DNN Sentinel

in this issue:

Vol. II, No. 3

 defense by other means

u.s. department of energy

(doe)

national nuclear security administration

(nnsa)

defense nuclear nonproliferation

(dnn) National Nuclear Security Administration 

3 A Perfect Fit: Customizing 

the New Radiological 

Alarm Response 

Training Course

4 CTBT at 20: Strong 

U.S. Support for 

International Nuclear 

Explosion Monitoring 

and Verification

5 Universities Partner with 

Los Alamos for a Unique 

Hands-On Experience

6 Innovation: Training 

Kits with Simple Props 

Help Teach Safeguards 

Principles Outside 

Nuclear Facilities

8 Convert, Remove, 

Dispose: The Roads 

to HEU Minimization

10 R&D Improves Ability to 

Geo-Locate the Origin 

of Nuclear Materials

11 Expert Profile: 

Rilla Hamilton

12 Adding Uniqueness to 

Safeguards with Cylinder 

Identification

13 New Group of Fellows 

Join DNN for 2016–2017 

Year

14 Country Profile: Japan

16 FAQs: IAEA and 

Nuclear Safeguards

ENERGY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

From the Deputy 

Administrator

When people ask me what I like best about being 

DNN’s Deputy Administrator, the answer is easy: 

the hundreds of dedicated professionals who devote 

their time, energy, and expertise to making the world a safer place. 

A recent one-month period brought into sharp focus just how diverse 

and creative our nuclear nonproliferation community is. 

At Washington State University (WSU) in Pullman, WA, I had the 

opportunity to interact with students and professors, as well as visit 

laboratories – including the research reactor that DNN had converted in 

2008-2009 from highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched fuel. I was 

already aware of some of the nonproliferation work done there, but was 

fascinated to see the extensive shock physics lab and to learn about 

contributions that this lab is making to NNSA’s stockpile stewardship 

efforts. WSU has many links to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

(PNNL), and during my stop at PNNL, we discussed the importance of 

those university links, as well as the need to nurture and mentor new 

generations of professionals entering the national laboratory system. 

While at PNNL, I also had a chance to join a meeting (via VTC) at the 

University of Michigan of the Consortium for Verification Technology 

(CVT), one of three consortia supported by the DNN R&D program. CVT 

includes some of the world’s best universities (with six of the 13 con-

sortium members in the top 25 of the QS World University Rankings). 

It focuses its science and technology capabilities on contemporary 

nonproliferation challenges, and it was exciting to hear the accomplish-

ments of the past year and the plans for the future.

From Washington State, I traveled to New Mexico where Sandia 

National Laboratories (SNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 

were hosting a nuclear security exchange with a senior delegation from 

Argentina. While at SNL, we signed a new memorandum of understand-

ing with Argentina’s Department of Energy and Mining to further our joint 
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DNN SENTINEL: 

DEFENSE BY OTHER MEANS

VOL. II, NO. 3

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/

ourprograms/nonproliferation-0

Editor-in-Chief

Anne Harrington

Editorial Board

Sid Bartlett

Andrew Brown

Tara Chandra

Jaci Dickerson

Erika Hunsicker

Cassandra Peterson

Evan Thompson

John Wengle

Meghan Wool

Editorial Advisors

Corey Hinderstein

Andrew Hood

Editor

Elaine Specht

Graphics 

Mike Crew

Sarah Kaukeinen

Visit us!

Email us at DNNOutreach@nnsa.doe.gov 

to request to be added to the mailing list.

work on advancing nuclear and radiological security. I then joined colleagues 

at LANL to officially open a new exhibit at the Bradbury Museum on LANL’s 

50 years of contributions to international safeguards. While at LANL, I also 

met with a truly outstanding group of women lab leaders, who manage major 

elements of work at the lab.

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was next. There we hosted a 

delegation of a dozen senior diplomats to show how we have transformed our 

former nuclear test site into a center of science that maintains a safe, secure 

and effective nuclear stockpile without nuclear explosive testing, and supports 

advances in nonproliferation science and technology. The feedback from the 

participants was overwhelmingly positive and confirmed that visits like this 

can make a real contribution to understanding each other’s challenges and 

perspectives. 

Then, it was on to London to meet with colleagues from the UK and France to 

discuss how we can further cooperate on nuclear security and related issues 

aimed at keeping nuclear materials and capabilities out of the hands of terrorists. While in London, I was honored to be the first woman invited to give the 

Vincent Briscoe Security Lecture, an annual event at Imperial College London.

The last milestone in my one-month tour was a meeting of the DNN Lab 

Science Council. Several years ago, a small group of senior lab representatives 

responsible for their respective global security programs met with DNN leadership to explore whether a mechanism for bringing us all together, at a strategic 

level, several times a year would be useful. Several years into the process, the 

group has identified the need for joint work in a variety of areas from identifying 

cyber risks specific to the nuclear nonproliferation mission, to how best to 

manage program travel-related risk, to how to develop more effective metrics 

for training and education programs. In each case, the efforts are co-led by lab 

and headquarters staff, whose efforts have resulted in practical and actionable 

recommendations. 

