Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Management of the Special Programs 

Unit at the Federal Bureau of Prisons 

Metropolitan Detention Center in 

Brooklyn, New York 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 15-08 September 2015 
 

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Introduction 

Ronell Wilson was convicted in 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 

District of New York of capital murder for killing two undercover New York City 

police detectives. In 2007, Judge Nicholas Garaufis sentenced Wilson to death. On 

February 18, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 

Wilson’s conviction but vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for a 

new penalty phase trial. On July 24, 2013, a federal jury again unanimously 

returned a death penalty recommendation and, on September 10, 2013, Judge 

Garaufis reinstated the death sentence. 

While at the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Metropolitan Detention Center 

in Brooklyn, New York (MDC Brooklyn) awaiting the new penalty phase trial and 

resentencing, Wilson had a months-long sexual relationship with then Correctional 

Officer Nancy Gonzalez that resulted in the birth of their child. Gonzalez’s conduct 

was investigated by the Investigations Division of the Department of Justice Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG), and she was prosecuted for and convicted of Sexual 

Intercourse with a Ward. 

During Wilson’s resentencing hearing in 2013, an inmate housed in the same 

unit as Wilson testified that he and another inmate had submitted a handwritten 

complaint to MDC Brooklyn’s head of security, reporting Gonzalez’s sexual 

relationship with Wilson. Testimony alleged that, following the inmates’ complaint, 

Wilson held an inquisition in the housing unit to determine who had reported him. 

The OIG Investigations Division investigated the possibility that a Correctional 

Officer in the unit in which Wilson was housed (the Special Programs Unit (SPU)) 

gave the inmates’ complaint to Gonzalez, who subsequently gave it to Wilson; but 

the OIG could not substantiate the information.1

 Inmates also testified at the 

resentencing hearing that Wilson bullied them and manipulated staff in a variety of 

ways. 

Judge Garaufis’s opinion regarding Wilson’s resentencing cited “the apparent 

ineptitude of the Bureau of Prisons” and recommended that the OIG “examine the 

management, policies, and procedures of the MDC that allowed [Wilson’s] behavior 

to occur, placing at risk of harm other inmates and the many hard working 

personnel at the facility.” 

Objective and Scope 

Our review sought to determine whether MDC Brooklyn’s management 

controls, policies, procedures, and practices could have contributed to Wilson’s 

1

 The SPU was established at MDC Brooklyn in October 2000, primarily to house inmates with 

mental health conditions who require greater control, supervision, or monitoring than afforded in a 

typical general population unit. The SPU also houses certain inmates whose characteristics may 

increase their likelihood of physical or sexual victimization while incarcerated. 

i 
 

 

alleged disruption of the safety and security of inmates and staff in the SPU from 

March 2011 to August 2012, and whether any such issues reflected more general 

problems that need to be addressed at the facility. 

Results in Brief 

Although the events the court noted in its resentencing opinion were due in 

large measure to the criminal actions of Gonzalez and the alleged misconduct of 

another Correctional Officer, we identified concerns related to the BOP’s placement 

of Wilson in the SPU with vulnerable inmates without implementing safeguards or 

providing guidance to correctional staff. We also noted areas where MDC 

Brooklyn’s ability to communicate information across shifts and housing units 

should be improved. However, we did not find that these communications 

deficiencies directly led to the incidents that were the subject of our review. During 

the course of our review, MDC Brooklyn management began to address some of the 

concerns we identified. 

Wilson Was Assigned to the SPU without Management Implementing Safeguards To 

Prevent and Detect His Disruption of the Safety and Security of the Unit 

MDC Brooklyn senior management (management) recognized the need to 

closely monitor Wilson because of his violent history and gang member status.2 

Management told us that they would have preferred to assign Wilson to the Special 

Housing Unit (SHU) for the duration of his resentencing proceedings, but they 

believed this was not an option because his death sentence had been vacated and 

during a previous incarceration at MDC Brooklyn the court issued an order requiring 

MDC Brooklyn to remove Wilson from the SHU and reassign him to general 

population, subject to his continued good behavior.3

 After a brief initial period in 

the SHU, management assigned Wilson to the SPU knowing that he would be 

housed with vulnerable inmates. Management told us they assigned Wilson to the 

SPU rather than a general population unit because the SPU is significantly smaller in 

size and population than typical general population units at MDC Brooklyn, which 

they assumed would make it easier for Correctional Officers to monitor him. 

While the SPU primarily houses inmates with mental health conditions, the 

unit’s procedures also allow MDC Brooklyn’s management to house inmates without 

mental health conditions there. However, SPU procedures do not provide any 

instructions for staff on how to manage inmates like Wilson who have not been 

classified as needing the BOP’s mental health services and who could potentially 

intimidate other SPU inmates. In addition, management did not provide any special 

instructions to staff on how to manage Wilson differently while he was in the SPU. 

2

 We define senior management at MDC Brooklyn as the Warden, Associate Wardens, and the 

Captain. 

3

 SHUs are housing units in BOP institutions where inmates are securely separated from the 

general inmate population and may be housed either alone or with other inmates. See BOP Program 

Statement 5270.10, Special Housing Units (August 1, 2011). 

ii 
 

 

 

As a result, staff told us that they generally did not manage Wilson differently than 

other inmates in the SPU. 

While it is clear that Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez disrupted the safety 

and security of the institution, we could not determine the extent to which the 

inmates’ allegations of bullying and manipulation occurred. Staff told us they were 

unaware of instances when Wilson’s behavior should have prompted them to write 

an incident report, and the unit’s documentation that we reviewed does not 

corroborate the inmates’ statements. 

During Our Review, Management Took Steps To Improve Communication Related to 

the Safety and Security of MDC Brooklyn; However, Areas of Concern Remain 

We identified several instances in which MDC Brooklyn policy was unclear 

and may not have been fully communicated to staff. For example, we found that 

MDC Brooklyn issued a revised SPU memorandum in January 2015, making it part 

of the directives (known as post orders) for staff in the SPU; however, some staff 

did not recall ever seeing this version or any previous versions.4

 We also found 

certain post orders in place at the time of our review did not ensure that 

Correctional Officers routinely conducted searches of all housing unit cells. Further, 

we found that the policy as to how staff should handle sealed inmate complaints 

that have been placed in unit mailboxes needs to be clarified. Finally, we found 

that MDC Brooklyn should consider additional steps to improve its methods to 

ensure relevant security information is consistently shared across shifts and 

housing units. 

Recommendations 

We make five recommendations in this report to improve MDC Brooklyn’s 

policies and procedures when managing inmates in the SPU who do not have a 

mental health condition, to ensure staff is notified of the process for handling 

sealed inmate complaints, to ensure that supervisors verify that staff is conducting 

searches of all housing unit cells within the time policy requires, and to ensure that 

staff receive relevant security information. 

4

 The Chief Psychologist originally issued the Operational Procedures for Unit K-81, Special 

Programs Unit (the SPU memorandum) to the then Warden on November 10, 2011, and again on 

November 19, 2013. During the course of our review, MDC Brooklyn issued a new SPU memorandum 

reflecting significant changes from the 2011 and 2013 memoranda. Chief Psychologist, MDC Brooklyn, 

memorandum to Warden, Operational Procedures for Unit K-81, Special Programs Unit, January 14, 

2015. 

iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 

Wilson Was Assigned to the SPU without Management Implementing 

Safeguards To Prevent and Detect His Disruption of the Safety and 

During Our Review, Management Took Steps To Improve Communication 

Related to the Safety and Security of MDC Brooklyn; However, Areas of
 

FINDINGS.................................................................................................... 9 

Security of the Unit .......................................................................... 9 

Concern Remain............................................................................. 16 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 21 

Conclusion........................................................................................ 21 

Recommendations ............................................................................. 22 

APPENDIX 1: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW ....................... 23 

Interviews ........................................................................................ 23 

Site Visits ......................................................................................... 23 

Document Review .............................................................................. 24 

APPENDIX 2: THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT............................ 25 

APPENDIX 3: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP’S RESPONSE ................................... 28 

The BOP's General Comments ............................................................. 28 

The BOP's Response to Recommendations............................................. 28 
 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION 

Ronell Wilson was found guilty of the March 10, 2003, capital murder of two 

undercover New York City police detectives who were posing as gun buyers in 

Staten Island, New York. Wilson, a member of the Bloods gang, shot them each in 

the back of the head at point blank range. After a trial before Judge Nicholas 

Garaufis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, a jury found 

Wilson guilty of capital murder on December 20, 2006. On March 29, 2007, Judge 

Garaufis sentenced him to death — the first federal death sentence in New York 

State in over 50 years.5 

On February 18, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Wilson’s 

conviction but vacated his death sentence based on constitutional grounds and sent 

the case back to the Eastern District of New York for a new penalty phase trial.6 On 

July 24, 2013, a federal jury unanimously returned a death penalty 

recommendation. On September 10, 2013, Judge Garaufis reinstated the death 

sentence. During the trial and again during the resentencing proceedings, Wilson 

was incarcerated at the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Metropolitan Detention 

Center in Brooklyn, New York (MDC Brooklyn).7 

After hearing extensive testimony during the resentencing proceedings about 

Wilson’s incarceration at MDC Brooklyn, Judge Garaufis found that, “not only did 

Mr. Wilson’s behavior in prison illuminate his continuing lack of remorse and 

disregard for authority, but it also shed light on the apparent ineptitude of the 

[Federal] Bureau of Prisons.” 

