CBP’s Border Security 

Efforts 

– An Analysis of 

Southwest 

Border Security Between 

the 

Ports of Entry – 

February 27, 2017 

OIG-17-39 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

February 2, 2017 

The Honorable Beto O’Rourke 

U.S. House of Representatives 

1330 Longworth House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Congressman O’Rourke: 

In your March 28, 2016 letter to the Department of Homeland Security Office of 

Inspector General (OIG), you requested that we update the 1993 Sandia 

National Laboratories study, A Systematic Analysis of the Southwest Border. 

You asked that we analyze audit and research reports on southwest border 

security issued since 2003, focusing specifically on actions taken by U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in response to the Sandia study 

recommendations. We have completed our review and analysis of relevant 

reports from DHS OIG, Government Accountability Office (GAO), and 

Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued in this timeframe. 

In summary, although CBP likely did not act in direct response to the Sandia 

report, it has instituted many border security programs and operations that 

align with the report’s recommendations. However, our review and analysis of 

DHS OIG, GAO, and CRS reports also highlighted some continuing challenges 

to CBP in its efforts to secure the southwest border. In particular, CBP does 

not measure the effectiveness of its programs and operations well; therefore, it 

continues to invest in programs and act without the benefit of the feedback 

needed to help ensure it uses resources wisely and improves border security. 

CBP also faces program management challenges in planning, resource 

allocation, infrastructure and technology acquisition, and overall efficiency. 

Finally, coordination and communication with both internal and external 

stakeholders could be improved. 

We provided a draft of this report to CBP for comments. We have incorporated 

the technical comments as appropriate and have enclosed a copy of CBP’s 

management comments. Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector 

General Act, we will provide copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the 

Department of Homeland Security. We will post a version of the report on our 

website. 

The results of our review are enclosed. 
DE4}/R\4

o;Fw ~OOFFICE OFINSPECTOR GENERAL

•° ~` Department of Homeland Security

You may call me with questions, or your staff may contact Laurel Loomis

Rimon,Acting Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations, at

(202)254-4100.