When I reflect on this four-week whirlwind, I also have to recognize that these 

were just the highlights. At the same time, preparations were underway to 

support the Secretary and Administrator at the December IAEA International 

Conference on Nuclear Security, transition materials were being finalized for a 

new Administration, and countless other taskings were being managed every 

day. And none of this happens without the work of a remarkable team, from 

scientists at the labs, site and field office staffs, travel and support personnel, 

fellows, the DNN program staffs, colleagues in other offices across DOE and 

NNSA, to our whole network of international partners. It is humbling to be a 

part of this extended family and as we approach the end of the year, I want to 

express my deepest gratitude to all for what you do.

Anne Harrington

Deputy Administrator

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

2

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Mailing List!

Letter from the Deputy Administrator – Continued

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3

A Perfect Fit: Customizing 

the New Radiological Alarm 

Response Training Course 

DNN’s Office of Radiological Security (ORS) within the Office of Global 

Material Security has developed the Customized Alarm Response 

Training (cART), a one-day tailored version of its three-day, in-resident 

Alarm Response Training course. 

Working in close cooperation with police officers from around the country, ORS 

designed the one-day cART so that local authorities can incorporate specific facility, site, and city information into a course that prepares local law enforcement 

officers and security personnel to respond to an attempted theft or intentional 

misuse of radiological materials of concern. The course is designed to be taught 

by local law enforcement officers with assistance from ORS partner sites in their 

community. To prepare the police officers who will serve as instructors, ORS also 

has developed a two-day cART “Train-the-Trainer” course. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved the cART course, which 

is now listed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency/National Training 

and Education Division State/Federal Sponsored Course Catalogue as DOE003-PROT, an awareness-level course. With cART approved by DHS and listed 

in the course catalogue, municipal law enforcement partners can request DHS 

grant funds to offset any local costs, such as overtime pay, incurred when teaching the course. DHS approval of the cART Train-the-Trainer course is pending.

Municipal police agencies in the United States that agree to undertake cART 

assume a city-wide responsibility for training their patrol officers. Current ORS 

cART partners include:

• City of Philadelphia and University of Pennsylvania 

Police Departments

• University of Cincinnati Police and University of Cincinnati

• Los Angeles County Sheriff and University of Southern 

California and University of California Los Angeles 

Medical Centers

• Washington DC Metro Police Department and 

Georgetown University and George Washington 

University and Hospital

To date, these ORS municipal police partners have conducted nine cART 

classes for 154 police officers and police dispatchers. In addition, the New York 

Police Department agreed to implement cART and a Train-the-Trainer course in 

fall 2016.

The customized version of the Alarm 

Response Training course incorporates 

information from local facilities and is 

taught by trained local law enforcement 

officers.

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4

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

CTBT at 20: Strong U.S. Support for International 

Nuclear Explosion Monitoring and Verification

On September 24, 1996, the United States was 

the first nation to sign the Comprehensive 

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), making clear the 

U.S. commitment to halt the development of advanced 

nuclear weapons capabilities and stop the spread of 

nuclear weapons programs worldwide. Today, a total of 

183 countries have signed and 166 have ratified the Treaty, 

pledging to not carry out any nuclear explosions. Eight 

remaining “Annex 2” countries, including the United States, 

need to ratify the Treaty before it enters into force. When 

the CTBT was opened for signature, the monitoring and 

verification regime described in the Treaty was a vision and 

much work remained to make it a reality. This, in fact, was 

a primary reason the U.S. Senate did not give its advice 

and consent to U.S. ratification in 1999. Since that time, the 

international community, backed by robust U.S. support, has 

developed the significant technical capability to monitor for 

nuclear explosions around the globe and detect events of 

interest, which, in turn, will enable CTBT States Signatories 

to make determinations regarding events of concern.

The U.S. commitment to further the state of readiness 

of all parts of the CTBT nuclear explosion monitoring 

and verification regime is strong. As demonstrated by its 

performance in monitoring the Democratic People’s Republic 

of Korea (DPRK) nuclear explosive tests, this system allows 

all CTBT States Signatories access to information that in 

many cases has allowed a large international coalition to 

condemn the DPRK tests through actions at the United 

Nations. NNSA experts support current operations of and 

improvements to the International Monitoring System (IMS) 

and the International Data Centre (IDC) and preparations to 

conduct an on-site inspection (OSI) once the Treaty enters 

into force. The international collaboration resulting in a 

worldwide network of sensitive nuclear explosion monitoring 

stations, supported by the IDC and OSI capabilities, means 

that all participating countries have access to the data that 

will help them decide whether or not a nuclear explosion has 

taken place. 

Experts from a number of DOE organizations support 

the CTBT effort, including Idaho, Lawrence Livermore, 

Los Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National 

Laboratories; the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS); 

and NNSA’s Offices of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and 

Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation. Recently, NNSA 

hosted 50 international OSI experts at NNSS to enhance 

their ability to identify evidence of a nuclear explosion. Other 

NNSA initiatives to support the CTBT effort include a project 

to re-engineer the capabilities of the IDC and workshops for 

international experts to assure the continued effectiveness 

of the IMS. NNSA experts also have been selected to train 

to be OSI surrogate inspectors, and many NNSA experts 

design and conduct CTBT-related training at the request of 

the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). 

