U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Review of the 

Drug Enforcement 

Administration’s 

El Paso Intelligence Center 

June 2010 

I-2010-005 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

INTRODUCTION 

The border between the United States and Mexico presents a longstanding challenge to U.S. law enforcement. Criminal organizations 

smuggle illicit drugs, undocumented aliens, and other contraband across 

the border into the United States, and cash and weapons into Mexico. 

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) led and funded intelligence center, located in 

El Paso, Texas, near Juarez, Mexico. EPIC focuses its programs on the 

collection and dissemination of tactical intelligence.1 EPIC provides 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies information they can 

use in investigations and operations that target smuggling and other 

criminal activities. 

When it was established in 1974, EPIC focused primarily on 

Mexican heroin traffickers and illegal alien and weapon smugglers. 

EPIC’s focus today is broader, providing an intelligence resource that 

targets a wider range of criminal activity. EPIC’s mission has evolved in 

response to a shift in focus to Southwest border smuggling and 

associated violence, and the need for improved collaboration and timely 

information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

EPIC currently hosts representatives from 21 different agencies and 

provides information to over 19,000 law enforcement officers and 

analysts who are approved EPIC users. 

This review by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined 

the roles and functions of EPIC and its analysis and dissemination of 

intelligence in support of federal, state, and local law enforcement 

investigations and interdiction operations. In this review, we interviewed 

representatives of investigative agencies that obtain intelligence from 

EPIC. We also conducted site visits at EPIC and several law enforcement 

agencies along the Southwest border and elsewhere, analyzed EPIC data 

and its performance measures, and reviewed U.S. national counter-drug 

strategy and policy materials. In addition, we administered a nationwide 

survey of EPIC users to obtain their perspectives on EPIC’s products and 

services. 

1 Tactical intelligence is information on which immediate enforcement action – 

arrests, seizures, and interdictions – can be based. 
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RESULTS IN BRIEF 

Our review found that EPIC is highly valued by its partner agencies 

and users, and that its users find its products to be valuable and useful. 

However, we identified several significant weaknesses that have prevented 

EPIC’s operations and programs from being as effective as they could be. 

We found that EPIC does not have an effective program or strategy 

to inform users and potential users about products and services that 

could assist them. Further, we found that EPIC did not adequately 

support several key interdiction programs and, as a result, its service to 

users was at times disrupted or diminished for periods of time. 

As a multi-agency intelligence center, EPIC relies upon its diverse 

federal and other members for staffing and access to external sources of 

law enforcement information and intelligence. We believe that the lack of 

an up-to-date agreement between EPIC and its participating members 

has contributed to coordination problems, such as member agencies not 

sustaining programs, sharing information, or contributing resources to 

EPIC. 

We also identified two EPIC programs that were not fully 

implemented because EPIC could not require the law enforcement 

participation necessary to execute these programs. First, EPIC has not 

developed the National Seizure System into a comprehensive database 

into which all drug seizures are reported nationwide.2 Rather, reporting 

seizure information into the system is optional for most federal, state, 

and local agencies. As a result, intelligence products based on this data 

may be incomplete or inaccurate. Second, EPIC has not established 

itself as the hub for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 

program. The HIDTAs, which coordinate drug control efforts among 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, operate as 

32 autonomous task forces and allied intelligence centers. 

Further, EPIC’s coordination with federal and state intelligence 

organizations across the country is inconsistent. For EPIC to more 

efficiently disseminate information, it should have contacts in key 

intelligence centers and ensure that those contacts are aware of EPIC’s 

products and services and how to access them. 

2 The National Seizure System is a repository for information on drug, 

clandestine laboratory, and other contraband seizures such as chemical precursors, 

currency, and weapons. The system also contains information on methods of 

concealment, seizure locations, people, organizations, and transportation, and is used 

in federal, regional, state, and local law enforcement analyses and policy development. 
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We also found that as the number of participating agencies at EPIC 

increased overall, federal agencies submitted fewer requests to EPIC for 

information, as measured by EPIC Checks, between fiscal year (FY) 2005 

and FY 2009. By contrast, the total number of requests for information 

submitted to EPIC by state and local law enforcement has steadily 

increased. 

We are concerned about the decline in the use of EPIC by 

Department components at a time when the Department has increased 

its focus on combating smuggling and its associated violence on the 

Southwest border. In light of this, use of EPIC by Department 

components should be increasing, particularly by the DEA and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

We also found that EPIC does not analyze information from several 

of the unique sources it possesses and, as a result, may be overlooking 

drug trafficking trends and patterns that could assist interdiction 

investigations and operations. In particular, EPIC conducts limited 

analyses of drug seizure information and does not analyze fraudulent 

documents and certain tactical information it collects on the activities of 

drug traffickers. Further, the information that EPIC maintains on 

Southwest border drug trafficking organizations is not always current. 

In addition, EPIC is not managing the performance of its programs 

through objective performance measures and by collecting user feedback. 

To address these issues and to improve EPIC’s utility to the law 

enforcement and intelligence community, we make 11 recommendations 

to EPIC in our report. 

We discuss these findings and recommendations below. 

EPIC users report high satisfaction with its products and services, 

but they also report needing more information about EPIC and 

improved access to its Portal. 

We surveyed law enforcement personnel and analysts within the 

Department, other federal agencies, and state and local agencies that are 

users of EPIC.3 Based on the responses of the 765 individuals who 

returned the survey (out of 2,499 sent), we found significant satisfaction 

among the users of EPIC products. Most federal, state, and local 

3 We did not survey law enforcement personnel who had never established 

accounts at EPIC. 
personnel who responded stated that they viewed EPIC products and 

services as fully meeting their criteria for timeliness (76 percent), 

accuracy (82 percent), relevance (80 percent), and immediate usability 

(74 percent). 

However, the results of the survey, along with interviews we 

conducted, indicated that EPIC does not have an effective program or 

strategy to publicize and promote its products and services. For 

example, we found that EPIC’s online information system for its users, 

known as the Portal, was not frequently used to request information from 

EPIC, although it provided quick access to non-case-specific information 

and could be a powerful law enforcement tool. Only 24 percent of EPIC’s 

users had registered Portal accounts, and few requests for information 

were submitted through the Portal. Our survey results indicate this is 

due in large part to users being unaware of the Portal or not knowing 

how to use it. 

EPIC has not adequately staffed several key interdiction programs 

or ensured that member agencies collaborate effectively to sustain 

programs and share information. 

We found that EPIC did not sustain staffing for several key 

interdiction programs and, as a result, service to its users was disrupted 

or diminished for periods of a year or more. A lack of agency 

participation caused EPIC’s Fraudulent Document Unit to be unstaffed 

and therefore unable to serve users from December 2007 to January 

2009, and EPIC’s Air Watch program was unstaffed for approximately 

9 months of 2007. In addition, EPIC did not maintain a consistent level 

of staffing and support to sustain its participation in a maritime 

intelligence group, and the number of tactical reports EPIC contributed 

to the group decreased from 2,010 to 819 (59 percent) between FY 2007 

and FY 2008. Because EPIC is the agency with the strongest information 

gathering capability for certain maritime drug smuggling corridors to the 

United States, the failure to fully staff and support this group likely 

hindered drug trafficking interdiction efforts. 

In addition, EPIC’s existing multi-agency agreement – the 1999 

Principals Accord – does not reflect EPIC’s current membership and 

missions. Further, EPIC does not use the Principals Accord effectively to 

resolve issues that arise in EPIC’s multi-agency setting, such as ensuring 

that priorities are agreed upon so that programs are sustained and that 

member agencies meet expectations for participation and information 

sharing. 

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We identified two other programs that were not fully implemented 

because national policy was lacking and because EPIC did not have the 

operational control to require the law enforcement participation necessary 

to execute these programs. First, we found that EPIC’s process for 

aggregating drug seizure information does not provide for comprehensive 

analyses of drug trafficking activity. EPIC has not produced a complete 

record of drug seizures nationwide because of incomplete reporting into 

the National Seizure System. Only five federal agencies are required to 

report their seizures to the system, and only seizures over threshold 

amounts must be reported.4 Similarly, state and local law enforcement 

agencies are not required to report drug seizures, and the number of 

different state and local agencies that reported drug seizure events directly 

into the National Seizure System during FY 2008 represented only about 

1 percent of law enforcement agencies nationwide. 

Recently, EPIC has begun importing more complete seizure 

information to the National Seizure System by gathering such 

information online from agencies. While this effort will increase the 

amount of data EPIC collects, EPIC is just beginning this process of 

working with state and local agencies willing to transmit seizure data 

through the Portal. EPIC also allows individual users to report seizure 

information through the Portal. However, only 24 percent of EPIC users 

have active online accounts, indicating that the Portal is not yet a system 

that individual users rely upon to report drug seizures to EPIC. 

We also found that EPIC is not yet the “hub for the HIDTAs,” which 

was defined as one of EPIC’s five functions in its 1999 Principals Accord 

and addressed in the 2000 General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (the 

Plan).5 The Plan stated that EPIC should serve as a hub by “centrally 

receiving and sharing drug-movement-related information developed by 

4 The DEA, FBI, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and Coast Guard are required to report drug seizures over specific 

threshold levels. 

5 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP) Reauthorization Act of 1998 authorize the Director of the ONDCP to designate 

areas within the United States as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas if they 

demonstrate serious drug trafficking problems with an impact in other areas of the 

country. Currently, the HIDTA program includes 32 HIDTAs that receive federal 

funding for infrastructure and joint initiatives that facilitate cooperation and 

information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations. 

Each HIDTA is led by an Executive Board comprising a representative from each 

federal, state, and local agency that has a member permanently assigned to the HIDTA 

Task Force in that HIDTA region. Neither EPIC nor the DEA exercise the control that 

would be needed to standardize the exchange of drug-movement-related information 

between EPIC and the HIDTA intelligence centers. 
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the HIDTA Intelligence Centers” as well as by “ensuring that EPIC’s Watch 

and relevant database checks are a standard part of appropriate HIDTA 

operational protocols.”6 While EPIC has made some effort to serve as an 

information hub for the HIDTAs, for example by making information from 

the Arizona HIDTA about traffic stops available to other HIDTAs, EPIC has 

not been able to establish itself broadly as an information hub for the 

HIDTA program. EPIC lacks policy-setting authority over the 32 regional 

HIDTAs, and no policy requires the HIDTAs to provide drug-movementrelated information to EPIC or to ensure that contacting EPIC is 

incorporated into their operational protocols. Consequently, EPIC cannot 

provide the regional HIDTAs with information by connecting their 

individual databases and providing them access to federal databases. The 

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) funds and oversees each 

individual HIDTA’s budget and counterdrug plan, and approves task forces 

formed by each HIDTA to ensure their efforts support national drug 

control strategy. Beyond this level of oversight by the ONDCP, the HIDTAs 

are largely autonomous entities. 

EPIC’s coordination with federal and state intelligence organizations 

is inconsistent. 

EPIC does not maintain an up-to-date list of key intelligence and 

fusion centers and their points of contact and does not know if it has 

users in each center. Of the 107 intelligence and fusion centers we 

identified, 23 did not have staff authorized to use EPIC. For EPIC to 

efficiently disseminate its information, it should have contacts in each 

key intelligence center throughout the country and ensure that those 

contacts are aware of EPIC’s products and services and how to access 

them. Further, we found that some members of the FBI’s Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces were not aware of EPIC’s Crime-Terror Nexus 

Unit, whose products could provide support for the work of the Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces. 

We compared EPIC’s mission, key products and services, customer 

base, and geographic focus with other national counterdrug intelligence 

centers identified in the 2000 General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, and 

we found that EPIC generally complements the other national centers.7 

6 The Watch is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to respond to information 

requests from EPIC users for simultaneous searches of 11 databases that can be used 

to support investigations. 

7 The Plan was published by a White House task force in February 2000 to 

clarify and make systemic improvements to U.S. drug intelligence and information 

programs. The four national counterdrug intelligence centers identified in the Plan 

were the El Paso Intelligence Center, in El Paso, Texas; the National Drug Intelligence 

(Cont’d.) 
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However, there is overlap in some program areas. For example, we noted 

that the case support provided by EPIC’s Asset Identification Unit 

overlaps with the case support that the Department of the Treasury’s 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network provides.8 Both entities research 

assets owned by or connected to suspects of investigations and their 

associates. 

When we compared EPIC with other multi-agency centers having 

counterdrug intelligence responsibilities, we found increasing potential 

for overlap in certain areas. For example, while EPIC continues its 

efforts to establish itself as the HIDTA hub, the HIDTAs are becoming 

more involved with the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

(OCDETF) Fusion Center in the exchange of drug trafficking investigative 

information. With the emergence of new centers and EPIC’s expansion 

into program areas that were not addressed in the Plan, there is an 

increased likelihood for duplication of effort among the centers. 

Therefore, updated guidance on the roles and missions of these various 

counterdrug intelligence centers is needed. 

Our review also found that the number of inquiries to EPIC from 

Department of Justice components, as measured in the number of times 

EPIC conducted simultaneous searches of its databases by request, 

decreased significantly between FY 2005 and FY 2009.9 At the same 

time, the total number of requests for information submitted to EPIC by 

state and local law enforcement doubled, rising from about 25,000 

requests in FY 2005 to almost 55,000 requests in FY 2009. We are 

concerned about the decline in the use of EPIC by Department 

components over the last several years because, during this same time, 

the Department significantly increased its activities related to combating 

smuggling and its associated violence along the Southwest border. 

EPIC does not sufficiently analyze some of its information for 

patterns and trends that could aid interdiction efforts. 

Although EPIC maintains access to large amounts of information 

in its own and other federal databases, we found that EPIC does not 

Center, in Johnstown, Pennsylvania; the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in 

Vienna, Virginia; and the Crime and Narcotics Center in Langley, Virginia. 

8 After our review was complete, EPIC renamed the Asset Identification Unit the 

Financial Targeting Unit. 

9 This does not include information obtained from EPIC that did not entail EPIC 

simultaneously searching its databases or instances in which users viewed or obtained 

information from EPIC’s Portal without submitting an information request to EPIC. 
 

 

 

analyze several of its unique data sources. As a result, EPIC may be 

overlooking trends, patterns, and connections that would assist EPIC 

users in conducting interdiction activities effectively and safely. We 

identified three examples of missed analytic opportunities within 

datasets that EPIC manages. 

First, EPIC maintains the National Seizure System database, but 

does not analyze it to identify drug trafficking patterns and trends. EPIC 

generates reports that merely aggregate data entered into the system and 

provide only limited analysis of the data. 

Second, EPIC does not analyze its repository of U.S. birth 

certificates, passports, and other documents suspected of being 

fraudulent or fraudulently obtained to identify patterns in their use by 

traffickers. While EPIC’s Fraudulent Document Unit responds to law 

enforcement requests to evaluate the validity of individual 

U.S. documents, the unit does not have the staffing or technical 

resources to identify trends and patterns in these documents. 

Third, EPIC does not fully analyze the information it collects on the 

activities of drug traffickers to identify trends and patterns. EPIC 

manages a program that collects information on the activities of 

traffickers and disseminates the information to federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies for their immediate use in interdiction 

activities. However, EPIC does not review and analyze the information so 

that trends and patterns that might have value to future operations can 

be identified. 

We also found that EPIC users consider the information in a key 

report that EPIC issues – the Gatekeeper report – to be out of date. EPIC 

is the only intelligence center that produces and widely disseminates 

reports that summarize the hierarchy, methods, and activities of the 

major organizations controlling the drug smuggling corridors between 

Mexico and the United States. Because the Gatekeeper reports are 

updated infrequently, they are used by investigators as reference 

material rather than in their day-to-day operations. 

EPIC is not managing the performance of its programs through 

effective performance measurement or collection of user feedback.

 We found that EPIC lacks measurable performance indicators for 

many of its programs and does not systematically collect user feedback. 

Of 18 EPIC programs we identified, only 11 had associated performance 

measures within EPIC’s strategic plan. Of the 11 programs with 

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performance measures, EPIC had systems and processes in place to 

track the performance of only 7. 

EPIC unit chiefs we interviewed were generally unaware of their 

programs’ performance measures and were not using them to evaluate 

operations. In addition, EPIC does not systematically solicit feedback 

from its users and does not keep its users regularly informed of program 

changes. Further, when it established new programs, EPIC did not 

consistently define the purpose, scope, and objectives of the programs or 

develop a plan for implementing them. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

To improve EPIC’s utility to the law enforcement and intelligence 

community, we recommend that: 

1.	 EPIC expand its outreach and education program to promote the 

use of its products and services, including information about how 

to use the EPIC Portal. 

2.	 EPIC update its Principals Accord or adopt a comparable multiagency framework that formalizes each member’s roles and 

responsibilities for implementing and sustaining EPIC’s programs 

and that provides a process for resolving differences that may 

arise. 

3.	 EPIC promote more complete reporting of drug seizure data to the 

National Seizure System through the EPIC Portal and traditional 

methods. 

4.	 The Office of the Deputy Attorney General work with the ONDCP 

to establish policy or guidance requiring HIDTAs to implement 

data and information sharing provisions to establish EPIC as 

their hub for seizure and drug movement information. 

5.	 EPIC establish points of contact at all national, regional, state, 

and local fusion centers to enhance information sharing and use 

of EPIC’s services and products. 

6.	 EPIC issue more substantive analytical products based on the 

seizure data collected in the National Seizure System. 

7.	 EPIC assess the feasibility of analyzing digitally scanned 

fraudulent documents to identify trends in both sources and 

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patterns of fraudulent document use, and of providing the data to 

other intelligence centers for their use. 

8.	 The DEA assess the feasibility of enhancing the capability at 

EPIC to analyze tactical information to identify links, trends, and 

patterns in drug trafficking activity in support of interdiction 

operations and investigations. 

9.	 EPIC examine new approaches for making Gatekeeper 

information more current and accessible. 

10. EPIC develop performance metrics for all of EPIC’s programs and 

operations that define relevant and objective standards, and use 

the metrics to evaluate program effectiveness. 

11. EPIC expand its existing mechanisms to systematically collect 

feedback on EPIC’s products and services from users. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

BACKGROUND..................................................................................... 1
 

APPENDIX II: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS 

APPENDIX VI: THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 

APPENDIX VII: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
 

APPENDIX VIII: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 

APPENDIX IX: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW ................................................................ 13
 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................... 44
 

APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW ........................ 47
 

WITH COUNTERDRUG RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................ 49
 

APPENDIX III: DATABASES QUERIED IN AN EPIC CHECK ................ 51
 

APPENDIX IV: RESULTS OF OIG SURVEY OF EPIC CUSTOMERS ..... 53
 

APPENDIX V: ACRONYMS ................................................................. 67
 

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT ......................................................... 68
 

ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE...................................................... 70
 

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT ......................................................... 71
 

ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE ........................................................... 77
 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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BACKGROUND 

Introduction 

The border between the United States and Mexico presents a longstanding challenge to U.S. law enforcement. Criminal organizations 

smuggle illicit drugs, undocumented aliens, and other contraband across 

the border into the United States, and cash and weapons into Mexico. In 

its June 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimated that 90 percent 

of the cocaine in U.S. drug markets transits through the Mexico and 

Central America corridor. Additionally, the 2010 National Drug Threat 

Assessment stated that “Mexican drug trafficking organizations continue 

to represent the single greatest drug trafficking threat to the 

United States.” 

In 1974 the Department of Justice (Department) published a 

study, A Secure Border: Analysis of Issues Affecting the United States 

Department of Justice, that detailed drug and border enforcement 

strategies and programs. The study recommended that the Department 

establish an interagency border intelligence center to: 

1. consolidate, analyze, and disseminate on request all-source data 

regarding border-related violations; 

2. identify conspirators and the scope and method of their activities; 

3. assess and evaluate border conspiracy operations; and 

4. develop and maintain coordination with the Southwest border 

enforcement agencies so that a prompt response can be mounted 

for “hot” intelligence items developed by one agency that fall under 

the responsibility of another. 

In response to that study, the Department established the El Paso 

Intelligence Center (EPIC) in El Paso, Texas. Led by the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA), EPIC is intended to serve as a 

tactical intelligence center, supported by databases and resources from 

member agencies.10 EPIC provides tactical information to federal, state, 

local, tribal, and international law enforcement agencies conducting 

interdiction activities, particularly along the Southwest border. EPIC’s 

stated mission is to support U.S. law enforcement and interdiction 

10 Tactical intelligence is information on which immediate enforcement action – 

arrests, seizures, and interdictions – can be based. 
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components through the timely analysis and dissemination of 

intelligence on illicit drug and alien movements, and on criminal 

organizations responsible for these illegal activities, within the 

United States, on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, across the 

Caribbean, and from other points of origin within the Western 

Hemisphere en route to the United States. 

The 2000 General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan issued by a 

White House task force identified EPIC as one of four primary nationallevel centers with drug intelligence responsibilities.11 Further, the Plan 

stated that “EPIC will be strengthened as the principal center for 

operational and investigative intelligence analysis of illicit drug 

movements in support of interdiction activities and U.S. law 

enforcement.” The ONDCP’s 2009 National Southwest Border 

Counternarcotics Strategy refers to EPIC as the “DEA’s most important 

intelligence sharing organization focusing on the Southwest border.” 

The sections below provide background on EPIC’s staffing, users, 

and budget; its management structure; and its operational capabilities. 

A description of the purpose and scope of this Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) review then follows. 

EPIC’s Staff, Users, and Budget 

Staffing. Twenty-one agencies maintain staff at EPIC. As of 

August 2009, EPIC had 343 investigative, analytic, and support staff on 

site. One hundred and sixty were from the Department, 81 were from 

other federal agencies, 6 were from state and local agencies, and 96 were 

contractors. 

