The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

1863

Civil War

 West

The

in 

the
CMH Pub 75–11

Cover: Battle of Mission [Missionary] Ridge, Nov. 25th, 1863, by Cosack & Co.

(Library of Congress)
by

Andrew N. Morris

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2016

1863

Civil War

 West

The

in 

the

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand.

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic of 

being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers on 

the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went to 

war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues to be, a 

key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. 

Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the fight because 

of their comrades and because they do not want to seem like 

cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink to nothing 

in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and minié ball. 

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 
6

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation. 

 CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

 Executive Director
The Civil War in the West

1863

Strategic Setting

The campaign of 1863 in eastern Tennessee was primarily 

a struggle for the small city of Chattanooga, on the banks of 

the Tennessee River in the mountainous southeastern corner 

of the state. For most of the year, Union and Confederate forces 

maneuvered and fought for this key rail junction, and for the vital 

resources in the region that surrounded it, including food, horses, 

copper, and niter. Union forces also intended to cut rebel lines of 

communication between Virginia and the western states, and to 

block provisions from being transported to Confederate forces 

in the Eastern Theater. Moreover, whichever side had possession of Chattanooga and its rail lines controlled access to Atlanta, 

Georgia, the heart of the South’s industrial production. Federal 

forces also sought to control eastern Tennessee, a stronghold of 

Southern Unionism, which U.S. President Abraham Lincoln had 

long sought to liberate.

The commander of the Federal Army of the Cumberland 

since October 1862 was 43-year-old Maj. Gen. William S. 

Rosecrans, a West Point graduate from Ohio. Having resigned 

7
8 

his commission in 1854 for 

employment as a civil engineer 

and architect, he returned 

to arms at the outbreak of 

the Civil War and became a 

major general of volunteers 

in March 1862. Profane and 

hot tempered, Rosecrans was 

a hard worker, whose active 

leadership style frequently led 

to exhaustion. He was by nature 

nervous and impatient, and 

often failed to delegate responsibilities. The army’s rank and 

file affectionately dubbed him 

“Old Rosy.” 

In late December 1862, 

Rosecrans moved the Army of 

the Cumberland southeast from 

Nashville to Murfreesboro, the 

start of his campaign to capture 

Chattanooga. At Murfreesboro, his forces were attacked by the 

Confederate Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg on 

31 December. The Southerners initially were successful in driving 

back the Union right flank along the banks of Stones River, but 

Rosecrans did not retreat. After a relatively quiet New Year’s Day 

1863, the Army of the Cumberland repulsed a second rebel assault 

and counterattacked Bragg’s troops on 2 January. The Confederates 

withdrew from the field late the next day to Shelbyville, about 

thirty miles southeast of Murfreesboro, but Rosecrans did not 

pursue them. Although Rosecrans claimed a victory due to Bragg’s 

retreat, Union and Confederate losses were heavy: each side 

suffered about thirteen thousand casualties. Rosecrans chose to 

remain at Murfreesboro to rest and refit his battered army despite 

pressure from Lincoln and the Federal War Department to follow 

up his victory.

As the Army of the Cumberland settled into its winter 

encampment around Murfreesboro, the morale of Rosecrans’ 

soldiers was excellent. Rosecrans had played a pivotal and 

inspiring role in the recent campaign, and had earned the respect 

of most of his officers. His army consisted of four infantry corps 

General Rosecrans

(Library of Congress)
9

and one cavalry corps. Maj. 

Gen. George H. Thomas, a West 

Point graduate from Virginia, 

led XIV Corps, and was a steady 

and reliable officer, although 

known for being slow and 

deliberate in moving his troops. 

The abilities of the army’s other 

corps commanders, however, 

were questionable. Maj. Gen. 

Alexander M. McCook from 

Ohio commanded XX Corps. 

Although a West Point graduate, 

he had performed poorly at the 

recent Battle of Stones River 

and at the Battle of Perryville, 

Kentucky, in October 1862. At 

the head of XXI Corps was Maj. 

Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, a 

political general from Kentucky 

with dubious military talents. 

Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger 

commanded the army’s Reserve Corps of three divisions. Granger, 

a West Point graduate and veteran of several Mexican War battles, 

was known for being outspoken and gruff, which alienated him 

from many fellow officers. Finally, Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, 

another West Point graduate from Ohio, led the twelve thousand 

Union cavalrymen, divided into two divisions. All told, Rosecrans 

had some sixty-nine thousand troops and thirty-three batteries of 

artillery in his field force by the late spring. 

Logistics remained the principal vulnerability for Rosecrans’ 

army. Equipment and rations were adequate as long as communications were intact, but the Cumberland River in central 

Tennessee was unreliable during low-water periods, and the 

Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, along which the Union 

troops would have to advance, was subject to disruption by rebel 

raiders. Moreover, any approach to Chattanooga would require 

the Federals to traverse several ranges of rugged hills and mountains in an area of limited supplies. Additionally, Rosecrans’ 

cavalry units were outnumbered and of poorer quality than 

Bragg’s Southern horsemen. With difficult supply problems and 

General Bragg

(Library of Congress)
General Thomas

(Library of Congress)

General Crittenden

(Library of Congress)

General Granger

(Library of Congress)

General McCook

(Library of Congress)
11

inadequate reconnaissance capabilities, Rosecrans was reluctant to begin operations against Bragg’s rebel forces between 

Murfreesboro and Chattanooga. He bombarded Washington 

with requests for reinforcements and provisions, without which 

he claimed he could not advance.

Southeast of Murfreesboro behind a long wooded ridge 

called the Highland Rim was the Confederate Army of Tennessee, 

commanded by General Bragg. These fifty thousand rebels had 

won a reputation for long marches and hard fighting, notably at 

the 1862 Battles of Shiloh and Perryville, as well as the recent 

engagement at Murfreesboro. The Confederate troops were “in 

a high state of efficiency, well clad and fed, and marked with 

every evidence of good discipline, high courage, and capacity 

for endurance,” according to a report. The army’s leadership was 

a different matter. Bragg was an 1837 West Point graduate, had 

fought in the Mexican War with distinction, and remained in the 

U.S. Army until 1856. Despite his extensive military experience, 

he was an argumentative and abrasive officer who was rarely on 

good terms with his subordinates. He was often reluctant to take 

risks and had a reputation for missing opportunities to crush 

his enemies on the battlefield. After setbacks, he usually blamed 

his officers, which led to deep 

resentments among the rebel 

army’s leaders and hindered 

its performance on campaign. 

Although Bragg was considered a talented administrator, 

many Southerners believed 

he remained in command 

only because of his personal 

friendship with Confederate 

President Jefferson Davis. 

Bragg’s force was divided 

into two corps of infantry, 

under Lt. Gen. Leonidas 

Polk, bishop of the Episcopal 

Diocese of Louisiana, and Lt. 

Gen. William J. Hardee, a West 

Point graduate and Mexican 

War veteran from Georgia. 

Bragg’s cavalry force consisted 

General Polk

(Valentine Richmond 

History Center)
12 

of a corps led by Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler and an additional 

division under Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Operations

Early in 1863, the Army of Tennessee was encamped 

north of Tullahoma, Tennessee, about thirty-five miles from 

Rosecrans’ position. Bragg deployed his troops in a wide arc 

north of the town, astride the Nashville and Chattanooga 

Railroad, which he presumed Rosecrans would use to advance 

as he moved toward Chattanooga. The Confederate commander 

posted Polk’s corps in strong defensive works on the left (west) 

of the Confederate line around Shelbyville and Hardee’s corps 

on the right (east) at Wartrace. Bragg placed a cavalry screen 

in front of his main army, which blocked the key gaps in the 

Highland Rim through which Rosecrans would have to pass as 

he advanced. Bragg also extended his mounted units on both 

flanks to detect any Federal advances. 

General Rosecrans kept his army at Murfreesboro for almost 

six months after his victory there. President Lincoln, Secretary of 

War Edwin M. Stanton, and the general in chief of all Union armies, 

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, implored him to resume operations 

against Bragg. They feared that while Rosecrans remained idle 

in Tennessee, the Confederates would move troops from Bragg’s 

army to Mississippi in an attempt to relieve the pressure that 

Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was applying against the rebel 

stronghold at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Frustration with Rosecrans’ 

failure to move led Halleck to threaten to relieve him if he did not 

promptly advance. Both armies spent considerable time foraging 

and conducting cavalry raids in the first half of 1863, which caused 

Rosecrans some concern for his supply line, but not enough to 

induce him to begin marching toward the enemy.

The Tullahoma Campaign

Throughout the spring of 1863, authorities in Washington 

increased their pressure on Rosecrans to begin his campaign 

against Bragg. In June, Halleck telegraphed Rosecrans that if 

he was unwilling to move, some of his troops would be sent 

to Mississippi to reinforce Grant. Rosecrans responded that 

advancing the Army of the Cumberland would do nothing to 

prevent the Confederates from sending troops to Vicksburg, 
13

and that an immediate advance was unwarranted. Most of his 

senior generals supported Rosecrans’ position and counseled 

against moving south. The only dissenter was his newly assigned 

chief of staff, Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield, who recommended 

an immediate advance. Under continued pressure from the 

War Department, Rosecrans finally ordered the Army of the 

Cumberland to advance on the morning of 24 June 1863 (Map 

1). Heavy rains impeded the movement of men, horses, and 

wagons for the next two weeks. 

Rosecrans planned to maneuver Bragg out of his prepared 

defenses in front of Tullahoma by turning the rebels’ right (east) 

flank, rather than attacking the enemy’s positions head-on. He 

intended to have Granger’s Reserve Corps and a strong force of 

cavalry move west to attract Bragg’s attention near Shelbyville 

on the rebel’s left flank, while the rest of the Union forces moved 

to the east. Thomas’ XIV Corps would march southeast on the 

Manchester Pike to threaten Hardee’s right flank, as McCook’s XX 

Corps would advance directly against Hardee’s position around 

Wartrace. Rosecrans directed Crittenden’s XXI Corps troops to 

head east and southeast toward Manchester and McMinnville, 

which would put them in Bragg’s rear and presumably force the 

Confederate army to retreat. In order to guard his supply lines and 

depots at Nashville and Murfreesboro, part of Granger’s reserve 

troops would remain behind.

