U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

40–380 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–256

IRAQ: AN UPDATE FROM THE FIELD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 19, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 1

Crocker, Hon. Ryan C., Ambassador to Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC (via video conference from Baghdad, Iraq) ..................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Feingold ................................ 29

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Murkowski ........................... 31

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Obama .................................. 33

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska, prepared statement ............. 27

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, prepared statement ............... 28

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, submitted the following:

Letter to President George W. Bush ............................................................... 34

‘‘The Way Forward in Iraq’’ ............................................................................. 35

(III)

(1)

IRAQ: AN UPDATE FROM THE FIELD

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker,

Sununu, Voinovich, Isakson, and Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

I’ve asked our—we welcome all of our guests, and we’re truly

happy you’re here. But let me say to you, this is a bit of an unusual

hearing, in that we are using a telephone connection from Baghdad. Our Ambassador, Ambassador Crocker, who we know well and

I have great respect for—I have—matter of fact, I spent some time

with him in an underground bunker in Afghanistan once we

opened up the—he opened up the Afghan Embassy, right after the

Taliban fell. But I’m going to ask the audience if they’d help us out

a lot. We don’t know exactly how good this connection’s going to be,

and we know there’s going to be a delay. So, you’re going to hear

a slight delay, and I’m not sure how the—how good the audio is

going to be. So, if you would all just help us out and be very quiet,

it would be useful. It may be of no consequence. It may be as crystal clear and as wide open as if he were sitting in front of us.

And—but we’re going to wait another moment, because—well, I

guess we’ll start.

Ambassador Satterfield is going to be here, from State. Well, actually, I guess—is he coming now? He’s just arriving.

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you very much for being here.

What we’re going to do now—and I can see Ryan—I can see our

Ambassador in Baghdad—I’m going to make a brief opening statement, and turn it over to my friend Chairman Lugar, and then

we’ll hear from Ambassador Crocker.

Ryan, thank you very much for accommodating our schedule. It’s

very important to us and to the Senate that we hear from you, and

we thank you very much for accommodating us. You probably have

a longer delay than 1 second in hearing me.

But, with that, let me begin my opening statement.

2

Mr. Ambassador, again, thank you for joining us. And I’d also

like to, as I said, welcome Ambassador Satterfield, who is here in

the committee room.

In case we have a breakdown, we may turn to you, Ambassador

Satterfield, but you’re welcome to chime in, any way you think is

appropriate. And I’d like to express my appreciation to you and the

Embassy staff.

Mr. Ambassador, we recognize the hardships you face, and we

are truly grateful—truly grateful—for your service. Most of us—I

think all of us here today have been to Baghdad. We have been,

in my case, and in many others, seven or more times; I’m sure others, as well. And it is not an exaggeration to say you are truly,

truly risking your good life for our country, and we appreciate it.

The purpose of this hearing is straightforward. Mr. Ambassador,

we hope to hear from you in a candid and unvarnished assessment

of the situation on the ground in Iraq, especially the political situation.

The primary goal of the President’s military escalation, or buildup, or whatever—I don’t want to be pejorative—whatever you want

to call it—was to buy time—was to buy time for the Malaki government to make compromises and political reconciliation.

Last week, the administration delivered an interim—an interim

assessment of the Iraqi Government’s performance on 18 specific

benchmarks.

The government made the least amount of progress, in my view,

where it matters the most, on the key political benchmarks: Oil

laws, provincial elections, constitutional revisions, and de-Baathification. I am of the view that, absent real political movement,

there is no ultimate solution. So, maybe you will talk to us about

whether or not these political benchmarks—oil, provincial elections,

constitutional revisions, de-Baathification—are as important as—

Sir, would you get out of the way of the screen, there? I’m going

to ask you to move. Thank you. Because we cannot see the screen.

The final assessment is due in 2 months. And the Iraqi Parliament is taking one of those months off. Given the lack of

progress since the surge began, 6 months ago, what gives you the

confidence that we will see any progress between now and September? And, if you’d be willing to tell us—what can you tell us

that will give us any confidence that the final report has any prospect of being one better than what we just received?

Mr. Ambassador, you’re in a tough spot. I believe that the President’s policy, which you are being asked to execute, is based on a

fundamentally flawed premise—and, I might add, the position of

some Democrats, I think, is based on a similarly flawed premise—

and that is, if we just give the cental government time, it will

secure the support and trust of all Iraqis, that there’ll be a unity

government that can actually deliver security, services, and an

effective government.

In my judgment—and I know you know this, it’s been my judgment for well over 2 years now—there is no possibility of that happening. But that’s purely my judgment. It seems to me that there

is no trust within the government now, no trust of the government

by the people. And I don’t see any realistic possibility of a capacity

developing, on the part of the government, to be able to deliver seVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:28 Jan 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 IRAQUPDATE sforel1 PsN: sforel1
3

curity and basic services. That is, the central government. And I

see no prospect of building that trust or capacity within the ensuing several years.

I’ve been saying this for some time. I know I sound like a broken

record to my colleagues. But I really believe, unless we decentralize

this process, we’re in real trouble.

And, by the way, it’s not just me. The director of the CIA, General Mike Hayden, back in November 2006, told the Iraqi Study

Group, ‘‘The inability of the central government to govern is irreversible.’’ That was the assessment of our CIA in November of last

year. Has anything changed?

The trust—the truth is, in my view, Mr. Ambassador, Iraq cannot be governed from the center, absent a dictator or indefinite occupation. And neither of these are reasonable possibilities. Instead,

I believe we should promote a political settlement that allows the

warring factions breathing room in their own regions and control

over the fabric of their own daily lives, their own police forces, their

own laws and education, jobs, marriage, religion. And a limited

central government would be in charge of truly common concerns,

including protecting Iraq’s borders and distributing oil revenues.

None of this is an American imposition. It’s entirely consistent,

as you know, with the Constitution. Probably you and I and my colleagues are among only the few people who have ever read that

Constitution. I’ve read the Constitution, and the Constitution talks

about this country being a decentralized federal system. We continue to seem to want to centralize the federal system. I would

argue the Articles of Confederation are closer to what they wrote

than in the Constitution.

But, having said that, it seems to me we have to also initiate diplomatic offensive to bring in the United Nations, the major countries, and Iraq’s neighbors to help implement and oversee a political settlement. It is past time to make Iraq the world’s problem,

not just our own.

So, Mr. Ambassador, whether you agree with what I’m proposing

or not, the bottom line is this. Just about everyone now agrees

there is no purely military way to bring stability to Iraq. We need

a political solution. So, I want your best assessment of the prospects of a political settlement, what it would look like, and how you

think it may be achieved. I look forward to hearing your testimony.

And, again, Ryan, I want to thank you. I saw you, firsthand, under

incredible pressure in Afghanistan, and I have watched you now.

I am very—not that you need me to be proud of you—but I am very

proud we have men and women like you, of your caliber, in the

Foreign Service. I thank you for your service.

I now yield to Chairman Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Ambassador Crocker as the Senate continues to debate U.S. policy in Iraq.

The future of that policy increasingly appears to depend on the

administration’s report, due in September. Regardless of what the

report says, however, we must begin now to prepare for what

comes next.

4

It is likely that there will be changes in military missions and

force levels as the year proceeds. If U.S. military leaders, diplomats, and, indeed, the Congress are not prepared for these contingencies, they may be executed poorly, especially in an atmosphere in which public demands for troop withdrawals could compel

action on the political timetable. We need to lay the groundwork

for alternatives so that when the President and Congress move to

a new plan, it can be implemented safety and rapidly.

I am encouraged that the President has announced he is sending

Secretary of State Rice and Defense Secretary Gates to the region

to engage in concentrated diplomacy. I would observe this diplomacy must be ambitious, sustained, and innovative. It must go well

beyond conferences with allied nations. We have to consider how

diplomacy can change the equation in the region in ways that enhance our prospects for success in Iraq.

Regional diplomacy is not just an accompaniment to our efforts

in Iraq, it is the precondition for the success of any policy that follows the surge. We cannot sustain a successful policy in Iraq over

the long term unless we repair alliances, recruit more international

participation in Iraq, anticipate refugee flows, prevent regional aggression, generate new basing options, and otherwise prepare for

future developments. If we have not made substantial diplomatic

progress by the time a post-surge policy is implemented, our options will be severely constrained, and we’ll be guessing at a viable

course in a rapidly evolving environment.

I believe the most promising diplomatic approach would be to establish a consistent forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties

in the Middle East. The purpose of the forum would be to improve

transparency of national interests so that neighboring states, including Syria and Iran, would avoid missteps. It would be in the

self-interest of every nation in the region to attend such meetings,

as well as the United States, the EU representatives, or other interested parties. The existence of a predictable, regular forum in

the region would be especially important for dealing with refugee

problems, regulating borders, exploring development initiatives,

and preventing conflict between the Kurds and the Turks.

A consistent forum in the Middle East is particularly salient, because that region suffers from conspiracy theories, corruption, and

the opaque policies of nondemocratic governments. We should be

meeting with states on a constant basis and encouraging them to

meet each other as a means of achieving transparency. We should

not underestimate the degree to which the lack of transparency in

the Middle East intensifies risks of conflict and impedes solutions

to regional problems. A constant, predictable, diplomatic forum

would allow countries and groups to keep an eye on one another.

And such a forum would make armed incursions more risky for an

aggressor. It would provide a means of applying regional peer pressure against bad behavior. It would also complicate the plans of

those who would advance destructive sectarian agendas. If nations

or groups decline to attend or place conditions on their participation, their intransigence would be obvious to the other players in

the region.

We know the task of initiating even a partial military redeployment from Iraq will be an extremely complicated and dangerous

5

undertaking. I am hopeful that you, Ambassador Crocker, will shed

light today not just on prevailing conditions in Iraq, but also on

what is being done to prepare for a post-surge strategy.

I appreciate very much your making time to hear us. Thank you,

sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much.

And the floor is yours. If you—I’m sorry. Thank you very much,

and the floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, AMBASSADOR TO

IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC (VIA

VIDEO CONFERENCE FROM BAGHDAD, IRAQ)

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator

Lugar. Thank you for this somewhat unique opportunity to appear

before the committee.

I was last before you about 5 months ago for my confirmation

hearing. I believe you received the statement that was prepared in

advance. I will not take up the time of the committee reading

through that. I will make a few observations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we have.

Ambassador CROCKER. Sorry, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I said we have received your statement, and it

will be placed in the record, as if presented.

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will make a few opening observations that deal with a few of

the issues that you and Senator Lugar raised, and then look forward to questions.

I’ve been in Iraq just a little less than 4 months. As you know,

sir, I served here previously, in 2003, when I had the privilege of

meeting you out here that summer. I was here earlier for a 2-year

tour in the late 1970s, when Saddam ruled this country. Coming

back, at the end of March, I was struck by a number of things.

First, I was struck by the damage that a year and more of violence, mainly sectarian violence, had done to the city and this country, both physically, psychologically, and politically. I was conscious

that this damage, as great as it was, did not take place simply in

its own terms of reference. It followed 35 years of Saddam’s rule,

during which all forms of social and political organizations were

effectively eliminated by terror from Iraq, throwing people back on

the most basic of identities and loyalties, and inculcating a tremendous sense of fear, suspicion, and mistrust. That is the legacy from

Saddam Hussein, that Iraq, its people, and its government have to

deal with today—intensified and deepened by the sectarian violence of 2006.

So, the challenges are immense. I, in no way, minimize the difficulty that Iraq faces, and that we face in support of the Iraqis.

As a result of the surge, which, as you know, just hit its full

stride in the middle of June, about a month ago, levels of violence,

sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, have come down to a

fairly notable degree. High-profile attacks, however, continue. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices are the best known and obviously the most devastating. Three days ago, there was one in

Kirkuk that killed over 80 people. I was up in Kirkuk yesterday,

meeting with local officials and some of our own personnel in the

6

Provincial Reconstruction Team there, to get an assessment of the

kind of damage these attacks do. And they work on fault lines—

political, sectarian, psychological fault lines. And they continue.

So, this is the context, Mr. Chairman, in which the Iraqi Government and Iraqi people must deal with their present and their future. And it is not at all easy.

I certainly will not try to present the Iraqi Government to you

as a model of smoothly functioning efficiency, because it’s not. It

faces considerable difficulties. The stresses, the strains, and the

tensions throughout society are reflected in the government. And if

there is one word that I would use to sum up the atmosphere in

Iraq—on the streets, in the countryside, in the neighborhoods, and

at the national level—that word would be ‘‘fear.’’ This is the fear

with which Saddam Hussein so effectively inculcated the country,

it’s a fear that’s been intensified by the sectarian strains. For Iraq

to move forward at any level, that fear is going to have to be replaced with some level of trust and confidence. And that is what

the effort at the national level is about. That is what the benchmark process is about—national reconciliation—which is another

way of talking about some basic level of national confidence. You’ve

all seen the report. You know that Iraq has a considerable way to

go.