In his opinion, the Judge expressed concerns in three general areas. First, 

Wilson was able to carry on “a months-long sexual relationship” with Correctional 

Officer Nancy Gonzalez “that resulted in the birth of their child.” Second, Wilson 

allegedly was given a handwritten complaint addressed to MDC Brooklyn’s head of 

security, reporting Gonzalez’s sexual relationship with Wilson. He then allegedly 

held “an inquisition in the housing unit, interrogating inmate after inmate to 

determine who had reported him.” Finally, Wilson “was permitted to treat MDC as 

his own private fiefdom” by manipulating staff members to his advantage and 

intimidating more-vulnerable inmates. The Judge therefore recommended that the 

Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) “examine the 

management, policies, and procedures of the MDC that allowed [Wilson’s alleged 

behavior] to occur, placing at risk of harm other inmates and the many hard 

working personnel at the facility.” 

5

 See United States v. Wilson, 04-CR-1016 (ED NY, December 20, 2006) (guilty verdict). See 

also United States v. Wilson, 04-CR-1016 (ED NY, March 30, 2007) (sentencing order). 

6

 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found in substance that the prosecution’s arguments 

related to the issues of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and future dangerousness impaired 

Wilson’s constitutional rights. 

7

 Wilson is currently incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute, Indiana, awaiting 

execution. 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Our review focused on whether weaknesses in management controls, 

policies, procedures, and practices contributed to Wilson’s alleged manipulation of 

staff and intimidation of vulnerable inmates in his housing unit. The OIG’s 

Investigations Division investigated the inmates’ allegation that Wilson was given a 

copy of their complaint; however, the OIG was unable to substantiate the 

allegation. The sexual relationship between Wilson and Gonzalez resulted in 

Gonzalez’s criminal conviction for Sexual Intercourse with a Ward, and she was 

sentenced to 12 months and 1 day in federal prison.8 

In this introduction section, we provide a general overview of MDC Brooklyn; 

a description of MDC Brooklyn’s Special Programs Unit (SPU); current BOP Office of 

Internal Affairs sexual abuse statistics; information about Wilson’s conviction and 

death penalty sentencing; and Wilson’s first and second confinement at MDC 

Brooklyn, including allegations inmates raised while Wilson was pending 

resentencing. 

Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York 

MDC Brooklyn is the largest federal metropolitan detention center in the 

country, currently housing approximately 1,853 inmates and employing over 

500 staff members. The institution’s mission is to house federal detainees from the 

New York metropolitan areas who are going through the federal judicial process. As 

an administrative security facility, MDC Brooklyn houses all types of offenders — 

sometimes including high-profile offenders — with a variety of criminal histories 

including terrorism, organized crime, and drug smuggling.9

 Generally, offenders 

are housed on a short-term basis averaging 120 to 180 days and, after conviction 

and sentencing, are assigned by the BOP to facilities that house sentenced inmates 

around the country. 

The SPU at MDC Brooklyn 

In October 2000, MDC Brooklyn established the SPU, also known as 

Unit K-81, primarily to house inmates with mental health conditions who require 

greater control, supervision, or monitoring than afforded in a typical general 

population unit. The SPU also houses certain inmates whose characteristics may 

increase their likelihood of physical or sexual victimization while incarcerated.10 The 

SPU is significantly smaller than other general population units, housing 

approximately 30 inmates compared to over 120 in typical general population units. 

8

 See United States v. Nancy Gonzalez, 13-CR-00122 (ED NY, February 19, 2014) (sentencing 

order). The BOP terminated Gonzalez’s employment on July 27, 2013. 

9

 Administrative facilities are institutions with special missions, where inmates are assigned 

based on factors other than security and/or staff supervision (for example, medical/mental health, 

pretrial and holdover). Administrative institutions are designed to house all security level inmates. 

See BOP Program Statement 5100.08, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification 

(September 12, 2006). 

10 These characteristics include physical handicap and physical appearance, for example, blind 

inmates or preoperative transsexual inmates. 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

There are two types of MDC Brooklyn staff with responsibility for overseeing 

inmates in the SPU: the unit team who are assigned to that floor and security staff 

who may rotate quarterly.11 Correctional Officers assigned to the SPU are 

responsible for ensuring the security and sanitation of the unit and the safety and 

accountability of the inmates. Lieutenants have a variety of responsibilities, 

including conducting rounds to supervise Correctional Officers. Because they are 

required to make rounds for many units and have various other supervisory duties, 

Lieutenants typically spend approximately 5 minutes in any one unit, including the 

SPU, during each 8-hour shift.12 In addition to the unit team and security staff, 

there is a Psychologist, also known as the SPU Coordinator, permanently assigned 

to the SPU. The SPU Coordinator has an office located directly outside the SPU’s 

door.13 

MDC Brooklyn Directives Governing the SPU 

Two main documents lay out the procedures for SPU staff to follow. The post 

orders lay out specific tasks and duties that must be performed on each shift.14 For 

example, the post orders state that the Morning Watch Officer for each unit is 

required to collect and screen the outgoing inmate mail at 1 a.m. In 2011 and 

again in 2013, MDC Brooklyn issued the Operational Procedures for Unit K-81, 

Special Programs Unit (the SPU memorandum), which contains information on 

managing the SPU, including the purpose of the unit, the types of inmates who can 

be assigned there, and the criteria for assigning inmates to the unit.15 

Both versions of this memorandum describe various ways that inmates can 

be assigned to the SPU. Specifically, they state that the SPU serves ”primarily as a 

placement for individuals suffering from a mental disorder, severe personality 

disorder, or medical condition that require greater control, supervision, or 

11 The unit team, which includes the Unit Manager, Case Manager, Correctional Counselor, 

and Unit Secretary, is tasked with determining and monitoring inmate program needs, such as 

counseling groups or recreation programs. The unit team also oversees other inmates on the same 

floor. Security staff includes Correctional Officers and Lieutenants. 

12 According to MDC Brooklyn’s specific post orders, three shifts collectively span a 24-hour 

day. Correctional Officers can serve on morning, day, or evening shifts. 

13 The SPU Coordinator assists the Correctional Officer on duty as needed, conducts meetings 

with the inmates to address issues they may have and to solve problems, and has some responsibility 

for cell assignments. In addition to other responsibilities for the institution as a whole, the Chief 

Psychologist supervises the SPU Coordinator, oversees management of the SPU, and authors updates 

to the SPU memorandum (described below). 

14 In addition to specific post orders, MDC Brooklyn unit staff are governed by special post 

orders that provide a general overview of Correctional Officers’ responsibilities, for example, how the 

Correctional Officer is required to handle inmate mail. 

15 The Chief Psychologist originally issued the SPU memorandum to the then Warden on 

November 10, 2011, and issued a revised version on November 19, 2013. The 2011 SPU 

memorandum was in effect at the time the events we reviewed took place. During the course of our 

review, MDC Brooklyn issued a new SPU memorandum reflecting significant changes from the 2011 

and 2013 memoranda. Chief Psychologist, MDC Brooklyn, memorandum to Warden, Operational 

Procedures for Unit K-81, Special Programs Unit, January 14, 2015. 

3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

monitoring than afforded in a general population unit.” In addition, these 

memoranda note that “other special-need individuals may be appropriate 

placements for the SPU due to having other characteristics which may increase the 

likelihood of physical and/or sexual victimization.”16 These memoranda also allow 

the Warden and his executive staff the discretion to assign inmates who, because of 

particular “demographic, legal, or other characteristics,” will be better managed in 

the smaller and more closely monitored housing setting of the SPU. Specific 

examples identified in the memoranda include inmates with sex offense charges 

adjusting poorly to the larger general population units, as well as certain highprofile cases. In these memoranda, the Warden and his executive staff are the only 

officials with authority to assign these inmates to the SPU, following a “courtesy 

notification” to the Chief Psychologist and/or the SPU Coordinator “for proper and 

safe cell and cellmate assignment.” Pursuant to these memoranda, the Warden 

infrequently may also assign inmates to the SPU for population control purposes. 

These memoranda require that, for such population control placements, the Warden 

consult the Chief Psychologist to assist in the selection of inmates who can 

adequately adjust to the SPU and who will not negatively impact other inmates in 

the unit. 

Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Inmates at MDC Brooklyn 

In light of Gonzalez’s sexual relationship with Wilson, as part of our review 

we looked at the number of reported allegations of sexual abuse of inmates by staff 

at MDC Brooklyn and all BOP facilities by reviewing the most recent BOP Office of 

Internal Affairs report of allegations of sexual abuse. Because there are still BOP 

cases pending completion and the relatively small number of allegations at MDC 

Brooklyn, we were unable to draw meaningful historical comparisons between the 

number of reported and substantiated allegations throughout BOP and at that one 

facility. However, the Internal Affairs report, issued in March 2015, does contain 

statistics on the number of reported and substantiated allegations of sexual abuse 

of inmates by fiscal year (FY), including a description of what the investigating 

entity found in each case as well as the number of allegations reported in that fiscal 

year that are still pending.17 The table below shows that from FY 2010 through 

FY 2014 there were 2,618 allegations of sexual abuse reported at BOP institutions, 

contract halfway house facilities, and privatized facilities, of which 140 were 

substantiated. MDC Brooklyn specifically had 27 reported allegations with 

2 substantiated during that 5-year period. Both of these allegations involved 

female Correctional Officers having inappropriate relationships with male inmates.18 

16 For example, the SPU memoranda noted some characteristics like physical handicap and 

physical appearance. 