Rosecrans’ plan of maneuver worked well despite the heavy 

rains and muddy roads. Critical to the plan was the quick capture 

of Hoover’s Gap, through which passed the Manchester Pike. A 

brigade of mounted infantry from XIV Corps under Col. John T. 

Wilder, armed with privately purchased Spencer repeating rifles, 

captured the gap and held it against several rebel assaults. Six 

miles to the west at Liberty Gap, McCook’s XX Corps advanced 

through hilly terrain and battled Hardee’s troops north of 

Wartrace. Although Federal troops reached Manchester on 27 

June, Confederate cavalry scouts failed to advise Bragg of the 

Union movement toward his rear. Moreover, mistrust and antagonisms among the general officers of the Army of Tennessee led 

to little direct communication about strategy, and neither Polk 

nor Hardee had a firm understanding of Bragg’s plans. After 

Polk and Hardee objected to orders to attack the advancing 

Federals, Bragg withdrew his forces south across the Duck River 

to Tullahoma on 27 June. 
Map 1

Tennessee R

Elk R

Duck R

24 Jun

24 Jun

16 Aug

16 Aug

1 Jul

27 Jun

20 Aug

9 Sep

4 Sep

27 Jun

27 Jun

FORREST

POLK

HARDEE

BRAGG

WHEELER

G R A N G E R

M c C O O K

X X

T H O M A S

X I V

X I V

X X I

X X I

X 

X X I

X I V

X I V

X X

X X

C AV

C A V

C R I T T E N D E N

X X I

X X

ROSECRANS

S

A

N

D

M

O

U

N T A I N

Liberty Gap

Hoover’s Gap

C U M

B

E

R

L

A

N

D

P 

S

L o 

Caperton’s Ferry

Bridgeport

Bellfonte

Salem

Winchester

Cowan

Tullahoma

Manchester

McMinnville

Faireld

Wartrace

Tracy City

Stevenson

Jasper

Shelbyville

Murfreesboro

Fayetteville

Memphis & Charleston RR

Nashvi l le & Chattanooga RR

T E N N E S S E E

A L A B A M A

A L A B A M A

G E O R 
Tennessee R

Hiwassee R

Sequatchie R

West Chickamauga Cr

20 Aug

9 Sep

9 Sep

p

4 Sep

POLK

BRAGG

D. H. HILL

X X I

X X I

X X I

X X I

McLemore’s

Cove

Raccoon

Mountain

P i g e o n M o u n t a i n

P L A

T E A

U

Steven’s Gap

Missionary

Ridge

o o k o u t M o u n t a i n W

A L D E N ’ S R I D

G E

Lee and Gordon’s Mill

Davis’

Cross Roads

to Atlanta 

Rossville

Trenton

Dalton

Cleveland

Shellmound

Alpine

Ringgold

La Fayette

Chattanooga

Western & A tlantic RR

East Tennessee & Georgia RR

T E N N E S S E E

G E O R G I A

G E O R G I A

UNION ADVANCE

24 June–9 September 1863

MURFREESBORO TO CHAT TANOOGA

Confederate Withdrawal

Area of Confederate Concentration

Union Position, Date

Union Axis of Advance

0 20

Miles
16 

While Bragg pulled his forces back, Rosecrans concentrated 

XIV and XX Corps at Manchester, twelve miles to the northeast. 

This maneuver put the Federals closer to Chattanooga than the 

rebels. Polk advised retreating to save the army. Hardee refused 

to recommend a withdrawal, but neither did he propose to stay 

and fight. On 30 June, Bragg evacuated Tullahoma and retired 

across the Elk River, which allowed Rosecrans to occupy that 

town without a fight the next day. Bragg, exhausted physically 

and emotionally, now had his Army of Tennessee in strong positions behind the Elk River, but was persuaded by Hardee and 

Polk to retreat farther south to Cowan, along the Nashville and 

Chattanooga Railroad. Still dissatisfied with his army’s position 

on 3 July, Bragg ordered a continuation of the rebel retreat to 

Chattanooga. Rosecrans did not vigorously press Bragg’s troops 

as he retreated across the rugged Cumberland Plateau, which 

allowed the Confederates to cross the Tennessee River on 4 July 

at Bridgeport, Alabama, and concentrate near Chattanooga by 7 

July. In a critical mistake, Bragg failed to ensure the destruction 

of the important railroad tunnel at Cowan, which would have 

made the Union army’s supply operations more difficult. 

With the loss of fewer than six hundred soldiers, Rosecrans 

had forced Bragg’s Confederates out of middle Tennessee and 

pushed the rebels into a corner at Chattanooga. Rosecrans, 

however, failed to receive the acclaim he expected and that he 

thought his troops deserved. News of the Tullahoma campaign 

was overshadowed by the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 

(1–3 July), and the Confederate surrender at Vicksburg (4 July). 

To Washington authorities, the Army of the Cumberland’s recent 

operations seemed indecisive. Secretary of War Stanton telegraphed Rosecrans, “Lee’s Army overthrown; Grant victorious. 

You and your noble army now have a chance to give the finishing 

blow to the rebellion. Will you neglect the chance?” Rosecrans 

indignantly responded, “I beg in behalf of this army that the War 

Department may not overlook so great an event [capturing middle 

Tennessee] because it is not written in letters of blood.” 

Moving into Georgia

After his successful campaign of maneuver, Rosecrans faced 

additional difficulties. His army’s supply lines needed extensive 

rebuilding to support any movement into the mountainous, barren 

territory surrounding Chattanooga. Rather than attack Bragg’s 
17

army at Chattanooga, Rosecrans intended to swing around the city 

to threaten the Confederate supply lines south and east of the rebel 

defenses. This maneuver would trap Bragg in the city, forcing the 

rebels either to abandon Chattanooga or to fight a battle that the 

Union commander was confident he could win. 

Because of the poor roads and scarce supplies in eastern 

Tennessee, Union forces would have to advance from their 

camps at Winchester, Manchester, and McMinnville on a 

wide front. In order to hold Bragg near the city while the rest 

of the Army of the Cumberland crossed the Tennessee River 

downstream in northeastern Alabama, Rosecrans planned a 

feint with part of his command upriver from Chattanooga. He 

ordered Crittenden’s XXI Corps to march over the Cumberland 

Mountains north of the city beginning on 16 August and to 

simulate preparations for a crossing of the Tennessee River in 

several places. Thomas’ XIV Corps would march southeast and 

cross the Tennessee River near Stevenson, Alabama, while XX 

Corps under McCook and the Cavalry Corps led by Stanley 

would make a wide arc to the south, coming up the north bank 

of the Tennessee River to make their crossing near Stevenson. 

Once Thomas and McCook crossed the river, Crittenden’s 

troops would then make their crossing near Chattanooga. 

Rosecrans’ army would then advance over several high ridges 

into northern Georgia to seize the rail lines and cut off Bragg 

from his supplies. While these maneuvers would allow the three 

army corps to advance on separate roads and ease the supply 

problems, these movements also would separate them widely 

in mountainous terrain close to the enemy and make it difficult 

for them to support one another in case of trouble. 

At Chattanooga, the fatigued rebel army attempted to 

regroup. President Davis asked Bragg if he could attack Rosecrans 

if reinforced by General Joseph E. Johnston’s twenty-three 

thousand men in Mississippi, but Bragg preferred to remain 

on the defensive. Additionally, Bragg had to worry about Maj. 

Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s slowly advancing Army of the Ohio, 

then threatening Knoxville, and the East Tennessee and Virginia 

Railroad to the north. Bragg worried that Burnside’s troops would 

join Rosecrans’ army for a combined attack on Chattanooga and 

his army’s supply lines. 

In late July, Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner’s Department of East 

Tennessee was added to Bragg’s overall command, which gave 
18 

Bragg an additional eighteen thousand troops but extended his 

responsibilities to Knoxville. It also added another subordinate to 

the list of those generals in his army who despised Bragg. However, 

Bragg must have been pleased when General Hardee transferred to 

Mississippi in mid-July, removing one of his harshest critics from 

the army. Bragg concentrated Polk’s troops around Chattanooga, 

and stationed Hardee’s old corps—now led by Lt. Gen. Daniel H. 

Hill—between the city and Cleveland, to the east. Buckner’s men 

and a division of the Army of Tennessee encamped along the 

Hiwassee River thirty-five miles to the north, and Bragg extended 

his cavalry to cover the army’s flanks from northern Alabama to 

near Knoxville. 

On 16 August, Rosecrans started moving his army to 

the Tennessee River west and southwest of Chattanooga. 

Simultaneously he initiated XXI Corps’ feint north of the city. 

On 21 August, several of Crittenden’s brigades began creating 

the impression that rafts were being constructed for a river 

crossing upstream. On 21 August, a battery of Indiana artillery 

bombarded the city from across the river, surprising the rebels 

and the town’s residents alike and destroying the Confederate 

pontoon train there. Bragg surmised that these Union movements upriver signaled Rosecrans’ attempt to link his forces with 

those of Burnside near Knoxville. 

On 29 August, with adequate supply depots established 

at Bridgeport and Stevenson, Rosecrans began crossing the 

Tennessee River by boat and pontoon bridges at Caperton’s Ferry 

and Bridgeport, both in Alabama, and Shellmound and Battle 

Creek, in Tennessee. All elements of Rosecrans’ army were safely 

across and moving south by 4 September, with little opposition 

from rebel forces. Crittenden’s troops crossed the Tennessee at 

Shellmound, then marched east toward the city. To the south, XIV 

Corps moved across Sand Mountain to Trenton, Georgia. Farther 

south, McCook’s soldiers crossed Sand and Lookout Mountains 

to Alpine, Georgia, supported by Stanley’s cavalry brigades. Each 

column had to use rough roads across difficult mountainous terrain 

as the Army of the Cumberland pushed toward the Western and 

Atlantic Railroad, Bragg’s main supply route.