Sincerely,

~~~~ John Roth

Inspector General

Enclosure

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

In 1993, Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) published a study on the state 

of the security along the United States/Mexico border. In the study, Sandia 

identified measures and made recommendations designed to increase border 

security and to gain control of areas of rampant illegal immigration and drug 

trafficking. Sandia recommended a two-part strategy of enforcement and 

containment. As the keystone of the enforcement strategy, Sandia 

recommended construction of a three-layer barrier fence. For containment in 

rural areas and locations with varied terrain, Sandia recommended: 

x Surveillance or sensor systems 

x Vehicle cable and concrete vehicle barriers 

x Passive surveillance combined with patrol strategy 

x Movable and static checkpoints and key transit points 

x Graded penalties for repeat offenders, “deep” deportation,1 and fast 

judicial actions 

At the time of the Sandia study, border security was the responsiblity of the 

U.S. Border Patrol, the enforcement arm of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS), which was part of the Department of Justice. The Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 established DHS, and on March 1, 2003, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) became responsible for securing of the Nation’s 

borders and ports of entry.2 Currently, CBP guards nearly 2,000 miles of U.S. 

land border with Mexico, seeking to deter, detect, and interdict illegal entry of 

people and contraband into the United States while facilitating lawful travel 

and trade. CBP also enforces applicable U.S. laws, including those pertaining 

to illegal immigration, narcotics smuggling, and illegal importation. Within 

CBP, the Border Patrol uses its $3.8 billion operating budget to secure areas 

between ports of entry. According to CBP, the Border Patrol’s more than 21,000 

agents accomplish this mission using surveillance, sensor alarms and aircraft 

sightings, and interpreting and following tracks. Traffic checkpoints, city 

patrols, transportation checks, and anti-smuggling investigations are also 

used. 

1 Deep deportation is transporting illegal aliens to interior areas of Mexico rather than 

transporting and releasing them in the immediate border area. Deep deportation is thought to
 

discourage immediate re-entry into the United States.
 2 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296, November 25, 2002)
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-17-39 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Results of Review 

From our review of audit and research reports on southwest border security 

issued by DHS OIG, GAO, and CRS since 2003,3 we concluded that CBP likely 

did not act in direct response to the Sandia report, but it has instituted many 

border security programs and operations that align with the report’s 

recommendations. However, our review and analysis of these reports also 

highlighted some continuing challenges to CBP in its efforts to secure the 

southwest border. In particular, CBP does not measure the effectiveness of its 

programs and operations well; therefore, it continues to invest in programs and 

act without the benefit of the feedback needed to help ensure it uses resources 

wisely and improves border security. CBP also faces program management 

challenges in planning, resource allocation, infrastructure and technology 

acquisition, and overall efficiency. Finally, coordination and communication 

with both internal and external stakeholders could be improved. 

CBP Has Taken Actions that Correspond to Sandia Study 

Recommendations 

In its 1993 study, Sandia categorized the entire border region into two distinct 

categories: urban and rural. Sandia recommended a two-pronged border 

security strategy of enforcement and containment. For enforcement and 

gaining control of urban areas, Sandia recommended construction of a border 

fence. Rural area threats were considered less common, and Sandia 

recommended containment through measures such as sensor placement, 

surveillance, vehicle barriers, checkpoint operations, and consequence 

programs. 

Urban Control Recommendations and Actions Taken 

Sandia determined that the urban landscapes of the southwest border 

presented the most imminent threat to border security and recommended 

construction of a border fence. 

3 Appendix B contains a list of DHS OIG, GAO, and CRS reports reviewed for this report. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-17-39 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Source: A Systematic Analysis of the Southwest Border, Sandia, 1993 

Figure 1: Border 

fence described in 

Sandia report 

According to 

Sandia, the border 

fence depicted in 

Figure 1 would 

discourage illegal 

entry in the 

vulnerable, overrun 

urban areas of San 

Diego, California 

and El Paso, Texas. 

Since the Sandia 

study was 

published, CBP has 

constructed many 

miles of fence in 

many southwest 

border sectors. 

Some of the first projects were completed in the urban areas identified in the 

study – San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas. According to a CBP official, in 

the early 1990s, migrants easily crossed the border into San Diego, but the 

Border Patrol tightened security in that area. Migrants then searched for other 

routes through the more rugged terrain of the southwest into the United 