17 The OIG Investigations Division receives complaints and reports of alleged misconduct 

directly from individuals and also forwarded from the BOP. The OIG has the right of first refusal to 

investigate these complaints. For each case, the Investigations Division may determine that it 

warrants investigation by the OIG or may refer it back to the BOP for investigation. 

18 The statistical information in the table includes allegations of Unprofessional Conduct of a 

Sexual Nature (e.g., inappropriate comments, voyeurism), and is not solely a reflection of sexual 

relationships like that of inmate Wilson and former Correctional Officer Gonzalez. 

4 
 

 

 

One of these involved Gonzalez and her relationship with Wilson that is the subject 

of our review.19 

Table
 

Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Inmates by Staff in BOP Institutions 

FY 2010 – FY 2014
 

Year All BOP 

Inmate 

Population 

All BOP 

Reported 

Allegations 

All BOP 

Substantiated 

Allegations 

MDC 

Brooklyn 

Inmate 

Population 

MDC 

Brooklyn 

Reported 

Allegations 

MDC Brooklyn 

Substantiated 

Allegations 

2010 210,154 415 34 2,685 3 1 

2011 217,562 392 29 2,376 4 0 

2012 218,665 549 37 2,264 8 1 

2013 219,323 675 30 2,312 4 0 

2014 214,365 587 10 1,977 8 0 

Total --- 2,618 140 --- 27 2 

Note: The BOP reports out the number of cases that were substantiated during each quarter, but not 

all allegations are completely investigated or substantiated in the year they are reported. For 

example, there were 415 allegations of sexual abuse reported in FY 2010 but there were 4 allegations 

still pending as of March 2015. In addition, we used full fiscal years and thus included only the 

numbers through FY 2014. 

Source: BOP Office of Internal Affairs. 

Ronell Wilson’s Incarceration at MDC Brooklyn 

Wilson was incarcerated at MDC Brooklyn twice: the first time during his 

original trial and death penalty proceedings in 2004 and the second time during his 

death penalty resentencing in 2011. (See the figure below.) 

19 The other sustained allegation was in FY 2010 and involved unprofessional conduct of a 

sexual nature by a female Correctional Officer with a male inmate. The OIG investigated the 

allegation, and the employee resigned. The government declined to prosecute the case. 

5 
 

 

Figure
 

Ronell Wilson’s BOP Incarceration Timeline
 

Source: BOP central file and court documents. 

Wilson’s First Confinement at MDC Brooklyn 

Wilson’s first confinement at MDC Brooklyn began on November 22, 2004, 

when he was transferred to federal custody and assigned to the Special Housing 

Unit (SHU).20 During the first 15 months Wilson remained in the SHU, his attorneys 

repeatedly petitioned the court to remove him, arguing that confining him in the 

SHU was impeding his participation in his legal defense. In a January 6, 2006, 

hearing on one of these motions, Judge Garaufis found that Wilson’s confinement in 

the SHU was “based on legitimate security concerns arising from” his repeated 

violations while incarcerated at MDC Brooklyn and Rikers Island and the fact that he 

had been charged with intentionally murdering two law enforcement officers. 

However, since Wilson had not incurred any disciplinary infractions since 

mid-October 2005, the Judge said he would be open to reconsidering Wilson’s 

motion if Wilson followed the rules for a sustained period of time. Judge Garaufis 

noted that he expected the Warden to consider moving Wilson to the general 

population if he did not incur any disciplinary infractions and directed MDC Brooklyn 

to report to him every 30 days on Wilson’s status. 

The following month MDC Brooklyn advised the court that, while Wilson had 

“been getting agitated during cell rotations and commissary procedures,” he had 

been in compliance with SHU rules and regulations. Nonetheless, MDC Brooklyn 

urged the court to refrain from ordering Wilson’s transfer from the SHU, arguing, 

“Based on the totality of the circumstances for his placement in the SHU, we do 

maintain our position that at this time it is not appropriate to place Wilson in 

general population.” Wilson’s attorneys again petitioned the court to have Wilson 

20 SHUs are housing units in BOP institutions where inmates are securely separated from the 

general inmate population and may be housed in a cell alone or with other inmates. See BOP Program 

Statement 5270.10, Special Housing Units (August 1, 2011). 

6 
 

 

moved to the general population for the same reasons as before. On February 9, 

2006, Judge Garaufis issued an order requiring MDC Brooklyn to reassign Wilson to 

general population, subject to Wilson’s continued good behavior. 

However, almost 1 year later, MDC senior management transferred Wilson 

back to the SHU after he committed two serious incidents of misconduct. Wilson 

was subsequently transferred from MDC Brooklyn on March 31, 2007, and arrived 

at the U.S. Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana (USP Terre Haute) on April 11, 

2007, pending his execution. 

Wilson’s Second Confinement at MDC Brooklyn 

After his appeal resulted in a remand for resentencing, the BOP transferred 

Wilson from USP Terre Haute on March 8, 2011, and he arrived back at MDC 

Brooklyn on March 9. MDC Brooklyn management initially housed him in the SHU 

for 3 weeks, then transferred him to the SPU on March 30, 2011. He was housed in 

the SPU for approximately 15 months, until he was transferred from the SPU back 

into the SHU on August 3, 2012, following the allegation that he was having a 

relationship with then Correctional Officer Gonzalez. He remained in general 

population at MDC Brooklyn, without returning to the SPU, until February 5, 2013, 

when he was transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New 

York (MCC New York).21 After Wilson was resentenced on September 10, 2013, the 

BOP transferred him back to USP Terre Haute on September 17, 2013. 

Inmate Testimony about Wilson’s Behavior in the SPU 

During Wilson’s resentencing, several inmates testified regarding his 

behavior while he was housed in the SPU at MDC Brooklyn. Judge Garaufis noted 

testimony that Wilson “manipulated staff members to his advantage,” “intimidated 

weaker and vulnerable inmates,” and was able to carry on “a months-long sexual 

relationship” with Gonzalez “that resulted in the birth of their child.” 

Judge Garaufis stated that, based on the testimony, there was substantial 

evidence concerning Wilson’s ability to manipulate staff, including manipulating 

Gonzalez into having a sexual relationship. Inmates testified that they saw Wilson 

and Gonzalez kissing and hugging in the unit’s activity room, talking outside of 

Wilson’s cell at night, and Gonzalez standing at Wilson’s cell door with Wilson with 

his pants down. Inmates also told the court that, while Gonzalez was pretending to 

do rounds of the SPU, she was really meeting Wilson inside the activity room. 

Inmates also testified that Wilson manipulated a Psychologist in several 

ways. This included Wilson being allowed to keep his excess legal materials in an 

empty cell, a violation of MDC Brooklyn policy. Inmates also testified about Wilson 

being allowed a cell by himself while other SPU inmates had to have cellmates, 

21 MDC Brooklyn’s Warden had Wilson transferred to MCC New York because he was afraid of 

gang retalitation against staff after a video of Wilson being restrained in the SHU surfaced on the 

Internet. Wilson’s incarceration at MCC New York was not within the scope of our review. 

7 
 

 

 

other inmates being prevented from occupying the cells on either side of Wilson’s 

cell, and an inmate who attempted to report Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez 

being reassigned to a different cell. 

During Wilson’s resentencing, inmates testified that they were intimidated by 

Wilson’s aggressive behavior, including verbal and physical threats toward them.22 

One inmate told the court that Wilson had talked about his affiliation with the 

Bloods gang and smiled when he talked about murdering two police officers; he 

said Wilson had compared himself to armor-piercing bullets, saying that they were 

both “cop killers.” Another inmate testified that after a confrontation regarding the 

use of the unit’s microwave, Wilson had threatened him with a “small ice pick.” 

Additionally, an inmate testified that he did not feel safe in his own cell because 

Wilson would search his and other inmates’ cells. 

Inmates gave other examples of Wilson’s intimidating behavior, including 

using threats to try to determine who in the unit had written the complaint 

reporting his relationship with Gonzalez, confronting an inmate in a menacing way 

about his homosexuality, forcing an inmate to give up his seat while eating dinner 

in the unit, monopolizing a television in the unit by not allowing other inmates to 

change the channel even when he was outside on the basketball court, and 

monopolizing the computer by turning the computer monitor around so that other 

inmates could not use it. 

22 Inmates also testified that Wilson violated institutional rules by exchanging cigarettes and 

marijuana with other Bloods gang members in the law library and by managing a Facebook account 

with the assistance of Gonzalez. Another inmate testified that Wilson slipped notes to inmates in 

other units while working as a kitchen orderly. 

