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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

TOWARD A UNIFIED MILITARY RESPONSE:

HURRICANE SANDY AND THE 

DUAL STATUS COMMANDER

Ryan Burke

Sue McNeil

April 2015

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-677-8
v

CONTENTS

Foreword .......................................................vii

About the Authors ...............................................ix

Summary .......................................................xi

1. Introduction .........................................................1

2. Evolution of the Dual Status Commander ..........7

3. The Military Response to Hurricane Sandy ......23

4. Post-Event Lessons Learned ............................53

5. Recommendations for Improvement ...............79

6. Conclusion ..................... ......................... 113

Appendix I – Acronyms...........................................117

Appendix II – Dual Status Commander 

Designation Process ............................................ 123

 

vii

FOREWORD

The military response to Hurricane Sandy was 

historically significant. For the first time, dual status 

commanders—military commanders authorized by 

law to serve in both state and federal status simultaneously—were activated in an effort to unify state and 

federal efforts under a single command structure during an unplanned response. The events that occurred 

over the 2-week response period provide a basis for 

lessons learned as we look to improve upon this first 

attempt to use this unique command construct in 

response to an unplanned incident. 

In this monograph, Mr. Ryan Burke and Dr. Sue 

McNeil discuss the results of their year-long case 

study examining the military response to Hurricane 

Sandy under the dual status commander arrangement. In one of the most thorough and comprehensive 

analyses of the subject to date, Burke and McNeil first 

address the chronology of the storm and the ensuing 

military actions. They then assess both the successes 

and shortfalls with the storm response. The authors 

conclude the monograph with a detailed discussion of 

15 recommendations, which have the potential to significantly improve future dual status commander-led 

civil support operations.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

RYAN BURKE is currently a doctoral candidate at 

the University of Delaware, with a research focus on 

military civil support operations. Before starting his 

Ph.D., he was a captain and logistics officer in the U.S. 

Marine Corps, where he served as a landing support 

platoon commander, operations officer, and company 

commander with Combat Logistics Regiment 27, 2d 

Marine Logistics Group, Camp Lejeune, NC. He then 

served as the Deputy Marine Officer Instructor for the 

Philadelphia Naval ROTC Consortium at the University of Pennsylvania. After leaving the Marines, he 

worked as a Senior Consultant and Logistics Analyst 

for Booz Allen Hamilton supporting several Department of Defense projects both in the Pentagon and 

aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico. Mr. Burke holds 

a bachelor’s degree in crime, law, and justice and a 

minor in military science from the Pennsylvania State 

University where he attended on a Naval Reserve 

Officers Training Corps scholarship, and a master 

of science in homeland security from Saint Joseph’s 

University.

SUE MCNEIL is Professor of Civil and Environmental 

Engineering, and Public Policy and Administration at 

University of Delaware. She also directs the Graduate Program in Disaster Science and Management and 

is the former Director of the Disaster Research Center 

at the University of Delaware. She has extensive experience working with transportation organizations 

and agencies on multicriteria decisionmaking, performance measures, target setting, and asset management. Dr. McNeil has served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Transportation Research Board 
x

and a member of the Board on Infrastructure and the 

Constructed Environment. She chaired the Transportation Research Board’s Committee on Asset Management from 2004 to 2010 and is an Emeritus Member 

of the committee. She is a founding Associate Editor 

for the American Society of Civil Engineers’ Journal of 

Infrastructure Systems and became the Editor-in-Chief 

in July 2010. She is a registered professional engineer.
xi

SUMMARY

U.S. military forces have played a role in supporting civil authorities in varying locations and capacities from the Whiskey Rebellion to Hurricane Sandy. 

In a large-scale incident response scenario requiring 

combined support from the National Guard and federal military, effective management and coordination 

continues to challenge all involved. There are issues of 

constitutionality, legality, policy, financial considerations, and even politics, all uniquely situated between 

individual states’ interests and those of the Federal 

Government. In this context, there is a philosophical conflict between federalism and state sovereignty 

during military civil support missions that continues 

to present itself as an impediment to success. Balancing these institutionally divergent approaches to 

achieve a unified, efficient, coordinated, and effective 

military response has, and will continue to be, a strategic and political imperative. Despite the challenges, 

military forces are frequently involved in domestic 

response missions, often in a very public manner. As 

such, military force allocation and management have 

evolved into major topics of conversation among 

policymakers, academics, emergency managers, and 

military strategists alike. 

Owing to these issues, State and Federal Government lawmakers adopted policy and law authorizing 

a single military commander, referred to as a dual 

status commander, to legally assume simultaneous 

but mutually exclusive command and control over 

both Title 32 and Title 10 forces during domestic operations. As a proposed solution to the notable coordination challenges plaguing domestic civil support 

operations, the dual status commander initiative has 
been used successfully during planned events since 

2004. The coordinated military response to Hurricane 

Sandy in the fall of 2012 was the first time in U.S. history dual status commanders assumed command of 

both Title 10 and Title 32 forces during a no-notice/

limited-notice incident. As such, this event provides a 

relevant and timely opportunity to study the military 

response to the storm and offer objective recommendations for improving future no-notice/limited-notice 

defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations 

under the dual status commander arrangement.

The purpose of this monograph, therefore, is to 

offer an objective and systematic documentation and 

evaluation of the military response to Hurricane Sandy 

as a basis for assessing the efficacy of the dual status 

commander arrangement for no-notice/limited-notice incidents in the homeland. To complete this effort, 

we employed a rigorous case study investigation emphasizing the combined state and federal response to 

Hurricane Sandy in the New York City metropolitan 

area from October 22-November 15, 2012. The research 

examines the events of the storm response under the 

command of Brigadier General Michael Swezey, the 

designated dual status commander for the storm response in New York. We combined interviews with 

Department of Defense officials, National Guard commanders, and Active Duty military officers involved 

in the Sandy response with extensive document and 

content analysis of various Sandy-specific reports to 

generate our findings. Through this research, we intend to present a detailed and objective analysis of the 

response in order to provide military and defense officials with a greater understanding of the benefits and 

limitations of the dual status commander arrangement during a no-notice/limited-notice civil support 

xii
xiii

incident. We conclude by offering a series of recommendations likely to improve policy, procedures, and 

training, among other things. 

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With often-unparalleled emergency response capabilities and capacities, the U.S. military is an extraordinary asset capable of providing immediate 

assistance to civil authorities to “save lives, prevent 

human suffering, and mitigate great property damage within the United States.”1

 The strategic rebalancing of defense priorities away from counterterrorism 

and insurgency operations and back to the homeland 

will see the U.S. military continue to play an important role in domestic civil support and crisis response 

operations. As such, it is imperative that we continue 

to learn from past events like Hurricane Katrina and 

Hurricane Sandy and strive for continuous improvement of our military’s domestic response capabilities.

Hurricane Sandy was the largest and most damaging Atlantic hurricane on record and the second 

most costly in U.S. history, eclipsed only by Hurricane 

Katrina.2

 At the peak of the October-November 2012 

military response to Hurricane Sandy in New York, 

more than 4,000 National Guard personnel, along 

with Active and Reserve Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, 

and Marines were engaged in supporting civil authorities as part of Joint Task Force Sandy. Most of our 

substantive post-Sandy knowledge is found in various Department of Defense (DoD) after-action reports 

and lessons learned publications.3

 Beyond DoD publications and a small body of news reports, there is a 

dearth of knowledge to date specifically analyzing the 

DoD response to Hurricane Sandy available for public 

consumption. Further, this particular defense support 

of civil authorities (DSCA) event marked the historic 
2

first-time use of a dual status commander to command 

both Title 10 and Title 32 force components in support 

of a no-notice/limited-notice4 incident. Owing to the 

newness of the concept and because it had not been 

used in an actual disaster before Sandy, our findings 

show a range of perspectives among DoD and state 

personnel: some advocating for and supporting the 

concept, others noting the concept’s limitations and 

challenges. Regardless of position, it is clear that the 

dual status commander arrangement has several benefits and limitations when applied to a no-notice/

limited-notice DSCA response environment. Our 

study analyzes the dual status commander-led DSCA 

response to Hurricane Sandy in New York. Through 

this lens, the study illustrates and discusses the perspectives of the dual status commander construct and 

offers recommendations for leveraging existing capabilities and improving those deemed insufficient. 

STUDY CONTEXT

In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy came ashore 

along one of the most densely populated regions in 

the country. Even though Sandy was downgraded to 

tropical storm status prior to landfall, it was a massive 

storm that affected east coast cities from Washington, 

DC, to New York City. As was the case with Katrina, 

the storm’s magnitude overwhelmed state and local 

responders. Requests for military support were widespread, resulting in an over-convergence of military 

forces inside the region within days of the storm’s 

arrival. Again, like Katrina, National Guard forces in 

both State Active Duty and Title 32 status operated 

alongside Title 10 federal forces in support of civil 

authorities responding to the storm’s damage. Unlike 
3

Katrina, however, this DSCA response effort was a 

historical first for the U.S. military. For the first time, 

National Guard and federal military forces executed 

unplanned civil support operations under the tactical 

command of dual status commanders.

In addition to being the first no-notice/limitednotice operation to combine Title 32 and Title 10 forces under the command of a single dual status commander, a daunting endeavor in its own right, several 

additional factors further complicated the Hurricane 

Sandy response effort. While the storm made landfall 

nearly 100 miles south of New York City, the leading 

northern edge of the storm, widely held as the strongest part of any hurricane, directly impacted New York 

City, its surrounding boroughs, and parts of northern 

New Jersey. This ultimately resulted in a multistate 

incident spread across a large area of some of the most 

densely populated counties in the United States. But 

perhaps the most significant complication, as it turns 

out, was the storm’s unprecedented timing. The 2012 

presidential election was set to take place nearly a 

week to the day, following the storm’s landfall. As we 

have seen with past disasters and emergencies, such 

events can serve as a serious political setback, or as an 

opportunity to exercise leadership in a way that builds 

political support for elected State and Federal Government executives. The unique political landscape 

at the time of the storm presented yet another challenge for the military response that would ultimately 

generate significant influence on the actual conduct of 

response operations. 
4

RESEARCH METHODS AND STUDY OUTLINE

This monograph presents the findings of our case 

study. It combines personal interviews with extensive document analysis to form the substance of the 

report and final recommendations. We were fortunate 

to interview several high-ranking civilian and military officials with practical and relevant knowledge 

of both the evolving dual status commander conversation and the Hurricane Sandy response effort in 

New York. In addition to reviewing over 1,000 pages 

of material relevant to dual status commanders and 

Hurricane Sandy, we conducted 20 individual interviews and two focus groups with civilian and military 

personnel representing the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the National Guard, and federal armed forces. 

Our research represents a broad range of perspectives within State and Federal Government and offers 

one of the most comprehensive and detailed studies 

on Hurricane Sandy and the dual status commander 

construct to date. 

Before describing the operation and presenting our 

findings, we offer a brief discussion of the history and 

evolution of the dual status commander concept. In 

this context, we discuss the relevant laws and constitutional authorities governing the use of military forces in a domestic environment, to include a review of 

the tenets of federalism and state sovereignty. We also 

describe the recent legislative chronology of the dual 

status commander initiative and its eventual adoption 

into federal law. After discussing the legal history and 

framework of the dual status commander concept, we 

offer a brief chronological description of the Hurricane Sandy response in New York State. We separate 
5

the response timeline into five sections (Shaping and 

Anticipation, Initial Response, Continued Operations, 

Stabilizing Operations, and Transition Operations), 

each describing a period of time ranging from 3-7 days. 

Using the description of events as a basis for further 

discussion, we then provide an analysis of the notable 

successes and areas of improvement based on our research. Finally, we conclude the monograph with a 

detailed discussion of 15 policy and strategy-specific 

recommendations intended for senior DoD leadership consideration. In summary, the monograph is 

structured as follows:

• Evolution of the Dual Status Commander

— Legal Framework

— Federalism and Sovereignty

— Origin of the Dual Status Commander

 Legislation

• The Military Response to Hurricane Sandy

— Shaping and Anticipation

— Initial Response

— Continued Operations

— Stabilizing Operations

— Transition Operations

• Post-Event Lessons Learned

— Successes

— Shortfalls

• Recommendations for Improvement

— Operational and Strategic

 Recommendations

— Policy Recommendations

• Conclusion
6

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3025.18: Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, September 21, 2012, p. 4.

2. Eric S. Blake, Todd B. Kimberlain, Robert J. Berg, John P. 

Cangialosi, and John L. Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane 

Sandy (AL182012), Miami, FL: National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Hurricane Center, 2013, p. 1, available 

from www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf. 

3. DoD generated more than 10 after-action reports specifically addressing the response to Hurricane Sandy. The Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, United States Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM), the U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Warfare Development Command, Joint Task Force Sandy, Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support, and others developed and published individual reports 

made available to the author for assistance with this research. 

4. “No-notice/limited-notice” is the DoD accepted vernacular 

referring to incidents other than planned events of national significance (i.e., national security special events such as the Super 

Bowl, political conventions, etc.). According to DoD personnel, 

the no-notice/limited notice designation can often apply to Hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, terrorism, etc. Currently, there 

is no doctrinal distinction between no-notice and limited-notice.
7

CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION OF THE DUAL STATUS 

COMMANDER

While military assets can provide a valuable service during civil support operations, establishing a 

unified effort between Title 10 and Title 32 forces has 

proven to be problematic in past civil support efforts. 

The dual status commander (DSC) concept offers a 

command arrangement legally authorizing one military officer to assume simultaneous but mutually exclusive command authority over both National Guard 

forces under State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status 

and Title 10 federal military forces. According to draft 

DoD Instruction 3025.xx, “Dual-Status Commanders for Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” a dual 

status commander is: 

A military commander who may, in accordance with 

the law, serve in two statuses, Federal and State, simultaneously while performing the duties of those 

statuses separately and distinctly.1

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines 

dual status commanders as: 

Military officers who serve as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command for state and 

federal forces—have authority over both National 

Guard forces under state control and active duty forces under federal control during a civil support incident or special event.2

More simply stated: a DSC is “responsible for performing two separate and distinct but related jobs 
8

with two separate and distinct teams for two separate 

and distinct bosses, all at the same time.”3 The need 

for such a unique command architecture stems from 

the various constitutional and legal considerations 

governing the use of military forces in a domestic capacity, the root of which is our federalist system of 

government. The process used for designating a DSC 

is shown in Appendix I. 

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Federalism implies a system of shared powers between individual states and the national government. 

These powers, as related to command and control of 

military forces, are defined in the U.S. Constitution 

and establish the legal authorities and limitations for 

the employment of the military in domestic operations. Figure 2-1 shows the relevant sections and their 

relationship to each other. The figure also serves as a 

reference for the subsequent discussion. 

In addition to authorizing Congress to “raise and 

support Armies,”4

 the Constitution also states:

Congress shall have the power. . . . To provide for calling forth the militia to execute Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide 

for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, 

and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to 

the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, 

and the authority of training the militia according to 

the discipline prescribed by Congress.5
9

Figure 2-1. Domestic Military Law Authorities and 

their Relationships.

While these authorizations ensure states’ rights to 

maintain a militia, or what is now the National Guard, 

the language also ensures individual states’ rights are 

subordinate to the power of Congress under certain 

conditions. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution upholds this authority by stating:

The President shall be commander in chief of the Army 

and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the 

several states, when called into the actual service of 

the United States.6
10

The federalist construct and its associated law, as 

applied to domestic military force operations, is intended to provide the legal mechanism for enabling a 

unified military response under the order of the President during incidents of national significance requiring a combined response from the National Guard 

and the Armed Forces. However, as we have seen in 

past operations, most notably in Hurricane Katrina, 

the Federal Government’s constitutional authorities 

conflict with the perceived rights and responsibilities of the individual states and territories. The issue 

of federal control versus state sovereignty presents 

a significant point of friction between the States and 

the Federal Government that continues to challenge 

the effective command and control of the military, 

most notably with regard to the National Guard and 

the various duty statuses under which it serves during domestic operations. Moreover, the actual extent 

of emergency powers and the range of discretionary authority state governors can exercise under the 

10th Amendment of the Constitution is not a wellsettled area of law or public policy that needs further 

examination.7

National Guard forces, unlike the Active and Reserve components of the federal armed forces, can 

serve in three different duty statuses during a domestic operation. When activated in SAD status, the 

National Guard serves under the command of the 

state governor through the Adjutant General (TAG), 

receives state pay and benefits, and is not subjected 

to the restrictions of Posse Comitatus;8

 that is, they 

can engage in law enforcement activities when directed. When supporting operations undertaken at 

the request of the President or Secretary of Defense 
11

(SECDEF), the National Guard serves under the authority of 32 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 502f; or in 

Title 32 status.9 Unlike SAD, a Title 32 designation 

must be requested by the governor and approved by 

the President. Once approved, Title 32 status entitles 

National Guard forces to receive federal pay and benefits while remaining under command and control of 

the state governor. This is advantageous for operations spanning multiple states, as it eliminates the disparity in state pay rates and ensures state governors 

command integrity of their National Guard forces. 

Title 10 U.S.C. pertains to the laws regulating the 

Armed Forces. In accordance with the language of the 

Constitution, Title 10 provides the legal authority for 

the President to “call into actual service”10 elements 

of the National Guard for federal duty. This ability to 

federalize state National Guard forces sets the legal 

precedent for the President to assume full authority 

over the militia.11 While the National Guard can serve 

under Title 10 status, this authority is used almost 

exclusively in support of overseas operations. Table 

2-1 summarizes the authorities and responsibility for 

different aspects of the National Guard under various 

duty statuses (SAD, Title 32, and Title 10).

Table 2-1. National Guard Duty Statuses.

In contrast, all Active and Reserve components of 

the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are conDuty Status State Active Duty Title 32 Title 10

Command Authority Governor President

Pay and Benefits State Federal

Posse Comitatus Act N/A Yes
12

sidered federal military forces and serve under Title 

10 authority. Title 10 forces, as they are referred to 

during civil support scenarios, receive federal pay and 

benefits, and are subjected to the restrictions of Posse 

Comitatus. These duty status distinctions are financially and legally necessary to distinguish the roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities between the states, 

Federal Government, and their respective military assets during domestic operations. The previous discussion also serves as the basis for the development of the 

dual status commander construct.

FEDERALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 

The interpretation of authority and legality concerning the command and control of military forces 

in the homeland continues to create tensions between 

states and the Federal Government. The conflict between state power and federal authority introduces 

confusion during response operations involving both 

the Armed Forces and National Guard. Without clearly established chains of command, lines of authority, 

and mission tasks, achieving unity of effort has proven difficult in past operations of large magnitude.12

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-28, Civil Support Operations, articulates the command complexities between 

the Armed Forces and the National Guard conducting 

simultaneous domestic operations:

There is not a chain of command in the military sense 

between the President and the Governors. The President as head of the federal government and military 

commander in chief may only exercise the authorities 

granted in the Constitution and U.S. law. Within their 

respective states, the Governors retain executive authority, to include command over their state’s national 
13

guard (Air and Army), until such time as the President mobilizes it for federal service. This is unique to 

this operational environment, and commanders at all 

levels need to understand the impact it has on the conduct of operations.13

As a result of the several duty statuses the National 

Guard can occupy during domestic response missions, 

combined with the possibility of integration with federal military assets, there are currently four command 

and control models for consideration when coordinating a combined state and federal response effort (see 

Table 2-2). As the table shows, the four models represent unique command arrangements, each of which 

offers advantages and disadvantages depending on 

one’s perspective.

* = Conceptual model. While such a model has been proposed in 

past legislation, currently, there is no legal basis for the governor of a state to assume direct command authority over federal 

military forces. 

Table 2-2. Domestic Military Command Options.

A unified and effective response is a desired end 

state of civil support operations involving military 

assistance. However, the constitutional impediments 

discussed earlier fuel the noted tension between states 

Command Option National Guard Armed Forces

State* Governor

Parallel Governor President

Dual Status Dual Status Commander (32 U.S.C. § 315/325)

Federal President
14

and the Federal Government during domestic response missions. Therefore, the previously discussed 

dual status model, wherein a single military officer 

commands both state and federal forces simultaneously, was created in an attempt to address some of 

the noted concerns. 

ORIGIN OF THE DUAL STATUS COMMANDER 

LEGISLATION

Through the 2004 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA),14 Congress passed legislation allowing 

a National Guard officer to hold temporarily both a 

state and federal commission simultaneously, or serve 

in a “dual status.”15 Since the 2004 enactment, DSCs 

have been authorized to command 23 events of national significance, most notably events designated as 

National Security Special Events.16 DSCs commanded 

operations in support of national political conventions, summits, and sporting events integrating Title 

10 and Title 32 forces under a single commander utilizing separate chains of command. These were preplanned events with extensive preparation prior to 

execution. As such, many viewed these DSC-led operations as a success. In contrast, no-notice/limitednotice incidents like hurricanes, earthquakes, and 

wildfires are less certain and can lead to significant coordination challenges, such as those observed during 

Hurricane Katrina. 

The U.S. military’s response to Hurricane Katrina 

was widely criticized for coordination failures between state and federal levels, procedural inefficiencies, force allocation redundancy in some places and 

gaps in others, administrative and legal failures, and 

overall response timeliness.17 In the years following 
15

the divided military response to Katrina, state governors and DoD officials realized the urgent need for 

policy changes and the requirement for an improved 

coordination mechanism between State Government, 

Federal Government, National Guard forces, and federal military forces. Realizing the legal precedent in 

place under 32 U.S.C. § 315 and 325 (a)(2),18 a new series of conversations developed in an effort to simplify the orders process, reduce force redundancy, and 

close the operational gaps within the DSCA environment, all while simultaneously addressing the noted 

tension between state sovereignty and federalism, the 

legality and constitutionality of using military forces 

for domestic response, and the financial barriers present when combining the National Guard and Armed 

Forces. (See Figure 2-2.) This began a lengthy debate 

over legislation outlining how military forces would 

operate in future domestic operations.

Figure 2-2. Dual Status Commander 

Influence Diagram.
16

Between 2006 and 2010, annual NDAAs contained 

legislation that outlined changes to the authority and 

control of Title 10 and Title 32 forces operating in support of no-notice/limited-notice incidents. Following 

repeated failed attempts between state and federal 

leadership to legislate a mutually agreeable command 

and control mechanism for emergency and disaster response, the DoD and a previously appointed Council 

of Governors came to an agreement on the use of dual 

status commanders during such events.19 In 2010, the 

Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort was 

signed and agreed upon by the DoD and the Council 

of Governors representing state interests.

The Joint Action Plan effectively established the 

guidance authorizing a DSC, in a simultaneous but 

mutually exclusive manner, to command both National Guard and federal armed forces during incident response scenarios. The goal of this agreement 

was to establish a common operating picture between 

State and Federal Governments regarding the employment of military forces in response to domestic 

emergencies or disaster. As noted by the plan, the 

DSC arrangement offers alternative command architecture to the traditionally divided parallel model 

and provides, conceptually at least, a mechanism in 

which state sovereignty and federal interests can be 

equally balanced.20 With the Joint Action Plan signed 

and agreed upon in early-2011, DSCs were authorized 

to command the DSCA response for both Hurricanes 

Irene and Isaac in 2011. However, DSCs were either 

not activated for these events or did not receive both 

Title 10 and Title 32 forces for the operations.21 Nonetheless, these events provided a valuable opportunity 

for governors and DoD officials to test the DSC activation process and further endorse its concept. With 
17

the notable success of past negotiations and the noted 

potential of the command concept following Irene and 

Isaac, legislators included the DSC concept in the 2012 

NDAA, which codified the DSC construct into law as 

the default command arrangement during incident response scenarios and specified the DSC as the “usual 

and customary command and control arrangement, 

including for missions involving a major disaster 

or emergency.”22 Less than 10 months after the 2012 

NDAA was signed into law, Hurricane Sandy became 

the first time a dual status commander received Title 

10 and Title 32 forces to execute unplanned civil support operations. Therefore, it is imperative that we 

take this opportunity to learn from the event and improve our future domestic response capabilities under 

the DSC arrangement. The following sections discuss 

the events of Hurricane Sandy in New York, with emphasis on the challenges faced under the DSC arrangement and some of the notable issues associated with 

the historic response.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 3025.xx: Dual 

Status Commanders for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d (draft).

2. “Homeland Defense: DOD needs to address gaps in homeland defense and civil support guidance,” Report to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, #13-

128, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

October 2012, p. 2.

3. Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Fact sheet: Dual Status Commander Overview,” Washington DC: Department of 

Defense, n.d.
18

4. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, available from https://www.

law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei.

5. Ibid.

6. U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University, available from www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/

articleii#section2.

7. The 10th Amendment to the Constitution states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 

prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” This amendment ensures states maintain the rights and individual authority to govern themselves in 

those situations not covered in the Constitution or other federally 

applicable laws and regulations. 

8. 18 U.S.C. § 1385: “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus,” Washington, DC. Except under extraordinary circumstances (invocation of the Insurrection Act), Posse Comitatus restricts the President from using federal military forces in a law 

enforcement capacity.

9. 32 U.S.C. § 502, “Required Drills and Field Exercises,” Subsection (f), Washington, DC, 1964, 2006.

10. U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University, available from www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/

articleii#section2.

11. The Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act) codified the Federal Government’s ability to federalize the National 

Guard under specific circumstances. The Act also provided federal funding authority for the National Guard and established 

the militia as two distinctive groups (in addition to the Regular 

Army): 1) the Organized Militia, consisting of members of the National Guard and Naval Militia; and 2) the Unorganized Militia, 

whose members consist of all able-bodied males over 18 years of 

age who are not members of the organized militia or armed forces. 

12. Peter Topp, “What Should Be the Relationship between 

the National Guard and United States Northern Command in 
19

Civil Support Operations Following Catastrophic Events?” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2006, pp. 1-73; 

Garrett Jensen, “DoD Disaster Response: Unity of Effort Versus 

Unity of Command,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 

2007, pp. 1-22; Michael Teague, “The Domestic Coalition: The 

Command and Control Relationship between Active Component 

and National Guard Forces in Defense Support of Civil Authorities Operations,” Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 2007, pp. 

1-17; Bert Tussing, “The Potential Need to Establish an Appropriate Mechanism for the Military to Accompany and Support Civilian Components Focused on Regional Response to Catastrophe,” 

Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Vol. 5-07, Carlisle, 

PA, U.S. Army War College, July 2007, pp. 1-4; Jeffrey Burkett, 

“Command and Control of Military Forces in the Homeland,” 

Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 51, October 2008, p. 130; Andy Hall, 

“Improving Military Response to Catastrophic Events within the 

United States,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2009, 

pp. 1-2.; William Prendergast, “Contingency Dual Status Commander: Balancing Title 10 and 32 Responsibilities,” Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, March 2011, pp. 1-24; Caroline Prosch, 

“Getting to One from Title 10 + Title 32 Unity of Effort in the 

Homeland,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2011, pp. 1-133; Bert Tussing, “Implementing a New Vision: 

Unity of Effort in Preparing for and Responding to Catastrophic 

Events,” Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Vol. 2-11, 

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2011, pp. 1-6; Alfred 

Poirier, “FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Teams: Considering 

an Improved Strategy for an Evolving Homeland Security Enterprise,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 

2012, pp. 1-105; Steven Blum and Kerry McIntyre, Enabling Unity 

of Effort in Homeland Response Operations, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2012.

13. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 

3-28, Civil Support Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, August 2010, p. 1-4.

14. Which cites similar law from 2000: 32 U.S.C. § 315, Detail 

of regular members of the Army and Air Force to duty with the 

National Guard.
20

15. 32 U.S.C. § 325 (a) 2), 2004, Relief from National Guard 

duty when ordered to Active Duty. 

16. Office of the Secretary of Defense, History of dual status 

commander authorizations, Washington, DC: DoD, 2013.

17. Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, “Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response,” Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Washington, DC: CRS, September 19, 2005; John Milliman, John Grosskopf, and Ozzie Paez, 

“Emergency Managers’ Views on Improving Defense Support/

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (DSCA/MACA) Education Programs,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 1-13; Kathleen Tierney, Christine 

Bevc, and Erica Kuligowski, “Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, 

Media Frames, and Their Consequences in Hurricane Katrina,” 

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 

Vol. 604, March 2006, pp. 57-81; Kathleen Gereski, “The Department of Defense as Lead Federal Agency,” Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3, October 2006, pp. 1-21; Topp; Jensen; Jason 

Schwabel, “Command, Control, Coordination, and Cooperation 

during Defense Support to Civil Authority Operations,” Carlisle, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2007, pp. 1-16; Teague; Burkett; Tussing, “The Potential Need,” pp. 1-4; Steven Osterholzer, 

“Education in Action: Educating USNORTHCOM’s Critical Stakeholders at the Away Game,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 

School, September 2008, pp. 1-91; Prendergast; Charles Dunphy, 

Jr., and Christopher Radel, “Assessment of Local, State and Federal Request Processes for Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

in the United States,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 

December 2009, pp. 1-63; Hall; Larry Porter, “Defense Support of 

Civilian Authorities (DSCA): What Emergency Managers Need 

to Know,” ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, No. 305210723, 

The George Washington University, May 2010, pp. 1-241; Aruna 

Apte and Susan Heath, “Request and Response Processes for Department of Defense Support during Domestic Disasters,” Journal 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 

2011, pp. 1-19; Prosch; Ludwig Schumacher, “Dual Status Command for No-Notice Events: Integrating the Military Response to 

Domestic Disasters,” Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 4, February 2011, pp. 1-9; Tussing, “Implementing a New Vision,” pp. 

2-4; Michael Bentley, “The Role of Military Forces in Disaster Re-
21

sponse: Remove the Impediments,” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, March 2012, pp. 1-34; Blum and McIntyre; Paul McHale, 

“Critical Mismatch: The Dangerous Gap between Rhetoric and 

Readiness in DOD’s Civil Support Missions,” The Douglas and 

Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, State Resolution (SR) No. 115, Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, August 

13, 2012, pp. 1-29; “Homeland Defense DOD Needs to Address 

Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil Support Guidance,” Report 

to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, No. 13-128, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2012. 

18. 32 U.S.C. § 315 provides the legal authority for a commissioned officer of the Active Component Army or Air Force to be 

detailed to temporary state duty with the National Guard. Any 

federal military commander assigned to state duty under this authority must receive a state commission in the appointed place 

of duty. National Guard officers, in contrast, hold both State and 

Federal (reserve) commissions and can command in both statuses. Per 32 U.S.C. § 325, National Guard officers can also be relieved from National Guard duty when ordered to Active Duty.

Partly because they must also receive state commissions, Active 

Component officers are rarely considered for use as dual status 

commanders.

19. John Gereski and Chris Brown, “Two Hats Are Better Than 

One: The Dual-Status Commander in Domestic Operations,” The 

Army Lawyer, June 2010, pp. 72-79; Prendergast; Schumacher; 

email communication between the author and an employee in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2013. 

20. “Action Memo: Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity 

of Effort,” Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

October 29, 2010, p. 4-6. 

21. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees, including those within the Office of Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs and United States Northern 

Command, January-March 2014. 

22. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 

Public Law 112-81, H.R. 1540, p. 98.

23

CHAPTER 3

THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO 

HURRICANE SANDY

The following sections offer a brief chronological 

description of the events of Hurricane Sandy under 

Joint Task Force (JTF) Sandy in New York from October 22 to November 15, 2012. This discussion is limited 

to the events surrounding the dual status commander 

(DSC) arrangement and any associated circumstances 

or considerations. To provide context, the discussion 

begins with a review of the unique geo-political environment in the New York metropolitan area. The 

events are then grouped into five similarly named 

categories representing a defined date range:

1. Shaping and Anticipation: October 22-29.

2. Initial Response: October 30-November 2.

3. Continued Operations: November 3-5.

4. Stabilizing Operations: November 6-9.

5. Transition Operations: November 10-15.

These categories align with existing Department 

of Defense (DoD) reference publications detailing 

defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) response 

phases. Also, to provide context, Figure 3-1 provides 

maps of the study area and snapshots of the military 

presence in three periods: October 30-November 2; 

November 3-5; and November 6-9. The placement of 

unit symbols within the counties (circles for National 

Guard and pentagons for federal military) is not representative of their actual locations during the response. 

If military activities occurred in a particular county 

during the defined date ranges, we placed a single 

unit graphic near the center of the county to illustrate 

a force presence. Force strength numbers for federal 
24

forces involved in the Sandy response were either inconsistent or unavailable, so we did not scale the unit 

graphics for federal forces. Consistent National Guard 

force strength estimates, however, were available to 

us via daily DoD press briefings detailing the ongoing storm response. The circles representing National 

Guard forces are scaled in size according to the average daily force strength estimates provided for the 

New York metropolitan area:

• October 30-November 2: approximately 2,300

Guardsmen;

• November 3-5: approximately 3,200 Guardsmen;

• November 6-9: approximately 4,100 Guardsmen.

Figure 3-1. Military Activities During 

Hurricane Sandy.
25

The activities are summarized in the timeline shown 

in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2. Hurricane Sandy: Timeline 

of Significant Events.

NEW YORK’S UNIQUE GEO-POLITICAL 

LANDSCAPE

Hurricane Sandy’s near-direct hit on the most 

populated city in the United States1

 and the financial center of our economy less than 1 week prior to 

a presidential election was unprecedented, a coincidence noted by multiple interviewees.2

 In addition to 
26

the timing of the storm’s landfall, the ensuing state 

and federal response was largely influenced by the region’s unique geo-political structure. Given this fact, it 

is important to understand the organizational context 

of the response by discussing some of the complexities 

within the system of government in and around New 

York City.

New York is a “home rule” State. Therefore, local municipalities below the state level can, with 

some restrictions, create and enact laws, and govern 

themselves as they see fit without state legislature approval. As a city municipality, New York City is no 

exception to this rule. Where New York City differs 

is in the unique structure of its governmental leadership within its five boroughs (Manhattan, Brooklyn, 

Queens, Bronx, and Staten Island). Each of the five 

boroughs, all of which maintain separate county distinctions (New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx, and Richmond Counties, respectively), is represented by a borough president rather than a county seat. The borough 

presidents are elected officials and interact directly 

with the mayor of New York City, who serves as the 

representative of all five counties. In addition, the Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey operates each 

of the airports, bridges, maritime ports, and ground 

transportation terminals in the New York City metropolitan area, including property in New Jersey. The 

complexities of the transportation network and commuting patterns within the New York metropolitan 

area, coupled with the diversity of its local commerce, 

further complicate city management functions. 

Adding to the confusion is the influence of and 

interactions with the counties surrounding New York 

City’s boroughs to the north (Essex, West Chester, and 

Rockland) and on Long Island to the east (Nassau and 
27

Suffolk). This layered bureaucracy creates complexity 

in the simplest of government activities and is often 

influenced by state versus local politics and, in some 

cases, personality conflicts. Beyond this, state and federal politics do not function the way a military command structure functions. Whereas the military uses 

an extensive hierarchical system of command delineation, civilian leaders operate under local and state 

jurisdictions. Therefore, the governor cannot dictate 

orders to city mayors just as the President cannot 

dictate orders to a state governor. Coordinating a regional response effort incorporating town, borough, 

county, state, and federal entities across a divided 

geo-political landscape can prove a daunting task. 

As suggested by multiple interviewees, the timing of 

Sandy’s landfall prior to the upcoming presidential 

election, combined with New York City’s unique geopolitical environment, may have prompted more aggressive involvement by the Federal Government and 

had a significant influence on the conduct of the joint 

state and federal military response activities.3

Shaping and Anticipation (October 22-29). 

The 2012 Atlantic hurricane season was a particularly active one, with 19 named storms, 10 of which 

became hurricanes.4

 On October 22, 2012, the 18th 

tropical depression of the season formed over the 

southwestern Caribbean Sea and quickly strengthened into Tropical Storm Sandy late that day. On October 24, less than 2 days after its initial formation, 

Tropical Storm Sandy was upgraded to Hurricane 

Sandy near Kingston, Jamaica.5

 A day later, on October 25, Hurricane Sandy’s projected path had become 

more apparent. As a result, the Federal Government, 
28

led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), began coordinating with several states in the 

mid-Atlantic region likely to be impacted by Sandy in 

the coming days. With the growing likelihood of a significant event unfolding, DoD, through the Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM), issued deployment preparation orders for pending DSCA operations on October 27.6

 Shortly thereafter, NORTHCOM deployed 

multiple defense coordinating officers (DCOs)7 to 

FEMA Regions 1 (New England), 2 (Northeast), and 

3 (mid-Atlantic) to assist in future DoD resource coordination efforts. While DoD coordinated its preparations, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Virginia each 

activated National Guard troops in their states. Over 

a period of 6 days, states and the Federal Government went from routine operations to a heightened 

state of alert in preparation for the arrival of this 

historic storm. 