At this stage in the process, many of my efforts are focused on

not only the push to help the Iraqis achieve benchmarks, but to develop the processes by which the work of the government might be

carried forward, and in which confidence of those in government,

and the people around them, might be further developed.

I will give you just one example, very briefly. That is, the evolution of what the Iraqis are calling the Executive Council. This is

the Presidency Council. The Kurdish President and the two Vice

Presidents, one Shia and one Sunni, are meeting now on a regular

basis with Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Meetings are

now scheduled every Sunday morning. There is a secretariat to

help staff the four officials. There is an agenda. There are prepared

minutes of the meeting. This brings, in particular, the leader of

Iraq’s Sunni community together with the Prime Minister in a

venue where they can deal with the crises of the moment, but also,

we hope, over time, chart a way forward on achieving both the legislative benchmarks and also the spirit of reconciliation that has to

underlie them.

Mr. Chairman, both you and Senator Lugar spoke of the region,

and I would just make a few remarks in that context, and then,

if you’ll permit me, come back very briefly to address other

comments you made about levels of government below the central

authority.

As you know, Iraq exists in a tough region. It was precisely to

engage the neighbors in a constructive manner that we supported

the establishment of the neighbors forum, which, as you know, has

now met at the ministerial level, one time in Sharm el-Sheikh, at

the beginning of May, and we look forward to further such meetings. This process also established a set of working groups, one of

which has already met, the energy working group in Istanbul, at

the end of last month, and two others are now scheduled, one on

refugees, in Amman next week, and another on border security, in

7

Syria at the beginning of August. We think this process is important. We think it should be intensified, precisely as a way of, again,

bringing Iraq’s neighbors into some constructive, rather than destructive, engagement on Iraq’s present and its future.

We would welcome, Mr. Chairman, as I think both you and Senator Lugar proposed, a more active role by the United Nations.

They have done important work here in the past. We have been in

contact here with the Special Representative of the Secretary General, in contact with the United Nations in New York and in Washington, to urge them to devote the personnel and the resources to

Iraq that Iraq needs and deserves. There is a lot of good work they

have done, and can do, on issues such as refugees and elections.

And I, for one, would like to see them staffed more robustly to

carry that forward.

Finally, on the international level, there is another U.N. and

Iraqi sponsored process, with which, of course, you are very familiar: The international compact with Iraq. That, too, had a successful ministerial at Sharm el-Sheikh in May. It also has developed

followup mechanisms that bring the broad international community into engagement, primarily on Iraq’s economic agenda. I think

we need to continue to support and encourage this effort, as well,

because it does benefit the whole process in Iraq.

My final comment, sir, would be on government at different levels. As you have commented previously, we have seen some encouraging developments in Iraq over the last few months, primarily

among Sunni communities, starting in the western province of Al

Anbar, where tribal figures that had been, if not supportive of alQaeda, at least tolerant toward al-Qaeda, shift over so that they

are now supporting coalition forces, and, by extension, the Iraqi

Government. This phenomenon has spread to Abu Ghraib, just

west of the city, in parts of Baghdad itself, and to other provinces,

such as Diyala and Ninawa. I was in Ninawa yesterday, in Mosul,

learning there of overtures from Sunni tribes who had once ferociously resisted the Iraqi Security Forces, now seeking to have its

young men join both police and the Iraqi Army. So, I think, incorporating this shift, and working to further intensify it at the grassroots level, is important to the overall prospects for success in Iraq.

In my view, Mr. Chairman, Iraq needs efforts at both these levels. Central authority, itself, is not sufficient, but a total decentralization, in the Iraqi context, I think, would also be both difficult

and potentially dangerous as a prelude to nongovernance and potential chaos.

Iraq is on a course, as you suggested, that is somewhere in the

middle. The Iraqi Council of Representatives passed legislation earlier this year that provides for the establishment of regions. And,

as you know, there is a Kurdish region, the Kurdish regional government already in existence. This legislation provides the framework for that. It also permits provinces in other areas to similarly

constitute themselves as regions. That is part of federalism, in the

Iraqi context, provided for in the constitution model legislated by

the Council of Representatives. And I think this provides an effective way of dealing both with the need for a central authority in

certain key areas, but also taking into account regional aspirations

and regional capabilities.

8

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to take your

questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN CROCKER, AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ, DEPARTMENT

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is with pleasure that I appear before the committee

for the first time since my confirmation hearing in February. Last week, the President submitted to Congress an interim assessment of the Government of Iraq’s

progress toward achieving a number of political, economic, and security benchmarks.

I believe it is a fair assessment which demonstrates that while the Government

of Iraq is making some progress, there is still much to do and much room for improvement. As we approach September, I and other senior-level Embassy officials

are—on a daily basis—personally engaging with the highest levels of the Government of Iraq to make clear that progress on the benchmarks is imperative, to suggest ways forward, and to serve as honest brokers to promote compromise. At the

working level, we also maintain daily contact with members of the Iraqi Council of

Representatives, from committee heads to rank-and-file members, to monitor

progress and serve as advocates for agreement on, and passage of, key legislation.

We do much of our work discreetly. Those who would like to see our efforts fail

in the hopes of stalling forward momentum past September 15 are quick to recast

our efforts as U.S. coercion and infringements upon Iraqi sovereignty. Recently,

there were public demonstrations in Iraq’s No. 1 ‘‘oil city,’’ Basra, condemning American pressure toward passage of a hydrocarbons law. But discreet should not be confused with ineffective, and we continue to make progress.

I would like to add a general note of caution, however, about benchmarks. The

benchmarks can be a useful metric; but the longer I am here, the more I am persuaded that progress in Iraq cannot be analyzed solely in terms of these discrete,

precisely defined benchmarks because, in many cases, these benchmarks do not

serve as reliable measures of everything that is important—Iraqi attitudes toward

each other and their willingness to work toward political reconciliation.

For example, I think if the committee examines the legislative benchmarks, it is

quite possible that Iraq could achieve few of them over the coming months and yet

actually be moving in the right direction. Conversely, I think it is possible that all

the legislative benchmarks could be achieved without making any real progress toward reconciliation. Merely passing legislation without a broad consensus of all

major Iraqi communities will not meet the goals of real or lasting reconciliation.

Moreover, passing laws without the requisite consensus will undermine the political

will for implementation on the ground following enactment. The benchmarks are

useful tools if we remain focused on the broader context—the fundamental reconciliation issues facing Iraq that the benchmark legislation represents.

Furthermore, I would note that the framework of these benchmarks focuses on

the central government’s capabilities and does not capture achievements made at

the provincial level. The progress in the provinces, if properly nurtured, could be

the basis for more substantial reconciliation efforts: A grassroots effort that produces security and prosperity for the citizens of Iraq.

Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams report that local governments are taking

the initiative—meeting the basic security needs of their citizens, planning and budgeting for reconstruction projects, and taking control of their futures by resisting

al-Qaeda. It is this kind of activity that provides a level of encouragement that potential shortcomings at the national level may be offset by the affirming activities

of state and local governments. Moreover, Iraqis at the local level are seeing the results of an improved political and economic process which is critical for a broader

national reconciliation.

Realizing that local government, small business, services and employment must

play a vital part in the stabilization and sustainability of a self-governing Iraq, we

have sharply increased the number of our PRTs, and we are strengthening their

staffs. We have deployed 10 new PRTs this year and 4 more will be coming in early

September. I have to be honest and say we have not yet deployed enough people

in those teams, and we are in the process of expediting staffing efforts.

I know the committee is interested in our New Embassy Compound—a project

which has benefited from your support. Overseas Buildings Operations Director Williams has assured us, as well as the Congress, that the NEC is on schedule and

on budget for completion in September. We seek to move personnel into the safer

9

NEC quarters as quickly as possible following installation of the necessary communications, logistical and other support services.

I look forward to your questions and thoughts.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will start this with 10-minute rounds. And if we run—begin

to run out of time, we will alter it, but we should be able to do the

2 hours, here.

Let me begin by asking you, Mr. Ambassador—the Iraqi Constitution—I can’t remember now, I think it’s section 115 or 116—

talks about the establishment of regions, and it’s what I’ve been

talking about for some time. Is it not true that, under the Iraqi

Constitution, any region that decides—of 18 governorates—any one

or more that choose to be a single—one governate can become a region, or they can combine with two, three, five, like they have in

the Kurdish area—to become a region. Once you are—declare that,

by a majority vote, is it not true that that region writes its own

constitution?

Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. That is my

understanding. That is what the Kurdish region has done.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is available to the other governorates,

as well, correct?

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. The region’s law, passed by the

Council of Representatives, implements that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, second, one of the things that, if you

conclude that you are going to be a region—and I read article 115,

‘‘The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, region, and governates, and local administration.’’

And section 116 goes and lays out and talks about the Kurdish region, and then 117 talks about this Council of Representatives can

enact a way—a timeframe in which people become a region. And

then it goes on to point out, in article 119 and 120, that if you

choose to be a region, you can have control over your, quote, own

security—your own security—like they do in the Kurdish area.

There is no Iraqi Army, absent the Kurdish permission to move

into there; they have their own local security. Is that not correct?

Ambassador CROCKER. That is largely correct; yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, next question I have is that you point out—

which I and the—Chairman Lugar have been talking about from

slightly different perspectives for 5 years now, or 4 years now—this

is a tribal society. There is no trust. As you’ve pointed out from the

outset of your comments, that as a consequence of Saddam’s tyrannical rule, that, in order to—you have gone back—they’ve gone

back to basics, from the family unit to the tribal unit, to generate

enough security and trust among themselves. That’s what this tyranny imposed upon Iraq.

And now we’re in a situation where, as I see it—this is the question—is it not true that, even in the Sunni areas, there is no

Sunni—or in the Shia areas, no Shia—overall unity? They are broken down into tribal and competing units within the Shia area, as

we speak. Is that not true?

Ambassador CROCKER. Iraq, Mr. Chairman, presents a very complex picture. Iraq does have a strong tribal element in its society,

but, in my experience here, both now and previously, I would not

10

characterize all of Iraqi society as tribal. There is also a very rich

urban society of long standing, certainly in Baghdad, but also in

other regional centers, such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Al Basrah.

And, indeed, at a political level, while there are political movements that may be largely tribally based, there are also others that

are very much crosscutting. The Iraqi Islamic Party, for example,

the largest Sunni party in the coalition, is, to a large degree, an

urban phenomenon, a middle-class urban phenomenon, of long

standing. So, yes, tribal society is very important in understanding

and dealing with Iraqi politics, but it’s much more than that.

The CHAIRMAN. I——

Ambassador CROCKER. You are absolutely right, sir——

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, I’m sorry.

Ambassador CROCKER. You’re absolutely right, sir, in my view, to

emphasize the element of fear, because that has permeated all

echelons of the society in this country, whether it’s rural or urban,

tribal or cosmopolitan. And that has to be overcome, in my view,

Mr. Chairman. Whatever models the Iraqis choose, I would be concerned that none of them are going to work in the interest of Iraq’s

long-term security and stability, unless and until Iraqis, at various

levels—local, provincial, regional, and national—are able to work

through the fear that has been imposed on them into, and toward,

a level of trust that at least permits basic compromises to take

place and a new society to begin to build.

The CHAIRMAN. In the interest of time, if I could interrupt you

to get to a couple more questions, if I may—and I don’t disagree

what you’ve said—with what you’ve said. But the bottom line here

is that almost 4 million Iraqis, many of them in that middle class

from those urban areas, have either fled internally within Iraq or

left the country. As I understand it, it’s close to 1.9 million displaced in the country, 2 million have left the country. I think we’re

kidding ourselves if we think you can, from the center—from the

center—build a system that eliminates the fear in the provinces, in

the—outside the urban areas. And I have been very disturbed that

this administration’s failure to push for the ability of this constitution to take form has, in my view, led to this continued over-reliance on the idea that Maliki, or anyone else, no matter how well

intended, representing elements of Sunni, Shia, and Kurd, would

be able to, from the center, eliminate this fear.

Now, let me get to my next point. I believe there is no possibility

we will have 160,000 troops in Iraq, a year from now. It’s just not

going to be the case. So, time is running out in a big way. And so,

unless we do something, in my humble opinion, like we did in the

Balkans, which you’re very familiar with, which is set up a loosely

federated system—we’ve had 20,000, on average, troops there—

Western troops there—for 10 years. Not one has been killed, thank

God. It’s not a answer to everything. But the genocide is stopped,

and they’re becoming part of Europe. To think that we can accomplish reconciliation from the center, I find to be well beyond any

reasonable expectation.