8 
 

 

 

 

FINDINGS 

Wilson Was Assigned to the SPU without Management Implementing 

Safeguards To Prevent and Detect His Disruption of the Safety and Security 

of the Unit 

We found that MDC Brooklyn senior management (management) recognized 

the need to closely monitor Ronell Wilson. They told us they would have preferred 

to assign him to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) for the duration of his resentencing 

proceedings.23 However, they also told us they believed that they could not 

consider SHU placement because the court had vacated Wilson’s death sentence 

and there was a previous court order that required MDC Brooklyn to remove him 

from the SHU so he could more easily participate in his legal proceedings. After a 

brief initial assignment to the SHU, management assigned Wilson to the Special 

Programs Unit (SPU) despite knowing that he would be housed with vulnerable 

inmates. According to the officials we interviewed, they did this because the SPU is 

significantly smaller in size and population than other general population units at 

MDC Brooklyn, which they assumed would make it easier for Correctional Officers to 

monitor him.24 While the SPU primarily houses inmates with mental health 

conditions, the SPU procedures also allow MDC management to house inmates 

there who do not have mental health conditions. However, the SPU procedures do 

not provide any instructions for staff on how to manage inmates like Wilson, whom 

the BOP has not classified as having a mental health condition and who could 

potentially intimidate other SPU inmates. 

In addition, we found that management did not provide any guidance to staff 

about how to manage Wilson differently than the other inmates in the SPU. As a 

result, staff told us that they generally did not manage Wilson differently. While 

Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez was clearly a major concern because it 

disrupted the safety and security of the institution, we could not determine to what 

extent the allegations of bullying and manipulation actually occurred because we 

were unable to corroborate the inmates’ statements. However, staff also told us 

that Wilson could have engaged in disruptive behavior when they were not able to 

observe it and that some inmates might have observed Wilson’s alleged behavior 

and were too intimidated to report it at the time. 

Despite Misgivings, Management Assigned Wilson to the SPU 

The BOP transferred Wilson to MDC Brooklyn for his death penalty 

resentencing proceedings on March 9, 2011, and he initially was assigned to the 

SHU there.25 The Captain, who is the head of security at MDC Brooklyn, told us 

23 We define senior management at MDC Brooklyn as the Warden, Associate Wardens, and 

the Captain. 

24 The SPU is significantly smaller than other general population housing units, housing 

approximately 30 inmates compared to approximately 120 in a typical general population unit. 

25 Wilson was first housed in the SHU upon returning to MDC Brooklyn on March 9, 2011, and 

was reassigned to the SPU 3 weeks later, on March 30, 2011. 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

that he assigned Wilson to the SHU for several reasons, including the publicity 

surrounding his case, and “the influence he might have on other inmates — 

especially Bloods gang members — because he was a high-ranking leader of the 

Bloods.” However, the former Warden told us that he and his executive staff did 

not consider the SHU a permanent option for Wilson because the court had vacated 

his death penalty sentence. They also did not believe they could defend such a 

placement to a federal judge if Wilson did not exhibit disruptive behavior.26 He told 

us that they believed the options they had for housing Wilson were either a typical 

general population unit or the SPU, which he described as a “hybrid” between the 

SHU and the other general population units.27 The former Warden said he and his 

executive staff did not want to assign Wilson to a typical general population unit 

because they believed he would not be sufficiently monitored there and he thought 

Wilson needed to be where he could receive enhanced staff scrutiny. 

Moreover, the Captain said he was reluctant to assign Wilson to a typical 

general population unit where Wilson would have more frequent interaction with 

other inmates. The Captain told us he knew that inmates in general population 

units looked up to Wilson because of the nature of his crime and because his death 

penalty had been vacated. According to the former Warden, they therefore 

decided that the SPU would be an appropriate place to assign Wilson because 

Wilson would be easier to “keep an eye on” if he was among 20–30 inmates rather 

than over 100. 

While the SPU primarily houses inmates with a mental health condition, or 

inmates whose characteristics may increase their likelihood of physical or sexual 

victimization, we learned that the 2011 and 2013 SPU memoranda gave the 

Warden or executive staff the discretion to assign inmates to the SPU who had 

neither a mental health condition nor were more likely to be victimized. This 

discretion included assigning inmates to the SPU for “population control purposes” 

or because of “particular demographic, legal, or other characteristics” that made 

them more likely to be better managed in that unit. 

The Warden, who assigned Wilson to the SPU for the latter reason, told us 

that he did not consult the Chief Psychologist prior to his decision to assign Wilson 

to the SPU, and we found that SPU procedures did not require him to do so.28 He 

26 Hereinafter, “former Warden” refers to the Warden at the time Wilson returned to MDC 

Brooklyn on March 9, 2011. 

27 While there is another small general population housing unit that MDC Brooklyn uses to 

house inmates who could be in danger while incarcerated, such as former law enforcement officers 

and some child molesters, we are unaware whether management considered that housing option for 

Wilson; however, because Wilson was convicted of murdering two police officers, it is understandable 

that MDC Brooklyn’s management may not have considered a unit that houses former police officers 

appropriate for him. 

28 While the 2011 and 2013 SPU memoranda required the Warden or executive staff to first 

consult with the Chief Psychologist prior to assigning an inmate to the SPU for population control 

reasons, they did not require advance notification when assigning a non-mental health inmate to the 

SPU for the other reasons. We learned that the 2015 SPU memorandum now requires that the 

referring department first consult with the Chief Psychologist or SPU Coordinator for all non-mental 

(Cont’d.) 

10
 
 

 

 

 

 

told us that he knew the Chief Psychologist always opposed housing inmates in the 

SPU who did not have a legitimate mental health condition, but he believed that the 

SPU was their best option for Wilson. 

The Chief Psychologist told us that she did not agree with the decision to 

house Wilson in the SPU: She identified him as a manipulative inmate who might 

victimize the SPU inmates who did have mental health conditions. Specifically, she 

told us that she had concerns about inmates like Wilson in the SPU because “many 

of the inmates housed there have mental retardation issues that make them 

especially vulnerable to be victimized by higher functioning inmates and inmates 

with anti-social characteristics.” The former Warden told us that he recalled the 

Chief Psychologist expressing these concerns but said he never heard anything 

about Wilson’s behavior in the SPU that would have warranted his reassignment to 

another unit. 

Neither SPU Procedures nor Management Provided the Additional Guidance To 

Prevent or Detect Wilson’s Disruption of the Unit’s Safety and Security 

SPU Procedures Do Not Contain Guidance for Managing Inmates Who Do Not 

Have Mental Health Conditions 

We found that MDC Brooklyn staff recognized the SPU as a smaller unit 

where inmates could be more closely monitored but that SPU procedures did not 

provide guidance for managing inmates without mental health conditions who were 

potentially disruptive to the unit. We reviewed the 2011 and 2013 SPU 

memoranda, which included two attachments that offered additional guidance and 

special instructions to Correctional Officers on how to manage SPU inmates with 

mental health conditions. For example, one attachment, entitled Special Programs 

Unit Inmate Management: Guidelines for Unit Officer, instructed staff not to take 

“what [inmates] say or do personally” and to “set limits on behavior, not on 

people.” While this additional guidance might have assisted staff in monitoring the 

inmates in the unit who did have mental health conditions, neither the SPU 

memoranda nor its attachments provided guidance for managing inmates like 

Wilson, who did not have a mental health condition and could potentially intimidate 

and manipulate the vulnerable inmates in the SPU. 

We learned that, in the absence of specific guidance in the SPU memoranda, 

staff believed they could closely monitor inmates based largely on the unit’s smaller 

size. For example, when we asked MDC Brooklyn staff how they interpreted 

management’s belief that inmates would be “more closely monitored,” almost 

uniformly they told us that this meant having fewer inmates to watch rather than 

taking additional steps or following different procedures. For example, a Lieutenant 

told us that he felt “the smaller number of inmates made a big difference.” 

According to another Lieutenant, the fact that there is a psychology staff office 

immediately outside of the SPU is another way that the unit can provide closer 

health placements in the SPU. Chief Psychologist, MDC Brooklyn, memorandum to Warden, 

Operational Procedures for Unit K-81, Special Programs Unit, January 14, 2015. 

11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

monitoring. However, these examples did not reveal any guidance or instructions 

on how to manage inmates like Wilson whom the BOP did not classify as needing 

mental health services. 

MDC Brooklyn Management Did Not Instruct SPU Staff To Manage Wilson 

Differently than the Other Inmates in the SPU 

While management believed Wilson could be managed closely because of the 

smaller size of the SPU, they did not issue any instructions to SPU staff to help 

prevent or detect Wilson’s alleged disruptive behavior. Without special instructions, 

staff told us that they managed all SPU inmates, including Wilson, in the same way. 

When we asked the former Warden whether there were additional instructions 

issued to staff about Wilson, he said that while he is generally not the person who 

would have given any special instructions or safeguards, he did not recall any 

discussion about issuing special instructions. Further, the Captain, as well as some 

of the staff we interviewed, expressed the view that generally Correctional Officers 

should monitor every inmate the same as every other inmate. The SPU 

Coordinator also told us that, even when a “high-profile” inmate is assigned to the 

SPU, that inmate should be managed the same as any other inmate. 