NNSA experts have designed many of the most critical components in use in the IMS and IDC and continue to improve 

the sensitivity, reliability, and performance of the system. 

NNSA also hosted 12 international diplomats at NNSS in 

October 2016 to discuss NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship 

Program and nonproliferation initiatives, including CTBT 

support and plans to host a CTBT OSI training event at 

NNSS in 2017. 

The international nuclear explosion monitoring and 

verification regime, essentially nonexistent when the CTBT 

was opened for signature 20 years ago, has developed 

substantially over the years, thanks in large part to U.S. 

support. Whether quickly identifying the location and nature 

of the five announced North Korean nuclear explosive tests 

or helping to mitigate the effects of natural disasters such 

as earthquakes and tsunamis, the CTBT’s monitoring and 

verification elements have regularly proven their value for 

detecting nuclear explosions and supporting important civil 

applications.

Trent Otteson of National Security Technologies (NSTec) holds a 

piston used in the JASPER two-stage gas gun at NNSS. Otteson 

explains how the JASPER facility works to support NNSA ScienceBased Stockpile Stewardship goals to international diplomats 

during their October 2016 visit at the NNSS. 

Back to Table of Contents
Universities Partner with Los Alamos 

for a Unique Hands-On Experience

F

aculty, students, and post-docs from five universities 

had the chance to measure radiation signatures 

from Category I Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at 

the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National 

Security Site (NNSS) as part of a two-week measurement 

campaign organized by Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL) and North Carolina State University. This unique 

activity was organized on behalf of the Consortium 

for Nonproliferation Enabling Capabilities (CNEC) and 

Consortium for Verification Technology (CVT) with support 

from DNN’s Office of Research and Development (R&D). 

The DAF is home to the National Criticality Experiments 

Research Center (NCERC), which is operated by Los 

Alamos. The facility maintains a substantial SNM inventory and expertise to support a variety of nuclear security 

missions requiring hands-on access to weapons-grade 

plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) in numerous 

configurations.

In July 2016, consortium participants from the University of 

Michigan, North Carolina State University, North Carolina 

A&T, Princeton, and the University of Illinois used different radiation detection systems (gamma spectroscopy, 

fast-neutron time-correlation, gamma scatter and pinhole 

aperture imaging, dual neutron-gamma scatter imaging, 

and neutron coded aperture imaging) to measure kilogram 

quantities of uranium, plutonium, and other fissile materials 

in bare, shielded and/or reflected (surrounded with materials 

that may reflect neutrons back into the SNM) configurations. 

This is the second year that LANL has partnered with 

CNEC and CVT to provide this unique research and training 

opportunity on SNM detection and analysis. Results from 

the measurement campaign held in summer 2015 

were presented at the 2016 Institute for Nuclear 

Materials Management Annual Meeting in Atlanta. 

The consortia plan to publish results from 2016’s 

measurements as well.

A separate DAF tour in July 2016 for several 

leaders of the new Nuclear Science and Security 

Consortium (NSSC) focused on exploring collaboration possibilities for critical nuclear data validation 

experiments. The NSSC is the third university 

consortium supported by DNN R&D.

5

Above: The delegation from the NSSC tour in one of the 

critical experiments buildings at NCERC located at the DAF. 

Right: Team of CNEC/CVT faculty, students and post-docs 

performing active measurements of correlated particle 

emissions from HEU shells surrounded by americium-lithium 

sources.

Back to Table of Contents
6

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Back to Table of Contents

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Members of the Nuclear Security and Safety Directorate of Jordan’s Energy and Minerals 

Regulatory Commission use the bulk MBA kit for an exercise during a tour at PNNL.

By Cornelia Brim 

Hands-on and on-the-job 

training can be very effective 

means to truly learn a craft. 

Of course, this can carry a certain 

amount of risk, especially in nuclear 

facilities and when using nuclear 

materials. Classroom learning, on 

the other hand, sometimes can be 

dry and lack the realism necessary 

for students to gain confidence 

in the practical application of a 

craft. Mark Schanfein of Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory 

(PNNL) experimented with a variety 

of concepts for hands-on training 

of safeguards inspectors outside 

a nuclear facility. DNN’s Office of 

Nonproliferation and Arms Control, 

through its International Nuclear 

Safeguards and Engagement 

Program (INSEP), sponsored 

Mark’s work to address this training 

challenge. The breakthrough came 

when he matched some low-cost 

measuring devices with simple props 

to introduce and guide students through the processes of 

a safeguards inspector’s job, and the idea for two separate 

training kits was born.

The first kit—the bulk material balance area (MBA) 

kit—teaches inspection principles in production facilities that 

handle materials in powder, liquid, or gas. The kit includes 

small metal cans that contain varying numbers of marbles 

to represent the nuclear material. Each can has a lid, a seal, 

and a label with identification number, date of entry, content 

description, gross weight, net weight, and chemical form. 