And let me get to my last question. You say that the benchmarks—in your statement—are not a reliable measure. Then, what

is the measure of whether or not political process and reconciliation

is taking place? And I would add, the very progress you show in

11

Anbar province is the very thing having Shia leaders call me here

in Washington, saying we’re picking sides, that we are aiding and

abetting the Sunnis in a civil war. I’m not suggesting that’s right

or wrong. I’m relaying the fear, the idea that we are making

progress in the provinces, relative to al-Qaeda, I would respectfully

suggest, is making it harder for you to deal with the Shia, generally, in accommodating a real political reconciliation.

But what are the benchmarks—not benchmarks—what are the

objective criteria we should be looking at to determine whether or

not Iraqi attitudes toward each other, and the willingness to work

together at reconciliation, is happening?

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, if I might start with your

last point, what’s going on in Al Anbar——

[Video call disconnected.]

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know what all this means, folks, but hang

on. Stay tuned. The one thing we don’t want to be looking at is a

picture of me, the one thing I don’t want to be looking at.

Bertie, what’s the story, do you know? I know—they’re checking

it out. I’m sorry. We’re going to have a—thank you. We’d—our staff

is on the phone with the technology experts trying to fix this. We

may—we may be getting back up quickly here. We’ll see.

Do we still—do we still have—Ambassador Crocker, can you hear

me? Because even if we don’t have visual, we—if we have audio—

I’m told we may still have audio. Is that—no, we don’t have audio.

Hang on a second, here.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. If we’ll come to order, we’re going to try this with

just the audio. I don’t know whether or not, and, Mr. Ambassador,

you can hear us. Can you?

Ambassador CROCKER. Hello. Go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, we’ve lost the video, but if—

Mr. Ambassador, can you hear us?

Ambassador CROCKER. Hello, can you hear us on the other end,

please?

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that speaking? Which end is up, here?

Are we being asked if we can hear?

We can hear you. So, Mr. Ambassador, just proceed with your

comments. We went blank, and we lost you after I finished my

questions. Would you proceed from there? The floor is yours, Mr.

Ambassador, if you can hear me.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, my microphone is off. I’m going to yield 10

minutes to the Senator, and then, I hate to say this to the rest of

you, but we’re going to cut back the time from 10 minutes to 5 minutes, to make sure everybody gets in. It’s—I apologize.

If we have time—I’m told the Ambassador had, from beginning

to end, a little over 2 hours—so, if we have time after that, we’ll

come back to—not to the chairman and I, but we’ll come back to

all of you who have gotten cut out, here—your time cut out. But,

in order to get everybody in, I think it’s going to—realistically, I’m

told, we’ll have to go closer to 5 minutes, assuming we get this connection at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Baghdad, can you hear the U.S. Senate?

Senator BOXER. That’s the problem. [Laughter.]

12

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say it another way—Ambassador Crocker, can you hear Joe Biden? No; they obviously can’t hear.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. We’re going to recess for somewhere between 3

and 5 minutes to see if we can set this up, and we’ll come back

and figure out where we go.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. We’re going to

the old tried-and-true method of a speakerphone. So, I’m going to

put my microphone down here. And, Ambassador Crocker, if you

can pick up where we left off, the floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Your question is a good one, because I think it brings into play

several of the issues we’ve been discussing. You mentioned the concerns that had been expressed to you by Shia acquaintances over

the impact of the Sunni outreach effort on their interests. And I

think this illustrates why there needs to be a linkage between what

happens in the provinces and the center.

What we have done here, in close coordination with the Iraqi

Government, was to establish, first, between General Petraeus and

myself, a special section in the Multinational Force and the Embassy—it’s cochaired by a Foreign Service officer and a British

major general—to deal with engagement issues.

Now, they work very closely with an Engagement Committee

that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has established through his office, and it is through this process that we deal, on the federal

level—the central level, with the steps we’re taking at the local

level. And this has worked, in the case of Al Anbar, quite well,

where the tribes that had a desire to get into the fight against alQaeda have been formed into provisional police units that have

been vetted through the Iraqi Central Government, and who are

paid by the Iraqi Central Government.

So, I think this is the direction in which we wish to work. If we

were to do this at a completely local level, without centralized connection, I think the phenomenon that you allude to there would

very quickly overtake the process, fears and concerns that whatever was going on in one area was somehow deeply inimical to the

interests of another. So, this way to connect what happens regionally and provincially to the center, I think, is very important as we

move forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador, thank you very much.

When are regional elections going to take place? When are the

governorates able to vote, if they wish to, to become a region? What

date does that begin to occur? When does the law that was passed

8 months ago or so take effect?

Ambassador CROCKER. My recollection, sir, is that the effective

date for the establishment of the regions is April 2008. That would

be—that would be the time after which new regions could be established, according to the law.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I’m now turning it over to Senator Lugar. We’ve also got a picture back.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Ambassador, are you aware of—or are you

a part of any planning being done with respect to a transition in

13

mission or redeployment of United States combat forces, something

that might called plan B? Now, I ask this, because I understand,

from widely reported press coverage, that back before the invasion

in 2003, such integrated interagency planning, was being retarded

by high-level political pressures and, therefore, had been abandoned. And I would simply want to know is any planning—and

then, more importantly, are you or the State Department involved

in interagency planning with regard to a so-called plan B?

Ambassador CROCKER. In terms of the future planning, Senator

Lugar—I am fully engaged, as is General Petraeus, in trying to implement the President’s strategy that was announced in January.

And from this vantage point, I can’t speak to the interagency process. If there are advantages to being in Baghdad, it’s having to deal

with things in the Iraqi context and letting the interagency take

care of itself. But the short answer is, I’m not aware of these

efforts, and my whole focus is involved with the implementation of

plan A.

Senator LUGAR. Well, apparently you’re not involved, at least

you’ve testified that you’re simply dealing with affairs as they are

there. So, let me ask you, then, directly: What is the most significant concern that you have about a potential redeployment of

United States Forces in Iraq?

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator Lugar, there are several aspects

of that that are of concern to me. Broadly speaking, they involve

the potential impact on the people of Iraq and the potential opportunity for the adversaries of the United States and of what we are

attempting to help the Iraqis do.

On the first point, I’ve had the opportunity, since I’ve been here,

to get out into the neighborhoods of Baghdad, including those that

have been severely affected by sectarian violence. And I’ve had the

chance to talk to the people in those neighborhoods. And I hear the

same things fairly consistently. One is that, by and large, the Iraqi

people have some confidence in the Iraqi Army forces—not full

confidence, concerns over their strength and their abilities still untested in the views of many Iraqis—but basically a positive attitude

toward them. But that is accompanied by, again, a fairly consistent

message: ‘‘You just got here. There is some return to normal life

because U.S. forces are here. Stay long enough to keep these areas

secure so they don’t spiral immediately back down into the violence

they’ve just been pulled out of over the last couple of months because of this surge.’’

And I would be concerned, particularly in the very demographically complex area that is Baghdad, still—in spite of all the separation that has occurred—still a mixed city, in communal terms, that

nonconditions-based withdrawals could lead to a sharp spike in

the—precisely the sectarian violence among the population that the

surge was intended to diminish, and which it has diminished.

The other area, sir, where I would be quite concerned is the

space that this could give to our adversaries. And I would mention

just two in this connection. One, obviously, is al-Qaeda, where, as

you know from statements from the Department of Defense and the

Multi-National Force, we have had some significant successes

against al-Qaeda elements. And, clearly, the current campaign

south of Baghdad and Diyala is affecting al-Qaeda in a fairly major

14

way. They continue to direct attacks. I believe that the Kirkuk

bombing of 3 days ago was—has all the hallmarks of an al-Qaeda

terrorist attack. Clearly, if a nonconditions-based set of withdrawals produces more violence among Iraqis, it also creates a

climate in which al-Qaeda will find a comfortable operating environment. And that clearly is not in our interest.

It could also establish conditions in which Iran would find further room to operate. We’ve already seen, as you’re aware, sir, the

indications of Iranian involvement through the Quds Force and

through proxies, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as elements

of the Jaysh al-Mahdi. In a scenario in which, again, central authority was unable to hold and violence increases throughout the

country, that would provide more running room for Iran and its

supporters, as something else that was not in our strategic national

interest.

So, those two points are the most important to me.

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador, you have mentioned al-Qaeda activities in Kirkuk; likewise, Iranian activities which are sometimes

alleged all over the country. General Petraeus has about 28,500

forces involved in the surge. His own work, out at Fort Leavenworth, would indicate a formula that maybe 250,000 would be required to cover the country of Iraq. My question, I suppose, simply,

is: How can the surge be successful with 28,500? And, specifically,

what does happen in all the rest of Iraq that is not Baghdad,

Diyala, Anbar, or one of those areas where we have not increased

the forces dedicated to population security or combating opposition

elements?

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, if—it’s a complex question. In some

areas, we’ve seen some significant improvements. One of them, obviously, is Al Anbar. Another is the northern province of Ninawa.

I was there, yesterday, talking to both our Provincial Reconstruction Team members and members of the Multi-National Forces. Because of an improvement of conditions—in Mosul, in particular,

and Ninawa, generally—General Petraeus has been able to redeploy forces from that area, elsewhere.

So, I think this is a process and a situation that’s going to require a lot of hard analysis and agility on our part, in coordination

with the Iraqi Government, at both national and provincial levels,

to determine where their forces are gaining the confidence, the experience, and the trust of communities to be able to hold, without

us present in large force, and where conditions have simply moved

in a direction that supports these kinds of shifts.

But, clearly, as we look at Iraq now, we’re not looking at a situation where, even under current circumstances, we need to be everywhere at once. We don’t. We just have to be smart enough to be

in the places where it counts.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry. We’re going to 5-minute rounds,

and—in light of the delay. That’s what we’re doing. It’s the prerogative of—I gave the Senator 10, but we’re—all started off at 10,

John, but we’ve run out of time. We’re going to have votes at 12

o’clock.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. It’s good to see you

for the second time today. I was your next questioner, over at the

15

Pentagon a little while ago, and we got interrupted there, so I’m

glad to be able to pick up here. And I will separate, certainly, what

was appropriate to that briefing to this one.

When I chaired your—nominated—your confirmation hearing,

you said, at that time, that you believed, as the President and the

Vice President and the Secretary of State and all of our generals

said, that there is no military solution, there is only a political solution. Do you still believe that?

Ambassador CROCKER. Absolutely, sir, no question.

Senator KERRY. And so, what we’ve achieved, militarily in the

last days, would have to be described as tactical successes. Is that

not correct?

Ambassador CROCKER. I think that is a very accurate description.

Senator KERRY. And one of those tactical successes in Al Anbar,

which has been much referred to, publicly and otherwise, is that

the tribal chiefs have joined with us in an effort to try to deal with

al-Qaeda; correct?

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. But they are, essentially, in Al Anbar, almost exclusively Sunni who are acting to protect their own interests, because al-Qaeda was killing their villagers and their sons and

daughters, raping them, correct? So, the Al Anbar success has to

be separated from the fundamental conflict of Shia and Sunni, the

fundamental civil strife that our troops are caught in the middle

of in other parts of the country, particularly Baghdad and its surrounding area. Is that correct?

Ambassador CROCKER. There, I’d make a slight distinction, which

is to say that each part of this country has to be understood and

dealt with in its own terms. Al Anbar, as you correctly point out,

is almost entirely Sunni and almost entirely tribal. A province like

Diyala has a mixed population, both Sunni and Shia.

Senator KERRY. Correct.

Ambassador CROCKER. And that has to be taken into account.

But in Diyala we have seen a similar phenomenon, where significant elements of a population that has been hostile to us are now

prepared to work with us. It’s more complex, because we’ve got to

be very careful that this is managed in a way that does create or

renew sectarian tensions. But the same desire to say, ‘‘We don’t

want to have these guys anywhere near us,’’ is at play in Diyala

and other provinces.

Senator KERRY. Well, let me follow up on that, because the

stated purpose, by the President, of the escalation of our forces—

on a temporary basis, I emphasize, and he did—was to provide the

breathing space for the leadership of Iraq to make fundamental political decisions; i.e., compromise. The Al Anbar—separating Al

Anbar there, because of its, sort of, uniqueness, there’s been almost

zero political compromise whatsoever on any of the major benchmarks and fundamentals. And your testimony earlier today was

that, essentially, you think the benchmarks aren’t as important as

the process itself. So, in a way, the goal posts are now moving a

little bit.

And my question to you is: If there is no military solution, and

the process is important, but the fundamental conflict and killing

16

is taking place because the stakeholders are battling between each

other for the future of Iraq, essentially, and for their status in it.

If there is no political settlement, how can the process become more

important? In the absence of that political settlement, our troops

are going to remain in the same trap they’re in today, with, as Senator Lugar said, inadequate people to do the job, and the ability of

al-Qaeda and others to use our presence to continue to be the magnet for terrorism and for jihadists and for naysayers and opponents

and so forth. So, where do we go, in looking for that political compromise, if you’re moving the goal posts, at this point in time? And

what are—what is—what do Americans have to look forward to, in

terms of a real resolution, since there can only be a political settlement of this conflict?