Bragg finally recognized that the Union army’s demonstrations north of Chattanooga were designed to deceive him and 

that Rosecrans’ main thrust was to the south. On 7 September, 

he ordered the evacuation of the city, and the next day all of his 
19

troops (including Buckner’s corps) began moving toward La 

Fayette, Georgia, about twenty-five miles south of Chattanooga. 

Crittenden’s troops occupied Chattanooga on 9 September without 

a fight, and Rosecrans telegraphed Halleck, “Chattanooga is ours 

without a struggle and East Tennessee is free.” Rosecrans assumed 

that Bragg’s entire force was in full retreat toward rebel supply 

points at Dalton and Ringgold, Georgia, and that the force could be 

destroyed while in flight. Rebel deserters attested to the desperate 

condition of the retreating Confederates. General Thomas warned 

Rosecrans against pursuing Bragg, since the advancing Union 

forces were spread too far apart to support each other quickly, but 

the triumphant Rosecrans ignored his advice. 

In fact, far from being in flight, Bragg’s rebel army halted east 

of Pigeon Mountain, near La Fayette. Bragg contemplated an attack 

on the advancing Federals, whom he had deceived by planting 

“deserters” with false stories of disorder within the southern ranks. 

The Army of Tennessee was also being reinforced. About eightyfive hundred troops in two divisions arrived from Mississippi in 

late August under Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker and Maj. Gen. 

John C. Breckinridge, which Bragg combined with other troops 

to form a Reserve Corps under Walker. On 1 September, fortyeight hundred additional troops from East Tennessee under the 

command of Brig. Gen. William Preston further strengthened 

Bragg’s ranks. Two Army of Northern Virginia divisions from 

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s corps, those of Maj. Gen. John Bell 

Pontoon bridge crossing, Tennessee River, 1863

(Library of Congress)
20 

Hood and Maj. Gen. Lafayette 

McLaws (under the temporary 

command of Brig. Gen. Joseph 

B. Kershaw), traveled a circuitous route by rail from Virginia 

through Atlanta to strengthen 

Bragg’s forces, although only 

five brigades (7,700 men) of 

these eastern troops arrived 

by 20 September. The Army 

of Tennessee now numbered 

some 67,000 men.

From his headquarters in 

La Fayette, Bragg recognized 

that with the Army of the 

Cumberland’s three infantry 

corps advancing on a wide 

front from Chattanooga to 

Alpine, a distance of about 

fifty miles, the rebels could 

concentrate on an element 

of the Union army and 

destroy it. The Confederate 

commander decided to attack 

part of Thomas’ XIV Corps, 

which was marching eastward 

from Trenton toward La 

Fayette. Bragg learned that 

on 9 September a XIV Corps 

division under Maj. Gen. 

James S. Negley had crossed 

Lookout Mountain at Steven’s 

Gap and entered McLemore’s 

Cove, a valley along West 

Chickamauga Creek hemmed 

in by Lookout and Pigeon 

Mountains. Negley was far 

in advance of any support as 

his men crossed the cove and 

headed for La Fayette. Bragg 

ordered Maj. Gen. Thomas C. 

General Longstreet

(Library of Congress)

General Hood

(Library of Congress)
21

Hindman’s division of Polk’s corps to strike Negley from the north 

on 10 September, and commanded Hill to have Maj. Gen. Patrick 

R. Cleburne’s division attack the Federal front by marching west 

across Pigeon Mountain. General Hill, however, did not order 

the advance, and although Hindman came within four miles of 

Negley’s Union column at Davis’ Cross Roads, he soon stopped 

his advance when he realized Hill was not attacking. Learning 

that Hindman’s Confederates were approaching from the north, 

Negley took up defensive positions near Davis’ Cross Roads and 

called for help. Although Bragg reinforced Hindman with two 

divisions of Buckner’s corps, the rebels still failed to launch an 

attack. Infuriated, Bragg tried again on 11 September to bag the 

Federals. However, Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird’s division joined 

Negley, and the two divisions withdrew from the cove westward to 

Steven’s Gap in Lookout Mountain. Bragg’s attempt to annihilate 

an isolated Federal division had failed. 

Growing frustrated at his subordinates’ inability or unwillingness to obey his orders, Bragg next sought to attack part of 

Crittenden’s troops, moving toward Lee and Gordon’s Mill, on 

West Chickamauga Creek in Georgia about ten miles south 

of Chattanooga. Bragg ordered Polk to attack at dawn on 13 

September with his own and Walker’s Reserve Corps, but by 

morning Crittenden was concentrated on the west side of 

Lee and Gordon’s Mill

(Library of Congress)
22 

Chickamauga Creek, and Polk lost his opportunity to launch an 

assault against the Federals. 

Rosecrans now realized that Bragg was not in full retreat and 

that he had narrowly avoided a trap. The Union commanding 

general began frantic efforts to concentrate his dispersed corps 

near Chattanooga, thus abandoning his offensive against Bragg’s 

supply lines. On 12 September, he ordered McCook and Stanley 

to move north from Alpine to join Thomas at Steven’s Gap. Both 

corps were to link up with Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. 

Once united, the combined forces of the Army of the Cumberland 

would join Granger’s reserves at Rossville, Georgia, at a gap in 

Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga, and then retire to that city. 

McCook’s troops met up with Thomas’ corps on 17 September, 

then began to move toward Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Within a 

few days, Rosecrans would have about fifty-eight thousand men 

concentrated near the mill on West Chickamauga Creek.

The Battle of Chickamauga

Rosecrans’ concern for his army’s safety was warranted, 

as Bragg planned to launch an attack on the Union position 

from the north along Chickamauga Creek to push the Army 

of the Cumberland south into McLemore’s Cove, where the 

Confederates could trap and destroy it. Even if Rosecrans got away, 

Bragg could recapture Chattanooga, forcing the Federals back 

across the Tennessee River. Confirmation that reinforcements 

were en route from Virginia further encouraged Bragg to attack 

Rosecrans, a decision supported by his corps commanders. Bragg 

decided to have Polk’s and Hill’s corps demonstrate against the 

Federals to keep them in place around Lee and Gordon’s Mill, the 

Army of the Cumberland’s left flank. Meanwhile, a Confederate 

flanking force made up of Buckner’s and Walker’s corps, along 

with a provisional division under Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, 

would cross Chickamauga Creek to the north at several fords and 

bridges, wheel to the left and attack southward. Rebel cavalry 

under Forrest and Wheeler would secure the army’s flanks. If 

Confederate troops could reach and hold the La Fayette Road 

north of the Union army, they could prevent Rosecrans from 

reaching Chattanooga. Bragg’s force numbered about sixty-eight 

thousand men on the eve of the offensive.

On the morning of 18 September, Johnson’s Confederates 

made the northernmost crossing of Chickamauga Creek at Reed’s 
23

Bridge, opposed by Union Col. Robert Minty’s stubborn cavalry 

brigade for much of the day. Johnson’s rebels were joined by newly 

arrived troops from Hood’s division of the Army of Northern 

Virginia, and Hood assumed command of the combined force. 

Once across the stream, Hood marched the column south in the 

direction of Alexander’s Bridge, where Walker’s Reserve Corps 

was to cross and turn south as well. Walker’s men met stiff opposition at the bridge around 1200 from Colonel Wilder’s mounted 

infantry, detached from XIV Corps. Walker’s troops had to use 

a ford north of the bridge to get across the creek at about 1630 

and flank Wilder’s men. With rebels now on the west side of 

Chickamauga Creek near Reed’s Bridge and Alexander’s Bridge, 

Minty and Wilder both retired toward Lee and Gordon’s Mill. 

The Southerners did not advance to the La Fayette Road, but 

Buckner did cross the creek late in the day at two fords south of 

Alexander’s Bridge. 

Battle of Chickamauga, by Alfred R. Waud (Library of Congress)
24

Despite the delays caused by Union resistance and confusing 

marches, Bragg finally had much of his army one mile from the 

Federal’s left flank by dusk, ready to move south through thick 

woods near Lee and Gordon’s Mill the following day. He ordered 

Polk and Buckner to cross the creek the following morning with all 

of their troops, to join Hood and Walker in the attack.

Bragg’s plan to crush the Federals with a flank attack was 

based on his assumption that Crittenden’s XXI Corps occupied 

the northernmost position of Rosecrans’ army along La Fayette 

Road at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. During the night of 18 September, 

however, Rosecrans ordered Thomas to move three of his XIV 

Corps divisions north of Crittenden’s troops at the mill. That 

evening, Thomas marched his men north on the Dry Valley Road, 

which ran parallel to the La Fayette Road less than a mile to the 

west, leaving Negley’s division along Chickamauga Creek south 

of the mill. Thomas then shifted his troops over to the La Fayette 

Road and occupied ground around the Kelly farm, about two miles 

north of Lee and Gordon’s Mill. By late evening, this put Thomas’ 

Federals on the right flank of the unsuspecting Confederates west 

of Chickamauga Creek, who intended to hit Crittenden’s men at 

the mill early the next day (Map 2).

While Thomas led his three divisions to the Kelly farm 

area, a brigade of Granger’s Reserve Corps under Col. Daniel 

McCook moved south from its position at McAfee’s Church 

near Rossville, about two miles to the north of the Kelly farm. 

Early on 19 September near Jay’s Mill, west of Reed’s Bridge, 

McCook’s men clashed with some rebel troopers, damaged the 

bridge, then retired toward Rossville under Granger’s orders. As 

the men began their return march, McCook met with Thomas, 

and informed the XIV Corps’ commander that one enemy 

cavalry brigade was west of Chickamauga Creek and vulnerable to attack. Thomas decided to strike the rebels—under Brig. 