Similarly, all of the Correctional Officers we interviewed told us that they did 

not receive any specific instructions from management to monitor Wilson 

differently. All but one of the Correctional Officers who responded to the question 

told us that they did not monitor Wilson differently than other SPU inmates. The 

exception is that one Correctional Officer told us that a Lieutenant said that Wilson 

was a “cop killer” and that he “should watch him around other inmates.” He also 

said that he did pay more attention to Wilson because he was sensitive to the 

nature of Wilson’s crime and that he was aware of Wilson being previously assigned 

to the SHU. 

Although MDC Brooklyn management did not issue any special instructions to 

SPU staff on how to manage Wilson, we learned that management can issue special 

instructions for certain inmates housed in the SPU if they feel the circumstances 

warrant them. For example, we learned that the Captain had placed two inmates 

assigned to the SPU on a “two-hour watch” for their own safety because they had 

been threatened by other inmates. The 2-hour watch requires an inmate to check 

in with a Correctional Officer every 2 hours from the time he is out of his cell in the 

morning until he is locked in at night; that Correctional Officer then notifies the 

control center that the inmate has checked in and is safe. According to the 

Captain, these two inmates were placed on 2-hour watch because gang members 

had threatened to kill them and the institution was concerned about their safety. 

Although the 2-hour watch was not required for Wilson, the Captain told us that if 

in the future he had an inmate like Wilson who could not be housed in the SHU, he 

would place him in the SPU with a 2-hour watch so he would know what he was 

doing at all times. 

We also found that Wilson’s inclusion in the electronic Posted Picture File 

(PPF), which BOP requires security staff to review regularly, did not require staff to 

take any additional specific monitoring actions, and that no such additional 

12
 
 

 

 

 

guidance was given even though the PPF is used to identify inmates who, among 

other things, pose a threat to inmates or staff. We learned that inmates are 

included in the PPF for various reasons which might or might not indicate that they 

should be managed in different ways.29 For example, if an inmate was included 

because of a history of escape, a Correctional Officer should monitor that inmate as 

a potential escape risk. In addition, the Warden told us that staff should be 

reviewing the PPF for their own safety. For example, the Warden told us that at 

one point terrorists were the largest group of inmates in the PPF and that staff 

should know who the terrorists are so if they see them congregating they can keep 

a closer eye on them. MDC Brooklyn management could not tell us the specific 

reason that Wilson was included in the PPF because at the time of our review, MDC 

Brooklyn no longer retained his PPF.30 However, we believe it is likely Wilson was in 

the PPF because of the nature of his crime, for murdering two police detectives. 

One Correctional Officer told us that there is no requirement to watch inmates in 

the PPF more closely and most of the Correctional Officers we interviewed told us 

that they did not manage Wilson differently because he was in the PPF. 

We recognize the constraints that MDC Brooklyn faced in housing Wilson and 

understand the factors that led to management’s decision to assign him to the SPU. 

Nevertheless, we found that management failed to issue any additional instructions 

to SPU staff that may have helped prevent or detect Wilson’s alleged disruptive 

behavior. While we are unable to determine the extent to which a 2-hour watch or 

a similar enhanced surveillance procedure would have prevented Wilson’s disruptive 

behavior, the fact that special instructions can be issued to Correctional Officers 

about managing certain SPU inmates demonstrates that additional controls for 

managing Wilson could have been put in place. 

Although the Extent of the Inmates’ Allegations Could Not Be Substantiated, Wilson 

May Have Engaged in Disruptive Behavior without the Staff Being Aware of It 

The fact that Wilson engaged in a sexual relationship with Gonzalez was, in 

and of itself, a disruption to the safety and security of the SPU and a very serious 

concern. We could not determine the extent to which Wilson engaged in additional 

disruptive behavior — including manipulating other staff — because we were unable 

to corroborate inmate testimony.31 However, we found that while most MDC 

29 According to the BOP’s PPF policy, the PPF is used “to identify inmates or detainees who, 

because of prior record, current offense, institution adjustment, or other factors, pose a significant 

threat to inmate or staff safety, the institution’s security, or the surrounding community’s welfare.” 

See BOP Program Statement 5510.13, Posted Picture File (August 22, 2011). 

30 When an inmate is transferred to another BOP institution, the receiving instution may alter 

the PPF based on its assessment; therefore, the PPF may not remain the same. 

31 We also looked into the inmates’ allegations that Wilson manipulated a Psychologist into 

making certain cell assignments that were advantageous to Wilson, including allowing him to keep his 

excess legal material in an empty cell, having empty cells on either side of his cell, and being assigned 

to a cell by himself. While we learned that this Psychologist (the SPU Coordinator) had some 

responsibility for making cell assignments in the SPU, we could not substantiate that Wilson 

manipulated her because our interviewees provided conflicting information about who allowed Wilson 

to use an empty cell for his legal materials. With regard to having empty cells on either side of his 

(Cont’d.) 

13
 
 

 

 

Brooklyn staff did not recall any serious behavioral issues with Wilson while he was 

in the SPU, they believed that he could have disrupted the unit without them being 

aware of his behavior. 

Most Staff Said They Did Not Recall Serious Behavioral Issues with Wilson in 

the SPU 

Of the Correctional Officers assigned to the SPU while Wilson was housed 

there, none of those we interviewed said they could recall any serious incidents 

involving Wilson that would have warranted writing an incident report or a need to 

communicate to management while he was in the SPU. Some staff said they 

recalled Wilson as well behaved and polite. For example, one staff member said 

that Wilson kept to himself and another described him as “just another person on 

the unit.” Correctional Officers also told us they did not recall seeing Wilson 

manipulate or bully other inmates, and a former SPU Unit Manager said that he did 

not recall any complaints from SPU inmates about Wilson, including complaints that 

Wilson was bullying them. 

However, the Chief Psychologist did recall that an inmate told her about 

Wilson bullying a transgender inmate in the SPU. She said she counselled Wilson 

about homophobic behavior being inappropriate and divisive to the unit and said 

that he seemed receptive. Further, two staff members recalled complaints 

involving Wilson’s responsibilities as a food orderly. For example, the SPU 

Coordinator said that inmates complained that Wilson was giving them small 

servings of food but she dismissed these complaints because she had heard similar 

complaints about the previous orderly. 

Documentation Did Not Further Corroborate Inmate Testimony Regarding 

Wilson’s Alleged Behavior 

We examined Wilson’s Central File and the SPU’s unit log and did not find any 

incident reports or log notations that would confirm the inmates’ allegations of 

Wilson’s manipulative and intimidating behavior.32 Inmates’ central files contain 

records of all incident reports an inmate has incurred while incarcerated by the 

BOP, and Wilson’s does not include any for the time that he was in the SPU for his 

death penalty resentencing. Similarly, we reviewed the unit log for this time and 

did not find any notations about Wilson’s behavior that verified the inmates’ 

allegations and concerns. The unit log is a record of all “pertinent information 

regarding inmate activity, detailing time, individuals involved, and the event” that 

occurred during a given shift. SPU post orders require Correctional Officers to 

complete log entries for every shift. The Captain advised us that while staff had 

cell, the Psychologist told us that this was because these empty cells leaked when it rained so they 

could not be used to house inmates. In addition, the Psychologist also said that she would give stable 

inmates cellmates last to ensure that unstable inmates had cellmates in order to help prevent suicide. 

32 The BOP maintains complete information on all inmates confined in BOP institutions in an 

Inmate Central File. See BOP Program Statement 5800.17, Inmate Central File, Privacy Folder, and 

Parole Mini-Files (April 3, 2015). 

14
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

discretion about what to record regarding inmate behavior, bullying should be 

recorded in the unit log. The only two notations we found about Wilson — one 

involving control of the television and the other a conflict with other inmates — are 

both unclear and suggest that the Correctional Officers who made the notations did 

not perceive Wilson as the instigator of these incidents. 

Wilson May Have Disrupted the Unit without Incurring Incident Reports or the 

Staff Being Aware of His Behavior 

We asked the staff if it was possible that Wilson could have engaged in the 

alleged bullying and manipulative behavior without them being aware of it. They 

told us that they viewed Wilson as savvy enough to engage in negative behavior in 

ways that staff either did not notice or did not deem necessary to take action. For 

example, one Lieutenant told us that she believed Wilson knew better than to “get 

stupid in front of a Lieutenant.” Another Lieutenant told us that he believed Wilson 

was careful not to act aggressively when staff could observe him because he knew 

he would be sent to the SHU. In addition, a Correctional Officer told us that she 

heard that Wilson was bullying other inmates by controlling the television and 

handing out food seconds only to select inmates; but, because she did not actually 

observe this alleged behavior, she could not do anything about it. A Psychologist 

also told us that while he believed Wilson was “up to something,” and that he was 

always watching Wilson for an excuse to remove him from the unit, he said that he 

did not observe anything that would warrant writing an incident report. 

Further, MDC Brooklyn staff told us that inmates are sometimes reluctant to 

complain to them about other inmates. The Chief Psychologist told us that inmates 

are often afraid to complain about another inmate until that inmate leaves the unit. 

The SPU Coordinator told us that she receives complaints from inmates about other 

inmates bothering them but that when she tries to obtain more information so she 

can address it, the reporting inmate will say “I am no snitch” and refuse to provide 

additional information. The Captain speculated that inmates in housing units other 

than the SPU would have spoken up about another inmate monopolizing the unit 

television, while SPU inmates might not say anything to staff. Similarly, another 

Lieutenant said he thought inmates in the SPU were “not going to come out and 

make allegations” against Wilson even if he was doing things like monopolizing the 

television. 

