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i 

20–062 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–110] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 15, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

STEVE KITAY, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Buck, Lt Gen David J., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional Component 

Command for Space 

Calvelli, Frank, Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

Cardillo, Robert, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command 

Loverro, Douglas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, 

U.S. Department of Defense 

Weatherington, Dyke, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Space, Strategic, and Intelligence Systems, U.S. Department of Defense 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Buck, Lt Gen David J. ...................................................................................... 71 

Calvelli, Frank .................................................................................................. 93 

Cardillo, Robert ................................................................................................ 85 

Hyten, Gen John E. .......................................................................................... 29 

Loverro, Douglas ............................................................................................... 48 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ..................................................................... 27 

Weatherington, Dyke ....................................................................................... 61 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Slide: Commercial Launch Environment ........................................................ 107 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 111 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 135 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 125 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Peters ......................................................................................................... 136 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 115 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 136 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL 

SECURITY SPACE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. This hearing of the House Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here and taking 

the time to prepare for this hearing. 

We are going to have a problem with votes in a little while, 

crunching our time. We have a big panel, so the ranking member 

and I have agreed that we are going to dispense with opening 

statements, both on our side and on your side, so we can go 

straight to questions and answers and try to get both the open side 

of this hearing as well as the classified part of this hearing done 

before they call us for votes, which we think will be around, what, 

4:00? 3:30 or 4:00. I have no control over that. 

So anyway, we will accept the opening statements for the record 

and go straight to questions, and I will recognize myself for the 

first set of questions. That is without objection. All right. 

[The prepared statements can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 27.] 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, some have suggested that we 

should—well, first let me for the record acknowledge who all we 

have for witnesses here today. 

We have General John Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space 

Command; Mr. Doug Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Dyke Weatherington, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic and Intelligence Systems. I would like to see your business card. That is a lot to put 

on there. 

Lieutenant General David Buck, Commander Joint Functional 

Component Command for Space; and Mr. Robert Cardillo, Director 

of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; as well as Frank Calvelli, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, deputy director. It says director here. I was trying to give you a promotion. 

Mr. CALVELLI. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Betty wouldn’t like that, would she? 

Mr. CALVELLI. No, she wouldn’t. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you all for being here. All right. We will go 

to questioning. 
2 

General Hyten, some have suggested that we should phase out 

Atlas V and go to Delta IV and Falcon 9 mix prior to a new U.S. 

engine being built. In testimony at the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] earlier this month, the Secretary of the Air Force 

stated that preliminary analysis showed it was going to cost $1.5 

to $5 billion in additional costs, depending on assumptions of when 

to transition. 

Can you provide your perspective on going to Delta-Falcon-only 

capability before we replace the RD–180? If this cost had to be 

taken out of existing space accounts, what would be the impact on 

the Air Force space mission? 

General HYTEN. Thank you, Congressman. The impact on the existing Air Force space mission would be significant, because if you 

have to take billions of dollars out and try to do something else 

with it, what are you going to take out? Are we going to stop doing 

GPS [Global Positioning System]? Are we going to stop doing missile warning? Are we going to stop doing satellite communications? 

Those are very, very difficult questions. So it will actually come 

back to the Air Force and we will have to decide where to do that. 

The number $1.5 to $5 billion is a significant number. What it 

should really tell you is, that in reality, we don’t know how much 

that will cost us. The reason we don’t know how much it will cost 

us, and the estimates are so huge is because, as the Secretary said, 

we have so many assumptions about what the future is going to 

look like. Are we going to have a Falcon 9 Heavy in the interim 

period between 2019 and 2022? What is the industry going to look 

like between 2019 and 2022? All those questions we really don’t 

know the answer to. 

We know if we come off of Atlas and go to Delta, there are certain things we have to do. SBIRS and AEHF, two of our big satellites today, the Space-Based Infrared System, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite system, only fly on Atlas today, 

so we would have to figure out on how to move those to Delta. We 

would have to do the engineering analysis and maybe reconfigure 

those satellites and reconfigure the interfaces to do that, which 

means we will have to store AEHF and SBIRS for a certain period 

of time. All that costs us money. That costs us money in the near 

years. 

Then Delta will be more expensive. There is no doubt Delta will 

be more expensive. The number is going to be in the billions, there 

is no doubt about that, but exactly where it comes out, I don’t 

know. So planning for uncertainty is not a good place to be. So we 

would like to plan for certainty in the transition, which is why we 

are asking for additional RD–180s to allow us to compete. 

Goodness knows we want off the Russian engine as fast as any 

human being on the planet. We want off the Russian engine as fast 

as possible. But, asking the American taxpayers to write a check 

for multiple billions of dollars in the future for an unknown is a 

very difficult thing to do, and for the Air Force, that will be a very 

difficult budget issue to work. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I would like for the record to ask you this question. We have had testimony on panels that you have sat on, as 

well as a host of other people at this table, as well as others, who 

have said that they believe with some degree of confidence that we 
3 

can have a replacement engine and have it certified in the 2020 to 

2022, 2023 timeframe. Is that something you still believe is accurate? 

General HYTEN. So the two contracts we have just signed, for the 

first stage engine, both require delivery of that engine by December 

of 2019. It will then take 2 to 3 years to certify that into a rocket 

system to allow us to launch. So that means by 2022 to 2023, we 

should be ready to launch. 

Mr. ROGERS. And you have confidence in that timeframe? 

General HYTEN. I have more confidence today than I did last 

year. There is always risk in any development program that is 

looking at new technology. So there is risk in that, but I am more 

confident this year with both the Aerojet Rocketdyne solution, as 

well as the Blue Origin solution than I was last year, because the 

progress that we have made working with industry and the 

progress that I have seen from those two companies. 

Mr. ROGERS. And my point in raising that is that this is not an 

infinite amount of time that we are talking about, that we have got 

to wrestle with this RD–180 issue, that we can see the light at the 

end of the tunnel if we just remain steadfast and find a way to 

make this—navigate these waters, and then get off of it permanently. 

Mr. Calvelli, you heard General Hyten’s observations about the 

Delta-Falcon mix. Do you agree with those, and can you tell us 

what impact that would have on NRO [National Reconnaissance 

Office] operations? 

Mr. CALVELLI. Yes. I agree with what General Hyten answered, 

and as well as, you know, the implications to us are the same that 

the Air Force has, and I think one of the big things here would be 

the timing. So, for example, I have got unique vehicles that were 

designed around flying on an Atlas. If I was told, like, tomorrow 

they could not go on an Atlas, I mean, the cost would be higher. 

If it is a gradual transition over a period of years, the cost would 

be lower. And so it all depends on the timeframe of the decision 

is made. 

Mr. ROGERS. But you would agree—I am asking. I don’t want to 

ask leading questions—— 

Mr. CALVELLI. Okay. 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. We are not in the courtroom, but would 

you agree that the timeframe after you get past 3 to 5 years is just 

hard to predict. I mean, there is no way to know that you are going 

to have, what kind of launch opportunities are going to be out 

there or demands. 

Mr. CALVELLI. Sure. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. The underpinning of the Air Force RD– 

180 replacement plan is based on creating two commercially viable 

launch systems which all meet the EELV [Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle] requirements. Let me give you two examples of 

what I have heard about the commercial market from experts on 

this point that we were just talking about. General Mitchell’s study 

on the RD–180 reliance mitigation stated, quote, ‘‘Launch capability exceeds demand three to one to service this fixed market,’’ 

closed quote. And you can see the monitors for a slide on this commercial launch environment according to General Mitchell’s report. 
4 

[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 107.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Separately, Ms. Katrina McFarland, who leads acquisition in OSD–AT&L [Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics], stated in one of our launch 

hearings last year that, quote, ‘‘The 2014 commercial space transportation forecast that came out has a flat line on what we can anticipate in the future that would bring in, in terms of commercial 

NGO [non-governmental organization] to the government. They are 

all competing for the same size pie,’’ close quote. 

General Hyten and Mr. Weatherington, do you disagree with 

General Mitchell and Ms. McFarland’s assessment of the commercial launch market? General Hyten first. 

General HYTEN. So if you look at that chart, the one thing that 

should be clear to everybody is that we have never predicted the 

commercial launch market correctly. I don’t think we fully understand what the commercial launch market is going to be, and I 

wouldn’t bet exactly where the commercial launch market is going 

to end up in 3 to 5 years again. 

What I would say is the commercial launch market is more mature. And the one thing, if you look at those numbers on there, 

there are still significant numbers available for the commercial 

launch industry. Our launch industry, unfortunately, has not been 

able to ever compete for those, because we have been way too high 

priced. If you look at how many EELVs, how many of the rockets, 

Atlas and Delta, that we have launched since the beginning, 92. Of 

those 92, 62 were for the Department of Defense [DOD] and the 

national security missions. Sixteen were for NASA, and 14 were for 

the commercial sector, only 14. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is amazing. 

General HYTEN. Fourteen in the entire history of the program. 

So whatever we do, we need to be more competitive and more commercially viable as we get to the out years. But that is why it is 

a public/private partnership, because the commercial sector is not 

there right now. We believe that, eventually, there will be a commercial industry in space, but even with the commercial industry 

we have right now, we need to be more competitive in—— 

Mr. ROGERS. What do you base that on when you say you believe 

there will be more of a commercial demand? 

General HYTEN. Because I watch the maturation, especially in 

the satellite communication business, of how the satellite communication business has flourished in recent years. When we started 

these programs back in the mid-1990s, there was really no commercial business. There is a commercial business now. A lot of that 

commercial business goes overseas to launch. There is also a new 

business taking place, mostly out of Silicon Valley, that many people call ‘‘new space’’ that is looking at distributed constellations of 

numbers of small satellites. One of those companies is going to figure that out, because there is a huge business case for them to figure it out. When that happens, I can’t tell you, I am not a business 

person. But I can tell you that that is much different than it was 

in the 1990s when we started down this path. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Mr. Weatherington, you heard me try to 

recite Ms. McFarland and General Mitchell’s observations. What 

are your thoughts? 
5 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So to leverage 

on what General Hyten said, from AT&L’s perspective, the launch 

market really has three components. It has got the NSS [national 

security space] component; it has got the other U.S. Government 

component, largely NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]; and it has got the commercial components. And as General Hyten indicated, all three of these components are difficult to 

predict in the future. Let me just give you one example. So for national security space, our manifest is flat to trending slightly downward through the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan]. Later on, 

you will probably ask us some questions on resiliency, and General 

Hyten and his staff are working hard to develop strategies that address our lack of resiliency today. 

One of those potential solutions is to disaggregate some constellations that likely would result in an increase in NSS launch 

capacity, but we aren’t there yet. So it is difficult to predict what 

the NSS launch manifest will be in the future. 

Other government contractors, NASA, we have got the question 

of where the International Space Station is going to go in the future, so that is an unknown. And, again, as General Hyten said, 

there is really two components for commercial: there is the base of 

commercial, commercial SATCOM [satellite communications], supporting a variety of users; and then this new space market that 

may be emerging. 

Now, you know, we bought this before about 10 years ago where 

we anticipated the significant increase in commercial space, and 

that did not materialize. So I think the point here is we have to 

plan for various contingencies. From AT&L’s perspective, we think 

the best solution moving forward is a plan that gives us two certified launch providers that support the entire NSS manifest, and 

some fraction of their capability could be used for the commercial 

or other government market. If that does not transpire, we still 

need two certified launch providers to provide the U.S. Government 

assured access to space. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The Chair now yields to the ranking 

member from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. I thank the chairman. I would also like to welcome 

the witnesses. It is a very distinguished panel. I will be saving 

most of my questions for the classified session later, but I would 

first like to associate myself with General Hyten’s answer to the 

chairman regarding the RD–180. I thought that was very well expressed. 

It worries me greatly the GPS OCX [Next Generation Operational Control System] ground system delays and cost overruns. 

And I noted that Lieutenant General Sam Greaves said that, quote, 

‘‘It is the number one troubled program within the Department of 

Defense,’’ end of quote. 

Sadly there is a lot of competition for that title, but to be the 

winner is not something to be proud of. So if any of you would like 

to comment on that situation, I would love to hear your answer. 

General HYTEN. Thank you, sir. I will start. I have been on the 

record expressing my displeasure of the OCX program. I called it 

a disaster in the press. And I think any program that is a billion 

dollars over budget and 5 years late meets the definition of a dis-
6 

aster. But the question we have to ask ourselves is what is the best 

way forward, what is the best way out of this. 

And Mr. Kendall and AT&L, and I will let Mr. Weatherington 

talk about the details, had a session in December, and a session 

just last week with the contractor, going through the details looking at the various options. And as we sit here today, the best answer is for Raytheon, the contractor involved, to deliver that capability in a time certain manner and give us the capability that we 

need to make sure that GPS is available for future years in a cyber 

secure environment. 

And I will let Mr. Weatherington answer the acquisition details. 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Sir, again, to leverage on General Hyten’s 

comments, Secretary Kendall signed out an ADM [Acquisition Decision Memorandum] on 22 December that provided an additional 24 

months of schedule for the program. It also set a requirement for 

quarterly deep dives. As General Hyten indicated, that first deep 

dive took place last week out at Aurora, Colorado. That was attended by Mr. Kendall and the Secretary of the Air Force, so I 

think that indicates this problem has significant senior leadership 

attention in the Department. 

Currently, we believe there is reasonable expectation that 

Raytheon can deliver the capability that we need, but Mr. Kendall 

also directed the Air Force to develop off-ramps for the program in 

the situation that we can’t close on this program. 

I think it is also important to point out that while the program 

is troubled, the capability that OCX delivers is absolutely critical 

to the warfighter. We have got to improve our resiliency both in 

space and in ground, and that was one of the significant goals that 

OCX had. So whatever we do for the program specifically, we have 

to deliver that capability to the warfighter. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the ranking member. The Chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the committee, Mr. Lamborn of Colorado, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this will be both 

for General Hyten and General Buck, but there is a difference between JICSpOC [Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations 

Center] and JSpOC [Joint Space Operations Center]. Can you explain why each one is—where it is at and what are the plans going 

forward, especially for JICSpOC, which is the newer of those two 

organizations? 

General HYTEN. Yes, sir. For the record, the Joint Space Operations Center is at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. It is the 

day-to-day operation center that is commanded by General Dave 

Buck, the commander of the joint force component under Strategic 

Command, to lead the day-to-day operations. 

And they have two fundamental missions that drive their focus: 

number one, they have to be organized, trained, and equipped to 

provide space support to theater warfighters around the world, and 

that is what they do tremendously well every day. And the second 

piece is they have to provide us situational awareness of everything 

that is going on in space. They end up providing that situational 
7 

awareness for us and for users around the world, including international partners as well as commercial partners. 

What we realized is that if conflict does, God forbid, extend into 

space someday, we need to have the capability to focus on planning 

for that conflict. And so we decided that we would create an experimental organization at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado, to 

look at experimentation of that conflict should it one day occur. We 

started that on the 1st of October and we continue to do that. 

The reason that Schriever Air Force Base was chosen was really 

for a very simple reason, is that Schriever Air Force Base has 

unique connectivity. We can talk about that connectivity in detail 

in the classified session, but basically the bottom line is it is connected to every national security ground station in the world from 

Schriever Air Force Base. That connectivity is essentially important so that you can respond real-time to concerns and contingencies that may arise in space someday. 

And so that is the basic reason why the JICSpOC, the Joint 

Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, was put at 

Schriever Air Force Base. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Yeah, General. 

General BUCK. Yeah. General, thank you, sir. I have nothing 

more to add. I think it was a very succinct answer and spot on. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Great. And then what is next for 

JICSpOC after the fourth and last experimental period in May? 

General HYTEN. So after the fourth experimental period in the 

JICSpOC—well, actually we are going through that process right 

now. We have learned a great deal from the first three periods. We 

are continuing to look. We have proposals up to the senior leadership in the Department now about how we transition to a future 

construct. 

You will see in our 2017 President’s budget that we have requested money, a small amount of money, for the JICSpOC, as well 

as continuing funding for the JSpOC and the JSpOC mission system. We believe that both of those will have a significant role in 

the future, but that role will be determined by the senior leadership in the Department as we come to the end, but those recommendations are coming forward now. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am just really excited about the potential 

for the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community 

[IC] working together in an organized, formal way for the first time 

ever when it comes to space. 

