DNN Sentinel

in this issue:

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for d n n s e n t i n e l can be sent

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Vol. I, No. 1

 defense by other means

us department of energy (doe)

national nuclear security administration (nnsa)

defense nuclear nonproliferation (dnn) ENERGY National Nuclear Security Administration 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

3 DNN Organization 

Looks to the Future

4 Nuclear Smuggling 

Detection and 

Deterrence—Integrating 

Detection and Law 

Enforcement

6 Field Training Exercises 

Promote Counter 

Trafficking Coordination 

with Interagency 

and International 

Partners

8 Small Business 

Innovation Contributes to 

Monitoring—No Batteries 

Required

9 Three Consortia Improve 

Links between Basic 

and Applied Research

10 New Academy is a 

Work of ART

11 DNN Involvement 

Across the Complete 

Supply Chain Supported 

Successful Shipment to 

Sri Lanka

13 DOE/NNSA Plays 

Significant Role in 

International Safeguards 

Symposium 

15 Facilitating the Safe, 

Secure, and Peaceful 

Use of Nuclear Energy 

in Algeria

Welcome from 

the Deputy 

Administrator 

Dear Friends, Supporters, and Colleagues –

Welcome to the inaugural issue of DNN’s newsletter, 

DNN Sentinel. DNN is proud of its mission, work, 

and people. We will publish DNN Sentinel three times in 2015 and hope 

to publish quarterly in 2016. Our goal is to keep you current on DNN’s 

work in Material Management and Minimization (M3), Global Material 

Security (GMS), Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC), and Research 

& Development (R&D). We look forward to sharing the important and 

innovative work we carry out with our domestic and international partners 

and also will feature the special contributions that the DOE laboratories, 

plants, and sites make to global nuclear nonproliferation.

This inaugural issue of DNN Sentinel comes at a time of exciting transition 

at DNN. With an eye toward the future, DNN implemented its organizational realignment plan on January 1, 2015. The new organizational vision 

was produced by the DNN team, and we are confident that DNN is now 

better positioned to meet the current, enduring, and emerging nonproliferation and security challenges while ensuring improved organizational 

flexibility and responsiveness.

Thank you for your continued support and engagement. We hope that 

you will find DNN Sentinel stimulating and informative and welcome your 

comments and suggestions at DNNOutreach@nnsa.doe.gov.

Best wishes,

Anne Harrington

Deputy Administrator

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
2

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DEFENSE NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION (DNN) 

deputy administrator

anne harrington

principal assistant deputy

administrator

dave huizenga

OFFICE OF GLOBAL 

MATERIAL SECURITY (GMS)

assistant deputy administrator

art atkins

associate assistant deputy

administrator

elly melamed

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SECURITY

RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY

NUCLEAR SMUGGLING 

DETECTION AND DETERRENCE

OFFICE OF DNN 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

(DNN R&D)

assistant deputy administrator

rhys williams

associate assistant deputy

administrator

edward watkins

PROLIFERATION DETECTION

NUCLEAR DETONATION 

DETECTION

OFFICE OF MATERIAL 

MANAGEMENT AND 

MINIMIZATION (M3)

assistant deputy administrator

pete hanlon

associate assistant deputy

administrator

vacant

CONVERSION

NUCLEAR MATERIAL REMOVAL

MATERIAL DISPOSITION

NONPROLIFERATION 

CONSTRUCTION/PROGRAM 

ANALYSIS

OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION 

AND ARMS CONTROL (NPAC)

assistant deputy administrator

kasia mendelsohn

associate assistant deputy

administrator

vacant

NPAC POLICY

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SAFEGUARDS

NUCLEAR CONTROLS

NUCLEAR VERIFICATION

The New DNN

Find us on the web at 

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/

ourprograms/nonproliferation-0
3

DNN 

Organization 

Looks to the 

Future 

I

n early 2014, there was no RussiaUkraine crisis, no Ebola outbreak in 

Africa, and ISIL had not emerged 

as a major force in the Middle East. 

Events like these demonstrate that the 

unexpected has, in some important 

ways, become the new normal. 

Because proliferation and security 

threats continue to evolve, the ability to 

respond must evolve as well. Effective 

January 1, 2015, the Office of Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) 

realigned its functions to create a more 

flexible, responsive, and agile organization that can adapt to both enduring 

and emerging threats. 

“Through our Over the Horizon study in 

2012 and our ongoing analysis, we’ve 

taken a hard look at evolving threats to 

national security, DNN’s core competencies, and opportunities where 

we can take a proactive leadership 

role,” said Anne Harrington, Deputy 

Administrator for DNN. “By undertaking 

this realignment, we have positioned 

DNN to stay relevant well into the 

next decade. Our new functionallybased structure clearly describes our 

priorities: Material Management and 

Minimization (M3), Global Material 

Security (GMS), Nonproliferation and 

Arms Control (NPAC), and Research & 

Development (R&D).”