A cloth mat grid is printed with a matrix of squares and an 

identifier for each square, representing different storage 

locations in a facility. An electronic scale is included in the kit 

and serves as the measurement device to address topics 

such as calibration, measurement, and uncertainty bounds. 

The second kit—the item kit—simulates the inspection 

that might be conducted on a sealed item in a facility like a 

nuclear reactor. The props are sealed PVC pipes containing 

shorter wooden dowels representing uranium fuel. Acrylic 

holders contain the simulated fuel rods in vertical arrays 

for different fuel rod locations found in a reactor. Student 

inspectors use the kit’s stud finder to represent a portable 

handheld gamma-ray detector to determine the active length 

of the “fuel” (wooden dowels) in the “rods” (PVC pipes). 

Each kit fits in a PelicanTM case for ease of transportation 

and contains instructions and a number of exercises. 

Discrepancies and errors are built in to test students and 

mimic the types of irregularities inspectors encounter during 

actual inspections. The kits are versatile enough for instructors to alter the scenarios and adapt the tool—fashioning it 

as part of a curriculum that is tailored to student needs.

innovation: Training Kits with Simple Props 

Help Teach Safeguards Principles Outside 

Nuclear Facilities

Back to Table of Contents
7

Training Kits – Continued

“Although the props are simple and inexpensive, the 

concepts students learn and practice are complex and 

true to the job,” said Schanfein. The low cost of the kits 

also makes it possible to leave behind with students so 

that practical learning can continue after completion of the 

DOE/NNSA-sponsored training activity.

Exercises using the kits help facility staff support 

international inspections and help regulatory bodies 

conduct and support international inspections.

The kits have both vocational and educational 

applications. They can be used, for example, to practice 

in a lower-pressure environment the hard and soft skills 

inherent to an inspector’s job, such as:

• Conducting simulated domestic inspections;

• Conducting a physical inventory verification;

• Reconciling nuclear material accounting records 

and reports;

• Performing inventory reconciliation;

• Performing random statistical sampling and item 

selection;

• Practicing measurement calibration and control;

• Identifying and resolving discrepancies; and 

• Strengthening observation, team building, 

negotiation, and communication skills.

They also can be used in an educational setting to demonstrate the fundamentals of nuclear material accountancy and 

independent verification.

PNNL is now offering the kits to university professors, DOE 

safeguards instructors supporting INSEP, IAEA trainers, and 

centers in the Republic of Korea and Japan. PNNL and Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory also are using the kits for training 

courses.

Cornelia Brim is a senior communication specialist at PNNL. 

Staff members from Vietnam’s Agency for Radiation and Nuclear 

Safety use the item kit to conduct a mock active fuel length 

measurement during an INSEP-sponsored training workshop in 

April 2016.

Inventory items are simulated in the bulk material balance area 

kit. This kit helps students practice the skills needed to conduct 

a physical inventory verification and reconcile nuclear material 

accounting records and reports.

Participants in the Nonproliferation and International Safeguards 

Summer Course at PNNL use the item kit to simulate an inspection 

that might be conducted on sealed items in a nuclear facility.

Back to Table of Contents
8

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Back to Table of Contents
Back to Table of Contents 9
10

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

R&D Improves Ability to 

Geo-Locate the Origin 

of Nuclear Materials 

Nuclear forensics research makes it harder for 

traffickers to hide their activities. DNN has a 

research and development (R&D) program focused 

on improving nuclear forensics methods, in concert with 

partners within DNN, NNSA, and the interagency.

Interdictions of unsecured nuclear material have occurred 

worldwide, with many cases recorded in the International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database. 

These events are stark realities showing that even as the 

international community is working toward securing all 

vulnerable materials, items outside of regulatory control pose 

a risk.

National Laboratory-based nuclear forensics research is generally led by world-class scientists able to apply advanced 

methods and research ingenuity to develop new insights. 

The DOE/NNSA National Laboratories have the required 

expertise and infrastructure to tackle such hard problems.

One area of focus for the R&D program is how the surface 

of a nuclear material sample interacts with its environment 

to retain impurities and create other features that help 

characterize the environmental conditions that the sample 

has recently experienced. This research is enabled by the 

reactive surfaces of uranium and plutonium metals and 

oxides and by the analytical power of modern microscopic 

techniques. 

The measurements and analyses of Lee Davisson and 

colleagues from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL) is seeking to confirm a hypothesis that measuring 

hydrogen and oxygen “uptake” from water on uranium 

surfaces can enable geo-location of recent environments. 

“If you measure oxygen in water across the globe using a 

mass spectrometer, which separates an element into its 

isotopes, you’ll find very different ratios of the two main 

isotopes of oxygen, 16O and 18O, depending on just where 

you take the measurement. It is this difference that enables 

you to geo-locate a sample found in one place to the place 

where it originally ‘uptook’ its water oxygen,” he explains. 

“It’s exciting to research the fundamentals and develop 

methodologies on this type of project,” says Davisson. “This 

could only happen with sponsors who invest in challenging 

R&D that attracts and retains the talent at the National Labs 

utilized in this work.”