As the storm approached the coast on October 

28, President Barack Obama signed Stafford Act 

emergency declarations for Connecticut; Washington, DC; Maryland; Massachusetts; New Jersey; and 

New York. Over the next 24 hours, Hurricane Sandy 

weakened from a category 1 hurricane to a tropical storm. The storm made landfall slightly north of 

Atlantic City near Brigantine, NJ, at approximately 

11:30 p.m. on October 29, 2012.8

 That same day, 

President Obama signed additional disaster declarations for Delaware, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania; 

and declared major disaster areas in New Jersey and 

New York following massive storm surges along 

each coast. With the new disaster declarations approved, the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a standing 
29

execution order directing NORTHCOM to provide 

direct support to FEMA in the affected states.9 This 

would set the stage for the unprecedented combined 

state and federal military response under the DSC 

arrangement. 

Owing to the Joint Action Plan and 2012 NDAA, 

state governors had the option to request a dual status commander for the pending DSCA response. Ultimately, six states received authorization to employ a 

DSC: New York, New Jersey, Maryland, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Of the six 

states receiving DSC authorizations, only two—New 

York and New Jersey—actually activated a DSC to 

lead the military response efforts.10 While the military 

response in New Jersey under Brigadier General Bud 

Grant did receive both Title 10 and Title 32 forces, this 

response effort was neither as geographically or politically complex as the New York response, nor did 

it experience the challenges noted in the DSC-led response in New York. For these reasons, the DSC-led 

response in New York under JTF Sandy, commanded 

by Brigadier General Michael Swezey, is the primary 

focus of this case study. 

Initial Response (October 30-November 2).

As this was the first ever use of DSCs during a nonotice/limited-notice incident combining state and 

federal response forces, Hurricane Sandy was, undeniably, an event of national and historic significance. 

In addition to the significance of the military response, 

Sandy also led to the first 2-day closure of the New 

York Stock Exchange since 1888.11 The storm also precipitated only the second mandatory evacuation ever 

issued for low-lying parts of New York City. In total, 

375,000 people were ordered to evacuate prior to the 
30

storm.12 Post-storm assessments suggest that over 

305,000 homes were destroyed in New York, most of 

which were located along major coastlines and subjected to storm surge.13 The storm surge also flooded 

an estimated 2,700 homes and businesses in the city14

and rendered more than 2,000 homes on Long Island 

uninhabitable.15 The storm disrupted power to more 

than 1.5 million New York City residents and killed 

43 people statewide.16 In total, New York experienced 

an estimated $19 billion dollars in damages, including 

$5 billion for the transportation system alone.17 The 

storm had a profound effect on the New York metropolitan area that ultimately led to a large military 

response. The events that followed during the 2-week 

military response to the storm provide us with several 

relevant topics to consider as we attempt to improve 

future dual status commander-led DSCA response 

efforts.

In the first days following Hurricane Sandy’s landfall, the DoD took a proactive, if not aggressive, forward-leaning approach in its response efforts. In anticipation of the need for military support, Governor 

Andrew Cuomo requested a DSC through the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and America’s Security Affairs (HD/ASA). 

Following this request and routing through the various approving authorities,18 the decision was made 

to establish a dual status commander-led JTF in New 

York to coordinate the military response within the 

state. In addition, members of Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support, commanded by Major General Jeff Mathis, 

deployed to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst 

(JBMDL) in New Jersey to coordinate the multistate response effort as part of the joint coordinating element 

(JCE). As the commanding general of this detachment, 

Mathis served as the JCE to the joint force land compo-
31

nent commander (JFLCC), Lieutenant General James 

Caldwell, of U.S. Army North (ARNORTH). In his 

capacity as the JFLCC JCE, Mathis coordinated Title 

10 activities between the DSCs in New York and New 

Jersey and ARNORTH. As the ARNORTH commanding general, Caldwell reported directly to General 

Charles Jacoby, Commanding General of NORTHCOM, who subsequently reported to the Secretary 

of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ultimately to the President. On the state side, Swezey, 

the appointed DSC, reported to Major General Patrick 

Murphy, the Adjutant General (TAG) for New York. 

As the New York TAG, Murphy reported directly to 

Governor Cuomo and represented the state’s military 

decisionmaking authority (Figure 3-3). 

Figure 3-3. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure.

Command and Coordination
32

Within 2 days of Hurricane Sandy making landfall 

in Brigantine, NJ, the command structure had been established, and military assets from around the United 

States deployed to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, 

NJ. An amphibious ready group (ARG) comprised 

of three U.S. Navy ships (USS Wasp, USS Carter Hall, 

USS San Antonio) sortied from Norfolk Naval Station 

toward the New York Harbor as part of routine hurricane avoidance maneuvers. The USS Wasp was the 

first to arrive and was anchored off the New York City 

coast on November 1. A reduced force contingent of 

the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) would arrive aboard the USS Wasp shortly thereafter. The USS 

San Antonio and USS Carter Hall arrived a day later on 

November 2. 

Meanwhile, personnel from the Office of the Secretary of Defense were engaged in administrative 

oversight of the response while the Defense Logistics 

Agency, with the help of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), began sourcing and transporting supplies to affected areas. The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE), as the lead federal agency for National Response Framework (NRF) Emergency Support Function (ESF) 3, Public Works and Engineering, 

was also heavily involved in the early stages of the 

response. Further, NORTHCOM, the National Guard 

Bureau, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other missioncritical DoD entities actively coordinated with FEMA, 

as well as state and local authorities throughout the 

mid-Atlantic region in an effort to get ahead of the 

storm response and provide support. This “go big, go 

early, go fast” approach19 employed by DoD during 

the response to Hurricane Sandy ultimately would 

influence the remainder of the operation and provide several opportunities for lessons learned toward 

improving such complex operations in the future. 
33

Additionally, the national significance of the storm 

on the financial center of the U.S. economy less than 

a week before the 2012 presidential election prompted an increased sense of urgency from the Federal 

Government.

We’re not going to tolerate any red tape. We’re not going to tolerate any bureaucracy.

 President Barack Obama,

 October 31, 201220

In hierarchical organizations, public statements 

from senior leaders and executives can greatly influence the actions of subordinates, regardless of whether 

such statements comply with organizational policies. 

In these “policy-by-speech” moments, such comments 

can be interpreted as standing guidance for future actions. President Barack Obama’s comment after Sandy’s landfall is no exception. In this case, red tape and 

bureaucracy can be found in national disaster guidance documents such as the NRF and National Incident Management System (NIMS). When the President publicly states that red tape and bureaucracy will 

not be tolerated, such guidance tends to be ignored 

or circumvented in order to make things happen in 

the most expeditious manner possible. The administration’s encouragement to abandon established strategies and policies during the conduct of a domestic 

military response is problematic. Operational strategies guide tactical decisionmaking and are designed 

to accomplish a given mission in accordance with the 

rule of law. DoD conducts military operations in accordance with clearly established strategies and associated tactics. The military needs to know its mission, but it also needs to know the rules. Encouraging 
34

noncompliance leads to messy, chaotic, and inefficient 

operations. 

In some cases, this is precisely what we saw during 

the military response in New York. The NRF, NIMS, 

and other such guiding documents and processes 

are not law. However, departing from the traditional 

forms of instruction tends to create additional problems as orders and missions begin to fall outside of 

established guidelines for conducting domestic response. In essence, these policy-by-speech moments, 

well-intentioned as they may be, sometimes serve the 

opposite intent and introduce greater confusion and/

or challenges in the response. 

While this is not an indictment of the President, 

it is also not an endorsement of the NRF and its associated guidance. National disaster response guidance is robust and detailed. Following such guidance 

can often be counterproductive during disasters and 

emergencies. However, federal disaster response is 

complex, so there is a reason for such formal guidance. 

Aggressive, mission-oriented decisionmaking by military commanders stimulated by the White House and 

reaffirmed by senior DoD leadership can accelerate 

the sometimes mechanistic response process, often 

leading to more effective deployment and support 

operations. However, this accelerated disregard for 

policies, procedures, and (in some cases) laws sometimes comes at the expense of unity of effort, sacrificing the principal focus for any combined state-federal 

response under the DSC construct. 

Despite the challenges noted, military commanders and the National Guard successfully navigated the 

geo-political landscape of New York City. In the early 

stages of the military response in New York, National 

Guard troops conducted operations in Manhattan, 

and as well as Nassau, Kings, and Suffolk Counties. 
35

New York-based National Guard units established 

supply points of distribution, executed search and 

rescue missions, assisted in resident evacuations, 

and supported local law enforcement by conducting 

security and presence patrols in areas affected by the 

storm.21 In addition to coordinating the myriad initial 

response efforts spread across Manhattan and several 

surrounding counties and boroughs, personnel assigned to JTF Sandy were busy setting up an operational command center and establishing a routine for 

the coming days’ efforts. By most accounts, the first 

days of the JTF Sandy response were largely effective 

and free of any noteworthy challenges. 

As the days passed, effects of the storm compounded. Three days into the combined state and federal response, power outages still plagued areas within the 

five boroughs; flooding from the recent storm surge 

continued to hamper restoration and recovery efforts; 

and fuel shortages led to increasing lines at area gas 

stations. As a result of this, the likely influence of 

expanding media coverage of the storm’s impacts in 

and around New York City, and the President’s “no 

red tape” speech, new guidance was issued from 

DoD leadership to begin integrating federal military 

forces into the response effort. This guidance, according to sources knowledgeable on the matter,22 was relayed from the highest levels of DoD to NORTHCOM 

commanders down to the tactically focused Title 10 

commanders, specifically directing them to:

• Get missions;

• Do not wait for mission assignment paperwork;

• Apply total force capabilities to accomplish

missions;

• When you get a mission: execute. Clean up

paperwork later.23
36

This external pressure to integrate Title 10 force activity into the Sandy response, despite a lack of formal 

requests by New York authorities at the time, would 

contribute to some of the most significant activities 

during the entire storm response days later.

Continued Operations (November 3-5).

Nearly a week after Sandy’s initial landfall, the 

storm’s effects were becoming more apparent. Despite 

a range of ongoing response activities throughout the 

metropolitan area, there were still unmet needs noted 

by local officials and first responders.24 As news media coverage grew, it contributed to the external pressures faced by the JTF Sandy staff to expand military 

response activities by involving prepositioned federal 

forces. The events of November 3-5 are among the 

most notable and regularly debated of the 2-week 

response operation. 

November 3.

By November 3, National Guard forces operating in New York under Swezey were performing a 

range of missions in four of the five New York City 

boroughs, as well as four additional counties north of 

the city and on Long Island. While the National Guard 

force in New York had demonstrated its ability to meet 

initial requirements, there was no way to accurately 

predict future requirements and needed capabilities. 

With several Title 10 assets pre-staged at JBMDL and 

pressure to integrate federal forces mounting, the 

DSC found himself in a unique position that required 

balancing political influence, operational requirements, financial considerations, and legal nuances to 
37

determine the most efficient and effective manner to 

respond to a growing need. 

On the morning of November 3, flooding from 

Sandy’s storm surge continued to present significant 

challenges for storm responders. In addition, there 

were widespread fuel shortages due to the ongoing 

power outages. With 4 days remaining before the 

election, national news media coverage regularly 

broadcast footage of lengthy lines of those waiting for 

gasoline at area stations.25 That morning, the White 

House, without consent of the states, issued an executive order for the Defense Logistics Agency to begin 

transport and distribution of fuel in both New York 

and New Jersey.26 As a result of this new order and the 

increasing external pressure to involve Title 10 forces, 

Swezey considered deploying a contingent of Active 

Duty forces to assist in dewatering operations in area 

subways as well as increasing fuel distribution in the 

surrounding boroughs.27 Prior to requesting Title 10 

force support and becoming the first DSC to assume 

command and control of Title 10 and Title 32 forces 

for a no-notice/limited-notice incident, Swezey had to 

weigh several considerations, not the least of which 

were the politics influencing the response. 

According to doctrine, Title 10 forces should only 

be considered during domestic response when local 

and state capacities have been overwhelmed or when 

civil authorities are otherwise incapable of performing the necessary mission28—in this case, pumping 

thousands of gallons of water out of subways and other flooded facilities and distributing fuel via military 

transport. Largely due to costs associated with using 

Title 10 assets, as well as the infringement on state sovereignty, federal forces, at least doctrinally, operate on 

a “last in, first out” philosophy in these situations. As 
38

a result, there is redundancy built into the state emergency response process. One form of redundancy regularly used during disaster response is the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Under 

EMAC, can request additional support (such as National Guard forces) from surrounding states to assist 

in incident response operations within their state.29

In order for the DSC to request support from Title 

10 forces, standing state-to-state EMAC agreements 

should be fully implemented. However, it is often left 

to the governor’s subjective assessment to determine 

the point at which EMAC agreements are no longer 

an option, and DSCA is a requirement. Therefore, it 

is difficult to clearly define the appropriate trigger 

for requesting DSCA. This can be problematic for 

several reasons. 

According to some, requesting Title 10 force support prior to exhausting all EMAC options carries 

strategic implications for the National Guard.30 If, 

instead of using an EMAC to request additional National Guard troops, Title 10 forces deploy to support 

state operations, the resulting public perception of the 

National Guard may be one of ineptitude. Such perceptions can strain the relationships between the DSC 

(who is most often a National Guard officer) and TAG 

(also a National Guard officer and appointed by the 

governor in most states). While these are political and 

policy issues, they can and do influence the conduct of 

DSCA operations. As we saw during Sandy, the DSC 

had to balance the political desires of elected officials 

with the necessity of mission accomplishment. As a 

commander with two distinct chains of command, 

the DSC must balance both state and federal responsibilities in a way that facilitates efficient and effective 

tactical leadership. 
39

With the political implications aside, EMAC requests for additional National Guard forces carry 

other logical considerations. Since National Guard 

personnel are civilians first, many have jobs outside 

of their role in the Guard. To justify a request for activating more Guard personnel, there must be missions 

to fulfill. Otherwise, activating civilian Guardsmen to 

wait idly by not only interrupts occupational continuity, but is also a waste of taxpayer money. During the 

early response to Sandy, the DSC knew he had Title 

10 forces at JBMDL ready to support the response operation if requested. With the experiences of Katrina 

in mind, no one at the state or federal level wanted 

to be late to respond or be short on resources. Owing to these issues and in addition to the state of operations on the morning of November 3, Swezey, with 

the support of both state and federal chains of command, made the decision to deploy Title 10 forces to 

assist in dewatering operations in New York City. At 

11:28 a.m. on November 3, 2012, Swezey became the 

first dual status commander in U.S. history to assume 

tactical control of Title 10 forces during a no-notice/

limited-notice DSCA response.31 On this day, a joint 

force of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps 

personnel assigned to the 19th Engineer Battalion in 

Fort Knox, KY, deployed to the area as part of Task 

Force (TF) Pump and began dewatering operations 

under the command of the DSC and JTF Sandy. 

November 4.

Less than a day removed from the successful coordination and first-time deployment of Title 10 forces 

under a DSC-led no-notice/limited-notice DSCA response, the dual status commander was unaware of a 
40

Title 10 force operation ashore on Staten Island. By the 

evening briefing, what was a successfully coordinated 

operation experienced its first and perhaps most significant coordination challenge of the entire Sandy 

response effort. 

The events of November 4 have been addressed in 

numerous after-action reports and post-Sandy analyses of the DSCA response. According to these sources, 

Swezey was made aware of the fact that U.S. Marines 

assigned to the 26th MEU and aboard the USS Wasp

off the coast of Breezy Point, NY, came ashore on Staten Island in order to support local authorities. What 

we do not know is exactly how the Marines were 

requested to support civil authorities or who generated the request. While the circumstances leading to 

the Marine Corps’ arrival on Staten Island remain in 

question, one thing is certain: the DSC did not request 

Title 10 forces to come ashore on November 4, nor was 

he aware of the Marines’ activities until long after they 

arrived. The events of this day provide perhaps the 

single most valuable example of confusion and, consequently, opportunities for lessons learned from the 

entire Sandy response. 

Upon learning of the Marines’ landing on Staten 

Island, the DSC contacted his state and federal chain 

of command to inquire about the mission request and 

authorization, or lack thereof. According to sources 

knowledgeable on the situation, none of the general 

officers within the state or federal chains of command 

were aware of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) mission 

on Staten Island or knew who authorized the landing.32 Fearing the perceived violation of state sovereignty as a result of a federal military force operating 

ashore without the governor’s request or approval, 

the DSC requested that the Marines on Staten Island 
41

cease all operations and return to the ship. Since neither the DSC nor the governor formally requested 

the Marines’ assistance, nor were any of the military 

commanders aware of the circumstances leading to 

the Marines’ activities, it was thought at the time that 

this would set a bad precedent for future DSC-led 

DSCA response efforts. Unless justified under Immediate Response Authority per DoD Directive 3025.18, 

some suggested that an unauthorized Title 10 operation would question the efficacy of the newly agreed 

upon DSC architecture for no-notice/limited-notice 

response scenarios. Due to the concerns voiced by 

members of JTF Sandy, NORTHCOM issued guidance on the evening of November 4 to halt all Title 

10 activities outside of the DSC’s awareness.33 While 

some voiced their concerns over the Title 10 presence 

on Staten Island, others praised the decision to bring 

Marines ashore. Regardless of position, the next challenge for the DSC was determining how and why the 

Marines were requested to come ashore and then, 

since they were ashore and capable of assisting, determining how to best use their force capability to help 

the citizens of New York. 

November 5.

With operations continuing overnight and into 

the morning of November 5, the Marine Corps presence on Staten Island remained a primary focus of the 

DSC and other senior leaders. Other than operating 

under Immediate Response Authority (IRA) in accordance with DoD Directive 3025.18, there is a lengthy 

and often arduous request process governing how 

Title 10 forces receive and fill mission assignments to 

support civil authorities. Given the questionable cir-
42

cumstances of the Marines’ arrival—particularly if not 

justified under IRA—it seems that the request for assistance (RFA) process was not followed. Despite this, 

the Marines were still ashore and actively involved in 

debris clearance and other assistance activities. After 

discussing options with TAG and the JFLCC, the generals determined that the DSC would assume tactical 

control of the Marine detachment operating on Staten 

Island. As the Title 10 JCE to the JFLCC, Mathis specified when the Marines were aboard the USS Wasp, 

they would be under tactical control of the joint force 

maritime component commander. However, in order 

to alleviate further confusion, the Marines would operate under the tactical control of the DSC anytime they 

were ashore. The JFLCC further clarified that all Title 

10 forces ashore in New York must have approval and 

awareness of the DSC moving forward or must be performing functions under ESF 3 and in direct support 

of the USACE. 

After clarifying these issues and assuming tactical 

control of the Marines in his area of operations, the 

DSC issued instructive guidance to the detachment 

authorizing them to perform debris clearance only—

not debris removal, due to important Stafford Act and 

associated legal distinctions between the two terms.34

Local residents welcomed the Marine Corps presence on Staten Island while local and national media 

outlets provided extensive coverage of the response 

activities. What started as a significant complication 

seemingly undermining the authority of both the governor and the DSC evolved into a mutually supportive 

and beneficial operation between the Title 10 forces 

and the DSC-led JTF.