The Over the Horizon study that 

informed the realignment drew on a 

broad range of sources and methods, 

including literature searches, community workshops, program issue briefs, 

structured interviews with subject 

matter experts, and peer review meetings. The study highlighted ongoing 

challenges, such as state-sponsored 

proliferation, nuclear materials that 

are not fully secured, and transfer of 

dual-use technologies to name just 

a few. As we have seen with additive 

manufacturing, new challenges can 

quickly become enduring parts of 

the landscape, with the likelihood 

that future transformative events will 

continue to alter the national security 

landscape. 

“The Over the Horizon process has 

confirmed that DNN’s mission is 

enduring and our core competencies 

are and will remain fundamental to 

how the U.S. Government responds to 

emerging nonproliferation and nuclear 

security challenges,” Harrington said. 

“But response to dynamic threats 

requires a more dynamic organization.” 

With the realignment, offices are organized by function, enabling synergy 

among subprograms. In addition, there 

are no offices with a single mission 

that focuses solely on one region or 

country. As a result, the offices are 

better able to prioritize resources to 

address the diverse threat spectrum. 

Although the organizational architecture is now different, previous DNN 

programs have not been terminated, and budgets were not affected 

because of this realignment. 

The timing of the January 2015 

realignment took advantage of other 

simultaneous changes within NNSA. 

“Through the end of calendar year 

2014, the NNSA and DNN leadership 

met with key stakeholders interested 

in our realignment—within DOE and 

NNSA, at OMB and the National 

Security staff at the White House, on 

Capitol Hill, and with our scientific and 

technical partners in the DOE complex,” Harrington said. “We received 

strong support, and our new structure 

already is getting positive reviews.” 

DNN’s Core Competencies

• Remove, eliminate and minimize 

the use of proliferation-sensitive 

materials;

• Safeguard and secure nuclear and 

radiological materials, technologies 

and facilities; 

• Detect and prevent the illicit 

trafficking of nuclear/radiological 

materials, technology, information 

and expertise;

• Provide R&D technology solutions 

for treaty monitoring, minimization 

of the use of proliferation-sensitive 

materials, and the application of 

safeguards and security; and

• Provide unique technical/policy 

solutions and develop programs/

strategies to reduce nuclear/

radiological dangers.

DNN Staff on the Move

Among the other changes at DNN, most of the staff will soon have a new home just up the 

street at the Portals III building located at the intersections of Maryland Avenue, 12th Street, 

and D Street in Southwest, Washington, DC. Our front office staff will remain in the DOE 

Headquarters Forrestal building on Independence Ave.
4

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Nuclear Smuggling Detection 

and Deterrence—Integrating 

Detection and Law Enforcement

By Erik Deschler 

Beginning in 2009, what is now the Nuclear Smuggling 

Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) program (formerly 

Second Line of Defense) partnered with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to provide partners with a 

“Radiation Detection Investigative Techniques (RDIT)” course 

designed to enhance the capabilities of international law 

enforcement agencies to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit 

trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials. RDIT 

emphasizes the importance of integrating law enforcement 

investigative skills into radiation detection operations by 

focusing on the use of NSDD-provided mobile radiation 

detection systems through scenario-based field training 

exercises. NSDD and the FBI enjoy a strong partnership and 

have jointly delivered 18 courses to partners with the most 

recent course delivered in Tajikistan in September 2014.

To address multiple trafficking scenarios, NSDD deployed 

mobile detection systems, including vans, backpacks, and 

handheld equipment, to Tajikistan and conducted training on 

the operation and maintenance of this equipment. After Tajik 

authorities gained some experience with the use of these 

systems, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and FBI 

trainers conducted a RDIT course to provide more hands-on 

training with the mobile detection systems through the 

use of scenario-based field exercises. Twenty participants 

from the Tajik agencies—including the Customs Service, 

Prosecutor General’s Office, Ministry of Interior, Nuclear 

Radiation Safety Agency, and Committee on Emergency 

Situations and Civil Defense—participated in this training. 

The training was held at the Customs Practical Exercise 

Training Area facility, which was donated by the U.S. 

Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border 

Security (EXBS) program in January 2014. This training was 

part of an integrated interagency capacity-building strategy. 

The training facility provides a variety of venues for enhanced 

weapons of mass destruction detection and interdiction 

training, including a land border crossing with a secondary 

inspection area; an airport passenger and baggage scanning 

area with operational baggage belts, X-ray machines, and 

metal detectors; and a full-scale functional commercial 

passenger aircraft. 