Dr. Michael Singleton of LLNL loads a uranium sample into a 

thermal gravimetric analyzer attached to an isotope ratio mass 

spectrometer

National Laboratory Expert 

on Loan to DNN

In addition to tapping into 

specialized expertise resident at 

the National Laboratories, DNN 

also invites National Laboratory 

staff to temporarily relocate to 

Headquarters. A case in point 

is Debbie Dale, who is currently 

on detail to the Office of Global 

Material Security’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection 

and Deterrence program from Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL). Debbie leads efforts in China, 

Japan, Algeria, France, and the European Union to 

improve indigenous nuclear forensics capabilities. 

She has a Ph.D. in physical chemistry and has 

supported weapon, nonproliferation, and threat 

reduction programs during her 26 years at LANL. 

In addition, Debbie was a nuclear safeguards 

inspector at the IAEA. 

Back to Table of Contents
11

DNN Expert Profile: Rilla Hamilton

By Cassandra Peterson 

The announcement of Rilla’s selection 

follows more than eight years of 

unflagging dedication to the NNSA’s 

Office of Material Management and 

Minimization (M3) work in the Convert 

program to reduce and eliminate the 

use of weapons-usable uranium at 

civilian sites around the globe. 

She received her BA in Foreign Affairs 

and a Master of Public Policy from the 

Frank Batten School of Leadership 

and Public Policy at the University of 

Virginia, where her thesis focused on 

permanent threat reduction alternatives 

for disused commercial radiological 

sources. In 2008, she began her work 

at NNSA by providing special project 

support under M3’s—then the Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative’s—Convert 

Program. She initially expected to stay 

with the NNSA for three months, but 

found that she loved the work. 

Rilla was with NNSA in 2008 when 

the Canadian and Dutch reactors that 

supply the United States with most 

of its Mo-99 supply unexpectedly 

shut down. Patients around the 

world were forced to cancel or delay 

important, life-saving diagnostic 

medical procedures. This large-scale 

shortage changed the way that the 

world viewed the small network of 

medical radioisotope producers and 

drove a new call for domestic Mo-99 

production. 

Rilla’s hard work, leadership, and 

commitment to avoiding future 

shortages elevated her to a position 

as the Mo-99 Program Director. 

Internationally, the program supports 

multiple projects to convert the 

production of the isotope from highly 

enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched 

uranium (LEU), thereby permanently 

reducing threats to peace and security. 

The program is also on the forefront 

of establishing a safe, dependable 

capacity to produce non-HEU-based 

Mo-99 within American borders. 

When asking about her daily life at 

NNSA, Rilla said “I often get teased for 

how much I enjoy my job. But not only 

do I get to help reduce the threat of 

nuclear terrorism, I get to help ensure 

that patients in the United States and 

around the world have access to an 

isotope that helps to save lives. It’s 

incredibly rewarding.” 

In October 2016, Rilla was detailed to 

the Office of the Administrator as the 

Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff.

Cassandra Peterson is an NNSA Graduate 

Fellow currently serving in DNN’s Office of 

Material Management and Minimization.

NNSA’s Rilla Hamilton recently was appointed to Chair the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development’s High Level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical 

Radioisotopes (HLG-MR). 

Rilla has represented the United States at the HLG-MR since its founding in 2009, when 

the group began evaluating issues related to the reliable supply of the medical isotope 

molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), a key component of nuclear diagnostic medicine procedures 

worldwide. Members of the HLG-MR selected Rilla to lead the group comprising 40 delegates 

from 17 countries, 20 independent entities from the medical industry, the European Commission, and the International 

Atomic Energy Agency. She will be the third person to serve as the HLG-MR Chair. 

The decay product of Mo-99, 

technetium-99m (Tc-99m), 

is used to diagnose heart 

disease and cancer, study 

organ structure and function, 

and perform other important 

medical procedures. For 

example, patients who have had 

a myocardial perfusion imaging 

test—otherwise known as a 

cardiac “stress test”—have likely 

benefitted from Tc-99m. 

Read the related article in the 

DNN Sentinel, Vol. II, No. 2, 

page 13.

HLG-MR Chair Rilla Hamilton of the United 

States and Vice Chair Tina Eboka of South 

Africa

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12

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Adding Uniqueness to Safeguards 

with Cylinder Identification

By Tara Chandra and Michael Whitaker

A key component of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) inspection regime is material 

accountability—that is, ensuring that whatever 

material the facility operator reports to be present on site is 

actually there. While this may seem like a relatively easy task, 

there are unique challenges that inspectors face in verifying 

facility compliance with this safeguards requirement. 

One challenge is labeling uranium hexafluoride (UF6) 

cylinders. Uranium hexafluoride plays an important role in the 

early stages of the nuclear fuel fabrication process. Natural 

and low-enriched UF6 is typically stored and transported in 

very large steel cylinders. There are approximately 20,000 

cylinders in active use at any time, plus those in storage. 

Each cylinder has a nameplate welded onto it during its 

manufacture that contains identification and certification information, including a serial number. However, the stamped 

or engraved serial number is generally very small—only 1⁄4 

inch tall—and cylinders can be in circulation for 30 to 40 

years while the lettering degrades over time. 