Gen. Henry Davidson, of Forrest’s corps—at once, and sent Brig. 

Gen. John M. Brannan’s division down the Reed’s Bridge Road, 

where it struck the Confederates in thickly wooded terrain at 

about 0730, one-half mile west of Jay’s Mill. Here, the Federals 

were stopped by Forrest’s troopers and two brigades of Walker’s 

reserve force, but the Southerners could make little headway 

against the Union infantry, the presence of which showed Bragg 

that Rosecrans’ left flank was no longer at Lee and Gordon’s 

Mill but farther north. 
Map 2

G R A N G E R

C R I T T E N D E N

T H O

M

A S

M c C O

O

K

W I L D E R

M I N T Y

N E G L E Y

D . H . H I L L

F O R R E S T

H O O D

P

O L K

W A L K E R

B U C K N E R

to Chattanooga

to Steven’s Gap to La Fayette

to Ringgold

McFarland’s Gap

M I S S I O N A R Y R I D G E

West Chickamauga Cr

West Chickamauga Cr

Lee and 

Gordon’s Mill

Kelly Snodgrass

Poe

Brotherton

Widow

Glenn

Viniard

McAfee’s Church

Jay’s Mill

Alexander’s Bridge

Thedford’s Ford

Dalton’s Ford

Reed’s Bridge

Dyer’s Bridge

Reed’s Ford

LA FAYETTE ROAD

DRY VALLEY ROAD

Rossville

Crawsh Spring

Confederate Position

Union Position

MIDNIGHT

18 September 1863

CHICKAMAUGA BAT TLEFIELD

0 1 2

Miles
26 

As the morning went on, more troops from each army 

became involved in the fighting near Jay’s Mill. Thomas committed 

General Baird’s division to the struggle, sending the troops into 

action south of Brannan’s men, who were running low on ammunition. On the rebel side, Bragg directed Walker to send in Brig. 

Gen. St. John R. Liddell’s division of two brigades against the 

Federals along Alexander’s Bridge Road. Liddell’s sudden attack 

near the Winfrey farm, south of Jay’s Mill, routed Baird’s division 

and captured much of its artillery. General Brannan, however, 

stymied the rebels’ advance with a counterattack of his own from 

his position to the north, and not only drove Liddell’s troops back 

but also recaptured Baird’s lost cannons. Assisting Brannan’s men 

was a division of XX Corps under Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson, 

which Rosecrans redeployed from McLemore’s Cove on the Union 

right flank.

Johnson’s Federals did not have long to wait before they 

too received a powerful attack. Earlier in the day, Confederate 

Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham crossed Chickamauga Creek 

at Dalton’s Ford with his large Tennessee division from Polk’s 

corps, and by 1100 these soldiers were located south of Liddell’s 

retreating rebels and available for action. On Bragg’s command, 

Cheatham’s men advanced through dense brush northwestward to 

the Brotherton Road, which ran east-west from Jay’s Mill to the La 

Fayette Road, pushing back some of Baird’s Federals as they came 

through the woods. Soon, however, Cheatham’s brigades were hit 

by Johnson’s Union division, which Thomas ordered to advance 

eastward toward the Winfrey farm. Johnson’s bluecoats stopped 

the surging Confederates and were soon joined by reinforcements 

sent north by Rosecrans, including Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer’s 

XXI Corps division, which deployed on Johnson’s right (south) 

along the Brotherton Road, and that of Brig. Gen. Horatio P. Van 

Cleve, also of XXI Corps, along the La Fayette Road. 

At about 1400, fighting broke out south of Cheatham’s 

position when the Union Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’ division 

of XX Corps moved north and met General Rosecrans north of 

Lee and Gordon’s Mill. The Federal commander directed Davis to 

move northward in support of Van Cleve, farther up the La Fayette 

Road, and soon the division entered the woods where Davis could 

hear heavy firing. Almost immediately Davis’ lead regiments were 

attacked by advancing rebels of Bushrod Johnson’s division east 

of Rosecrans’ headquarters at the Widow Glenn house along Dry 
27

Valley Road. The Confederates pressed Davis hard and forced his 

division back. Both sides committed more troops to the fray. Fierce 

fighting swirled around the Viniard farm in particular, located one 

mile north of Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the La Fayette Road. The 

Union lines along the La Fayette Road eventually were stabilized 

by the arrival of additional divisions of Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood 

(XXI Corps) and Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (XX Corps), as well 

as Wilder’s brigade.

Late in the afternoon, Bragg called on Maj. Gen. Alexander P. 

Stewart of Buckner’s corps to march north from Thedford’s Ford 

and fall in on Cheatham’s left (south) flank, still aligned on the 

south side of the Brotherton Road. Stewart attacked westward 

with his several brigades in column, hitting the Federals on the 

La Fayette Road at its intersection with the Brotherton Road. This 

powerful assault smashed into Van Cleve’s division and other 

nearby Federal units at about 1600, and soon Stewart’s rebels were 

joined by a brigade of Hood’s command under Col. James Sheffield 

to their right. The leading troops of Stewart’s attack crossed the La 

Fayette Road, splitting Rosecrans’ forces in half. Lacking support, 

however, these Confederate troops had to withdraw under heavy 

pressure from advancing Federals. Still looking for a decisive blow 

against the Federal left to cut off Rosecrans from Chattanooga, 

Bragg ordered Hill’s corps to cross the Chickamauga at Dalton’s 

Ford and Alexander’s Bridge, and proceed north, away from the 

army’s original position at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. 

The final action of the day came at about 1800, when one 

of Hill’s divisions under Cleburne moved to the north end of the 

battlefield and launched an attack “in magnificent style” toward 

the Winfrey farm from Jay’s Mill Road behind Walker’s exhausted 

troops (Map 3). Cleburne’s men hit Johnson’s Federals, along with 

Baird’s division on Johnson’s left (north) flank, and the fighting 

quickly became confused and chaotic in the smoky woods and 

growing darkness near a clearing at the Winfrey farm. By 2100, 

Cleburne’s attack had driven the Federals back to the Kelly farm, 

on the north edge of the day’s battleground, where General Thomas 

had been working to establish a new defensive line that evening. 

The Army of the Cumberland had suffered serious casualties during the day’s battle, as Rosecrans had shifted brigades 

and divisions to parry Bragg’s attack on his left. While the ad hoc 

deployment of his units disturbed the army’s organization, the 

Federals now controlled two roads leading over Missionary Ridge 
Map 3

B A I R D

JOHNSON

TURCHIN

CRUFT

G R O S E

H A Z E N

H A R K E R

K I N G VA N C L E V E

S H E R I D A N

W I L D E R

L Y T L E

B A R N E S

D A V I S

N E G L E Y

B R A N N A N

F O R R E S T

WALKER

H O O D

B . R . J O H N S O N

B R E C K I N R I D G E

C H E A T H A M

C L E B U R N E

S T E W A R T

L I D D E L L

P R E S T O N

H I N D M A N

West Chickamauga Cr

to Chattanooga

to Rossville

to McFarland’s Gap

to Crawsh Spring

Lee and 

Gordon’s Mill

Kelly

Snodgrass

Cloud

Poe

Brotherton

Widow Glenn

Viniard

Jay’s Mill

Alexander’s Bridge

Thedford’s Ford

Dalton’s Ford

Reed’s Ford

D R Y V A L L E Y R O A D

BROTHERTON ROAD

LA FAYETTE ROAD

Confederate Position

Confederate Attack

Confederate Movement

Union Position

Union Counterattack

EVENING

19 September 1863

CHICKAMAUGA BAT TLEFIELD

0 1

Mile
29

toward Rossville and Chattanooga and were no longer in danger 

of being trapped by Bragg’s turning movement. Rosecrans and his 

chief lieutenants gathered at the Widow Glenn house to discuss 

the next day’s possibilities. A retreat to Chattanooga was ruled out 

due to the proximity of enemy forces. Rosecrans was also hesitant 

to abandon the thousands of Union wounded at field hospitals 

at Crawfish Spring to the south of Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Due to 

heavy casualties suffered throughout the day, none of the officers 

present recommended a Federal counterattack. Rather, Rosecrans 

decided to remain in place, with Thomas fortifying his position on 

the Union left at the Kelly farm, McCook’s troops deployed to the 

south with his right near the Widow Glenn house, and Crittenden’s 

two divisions in reserve behind the army’s center. General Granger 

was at McAfee’s Church with three brigades of the Reserve Corps, 

about three miles north of Thomas’ lines.

Bragg decided to continue his attack on Rosecrans’ army 

the next day, 20 September. Of about sixty-six thousand soldiers, 

Bragg had twelve fresh brigades available to him, and received 

word that General Longstreet would soon join him with reinforcements. To better coordinate his army’s movements in the dense 

woodland, Bragg divided his army into two wings. General Polk 

led the right wing on the northern side of the rebel line, made 

up of the corps of Walker and Hill, in addition to Cheatham’s 

division. Longstreet was assigned the left wing, which included his 

own troops under Hood, Buckner’s corps, and Hindman’s division. 

Bragg planned to have Polk attack the Federal left flank at dawn, 

to push the Union troops south, away from Chattanooga. As the 

Union lines collapsed, the rebel left wing would join in the attack 

to overwhelm Rosecrans’ army in a decisive southern victory. 

However, due to the confusing terrain, darkness, and ineffective 

staff work that night, several key leaders, including Generals Hill 

and Breckinridge, did not receive orders until late, forcing Bragg 

to delay the attack several hours.

On the opposite side of the smoky battleground, Rosecrans 

also made preparations during the early morning of 20 September. 

He repositioned units of XX and XXI Corps, and anchored his 

southern flank on the Widow Glenn house. Riding north, he saw 

that Thomas’ men were positioned in a half circle to the east of 

the Kelly farm, with both flanks resting on the La Fayette Road. 