Staffing at EPIC increased 22 percent from fiscal year (FY) 2007 to 

FY 2009. In the next several years, up to 193 additional Department of 

Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense 

personnel are slated to be assigned to EPIC to support its expanding 

programs and new initiatives. Full implementation of these expansions 

and initiatives would increase staffing at EPIC by 56 percent. Ninety 

percent of these additional personnel would come from agencies other 

than the DEA. Figure 1 depicts staffing trends and projections at EPIC. 

11 The other three national counterdrug intelligence centers identified in the 

plan were the National Drug Intelligence Center, in Johnstown, Pennsylvania; the 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in Vienna, Virginia; and the Crime and 

Narcotics Center in Langley, Virginia. 
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Figure 1: EPIC Staffing, FY 2001 – Planned 

Hundreds

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

375

132 132 133 135 151 144 135 194 201

163 164 153 152 148 147 147 142 142 161

DEA Non DEA

Source: EPIC and OIG analysis. 

Users. EPIC supports more than 19,000 individual users and also 

provides information to a wider population of law enforcement users 

through High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) intelligence 

centers, state and local fusion centers, and other federal centers.12 

Appendix II contains a list of national and regional intelligence centers 

that have responsibilities related to drug trafficking and with which EPIC 

shares information. For officers or analysts to become EPIC users, they 

must contact EPIC and request access to EPIC information. EPIC 

requires that applicants include their supervisor’s and security 

manager’s contact information in their applications. For an application 

to be approved, the security manager must verify that the applicant’s 

parent agency has the applicant’s fingerprints on file. EPIC informs the 

applicant’s supervisor of the application so that the supervisor can 

contact EPIC if the applicant should not be provided access. EPIC has 

historically required state and local users to follow this process and 

12 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP) Reauthorization Act of 1998 authorize the Director of the ONDCP to designate 

areas within the United States as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas if they 

demonstrate serious drug trafficking problems with an impact other areas of the 

country. Currently, the HIDTA program includes 32 HIDTAs that receive federal 

funding for infrastructure and joint initiatives that facilitate cooperation and 

information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations in an 

effort to reduce drug trafficking. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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began applying it to federal users in 2006. Figure 2 shows the 

distribution of EPIC users by agency type. 

Figure 2: Distribution of EPIC’s Users 

by Agency Type, FY 2009 

24%

6%

15%

55%

DEA

Other DOJ Agencies (e.g., FBI, ATF)

Non‐DOJ Federal Agencies (e.g., CBP, ICE)

State and Local Police and Sheriff Departments

Source: OIG analysis. 

Budget. The DEA provides most of EPIC’s non-salary, operational 

funding. It contributed $18 million (92 percent) of the FY 2009 budget of 

$19.6 million.13 The remaining $1.6 million (8 percent) was paid by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services; intelligence agencies; federal, state, and local asset 

forfeiture funds; the Department of Transportation; and the HIDTA 

program for projects these agencies conducted at or with EPIC. Figure 3 

shows EPIC’s operational budget and the share that the DEA funded 

from FY 2005 to FY 2009. Between FY 2005 and FY 2009, other 

agencies’ contributions to EPIC’s operational budget declined from 

$3.1 million to $1.6 million, even as these other agencies increased the 

number of staff they assigned to EPIC. 

13 Each agency represented at EPIC assumes the salary and benefit costs of its 

own employees. 
 

 

 

Figure 3: EPIC’s Operational Budget and Percentage of 

DEA Funding, FY 2005 – FY 2009 

         

   

Millions

25.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

19.1 18.0

12.2 12.5

11.9

3.2 2.8 1.5 1.4 1.6

Other Funds DEA Provided Funds

Source: OIG analysis. 

EPIC’s Management Structure 

EPIC’s management structure is defined in its Principals Accord 

(Accord), which sets forth EPIC’s mission statement, objective, functions, 

membership, staffing, and management principles. The Accord defines 

three levels of membership for agencies affiliated with EPIC. 

	 Principal Members are “federal agencies that directly support the 

national effort in the coordinated drug intelligence process by 

offering intelligence information and a minimum of seven 

personnel to EPIC.”14 

	 Participating Members are “any federal agency that directly 

supports the national effort in coordinated drug intelligence but 

that provides less than seven personnel to EPIC.” 

	 Associate Members are “any criminal justice agency, as well as 

State and Local agencies, involved in the investigation and 

14 As of August 2009, Principal Members are three Department components (the 

DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the FBI) and three 

components of the Department of Homeland Security (Customs and Border Protection, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Coast Guard). 

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enforcement of controlled substance laws and covers those 

agencies with written agreements with EPIC prior to the 

implementation of the Accord.” 

A Principals Group of six Intelligence Chiefs from Principal Member 

agencies provides “internal interagency management and coordination,” 

oversees EPIC operations, and is responsible for approving new members 

and making changes in agencies’ membership status. EPIC’s Director 

oversees the center’s operations, presents requests for EPIC membership 

additions or changes to the Principals Group, and serves as chairperson 

of the Principals Group. The Accord calls for EPIC’s Director to report to 

the DEA’s Chief of Intelligence; thus, the EPIC Director has always been 

a DEA employee. The position of Deputy Director may be occupied by a 

representative from any agency and is currently held by a representative 

of the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP). 

EPIC’s Operational Capabilities 

The EPIC staff is organized into three operational sections that 

provide intelligence support to the field: the Watch, Tactical Operations, 

and Research and Analysis.15 Figure 4 shows EPIC’s organizational and 

DEA reporting structure. 

15 Other EPIC sections that provide administrative and technical support to 

operational units include: (1) the Information Management Section that maintains 

EPIC databases and applications, (2) the Communications Management Unit that 

maintains the flow of electronic information between EPIC and other law enforcement 

agencies, and (3) the Database Management Unit that reviews drug seizure data entered 

into the National Seizure System. 

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Figure 4: EPIC Operational Reporting Structure 

Note: After our review was completed, EPIC reported that it had renamed the Asset 

Identification Unit the Financial Targeting Unit and renamed the Predictive Analysis 

Unit the Predictive Analysis and Targeting Unit. EPIC also stated that it moved its 

Maritime Intelligence Program from the Tactical Operations Section to the Research 

and Analysis Section. 

Source: EPIC. 

Watch Section 

The Watch Section is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to 

respond to requests from EPIC users for information to support their 

investigations. EPIC responds to requests by performing “EPIC Checks,” 

which are simultaneous searches of four databases that EPIC owns and 

seven additional databases that EPIC can access.16 The following 

databases are included in an EPIC Check (see Appendix III for 

descriptions of the databases): 

Internal Databases 

 EPIC 10 Database 

 EPIC Law Enforcement Information Search and Analysis (ELISA) 

16 After the completion of this review, EPIC reported that it had added the Drug 

Precursor Database, the DEA’s License Plate Reader Database, and the DEA’s Analysis 

and Resource Tracking System. 

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 EPIC Internal Database 

 National Seizure System 

External Databases 

 DEA’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System 

 Department of Homeland Security’s Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System II 

 FBI’s National Crime Information Center System 

 CBP’s Central Index System 

 Federal Aviation Administration’s Aircraft Registration System 

 Federal Bureau of Prisons’ SENTRY 

 United States Marshals Service’s Warrant Information Network 

The Watch Section’s General Watch provides tactical intelligence 

support to law enforcement and interdiction personnel conducting 

criminal investigations and interdiction operations. In response to 

requests by law enforcement officers, the General Watch also posts EPIC 

Lookouts, which alert law enforcement officers to be on the lookout for 

specific individuals, vehicles, and vessels that are of interest to law 

enforcement. In addition, when the General Watch receives information 

about drug seizures, EPIC staff enters it in the National Seizure System, 

which is the repository for the reporting of drug seizures within the 

United States.17 

EPIC receives requests for information through its General Watch 

from users in the Department of Justice, from other federal agencies, and 

from state and local law enforcement officers. Users may also obtain 

information from EPIC by contacting analysts within EPIC directly. If 

these analysts conduct EPIC Checks, the requests will be counted in 

EPIC’s database of requests for information. The number of EPIC Checks 

performed on behalf of Department components, other federal agencies, 

and state and local agencies is depicted in Figure 5.18 

17 The National Seizure System, which contains information on seizure events 

since 2000, is used in federal and regional drug trafficking analyses, and in the 

development of drug policy. (Seizure information from the 1970s through 1999 is 

maintained in the EPIC Internal Database.) The DEA, FBI, CBP, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, and Coast Guard are the only agencies required to report drug 

seizures to the National Seizure System, and they must do so only if the amounts seized 

meet specific threshold levels. 

18 The information in Figure 5 does not include requests for information that 

did not result in a simultaneous search of the EPIC databases or instances in which 

users viewed or obtained information from EPIC’s Portal without submitting an 

information request to EPIC. 

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Figure 5: Requests for Information by Agency Type, 

FY 2005 – FY 2009 

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

State and Local

Department

Other Federal

Source: EPIC. 

The portion of requests for information attributable to each of 

these groups has shifted significantly in the last 5 years. Since FY 2005, 

the number of requests for information submitted by Department users 

has been decreasing, falling from about 40,000 in FY 2005 to about 

20,000 in FY 2009. Requests from non-Department federal users, who 

have always made the fewest number of requests for information from 

EPIC, have trended slightly downward. Meanwhile, the total number of 

requests for information submitted to EPIC by state and local law 

enforcement has steadily increased, rising from about 25,000 requests in 

FY 2005 to almost 55,000 requests in FY 2009. In FY 2009, state and 

local law enforcement generated 60 percent of EPIC’s 89,932 requests for 

information. 

In addition to the General Watch’s activities, three units within the 

Watch provide specialized investigative support to law enforcement and 

interdiction agencies. The Maritime Intelligence Unit supports maritime 

interdiction agencies, such as the Coast Guard, by conducting EPIC 

Checks on individuals on vessels boarded because of their suspected 

involvement with smuggling. The EPIC Gun Desk supports the 

disruption of illegal weapons trafficking by compiling information on 

weapons seizures and querying databases for the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) field personnel and participants 

at EPIC. The Military Sealift Command conducts EPIC Checks on nonmilitary personnel, such as crew, contractors, and visitors, scheduled to 

board or work on U.S. cargo and other vessels. 

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Tactical Operations Section 

The Tactical Operations Section operates EPIC’s programs to 

collect information along certain sections of the Southwest border, the 

Caribbean, and Eastern Pacific, and disseminates the information to 

appropriate law enforcement agencies. As part of its maritime program, 

EPIC participates in a maritime intelligence group that works 

collaboratively to collect and share information used to interdict 

contraband being smuggled into the United States. The agencies in this 

group target different geographic areas. When one of these agencies 

collects tactical information based on the maritime movements of drug 

traffickers, it creates tactical reports and circulates them to other 

members of the group for verification. The group provides these reports 

to U.S. law enforcement agencies engaged in maritime drug interdiction 

to assist them in planning operations and directing resources to specific 

threats. 

The Tactical Operations Section also manages EPIC’s beacon 

tracking program and Air Watch. The beacon tracking program 

continuously monitors beacons used by law enforcement personnel, 

either for their own safety or to assist them in tracking suspects of their 

investigations. EPIC’s Air Watch supports aviation- and aircraft-related 

investigations by providing information on aircraft, pilots, and 

passengers suspected of having links to criminal activity, and by issuing 

EPIC Lookouts on movements of suspect aircraft and pilots. 

Research and Analysis Section 

EPIC’s Research and Analysis Section produces reports on 

smuggling practices and seizure trends, and provides specialized support 

to investigations. Within this section, the Southwest Border Unit 

researches and produces reports on drug trafficking organizations, 

known as “gatekeepers,” that control contraband smuggling routes along 

the U.S.-Mexico border. EPIC’s “Southwest Border Gatekeepers” report 

is the only continuously maintained summary of the hierarchy, methods, 

and activities of the major players operating along the border between 

Mexico and the United States. The following four additional units 

provide other types of specialized support. 

EPIC’s newly established Predictive Analysis Unit produces reports 

summarizing drug seizures along routes identified as drug smuggling 

corridors and provides these reports to interdiction agencies. 

The Asset Identification Unit researches commercial, federal, and 

open source databases to identify properties, businesses, vehicles, and 

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financial assets owned by individuals who are under investigation for 

drug trafficking and money laundering. 

The Crime-Terror Nexus Unit conducts research and analysis on 

individuals under investigation by law enforcement to determine whether 

criminal proceeds are used in support of terrorism. 

The Fraudulent Document and Tactical Bulletin Unit provides two 

distinct types of services. The Fraudulent Document Unit examines 

seized U.S. documents such as passports and birth certificates 

suspected of being fraudulent or fraudulently obtained. The Tactical 

Bulletin Unit reviews information contained in drug seizure reports and 

creates bulletins on drug transportation trends and practices that have 

implications for officer safety or that could assist law enforcement in 

drug interdiction. This unit disseminates the tactical bulletins to over 

800 law enforcement personnel. 

Additional EPIC Functions 

Liaison. EPIC allows representatives of 21 (primarily federal) 

agencies to share intelligence and investigative leads, and to coordinate 

Southwest border interdiction operations. EPIC also facilitates tactical 

information sharing between U.S. agencies and the governments of 

Colombia and Mexico through liaisons embedded at EPIC. 

EPIC Portal. The EPIC Portal, established in 2006, provides users 

online access to certain EPIC information and databases. Through the 

Portal, users can:19 

	 request EPIC Checks from the General Watch (EPIC responds to 

requests by e-mail), 

	 search the databases that EPIC owns (EPIC 10, the EPIC Internal 

Database, ELISA, and the National Seizure System), 

	 enter seizure events into the National Seizure System, 

	 display the location of drug seizure events by state and county, 

19 After our review was completed, EPIC reported that it had added access to 

two additional resources to the Portal: (1) the Drug Precursor Database and (2) the 

capability to access OneDOJ. The Department’s OneDOJ Database is a repository for 

law enforcement information such as open and closed case documents, investigative 

reports, witness interviews, criminal event data, criminal history and incarceration 

information, and identifying information about individual offenders. It allows 

Department and regional criminal law enforcement users to share information 

internally with other investigative components. 

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 display seizure event information on a map, and 

 obtain 34 standard reports and EPIC published reports. 

Interdiction Training. EPIC provides training to personnel in other 

law enforcement agencies that conduct interdiction operations. The 

courses, mainly tailored to the needs of state and local law enforcement, 

cover the interdiction of passenger vehicles on highways, the interdiction 

of commercial vehicles on highways, and interdiction in public spaces 

such as airports, hotels, and conveyances such as aircraft, buses, and 

trains. In FY 2008, EPIC conducted 29 courses throughout the 

United States for 3,027 officers. 

Acts as Law Enforcement Interface for the Federal Aviation 

Administration. After the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) law 

enforcement authority was transferred to the Transportation Security 

Administration following the Homeland Security Act of 2002, EPIC 

assumed responsibility for providing information from its databases to 

the FAA when the FAA needs information about suspicious activity 

involving aircraft. 

Backup Beacon Monitoring Agency for the Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South. If the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which detects 

and monitors illicit air and maritime targets, is unable to maintain 

continuous beacon monitoring (for example, because of an evacuation 

due to weather), EPIC adds the task force’s beacon signals to its own 

system and monitors them until the task force is once again able to 

perform this function. 

Purpose and Scope of the OIG’s Review 

In this review, the OIG assessed EPIC’s analysis and dissemination 

of intelligence in support of law enforcement interdiction operations, 

activities, and investigations; which agencies are using EPIC and how 

EPIC is supporting these agencies’ investigations and operations; and 

whether there are opportunities for EPIC to expand its user population. 

We also examined the utility of EPIC’s products and services through a 

survey of EPIC vetted users. We conducted our fieldwork from March to 

September 2009 and focused on EPIC’s operations between FY 2005 and 

FY 2008. More details on our methodology are discussed in Appendix I. 

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RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

We found that EPIC is highly valued by its partner 

agencies and users, but users also report needing more 

information about EPIC and improved access to its 

online information system. In addition, we identified 

several weaknesses that have prevented EPIC’s 

operations and programs from being as effective as they 

could be. EPIC did not adequately staff some key 

interdiction programs and, as a result, its service to 

users was disrupted or diminished. EPIC also did not 

develop the National Seizure System into a 

comprehensive database of drug seizures nationwide or 

establish itself as the hub for the HIDTA program. 

Further, EPIC did not coordinate consistently with other 

intelligence centers. We also found that EPIC does not 

analyze significant information and, as a result, may not 

be identifying drug trafficking trends and patterns that 

could assist interdiction activities. Further, EPIC is not 

managing its programs through effective performance 

measurement or collection of user feedback. 

EPIC users report high satisfaction with its products and services, 

but they also report needing more information about EPIC and 

improved access to its Portal. 

We surveyed law enforcement personnel and analysts within the 

Department, other federal agencies, and state and local agencies who are 

users of EPIC, and found that those who had used EPIC’s products 

generally rated the quality high and reported the products were valuable 

to their operations. However, we also found that users need more 

information about EPIC and improved access to its Portal. 

We sent 2,499 surveys to EPIC users asking about their 

experiences with EPIC and their views about the value and quality of 

EPIC’s products and services.20 We received 765 responses that we were 

20 We summarize the results in this section and provide more detail on the 

results in Appendix IV. Our survey methodology is summarized in Appendix I. 

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able to analyze. It is important to note that we did not survey law 

enforcement personnel who had never established accounts at EPIC.21 

Survey respondents who had used EPIC’s products generally rated 

the quality high and reported the products were valuable to their 

operations. Sixty-two percent of respondents stated that EPIC’s products 

and services had been “very helpful” in supporting their operations, while 

34 percent indicated these had been “somewhat helpful.” Only 4 percent 

of the 638 respondents who answered this question indicated that EPIC 

products and services had been “not very helpful” or “not helpful at all.” 

We asked respondents who reported that an EPIC product or service 

added “little value” or “no value” to their operations to explain the reason 

for this. Overall, few respondents reported that EPIC’s products and 

services had diminished value because of a shortcoming in the product; 

rather, the primary reasons were that the respondents had not used the 

product or service (either because they were unaware of it or because 

they did not know how to use it) or that the product did not apply to 

their mission. 

When asked to evaluate EPIC’s products and services based on 

four specific criteria – accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and actionability – 

a large majority of respondents rated EPIC’s products and services highly 

on all four. See Table 1. 

Table 1: Percentage of Respondents Reporting that EPIC Products 

and Services Fully Met Their Criteria 

Criteria Products and Services 

Fully Met Criteria 

Accurate 82% 

Relevant 80% 

Timely 76% 

Actionable 74% 

Source: OIG survey. 

In response to our question about whether there were additional 

comments about EPIC, many survey respondents stated that EPIC could 

improve the utility of its products and services to law enforcement by 

providing more information about these products and how to access 

them. For example, respondents stated, “EPIC needs to get out into the 

field to educate local, state and federal agencies of its existence and what 

valuable services it does provide,” “I feel that I don’t know enough about 

21 EPIC users represent about 2 percent of all law enforcement personnel in the 

United States. 

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EPIC and therefore I was not using it to its fullest potential,” and “I 

would like to use EPIC to support investigations but am not sure in what 

areas EPIC can and will support other [agencies’] investigations.” 

EPIC senior managers told us that EPIC does not have a formal 

marketing program and relies on presentations made during the drug 

detection and interdiction training sessions it conducts to expose federal, 

state, and local partners to its products and services. In FY 2008, EPIC 

provided interdiction training to approximately 3,000 officers. Our survey 

showed that 16 percent of survey respondents indicated they first learned 

of EPIC through its interdiction training, while over 50 percent reported 

they learned about EPIC through other training or from coworkers. 

We also asked in our survey about why EPIC users were not using 

EPIC’s Portal. During our review, EPIC managers told us that their 

vision was to significantly expand the use of EPIC’s Portal for customers 

to access EPIC information. However, only 4,638 (24 percent) of EPIC’s 

19,416 users had active Portal accounts as of July 2009, and in FY 2008 

only 2 percent of the requests EPIC received for information were 

submitted through the Portal. Our survey of 765 users indicated that 

the primary reasons that Portal usage remains low are that users need 

additional information about what the Portal provides or training in how 

to use the Portal (90 respondents) and because users find obtaining and 

maintaining active accounts is difficult (53 respondents).22 

Overall, our results indicate that EPIC has the opportunity to 

improve its utility to the law enforcement and intelligence community by 

increasing its outreach efforts, and particularly by improving the 

accessibility of the EPIC Portal. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that EPIC: 

1. Expand its outreach and education program to promote the use 

of its products and services, including information about how to 

use the EPIC Portal. 

22 EPIC provides little training and information to its users about how to use the 

Portal. EPIC Portal training consists of a computer-based training module hosted on 

the Portal itself that describes the Portal’s capabilities, components, and applications. 

In addition, during FY 2009, EPIC staff trained 48 users during 6 sessions on the Portal 

given at EPIC and 59 users during 3 off-site sessions. EPIC stated that users also can 

call or e-mail to request assistance and training. 

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EPIC has not adequately staffed several key interdiction programs 

or ensured that member agencies collaborate effectively to sustain 

programs and share information. 

We found that EPIC could not sustain staffing for several key 

interdiction programs, and as a result, service to its users was disrupted 

or diminished for approximately a year. We found that EPIC’s programs 

to help investigators identify fraudulent documents was unstaffed from 

December 2007 to January 2009, and its program to provide 

investigators with information pertaining to pilots, suspect aircraft, and 

aircraft movements was unstaffed for approximately 9 months of 2007. 

Further, EPIC did not maintain a consistent level of staffing and 

support for its efforts to collect information on the maritime activities of 

drug traffickers, with a result that EPIC’s contributions to a maritime 

intelligence group decreased 59 percent between FY 2007 and FY 2008. 

Because EPIC is the agency with the strongest collection capability for 

certain maritime drug smuggling corridors to the United States, the 

failure to staff and support this group likely hindered drug trafficking 

interdiction efforts. 