Customs officers search vehicle for radioactive sources.
5

The RDIT training made use of this facility as participants 

worked through three scenarios selected in coordination 

with the Tajik stakeholders: 1) a “green” border crossing 

with radioactive material, 2) an interior public roadway 

interdiction, and 3) an operation to seize material during an 

exchange between a buyer and a seller. During the first two 

scenarios, participants set up a mobile van at a simulated 

border crossing and roadside point to detect and interdict 

illicit nuclear materials crossing the border. Participants 

operated the vans, detected materials, established secondary inspection areas, interviewed suspects, and conducted 

detailed vehicle searches. The final capstone scenario 

presented training participants with prior law enforcement 

information that smugglers intended to bring nuclear 

material to a soccer match and transfer that material to 

another group, who would assemble it into a radiological 

dispersion device (RDD) and take it to an airport for delivery 

by aircraft to its target. Participants set up discrete entry 

checkpoints using vans and backpacks and used metal 

detectors in conjunction with handheld radiation detectors 

at the entrance of the soccer stadium. They also collected 

evidence, establishing one team to search a makeshift shop 

that was suspected as the location for assembling an RDD 

and another team to search the cabin of an aircraft. 

Feedback from the Tajik participants was very positive. The 

training helped participants understand the various smuggling scenarios that could occur, enhanced their readiness to 

respond to these types of scenarios, and improved internal 

coordination among the various Tajik agencies that would be 

involved in a smuggling response. 

Looking forward, the new NSDD intends to continue its partnership with the FBI to support similar training opportunities 

for other partners. Through this partnership, NSDD is able to 

more effectively enhance the capabilities of international law 

enforcement agencies to deter, detect, and interdict 

illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials. 

Erik Deschler began working with NSDD in 2002 and currently 

is engaged in overseeing its mobile detection efforts to provide 

mobile and man-portable radiation detection equipment to foreign 

law enforcement agencies. Mr. Deschler holds a Master’s Degree 

in International Security Studies from the Josef Korbel School of 

International Studies, University of Denver.

Packeye backpack and other handheld devices were used to locate and identify sources in an aircraft.
6

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Many NSDD-developed exercise scenarios are based on actual incidents 

of material out of regulatory control encountered by partner countries. 

Such incidents are reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency 

Incident and Trafficking Database by Member States. The database contains 

information on 2,477 confirmed incidents from 1993 to 2013, including 

unauthorized possession and related criminal activities (424), theft or loss 

(664), and other unauthorized activities and events (1,337). 

One of NSDD’s earliest exercise collaboration efforts was with the Republic 

of Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. The exercise focused on mobile 

detection technologies. NSDD began working with a number of countries 

in 2012 to develop and deliver detection and interdiction exercises. Since 

then, NSDD has worked with Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Mexico, Poland, 

Romania, Slovakia, Thailand, and Ukraine to plan and conduct exercises.

Field Training Exercises Promote Counter 

Trafficking Coordination with Interagency 

and International Partners

By Richard Pappas

DNN’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence 

(NSDD) program (formerly Second Line of Defense) 

has developed tabletop and field training exercises as 

a key component of its efforts to sustain NSDD-provided radiation detection systems. Practical exercises have proven to 

be effective in maintaining a state of readiness for combating 

illicit trafficking. With NSDD collaboration, partners design, 

develop, and deliver field exercises that provide realistic test 

of radiation detection systems, alarm response procedures, 

and operator skills and knowledge. Effectively designed 

exercises that employ real-life scenarios help to identify both 

strengths and deficiencies in the operation, maintenance, 

and management of a country’s nuclear security measures. 

They are a proven methodology for continuously improving 

response while enhancing operational readiness for a wide 

range of hazards and emergencies.

When preparing for exercises, one size certainly does not

fit all. NSDD actively collaborates with the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO) to adapt proven and practical exercise guidance 

materials and a series of capacity-building activities. The 

goal is to customize tools to enable partners to develop a 

robust radiation detection exercise program. A step-by-step 

progressive approach has proven successful: 1) a practical, 

hands-on tutorial workshop is conducted to provide the 

framework and tools for the design, development, and 

delivery of exercises; 2) classroom training is immediately 

reinforced by developing and delivering a partner country’s 

own national or regional exercise event within six to nine 

months of the workshop. This approach currently is being 

piloted with partners in Armenia, Djibouti, Kenya, and 

Slovakia—and will be refined throughout FY 2015. The 

inaugural exercise tutorial workshop was successfully 

conducted in September 2014 at the DOE Hazardous 

Material Management and Emergency Response (HAMMER) 

training center in Richland, Washington.

In addition to coordinating with DNDO, NSDD has worked 

closely with the Department of Defense’s Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, Department of State’s Export Control 

and Related Border Security and WMD Terrorism offices, 

Exercises Provide 

Training for a 

Real-World Risk
7

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, the European Commission 

Joint Research Centre, and the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 

on a variety of exercise events. The 

goal of these partnerships is to 

develop and promulgate clear and 

consistent guidance to NSDD partners 

that will promote the long-term, routine 

application of exercises as a tool for 

the sustained operation, maintenance, 

and management of radiation detection systems. 

Richard Pappas coordinates workshops 

and exercises for NSDD and has been 

with the program for more than 12 years, 

four years as a DOE employee. He holds 

a Doctorate Degree in Physics from Ohio 

University.

Exercise tutorial held at HAMMER with six countries in 2014.