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator Kerry, I’ll repeat to you here

what I believe I said when you chaired my confirmation hearing,

which is: As long as it’s my privilege to serve as the American Ambassador to Iraq, I will give you and the American people my best

assessment as to what ground truth and ground reality looks like.

So, I’m certainly not moving any goal posts. What is the case is I’ve

been here now for about 4 months, I’ve had time to get in on the

ground, to spend as much time as I can outside the Green Zone,

to try to understand the complexity of what is going on here. And

what that tells me is there are a lot of processes at work—some

of them positive, some of them negative. A positive process is the

one that we have seen in Al Anbar. We didn’t create that. The central government didn’t create it. It started among Anbaris. I think

we have done the right thing, in coordination with the central government, to try to develop and strengthen that process and ensure

that it is linked to the central government to avoid the kinds of

suspicions that Chairman Biden mentioned a little bit ago.

Now, that is a phenomenon that, when I appeared before you in

February, we could not have begun to foresee or predict. But it has

developed, and it’s developed in a fairly positive way. These are the

kinds of things I think we’ve got to have the agility and the imagination and the people on the ground, both military and civilian, in

the form of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Al Anbar, to

identify and then take advantage——

Senator KERRY. Right, but I’m not talking about Al Anbar, Ambassador. I’m trying to direct your attention to the rest of the fundamental conflict that is different from an Al Anbar. I mean, Al

Anbar is not the model for the resolution of the Muqtada al-Sadr

problem, who is modeling, now, his organizational effort on Hamas

and Hezbollah. It’s not the model for the resolution of the militia

conflict between Shia and Sunni, et cetera, nor even the jockeying

of political players between the rejectionists in the Sunni population and the Shia, who have different interests. So, I’m really trying to focus you on that.

Ambassador CROCKER. I agree, Sir; Al Anbar is Al Anbar. But,

you know, there are similar phenomena repeated around the country. At the national level, the process I referred to was the effort

that the four senior officials in this country are exerting to come

together in an established, regularized forum to deal with differences among them—the Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds. That has, in

the—at the national level, those who need to come to terms on a

17

national basis. So, that’s one process. What’s going on in Diyala is

another process. What’s happening in the south—and the south,

too, is not a monolith. You know, very different conditions, as you

rightly suggest. What does Muqtada al-Sadr intend? And how are

parties of a different persuasion, and the government itself, dealing

with that particular challenge? And how can we help? In the south,

Jaysh al-Mahdi has received several significant setbacks in places

like An Nasiriyah and Ad Diwaniyah—in part, through coalition

intervention, but also through Iraqi Security Forces standing up

and dealing with that particular challenge.

So, again, I am not trying to gild any lilies here, and I’m certainly not trying to oversimplify a highly complex process, but

there are opportunities in that complexity. We just have to be, I

think, aware enough and quick enough to see them and turn them

to the advantage of the Iraqi Government and people.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. My time is up, and

I need to go vote in Finance. But we’re grateful to you—and I

didn’t have a chance to extent that to General Petraeus—but we’re

grateful to you, and all of the people serving over there, for what

you’re doing for your country. And we want you to be safe.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Ambassador Crocker, I would—like all my colleagues here in the Congress, add my thanks to you and your colleagues who are serving in Iraq. We are grateful for that service.

We may have differences of opinion on policy, but we acknowledge

your service, and all of your colleagues’ service, and we are grateful

for that service.

I have, as all my colleagues do, limited time, and I wanted to

begin with acknowledging what the State Department noted this

week, in that our Government would be engaging Iran once again.

And if we have time to get to that, I would like a brief comment

on that, as to—When will that occur? And where will that occur?

What do we hope to accomplish?

But let’s stay focused, for the present time, on the questioning

here this morning.

One of the points that you made, Ambassador, when you opened

this conference, a statement—and I’m paraphrasing, but I believe

it’s pretty accurate—you said, after a year away from Iraq, you

were struck by the damage that had been done in Iraq mainly by

sectarian violence. Now, that is, in some conflict with a number of

senior administration officials—in fact, including the President,

who has said, over and over, that Iraq is the forefront, the battleground, against al-Qaeda, that al-Qaeda is the central element of

violence and destabilization in Iraq. Now, of course, our National

Intelligence Estimates of our 16 intelligence agencies have said

that that’s not true, either. But I lay that out as a preface to a couple of questions that I have coming your way.

Senator Lugar made an interesting observation, and he’s correct

in this, as Senator Lugar normally is correct on these things, and

that is that the counterinsurgency manual, that General Petraeus

actually wrote, lays out a formula for force structure, essentially

matching the force structure with the mission. And, unfortunately,

we have put our troops in a situation where they are woefully overVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:28 Jan 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 IRAQUPDATE sforel1 PsN: sforel1
18

matched with a mission, because they do not have even near the

numbers of troops that General Petraeus actually, himself, wrote

in his counterinsurgency manual, in order to do the job. So, we’re

putting our troops in a terrible position, overburdening them with

an almost impossible task.

And I noted—and I would like you to respond to this question

and a second question—that the Prime Minister of Iraq said, this

week, that—I’m paraphrasing again—that Iraq was capable and

ready to take over the security responsibilities of Iraq at any time,

I believe he said. In light of what you have just told us, the last

hour, that it seems to me, at least your interpretation, is in some

conflict with what the Prime Minister’s analysis of his own forces

are—and that’s one question, Ambassador, I’d like you—to have

you respond to.

The second is, we hear an awful lot about—and you have said

it—we have to buy time. We have to buy time. We need more time.

We understand that. But here are the set of questions. We buy

time for what? For a political reconciliation process that is not occurring, that is not working. There’s not even a political accommodation as the prelude to political reconciliation that we’re making

progress on. We talked about some of the successes in Iraq, and we

have had some. I was there, as you know—appreciated your time—

6 weeks ago. You just mentioned the south. I had two very informed individuals, who you met with, who were over there for a

few days last week, tell me that those four southern provinces are

gone, that the Shia militia are in charge. Now, I don’t know that’s

an overstatement or not, but you might want to comment on that.

So, I’m a bit puzzled, because if, in fact, we’re buying time, I

think the question needs to be addressed, We’re buying time for

what? How long is enough time? We’re in our fifth year, and we

still see no political reconciliation occurring. Actually, I think we’re

going backward. So, if you could focus on those two questions that

I’ve noted—one, buying time, for how long, and for what; and, second, your comment on the Prime Minister’s statement this week

that the Iraqi forces are ready and prepared to take responsibility

for security in Iraq at any time.

And, thank you.

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Buying time for what, and how much time do we have to buy,

is a critical question. And, again, not to key up—not to steal your

time, but the answer is complex, because this is a complex situation.

You mentioned the south. Al Basrah, Iraq’s second-largest city,

and the provincial center for most of Iraq’s oil resources, has been

very, very unstable, with a high level of militia activity. What the

Iraqi Government has done over the last few weeks is to take a

couple of tested commanders—one army, one police—and send

them down to Al Basrah with the instruction to get the city under

control. It is a tall order, but these are officers who, by all accounts, have the background and capability to do this sort of thing.

Now, I’ve talked to them both, and they’re looking for resources.

They both need more forces than they’ve got—forces that would

normally be assigned down to Al Basrah are up—Iraqi forces—are

up as part of the Baghdad security plan. So, they’re working out

19

their own plan for Al Basrah. They’ve got to resource it, and then

they’ve got to implement it.

It’s going to be hard. It’ll take time. I can’t predict to you what

the outcome will be. But here we have a case of a government recognizing it’s got a militia problem in its second-largest city, and

taking some steps to deal with it, and I find that encouraging, as

far as it goes.

Elsewhere, again, the situation is intensely complicated in some

of Baghdad’s neighborhoods, where the introduction of our forces

has made a huge difference. And I’ve seen it for myself, in places

like West Rashid, which, just at the time you were here, sir, was

a place where neither one of us would have wanted to set foot in—

well, you can do that now. I did it on Saturday. And you can do

it, because our forces are there. They can’t stay there forever. I

mean, that much is clear. But I certainly hope that they can stay

there long enough for Iraqi Security Forces to be available in the

numbers and with the training and the equipment and the reliability to do that job of protecting the Iraqi people themselves. So,

that would be another instance of buying time.

The third point, sir, is, I think, the national point. How much

time is necessary for an Iraqi Central Government to effectively

function as one? As you know—you were just out here—they are

having, you know, significant difficulties. I—as I said, I’ve been encouraged that they are able at least to come together and thrash

out these difficulties, face to face. They are going to need more

time, because, again, in the climate that has been created, Saddam

plus the sectarian violence, it’s pretty hard to make sweeping compromises, even if you, as a leader, are so inclined, because you have

got a constituency out there that is very badly scarred and very

badly afraid of what the consequences of those kinds of compromises can be.

So, there’s got to be time to build, again, that minimum level of

trust that will let this country move forward.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I just want to raise a note of caution about this discussion

about Anbar province. The first, of course, is the one that Senator

Kerry so effectively raised, is the applicability of the lessons, Ambassador, of Anbar to other parts of Iraq. That’s a very serious

question which we have to address. The second is, I’m not so sure

about Anbar itself. We have been subjected to so much hype in the

course of this war that I would just urge you and the administration and my colleagues to not be so sure that everything will continue to be rosy in that region. The fact is that when I was in

Fallujah—Camp Fallujah in 2005, there was a very rosy scenario

presented after the battle of Fallujah. A year later, when I was in

the same place, it didn’t sound so good. Now, in 2007, it sounds

better.

But for people to start suggesting that this is somehow a result

the surge or somehow, simply because they’re now on our side,

they’re our buddies now, I think we’ve heard enough things in this

war, I would caution my colleagues.

20

I hope it is true. I hope those are the long-term consequences for

that region. But I think once al-Qaeda is, in some way, minimized,

our presence there may become the greatest focus of the Sunnis,

who do not like it that we are there. So, I would urge everyone to

not be so sure that Al Anbar is taken care of, any more than

Basrah was taken care of when everybody thought that was done,

or Hillah province, where I was taken, because that’s a safe place.

The fact is, these places come and go. And if we are so naive as

to think that, sort of, we’re done with a place, we haven’t learned

the lessons that caused us to make the mistake in the first place,

of invading a civilization that, frankly, is extremely complex. That

applies to Anbar, as well.

On a different matter, Ambassador, the interim assessment report, released last week, states, ‘‘Left on their own, many ISF units

still tend to gravitate to old habits of sectarianism when applying

the law.’’ Indeed, there have been reports in a number of media

outlets, of ISF complicity in attacks on U.S. forces. Can you discuss

with us the extent to which members of the ISF are participating

in sectarian violence?

Ambassador CROCKER. As the report notes, there are problems of

sectarianism within the Iraqi Security Forces, primarily in the

Iraqi police, and especially the Iraqi national police, less so, as far

as I can determine, in the Iraqi Army, although it does exist there,

too.

This is a major problem, Senator. And, again, one sees it in different parts of Baghdad. I have discussed, before, the sense I get

from people out there, that they’re really counting on U.S. forces.

They’re the ones who secure a particular neighborhood. They feel

that their army is—has got the right orientation and intention,

they’re less sure of the capabilities.

When one asks about the police, a lot of people I’ve talked to, and

our colleagues have talked to, have very serious concerns, because

they have been involved in sectarian violence themselves. This is

something that the Iraqi Government is aware of. It has taken

some actions. Clearly, it’s going to have to take more actions if

there is to be an Iraqi police that truly is involved in the protection

of its—of the Iraqi people, and is perceived as such by those people.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, what sort of action——

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, I’d just make one comment on Al

Anbar. Sorry.

Senator FEINGOLD. Go ahead. Well, I was just going to ask, what

actions have been taken——

Ambassador CROCKER. I wanted to make one——

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m sorry.

Ambassador CROCKER. There have been arrests of police officers—some senior, some junior. Whole units have gone back in for

retraining. There are efforts now to monitor the performance and

the orientation, the actions, of police units. But, again, I would not

want to suggest that this is a problem that, by any means, has

been fixed. It is a problem, and it’s going to need a lot more applied

attention.

Senator FEINGOLD. And, please, your comment on Anbar.

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. I certainly wouldn’t want you, or

any of the other members, to think that I was going beyond the

21

current situation in Al Anbar to predict a rosy future for Al Anbar

or anywhere else. I, too, have seen these evolutions. Al Anbar is in

a pretty good place right now. And I think the challenge that the

Iraqi Government has, and we, by extension, have in support of the

Iraqi Government, is to try to solidify that. And I think the best

way that can be done is to try to establish linkages between the

Anbaris who have signed up for duty and the central government,

so they feel that they are a part of the system, they’re getting a

regular wage, they’ve got a better future for themselves, and prospects of a better future for their kids.