General HYTEN. Well thank you, Congressman, for that statement, because to me that is the number one lesson learned from 

the JICSpOC right now, is that the critical partnership we have 

with the NRO and the Intelligence Community, it is better than I 

have ever seen it in my 35-year career. It is remarkable the 

progress that we are making, and that partnership is critical to the 

future. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Would anyone from the Intelligence Community 

like to add anything? 

Mr. CALVELLI. Yes. So as you know—and I couldn’t echo better 

the words General Hyten said, but as you know, I mean, there are 

adversaries out there that are trying to deny our capabilities that 

we have in space and the decisive advantage that space gives us. 
8 

The JICSpOC is an amazing effort between the IC and the DOD 

to share information, whether that is indications and warning, or 

whether it is on defensive kinds of maneuvers that we potentially 

could do, through a whole unity of effort between the two organizations. 

And to me from an IC perspective, the more information we have 

between ourselves to share information and protect our systems, 

the better off we will be. So it is a great opportunity, and it is a 

great teamwork between the IC and DOD. 

Mr. CARDILLO. I would just quickly echo those comments on both 

ends. It is a synergy we haven’t seen before. NGA [National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] is fully participating in all of these 

experiments so that we can best serve the Nation. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And one last question. General Hyten, 

you are asking for $20 million for a ground enterprise to take 17 

different interfaces for ground control systems and make one system, so training is much more consistent throughout the Air Force. 

Do you want to respond to that? 

General HYTEN. So it is taking 17 different ground systems that 

we have right now, and not creating a single ground system, but 

creating a single interface and a single common structure, because 

today we have to train our airmen, top rate, 17 different systems. 

That is inefficient, it is expensive, and it is also hard on our airmen. 

So we would like to have a common interface, a common structure that everything plugs into so that the ground systems of the 

future will all be built to plug into that same common interface as 

we walk into that. That is what we are really talking about, the 

enterprise ground. That is why it is a fairly small amount of 

money, because it is really engineering work, system engineering 

analysis that has to be done to define where we are going to go in 

the future. 

Because the money for the ground systems is actually in all these 

big programs, SBIRS, AEHF, GPS, they all have significant funding for the ground. The question is, how do we actually build that 

ground structure in the future so it is a common structure for our 

airmen to operate on. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much. 

General HYTEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Ashford, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a brief 

question, if I might. I was out at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] last week and met with General Wilson, and he gave a great 

brief on all the issues they are dealing with. Could someone answer, I do—one of the areas we talked about, of course, and we talk 

about a lot in here is cyber and being able to stand up the force 

necessary by 2018 to address those issues. Could someone just give 

a comment, General, on where that is? General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. So I actually think I am the only one on the 

panel that can, so I apologize to my panel members, but I have 

cyber underneath my command as well. And so part of our job in 

the Air Force is to man our section of the Cyber Mission Force, 39 
9 

teams that we have to field. We are in the process of building those 

out right now. 

The Cyber Mission Force is a key element. It consists of national 

mission teams to protect the Nation, combat mission teams to support the combatant commanders, and cyber protection teams to defend our own capabilities. 

We are making progress. We are a little behind in the Air Force 

in stepping up to that. We have a training pipeline that is limited 

in how many people we can put through that. I know that commanders for Strategic Command and the commander of Cyber 

Command have both complained to my leadership about us going 

faster. We are doing everything we can to put extra capabilities, 

and figure out smarter ways to train our cyber professionals to get 

there. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thanks, General. Could I ask one follow-up? Do 

you see a benefit, we had some discussions about, to ramp up the 

training, to provide additional training sites, additional training 

opportunities? Is that something you are thinking about doing? 

General HYTEN. It is. In fact, the Air National Guard is standing 

up a new unit in Arkansas—— 

Mr. ASHFORD. Right. 

General HYTEN [continuing]. And one of the things we are looking at is how to better leverage the Guard as a total force to provide us additional training opportunities. 

Mr. ASHFORD. And I think Nebraska is one of those National 

Guard teams as well. 

General HYTEN. Yes. And the Guard is a perfect partner in 

cyber, more than maybe any other mission, because it can be done 

from anywhere, it requires unique training, it doesn’t require 24/ 

7, because you can come in and come out. It is a perfect total force 

mission, and we are looking at new ways to leverage the Guard 

and the Reserve to do that. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thanks, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

Chairman Forbes for 5 minutes for any questions he may have. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for being here today. 

Earlier this month in a House Appropriations hearing with Secretary James and General Welsh, they were asked a question about 

eliminating single-point failures in space launch by continuing development of secondary launch sites at Wallops Island, Virginia, 

and Kodiak, Alaska, which help support small- and medium-class 

launches for DOD, civil, and commercial users. In response, General Welsh stated that, quote, ‘‘As we look at the space enterprise 

and how we do it differently in the future as we look at more disaggregation, micro sats [satellites], cube sats, small sats, things that 

don’t have to go from a large launch complex, I think proliferating 

launch complexes is going to be a natural outshoot of this.’’ 

He added, ‘‘this is the kind of thing General Hyten is talking 

about. How do we change the game for the long-term.’’ 

General Hyten, as you know, Wallops and Kodiak represent the 

only other launch sites in the United States capable of launching 

to orbit outside of the Cape and Vandenberg. Could you please 
10 

elaborate on General Welsh’s comments about opportunities to 

make greater use of these space ports to support DOD missions? 

General HYTEN. So the most important element in General 

Welsh’s statement was the existence of smaller satellites and different satellite architectures in the future. We believe, and we have 

built something we call the Space Enterprise Vision, the joint vision with the National Reconnaissance Office, where we look at different ways of doing business in the future. And smaller satellites—not necessarily small, but smaller satellites are a key piece 

of that puzzle. 

One of the reasons that we only operate out of the Cape and 

Vandenberg today, Cape Canaveral in Florida and Vandenberg in 

California, is because the satellite processing facilities that are required in order to move those satellites onto the rockets only exist 

at the Cape and Vandenberg. We could not do that out of Kodiak 

or Wallops today. 

But as we move into a different structure where we have smaller 

satellites, and small satellites, and maybe cube sats as well as 

someday to do missions, we will need to take advantage of it. That 

also builds resiliency into our launch infrastructure. We have vulnerabilities when everybody knows that the only place that we 

launch our rockets from are at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg. 

It is better to have more places to launch from. 

I will be going up to Alaska in 2 months to visit Kodiak. I look 

forward to that. I have seen Wallops in the past. I did Wallops missions way, way back when, when I was a captain. There are advantages of going there, but, again, the satellites have to be ready. It 

is satellites that drive the launch business, not the rockets. If the 

satellites are there, then the launch industry will respond to it. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. Loverro, how are DOD space procurement policies taking 

into account the opportunities that newer orbital launch facilities 

like Wallops and Kodiak provide, and how can Congress support efforts to make sure these launch complexes are available to support 

small- and medium-class defense launch needs? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Sir, I think most of the policies that the administration has put forward definitely support both commercial and 

State-sponsored launch capabilities. So you have seen a proliferation, we have talked about Kodiak and Wallops today, but there 

are no less than 6 different States that have filed for space launch 

ports authority. 

I think this is a great example of the competitive nature of space 

launch and I think that this is a place that we should allow that 

industry to flourish by, again, encouraging the commercial world 

and the States to go ahead and make those investments. 

I will tell you, I agree with everything that General Hyten says, 

but I would also harken back to the question of what is the launch 

industry going to look like in the future that we answered when 

we talked about launch vehicles. 

If we don’t have a large commercial space industry, if we only 

have the government space launch capability, we also can’t maintain economically more than a couple of launch sites, so—because 

launch sites are not free. They are just not pads that sit there by 

themselves. They have to be maintained. So there has to be enough 
11 

throughput. And that goes back to what General Hyten said, you 

need—the satellites drive the launch infrastructure. Launch infrastructure doesn’t drive the satellites. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you very much for your testimony. And I wish we had several 

hours to go through it. 

General Hyten, is the Air Force and the military dependent upon 

GPS for virtually everything? 

General HYTEN. I think the world is dependent on GPS. The 

military certainly is. We have built an amazing capability that fundamentally changed warfare. All precision warfare—most all precision warfare today is based on GPS. We still have laser-guided munitions that we drop in certain areas, but most of the munitions we 

drop are GPS-guided. Most of our operations are GPS-fed. The timing signal that comes off GPS in some ways is more important than 

the navigation signal. So we are unbelievably—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In fact, the ATM [automated teller machine] 

won’t work without the timing—— 

General HYTEN. Your ATM won’t work—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No—— 

General HYTEN [continuing]. Gas, stoplights stop working. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do all of you gentlemen agree with that? You 

know, it is like—it has been said that GPS is the single point of 

failure, is that correct, for virtually everything that you have 

talked about here? 

General HYTEN. It could be looked at as a single point of failure, 

but one of the things that we do is we build resiliency into our 

weapons systems, we have a backup inertial navigation system 

that we use in most of our weapons systems to allow us to do that. 

Nonetheless, GPS is a vulnerability, so we are looking at a number 

of different ways, we can talk about that in the closed hearing in 

more detail, but a number of different ways to ensure that we can 

continue to operate in a GPS-denied environment. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Have you considered terrestrial-based timing? 

General HYTEN. There are a number of terrestrial-based timing 

sources that are out there. eLoran [Enhanced Long Range Navigation] is one of the ones we are looking at across the coast. That is 

not a DOD system, but the Department of Transportation and the 

Coast Guard, in particular, are looking at that. That has significant 

benefits around our ports to reduce vulnerability of GPS. 

But in order for eLoran to work, there has to be eLoran receivers 

that can take the signals off of eLoran, because if you build eLoran 

and there are no receivers, it would be like building GPS without 

the GPS receiver. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are receivers possible to be built? 

General HYTEN. Yes, they are. But, again, somebody has to invest in that money. The GPS market blossomed because there was 

a huge commercial market. The question you have to ask yourself 

for eLoran, and that is for somebody that is not on this panel, that 

is the Department of Transportation question. But what is the 
12 

marketplace that will come for eLoran? It is probably shipping, 

those kind of people. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Let’s see. The Department of Defense is for defense? 

General HYTEN. Department of Defense is for defense, absolutely, 

and that is why we are—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So if somebody wanted to knock out our electrical systems or our communication systems or our financial systems, they would knock out the GPS, wouldn’t they? 

General HYTEN. They would. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is that a defense issue? 

General HYTEN. That is a defense issue. That is why we look at 

that, that is why we are part of the national—Positioning, Navigation and Timing EXCOM [executive committee]. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why did you write me a letter saying that there 

is no role for the Department of Defense for the eLoran system? 

Why is the Department of Defense not willing to spend, like, I don’t 

know, $50 million a year to provide the foundational backup system to GPS? Why did you write that letter to me? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Sorry, sir. Is that to me? I didn’t hear the—who. 

It was addressed to me? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, your name was on it, so—— 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yeah. Okay. No. I just didn’t hear if you said that 

was to me or not, so—sir, so there was not—so we do not have a 

Department of Defense requirement for GPS. You do know, and 

I—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, we just established the fact that GPS is 

a—that the absence of GPS is a defense issue. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. There are many issues that trans—that 

go ahead and transition from defense issues to national security 

issues. I would go ahead and—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ah, the Department of Defense is not a national 

security issue? 

Mr. LOVERRO. No, sir. I—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is that what you are saying to me? 

Mr. LOVERRO. I absolutely agree it is. As you know, I have told 

you that I wanted to look into this question more. I have done that. 

I still owe you a written paper on this, I understand. 

My sense is that eLoran is one of several capabilities that could 

help this issue, but I think the point that—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And the other ones are? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The other ones are better GPS or GNSS [global 

navigation satellite systems] user equipment, local time sources. 

And, in fact, in many cases it is a combination of all three. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are they available? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir, they are, because, in fact, the DOD is— 

in our own timing infrastructure, those are the kind of backups 

that we are putting into our infrastructure. 

The point that General Hyten, though, made is very important 

and I think it is instructive. You may not know that when we created the newest version of GPS, we created a second civil signal 

called L2 based upon the President’s direction back in 1996, because many people believed the commercial world would adopt it. 
13 

There are no L2 receivers available in the world today, because nobody feels it necessary to listen to the second civil signal. 

So I think their concern isn’t so much what is the source of timing, which eLoran would be a good and appropriate source for the 

continental United States; I think the question is how do we make 

sure people adopt the receiver infrastructure to go ahead and make 

the source? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I have got no time left, but let me just pose this 

question. You can send it to me in writing along with the other information you promised. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. I absolutely will. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Have other countries and other parts of the 

world established a ground-based terrestrial timing system? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Sir, as a matter of fact, they did, and they have 

shut them down, because—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. All of them? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes. France, Norway, and—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Russia and China? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Russia has a different system. I don’t know about 

Russia’s status, but France, Norway, and the U.K. [United Kingdom] have shut theirs down because of a lack of users. So the same 

problem that we—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is a longer question. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will get into it with you again. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair will point out now we have been called for votes. We 

are going to recognize Mr. Bridenstine from Oklahoma for 5 minutes, and then we will recess and come back after this series of 

votes, which will be about 1 hour from right now. 

The gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Hyten, the Air Force has requested funding for a wideband SATCOM AOA [analysis of alternatives]. I think that is perfectly appropriate. And then we received information in news reports about the Air Force purchasing additional legacy satellites, 

WGS [wideband global satellite communications] satellites. 

How do we make sure that we, as a country, are taking advantage of the technological advances happening in the commercial 

sector? Of course, the AOA is what I thought that was what that 

was for, and now it doesn’t necessarily appear that that is going 

to be the case. Can you share with us how you plan to make sure 

that we are taking advantage of the commercial advancements? 

General HYTEN. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the question. 

The real issue there is that the AOA is going to answer those 

questions. We have not made a commitment yet to build any more 

WGS satellites, not one, not two, not three. We haven’t made any 

commitment along those lines. We won’t make any commitments 

about what we are going to build next until we have done the analysis of alternatives. 

The analysis of alternatives is being structured through the staff 

right now. One of my panel members may be able to comment on 
14 

those, especially those that work in the Pentagon. But it is critical 

that that AOA look at it across the board, and we are going to be 

demanding customers of the AOA to make sure that the commercial sector is properly looked at across the board, not just from a 

provision of capabilities standpoint, but from an opportunity to provide different capabilities that we may not think about. 

So that AOA is critical to defining the future. We are putting 

those—we want to make sure that that is done in a very time certain environment. We hope to get it done by March the 17th so we 

can meet the congressional direction there. That is going to be a 

fast time to do an AOA, but the faster we do AOAs, the better they 

are, because AOAs that take a long time tend to be somewhat irrelevant by the time they are reported out. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Got it. 

And, Secretary Loverro, we have heard cost estimates from commercial operators and, of course, from the Department of Defense 

on WGS, and it doesn’t seem to add up that we are getting applesto-apples comparisons. Can you help us make sure that we are 

going to get apples-to-apples comparisons on the cost of commercial, vice military-owned and operated satellites? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Sir, absolutely. We have got to go ahead and do 

an apples-to-apples comparison. We have got to go ahead and include all the costs that are relevant to things like WGS. That is 

not always easy to do, because some of those costs are at third and 

fourth level, but we have to go ahead and do that, because otherwise we will get a skewed result from the analysis. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. And, Secretary Loverro, in January in 

an interview with SpaceNews, you suggested that a civil agency 

should perform certain day-to-day nonmilitary space situational 

awareness [SSA] activities for commercial and foreign operators. 

Specifically you stated that, quote, ‘‘The JSpOC’s primary role 

should be to support U.S. and allied military space operations,’’ unquote. 

Do you support building the capability of a civilian agency to obtain space situational awareness data and perform limited SSA activities for commercial and foreign operators? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Congressman, I do. So this is obviously a very important question. The DOD is not going to go ahead and give up 

our ability to go ahead and do SSA for our warfighting mission. 

At the same time, we recognize that to fully support our commercial industries, we need to go ahead and put that on a more civil 

footing, one that not only can go ahead and do space traffic monitoring, which is what we do from the JSpOC today, but some level 

of space traffic management. The Congress recognized this in their 

legislation last year, and I think we recognize it as well. 

So I know with my colleagues up here, we are all trying to figure 

out what the right balance is between that, how do we do that. I 

think we all believe this has got to start off with a crawl, a walk, 

and a run, which we would believe would begin with putting probably FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] personnel out at the 

JSpOC to help that function, but we recognize that the future is 

going to require that a civil agency take over this far larger and 

growing sector than we should support from the DOD. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you. 
15 

And, General Hyten, as the commander of Air Force Space Command, is performing space traffic management for the entire world 

in your mission statement? 