Left: Field exercise with Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2012. Right: Field exercise with Thailand Customs in 2013.
8

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Small Business Innovation Contributes 

to Monitoring—No Batteries Required

DNN’s Research and Development program (DNN 

R&D) improves U.S. national security through the 

development of advanced capabilities that support 

foreign nuclear weapons proliferation monitoring, nuclear 

detonations monitoring, and nuclear security. 

Stakeholders who benefit from these advanced capabilities 

include other offices within NNSA, other U.S. government 

agencies, and private industry, as well as international 

organizations, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty Organization and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, which leverage these promising technologies via 

DNN R&D’s sister organization, Nonproliferation and Arms 

Control (NPAC).

In some cases, DNN R&D reaches out to small business 

for solutions to pressing technical concerns. DNN R&D 

formally supports such joint venture opportunities for small 

businesses and nonprofit research institutions via the Small 

Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business 

Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, which help bridge the 

gap between performance of basic science and commercialization of resulting innovations. 

In one recent case, Dirac Solutions Inc. (DSI), a five year-old 

small business start-up located in Pleasanton, California, 

played a key role in improving technology for safeguard 

applications. DNN R&D sponsored an SBIR project to 

develop secure, passive, battery-free radio frequency 

identification (RFID) tags integrated with fiber-optic seals 

and sensors in support of international safeguards, arms 

control, and waste management and storage needs. For 

this project, DSI partnered with principal investigators 

from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to 

significantly improve reliability of a state-of-the-art seal and 

sensor by automating the inspection processes in safeguard 

applications. Normally in safeguard applications, most seal 

technologies lack real-time remote monitoring capabilities 

from a safe distance and require visual inspection. Seals that 

can be remotely monitored also usually require batteries. 

The DSI-LLNL innovation is revolutionary in that the seal status and sensor data can be monitored from a safe distance 

without relying on batteries. The RF tag and seal encrypts 

and authenticates wireless data that reports the state of 

the physical seal that cannot be intercepted or spoofed by 

malicious adversaries and addresses data security problems 

such as the “man-in-the-middle.” 

DSI’s testing of the seal and sensor has highlighted potential 

areas for expanded capabilities, such as increased reader 

range or added sensor technologies, including for movement, radiation, and temperature. DSI also is developing 

an optional wall-mountable battery back-up system, which 

would provide power to the readers in order to ensure 

interim tag-and-seal monitoring in the event of a facility-wide 

power failure. One of the objectives for this partnership 

with DSI is to enable the inexpensive reproduction of these 

tag-and-seal sensors when produced in large quantities. 

LLNL researcher attaching an RFID tag to a container used in a 

technology demonstration.
9

Nuclear Science 

and Security 

Consortium

Lead University

Members

• Michigan State University • UC-Davis • UC-Irvine • UC-San Diego • University of Nevada, Las Vegas

• Washington University in St. Louis

Consortium for 

Nonproliferation 

Enabling Capabilities

Lead University

Members

• University of Michigan • Purdue University • University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign • Kansas State University • Georgia Tech

• North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State 

University

Consortium for 

Verification Technologies

Lead University

Members

• Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology • Princeton University • Columbia University • North Carolina State University • University of Hawaii

• Pennsylvania State University

• Duke University

• University of Wisconsin

• University of Florida

• Oregon State University

• Yale University

• University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Three Consortia Improve 

Links between 

Basic and Applied 

Research

DNN’s Research and Development program (DNN 

R&D) directs an integrated research and development 

portfolio in support of its mission to detect signs of 

nuclear proliferation and nuclear detonations. DNN R&D 

leverages the unique facilities and scientific skills of the NNSA 

nuclear security enterprise, other DOE national laboratories, 

academia, and industry to perform research, conduct 

technology demonstrations, and develop operational 

systems and their prototypes in support of this goal. 

As a critical part of its strategy of investing in the next 

generation of nuclear security experts, DNN R&D administers 

a university program constructed as three complementary 

university-national laboratory consortia. These consortia 

link basic research capabilities in academia with the applied 

research capabilities of the national laboratories, and in doing 

so, introduce students to career possibilities at the national 

labs while providing education in areas of great importance 

to the nonproliferation mission. The consortia have strong 

links to minority-serving institutions, are funded as five-year 

grants, and are viewed as sizeable, long-term investments. 

The Nuclear Science and Security Consortium 

(NSSC) supports the core set of experimental 

disciplines that support the nation’s nonproliferation 

and nuclear security mission: nuclear physics, 

nuclear chemistry, nuclear instrumentation, and 

nuclear engineering. 

The Consortium for Nonproliferation Enabling 

Capabilities (CNEC) develops technologies to 

enhance simulation capabilities, algorithms, and 

modeling; new test and evaluation models for detection sensors; new remote sensing capabilities; and 

applications of big data analytics and data fusion/

management technologies to better characterize and 

detect special nuclear materials. Additionally, CNEC 

develops radiological source replacement technology 

research and development to reduce the risk of 

radiological or nuclear proliferation incidents. 

The Consortium for Verification Technologies 

(CVT) focuses on analytics for improving nuclear 

safeguards effectiveness and the ability of the U.S. 