Thomas’ lines did not cover the key intersection of that road with 

the McFarland’s Gap Road, which would have to be used to move 
30 

to Chattanooga if the army retreated. Thomas asked for Negley’s 

division, detached from his corps to the south, to join him so he 

could secure the road junction. Rosecrans ordered that division 

to join Thomas, and for General Crittenden to replace Negley’s 

troops. Crittenden sent Wood’s division to fill the lines, and Negley 

marched north at 0930.

At the same time, the Confederate assault on Thomas’ 

fortified position on the Union left finally began. Breckinridge’s 

division hit the Federals along the La Fayette Road, south of the 

McFarland’s Gap Road and shattered the Union line in that sector. 

Now in Thomas’ rear, the rebel troops rushed southward but 

were thwarted by two Union brigades arriving at the Kelly farm. 

Breckinridge’s flank attack was supposed to have been supported 

by Cleburne’s division to the south, but Cleburne’s troops could 

make no headway against Thomas’ men firing from behind strong 

log breastworks, hastily constructed during the night, and some 

of the Confederate units lost alignment in the smoky forest and 

confusion of the assault. Although additional rebel brigades from 

Polk’s wing attacked Thomas’ Union lines that morning, all were 

repulsed by noon with heavy losses in what General Hill called “an 

obstinate contest.”

The strong Confederate attacks against the Kelly farm defenses 

alarmed Thomas, prompting him to make urgent calls for more 

troops to secure the Army of the Cumberland’s left flank. After 

a confusing sequence of misunderstandings among several of the 

Union army’s generals on the south end of the lines—including 

Rosecrans, McCook, and several division commanders—General 

Wood withdrew his division from the Union line near the 

Brotherton farm at 1100 and moved behind Maj. Gen. Joseph 

J. Reynolds’ division (XIV Corps), to his north. Unknown to 

Rosecrans, Wood’s movement left a dangerous 600-yard gap in 

the Union line, into which other Federal troops should have been 

posted. As he proceeded northward to support Reynolds in the 

center, Wood soon encountered General Thomas, who ordered 

him to help shore up the Union left flank.

While the Federals shifted more troops to the north in 

response to rebel assaults on Thomas’ lines, Bragg struggled 

to coordinate his army’s morning attacks. At Bragg’s urging, 

General Stewart’s three brigades hit the Union lines north of the 

Brotherton Road at the Poe farm, although he failed to notify his 

wing commander, Longstreet, of his initiative. Some of Stewart’s 
31

troops pushed across the La Fayette Road, broke Brannan’s right 

flank, and routed Van Cleve’s division in Brannan’s rear. Federal 

troops, however, were able to push Stewart’s Confederates back to 

their starting point with heavy losses.

After Stewart’s repulse, Longstreet launched a powerful 

attack just after 1100, with his right aligned on the Brotherton 

Road. Hood led the combined divisions in column of Bushrod 

Johnson, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws (from the Army of Northern 

Virginia), and his own men under the temporary command of 

Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law. Hindman’s division deployed south of 

Hood’s troops (Map 4). These rebels advanced against the Union 

soldiers west of the La Fayette Road on the southern end of the 

battlefield, as many Federal units were moving north to reinforce 

Thomas’ position. Johnson’s men struck the Union position just 

where Wood’s division had left a gap in Rosecrans’ line moments 

before. “On they came like an angry flood,” wrote one Union 

officer. The Confederates hit Brannan’s and Reynolds’ divisions 

near the Brotherton and Poe farms. Hindman’s Confederate 

division soon emerged from the woods to Johnson’s left, into 

open fields west of the La Fayette Road, striking Sheridan’s and 

Davis’ Federal divisions. Longstreet’s successful assault routed 

thousands of Union troops and captured scores of wagons and 

Union artillery pieces as the rebels managed to reach the Dry 

Valley Road and create panic in the Federal rear. General Hill 

wrote a vivid description of the stunning Confederate onslaught: 

“On they rushed, shouting, yelling, running over batteries, 

capturing trains, taking prisoners, seizing the headquarters of 

the Federal commander, at the Widow Glenn’s.”

Some Union troops managed limited resistance to 

Longstreet’s assault. Several artillery batteries around the Dyer 

field briefly halted Johnson’s attack, and the Union brigade of Col. 

Bernard Laiboldt of Sheridan’s division made a desperate charge 

against part of Hindman’s rebels east of the Dry Valley Road. 

Sheridan’s other two brigades also attempted to hold back the 

tide of onrushing Confederates, but soon had to retreat in confusion. “Fugitives, wounded, caissons, escort, ambulances, thronged 

through the narrow pathways,” a Federal officer observed. His 

shattered men, along with Davis’ demoralized division, made their 

way to McFarland’s Gap, en route to Chattanooga. Rosecrans, 

McCook, and Crittenden also left the field with the fleeing soldiers, 

unable to rally the troops. Although Wilder’s mounted brigade on 
Map 4

BRANNAN

B A I R D

J O H N S O N

W I L D E R

R E Y N O L D S W O O D

DAVIS

NEGLEY

V A N C L E V E

ROSECRANS

S H E R I D A N

C L E B U R N E

L I D D E L L

W A L K E R

B R E C K I N R I D G E

C H E A T H A M

H O O D

P R E S T O N

BRAGG

S T E W A R T

B . R .J O H N S O N

H I N D M A N

F O R R E S T

to Rossville

to McFarland’s Gap

West Chickamauga Cr

Kelly Snodgrass

Cloud

Poe

Brotherton

Widow Glenn

Viniard

Jay’s Mill

Alexander’s Bridge

L A F A Y E T T E R O A D

D R Y V A L L E Y R O A D

Confederate Position

Confederate Attack

Confederate Retreat

Union Position

Union Counterattack

Union Retreat

LATE MORNING

20 September 1863

CHICKAMAUGA BAT TLEFIELD

0 1

Mile
33

the far right of the Union line repulsed a small Alabama brigade 

of Hindman’s division, Wilder’s men could not follow up on this 

success and soon left the field as well. 

General Longstreet “had now swept away all organized opposition in his front,” noted a Union witness. Longstreet decided not 

to turn south in accordance with Bragg’s original battle plan but 

to attack northward against Thomas’ position around the Kelly 

farm. The Confederates could not leave Thomas in their rear, and 

by noon Longstreet wheeled Hood and Hindman to the right, 

facing north, and advanced upon the Federals. General Hood was 

severely wounded as he rode among his attacking divisions and 

was no longer able to lead his men.

While much of the southern end of the Union line had 

collapsed and was in flight, other Federal units escaped Longstreet’s 

onslaught by moving north, including two brigades of Wood’s 

division that had created the fatal gap in Union lines, and men 

from the divisions of Brannan, Negley, and Van Cleve. Many of 

these soldiers from a mix of shattered brigades and divisions took 

up defensive positions on Horseshoe Ridge, wooded hills immediately west of the Kelly farm and the La Fayette Road, including 

Snodgrass Hill, closest to La Fayette Road. To steady and encourage 

the troops on the ridge, General Thomas rode among his men in 

his stoic, confident manner, for which he would become known as 

the “Rock of Chickamauga.”

Beginning about 1300, Longstreet’s divisions (except Stewart’s) 

launched a series of hard-hitting but disjointed assaults against the 

Federals on Horseshoe Ridge over a six-hour period (Map 5). With 

Hood out of action, the rebels had difficulty coordinating their 

offensives throughout the afternoon. Longstreet and his generals 

were also unaware of a 500-yard gap in the Union lines between 

Federal units around the Kelly farm and those on Snodgrass Hill, 

which Thomas had no troops to fill. Thomas’ Federals managed to 

repulse repeated southern charges against their lines but quickly 

began to deplete their ammunition. The far right of the Union 

line was the scene of bitter hand-to-hand fighting, and it appeared 

that Longstreet’s Confederates would overpower the hard-pressed 

bluecoats and make for Thomas’ rear. “The bayonet was used,” one 

witness recalled, “and men were killed and wounded with clubbed 

muskets.” 

Just in time, however, Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman’s fortyfive hundred Federal troops from General Granger’s Reserve 
Map 5

THOMAS

W I L D E R

S T E E D M A N

P O L K

L O N G S T R E E T

to Chattanooga

to Steven’s Gap to La Fayette

to Ringgold

McFarland’s Gap

M I S S I O N A R Y R I D G E

We st Chi c k a mauga Cr

West Chickamaug a Cr

Lee and 

Gordon’s Mill

Kelly

Snodgrass

Poe

Brotherton

Widow Glenn

Viniard

McAfee’s Church

Jay’s Mill

Alexander’s Bridge

Thedford’s Ford

Dalton’s Ford

Reed’s Bridge

Dyer’s Bridge

Reed’s Ford

LA FAYETTE ROAD

D R Y V A L L E Y R O A D

Rossville

Crawsh Spring

Confederate Position

Confederate Attack

Union Position

Union Retreat

AFTERNOON

20 September 1863

CHICKAMAUGA BAT TLEFIELD

0 1 2

Mile
35

Corps arrived to rescue the right flank, bringing with them almost 

one hundred thousand rounds of ammunition for Thomas’ beleaguered men. Granger had heard the fighting from his position near 

Rossville Gap, and without orders marched to the sound of battle 

with all but one of his brigades. “Swift was the charge and terrible 

the conflict,” Rosecrans wrote of Steedman’s arrival on the field. 

To reinforce the assault on the ridge, Longstreet requested 

reinforcements from Bragg, although he had not deployed his 

own reserves of Preston’s fresh division into the fight. Rather than 

strip Polk’s right wing of troops, Bragg instead ordered the former 

bishop to attack Thomas’ Kelly farm lines “with his whole force.” 

Late that afternoon, Polk’s Confederate troops under Walker, 

Cleburne, and Breckenridge attacked the Federals behind their 

strong breastworks around the Kelly field “with alacrity,” while 

at 1600 Preston’s Confederates finally got into action against 

Snodgrass Hill from the south. 