Does that mean it’s all going to come right from Al Anbar? Sir,

I have no idea. But I think what we have to do is try to work a

pretty positive development now, which, as you point out, we didn’t

create—that happened. We need to try to develop it in a way that

is sustainable.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you. Thank you for your service. And I

appreciate your reflections of the complexity of what we’re dealing

with in Iraq in various regions.

I just have to make one note of—about Anbar, because I would

hope that the public would understand that, you know, this is not

about hype, and this is not something coming from the administration sending a message. I think you’re right about the complexity,

about trying to establish linkages so that there’s long-term success.

But, when I was in Anbar, in late April of this year, we had troops

there from Minnesota National Guard. They’re—two of the 136th

Combined Arms Battalion. And they told me the story of a bombing

in Habiniyah, in which 80 Iraqis were either killed or wounded,

and it was our troops that were then giving blood. There were no

American casualties. And they told me the story of, the next day,

the local sheikh and the mayor coming in and identifying al-Qaeda

operatives and saying, ‘‘We want to work with you,’’ and—you

know, so they were telling me that, for them, it was a turnaround.

It had been the Wild West 6 months ago. And I think the challenge

is long term. And I think it’s fair commentary of my colleague from

Wisconsin. But, clearly, the success is real. And if that can become

a model to beyond Anbar, I think we’d all be well served. But I appreciate your understanding that we have to have linkages, long

term.

And, if I can, just one other comment for my colleague from Nebraska. And I’m sure he wasn’t intending this, but I almost got a

sense from his—the preface to his question, that somehow discounting the al-Qaeda threat and that sectarian violence is the key

to, you know, all the fear and everything we’re dealing with in

Iraq. And I’m sure that’s not the case. If anything, from what I

heard from you this morning and today, what al-Qaeda does is, as

you said, operates on the fault line, and that their attacks are intended to—is it correct that their attacks are intended to exacerbate the sectarian violence? Is that part of their plan? Is that part

of what you’re seeing?

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir; that is certainly my assessment.

In the 4 months I’ve been here, I have seen attacks from al-Qaeda

22

that have been aimed at virtually every community in Iraq. They

have targeted Sunnis, they have targeted Shia, they have targeted

Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, and they have targeted coalition forces, as

well as the symbols of the Muslim faith. Al-Qaeda was the entity

that attacked the Baghdad bridges, bringing one main bridge down,

and damaging others. And it was an al-Qaeda operative who got

into the Council of Representatives and detonated his suicide vest

there as a symbolic strike at an institution of the new state.

So, they are working, I think, every avenue of attack they possibly can, in a very bloody fashion. And, again, I certainly don’t intend to paint a rosy picture out of something that brutal. I think

it is worth noting that, thus far, they have had fairly limited success, as far as I can see, in actually reigniting that sectarian violence.

Senator COLEMAN. Let me talk about, if I can—again, in the time

that I have, Ambassador—just about shutting down Anbar and

moving to the diplomatic side.

One thing that frustrates me is that, for the neighbors in the region, for—you know, for Mubarak, in Egypt, al-Qaeda is a threat

to him; Iran and the extremists that they support are a threat to

him; the same thing with Abdullah, in Jordan; the same thing with

the House of Saud. The threats to their existence are al-Qaeda and

the forces they support, as well as the extremists that the Iranians

support.

What is it that—and you’ve—we also know, and as you indicated

earlier, a lot of the flow of foreign fighters come from these countries, and they come through Syria into Iraq. So, it’s a two-part

question, because I know Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice will

be going into the region—what is it that our allies, our friends, who

are equally endangered by the strength of an al-Qaeda and the

strengths of Iran—what is it that they’re not doing that they can

do? What is it that we have to do to get them to be more involved?

And then, the third part of that is, can they be helpful in shutting

off the flow of al-Qaeda and these, you know, terrorists, coming in

through Syria? Is there something that they can be doing, they’re

not doing? And what is it that we have to get their—how do we

make that happen?

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, sitting, as I am, in Baghdad, my

perspective on that broad regional question is a little bit limited,

but it is clearly something that is very important to us here. I may

not have full visibility on everything that’s being done, but I would

point to a couple of things.

One is the neighbors conference mechanism that I mentioned.

This is an opportunity to get all of Iraq’s neighbors engaged on

issues like border security. And a working group on border security

will be convening at the beginning of August in Damascus, which

is a pretty good place to do it, given the involvement of Syria in

the flow-through of foreign fighters.

It’s an opportunity to impress again, just the points you made,

that the enemy we’re fighting in Iraq—al-Qaeda—aims at the overthrow of each one of those regimes, and they have all suffered

losses among their citizens from al-Qaeda attacks. So, they have

got common cause here, and they need to move forward in that

way.

23

I know we’ve had discussions in regional capitals about the importance of these governments, given this is a common enemy, of

taking every step they can to ensure that their young men don’t

make this particular trip up to Damascus and then across into

Iraq. I think we’re just going to have to keep at them, both collectively, in a regional context, through regional diplomacy, and bilaterally.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for

your leadership on continuing to push for a political solution, which

I think makes eminent sense.

And, before Senator Hagel leaves, I really have a rhetorical question I’m going to ask, which doesn’t require an answer. It’s really

a way of expressing my own frustration.

As Senator Hagel has pointed out—and, I think, very

straightforwardly—here you have an Iraqi leader who says to the

Americans, ‘‘You can go home now. We’re fine. Don’t stay here on

our account.’’ So, I guess the question—the rhetorical question I

have is: How many Americans have to die while we’re buying time

for an Iraqi Government whose leader says we don’t need to be

there?

And so, to answer my own question—it’s not a single one should

have to die for that.

And, no—and I hope the people in the audience will not respond

to this, one way or the other. The point is, there’s a deep feeling

of frustration and outrage in this country as we keep on pouring

dollar after dollar, and life after life, into a place where the people

say they don’t really want us there.

Now, al-Qaeda is a serious problem, sir. And, by the way, thank

you so much for your sacrifice and what you’re doing for your country. I can’t thank you enough for it. But the bottom line is, 53 Senators, a majority of the Senate, voted to change this mission, because we know al-Qaeda’s there. They’re 15 percent of the problem,

according to the Bush administration. And we’re saying, ‘‘Get our

troops out of the middle of a civil war, where 85 percent of the

problem is coming from. And, yes, redeploy them out, so they can

be a force to act quickly to go after al-Qaeda.’’

And I just have another question, a real question for you, that

deals with one of the comments that you made, and that is that

you, kind of, put aside the benchmarks, really, basically didn’t

think they were important. As a matter of fact, this past Saturday,

sir, you said, ‘‘I think electricity is more important to the average

Iraqi than all 18 benchmarks rolled into one.’’

So, I decided to look at what’s happening on the electricity front.

May 16, for the week of May 9–15—and this is State Department

report—national electricity supply was 2 percent below the period

in 2006. May 23, national electricity supply was 11 percent below

the same period in 2006. May 30, national electricity supply was

7 percent below the same period in 2006. June 6, below the same

period in 2006 by 3 percent. June 13, 8 percent below the same period in 2006. June 20, it was unchanged from the same period.

24

June 27, 7 percent below. June—July 4, 6 percent below. July 11,

4 percent below.

So, I don’t understand, if you’re trying to tell us how much

progress is being made here, and you dismiss the benchmarks, and

then you tell us electricity—aren’t we failing there, as well?

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I made that comment after talking to a number of Iraqis in a store in West Rashid, Baghdad, that

didn’t have any electricity. And I certainly, in that comment, was

not painting a rosy picture about the availability of electricity in

West Rashid or anywhere else in Baghdad. The point I was making

is that, for those Iraqis, getting a reliable source of power was a

whole lot more important than passage of a revenue-sharing bill by

the Council of Representatives.

The hard fact is that the availability of electricity to the average

citizen in Baghdad is still at a very low level, an hour or two a day.

It’s better in much of the rest of the country, but that is small comfort if you’re sitting in Baghdad in the middle of summer.

There are a lot of reasons for it, and the main reasons have to

do with continued attacks by insurgents against electrical transmission lines and against fuel pipelines that provide the energy

source that you need to generate electricity. It’s one more in a long

series of hard problems, but it’s a very real problem for many,

many Iraqis.

Senator BOXER. Sir, I hear you.

Ambassador CROCKER. And, if I could——

Senator BOXER. I hear you. My point—you’re, sort of, missing my

point, if I might. And my—because I’m running out of time here—

the point that I’m trying to make is, you said—you kind of pushed

aside the benchmarks. Now, a lot of people have worked on these

benchmarks—Republicans, Democrats, the White House, everybody—you set them aside, and you were making a good, I think,

point that the daily lives of the Iraqis are not going well. I’m echoing that point. And the fact is, the estimates that I read to you

come from all over the country—all over the country. So, my point

is, not meeting the benchmarks—the Iraqi Government’s not meeting the benchmarks. The electricity that you say is so important is

worse, not better. The Iraqi leader says, ‘‘We can handle this.’’ And,

in my last trip to Iraq, I have to say, General Petraeus, at that

time, was in charge of training the troops, he said he thought the

troops were very well trained, he was very optimistic about them.

What happened to, ‘‘If we stand up—if they stand up, we stand

down,’’ all this changes, there’s a moving target—the bottom line

here, sir, is, I know you have a very difficult assignment. I want

to be helpful to you.

I guess, in closing, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to express the deepest

sense of frustration from my State that people feel we have given

blood, we have given dollars, we have given patience, we have

given everything, and people are at the end of their patience.

And, sir, I hope you will continue your work. I hope you will tell

us the reality on the ground, and not paint rosy scenarios in September and say, ‘‘Well, none of the benchmarks are met, we can’t

deliver electricity, but we’re making progress,’’ because that’s only

going to prolong the killing.

Thank you.

25

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I’d like to submit, for the record, the letter that I sent

to the President, along with ‘‘The Way Forward,’’ that outlines a

program to urge him to develop a comprehensive plan for our country’s gradual military disengagement from Iraq in a way that will

protect our national security interests and prevent chaos in the

region.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

Senator VOINOVICH. It may seem contradictory to some, Mr.

Chairman, but I believe we can accomplish more in Iraq by gradually and responsibly reducing our forces and focusing on a robust

strategy of international cooperation and coordinated foreign aid.

And I agree with our Ambassador, and I thank him very much

for his service to our country, that we cannot abandon Iraq in

chaos, but we must start to face reality and begin a transition,

where the Iraq Government and its neighbors play a larger role in

stabilizing the country. And I think that you’ve got to make sure

that they know it’s inevitable that the United States is going to

disengage and that our commitment is not open-ended. And what

he does now, and in the next several months, is going to have a

great deal to do with the kind of a reaction that we’re going to have

to the recommendations that you and General Petraeus are going

to be making to the Congress. It doesn’t seem that he understands

the urgency of the situation, that he’s not taking advantage of our

presence, and he should be. He ought to get on with the constitution, he ought to get on with the oil. And I read, in The Economist,

where the they met at Sharm el-Sheikh. You made reference to it.

The country’s talking about oil and security and the refugee problem. And what I understand is, he wasn’t enthusiastic about it.

And he ought to understand, again, that he ought to be reaching

out to these people in his executive committee to get them to help

him deal with the situation that he has in his country.

In addition to that, we met earlier this week, several of us, with

Secretary Moon, Secretary General Moon, of the United Nations,

and I urged him, ‘‘It’s urgent for them to get involved. Is there a

sense of urgency? What are you doing to let them know that this

time is running out? Time is running out. What are you doing?’’

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, that is a point we have made to

the Prime Minister, to the rest of the Iraqi leadership, that we are

buying time. We’re buying time, at the cost of the lives of our soldiers and of Iraqi soldiers, and they need to honor that sacrifice by

moving the country forward.

I don’t think the Prime Minister fails to understand the challenge he has. This is hard work. We’ve put a lot of time here, me

and all of my colleagues, in working with him to achieve these

benchmarks. It is frustrating to us when the progress is as slow as

it has been in many areas. It’s frustrating to them. They’ve got to

keep at it, and we’ve got to keep pushing. And we will do that.

And with respect to the United Nations, Senator, I think their

engagement is very important. And I applaud your encouragement

of further efforts on their part to make a difference out here.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I want to thank you. I’ve been informed that if I don’t——

26

The CHAIRMAN. Well, actually, I was mistaken. They’re going to

leave the—they’re going to have the 5-minute grace period, so you

still have a minute and a half to go.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, there’s got to be some real evidence

that action’s taking place there. And everything you can do to convey to Mr. Malaki and his executive committee, to the other players in the region, that the American people’s patience is running

out. And you may assume that some of the things you talked about

are going to continue, but the fact of the matter is, I don’t think

that’s what the case is going to be. And if I were, you know, in the

position of the President or Secretary Bond, I’d put them all in a

room and say, ‘‘You know what? We’re on our way out of here.

Take advantage of the opportunity that you have. You all have a

symbiotic relationship to work together so this thing doesn’t blow.