General HYTEN. No, sir, it is not. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. If a civil agency were to perform some space 

traffic management activities for non-DOD customers, would that 

make it easier or harder for airmen at the JSpOC to focus on deterring, fighting, and winning wars in space? 

General HYTEN. That would make it easier, but I do have one 

comment about that, is that it is not in our mission to do those 

things, but what you have to realize is that we have to do those 

things in order for us to operate safely. 

So it is critical that we continue to perform the space situational 

awareness mission and critical that we have the ability to integrate 

that into all of our operations, but nonetheless, the ability to do 

space traffic management, like Mr. Loverro described, is not in our 

mission statement. We do it because we have to do it. Somebody 

has to do it for the world, but it is more a civil function than it 

is a military function. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Fantastic. I have got just a few seconds left, 

and so we will just take this for the record. 

Space and Missile Systems Center released an RFI [request for 

information] seeking input from industry on commercial weather 

data and services to meet DOD requirements. And basically it is 

a policy to buy data from the commercial sector to feed our numerical weather models and predict weather. 

Could DOD benefit from following NOAA’s [National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration’s] pilot program approach to begin the 

process of establishing standards, testing integration, and eventually buying data and services for weather purposes? 

General HYTEN. We will take it for the record, sir, but the answer is yes. We are going to use all data capabilities that we can. 

But we will take that and give you a detailed answer for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 111.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now calls that we will be in recess until about 4:40, 

when we will return to this room. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair calls the meeting back to order and recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr. Fleming, for 5 minutes. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Hyten and Mr. Weatherington, what is the Air Force’s 

plan for ensuring optimal U.S. investment to replace the Russian 

RD–180 engine? 

General HYTEN. So I can talk about the top level, and then I will 

let Mr. Weatherington talk about the acquisition strategy. 

But our basic overall plan is to develop public/private partnerships with industry to leverage the capability that we need to ensure that all the capabilities we need, for the future launch enterprise, exists when we need them, not just as soon as possible, to 

get off the RD–180. 
16 

So that includes first-stage engines, it includes upper-stage engines, it includes solid adjunct boosters as well as the solid main 

core. So we are looking at the entire enterprise to make sure that 

the enterprise will be ready when we get there. 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Yes, Congressman, I think it is also important to point out that for the U.S. Department of Defense, we do 

not procure actual launch systems. We procure that service. So the 

plan for the Department moving ahead, is to incentivize industry 

to partner with us to develop launch capability that will meet the 

full manifest requirements that DOD has. 

Now, as General Hyten has indicated, there are several different 

technologies that we need to invest in to get there. We need both 

main-stage engines, and we need upper-stage engines. But fundamentally, we need an integrated solution that will launch our 

satellites. 

Again, as General Hyten said, it is about the satellite, and the 

rocket will follow. So the strategy the Department has is to incentivize team in public/private partnerships with various commercial 

entities, either rocket integrators or in some cases specific subsystems. 

And the Air Force has done a great job of structuring the other 

transaction authority activities currently underway to go out and 

invest in those critical technologies we need with the plan that 

every one of those has a path to get to a rocket integrator and deliver us an integrated solution, likely in the 2019, 2020, 2021 timeframe. 

Dr. FLEMING. Are the specifications superior to the Russian RD– 

180 engine? In other words, do we end up with a better product if 

this flows properly? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Well, again, sir, because we are not actually buying a rocket or even buying an engine, what DOD requires 

is a requirement to launch our full manifest. So today, as I think 

you are aware, we have two systems certified to do that today, 

Atlas and Delta, several variations of each of those systems, but 

they cover the entire manifest. 

Delta IV Heavy, which we use for our largest systems, is a fairly 

expensive system. Our goal in the development of these future 

launch systems is to bring that cost down, especially at the high 

end. 

Dr. FLEMING. Uh-huh. Okay. And how do we maintain assured 

access and protect the taxpayers as we transition off that engine, 

the RD–180? 

General HYTEN. So that is why our recommendation, sir, is to 

allow us to buy enough RD–180s to cover us through the transition 

period, because that will be significantly less cost to the taxpayer. 

As we talked about earlier, we don’t know for sure what the cost 

will be if we go a different direction, for example, a Delta-Falcon 

mix. 

If we go a different direction, I believe that the cost will be measured in the billions. The Secretary stated that the estimates are up 

in $1.5 billion to $5 billion. That is true, but that spread in the estimates are all based on the assumptions. So if you make certain 

assumptions about where the industry is going to be, you can drive 

that answer to wherever you want. But I am confident that it will 
17 

be a significant bill to the taxpayer if we need to do something in 

the transition period. 

But again to emphasize the point, we want off the Russian engine as fast as we can get, and that is why we put the program 

in place that we have. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I believe the gentleman from Colorado is next up for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Hyten and Lieutenant General Buck, can you discuss 

how funding for the 460th Space Wing and 233rd Space Group are 

prioritized within Air Force Space Command and JFCC Space 

[Joint Functional Component Command for Space]? Is it a top priority? Do you have any concerns that funding priorities will negatively impact our missile warning mission? 

General HYTEN. So, I guess, the easy answer to that question— 

and I will let General Buck weigh in, but the easy answer is that 

missile warning is a survival mission for the Nation. So a strategic 

missile warning has been and will continue to be the highest priority mission that we have in Space Command. That is the mission 

of the 460th Wing, part of the mission of the 233rd. 

So as we look at those capabilities in the future, that will continue to be a high priority. 

General BUCK. And the good news there, sir, is that we are putting some money into the infrastructure up there, as you know. We 

just replaced the UPS [universal power supply] up there because 

we had power issues, as you are tracking them, I am sure, not only 

in the survival of mission control center but also in the primary 

mission control center. So we have got our eye on the ball there, 

and we are very aware of how critical that mission is to the warfighter. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. General Hyten, can you discuss a level at 

which the Air Force makes cost, schedule, and performance trade 

space decisions related to missile warning. Are there any instances 

where the Air Force and STRATCOM would have to sacrifice national missile warning responsiveness in order to reduce cost? 

General HYTEN. So we will never trade off the strategic missile 

warning mission, because that is a survival of the Nation issue. So 

that can’t be traded off. There is a discussion worth having about 

how much of the secondary missions you get from Overhead Persistent IR [infrared], in other words how much battle space awareness, how much technical intelligence, how much capability that 

you want to build. 

There is also an issue about how do you want to provide that capability. But the fundamental strategic missile warning capability 

that we have to have as a Nation cannot be traded off, and the 

commander of STRATCOM has told me that in person. And those 

capabilities will not be traded. That is a survival of the Nation 

issue. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Mr. Cardillo, last year, you released your 

commercial GEOINT [geospatial intelligence] strategy, which outlines how you intend to leverage our commercial space imagery, 

services, and analysis. Can you tell us what progress you are making so far this year, and can you tell us how your fiscal year 2017 
18 

budget request further enables your successful implementation of 

the strategy? 

Mr. CARDILLO. We are in the learning and investigation phase of 

that overall strategy. We are doing it with our mission partner at 

the NRO, because whatever we end up deciding to do from that 

commercial market, as it matures and becomes viable, we are going 

to have to share how we store that data, how we move it around, 

how we intermingle it with our classified systems. And we can talk 

more about that in closed session. 

I have been very pleased with the reaction that we have gotten 

from industry to date. And so we are making small purchases to 

understand data types, and sensor types, and what kind of imagery 

sources they are collecting. As we learn more, but I must say too, 

as they become more commercially viable to create that market, we 

do intend, and in fiscal year 2017, pending Congress’ budgeting, is 

to expand our ability to exploit that space. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Calvelli, in your written statement, you mentioned that NRO is improving space-based persistence, creating a, 

quote-unquote, ‘‘thinking system’’ called Sentient and developing a 

transformative future ground architecture. Can you discuss how 

Buckley Air Force Base and the Aerospace Data Facility, ADF–C 

[Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado], fit in these efforts? 

Mr. CALVELLI. Sure. All of our ADFs are a major piece of how 

we operate our systems today and will continue to be for the future. What we are trying to do is to try to tie our systems together 

more closely, so instead of stovepipes of GEOINT or stovepipes of 

SIGINT [signals intelligence], it is sort of an integrated set of sensors in space, integrated ground providing data to our user community. The ADF–C, ADF–E [Aerospace Data Facility-East], ADFSouthwest will all play major roles in that in the future. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I believe the gentleman from Oklahoma has one cleanup question. Is that what I was told? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I have got a couple—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Knock yourself out. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I wanted to ask, General Hyten, Air Force 

budget documents state that you will conduct an end-to-end overthe-air demonstration of protected tactical waveform [PTW] in mid2019. The Air Force apparently delayed the initial launch capability of protected tactical service [PTS] by 3 years until 2027. 

What factors account for the delay to PTS, and why is there an 8- 

year gap between full-up PTW demo and ILC [initial launch capability]? 

General HYTEN. So the answer to the question, Congressman, is 

that we have yet to complete the protected SATCOM communication system AOA, the analysis of alternatives. Before we can start 

a program within the Department, we need to complete the AOA. 

The AOA is imminent. We have completed it. Mr. Kendall, the 

Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has 

signed off on it, pushed that into CAPE [Office of Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation]. CAPE is now doing the sufficiency study. 

They have committed to completing that by April 15. 
19 

But as we submitted our budget documents, we had to make 

some assumptions of what we thought the future was going to be. 

And to us, it looked clear that protected tactical waveforms will be 

part of the architecture in the future; therefore, it was important 

for us to pursue the pathfinder that you saw in the budget documents. And then the rest is to be determined. 

So we don’t want to put a program in place without the proper 

analysis having been completed, and that will be complete here 

very shortly. And we will share that with the Congress when it is 

complete. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Last question, I have been told that 

prior to this RD–180 issue, a new low-cost, upper-stage engine replacement had been a high priority for your national space security 

launch needs. If this is true, how do you plan to address the upperstage replacement, and is there a way to couple the development 

of this upper-stage engine, such as those already funded and developed through the Small Business Innovation Research program, in 

a matter that benefits replacement of the RD–180? 

General HYTEN. So in the contracts we just let with industry, in 

those contracts, in those other transactional authority contracts, 

there are two pieces of it that look at upper stages. 

One is with SpaceX for their Raptor upper stage, and one is with 

the ULA [United Launch Alliance] for their ACES [Advanced Cryogenic Evolved Stage] upper stage. Both of those are required in 

their business plan in the future to allow them to access all the orbital requirements that we have to launch our entire manifest. 

So as you stated, the upper stage is extremely important. We 

have recognized that for a long time, long ahead of the RD–180 

issue. It is a challenge though to get the capabilities that we need 

out of those upper stages, but if we do it correctly, we will be able 

to move into a different architecture for the future that will be 

much more efficient because the upper stage will be more efficient 

in achieving multiple orbits. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And the last question, if the chairman will 

allow me, and this is for you as well, General Hyten, how does EGS 

relate to the requested protected tactical enterprise service? 

General HYTEN. EGS being the enterprise ground system? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Yes, enterprise ground service. 

General HYTEN. So the enterprise ground capability, as we look 

at the protected tactical waveform, what we are trying to get to 

with enterprise ground is we are trying to structure the process so 

that we can operate our satellites, perform telemetry tracking and 

controlling off of a common infrastructure in our ground system, so 

we can have our operators focus on providing the warfighting effect 

to the world to our entire force structure across the board as we 

look at that. 

So it is important that we move into an enterprise ground structure because that will free up our airmen to effectively operate the 

protected tactical waveform in a threatened environment as we go 

through. It is not that we can’t do it on the legacy; we will be able 

to do it on the legacy, but in order for us to fully use our airmen 

capabilities, we need to structure the program so that we are focused on the effect that we are creating on the battlefields of the 

future, not on just flying the satellite. 
20 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Got it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman from Colorado has one cleanup 

question. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Calvelli, and Mr. Cardillo, and General Hyten, are NRO, 

NGA, and Air Force Space Command getting what you need from 

Buckley Air Force Base in the city of Aurora? Is there anything 

else Congress can do to support your efforts at ADF–C? 

Mr. CALVELLI. I will start and say, I think, we are in great shape 

out at ADF–C, and appreciate all the support out there from Aurora and the whole town. 

Mr. CARDILLO. Mr. Calvelli is my landlord. I am a happy tenant. 

We are very pleased with the support we get from Buckley. 

General HYTEN. And the 460th is everybody’s landlord. And, you 

know, the whole issue recently about encroachment was a big concern of ours. That was just addressed this last week when we 

looked at the adjacent land and how we are going to deal with that 

in the future. That was the one, big issue that was hanging out 

there for Buckley, because, in many of our bases in the past, we 

have had encroachment issues that have really impacted our mission. I think the actions of the last week with the land around 

Buckley have really gone a long way to solving that problem for a 

very, very long term, perhaps forever. And that is where we need 

to be. 

So thank you, Congressman, for that help there. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

General Hyten, can you tell us about the status of the DMSP– 

19 [Defense Meteorological Satellite Program flight 19]? 

General HYTEN. So the DMSP–19 is about dead. That is about 

as blunt as I could put it. A few weeks ago we lost the ability to 

command the satellite. The way DMSP satellites operate is they 

still broadcast tactical information, but we can’t get the recorded 

information down to our users because we can’t task the satellite, 

we can’t command it anymore. 

When we can’t command it anymore, that also means we can’t 

take care of the satellite’s health, keep it pointed in the right direction, keep it safe. So in the very near future, if we can’t command 

it again, we will lose the satellite forever. 

Mr. ROGERS. So should we launch DMSP–20? 

General HYTEN. In a perfect world, Congressman, I would prefer 

to launch DMSP–20, but we received direction from the Congress 

last year to terminate that program. General Greaves in Los Angeles issued the order to terminate on the 30th of December, 2015. 

We are in that process. We will reach the point of no return in 

June of this year; that, after that point, the satellite will be torn 

apart and not able to be put back together. 

So I said last year in testimony that it was a difficult decision 

to recommend whether we wanted flight 20 or not, but we ended 

up recommending to the Congress that we launch flight 20. I wish 

I would have been stronger in that, because the statement I made 
21 

is that we need it if we have a failure, and it appears now we have 

had a failure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, if it is important to get that capability up 

there, why isn’t the Air Force working on a follow-on program to 

meet that capability? 

General HYTEN. So we are working on a follow-on program—it is 

called the weather satellite follow-on capability—to meet the three 

elements of the needs. We also have a new tasker from the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC. General Selva sent us 

the tasker this last week to look at the first two gaps, which are 

cloud characterization and theater support; report back to him by 

the 1st of May whether the capabilities we have right now, given 

all the changes, will be able to support the requirements that we 

need. In that memo, he also supported the launch of DMSP flight 

20. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

General Hyten, I am concerned about the loss of our transfer of 

spectrum and the impact on national security, particularly when I 

hear the chairman of the FCC [Federal Communications Commission] telling the satellite industry that, quote, ‘‘it is more practical 

to get on the train than being run over by it,’’ close quote. 

You may recall that your predecessor, General Shelton, testified 

from pretty much where you are seated right now and warned that 

a proposal under consideration by the FCC would have created extensive, harmful interference to GPS. Can you please describe for 

me your views on the proposal by the LightSquared or the company 

LightSquared or its successor Ligado? 

General HYTEN. So I have heard Ligado has put forth a new proposal to use that spectrum. But I will tell you, Congressman, I 

have seen no data that supports the use of that frequency spectrum 

other than the data I saw in 2011. So the position of Air Force 

Space Command is the same as it was when General Shelton sat 

in that seat. 

I don’t think that we should infringe on the GPS spectrum. That 

is a critical capability, not just for the military security of the Nation but for the entire economic well-being of this Nation. We can’t 

allow that to happen. 

All that being said, is that we have an effort with the Department of Transportation in April of this year that we are going to 

go out and do some detailed testing on that spectrum area. We will 

then have a peer review in May and June of this year, and then 

we will go through a process where we will look at it and see what 

elements of those spectrum. 

Because we are trying to be good partners as we work at that, 

but the partnership has to be based on real testing, real impacts, 

and what the impacts on the national security are. And we cannot 

do something that will infringe on our national security, period. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. That brings the open portion of this hearing to a conclusion. We will now recess briefly while we move upstairs to 2216 for the classified portion. 

