all agencies should make reasonable efforts to 

ensure that they do not assign non-JTTF tasks to their JTTF members, only 

DHS ICE JTTF members raised that issue during our site visits, which 

included interviews with JTTF members from state, local, and other federal 

(non-FBI) agencies as well as DHS ICE JTTF members. 

RECOMMENDATION 

Recommendation 27: Resolved – Open. The Deputy Attorney General 

should work jointly with DHS officials to ensure: 

• Sufficient DHS participation on the Department’s task forces, 

• Sufficiently trained DHS ICE members on the task forces and their 

supervisory chain of command, 
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• Non-task-force related assignments to DHS members are minimized, 

and 

• Updated MOUs defining roles and information responsibilities 

between the FBI and DHS. 

Summary of the DHS ICE’s Response. The DHS ICE stated that the 

report did not reflect the significant resources it already provided to the JTTFs. 

The DHS ICE stated that it is second only to the FBI in terms of the numbers of 

its participants on the Department’s task forces and therefore has a significant 

interest in ensuring its resources are used in an efficient and effective manner 

that contributes to the important mission of the JTTFs. The DHS ICE has 

personnel assigned to other FBI terrorism task forces, such as the FTTTF, 

ITOS, TFOS, and NJTTF as well as personnel assigned to the CIA. The DHS 

ICE stated that the FBI has declined to assign any personnel to DHS ICE 

counterterrorism or intelligence units at DHS ICE headquarters. The DHS ICE 

also stated that it has increased its presence at CBP’s National Targeting 

Center by a factor of four allowing DHS ICE to be operational 24 hours a day, 7 

days a week to address terrorist-related lookouts and other issues. The DHS 

ICE reported that as a result of its partnership with the National Targeting 

Center, DHS ICE JTTF agents responded over 935 times to various ports of 

entry to interview and take appropriate action to persons arriving at ports who 

were matches or potential matches to those listed on the national terrorist 

watch list. 

The DHS ICE stated that JTTFs have expanded to more than 100 

locations in a short period of time and some are in remote locations where DHS 

ICE may not have an established office and where the workload would not 

support a full-time DHS ICE position. 

The OIG’s Analysis. The OIG has revised the DHS section of the report to 

include updated information about ICE’s participation on the JTTFs. However, 

at almost every field site visited, DHS ICE employees raised ICE managerial 

issues that they believed affected their efficiency or effectiveness on the task 

force 

The DHS ICE stated that the report cited only anecdotal comments from 

task force agents regarding the need for additional DHS ICE staff. However, 

FBI field supervisors and managers and officials at FBI headquarters also cited 

the need for additional DHS support on the task forces. This information from 

interviews also was supported by survey responses of randomly selected JTTF 

members nationwide, who indicated that more task force members with 

immigration and customs expertise are needed. From our analysis of the 

qualitative data from our interviews and survey, we concluded that the DHS 
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ICE should increase its membership on the JTTFs with personnel cross-trained 

in immigration and customs matters. 

Additionally, as stated in the report, at the request of DHS, the NJTTF 

conducted a critical needs assessment of staffing by querying the JTTF field 

supervisors on how many DHS ICE agents were needed on each JTTF. The 

results showed 159 full-time and 22 part-time DHS ICE agents on 86 JTTFs in 

November 2003, and that JTTF supervisors requested an additional 138 fulltime DHS ICE agents – a proposed increase of approximately 45 percent. As of 

October 2004, the number of JTTFs had increased to 100 and DHS ICE JTTF 

task force members had increased by 110 full-time and 20 part-time members. 

When we interviewed DHS ICE officials, they informed us that they had 

requested an analysis of DHS ICE’s participation on the terrorism task forces 

to determine where and how many personnel were assigned and where the 

DHS ICE will gain the most benefit. 

Although the DHS did not state whether it concurred with the 

recommendation, it is considered “Resolved – Open” since the recommendation 

is directed to the Deputy Attorney General to work jointly with DHS officials to 

ensure that the intent of this recommendation is carried out. The Deputy 

Attorney General, in his response, stated, “. . . as DHS and we jointly 

undertake to implement and execute the National Response Plan and other 

related Homeland Security policies and programs, we will work with our 

colleagues at DHS to ensure effective participation of DHS components on the 

JTTFs.”