Beyond the scope of the USMC activities on Staten 

Island, the remaining operations on November 5, con-
43

sisted mainly of dewatering missions under TF Pump 

in the Rockaways and Manhattan. These missions 

continued into the evening of November 5 with visibility and approval of the DSC. At the conclusion of 

the day on November 5, the DSC-led DSCA response 

in New York under JTF Sandy now had a full contingent of both state National Guard and federal military 

forces operating throughout. Many of the previously 

encountered challenges had been resolved, or at least 

stabilized. The impacts of the military response effort were becoming tangible as time progressed further from initial landfall. The DSCA operation moved 

into the stability operations phase of the response 

with a positive outlook for the remaining stability 

and transition. 

Stabilizing Operations (November 6-9).

November 6.

On the morning of November 6, the National 

Weather Service issued nor’easter warnings for a large 

area in the northeastern United States, including New 

York City. While both the USS San Antonio and USS 

Carter Hall vacated the area to avoid the coming storm, 

the USS Wasp chose to remain at anchor off the coast of 

the city. With a small detachment of Sailors assisting 

in dewatering missions on Liberty Island and Marines 

from the 26th MEU still supporting debris clearance 

on Staten Island, the ship’s captain chose to weather 

the storm off the Breezy Point coast. With the Navy 

ships moving out, dewatering operations in support 

of TF Pump continued across the region under the 

tactical control of the DSC. Meanwhile, outside of the 

DSC chain of command, FEMA, the Defense Logistics 
44

Agency, the USACE, and US TRANSCOM continued 

supporting response operations in affected areas in 

New York and New Jersey.35 As the storm closed in on 

the New York City area, NORTHCOM officials issued 

guidance to all Title 10 forces supporting the response 

to prepare for retrograde after the storm passed. The 

next 2 days would see minimal changes in activity as 

the storm approached.

November 7.

As the nor’easter approached on November 7, Title 

10 and Title 32 forces continued supporting civil authorities in a variety of capacities. According to the 

DoD’s daily Pentagon briefing on November 7, Marine Corps engineers assigned to TF Pump assisted 

in dewatering operations in Queens, Air Force teams 

operated in support of the New York City Fire Department in the Rockaways and Brooklyn, and Navy 

dive teams assisted in pumping missions at the World 

Trade Center.36 The DoD also reported that Marines 

continued to assist with debris clearance on Staten Island and pumping operations in Breezy Point alongside Navy personnel.37

November 8.

November 8 consisted of much of the same from 

the previous day’s work. While the nor’easter had not 

completely cleared the region and continued to limit 

flight operations, military forces maintained their 

support of local authorities in dewatering missions 

throughout Manhattan and the surrounding boroughs. Again, according to DoD reports on November 8, elements of the Army Reserve’s 401st quarter-
45

team supported pumping operations on Long Beach 

Island and Staten Island. Interviews with Sandy 

commanders revealed that the Army Reserve unit 

on Staten Island was operating outside of the DSC’s 

awareness and under Immediate Response Authority, according to their unit commander.38 As a result 

of this and the expiration of the 72-hour time limit 

granted under IRA, the Reserve unit was instructed to 

vacate the area. 

While minimal in comparison to the Marines’ 

so-called “invasion” of Staten Island, this was still a 

noteworthy issue that offers support for the recommendations that follow. With regard to the Marines, 

they continued their support to civil authorities by 

dewatering homes and apartment buildings in Breezy 

Point and the Rockaways. Airmen supported pumping missions at the Rockaway Waste Water Treatment 

Facility while Navy divers maintained their support 

of dewatering efforts at the World Trade Center.39

Army and Air National Guard personnel continued 

their assistance through ongoing food and water distribution, fuel distribution, sheltering, debris removal, 

and donations distribution.40 Operations continued 

throughout the day and into the evening without any 

notable incidents. By the evening of November 8, the 

nor’easter had passed, making way for a new day of 

unrestricted response efforts.

November 9.

By November 9, DSCA stability operations were 

nearing an end. The storm had passed, and many of 

the same activities from November 8 carried over into 

operations the following day. In addition to ongoing 

debris clearance and removal in Staten Island and 
46

the Rockaways, operations on November 9 included 

Air Force support in the Rockaways and on Long Island, Army and Navy dive team support at the World 

Trade Center, and Marine Corps and Navy pumping 

missions in the Rockaways and Breezy Point.41

Transition Operations (November 10-15).

Operations from November 10-15 quickly reduced 

in frequency and scope. By November 11, NORTHCOM had released a redeployment order for the ARG 

to return to Norfolk.42 The next day, most of the 26th 

MEU redeployed back to Camp Lejeune, NC. The majority of the Title 10 forces departed by November 13, 

leaving mostly National Guard personnel in the area 

of operations. Seemingly as fast as the operation began, it was nearing its conclusion. By the middle of 

November, nearly 2 weeks after Sandy’s initial landfall, most of the region’s power was restored; well 

over a million gallons of water had been pumped from 

area homes, apartments, subways, and other facilities; 

thousands of rations of food and water were distributed, and countless quantities of debris removed from 

areas with damaged infrastructure. By many accounts, 

the first ever use of a dual status commander-led nonotice/limited-notice DSCA response was nearing a 

successful completion. 

In total, it is impossible to say how many lives 

were saved due to JTF Sandy’s actions during the 2 

weeks following the storm. While lives saved cannot be measured, military actions during the storm 

response contributed in significant ways to preventing suffering and mitigating further property damage 

for the residents of New York and other surrounding 

states. The DSC-led response under JTF Sandy in New 
47

York successfully integrated National Guard and federal armed forces for the first time in a no-notice/limited-notice incident. As with any first-time experience, 

there were instances of success and challenge. As a test 

case for future operations, this event provided several 

examples of lessons learned, which can be used to improve future DSC missions in similar capacities. The 

following section discusses some of the most pressing 

lessons learned, including successes and perceived 

failures, and analyzes the circumstances surrounding each occurrence. The lessons learned provide the 

foundation for the final section of recommendations 

based on the conclusions found in this research.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. See “Annual Estimates of Resident Population for Incorporated Places of 50,000 or More, Ranked by July 1, 2013 Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013-United States-Places over 50,000 

Population,” details available from factfinder.census.gov/faces/

tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 

2. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers that 

participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some capacity, 

January-March 2014.

3. Ibid.

4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), “2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season,” January 23, 2014, at 

www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/summary_atlc_2012.pdf.

5. Ibid., p. 4.

6. See “The Department of Defense Prepares for Hurricane 

Sandy,” Release No: 854-12, October 27, 2012, available from 

www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15646.
48

7. A DCO is a single point of contact for domestic emergencies 

who is assigned to a joint field office to process requirements for 

military support, forward mission assignments through proper 

channels to the appropriate military organizations, and assign 

military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency support 

functions. See Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Associated Military Terms, p. 67. 

8. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

9. For details, see Hurricane Sandy: Timeline, Washington, 

DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, available from 

www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline.

10. Interviews conducted January-March 2014; DoD Release 

No: 854-12.

11. Eric S. Blake, Todd B. Kimberlain, Robert J. Berg, John P. 

Cangialosi, and John L. Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy (AL182012), Miami, FL: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, February 12, 

2013, p. 18, available from www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_

Sandy.pdf.

12. See “Mayor Bloomberg Issues Order for Mandatory 

Evacuation of Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane Sandy Approaches,” available from www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/377-12/

mayor-bloomberg-issues-order-mandatory-evacuation-low-lying-areashurricane-sandy.

13. Blake et al., p. 18.

14. Linda Gibbs and Caswell Holloway, Hurricane Sandy After 

Action Report and Recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, 

New York: New York City Office of the Mayor, May 2013, p. 12.

15. Blake et al., p. 18.

16. Gibbs and Holloway, pp. 1, 13. 

17. Blake et al., p. 18. 
49

18. See “Dual Status Commander Designation Process” flow 

chart in Appendix II. 

19. Interviews conducted January-March 2014.

20. Quote from the President’s address to residents of Atlantic 

City 2 days after the storm’s landfall. See “Obama, Christie Tour 

Hurricane Ravaged NJ,” available from www.msnbc.com/the-lastword/obama-gov. 

21. Interviews conducted by the author with various National 

Guard officers who participated in the Joint Task Force Sandy response effort, February 2014.

22. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers 

that participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some 

capacity, January-March 2014.

23. Copied material from NORTHCOM guidance (fragmentary order) of November 2.

24. Interview conducted by the author with a National Guard 

officer that participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy,

February 2014.

25. See “A Slow Return to Normal Skips the Gas Station,” 

The New York Times, November 4, 2012, available from www.

nytimes.com/2012/11/04/nyregion/gas-rationing-is-new-burden-afterhurricane-sandy.html?_r=0.

26. Interview conducted with a National Guard officer that 

participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy, February 2014.

27. Interviews conducted with various DoD employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers that participated 

in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some capacity, JanuaryMarch 2014.

28. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-28: Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, July 31, 2013, pp. viii-ix.
50

29. See “What is EMAC?” available from www.emacweb.org/

index.php?limitstart=0.

30. Interviews conducted with various DoD employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers that participated 

in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some capacity, JanuaryMarch 2014.

31. Interview conducted with a National Guard officer that 

participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy, February 2014.

32. Interviews conducted with various DoD employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers that participated 

in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some capacity, JanuaryMarch 2014.

33. “Hurricane Sandy Disaster Response Active Collection 

Lessons Learned,” Norfolk, VA: U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), February 22, 2013.

34. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act (Stafford Act), Secs. 403(a)(3)(A), 407, and 502(a)

(5), specify conditions when the President may authorize federal 

agencies to conduct debris removal or reimburse private contractors for such services using a 75/25 federal/state cost share, respectively. Under 42 U.S.C. § 5107b(a)(3)(A), federal agencies may, 

at the direction of the President, provide assistance to save lives 

and protect property, including reimbursement for debris removal services. 42 U.S.C. § 5173, supported by 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(5), 

specifies that federal agencies can conduct debris clearance ((a)

(1)) and authorizes private contractors to conduct debris removal

((a)(2)). Due to these provisions, the DSC chose to authorize Marines to engage in debris clearance activities only. Also of note: 

Prior to October 27, 2012, 44 CFR 206.228(a)(2), “Force Account 

Labor,” did not permit reimbursement of straight or regular time 

salary costs for contractors performing debris removal under the 

aforementioned provisions; they were instead reimbursed at the 

overtime rate. Following Hurricane Sandy, a retroactive revision 

to this law was signed allowing for reimbursement of debris removal activities only at the regular salaried rate. Debris clearance 

activities were not included in this revision. See “FEMA Recovery 

Fact Sheet 9580.215: Hurricane Sandy: Debris Removal Force Ac-
51

count Labor Costs,” available from www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/20130726-1857-25045-0130/rp9580_215_debris_removal_force_

account_labor_costs_fact_sheet__11_5_12_.pdf.

35. See “Pentagon Officials Detail Continuing Storm Response 

Support,” Daily Briefing, November 6, 2012, available from www.

defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118464. 

36. See “Pentagon Officials Provide Storm Response Update,” 

Daily Briefing, November 7, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118473. 

37. Ibid.

38. Interviews conducted with National Guard officers that 

participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy, February 2014.

39. See “Pentagon Provides Storm Response Update,” Daily 

Briefing, November 8, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=118488. 

40. Ibid.

41. See “Pentagon Provides Sandy Response Update,” Daily 

Briefing, November 9, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=118496. 

42. USFFC, p. 25.

53

CHAPTER 4

POST-EVENT LESSONS LEARNED

Hurricane Sandy caused a great deal of damage 

in the New York metropolitan area. However, Sandy 

was only a Category 1 storm when it made landfall 

and quickly dissipated after coming ashore. While the 

storm surge was one of the most significant in New 

York’s history, the storm could have been worse. The 

post-event lessons learned from this storm cover everything from conflicting command intent, command 

and control, communication, coordination, mission 

assignments, laws, policies, and even politics. Within 

the observations of this analysis, there are examples of 

successes that should be repeated, as well as examples 

of issues needing improvement. This chapter is divided into two main categories: successes and shortfalls. 

Within successes, there are four sub-categories and 

associated discussions: 

• Coordination;

• Liaison officers;

• Forward-leaning strategy;

• Sustaining successes.

Within shortfalls are six sub-categories and associated 

discussions: 

• Process Integrity;

• Title 10 Awareness of the Dual Status Commander Construct;

• Command Stucture;

• Mission Assignment Process;

• Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Education;

• Dual Status Commander Guidance/

Instructions.
54

SUCCESSES

Between extensive dewatering and supply transport and delivery, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 

were critical to the ongoing success of the overall federal response. Despite the importance of these contributions to the operational successes, the dual status 

commander (DSC) was not in a position to command 

or direct USACE or DLA activities. Since these Department of Defense (DoD) activities occurred outside 

of the DSC-led response in New York, they are not detailed in this analysis. This is not to say that the dual 

status commander (DSC)-led joint task force (JTF) did 

not succeed. Despite being the historic first-time use 

of a DSC for a combined state and federal response, 

there were some notable successes. Hurricane Sandy 

provided a proof-of-concept environment for evaluating a DSC operation that involved effective coordination, the successful integration of liaison officers 

(LNOs), and a strategic forward-leaning approach to 

the operation, including pre-positioning Title 10 assets, all of which should be repeated and leveraged 

again in future DSCA response operations of similar 

circumstances and requirements. 

Coordination.

While it cannot be empirically proven through systematic analysis, according to several accounts of the 

response effort, the DSC JTF successfully coordinated 

many complex staff integration processes that facilitated effective joint communication and coordination 

between Title 10 and Title 32 staff representatives.1

During the beginning stages of establishing the tem-
55

porary JTF, National Guard and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) staff officers transitioned into 

the initial operations phase with minimal complication. Initial staffing procedures, including the identification and pre-deployment of defense coordinating 

officers (DCOs) to the anticipated affected areas, were 

executed with clarity and focus. The JTF established 

the required staff cells and began coordinating the 

response operation. These critical staff procedures, at 

least in the early stages of the storm response, were 

efficient and effective, and should be used as a guide 

for future DSC-led JTF augmentation. Additionally, 

the willingness of commanders and senior leaders to 

use verbal orders of the commanding officer (VOCO) 

as a basis for executing tasks and missions was also 

an effective coordination mechanism noted during the 

Sandy response. 

With the noted complexities and burdensome 

nature of the mission assignment process, leaders 

encouraged their subordinates to obtain VOCO as a 

basic form of approval prior to conducting response 

activities. Commanders and other senior leaders demonstrated a willingness and ability to coordinate verbally and direct the tactical response activities without waiting for the often sluggish written approval 

process to occur. In many cases, this led to quicker 

response activities that ultimately benefitted the citizens of New York. One specific example of this VOCO 

process occurred immediately following the Marine 

Corps’ arrival on Staten Island on November 4. 

Aside from the administrative coordination successes noted previously, one of the most significant 

tactical coordination successes that can offer insight 

into future command decisionmaking occurred when 

the DSC received word of the Marines’ unsolicited 
56

(from the DSC JTF) landing on Staten Island. As mentioned earlier, following an initial period of frustration 

over the landing and subsequent verbal coordination 

with general officers within the chain of command, 

the DSC was given tactical control of the Marine detachment ashore instead of having them return to the 

ships. This decision provided two benefits: 1) the command authority of the DSC and ultimately the Governor of New York remained intact by assuming tactical 

control of the unrequested force; and 2) it offered a 

tried and accepted decision mechanism for future operations where DSCs can request tactical control of all 

Title 10 forces entering the joint operations area (JOA) 

regardless of pretext. 

Conversely, had the Marines been permitted to continue operating ashore outside of the DSC command 

architecture, the sovereignty of New York and the 

governor’s authority, and thus the purpose of establishing a DSC as a principal coordination mechanism 

between the states and Federal Government, would 

have been undermined. In contrast, had the Marines 

returned to the ship as was originally proposed, this 

would simply serve to further the divide between the 

State and Federal Government, ultimately to the detriment of the citizens of New York, further questioning 

the efficacy of the DSC arrangement. 

As it occurred, the DSC’s assumption of tactical 

control over the Marines, to the satisfaction of both the 

Title 10 and Title 32 commanders, resulted in a successful solution to what was one of the biggest points of 

friction and areas for improvement of the entire DSCA 

response to Hurricane Sandy. Assessing the dynamics of VOCO, including the level of compliance and 

implementation, is nearly impossible from a lessons 

learned perspective. However, the benefit of VOCO is 
57

evident from the Sandy response. Coordinating operational continuity by assuming tactical control of the 

Marines occurred almost entirely through verbal discussion and coordination, thus reaffirming the value 

of the VOCO process as a critical coordination practice. In many cases, VOCO coordination is facilitated 

by and through strategically positioned LNOs inside 

the relevant agencies, services, departments, and 

organizations. 

Liaison Officers.

Interservice/agency coordination is critical to the 

success of any joint operation. It is perhaps even more 

critical to the success of no-notice/limited-notice response, given the dynamic and evolving nature of 

such operations. Since information and requirements 

so often change during these events, generating and 

maintaining situational awareness is a necessity for 

commanders. As designated representatives of their 

respective service or organization, LNOs and/or emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) provide a 

vital function to any commander executing joint operations. The placement of LNOs across the entire JOA 

was considered by many senior commanders to be one 

of the most beneficial practices employed by the joint 

force during Hurricane Sandy.2

 By embedding LNOs 

representing various services in and around important 

staff elements, such as the joint field office (JFO), JTF 

Headquarters, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), and the respective military service 

headquarters, operational decisionmaking processes 

were enhanced through shared situational awareness. 

While there were some LNO coordination gaps 

noted (discussed later in this monograph), the empha-
58

sis on using LNOs to improve coordination is a success worth repeating. While it is unclear exactly how 

many LNOs were essential to amplify command coordination during Sandy, it appears from the available 

data that LNO integration provided an intangible but 

genuine benefit. By identifying needs and assigning 

LNOs to critical areas, the joint force demonstrated a 

forward-leaning, assertive approach to this civil support operation that is also worth noting. 

Forward-Leaning Strategy.

Exercising command initiative by deploying LNOs 

throughout the JOA is an example of a successful, 

forward-leaning approach employed by DoD and 

the National Guard in response to Hurricane Sandy. 