We also identified two programs that were not fully implemented 

because national policy was lacking and because EPIC did not have the 

operational control to require the law enforcement participation 

necessary to execute these programs. First, EPIC’s process for 

aggregating drug seizure information into a comprehensive database into 

which all drug seizures are reported nationwide has not produced a 

complete database of seizures. Second, EPIC has not established itself 

as the hub for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program, which 

coordinates drug control efforts among federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies through 32 task forces and allied intelligence 

centers. 

In addition, EPIC’s coordination with other federal and state 

intelligence centers is inconsistent. Specifically, EPIC does not maintain 

an up-to-date list of key centers and their points of contact, and cannot 

ensure it has users in each center. We also found that some members of 

the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces were not aware of EPIC’s CrimeTerror Nexus Unit, whose products could provide direct support to the 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces. We discuss these shortcomings in the 

following sections. 

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EPIC’s Fraudulent Document Unit was unstaffed for more than a year. 

EPIC did not maintain staff in its Fraudulent Document Unit 

between December 2007 and January 2009, and as a result the unit 

developed a backlog of 7,000 unexamined documents and did not 

provide support to law enforcement officers who contacted EPIC for 

information during this period. The Fraudulent Document Unit supports 

law enforcement agencies through its examination of U.S. documents, 

such as passports and birth certificates that are fraudulent or are 

authentic but were obtained or used fraudulently. Prior to December 

2007, the unit received and verified documents for authenticity and 

stored them on microfilm. In December 2007, the unit’s three 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) staff retired or were reassigned 

by DHS and were not replaced, leaving the unit without personnel and 

unable to respond to user requests. 

In January 2009, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection agency 

assigned three analysts to the unit, and the unit resumed responding to 

law enforcement officers who requested assistance in assessing 

documents. However, according to the Unit Chief, as of fall 2009 the 

unit still lacked sufficient staff to respond to these requests on a timely 

basis, to examine the 20 to 150 new documents received each week, and 

to examine the documents in the backlog. 

EPIC’s Air Watch was unstaffed for 9 months. 

EPIC also was unable to maintain continuous staffing of its Air 

Watch. Before 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration provided staff 

to support the Air Watch. In 2002, the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) was formed, and the FAA positions were converted 

to TSA positions. In 2007, the TSA removed its personnel from EPIC 

and, as a result, EPIC could not provide specialized information in 

support of investigations involving aircraft or pilots until 2008 when 

EPIC staffed the unit with Air National Guard personnel. During the 

time when the Air Watch was unstaffed, EPIC continued to provide 

investigators with information from EPIC’s databases, including the 

FAA’s Aircraft Registration System, when requested, but could not 

provide specialized support such as information on suspect aircraft 

movements or additional analysis. Customs and Border Protection’s Air 

Marine Operations Center, located in San Diego, California, provided this 

specialized support while EPIC could not. 

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EPIC did not maintain staffing sufficient to sustain its contributions to a 

maritime counterdrug intelligence group. 

EPIC also did not maintain a consistent level of staffing and 

support to a maritime intelligence group in which it participates. EPIC is 

one of five agencies in a maritime intelligence group that collects 

information on the maritime movements of drug traffickers in the 

corridors to the United States and provides information to law 

enforcement agencies so they can interdict vessels suspected of being 

used to smuggle contraband into the United States. 

Because, of the agencies in this maritime group, EPIC is the federal 

entity with the strongest collection capability for certain corridors to the 

United States, it is important that EPIC fully maintain its collection 

efforts and participation in the group. In a memorandum to us, an 

analyst from an agency providing oversight of the maritime intelligence 

group wrote: 

EPIC’s value in the program extends beyond sheer volume 

and quality of reporting. While Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South has focused on attacking the source and 

departure zones EPIC has often been the sole-source of effort 

directed against the arrival zones, several steps closer to the 

Southwest border . . . . 

Noting that EPIC has the primary role for collecting information in 

this region, another analyst we interviewed stated that “if they don’t 

[collect] it, nobody else will.” As Figure 6 on the next page shows, EPIC 

has been a major contributor to the group. In FY 2008 EPIC credited its 

maritime collection efforts with contributing to 41 arrests and the seizure 

of 11 vessels and 30.5 metric tons of cocaine. 

However, from FY 2005 through FY 2008, the number of tactical 

reports EPIC contributed to this maritime intelligence group decreased 

from 2,330 to 819 (65 percent) (see Figure 6). In that time, it decreased 

its relative contributions to the group from 42 percent to 25 percent, 

based on total tactical reports. EPIC also failed to meet its internal 

performance measure goal of issuing five drug movement alerts per 

month, issuing only nine for FY 2008. It also failed to meet its target of 

identifying three major maritime drug transportation groups for FY 2008, 

identifying only one. 

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Figure 6: Contributions of Tactical Reports to a Maritime 

Intelligence Group by Agency 

2,330 2,659

2,010

819

1,301

1,797

1,926

1,519

824

1,115

1,002

685

310

188

63

142

760

316

226

93

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008

El Paso Intelligence Center Joint Interagency Task Force‐South

Fleet Information Operation Center Panama Express

Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Atlantic

Source: EPIC. 

EPIC’s maritime intelligence managers and staff told us that the 

decrease in tactical reports was due to changes in drug trafficking 

methods that hampered the collection of information on maritime drug 

movements, and additional factors specific to EPIC that are described 

below. As Figure 6 shows, the overall output of the group has decreased 

since 2006. 

Additional factors and EPIC’s management decisions further 

contributed to EPIC’s decline in productivity. According to written 

information provided by EPIC, EPIC shifted personnel from its maritime 

to its land-based program due “to an increase in reported violence along 

the Southwest border.” EPIC’s Director noted that EPIC staff who collect 

information on maritime and land-based drug trafficker movements come 

from the same limited pool. The Director said he decided how much of 

U.S. Department of Justice 19 

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Evaluation and Inspections Division 
their limited time to allocate to each collection activity based on where 

the manpower was likely to have the greatest and most immediate value. 

Further, four staff members supplied by the DEA left EPIC during 

FY 2008 and were not replaced for approximately 8 months. EPIC also 

experienced equipment problems for a period of time in FY 2008. 

Analysts from one of the other agencies in the maritime intelligence 

group stated they noted a “drop-off” in the quality and quantity of EPIC’s 

contributions and in the frequency with which EPIC staff provided 

information to them beginning in 2008. One analyst stated that while 

this decrease in EPIC’s contributions did not cause the mission to 

collapse, it adversely affected the strength of individual interdiction 

cases. 

EPIC’s Principals Accord is outdated, is not used effectively, and does not 

define the roles and responsibilities of its member agencies. 

EPIC lacks a current, coordinated multi-agency agreement that 

clearly delineates the roles, responsibilities, and contributions of its 

member agencies. EPIC does maintain bilateral Memoranda of 

Understanding with agencies in every state and with several federal 

agencies, foreign governments, and agencies. EPIC’s Principals Accord 

no longer effectively serves as a multi-agency agreement that defines 

member agency participation, does not establish program goals and 

priorities, and does not ensure regular meetings and collaboration among 

the partners. We believe that the absence of a current multi-agency 

agreement has contributed to problems with the continuity of EPIC’s 

programs and agency collaboration. While EPIC relies on its member 

agencies to staff, implement, and sustain EPIC programs, EPIC’s 1999 

Principals Accord is outdated, no longer reflects EPIC’s current 

membership or the scope of EPIC’s operations and missions, and does 

not provide a decision making process where issues can be decided. 

Although a majority of member agencies at EPIC collaborate effectively, 

several EPIC officials informed us of instances where a member agency 

did not share information or contribute resources, leaving EPIC without 

an agreed upon method for resolving the dispute. 

The Principals Accord calls for regular meetings of the Principals 

Group, but does not establish a schedule for how frequently the meetings 

should be held. We requested information regarding previous Principals 

Group meetings, but we did not receive any documentation from EPIC. 

EPIC’s senior management told us that these meetings had not been held 

in “at least several years.” We were also informed that EPIC’s Director 

communicates with members of the Principals Group informally rather 

than through a formal process that ensures adequate collaboration. 

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In March 2009, EPIC’s Deputy Director acknowledged that EPIC 

lacked an interagency guide and that the Principals Accord needed to be 

updated. EPIC reported that 3 years ago it started the process of 

formulating a replacement document that would establish a steering 

group to provide oversight of EPIC. According to EPIC, in April 2010 the 

Interdiction Committee agreed to “facilitate discussions at the 

Department level” that would establish the steering group.23 

As a result of the lack of an effective multi-agency agreement, EPIC 

has been unable to sustain several key programs or to resolve differences 

that arose in the course of operating as a multi-agency center. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that EPIC: 

2. Update its Principals Accord or adopt a comparable multi-agency 

framework that formalizes each member’s roles and responsibilities 

for implementing and sustaining EPIC’s programs and that 

provides a process for resolving differences that may arise. 

EPIC’s process for capturing drug seizure information has not produced 

a comprehensive database nationwide. 

EPIC responded to the directive in the 2000 General Counterdrug 

Intelligence Plan (the Plan) to establish a process to aggregate federal, 

state, and local drug seizure information into one system to enable 

analyses of drug trafficking activity by creating the National Seizure 

System database. However, the process that EPIC established for 

agencies to report seizure data has not produced the comprehensive 

database envisioned in the Plan. Unlike the ONDCP’s annual National 

Drug Control Strategy, which guides U.S. efforts and national priorities 

for reducing illegal drug use and disrupting the illegal drug market, the 

Plan provides direction and assigns tasks to U.S. counterdrug law 

enforcement and intelligence entities, including EPIC. The Plan called 

for: 

the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat, in 

cooperation with EPIC and its various points-of-contact, 

HIDTA intelligence centers, the DEA, and Regional 

23 The Interdiction Committee is a multi-agency body of federal agencies 

involved in drug interdiction efforts. It is chartered by the ONDCP to discuss and 

resolve issues related to the coordination, oversight, and integration of international, 

border, and domestic interdiction efforts. 

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Information Sharing System, to coordinate the development 

of a process to capture drug seizure data at the state and 

local level. 

The National Seizure System EPIC maintains is not a complete 

record of drug seizures made by U.S. law enforcement, and as a result, 

intelligence products based on analysis of the seizure data contained in 

this system may be incomplete or inaccurate. 

EPIC’s National Seizure System is not a complete record of drug seizures 

made by U.S. law enforcement.

 Although many federal law enforcement agencies may make or be 

involved in making drug seizures, only five are required to report 

information to EPIC’s National Seizure System: the DEA, FBI, CBP, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Coast Guard.24 

Further, these five are required to report only seizures above threshold 

levels established by the DEA, even though the National Seizure System 

accepts seizures of any drug quantity.25 Based upon information provided 

by EPIC, we found that only the five required federal agencies and an 

additional four (ATF, Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, 

and Postal Inspection Service) had supplied data to the system in FY 2008. 

The number of drug seizures made by federal agencies that are not 

required to report is not known. To determine whether these agencies 

are making drug seizures that are not being reported, we conducted 

telephone interviews with representatives from three federal agencies 

that had not reported seizures directly in the National Seizure System 

during FY 2008 and that seemed likely to conduct drug seizures. The 

three agencies we contacted were the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Fish 

and Wildlife Service, and the Food and Drug Administration. We asked 

officials from these agencies whether their agencies seized drugs, how 

they reported the seizures, and into what system. The official from the 

24 Using the July 2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Federal Law 

Enforcement Officers, 2004, we identified a number of federal agencies that could 

reasonably be expected to have seized drugs in the conduct of their law enforcement 

operations but that, according to EPIC, reported no seizures directly to the National 

Seizure System in FY 2008. A copy of this reference may be found at 

bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo04.pdf. 

25 In 2001, the DEA established quantities of drugs seized that are required to 

be reported. These quantities are listed on the 2001 Drug Threshold Weights and 

Equivalents. Examples of substances and threshold amounts over which seizures must 

be reported are cocaine, 500 grams; hashish, 1 kilogram; heroin, 100 grams; 

marijuana, 25 kilograms or 50 plants; and methamphetamine, 250 grams. 

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Bureau of Indian Affairs stated that his agency seizes drugs “daily – 

somewhere, we are always seizing drugs.” In contrast, an official from 

the Fish and Wildlife Service stated that his agency rarely seizes drugs. 

The official from the Food and Drug Administration said that agency 

occasionally seizes illegal drugs in the course of other investigations. 

The representatives of the three agencies told us that when they 

seize drugs, they submit them to another federal agency such as the DEA 

or CBP, either directly or through a task force, and do not know whether 

those agencies report the seizures into the National Seizure System. One 

believed incorrectly that the National Seizure System did not accept 

seizures below the thresholds. 

Based on this anecdotal information, we believe that drug seizures 

are being made by federal agencies not required to report them. While it 

is likely that many federal seizures above the thresholds are reported 

indirectly to the National Seizure System through other agencies or task 

forces, the lack of a requirement to report makes it difficult to determine 

whether this information is reported or to ensure that it is reported. 

In addition, there is no requirement for state and local agencies to 

report their drug seizure information to EPIC’s National Seizure System 

database. EPIC accepts seizure information in a wide range of formats, 

such as facsimiles that EPIC personnel enter into the National Seizure 

System and electronic transfers of data submitted through the Portal. 

However, we could verify only that 209 (1 percent) of the approximately 

17,876 state and local agencies and task forces nationwide had reported 

information directly to the system during FY 2008.26 

An EPIC manager noted that there is little incentive for state and 

local agencies to report seizures. The manager said that “it is difficult to 

enlist the locals to cooperate because it requires them to put limited 

resources to this effort at a time when resources are short, and it’s not 

clear to them what they will get back from their effort.” He also noted 

that local police sometimes view themselves as intelligence consumers, 

rather than intelligence collectors and reporters. 

A problem within EPIC also may have caused the National Seizure 

System to be incomplete. When we compared selected data reported to 

26 This does not mean that all seizures by these agencies were not reported to 

the National Seizure System. Seizures may be consolidated and reported through 

federal agencies such as the DEA, or through individual state or local agencies, or 

through task forces such as HIDTAs whose officers were involved in the operations. 

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the National Seizure System with data in another DEA drug seizure 

database, we found evidence that National Seizure System data was 

incomplete. For the comparison, we used the Federal-wide Drug Seizure 

System, which automatically receives data from the National Seizure 

System about seizures above established thresholds. Because the 

National Seizure System contains data on all seizures reported to EPIC 

regardless of size, the aggregate quantities in the National Seizure 

System should be greater than or equal to those in the Federal-wide 

Drug Seizure System. However, we found several instances in which 

reported seized quantities of the drug MDMA were higher in the Federalwide Drug Seizure System than the amounts reported in the National 

Seizure System.27 For example, the National Seizure System reported 

20,000 fewer dosage units of MDMA seized in Michigan than were 

reported in the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System for the same time 

period. EPIC personnel could not explain why National Seizure System 

seizures amounts were less than Federal-wide Drug Seizure System 

totals.28 

As of March 2010, the ONDCP was planning to begin a “census” by 

the end of 2010 of the data in drug seizure databases maintained by law 

enforcement agencies to track their drug evidence. These databases are 

presumed to be fairly complete because they are used to track evidence 

that may, for example, form the basis of criminal cases. The census 

would compare the seizure information in the individual databases with 

the information in the National Seizure System and would enable the 

ONDCP to assess how incomplete the national system is and to what 

extent analyses conducted based on information in the National Seizure 

System may be flawed. 

27 MDMA stands for methylene dioxymethamphetamine, a drug commonly 

referred to as ecstasy. In 2003, the totals of MDMA recorded in the Federal-wide Drug 

Seizure System for Michigan were 83,586 dosage units compared with 63,430 in the 

National Seizure System. In 2004, the totals of MDMA recorded in the Federal-wide 

Drug Seizure System for Michigan were 70,309 compared with 35,672 recorded in the 

National Seizure System. Additionally, the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System quantity 

of MDMA seized in Washington, Vermont, and Montana for 2003 to 2006 was 335,513 

dosage units greater than the quantity reported in the National Seizure System for the 

same states over the same time period. 

28 After our review was complete, EPIC managers stated that this type of 

discrepancy may be less likely to occur after the DEA and EPIC complete the retirement 

of the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System. They noted that a full-time data analyst will 

be hired to review the quality of data before, during, and after the process of migrating 

Federal-wide Drug Seizure System information to the National Seizure System. 

Although EPIC reported that this process is under way, a draft plan for the migration is 

not expected until August 2010. 

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When we asked an ONDCP research analyst about the 

ramifications of the National Seizure System being incomplete or 

inaccurate, he stated that for the United States to not have a complete 

record of its drug seizures in one system is “an opportunity lost.” For 

example, the CBP uses state and local seizure information from the 

National Seizure System to track and quantify the amount of drugs 

successfully smuggled into the United States and thus to identify and 

then address vulnerabilities at the border. Such analyses would be more 

accurate if the National Seizure System provided a complete picture of 

drug trafficking in the United States and of law enforcement’s efforts to 

address trafficking. 

EPIC’s management of the National Seizure System does not facilitate 

collection of the data needed to fully support tactical analyses. 

The National Seizure System database is structured to collect 

approximately 140 separate pieces of information, in 7 broad categories, 

for each drug seizure event reported. All seven of the categories include 

both mandatory data fields and optional data fields, such as the state of 

vehicle origination, drug concealment area, vehicle model, and 

commercial carrier name. Having too many required fields may make 

reporting so onerous that fewer agencies will report. However, ensuring 

that key fields are populated with data is essential for comprehensive 

analysis based on that information. An ONDCP research analyst told us 

that information from many of the optional data fields would be useful 

for identifying trends and predicting patterns of drug trafficking, but 

because the fields are frequently left blank, the analyses based on them 

are limited. 

To illustrate the impact of these gaps in reporting, EPIC presented 

information in one intelligence report based on reported drug seizures 

that occurred in July and August 2009. In 11 of 36 (31 percent) reported 

seizures, the “drug concealment area” field was not populated, and in 

6 of 32 (19 percent) seizure reports, the “vehicle model” field was left 

blank. Complete information is important for forming the national 

picture of drug trafficking trends and patterns, as well as to effectively 

support tactical intelligence needs. 

A National Drug Intelligence Center research analyst who develops 

the center’s Inter-Agency Assessment of Cocaine Movement report told us 

that his analysis relies on the “location of origination” field, which is an 

optional field in the National Seizure System. The report is intended to 

show the geographic patterns drug traffickers use to move cocaine within 

the United States. If the origination field is blank, the data cannot be 

used to determine patterns of trafficking. The analyst stated that 

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missing data in this field “directly affects the report’s accuracy and 

utility.” 

EPIC is enhancing the completeness and utility of drug seizure data in the 

National Seizure System. 

EPIC managers told us that they are working with the CBP to 

import CBP, ICE, and other Department of Homeland Security agencies’ 

seizure information now stored in the Treasury Enforcement 

Communication System II (TECS II) database into the National Seizure 

System.29 EPIC plans to import seizure information from FY 2005 

through FY 2009 and to link the systems so that future seizures 

recorded in TECS II are regularly transferred to the National Seizure 

System. In February 2010, EPIC managers told us that they had a 

commitment from the CBP to do this, but that the matter was “under 

legal review” at the CBP and no date had been specified for the 

completion of the effort. 

Traditionally, agencies report their seizure information to the 

National Seizure System by calling the EPIC Watch and providing the 

information associated with their seizure event over the telephone. We 

found that several state and local entities have begun to transmit their 

seizure information through the EPIC Portal. As of August 2009, the 

Arizona and Florida HIDTA intelligence centers each began transmitting 

about 100 interdiction seizures a month to the National Seizure System, 

and the California Department of Justice and agencies in Tennessee and 

Arkansas began transmitting clandestine laboratory seizure information 

to EPIC’s system. EPIC also expected to begin receiving data from the 

Texas Department of Public Safety through the Portal. 

We believe the EPIC Portal has the potential to streamline 

reporting to, and improve the completeness of, the National Seizure 

System. However, as previously mentioned, only 4,638 (24 percent) of 

EPIC’s 19,416 users had active Portal accounts as of July 2009, and in 

FY 2008 only 2 percent of the requests EPIC received for information 

were submitted through the Portal. In addition, many interviewees and 

survey respondents reported that they needed more information and 

training before they could rely on the Portal. 

29 TECS II is the Department of Homeland Security’s automated indexing 

system of case files and investigative case information that is used to record seizure 

data. 

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Recommendation 

We recommend that EPIC: 

3. Promote more complete reporting of drug seizure data to the 

National Seizure System through the EPIC Portal and traditional 

methods. 

EPIC is not yet operating as the “hub” for the HIDTA program. 

We found that EPIC is not yet the “hub for the HIDTAs,” which was 

defined as one of EPIC’s five functions in its 1999 Principals Accord and 

contained in the 2000 General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan. The Plan 

stated that EPIC should serve as a hub by “centrally receiving and 

sharing drug-movement-related information developed by the HIDTA 

Intelligence Centers” as well as by “ensuring that EPIC’s Watch and 

relevant database checks are a standard part of appropriate HIDTA 

operational protocols.” We found that, although as of August 2009 all 

HIDTAs had staff approved to use EPIC, EPIC was not yet receiving and 

incorporating all HIDTA drug seizure data into its seizure system and 

that EPIC Checks were not a standard part of operational protocols for 

all HIDTA intelligence centers. In addition, we found that EPIC lacks the 

authority to direct the actions needed to make itself a hub. 

Consequently, the 32 regional HIDTAs still lack the national perspective 

EPIC was intended to provide by connecting their individual databases 

and providing them access to federal databases. 

We found during our interviews that HIDTA managers and 

analysts did not view EPIC as a hub. For example, one manager in the 

Southwest region HIDTA we visited stated that “EPIC has the potential to 

make a good hub because of the network of centers and agencies that 

draw information from it, but EPIC is not there yet.” In addition, a 

manager from a different HIDTA stated that he did not view EPIC as a 

hub for the HIDTAs, although he thought that EPIC was a hub for the 

Domestic Highway Enforcement Program.30 EPIC’s Director told us that 

he is “fighting an uphill battle” to become the hub for the HIDTAs and 

that EPIC needs the ONDCP’s support in publishing a “policy 

endorsement” establishing EPIC in that role. While the HIDTAs are 

largely autonomous, the ONDCP controls their budgets and can direct 

their activities to ensure they support national drug control strategy. 