States.4 

Currently on the southwest border, there are about 354 miles of pedestrian 

fencing, mostly in urban areas in California, Arizona, and Texas. In addition to 

constructing pedestrian fences in urban areas, CBP also erected several miles 

of fence in the rural areas of the Yuma Sector (Arizona). Yuma Border Patrol 

Sector Intelligence Unit cites border fencing as the most significant factor 

contributing to decreased illegal alien and narcotic smuggling in the Yuma area 

of responsibility. 

4 Koscak, P (2016). From Padilla, Manuel, Rio Grande Valley Chief Patrol Agent, as quoted in 

Frontline June 2016: A Perilous Journey, Humanitarian Program Aims to Save Live. Available 

from https://www.cbp.gov/frontline/frontline-june-2016-border-security-initiative. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-17-39 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Portions of the current pedestrian fencing 

in San Diego, California are composed of a 

corrugated steel landing mat, which is 

approximately 10 feet high; other sections 

consist of 18-foot high bollards. 

Additionally, the El Paso, Texas area is 

completely fortified by pedestrian fencing. 

Portions of that fence are 10 feet high, as 

recommended by Sandia, and are topped 

with barbed wire. The El Paso area also 

has 18-foot bollard and wire mesh fencing. 

Some rural areas in the Yuma Sector 

(Arizona) are protected by a pedestrian 

fence made of 20-foot transparent 

steel mesh and a “floating” fence with 

gaps that allow sand to flow through, 

but which are not big enough for 

people or vehicles to pass. 

Pedestrian fence in San Diego sector Source: CBP 

Pedestrian fence in Yuma Sector Source: CBP 

Figure 2 shows the miles of pedestrian fencing, as of November 2, 2016, in all 

CBP sectors along the southwest border. 

Figure 2: Southwest Border Pedestrian Fencing 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-17-39 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Rural and Near Border Containment Recommendations and Actions Taken 

Sandia determined that threats to rural, near-border areas varied, depending 

on the terrain and environment. Because no single remedy could ensure border 

security in these areas, Sandia recommended containment through measures 

such as sensor placement, surveillance, vehicle barriers, checkpoint 

operations, and consequence programs. 

Sensor systems, such as fixed and mobile platforms 

The Border Patrol used unattended ground sensors before Sandia published its 

study and continues to use them today. CBP asserts that these sensors 

increase situational awareness of activity in areas that are difficult to 

persistently patrol. As shown in figure 3, the number of sensors assigned to the 

southwest border sectors has nearly doubled since fiscal year 2001, going from 

just over 6,000 to almost 12,000 in FY 2016. Also, the sensors and the 

supporting software have undergone numerous upgrades since 2001. 

Figure 3: Southwest Border Sensor Inventory, FYs 2001-2016 

0 

2000 

4000 

6000 

8000 

10000 

12000 

Sensor Count 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP data 

Passive surveillance combined with an optimized patrol strategy 

Sandia recommended passive surveillance combined with an optimized patrol 

strategy as part of a containment strategy for open areas in rural, near-border 

regions. According to the report, targeted surveillance would allow the Border 

Patrol to efficiently and effectively apply manpower to areas at risk of illegal 

incursions. 

Documentation from CBP showed the Border Patrol has an inventory of 

technology solutions to augment surveillance. These capabilities include longwww.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-17-39 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

range surveillance with equipment, such as the Integrated Fixed Tower 

network5 in the Tucson sector; and short- to medium-range equipment, such 

as Mobile Surveillance Capability units.6 Mobile Video Surveillance Systems,7 

which will provide additional short- to medium-range capabilities, are being 

procured. A CBP directive provides for the use of radiation detection 

equipment, such as personal radiation detectors and radiation isotope 

identifiers, to enhance detection capabilities at checkpoints.8 

Vehicle barriers 

Sandia recommended vehicle barriers in rural areas. CBP has installed 

barriers, using steel bollards, to prevent illegal vehicle entry. Most of the 

vehicle barriers along the southwest border are in rural areas where, according 

to CBP, pedestrian traffic is uncommon or easily detected. These barriers are 

designed to deny vehicle entry, while allowing pedestrians and animals to pass 

freely. As of November 2, 2016, CBP records showed there were about 300 

miles of vehicle barriers along the southwest border. 

Permanent and tactical checkpoints at key transit points 

As a component of the containment strategy, Sandia recommended 24-hour 

highway checkpoints. According to the study, the checkpoints would decrease 

the smuggling of illegal aliens and narcotics into the interior of the United 

States. In an effort to apprehend illegal aliens and smugglers who make it past 

the first line of border security measures, the Border Patrol operates 

checkpoints across the southwest border. CBP divides immigration checkpoints 

into: 

x Permanent – permanent buildings and traffic controls 