To mitigate the challenge of reading the cylinder number 

on the nameplate, individual companies have implemented 

various supplemental labeling and marking practices for 

identifying cylinders while they are at their facility—but as 

cylinders are circulated among facilities over decades, they 

can accumulate myriad labels. Each company can easily 

distinguish its own label, but IAEA inspectors must sort 

through the various labels and relate them to the small, 

difficult-to-read serial number permanently engraved on the 

official nameplate during the inspection. This adds time to 

the inspection effort—especially when some sites contain 

thousands of cylinders to be verified. 

To facilitate greater efficiency and effectiveness for the IAEA 

in verifying the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared activities, a multi-laboratory team sponsored by DNN and led by Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

(ORNL) is working on a new standardized identifier for UF6

cylinders. These ‘global identifiers’ would supplement the 

current nameplates, but would contain the identification 

information in a standardized, larger, more readable form, 

and in a two-dimensional barcode enabling direct scanning. This would prevent current reading and transcription 

challenges. An essential benefit of the global identifier is 

that it could be independently usable by both the IAEA and 

industry. Deployment of the global identifier by industry 

will greatly 

benefit the IAEA 

by enabling 

inspectors to 

conduct current 

cylinder verification activities 

more quickly 

and reconcile 

cylinder-related 

information 

reported 

from different 

sources more 

effectively. More 

strategically, the 

ability to read 

the cylinder 

identification from the barcode will enable the IAEA to pursue 

more automated inspection methods for some routine, time 

consuming, labor-intensive inspections activities.

There are challenges involved in creating these global identifiers. They are not simply stickers that we might envision as 

a “label.” These identifiers must be permanently associated 

with the container and readable up close when the cylinders 

are stored in tight configurations and from a distance when 

IAEA inspectors conducting a simulated 

cylinder inventory to evaluate potential 

benefits from the global identifier being 

pursued by industry.

Reading the serial numbers engraved on cylinder nameplates 

from a distance presents a challenge for inspectors.

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13

New Group of Fellows Join DNN 

for 2016–2017 Year

By Tara Chandra

Each year, participants in the NNSA Graduate Fellows Program (NGFP) gather 

for a one-week orientation at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 

to learn about the organization they’re about to join. New fellows participate in 

a mock congressional hearing, attend a radiation detection training, and visit 

Hanford’s B Reactor. The orientation is also an excellent opportunity for fellows 

to get to know each other. Fifteen of the 49 Fellows are placed across DNN’s 

programs, making important contributions to their offices’ support of the global 

nonproliferation mission.

To learn more about the NGFP program, see the DNN Sentinel, Vol. I, No. 2, 

page 10.

Photos by Maren Disney of PNNL

the cylinders are stacked two or 

three high. For full benefit to the 

IAEA, the identifiers need to be 

tamper indicating and not able to 

be counterfeited. They also must 

endure a 40+ year life cycle in 

harsh environments experienced 

by a typical UF6 cylinder. There is 

also enormous inertia in a heavily 

licensed and regulated industry 

to deviate from any accepted and 

approved practice that has been in 

place since the dawn of the industry. 

Because the cylinders are owned by 

facility operators and the IAEA cannot mandate how facility operators 

identify containers of nuclear material, it was essential that industry be 

part of developing a common approach to standardizing the cylinder 

identifier. The DNN team worked to 

engage both the IAEA and industry 

leaders on that approach. The World 

Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) 

has established a working group to 

develop guidelines for UF6 cylinder 

identification and recommendations 

for managing the identification 

numbers. The WNTI guidelines 

are expected to be published in 

2017. The next milestones will be 

the adoption of the guidelines by 

companies, the production of UF6

cylinders with the global identifiers, 

and the implementation of barcode 

scanning technology to confirm 

cylinder inventories by the IAEA 

during inspections.

Michael Whitaker manages the ORNL 

International Safeguards Program. He 

has more than 30 years of collective 

experience at ORNL, Y-12 NSC, and Oak 

Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Tara 

Chandra was an NNSA Graduate Fellow 

in the DNN Front Office in 2016. 

Safeguards – Continued

All 49 NGP Fellows at Hanford’s B Reactor during orientation.

“Orientation was a fantastic 

opportunity to experience firsthand what our program offices 

do on a daily basis. As a fellow 

... doing a simulated radiation 

detection training really helped 

me understand how important 

DNN’s work with our international 

partners is to the DNN mission.”

Evan Thompson is an NGP Fellow 

in DNN’s Office of Global Material 

Security. 

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14

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

country profile: japan

Atomic Energy Basic 

Law restricts nuclear 

energy use to peaceful 

purposes

Three Non-Nuclear 

Principles state 

that Japan will not 

possess, produce, 

or permit the 

introduction of 

nuclear weapons 

into the country

Stood up new 

Nuclear Regulation 

Authority agency

Hosted G7 foreign 

ministers visit to 

Hiroshima Peace 

Memorial Park

1955

1968

2016

Japan’s 

Nuclear 

History 

in Brief

PACIFIC OCEAN

Sea of Japan

REPUBLIC 

OF 

KOREA

DEMOCRATIC 

PEOPLE’S 

REPUBLIC 

OF KOREA

CHINA RUSSIA

JAPAN Tokyo

Acceded to the 

Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty 1976

Ratified the 

Comprehensive 

Nuclear-Test-Ban 

Treaty 1997

2012

Japan is a world leader in the peaceful 

use of nuclear technology and nuclear 

nonproliferation. Largely dependent 

on imports to supply its energy needs, 

Japan has built an extensive civil 

nuclear research and power program 

over the course of five decades. 