And, if it does, then you are going to have some very, very serious

problems. So, help us. Help us, so we can stabilize the area, and

we’ll be willing to provide humanitarian help, we’ll be—we’re going

to stay in the region, but we have to disengage. It’s inevitable.

Take advantage of this wonderful opportunity that you have.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you. I’ll make a closing comment here, in the next minute or so.

No. 1, having the United Nations involved on the ground is not

the same as having the Permanent Five of the Security Council

take ownership of this problem. I met with them—and you may

find it of interest—3 weeks, the permanent members. I asked what

would happen if the President came to them and said—called an

international conference—not Sharm el-Sheikh—where they had

equal ownership with the United States—equal ownership of the

problem. They said they would all participate. They would call an

international conference. If you don’t raise this up, Mr. Ambassador, you’re going to be left there adrift.

Second point is, with all due respect to everyone who has talked

about this, you heard from my colleague—we’re not staying, Mr.

Ambassador. We’re not staying. You don’t have much time. And

there’s not much you can do about it, I know, if we’re to make—

begin to make this the world’s problems.

And the last thing I’d like to say to you, Mr. Ambassador—I have

overwhelmingly high regard for you—you said one thing that demonstrates that we have a fundamental disagreement, though. You

pointed out that you were talking to a group of Iraqis and saying

that—where there is no electricity—saying electricity is more important than an agreement on revenue-sharing. I would respectfully suggest, if you got an agreement on revenue-sharing, that

would mean there was genuine political progress being made, and

accommodations being—going forward among the warring factions,

and that would mean there would be more cooperation in seeing to

it that those who are blowing up the transmissions lines didn’t

blow them up.

So, I really think you guys have it wrong when you put, on the

back end, the political settlement relating to regionalism, you put,

on the back end, the constitutional changes, you put, on the back

end, the importance of the oil agreement. I don’t know how you get

the Sunnis to buy in without them knowing they, in fact, have a

27

piece of the oil. I don’t know how you get the Shia to buy in, unless

they’re able to have a regional government. I don’t know how you

do that. You may know. I’m anxious to hear it later.

But, bottom line, Mr. Ambassador, you’re a very skilled diplomat,

you’re professional, you’ve been around a long time. I promise you,

old buddy, forget what Joe Biden said, listen to the Republican. We

ain’t staying. We’re not staying. We’re not staying. Not much time.

Political benchmarks better be met, or we’re in real trouble, because we will have traded a dictator for chaos, notwithstanding all

your incredible efforts.

And, with that, Mr. Ambassador, if you’d like to make a quick

closing comment, the floor is yours, and I’m going to have to go

leave and vote, and I’ll be in touch with you, by plain-old telephone, personally, if I can.

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks

for the opportunity to meet with the committee at this important

time on this important issue.

The benchmarks are important. We put an extraordinary amount

of time and effort—and I do, personally—in pushing, pulling, prodding, looking for the deals, trying to drive this forward so that

benchmarks are met, because they mean something, in and of

themselves, and they clearly mean something, in terms of American support.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I’m sorry, I’m going to have to

go vote. I truly apologize. The time has run out.

I’d respectfully suggest they would be more inclined to meet the

benchmarks if the whole world community were pushing them. We

have so little credibility, I think it’s important you get the rest of

the Permanent Five, equally as hard pushing. That may be the

way.

But, at any rate, I’m going to have to end this, Mr. Ambassador,

and I—with your permission, I’d like to give you a personal call,

if I may, to follow up what we’re talking about.

Thank you very much. I apologize to everyone for this truncated

hearing.

And we are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for taking the time out of your schedule to make

yourself available to the committee for this hearing. The Senate has spent a great

number of hours this week discussing where we as a nation are in terms of our

strategy for Iraq and what kind of progress is being achieved. I’m not sure that we

resolved anything other than that there remains many divergent views on our continued military presence in Iraq.

The interim report issued by the President on July 12 underlines what has become a recurring source of frustration for many of us; our military is achieving some

success on the ground, particularly in Anbar province, but political achievements on

the part of the Iraqi Government have been much slower, if not nonexistent. Iraq’s

political leaders must be able to demonstrate to the Iraqi and American people their

willingness and ability to set aside sectarian differences to make difficult decisions

and reach compromises for Iraq as a whole.

Mr. Ambassador, Senator Sununu and I unfortunately missed you when we visited Iraq this past March—our visit occurring just before you took up your current

post. One of the things that was impressed on me during my time there was the

28

need to have a civilian surge to go along with the military surge. To make sure that

the progress that is achieved on the military side in terms of training Iraqi troops

and policemen, and securing more areas of Baghdad and the rest of Iraq, is not undercut by a lack of technocrats to perform activities such as the detention and prosecution of those who break the law, or develop the financial capability to distribute

federal revenues—or even to deliver paychecks to the Iraqi troops. These are capabilities that need to be in place if the Iraqi Government does enact key pieces of

legislation such as hydrocarbon revenue distribution, or de-Baathification laws. The

passage of these laws means nothing if there is no ability to implement them. So

I urge this administration to ensure we are doing our part in those areas that don’t

get quite as much media attention, so that these next steps are in place.

I want to compliment the ranking member for his work with Senator Warner on

their amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill. The legislation

passed by Congress and signed into law by the President in May says that if it is

determined in September that the benchmarks have not been met, or significant

progress has not been made in attaining them, the President shall include in his

report a description of how the United States strategy for Iraq will be revised.

There are, of course, differing views on how, when, and whether our policy toward

Iraq should change. While the Senate has not come to any agreement on that, the

Lugar-Warner amendment rightly suggests that consideration for what happens

after the September report and testimony from yourself and General Patreaus must

be taking place now. In my view this is not a prejudgment of the September report,

but rather ensures that the administration is at least putting together a plan B. I

whole heartedly agree.

Mr. Ambassador, I have committed to waiting for the September report before

making a decision on my continued support for the current policy. But there are

only so many times that the argument, ‘‘give it more time’’ can be taken seriously

when our partner has not demonstrated that they are committed to the process as

well. Verbal commitments are nice; visible action is better.

It is a frustrating position, as no matter how much we in Congress may want the

Iraqi Government to succeed, it is basically out of our hands. They are the ones that

need to make the decisions—to take the action. You commented in your testimony

that the benchmarks may not be the best way to judge whether progress is being

made—particularly at the provincial level. I agree that if we were to solely look at

provinces like Anbar, the reports would be more positive, but that would leave out

the largest population center in Iraq where the sectarian strife is most visible. I believe the line goes, as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.

We cannot cast their votes for them. It is not our place to determine what the

best course of action for Iraq is. That is up to the Iraqi people and their elected

government. But they must know, as the President has said on a number of occasions, America’s commitment in Iraq is not open-ended. The Iraqi Government has

between now and September to demonstrate that they want the United States as

their partner.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and for giving us an opportunity to gather more information on the situation in Iraq. I also appreciate Ambassador Crocker’s willingness to provide an update on the situation from his perspective.

We’ve heard from the administration and from many of our Senate colleagues this

week that we need to give the President’s surge more time and that we need to wait

to hear the report in September before we make a binding decision to redeploy our

troops. However, we learned last week that the Iraqi political leaders have not met

a single benchmark that they agreed to in January.

We don’t need to wait for another report. We have seen the results of a failed policy in the form of multiple deployments, more sacrifice from our military families,

and a deepening civil war in Iraq that has caught our troops in the middle.

It is long past time to turn the page in Iraq, where each day we see the consequences of fighting a war that should never have been authorized and should

never have been waged. The single most important decision a President or Member

of Congress can make is the decision to send our troops into harm’s way. It is that

decision that determines the fate of our men and women in uniform, the course of

nations, and the security of the American people. It is that decision that sets in motion consequences that cannot be undone.

29

Since this war began, 3,618 Americans have been killed—532 since the President

ignored the will of the American people and launched his surge. Tens of thousands

more have been wounded, suffering terrible injuries seen and unseen.

Here is what else we know. We know that the surge is not working, that our mission in Iraq must be changed, and that this war must be brought to a responsible

conclusion.

We know Iraq’s leaders are not resolving their grievances. They are not stepping

up to their security responsibilities. They are not improving the daily lives of Iraqis. We know that the war in Iraq costs us $370 million a day and $10 billion each

month. These are resources that could be spent to secure our ports and our borders,

to invest in jobs and health care, and to focus on a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan

and the wider war on terrorism.

We know that because of the war in Iraq, America is no safer than it was on

9/11. Al-Qaeda has gained the best recruiting tool it could ask for. Tens of thousands of terrorists have been trained and radicalized in Iraq. Terrorism is up worldwide. America has fewer friends, and more enemies, in the world.

We know—because of the release of a declassified NIE earlier this week—that we

continue to face a ‘‘persistent and evolving’’ threat from al-Qaeda. And last week,

a threat assessment concluded that al-Qaeda is as strong today as it was before

9/11.

As I said nearly 5 years ago, during the runup to this war, we are fighting on

the wrong battlefield. The terrorists who attacked us and who continue to plot

against us are resurgent in the hills between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They

should have been our focus then. They must be our focus now.

In January, I introduced a plan that would have already started bringing our

troops home and ending this war, with a goal of removing all combat brigades by

March 31, 2008. Seventy-nine days ago, President Bush vetoed a bipartisan plan

that passed both Houses of Congress that shared my goal of changing course and

ending this war.

During those 79 days, 266 Americans have died and the situation in Iraq has continued to deteriorate.

We in Congress must take action to change the President’s failed policy. I was

deeply disappointed that some of our colleagues blocked an amendment yesterday

that would have required a drawdown of our forces by the end of April 2008—a date

that is consistent with the date in the plan I proposed back in January, and a goal

shared by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group.

I will continue to push for a new course that gets our troops out of harm’s way,

that changes our military mission to focus on training and counterterrorism, that

puts real pressure on the Iraqis to resolve their grievances, and that urges the robust diplomacy that is so badly needed.

Thank you.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR

RUSSELL FEINGOLD

Question. I would like you to address the displacement of millions of Iraqis. I am

interested to hear from you about the process in assisting Iraqis who are working,

or have worked with the U.S. Government and are seeking assistance in resettlement to the United States. The progress on processing these cases appears to be

painstakingly slow—would you explain why it is taking so long to process these

cases? What mechanisms are you putting in place in order to process cases more

quickly? How are you handling this calamitous situation in-country?

Answer. We have many mechanisms in place to facilitate and expedite access to

the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for those Iraqis who have been targeted due to their association with the USG and are interested in seeking resettlement to the United States, including the use of Embassy referrals for Iraqis still

in Iraq who have worked closely with the USG. To date, Embassy Baghdad has referred over 20 Iraqi employees and their family members to the USRAP.

Embassy Baghdad has established a refugee committee to evaluate cases brought

to their attention by USG personnel. Once the Department concurs in accepting the

referral, the Embassy works closely with the individual to determine where they

wish to be processed and passes on the information to the appropriate Overseas

Processing Entity (OPE). In some cases, the USG facilitates entry into a country of

first asylum. The OPE prioritizes Embassy referrals and works to quickly prepare

the case for presentation to DHS/USCIS. The Embassy and OPE also keep the applicant informed of the timing of DHS/USCIS circuit rides so that they can minimize

the time spent in the country of first asylum.

30

Refugee processing generally takes 4 to 6 months from referral to admission in

the United States due to the required security checks, a face-to-face interview with

DHS/USCIS, and medical exams. However, the State Department acts expeditiously

to refer cases of Iraqi locally engaged staff (LES) to the USRAP, to provide emergency shelter in the IZ, and facilitate entry to the country of first asylum when

needed. Assisting the LES and his/her family in arriving to a safe location can be

completed in only a few days if needed, so that the vast majority of the processing

time can be spent in a secure location.

In addition to the processing of Embassy referrals, the USRAP is processing thousands of Iraqi asylum seekers in neighboring countries referred by UNHCR. Prior

to March, the USRAP had two OPE’s in the region located in Cairo and Istanbul.

We now have established two additional OPE offices in Damascus and Amman. Additionally, on a circuit-ride basis OPE personnel and DHS/USCIS officers travel to

Lebanon periodically to process UNHCR referrals of Iraqi and other refugees.

Question. The Washington Post reported that you sent a cable to Under Secretary

Fore making a strong case that we need to do more to make it possible for Iraqis

employed by our government to come to the United States. The cable stated that

Iraqis who work with the United States ‘‘work under extremely difficult conditions,

and are targets for violence including murder and kidnapping.’’ Senators Smith,

Biden, Hagel, Lieberman, Leahy, Levin, and Kennedy have introduced legislation,

which establishes a program to do precisely what you called for in the cable. What

was Under Secretary Fore’s reaction to this cable? Will you work with the Congress

to establish such a system of aiding those who have helped our government?

Answer. In February of this year, the State Department identified the issue of assisting Iraqis who work for the Embassy as a matter of urgency. The Department

took immediate steps to address the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their

association with the U.S. Government. The Department asked Congress to expand

access for these Iraqis to the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, so that more

brave Iraqis who are making their own contribution to their country are eligible for

inclusion in this program.