x Tactical – movable equipment and contains no permanent buildings 

Sandia reported that the Border Patrol operated 29 permanent checkpoints on 

the southwest border. As shown in figure 4, as of May 2016, the Border Patrol 

reported it operated 33 southwest border permanent checkpoints. According to 

the Border Patrol, it can operate 182 tactical checkpoints, based on operational 

requirements. 

5 The Integrated Fixed Tower network assists in providing long-range, persistent surveillance to 

detect, track, identify, and classify items; it provides data, video, and geospatial locations of 

items of interest. 

6 Mobile Surveillance Capability Units provide long-range mobile surveillance in remote border 

areas. Vehicle-borne equipment houses integrated equipment comprising radar, camera, and 

an operator console. 

7 Mobile Video Surveillance Systems will provide short to medium-range surveillance in border 

areas. The equipment consists of a mast-mounted monitoring system configured on Border 

Patrol vehicles. 

8 CBP Directive No. 5290015, December 24, 2003. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-17-39 
 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 4: Permanent Checkpoints at Southwest Border, as of May 2016 

Sector Number of Permanent 

Checkpoints 

San Diego 5 

El Centro 2 

Yuma 3 

Tucson 0 

El Paso 7 

Big Bend 4 

Del Rio 5 

Laredo 5 

Rio Grande Valley 2 

TOTAL 33 

Source: OIG analysis of CBP data 

Consequence Delivery System 

Sandia identified policies it believed would strengthen the enforcement and 

containment strategy. According to the report, “graded penalties for repeat 

offenders ... deep deportation, and fast judicial actions” would enhance the 

effectiveness of border security efforts. These recommendations closely 

resemble elements of the Border Patrol’s Consequence Delivery System (CDS), 

which aims to deter repeated illegal border crossings. According to CBP, CDS is 

designed to guide CBP decision-making based on an evaluation of the unique 

situation of each individual to identify the administrative or criminal 

consequence most likely to deter further illegal activity. Between January and 

October 2011, the Border Patrol implemented CDS in all southwest border 

sectors to standardize its application of consequences for illegal entry into the 

United States. According to Border Patrol officials, agents use sector-specific 

data to evaluate the circumstances of the illegal entry and determine an 

appropriate criminal or administrative consequence such as repatriation to a 

different location from the point of entry, referral of prosecution to Mexico, or 

Federal criminal prosecution, among other options. However, in recent 

congressional testimony, then acting Border Patrol Chief said that the ability to 

impose consequences also depends on factors imposed by states and judicial 

districts.9 

Although not considered a consequence, a Mexico bilateral humanitarian effort, 

begun in 2004 and known as the Mexico Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP), 

9 Vitiello, Ronald, U.S. Border Patrol Acting Chief. Written testimony for a Senate Committee on 

the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest hearing “Declining 

Deportations and Increasing Criminal Alien Releases – The Lawless Immigration Policies of the 

Obama Administration,” May 19, 2016 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-17-39 
 

 

 

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resembled the “deep deportation” recommended by Sandia. CBP intended to 

use MIRP to break the smuggling cycle by returning Mexican nationals 

apprehended in Tucson and Yuma to their places of residence in the Mexican 

interior. While CBP no longer repatriates Mexican nationals through MIRP, in 

February 2008, CBP initiated the Alien Transfer and Exit Program (ATEP), 

which similarly aims to separate aliens from their smuggling cells, although 

through a different method. CBP uses ATEP in conjunction with other 

consequences to move Mexican nationals from the area of apprehension to a 

different sector at the conclusion of deportation proceedings just prior to 

repatriation. 

CBP Faces Continuing Challenges in Three Key Areas 

In researching and analyzing the results of reviews of CBP, we identified three 

trends that point to needed improvements in CBP’s efforts to secure the 

southwest border. Generally, CBP concurred with DHS OIG and GAO 

recommendations and took steps to address them. 

Measuring the Effectiveness of Programs and Operations 

As far back as 1993, Sandia recognized that identifying measures of 

effectiveness is critical to controlling the border. In the 2012–2016 Border 

Patrol Strategic Plan (Plan), CBP also acknowledged the importance of 

measuring effectiveness, noting that it was developing “measures of 

performance” and “indicators of impact” for all objectives in the Plan.10 

However, in a 2012 report examining the Plan, GAO cited data limitations that 

precluded comparing the overall effectiveness of resource deployment in Border 

Patrol sectors.11 In his March 2016 testimony, the acting Border Patrol Chief 

reiterated the need for performance measures, but fell short of describing any 

processes underway for developing them. Instead, he remarked that the 

magnitude of the border, integrated operations, and individuals’ motivation to 

cross the border illegally are challenges to establishing metrics.12 