Fifty-four nuclear power reactors were 

in operation in 2011, giving Japan 

the world’s third largest fleet of power 

reactors (behind the United States 

and France). But all of Japan’s power 

reactors were shut down after the 

Great East Japan Earthquake triggered 

a major tsunami, severely damaging 

the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 

Station. Five years later, over 90% 

of Japan’s nuclear power plants 

remain shut down while efforts to 

obtain regulatory approval for a restart 

continue.

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency 

(JAEA) is one of DOE/NNSA’s longeststanding international partners in 

the area of nuclear nonproliferation 

and nuclear security cooperation, 

working together on more than 100 

successful projects. DOE/NNSA, JAEA, 

and predecessor organizations have 

collaborated to pioneer technologies 

to resolve some of the most difficult 

safeguards verification challenges, 

address nuclear security issues, and 

advance capabilities in the area of 

nuclear forensics. Specific examples of 

collaboration and cooperation between 

the United States and Japan in the 

area of nuclear nonproliferation are 

described below.

HEU and Plutonium Minimization

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit 

(NSS), the United States and Japan 

announced the fulfillment of the 

joint pledge from the 2014 NSS to 

remove all highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) and plutonium from Japan’s 

Fast Critical Assembly (FCA). DNN’s 

Office of Material Management and 

Minimization’s (M3) Office of Nuclear 

Material Removal cooperated with 

Japan for nearly two decades to 

remove excess vulnerable nuclear 

material from Japan. The FCA project 

was the largest removal in the history of 

the Summit process, totaling hundreds 

of kilograms of plutonium and HEU. 

In addition to the removal, the United 

States and Japan began a series of 

joint research collaborations that will 

allow FCA to restart in the future using 

low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. 

Building on the success of the FCA 

cooperation, the United States and 

Japan also announced a pledge at 

the 2016 NSS to convert the Kyoto 

University Critical Assembly (KUCA) 

facility from HEU to LEU fuels and 

remove all HEU. 

Under the U.S.-Japan Plutonium 

Management Experts Group led by 

M3’s Office of Material Disposition, 

A Long-Standing Partner in Nonproliferation

Accident at 

Fukushima Daiichi 

nuclear power station

2011

In 2013, DOE/NNSA and JAEA celebrated 

25 years of partnership. Assistant Deputy 

Administrator Kasia Mendelsohn presented 

a commemorative plaque to then Executive 

Director Hideki Namba.

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15

15

the United States and Japan 

have undertaken informal bilateral 

discussions on technical collaboration 

for plutonium management strategies. 

These efforts help ensure that the two 

countries continue to work toward 

a common interest of securing, 

effectively managing, and—when 

possible— reducing global stockpiles 

of plutonium.

Center of Excellence

Japan opened its Integrated Support 

Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and 

Nuclear Security (ISCN) in December 

2010, fulfilling its pledge at the NSS 

earlier that year. Since opening, ISCN 

has provided training to thousands of 

participants from over 20 countries 

in the region. Prior to and during 

ISCN’s launch, DNN staff worked with 

JAEA to develop training materials 

and curricula, a nuclear security test 

bed, and information technology 

training tools. DNN continues to work 

with ISCN to develop the Center’s 

advanced training curriculum, and 

government agencies from both 

countries identify goals and coordinate 

activities through the U.S./Japan 

Nuclear Security Working Group that 

meets annually.

Improving Nuclear Forensics

DNN’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection 

and Deterrence program conducts 

technical cooperation with JAEA to 

advance nuclear forensics capabilities. 

Current activities focus on methods to 

improve uranium age-dating methods. 

Uranium age-dating measurements 

indicate the most recent purification 

date of the material, information that 

can help determine the origin and 

process history of material.

Addressing Nuclear Safeguards 

Challenges

Over nearly 30 years, DOE/NNSA has 

cooperated with Japan to address a 

wide variety of international safeguards 

challenges, which have evolved 

alongside Japan’s nuclear capabilities. 

Among the dozens of successfully 

completed projects, recent 

accomplishments include working 

with JAEA to deploy Advanced 

Technology for Enrichment Monitoring 

at the Ningyo-Toge Enrichment Plant 

to monitor uranium hexafluoride (UF6) 

holdup and cleanout effectiveness 

during decommissioning, and on 

Advanced Holdup Measurement 

Techniques to improve safeguards 

measurements at the Plutonium 

Conversion Development Facility. In 

addition to addressing safeguards 

challenges at operating facilities and 

those nearing end of life, DOE/NNSA 

also has assisted Japan in developing 

and maintaining safeguards systems 

at new facilities, such as the improved 

Plutonium Canister Assay System 

(iPCAS) located at Japan Nuclear 

Fuel Limited’s (JNFL) Rokkasho 

Reprocessing Plant (RRP), and the 

Advanced Verification for Inventory 

Sampling System located at JNFL’s 

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. 