[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 15, 2016 

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MARCH 15, 2016 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 15, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2016 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

General HYTEN. The NOAA pilot program is being closely followed by the DOD 

Weather Enterprise and we eagerly await the results to evaluate where we can benefit from a data acquisition model such as this. The DOD has already taken actions 

by releasing a Request for Information (RFI), soliciting the industry’s intent and 

ability to develop, launch, and operate space based commercial services that could 

meet the 11 weather capability gaps identified in the Spaced-Based Environmental 

Monitoring (SBEM) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). Based on the industry responses 

to the RFI, there seems to be a viable existing/emerging vendor market that has 

the potential to provide the weather data that can satisfy a subset of SBEM AOA 

weather gaps. We will continue to evaluate the commercial data standards compared to the data currently provided by DOD, civil and international satellites, and 

determine if any changes in our DOD data enterprise would need to be made to accommodate integration of commercial data. Additionally, we will continue to address 

operational risks and long-term viability of commercial data sources. [See page 15.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2016 

(115) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the current state of the space acquisition workforce with regard to numbers of acquisition professionals and their acquisition management expertise? If there are shortcomings in the acquisition workforce, what is being done 

about them? What efforts are underway to enhance development of the space acquisition workforce? 

General HYTEN. The Department of Defense has established a requirement for 

each acquisition workforce member to meet mandatory acquisition certifications 

when occupying an Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) Coded 

positions. For Space Program Managers, 97% of the Acquisition Professional Workforce is certified. 

The Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund (DAWDF) implements targeted development efforts for the acquisition workforce. These efforts include targeted training for 

priority skill needs, initials skills courses, continuous learning, recruiting, coaching, 

training, and mission assistance. Over the past five years the Air Force has been 

benefited by leveraging over $60M across these efforts. 

Mr. ROGERS. Cloud characterization and theater weather imagery are the top two 

most important certified requirements regarding space-based weather collection. 

What are the risks if these warfighter requirements are not met? 

General HYTEN. The Air Force, other Services and Department of Defense (DOD) 

continue to assess the impacts of relying on civil and international partner for 

space-based environmental monitoring capabilities to address cloud characterization 

(CC) and theater weather imagery (TWI) needs, vice continuing an inherent DOD 

capability as a follow-on to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). 

At this time, the Joint Requirements Council (JROC) has validated DOD materiel 

solution needs focused on other capability areas and identified that reliance on civil/ 

international partner capabilities for CC/TWI is acceptable. However, the JROC 

wants to maintain awareness of issues surrounding those partner capabilities and 

warfighter concerns, primarily over the Indian Ocean region (JROCM 092–14, dated 

3 September 2014). If there is no weather satellite coverage in this theater, 

warfighter concerns cover the full range of military operations, such as tropical cyclone assessments, resource protection (i.e. warnings for thunderstorms, severe 

weather, and heavy precipitation) and tactical operations (e.g. aircraft, land and 

naval maneuvers). 

On 3 March 2016, the JROC issued a memorandum titled ‘‘Space Based Environmental Monitoring Gap Coverage’’ (JROCM 012–16) that directs the Air Force, 

along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation and the Principal DOD Space Advisor’s Office, to complete a risk assessment and determine non-materiel options for addressing the CC and TWI gaps, taking into account recent programmatic, threat and operating environment changes. 

The Air Force’s intent is to brief results to the Joint Capabilities Board no later 

than 1 May 2016, as directed. 

Mr. ROGERS. With the delays of both GPS III and OCX, when does the Air Force 

plan to deploy Military code (M-code) signal capability? What is the risk of not sustaining the current, as well as required, levels of GPS service, and what is being 

done about this risk? a. What measures is the Air Force taking to address problems 

with GPS OCX software development in order to minimize further cost and schedule 

growth? 

General HYTEN. At this time, we currently have an M-code test-only capability 

since we have 19 M-code capable satellites on orbit. In order to deliver an initial 

operational M-code signal capability, we need an M-code command and control capability in the ground system and a global M-code monitoring network. This is 

planned to be delivered with OCX Block 1 in July 2021. In order for this signal capability to be operationally useful, we will need fielded M-code capable receivers in 

DOD weapon systems. The services are mandated to procure only M-code capable 

receivers after FY17. 

The M-Code signal is already being broadcast by 19 satellites (12 Block IIF, 7 

Block IIR–M) on orbit, which fulfills the satellite constellation portion of an initial 

operational M-code capability. While there have been delays in the GPS III pro-
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gram, the program is planned to have satellites available for launch ahead of the 

ground system’s capability to launch them. 

The Next-Generation Operational Control System (OCX) will provide command, 

control and mission support for the GPS III and legacy satellites’ M-code capability 

using an expandable robust information assurance architecture. OCX is critical to 

continuing high priority national efforts to modernize GPS with new military and 

civil positioning capabilities, including enhanced security, precision, reliability and 

integrity. As a mitigation of risk for late delivery of OCX, on 3 February, the GPS 

Directorate put Contingency Ops (COps) on contract with Lockheed Martin. COps 

is a modification to the legacy ground system that will allow us to command, control 

and operate the GPS III satellite at a GPS IIF capability-level until OCX Block 1 

is ready for operations in July 2021. As a contingency effort, COps does not change 

M-Code capability; rather, it enables growth of the M-Code capable satellite constellation. COps delivery is planned for April 2019. 

Finally, worldwide M-code signal monitoring is a required piece of an operational 

M-code capability. This capability is projected to deliver as a part of the OCX program in July 2021. We also are studying options for a contingency worldwide Mcode monitoring program that could deliver ahead of OCX. 

There is no credible risk of not sustaining the current and required level of GPS 

service because the likelihood is so low. The satellite constellation is healthy, with 

31 satellites in service and the requirement is to have a 95% probability of at least 

24 operational satellites and a 98% probability of at least 21 GPS satellite constellation slots broadcasting a healthy signal (in order to meet these requirements, the 

Air Force’s practice is to maintain at least 27 operational satellites). GPS III satellites are on track to maintain the current levels of service and provide enhanced 

anti-jam capabilities for greater resilience. The current ground system is proactively 

maintained to sustain current operations and shore up cyber defense/security until 

OCX is operational. 

The Air Force has taken a very active role in the management of OCX in order 

to minimize further cost and schedule growth through three major actions. First, the 

Air Force increased Government oversight at all levels (PM-weekly, PEO—bi-weekly, AQ—monthly, USD(AT&L) & SECAF—quarterly) to drive contractor performance. Second, we established shoulder-to-shoulder testing with government reps in 

plant. This helps eliminate coordination and approval delays and provides additional eyes on the processes. Third, we developed technical off-ramps should poor 

performance continue. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the status of your efforts for consolidating the acquisition 

of commercial satellite communication services across the Department of Defense 

into a single program office or under the direction of a senior DOD official? 

General HYTEN. The Defense Department is continuing to investigate the courses 

of action concerning FY16 NDAA Sec 1610 that addressed wideband consolidation, 

with the Air Force as a stakeholder. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain how implementation of the Space Enterprise Vision 

will improve the affordability, resilience, and capability of the future national security space architecture. 

The Space Enterprise Vision will drive future operations, acquisitions, and programming decisions which support the national security space architecture. Air 

Force Space Command is working directly with the National Reconnaissance Office 

and folding in the Army, Navy and Joint equities per the direction of the Defense 

Space Council. When AFSPC developed the SEV warfighting construct for space, we 

identified the need for several follow on studies in order to determine how to attain 

a resilient and affordable space enterprise before 2030. For example, the strategic 

missile warning and satellite communication study is currently underway, and will 

determine how we support the nuclear command and control mission with respect 

to affordability, resilience, and capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Some assert that ‘‘disaggregation’’ will result in more affordable, capable, or resilient space systems. On what specific analysis(es) is this judgment 

based? Please provide a copy of the relevant analysis(es) to the committee. 

General HYTEN. The Protected SATCOM Services (PSCS) Analysis of Alternatives 

(AOA) Final Report recently received an assessment from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD)-Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and was provided to Congress on 18 April 2016. CAPE concluded the AOA complied with the 

guidance issued and is analytically sufficient to inform future acquisition decisions. 

While CAPE’s assessment called out an aggregated satellite constellation as most 

cost-effective, the assessment left room for a possible disaggregated constellation 

based on some additional challenges that are being addressed in two additional 

studies. Specifically the PSCS AOA Follow-on for Resiliency (PAFR) study and the 
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Space Enterprise Vision (SEV) Strategic Missile Warning and Satellite Communications Focused Study. 

The PAFR Study is nearly complete and will provide additional analysis and recommendations in three key areas: 

1) Analyzing and costing specific survivability capabilities for protected SATCOM 

architectures, 2) Further analyzing follow-on options for the Enhanced Polar System 

(EPS), and finally 3) Further inform the pros and cons for aggregated and disaggregated space systems. 

The current SEV study will provide specific recommendations for a resilient space 

enterprise that can deter aggression within the space domain and prevail in any 

high-end conflict that extends to space. This study is using data supplied by previously mentioned studies and the SBIRS Follow-on AOA, and will deliver a strategy for countering threats to the space domain that will take into account any contributions from an aggregated or disaggregated architecture. 

Upon completion and approval of the study, we will provide the analysis to the 

committee. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the challenges in managing multiple new simultaneous 

satellite procurements? 

General HYTEN. The nature of the emerging threats in space will require us to 

assess the risks in developing and fielding new, resilient capabilities simultaneously. We do not have the luxury of time to field the elements of the Space Enterprise Vision sequentially. The simultaneous approach will enable common technical 

approaches for resiliency across the various space architectures. 

Managing these efforts will require programs to be adequately resourced, both in 

personnel and funding, to ensure success. Limited resources can severely affect the 

trade space available to address unforeseen technical or acquisition issues all at the 

same time. To mitigate this risk, Space and Missile Systems Center has implemented a Tiered approach across the mission areas and programs to ensure resources are allocated to our most critical programs that meet the Space Enterprise 

Vision, to include both Government and Industry resources. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the Air Force Space Command and the National Reconnaissance 

Office taking different approaches to improve the resilience and assurance of the national security space architecture? If so, why? 

General HYTEN. No. AFSPC and NRO are taking an integrated approach to improve resilience and mission assurance of the national security space architecture. 

AFSPC and NRO have jointly developed a Space Enterprise Vision that describes 

a combined approach to improving resilience and mission assurance. The two organizations are in the processes of establishing a joint approach to governing the planning and development of space mission architectures and capabilities to realize 

these improvements. 

Mr. ROGERS. What affect will disaggregation of nuclear and non-nuclear missions 

have on an adversary’s risk calculus regarding attacking U.S. space assets? Will it 

lead to less complicated and/or lower the threshold for attacking space systems supporting the United States’ ability to project power with non-nuclear forces? If so, are 

you concerned that disaggregation could weaken deterrence and foster crisis instability? 

General HYTEN. Credible arguments have been made that support cases both for 

and against disaggregation versus aggregation of nuclear and non-nuclear missions 

and the potential impact this one factor could have on adversary decision calculus 

to attack or refrain from attacking U.S. space assets. Our adversaries understand 

the competitive advantage we derive from space. Whether our systems are aggregated or disaggregated, all our space systems are being put at risk by various kinetic and non-kinetic threats. While it’s possible that disaggregation could lower the 

threshold for adversaries to attack systems that only support non-nuclear forces, we 

also have to weigh the possible advantages that disaggregation lowers the risk of 

adversary attack to space systems dedicated to nuclear warning, and command and 

control while providing additional options that could increase the resilience capacity 

and survivability of space systems dedicated to support non-nuclear forces. We need 

to ask ourselves to what extent would it be prudent to continue to assume that different potential adversaries with different strategic interests and differing decision 

calculus will decide to refrain from attacking U.S. space systems that support nonnuclear missions because they are aggregated with our space systems that support 

nuclear command and control and strategic missile warning. It can be credibly argued that aggregation, not disaggregation, may foster increased crisis instability 

since U.S. policy makers will not be able to discern an adversary’s intent if an aggregated space asset was attacked, that is whether or not such an attack was intended to be limited to degrading U.S. non-nuclear forces or whether such an attack 

was intended to purposefully degrade strategic missile warning and nuclear com-
118 

mand and control assets as a prelude to attacking the United States of America 

with nuclear weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you support establishing so-called ‘‘red lines’’ through declaratory 

policy statements to refrain from deliberate interference with nuclear command, 

control, and communications or early warning space systems? 

General HYTEN. Attacks on national or military infrastructure is always a serious 

matter; however, we must be cautious about formally declaring ‘‘redlines.’’ Based on 

Presidential direction, there are various degrees of consequences we can take militarily when we are attacked, but signaling what those are, or at what point we will 

take a particular action, does not enhance our deterrent posture. Maintaining a 

level of opacity is to our advantage. The present state of mutually shared thresholds 

in space developed over time during the Cold War. It was well understood by all 

parties that interfering with nuclear command and control or strategic warning systems was extremely risky and could be interpreted as a prelude to conflict. This position was reinforced through treaty agreements and national technical means that 

created some level of transparency between the United States and the former Soviet 

Union. 

However, in the years since the Cold War, we have seen multiple new actors with 

the ability to put dangerous capabilities on-orbit or otherwise hold space assets at 

risk. As the days of mutual bi-lateral balance of power in space faded, so did the 

ability to effectively establish an ‘‘off limits’’ position with respect to strategic capabilities. Well-known nuclear thresholds can be reinforced, but it must be backed up 

with the ability, and national will, to respond. This is one of the reasons we must 

pursue new ways of ensuring these systems can operate effectively despite being 

threatened or challenged. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that Russia or China will honor international norms 

to refrain from deliberate interference with nuclear command, control, and communications or early warning space systems in the event of crisis or conflict with the 

United States? 

General HYTEN. Negotiations in the United Nations have shown that Russia and 

China are resistant to entering into any formal international norms agreement for 

space. We have seen increasing military ‘‘adventurism’’ from both countries and feel 

that crossing previously established red-lines would be considered if they felt it was 

in their best interest and supported bold strategic objectives. It is therefore up to 

us to deter these actions and communicate our national will to respond. 

Effective deterrence is created through a position of strength. We are pursuing 

new ways to both field the ability to respond and deny the benefits of an attack. 

We are also being transparent in our plans and actions so that potential adversaries 

will know that hostile actions in space will not be effective and will have very negative consequences. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are you doing to ensure the right policies are in place so that 

emerging commercial space capabilities help our national security and don’t hurt it? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Department recognizes that U.S. national security in space and 

elsewhere is critically dependent on a robust and innovative commercial sector. A 

centerpiece of our overall space policy and strategy is to eliminate barriers constraining that innovation. We must balance that interest with any possible negative 

national security impacts of these activities. This tension has been the focus of departmental thinking over the last three years and is the exact reason why the Secretary and the Administration supported relaxation of commercial remote sensing 

standards in 2014. As a department, we have aggressively worked with the intelligence community, NOAA, NASA, and the FAA to find ways to approve activities 

such as on-orbit servicing, commercial SSA, and even on-orbit imaging, establishing 

the right safeguards to protect national security while enabling commercial innovation. 

Beyond simple policy changes, the Department of Defense is also pressing forward 

with activities to harness better these commercial innovations for DOD use. Such 

is the purpose of our funded commercial communications pathfinder work and 

hosted payload concepts being explored in many mission areas. In fact, a key element of our thinking on disaggregation is to open up greater portions of our space 

architecture to commercial-like solutions. 

Finally, we are actively supporting FAA in establishing the right oversight structure for commercial and entrepreneurial space activities that will support necessary 

flight safety needs to assure that we do not constrain the US commercial space renaissance due to future on-orbit collision risk. 

Addressing this challenge is one of the most important strategic tasks facing the 

Department because too great an erosion of our technological superiority would ultimately undermine our conventional deterrence, contribute to crisis instability, and 

greatly raise the potential cost of any future U.S. military operation. That’s why the 
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Department is exploring new ‘‘offset strategies’’—with new combinations of technologies, operational concepts, and organizational constructs—to maintain our ability to project overwhelming combat power into any theater and at the times of our 

own choosing. This includes reviewing and updating appropriate policies to ensure 

continuous innovation of commercial space capabilities without adversely affecting 

national security. 

Mr. ROGERS. Some assert that ‘‘disaggregation’’ will result in more affordable, capable, or resilient space systems. On what specific analysis(es) is this judgment 

based? Please provide a copy of the relevant analysis(es) to the committee. 