Rather than waiting to deploy forces until after receipt of a support request, both DoD and the National 

Guard took a proactive approach and prepositioned 

forces and equipment in and around areas affected by 

Sandy. As discussed, the lessons of Hurricane Katrina 

remain embedded in the minds of many. Given the 

highly criticized federal response to Katrina, the prevailing philosophy of senior leaders involved with the 

planning and execution of the Sandy response held 

that DoD should take aggressive measures to ensure 

that the citizens of New York and other affected states 

receive the assistance they need when they need it. In 

other words: “don’t be late.”3

DoD’s effort to avoid repeating the failures of 

Katrina resulted in the aforementioned “go big, go 

early, go fast” approach that involved prepositioning 

equipment and forces and taking additional steps to 

facilitate coordination and communication between 

all participating units and agencies. Rather than op-
59

erating via a pull philosophy, in which DoD waits for 

requests from local and state agencies to mobilize resources, a push mentality was employed. This push 

vs. pull approach is a paradigm shift of sorts for DoD 

compared to past response efforts. Placing personnel 

and equipment assets on standby status in geographic 

proximity to the JOA offered the DSC additional capabilities to consider during the response, which 

ultimately proved beneficial. 

Although the prepositioned forces assume an associated cost risk if they are not used—and therefore 

pressure commanders to employ mobilized assets—

the benefit of having prepositioned Title 10 forces near 

the JOA as a force multiplying capability is significant. 

Additionally, this option saves National Guard forces 

from activating troops, forcing them to unnecessarily 

leave their civilian jobs for extended periods in the 

event they are not involved in the response operation. 

In the case of Hurricane Sandy, prepositioned Title 10 

forces gave the DSC the flexibility to maximize the National Guard assets currently in the JOA and prevented 

the unnecessary mobilization of potentially thousands 

of additional Guard troops at the additional expense 

to the taxpayer. The Title 10 forces prepositioned in 

and around the JOA provided an obvious benefit to 

the DSC that should be considered an administrative 

and strategic best practice for future civil support 

scenarios.

Sustaining Successes.

While not a comprehensive list, the aforementioned information reveals some notable successes that 

should be considered by those directing future operations. Sustaining the successes will provide some of 
60

the critical components of the strategic, operational, 

and tactical level frameworks necessary to ensure a 

successful DSCA response under a DSC-led JTF. To 

ensure the continued use and implementation of those 

actions for future operations, it is important to include 

these successes in lessons learned and after-action 

reports. DoD has a robust lessons learned program 

within each service component. Often, reports generated by Centers for Lessons Learned provide DoD 

with valuable information and recommendations to 

incorporate into future training exercises, simulations, 

and actual operations. Integrating these successes into 

the ongoing lessons learned process would ensure 

leaders have the information necessary for improved 

decisionmaking during future DSCA events. 

Leveraging lessons learned ensures commanders can incorporate valuable knowledge into critical 

training and exercise simulations. These simulations 

often provide military forces with the most comprehensive and realistic opportunities to train and prepare for likely operational situations. Integrating this 

knowledge into future DSCA training events offers 

commanders an opportunity to test and evaluate the 

efficacy of the aforementioned strategies and tactics. 

By simulating such operations, commanders are better positioned to execute actual operations when the 

time comes. Further, training and simulations create 

evaluation scenarios that help identify mission-critical gaps and areas for improvement, such as training 

more LNOs to serve in this necessary function. 

Finally, DoD and the National Guard can ensure 

sustained successes in future DSCA operations by 

training more personnel to serve as LNOs. The LNO 

requirement is essential for a successfully coordinated 

response, especially one involving multiple services, 
61

agencies, departments, and organizations. Maintaining a cadre of trained personnel capable of serving as 

LNOs is necessary for continued success. With trained 

LNOs involved in extensive exercises and simulations 

designed in consideration of past lessons learned, 

DoD and the National Guard can sustain the notable 

successes from Hurricane Sandy and improve performance during the next no-notice/limited-notice incident requiring DSCA. However, beyond sustaining 

the successes gleaned from Hurricane Sandy, there are 

several areas for improvement to learn from as well.

SHORTFALLS

Despite some important successes, it is crucial to 

note that temporary JTFs for no-notice/limited-notice 

incidents are just that: temporary. These makeshift 

commands stand up in response to events requiring 

joint coordination of military activities in support of 

civil authorities. They do not train for months in preparation for deployments, as defined military units often do. Due to this temporary joint structure, the JTF 

often lacks continuity and sound working relationships. As a result, these operations inevitably experience challenges. While the preceding successes offer 

valuable insight into sustaining future actions, there 

are, as expected, numerous areas for improvement 

worth noting.

The coordinated federal response to Hurricane 

Sandy had many successes; and, as is to be expected 

with the first-time implementation of a new command arrangement, the operation had many failures 

from which to learn. The following section identifies 

some of the more significant challenges the DSC-led 

JTF and associated personnel experienced during the 
62

2-week response. For clarity and consistency, the topics are again separated into categories with a detailed 

description of the circumstances for context and consideration. This section serves as the basis for the final 

section of this monograph that details specific recommendations for improvement of strategy and policy. 

Process Integrity. 

As previously discussed, the preparation phase of 

the Sandy response was efficient and largely effective. 

In New York, civilian and military personnel deployed 

to the planned JOA early and set up a functioning 

JTF ready to coordinate the receipt and employment 

of state and federal forces. From the storm’s landfall 

on October 29 to the conclusion of initial area assessments on October 31, most accounts of the operation 

were positive. National Guard forces were the main 

military presence within the New York City boroughs 

and on Long Island. Title 10 assets and personnel had 

been prepositioned at nearby Joint Base McGuire-DixLakehurst (JBMDL), Trenton, NJ, and were awaiting 

mission assignments. However, growing frustrations 

over power outages, fuel shortages, and expanding 

news media coverage of the response, likely coupled 

with the pressures of the pending election, prompted 

the Federal Government to begin taking a more assertive stance in the response effort. The administration’s October 31 “no red tape” guidance, coupled 

with NORTHCOM’s November 2 fragmentary order 

(FRAGO),4

 while both certainly well-intentioned, contributed to some of the resulting confusion during 

subsequent days.
63

November 2 NORTHCOM FRAGO 

• Get missions. Start with menu of DoD capabilities in the JOA that can be applied to support 

FEMA requirements.

• Do not wait for mission assignment paperwork.

Coordinate with FEMA and the DCOs.

• Apply total force capabilities to accomplish

missions. Operate on VOCO mission assignments when possible.

• When you get a mission: execute. Clean up paperwork later by coordinating with FEMA and 

the DCO.5

Those instructions, copied from a written 

FRAGO on November 2, seemingly encourages military commanders to abandon the structured processes 

normally in place in favor of less restrictive, verbal 

communication. In most cases, this demonstrates the 

military’s ability to conduct flexible, adaptive, and in 

some cases, improvised operations when bureaucracy 

would simply be an unnecessary obstacle impeding 

efficiency. On its own, this guidance is encouraging 

and could be interpreted as consenting direction for 

Title 10 forces to respond under Immediate Response 

Authority. However flexible, it was in conflict with 

the DSCA process taught to military officers as part of 

their professional military education. 

When guidance stems from the most senior levels, 

it tends to move through the subordinate echelons 

with greater urgency. As a result, actions often happen with more fervor and zeal. When such guidance 

contradicts policy and legislation, however, it invites 

violations of the same laws and procedures that are 

designed to maintain order, structure, and accountability in the first place. In some ways, senior com-
64

manders decided, essentially, to marginalize or ignore 

many of the guiding documents and laws governing 

military civil support operations. As a result, the National Response Framework (NRF), the mission assignment process, and other pertinent procedural 

guidance that serve as a system of checks and balances 

were largely ignored or abandoned by some senior 

leaders. The most notable example of this issue was 

the U.S. Marines landing on Staten Island without the 

prior consent or knowledge of the DSC. 

Title 10 Awareness of the Dual Status Commander 

Construct. 

Building on the earlier discussion detailing the 

events of November 4 and 5, we know that the Marines’ arrival on Staten Island resulted from a series of 

conversations outside of the established chain of command and perhaps without consideration for normal 

Title 10 request for assistance procedures. A number 

of after-action reports and personal interviews with 

those knowledgeable of the events support the claim 

that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, through 

the II Marine Expeditionary Force commanding general directed the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 

commander to deploy his unit to the USS Wasp off the 

coast of New York. The guidance from the Commandant instructed the MEU to: “Get to New York City, 

go ashore, do good, and relieve the suffering that is occurring.”6

 These same reports and interviews suggest 

that a New York/New Jersey Port Authority official 

circumvented the normal processes and initiated the 

request via direct communication with Headquarters 

Marine Corps (HQMC). As a result, without a mission 

assignment or notifying the DSC, Marines carried out 
65

their orders and began support efforts on November 

4. Except for justifying the Marine Corps’ arrival on 

Staten Island as Immediate Response Authority (discussed in subsequent sections), the legal basis for the 

Marines’ activity on Staten Island on November 4 and 5 

is, at best, questionable. Since the DSC was unaware of 

the Marines’ activity until after their arrival, this offers 

a valuable lesson learned to improve future Title 10 coordination with the DSC JTF. This failure of communication and coordination suggests several things worth 

discussing. 

Incursion, intrusion, invasion, initiative: all are 

words that have been used to describe the Marines’ 

landing on Staten Island on November 4. Aside from 

debating the semantic classification of the Marines’ 

presence on Staten Island, this event illustrates some 

important points. Perhaps the most significant lesson 

learned from this action is the lack of familiarity and 

understanding of the DSC arrangement among some 

Title 10 officers. Some officers who commanded units 

during Sandy admitted to being completely unaware 

of the DSC concept, structure, and command arrangement prior to execution.7

 In addition, due to the pressure from the Commandant and the aforementioned 

NORTHCOM guidance to “get missions,” the MEU 

repeatedly contacted the joint coordinating element 

at JBMDL, rather than the DSC JTF, to request mission assignments. This is problematic for two reasons. 

By contacting the joint coordinating element (JCE) 

and other senior commanders to request missions, 

the MEU:

• demonstrated that it did not have a clear understanding of the DSC chain of command and 

was, in effect, excluding the DSC from the con-
66

versation simply because it was unaware of the 

DSC role.

 • was, in effect, pressuring senior commanders

to involve a Title 10 force in the response effort 

prior to the DSC JTF’s acknowledgement of the 

requested need.

After some time without acknowledgement from 

the JCE and following discussions with HQMC and 

Port Authority personnel, the MEU debarked a small 

detachment of Marines from the USS Wasp to assist 

Staten Island authorities in debris removal and restoration activities (a mission not covered by an approved 

mission assignment and without the awareness of the 

New York DSC at the time). Despite occurring outside 

of DSC’s scope, the Marines provided a requested 

service in support of the residents and local authorities on Staten Island. As such, it became evident that 

this activity should continue. Following a brief interruption in activity on the evening of November 4 (as 

previously discussed), the Marines resumed support 

activities under the tactical control of the DSC on

 November 5. 

The lessons learned here suggest several things. 

First, when command guidance encourages the abandonment of policies, accountability and clarity are lost 

in such a complex response environment. A long history of disaster research suggests that the “red tape” 

of government bureaucracy hinders response processes, often to the detriment of the citizens of an effected 

area.8

 As taxing as it may be to adhere to response policies and procedures, combined state and federal response efforts require some semblance of structure to 

function adequately. The Marines’ landing on Staten 

Island suggests that not only do some military com-
67

manders lack the necessary education and knowledge 

concerning the DSC construct, but there is also limited 

understanding of the requirements and procedures 

of the mission assignment process. Regardless of the 

reason for abandoning procedures, this particular set 

of circumstances suggests that military commanders 

do not have a clear understanding of the dual status commander construct and its application during 

no-notice/limited-notice DSCA response scenarios. 

Moreover, between political influences, uncoordinated civilian activities, and occasional federal military 

ventures under Immediate Response Authority, DSC 

may not be able to command and control as much of 

the response as we expect them to. These events also 

suggest that the established command structure for 

the Sandy response was unclear. 

Command Structure. 

Beyond the Marine activity on Staten Island, confusion and lack of clarity concerning the actual joint 

command structure further complicated matters during the Sandy response. Because Sandy was a multistate incident, the decision was made to put a JCE 

as an intermediary echelon between the Army North 

commander (Lieutenant General William Caldwell) 

and the New York DSC. In this case, Major General 

Jeff Mathis, Commanding General of Joint Task ForceCivil Support served in this capacity as the JCE with 

supervision of all Title 10 forces in both New York and 

New Jersey during the Sandy response. In a single 

state incident, this would be an unnecessary command position, as the DSC would report directly to the 

Army North (ARNORTH) commander, to NORTHCOM, to the Secretary of Defense, and finally to the 

President on the Title 10 side. In the Sandy response, 
68

however, the JCE served as an additional command 

layer and added confusion to the already complex 

command hierarchy. 

According to some accounts in after-action reports 

and personal interviews, the command structure 

changed multiple times during the first days of the 

operation. The role of the JCE was unclear to many, as 

there are conflicting accounts among those who participated in the event. Some maintain that the JCE was 

the intermediate link between the JFLCC (ARNORTH) 

and the DSC with command authority linking the two 

echelons (Figure 4-1). Others, however, dispute this, 

suggesting that the JCE’s role was just that: a coordinating element with no command authority over the 

DSC, as suggested in the alternative structure shown 

in Figure 4-2. 

While accounts differ, the fact remains that the 

command and control structure of the Sandy response 

was unclear to the Title 10 side. On more than one occasion, this lack of clarity resulted in the New York 

DSC fielding calls on his cell phone or receiving emails 

from Title 10 forces advocating for their capabilities 

and requesting orders to assist in the response. In effect, the DSC received multiple unsolicited requests 

from Title 10 forces petitioning for their inclusion in 

the operation. This not only points to a lack of clarity 

regarding the command structure, but also suggests 

that Title 10 forces either deliberately ignored processes or were mostly ignorant to the coordination and 

approval procedures involving the DCOs and their 

counterparts in the JFO. Within this context, other 

processes were equally challenging, leading to confusion during the Sandy response in New York. 
69

Figure 4-1. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure.

Figure 4-2. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure, 

Alternative View.

Command and Coordination

Command and Coordination
70

Mission Assignment Process.

The DoD mission assignment process outlining the 

procedures for Title 10 support of civil authorities is 

unwieldy. Combining this cumbersome process with 

the urgent needs following a no-notice/limited-notice 

incident creates additional burdens for military and 

civil authorities to manage. The unprecedented timing 

of Hurricane Sandy just prior to a presidential election 

and its near-direct hit on the most populated city in 

the United States only increased the interagency pressure to provide timely response. For reasons previously mentioned, the mission assignment process was 

not followed on several occasions during the federal 

response to Sandy in New York. The lack of adherence to established procedures can be attributed to all 

levels of command. Specifically, the Sandy response 

in New York suggests needed improvement in the 

mission assignment process as it relates to approval 

and authorization, as well as speed and necessity of 

assignment processing.

Within the mission assignment parameters, requests for DoD assistance are generated from local 

and state authorities after all other resources (local, 

county, state [including National Guard], and Emergency Management Assistance Compact) have been 

exhausted or are otherwise unable to provide the 

necessary service due to limited capabilities. (For example, dewatering the New York subways required 

pumping capabilities beyond local and state capabilities). Conceptually, this bottom-up process ensures 

that federal forces sourced for DSCA have a mission 

to perform based on requests from local authorities. In 

actuality, the mission assignment process sometimes 

creates a bureaucratic obstacle for a commander that 
71

hinders operational response. When there are unmet 

needs in a DSCA response scenario, bureaucracy creates frustrations and impatience, which can lead to 

noncompliance with established procedures. During 

Sandy, there were several instances of this as missions 

came from the top-down and without requests from 

state and/or local officials. 

Without approved mission assignments but in 

consonance with NORTHCOM guidance, military 

units converged on the New York area in the days following Sandy’s landfall. Units deployed intending to 

provide assistance without consideration for accounting procedures or Title 10 and Title 32 coordination 

strategies. This force surge created a cluttered JOA 

with some units in the area without the knowledge of 

the DSC. This also led to the inundation of unsolicited 

offers of support from Title 10 forces, which had to be 

fielded by members of the JTF staff, further complicating an already complex coordination effort. In some 

instances—and likely due to the sluggish mission assignment approval process—missions were generated 

and disseminated from the top-down, rather than 

bottom-up, per the NRF guidelines. Eventually, Title 

10 forces began conducting support activities without 

a mission assignment or knowledge of the DSC. As a 

result, key personnel in the JTF staff, the New York 

State Office of Emergency Management, including the 

state coordinating officer (SCO), and other critical coordination elements, were excluded from the conversation. This led to increased confusion and reduced 

interagency coordination. With Title 10 forces operating in the DCS’s tactical area of control and responsibility and without a valid mission assignment, the 

immediate reaction in some instances was to order 

all nonapproved activities halted until approval was 
72

granted. As a resource employer, the DSC is responsible for coordinating federal and state efforts simultaneously. Mission assignment protocol should not 

restrict the DSC from employing state and/or federal 

resources appropriately to meet a need. The impediments that prevent a DSC from approving missions 

within his/her area of responsibility, especially Title 

10 missions providing needed support to local authorities, hence, should be removed.

To many, the published mission assignment process is mechanistic and convoluted. Some argue that 

the heavily bureaucratic process creates delays and 

inefficiencies at a time when speed and effectiveness 

are most critical. Therefore, the fact that DoD did not 

adhere to the mission assignment process during 

the Sandy response may be perceived by many as a 

progressive step forward. However, abandoning the 

mission assignment process entirely creates significant impediments to coordinating and executing an 

operationally, legally, and financially sound federal 

response. With increased confusion resulting from ad 

hoc processes outside of the established guidelines, 

this ultimately diminishes the unity of effort desired 

in DSC-led DSCA responses. 

As with other topics discussed, the Sandy response in New York illustrated some of the current 

issues plaguing the process and offers a useful case 

study platform to generate improvement. Based on 

this event, it is clear that the mission assignment process can be improved to ensure this situation does not 

occur again in future DSCA missions. During a nonotice/limited-notice incident, the first 72-96 hours 

of the federal response are absolutely critical and can 

mean the difference between a manageable disaster 

and one where Congress, the media, and the public 
73

collectively blame DoD for sluggishness. A better 

and more streamlined mission assignment process 

is needed to recognize this critical response period. 

However, improving the mission assignment process 

is only one step in the larger DSCA context. As the 

response to Sandy demonstrated, some military commanders and other senior defense officials lack the 

requisite knowledge of the DSCA environment and 

the newly established DSC construct. We must ensure 

that senior military commanders and defense officials 

are fully educated in the DSCA arena, with specific 

emphasis on the DSC arrangement.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities Education. 