Government to verify nuclear arms control treaty 

obligations. Objectives include considerations of core 

technical challenges associated with these areas, 

such as geophysical modeling for the detection of 

underground nuclear detonations to support test 

monitoring.

All three consortia include student and early-career research 

fellowships and have long-term objectives aimed at building 

expertise in several technical areas relevant to nuclear security technology and policy. Research results are incorporated 

readily into university curricula and management plans 

are in place to allow students, faculty, and researchers to 

work unencumbered across organizational boundaries of 

the academic and governmental facilities engaged in their 

proposed consortium. 

As Deputy Administrator Harrington aptly sums up, 

“Developing the R&D expertise of tomorrow can take years 

to cultivate, but we are linking national laboratories and 

academia by funding the next generation of researchers to 

perform complex research and gain an understanding of 

technical challenges in areas of major importance for the 

nuclear nonproliferation mission that can only be garnered 

first-hand at the national laboratories.” 
10

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

New Academy 

is a Work of ART

By Eric Swanson

T

he NNSA Alarm Response Training (ART) course is 

a proud new homeowner—well, a new owner of an 

old home. The NNSA program recently completed 

renovations to an existing facility within the Y-12 National 

Security Complex, which saved roughly $5M in new 

construction costs. ART celebrated its move to a new location with an October 23, 2014 ribbon-cutting ceremony that 

featured NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Anne Harrington.

The purpose of the ART course is to train on-site radiation 

safety and security experts, local law enforcement officers, 

and other personnel on how to respond to a security 

incident involving nuclear or radiological materials. Since its 

inception in 2009, ART has trained over 3,400 personnel 

from 44 states and 18 countries. 

Until now, ART has held its table-top and live-action 

exercises in a Manhattan Project-era facility that once 

housed the site’s medical center. ART Program Manager 

Toby Williams had been hoping to move to a newer facility 

for some time when a frozen pipe burst, forcing a quick 

extraction from “Old Medical.”

“We looked at possibly constructing a new facility for our 

global security training programs,” Williams said, “but as we 

considered the cost of constructing a new facility, budget 

constraints, and being good stewards of taxpayer money, 

we looked around the site for a facility that would closely fit 

our needs. There was no need to spend additional money 

when we had something that was close enough and could 

be repurposed.” That facility is now the Alarm Response 

Training Academy, a permanent home for the growing ART 

program. 

“This course offers a unique opportunity for the responsible 

parties from sites that maintain radiological sources to come 

together to understand the response challenges, as well as 

develop and practice their own response tactics,” Williams 

said. “After two days of classroom instruction, our expert 

trainers facilitate live-action scenarios so participants can 

test their newly gained knowledge in this environment.”

The ART course is a key component of the DNN nuclear and 

radiological security program, which works domestically with 

volunteer sites such as hospitals, universities, industry, and 

state and local governments to install sustainable security 

enhancements for high-priority nuclear and radiological 

materials. Many of the props and equipment used by the 

program were donated by industry vendors, increasing the 

The Alarm Response 

Training Academy 

officially celebrated its 

new location at the Y‐12 

National Security Complex 

Thursday, October 23, 

2014. On hand to cut the 

ribbon were (pictured 

from left) Teresa Robbins, 

NNSA Production Office 

Acting Assistant Manager 

for Environment, Safety, 

Health and Quality; Anne 

Harrington, NNSA Deputy 

Administrator, Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation; 

and Morgan Smith, 

Chief Operating Officer, 

Consolidated Nuclear 

Security.
11

At the time of the ribbon cutting at 

the new training academy, a team 

from Sri Lanka was there to further 

its own tactics, techniques, procedures, and protocols for responding 

to a theft and/or sabotage event 

involving risk-significant nuclear 

and radiological materials. See our 

next article to learn the role earlier 

DNN training played in the safe and 

secure shipment of a highly radioactive material to Sri Lanka.

authenticity of the training environment. 

Y-12’s 70 years of experience securing 

and protecting nuclear materials made it a 

natural fit to host the training. 

“National Security is the foundation of the 

NNSA and Y-12 missions,” Williams noted. 

“This new training academy will help us 

take the ART program to a higher level 

of excellence and continue to highlight 

the Y-12 site’s experience in addressing 

security challenges.”

At the ribbon-cutting ceremony, Harrington 

highlighted the continuing need for this 

and other DNN efforts. “Nuclear and 

radiological terrorism is a threat that affects 

us all. It is one of the greatest threats 

to national and global security, and the 

Alarm Response Training program directly 

addresses this threat,” she said. “Reducing 

the risk of radiological or nuclear terrorism 

requires an organized approach that brings 

together officials and responders from 

the federal, state, local, and facility levels. 

NNSA is able to utilize its unique expertise 

and technical resources to partner with 

local communities and other agencies to 

make our cities safer here and around the 

world.” 

Eric Swanson is an editor and writer at the 

Y-12 National Security Complex. He holds a 

master’s degree in English from the University 

of Tennessee.