The Border Patrol currently uses the number of apprehensions as an indicator 

of the volume of illegal migration. It is OIG opinion that fewer apprehensions 

indicate more success in programs and security measures, but CBP has not 

10 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan; available from 

https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bp_strategic_plan.pdf 11 GAO-13-25; Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform 

Border Security Status and Resource Needs; December 10, 2012 12 Vitiello, Ronald, U.S Border Patrol Acting Chief. Written testimony for a House Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security “Transparency Trust and 

Verification: Measuring Effectiveness and Situational Awareness along the Border,” March 1, 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-17-39 

2016 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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used this standard. In August 2009, GAO found that the Border Patrol did not 

calculate the amount of illegal activity circumventing the checkpoints. 

Therefore, checkpoint apprehensions were not a reliable indicator of total illegal 

activity or an appropriate measure of effectiveness.13 In September 2016 

testimony, the then Border Patrol Chief acknowledged that a recent decline in 

apprehensions was a positive result.14 However, program reviews have shown 

that CBP does not build this type of effectiveness measurement into its 

programs at the outset. For example, OIG found that the concept of operations 

for CBP’s Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) program cited increased 

apprehensions as a program expectation, but the document did not list 

measurable performance standards for apprehensions.15 

OIG and GAO have issued multiple reports assessing how well DHS and CBP 

determine effectiveness of programs and operations. In general, the reporting 

shows that, although CBP has implemented many new programs to address 

border security issues, it has struggled to develop measures of effectiveness. 

For example, both OIG and GAO have pointed out that using apprehension 

numbers as a performance goal measurement does not indicate program 

results and therefore limits accountability, as well as DHS and congressional 

oversight. OIG also concluded that CBP may sometimes skew its 

measurements and analyze data to attain the most successful outcome, rather 

than use best practices for accurate measurement. In general, DHS and CBP 

agreed with the recommendations in these reports and took steps to address 

the issue. However, as the following reports illustrate, CBP’s insufficient or, in 

some cases, nonexistent performance measurement is a continuing trend. 

x In a 2009 report, GAO pointed out that the performance measures 

established by the Border Patrol did not help determine whether 

checkpoints were operating efficiently or effectively.16 

x In December 2014, OIG reported that CBP planned to expand its UAS 

program without having developed performance measures to determine 

its effectiveness. DHS OIG acknowledged that the UAS program had 

contributed to border security, but without verifiable performance 

13 GAO-09-824; Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More 

Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness; August 

31, 2009 

14 Morgan, Mark, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol. Written testimony for a House Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security hearing “Moving the Line 

of Scrimmage: Re-Examining the Defense in Depth Strategy,” September 13, 2016 15 OIG-15-17; U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not 

Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations; December 24, 2014 

16 GAO-09-824; Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More 

Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness; August 

31, 2009 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-17-39 
 

	 

	 

	 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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measures, CBP could not demonstrate how much the program had 

improved border security. Further, CBP limited operation of a sensor on 

the unmanned aircraft to primarily focus on an area around a single 

Border Patrol station to “increase the certainty of a positive law 

enforcement resolution,” such as apprehensions.17 

x	 The Border Patrol credits the CDS for a decrease in alien recidivism (recrossing the border illegally). However, in a May 2015 report on one CDS 

program, Operation Streamline (renamed the Criminal Consequence 

Initiative), OIG concluded that although the Border Patrol measured 

Streamline’s effect on re-entry of illegal aliens, its metrics did not reflect 

an alien’s crossing history, re-entry, or re-apprehension over multiple 

years. As a result, the Border Patrol was not fully and accurately 

measuring Streamline’s effect on deterring aliens from entering and reentering the country illegally.18 

x	 In January 2016, OIG reported that the Border Patrol could not 

determine the efficiency and effectiveness of its Special Operations Group 

because of a lack of formal performance measures. Although the Border 

Patrol was developing and implementing performance measures, at the 

time of the report, the program had been in place for 9 years.19 

Managing Programs 

Although Sandia offered some minor technology-based solutions for gaining 

control of near-border rural areas, it recommended against costly technology 