Of the noted areas needing improvement, perhaps 

none is more important than DSCA education for senior military leaders. While there are many subject 

matter experts in all things related to defense support 

of civil authorities, there appears to be a critical gap in 

DSCA knowledge among some senior military commanders. As evidenced by the failure to follow mission assignment processes and the notable confusion 

over the role and authority of the DSC, it appears that 

some senior leaders, often with decisionmaking authority, lack the required knowledge to ensure their 

decisions fall within established legal, financial, and 

doctrinal barriers of DSCA operations. The critical 

triad of DSCA considerations—the legal, financial, 

and doctrinal guidelines—were abused during the 

Sandy response in New York, in many cases due to 

a lack of DSCA knowledge among commanders and 

their support staffs. This is not to suggest that all Title 

10 DSCA operations were in violation of policies and 

procedures; much to the contrary, in fact. The prob-
74

lems that occurred during the Sandy response in most 

cases can be attributed largely to lack of formal education, training, and knowledge of the DSCA response 

environment. 

As noted previously, some Title 10 force commanders were unaware of the DSC arrangement prior 

to their involvement in Sandy. The same reports and 

interviews suggest that USACE commanders were 

equally unfamiliar with the DSC construct. In this 

case, Title 10 forces attached to Task Force Pump and 

in support of the USACE as the lead federal agency 

for Emergency Support Function-3 were assigned 

missions beyond the scope of any pre-approved mission assignments for Title 10 forces. Reports suggest 

that USACE personnel were unaware of certain Title 

10 restrictions for federal military forces and did not 

have an effective process in place to facilitate coordination with the DSC. While these issues were resolved 

through effective interservice liaison efforts, they 

point to larger issues that must be addressed.

If unit commanders supporting DSCA operations 

are unaware of the command structure in place, this 

can certainly contribute to increased confusion and 

uncertainty, much like what occurred during Sandy. 

The DSC construct is relatively new and had never 

been used during a no-notice/limited-notice DSCA 

response prior to Sandy, so there is some expectation 

of unfamiliarity. However, the lack of knowledge toward the DSC arrangement on behalf of some commanders during the execution of a real-world DSCA 

operation is troubling. This suggests that we need to 

improve knowledge and awareness of senior military 

officers with DSCA-related mission capabilities organic to their units. It also suggests that we need to 

significantly improve our communication and infor-
75

mation sharing prior to and during DSCA operations 

so that commanders supporting civil authorities can 

operate within the established command configuration, limit future confusion, and therefore, contribute 

to the desired unity of effort that the DSC arrangement 

is designed to facilitate. Finally, this suggests an urgent need for more realistic training and exercises like 

Vigilant Guard, Ardent Sentry, and others designed 

to simulate a DSCA response under a dual status 

commander. 

Dual Status Commander Guidance/Instructions.

Much of the confusion and lack of situational 

awareness concerning the DSC initiative can be attributed to the lack of formal guidance currently contained in DoD reference publications, doctrine, and 

instructions. Currently, the DoD Instruction 3025.xx, 

“Dual Status Commanders for Defense Support of 

Civil Authorities,” is in draft status, with a tentative 

fall 2014 release. As a subordinate publication to the 

more widely circulated DoD Directive 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities,”9

 DOD Instruction 

3025.xx will address many of the current issues of confusion concerning dual status commander-led DSCA 

operations. Until the release of this new instruction, 

few other defense references offer guidance on the 

dual status commander construct, and even fewer contain any substantive information that can be applied 

to no-notice/limited-notice incidents.10 There is a critical need within DoD and the National Guard to codify 

DSC guidance through the development and continued revisions of relevant guidance, doctrine, and reference publications. Such work is ongoing within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM, and 
76

the individual services. However, until DoD develops 

and releases clear, well-articulated guidance detailing 

the many issues relevant to the DSC construct, these 

operations will continue to experience challenges like 

those noted. 

While not a comprehensive list, this chapter offers 

a brief description of some notable areas recognized 

through the Hurricane Sandy operations as needing 

improvement during dual status commander-led 

DSCA operations. Using this as a basis for future decisionmaking and planning efforts can lead to improvements in these critical mission capabilities under the 

unique command arrangement noted. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers that 

participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some capacity, 

January-March 2014.

2. Ibid.

3. “Don’t be late” was a repeated axiom describing DoD’s 

strategic planning approach to the Sandy response. This was noted in multiple after-action reports and in the context of the lessons 

learned from Hurricane Katrina. 

4. “Fragmentary Order” is defined by Joint Publication (JP) 

1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Associated Military Terms, 

as “An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed 

after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.” JP 1-02, Washington, DC: 

DoD, 2014, p. 105.

5. Copied material from NORTHCOM guidance (fragmentary order) of November 2. 
77

6. Summary of guidance issued by the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps provided to the authors through personal interviews and multiple DoD after-action reports detailing the circumstances of the Marines’ response. 

7. Various DoD after-action reports suggest Title 10 unit commanders were unaware of the DSC construct or how federal military forces integrate into the joint structure. 

8. David Neal and Brenda Phillips, “Effective Emergency 

Management: Reconsidering the Bureaucratic Approach,” Disasters, Vol. 19, Issue 4, 1995, pp. 327-337; Gary Webb and François 

Chevreau, “Planning to Improvise: The Importance of Creativity 

and Flexibility in Crisis Response,” International Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 66-72; Gregory Streib 

and William Waugh, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective 

Emergency Management,” Public Administration Review, Special 

Issue, December 2006, pp. 131-140; William Waugh, “Mechanisms 

for Collaboration in Emergency Management: ICS [Incident Command System], NIMS, and the Problem with Command and Control,” Rosemary O’Leary and Lisa Blomgren Bingham, eds., The 

Collaborative Public Manager: New Ideas for the Twenty-First Century, 

Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 157-175; Russell Dynes, “Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies,” International Journal of Mass 

Emergencies and Disasters, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1994, pp. 141-158.

9. DoD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 

was last revised in September 2012 and contains no language 

addressing the DSC construct in any capacity. 

10. The only DoD publication devoted to the DSC construct 

at this time is NORTHCOM Publication (NP) 3-20, Title 10 Support 

to Dual Status Command Led Joint Task Force Standard Operating 

Procedures. Released in January 2012, this document outlines the 

employment procedures and considerations for the use of DSCs 

during civil support missions. However, this document pre-dates 

Hurricane Sandy by nearly a year. Lessons learned from Sandy 

are beginning to trickle in and have led to the need to rewrite 

this publication. According to NORTHCOM personnel, NP 3-20 

is undergoing significant revisions at this time. JP 3-28 was published in July 2013 following significant revisions from the 2007 
78

version. JP 3-28 offers some of the most comprehensive text regarding DSC of all DoD publications reviewed. This new version 

“introduces, defines and clarifies the dual-status commander to 

include nomination, training and appointment requirements” (p. 

iii). Additionally, JP 3-28 includes a useful process diagram (Figure 13) to depict the DSC designation process once requested by 

state governors (2013, p. C-9). U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-28, 

Civil Support Operations provides a detailed description of the DSC 

concept and construct. This reference defines the authorities and 

requirements for establishing DSC arrangements and provides 

useful graphics to illustrate the operational and tactical command 

relationships between the DSC, State Governments, and the Federal Government (p. 7-5). However, defined guidance on the execution process for no-notice/limited-notice incidents is absent in 

this reference. Other pertinent military reference publications, including Army Doctrinal Publication 3-28 and Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) 3-28, address the DSC concept 

briefly without providing any substantive guidance for the execution of complex no-notice/limited notice DSCA operations such 

as Hurricane Sandy. 
79

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Building on the previously stated issues and the 

preceding analysis of the defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) response to Hurricane Sandy, this 

final chapter of the monograph outlines a detailed series of strategy and policy-related recommendations 

specific to no-notice/limited-notice DSCA responses 

under a dual status commander (DSC)-led joint task 

force (JTF). The following recommended actions and 

measures are intended for senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders to consider to improve potential 

DSC improve the DSC construct and related concepts 

within defense support of civil authorities operations. 

The suggestions are based on an extensive analytical coding process that identified recurring themes in 

the source data (interviews, after-action reports, etc.). 

After coding and interpreting the material to identify 

viable recommendations, we again coded the material into two distinct categories using an axial coding 

approach. The recommendations are grouped into 

two categories: 1) operational and strategy-specific, 

and 2) policy-specific. A brief narrative description or 

justification accompanies each recommendation. The 

material offers a condensed summary of the most 

advocated recommendations from throughout DoD. 

The recommendations are intended to be actionable 

and realistic; although some, if implemented, require 

significant changes or alterations to existing policies, 

procedures, or doctrine, and may, therefore, be judged 

impractical by some. 
80

OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Lean, But Don’t Push Forward.

The forward-leaning approach employed by DoD 

prior to and during the Sandy response was effective. 

Prepositioning Title 10 forces at nearby bases and offshore, issuing prepare-to-deploy orders, and deploying defense coordinating officers to anticipated disaster areas is necessary to facilitate a timely response 

upon request from civil authorities. Cost issues aside, 

moving Title 10 forces into the joint operations area 

(JOA) provides the DSC with abundant force capabilities ready to meet nearly every contingency. 

Some officers who participated in Sandy suggested 

that prepositioning Title 10 forces was the preferred 

strategy, rather than activating National Guard troops 

through Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

(EMAC) and other sourcing mechanisms.1

 Aggressive 

posturing of Title 10 forces in and around a disaster 

area offers quick response and unmatched capabilities. However, DoD and the service components must 

avoid being too forceful while ensuring compliance 

with laws, policies, and procedures. 

Title 10 forces and commanders should be encouraged to comply with national guidance. The concern 

over a forward-leaning approach arises when Title 10 

forces are not integrated into the response as expected 

following deployment to the affected area. Federal 

funds are used to transport units to the JOA. Upon 

arrival, commanders often search for opportunities to 

integrate their forces into the DSCA response to justify 

the cost of transport, among other things. This external 

pressure can have a detrimental effect and should be 
81

avoided to the extent possible. Therefore, DoD should 

continue to preposition assets and personnel when 

there is an anticipated need. However, despite public and Hollywood mythology, federal military forces 

are not the nation’s principal emergency response 

service. Therefore, upon arrival, commanders should 

refrain from asking for Title 10 integration and instead 

wait until they are requested through the established 

methods. 

Delineate Clear Federal Chain of Command Prior to 

Deploying Forces.

To avoid similar confusion regarding the chain of 

command structure in place for Sandy, once the decision is made to activate a dual status commander for 

a joint DSCA response, both DoD and the affected 

state(s) should clearly articulate and approve a unified chain of command. The roles, responsibilities, 

and lines of command and coordination, respectively, 

must be clearly established prior to the deployment of 

a joint task force. During Sandy, there was confusion 

over the role of the joint coordinating element (JCE) 

and whether the JCE was internal or external to the 

federal chain of command. As previously addressed, 

some commanders who participated in the Sandy response contend that the JCE was the parent command 

element to the DSC and therefore served as the command link between the DSC and the joint force land 

component commander (JFLCC)-Army North (ARNORTH). Conversely, others claim the JCE was simply 

a coordination element with no command authority 

over the DSC. In this view, the DSC reported directly 

to the JFLCC on the federal side. This confusion and 

lack of clarity among participants during Sandy cre-
82

ated additional challenges that should be avoided in 

future DSCA operations. As early as possible, U.S. 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) should clearly 

articulate a federal chain of command, including the 

names and titles of each command echelon down to 

the DSCs. Command and control wire charts should 

be created and disseminated prior to operations, to 

the greatest extent possible given the circumstances. 

Eliminate the Joint Coordinating Element.

According to senior DoD officials, the inclusion of 

a JCE during the Sandy response was a trial concept 

intended to improve coordination efforts between 

multiple dual status commanders and the federal 

chain of command during a multistate incident.2

 Due 

to the increased confusion presented by the inclusion 

of a JCE during Sandy, this command element should 

be removed from future consideration. Some advocate 

for inclusion of a JCE during a DSCA response to facilitate Title 10 force coordination, including joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI). For a multistate event such as Sandy, effectively 

coordinating Title 10 force activities logically warrants 

consideration of a JCE. The problem occurs when the 

JCE commander’s role is not clearly articulated. If using a JCE for the purpose of effective JRSOI of Title 10 

forces, the JCE should not be included as part of the 

formal command structure. Instead, the JCE should be 

listed as a coordination entity (dotted line doctrinally) 

only. If a JCE is not desired for JRSOI, then removing 

the JCE entirely from the federal chain of command 

reduces the layering effect noted during the Sandy response. Without a JCE, the dual status commander can 

and should report directly to the JFLCC/ARNORTH 
83

commander as the parent command entity. Figure 5-1 

illustrates how this command structure would have 

looked during Hurricane Sandy.

Figure 5-1. Hurricane Sandy Command Structure, 

No JCE.

Appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer in Charge.

National response plans, such as the National Response Framework (NRF) and other guiding documents, call for one DCO to serve as the single point of 

contact at the joint field office (JFO) for DoD activities 

within each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) regions. However, as noted in Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-28, larger incidents and multistate 

incidents sometimes require additional DCOs to assist 

in coordination efforts.3

 According to DoD after-action 

Command and Coordination
84

reports and interviews, multiple DCOs deployed to 

New York during Sandy, each with a defined area of 

responsibility but no guidance for DCO-DCO coordination.4

 Similar to the JCE, deploying multiple DCOs 

creates the potential for confusion and coordination 

issues. There were several issues noted in Sandy 

after-action reports detailing failures of DCO-DCO 

coordination within New York, resulting in duplicated planning efforts or redundant mission assignment generation—something that the DSC concept is 

designed to help alleviate.

Currently, there is no defined adjudication process between the multiple DCOs assigned to a FEMA 

region and NORTHCOM. In essence, NORTHCOM 

may receive duplicate requests from different DCOs 

in the same region who have no established protocol 

to coordinate with each other. The suggested defense 

coordinating officer in charge (DCOIC) billet will 

serve as this needed adjudication body for all DCO 

activity during designated incidents involving multiple DCOs. In this model, DCOs will preliminarily 

approve requests for forces and submit them to the 

DCOIC for final approval. The DCOIC will validate or 

deny these requests and inform the DSC accordingly.

There are multiple options for designating a 

DCOIC. One alternative is to simply designate a DCO 

as the senior DCO in charge based on established criteria (rank seniority, time in billet, etc.). In this model, 

all subordinate DCO activities are routed through 

the DCOIC to ensure effective coordination, reduced 

redundancy, and a unified mission assignment process. The DCOIC would coordinate directly with the 

DSC JTF as the DoD representative to the JFO. An additional alternative to this recommendation places a 

general officer in the DCOIC billet. In this model, the 
85

Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) commanding general (CG) is an ideal candidate for the DCOIC 

position, as this person is one of the leading subject 

matter experts on domestic civil support and DSCA. 

Assuming a temporary assignment like DCOIC does 

not conflict with the JTF-CS CG’s principal chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear DSCA responsibilities, this general officer should hold a key role in 

the execution of DSCA operations, especially those using the DSC arrangement. This recommendation also 

complements the previous suggestion to remove the 

JCE from the command structure. Rather than assigning the JTF-CS CG to serve in a billet of questionable 

necessity (JCE), this general officer can be deployed 

to the designated JFO to serve as the DCOIC with ultimate approval authority over all DCO-authorized 

mission assignments in the DSC JOA.

Regardless of the chosen option, establishing an 

adjudication body for the multiple DCO constructs 

likely to occur again in major incidents will help limit 

future confusion and redundancies. 

Define Time for Early Title 10 Integration.

Hurricane Sandy gave federal military forces the 

opportunity to highlight their timely response capabilities. As members of a professional military force, 

Active Duty Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines 

remain in a constant state of readiness to deploy and 

respond to domestic contingency operations. This 

quick response capability was displayed during Sandy as various Title 10 assets converged on the JOA 

within days of the storm’s landfall. The Active Component’s ability to mobilize and deploy forces quickly, 

coupled with the Reserve component’s widespread 
86

geographic distribution of forces, often means Title 

10 forces are able to respond quicker and with more 

capabilities than their National Guard counterparts. 

However, Title 10 forces come with a greater financial 

requirement. Therefore, through state National Guard 

capabilities and EMAC agreements, National Guard 

assets are the primary military sourcing solution for 

disaster response operations. Whether due to administrative delays through EMAC requests or insufficient capabilities, the National Guard cannot always 

address immediate requirements, such as the need for 

dewatering the New York City subway system during 

Sandy. In these cases, states look to the Federal Government for support. With this in mind, DoD and the 

governors should consider a strategic shift that would 

allow federal forces to be sourced, following a request 

from civil authorities and external to Immediate Response Authority (IRA), for a predetermined (and finite) period of time during the early phases of a DSCA 

response. This can be done prior to sourcing National 

Guard units during the initial stages of DSCA operations to facilitate quicker military response when 

necessary. 

The proposed Title 10 integration period should not 

be misconstrued as an unrestricted authorization for 

the DSC to employ Title 10 forces. Rather, this should 

be considered a defined period of time when Title 10 

forces can be sourced prior to the National Guard’s 

arrival and without an approved mission assignment. 

In many ways, this is similar to IRA in that the proposal allows federal forces to provide assistance without the need for paperwork delays. However, this is 

different from IRA in that the DSC approves the Title 

10 integration and therefore assumes tactical control 

of the federal force. The DSC does not have tactical 
87

control of Title 10 forces operating under IRA, per JP 

3-28.5 Similar to the policy governing IRA, this Title 

10 integration period should extend at least 72 hours 

from the activation of the DSC. During this period 

and assuming consent of the federal and state commands respectively, the DSC should be authorized to 

use Title 10 forces to address priority requests for assistance with consideration of cost share and mission 

assignment generation after the fact.6

 The integration 

period should also establish a clear time limit (e.g., 

96 hours) to conclude all initial Title 10 sourcing. At 

the conclusion of the proposed integration period, the 

DSC can prioritize National Guard forces for secondary and tertiary requests. This will facilitate flexibility 

and adaptation to the evolving situation and limit the 

bureaucratic delays present in the current system.

The proposed Title 10 integration period will provide a mechanism to address external pressures to involve Title 10 forces in DSCA operations. Ideally, Title 

10 forces would exercise better fidelity to the “last in, 

first out” philosophy during domestic response. However, the political realities of domestic response often 

supplant policy and law. The President, governor, and 

other elected representatives risk a political death sentence for inadequate, insufficient, or late response in 

events of national prominence or significance. As evidenced by the federal response to Hurricane Sandy, 

politicians will often marginalize or abandon restrictive laws and policies in order to provide immediate 

federal assistance and avoid public ridicule. Providing a mechanism to integrate Title 10 forces into the 

early stages of a DSCA operation will address these 

concerns while ensuring prompt assistance to civil 

authorities when requested. It will further reduce the 

tensions over Title 10 activities under IRA, as federal 
88

forces will be integrated into the response and under 

the tactical control of the DSC. 