Two security officials told us that in retrospect they believe Wilson may have 

had some degree of control in the SPU that they were unaware of at the time. For 

example, the Captain told us that he believed that Wilson “ran the heck out of that 

place.” A Lieutenant told us that he understands why SPU inmates said Wilson 

controlled the unit television and microwave and said he believed that, as a gang 

member in a unit with inmates who were easily preyed upon, Wilson could have 

been “running the unit.” 

15
 
 

During Our Review, Management Took Steps To Improve Communication 

Related to the Safety and Security of MDC Brooklyn; However, Areas of 

Concern Remain 

During our review, we identified several areas of concern related to 

communication that we believe MDC Brooklyn should address. Although we did not 

find that all of these deficiencies directly led or contributed to the misconduct that 

led to our review, the issues we identified relate to the safety and security of the 

institution. First, we found that staff were not aware of and may not have received 

specific directives that applied to the SPU. Second, we found that certain directives 

in place at the time of our review did not ensure that Correctional Officers routinely 

conducted searches of all unit cells. Third, policy was unclear regarding how sealed 

inmate complaints placed in housing units’ mailboxes along with outgoing mail 

should be handled. Finally, we found that MDC Brooklyn could improve its 

procedures and methods to ensure relevant security information is consistently 

shared across shifts and housing units. During the course of our review, MDC 

Brooklyn management began to address some of the concerns we identified. 

Not All Staff Were Aware of and Had Read the SPU Memoranda 

We found that MDC Brooklyn management did not ensure that all staff 

assigned to the SPU were aware of the SPU memorandum, which provides guidance 

on managing inmates in the unit. As discussed previously, we learned that the SPU 

memorandum was issued in 2011 and updated in 2013 and 2015. However, most 

staff we interviewed who had worked in the SPU said they were unfamiliar with any 

version of the memorandum. We note that until the 2015 revision, the SPU 

memorandum was not required to be included in the unit’s post orders that 

Correctional Officers are required to sign to indicate that they have read the orders 

prior to their first shift in the unit.33 The Warden informed us that the SPU 

memorandum was revised in January 2015 to remove redundant information. We 

also found that there were other significant changes to the 2015 SPU 

memorandum, including a new requirement that the referring department, i.e., 

medical or security, consult with the Chief Psychologist or the SPU Coordinator prior 

to placing inmates without mental health conditions in the unit.34 We reviewed the 

post orders during an observation of the SPU in January 2015 and found that the 

2015 SPU memorandum was now included. We later learned that management 

notified staff about the 2015 SPU memorandum by emailing it to them about 

5 weeks after it was issued; but, because the notification occurred after we 

completed our fieldwork, we could not verify that all staff members were 

aware of it. 

33 Post orders are general instructions designed to aid the Correctional Officer in the daily 

operation of each custodial post. 

34 We also learned that, under current practice, if there is a disagreement between the 

referring department and the Chief Psychologist and/or SPU Coordinator on an inmate’s placement in 

the SPU, there is a team meeting. After careful review, the Chief Psychologist makes the final 

decision. However, the Warden retains discretion to place an inmate in the SPU. 

16
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Post Orders in Place at the Time of Our Review Did Not Ensure that Correctional 

Officers Routinely Conducted Searches of All Cells in Housing Units 

Despite the importance of housing unit cell searches to the safety and 

security of the institution, post orders in place at the time of our fieldwork did not 

provide Correctional Officers with clear policy to ensure that all cells in the unit 

were searched regularly.35 When we asked the BOP Central Office what was 

required of Correctional Officers regarding searches during their shifts, the 

Administrator of the Correctional Services Branch, Correctional Programs Division 

told us that “typically, the requirement is that the Correctional Officer search five 

areas at a minimum in the housing unit, but the number of search areas is dictated 

by the Captain.”36 However, the Captain at MDC Brooklyn told us that the number 

of searches a Correctional Officer has to conduct per shift is "open" and that, while 

Correctional Officers were previously required to search five cells, the current 

requirement does not mandate a specific number of searches. 

When we asked MDC Brooklyn Correctional Officers about the number of cell 

searches they are required to conduct during their shifts, none of the Correctional 

Officers we interviewed were aware that there was not a specific number required, 

nor were they aware of where information on the search policy was located. 

Several Correctional Officers told us that they are supposed to do five cell searches 

during a shift. When we asked where that is documented, one Correctional Officer 

told us that he remembered reading it somewhere (perhaps in the post orders) but 

he could not recall for sure. Another Correctional Officer suggested that it might be 

in the post orders or it might have come from a training class he took years ago. 

Further, the Deputy Captain and most of the Correctional Officers we interviewed 

were still under the impression that Correctional Officers were required to conduct a 

minimum of five searches each shift. Although the staff generally assumed that the 

requirement was to conduct five searches each shift, there was no systematic way 

to ensure that the same five cells were not searched repeatedly, thereby potentially 

leaving some cells without having been searched over a significant time period. 

After our fieldwork was completed, we learned that on February 23, 2015, 

MDC Brooklyn management revised the post orders to clarify the cell search 

requirements. The new post orders do not require a specific number of searches 

per shift, but they specify that all cells in the unit will be searched within a 30-day 

period. In addition, it appears that the BOP’s institution management system, 

called TRUSCOPE, will help Correctional Officers ensure that all cells within each 

unit are searched in a timely fashion.37 Specifically, we observed during our 

fieldwork that TRUSCOPE has the capability to allow Correctional Officers to sort a 

35 MDC Brooklyn staff are required to read and sign the post orders prior to assuming the post 

for the first time each quarter. 

36 The BOP’s Central Office is in Washington, D.C. 

37 TRUSCOPE is a software application within the BOP’s TRUNET program. TRUSCOPE 

provides institution staff with detailed inmate and institution security-related information and provides 

unit officers an electronic event log. According to the BOP’s Central Office, the Northeast Region, 

which includes MDC Brooklyn, activated TRUSCOPE on July 28, 2014. 

17
 
 

 

 

 

 

unit’s search log by the last date that cells were searched. We believe that if 

TRUSCOPE is fully implemented as intended it will allow MDC Brooklyn to ensure 

that all cells are searched within a 30-day period, as required in the revised post 

order. 

Policy Is Unclear Regarding How To Handle Sealed Inmate Complaints 

During our review, we examined the policy and procedures for handling 

sealed inmate complaints addressed to staff that are placed in unit mailboxes. This 

was relevant to our review because an inmate testified that he and another inmate 

had placed an anonymous, sealed complaint in the SPU’s mailbox to report the 

relationship between Gonzalez and Wilson, as well as Wilson’s inappropriate 

behavior toward inmates, and that Wilson had received the intercepted complaint. 

The alleged complaint was addressed to the Captain; but, according to the inmate’s 

testimony, Wilson somehow gained possession of the handwritten complaint and 

attempted to determine who submitted it by comparing SPU inmates’ handwriting 

with the complaint. The OIG Investigations Division investigated but could not 

substantiate the possibility that a Correctional Officer gave the inmates’ complaint 

to Gonzalez, who subsequently gave it to Wilson. 

We learned that staff members inconsistently understand how sealed inmate 

complaints addressed to staff and placed in housing units’ mailboxes should be 

handled, and that there is no policy establishing the institution’s procedures for 

handling those complaints. Correctional Officers and Lieutenants we interviewed 

were unclear about how to handle sealed inmate complaints in the unit’s mailbox. 

One Correctional Officer stated that he would not open sealed internal mail if it was 

addressed to the Captain, while another stated that all mail in the unit mailbox 

should be opened by the morning shift Correctional Officer.38 Another Correctional 

Officer believed that only legal mail and internal mail to the BOP’s Special 

Investigative Services could be left sealed and unopened. Lieutenants were also 

uncertain as to whether sealed internal mail in the unit mailbox should be opened. 

One Lieutenant stated that he would not open sealed internal mail but would give it 

to the Captain, while another Lieutenant believed that all mail placed in the mailbox 

should be unsealed. 

Further, we found that neither the BOP nor MDC Brooklyn policy regarding 

the handling of inmate mail specifically deals with inmate complaints addressed to 

staff and placed in a unit’s mailbox. The BOP’s relevant Program Statement 

acknowledges that inmates are permitted to make written requests to staff 

members, but it does not provide any guidance on how those requests should be 

handled.39 

While MDC Brooklyn management now allows inmates to report complaints 

electronically through TRULINCS, including directly to the Warden, we remain 

38 Some staff referred to internal mail or mail that is sent to staff or MDC Brooklyn 

departments as “cop outs.” 

39 See BOP Program Statement 5511.07, Request to Staff, Inmate (August 14, 1998). 

18
 
 

 

 

 

concerned that MDC Brooklyn has not implemented guidance to ensure the 

confidentiality of sealed inmate complaints placed in the unit mailbox are consistent 

with institutional security requirements and specifically instructs staff on how to 

handle complaints they receive through housing units’ mailboxes, especially in light 

of the inmates’ allegations that their complaint was intercepted in this case.40 

Certain Methods for Ensuring that Relevant Information Is Shared Across the 

Institution Could Be Improved 

While MDC Brooklyn shares relevant information across the institution in a 

variety of ways, we found that two communication methods could be improved. 