General Rosecrans, who had reached Chattanooga at 1540, 

ordered Thomas to abandon his defensive positions and retreat 

to Rossville. Under heavy pressure from simultaneous attacks by 

Longstreet and Polk, Thomas gave the necessary orders to withdraw 

via McFarland’s Gap at about 1630, while his men were still under 

attack. Before he rode over to the Kelly farm to oversee the retreat of 

his troops there, he tasked Granger with overseeing the withdrawal 

of Union troops on Snodgrass Hill. Granger did not remain long on 

the high ground and soon left the field without giving further instructions to his subordinates. Without orders to retire, three Union regiments held their ground obstinately until captured by Confederate 

troops swarming over the high ground. Sheridan’s division, which 

had retreated through McFarland’s Gap earlier in the day, attempted 

to return to the battlefield using Rossville Gap to the north, but the 

division was unable to arrive in time to support Thomas. 

Victorious Southern units cheered the capture of the Union 

position as the Federals fled. “Disorganized masses of men were 

hurrying to the rear,” wrote General Hill, “batteries of artillery were 

inextricably mixed with trains of wagons; disorder and confusion 

pervaded the broken ranks struggling to get on.” Heavy casualties, 

disorganized units, and approaching darkness, however, precluded 

a rebel pursuit of Thomas’ fleeing bluecoats. 

The battle had been costly for both belligerents. Bragg’s losses 

were over 18,000 men (2,312 killed, 14,674 wounded, and 1,468 

captured or missing), replacements for which would be difficult to 
36 

find. Rosecrans lost over 16,000 men (1,657 killed, 9,756 wounded, 

and 4,757 captured or missing), and 600 of his wounded soldiers 

had to be abandoned in nearby field hospitals and were captured 

by Bragg’s army. These were the highest losses of any battle in the 

Western Theater during the war and, after Gettysburg, the second 

highest of the war overall. 

The Chattanooga Campaign

Although Rosecrans feared a rebel attack on 21 September, 

Bragg did not actively pursue the Federals after the Battle of 

Chickamauga. In fact, he seemed to doubt that his army had won a 

victory. Some Confederate officers criticized him for not pressing 

the retreating Union army: “What does he fight battles for?” 

pondered General Forrest. Grateful for the reprieve, Rosecrans 

had regrouped his army at Chattanooga by the evening of the 

twenty-first and begun organizing the city’s defenses. 

Chattanooga was a rail junction town of two thousand 

people, situated in a low plain alongside the Tennessee River in the 

Cumberland Mountains. Two miles east of town was Missionary 

Ridge, which stretched about fifteen miles from Chickamauga 

Creek on its north end into Georgia to the south. South of 

Chattanooga was Lookout Mountain, a high ridge beginning just 

downstream from the city and running eighty-five miles south 

into Georgia. The northern peak of Lookout Mountain was a 

huge promontory, some eighteen hundred feet high, overlooking 

the city and its environs. On the opposite side of the Tennessee 

River from Chattanooga was Walden’s Ridge, a rugged mountain 

crossed by a few poor roads.

Despite the losses and defeat the North suffered at 

Chickamauga, the morale of the Army of the Cumberland’s 

soldiers was surprisingly high. General Rosecrans now had about 

thirty-five thousand troops available to him and contemplated 

retreat, but President Lincoln demanded that he defend the city 

and promised reinforcements. The War Department instructed 

the commander of the Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. William 

T. Sherman, to march with twenty thousand men from Vicksburg 

to Chattanooga. Lincoln and Halleck also urged General Burnside 

to march from Knoxville to Rosecrans’ relief, but they could not 

prompt the general to cooperate. Frustrated with Burnside’s recalcitrance, they decided instead to send troops from the Army of 

the Potomac in Virginia. Beginning on 25 September, Maj. Gen. 
37

Oliver O. Howard’s XI Corps and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum’s 

XII Corps, led by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, began a circuitous rail 

passage from Virginia through Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky to the 

Tennessee River. After a journey of 1,159 miles in nine days, these 

23,000 troops would reach Bridgeport in the first week of October. 

As Northern leaders decided on measures to reinforce the 

Army of the Cumberland, General Bragg moved his army into 

positions around the city on 23 September. His men occupied 

Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, and the valley of 

Chattanooga Creek between them. Bragg put Longstreet on the 

left to block Union access around Lookout Mountain and deployed 

Breckenridge’s corps to Missionary Ridge. Polk’s corps occupied 

the right flank of the rebel lines to close off Chattanooga from the 

north. The only remaining Union access to the city was across the 

Tennessee River onto Walden’s Ridge (Map 6).

In no hurry to attack, Bragg sought to rid his army of several 

senior officers with whom he had poor relationships. On 29 

September, he relieved from their commands General Hindman 

for his poor performance at McLemore’s Cove and General Polk 

for failing to attack the Union forces at Chickamauga early on 

20 September. In response, twelve senior generals petitioned 

Confederate President Davis on 4 October to relieve Bragg from 

command. Davis traveled to Bragg’s headquarters to hear the 

officer’s complaints and meet in person with Bragg’s detractors 

on 9 October. When Davis announced he would sustain Bragg, 

the rebel army commander relieved Hill of his duties and reduced 

Buckner from corps to division command. General Hardee superseded Polk and brought one brigade of troops with him from 

Mississippi. Davis convinced Polk to transfer to Mississippi, along 

with Forrest, who refused to serve under Bragg any longer. Bragg 

reorganized his army once Davis departed: Breckenridge became 

a corps commander along with Hardee, and Longstreet retained 

command of his own troops from Lee’s army.

In addition to Bragg’s Confederate forces deployed around 

Chattanooga, Rosecrans’ chief concern was providing for his men, 

mules, and horses as winter approached. The Confederates on the 

high ground dominated Union lines of communication and made 

resupply difficult for the Federals. The main Union supply depot 

was at Bridgeport, on the Tennessee River. Bragg’s army controlled 

the Tennessee River and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad 

from their defensive positions at the base of Lookout Mountain, 
Map 6

WALTHALL

S T E V E N S O

N

H O O K E R

S H E R M A N

24 Nov

24 Nov

W i t h d r a w a 

24 Nov

23–24 Nov

Federal Supply L ine Opened 28 Oct

W a l d e 

R A

C

C

O

O

N

M

O

U

N T A I N

C H A

T

T A

N

O

O

G A V A L L 

Moccasin

Point

Williams

Island

L o o k o u t M o u n t a i n

L o o k o u t V a l l e y

Cummings Gap

to Bridgeport, Union Army Railhead

Brown’s

Ferry

Kelly’s Ferry

Tennessee R

Lookout Cr

Chattanooga Cr

Nashvi l le & Chattanooga RR

Wauhatchie

CHAT T

T E N N E S S E E

G E O R G I A
H A R D E E

B R E C K I N R I D G E

C L E B U R N E

A N

H O

O K E R

T

H

O

M

A S

S H E R M A N

25 Nov

25 Nov

25 Nov

a l N i g h t 2 4 N o v

23 Nov

25 Nov

25 Nov

24–25 Nov

Orchard

Knob

e n ’ s R i d g e

G A 

L L E Y

MISSIONARY RIDGE

MISSIONARY RIDGE

to Ringgold

to Ringgold

Tunnel

Chickamauga Station

Tennessee R

South C h i c kamauga Cr

Western & A t lantic RR

East Tennessee & Georgia RR

Rossville

TANOOGA

Confederate Position

Confederate Withdrawal

Union Position

Union Axis of Advance

Union Attack

Cracker Line Supply Route

23–25 November 1863

BAT TLE OF CHAT TANOOGA

0 1 2 3

Miles

H A R D E E

B R E C K I N R I D G E

C L E B U R N E

A N

H O

O K E R

T

H

O

M

A S

S H E R M A N

25 Nov

25 Nov

25 Nov

a l N i g h t 2 4 N o v

23 Nov

25 Nov

25 Nov

24–25 Nov

Orchard

Knob

e n ’ s R i d g e

G A 

L L E Y

MISSIONARY RIDGE

MISSIONARY RIDGE

to Ringgold

to Ringgold

Tunnel

Chickamauga Station

Tennessee R

South C h i c kamauga Cr

Western & A t lantic RR

East Tennessee & Georgia RR

Rossville

TANOOGA

Confederate Position

Confederate Withdrawal

Union Position

Union Axis of Advance

Union Attack

Cracker Line Supply Route

23–25 November 1863

BAT TLE OF CHAT TANOOGA

0 1 2 3

Miles
40 

on the south bank. The Confederates could also fire on a rough 

wagon road along the north bank as well, making that route a risky 

prospect for bringing in supplies. Another wagon road ran north 

from the city and crossed Walden’s Ridge about sixteen miles 

away, before it turned south along the Sequatchie Valley to Jasper, 

Tennessee, and on to Bridgeport. This sixty-mile route, however, 

was narrow, rough, and almost impassable in wet weather, which 

began in earnest on 1 October. 

On 2 October, Rosecrans cut the soldiers’ rations by onethird, although many regiments had been able to issue only half 

rations—consisting of hardtack and small portions of rancid pork 

and beef—for days before that. The Federals’ lack of provisions 

was made more difficult by an enemy cavalry raid conducted by 

General Wheeler that same day, in which his troopers attacked a 

Union supply train and burned over four hundred wagons. The 

shortage of supplies also meant that Rosecrans would have no 

way to feed the approaching reinforcements from Hooker and 

Sherman once they arrived in the city.

Just as Bragg reshaped his army after Chickamauga, the Union 

high command reorganized its own forces. In late September, 

Rosecrans relieved McCook and Crittenden and consolidated the 

XX Corps and XXI Corps into a new IV Corps, led by General 

Granger. In mid-October, the Lincoln administration promoted 

Grant to command all the territory from the Appalachian 

Mountains to the Mississippi River, called the Military Division 

of the Mississippi, which included the Departments of the 

Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio. This organization 

would facilitate coordination of the Union war effort, particularly 

in Tennessee, where Burnside still showed no inclination to cooperate with Rosecrans.