investments, stating that advanced technologies typically “did not provide 

benefit commensurate with cost.” CBP went in a different direction, acquiring 

technology through America’s Shield Initiative (ASI), the Secure Border 

Initiative (SBI), and currently, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan. Through the duration of these initiatives, GAO and DHS OIG reports have 

highlighted program management issues. In particular, CBP has had trouble 

ensuring it has enough staff to adequately manage programs and contractors, 

and that it sufficiently oversees acquisitions, builds metrics into program 

planning and management, and collects reliable and complete data for cost 

estimating and program performance. 

In 2004, DHS initiated ASI, which was intended to expand the capabilities of 

INS’ Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System, using sensors, cameras, and 

17 OIG-15-17; U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does 

Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations; December 24, 2014 

18 OIG-15-95; Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing; January 27, 2016 

19 OIG-16-34; CBP’s Special Operations Group Program Cost and Effectiveness Are Unknown; 

January 29, 2016 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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databases. ASI was short lived; in September 2005, the DHS Deputy Secretary 

said the program should be reevaluated, and in a January 2006 response to 

GAO CBP noted intent to incorporate the program into SBI. In reviewing ASI, 

GAO determined that managers had not performed some key elements of 

effective program management, including ensuring adequate staffing, defining 

roles and responsibilities, and defining acquisition management processes. 

In November 2005, DHS launched SBI, a multibillion dollar program. 

According to CBP, SBI would secure the Nation’s borders and reduce illegal 

immigration through enhanced surveillance technologies, increased staffing, 

and infrastructure improvements. CBP planned to deploy SBInet, the 

technology component of SBI, an infrastructure that included cameras, radars, 

sensors, as well as command, control, communications, and intelligence 

technologies, along the southwest border in phases. Initial plans were to 

complete 387 miles by December 31, 2008. According to DHS, it had 

implemented an effective program management process to provide a solid 

foundation for SBI, but SBI was plagued by similar issues. 

Throughout the life cycle of SBI, GAO audited the initiative and its technology 

component, SBInet, and issued reports detailing CBP’s program management 

challenges and shortcomings. For example, in a September 2009 report, GAO 

found that CBP had not followed the best practice of conducting a program 

evaluation to determine the overall contribution of the SBI deployed tactical 

infrastructure to border security. 20 In a subsequent report, GAO also noted 

that project scheduling did not adequately capture all necessary activities, 

assign resources to them, and reflect schedule risks. Ultimately, in May 2010, 

GAO recommended CBP should limit funds spent on SBInet to in-progress 

projects and should curtail future investment, which lacked adequate economic 

justification. In that report, GAO also made a final recommendation to CBP to 

improve key program management areas.21 

In 2010, DHS OIG reviewed $267 million worth of items acquired in 2008 for 

SBInet. As a result of its review, OIG determined that SBI program officials 

were not consistently updating information for identifying cost overruns and 

determining program progress. OIG also found that officials did not ensure 

contractors completed program steps before moving on to next steps. Finally, 

according to OIG, there was not enough staff to oversee contractor activities.22 

20 GAO-09-896; Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact 

of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed; September 9, 2009 

21 GAO-10-340; Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in 

Key Technology Program; May 5, 2010 

22 OIG-10-96; Controls over SBInet Program Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved; June 16, 

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SBInet experienced significant schedule delays and cost overruns, eventually 

delivering technology systems to two areas in Arizona. In January 2011, DHS 

cancelled SBInet because it was not meeting viability and cost effectiveness 

standards. 

Citing high costs and unnecessary complexity, DHS decided to replace SBI with 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, a technology “menu” offering 

tailored solutions based on operational needs. In November 2011, GAO 

reported on CBP’s issues managing this new technology plan. Specifically, CBP 

had analyzed alternatives and reached out to potential vendors, but did not 

document the analysis to justify major decisions concerning border 

surveillance technologies. CBP also had not defined the mission benefits 

expected from implementing the plan. The component did not plan to assess 

the effectiveness and suitability of SBInet to help make decisions on 

alternatives for implementing the new plan. Finally, CBP's 10-year life cycle 

cost estimate was based on a rough cost estimate analysis, and component 

officials could not determine a level of confidence in their estimate.23 