One concern involves information from the Warden’s Monday morning briefings 

getting to staff who cannot attend the briefings, and the other involves the 

inconsistency with which Lieutenants conduct regular conference calls with 

Correctional Officers. 

The Warden told us that she instituted Monday morning briefings upon her 

arrival at MDC Brooklyn to make herself available to staff and to provide staff with 

relevant information each week. For the first few months, the institution posted the 

Monday morning briefing minutes both on Sallyport and as an icon on staff desktop 

computers so that staff who could not attend the briefings would have access to the 

information that was presented.41 After a few months, however, MDC Brooklyn 

management stopped updating the desktop icon and began posting the minutes in 

TRUSCOPE instead. While several staff we interviewed recalled viewing the minutes 

on their desktop initially, they said that they assumed the Warden had stopped 

having the Monday morning briefings because they no longer saw the minutes. 

Additionally, other staff said they were unaware that meeting minutes are now 

available in TRUSCOPE.42 

Further, staff told us that Lieutenants hold conference calls with Correctional 

Officers at each post to pass along information and that the frequency of the calls 

depended on the Lieutenant. While a Lieutenant told us that the conference calls 

are usually done each shift, Correctional Officers told us that some Lieutenants hold 

conference calls daily, some weekly, and some every 3 weeks. In addition, another 

Lieutenant told us that he “stopped doing conference calls [during] the day shift 

because someone on the call keeps hanging up causing the phone to make beeping 

sounds.” Moreover, most Lieutenants we interviewed told us that they prefer to 

communicate information, especially sensitive information, to Correctional Officers 

40 According to a BOP Program Statement, the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System 

(TRULINCS) provides inmates with a computer system that does not jeopardize the safety, security, 

orderly operation of the correctional facility, or the protection of the public or staff. BOP Program 

Statement 4500.11, Trust Fund/Deposit Fund Manual (April 9, 2015). Wardens have discretion as to 

whether they allow inmates to email them directly. 

41 Sallyport is the BOP’s internal, centrally operated electronic depository of reference 

information published independently by multiple BOP sites and disciplines. 

42 In July 2014, the Monday morning briefing minutes started being entered into TRUSCOPE 

and were no longer placed on staff desktop computers. 

19
 
 

in person while visiting each unit, though we were not told and did not assess how 

often this occurs in practice. 

Timely, consistent communication between management and staff is vital to 

the safe, secure operation of any correctional facility. We are thus concerned that 

relevant security information, including what is discussed at the Warden’s Monday 

morning briefings, may not be consistently or timely shared with MDC Brooklyn 

staff because staff do not know where to find the briefing minutes and because 

Lieutenants are not consistently conducting conference calls or taking similar steps 

to provide them necessary information. 

20
 
 

 

 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Conclusion 

Overall, we believe the events the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 

of New York noted in Ronell Wilson’s resentencing opinion are due in large measure 

to the criminal actions of former Correctional Officer Nancy Gonzalez and the 

alleged misconduct of another Correctional Officer. We found that MDC Brooklyn 

management placed Wilson in the Special Programs Unit (SPU) because they 

recognized the need to closely monitor him and believed that his vacated death 

sentence and a court order requiring MDC Brooklyn to house him in general 

population during a previous incarceration prevented housing him in the Special 

Housing Unit on a continual basis. While SPU procedures allow inmates like Wilson 

to be housed in this unit, which primarily houses inmates with mental health 

conditions, we found that neither policies nor management provided any safeguards 

or guidance on how to manage Wilson differently while he was there. As a result, 

SPU staff generally did not manage Wilson differently than other inmates. Further, 

while it is clear that Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez disrupted the safety and 

security of the institution, we could not determine to what extent the alleged 

bullying and manipulation actually occurred because staff statements and the unit’s 

documentation that we reviewed do not further corroborate them. 

During the course of our review, we also identified some areas in MDC 

Brooklyn’s ability to communicate information across shifts and housing units that 

could be improved. Though we did not find that all of these deficiencies directly 

contributed to the misconduct that led to our review, MDC Brooklyn has begun to 

address them. We found that MDC Brooklyn issued a revised SPU procedures 

memorandum in January 2015, making it part of the post orders directing the staff 

in the SPU; however, some staff did not recall ever seeing this version or any 

previous versions. We also found that certain post orders in place at the time of 

our review did not ensure that Correctional Officers routinely searched all housing 

unit cells. Further, we found that policy is unclear regarding the handling of sealed 

inmate complaints placed in housing units’ mailboxes. Although there is now an 

electronic method that allows inmates to send complaints directly to specific 

departments in MDC Brooklyn, as well as to the Warden, there has been no 

clarification as to how staff should handle inmate complaints that have been placed 

in the unit mailbox to ensure their confidentiality in a way that is consistent with 

institutional security requirements. 

Finally, we found that MDC Brooklyn could improve its methods for ensuring 

relevant security information is consistently shared across shifts and housing units. 

For example, the Warden at MDC Brooklyn instituted Monday morning briefings 

with staff; but staff were not aware, after the first few months, that the meetings 

were still being held or that the minutes summarizing the information from those 

briefings were still available. Lieutenants can also use a conference call to pass 

relevant information along to staff at the beginning of each shift; however, we 

learned these conference calls or other efforts to convey security information do not 

occur consistently. 

21
 
 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Bureau of Prisons work with MDC Brooklyn to: 

1.	 Include information in the Special Programs Unit memorandum on how to 

manage those inmates assigned to the SPU who are potentially disruptive 

and do not have a mental health condition. 

2.	 Consider implementing additional safeguards whenever a potentially 

disruptive inmate without a mental health condition is placed in the SPU. 

3.	 Establish guidance and procedures that staff at MDC Brooklyn should follow 

that ensure the confidentiality of sealed inmate complaints placed in unit 

mailboxes are consistent with institutional security requirements, and ensure 

staff are notified of the new guidance. 

4.	 Ensure that clear procedures are in place and communicated to staff at MDC 

Brooklyn to ensure searches of all housing unit cells are regularly conducted. 

5.	 Consider additional steps to ensure that relevant security information is 

communicated to MDC Brooklyn staff consistently and effectively. 

22
 
 

 

 

APPENDIX 1 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW 

In this review, the OIG examined the policies, practices, and procedures in 

place at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (MDC Brooklyn) 

between March 2011 and August 2012, the time cited in U.S. District Judge 

Nicholas Garaufis’s September 10, 2013 opinion regarding the resentencing of 

Ronell Wilson. Our review focused on what could have contributed to allowing 

Wilson to disrupt the safety and security of inmates and staff in the Special 

Programs Unit (SPU) where Wilson was housed during this time, and whether any 

such issues reflected more general problems that need to be addressed at the 

facility. Our fieldwork, conducted from April 2014 through March 2015, included 

interviewing current and former MDC Brooklyn officials regarding policies, practices, 

and procedures at the institution and for the SPU; conducting site visits to MDC 

Brooklyn; and reviewing documents. The following sections provide additional 

information about our methodology. 

Interviews 

We interviewed current and former Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials 

regarding their roles in management, policy, training, and oversight of inmates 

housed in federal custody. We also interviewed BOP Central Office managers of the 

Correctional Programs and Correctional Services Branches to understand the 

policies regarding inmate use of amenities such as the television, telephone, 

computer, exercise room, commissary, library, and law library. We spoke to 

subject matter experts from the Policy Development and Planning Section; the 

Industries, Education & Vocational Training Division; the Health Services Division; 

and the Trust Fund Branch. 

We also interviewed one of the OIG Special Agents who investigated the 

relationship between then Correctional Officer Nancy Gonzalez and Wilson. We 

attempted to interview Gonzalez in April 2014, but she declined our request on the 

advice of counsel. 

Site Visits 

We visited MDC Brooklyn on two occasions: once in May 2014 and a followup visit in February 2015. During our visits, we interviewed a total of 27 staff 

members, including the Warden, the Captain, four Lieutenants, the institution’s 

Health Services Administrator, as well as Correctional Officers, unit management 

staff, and psychology department staff who worked in the SPU at the time the 

incidents discussed in the resentencing statement occurred and currently. Our 

interviews pertained to the procedures, practices, oversight, training, and 

communication of policies, procedures, and security information throughout the 

institution. We also interviewed three inmates who were assigned to SPU during 

the time Wilson was housed in that unit. In addition, we conducted an onsite 

inspection of the SPU during both site visits. 

23
 
 

APPENDIX 1 

Document Review 

We reviewed BOP and MDC Brooklyn policy and guidance pertaining to the 

management of the SPU and other housing units. We also examined the unit logs 

for the SPU housing unit from March 2011 through August 2012, the time Wilson 

was assigned to the unit, and received a brief tutorial of the new electronic unit 

logs, referred to as TRUSCOPE, that MDC Brooklyn implemented in July 2014. To 

understand the scope of sexual abuse allegations made against BOP staff members, 

we also reviewed the BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs data regarding allegations of 

sexual abuse of inmates. 