30 The Domestic Highway Enforcement Program coordinates information and 

resources for enforcement and interdiction operations conducted by federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies along key drug transportation corridors. 

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We observed that the HIDTA intelligence centers do not 

consistently request information from the EPIC Watch as a standard 

operational protocol as directed by the Plan. In our survey, 54 of the 

respondents reported being assigned to a HIDTA, and only 13 of the 54 

reported that they used EPIC because they were required to. This 

suggests that the existence of a protocol was not a major reason for 

HIDTA analysts to use EPIC. 

Only one of the three HIDTA intelligence centers we visited 

incorporated EPIC Checks into its standard protocol by including it as an 

option on its information request form. An analyst in this HIDTA 

intelligence center informed us that she submitted EPIC Checks every 

day and viewed EPIC as a unique “one-stop shop for getting the most 

information on targets.” Other analysts in the same center reported 

having a “good overall relationship with EPIC.” Analysts at another 

HIDTA intelligence center we visited said they submitted approximately 

7 to 10 requests for information to EPIC each week. In contrast, at a 

third HIDTA intelligence center we visited, in the Southwest region, 

analysts reported having a very limited relationship with EPIC. They said 

they did not routinely contact EPIC to gather information and did so only 

when the subject or the nature of the information they sought reached 

outside their HIDTA region. 

We asked EPIC’s Director about the status of EPIC’s effort to 

establish itself as the hub connecting the HIDTAs in August 2009. At 

that time he stated that “the first spoke” would be established soon, 

when the Southwest Border-Arizona Regional HIDTA intelligence center 

electronically sent EPIC 5,000 records of Domestic Highway Enforcement 

Program traffic stops for EPIC to host so that the information would be 

more accessible to other HIDTAs and law enforcement agencies 

participating in the program. In April 2010, EPIC managers reported 

that the data transfer of Arizona Domestic Highway Enforcement 

Program traffic stops information did not begin until November 2009 and 

was completed in January 2010. According to a manager at the ONDCP, 

connecting information collected by the HIDTAs through EPIC is 

important because HIDTA data is not aggregated in a way that can 

provide a national perspective, and as a result HIDTAs generally “only 

see what’s in their own backyard.” 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General: 

4. Work with the ONDCP to establish policy or guidance requiring 

HIDTAs to implement data and information sharing provisions to 

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establish EPIC as their hub for seizure and drug movement 

information. 

EPIC’s coordination with federal and state intelligence organizations 

is inconsistent. 

EPIC does not coordinate with other intelligence centers in a 

consistent and structured manner. We found that of 107 intelligence 

and fusion centers we identified, 23 did not have staff that had been 

approved to use EPIC services.31 EPIC’s Director stated that due to the 

large number of law enforcement agencies within the United States, he 

believed it is more efficient for officers and analysts to use regional 

intelligence centers if they had access to one and then for analysts in the 

regional centers to submit requests to EPIC. However, we believe for this 

model to work, EPIC must be aware of which regional centers are central 

to intelligence dissemination to state and local law enforcement agencies 

and to have points of contact at these centers. EPIC must also ensure 

that those points of contact are aware of EPIC’s products and services 

and how to access them. 

EPIC’s Director also acknowledged that the “proliferation of 

intelligence and fusion centers makes it difficult for EPIC to maintain upto-date points of contact in every center.” Further, EPIC cannot ensure 

that it has users in all centers because EPIC tracks its users by their 

parent agency rather than by the affiliation they may have to an 

intelligence center. To illustrate this issue, we reviewed EPIC’s user list 

to identify which intelligence centers were represented. We then 

provided EPIC with a list of the intelligence centers that appeared to lack 

an EPIC user and asked EPIC to confirm the information. The Organized 

Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center was 

among the centers we did not find associated with any user on EPIC’s 

list. EPIC told us it could not confirm that the OCDETF Fusion Center 

had an EPIC user. However, we found the names of two analysts from 

this center on EPIC’s user list under their agency affiliations – the DEA 

and FBI. 

Further, some members of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

whose work is directly related to EPIC’s specialized research units were 

not aware of EPIC’s services. For example, EPIC’s Crime-Terror Nexus 

Unit develops intelligence products related to terrorism activities, but of 

the five FBI Special Agents assigned to three different Joint Terrorism 

31 Our list of 107 intelligence centers consists of state fusion centers approved 

by the Department of Homeland Security, HIDTA intelligence centers, and the 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center. 

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Task Forces we interviewed, only the two agents in the El Paso area were 

aware of and routinely received information from EPIC. The other three 

agents told us they were not aware that the Crime-Terror Nexus Unit 

existed and did not use EPIC. One of these FBI Special Agents stated 

that he had “zero contact with EPIC.” 

Recommendation 

We recommend that EPIC: 

5. Establish points of contact at all national, regional, state, and local 

fusion centers to enhance information sharing and use of EPIC’s 

services and products. 

EPIC generally complements other drug intelligence centers, but some 

overlap exists as the roles of the centers have changed and new centers 

have been established. 

The 2000 General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan was published by 

a White House task force in February 2000 to clarify and improve 

U.S. drug intelligence and information programs. The Plan assigned 

specific roles to EPIC, the National Drug Intelligence Center, and the 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to improve their effectiveness as 

national centers. 

In this review, we compared EPIC’s mission, key products and 

services, customer base, and geographic focus with the other national 

counterdrug intelligence centers identified in the Plan. We concluded 

that EPIC is generally complementary to these other centers, but we 

noted overlap in an individual program area. 

EPIC and the National Drug Intelligence Center both receive 

information from other centers, law enforcement agencies, and 

databases, and use the information to support law enforcement 

organizations with drug interdiction responsibilities. However, EPIC 

alone disseminates tactical information for immediate use in the field, 

such as through EPIC Checks. In contrast, the National Drug 

Intelligence Center serves a strategic role by analyzing data to develop 

national and regional Drug Threat Assessments that the ONDCP can use 

in developing the national drug control strategy and that HIDTAs can 

use in developing their own drug threat assessments. 

In comparing EPIC to the Department of the Treasury’s Financial 

Crimes Enforcement Network, we also noted overlap in the case support 

provided by EPIC’s Asset Identification Unit. The 2000 Plan assigned the 

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Financial Crimes Enforcement Network as the principal center for 

investigative support to law enforcement on cases involving narcoticsrelated financial crimes.32 However, both EPIC and the Financial Crimes 

Enforcement Network provide investigative support by researching law 

enforcement, commercial, and financial databases to identify assets 

owned by or connected to targets of investigations and their associates. 

Since publication of the 2000 Plan, the OCDETF Fusion Center 

has emerged as a key drug intelligence center. While EPIC has been 

unable to establish itself as a hub for the exchange of drug seizure 

information with the HIDTAs as specified in the Plan, managers at the 

National Drug Intelligence Center and in the OCDETF Program Office 

told us that some HIDTAs are now looking to exchange investigative 

information with the OCDETF Fusion Center, potentially establishing 

that Center as a parallel information hub for the HIDTAs. These parallel 

processes are occurring separately from each other and without 

coordination among the HIDTAs, ONDCP, EPIC, and the OCDETF Fusion 

Center. 

To avoid duplication and overlap, we believe that as new 

intelligence centers emerge and existing centers like EPIC expand into 

other program areas, it is essential that an updated General Counterdrug 

Intelligence Plan or other policy document guide the roles and missions 

of the various entities. 

The use of EPIC by Department components has declined since 2005, 

although the use of EPIC by state and local law enforcement agencies 

has increased. 

The Department’s use of EPIC has declined since FY 2005, 

dropping significantly between FY 2007 and FY 2008. In contrast, state 

and local law enforcement agencies’ use of EPIC has steadily increased 

each year since FY 2005 and significantly spiked upward from FY 2007 

to FY 2008 (see Table 2). Use by federal agencies outside the 

Department of Justice declined gradually from FY 2005 to FY 2008, but 

increased slightly from FY 2008 to FY 2009. These non-Department 

federal users of EPIC are primarily from the Department of Defense and 

specific components of the Department of Homeland Security. 

32 After our review was complete, EPIC renamed the Asset Identification Unit 

the Financial Targeting Unit. 

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Table 2: Requests for Information by Agency, 

FY 2005 – FY 2009 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

FY 

2008 

FY 

2009 

% 

Change 

FY 2005-

2009 

Department of Justice agencies 

ATF 575 566 604 772 697 21% 

DEA 38,692 37,177 34,520 20,101 19,368 -50% 

FBI 2,331 2,182 2,451 1,184 787 -66% 

USMS 296 364 286 342 329 11% 

EPIC 1,294 590 1,907 1,556 2,475 91% 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies 

CBP 2,889 1,699 1,523 881 2,150 -26% 

ICE 2,993 2,408 2,652 1,738 2,322 -22% 

Coast Guard 1,642 1,567 1,387 3,082 3,438 109% 

Other DHS agencies 606 486 356 280 211 -65% 

Other federal 

agencies 5,825 5,072 3,573 2,978 2,782 -52% 

Total federal 57,143 52,111 49,259 32,914 34,559 -40% 

State, local, and 

HIDTA 24,343 25,441 32,842 52,211 54,040 122% 

Other 291 294 638 1,080 1,333 358% 

TOTAL 81,777 77,846 82,739 86,205 89,932 10% 

Source: EPIC. 

The decrease in EPIC use by the Department is a result of 

significant drops in use by the DEA (a 50-percent reduction from 

FY 2005 to FY 2009) and the FBI (a 66-percent reduction from FY 2005 

to FY 2009). Use by ATF increased 21 percent between FY 2005 and 

FY 2009, and use by the United States Marshals Service (USMS) 

increased 11 percent in the same period. However, these two 

components generate only a small percentage of the requests for 

information from EPIC. 

When we asked EPIC managers why Department users’ requests 

for information had declined, they attributed the decline to four possible 

contributing factors. First, in 2006, EPIC began requiring federal users 

to go through EPIC’s approval process before they could receive EPIC 

information – a requirement that had previously applied only to state and 

local users. EPIC managers told us that many federal users complained 

about this requirement and that it may have caused some not to use 

EPIC or to circumvent EPIC’s Watch by contacting EPIC analysts 

informally. The latter method allows users to obtain the information 

without requests being registered in EPIC’s database. Similarly, as of 

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mid-2007, users can submit data requests that do not require immediate 

response to a central point within EPIC. Depending on the nature of the 

requests, the central point assigns them to the relevant office to be 

addressed. The 171 requests received through the central point in 

FY 2008 and the 560 received in FY 2009 are not counted in EPIC’s 

database. 

Second, EPIC managers stated that since 2006, EPIC has 

increased the information it has provided informally through other 

programs, which has met information needs of some of these federal 

users in the field. Third, the increase in task forces combining state and 

federal personnel may be providing federal users a way to get EPIC 

information through state users rather than by calling the EPIC Watch 

directly. Fourth, EPIC personnel informed us that users may be 

obtaining information they want through the EPIC Portal rather than by 

submitting requests for EPIC Checks. The Portal allows users to search 

the four databases that EPIC owns and to obtain a variety of reports, but 

it does not provide access to seven additional databases that are 

included in an EPIC Check. 

We asked the FBI why its use of EPIC had decreased because it 

has historically used EPIC more than any agency other than the DEA. 

FBI officials stated that the FBI submitted fewer requests for information 

between FY 2005 and FY 2009 because of the establishment of the 

OCDETF Fusion Center and other fusion centers and analytic entities 

that “enhance the flow of operational intelligence within the criminal and 

national security programs.” FBI officials stated that the FBI’s requests 

to these entities increased as its requests to EPIC decreased. 

EPIC managers also stated that the corresponding increase in use 

of EPIC by state and local law enforcement reflects EPIC’s greater 

emphasis on recruiting new users during the interdiction courses it 

conducts for state and local law enforcement officers. 

However, we are concerned about the decline in use of EPIC by 

Department components, especially at a time when the Department has 

increased its focus and allocated substantial resources to combating 

smuggling and its associated violence on the Southwest border. For 

example, according to congressional testimony, at the end of FY 2008, 

the DEA had 1,203 authorized Special Agent positions in domestic offices 

with responsibilities for the Southwest border. This represents 

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approximately 23 percent of the DEA’s total Special Agent workforce.33 

The Department’s January 2010 Strategy for Combating the Mexican 

Cartels states as an objective increasing intelligence and information 

sharing among law enforcement agencies in the United States and 

Mexico. In light of the increase in Southwest border violence, use of 

EPIC by Department components should be increasing, particularly by 

key components such as the DEA and FBI. Law enforcement agencies 

must have the ability to access, link, and interpret voluminous 

intelligence information from as wide a community as possible. 

EPIC’s Director told us that he is concerned about the indication 

that federal use of EPIC has decreased and that EPIC is “on the training 

road” and is conducting outreach and marketing to federal users. 

EPIC does not sufficiently analyze some of its information for 

patterns and trends that could aid interdiction efforts. 

EPIC collects, maintains, and stores information extracted from 

multiple databases and other sources, but may be overlooking trends, 

patterns, and connections within the data because it conducts only 

limited analysis of datasets that are unique to EPIC. The 2000 General 

Counterdrug Intelligence Plan states that “EPIC will provide regional 

analysis to identify drug trafficking trends and patterns associated with 

those regions, and will issue timely reports as appropriate.” 

When we asked law enforcement personnel and analysts we 

interviewed how EPIC could improve its support to them, several stated 

that EPIC could better meet their needs if it conducted more analysis of 

the information it collects. For example, two DEA employees in different 

field offices stated that EPIC could improve its support to them by 

providing more analysis that would support cases. Similarly, when 

asked in what ways EPIC could improve support, one FBI analyst stated 

that her agency could use more trend analysis in its case support. 

Further, an intelligence agency representative told us that EPIC is not 

analyzing important information that could be used to identify trends 

and patterns in drug trafficking along the border. Another intelligence 

agency representative suggested providing EPIC analysts with software to 

identify links in information so that they did not miss connections 

between related information and could provide a faster, more advanced 

product to EPIC’s users. Also, in explaining why the FBI’s use of EPIC 

33 The Special Agent in Charge of the El Paso Division, DEA, before the 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the Committee 

on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, concerning “Violence Along the 

Southwest Border,” March 24, 2009. 

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has decreased while its use of other fusion centers has increased, FBI 

officials stated that “requests for information into the OCDETF are most 

valuable as the mission of the OCDETF Fusion Center is to collect and 

analyze all-source information and through incisive analysis, produce 

intelligence products in support of multi-agency, multi-jurisdiction 

investigations.” 

While certain analyses fall within EPIC’s mission of providing 

tactical intelligence, EPIC may not be the best facility for analyzing all of 

the data that it collects. In some cases, getting the most from EPIC’s 

data may be accomplished by EPIC’s sharing the information with other 

centers rather than undertaking the analysis directly. We believe it is 

important for EPIC to determine whether other centers may be better 

prepared to analyze information and, if so, to forward the information to 

them. 

EPIC does not analyze National Seizure System data to identify drug 

trafficking patterns and trends. 

EPIC’s reports generate aggregate data entered into the National 

Seizure System but do not synthesize or provide any analysis of the data. 

EPIC’s National Seizure System can produce 14 standard reports, such 

as the Top 10 Seizures per Contraband, Seizures by Agency, and the 

U.S. Seizure Details report that produces information about drug 

seizures such as type of drug, times, locations, and methods. Similarly, 

the EPIC Portal enables users to display the locations of seizure events 

recorded in the National Seizure System geographically so that possible 

relationships among seizures can be seen. However, it does not provide 

any analysis of the data. 

During summer 2009, EPIC formed a Predictive Analysis Unit to 

assist state and local law enforcement agencies with their interdiction 

activities along suspected trafficking routes.34 The unit provides reports 

called Intelligence Notes that are based on National Seizure System 

information. The notes are intended to provide “predictive intelligence” to 

help agencies connect highway traffic stops to major drug trafficking 

activities and organizations. Being able to make that connection would 

allow trafficker patterns and routes to be identified and would help 

agencies plan coordinated interdiction operations. However, the notes 

are simply a report of law enforcement drug seizures from the National 

34 After our review was completed, EPIC renamed the Predictive Analysis Unit 

the Predictive Analysis and Targeting Unit and stated that the unit will provide much of 

the Research and Analysis Section’s trend-based reporting. 

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Seizure System, with only limited analysis that could be used to predict 

trends and patterns in trafficking activity. 

EPIC plans to expand the capabilities of the Predictive Analysis 

Unit. EPIC’s Deputy Director stated that he envisions this unit 

conducting “post seizure analysis” to identify the point at which drugs 

entered the United States and to determine the reasons for the failure to 

interdict the drugs at the border. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that EPIC: 

6. Issue more substantive analytical products based on the seizure 

data collected in the National Seizure System. 

EPIC does not identify trends and patterns in the use of documents 

suspected of being fraudulent or fraudulently obtained. 

EPIC cannot electronically search its catalog of 1 million archived 

fraudulent documents and does not analyze this repository of current 

documents to identify trends and patterns in fraudulent document use. 

For officers who must quickly evaluate a document’s authenticity during 

a traffic stop or at a U.S. port of entry, it is important to be able to 

reference an updated database of seized documents that can be searched 

and compared to documents seized from the field. In addition, because 

fraudulent documents are often used repeatedly, identifying trends and 

patterns in how, when, and by whom they are used could be a valuable 

source of information for law enforcement. EPIC is unable to 

electronically search the documents in its repository because they are 

stored on microfilm, which is not a searchable format. Further, at the 

time of our review EPIC could not search these documents manually, 

because the unit’s microfilm reader was not working. 

EPIC has developed a plan to transfer the 1 million documents on 

microfilm to a digital format that will map every data field in each 

document to a corresponding field in a database through which the 

documents can be searched, retrieved, and analyzed. EPIC management 

told us that as of February 2010, the equipment needed to complete this 

project had been ordered and that the documents would be scanned into 

the new format by September 2010. This would allow EPIC to compare 

documents already in its repository to those it receives in the future. 

EPIC’s plan also includes the hiring of data entry personnel to speed 

processing time and increase the accuracy of data entry for the archive. 

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Until the documents are available for analysis, front line law 

enforcement officers will not receive immediate assistance in determining 

whether a suspicious document is fraudulent based on EPIC’s document 

repository. EPIC is also not able to conduct analysis of newly seized 

documents. We note that after EPIC has completed this database, it will 

have the potential to provide law enforcement personnel valuable tactical 

information and analysis when specifically requested. But according to 

an OCDETF program manager, the data also could serve a wider purpose 

of supporting investigations and being used in analysis if EPIC shared 

the data with intelligence centers, such as the OCDETF Fusion Center, 

that have a greater focus on analysis. If EPIC’s fraudulent documents 

database was incorporated into the OCDETF Fusion Center’s data 

system, connections between use of fraudulent documents and OCDETF 

cases could be identified. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that EPIC: 

7. Assess the feasibility of analyzing digitally scanned fraudulent 

documents to identify trends in both sources and patterns of 

fraudulent document use, and of providing the data to other 

intelligence centers for their use. 

EPIC is not fully analyzing tactical information it collects to identify drug 

trafficking patterns and trends. 

We found that EPIC operates a program that collects certain 

tactical information on the activities of drug traffickers and reports this 

information to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, but does not 

fully analyze the information to identify trends and patterns.35 

Currently, the information EPIC collects is used almost exclusively for its 

immediate intelligence value and to warn law enforcement of immediate 

threats they may encounter in their investigations and operations. 

In March 2009, the DEA assigned a Reports Writer at EPIC to 

review the summaries of this information as it is collected, to author 

Intelligence Information Reports, and to send the reports to the 

Intelligence Division at DEA Headquarters. The Intelligence Division 

35 Tactical intelligence is information on which immediate enforcement action 

can be based. In the case of this EPIC program, it is perishable and time sensitive in 

that it requires immediate action as soon as it is collected. The specific tactical 

information that is referred to in this section is law enforcement sensitive, and we do 

not identify it here. 

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then disseminates the information to members of the intelligence 

community and may incorporate it into DEA reports, such as the Drug 

Intelligence Bulletins. Initially, the Reports Writer generated 

approximately 10 reports a month, but from January 1 through 

March 31, 2010, the Reports Writer generated approximately 61 reports 

a month. 

So far, this initiative has generated reports of drug trafficker 

activities that are disseminated to the intelligence community, rather 

than analyses of the information collected by the program to identify 

trends and patterns in drug trafficking and drug trafficker activity. A 

Department of Defense official from Joint Task Force-North told us that 

analyzing the information collected through this program to identify 

trends and patterns could aid interdiction efforts. Similarly, an agency 

representative assigned to EPIC suggested that adding a trained 

“collection manager” to analyze and track patterns could strengthen this 

program. 

EPIC officials told us that EPIC plans over the next 2 to 3 years to 

significantly expand the program that collects this tactical information. 

As the program expands and more information is collected, there will be 

a greater opportunity to identify links, trends, and patterns in this 

information. By not analyzing information EPIC collects to identify 

patterns and trends, EPIC is missing opportunities to assist law 

enforcement agencies conducting interdiction operations along the 

Southwest border and to better analyze trends and patterns in drug 

trafficking activity. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the DEA: 

8. Assess the feasibility of enhancing the capability at EPIC to analyze 

tactical information to identify links, trends, and patterns in drug 

trafficking activity in support of interdiction operations and 

investigations. 

EPIC does not regularly update Gatekeeper reports. 

EPIC managers and other interviewees told us they were concerned 

that the information in EPIC’s Gatekeeper reports was not up to date. 