Lacking confidence in Rosecrans, Stanton ordered Grant to 

go to Chattanooga himself, with the authority to replace Rosecrans 

if he desired. Grant relieved Rosecrans and selected Thomas to 

command the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans immediately 

left Chattanooga for Cincinnati, Ohio, on 20 October, to await 

further orders. Grant, still suffering from a painful leg injury 

resulting from his horse falling on him in September, arrived in 

Chattanooga on 23 October, having traveled the difficult road 

over barren Walden’s Ridge. After promoting General Palmer to 

command XIV Corps, Thomas reluctantly assumed command of 

the Army of the Cumberland.
41

The immediate challenge Grant faced at Chattanooga was 

how to supply the Union troops. Upon his arrival in the city, he 

discussed options with Thomas and Brig. Gen. William F. “Baldy” 

Smith, the Army of the Cumberland’s acting chief engineer. Smith 

recommended opening a route from Chattanooga on a road that 

ran directly west of the city across Moccasin Bend to Brown’s 

Ferry, on the Tennessee River. Across the river, in rebel-held territory, was Raccoon Mountain, over which a road passed through 

Cummings Gap, then on to Kelly’s Ferry, where a pontoon bridge 

was situated to allow passage to the west side of the Tennessee. 

From there, an adequate road led to the Federal supply depot 

at Bridgeport. If Union forces could drive the rebels away from 

Brown’s Ferry and emplace a pontoon bridge there, then secure 

Cummings Gap, supplies could be brought to Chattanooga along 

this route, avoiding the rebel positions at Lookout Mountain. 

Grant approved the plan, and preparations to open this logistical 

route began at once.

Smith’s plan called for securing Brown’s Ferry, while 

Hooker advanced from Bridgeport toward Lookout Mountain. 

On the night of 26–27 October, Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen’s 

brigade floated down the Tennessee River in pontoon boats from 

Chattanooga without being detected by Confederate pickets 

along the south bank of the river. Hazen secured the rebel-held 

southern side of Brown’s Ferry by 0440. The troops fortified their 

landing site, while additional Federals began to come across the 

Tennessee in pontoon boats. A weak Confederate attack failed to 

dislodge Hazen’s men, and after some delays Hooker brought up 

the XI Corps and Brig. Gen. John W. Geary’s division of XII Corps 

from Bridgeport, marching on the south side of the river to clear 

Confederate forces from Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley. 

The Confederate reaction was slow and confused, particularly on 

the part of General Longstreet, whose continued hostility toward 

one of his own brigadiers and General Bragg hindered the effectiveness of his leadership. By the afternoon of 28 October, the new 

supply route dubbed the “Cracker Line” was open, and Hooker 

was positioned on the rebel left flank. 

Unable to starve the Federals into submission, Bragg 

announced a new plan on 3 November. Longstreet’s corps of twelve 

thousand infantry and Wheeler’s five thousand cavalry would 

move north against Knoxville to push Burnside’s Army of the Ohio 

out of East Tennessee and prevent Burnside from marching to join 
42 

Grant. If successful, this plan 

would also clear a rail line to 

Virginia and open a new supply 

line to Bragg’s army. Bragg may 

also have sought to rid the 

army of Longstreet, one of his 

chief detractors. For his part, 

Longstreet objected to the plan. 

He did not believe that Bragg 

had allocated him sufficient 

force to overcome Burnside’s 

twelve thousand infantry and 

eighty-five hundred cavalry. 

Moreover, while the maneuver 

would threaten Grant’s left 

flank, it also weakened the 

main rebel army just as Grant 

was being reinforced by Hooker 

and Sherman. General Bragg 

overruled his subordinate, and 

Longstreet and his men began 

marching toward Knoxville on 

5 November. 

With Bragg’s fighting strength reduced, Grant sought to end 

the siege with an attack by all of his forces, including Sherman’s 

reinforcements, which were still marching toward the city. The plan 

called for Sherman’s troops to move upriver from Chattanooga, 

cross the Tennessee River near the mouth of Chickamauga Creek 

and attack the northern end of Missionary Ridge, the rebel’s right 

flank. Thomas would demonstrate against the Confederate center 

to pin down the enemy. Hooker would attack the Confederate 

left flank at Lookout Mountain and push onward to Rossville, 

where he would turn north on Missionary Ridge and continue his 

advance. If all worked as planned, Bragg would be cut off from 

his rail connections, and his army destroyed. Sherman reached 

Grant’s headquarters on 14 November, but his troops did not begin 

to arrive until 20 November. Under pressure from Lincoln and 

Staunton about Longstreet’s threat to Knoxville, Grant ordered the 

attack to commence on 23 November.

Bragg was uncertain about Grant’s intentions in the city 

below him. When Bragg sent Wheeler’s cavalry with Longstreet to 

General Grant

(Library of Congress)
43

Knoxville, he limited his ability to reconnoiter the opposing Union 

forces. He knew that Hooker and Sherman were approaching 

Chattanooga, but he expected that Sherman’s troops would follow 

Longstreet to Knoxville. Although outnumbered, the Confederates 

occupied what appeared to be strong defensive positions. 

Concerned for his left flank, on 12 November he placed Maj. Gen. 

Carter Stevenson in charge of the defense on Lookout Mountain, 

with his division on the summit and three brigades on a narrow 

plateau that wrapped around the northern end of the mountain 

about halfway down from the peak. The rebel defenses here looked 

stronger than they were, as the chosen positions lacked effective 

fields of fire covering Union avenues of approach. 

Similar problems arose further along the Confederate line. In 

the center, Breckinridge had only sixteen thousand men to cover 

five miles. The situation became worse on 22 November when 

Bragg directed Cleburne’s and Buckner’s divisions to reinforce 

Longstreet at Knoxville, potentially subtracting another eleven 

thousand men from his already weakened host. Federal scouts 

observed these movements and reported on 23 November that two 

enemy divisions were leaving their positions. Grant, worried that 

Bragg was attempting to reinforce Longstreet, ordered Thomas 

to reconnoiter Bragg’s lines with a strong force. Thomas ordered 

General Wood, supported by Sheridan’s division and Howard’s XI 

Corps, to seize Orchard Knob, the forward-most position held by 

Confederate infantry. The troops were to return to their positions 

when Confederate strength and intentions were clear. Thomas 

deployed about twenty thousand soldiers in parade-ground alignment some two thousand yards west of Orchard Knob and overran 

the six hundred stunned Confederate defenders shortly after 1300. 

The hill was so advantageous that Grant and Thomas had Wood’s 

troops remain there.

Surprised by the attack, Bragg recalled Cleburne and 

Buckner, who returned to their former positions after dark that 

evening. Bragg also moved a division from his left to a post 

south of Tunnel Hill on his far right flank under Hardee’s overall 

command. The divisions led by Brig. Gens. William B. Bate and 

Patton Anderson, which had been entrenched in rifle pits along 

the forward base of Missionary Ridge, were ordered to move 

half of their men to the crest. Inexplicably, they were placed in 

positions at the top of the ridge, where they could not directly 

support the units remaining below.
44 

Grant had to adjust his plans as well. The pontoon bridge at 

Brown’s Ferry broke after three of Sherman’s four divisions had 

crossed north of the Tennessee River, leaving Brig. Gen. Peter J. 

Osterhaus’ division in Lookout Valley. Sherman assured Grant that 

his force was sufficient to attack the northern end of Missionary 

Ridge as planned, so Grant reassigned Osterhaus’ men to Hooker, 

which gave the latter three divisions to attack the rebel defenders 

on Lookout Mountain.

Grant wanted Hooker to be cautious. On 24 November, 

he ordered Hooker to “take the point only if his demonstration 

should develop its practicability.” Instead, Hooker ordered his 

forces “to cross Lookout Creek and to assault Lookout Mountain, 

marching down the valley and sweeping every rebel from it.” 

Of Hooker’s three divisions, only General Geary, on the right, 

crossed Lookout Creek without significant opposition, but then 

faced Brig. Gen. Edward C. Walthall’s Confederate brigade. 

Geary pushed along the base of Lookout Mountain, forcing 

Walthall back to the Cravens house, just below the northern end 

of the mountain. This allowed Hooker’s other two divisions to 

cross Lookout Creek close to the river.

On the mountaintop, Brig. Gen. John C. Brown’s Confederate 

brigade was unable to affect the combat below the cliffs. Stevenson 

brought Brig. Gen. John C. Moore’s brigade forward in support 

of Walthall around 1300 and the fighting became heavy. When 

Moore was unsuccessful in holding Geary, now supported by a 

Union brigade under Brig. Gen. Walter C. Whitaker, Stevenson 

committed Brig. Gen. Edmund Pettus’ rebel brigade. At about 

1500, a thick fog cloaked the mountain, which gave the fight 

the name “Battle Above the Clouds.” Both sides continued the 

struggle for the rest of the afternoon, but realizing that his chances 

of restoring the Lookout Mountain position were gone, Bragg 

ordered Stevenson’s units back behind Chattanooga Creek under 

the cover of darkness. That night the rebel defenders retreated 

across Chattanooga Creek, burning the bridges once across.

While Hooker attacked the Confederates at Lookout 

Mountain, Sherman crossed the Tennessee River on the morning 

of 24 November with his three divisions and captured what he 

thought was the north end of Missionary Ridge at Tunnel Hill. 

His inadequate reconnaissance failed to reveal that it was actually 

a completely separate hill. Seeing that Cleburne’s forces were well 

entrenched across a deep ravine to his front, Sherman dug in for 
45

the night. He advised Grant that he would make a dawn attack on 

the enemy’s Tunnel Hill defenses. Intending for Sherman to make 

the main assault on the twenty-fifth, Grant directed Hooker to be 

ready to attack the Confederate left and for Thomas to advance 

against the Confederate center, ready to support either Sherman 

or Hooker as the situation developed. Specifically, Grant ordered 

Thomas to “either carry the rifle pits and ridge directly in front 

of [Sherman] or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy 

may require.” 

Bragg queried his two corps commanders that night about 

what the Army of Tennessee should do. Hardee counseled retreat, 

but Breckinridge convinced Bragg that the position on Missionary 

Ridge was too strong to give up. On the morning of the twentyfifth, Bragg withdrew Stevenson’s division from his left flank to 

bolster Cleburne’s men against Sherman’s anticipated assault.

Sherman began his assault against Missionary Ridge at 

0930. Cleburne’s infantry and artillery put up a stout defense 

from their strong works on the slopes of Tunnel Hill. Sherman’s 

veterans could make no progress against the Confederates, 

so Grant looked to the southern end of the battlefield to add 

pressure to Bragg’s thin line on the ridge. He ordered Hooker 

Battle of Lookout Mountain, by Kurz & Allison

(Library of Congress)
46 

to advance against the rebel’s left flank on Missionary Ridge, 

and then to turn north. Hooker began moving east at about 

1000 but was delayed crossing Chattanooga Creek, which had 

to be bridged. Hooker left his artillery and wagons behind and 

continued with his infantry, but the holdup cost him three hours. 

His men finally reached Rossville Gap at the southern end of the 

rebel lines at about 1530. Osterhaus’ Federals arrived just before 

a Confederate brigade commanded by Col. James T. Holtzclaw 

appeared under orders from General Breckinridge to hold the 

gap. The rebels were too late. Aware that he had now outflanked 

the Confederate line, Hooker attacked to the north along the 

ridge and on its slopes. Holtzclaw tried unsuccessfully to resist 

the Union onslaught but was pushed back and surrounded, and 

seven hundred of his men surrendered.

Agitated by Sherman’s lack of success at Tunnel Hill and by 

the slowness of Hooker’s advance on Rossville Gap, Grant at 1400 

ordered Thomas to move the Army of the Cumberland forward 

to capture the enemy rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge. 

At about 1530, Thomas’ attack began with twenty-three thousand 

men from the divisions of Baird, Wood, Sheridan, and Johnson 

crossing open ground toward the ridge in what Grant called “a 

grand panorama.” The Federals easily took the undermanned line 

of rifle pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, but the attackers found 

themselves under rifle and artillery fire from the Confederate 

positions on the ridgeline above them. Although the Union high 

command had not ordered the attack to continue up the ridge, 

many junior officers were unwilling to remain under enemy fire 

and spontaneously led their men forward up the steep slope. 

Because of the shape of the hill, Bragg’s artillery and infantry on 

the crest were unable to fire effectively on the advancing Federals 

the higher they climbed. Seeing the unauthorized continuation of 

the attack up the ridge, Grant angrily demanded to know who had 

ordered it. When Thomas and Granger told him that they did not 

know, Grant responded tersely, “Somebody will suffer if they don’t 

stay there.”

Grant need not have worried. Thomas’ soldiers advanced 

to the ridgetop in an unstoppable wave. Because Breckenridge’s 

Confederate defenders were too few and their defenses poorly 

planned, they were unable to resist the Federals. By 1630, the 

impromptu assault had shattered the center of Bragg’s line. 

Thousands of rebel soldiers fled the field to the south and east 
47

“in a panic I had never before witnessed,” reported Bragg. Grant 

confirmed the chaotic nature of the moment, writing that “the 

retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate, and the 

panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their 

men.” Most of the disordered rebels retreated to West Chickamauga 

Creek and the railroad beyond it.

On 26 November, Bragg’s troops continued retreating toward 

the rail junction at Dalton, Georgia. Grant ordered a pursuit the 

following day. Hooker’s men marched off after the enemy but 

encountered Cleburne’s division, which occupied defensive positions between Dalton and Chattanooga. Cleburne ordered his 

troops to hold their line until their wagons and artillery were safe, 

then he waited until the Federals were almost upon his position 

before opening fire. Surprised, Hooker tried to push through, 

but Cleburne’s four thousand soldiers and two cannons defied 

Hooker’s twelve thousand men for five hours until the Southerners 

retired to Dalton. 

Union casualties at Chattanooga were 5,824 (753 killed, 

4,722 wounded, and 349 missing) of about 56,000 engaged. 

Bragg reported casualties of 6,667 (361 killed, 2,160 wounded, 

and 4,146 missing, mostly prisoners) of about 44,000, although 

Grant counted 6,142 prisoners taken at the battle. Bragg blamed 

Battle of Chattanooga, by Thure de Thulstrup

(Library of Congress)
48 

Breckinridge for the defeat, relieving him from command 

and accusing him of drunkenness during the battle. At the 

same time, President Davis accepted Bragg’s resignation from 

command of the Army of Tennessee on 1 December for what 

the general called “the disaster.” Hardee acted as the temporary 

army commander until General Joseph E. Johnston replaced 

him at the end of the month. 

The Knoxville Campaign

Although President Lincoln and his advisers were pleased 

with the news of the Union victory, they did not overlook other 

important objectives. Lincoln’s message of congratulations to 

Grant after Missionary Ridge said only: “Well done. Many thanks 

to all. Remember Burnside.” 

Indeed, Knoxville was still threatened by rebel forces under 

Longstreet. On 16 November, nine days before Thomas’ men 

swept up Missionary Ridge, General Burnside had marched 

from Knoxville to Campbell’s Station, about fifteen miles to the 

west, with the intent of delaying the Confederate advance. After 

repulsing Longstreet’s attempt at a double envelopment, Burnside 

had led his men back to Knoxville the following day. 

Longstreet had intended to attack the city on 20 November but 

decided to wait for reinforcements. The delay lasted a week. Short 

of supplies and lacking the heavy artillery and engineers needed to 

conduct a siege, he decided to launch a surprise assault. His reconnaissance of the Union defenses led him to conclude that the only 

vulnerable place in the position was at Fort Sanders, which topped 

a steep hill northwest of Knoxville. Consequently, on 29 November, 

following a brief artillery bombardment, three Southern brigades 

attacked the fort. The Confederate troops encountered difficult 

obstacles as they advanced, including a Union innovation, entanglements made by connecting tree stumps with telegraph wire in 

the cleared ground in front of the embankments. Farther on, the 

attackers came upon a ditch twelve feet wide and from four to ten 

feet deep with steep sides. Crossing the ditch under devastating 

Union fire was impossible, particularly since the Confederates 

failed to prepare scaling ladders. “Flesh and blood could not stand 

the storm of shot and shell that was poured upon them, and they 

soon broke in confused retreat,” reported a Union officer. The 

costly attack ended in just twenty minutes, with the Confederates 

suffering 813 casualties and the Union defenders 13. 
49

As he planned his next move, Longstreet learned that Grant 

had defeated Bragg at Chattanooga. Although ordered to rejoin 

Bragg, he decided to maintain the siege of Knoxville as long as 

possible and then to rejoin Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. He 

remained outside of Knoxville until 4 December, when word 

that Sherman was approaching with twenty thousand Federals 

led him to abandon his positions and move to Rogersville, sixtyfive miles to the northeast. On 9 December he went into winter 

quarters. With the threat to the city ended, Sherman returned to 

Chattanooga immediately with the bulk of his army. 

Analysis

The operations in Tennessee in 1863 were significant on several 

counts. Not only had the Union gained control over most of the 

state, but by seizing Chattanooga, it also had gained an important 

base from which to invade the Deep South in 1864, an endeavor 

that would culminate in the capture of Atlanta in September of 

that year. The campaign also highlighted the growing strategic 

significance of railroads, as first the Confederacy, and then more 

spectacularly the Union, moved large numbers of troops rapidly 

Fort Sanders, Knoxville, Tennessee

(Library of Congress)
50 

from the Eastern to the Western Theater in bids to gain a decisive 

advantage. Finally, the campaign illustrated the timeless importance of leadership in determining the outcome of military operations. Talent and mediocrity were demonstrated on both sides, but 

ultimately it was the Union that was able to put together a winning 

team. As a result of the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns, 

President Lincoln was able to identify two men—Generals Grant 

and Sherman—upon whom he could rely to bring the war to a 

successful conclusion. President Lincoln then empowered these 

men to overcome the dysfunctional command arrangements that 

had often bedeviled Union operations in the past, first by putting 

Grant in charge of all Federal forces in the Western Theater in 

October 1863, and then by making him commander of all Federal 

armies in March 1864, with Sherman taking over command of the 

Western Theater. By contrast, the Confederacy proved unable to 

rationalize its command structure and bring talent to the fore. 

The mutual antipathy of Bragg, Polk, Hardee, Buckner, and 

Longstreet impeded effective operational and tactical coordination 

and contributed to several lost opportunities for the Confederates 

to defeat Union forces in middle and eastern Tennessee. Even the 

intervention of Confederate President Davis was ineffective in 

repairing the dysfunctional command situation. Without an effective command structure, the South would be hard pressed to keep 

the more numerous Federal forces in check. The Union victory left 

its armies poised to invade the Deep South in 1864.
51

The Author

Andrew N. Morris is a retired U.S. Army infantry officer with 

a combat tour in Vietnam, multiple Cold War tours in Germany, 

and training deployments to Korea and Japan. After he left active 

duty, he earned his Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas. 

In 2001, he begun work in the U.S. Army Europe’s Military History 

Office, and was there until his May 2016 retirement, serving as the 

chief historian for the last four years.

53

Further Readings

Connelly, Thomas L. Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee 

1862–1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 

1971. 

Cozzens, Peter. This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga. 

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. 

_________. The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for 

Chattanooga. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994. 

Daniel, Larry J. Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861–

1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 

Hess, Earl J. The Knoxville Campaign: Burnside and Longstreet in 

East Tennessee. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012. 

Woodworth, Steven E. Nothing but Victory: The Army of the 

Tennessee, 1861–1865. New York: Knopf, 2005. 

________. Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and 

Chattanooga Campaigns. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 

1998.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History

(www.history.army.mil).


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