Mr. LOVERRO. As in most areas, blanket statements on the effectiveness of any 

tool needs to be carefully examined. This is especially true for disaggregation, which 

has been used to mean many things in many contexts. The DOD White Paper, 

‘‘Space Domain Mission Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy’’ defines disaggregation 

as ‘‘the separation of dissimilar capabilities into separate platforms or payloads’’. An 

example of this would be separating tactical and strategic protected satellite communications. 

Disaggregation may serve many purposes, of which cost, capability, and resilience 

are just some. In the DOD, most discussions of disaggregation, first and foremost, 

begin with a discussion of the policy and deterrence benefits of separating strategic 

nuclear warfighting and tactical conventional warfighting capabilities and then examine the resulting cost, capability, and resilience impact of that architectural decision. In the protected communications example, separating tactical and strategic 

protected satellite communications may help mitigate the risk of uncontrolled escalation during a crisis or conflict without necessarily bolstering resilience. 

The exact effects of disaggregation—positive or negative—on resilience, cost, system capability, performance, and other considerations would depend on the specific 

system and the disaggregation approach. It would be expected that in some cases, 

disaggregation would actually increase the cost of the total system, although individual system elements might be less expensive. Such was the case in the recently 

delivered Analysis of Alternatives on Protected Communication, which judged an 

overall increase in cost to fulfill all protected communication requirements for a 

disaggregated system, although specific elements, such as the NC3 portion, decreased in cost substantially. On the other hand, the missile warning AOA statement showed little to no increase in overall cost for disaggregation. Both AOA reports have been delivered to Congress. 

The bottom line is that disaggregation is just one of several strategies for addressing tension between strategic deterrence, cost, performance, resilience that must be 

foundational in our future space activities. Disaggregation may cost more in some 

cases. But this added cost may be acceptable if it restores strategic clarity, reduces 

the likelihood of unintentional escalation and provides more flexibility for addressing the rapidly changing space threat and technology landscape we expect in the 

future. 

Mr. ROGERS. What affect will disaggregation of nuclear and non-nuclear missions 

have on an adversary’s risk calculus regarding attacking U.S. space assets? Will it 

lead to less complicated and/or lower the threshold for attacking space systems supporting the United States’ ability to project power with non-nuclear forces? If so, are 

you concerned that disaggregation could weaken deterrence and foster crisis instability? 

Mr. LOVERRO. It is accurate that several observers have suggested that 

disaggregating strategic and tactical space systems may lower the threshold for attacks on the resulting non-nuclear system elements. The converse is also correct 

that it would raise the threshold for attacks on the nuclear elements. Thus, 

disaggregating creates greater clarity of adversary intent, increases nuclear stability, reduces the potential for unintended escalation, and assures the President of 

this ability to command and control strategic forces, but at the expense of a potentially lowered threshold of attack in a non-nuclear elements. 

So, any decision to disaggregate must therefore address how that potentially decreased threshold will be restored. Other elements of space mission assurance, such 

as incorporation of commercial and allied systems, defensive measures, proliferation, 

and diversity may be required to address that consequence. Each of these elements 

provides added strategic benefit, in addition to the ultimate benefit of strategic clarity and avoidance of unintended escalation that current aggregated architectures 

pose. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you support establishing so-called ‘‘red lines’’ through declaratory 

policy statements to refrain from deliberate interference with nuclear command, 

control, and communications or early warning space systems? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Removing ambiguity, especially as it relates to nuclear command, 

control, and communication and missile warning, can greatly enhance stability and 
120 

reduce the likelihood of unintentional crisis escalation. However, the method used 

to remove ambiguity is also important. So called ‘‘red lines’’ have not been demonstrated to achieve consistently the strategic benefits desired. Thoughtful and deliberate bi-lateral discussions that ensure our position about nuclear-related space 

systems is clear, complimented by clear lines of distinction in system character, are 

more likely to achieve a meaningful understanding of restraint. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that Russia or China will honor international norms 

to refrain from deliberate interference with nuclear command, control, and communications or early warning space systems in the event of crisis or conflict with the 

United States? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Norms of behavior shape the international community’s understanding of responsible and irresponsible behavior in outer space and of expected 

reactions if these norms are broken. By establishing clear U.S. norms against purposeful interference with nuclear command, control, and communications or early 

warning space systems, then a country violating those norms would be sending a 

clear signal of its intentions. The Administration would take very seriously any interference with the nuclear command, control, and communications and early warning space systems of the United States and our allies, whether in peacetime, crisis, 

or conflict, and may consider such action to be escalatory in nature. But we must 

be clear on norms in and of themselves will not dissuade an adversary intent upon 

escalating conflict to nuclear levels from attacking U.S. strategic space system. They 

clarify understanding on both sides, just as it was the case during the Cold War, 

but must be backed up by other means to assure strategic space services can continue to support U.S. strategic needs even following attack. 

Mr. ROGERS. The committee has been informed that the only remaining strategic 

radiation hardened microelectronics foundry does not have enough orders to remain 

economically viable after this year. What options does DOD have to ensure access 

to strategic radiation hardened microelectronics—both now and if this foundry 

closes? What level of funding would be necessary to keep that foundry open, and 

what resources would be necessary to ensure the long-term viability of that source? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Department is acutely aware of this issue and USD(AT&L) is 

leading the effort to actively address it. The Department will follow its policy, guidance, and best practices as described in DOD Instruction 5000.60, ‘‘Defense Industrial Base Assessments,’’ July 18, 2014. AT&L is pursuing a number of Departmentwide and program specific methods to address this problem such as, where appropriate, lifetime buys or tailored assurance activities for non-US success. AT&L is 

best positioned to provide details on specific strategies and funding needs. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the current state of the space acquisition workforce with regard to numbers of acquisition professionals and their acquisition management expertise? If there are shortcomings in the acquisition workforce, what is being done 

about them? What efforts are underway to enhance development of the space acquisition workforce? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department’s budget request would ensure the acquisition workforce remains mission capable. While the Department tracks the qualifications and expertise of its overall acquisition workforce, it does not subdivide the 

workforce by domain (e.g, ships, aircraft, space). As such we do not track a ‘‘space 

acquisition workforce’’ separately. DOD has established a requirement for each acquisition workforce member to meet mandatory acquisition certifications when occupying an Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) Coded positions. 

For Space Program Managers, 97% of the Acquisition Professional Workforce is certified. 

The Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund (DAWDF) implements targeted development efforts for the acquisition workforce. These efforts include targeted training for 

priority skill needs, initials skills courses, continuous learning, recruiting, coaching, 

training, and mission assistance. Over the past five years the Air Force has been 

benefited by leveraging over $60M across these efforts. 

Mr. ROGERS. Cloud characterization and theater weather imagery are the top two 

most important certified requirements regarding space-based weather collection. 

What are the risks if these warfighter requirements are not met? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. If these warfighter requirements are not met by civil or 

international assets once the Defense Meteorological Support Program ends, the Department of Defense may experience decreased battlespace awareness for imaging 

quick-moving weather systems such as thunderstorms, dust storms, frontal activity 

or tropical cyclone assessments, and worldwide cloud forecasting. Missions such as 

resource protection, transiting aircraft and shipping, anti-submarine operations, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance collections, and Navy/Army/Air Force 

Coalition tactical operations could be moderately affected. Central Command, Pacific 

Command, and Africa Command would be most impacted by the increased risk of 
121 

these gaps not being met, primarily over the Indian Ocean region. Worldwide coverage in austere and data-sparse areas benefits most from space-based weather collection. The Department is currently re-addressing the requirements for cloud characterization and theater weather imagery. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the status of your efforts for consolidating the acquisition 

of commercial satellite communication services across the Department of Defense 

into a single program office or under the direction of a senior DOD official? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in 

the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Some assert that ‘‘disaggregation’’ will result in more affordable, capable, or resilient space systems. On what specific analysis(es) is this judgment 

based? Please provide a copy of the relevant analysis(es) to the committee. 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Disaggregation has been used to mean many things in 

many contexts, resulting in considerable confusion surrounding the term. In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and Global Security authored the Department of Defense White Paper, ‘Space Domain Mission Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy’, in order to provide a standard 

lexicon for space domain mission assurance. According to this taxonomy, 

‘‘Disaggregation is defined as the separation of dissimilar capabilities into separate 

platforms or payloads. An example of this would be separating tactical and strategic 

protected satellite communications. It should be noted that disaggregation may 

serve, and be justified by, a variety of purposes that are worthy in and of themselves, but which may not relate to resilience. Separating tactical and strategic protected satellite communications, for example, may help mitigate the risk of uncontrolled escalation during a crisis or conflict without necessarily bolstering resilience. 

Further, disaggregation can also apply in other cases to reduce the complexity of 

systems, making it easier to implement other resilience characteristics. In this respect, disaggregation is a means to an end; not bolstering resilience directly, but allowing it to occur more readily.’’ 

The exact effects of disaggregation—positive or negative—on resilience, cost, system capability, performance, and other considerations would depend on the specific 

system and the disaggregation approach. For example, two recently concluded Analyses of Alternatives (AOA)—one for Protected Satellite Communications Systems 

and a second for Space Based Infrared System Follow-on—examined the trade-offs 

of some disaggregated architectures among the possible alternatives. The final reports for these AOAs have previously been provided to Congress. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the challenges in managing multiple new simultaneous 

satellite procurements? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Even as we complete deployment of our current satellite 

constellations, we are deliberately planning for procurement of the replenishments/ 

replacements for our Military Satellite Communication, missile warning, and weather capabilities. This planning addresses a number of architectural and business 

challenges. 

We are evaluating resiliency measures against jamming, cyber, and on-orbit 

threats. We are assessing the value of disaggregation for resiliency, strategic messaging, and reducing costs. In addition, we are balancing the strategies of leveraging 

commercial and international capabilities versus maintaining inherent U.S. Department of Defense capabilities. We are evaluating insertion of newer technologies to 

meet emerging Department needs ?versus acquiring functional equivalents, which 

could result in less cost, schedule, and technical risk. As always in our major defense acquisition programs, we are enabling competition to the maximum extent 

possible and paying attention to industrial base issues and considerations. We are 

assessing the prioritization of systems in terms of risk and threats to ensure limited 

Department resources are available to study, evaluate, and execute systems. Capability options for systems selected will be applied in the most effective and efficient 

manner. 

Mr. ROGERS. The committee has been informed that the only remaining strategic 

radiation hardened microelectronics foundry does not have enough orders to remain 

economically viable after this year. What options does DOD have to ensure access 

to strategic radiation hardened microelectronics—both now and if this foundry 

closes? What level of funding would be necessary to keep that foundry open, and 

what resources would be necessary to ensure the long-term viability of that source? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. No strategic radiation hardened microelectronics foundry 

has notified its Department of Defense customers of a decision to discontinue operations or the end-of-life of specific parts or processes. If and when one does, the Department will follow defense industrial base assessments and the diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages processes that provide a range of mitigation options, such as life time buys. Estimated costs associated with maintaining 
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foundry capabilities and access required for the production of the parts required by 

Department customers cannot be calculated without foundries providing additional 

business and technical information. These estimates vary widely and depend to a 

great extent on the commercial marketplace’s support of specific process technologies, feature sizes, and performance features. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the foreign threats to our space systems? What are we 

doing about the growing foreign threat to our space systems? 

General BUCK. Today the United States’ space enterprise faces a wide spectrum 

threats from interference with the signals that carry information from orbit to end 

users, such as GPS signals or satellite communications, to the use of directed energy 

against our space-based ISR capability, to the development of kinetic options 

against on-orbit platforms . . . these threats continue to proliferate. To address these 

threats, we continually seek ways to make our architectures more resilient and able 

our space-based systems to ‘operate through’ any contested, denied, or operationally 

limited environment. From a more ‘whole of government’ approach, JFCC SPACE 

continues strengthen relationships with the interagency and mature our international partnerships with like-minded, space-faring nations toward increasing 

overall deterrence by demonstrating that an attack on a U.S. space capability is an 

attack on global stability and that assured access to space by all is a global concern. 

Mr. ROGERS. The growing congestion in the space environment, including the increasing number of small satellites such as cubesats, has raised concerns about the 

potential for increased space debris. What is DOD doing to track objects such as 

cubesats, minimize the possibility of collision among its space assets, and improve 

tracking of space debris? 

General BUCK. To track; and improve tracking of debris: 

DOD employs the global Space Surveillance Network (SSN) to track objects in all 

orbital regimes and receives on average over 400,000 observations each day. The 

SSN is a mix of optical, mechanical radar, phased array radar, and space-based assets which provide the backbone of the U.S. Satellite Catalog. 

The SSN’s day to day operations are managed from the JFCC SPACE’s Joint 

Space Operations Center (JSpOC) that optimizes these resources to sufficiently 

track and report high interest events such as human spaceflight, potential adversary actions, launches, and reentries, in addition to normal space flight activities. 

The observations on these high interest events and objects are transmitted to the 

JSpOC for analysis and used to build the total space situational awareness (SSA) 

picture by layering positional information with additional sources such as operator 

provided ephemeris or intelligence. 

To improve overall tracking, a notable upgrade is the new Space Fence, scheduled 

for operations in 2018, which I believe is the most-significant improvement to lowand medium-earth orbit SSA capabilities in decades. By some estimates, the Space 

Fence will improve our catalog awareness from 23,000 to over 200,000 tracked objects. The delivery of the Space Fence will provide JFCC SPACE greater coverage 

for detection of near-earth objects as well as improved ability to detect unforeseen 

or unannounced space events such as breakups and maneuvers. 

Cubesat Tracking: 

Cubesats are a unique challenge, but one that the DOD has actively engaged with 

industry on for a number of years. Partnerships with academia, NASA, and other 

cubesat launchers has resulted in a large number of operators engaging with JSpOC 

very early in their constellation planning to ensure they take DOD tracking techniques into account when they deploy their objects. Ultimately, we would like to see 

more active tracking techniques added to these objects to improve responsiveness 

in identification. 

To minimize collisions: 

Collision mitigation is accomplished by JFCC SPACE through the JSpOC by comparing the predictive locations of orbiting objects to assess if there is a risk of close 

approach and, if so, what the predicted miss distance is at the time of closest approach. This process is referred to as Conjunction Assessment (CA). Through our relationships with over 600 civil, commercial, and military missions worldwide, we 

issue over 3,000 notifications daily to these partners advising of possible close approaches. Not all notifications are actionable, but for those messages in which the 

operator decides to maneuver, we screen their proposed maneuver plan to ensure 

they do not create new or increased risk to their satellite or others. 

The CA mission continues to evolve. The JSpOC screens all active payloads 

against all tracked objects multiple times a day. Current screening data not only 

includes our SSN data but also includes ephemeris and future maneuver plans from 

many operators. We are constantly innovating new techniques, with the collaboration of other military organizations, NASA, and commercial partners. With the implementation of the JSpOC Mission System (JMS) Service Pack 2 this year and new 
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sensors like the Space Fence, JFCC SPACE’s ability to detect and warn of potential 

collisions will be improved. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the plan for the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSPOC) going forward, and how does this compare with the plan 

for the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC)? 

General BUCK. Although there has not been a final decision on the long-term mission of the JICSpOC, we have already learned much from its first three experiments 

and are using the information to determine the future construct for unity of effort 

across the USG to preserve our Nation’s access to space and to provide seamless 

space-based capabilities for our forces. We will continue to use the information coming out of the JICSpOC to plan for emerging and advanced space threats and will 

leverage it to provide vital information, capabilities and effects for national leadership, allies and partners, and the Joint Force. Like the JSpOC, JFCC SPACE’s primary command and control operations center, the JICSpOC will be assigned to 

JFCC SPACE; the two centers will work in unison to ensure space-based capabilities are delivered to our forces and to protect and defend the space domain. 

Mr. ROGERS. Cloud characterization and theater weather imagery are the top two 

most important certified requirements regarding space-based weather collection. 

What are the risks if these warfighter requirements are not met? 

General BUCK. Accurate characterization of cloud tops is critical to missile detection, missile warning and intelligence collection and analysis. Insufficient spacebased weather collection over theaters of operation will negatively affect our ability 

to accurately monitor and subsequently forecast thunderstorms, icing, turbulence, 

tropical cyclones and other environmental factors affecting force maneuver and mission execution. 