EPIC intends for the Gatekeeper reports to be thorough descriptions of 

the current hierarchies, methods, and activities of the drug, weapon, and 

alien traffickers (referred to as gatekeepers) controlling the trafficking 

corridors between Mexico and the United States. The more current the 

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information is, the better it can support active investigations. However, 

the information in the reports becomes outdated quickly because 

traffickers are incarcerated, killed, or develop new smuggling methods. 

During our interviews with EPIC users, we found that users valued 

Gatekeeper reports as historical references but considered them to be out 

of date and did not use them in their day-to-day operations. Our survey 

results indicated that Gatekeeper reports were not used extensively – 

68 percent of respondents reported “no opinion” when asked about 

Gatekeeper reports. 

EPIC published its last complete Gatekeeper report on Southwest 

border corridors in April 2007. EPIC’s practice had been to complete an 

update on every corridor before publishing them collectively in a single 

comprehensive report. At the time of our fieldwork, EPIC was in the 

midst of changing its process and planned to publish four smaller 

reports with each covering one of four regions of the border. In April 

2008, EPIC published the first of these smaller reports, the Arizona 

Corridors Report, and in 2009 EPIC was drafting a report covering West 

Texas and Southern New Mexico. 

An EPIC manager told us that it took 6 to 9 months to update 

information about each individual region. At that rate, we determined 

that the information about each region would be updated only every 2 to 

3 years, and the material in the reports would likely quickly be outdated. 

In addition to the full reports, EPIC also disseminates daily 

updates of Gatekeeper information through: (1) briefings at EPIC and 

(2) electronic messages to investigators working on Mexican drug 

trafficker cases, as well as certain DEA, FBI, and Department of 

Homeland Security managers. However, the information from these daily 

updates is not reflected in the Gatekeeper report until EPIC produces the 

next version, which may not occur for years. 

A possible solution for ensuring that all Gatekeeper information is 

current and accessible could be to use widely available technology that 

allows for the integration of new information into an existing framework 

as other intelligence operations have done. For example, in September 

2008, the FBI set up a secure, internal “wiki” using the same freely 

editable webpage software used by Wikipedia that allows agents and 

analysts to share information and subject matter expertise.36 This wiki 

36 Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.org, was created in 2001 and is a free-content 

Internet encyclopedia that allows anyone with Internet access to contribute, edit, and 

collaborate on information posted on the site. 

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also links to the Director of National Intelligence’s secure, internal wiki, 

Intellipedia, enabling information sharing between intelligence and law 

enforcement personnel. 

We believe that, as an alternative to EPIC internally updating and 

publishing the Gatekeeper reports, EPIC staff could use wiki software to 

manage the sharing of this important information. By promoting timely 

updates from a broad range of selected investigators and analysts, as 

well as integrating information from daily updates of Gatekeeper 

information, EPIC could provide current information to users. As a first 

step, EPIC should consider a secure webpage application, as the FBI and 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have done, to enable 

contemporaneous production of updated Gatekeeper reports. 

Establishing secure, up-to-date online Gatekeeper information on drug 

traffickers and their activities could improve EPIC’s support of 

interdiction operations and investigations. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that EPIC: 

9. Examine new approaches for making Gatekeeper information more 

current and accessible. 

EPIC is not managing the performance of its programs through 

effective performance measurement or collection of user feedback. 

We found that EPIC’s FY 2008 to FY 2013 Strategic Plan does not 

include objective measures of the performance of its programs. 

Moreover, EPIC does not have documentation for all planned programs. 

As a result, EPIC cannot ensure its programs are performing adequately 

and meeting defined objectives. 

EPIC’s Strategic Plan includes 65 performance measures, but in 

many cases these measures do not reflect current operations or actual 

program constraints. In addition, EPIC managers we interviewed did not 

use the measures to monitor the performance of their programs or 

identify areas for improvement. In none of our initial interviews with 

EPIC managers, supervisors, or personnel did they tell us that they had 

performance measures for their programs when we asked questions 

pertaining to oversight or criteria used to ensure program effectiveness. 

Of the 16 current and 2 developing EPIC programs we identified, 

EPIC had performance measures for only 11 of these programs in its 

FY 2008 – FY 2013 Strategic Plan. When we requested data to determine 

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whether EPIC had measured performance for these 11 programs in 

FY 2008, EPIC could provide the data to show whether the measure was 

achieved for only 7 programs. 

When we asked EPIC program supervisors and personnel about 

the Strategic Plan performance measures in follow-up interviews, 

supervisors told us that they were unaware of their own programs’ 

performance measures, or that the wording of the measures did not allow 

for an accurate measurement of program performance, or that the 

measures themselves were unrealistic given the constraints facing the 

programs. 

For one performance measure, we found that EPIC had 

accidentally deleted the database used to track the measure, and when 

the database was re-created, the fields that tracked the information 

necessary to show whether the performance measure was achieved were 

not included. In another example, a program performance measure did 

not accurately reflect the operation of a unit that monitors signals from 

tracking devices that law enforcement personnel have placed on targets 

they are investigating. The performance measure for this beacon 

tracking program states that EPIC “will disseminate beacon movement 

intelligence to case agents within 5 minutes of the beacon movement 

notification.” When we reviewed EPIC’s data to determine how 

successful the program had been, we found that only 15 percent of 

EPIC’s notifications had been made within 5 minutes during FY 2008. 

EPIC managers stated that the 5-minute standard applied only to cases 

in which a case agent had requested notification, even though the 

performance measure was worded as though it covered all cases. 

Further, regarding the 15 percent of the notifications made within the 

5-minute standard, EPIC managers told us they believed all of those 

notifications had actually been immediate. However, EPIC did not 

measure when notifications actually occurred, so there was no 

documentation to support the managers’ belief. 

Another performance measure stated that the Fraudulent 

Document and Tactical Bulletin Unit “will attend the quarterly 

Consolidated Counterdrug Database meeting and provide EPIC’s input to 

the process.”37 When we inquired about the measure, EPIC management 

responded that: 

37 The Consolidated Counterdrug Database captures details of maritime drug 

seizures in the maritime regions between South America and the United States 

submitted by U.S. and foreign counterdrug agencies. Multi-agency meetings are held 

quarterly to review interdiction cases and vet information to be added to the database. 

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attendance at the Consolidated Counterdrug Database 

meetings was a historical function performed by a cell of the 

EPIC Transportation Unit, which was disbanded in 

approximately January 2007. This function did not apply to 

the Fraudulent Document and Tactical Bulletin Unit as it is 

not related to their current mission and functions. 

In addition, a program that had only recently been reconstituted 

after being out of operation for over a year still had two performance 

measures in the current Strategic Plan for the year the program was not 

in operation. 

We also found that EPIC does not systematically seek customer 

feedback on its products and services. EPIC’s Strategic Plan states that 

one of EPIC’s “key external challenges” is to develop a “measurement tool 

for customer satisfaction.” EPIC has not accomplished this. We asked 

EPIC managers how they measure customer satisfaction and found that 

neither EPIC nor individual sections within EPIC had a system to gauge 

whether EPIC’s products and services are meeting customer demands. 

Instead, EPIC relies on receiving sporadic unsolicited feedback, or the 

fact that more agencies are participating in EPIC, to show that EPIC is 

meeting needs. 

Further, as EPIC has established new programs, it has not done so 

consistently with a defined purpose, scope, and objectives. For example, 

although EPIC was in the early stages of implementing the License Plate 

Reader Program, it did not have documentation for it.38 When we sought 

documentation we were referred to a program manager at DEA 

headquarters who summarized the program’s plans in an e-mail. In 

addition, we learned through interviews that EPIC will expand its tactical 

intelligence collection program to cover more of the Southwest border, 

but EPIC did not have a written plan for how this would be accomplished 

or, as discussed previously, how the additional intelligence collected 

would be analyzed. 

EPIC has grown rapidly in recent years and, as noted in the 

Background section of this report, will continue to grow by adding 

agency participants, new programs, and staff, and by expanding the size 

of its facility. These expansions are associated with significant financial 

38 The DEA’s License Plate Reader Program places optical character recognition 

devices along key areas of the Southwest border to help locate vehicles suspected of 

transporting bulk cash, drugs, weapons, and other illegal contraband. The DEA plans 

to base this program at EPIC and to staff it with 19 contractor analysts to monitor data 

generated by the readers. 

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resources.39 It is important that EPIC ensure its growing programs 

expend resources prudently, efficiently, and with a focus on EPIC’s 

priority missions. This requires that EPIC establish meaningful 

performance metrics for its programs and that it evaluate and measure 

its overall effectiveness on the basis of its performance and the needs of 

its users. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that EPIC: 

10. Develop performance metrics for all of its programs and 

operations that define relevant and objective standards, and use 

the metrics to evaluate program effectiveness. 

11. Expand its existing mechanisms to systematically collect 

feedback on its products and services from users. 

39 The President’s FY 2011 budget for the Department includes $54 million to 

expand the EPIC facility by about 20,000 square feet. 

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

EPIC was established as the DEA’s Southwest border intelligence 

center and has emerged as a valuable resource, not only for the DEA, but 

for other federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies 

seeking intelligence information to support their Southwest border 

operations. 

We found that EPIC is highly valued by its partner agencies and 

users, and that users find its products and services timely, accurate, 

relevant, actionable, and valuable. However, we identified several 

significant weaknesses that have prevented EPIC’s operations and 

programs from being as effective as they could be. 

EPIC lacks a formal program to inform users and potential users 

about products and services that could assist them. Further, we found 

that EPIC has not sustained effective operation of some key programs 

and has not ensured that it coordinates effectively with member 

agencies. As a result, EPIC’s service to users has been disrupted or 

diminished for periods of time in several areas. 

EPIC’s 1999 Principals Accord does not reflect EPIC’s current 

membership or missions and is not used effectively to resolve issues that 

arise in EPIC’s multi-agency setting, such as ensuring that priorities are 

agreed upon so that programs are sustained and member agencies meet 

expectations for participation and information sharing. We believe that 

with an updated agreement that defines relationships, protocols for 

communication and the exchange of information, and that identifies a 

collaborative governance structure and process to address coordination 

issues, EPIC could be a more effective and efficient center for the 

exchange of information and intelligence, and could improve its ability to 

analyze data from the multiple sources that it accesses. 

We also found that EPIC has not accomplished two of the five 

functions in its Principals Accord that were contained in the 2000 

General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan. First, EPIC’s process for 

aggregating drug seizure information has not produced a comprehensive 

database of drug seizures nationwide because of incomplete reporting 

into the National Seizure System. As a result, intelligence products 

based on the data may be incomplete or inaccurate. Second, EPIC has 

not become, as envisioned, the hub for the HIDTA program. 

Further, EPIC’s coordination with federal and state intelligence 

organizations across the country is inconsistent. For EPIC to more 

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efficiently disseminate information, it should have contacts in key 

intelligence centers, and ensure that those contacts are aware of EPIC’s 

products and services and how to access them. 

We also found that as the number of participating agencies at EPIC 

increased overall, federal agencies submitted fewer requests to EPIC for 

information, as measured by EPIC Checks, between FY 2005 and 

FY 2009. By contrast, the total number of requests for information 

submitted to EPIC by state and local law enforcement has steadily 

increased. 

In addition, although EPIC’s mission is to conduct analyses and to 

disseminate information, EPIC does not analyze some information that it 

uniquely collects. As a result, EPIC may not be adequately identifying 

trends and patterns in drug trafficking activity that could be used to 

increase the effectiveness and safety of drug interdiction operations. In 

instances where EPIC is not the appropriate center for analyzing the 

information it collects, EPIC should ensure that it shares the information 

with the appropriate intelligence centers. 

Additionally, EPIC is not managing the performance of its 

programs through objective performance measures and by systematically 

collecting user feedback. We believe that EPIC should develop 

performance metrics for the entirety of EPIC’s programs and operations 

that define relevant and measureable standards. EPIC also should 

develop a mechanism to systematically collect feedback from users on its 

products and services. 

To improve EPIC’s utility to the law enforcement and intelligence 

community we recommend that: 

1.	 EPIC expand its outreach and education program to promote the 

use of its products and services, including information about how 

to use the EPIC Portal. 

2.	 EPIC update its Principals Accord or adopt a comparable multiagency framework that formalizes each member’s roles and 

responsibilities for implementing and sustaining EPIC’s programs 

and that provides a process for resolving differences that may 

arise. 

3.	 EPIC promote more complete reporting of drug seizure data to the 

National Seizure System through the EPIC Portal and traditional 

methods. 

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4.	 The Office of the Deputy Attorney General work with the ONDCP to 

establish policy or guidance requiring HIDTAs to implement data 

and information sharing provisions to establish EPIC as their hub 

for seizure and drug movement information. 

5.	 EPIC establish points of contact at all national, regional, state, and 

local fusion centers to enhance information sharing and use of 

EPIC’s services and products. 

6.	 EPIC issue more substantive analytical products based on the 

seizure data collected in the National Seizure System. 

7.	 EPIC Assess the feasibility of analyzing digitally scanned 

fraudulent documents to identify trends in both sources and 

patterns of fraudulent document use, and of providing the data to 

other intelligence centers for their use. 

8.	 The DEA assess the feasibility of enhancing the capability at EPIC 

to analyze tactical information to identify links, trends, and 

patterns in drug trafficking activity in support of interdiction 

operations and investigations. 

9.	 EPIC examine new approaches for making Gatekeeper information 

more current and accessible. 

10. EPIC develop performance metrics for all of its programs and 

operations that define relevant and objective standards, and use 

the metrics to evaluate program effectiveness. 

11. EPIC expand its existing mechanisms to systematically collect 

feedback on its products and services from users. 

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APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW 

We conducted in-person and telephone interviews of personnel at 

EPIC and in the Washington, D.C., area, conducted site visits to 

interview EPIC’s customers and federal partners, administered a survey 

to EPIC users, and performed data analysis and document reviews. 

Interviews 

Washington, D.C., area interviews. We conducted interviews with 

personnel at Headquarters components of the Department of Justice 

including the Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force; Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force Program; Justice Management Division; and the 

National Drug Intelligence Center. We interviewed officials from the 

Department of Homeland Security, including Customs and Border 

Protection and the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement. We also 

conducted interviews with personnel at headquarters components of the 

National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy. 

El Paso Intelligence Center. During the course of fieldwork, we 

conducted interviews at EPIC with the Director, Deputy Director, Section 

Chiefs, Unit Chiefs, and personnel from the General Watch, Tactical 

Operations, and Research and Analysis sections. We also interviewed 

representatives from EPIC partner agencies embedded at EPIC and 

personnel performing database and collections management support 

functions. 

Site visits. We conducted site visits to El Paso, Texas; San Diego, 

California; and Miami-Key West, Florida. During site visits, we interviewed 

personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and FBI Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; 

Customs and Border Protection; Drug Enforcement Administration; and 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We also interviewed state and 

local law enforcement officers with the Las Cruces Police Department; the 

San Diego Police Department and Sheriff’s Office; the Florida Department of 

Law Enforcement; and the Florida Highway Patrol. 

Intelligence centers. We conducted interviews with personnel at the 

National Drug Intelligence Center; Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 

Task Force Fusion Center; Customs and Border Protection’s Air and 

Marine Operations Center; Joint Interagency Task Force-South; Joint 

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Task Force-North; and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area regions in 

California, Florida, Texas, and Maryland. 

Data Analysis 

We analyzed EPIC’s requests for information over time to identify 

patterns in agencies’ use of EPIC, and also analyzed EPIC’s list of users 

to determine the distribution by type of agency and EPIC account. 

Further, we examined a list of reported seizures for FY 2009 to identify 

the agencies whose data was entered into National Seizure System. In 

addition, we analyzed EPIC’s budget information to see whether the 

share of EPIC’s budget funded by the DEA had changed over time. 

EPIC Customer Survey 

We surveyed a random sample of EPIC’s users to assess their 

perceptions of EPIC products and their value. We classified each of 

EPIC’s 19,416 users into one of three agency categories: Department of 

Justice (29 percent), other federal (17 percent), and state or local 

(54 percent) using their e-mail addresses and agency names. We 

eliminated 696 because we could not determine the user’s agency, the 

user worked at EPIC, the user was from a foreign government, or the 

user had access only to the EPIC Portal. From the 18,720 users 

remaining, we randomly selected a total of 2,442 users proportionally 

from the three agency categories. Within each agency category we drew 

half the users from those who had access to the EPIC Watch only and 

half from those who had access to the EPIC Portal and Watch. We did 

this to increase our likelihood of getting adequate responses from recent 

EPIC users because to maintain Portal access users must have logged on 

within the last 3 months. To capture responses from EPIC users 

embedded in intelligence centers, we selected an additional 57 users of 

EPIC who were assigned to intelligence centers. 

Document Review 

We examined the 2000 General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, the 

National Southwest Border Counter Narcotics Strategy, the 2009 

National Drug Threat Assessment, and the 2009 National Drug Control 

Strategy. We reviewed EPIC’s FY 2008–FY 2013 Strategic Plan, EPIC 

Charters, and the 1999 Principals Accord. In addition, to understand 

how EPIC supports law enforcement customers and partners within the 

intelligence community, we analyzed EPIC’s products by each EPIC 

section. These included examples of intelligence products, training 

materials, internal procedures, performance measure requirements, and 

agreements with EPIC partners. 

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APPENDIX II: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS 

WITH COUNTERDRUG RESPONSIBILITIES 

Department of Justice Centers 

1. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center 

collects and analyzes all-source drug and drug-related financial 

investigative information to support coordinated multi-jurisdictional 

investigations that are focused on disrupting and dismantling the 

most significant drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. 

2. The DEA’s Special Operations Division produces comprehensive 

analyses of data revealing the activities and organizational structures 

of major drug-trafficking and drug-related money laundering 

organizations. Through court-approved Title III electronic 

interceptions, it assists multi-jurisdictional investigations by targeting 

the command and control of these illicit organizations. 

3. The National Drug Intelligence Center “provides strategic drug-related 

intelligence, document and computer exploitation support, and 

training assistance to the drug control, public health, law 

enforcement, and intelligence communities” to reduce and deter drug 

trafficking and drug-related crime. 

Non-Department of Justice Centers 

1. The Central Intelligence Agency’s Crime and Narcotics Center 

supports and conducts operations to counter illicit drug activities, 

transnational crime, and war crimes by providing targeting 

assessments of key individuals and criminal organizations to law 

enforcement in the field. The center also provides U.S. policy makers 

with analyses of long-term trends of the drug trafficking and 

organized crime affecting U.S. national security. 

2. Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine Operations Center 

“deters, sorts, tracks, and facilitates the interdiction of criminal 

entities throughout the Western Hemisphere, by utilizing integrated 

air and marine forces, technology, and tactical intelligence.” 

3. Joint Interagency Task Force-South conducts “interagency operations 

against illicit trafficking through the detection and monitoring of illicit 

air and maritime targets and facilitate interdictions and information 

sharing in support of the national and regional security.” 

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4. Joint Task Force-North is a joint service command within the 

Department of Defense that supports federal law enforcement 

agencies with the identification and interdiction of suspected 

transnational threats within and along the approaches to the 

continental United States. 

5. Border Patrol and CBP Border Intelligence Centers perform 

intelligence functions to support their field offices and law 

enforcement personnel. 

6. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network detects and deters criminal 

activity and safeguards financial systems from abuse by promoting 

transparency in the United States and international financial systems. 

It supports law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory agencies by 

sharing and analyzing financial intelligence. 

7. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas maintain intelligence centers 

that provide tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence support to 

the HIDTA executive board. They also develop regional threat 

assessments and target de-confliction. 

8. State fusion centers exist in many states and large cities to share 

information and intelligence within their jurisdictions as well as with 

the federal government. As of July 2009, the Department of 

Homeland Security had identified and designated over 70 fusion 

centers. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

50 
APPENDIX III: DATABASES QUERIED IN AN EPIC CHECK 

EPIC-Owned Databases 

EPIC 10 Database (EPIC 10) – Tracks requests for inquires sent to EPIC 

and records points of contact information and summary results. 

EPIC Law Enforcement Information Search and Analysis (ELISA) – Tracks 

requests for inquires sent to EPIC through the EPIC Systems Portal and 

records points of contact information and summary results. 

EPIC Internal Database (EID) – EPIC’s legacy repository for seizure 

information relating to drug trafficking from the 1970s through 1999, 

and other current bulk seizures information. It also contains current 

EPIC Lookout information. 

National Seizure System (NSS) – Current repository for seizure 

information from 2000 to the present regarding drugs, weapons, and 

currency seized above federal threshold limits. 

Drug Precursor Database (DPD) – Contains pseudoephedrine sales 

violators from the state of Tennessee. 

External Databases 

DEA’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Information System (NADDIS) – 

Automated indexing system of DEA case files and investigative case 

information. 

Department of Homeland Security’s Treasury Enforcement 

Communication Systems II (TECS II) – Automated indexing system of 

case files and investigative case information. 

FBI’s National Crime Information Center System (NCIC) – Index of 

criminal justice information concerning crimes and criminals of 

nationwide interest. Includes information concerning wanted persons, 

missing persons, stolen property, and criminal histories. Only the Wants 

and Warrants File is checked during the EPIC Check. 

CBP’s Central Index System (CIS) – Contains identifying information on 

individuals of interest because they have violated immigration laws or are 

immigrating to the United States. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

51 
 

FAA’s Aircraft Registration System (ARS) – Contains current information 

on all aircraft registrations, aircraft owners, and pilot licenses in the 

United States. 

Federal Bureau of Prisons’ SENTRY System (SENTRY) – Contains 

information on all federal prisoners incarcerated since 1980. 

USMS’s Warrant Information Network (WIN) – Contains fugitive and 

warrant information and records of information collected during 

U.S. Marshals Service investigations. 

DEA’s License Plate Reader Database – Stores vehicle license plate 

information captured from specific locations along the Southwest border. 