Simply put, if DoD and the states are going to embrace the DSC concept, per the 2012 National Defense 

Authorization Act, as the usual and customary command arrangement during the simultaneous employment of the National Guard and Armed Forces, we 

must empower the DSC in such a way that leverages 

all available resources and capabilities, both state and 

federal. The DSC should be able to request Title 10 

forces to meet a need within the JOA so long as such 

support is not illegal, immoral, or unethical. There are 

too many impediments in the current process restricting commanders from providing the best and most 

capable response resources in a timely manner, while 

also encouraging the abuse of less restrictive policies 

like IRA to justify response activities. This mechanism 

will help address some of the noted issues. 

Authorize Transition of Authority.

While the previously discussed recommendation 

addresses initial Title 10 activities requested by the 

DSC, it does not address similar activities performed 

outside of the DSC’s knowledge under IRA. DoD Directive (DoDD) 3025.18 provides commanders IRA 

when requested by a civil authority and under “imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from a higher authority.”7

 In these instances and where Title 10 forces are operating within 

the DSC’s joint operations area, consideration should 

be given to whether the DSC should assume tactical 

control of federal forces operating under IRA. This 

topic is debated regularly in and around DoD, with 

perspectives advocating both for and against such a 

recommendation. 
89

Those who support the DSC gaining tactical control of Title 10 forces under IRA cite joint doctrinal 

concepts, such as unified action and unity of effort8

as a basis for their argument, often noting that when 

Title 10 forces operate under IRA and thus outside of 

the DSC JTF, neither is achieved. Instead, their argument holds that any force operating outside of the 

command of the DSC JTF creates friction rather than 

promoting synergy and unity of effort. Advocates further contend that one of the main intentions for creating a DSC architecture is to unify state and federal 

military actions under a single commander, albeit in a 

mutually exclusive capacity. Title 10 forces operating 

externally to this joint command structure are not in 

consonance with the unified, coordinated concept the 

DSC is designed to facilitate. 

The counterargument to this position is rooted 

in the tenets of federalism and the division of powers between the States and Federal Government. As 

noted earlier, the legal framework guiding the use 

of military forces domestically is complex. Despite 

the complexities, however, critics affirm the constitutional basis of the laws and philosophical principles as 

the foundational structure for using the military domestically. According to the Constitution—and with 

support from Title 10 of the United States Code—the 

President is the commander in chief of the Armed 

Forces under all circumstances. When responding under IRA, Title 10 forces maintain autonomy from the 

DSC, instead reporting directly to their service commanders and, in effect, to the President. Permitting a 

DSC (who in most cases is a National Guard officer) to 

assume tactical control of a Title 10 force under IRA, 

according to critics, contradicts not only the doctrinal 

restrictions prohibiting DSCs from exerting command 
90

authority over Title 10 forces under IRA,9 but also the 

principles of federalism that are intended to ensure a 

divided system of power and authority between the 

states and national government. Using this logic, opponents even suggest that the mere concept of a DSC 

violates the Constitution and the federalist system of 

government.10

Regardless of perspective, DoD must determine a 

policy and strategy for coordinating with or integrating Title 10 forces on IRA during a DSC-led DSCA 

incident. While there is some question as to whether 

the Marines were operating under IRA during their 

initial arrival on Staten Island, the presence of a Title 

10 force ashore during Sandy without the knowledge 

of the DSC created avoidable tension and confusion. 

In this case, the DSC in New York assumed tactical 

control of the Marine detachment ashore on Staten 

Island, following a series of discussions with other 

general officers within the chain of command. This 

tactical control ceased once the Marines returned to 

the ship. Despite initial disagreements, the assumption of tactical control of the Marines worked under 

these circumstances. Once the DSC gained situational 

awareness of the Title 10 activities ashore, he was 

better able to integrate their capabilities into future 

missions and support activities. If this is determined 

to be the most desirable course of action for future 

incidents of similar circumstances, there should be a 

process or procedure in place for the DSC to assume 

tactical control of Title 10 forces under IRA without 

having to go through several layers of command discussions. Defining such procedures in future doctrinal references will help future DSCs avoid the lengthy 

command discussions and negotiations that occurred 

during Sandy. 
91

Designate and Employ a Title 10 Adaptive 

Task Force. 

Much of the Title 10 activity during the Sandy response occurred under Task Force (TF) Pump, a joint 

force represented by all four services and responsible 

for numerous dewatering missions throughout the 

JOA in New York. This model worked well during 

Sandy. As a somewhat ad hoc and hastily requested 

force asset, TF Pump gave the DSC the tactical flexibility to employ Title 10 forces for specific missions related to dewatering, pumping, etc. TF Pump received 

most of the requests for dewatering and subsequent 

mission assignments falling under this special capability. This provided the DSC with at least one clear 

decision point during the entirety of the response 

operation. Similar actions should be considered for 

future missions. 

Given the notable successes of TF Pump during 

Sandy, DSCs, in consonance with their state and federal chains of command, should identify a large critical 

mission capability (such as dewatering during Sandy) 

during the initial stages of a response effort. After 

agreeing on this capability requirement, NORTHCOM should identify and designate a unit capable of 

providing such services. This unit should be issued 

prepare-to-deploy orders and assume the designation 

as the Title 10 adaptive task force. Once identified, the 

DSC can exercise the option to activate the adaptive 

task force to complete mission assignments within 

the task force’s identified specialty. Predetermining 

a Title 10 task force for performing specific mission 

functions will limit the tensions between Title 10 and 

Title 32 commanders lobbying for inclusion of their 

respective assets. 
92

As with the other recommendations, there are 

counterarguments to this as well. It is difficult to predict future incident requirements, so employing an 

adaptive task force may not always be a possibility. 

Beyond this, there is a cost element associated with 

a federal military force supporting civil authorities. 

Financial considerations are (or should be) external 

to the DSC’s focus during a DSCA response. However, cost is something that must be considered when 

determining whether to deploy any Title 10 force in 

support of civil authorities. With this in mind, some 

might suggest that a Title 10 task force represents unnecessary redundancy that can otherwise be sourced 

from existing unit capabilities. While these are valid 

considerations, designating an adaptive Title 10 task 

force is still worth considering, based on the observations from TF Pump during Hurricane Sandy. 

Maximize the Use, Distribution, and Presence 

of Liaison Officers.

You can’t have enough LNOs in my opinion.11

 National Guard Interview

One of the most frequently discussed topics following the Sandy response was the use of liaison officers (LNOs) throughout the operation. Numerous 

interviews and after-action reports noted the importance of using LNOs to coordinate efforts and enhance 

situational awareness across the seemingly endless 

bureaucracy of local, state, and federal agencies, departments, offices, and services participating in the 

response. The mostly positive feedback concerning 

LNOs suggests that these positions are vital to suc-
93

cessful coordination and information sharing of future DSCA response efforts, especially under the DSC 

construct when both states and the Federal Government are represented. 

LNOs provided critical information to commanders and their staffs during the entire Sandy response 

effort. While they were used in many places, some 

agencies or offices did not have LNOs representing 

all relevant military units. In addition to providing a 

Title 10 and Title 32 LNO to every major command 

element, including both the DSC and any adaptive 

Title 10 task force, LNOs should also be located in the 

State Office of Emergency Management or Emergency 

Operations Center, and with FEMA to facilitate mission assignment coordination and subsequent force 

packaging. Additionally, some LNOs were underutilized according to various reports. Given the critical 

capability and knowledge provided by LNOs, assigning liaison personnel to perform staff functions is not 

an effective way to leverage their presence as subject 

matter experts in coordination. DoD and the National 

Guard should continue using LNOs in every location 

deemed necessary and ensure they are used in a manner consistent with their capability and expertise. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

The most needed recommendation is to establish a 

DSC policy. Short of that, there are several policy revisions worth considering to improve future DSCA efforts involving the DSC arrangement. The most pressing change, based on observations from Hurricane 

Sandy, centers on the IRA provision in DoDD 3025.18. 

Additionally, revisions need to be made to the mission assignment process and certain Title 10 and Title 

32 legislation, among other things. 
94

Immediate Response Authority.

Revise and Codify Definition of Civil Authority. 

The current language describing IRA in DoDD 

3025.18, 4(g) states: 

In response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if 

time does not permit approval from higher authority, 

DoD officials may provide an immediate response by 

temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided 

by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human 

suffering, or mitigate great property damage within 

the United States.12

The policy language here, according to DoD officials, is intentionally vague to allow for flexibility in 

the interpretation of what constitutes a civil authority.13 The intended ambiguity allows for open interpretation based on individual circumstances and provides 

justification for military commanders to offer critical 

support to civil authorities without the need to subject 

their decisions to a lengthy and often-cumbersome approval process. This ensures that when American citizens have an immediate need for military support, the 

language of a policy does not prevent saving lives and 

alleviating suffering. Conceptually, this is sound logic 

based on the best interests of the American people. In 

practice, however, there are issues with the current 

wording that can lead to abuse of the provision or arguments over whether federal military action actually 

constitutes IRA.

Among the many ambiguities, the IRA policy fails 

to define an appropriate level of civil authority to re-
95

quest assistance from DoD using the IRA justification. 

As noted earlier, U.S. Marines from the 26th Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) came ashore on Staten 

Island at the request of an unidentified employee of 

the New York/New Jersey Port Authority.14 While 

these actions have not been formally designated as 

IRA, as some question whether “imminently serious 

conditions” were present, there is no other legal basis 

for justifying the Marines’ presence on Staten Island 

during the initial response period. Based on previous 

language, “the Marine invasion of Staten Island,” as it 

has been referred to, was, in effect, compliant with at 

least part of Section 4(g) of DoDD 3025.18, in response 

to a request for assistance from a civil authority. Aside 

from revisiting the semantics and meaning of “under 

imminently serious conditions,” DoD should consider 

revising, expanding, and clarifying the description of 

“civil authority” as it applies to IRA. 

In its current form, the term “civil authority” is ambiguous and leaves significant room for interpretation. 

According to JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary 

of Military and Associated Terms, civil authorities are:

Those elected and appointed officers and employees 

who constitute the government of the United States, 

the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United 

States territories, and political subdivisions thereof.15

This broad definition lacks the specificity needed 

for DSCA operations and, legally speaking, facilitates 

federal military actions in response to a request from 

any level of civil authority without restriction. Others 

can debate the necessity of the Marines’ presence on 

Staten Island and whether “imminently serious conditions” existed. The emphasis here is that DoD should 
96

consider revising the term civil authority(ies) to avoid 

future confusion and/or abuse of the IRA policy. The 

revision should specify distinct levels of civil authorities on a hierarchical scale; or, where appropriate, 

titles of positions. It should further designate what 

level constitutes an appropriate requesting authority (e.g., “In response to a request from a Level 3 civil 

authority . . .”). Such policy revisions are needed to 

avoid similar problems in future response efforts. In 

addition to expanding on the appropriate level of civil 

authority to which the DoD can respond under IRA, 

the provision should be revised to expand and clarify 

“supplemental direction.”

Supplemental Direction. 

The IRA guidance permits military commanders to engage in immediate response “subject to any 

supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters.”16 In order to avoid abuse of IRA in future DSCled DSCA efforts, DoD should create a standardized 

“supplemental direction” for reference under IRA. In 

this context, DoD and/or NORTHCOM should consider drafting a template standing order or directive to 

augment or serve in addition to the current Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff DSCA Standing Execution 

Order. This additional standing order shall be applicable specifically to DSC-led responses and instances 

of IRA under which federal forces may operate. This 

order should be issued by the NORTHCOM CG and 

hold all Title 10 force commanders accountable to a 

specified standard of conduct or procedure when providing assistance under IRA. 

For example: U.S. Marines of all ranks are intimately familiar with the 11 general orders of a sentry. Just 
97

as a marine can receive punitive action for quitting 

his/her post without being properly relieved (general 

order 5), a military commander should be deterred 

from abusing or violating federal policy on DSCA. 

Similar in style and custom to the general orders of a 

sentry, NORTHCOM should develop a standing general order to guide the conduct of DSCA operations 

under IRA, with emphasis on those occurring within 

the DSC construct.

Example General Order for Immediate Response 

Authority within a DSC JOA: Commanders using Immediate Response Authority to support civil authorities within a dual status commander joint operations 

area must notify the dual status commander within 

three hours of authorizing immediate response. 

Currently, there is no incentive for commanders 

to ensure the integrity of DSCA doctrine, policies, 

and procedures. While the legal basis for some Title 

10 actions during Sandy is questionable, it is nearly 

inconceivable to think of a situation where such violations of policy or law would result in punitive action against the responsible commander, nor are we 

suggesting that commanders should be punished for 

providing immediate response, especially when the 

actions of response forces are carried out with the intent to provide assistance to local residents. However, 

without changes or additions to the current policy, 

there is ongoing potential for similar issues in future 

DSCA activities. Issuing a combatant command endorsed general order prior to the execution of a DSCA 

response would provide the necessary mechanism 

or incentive for command compliance with standing 

laws, policies, and procedures. The revision to the 

IRA guidance could read: DoD officials may provide 

an immediate response by temporarily employing 
98

the resources under their control, in accordance with 

NORTHCOM general order or any additional supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters.

As with other recommendations, this suggestion may be unpopular with some. While the need to 

maintain speed and flexibility during DSCA is critical, maintaining accountability and awareness of response activities is important as well. In many cases, 

creating additional layers of policy compliance slows 

response decisionmaking and operational efficiency. 

In this case, however, requiring a single notification 

from a Title 10 commander to the DSC does not add to 

existing restrictions, nor does it limit a commander’s 

ability to provide support under IRA. This recommendation simply ensures Title 10 commanders exercising 

IRA provide the DSC with appropriate notification of 

their intent and ongoing activities up to the 72-hour 

period of authorization. This contributes to the goal of 

achieving unified actions and an overall unity of effort 

under a DSC-led JTF. 

Mission Assignment Process.

The recommendations given earlier offer a mechanism for clarifying preliminary considerations and approval measures for Title 10 actions under the pretext 

of IRA. However, the DSC in New York encountered 

several issues after Title 10 forces arrived, most of 

which can be improved through changes to current 

mission assignment policies. 

Assuming Title 10 actions meet all established criteria for IRA, the DSC may wish to sustain this support activity beyond the currently approved 72-hour 

authorization period. To facilitate sustained Title 10 

activity beyond the first 72 hours of IRA, a mission 
99

assignment must be generated and approved through 

the appropriate channels, or Title 10 forces risk being subjected to a work stoppage request, as was the 

case with the Marines on Staten Island. To avoid such 

problems, DoD, in conjunction with the requesting local/state agency, should codify a process by which a 

mission assignment/formal request for assistance is 

generated and submitted through the proper channels. Developing a post-IRA mission assignment/request for assistance process and incorporating it into 

current policies will:

• Fill a current gap in which no policy guidance 

exists for actions occurring beyond the initial 

72-hour period under IRA.

• Provide a policy/doctrinal basis for DSCs to

assume tactical control of Title 10 forces operating within the JOA, if desired.

• Provide a needed policy mechanism for reimbursement of Title 10 support activities that 

will eventually fall under an approved mission 

assignment.

Without the restrictions, civil authorities with 

knowledge of the IRA policy language can ignore the 

current mission assignment and/or request for assistance process while leveraging the ambiguous language of IRA. As seen during Sandy, this can lead to 

violations, intentional or not, of policy and, in some 

cases, law. The absence of this essential guidance 

further marginalizes the essential considerations for 

initiating requests for DoD support, often leading to 

greater end costs and confusion. 

With this in mind, DoD should consider developing a draft instruction outlining the specifics of the 

mission assignment process, to include when and 
100

how Title 10 forces operate under IRA.17 The political pressures and realities of a response situation can 

cause the established system of accountability to be 

circumvented, or in some cases abandoned. Sending 

troops “towards the sounds of chaos”18 may be politically convenient for elected officials seeking public 

approval and for military commanders cleverly seeking a boost in their service’s recruiting mission and 

budget appropriations, but it can also impede and 

aggravate planned and coordinated response efforts. 

Final Thoughts.

Again, in most cases, we would not advocate for 

expanding an already burdensome series of laws, 

policies, and procedures. The singular intent of IRA 

is to provide a policy justification for rapid military 

support under imminently serious conditions when 

time does not permit commanders to obtain senior 

leader approval. Adding layers to and expanding the 

language of a policy intended to ensure speed and 

flexibility under dire circumstances seems counterintuitive. However, the single most debated activity 

during the entire joint response to Hurricane Sandy 

occurred under the questionable justification of IRA, 

hence the motivation to suggest changes. 

Many with direct knowledge and experience of the 

response in New York refute the justification offered 

by commanders that the Marines came ashore under 

IRA, noting that their arrival occurred 6 days after the 

storm’s initial landfall and without urgent need or 

“imminently serious conditions.”19 Moreover, according to the same sources, the initial Marine activities on 

Staten Island did not “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.”20 Therefore, according to many, these actions do not consti-
101

tute IRA. Others dispute this argument and reaffirm 

the Marines’ support to the residents of Staten Island 

was justified under IRA, as they were requested to 

come ashore by a civil authority and in response to an 

immediate need as determined by the authorities on 

the ground. 

One position remains consistent among those 

we spoke with, however. Regardless of the circumstances leading to or the justification for the Marines’ 

support in New York, the activities carried out by 

the Marines post-Sandy were extremely beneficial to 

the residents and local authorities. So, while nobody 

debates the positive impact the Marines had on the 

Sandy response, the argument over IRA has been and 

will continue to be debated. Regardless of position, 

this debate centers on the subjective and often widely 

varied interpretation of the IRA policy in its current 

form. Our recommendations for changing the IRA 

policy address the primary concerns voiced by the 

majority of our data sources. At the very least, DoD 

should consider the preceding suggestions and form 

their own assessments by evaluating the utility and 

applicability of the content as it would be applied to a 

future DSC-led DSCA response. 

Legislative and Associated Policy Revisions.

10 U.S.C. § 12304a.

Section 515 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense 

Authorization Act added the legal authority for the 

Secretary of Defense to activate Reserve forces of the 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in response 

to a governor’s request for federal assistance during 

a disaster or emergency.21 On December 31, 2011, 10 
102

U.S.C. § 12304a became law and was implemented for 

the first time during the DoD response to Hurricane 

Sandy in New York with the activation of the three 

separate Army Reserve quartermaster detachments.22

As with the larger DSC structure, the first attempt 

to implement this newly adopted statute resulted in 

some notable issues. 