Numerous nondestructive assay (NDA) 

tools that the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) now uses were 

also developed or field tested through 

U.S.-Japan cooperation.

Training the Next Generation of 

Nuclear Safeguards Professionals

In May 2016, 20 National Laboratory 

staff and graduate students 

participated in the Nuclear Facilities 

Experience (NFE) in Japan. The 

one-week intensive training 

opportunity was sponsored by 

DNN’s Office of International Nuclear 

Safeguards through its Human Capital 

Development program. The training 

course offered in-depth explanations 

of international safeguards practices at 

nuclear facilities and the opportunity to 

see safeguards equipment deployed 

at facilities first-hand. The group visited 

the MONJU Fast Breeder Reactor, 

the FUGEN Decommissioning Center, 

the Mihama Nuclear Power Plant, 

the Tokai Reprocessing Technology 

Development Center, the RRP, and 

the IAEA’s Tokyo Regional Office. 

Because most facilities were shut 

down, participants were able to access 

areas that would normally not be 

accessible for visits during operations. 

Additionally, participants visited the 

Hiroshima National Peace Memorial 

and met with an atomic bomb survivor. 

See DNN Sentinel, Vol. II, No. 1, page 

7 to learn more about the NFE.

Country Profile: Japan – Continued

DNN continues to provide subject matter 

experts who assist with curriculum 

development at ISCN in Japan. 

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16

FAQs: IAEA and Nuclear Safeguards

As the world’s nuclear inspectorate, the International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) is responsible for 

verifying that nuclear material, facilities, and other 

items subject to safeguards are used only for peaceful 

purposes. The objective of IAEA safeguards is to deter the 

spread of nuclear weapons by early detection of misuse of 

nuclear material or technology, thereby providing credible 

assurances to the international community that States are 

honoring their legal obligations.

What are IAEA safeguards?

IAEA safeguards are a set of technical measures applied 

on nuclear facilities and material, through which the Agency 

seeks to independently verify a State’s declaration of 

nuclear activities, and provide credible assurances that 

nuclear facilities are not misused and nuclear material is not 

diverted from peaceful uses to the development of nuclear 

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Technical 

measures include, for example, on-site inspections, nuclear 

material accountancy, physical measurements, facility 

design information verification, containment using tamperindicating tags and seals, surveillance, and environmental 

sampling.

Pursuant to the IAEA’s Statute, which authorizes the IAEA 

to establish and administer safeguards, States accept the 

application of IAEA safeguards through the conclusion of 

agreements with the IAEA.

Why are nuclear safeguards important? 

Peaceful applications of nuclear-related technologies 

and materials in electricity generation, health, research, 

and other uses boost States’ economies and standards 

of living. At the same time, proliferation and terrorism 

threats resulting from theft or diversion of nuclear material 

and technology continue to evolve. By applying nuclear 

safeguards measures, the IAEA and Member States can 

reassure the international community that nuclear materials 

and facilities are not being used for illicit purposes. 

What are Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 

(CSA)?

CSA are the legal basis for the IAEA to apply safeguards 

on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities in a State. 

It provides the IAEA’s right and obligation to ensure that 

safeguards are applied on all source and special fissionable 

material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory 

of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its 

control anywhere.

What is the Additional Protocol (AP)?

The AP to a safeguards agreement enhances IAEA 

access to sites and information to provide the IAEA with 

the authority to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear 

material activities in a State. Through an AP, States provide 

additional information in expanded declarations and the 

IAEA may perform complementary access visits in addition 

to routine and ad hoc inspections. 

What is a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP)?

An SQP is a safeguards agreement for States with minimal 

or no nuclear activities. The purpose of the SQP is to 

minimize the burden of safeguards activities on States with 

little or no nuclear activities, while ensuring that the IAEA’s 

safeguards conclusions are soundly based. Modified in 

2005 by the IAEA Board of Governors, the modified SQP 

requires States to provide an initial declaration of any 

nuclear materials and their locations, which can be verified 

by the IAEA, and to notify the IAEA as soon as a decision 

is made by the State to construct or authorize construction 

of a nuclear facility. The SQP remains operational until such 

time as the State’s inventory of nuclear material exceeds 

a defined amount, or the State chooses to build a nuclear 

facility.

What is DNN’s role with nuclear safeguards?

DNN supports a number of activities designed to strengthen and encourage IAEA safeguards activities and the 

ability of Member States to comply with their safeguards 

obligations. These activities include developing innovative 

policies and approaches to advance the state of the art in 

safeguards technologies and safeguards implementation, 

assisting countries with implementing CSAs and APs, and 

providing training for the next generation of safeguards 

professionals. DNN also coordinates the implementation of 

IAEA safeguards activities at DOE sites. 

To learn more about international safeguards activities, see 

the IAEA Bulletin for June 2016.

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