DEA’s Analysis and Resource Tracking System (DARTS) – Contains 

information on phone numbers, push-to-talks, Internet addresses, 

vehicle information, and business information. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

52 
 

APPENDIX IV: RESULTS OF OIG SURVEY OF EPIC CUSTOMERS 

We conducted a web- and e-mail-based survey of a random sample 

of EPIC users to assess their perceptions of EPIC’s products and services 

and their value to users. Survey recipients were notified that the OIG 

intended to assess their usage of EPIC’s products and services, opinions 

about the value of EPIC’s products and services, reasons for going or not 

going to EPIC for certain information, and ideas for how EPIC could 

enhance its support to the law enforcement and intelligence 

communities. We sent invitations to participate to 2,499 members of the 

chosen sample. Seven hundred sixty-eight users responded to the 

survey, although three surveys were excluded from analysis because 

respondents were assigned to EPIC. 

Note: Some percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding. 

Respondent Information 

1. What type of government organization do you work for? (Select 

one.) 

 Number Percentage 

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 239 31% 

Federal government other than DOJ 150 20% 

State 209 27% 

Local (City or County) 165 22% 

Tribal law enforcement 2 0.3% 

Total 765 100% 

N=765 

2. Are you assigned to an Intelligence or Fusion Center? 

 Number Percentage 

Yes (please choose the one that fits best) 181 24% 

No 584 76% 

Total 765 100% 

N=765 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

53 
 

 

 

If you answered Yes, please choose the center that fits best: 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Parent agency’s intelligence resource, such as a 

Field Intelligence Group 

18 10% 

HIDTA Intelligence Support Center or Law 

Enforcement Support Center 

54 31% 

State Fusion Center 48 27% 

Border Intelligence Center 3 2% 

National Drug Intelligence Center 2 1% 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

Fusion Center 

1 1% 

DEA Special Operations Division 2 1% 

Other (specify) 49 28% 

Total 177 100% 

N=177 

Only 177 of 181 Respondents who provided a response for Question 2 answered this 

question. 

3. Which of the following best describes your current duties? 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Conduct investigations 309 41 

Conduct interdiction activities 123 16 

Provide ongoing analysis to support investigations 177 23 

Provide tactical information upon request 28 4 

Other (specify duty) 125 16 

Total 762 100% 

N=762 

125 Respondents chose “Other” in Question 3 and provided answers in their own 

words. The OIG categorized information within their answers as follows:

 Responses 

Support 54 

Administrative 32 

Interdiction 23 

Investigations 7 

Cannot tell from answer 7 

Other 2 

Total 125 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

54 
 

4. What type of law enforcement operation(s) are you currently most 

involved with? (Select one.) 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Traffic or highway enforcement 130 17 

Drug trafficking 413 54 

Human trafficking 18 2 

Gun trafficking 14 2 

Money laundering 35 5 

Gang activity 22 3 

Terrorism 24 3 

Other (specify) 106 14 

Total 762 100% 

N=762 

106 respondents chose “Other” in Question 4 and provided answers in their own 

words. The OIG categorized information within their answers as follows:

 Responses 

General investigations/all or more than one choice 42 

Other investigations/work 28 

Duties do not support specific investigations 8 

Cannot tell from answer 8 

Interdiction and/or traffic enforcement 6 

Drug 6 

Fugitive 5 

Immigration 3 

Total 106 

EPIC Utilization and Perceptions 

5. From what source did you first learn about EPIC? (Select one.) 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

EPIC training 124 16% 

EPIC e-mail notification 8 1% 

Conference or briefing presentation by EPIC 

personnel 

74 10% 

Conference or briefing presentation by non-EPIC 

personnel 

50 7% 

New law enforcement position training 123 16% 

New intelligence analyst position training 73 10% 

Co-worker or peer 175 23% 

Other (specify) 74 10% 

Don’t recall 64 8% 

Total 765 100% 

N=765 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

55 
 

6. Have you ever used EPIC? (If No skip to Question 8.) 

Number of Responses Percentage 

Yes 679 89% 

No (Skip to Question 8) 86 11% 

Total 765 100% 

N=765 

7. How often do you use EPIC? 

 Number of 

Responses 

Percentage 

Very often (Skip to Question 10) 133 20% 

Sometimes (Skip to Question 10) 358 52% 

Rarely (Skip to Question 10) 170 25% 

It’s been longer than 3 years since I have used 

EPIC (Please specify why) 

22 3% 

Total 683 100% 

N=683 

8. Please select the reason(s) that you have not been using EPIC, 

from the following list. (Check all that apply.) 

 Number of 

Responses 

I am required to use other intelligence resources 30 

EPIC does not have the information I need or use 14 

I feel more confident in the accuracy of the information provided 

by my parent organization’s internal intelligence center or 

division 

21 

EPIC can’t provide information quickly enough to be useful to me 19 

EPIC information is difficult to access or obtain 44 

EPIC does not provide enough analysis with the information 8 

Other (Specify) 103 

N=765 

Respondents could select more than one response. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

56 
 

 

 

 

Respondents who chose “Other” in Question 8 provided answers in their own words. 

The OIG categorized information within their answers as follows: 

 Responses 

Don’t or haven’t yet needed EPIC information 22 

Unfamiliar with EPIC products 20 

Not applicable to job 16 

No access/access issues 8 

Do use EPIC 8 

No specific reason 6 

Other source used 5 

EPIC information is not good or useful 4 

Use EPIC indirectly 3 

EPIC’s dissemination does not meet needs 2 

Other 1 

9. Which of the following sources of law enforcement information or 

intelligence do you use instead of EPIC? (Check all that apply.) 

 Number of 

Responses 

Parent agency’s intelligence resource such as a Field 

Intelligence Group 

53 

HIDTA Intelligence Support Center or Law Enforcement 

Support Center 

60 

State Fusion Center 48 

Border Intelligence Center 19 

National Drug Intelligence Center 7 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center 10 

DEA Special Operations Division 28 

Other (specify) 53 

No source used 47 

N=765 

Respondents could select more than one response. 

If you have never used EPIC or have not used EPIC within the 

last 3 years, Questions 10 through 21 do not apply. Please skip 

to Question 22. 

If you have used EPIC within the last 3 years – 

please proceed to Question 10. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

57 
 

10. What are the main reasons you use EPIC as a resource? 

(Check all that apply.) 

 Number of 

Responses 

I am required to use EPIC by my agency 175 

Convenience 137 

Can get multiple database checks at the same time 

(one-stop shop) 

402 

Confidence in the accuracy of EPIC’s info 74 

EPIC is the only source of the information 70 

Other (specify) 45 

N=765 

Respondents could select more than one response. 

Respondents who chose “Other” in Question 10 provided answers in their own 

words. The OIG categorized information within their answers as follows:

 Responses 

Data 14 

Can’t tell from answer 10 

Requested by office 9 

Other 7 

NSS & seizure info 6 

Best/trusted source of info 4 

Air Watch 2 

Confidential source establishment 2 

Border Activity 2 

Verification 2 

Deconfliction 1 

Bulletins 1 

EPIC is fast 1 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

58 
11.	 In your opinion, which of the following law enforcement 

operations do you believe benefit the most by using EPIC’s 

products and services? (Check all that apply.) 

 Number of 

Responses 

National law enforcement 369 

Regional law enforcement 276 

Southwest border 314 

Traffic or highway enforcement 331 

Drug trafficking 500 

Human trafficking 177 

Gun trafficking 167 

Money laundering 228 

Gang 127 

Terrorism 164 

Don’t know 46 

Other (specify) 4 

N=765 

Respondents could select more than one response. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

59 
Value of EPIC’s Products and Services 

12.	 Of the following list of EPIC products and services that you 

have used, how would you rate their value to your 

operation(s)? (If you have not used the product or service 

please check “No opinion.”) 

(We asked respondents to report how valuable 10 specific EPIC 

products and services had been to their operations. The table 

below summarizes these results) 

Value of Product or Service 

Percent 

Reporting 

Great or Some 

Value 

Percent 

Reporting 

Little or No 

Value 

Percent 

Reporting 

No Opinion 

Calling the Watch 82% 4% 15% 

Tactical Bulletins 68% 6% 27% 

Lookouts 66% 4% 30% 

E-mailing the Watch 60% 6% 34% 

EPIC Portal 53% 7% 40% 

Asset Identification 42% 7% 52% 

Aircraft or Pilot Information 36% 6% 58% 

Tracking Beacons 29% 6% 66% 

Maritime Information 27% 8% 66% 

Gatekeeper Report 26% 7% 68% 

Note: Rows may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

Source: OIG survey. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

60 
 

13.	 If you selected “No value” or “Little value” for any of the 

above products and services, please explain why. 

Respondents provided answers to Question 13 in their own words. The OIG 

categorized information within their answers as follows: 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Not aware of/haven’t used 63 42% 

Doesn’t apply to need 34 23% 

Portal deficiencies/tactical limitations 13 9% 

Quality of timeliness of EPIC data 10 7% 

Unaware of FDIN value 9 6% 

Can’t tell meaning of comment 9 6% 

EPIC unresponsive/difficult to access 5 3% 

Assorted comments 3 2% 

EPIC is duplicative 3 2% 

Service is unavailable 2 1% 

Total 151 100% 

N=151 

14.	 Overall, how would you rate the timeliness, accuracy, 

actionability, and relevance of the EPIC products and services 

you have used? 

Timeliness: Information was received in time for it to be useful 

Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Does not meet the criteria 8 1% 

Barely meets the criteria 21 3% 

Somewhat meets the criteria 106 17% 

Fully meets the criteria 477 76% 

No opinion 20 3% 

Total 632 100% 

N=632 

Accuracy: Information was correct 

Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Does not meet the criteria 7 1% 

Barely meets the criteria 6 1% 

Somewhat meets the criteria 73 12% 

Fully meets the criteria 517 82% 

No opinion 29 5% 

Total 632 100% 

N=632 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

61 
 

 

Actionable: Information was immediately usable in my work 

Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Does not meet the criteria 12 2% 

Barely meets the criteria 10 2% 

Somewhat meets the criteria 106 17% 

Fully meets the criteria 464 74% 

No opinion 36 6% 

Total 628 100% 

N=628 

Relevance: Information was applicable to my work 

Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Does not meet the criteria 5 1% 

Barely meets the criteria 3 1% 

Somewhat meets the criteria 97 15% 

Fully meets the criteria 505 80% 

No opinion 21 3% 

Total 631 100% 

N=631 

15.	 If you selected “does not meet” or “barely meets” for any of 

the above criteria, please explain why. 

Respondents provided answers to Question 15 in their own words. The OIG 

categorized information within their answers as follows: 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Takes too much time to get 17 40% 

Information was inaccurate, incomplete, or out of 

date 

8 19% 

Can’t tell what response means 6 14% 

EPIC employee incompetent or unprofessional 3 7% 

No value added 3 7% 

Never received response 2 5% 

No standard format for responses 2 5% 

Difficult to get info from EPIC 2 5% 

Total 43 100% 

N=43 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

62 
16. How helpful have EPIC’s products and services been in 

supporting your law enforcement operations? 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Very helpful 394 62% 

Somewhat helpful 218 34% 

Not very helpful 20 3% 

Not helpful at all 6 1% 

Total 638 100% 

N=638 

17.	 Are you aware of the secure internet connection known as the 

EPIC Portal? (If “No” skip to Question 21.) 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Yes 433 68% 

No 207 32% 

Total 640 100% 

N=640 

18.	 Have you ever used the EPIC Portal? (If yes, skip to 

Question 20.) 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Yes 261 59% 

No 181 41% 

Total 442 100% 

N=442 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

63 
 

 

19. Please select the reason(s) that you have not used the EPIC 

Portal, from the list below. (Check all that apply.) 

 Number of 

Responses 

I have never received training on the Portal 89 

User ID/password expired 28 

I prefer to speak with a person 21 

Too difficult to get user ID and password 18 

Don’t know 12 

Information I need is not available through the Portal (specify) 4 

Other (specify) 34 

N=765 

Respondents could select more than one response. Additionally 4 respondents 

specified information they need including: money laundering, no instructions on 

Portal, parameters unavailable, and the Portal offers nothing useful. 

Respondents who chose “Other” in Question 19 provided answers in their own 

words. The OIG categorized information within their answers as follows:

 Responses 

Other 10 

Access issues 7 

Don’t have internet access when info needed 5 

Not aware of 3 

Don’t find it useful 3 

Easier to call Watch 3 

Haven’t needed it 2 

Don’t know how 1 

Total 34 

20. What additional comments do you have about the EPIC Portal? 

Respondents provided answers to Question 20 in their own words. The OIG 

categorized information within their answers as follows: 

 Number of 

Responses 

Not user friendly 24 

Positive comments 14 

Need more info or training 12 

Doesn’t have needed information 6 

Slow response 4 

Password/access problems 3 

Other 3 

Format of responses inconsistent 1 

Total 67 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

64 
 

 

 

21.	 Which of the following sources of law enforcement information 

or intelligence do you use in addition to EPIC? (Check all that 

apply.) 

 Number of 

Responses 

Parent agency’s intelligence resource such as a Field Intelligence 

Group (FIG) 

257 

HIDTA Intelligence Support Center (ISC) or Law Enforcement 

Support Center 

322 

State Fusion Center 203 

Border Intelligence Center 76 

National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) 178 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion 

Center 

171 

DEA Special Operations Division (SOD) 296 

Other (specify) 79 

Do not use any other source in addition to EPIC 50 

Don’t know 14 

N=683 

Number of responses equals more than 683 because of multiple responses.
 

Final Comments about EPIC 

22.	 Do you feel that EPIC is doing enough to inform the law 

enforcement community about its products and services? 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Yes (Skip to 24) 428 56% 

No 192 25% 

Don’t know (Skip to 24) 141 19% 

Total 761 100% 

N=761 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

65 
 

23.	 In your opinion, what is the best way for EPIC to inform the 

law enforcement community about its products and services? 

 (Select one.) 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

EPIC representatives making presentations about 

its products and services to agencies 

98 50% 

EPIC producing printed information about EPIC’s 

products and services 

28 14% 

EPIC posting information about its products and 

services on law enforcement websites and portals 

52 26% 

Other (specify) 13 7% 

Don’t know 6 3% 

Total 197 100% 

N=197 

24.	 Do you have any additional comments or suggestions about 

EPIC that were not covered by the previous questions? 

Respondents provided answers to Question 24 in their own words. The OIG 

categorized information within their answers as follows: 

 Number of 

Responses Percentage 

Positive comments 46 15% 

Need more EPIC information/training 36 12% 

Specific suggestion 28 9% 

Bad customer service 6 2% 

EPIC not necessary or useful 3 1% 

Access/password issues 3 1% 

Other 2 1% 

EPIC has improved 1 0.3% 

Total 125 100% 

N=300 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

66 
 

APPENDIX V: ACRONYMS 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

CBP Customs and Border Protection (DHS) 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration (Department of 

Transportation) 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FDIN Federal Drug Interdiction Number 

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Department of the 

Treasury) 

FY Fiscal year 

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS) 

MDMA Methylene dioxymethamphetamine (Ecstasy) 

NADDIS Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System 

NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center 

NSS National Seizure System 

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

OIG Office of the Inspector General 

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy 

TECS II Treasury Enforcement Communications System II 

USAO United States Attorney’s Office 

USMS United States Marshals Service 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

67 
 

APPENDIX VI: THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

68 

u.s. of 

Office of the At1nrr,ev General 

May 26. 2010 

Michael D. Gulledge 

Assistant Inspector General for Eva! uation and Inspr;ction 

Office oftllc Inspector General 

U.S, Department of Justice 

\Vasbingtoti, D.C. 20530 

Dear Mr. Gulledge: 

The Office of the Deputy Altorney General (ODAG) very much appreciates the 

opportunity to review and respond to the Office of the Inspector General's draft audit report 

entitled, "A Review of the El Paso [utdllgcm.:e Center" (hereinafter. "Report"). 

The now ofhl1man trafficking and narcotics noMh into the United Stutes, along with 

smuggling of illegal firearms ami criminal moncraJY proceeds south out of the Cnited States, has 

had a devastating ciTed on the C nitcd States and Mexico, particularly along the Southwest 

Bordc!"' Among the DepartmenCs most lmportal1t priorities is to increase U.S. pressure on drug 

trafFicking organizations by targeting illegal ~lrms trafficking, the flow of narcotics into the 

United States. the movement of bulk currency. alld gang affiliations ""lth >.1exican drug cartels. 

Key to our operational success is the collection and sharing of jnteHigencc. which enables U.s. 

law enl0n:enlcnt to be guided by current and robust intelligence resources, as it works diligently 

on both sides of the border to stem the How of illicit drugs and assist the Government of Mexico 

in breaking the power and impunity of the drug cartels, 

The E! Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a national tactical intelligence ceniCr that 

f{)cuses its efforts on supporting law enforcement effOlts in the Western Hemisphere, with a 

significant empha'),is on the Southwe::;t Border, Through its 24-hour Watch function, EPIC 

provides immediate access to participating agencies' databases LO lawen lorcement agents, 

investigators, and analysts. This function is criticaJ in the dissemination or relevant information 

in supporL of tactical and investiga.tive activities, dcconfliction~ and officer sarety. EP[C also 

provides significant, direct tactical intelligence support to state and local law enforcement 

agencies, espeCIally in the areas of clandestine Iflboratory investigations and highway 

interdiction" 

1'h(; Report documents the important role lhat EPIC serves in providing the tadical 

intelligence necessary to fight criminal organizations engaged in wide rangc of <:riminal activity. 

particularly along the Southwest Hordcr, :'\nd~ while the review found that EP[C is highly 

valued by its partner agencies and users. the Report also recommends certain steps to make EPIC 

an even more effective and valuable law enforcement reSOUf<:e, 
2 

For instance, the RepOlt one recommendation Jbeused on improv;ng the 

information sharing relationship be:wc",!! EPIC and the High Intensity Drug Trnfi1cking Area 

(HIDTA) Program. The Report thaI neither EPIC nor DEA exercise the cOl1trol 

necessary to standardize the cxchange or drug-movcment-relatcd inrormation between EPIC and 

the I·!IDTA intelligence celllers. It is the Director of the Olliee of National Drug Conlrol Policy 

who is authorized to designate an area withi!: the United States as a HIDTA. Each BIOTA, in 

tum, is led by an Executive Board comprise'; of n represcntative from each federnl, stale, Wld 

local agency has a member pcnnancntly to the HlDTA Task Force in that HIOTA 

''';;''UIL Currently, Ihere arc 32 H IDr As thai federal funding I'll' infrastructure and joint 

inilialives that facilitate cooperation and information sharing among federal. and local law 

enforcement organizations. 

Thus, the Rcport recommends: 

4, The Office orlhe Deputy Attorney Geneml work with Ihe O!-:DCP to establish 

or IIIDTAs to datu and int(>rInation s]u,rir,c 

pruvlsiuns tu cslabHsh EPIC a'} their hub Jbr seizure and drug movemt:nt 

information. 

We concur with the recommendation, The Om"e or the Deputy Attorney General will 

work with the ONDCP to establish EPIC as the hub for JUDT A Support Centers. 

Please feel free to contact me should you have any questiol1,S. 

Senior COllus,,1 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

69 
 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX VII: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General provided a draft of this report to 

the Office of the Deputy Attorney General for its comment. The ODAG’s 

response is included in Appendix VI to this report. The OIG’s analysis of 

the ODAG’s response and the actions necessary to close the 

recommendation are discussed below. 

Recommendation 4. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

work with the ONDCP to establish policy or guidance requiring 

HIDTAs to implement data and information sharing provisions to 

establish EPIC as their hub for seizure and drug movement 

information. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the ODAG Response. The ODAG concurred with the 

recommendation and noted that neither EPIC nor the DEA exercise the 

control necessary to standardize the exchange of drug-movement-related 

information between EPIC and the HIDTA intelligence centers. ODAG 

stated that it will work with the ONDCP to establish EPIC as the hub for 

the HIDTA Intelligence Support Centers. 

OIG Analysis. The ODAG response is partially responsive to our 

recommendation. However, the ODAG did not provide any specifics 

about the actions it plans to take to establish EPIC as the hub for the 

HIDTA Intelligence Support Centers. Please provide the OIG a 

description and a timeline for implementation of the actions planned to 

establish EPIC as the seizure and drug movement information hub for 

the HIDTA Intelligence Support Centers. 

Please provide the OIG with information about what actions ODAG 

plans to take to address the recommendation, or the status of any 

actions taken, by August 31, 2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

70 
APPENDIX VIII: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

71 

U. S . D epa rtm e nt o f Justice 

Drug Enforoemmt Administration 

www.lko.gt:w W~nli:ton. D.C. 2051] 

JUN 01 1010 

MEMORANDUM 

TO, Michael D. Gulledge 

Assiswn 11llp«lor Gene .. l 

for Evaluali~ and lnspe<:lions 

Office of ~ Inspecl"," Cknen.1 

FROM: ~~~~Ye~ Office of InSpeCtions 

SUBJECT: DEA', ReSpOn>C to lh< 010·, Draft Report; ~.I~ p/II,. EI PiUO 1",.lIig.",,~ 

CI~Ur 

The Urug tinlOr"cemenl AdmmislraUOII (ULA) IIu rev,ewed the L>epartment oUUOlioc (LX.IJ), 

Offi« oflbe [nspeooIOrGene...t·. (OIG) d .. fI.udil ~rt,emilled: Revl_ Q!IIw EII'MO 

/TIlI/lip,," CeTlltr. A·1009.()1)/. PEA II<:knowledges O[G'I efforts in cooducting l \borough 

re,.;e...,. of !he DOJ IlWIaged, mu.lti..agency in.elli2eDCe center which oerves .., • III<:tical i" reUige""<' 

reoource fur federal., owe, local and internalion.oJ 1_ enforcement agencies on • wide range of 

criminal1hre:au. DEA concurs with n:conunendations I . ] and 5· II, and will take the nocaiWY 

stepo 10 implement 1M recommertdalions. rbe urtK:e oflbe Ikpu!y Anomer Uene...t responded 

Sq>ru"llely ro r«<:>lIlJn(fl(IatioIl 4. 