Secretary Rice set up the interagency task force on Iraqi Refugees and Internally

Displaced Persons led by Under Secretary Paula Dobriansky, which continues to

meet regularly. The interagency task force has a specific focus to address the humanitarian situation, including the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their

association with the U.S. Government.

The interagency task force drafted and cleared the administration’s legislative

proposal to provide a mechanism to lower, in ‘‘extraordinary circumstances,’’ the

years of service required for SIV eligibility under the Immigration and Nationality

Act. Embassy Baghdad was consulted often during the drafting process and its recommendations, which included the number of years of service required for SIV eligibility, were integrated into the administration’s SIV proposal.

In April, the Department sent to Capitol Hill the legislative proposal as an administration position which allows SIVs for Locally-Engaged (LE) Staff who have served

in ‘‘extraordinary conditions’’ as determined by the Secretary and have fewer than

the minimum years of service otherwise required. The Department is now working

actively to gain support in both the Senate and House to secure the introduction,

consideration, and passage of the proposal.

While the Department appreciates the intention of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act

introduced by Senators Kennedy and Smith, we believe the administration’s SIV

proposal is a more comprehensive and practical vehicle for addressing the dangers

that local employees of the USG confront in a manner that will ensure continued

effective operation of our diplomatic operations in Iraq and of our worldwide administration of the SIV program.

The Department and Embassy Baghdad have communicated to LE Staff the processes by which locally employed interpreters and translators under Chief of Mission

authority can take immediate advantage of the Special Immigrant Visa opportunities offered by Public Law 110–36. Embassy Baghdad has also acted to accelerate

the access of LE Staff to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.

The Department and the administration recognize that a solution must be secured

to assist those LE Staff in extraordinary conditions who are serving the American

people. We very much appreciate your support and interest in this matter as we

seek to partner with the Hill to implement the legislative changes that are required.

Question. There is currently a special immigrant visa program for Iraqi and

Afghan translators. DHS has approved more than 600 petitions under this program

but less than 40 have been issued. Five hundred visas are available under this program over the next 2 years. There are reports that Iraqi translators with approved

petitions who have attempted to travel to Jordan to obtain their visas have been

31

turned back to Iraq by Jordanian immigration officials. How many special immigrant visas have been issued for Iraqi and Afghan translators this year? Why have

so few been issued when more than 600 petitions have been approved?

• What steps is the State Department taking to ensure all the 500 visas available

this year are utilized?

Answer. Under previous legislation, only 50 visas were available per fiscal year.

New legislation was passed in June raising the total number of visas available in

FY07 to 500 and the total number available in FY08 to 500.

The National Visa Center has received 629 approved Special Immigrant Visa petitions (1,442 applicants total, including derivatives) for Iraqi or Afghani translators

from DHS/CIS. The National Visa Center has been able to contact over 500 of these

629 SIV applicants in order to begin the document collection process.

Through the end of June 2007, the Department issued 37 SIVs (along with 32 derivative visas issued to dependents) under the previous legislation that allocated 50

such visas for FY 2006. These cases pose unique challenges because it is difficult

to contact the applicants, many of whom are deployed with U.S. troops in Iraq. In

addition to the difficulties contacting the applicants, there are challenges in firmly

establishing the true identities of some applicants given the various naming conventions used in Iraq and the unreliability of civil identification documents.

Over 80 cases are scheduled for August and cases will continue to be added as

they are ready.

The Department has sent an additional consular officer to Embassy Amman,

where most SIV applicants have their visa interview, to assist in processing. We

have expedited security clearance requests for SIVs and our interagency partners

have been very responsive. We are also working closely with CBP to facilitate the

entry of translators and their families who do not have an Iraqi ‘‘G’’ series passport

valid for travel.

• How many Iraqi translators with approved SIV petitions have been turned back

by Jordanian officials? What steps are you taking to ensure this does not happen again?

Answer. Amman has had two cases of SIV applicants who were turned around

at the Jordanian border, apparently after trying to enter without evidence of an

interview, but who were later rescheduled for other appointments. At the translators’ request, four cases were transferred to Damascus for appointments. We are

working with the appropriate authorities to facilitate entry for SIV applicants into

Jordan and neighboring countries. The U.S. Embassy in Jordan works closely with

the GOJ officials to ensure translators can enter Jordan for their SIV interviews.

The Ambassador recently briefed the GOJ on this program and its importance to

the USG and access to Jordan for these applicants appears to be resolved at this

time.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR

LISA MURKOWSKI

Question. What kind of civilian surge is taking place to match the military

surge—particularly in the financial and judicial sectors—in order to provide a functioning bureaucracy for when the Iraqi Government passes legislation such as the

hydrocarbon revenue sharing bill?

Answer. The civilian surge is a robust, three-phased plan to increase staff at existing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), as well as create new ones. There

will be more than 20 teams in total. Many of them will be embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs), which operate side by side with brigade headquarters.

They live with the soldiers and go everywhere the soldiers go. The mission of PRTs

is to work with local leaders—whether they be tribal shaykhs, provincial governors,

mayors, or neighborhood leaders—to build local networks of moderates. They also

facilitate civilian technical assistance efforts among Iraqi provincial and local government officials and the citizens they represent to deliver essential services and

programs to rebuild communities. This surge has consisted of approximately 500

personnel across a dozen specializations. PRTs and ePRTS are typically staffed with

10–12 experts, led by a senior Department of State Foreign Service Officer, that

gear their assistance to the needs of their individual communities. Three hundred

twenty-five positions are filled, with another 96 in process. As a result of the civilian

surge’s success, military commanders recently requested four new ePRTs, which we

have planned with 84 positions.

One of the primary goals of the PRT initiative is to improve the capacity of local

and regional Iraqi governments. This complements an ongoing effort to develop the

32

capacity of key Iraqi ministries. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s

National Capacity Development (NCD) Program has full-time public management

advisors in nine key institutions, including the Prime Minister’s office and the

Council of Representatives Secretariat. These advisors are helping these entities improve their capacity to develop and execute their budgets, design personnel policies,

and implement procurement regulations.

Oil and electricity are key priority ministries, within which USAID focuses on capacity development in public management. Each ministry is well advanced in formulating a capacity development plan addressing the ministry’s needs; a key focus

of these plans is improved financial and project management. Additionally, over 80

staff from the ministries have enrolled in the program’s training sessions, receiving

training in topics such as procurement, budget management, project management,

strategic planning, and communications and leadership. We have recently expanded

our efforts to improve Iraqi ministerial capacity by adding 26 more contractors, 11

of whom are already on the ground and the rest will be in place by the end of

August.

Question. I traveled with Senators Sununu, Klobuchar, and Whitehouse to Baghdad and Fallujah in mid-March. When we met with now former Speaker Mahmoud

al-Mashhadani, he mentioned that when considering the hydrocarbon revenue distribution law, beyond the differences of opinion of the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites,

the Iraqi National Assembly needed time to convince the average Iraqi on the street

that the plan was truly an Iraqi plan, and not a United States plan—and that was

part of the delay in considering the bill. Is the pressure being put on the Iraqi Government by Congress and the administration having a detrimental effect with the

Iraqi people on the believability of any future legislation enacted by the National

Assembly?

Answer. Ever since Iraq nationalized its oil industry in 1960, the structure and

operation of the Iraqi oil sector has generated strong nationalist feelings among the

Iraqi public. As a number of articles, seminars, and public comments by Iraqi commentators have indicated, many Iraqis are very concerned about issues such as the

role of foreign companies in the oil sector, corruption, and the power of regions to

direct their own development.

The Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)

have been in intensive discussions since last July, and have completed drafts of a

framework hydrocarbon law and a revenue management law, both of which are

wholly Iraqi products. Over the last 3 months, central government representatives

have met with a wide range of parliamentarians to brief them on the main concepts

in the law. The GOI and KRG also held a seminar in Dubai in April to broaden

the discussion of the main points of these laws.

While these actions are useful initial steps, the Iraqi public still does not have

a good understanding of what the framework hydrocarbon law does and does not

do, including provisions on foreign investment in the oil and gas sectors. We expect

that both the GOI and KRG will mount a broader public information campaign to

address issues of concern once work on the remaining portions of the oil law package is complete and approved by the Iraqi Cabinet.

The United States has made clear publicly and privately the high priority we attach to Iraq’s passing this legislation. These expressions of interest, including encouragement to pass these laws this summer, have created the impression within

some Iraqi circles that the USG is attempting to exert undue influence on the entire

process. We are sensitive to this perception as we calibrate our efforts to encourage

the GOI and the KRG to proceed with all due dispatch on crafting a durable set

of laws recognized as legitimate by the Iraqi people to govern the most important

sector of Iraq’s economy.

Question. Has the Prime Minister undertaken additional good-will generating activities with local sheiks and other Iraqi political leaders since his March 13 visit

to Anbar province?

Answer. Prime Minister al-Maliki meets regularly with leaders from across Iraq’s

political spectrum, as well as with local sheiks and tribal leaders. For example, during a July visit to Diyala province, the Prime Minister met with local leaders to discuss joint efforts to expel al-Qaeda from Baquba. He praised local citizens, victims

of terrorism, and the tribally based Diyala Support Council for their efforts in working with Iraqi and coalition forces. In June, the Prime Minister received a delegation of tribal and local government leaders from Al-Qaim, in Anbar province.

Recently the Prime Minister formed a committee of senior advisers and technical

experts to work directly with coalition and Embassy representatives on issues relatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:28 Jan 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 IRAQUPDATE sforel1 PsN: sforel1
33

ing to Sunni tribal and insurgent group outreach. The committee has a mandate to

integrate anti-al-Qaeda fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces.

We continue to emphasize the need for outreach by Iraq’s leaders, including the

Prime Minister, to all of Iraq’s communities as a critical element in building political stability through broad participation in a national political process.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR

BARACK OBAMA

Question. The interim report released last week indicates progress on all of the

first order political priorities has been unsatisfactory.

• Given that the Iraqi Parliament is planning to be in recess during the month

of August, what expectation do you have that the Parliament will convert the

unsatisfactory progress on these priorities into satisfactory progress by the time

you submit your report in September?

Answer. Political progress is a shared responsibility between the executive and

legislative branches of the Iraqi Government, and is not solely the responsibility of

the Council of Representatives (COR). The Presidency Council and the Prime Minister are all part of the process and the weight of progress falls on all of their shoulders. We have made clear to the Iraqi political leadership that we attach great importance to the resolution of a number of political issues, including those laid out

as priorities in the July 15 interim report.

Recent action in the COR indicates there may be forward movement in some

areas, for example, in legislation connected with defining provincial powers, while

other legislation remains the subject of intense discussion. It is probable that the

COR will not complete action on all political priorities by the time we submit the

September report; however, the challenge of enacting legislation involves more than

securing approval from the COR.

While progress has not moved as rapidly as we would like, we must not diminish

the importance of what the COR has accomplished as a functioning democratic institution. In a little over a year, the COR has passed more than 60 pieces of significant

legislation, despite a climate of continuing sectarian violence, including an attack

on the COR parliamentary building that left one parliamentarian dead.

Finally, while the COR is currently taking a constitutionally mandated recess,

that does not preclude members of the political blocs or committees from meeting

to negotiate the specifics of pending legislation in anticipation of the COR returning

to session on September 4.

Question. Press reports indicate you may be meeting with your Iranian interlocutors again sometime in the next 10 days.

• What is on the agenda for these discussions?

• What do you want to accomplish during the discussions?

Answer. On July 24, the Iraqi Government hosted the second round of U.S.-Iranian-Iraqi discussions focused on security and stability in Iraq. Prime Minister Nuri

al-Maliki welcomed us and the session was chaired by Foreign Minister Hoshyar alZebari and National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie. As was the case in the

May meeting, I headed the American team and my Iranian counterpart, Ambassador Kazemi Qomi, headed the Iranian team.

As was also the case in May, the sole subject on the agenda for this meeting was

security in Iraq. There was no broader agenda.

All parties agreed in principal that it is in the best interests of all parties to see

a democratic and stable Iraq, but the challenge remains applying those principles

on the ground.

We expressed concerns, as we have in the past, over the Iranians arming and

training violent militia elements. We made clear in our talks that in the 2 months

since our last meeting we have not seen a reduction in militia-related activities attributed to Iranian support, but rather an increase. The presence and lethal activities of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quds Force (IRGC–QF) personnel in

Iraq and their provision of lethal support—in the form of weapons, training, funding, and guidance—to illegal militias who target and kill coalition and Iraqi Forces,

as well as innocent Iraqi civilians, contradicts the Iranian Government’s stated policy of supporting the Iraqi Government.