24
 
APPENDIX 2 

THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

25
 

u.s. Deplr1menl of JUJtlce 

Federal Bureau of Prisons 

Augu5t 21, 2015 

MEMORANDUM FOR NINA PELLETIER 

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FOR EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS 

FROM: Charles ~~ E. Samuels, Jr., Direct.or 

Federal Bureau of Prisons 

SUBJECT, Response to the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) 

Formal Draft Audit Report: Review of t.he Management 

of the Special Programll Unit at. the Federal Bureau 

of Prisona Metropolitan Detent.ion Center in 

Brooklyn, New York, Assignment Number A 2014-006 

The Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) appreciates the opportunity to respond 

to the open recommendat.ions from the formal draft report entitled, 

Review of the Management of the Special Programs Unit at the Fede~al 

Bureau of Prisona Metropolitan Detention Cente r (MDe) in Brooklyn, 

New York. 

As detailed below. the Bureau agrees with the recommendations of the 

Office ot Inspector General (DIG), and appreciates the efforts of 

the investigators to provide recommendations based on evidence 

obtained through their observations. review of policies and 

procedures, and interviews with BOP staff, regarding Special 

Programs Unit (SPU) operations. 

The Bureau remains concerned, however, that as a public document, 

the DIG report does not provide a mor~ detailed r~view and analysis 

of the impact on MDC Brooklyn op~rations caused by the orders of the 

Court in Ronell Wilson's criminal case. During both of inmate 
2 

APPENDIX 2 

26 

Wilson's periods of confinement at HOC Brooklyn, t.he court restricted 

HOC Brooklyn ' s exercise of its correctional judgment by prohibiting 

inmate wilson's placement in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) other 

thsn for disciplinary reasons. See, Order, February 9, 2006; and 

Transcript of Criminal Cause for Conf'~rence, October 5, 2012. The 

Bureau believes it is important for the report to reflect that, but 

for the restrictions placed on HOC Brooklyn's correctional judgment 

on where and ho .... best to house inmate: wileon, the unla .... ful sexua l 

relationship that resulted might nevl!!:r have occurred . 

Please find the Bureau's response to the recommendations belo .... , 

a.c:oaaend.ation '1 : Include informaticm in the Special Programs Unit 

memorandum on how to manage those inmates assigned to the SPU who 

are potentially disruptive and do not have a mental health condition. 

Initial Re.pon •• : The Bureau agrees with thb recommendation. The 

staff at MOe Brooklyn are exploring n~ifications consistent with 

national policy. and the projected implementation is October 1, 2015. 

a.comm.ndation '2 : Consider lmplementing additional safeguards 

whenever a potentially disruptive inn~te without a mental health 

condition is placed in the SPU. 

Initial Re.pon •• ; The Bureau agrees with this recom:nendation. The 

staff at MOe Brooklyn are explorlng modifications consistent with 

national policy, and: the projected implementation is October 1, 2015. 

Rec~nd&ti n '3 : Establish guidanc.! and procedures that staff at 

MDC Brooklyn should folIo .... that ensure the confidentiality of sealed 

inmate complaints placed in unit mailboxes are conaistent .... ith 

institutional security requirements, ,!lnd ensure staff are notified 

of the new guidance. 

Initial R •• pon •• ; The Bureau agrees with this recommendation. The 

staff at MOe Brooklyn will explore o~,tions for local guidance and 

procedures in light of applicable nati(mat policies for the handling 

of sealed inmate complaints and given the unique nature of its various 

hOUsing units. The projected date fc'r implementing these changes 

is October 1, ~015. 

ReCOlllllL8nclation '4 : Ensure that cleat· procedures are in place and 

communicated to staff at HOC Brooklyn to ensure searches of all 

housing unit cells are regularly conducted . 
3 

APPENDIX 2 

27 

Ini tial Response: The Bureau agrees with this recommendation. The 

staff at MOe Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and 

procedures in light of applicable national policies for cell 

searches . The proj ected date for implementing these changes is 

October 1, 2015. 

Recommendation #5: Consider additional steps to ensure that 

relevant security information i s communicated to Moe Brooklyn staff 

consistently and effectively. 

Initial Response : The Bureau agrees with this recommendation. The 

staff at MDe Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and 

procedures in l i ght of applicable national policies, and the unique 

challenge of sharing relevant security information with staff 

throughout the facility . The proj ected da t e for implementing these 

changes is October 1, 2015. 

If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact 

Sara M. Revell, Assistant Director, Program Review Division, at 

(202) 353-2302. 
 

 

 

APPENDIX 3 

OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP’S RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to 

the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for its comment. The BOP’s response is in 

Appendix 2 to this report. We discuss the OIG analysis of BOP’s response and 

actions necessary to close the recommendations below. 

The BOP’s General Comments 

BOP Comment: The BOP stated that it remains concerned that the OIG’s 

report does not provide a more detailed review and analysis of the impact on MDC 

Brooklyn operations caused by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 

New York in Ronell Wilson’s criminal case. The BOP stated that during both of 

Wilson’s periods of confinement at MDC Brookyln, the court restricted MDC 

Brooklyn’s exercise of its correctional judgment by prohibiting inmate Wilson’s 

placement in the Special Housing unit (SHU) other than for disciplinary reasons, on 

February 9, 2006 and October 5, 2012. The Bureau believes it is important for the 

report to reflect that, but for the restrictions placed on MDC Brooklyn’s correctional 

judgment on where and how best to house inmate Wilson, the unlawful sexual 

relationship that resulted might never have occurred. 

OIG Analysis: The OIG report discusses that MDC Brooklyn management 

recognized the need to closely monitor Ronell Wilson and that they would have 

preferred to assign him to the SHU. It also states that the OIG learned that 

management believed they could not consider SHU placement because the court 

had vacated Wilson’s death sentence and because of the previous court order on 

February 9, 2006, that required MDC Brooklyn to remove him from the SHU. 

However, the BOP incorrectly identifies the October 5, 2012, court order as relevant 

to the events we reviewed because these events took place between March 30, 

2011 and August 3, 2012. Therefore, the October 5, 2012, court order was not a 

factor in our review or the unlawful sexual relationship between Ronell Wilson and 

Nancy Gonzalez. 

The BOP’s Response to Recommendations 

 Recommendation 1: Include information in the Special Programs Unit 

memorandum on how to manage those inmates assigned to the SPU who are 

potentially disruptive and do not have a mental health condition.

 Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that staff at MDC Brooklyn are exploring modifications consistent with national 

policy. The BOP stated that the projected implementation date is October 1, 2015. 

 OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By January 4, 2016, please provide a copy of the revised SPU memorandum that 

28
 
 

 

 

APPENDIX 3 

includes information on how to manage those inmates who are potentially 

disruptive and do not have a mental health condition. In addition, please provide 

documentation, including dates, that shows MDC Brooklyn management notified 

staff of the revised memorandum. 

 Recommendation 2: Consider implementing additional safeguards 

whenever a potentially disruptive inmate without a mental health condition is 

placed in the SPU. 

 Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that the staff at MDC Brooklyn is exploring modifications consistent with national 

policy. The BOP stated that the projected implementation date is October 1, 2015. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By January 4, 2016, please provide a summary of the additional safeguards the 

BOP considered and/or implemented when potentially disruptive inmates without a 

mental health condition are placed in the SPU. In addition, please provide 

documentation that shows that MDC Brooklyn staff were notified of any changes. 

 Recommendation 3: Establish guidance and procedures that staff at MDC 

Brooklyn should follow that ensure the confidentiality of sealed inmate complaints 

placed in unit mailboxes are consistent with institutional security requirements, and 

ensure staff are notified of the new guidance. 

 Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that the staff at MDC Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and 

procedures in light of applicable national policies for the handling of sealed inmate 

complaints and given the unique nature of its various housing units. BOP stated 

that the projected implementation date for these changes is October 1, 2015. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By January 4, 2016, please provide documentation that includes the guidance and 

procedures that MDC Brooklyn implemented to ensure the confidentiality of sealed 

inmate complaints. In addition, please provide documentation that shows that MDC 

Brooklyn staff were notified of the new guidance and procedures. 

Recommendation 4: Ensure that clear procedures are in place and 

communicated to staff at MDC Brooklyn to ensure searches of all housing unit cells 

are regularly conducted. 

 Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that staff at MDC Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and procedures in 

29
 
 

 

APPENDIX 3 

light of applicable national policies for cell searches. The BOP stated that the 

projected implementation date for these changes is October 1, 2015. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By January 4, 2016, please provide documentation that includes the guidance and 

procedures that MDC Brooklyn implemented to ensure that clear procedures are in 

place and communicated to staff to ensure searches of all housing unit cells are 

regularly conducted. In addition, please provide documentation that shows that 

MDC Brooklyn staff was notified of the new guidance and procedures. 

Recommendation 5: Consider additional steps to ensure that relevant 

security information is communicated to MDC Brooklyn staff consistently and 

effectively.

 Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that staff at MDC Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and procedures in 

light of applicable national policies, and the unique challenge of sharing relevant 

security information with staff throughout the facility. The BOP stated that the 

projected implementation date for these changes is October 1, 2015. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By January 4, 2016, please provide documentation that includes the additional 

steps that MDC Brooklyn considered and/or implemented to ensure that relevant 

security information is communicated to MDC Brooklyn staff consistently and 

effectively. 

30
 
31 

   

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity 

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, 

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and 

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s 

operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ 

OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or 

(800) 869-4499. 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

www.justice.gov/oig