"The E1 Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC or the '""Cenrer") is. narional ra.orical inrellige""" cenler 

\hat was initially e. llhlished to ..,.;01 law enforcement in Iddressi"i Southwell border reuted i$.Sues. 

DurinK ill 36- year history, EPIC'. focus &lid ra<:h bave . ",pllllded beyond Ibe Southwest border lO 

encompo..ss \lie emire Western tfemispl>ere. Ho ...... ver, 1lle Ceo\cr retains iU "'lletical·· orientation ­

providing time sensitive infOfmatioo thai un be .. ted upon immediately hyend useR. Ths !aerial 

fo<:us diJlingujsbes EPIC from investiatltive support cenrers Or organizations thai seek lO infontl 

policy lhroujb. Slralelic ona1ysis. AlthoUih DEA bas been resp()IIsiblc for the managemenr of EPIC 

';/ICe its inceplion. EP[C is • lrue multi-agmcy center lhaI remains beavily deper.:lenl on a variety <>f 

lIlIencies for data, . taffini and participa.tion. 

DEA apprcciale!llhal the draft oudil rep<lrt reflecrN lbe results of an DIG """"y which found 

thor EPIC i. highly valued by ils paMer lIlIeoc ie5 and users.. Spe<ifically, the ' '''''''y results!lOted 

thlt EPIC ut«S r<']>Orted hiah utisfaction willi the prodl.lCl$ and ..,.-vice, thor EP[C provides. Those 

\I#I"l abo tq><><1ed the ptOduo:ts ro be timely and valuable to their operations. While DEA remains 
 

Michlel D, Gulleclfe, AIfiIIant blll*1O' Cia>enI 

oommlltail(l "";"11 piOCCll i" .. o.o, ..... II EPIC mol '';11lI'0II: 10 implemerM lIIe 

,eeooihi ... idltions ooade by lIIe DIG. EPIC k/jeo,'ellhII cwton\tJ lIIiloolon II the key 10 lIIe 

caila"', allltinu«l ......... 

DBA providco the followina iCifiOi* I(IlIIe 010'. r..:ommendatiolll: 

Rtrommeodotlo. I. [ PIC Imptt-.ol .. OII lr ~ o.d tdM'ow "OH procno .. 10 promolt Ih • .., 

of lll produttJ ud .., .... 1«1. l.d.dl. ,I.Jor .. olkHI.IHto I II .... "t Rr lC hn.L 

OEA coneu ... with lIIe m:ommmda!ion. bot btli~ellhat thi. ~ion oni.,........., 

-wropria'ely real ""EPIC ~ ns outreacll ond alUCMion pro...,. ... w While 0f!A 

ocki\OwlalWeilhal EI'IC Ihould improve il', out~lCh pro,"", 1(1 Nile •• ,Old promote EPIC, 

lOefViteo ond products, DEA off"" that the CUOTeIlI maneton,lti"ItelY Iw raultN in sianifieant 

powlh In the number of \lien of EPIC. SifICe ill inceplion. EPIC Iw mlde nlellli'lt effurto to 

man;cI lIIe uti lity of ill producll &lid la"Vica. Evidence of thll II IUpported by IhI: over 25.000 

VUIOd. ulCfl who hive _ to EPIC (Ill ilCrcaK 0(6.000 uaen linee the 010'. ,isit to EPIC), 

Mcno_. EPIC hosts an overage of over 1.000 vi,ilOn annUlOlIy 10 provide infomulliooal briefing&. 

It i. &I .. noICWOflhy IhIllhI: lIlIaI number Ohcllod ""'" i. an W1der·repi'CK"nlllion of the IClu&l 

nwnber of individuals &om Ibe I.w aof_ axnmunily thai ..... ware of ond lISO EPIC 

rat)IlI'I:a ono dailybuU. iii ...... ycua, one lUCI" .. tlaflei the infomwion fUjuimnenIJ of.., 

enliRl.......,..,em. oq.o.od or .... it. Addillonally, the EPIC 5111<1 ond J.oeal Pro$rli1ll Unit fII'O"idH an 

overa&" of25 10 30 interdic\ion.orienled 

·00. InIinin, KaiOlll annUlOlIy •• loeI,iono Ihroui/lOUl the 

eowrtty. Thae!Bini", lOII~ncly l"O"ide ).000 10 $.000 low ... fun: ........ officers annllllly 

" lib dNiled infonnaOan abou' EPIC. EPIC hao conAaauJy JiIOIIlOIN ill c.pabiliti .. 10 the ~ 

ert1Oo«ment communily Ind eontinuo""y NlltttJ ill terVic • . The incteUOd 10K of EPIC terVic. 

ond ill ~idly gro~ u_ laMe. clearly IIIppOIU EPIC'. aillio, rnart<ct:i", capabilities. The 

C ... , ... i. on IrICk 10 "'"""" mont !han 100.000 q_ d";o, flICI.l yur2()lO. 

DBA will n plom new opportImiliea to upmd lIIe nw1tetin, of EPIC and will &110 cIcvdop a 

prolfllll of ""pondi", CUltomer IUqI ofth: EPIC S)'IICmI Portal. 

RH .. ",mudalklal. EPIC .pdottlll PrfIoC'lpak A«e-rd or MOpt a companobk _ ltiqfH)' 

framework Ihl f .. rnll'luI ... , rumbtr'. roIu •• d rn po'tliIoili!ia for impltlWlllat, •• d 

l uslalalRg EPIC'I progra .... a.d Iba, p"~ u a prOflU for rttOl~I.1 rr~._ Ihl "' .~ 

I n K. 

... " 

DCA cone .... with the I'<'COmmtndatlon. Sn:e Sefltcmbcr 11. 2001. the information shari". 

landseape h .. cllanlled and there 1\11 btcn a rapid c~pat\lion of i!l'ellilence centeno IncludiTlj 

apprt>xiro ... ly n lIate rulion conten. whlclt art flUldtd at leul in p&rt by the DHS. AI rteently u 

five yur:o .... 1bcrc wne thmo ()) fNera! ta(:1i(a l lnlel!lllfllCe ctnl .... • EPIC.1he Border Field 

Imd.igonu C.,,"er (OORFIC). ond .Ioim T .. k Foree-North (lTF-N) - within two miles of one 

anotller in EI P ..... Tuu and pi .... 10 <OnJ:nH:I. f<l<tM con, .. • the Border Interdiclion SuWOrt 

Ctnt .. (DISC) · in the same o;;ty. II w .. 1101 poIIibJe 10 update EPIC', Princil'&i"1 Aa:ord without 

raaMlIj the oYerlappi"l miuiOlll and functions oflllele cmtera. Fommately.1hroulk' «OIICertod 

mulu-yeu effill"l. DEA ond ill part ...... have ooade ~ in lbil mo. The BORrlC and iIJ 

cttpal:oillliea ha"" boUI utCOtpOutN into l!PIC. JTF.N;. cuOTelltly nqot:iotilli 10 mer. iIJ 

imelli&m<e limetiona into EPIC. PI8na 10 atablish the DISC are "" Ionaer bei", oonaiclcnod. The 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

72 
 

.... ' 

prooru of fonIullllia& • rcplK...,.,1 <be....,... lhII """lei ..ublilh I ~ JftlllllIO provido 

O_pl ofEl'IC .... already -. ("itilled. DE ..... ilI keep \fie OIG InfonneCl O( the: IHIIt'OmCOI or 

thooo: .....,.'" eiTono 10 update 1M: Cer.I«', tIwter....s p:vvide. mu~ fi-a.-nework Ilw 

furm.lliJJel eIdIl!IeIIIbef'. IOIei and rtlponsiloililies for ;!T'4'lerMltin8111d IJStIininj EPIC', 

pIC""," """ IIw pIOvideo I Pl"'UJ for moclv;ng ~ifT_. 

"" m~d.UOft 3. EPIC pr_, .~rt8Ud rtportll l " (drl,RllIIrc d." to th NaU" ... 

Srtr;.reSylleo •• ~ ..... ~ Ibe EPIC Porta' ODd Ir. dltlolll .... ~od •. 

DEI'. CUlCUr1 rri!h 1M: _eodot;"'. De!pilC: It", <I.,. ..ubI)' of having .. tingle .. , .. ioNl 

d· ........ 1kaI tOlllai .. 01 1 ."lilable ;of<:m!.Otion OII<onU'abmd ..mua. EPIC does not .. ..., tho: 

~ 

I<Ihorit11O di;uc rnmdaIory rqatm,; ~prdinllt.c: ocizJrre of dRaa. ourmICy, ,....,.... .... <>Ikt 

inIo thc: Nllioral Seizure S)'SICm (NSS~ H"" ........ DEA _ ~rly ""Iuirccl 

fdnlliClll'* LO lI'O"idr ..... oa drua ocinrcs WIIicr "'" Fcdcnl DN. ldontifio;otion Number 

(FOIN) I'roIJ"III for.oov.thraDold Irizw'a. T1W _ KIDDIIli'lisbod by requiriT., an m IN 

....,bcr on all faIcnI q.eizIR exbibiu •• ~\e fOr DEA', Iabomoria 10 """,ide 

ra' ....... yo;.. SOniWiY. wbilo IlEA carmo1 ~r de or locaIaulhoririeo 10 "",¥ide 

;~ OIl dnI&.mw.. (theoe ..,..,;.. rypiaIJy onaI)'U IXir II'n drill ",,"'biu). ore have 

proviIW incalli_ -" • B...a- Judlia-:e Systan, a-.tpa!iaIlnlOlmltioo. SY$km, .... Uni: 

ViaWiwion IDOla l>r '. ie ..... vtlhnanly comply. f>:pan6i", IIaiJ model 10 inc""" otbor 

typoo ofcontroband. i"d...rina --"" _ <WTCft<)'. will require new 1TICICUni .... IIIao eilba 

ccmpeIor pnl>'ide ... flic .... ' irlMlli_ ..,. participolion. Sucilaulhorily for fedolnl I!lp<f1inl must 

be etubI,1hod at the 0qI1lfmerIl Levd lOr eadt of IX fcclml dtpInmenll invol~ed in lho oeizuo: or 

llDe ')'pel of roDInband. Similarly, EPIC has no outhorily 10 .w>daIe Hi.,. inlM<ily Drug 

Tnffk:kil\i M. (HlOT A) wi< i>rtts ~ rcpon Dr ooordilllC IlzoolIIh EPIC _ IhallUthority rt:m 

...,Ih ONOCP olnne. I["",,,,·cr. DEA belicveslhl, ONDCp·, bWgd ccniflCllion wthorities L">d \he 

..,1 nukin"mcOli <01114 be ~If«tiv.ly """ 10 , .. ndlle redertll swe anollocal agency rq>OIti"l 

into ~c NSS iii EriC. WJik EriC doxt IlCr1l1a'·c Ik roqlililC I\I!l\Orily \D «Impel ~ning. EPIC 

Iw alrcody .. labli,h:<I and will «Inlina. 10 "'lJIait tJo.e "'·SS .. tho m)f[ compreh:ns.iv. database of 

~""1",b;nd ... izut1!l O\IlTCIIIly IvliLobIe. 

Rt<o_-.dado. 4. ~.Offkt . f,K ~~ty Allor • .,.~ . . .. 1 work wltlo u. ONDer 10 

llblb~ policy or C.kIIIKt tqll .... ~ HIDTAS III ["1* __ dlU! .. d ilfonutiol MllriI,; 

,.-..,bl6a.lo tl tallls~ UIC .. 'kir IIIb for IrinIn n d d"l _ ..... 1 idar_.'''. 

'"""' ",.. ~ . hal ...... responded 10 ..,.....~Iy by tile OffICe . f \be Deputy All1mCy 

___ .d_ $. IlPlC eo .... ,." "",.to or 1Mi ~ oil u_ ........... L ot.c ..... '--I 

r ....... _~ .0 _10 ..... iIIf_"" . Ioarinl lid .... fJI frlCI wn'~ aDd prod.clS. 

DEA concun with Ihis~. EPIC alnldy 11M Icq sIanfdi .... poincs fJI COIIUCI. 

eIl.Ibijshed "";'.h nllnlftl)lItnarioul. reJional. wilille in:dl(go!« e~;~. the number o( 

;III.lIi...,., ................ tho US. haoinc:reQed blli ....... lyov ... tho pd KveDI re- In 

particular, approximnely 72 DHS funded JIa:O.lcvd Inlelipnao Filii"" Ccntcn hlv ....... 

nublillled lince Sqllcmbor I t. ZOOt. In 1lIOII illlWlCal. EPIC play",o rol. in lho eoIabHobm:nl of 

Ih..., inIC\lign<. """t(n ond only becomct JWIR! oflhcir tIli"",","" " ben clemenlO witltin thcle 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

73 
 

' .... 

cmtm CanllC! EPIC lOr inrOll1l&tion nlUpport. EPIC hJs bci\ll1 WOfting .... ith the OH5, OI'Jloc of 

Inlclliamu IIICI Analytil (t.lA). 10 INure It'IOR complete ooMectivity. AJ. relllll ohhe ~ 

EPIC - I4A tllilrt, I single "RtqueII for [nfOflTlllion Collo:tion Sene" h .. boen oIdopIod 10 

drcctiYdy ..... fer the respDftlibllityof the EPIC Collection IIId Requirements Unit to the OHS 

11(lme11lld lnfeUiaencc Suppon TCIIII (DIIS !lIST) which ill o;o-loo;aIed It EPIC. Thilaction ~ 

directly ~ the EPIC CoIIeetioII ~ Unit with the 72 OHS manqed IIld tlllldct! 

Itll!~ Intelligence fUsion <:men. 

In an effott IOcrohantc infonnation WrinJ. EPIC will CONi ..... wmin& .. ;.11 theeatab~shed poinll 

of tonlaet IIICI will leek to esublilh ""' poin .. of com.ct fOl'lllY ranaini", intellijmu ccntm. 

RK(lmmeldl,loa 6. EPIC luu~ monIMbi, .. ,h'e ... lyllnl pndlfU based 01 tII,"'re 

dill tollKltd In the N.ti9nol Sel~ Mre Sl"lem. 

DEA c:oncun with thilrccommmlluion, Sall,fyi ll, thil requirement r'Uluinol comrnilmenll'tora our 

Itderal plf\1lCII in popuLatill(l1ht: NSS lIICI.u.ffinlthe Re$ean:h and Anllysi. Section. !loweva', 

EPIC bu aIt9cIy eatlbliWd • PrtIIIic:tive and Tqetinj Unil dedicated 10 the _ I)'til of tile 

inltlliJcncc routinely lICquiml by EPIC vi, the NSS. Thill UIIil will be enS-Hell in idcI1tifyin. the 

poilll of enII'y of oon&rabaod inIo the U.S. II1II determining 1M IUIOI1I for failure 10 intenlid the 

drup or 0Iher ilIepi i_III tbc border. EPIC will o;anIinue ..., 0;011«"1 and analyze dl!l, bUI will 

rmin ill f.lClieal ~ and "",,vide ....arm thai _Ill lion! ~1111 inlcrdi<;lOn and in"C!lniplOrl. Ill. 

lII11cipllcd !hal odIer orpniZiliona wiU _die inl'onnalion eoll«1cd by EPIC 10 providcI tInIesic 

~cl an.ol)$i5!ha1 infonnJ notional policy. 

K«(lmmtod.lloo 7. EPIC.uno the feulbWly l f .llIyU •• dick_tly KI •• ed ftllld.\e.1 

eloeumenu 10 ldulify Il'flIdl ll bot ...... 1'ftI •• eI pa1UtII .... r ..... d.It. 1 ..... mul UM, lIei of 

proyldlnil ihe dill 10 olber lOlclllatltt ¢flltrl ror Iklr . .... 

DE!. coneUr! with !hi. rccommCDdatien. The Frudulen! Document diacip~ne illtpOeiaJiud 

..w)'lical p1QCC#. Durini llle December 2008. twe criticlllllal)'ltlutia:ncd to tM unil I'di"; m 

0Ihu key 1IIli! penonnel W"m! IT_pcd by 0115. h11I11ulr)' 2C()9,' compRt.elllive I "'nellt 

_ eondllClcd oftbc FlMICIulenc Document Unit and u • raul1 between lUM and (kIOtKr 2009, 

k'llior -JC!II1CM II EPIC ITIoeIllcod tho: liauduknt do<;umen1 initiatiye to the Ocncnl WItCh. 

Sinoe \lilt date, ptoIfftI hal COIIliDIIed. in III tffon to l'HSIablilb tho: progrwn and Improve EPIC'. 

ClIpabtlillOllO _!he inl'onnlllioa bel,t 

EPIC ~Iy dcvdopcd • ~Iily on till NSS 10 captw-e iIIformaIion obIained from Iei1:cd 

doc;umenll, ineludina fraudulent doewnenll. The protocol illO eleetmnie.tlly XIII tho: doclllnClllS 

and map tbe cIata elemcnlllO the Wopilte flCidI in lite NSS. Thill proj«1 iI on achcdule and once 

complClcd, uscn will be: able 10 ~ tho: Buli_lllldlipQ S)'$IC!In. tho: Gco-~ial 

lnfootlluion Sy.lem. and the UnJc ViIualiUlion 10011 on !he ESP to iclenti~ IfmIII and f1111em1 in 

the tile of OOtumenli ~Icd ofbeina: Craudulenl or fraudulmtly obIaincd. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

74 
Michael D. c..lledge. Auimnt hupllClOf Gencrr.l ,,.., 

!Uton'mtldIUOI'. TH DEA IUUI t~ e f~IIIblUly ofeahldlk Ihtuplbmly II EPIC 10 

lulyu 11(llcll laformlno. 10 ldelUty IIlk" ,uad" nd p.nunl ln drMI lr. fTkklnl ICIMty 

II JUPpMt of l.tudklloaJ OpeI1lUOI •• Id IB'·Ullilllon 

DEI. cone"" .. i!h !his RIXlmmmdltioa.. EPiC .......... and concho;:lJ • pR>&r1m .... hich c:olkcq 

IElic:al inl'onnatiCIII on tbucti~itiel of dNt IrlIf'I"ockm MIl providn1lle iotformltJon 10 II .. 

enliloCGllml and iDimliction lIIGICieib immed:ialC lIC1icft.. Inrcllipnce ICqIIired by _ orlhil 

opcntion .. hiJIlIy paishobl.1IdicaI inlel~pnce. AI _II, ~ is CGI\II.Intly lllllyUId by trained 

DBA INC1Upnce Rnan:h Specialietl (IRS) for by Ktionabk information. Followina Ihis 

1I\IJ)'Iil. the intdlijaoce iI_ IiO tciecl U.s . ...... enfo!oMCliC I&CIICY pe'lOillltllO ra.:ilitak: 

intmliction 0.- OIlIer ."bCC ..... iC .,tiooo. AIoaI)'Iis i, pcrfonncd 10 mhanoe inlapo'eWioa ohhe 

in{onnIIIion for t.:Iical application. bulllldilionll rnoun:es will be required to concIucIlraId 

l!II.l)'Iil. DE.!. hal pll100d I RqxIIU Om-.. EPIC 10 prr:parc summarin of Ihis information IncI 

develop In •• lligcnee InlOOnotion Rq'lOfU (11K ) that CUI 1It.-:r to prepor1Ilrmd 1I\IJ)'foit. SI_ 

M&n:h 2()()9, onr 600 URI have bmt produced ba.ed on .be lICIicl l inteliiJftlC4lIfom the opcrIIioa. 

The Pl"C'([iclivc and T ... ,etm, Unil i, no ... III omcill"l.and· lQnc~ unit will1in.tIc ReK&n:h and 

Anll)'l;' Section and iI.lIlTed by _1)'111 fIom mu l.iple Iger.ciel. Thilllllit ... ill bct:ome!be tn.i.y 

that conductl trm;I and pIl.em lI\IJyail, 

Reo .... e.dllkNI ,. EPIC tumi ••• t ..... pproac~n for IIUlkhll Glttktrprr bI(orllUlUOII maN 

( .. rut lid IttftIlblt. 

DEA f')ftCUI'I willi lltil ~ M preWHaJy indk· ..... i. ia __ 11M dif'l"lCUlllO 

rapood 10 litis (tndlna due the lack of lpIICi6c: idmofiCllion of .. hklo ~ ... EPIC ......... ~ dele""i .. ed 

the Iq>OI1 "to be 0lIl of dale .~ With thallimilllioft in mind. the followi", .apoo .. iI repelled: 

The EPIC Galri:<qlCI" Study .... 111 and bI inlCl'ldai U I tat6clllntellipncc publie.alion for '*' by lineofficen \0 provide IilIIHUIllI1ll of tile crimiMl elemcnt& c:omromn, key portionI orthe bonScr 

ImUiIIliTlJ "ctwon:. While !be initill publication ..... iIlued in ZOO7, .... ilh • wbMquent exP'Qdod 

publication in 2008. updllea M~e been prepued u new information bec_ available. Durinl the: 

past two )",ilI'I. periodic publiclliOlU Ofl lpee;'", Gltekoo:per Corridon Mve bmt dirtributed. In 

oddition. key Law ",,1Ore_ment m&rI&jjtnlent penonnel Mv. been pr!.Il'idcd nunlmlUl merongo 011 

curreDI 0",*"'1'" Intfllilmef. Morenver. u illlflliBfDCe rcprdinll Gi.ekeoper ",bjecll il 

Ilc\·clopcd il II ill1JllNiaicly ondl'Olllinely Ihared bct .... mt EPIC lIIlalyatl antl \llc:lkal elemtnll. 

Ad<.Iitional dillllCminllion of CUllen. Gatclroo:per intellilltnCe hu btrn prO~ided vii RepoN Offtcm 

and lIR di....run.tion. 