Specific effects include: 

• Space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 

required for monitoring enemy force disposition/employment and targeting, require accurate cloud characterization for planners to predict the best time and 

locations for electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) coverage. • Overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) collections, critical for strategic and theater missile warning, require accurate cloud characterization and theater 

weather information for collection, monitoring and characterization. • Successful force employment to include planning, maneuver, weapon selection, 

and execution timing rely on accurate weather forecasts enabled through persistent theater weather imagery. • Time sensitive operations such as search & rescue and medical evacuation require timely and accurate weather forecasts. 

Mr. ROGERS. What affect will disaggregation of nuclear and non-nuclear missions 

have on an adversary’s risk calculus regarding attacking U.S. space assets? Will it 

lead to less complicated and/or lower the threshold for attacking space systems supporting the United States’ ability to project power with non-nuclear forces? If so, are 

you concerned that disaggregation could weaken deterrence and foster crisis instability? 

General BUCK. Disaggregation of space-based missions complicates a potential adversary’s risk calculus and provides a level of resilience to our space based capabilities. Disaggregation should be investigated from both mission and orbital regime 

perspectives. Using multiple orbital regimes for space based missions (low earth 

orbit, medium earth orbit, geosynchronous earth orbit and highly elliptical orbits) 

complicates an adversary’s decision calculus. Focusing solely on mission 

disaggregation could enable an adversary to assume non-nuclear targeting remains 

below any threshold for escalating into multi-theater armed conflict. A balanced approach to disaggregation increases overall resilience, avoids any implication that 

some space capabilities can be targeted with fewer consequences, and, as such, offers a greater potential for deterrence and stability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you support establishing so-called ‘‘red lines’’ through declaratory 

policy statements to refrain from deliberate interference with nuclear command, 

control, and communications or early warning space systems? 

General BUCK. The United States is committed to reinforcing positive norms of 

behavior to ensure the continued peaceful use of space for all responsible nations. 

The establishment of ‘‘red lines’’ as posed in your question is a policy vice military 

decision. The political decision on declaratory policy will likely need to weigh the 

loss in flexibility with respect to an ever changing geopolitical environment against 

any potential deterrence value from such a declaration. That said, if such declarations are made, JFCC SPACE is prepared to execute any mission received should 

an adversary decide to act in abeyance of those declarations. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that Russia or China will honor international norms 

to refrain from deliberate interference with nuclear command, control, and commu-
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nications or early warning space systems in the event of crisis or conflict with the 

United States? 

General BUCK. I believe that Russia and China will honor international norms 

(and in Russia’s case, its specific obligations under the New START treaty) as long 

as they perceive it as in their national interests to do so. While neither seek nuclear 

conflict with the United States, it is prudent to consider that, if either regime feels 

threatened, neither is likely to remove options from consideration. That said, the degree of international cohesiveness against aggression in the space domain will be 

a part of both Russian and Chinese decision calculus. To convince them to continue 

to honor those norms, we need to employ a well-rounded strategy of deterrence to 

include strong partnerships with like-minded space faring nations. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the current state of the space acquisition workforce with regard to numbers of acquisition professionals and their acquisition management expertise? If there are shortcomings in the acquisition workforce, what is being done 

about them? What efforts are underway to enhance development of the space acquisition workforce? 

Mr. CALVELLI. NRO has a robust complement of acquisition professionals, including personnel from the CIA’s Directorate of Science & Technology (DS&T) Office of 

Space Reconnaissance (OSR), Active Duty Air Force, Navy, and Army personnel, 

and NRO’s new DOD Cadre workforce. While the entirety of NRO’s space acquisition workforce is not ‘‘formally’’ designated, this diverse set of professionals is focused on ensuring every NRO space acquisition is successfully delivered on time and 

on budget. With respect to training and expertise, personnel occupying acquisition 

positions are required to pursue appropriate certifications through the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) in accordance with DOD regulations and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). Personnel assigned to the NRO 

from other agencies are required to comply with their home agency certification and 

training requirements, in addition to taking courses offered by the NRO’s Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE). Additionally, CIA officers can also take available 

CIA-specific acquisition courses. In addition to other Intelligence Community 

detailees, the CIA does not specifically code their billets as ‘‘acquisition.’’ However, 

the CIA’s DS&T Office of Space Reconnaissance (OSR) was formally established in 

2014 to provide CIA officers a career path focused on space and space-related acquisitions. The number of CIA personnel assigned to the NRO is classified and will be 

provided separately to your staff. At this time, I do not believe there are shortcomings in the NRO acquisition workforce. Those acquisition coded positions not 

currently occupied by appropriately certified personnel are monitored on a monthly 

basis to assess their status and track their certification progress. The NRO continues to receive tremendous support from its military service and intelligence community partners. In addition to Defense Acquisition University (DAU) training, the 

NRO has numerous other avenues available to personnel to broaden and deepen 

their acquisition skillset both formally and informally. These include the NRO Acquisition Center of Excellence (offering NRO-unique acquisition training); informal 

training/experiences; advanced education (University of Maryland and Virginia Tech 

on-site Masters programs); professional certifications (Naval Post Graduate School, 

etc.), and other programs within the DOD or the Intelligence Community (National 

Defense University, National Intelligence University, etc.). Additionally, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel seeking CIA Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) certification may take CIA-specific courses, or substitute NRO 

ACE courses for CIA COTR Acquisition Training I (CAT–I) and COTR Acquisition 

Training II (CAT–II). 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain how implementation of the Space Enterprise Vision 

will improve the affordability, resilience, and capability of the future national security space architecture. 

Mr. CALVELLI. The Space Enterprise Vision (SEV) describes a shared vision between the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). 

It is a resiliency strategy that achieves robustness through a layered defense-indepth integrated with architectural agility designed to promote threat denial and 

asymmetric cost imposition in combination with decision superiority. The vision developed jointly between the NRO and AFSPC is responsive to a broad spectrum of 

disruptive counter space threats in all contested regimes including space, ground, 

and cyber. While this vision does not call for a shared single architecture, it describes a coordinated approach across all space mission areas, coupling the delivery 

of space mission effects to policy makers, the warfighters, and the Intelligence Community with the ability to protect and defend space capabilities against emerging 

threats. Core elements include persistent situational awareness, protection of strategic-enabling capabilities, and agile operations within a balanced force structure 

optimized to preserve mission and enforce a deterrence posture against adversaries. 
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The strategy builds resiliency through an enterprise approach that leverages a synergistic strength created by mutually supporting capabilities, effects, and tactics. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the Air Force Space Command and the National Reconnaissance 

Office taking different approaches to improve the resilience and assurance of the national security space architecture? If so, why? 

Mr. CALVELLI. Although the orbital disposition and mission composition of the 

NRO and Air Force space architectures are different, they are complementary and 

the central tenets of achieving resiliency are largely the same. Both organizations 

are evaluating the appropriate mixture of resiliency insertion options to include 

hosted payloads, off-boarding, path diversity, and disaggregation to best accomplish 

the breadth of title 10 and title 50 missions in a contested environment. Varying 

approaches to achieving balance between resiliency and mission assurance at the 

platform and constellation level are being pursued by the NRO and Air Force Space 

Command depending on mission parameters. These systems exhibit varying degrees 

of interoperability within the national security space architecture to achieve the 

overall performance and resiliency goals prescribed for the SEV. In addition, both 

organizations benefit from distributed indications and warning systems working cooperatively to avoid surprise and to provide timely attribution of threats for effective 

mitigation and operate-through. Integrated decision support tools such as those 

demonstrated in the JICSpOC will combine data flows derived collectively from multiple sensor perspectives to improve threat prediction confidence, prioritize alerts, 

and orchestrate responses for space control at the leading edge of threat engagement. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. How does DOD’s approach to phasing out reliance on Russian engines best ensure rapid and reliable access to space? What would the impact be of 

restricting funding to just an engine? Would this be the optimal way forward to gain 

assured access to space in the near and long-terms? 

General HYTEN. The optimal path to assured access to space is by initiating public 

private partnerships for the development of commercial launch systems that also 

meet the requirements to provide national security space (NSS) launch services. Investment in industry’s launch services improves assured access to space for multiple 

reasons. First, the DOD has insight into the development of new or upgraded launch 

systems and can work directly with industry to manage the integration of NSS requirements. Second, investment increases the likelihood of meeting stressing NSS 

launch requirements using launch systems that are also commercially viable. Commercially viable launch service providers share the fixed costs of commercial launch 

services across commercial and Government customers, reducing the overall cost to 

the Government even if NSS missions cost more to meet the more strenuous launch 

requirements. Engine development alone does not guarantee a launch solution unless a launch service provider uses the engine and could result in billions in taxpayer funds wasted if the Government developed engine is not used by a launch provider. In addition, implementing a ‘‘drop in replacement’’ without significantly redesigning the launch vehicle drives inefficiencies that may make the overall launch 

vehicle more expensive because it may require more fuel or strap-on solids to take 

the satellites to the required orbits. Thus, the best way near- and long-term to obtain the required performance at a reasonable cost is to design the launch vehicle 

and engine together. If authorized in FY17, the Air Force will start investing in 

launch services, which will result in the development of launch systems including 

completing the rocket propulsion systems, and any required launch system infrastructure. Shared investment with launch providers and competition for launch 

services is a feasible and cost-effective approach. This type of approach was successfully demonstrated on: 1) Original EELV program, 2) NASA Commercial Orbital 

Transportation Services (COTS), and 3) NASA Commercial Crew. 

Mr. COOPER. Commercial industry, including SpaceX, Orbital-ATK, ULA and Blue 

Origin have are planning to make or use a methane engine in their launch vehicle. 

If this type of engine is not deemed too risky for a large part of the industry (assuming it is tested and certified), should it be considered too risky for government? 

General HYTEN. The Department of Defense strategy is to invest in a commercial 

launch service provider solution. Multiple providers are considering methane engines. If an engine is acceptable in terms of risk for the industry and it meets all 

our National Security Space (NSS) requirements for launch vehicle certification, it 

would be appropriate for NSS launches. 

In addition, the DOD has initiated engine studies as part of the effort to reduce 

the biggest risks to engine development, including the use of methane as a fuel. 
126 

These results are already being shared with industry to increase the chances of engine development success. While there is much interest in an oxygen rich staged 

combustion (ORSC) methane engine, the difficulty in developing one cannot be dependably characterized yet. With little American experience with methane and kerosene ORSC engines, there are many opinions, and no solid evidence regarding the 

pros or cons of ORSC methane engines. For this reason, we are pursuing both methane and kerosene engine technologies until they are demonstrated. 

Mr. COOPER. How much funding is there in FY17 to enhance resilience in space? 

General HYTEN. The current U.S. space enterprise is not resilient enough to survive all threats that extend into space. The entire FY17 Presidents Budget for the 

Air Force Space portfolio directly or indirectly supports resilient capabilities, agile 

defense, reconstitution, and robust Command, Control and Communications (C3) to 

provide Space Superiority. All systems we are requesting in the budget are being 

designed to improve the resiliency of the space enterprise. Examples of these efforts 

include investments in a more standardized, agile, and cyber-secure enterprise 

ground architecture; improved Space Situational Awareness capabilities; battle 

management and command and control experimentation; and a range of development initiatives focused on resilience of the Air Force Space portfolio of capabilities. 

Mr. COOPER. Absent the launch of DMSP–20, beyond 2020 (estimated lifespan of 

DMSP–19), how does the Air Force plan to provide the capabilities DMSP–20 would 

have provided? With DMSP–19 failing recently, would there now be renewed utility 

to launch DMSP–20? 

General HYTEN. Consistent with Joint Requirements Council (JROC) validation of 

the Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Analysis of Alternatives (JROCM 092– 

14, dated 3 September 2014) the Department of Defense (DOD) has been working 

to address microwave imaging and space weather satellite anomaly assessment capabilities with a DOD materiel solution acquisition, the Weather System Follow-on. 

The JROC directed leveraging civil/international partner capabilities, as well as possible non-materiel solution options, for the remaining space weather and electro optical/infrared sensing needs (such as cloud characterization and theater weather imagery). Per Congressional direction in the FY15 & FY16 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), the FY16 Consolidated Appropriations Act, and in coordination 

with stakeholders, the DMSP Program Executive Officer and Milestone Decision Authority (Lt Gen Greaves) signed a Termination Acquisition Decision Memorandum 

on 30 December 2015. The Termination ADM initiates a set of activities and specific 

tasks defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Specific timelines are specified 

in the FAR for completion of those efforts and an integrated program schedule has 

been developed to manage those efforts, resulting in space vehicle disposition by 20 

December, 2016. While the implementation of termination is underway, Lt Gen 

Greaves directed the program office to take no irreversible action for the moment 

to allow the AF, DOD, and Congress an opportunity to evaluate the utility of 

launching DMSP–20. Bottom line is that the Air Force is executing the termination 

plan per the FAR and has until 1 June 2016 to make a decision on DMSP 20 without affecting the 20 December 2016 mandate. 

Mr. COOPER. Are we willing and sufficiently prepared to be able to rely on allied 

space launch capability in an emergency case where U.S. launch providers would 

not be available? 

General HYTEN. The National Space Transportation Policy states: ‘‘United States 

Government payloads shall be launched on vehicles manufactured in the United 

States unless an exemption is coordinated by the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor and the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy through an interagency process.’’ In addition to this, 51 USC 50131 states, ‘‘. . . the Federal Government shall acquire space transportation services from United States commercial providers whenever such services are required in the course of its activities. To the 

maximum extent practicable, the Federal Government shall plan missions to accommodate the space transportation services capabilities of United States commercial 

providers.’’ 

It may be necessary in an emergency to use allied launch services, but each of 

the NSS satellite program offices and customers (AFSPC and NRO) have specific 

detailed technical interface and security requirements that would have to be met 

and accommodated by the allied launch service, which would be difficult to achieve 

on short notice. The Air Force and The Aerospace Corporation conducted a very general study in late 2013 which found nothing to preclude an allied launch provider, 

Arianespace, from potentially launching NSS payloads. The Air Force plans to conduct a more in-depth study/assessment during 2016 in collaboration with Arianespace. This study will focus on collecting data and a detailed assessment of Arianespace launch vehicles as a backup capability for NSS missions. When the study is 
127 

complete, we will have a much better idea of what it will take (time, resources, and 

technical resources) to launch NSS payloads using allied launch services. If it is determined that launch of a mission payload on a foreign launch service is in the national security interests of the U.S. due to the unavailability of a domestic launch 

capability, the Air Force would comply with the National Space Transportation Policy exemption guidelines. 

Mr. COOPER. Last year during the Strategic Forces Subcommittee launch hearing, 

both SpaceX and ULA testified that they did not require any government funds to 

develop a new engine. What are the incentives for private industry to develop a new 

engine and what is the value of planned expenditures by DOD that these companies 

would compete for in the national security market once they have developed an engine? What is the right balance in a public/private partnership in terms of funding 

a new engine? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Department’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) 

Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) and Launch Services Investment (LSI) programs 

represent an integrated approach in which the Department partners with industry 

to develop not only domestically designed and manufactured liquid- and solid-fuel 

based propulsion systems, but more importantly, new and improved launch services 

capabilities. The Department is funding these activities in an effort to ensure that 

current and future launch service providers focus on developing systems that meet 

all of the Department’s requirements, not just those driven by the commercial market place. The Department’s requirements are typically much more demanding than 

those of commercial customers. 

Because of the Department’s innovative use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA) 

on the RPS program, industry is required, by statute, to provide at least one-third 

of the funding for the project. The Department is encouraging our OTA industry 

partners to contribute at a level higher than one-third. Even at a one-third contribution, however, the Department is receiving an excellent return on its RPS investments. The ultimate incentives for those investments is clearly access to the future 

National Security launch market, which CAPE estimated at $80B in 2013. 

Mr. COOPER. How can we better take advantage of emerging commercial capabilities, whether it be imagery or space situational awareness? 

Mr. LOVERRO. As I testified in my hearing and in response to HASCSF–03–12, 

leveraging U.S. commercial entrepreneurial developments is a center piece of our 

overall space strategy. From a policy perspective, we have focused on efforts to 

eliminate unnecessary and outdated barriers to commercial innovation while still 

assuring national security protections. From an architectural basis, we are carefully 

studying whether we can disaggregate previously aggregated strategic and tactical 

space systems to allow greater utilization of commercial capability to meet those tactical needs. Most challenging are the acquisition and business impediments to utilizing commercial space capabilities, which we are trying to address with innovative 

business arrangements such as the commercial SatCom Pathfinder activities and 

more intensive use of other transaction authorities. 