As the reports on ASI, SBInet, and the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan illustrate, to make certain significant investments in technology for 

enhanced security, CBP needs to ensure it bases program management on 

solid fundamentals and follows good business practices. 

Coordination and Communication with Stakeholders 

According to Sandia, at the time it published its report, the largest threat to the 

southwest border was the illegal entry of people and narcotics between the 

ports of entry. Today, CBP must also deal with the threat of terrorist 

organizations or terrorists crossing the southwest border. This new threat, in 

addition to continued border security challenges of illegal border crossers and 

drug organizations, make coordination and communication essential. 

DHS OIG and GAO have examined CBP’s coordination among some 

stakeholders, both internal and external to DHS, issuing multiple reports and 

making recommendations for improvement. For example, in 2007, DHS OIG 

reported that although coordination and interoperability between CBP and U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had improved, communication 

between headquarters and field personnel, and intelligence and information 

sharing could be enhanced.24 In 2012, OIG reported again on the need to 

improve coordination between CBP and ICE Homeland Security Investigations 

23 GAO-12-22; Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding; November 4, 2011 

24 OIG-07-38; DHS' Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges between Customs and 

Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; April 13, 2007 

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in their efforts to counter the threat posed by cross-border tunnels.25 OIG also 

issued two reports on the need for DHS to better coordinate with and support 

the National Network of Fusion Centers.26 27 

In one of two reports examining border security threats on tribal and other 

federal lands, GAO highlighted minimal interagency coordination in 

information sharing, strategies, joint operations, and budget requests among 

DHS, the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture;28 

in the second report, GAO pointed out coordination issues between the Border 

Patrol and some Native American tribal representatives.29 Finally, in a 2013 

review of information sharing among field-based Federal, state, and local 

entities, GAO concluded that Federal agencies were not holding these entities 

accountable for coordination or assessing opportunities for enhancing 

coordination to reduce potential overlap and find efficiencies.30 

Conclusion 

At times, CBP’s efforts to secure the southwest border appear to be sisyphean, 

but to ensure it is continually improving its capabilities and securing the 

border in an evolving threat environment, it needs to consistently and 

accurately measure effectiveness and carefully manage its programs and 

operations. The ability to accurately measure effectiveness requires complete 

and accurate data. The reports we reviewed identify this as an ongoing issue — 

data is often unreliable and incomplete and statistics are sometimes subject to 

misinterpretation. Program management includes building in measures of 

effectiveness, planning thoughtfully, getting feedback on performance, and 

carefully acquiring infrastructure and technology. Given CBP’s vast mission 

and widely dispersed operations, as well as evolving threats, these efforts are 

herculean, but essential, to ensure the border is secured through responsible 

use of financial, technological, and human resources. Full transparency and 

accurate accounting of costs and spending in program planning and operations 

are also vital to the effort. Without these elements, CBP risks investing in 

expensive technology and infrastructure that is neither justified nor useful in 

accomplishing its mission. Today, the southwest border is still porous, and 

25 OIG-12-132; CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels; September 26, 2012 

26 OIG-11-04; Information Sharing with Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System 

Challenges Remain; October 26, 2010 

27 OIG-12-10; DHS' Efforts to Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing with 

Fusion Centers; November 16, 2011 

28 GAO-11-177; Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 

Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands; November 18, 2010 

29 GAO-13-352; Border Security: Partnership Agreements and Enhanced Oversight Could 

Strengthen Coordination of Efforts on Indian Reservations; April 5, 2013 

30 GAO-13-471; Information Sharing: Agencies Could Better Coordinate to Reduce Overlap in 

Field-Based Activities; April 4, 2013 

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questions remain as to whether CBP’s significant investments have resulted in 

better security. 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

DHS OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 

ïE\DPHQGPHQWWRWKHInspector General Act of 1978. 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspection and 

Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 

Efficiency. 

In response to a congressional request (see appendix C), we reviewed DHS OIG, 

CRS, and GAO reports issued from 2003 to the present. We also reviewed and 

analyzed program data submitted by CBP. 

The Office of Inspections and Evaluations major contributors to this report are: 