DNN Involvement Across 

the Complete Supply Chain 

Supported Successful 

Shipment to Sri Lanka

By Randy Howell

Shipping hundreds of thousands of curies of cobalt-60, a highly 

radioactive isotope used for bulk sterilization, from Canada to 

Sri Lanka is a big undertaking—and a big target of opportunity 

for terrorists on the hunt for dirty bomb material. Instead, DNN training, assistance, and technology sharing with Sri Lanka was able to spur security 

awareness across the entire supply chain, resulting in the safe and secure 

transport of the material.

Over the last two years, personnel from DNN’s radiological security 

program have been working intensively with the regulatory authority 

of Sri Lanka—the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA)—and the country’s 

Special Task Force (STF), a paramilitary anti-terrorism group, to develop 

procedures for responding to security incidents involving radioactive 

sources. During an April 2014 training course, DNN learned of an upcoming shipment of cobalt-60 and discussed how to ensure the hundreds 

of thousands of curies were being properly protected en route to the 

site from the port. The material was bound for Ansell Lanka, a company 

approved to use cobalt-60 to sterilize products such as medical and 

industrial gloves. 

Realizing more needed to be done to prepare for the shipment, STF took 

over. Its unique role in dealing with some of the most difficult challenges 

of Sri Lanka’s long civil war and the specific experience of its head trainer, 

who spent time with the United Nations peacekeeping force in South 

Sudan, led the STF to quickly create and establish a Radiological Security 

Incident Response Team (RadSIRT). 

Building on training received from DNN, commanders with the STF and 

representatives of AEA convened to offer an intensive course to members 

of the RadSIRT. They were given the background and information necessary for their unique mission: ensuring high-activity sources are protected 

in transit and responding to any security incident involving radioactive 

materials. In addition, instructors from Sandia National Laboratories and 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory facilitated an exercise hosted by Ansell 

Lanka with participation from the STF, RadSIRT, and other agencies.

The RadSIRT was fully prepared when the cobalt-60 arrived on a cargo 

vessel in July 2014. It had coordinated with the AEA to have a team 

with radiation monitoring equipment present and with Customs to 

DNN Involvement Supported Shipment to Sri Lanka, Page 12
12

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

ensure expedited unloading of the container. The Customs 

personnel manning the DNN-supplied radiation detection 

portal monitors were expecting the shipment and saw the 

radioactive signal when the truck exited the port. The escort 

team was waiting in a convoy of official vehicles just outside 

the port gates.

The lead cars cleared a path through the heavy Colombo 

traffic, with an armed response team and radiation monitoring vehicle following close behind. The trip was not far, but 

there were a variety of chokepoints along the way, with traffic 

police strategically positioned to ensure a smooth flow for 

the convoy. Safely and securely, the material made it to the 

irradiation facility—which also received assistance from DNN 

to improve its security—and was provided with additional 

site security while the sources were swapped during the 

subsequent hours.

After the material was loaded into the irradiator facility, the 

shipping container was to be sent back to Canada with 

some of the old cobalt-60 material. Taking advantage of 

an opportunity to test a prototype technology, the DNN 

team worked with the Sri Lankan authorities, the supplier, 

and the shipper to get permission to install and test a new 

tracking and ingress detection system. With the new system, 

everyone involved could track where the container was, 

when it was handled, and even remotely provide access to 

customs or port officials, as needed. 

AEA Deputy Director Dr. Anil Ranjith stated to the Sri Lankan 

Sunday Observer that setting up the RadSIRT was a great 

achievement for the country and that it also will enable 

industrial activities related to the radiological field, boosting 

the country’s economy. 

Through the rapid reaction to a perceived threat and enabled 

by comprehensive DNN assistance and training, Sri Lanka 

successfully demonstrated its commitment to robust source 

security management—and the value of DNN assistance.

Although the cobalt-60 shipment is complete, DNN’s 

collaboration with Sri Lanka continues, as demonstrated 

by the delegation that participated in the Alarm Response 

Training course at its new training academy (see previous 

article). Inviting them to the course held at Y-12 provided an 

opportunity to show how DNN has institutionized the type of 

training deliverered in Sri Lanka to prepare for last summer’s 

shipment and to help ensure the country has a good basis 

for similar shipments in the future. 

Randy Howell is the former project manager for radiological security 

projects in China and South Asia, previously with the Office of 

Former Soviet Union and Asian Threat Reduction within the former 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative. He managed that portfolio and 

did similar work in Central Asia for the better part of six years. He 

now supports the Mo-99 subprogram in DNN’s Office of Material 

Management and Minimization.

DNN Involvement Supported Shipment to Sri Lanka 

- Continued

The members of Sri Lanka’s RadSIRT prepare for the shipment 

by creating an escort plan and discussing temporary site security 

measures.