In the specific area of remote sensing and commercial SSA, we have two main 

efforts. For remote sensing, NGA has built a strategy for commercial utilization 

which they are rapidly pursuing. On the SSA side, Air Force Space Command and 

STRATCOM have embraced the Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpoc 

from AGI) as a foundational element within the JICSPoC experiment to see how it 

might address current shortfalls. 

We welcome and embrace these emerging innovations; however, rather than focusing on outdated policy barriers, the Department must improve its ability to exploit 

innovative approaches while maintaining national security. 

Mr. COOPER. How does DOD’s approach to phasing out reliance on Russian engines best ensure rapid and reliable access to space? What would the impact be of 

restricting funding to just an engine? Would this be the optimal way forward to gain 

assured access to space in the near and long-terms? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department continues to be dedicated to ending use of 

the Russian manufactured RD–180 engine as soon as reasonably possible, but still 

believes that access to the RD–180 while transitioning to new and improved launch 

service capabilities is the optimal way forward to meet statutory and Department 

policy requirements for assured access to space in both the near and long term. The 

Department also continues to focus on the development of new and improved launch 

service capabilities as this approach allows launch service providers to perform the 

design and optimization trades necessary to offer commercially viable launch services, using domestic propulsion systems, capable of meeting the Department’s space 

launch requirements. Any new engine still has to be incorporated into a launch vehicle. The Department does not want to be in a position where significant resources 

have been expended on an engine and no commercial provider has built the nec-
128 

essary vehicle to use that engine. Restricting funding to engine development only 

would likely drive the development of an engine designed for a specific rocket, and 

at least initially, provide an advantage to a single launch service provider. 

Mr. COOPER. Last year during the Strategic Forces Subcommittee launch hearing, 

both SpaceX and ULA testified that they did not require any government funds to 

develop a new engine. What are the incentives for private industry to develop a new 

engine and what is the value of planned expenditures by DOD that these companies 

would compete for in the national security market once they have developed an engine? What is the right balance in a public/private partnership in terms of funding 

a new engine? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department’s long-term goal is to field new and improved launch service capabilities that will result in two or more commercially viable launch service providers utilizing domestically manufactured propulsion systems, that can support National Security Space missions to all 8 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) reference orbits. 

The Department’s EELV Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) and Launch Services 

Investment programs are designed to incentivize industry to develop not only domestically designed and manufactured liquid and solid fuel based propulsion systems, but more importantly, new and improved launch services capabilities. The Department is funding these activities in an effort to ensure current and future launch 

service providers focus on developing systems that meet all of the Department’s requirements, that being able to place missions to all 8 EELV reference orbits, and 

not just those driven by the commercial market place. The Department’s requirements are typically much more demanding than those of commercial customers. 

The Department is utilizing innovative use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA) 

agreements on the RPS program. The OTA agreements awarded by the Air Force 

require industry performers, by statute, to provide at least one third of the funding 

for the project. The Department is encouraging our OTA industry partners to contribute at a higher percentage. Even at a one third contribution, the Department 

is receiving an excellent return on its RPS investments. Additionally, a launch service provider who develops a system that meets the Department’s requirements will 

have the opportunity to bid on up to 23 Air Force missions valued up to $8B over 

the FYDP. 

Mr. COOPER. Commercial industry, including SpaceX, Orbital-ATK, ULA and Blue 

Origin have are planning to make or use a methane engine in their launch vehicle. 

If this type of engine is not deemed too risky for a large part of the industry (assuming it is tested and certified), should it be considered too risky for government? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department does not deem a methane based engine as 

too risky for government use based on current knowledge. To date, there has not 

been a methane based engine developed, tested, and certified of the size necessary 

to power to an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) class launch vehicle. 

The Blue Origin BE–4 engine, currently under development and planned for possible use in the ULA next-generation Vulcan launch vehicle, is a methane based engine designed to use an oxygen-rich staged combustion (ORSC) engine cycle, similar 

to that used by the RD–180. While there has been international manufacturing of 

ORSC engines for many years, U.S industry has never designed, manufactured, and 

fielded an ORSC engine, either methane or kerosene based, capable of powering an 

EELV class launch vehicle. In order to reduce program risk and build U.S. manufacturing expertise in the ORSC area, the Department recently awarded four Other 

Transaction Authority agreements to fund multiple liquid and solid propulsion system development approaches as part of the EELV Rocket Propulsion System program. 

Mr. COOPER. Has the advent of new entrants in national security space launch 

benefited national security and the taxpayers? On what basis do you make this assessment? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The emergence of new entrants provides the Department 

with an additional path to space, for some of our missions, which enables us to preserve assured access to space and benefits national security. The Department recently announced award of the GPSIII–2 launch service; this award achieves a balance between mission success, meeting operational needs, lowering launch costs, 

and reintroducing competition for National Security Space missions. The Air Force 

expects to compete three more launch services in FY 2016. The Department will be 

better able to quantify the cost reduction benefit to the taxpayer after these contracts have been awarded. While the cost reductions associated with competition are 

extremely important, ensuring that all certified EELV providers and potential 

EELV new entrants meet the Department’s rigorous mission assurance standards 

and are able to reliably fly to all eight EELV mission orbits remains our top priority. 
129 

Mr. COOPER. The request includes $30M for pathfinder activities to improve the 

acquisition of commercial satellite communications. There is support to bring additional commercial capabilities to DOD, better value to taxpayers and new approaches to acquiring COMSATCOM. However, there are questions about the extent 

to which the Air Force is leveraging the latest technology to its full capability, and 

whether it is heeding the direction in the FY16 NDAA which required a pilot program to demonstrate orders-of-magnitude improvements in capability and capacity. 

Why are investments in this type of pathfinder not planned until the 2020s instead 

of in the next few years? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department’s wideband satellite communication 

(SATCOM) pathfinder activities have already started and include five Air Force and 

five Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) pathfinders. The first four DISA 

and the first Air Force pathfinder activities have either been completed or are providing useful data. The last DISA and the second Air Force pathfinder efforts should 

be on contract by the end of FY 2016. The FY 2017 President’s Budget requested 

funds for the Air Force’s last three pathfinder efforts, which should be awarded in 

FY 2017 through FY 2019. These pathfinder activities are part of the pilot program 

for providing a cost-effective and strategic method to acquire commercial SATCOM 

services directed by the FY 2016 NDAA. 

Mr. COOPER. Are we willing and sufficiently prepared to be able to rely on allied 

space launch capability in an emergency case where U.S. launch providers would 

not be available? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department is required by statute and policy to fly National Security Space (NSS) payloads on U.S. manufactured launch vehicles. While 

there has been some preliminary investigation into the use of the Ariane V vehicle 

for use by NSS payloads, a significant amount of follow-up work would be required 

before any definitive conclusions could be made. In the case of a national emergency, 

this analysis could become a priority, but it is difficult to imagine a situation where 

the entire U.S space launch capability was grounded for a period long enough to 

allow the reintegration of an NSS payload to a new launch vehicle. The first time 

integration of a satellite onto a launch vehicle is a process that typically takes 2 

to 3 years. 

Finally, it should be noted that Ariane V has not demonstrated the capability to 

fly to all eight of the NSS required orbits. 

The FY 2016 NDAA Sec. 1607, Joint Explanatory Statement (JES) included a congressional briefing requirement for an executable backup plan for assured access to 

space. The JES directs the Department to evaluate options for an executable backup 

plan for assured access to space that maintains competition as feasible. The Air 

Force is in the initial rounds of coordinating the draft briefing and plans to deliver 

it to the Congressional Defense Committees by the end of July 2016. 

Mr. COOPER. How can we better take advantage of emerging commercial capabilities, whether it be imagery or space situational awareness? 

Mr. CARDILLO. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. How have you leveraged commercial capabilities and open source 

analysis to augment traditional collection? Do you need additional authorities for 

this? 

Mr. CARDILLO. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. How much funding is there in FY17 to enhance resilience in space? 

Mr. CALVELLI. A classified, detailed breakdown of NRO’s funding for resiliency 

will be provided separately via secure means. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ‘‘Future Operating Concept’’, 

a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking vignettes. One vignette, titled ‘‘Space Control Challenged’’ envisions a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates 

air, space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air Force 

Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack on one of our 

commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response. As the battle continues, he is able to have 

real-time situational awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. 

In another vignette, called ‘‘Satellites On-Demand’’, an F–35 pilot responds to an adversary’s offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the F–35 releases the satellite clus-
130 

ter at high altitude, a modular satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where 

it deploys into a dispersed network formation of micro-sat’s complete with electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-control actions. 

The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an area of interest and supports a 

strike package inbound to attack targets in enemy territory. My question is, what’s 

being done to make this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? 

How can we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this 

represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 

20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What’s stopping us from doing it 

faster? 

General HYTEN. JICSpOC experimentation, the Space Mission Force (SMF), and 

development of a threat-informed Space Enterprise Vision (SEV) are the foundational elements to implement the Air Force strategic vision described in the ‘‘Future 

Operating Concept.’’ These initiatives will enable our space mission forces to more 

effectively respond to counterspace threats, enhance space crew readiness with advanced training and tools, integrate space into agile, multi-domain operations, and 

increase the resilience of the space enterprise. 

Mr. LAMBORN. How can we help you achieve your vision? 

General HYTEN. Consistent funding over time; more specifically, your continued 

support toward experimentation activities, embodied in the current JICSpOC effort, 

is extremely important. The JICSpOC will not only inform us how to better operate 

with current capabilities, but will also identify any materiel gaps requiring additional acquisition and funding requirements. 

Current gap assessments identify the need for a fully funded, joint, and combined 

Space Battle Management Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3) system 

to assure continued access to space for the U.S. and its partners and allies. Another 

key initiative is our shift toward a Space Mission Force as we advance the skillsets 

of our space crews to operate in a contested environment. Finally, congressional support toward the Enterprise Ground Services initiative is necessary as we move to 

a common interface environment for our Airmen so they may focus on improved 

mission and warfighter effects vice routine tasks. 

While the Bipartisan Budget Act provides much needed stability and predictability, we would reiterate the Secretary of the Air Force’s call for a permanent lift 

to sequestration. Ultimately, continued support for the FY17 Air Force budget request is an important step toward arresting the erosion of our competitive advantage. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Also, given that this represents where the Air Force would like to 

be in 2035, do we really have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? 

General HYTEN. Given today’s space and cyberspace threats and projected future 

threats, we cannot afford to wait 20 years. Some nations are aggressively expanding 

their pursuit of counterspace technologies now. They are adapting quickly to hold 

U.S. space and cyberspace capabilities at risk. It is imperative that we respond more 

rapidly to changing threats in space. 

Mr. LAMBORN. What’s stopping us from doing it faster?’’ 

General HYTEN. The challenge is significant, and the largest barrier to faster 

progress is a lack of mature technology. We are actively pursuing technologies in 

support of the Air Force future concept, such as development of a shared common 

operating picture that will allow automated information sharing and integration 

across multiple domains and security levels. Development of this technology is a priority. Further, we are engaged in interagency and international forums, exercises, 

and experiments to explore synergistic efforts/technologies that may address shared 

and pervasive needs in the space arena. This investment of time also allows examination of potential solution sets, current operational limitations, and capture of mature requirements needed to develop the requisite capabilities and highly-trained 

forces needed to fulfill the vision and accelerate concept implementation. Inculcating 

greater threat awareness into a space force that has traditionally operated platforms in the relatively safe, benign environment of space will also take time, but 

we are tackling that with the Space Mission Force initiative. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you please provide some more detail about your Space Training Transformation Initiative? During the four-month periods when space operators 

are ‘‘off-crew’’, where, and how, does advanced training take place? 

General HYTEN. The Space Training Transformation (STT) Initiative implements 

guidance from CORONA Top 2012 and the Space Professional Functional Authority 

to develop and implement a more robust Air Education and Training Command 

(AETC) Officer and Enlisted Undergraduate Space Training (UST) expanding the 

course from 33 to 76 training days. STT also transitions the responsibility for space 

weapon system specific training from AETC to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). 
131 

Through the realignment of resources and organizational responsibilities, STT functions will allow for rapid unit training content updates and enable the most costeffective use of Air Force resources while increasing technical understanding of the 

space domain. 

The second part of the question is part of our separate, but related, Space Mission 

Force (SMF)/Ready Spacecrew Program (RSP) Initiative. During the four-month periods when space operators are ‘‘off-crew’’, they will receive advanced training at 

their local units/wings. Advanced training is the set of formal training requirements, 

beyond weapon system qualification and continuation training, to advance the skills 

required to ensure mission accomplishment in a contested, degraded and operationally-limited (CDO) environment. Advanced training events will include classroom, 

simulator and exercise sessions focusing on CDO challenges, defensive tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), system and operations integration, and mission planning and debriefing for the current and future threat environment. Advanced training events will push operators to their limits and drive them to improve and discover new and better ways to conduct operations. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ‘‘Future Operating Concept’’, 

a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking vignettes. One vignette, titled ‘‘Space Control Challenged’’ envisions a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates 

air, space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air Force 

Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack on one of our 

commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response. As the battle continues, he is able to have 

real-time situational awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. 

In another vignette, called ‘‘Satellites On-Demand’’, an F–35 pilot responds to an adversary’s offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the F–35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where 

it deploys into a dispersed network formation of micro-sat’s complete with electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-control actions. 

The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an area of interest and supports a 

strike package inbound to attack targets in enemy territory. My question is, what’s 

being done to make this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? 

How can we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this 

represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 

20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What’s stopping us from doing it 

faster? 

Mr. LOVERRO. In 2015, the Air Force published the Air Force Strategy, ‘‘Call to 

the Future, the Air Force Future Operating Concept,’’ which provides an explanation of a notional end-state; and the Strategic Master Plan (SMP), which includes 

a 20-year roadmap to achieve the Air Force Future Operating Concept (AFFOC) 

end-state. The SMP has five vectors (21st Century Deterrence, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Multi-Domain Approach, FullSpectrum Capable, High-End Focused Force, and Game-Changing Technologies); 

these vectors represent the path to get to the AFFOC end-state. Implementing the 

strategy will be a long process that crosses all of the core missions and every organization and that uses all major corporate processes including resourcing, manpower, 

acquisition, training and education, and technology development. The Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force have appointed 

3-star ‘‘Champions’’ for each of the vectors to provide the strategic leadership and 

synchronize the tactical tasks associated with implementing the SMP Goals and associated Objectives. They are using the Air Force Council as the forum to institutionalize senior leader dialogue and the strategic focus that will be required to implement the Air Force strategy. 

From an OSD perspective, we view these vectors as important glide-paths to future warfighting concepts, but we all recognize that bold vision such as these will 

mature and evolve over time and that it may not be technologically possible to 

achieve those goals sooner than the Air Force estimates. 

Mr. LAMBORN. In establishing the Principal DOD Advisor for Space position, 

DEPSECDEF noted that the Executive Agent for Space construct did not work as 

planned because it was essentially a coordinating body with little authority. What 

reason is there to believe that the PDSA will not suffer the same fate, especially 

when it does not have any budget authority? What, if any, are the current challenges with the PDSA structure? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Deputy Secretary has designated the Secretary of the Air Force 

as the Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA) and has expanded her authorities and 

responsibilities to provide independent assessments and recommendations to the 
132 

Secretary of Defense and the Deputies Management Action Group regarding space 

programs, budgets, and activities. 

This is an important step to improve governance of DOD space programs, and the 

Department believes that the PDSA has sufficient authority to accomplish the task. 

The Deputy Secretary has been clear that we will evaluate the effectiveness of the 

PDSA over time and, if necessary, adjust authorities to fully meet the intent of the 

PDSA structure. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ‘‘Future Operating Concept’’, 

a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking vignettes. One vignette, titled ‘‘Space Control Challenged’’ envisions a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates 

air, space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air Force 

Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack on one of our 

commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response. As the battle continues, he is able to have 

real-time situational awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. 

In another vignette, called ‘‘Satellites On-Demand’’, an F–35 pilot responds to an adversary’s offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the F–35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where 

it deploys into a dispersed network formation of micro-sat’s complete with electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-control actions. 

The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an area of interest and supports a 

strike package inbound to attack targets in enemy territory. My question is, what’s 

being done to make this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? 