EPIC till lind bI continlllDi to diuentinlle _Iy ckvcloped loIIcll~ .. bled 10 the: Gatdt<qlCl1 

_ receltly publiIhcId allUlty ~ 011 U.s. ~ *"1 dillriblWort netwom linked 10 the 

South"eII BonIa". The 010 Rn'icw Team recommCl'ldai lii0i ... of"Wiki~ IOftware __ 

intttnd techno!o&Y 10 IUpport die conlC:ll"op<nneOlII production of updated Gatckeeper·rdMod 

reponiTlJ /\om I v";ety of utanal ond imcmaI EPIC ~ Thlo i, ... inlmsUlI& COIICCJI! and 

.. iU lit considered by EPIC III I ~ti.:r 1001 for the: production and dilllCmination ofGatd< ........ 

informatiOn. The primary concern EPIC hal ... ill1 die propou.I II in volidalillj the _lIfEY o{the: 

informal Ion belllJl pll!lCn.td. Thi. rec:ommeoo.tion will be liken under consideration for pouible 

futu .. exparlIlon of ... ha. EPIC cwmuly colllidm Ilubatllltially elTeo:live diucminatioo pt"O«II. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

75 
Mithael 0 , Gulled .. Alli.lanl 1ru.pec1Or General 

Ilero.,_.dllio. 10, r.PIC del-'fIop pbiOl' .... u _ trla'&I' 111111 PfOIrlUnlud ollfrltloal 

tht ddiat ..,.levllt nd objK1ln JII.dll"lll, • .d Itt tM _tm HI enl .. te prtcnlll 

~Il'..,tlvtu .. ,

DEA concurs wilh lIti. rcc:ommenr.t.im The EPIC SIItlep: P'-nand pafonnancemetricl bave 

been revised 10 ~n!et EPIC'. CUfl'tl'tt cortfilJUl'llion: however, .. EPIC it currenlly wtdf: .... ", 

illddilional miMion nl o:JIi&IliuriooaJ chan.,., L/lI' EPIC StrIItiic I'bn will than&e and_1IICtricoI 

will be developtd .. __ y, 

R __ ldlllol II. EPIC develop. _hnbm " 1)'lleml ricllly colle<l fHdbKk 01 h' 

p..cIlCU •• d tt~ fro ...... f'S. 

DEA CODC:ul1 with!IW reoomrnmdaIiort bill klieva thIt!he lmIIIt'llftldltion would be tn(lI"e 

lCCunie if it rtId "EPIC aM 9jlljPB !!!!lfhaplRQI 10 ')'IIemalielily toIlect fecdbac:k ... " 

AltOOqIo EPIC"" repeI1fdIylOJiciICd ~ feedbao:k on the lCC_y. ut t~y. -.I nocd lOr 

rtvilion of 1M Cmler', p....m.m ond teMces. EPIC willipin CUl:lUoe lilldilionlllvmlllel of 

IOlicitlllon of fHdback rcgardinl!he Cmtcr'1 df«livalClllO lhe bw enlOKement. To I a.uin 

Cllen~ we belien It .. t the IAcl of Cllllomer ffCldbld: rtllectllllisflCUon. We oro', lite II]*iII note: of 

the 11M of, III!VCY i!I$IJUmCi"\1 tha!lyatemaliully plhemI f<l:dblck lOIld detcnnined thII 

EPIC o;\IIIOmCn wen: very plu ... 1 .... ilh the quality, timelineu IOId Iii Ii.), oflhl inbmalion and 

... io;ea pn:rridcd by EPIC, EPIC will coruider lIIinlll,imilar lW'VCY in OW"0ft01Oi1l8_11 

ort~ Centcr', dwim.. Othcr f __ of Cllltomer fecdbKk ..,Iici.ot''''''' we ~ considc:rinll incilldo: 

lteYiIion ofltle 

T

o:curx critique questionnairt 

.-mna 

pr(Ivkted 10 participants in EPIC', Stile and 

Loeal LiaiIon I'ropanI, 

Elit questioo.rWi"tI far...,... vilitinJ the Cenla. 

An 1lU1I1ll.-smertt q~ _ 10 .. 1 pmUcipatina EPIC apocy member 

lludqulll1m, NlIionIllOlld Stale itMelJipnce centen and inlCmpnce lWon Cenlm, and 

H1DTAI. 

Doounenlltion KuBin. DBA', dfortl to imp\cn>enl each orlho ~ noted in IhiI 

drift repon will to: rrm'ided to the 010 on I qLllt1criy ~il. until w;h lime tNt all OOI'ftO:tive 

acliOlll hln bmI mnpklcd, If )'011 hI~e any qUCItiQIII ~JIl1Iin. DEA " rapoose 10 lhe OIG', 

recommcndaI>ons ple_ ~. L/lI' Audil Uai$Oll Team at (2(1) ))7-8200, 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

76 
 

 

 

APPENDIX IX: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT 

ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General provided a draft of this report to 

the Drug Enforcement Administration for its comment. The DEA’s 

response is included in Appendix VIII to this report. The OIG’s analysis 

of the DEA’s response and the actions necessary to close the 

recommendations are discussed below. 

Recommendation 1. EPIC expand its outreach and education 

program to promote the use of its products and services, including 

information about how to use the EPIC Portal. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

OIG’s recommendation that it use its outreach and education program to 

promote the use of its products and services, but stated that the 

recommendation should be reworded to recognize EPIC’s current 

marketing efforts. Specifically, the DEA stated that the OIG’s 

recommendation should be reworded to state, “That EPIC expand its 

outreach and education program . . . .” 

The DEA stated that EPIC has continuously marketed its products 

and services, and that this resulted in a significant increase in the 

number of EPIC’s approved users from about 19,000 to about 25,000 

during the last year. The DEA commented that EPIC’s outreach efforts 

had included hosting about 8,000 visitors at EPIC annually. The DEA 

further stated that EPIC provided information about its products and 

services during training events it conducted at locations throughout the 

country to about 3,000 to 5,000 law enforcement officers each year. The 

DEA specifically noted that the overall number of approved EPIC users is 

an under-representation of the actual number of individuals from the law 

enforcement community that are aware of and that use EPIC on a daily 

basis. The DEA stated that one approved user might satisfy the 

information requirements of an entire department, squad, or unit. The 

DEA stated that EPIC is on track to process more than 100,000 queries 

during fiscal year 2010. 

The DEA further stated that it will explore new opportunities to 

expand the marketing of EPIC and will also develop a program to expand 

customer usage of the EPIC Portal. 

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OIG Analysis. The DEA’s planned actions to explore new marketing 

opportunities and increase customer use of EPIC’s products and 

services, including the Portal, are responsive to our recommendation. 

Further, the OIG recognizes that these planned actions are an expansion 

of EPIC’s outreach and training efforts, and we therefore amended the 

recommendation from “implementing an outreach program” to 

“expanding its outreach program.” 

While we amended the wording of our recommendation to 

acknowledge that EPIC has conducted some outreach, we nevertheless 

believe that EPIC’s outreach program needs significant improvement. 

During our review, we found that EPIC staff had principally provided 

information about EPIC’s products and services to law enforcement in 

conjunction with interdiction training events it conducted each year. 

Yet, these efforts were not based on a plan that encompassed a 

comprehensive strategy targeting specific categories of actual or potential 

users. The outreach that EPIC is providing through its interdiction 

training targets only a relatively small population of state and local law 

enforcement organizations that are likely to already have an association 

with EPIC. The outreach EPIC conducts through interdiction training 

also does not reach the majority of state and local law enforcement 

organizations, many of which may be unaware of EPIC’s capabilities. 

While the DEA reported that EPIC had increased its number of 

approved users by nearly one-third, from about 19,000 to 25,000, this 

net increase in approved users still represents a very small segment of 

the law enforcement community – less than 1 percent of federal, state, 

and local law enforcement officers – that EPIC could potentially support, 

either directly or indirectly.40 Similarly, we accept EPIC’s statement that 

it hosts about 8,000 visitors each year and uses the opportunity of these 

visits to possibly increase the visitors’ awareness of EPIC’s products and 

services. However, describing products and services to a wide range of 

visitors, many of whom are not potential users, does not substitute for a 

targeted marketing effort to reach potential users not already aware of 

EPIC and its services. 

The OIG agrees with the DEA’s comment that the number of 

approved users is probably an under-representation of the actual 

40 During this review, EPIC provided the OIG with a list of the names of its 

approved users that totaled 19,416 users as of July 2009. We did not verify the DEA’s 

statement that, since then, the number of authorized users has increased by over 

25 percent to 25,000 users (an increase of approximately 6,000 approved users). 

Further, we did not examine the composition of the additional 6,000 to determine 

whether they were federal, state, or local users. 
 

 

 

number of individuals from the law enforcement community that benefit 

from EPIC. Yet, in light of the DEA’s example that one approved user 

might satisfy the information requirements of an entire department, 

squad, or unit, we believe EPIC could greatly expand its impact and its 

efficiency by targeting individuals that can serve as points of contact in 

their agencies for information requests to EPIC and for dissemination of 

information and products from EPIC. A more targeted outreach and 

education program designed to establish points of contacts with agencies 

unaware of EPIC capabilities could also help EPIC better inform the 

intelligence and law enforcement communities about EPIC’s capabilities. 

Please provide the OIG with a detailed description, timeline, and 

intended audience of the actions planned to expand EPIC’s outreach and 

education program to promote its products and services, including how 

to use the Portal, by July 30, 2010. 

Recommendation 2. EPIC update its Principals Accord or adopt a 

comparable multi-agency framework that formalizes each member’s 

roles and responsibilities for implementing and sustaining EPIC’s 

programs and that provides a process for resolving differences that 

may arise. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

OIG’s recommendation and stated that EPIC had previously initiated the 

process of formulating a document to replace its 1999 Principals Accord. 

The DEA noted that there had been a rapid expansion of intelligence 

centers nationwide since September 11, 2001, and that EPIC could not 

update the Accord until it had resolved overlapping missions and 

functions of other intelligence centers established in the El Paso area. 

According to the DEA, the capabilities of these other centers have been or 

will be incorporated into EPIC. 

The DEA stated that the updated Accord will establish a steering 

group to oversee EPIC and will provide a multi-agency framework that 

formalizes each member’s roles and responsibilities for implementing and 

sustaining EPIC’s programs and that provides a process for resolving 

differences. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the DEA are responsive to 

the OIG’s recommendation. Please provide the final version of the 

replacement document, or the status of planned actions, by July 30, 

2010. 

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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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Recommendation 3. EPIC promote more complete reporting of drug 

seizure data to the National Seizure System through the EPIC Portal 

and traditional methods. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

OIG’s recommendation. The DEA stated that EPIC does not have the 

authority to direct mandatory reporting of seizures of drugs and other 

contraband, but it will continue to manage the National Seizure System 

as the most comprehensive database of contraband seizures currently 

available. The DEA stated that it has successfully required federal 

agencies to provide data under the Federal Drug Identification Number 

Program on seizures above specified threshold amounts. The DEA stated 

that while it cannot compel state or local authorities to provide 

information on drug seizures, EPIC has provided incentives for reporting 

in the form of additional analytical tools available to agencies that 

voluntarily comply. The DEA stated that additional requirements for 

reporting seizures into the National Seizure System would have to be 

established at the federal Department level or by the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy through its budget certification authority. The DEA 

stated that it believes that the ONDCP’s budget certification and the 

grant-making process could be used effectively to mandate federal, state, 

and local agency reporting to the National Seizure System at EPIC. 

OIG Analysis. The DEA’s planned actions to expand the 

availability of analytical tools as incentives to promote voluntary 

reporting into the National Seizure System and to work with the ONDCP 

on budget and grant issues are responsive to the recommendation. 

Please provide the OIG with a description of how EPIC proposes to 

further develop and make available analytical tools and the timeline for 

implementation. Also, provide the DEA’s plan for engaging the ONDCP to 

promote increased reporting into the National Seizure System by federal, 

state, and local agencies. Also, please identify how EPIC will monitor 

and measure progress in improving the completeness of federal, state, 

and local agency reporting into the National Seizure System. Please 

provide the requested information, or the status of planned actions, by 

July 30, 2010. 

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Recommendation 5. EPIC establish points of contact at all national, 

regional, state, and local fusion centers to enhance information 

sharing and use of EPIC’s services and products. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

OIG’s recommendation and stated that EPIC had already established 

longstanding points of contact with numerous national, regional, and 

state intelligence centers. The DEA stated that the number of state and 

local intelligence centers across the United States had increased in 

recent years, that EPIC exercised no role in the establishment of these 

centers, and that EPIC only became aware of the existence of some of 

these centers when they contacted EPIC for support. According to the 

DEA, EPIC recently took action to directly connect EPIC with the 72 state 

intelligence fusion centers managed and funded by the Department of 

Homeland Security. EPIC has now assigned responsibility for managing 

requests for information from these centers to a DHS unit at EPIC, the 

Homeland Intelligence Support Team, which has a direct automated 

connection to the DHS-funded centers. The DEA also stated that it will 

seek to establish points of contact for any centers where it lacks them. 

OIG Analysis. The DEA’s planned action to seek points of contact 

for centers where it lacks them is responsive to our recommendation. 

However, as the DEA noted, the number of intelligence centers has 

increased significantly over the past several years and is likely to 

continue to increase. Please provide documentation of EPIC’s efforts to 

identify the universe of centers and a point of contact in each center and 

of how EPIC will update its information on centers and points of contact. 

Also, please describe how the DHS unit at EPIC is ensuring that EPIC is 

connected to the DHS-funded centers. Please provide the requested 

information, or the status of planned actions, by July 30, 2010. 

Recommendation 6. EPIC issue more substantive analytical 

products based on the seizure data collected in the National Seizure 

System. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that it established a Predictive Analysis and 

Targeting Unit dedicated to the analysis of the intelligence EPIC routinely 

acquires via the National Seizure System. This unit will identify points of 

entry of contraband into the United States and determine the reasons 

interdictions fail at the border. 
 

 

OIG Analysis. The actions described by the DEA are responsive to 

the OIG’s recommendation. Please provide the OIG with examples of the 

analytic products created by the Predictive Analysis and Targeting Unit 

and a description of how and to whom EPIC will disseminate these 

products. Please provide the information, or the status of planned 

actions, by July 30, 2010. 

Recommendation 7. EPIC assess the feasibility of analyzing 

digitally scanned fraudulent documents to identify trends in both 

sources and patterns of fraudulent document use, and of providing 

the data to other intelligence centers for their use. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

OIG’s recommendation and stated that EPIC recently developed a 

capability within the National Seizure System to capture information 

obtained from seized documents, including fraudulent documents. Once 

this capability is implemented, EPIC will scan and map the data 

elements in seized documents into the National Seizure System so that 

users will have access to these data. The DEA stated that this will allow 

users to identify trends and patterns in the use of documents suspected 

of being fraudulent or fraudulently obtained. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the DEA to map fraudulent 

document data to a database were described to the OIG during this 

review (see pages 36–37 of this report). While these actions will enhance 

users’ access to the information contained in seized documents, the DEA 

response did not address the OIG’s recommendation that the DEA assess 

the feasibility of EPIC conducting its own analyses to identify trends and 

patterns in the use of seized fraudulent documents. Also, the DEA did 

not address its assessment of the feasibility of providing the data to other 

intelligence centers for their use. Please provide the OIG with the 

assessments of the feasibility of EPIC analyzing digitally scanned 

fraudulent documents and of providing the data to other intelligence 

centers. Please provide the information, or the status of planned actions, 

by July 30, 2010. 

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Recommendation 8. The DEA assess the feasibility of enhancing the 

capability at EPIC to analyze tactical information to identify links, 

trends, and patterns in drug trafficking activity in support of 

interdiction operations and investigations. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that EPIC’s Predictive Analysis and 

Targeting Unit will become the entity that conducts trend and pattern 

analysis on the data EPIC collects to provide information on the activities 

of drug traffickers to law enforcement and interdiction agencies for 

immediate action. 

OIG Analysis. The DEA’s planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. Please provide documentation (such as an internal 

EPIC directive or a DEA or EPIC teletype or standard operating 

procedure) that demonstrates that this new responsibility has been 

assigned to the Predictive Analysis and Targeting Unit, and provide 

examples of analytical products identifying trends and patterns, or the 

status of planned actions, by July 30, 2010. 

Recommendation 9. EPIC examine new approaches for making 

Gatekeeper information more current and accessible. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

OIG’s recommendation but commented that it could better respond if it 

knew the identification of users who believed the Gatekeeper report “to 

be out of date.” The DEA emphasized that the EPIC Gatekeeper report 

“was and is a tactical intelligence publication for use by line officers to 

provide an assessment of the criminal elements controlling key portions 

of the border smuggling network.” According to the DEA, the Gatekeeper 

report was initially published in 2007 and was expanded as a publication 

in 2008, and that updates and publications addressing specific 

Gatekeeper Corridors have been periodically published since. In 

addition, Gatekeeper intelligence is briefed often and shared immediately 

and routinely between EPIC analysts and tactical elements. The DEA 

commented that EPIC considers its internal process for disseminating 

Gatekeeper information to be timely and effective. 

The DEA stated that it would consider the OIG’s suggestion to 

explore the use of “wiki” software as a mechanism to maintain 

Gatekeeper information. The DEA stated that this recommendation 
 

would be taken under consideration for possible future expansion of 

what EPIC considers to be a substantially effective dissemination 

process. Further, the DEA noted that its primary concern in using 

technology such as a “wiki” would be validating the accuracy of the 

information presented. 

OIG Analysis. The DEA’s planned action to consider the use of 

“wiki” software is generally responsive to our recommendation. Our 

conclusion that EPIC’s Gatekeeper report could be more current and 

accessible is based on interviews with agents and analysts in the 

Southwest border area and at EPIC as well as on our survey results. 

During these interviews, agents and analysts generally commented that 

the Gatekeeper report was a good product, though some stated that its 

usefulness was often limited because it was not current. Several 

interviewees stated that the Gatekeeper report was useful to them 

primarily as a historical reference. This is not consistent with the DEA’s 

intent that the Gatekeeper report be a “tactical intelligence publication 

for line officers.” Also, our survey results indicate that the Gatekeeper 

report is not widely accessed or used by line officers, as the majority of 

respondents, many of whom had the capability to access the Gatekeeper 

report, nonetheless did not use or know of the Gatekeeper report. 

Further, we noted that EPIC has increasingly used the 

dissemination of tactical reports to provide updates of Gatekeeper-type 

information, but that these tactical reports do not appear to be 

integrated into the Gatekeeper report in a way that would provide line 

officers a comprehensive view of the Gatekeeper Corridors. While the use 

of “wiki” software would present EPIC with challenges to ensuring the 

validity of data, we found during our review that the intelligence 

community is already using “wiki” software in its “Intellipedia,” 

suggesting that these issues are not insurmountable. Our 

recommendation that EPIC examine new approaches for making 

Gatekeeper information more current and accessible is intended to 

benefit Gatekeeper’s customer base – line officers and their organizations 

needing timely access to this type of information. 

Please provide the OIG with the planned assessment of using 

“wiki” software or other approaches to make Gatekeeper information 

more current and accessible, or the status of planned actions, by 

July 30, 2010. 

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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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Recommendation 10. EPIC develop performance metrics for all of 

its programs and operations that define relevant and objective 

standards, and use the metrics to evaluate program effectiveness. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that EPIC’s Strategic Plan performance 

metrics have been revised to reflect EPIC’s current configuration. In 

addition, because EPIC continues to undergo additional mission and 

organizational changes, the DEA stated that EPIC’s Strategic Plan will 

continue to change and new metrics will be developed as necessary. 

OIG Analysis. The actions taken and planned by the DEA are 

responsive to the recommendation. Please provide the OIG with the 

revised metrics from EPIC’s Strategic Plan and the data that EPIC will 

use to measure whether it met its goals. Please provide the information, 

or the status of planned actions, by July 30, 2010. 

Recommendation 11. EPIC expand its existing mechanisms to 

systematically collect feedback on its products and services from 

users. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the DEA Response. The DEA concurred with the 

OIG’s recommendation to systematically collect feedback from users and 

stated that it believed the recommendation should be revised to recognize 

EPIC’s existing mechanisms for collecting feedback. However, the DEA 

stated that the OIG’s recommendation should be reworded to read that 

“EPIC expand existing mechanisms to systematically collect 

feedback . . . .” 

The DEA stated that EPIC had repeatedly solicited customer 

feedback on the accuracy, utility, and the need for revision of its 

products and services, and that EPIC would examine additional avenues 

for soliciting feedback regarding its effectiveness to law enforcement. The 

DEA stated that the lack of customer feedback to EPIC reflects a general 

level of satisfaction. The DEA stated that EPIC would consider: 

(1) future use of a survey similar to the one the OIG used in this review 

to assess user opinions about the utility of EPIC’s products and services, 

(2) revising the course critique questionnaire provided to participants in 

EPIC’s State and Local Liaison Training Program, (3) using exit 

questionnaires for groups visiting EPIC, and (4) administering an annual 

assessment questionnaire to all participating EPIC agency members at 

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headquarters, at national and state intelligence centers and intelligence 

fusion centers, and at High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 

intelligence support centers. 

OIG Analysis. Although the DEA did not identify specific 

mechanisms that EPIC currently employs to systematically collect user 

feedback, the DEA did identify additional forms of customer feedback 

solicitations that EPIC would consider implementing. The additional 

mechanisms are responsive to our recommendation. The OIG also 

recognizes EPIC’s planned actions to expand its collection of user 

feedback and has amended the recommendation from “implement 

mechanisms” to “expand existing mechanisms.” 

In particular, the OIG views EPIC’s use of an annual assessment 

questionnaire to be completed by all participating EPIC agency members 

at headquarters, national and state intelligence centers and intelligence 

fusion centers, and HIDTAs to be a useful assessment mechanism. 

Please provide a description of the current methods and the new 

methods selected for systematically collecting user feedback on EPIC’s 

products and services, EPIC’s plan for collecting and analyzing the 

information, and examples of the completed analyses. Please provide the 

requested information, or the status of planned actions, by July 30, 

2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

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