Angela Garvin, Chief Inspector; Lorraine Eide, Lead Inspector; Jennifer Berry, 

Senior Inspector; and Kelly Herberger, Communications Analyst. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Sandia Study Summary 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Reports Reviewed 

DHS OIG 

OIG-07-38; DHS' Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges between 

Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 

April 13, 2007 

OIG-09-56; Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational 

Requirements and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence; published April 

15, 2009 

OIG-10-96; Controls over SBInet Program Cost and Schedule Could Be 

Improved; June 16, 2010 

OIG-11-04; Information Sharing with Fusion Centers Has Improved, but 

Information System Challenges Remain; published October 26, 2010 

OIG-12-05; U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Management of the 

Purchase and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative; 

November 7, 2011 

OIG-12-10; DHS' Efforts to Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and 

Information Sharing with Fusion Centers; November 16, 2011 

OIG-12-132; CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels; 

September 26, 2012 

OIG-12-85; CBP’s Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border 

Security; May 30, 2012 

OIG-15-17; U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Unmanned Aircraft System 

Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of 

Operations; December 24, 2014 

OIG-15-95; Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing; 

January 27, 2016 

OIG-16-34; CBP’s Special Operations Group Program Cost and Effectiveness 

Are Unknown; January 29, 2016 

GAO 

GAO-05-435; Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest 

Differences in Sector Performance; July 22, 2005 

GAO-06-295; Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of 

Border Surveillance Technology Program; February 22, 2006 

GAO-07-309; Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to 

Better Support Oversight and Accountability; February 15, 2007 

GAO-08-1086; Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant 

Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment; September 22, 2008 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

GAO-09-824; Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's 

Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement 

Could Improve Effectiveness; published August 31, 2009 

GAO-09-896; Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist 

and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed; September 9, 

2009 

GAO-10-158; Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and 

Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk; January 

29, 2010 

GAO-10-340; Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed 

Investment in Key Technology Program; May 5, 2010 

GAO-11-6; Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management 

and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor; October 18, 2010 

GAO-11-38; Southwest Border: More Timely Border Patrol Access and 

Training Could Improve Security Operations and Natural Resource Protection 

on Federal Lands; October 19, 2010 

GAO-11-177; Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a 

Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands; November 

18, 2010 

GAO-11-68; Secure Border Initiative: Controls over Contractor Payments for 

the Technology Component Need Improvement; May 25, 2011 

GAO-12-22; Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on 

Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding; November 4, 2011 

GAO-12-518; Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective 

Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets; March 30, 2012 

GAO-13-25; Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in 

Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs; December 10, 

2012 

GAO-13-471; Information Sharing: Agencies Could Better Coordinate to 

Reduce Overlap in Field-Based Activities; April 4, 2013 

GAO-13-352; Border Security: Partnership Agreements and Enhanced 

Oversight Could Strengthen Coordination of Efforts on Indian Reservations; 

April 5, 2013 

GAO-14-368; Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional 

Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness; March 

3, 2014 

GAO-14-494; Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative 

Mechanisms along the Southwest Border; June 27, 2014 

GAO-15-201; Border Security: Additional Efforts Needed to Address 

Persistent Challenges in Achieving Radio Interoperability; March 23, 2015 

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Department of Homeland Security 

CRS 

CRS R41237; People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of U.S. Border Protection 

Policies; May 13, 2010 

CRS R42138; Border Security: Immigration Enforcement between Ports of 

Entry; December 31, 2014 

CRS R44386; Border Security: Metrics between Ports of Entry; February 16, 

2016 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Congressional Request Letter 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

CBP Response Memorandum 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Commissioner, CBP 

Chief, Border Patrol 

CBP Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

Honorable Beto O’Rourke, Congressman 

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