Sandy reports suggest that, although approved 

mission assignments were generated for the Army 

Reserve units in New York, coordinating with these 

detachments proved challenging. While the details of 

these challenges are vague at best, the recurrence of 

the issue across multiple sources suggests that DoD 

needs to improve Reserve component activation policies, and procedures under 10 U.S.C. § 12304a, in consonance with the recommendations noted in the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s 2012 Information Memo 

on Reserve Component Operations in the Homeland.23

Since the Reserve component is now a force-sourcing 

solution for DoD during disasters and emergencies, 

federal response capabilities and capacities are even 

greater. To maximize the effective use of the Reserve 

component during such incidents, each service branch 

must also implement policies detailing the activation 

procedures for their respective Reserve units under 

12304a, including circumstances when Reserve units 

will be activated and under what capacity.

Establishing defined policies and procedures for 

reserve unit activation and sourcing under 12304a will 

improve an appointed DSC’s ability to manage a joint 

operation. Due to its widespread geographic distribution throughout the continental United States, the 

Reserve component is a significant force multiplying 

asset that should be integrated into emergency and 

disaster response when required. This newly adopted 
103

legislation needs to be followed by service-specific 

policies that will ensure efficient mobilization and deployment of Reserve units in future DSC-led DSCA 

operations. Just as the Reserve component can now be 

a viable sourcing solution for Title 10 response efforts, 

so, too, can the National Guard.

32 U.S.C. § 502f.

Under 32 U.S.C. § 502f, the National Guard (or a 

member thereof) may “be ordered to perform training 

or other duty . . . (2) that may include . . . (A) support 

of operations or missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or Secretary 

of Defense.”24 When using 502f to activate the National Guard, troops remain under State control while 

support operations are funded 100 percent by DoD. 

Because states often are unable to fund their National 

Guard forces fully under State Active Duty for more 

than a few days, 502f provides a legal mechanism to 

relieve states of a funding dilemma. Historically, this 

legislation has been used as federal authority to mobilize the National Guard during nationally significant 

disaster responses such as Hurricane Katrina, as well 

as pre-planned national special security events.25 As 

this statute offers states a mechanism to maintain control of the National Guard at 100 percent cost share to 

the Federal Government, it is clearly advantageous for 

states to request approval of a 502f designation during a presidentially declared disaster. However, due 

to ambiguity in the law, combined with states’ desires 

for maximum control at minimum cost, states regularly request 502f designation from DoD. While some 

requests are approved, many are subsequently denied. Revising the current 502f language is necessary 
104

to address some of these issues, especially as it applies 

to force sourcing decisions within the DSC construct.

The main objective of the DSC during a no-notice/

limited-notice incident like Sandy is to promote unity 

of effort between the National Guard and the Armed 

Forces. As such, the DSC should not be strategically 

or even operationally focused. The DSC should be a 

resource employer: a tactically focused commander 

looking to send the right resources to the right place 

at the right time. This general officer serves as a coordination mechanism between states and the Federal 

Government, and should not be concerned with the 

legal nuances and interpretations limiting National 

Guard duty statuses and funding source determinations. The DSC should possess a working knowledge 

of such information so as to appropriately influence 

tactical decisionmaking. However, National Guard 

duty status should be externally adjudicated to the 

DSC purview. If the DSC can use the National Guard 

to fill a request for assistance intended for Title 10 

forces, he or she should not be limited in employing 

the necessary or available resources simply due to 

statutory nuances. Changing the current 502f wording to include specific criteria or guidelines for 502f 

designation and subsequent sourcing solutions can 

add strategic, operational, and tactical value to future 

DSCA operations. 

Thus, DoD, the National Guard Bureau, and the 

states should establish specific criteria for 502f designation that includes the type(s) of incident(s) and/or 

circumstance(s) leading to a 502f authorization and 

under what circumstances a DSC can use 32 U.S.C. § 

502f forces as a sourcing solution in place of Title 10 

forces. Building on the recommendations of the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s 2012 Information Memo 

noted earlier, these revisions should include criteria
105

such as complex catastrophes, national significance or 

impact, or multistate response.26 Defining such criteria 

and force-sourcing procedures will minimize the time 

required to allocate Title 32 resources if requested by 

the DSC. The 502f revisions, coupled with 12304a revisions, will address two notable gaps in the DSCA 

response to Sandy. While the DSC does not need to 

be an expert on the legal discussion, ignorance to the 

relevant laws is intolerable. As such, lawyers can and 

should be included as part of the joint staff in future 

DSC-led missions.

Inclusion of Staff Judge Advocate as part of 

Joint Task Force Headquarters Staff.

If you tell military commanders to cut through the 

red tape and make things happen, as was the case in 

Sandy, it is often the lawyer, or staff judge advocate 

(SJA), who is excised from the command decisionmaking process. With the numerous legal complexities and considerations that arise during a DSC-led 

DSCA response, excluding the SJA and overlooking 

laws and regulations leads to greater challenges during and after the incident. In some cases, the perceived 

urgency of a no-notice/limited-notice response effort 

and the need to provide assistance takes precedence 

over necessary legal considerations for managing and 

employing state and federal forces. Some decisions 

made during the Sandy response were of questionable legality and contrasted with the interpretations 

or advice of participating legal officers.27 In other instances, SJAs were not provided an opportunity to advise commanders prior to such decisions.28 As Sandy 

was the first attempt at using the DSC arrangement in 

this capacity, these issues are expected but should be 

addressed for future operations. 
106

However cumbersome, nuanced, and seemingly 

arbitrary these laws may seem to commanders focused on accomplishing a mission, laws are written to 

provide structure and limits. Within the context of the 

DSC, many of the relevant laws are rooted in the Constitution and the foundational principles by which we 

govern our Armed Forces. Lawyers arguably provide 

some of the most critical knowledge during a combined state and federal military response; they cannot 

be excluded from advising the DSC on the statutory 

limitations of military actions under unpredictable 

circumstances. 

As part of its effort to develop a DSC instruction 

for DSCA operations, DoD should incorporate policy 

guidance that encourages the use and active employment of DSCA-knowledgeable SJA personnel as contributing members of future JTF staffs. Consideration 

should also be given to employing two attorneys: one 

with Title 10 knowledge and oversight and one with 

Title 32 knowledge and oversight. Including SJAs in 

future DSCA staffs will enhance the operational and 

legal integrity and minimize future issues like those 

encountered following Sandy. However, legal knowledge alone is not sufficient to improving future DSCA 

operations under the DSC construct. The confusion 

among Title 10 forces during this response points to 

a critical need to improve DSCA education in future 

Title 10 officers. 
107

Expand and Reinforce DSCA Education 

for Officers.

If Sandy is a barometer for the state of DSCA 

knowledge among Title 10 commanders, there is significant room for improvement. Not only were some 

Title 10 commanders unaware of who the DSC was or 

how to contact him and his staff, but also some officers 

had never heard of the DSC construct prior to Hurricane Sandy.29 Active Component forces demonstrated 

a degree of ignorance or disregard to the mission assignment process that was reaffirmed through command guidance. By abandoning processes and procedures, some Title 10 forces supplanted (rather than 

supported) local authorities’ efforts. Likewise, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) personnel were 

equally unfamiliar with the DSC construct and the 

statutory limitations over Title 10 forces in support of 

ESF 3. While not a blanket indictment of the military 

officer corps or the USACE, as only a small sample 

participated in Sandy, these issues are just some of the 

many encountered during the DSCA response, further 

suggesting that improvements to DSCA education are 

necessary. 

Most, if not all, top-level DoD schools offer some 

degree of DSCA education through practical application exercises, classroom instruction, or a combination 

of both. Many officers also receive in-depth instruction on or exposure to the topic through the completion of these and other capstone-type projects pursued 

while in residence. So, while most commanders have 

received at least some exposure to DSCA, the inherent 

complexities and fluidity of the DSCA environment require constant refresher training. Not all commands/

billets require the same level of DSCA knowledge, 
108

however. Therefore, DoD, with the support of the 

individual services, should identify and designate 

DSCA-relevant command billets required to complete 

annual DSCA training. Following an assessment of expected DSCA requirements, capabilities assessments 

should help identify DSCA-capable units and their 

respective command billets. An example of a DSCAcapable unit is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). 

MEU commanders from I and II MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force, continental United States) should receive annual refresher training similar in format to the 

currently offered DSCA courses via Joint Knowledge 

Online. 

In addition to identifying DSCA-relevant command billets and requiring refresher training, DSCA 

education should occur during basic officer training 

and continue during subsequent professional military 

education and career level schools. Marine officers attending The Basic School, for example, should receive 

DSCA familiarization training via classroom instruction during Phase IV of the course curriculum. Following initial exposure in entry level schools, officers 

will have a foundational understanding of the subject 

to leverage as they progress through future professional military education. Adopting such educational 

requirements for company grade officers will ensure 

those officers slated for top-level school and future 

command billets at DSCA-capable units possess the 

necessary and continued education to facilitate operationally and tactically sound decisionmaking in future 

DSCA environments.
109

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Interviews conducted by the author with various National Guard officers and active military officers that participated 

in the response to Hurricane Sandy in some capacity, JanuaryMarch 2014.

2. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

officials with relevant knowledge of the circumstances before, 

during, and after the Sandy response, March-May 2014.

3. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, July 31, 2013, p. II-12.

4. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD employees, National Guard officers, and active military officers.

5. JP 3-28, p. C-1.

6. Federal/state cost share/reimbursement considerations 

are beyond the scope of the DSC. If this recommendation were 

to be implemented in the future, revisions to relevant legislation 

(Stafford Act, etc.) should be considered, with possible changes 

that would include a period of 100 percent federal cost share for 

the duration of the proposed Title 10 integration period. 

7. DoD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 

Washington, DC: DoD, p. 4.

8. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-03, Joint Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 

11, 2011, pp. xi, I-8.

9. JP 3-28, p. C-1. 

10. Interviews conducted by the author with multiple DoD 

officials with relevant knowledge of DSCA policies, May 2014.

11. Interview conducted by the author with a National Guard 

officer that participated in the response to Hurricane Sandy, 

February 2014.
110

12. DoD Directive 3025.18, p. 4

13. Interviews conducted by the author with multiple DoD 

officials with relevant knowledge of DSCA policies, May 2014. 

14. This claim is supported through interviews with multiple 

officers of both the National Guard and Active Component who 

participated in the Sandy response effort. 

15. Department of Defense, JP 1-02: Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, March 15, 2014, p. 36.

16. DoD Directive 3025.18, p. 4.

17. Dunphy and Radel (2009) offer a useful approach to evaluating this process. Their study methodology can be duplicated 

with emphasis on the mission assignment process. See Charles 

Dunphy, Jr., and Christopher Radel, “Assignment of Local, State, 

and Federal Request Processes for Defense Support to Civil Authorities in the United States,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 

School, December 2009.

18. See Marine Corps Fiscal Year 2012 recruiting campaign, 

“Towards the Sounds of Chaos.” In order to appeal to a growing sense of altruism and public service in the millennial generation, the Marine Corps adopted the aforementioned campaign 

with commercials depicting Marines engaged in humanitarian 

assistance/disaster response missions, among other things. Author’s personal knowledge of and experience with Marine Corps 

recruiting initiatives. 

19. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees, National Guard officers, and Active Component 

officers involved in the Sandy response.

20. Ibid.; DoD Directive 3025.18, p. 4.

21. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 

Public Law 112-81, H.R. 1540, p. 98. 
111

22. Office of the Secretary of Defense After Action ReviewHurricane Sandy, January 10, 2013, p. 32. 

23. Report of Reserve Forces Policy Board on New Policies and 

Clearer Funding Flows for Reserve Component Operations in the Homeland, Falls Church, VA: Department of Defense, April 9, 2012, p. 

7, available from rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Documents/RFPB%20

Memo%20to%20SECDEF-Policy%20and%20Funding%20RC%20

Homeland-9%20Apr%202012.pdf.

24. 32 U.S.C. § 502, “Required Drills and Field Exercises,” 

Subsection (f). 1964, 2006. 

25. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees and National Guard officers who participated in 

Hurricane Sandy. 

26. Report of Reserve Forces Policy Board on New Policies and 

Clearer Funding Flows for Reserve Component Operations in the 

Homeland, p. 10. 

27. Interviews conducted by the author with three military 

judge advocates, including one who served as an on-the-ground 

observer of Title 10 activities during the Sandy response in New 

York, December 2013-January 2014. These assertions are corroborated across multiple DoD after-action reports reviewed by the 

authors while conducting this research. 

28. Ibid.

29. Interviews conducted by the author with various DoD 

employees, National Guard officers, and Active Component officers involved in the Sandy response, January-March 2014, and 

reaffirmed through document analysis of after-action reports and 

other Sandy-relevant resources. 

113

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The U.S. military’s primary mission is to fight and 

win our nation’s wars. In this regard, our nation’s military will continue training for combat operations and 

other contingency missions around the world. However, with the ongoing defense drawdown from combat operations in Afghanistan, the military will now 

look to enhance its civil support readiness as a priority domestic mission focus. The reality is that, when a 

large-scale event occurs, the Department of Defense 

(DoD) and its assets can provide timely and extensive 

support beyond the capacity of any state or local government agency. Combining Title 10 and Title 32 forces only further multiplies this already unparalleled 

capability. Written into law as the “usual and customary” arrangement during the simultaneous employment of the National Guard and Armed Forces,1

 the 

dual status commander (DSC) arrangement serves as 

the coordination mechanism that should enable the 

efficient and effective integration and employment of 

military forces to meet the needs of those affected by 

future disasters and emergencies. With the events of 

Hurricane Sandy behind us, now is the time to learn 

from this historic response and determine ways to improve future military civil support efforts under the 

DSC construct. 

The preceding analysis offered suggestions aimed 

at improving the mechanics of the DSC process through 

various operational strategy and policy-oriented recommendations. The DSC concept shows promise and 

has been used again in more recent events with notable success.2

 While the concept is sound, the execution 
114

during Sandy was flawed. Failing to acknowledge 

and improve upon the lessons learned from Sandy 

will question the efficacy of using DSCs for future response efforts. If we truly want to commit to the DSC 

as the usual and customary command arrangement as 

the law states, we need to maximize the use of this and 

other analyses to repeat the successes and avoid the 

failures in future operations. 

With such a large and complex mission to coordinate, including the consideration of relevant laws, 

procedures, and command authorities, many of which 

are embedded in our Constitution, the DSC construct 

provides the necessary structure to facilitate effective 

Defense Support of Civilian Authorities operations 

between States and the Federal Government. While 

improvisation, adaptability, and flexibility are valued 

aspects of military operational doctrine and missionoriented command and control, the complexities of 

no-notice/limited-notice response missions require 

some semblance of organization and boundaries. 

Hurricane Sandy was a significant event; but it 

was not a catastrophe. The urgency of the federal 

response and the lack of adherence to policies and 

procedures added to the confusion in some cases. We 

cannot forecast future requirements, nor can we predict how future operations will transpire. There will 

always be a level of uncertainty and a sense of urgency during no-notice/limited-notice incidents. We 

can, however, mitigate, in part, future uncertainty and 

confusion through the application of lessons learned, 

such as those provided in this analysis. By identifying 

and incorporating lessons learned into future incident 

response, we can continue our efforts to mature these 

complex operations. Such improvements will likely 

lead to increased capability of military personnel; en-
115

hanced knowledge for those unfamiliar with the identified concepts; and ultimately, more lives, property, 

and resources saved in the aftermath of the next event 

requiring defense support of civil authorities.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 

Public Law 112-81, H.R. 1540, p. 98.

2. A DSC was appointed and commanded Joint Task Force 

Centennial, a combined Title 10 and 32 operation, during the September 2013 response to the Colorado Floods. 

117

APPENDIX I

ACRONYMS

AAR After Action Report

AC Active Component

ADP Army Doctrinal Publication

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

ARNORTH Army North

BG Brigadier General

CBRN Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear

CG Commanding General

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff 

CJCSG Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Guidance 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Manual 

COCOM Combatant Command

CONUS Continental United States

COP Common Operating Picture

DCO Defense Coordinating Officer

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense Directive

DSCA Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities

DSC Dual Status Commander
118

DSC JTF Dual Status Commander Joint 

Task Force

EMAC Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact

EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison 

Officer

ESF Emergency Support Function

EXORD Execution Order

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer

FEMA Federal Emergency Management 

Agency

FM Field Manual

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

GAO Government Accountability 

Office

GOV Governor

HD Homeland Defense

HD/ASA Homeland Defense and 

America’s Security Affairs

HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps 

HS Homeland Security

IRA Immediate Response Authority 

JBMDL Joint Base McGuire Dix 

Lakehurst

JCE Joint Coordinating Element

JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters

JFLCC Joint Force Land Component 

Commander

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component 

Commander
119

JKO Joint Knowledge Online

JOA Joint Operations Area

JP Joint Publication

JRSOI Joint Reception Staging Onward 

Movement and Integration 

JTF Joint Task Force

JTF-CS Joint Task Force Civil Support

LNO Liaison Officer 

LTG Lieutenant General

MA Mission Assignment 

MA Massachusetts

MD Maryland 

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MG Major General 

MOA Memorandum of Agreement 

MTTP Multi-Service Tactics Techniques 

and Procedures

NDAA National Defense Authorization 

Act

NG National Guard

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NH New Hampshire

NIMS National Incident Management 

System

NJ New Jersey

NRF National Response Framework

NSSE National Security Special Event
120

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command

NY New York

NYC New York City

OEM Office of Emergency 

Management 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA Pennsylvania 

PCA Posse Comitatus Act

PL Public Law

PME Professional Military Education 

POTUS President of the United States

PTDO Prepare to Deploy Orders

RFA Request for Assistance 

RI Rhode Island

SAD State Active Duty

SCO State Coordinating Officer

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SJA Staff Judge Advocate

T10 Title 10

T32 Title 32

TACON Tactical Control 

TAG The Adjutants General

TF Task Force

TRANSCOM United States Transportation 

Command

TS Tropical Storm

UOC Unity of Command

UOE Unity of Effort 
121

US United States

USA United States Army

USACE United States Army Corps of 

Engineers

USAF United States Air Force

USAR United States Army Reserve

USC United States Code

USCG United States Coast Guard

USFF United States Fleet Forces

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USS United States Ship

VOCO Verbal Orders of the 

Commanding Officer

123

APPENDIX II

DUAL STATUS COMMANDER

DESIGNATION PROCESS

Source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-28, Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 2013, p. C-9.

Figure II-1. DSC Designation Process.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Mr. Ryan Burke

Dr. Sue McNeil

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil