COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Bray 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LESTER LYNN LEONARD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 2089-96-2 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 JUNE 3, 1997 

COUNTY OF SPOTSYLVANIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge 

 Carroll E. Smith for appellant. 

 John C. Bowers (William F. Neely, 

Commonwealth's Attorney, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Lester Lynn Leonard (appellant) appeals from his bench trial 

conviction by the Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County for 

driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of County 

Ordinance § 12-86, which parallels Virginia Code § 18.2-266. The 

sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court 

erred when it denied appellant's motion to suppress the 

certificate of blood alcohol analysis tendered by the 

prosecution.1

 Appellant and Corporal T.G. Benton of the Spotsylvania 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1In appellant's petition for appeal, he raised only this 

issue. In his brief, appellant raises additional issues. Rule 

5A:12(c) provides that "only questions presented in the petition 

for appeal will be noticed by the Court of Appeals." See Cruz v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 661, 664, n.1, 406 S.E.2d 406, 407 n.1 

(1991). We did not grant appellant an appeal on the additional 

issues raised in his brief and will not address them. 
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County Sheriff's Department gave conflicting statements on the 

issue appellant deemed relevant. Appellant asserts that he 

consented to take a breath test as provided in Code § 18.2-268.2 

and was taken to the County Sheriff's office where a breathalyzer 

was usually available. However, it was determined that the 

breathalyzer was malfunctioning, and a valid test could not be 

administered. Appellant testified that he was then transported 

to a magistrate where Benton obtained an arrest warrant. 

 Corporal Benton confirmed that the breathalyzer in the 

sheriff's office was malfunctioning but declared that, to the 

best of his recollection, he then took appellant to the 

Fredericksburg police station where he administered an accurate 

test which revealed appellant's blood alcohol concentration of 

0.11. He testified further that he then appeared before the 

magistrate and obtained the arrest warrant. However, the arrest 

warrant contains a "time issued" of 12:34 a.m., and the 

certificate of analysis discloses a "time sample taken" of 1:08 

a.m. Notwithstanding this discrepancy, Benton insisted that, to 

the best of his recollection, the warrant was not obtained until 

after the breath test was administered. 

 In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 

"[t]he burden is upon [the appellant] to show that this ruling, 

when the evidence is considered most favorably to the 

Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." Fore v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980). We 
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"review findings of historical fact only for clear error and 

. . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by 

resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Ornelas v. 

United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). 

 The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Benton 

administered the test before he obtained the warrant. The trial 

court obviously accepted Benton's account of the events and 

observed that the arrest warrant showed it was executed at 

1:25 a.m. We find no error in the ruling. 

 Moreover, we review de novo the ultimate questions of 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause. See id. Viewed 

accordingly, the record discloses that Benton stopped appellant 

after observing appellant weaving his car across the center line. 

 Appellant had a strong odor of alcohol about his breath and 

performed poorly on several field sobriety tests. While 

appellant initially denied that he had been drinking, he 

subsequently admitted he had "a couple of beers." Upon further 

questioning, appellant angrily stated that he had consumed twelve 

beers and three Jim Beam and cokes and admitted being drunk. 

 Even if we were to accept appellant's assertion that the 

warrant was issued prior to the breathalyzer test, he has 

suffered no harm. Where an officer has probable cause to obtain 

an arrest warrant for driving under the influence, there is no 

legal requirement that the officer administer a breathalyzer test 

before obtaining the arrest warrant. The record supports that 
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the arresting officer had probable cause to procure the arrest 

warrant even before administering the test. 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.