RadSIRT members providing security during transport of the high 

activity radioactive sources from the port to the site.
13

DOE/NNSA Plays 

Significant Role 

in International 

Safeguards 

Symposium 

By Melissa Einwechter 

Every four years, the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

convenes experts from around the 

world at its Symposium on International 

Safeguards in Vienna, Austria. The most 

recent symposium, held in October 2014, 

focused on the theme “Linking Strategy, 

Implementation, and People.” 

The symposium’s opening plenary session 

featured remarks from IAEA Director 

General Yukiya Amano and a keynote 

address by DNN Office of Nonproliferation 

and Arms Control Assistant Deputy 

Administrator Kasia Mendelsohn. 

In her remarks to the 700 symposium 

participants, Ms. Mendelsohn complimented the IAEA for its efforts to 

implement strengthened safeguards to 

address ever-increasing challenges to the 

nonproliferation regime. “More than ever,” 

she stressed, “IAEA safeguards are an essential element of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and of international efforts to 

verify the peaceful uses of atomic energy.” 

Mendelsohn thanked the Secretariat 

for going to “extraordinary lengths over 

the last year to explain how safeguards 

implementation has evolved, particularly at 

the level of the state as a whole.” 

While discussing the challenges posed 

by the greater availability of proliferationsensitive information and the growing 

number of countries with nuclear activities, 

DOE/NNSA Plays Significant Role, Page 14

“Safeguards 101”

What are international safeguards? 

International safeguards comprise a set of technical measures to verify 

that a State’s nuclear material is accounted for and not diverted to 

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to provide 

credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material 

and activities, in accordance with the terms of the State’s bilateral 

safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

These measures include, for example, on-site inspections, nuclear 

material accountancy, facility design information verification, containment using tamper-indicating tags and seals, surveillance, and 

environmental sampling. 

Why are safeguards necessary?

The peaceful uses of nuclear material include such applications as 

electricity generation, seawater desalination, the mapping of underground aquifers to improve groundwater management and investigate 

contamination events, the diagnosis of and treatment for cancer, and 

the control and eradication of disease-bearing insects. Unfortunately, 

some of the nuclear materials employed for these applications—and 

the facilities used to produce them—also can be applied for the 

production of nuclear weapons. 

With its unique access to nuclear expertise, facilities, and information, 

the IAEA is in a critical position to reassure the international community 

that Non-Nuclear Weapon States are not diverting nuclear material 

from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapon programs. A robust IAEA 

capability to verify peaceful activities and to detect and investigate 

clandestine programs can reduce States’ incentives to develop nuclear 

capabilities as a strategic hedge against an uncertain future. By the 

same token, confidence in the IAEA safeguards system can help 

encourage the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, thereby helping to 

meet growing global energy requirements.

How do National Laboratories contribute to international 

safeguards?

DOE/NNSA relies heavily on the policy and technical expertise resident 

in the National Laboratories to strengthen and sustain the international 

safeguards system. National Laboratories are essential partners in 

conducting policy studies, contributing to IAEA guidance documents, 

providing trainers to help other countries improve their safeguards 

infrastructures, fielding improved facility safeguards tools and technologies, and preparing the next generation of safeguards professionals 

through courses, seminars, and hands-on work experiences.
14

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

she encouraged symposium participants to consider and 

identify options to help the IAEA, as appropriate, find the 

best possible technologies, procedures, and practices for 

safeguards implementation. 

Mendelsohn talked in detail about U.S. contributions to 

the IAEA safeguards system, including the U.S. Support 

Program (USSP) to IAEA Safeguards and DOE/NNSA’s Next 

Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). In this context, she 

summed up her remarks by urging the assembled experts 

at the symposium to work together “to make real progress 

on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, strengthening 

safeguards, and preventing proliferation.”

DOE/NNSA Laboratory and Headquarters representatives 

presented 43 of the 237 oral presentations featured during 

the four day event. A number of the 91 DOE/NNSA poster 

presentations received awards for best poster, presentation, 

or content. In addition, DOE/NNSA representatives chaired 

or co-chaired seven technical sessions featuring topics 

such as nondestructive assay measurements, training and 

education in nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards, new 

trends in the application of statistical methods for safeguards, challenges in spent fuel verification, and safeguards 

by design. 

Overall, the symposium provided an opportunity to build 

awareness and understanding of the important accomplishments of DOE/NNSA and the national laboratories to 

DNN Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assistant Deputy 

Administrator Kasia Mendelsohn delivered the keynote address 

at the 12th IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards held in 

October 2014.

DOE/NNSA Plays Significant Role - Continued

NNSA is pleased to introduce its first edition of Prevent, Counter, and Respond—

A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2016–FY 2020) (NPCR). 

The NPCR report, which will be issued biennially with annual updates, describes 

NNSA’s strategic approach to reducing nuclear and radiological dangers in a 

dynamic and complex global environment. 

Download the full report online at:

http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/dnn/npcr

strengthen the international safeguards system and set the 

stage for continued progress in the future.

Visit the 2014 IAEA Safeguards Symposium website at 

http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/home/

index.html to see a six-minute video of conference highlights. 