We made clear to the Iranians that their efforts will be measured by the security

conditions on the ground, not by stated principles or by promises. The goal of these

discussions is not to schedule more discussions but rather to find a solution to the

issue of Iraqi security. To that end we discussed the formation of a security subVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:28 Jan 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 IRAQUPDATE sforel1 PsN: sforel1
34

committee that would address at the expert or technical level issues relating to security, including support of militias, al-Qaeda, and border security. We are working

on the composition, level of representation, and function of such a committee.

Question. Recent reports from Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, indicate extremist

groups may be taking control of this key city.

• How would you characterize the situation in Basra?

• What is the plan to address the growing challenges in this strategically important city?

Answer. There is considerable instability in Basra. Intra-Shia violence in Basra

has contributed to a significant increase in attacks against coalition forces in Basra

and greater hostility toward the coalition presence. The ongoing violence has highlighted the failure of the Iraqi police to challenge Iranian-backed Shia militants in

southern Iraq.

The security situation in Basra is a concern to us and our coalition partners, particularly the British, who have responsibility for Basra province. In June, the Chief

of Police in Basra was replaced, as was the Basra Operations Commander. While

the full impact of these new leaders remains to be seen, both have already improved

the situation on the ground, with the new Chief of Police addressing issues of concern regarding the Basra police force and the new Operations Commander focusing

on militia activity. There is currently a proposal to create a new 14th Army Division

in the south which will assist the Iraqi Army 10th Division already stationed in the

region. Coalition Forces are also working with the Iraqi Government to create a new

Presidential Palace Protection force which will ultimately take over responsibility

for the protection of the Basra Palace Complex once it is handed over to Iraqi

control. The ultimate goal is to see Basra under Provincial Iraqi Control, but

implementing this transition will be a conditions-based decision made jointly by

MNF–I and the Iraqi Government. Until that time, coalition forces will continue to

conduct operations against militia elements in cooperation with Iraqi Security

Forces.

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH: LETTER TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W.

BUSH AND SENATOR VOINOVICH’S PROPOSED PLAN ‘‘THE WAY FORWARD IN IRAQ’’

JUNE 26, 2007.

President GEORGE W. BUSH,

The White House,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The United States has been faced with tremendous challenges during your administration. As the United States engages in its fifth year

in Iraq, I submit to you respectfully that we must begin to develop a comprehensive

plan for our country’s gradual military disengagement from Iraq and a corresponding increase in responsibility to the Iraqi government and its regional neighbors. Though it may seem contradictory, I believe we can accomplish more in Iraq

by gradually and responsibly reducing our forces and focusing on a robust strategy

of international cooperation and coordinated foreign aid. We must not abandon our

mission, but we must begin a transition where the Iraqi government and its neighbors play a larger role in stabilizing Iraq.

As you know, I have been concerned about the situation in Iraq for some time.

Nonetheless, I was steadfast in voting against any legislation that would limit or

cut off spending for the war. I have consistently opposed attempts to limit your powers as our Commander-in-Chief, and I have openly opposed any form of precipitous

withdrawal that would threaten our men and women in uniform, endanger American interests, or abandon the commitment we have made to the people of Iraq who

do want our help.

A policy of responsible military disengagement with a corresponding increase in

non-military support is the best way to advance our nation’s interests in Iraq and

achieve our primary goals: to help Iraqis stabilize their country and improve the security of the United States. However, I am also concerned that we are running out

of time.

The commitment of the United States to the principles of democracy and freedom

will not falter. Our military has fought courageously and admirably, and it is time

to pursue a strategy that combines the resources of our military with the resources

of our diplomatic corps and international partners. I have enclosed a brief position

paper that outlines my thoughts for a way forward in Iraq .

35

I hope that you will review this paper, and the many other recommendations that

have been proposed, as you fulfill the responsibilities of being our Commander-inChief. My prayers are with you and our nation.

Sincerely,

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,

United States Senator.

Enclosure.

THE WAY FORWARD IN IRAQ

It is in our Nation’s security and economic interests to begin to change our strategy in Iraq and initiate a plan for a responsible military disengagement. We have

lost 3,530 lives to military operations in Iraq. We have spent over $378 billion plus

the funds that were appropriated in the most recent supplemental bill. Our national

debt is rising and our government is being forced to abandon critical domestic priorities. Our public image to the world has deteriorated drastically and continues to

suffer. If we proceed on the current path, we will endanger our Nation’s long-term

competitiveness and well-being. Moreover, political realities in Washington will force

change. As we approach the 2008 Presidential election campaign, the people of the

United States may choose to elect a President that promises an immediate withdrawal. This could be very dangerous for the region and American national security

interests. Therefore, it is time to deal with the realities—the inevitability of our

eventual disengagement—and begin the planning for a new way forward in Iraq.

Military Disengagement Does Not Equal Abandonment

It is absolutely critical that we avoid being forced into a precipitous withdrawal,

whether it is because of world events or our own political atmosphere at home. The

dangers of a precipitous withdrawal include the potential destabilization of the region; the disintegration of United States relations with various allies in the region;

the endangerment of vital energy supplies in the Middle East; and irreparable damage to the credibility of the United States throughout the world (especially if we

leave and a humanitarian crisis ensues). If we lose the opportunity to implement

a responsible military disengagement on our own terms, we may find ourselves unable to prevent the aforementioned dangers. Therefore, we must formulate a strategy for disengagement that seeks to prevent these outcomes and protect our longterm, strategic interests in the region.

While our men and women in the field courageously fight day in and day out,

complex power struggles in the region and among Iraq’s religious sects and political

factions continue to undermine American troops. Iraq’s elected government has not

yet proved capable of forging a political reconciliation and winning the support of

these groups. Following the second attack on a Shiite shrine in Samarra, Iraq’s Government has grown increasingly nervous as political factions split even further.

Shiites are now fighting with Shiites in neighborhoods that were previously calm.

According to the testimony of numerous experts and officials who have testified to

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, Iraq’s problems cannot be solved with a military solution alone. Rather,

Iraq’s future rests largely on political solutions within the Iraqi Government, its

perceived leaders and Iraq’s neighboring countries where American influence is limited. Currently, the only leverage we have to influence these actors and trigger political cooperation is through the presence and/or removal of our military forces from

Iraq.

Unfortunately, the presence of American forces in Iraq is being exploited by Iraq’s

political actors, religious sects, and militias, as well as al-Qaeda, other foreign fighters, and Iraq’s neighboring countries. Their leaders are not moving quickly to make

responsible decisions and change the situation, because the continued presence of

American forces fuel their arguments and make compromise unnecessary. Therefore,

our best chance of stabilizing Iraq is to develop and implement a strategy for United

States military disengagement that is coupled with a robust diplomatic effort to contain instability and protect our interests in the region. It is time the Iraqi Government and its regional neighbors take a greater responsibility in stabilizing this

situation. Military disengagement is the only way to force Iraq’s leaders and neighboring countries to make the difficult decisions needed to create stability and prevent a catastrophe in the region. Only by initiating such a strategy can we hope

to achieve all of the following goals:

Compel Iraq’s leaders and neighbors to take actions that will support stability in Iraq and prevent chaos in the region;

36

Make al-Qaeda’s mission to drive out U.S. forces obsolete, so Iraqi tolerance

for al-Qaeda decreases;

Stop terrorist networks from using Iraq’s perceived occupation as a recruitment tool;

Develop a plan for Iraq that can be endorsed by all of Iraq’s neighbors and

key international organizations;

Agree on a timeline for disengagement that is acceptable to the people of

Iraq, blessed by the international community, and easier to implement because it has their support;

Protect key American alliances in the region by working with them to develop our exit strategy and working to address their fears and concerns;

Preserve American credibility by staying involved in Iraq and focusing more

energy on refugee assistance, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction aid;

Focus our resources on other fronts in the war on terrorism; and

Rest and repair our military forces for potential future conflicts.

Military disengagement cannot be viewed as an abandonment of Iraq or our longterm strategic interests in the region. If we pursue a well-developed and comprehensive plan for withdrawing U.S. forces, we will have a better chance of achieving our

goals and sustaining domestic support for a continued commitment in the future.

Drawing out our current efforts indefinitely will deplete our resources and limit our

options when we eventually decide to draw down our forces. By forming the strategy

now, we have time on our side and can mitigate the possible negative consequences

of our departure.

WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD?

A Clear Announcement and a Clear Commitment

The United States should begin by issuing a clear announcement about the intention to responsibly withdraw our military forces from Iraq, while stressing our commitment to remain engaged in Iraq’s future and the future stability of the Middle

East. The statement should and must go hand in hand with a demonstration of our

decision, to ensure that it is taken seriously. The demonstration could be to draw

back a significant number of our forces to major military garrisons or to redeploy

them to forward operating bases in neighboring countries. The goal would be to reduce our visible presence, while sustaining our ability to respond immediately to

any serious crisis or attack on U.S. soldiers or installations.

The announcement should also be coupled with an expression of our commitment

to Iraq’s future and our determination to stay involved in the region and prevent

its destabilization. We must make clear that our decision to leave is based on a desire to bring an end to the violence, to force out foreign fighters, and to allow Iraqis

to reclaim their country from terrorists and militants. We must also emphasize that

we will come to Iraq’s assistance if asked, and that we will remain in the region

to assist our other allies as well.

Lastly, we should make clear our pledge to provide Iraq with our financial and

humanitarian assistance for the next several years, including a special program for

assisting refugees who have left Iraq and refugees who want to return to Iraq when

the violence stops. Prior to the announcement, we should have a plan in place to

resettle a portion of Iraqi refugees in the United Sates, especially those who helped

U.S. forces as linguists, informants, or in other ways.

An International Conference and Shuttle Diplomacy

Military disengagement must go hand in hand with a plan for robust diplomatic

engagement aimed at preventing instability and leveraging Iraq’s neighbors to help

us prevent chaos in the region. On the multilateral front, the United States should

organize an international conference to bring together Iraq’s neighbors, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and the U.N. Secretary General. The

purpose of the conference would be to discuss how to maintain stability in the

Middle East, manage the refugee crisis, and forge a new political compact in Iraq

that will address key political issues in Iraq, including resource allocation, deBaathification, and reconciliation. The conference should aim to produce an agreement among its participants and a subsequent U.N. Security Council Resolution.

The agreement should establish agreement on a number of important issues, including respect for Iraq’s sovereignty and its current borders, and any arrangement to

provide an international peacekeeping force if sectarian conflict leads to a humanitarian crisis.

37

On the margins of the international conference, the United States should conduct

a series of focused bilateral meetings with Iraq’s leadership, our allies, and Iraq’s

neighbors. The meetings should address specific concerns, including cooperation to

control Iraq’s borders and cooperation to prevent retaliatory attacks on U.S. soldiers

upon withdrawal. We should make clear that any coordinated attack on U.S. soldiers would be responded to with speed and severity.

A Substantial Package of Foreign Aid

The way forward and out of Iraq will require a substantial aid package for Iraq.

This is an important step and will send a clear message that we intend to keep our

promise to the Iraqis and help stabilize their country. We will also need to provide

foreign aid to key partners in the region, such as Jordan and Kuwait, who will be

impacted strategically and economically by military disengagement. This must include refugee assistance and increased economic and security assistance to help

them deal with the thousands of Iraqi refugees and manage security at their borders. It is a sign of goodwill that advances U.S. interests by helping to protect our

partnerships and prevent the spread of instability through the region. Though some

may balk at the expense of foreign aid to Iraq or other partners, it is only a fraction

of the costs of sustaining war operations.

Sustain U.S. Credibility and Bolster Public Diplomacy

As a final and critical component of any plan for military disengagement, we must

find ways to restore our credibility and standing in the world. The war in Iraq was

a major blow to our soft power and public diplomacy. It cannot be rebuilt overnight,

but steps should be taken to prevent the further deterioration of our image in the

aftermath of a withdrawal. First, we should follow up our disengagement from Iraq

with an announcement of our commitment to remain involved in the greater fight

against terrorism and to engage more heavily in Afghanistan and the Global War

on Terrorism. We should devote more resources to strangling terrorist financial networks, promoting international law enforcement cooperation, and ridding countries

of dangerous madrassas that train terrorists. Second, we should give a visible priority to the Middle East Peace Process and our relations with all countries in the

Middle East. We must show that our disengagement from Iraq does not represent

an abandonment of our commitment to stabilize the Greater Middle East. Third, we

should pursue a significant foreign aid program that will draw attention to the

United States good works and involvement in the world. This could begin with our

commitment to pay the full amount of our current outstanding dues to the U.N. for

international peacekeeping and other arrears, which would send a powerful message

to the world and bolster the American image tremendously.

Conclusion

I believe that we can set our Nation on a new course in Iraq that has bipartisan

support in Congress and sustains our commitment to the people of Iraq. We can

share more of the responsibility with Iraqis and their neighbors, while protecting

our vital interests. We must begin the process now. The United States is a powerful

and principled nation, and we are entering just one more phase of our Nation’s history. Our courage and resolve can carry us through this experience and into a new

phase of global leadership.

Æ