How can we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this 

represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 

20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What’s stopping us from doing it 

faster? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department’s efforts to transition to an operationally 

agile, fully integrated, multi-domain force are being supported by on-going technology development, experimentation, wargaming, and use of open architecture and 

network centric engineering principles. We are developing network enabled command and control systems (i.e., Air Operations Center, Joint Space Operations Center Mission System) that incorporate open architecture principles to enable interoperability and operational flexibility. In parallel, the Department has implemented 

the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center to facilitate joint experimentation to ensure we can effectively access, fuse, and analyze all sources of information to enable effective decision making in peacetime and in crisis. This effort 

will refine optimum command and control relationships, concepts of operations, and 

materiel solution requirements to achieve operational agility. Achieving this vision 

will take time to mature these concepts and supporting technology. 

This transition will also require a balanced resourcing strategy to ensure the Department can continue to meet current requirements while implementing the force 

structure of the future. The Department is assessing options to improve resiliency 

in the next generation of our current systems (i.e., Space Based Infrared System 

and Military Satellite Communications) while conducting technology development 

for next generation capabilities. To guide efforts to improve resilience of the national 

security space enterprise, Air Force Space Command recently released its ‘‘Space 

Enterprise Vision’’. This vision establishes a new ‘‘resiliency capacity’’ concept that 

takes into account how well a capability can address a current threat and how 

quickly they can adapt to counter future threats. This resiliency capacity metric will 

replace the traditional ‘‘functional availability’’ metric that has been used to characterize and evaluate space capabilities. Implementing the Air Force’s Future Operating Concept will also require continued investment in technology development and 

advances to address future threats. An example of this technology development is 

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s continuing effort to develop a significantly less expensive approach for routinely and rapidly launching small satellites into low Earth orbit. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ‘‘Future Operating Concept’’, 

a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking vignettes. One vignette, titled ‘‘Space Control Challenged’’ envisions a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates 

air, space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air Force 

Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack on one of our 

commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response. As the battle continues, he is able to have 

real-time situational awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. 
133 

In another vignette, called ‘‘Satellites On-Demand’’, an F–35 pilot responds to an adversary’s offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the F–35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where 

it deploys into a dispersed network formation of micro-sat’s complete with electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-control actions. 

The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an area of interest and supports a 

strike package inbound to attack targets in enemy territory. My question is, what’s 

being done to make this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? 

How can we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this 

represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 

20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What’s stopping us from doing it 

faster? 

What’s being done to make these vignettes reality? 

General BUCK. The synergistic Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force space team at 

the Joint Functional Component Command for Space and its Joint Space Operations 

Center (JSpOC) forms the basis for future warfighting enhancements along the lines 

of a Multi-Domain Operations Center (MDOC). By definition, a true MDOC must 

not only integrate the Air, Space and Cyber domains within the Air Force but integrate the Land and Maritime domains as well. 

A current and ongoing endeavor to better integrate the Joint and Interagency 

space enterprise is the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center 

(JICSpOC) experimentation to determine the necessary constructs and processes for 

unity of effort across the USG. In addition to Joint and Interagency lines of effort, 

the US Air Force is implementing the Space Mission Force (SMF) and developing 

a threat-informed Space Enterprise Vision that will increase the resilience capacity 

of the space enterprise and prepare our space mission forces to effectively respond 

to space threats. In addition, the SMF and Space Enterprise Vision (SEV) are the 

foundational elements for developing and implementing the AF strategic vision described in the ‘‘Future Operating Concept,’’ to including building a more resilient 

space enterprise and providing advanced tools and training to increase space crew 

readiness in order to fully integrate space operations into agile, multi-domain operations. 

Mr. LAMBORN. How can we help you achieve your vision? 

General BUCK. Predictable funding for capability improvements and increased resilience helps enable the Joint space enterprise focus on refining and developing 

new tactics, techniques, and procedures. Experimentation efforts, like the current 

JICSpOC activities, are extremely important in identifying not only how to better 

operate with current capabilities but also to identify any material gaps requiring acquisition and funding. Current gap assessments identify the need for a fully-funded 

Space Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2) system. We also face a 

shortfall in Indications and Warning for the space domain in addition to a shortage 

of space trained and focused intelligence personnel. 

As Commander, JFCC SPACE, I am relying on two significant efforts from Air 

Force Space Command. First, the SMF focuses operations personnel on providing 

space effects in contested, degraded and operationally limited (CDO) environments. 

Second, the Enterprise Ground Services (EGS) initiative provides the common environment from which we can access space and ground asset data gathered at the tactical level of space and provide insight to the operational level of space to determine 

if we are in a CDO environment and implement actions to mitigate effects. The SMF 

and EGS will work together to give us insight into the space environment which 

we simply don’t have today. Finally, we’re creating a culture of experimentation and 

change in satellite operations and space warfare to get ahead of the adversaries. 

We’re doing this on the operations side through the Joint Space Operations Center 

(JSpOC) and support to the JICSpOC experimentation. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Also, given that this represents where the Air Force would like to 

be in 2035, do we really have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? 

General BUCK. If we are to maintain our competitive and operational advantages 

in, through and from space, it is imperative that we respond and field systems on 

faster and more agile timelines. 

Mr. LAMBORN. What’s stopping us from doing it faster?’’ 

General BUCK. Rapidly evolving threats and technologies coupled with a dynamic 

environment are outpacing our deliberate acquisition processes. We need the ability 

to observe, orient, decide, and act faster than our adversary through resilient and 

responsive future space capabilities and tactics. Leveraging near-term experiments 

in space along with enterprise ground systems will ensure rapid development and 

maturation of much needed requirements. Establishing resilient Enterprise Ground 
134 

Systems and developing and fielding robust BMC2 capabilities to fight on operationally-relevant timelines are critical. In this endeavor, we should explore rapid prototyping, automation, machine-to-machine interfaces and artificial intelligence. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ‘‘Future Operating Concept’’, 

a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking vignettes. One vignette, titled ‘‘Space Control Challenged’’ envisions a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates 

air, space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air Force 

Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack on one of our 

commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response. As the battle continues, he is able to have 

real-time situational awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. 

In another vignette, called ‘‘Satellites On-Demand’’, an F–35 pilot responds to an adversary’s offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the F–35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where 

it deploys into a dispersed network formation of micro-sat’s complete with electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-control actions. 

The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an area of interest and supports a 

strike package inbound to attack targets in enemy territory. My question is, what’s 

being done to make this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? 

How can we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this 

represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 

20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What’s stopping us from doing it 

faster? 

Mr. CARDILLO. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ‘‘Future Operating Concept’’, 

a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking vignettes. One vignette, titled ‘‘Space Control Challenged’’ envisions a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates 

air, space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air Force 

Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack on one of our 

commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response. As the battle continues, he is able to have 

real-time situational awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. 

In another vignette, called ‘‘Satellites On-Demand’’, an F–35 pilot responds to an adversary’s offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the F–35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where 

it deploys into a dispersed network formation of micro-sat’s complete with electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-control actions. 

The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an area of interest and supports a 

strike package inbound to attack targets in enemy territory. My question is, what’s 

being done to make this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? 

How can we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this 

represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 

20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What’s stopping us from doing it 

faster? 

Mr. CALVELLI. The NRO’s Advanced Systems & Technology (AS&T) Directorate’s 

research and development in the area of time-dominant intelligence collection using 

the SENTIENT automated mission management schema has promoted new opportunities for future ground architectures. SENTIENT modernizes intelligence collection 

by introducing modular big-data analytic services in a highly automated, multi-INT 

system, employing a ground architecture controlling various sensors (strategic, tactical, commercial and specialized systems). In addition to transitioning SENTIENT 

capabilities into ground architectures, the NRO maintains a SENTIENT research 

infrastructure and research methodology enabling proof-of-concept demonstrations 

for prototype capabilities and works closely with the joint community to transition 

additional capabilities into operational baselines. The Congress, and this committee 

specifically, have repeatedly provided the NRO the authorization, encouragement, 

and resources it needs to meet the demands of a contested space environment. Your 

continued support of this efforts and your partnership in the future is appreciated. 

The NRO researches and develops new technologies and capabilities to 

operationalize on a variety of timescales. The NRO is committed to inserting new 

capabilities and products into the joint architecture routinely in order to assist maturation towards the objective 2035 architecture. Ultimately, the objective architecture may take 20 years before it is a reality, but piece-parts will be delivered along 
135 

the way as technologies and systems mature. I’m not aware of any limitations at 

NRO that are inhibiting the Air Force’s ‘‘Future Operating Concept.’’ The NRO, 

working through the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, are 

committed to providing U.S. policymakers and warfighters the collection capabilities 

and tools necessary to meet national security demands today, tomorrow, and beyond. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Is there a synergy that could be had between NASA and the Air 

Force on the development of a new-technology upper stage engine at significantly 

lower life cycle cost? Could improvements to the upper stage engine support the goal 

of assured access to space? How does your 4-step acquisition strategy include these 

opportunities that could benefit not only the AF and NASA, but also the American 

taxpayer? 

General HYTEN. Yes, there is considerable potential synergy with NASA in the development of booster upper stage propulsion. NASA’s Low Earth Orbit (LEO) missions, such as LEO science missions, International Space Station (ISS) resupply and 

commercial crew, fall within the Air Force’s mission requirements. NASA’s Commercial Crew organization has expressed some interest in how the Air Force executes 

mission assurance. Additionally, NASA’s large Space Launch System (SLS) will utilize an upper stage based on the United Launch Alliance (ULA)’s RL10 engine. The 

SLS configuration will use a two-engine RL10, while ULA is developing the SLS Exploration upper stage with up to four RL10s. The Air Force’s deep experience with 

RL10 can potentially help NASA’s SLS development. However, directing a specific 

engine is not compatible with the principle of full and open competition and is not 

part of the Air Force’s strategy. If authorized in FY17, the Air Force plans to transition away from using the RD–180 engine by competitively awarding Launch Service 

Investment (LSI) Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs) to partner with industry on 

their commercial launch system development efforts while ensuring that their 

launch systems also meet National Security System (NSS) requirements. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Is there a synergy that could be had between NASA and the Air 

Force on the development of a new-technology upper stage engine at significantly 

lower life cycle cost? Could improvements to the upper stage engine support the goal 

of assured access to space? How does your 4-step acquisition strategy include these 

opportunities that could benefit not only the AF and NASA, but also the American 

taxpayer? 

Mr. LOVERRO. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address this question 

for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide additional information. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Once awarded, will the Department’s propulsion system provider 

or providers be the only options for decades to come. How do you plan to continually 

asset and pursue new and innovative launch technologies? 

Mr. LOVERRO. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address this question 

for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide additional information. 

Mr. COFFMAN. How would you adjust your 4-step approach to permit the full benefit of competition for the entire rocket stack? Can you ensure that truly new and 

innovative propulsion providers—some with dramatically new technologies—are 

made part of your acquisition approach for launch services? What are the on-ramps 

that you will make available? 

Mr. LOVERRO. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address this question 

for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide additional information. 

Mr. COFFMAN. How is the Department going to ensure, in its desire to procure 

a launch service, that the taxpayer receives the full benefit of open competition 

across the rocket stack, to include the upper stage? 

Mr. LOVERRO. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address this question 

for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide additional information. 

Mr. COFFMAN. How does the Department’s 4-step approach address finding and 

promoting innovative rocket engine providers, some of whom the government has 

already invested in via the SBIR program? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The first step in the Department’s multi-step process to 

field new and improved launch service capabilities was to issue a Broad Area Announcement (BAA). The BAAs solicited ideas and project proposals that would provide risk reduction and technical maturation in support of future domestic liquid 

rocket engine and solid rocket motor development activities. The Air Force issued 

a total of 10 BAA awards to a combination of academic institutions, small and large 

businesses. The projects include a number of innovated additive manufacturing 

process development activities for individual rocket engine components, as well as 
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developing test and qualification standards for those new processes. Opportunities 

for innovation continue with step 2 investments at Orbital ATK, SpaceX, United 

Launch Alliance, and Aerojet Rocketdyne through the use of Other Transaction Authority agreements. All these projects will support the broader industry propulsion 

system development efforts. The final 2 steps of the approach will culminate in the 

development of new and improved launch service capabilities that will be available 

to the Department in FY 22. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. During the hearing it was stated that the Department of Defense 

is not pursuing launch systems, but instead pursuing launch services that consist 

of an integrated solution that addresses the components of main and upper stage 

engines. How does this approach ensure that new entrants are not shut out because 

the launch service provider has chosen their own solution? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

(EELV) New Entrant process is designed to ensure every company that wishes to 

become a certified EELV launch service provider (LSP), has an opportunity to do 

so. The New Entrant Certification Guide (NECG), issued by the Air Force in October 2011, delineates the top level requirements all prospective New Entrants must 

meet. The NECG is focused on the LSP requirements and not at the component provider level. The Department’s expectation is the LSP will offer an integration solution for the government to evaluate to include incorporating innovative solutions 

from the 2nd/3rd tier technology base. In addition, the Department presumes the 

LSP will work with its vendor base to incorporate any and all new and innovative 

components into their final vehicle design. The Department is already funding some 

of these technology improvements as part of our Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) 

program. For example the funded RPS development activities include; the Aerojet 

AR–1 and Blue Origin BE–4 engines, improved solid rocket motors and launch vehicle upper stage design. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PETERS 

Mr. PETERS. Last year’s NDAA had a provision that requires DOD to undertake 

a Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Pilot program to test out the best commercial SATCOM services. Section 1612, requires that these Pilots are supposed to be 

separate and different from the Pathfinder program. They were supposed to be ‘‘orders of magnitude’’ better that tested new technology, like high capacity satellites. 

The Air Force’s plan in the FY 17 Budget seems to ignore this Pilot program and 

it appears there is no plan for testing high capacity SATCOM technology this year, 

or next year. Does the Air Force have a plan to implement the ComSat ‘‘Pilot program’’ and test this new high capacity technology? And in order to get this new technology to the warfighter, will you expedite the testing of high throughput/high capacity technology? 

General HYTEN. The Air Force plans to implement five pathfinders as part of its 

pilot program. Currently, we are studying life cycle cost affordability implications 

and potential impacts to Joint Service terminals. Pathfinder #3, which is planned 

for FY17, will reduce risk by investigating interoperability issues between DOD infrastructure and High-Capacity Satellite ground stations. Pathfinder #5 will incorporate results from the Pathfinder #3 and #4 efforts to further demonstrate interoperability with High Capacity Satellites. 

Mr. PETERS. We understand the Department’s Purpose-Built and leased Satellite 

solutions don’t take advantage of newer, less expensive technology, like high capacity Satellites: this new technology could enable capabilities, like in-flight tele-medicine for aeromedical evacuation, and ultra-high definition sensors for tactical ISR 

aircraft. Is there a way to accelerate the Commercial Satellite Pilot program efforts 

so that these demos or tests of high capacity ComSats, can contribute to the upcoming AOA? If so, will they address countermeasures to jamming and cyber threats? 

General HYTEN. As discussed in the answer to the previous question (#65), the 

Air Force’s Pathfinder program is investigating the use of COMSATCOM outside 

traditional leasing methods, including Pathfinder #5 with high capacity satellites. 

As we work through these non-traditional acquisitions, we are investigating policy, 

regulatory, and life-cycle cost implications. The Air Force and the Department expect to incorporate lessons learned from the completed and ongoing Pathfinder efforts in the upcoming Wideband SATCOM AOA. Additionally, the Air Force is addressing jamming threats through other demonstrations like the protected tactical 

waveform that can be used over COMSATCOM. 
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Mr. PETERS. We understand the Department’s Purpose-Built and leased Satellite 

solutions don’t take advantage of newer, less expensive technology, like high capacity Satellites: this new technology could enable capabilities, like in-flight tele-medicine for aeromedical evacuation, and ultra-high definition sensors for tactical ISR 

aircraft. Is there a way to accelerate the Commercial Satellite Pilot program efforts 

so that these demos or tests of high capacity ComSats, can contribute to the upcoming AOA? If so, will they address countermeasures to jamming and cyber threats? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department’s commercial satellite communication 

(SATCOM) pilot program includes five Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 

and five Air Force pathfinder activities. The Air Force pathfinder program is investigating the use of commercial SATCOM outside of traditional leasing methods, including pathfinder #5 with high capacity satellites. The Department expects to incorporate lessons learned from the completed and ongoing pathfinder efforts in the 

upcoming wideband SATCOM Analysis of Alternatives. Additionally, the Air Force 

is addressing jamming threats through other demonstrations like the protected tactical waveform that can be incorporated into commercial SATCOM architectures. 

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