Melissa Einwechter (née Scholz) is the federal program manager for NGSI Concepts and Approaches, NGSI Human Capital 

Development, and for the implementation of IAEA safeguards within 

the DOE complex. She is the recipient of the 2014 Linton Brooks 

Medal for Dedication to Public Service.
15

Nuclear Energy in Algeria, Page 16

Facilitating the Safe, Secure, 

and Peaceful Use of Nuclear 

Energy in Algeria

By Sean Dunlop

I

n 2014, DOE devoted an increasing amount of attention to its bilateral relationship with counterparts in the 

People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria. Secretary Ernest 

Moniz met with Algerian Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi on 

three separate occasions between June and September: 

first at the Algiers International Trade Fair, then during the 

U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, and finally on 

the margins of the General Conference of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. In addition to 

facilitating commercial cooperation on the development of 

oil, gas, and renewable energy resources, DOE is interested 

in accelerating collaborative efforts to ensure that Algeria’s 

growing civil nuclear program develops in a manner that 

is consistent with the highest standards of nuclear safety, 

nuclear security, and nonproliferation and can potentially 

serve as a model for other nuclear newcomer countries.

Algeria currently operates four civil nuclear research centers, 

which include two research reactors, a pilot facility for 

converting yellowcake to ammonium diuranate and ammonium uranyl carbonate and fuel fabrication, and institutes 

for education and training in nuclear engineering and nuclear 

security. Algeria’s future plans include modifying the NUR 

Research Reactor both to enable commercial radioisotope 

production using low-enriched uranium and to develop the 

capacity needed to implement a nuclear power program, 

potentially as early as 2025. Building upon the success of 

its initial engagement efforts, DOE is now poised to help 

facilitate a comprehensive program of technical exchange on 

a broad range of nuclear-related topics.

In 2007, DOE and Algeria’s Commissariat à l’Energie 

Atomique (COMENA) signed an arrangement for information 

exchange and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear 

energy. Under this framework, DOE and COMENA successfully completed a five-year technical cooperation 

project in radiation protection, radiobiology, and medical 

physics. This included a joint assessment and evaluation of 

training, procedures, equipment, regulatory requirements, 

and organizational structure related to COMENA’s existing 

programs, as well as focused training in radiation safety, 

radiation control, and dosimetry. DOE and COMENA 

continue to cooperate on projects initiated in 2012 on quality 

assurance and quality control and integrated management 

systems as well as on enhancing the implementation of 

international nuclear safeguards in Algeria, including through 

technical preparations to implement the Additional Protocol.

Last year, DOE and COMENA agreed to expand bilateral 

cooperation in the peaceful uses of energy by initiating 

three new multi-year projects in reactor safety, nuclear and 

radiological security, and nuclear forensics. DOE plans to 

help COMENA run modeling and simulation calculations for 

criticality safety and burnup in a way that is consistent with 

U.S. export control requirements and help develop project 

concepts and identify potential service providers for safety 

analysis of the NUR Research Reactor. DOE and COMENA 

also plan to design a training program incorporating the 

latest international recommendations on physical protection 

of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the security 

of radioactive sources and form a working group to help 

meet the needs identified in Algeria’s IAEA Integrated 

Nuclear Security Support Plan. Finally, DOE plans to work 

with COMENA to conduct a joint needs assessment and 

establish a working-level training program that enhances 

COMENA’s nuclear forensics capacity, including its ability to 

play a technical role in responding to nuclear material found 

out of regulatory control.

This enhanced cooperation is a key part of DNN’s regional 

engagement strategy. Several countries in North Africa, SubSaharan Africa, and the Middle East have plans to develop 

nuclear power for the first time and maintain active civil 

nuclear research programs. With its diversity of facilities and 

the significant resources it is investing in its nuclear training 

centers, Algeria is an ideal host for regional training courses. 

In June, COMENA hosted an IAEA regional training course 

on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear 

material and non-destructive assay, for which DNN provided 

technical and financial support. 
16

Possibilities for additional regional training opportunities 

already are being discussed.

It is always nice for DNN to have its efforts publicly 

acknowledged by foreign partners, and Algeria did just that 

during its plenary statement at the IAEA General Conference 

in September 2014. Minister Yousfi stated, “Algeria wishes 

to reiterate its support for the authority of the IAEA as an 

institution duly authorized for verification, as well as for 

the universalization of its safeguards as an effective tool 

for nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. As such, 

we highly appreciate the contribution made in this area in 

recent years by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and 

the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the 

Department of Energy of the United States of America.”

DNN is pleased to be able to provide this support and looks 

forward to the prospects for broader and deeper cooperation with its Algerian counterparts in the months and years to 

come. 

Sean Dunlop is a program analyst contracted by the Office 

of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. He is a graduate of the 

Monterey Institute of International Studies and has held various 

positions within the Department of Energy since 2010.

Visit us!

Nuclear Energy in Algeria - Continued

After meeting with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika on the margins of the 47th Algiers International Trade Fair in 

June 2014, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and Minister of Energy Youcef Yousfi gave statements to the press.