114th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

NUCLEAR POLLUTION IN THE 

ARCTIC: THE NEXT CHERNOBYL? 

NOVEMBER 15, 2016 

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington: 2017 
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

202–225–1901 

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov 

@HelsinkiComm 

Legislative Branch Commissioners 

HOUSE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, TEXAS

STEVE COHEN, TENNESSEE

ALAN GRAYSON, FLORIDA

RANDY HULTGREN, ILLINOIS

JOSEPH R. PITTS, PENNSYLVANIA

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

NEW YORK

SENATE 

ROGER WICKER, MISSISSIPPI, 

Co-Chairman 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. MARYLAND

JOHN BOOZMAN, ARKANSAS

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA

JEANNE SHAHEEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE

TOM UDALL, NEW MEXICO

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

Executive Branch Commissioners 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ELISSA SLOTKIN, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ARUN M. KUMAR, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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NUCLEAR POLLUTION IN THE 

ARCTIC: THE NEXT CHERNOBYL? 

NOVEMBER 15, 2016 

Page 

PARTICIPANTS 

A. Paul Massaro III, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ..... 1 

Nils Bohmer, Managing Director, Bellona Foundation ............................................................... 2 

Julia Gourley, U.S. Senior Arctic Official, Department of State ................................................ 5 

Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, Visiting Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ........................................................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

Slide presentation by Nils Bohmer ................................................................................................ 18 

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NUCLEAR POLLUTION IN THE 

ARCTIC: THE NEXT CHERNOBYL? 

NOVEMBER 15, 2016 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington, DC 

The briefing was held at 3:30 p.m. in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, 

Washington, DC, A. Paul Massaro III, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, moderating. 

Panelists present: A. Paul Massaro III, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; Nils Bohmer, Managing Director, Bellona Foundation; Julia 

Gourley, U.S. Senior Arctic Official, Department of State; and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, 

Visiting Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Mr. MASSARO. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you all for coming today. 

Welcome to today’s briefing on nuclear pollution in the Arctic. My name is Paul Massaro, 

and I’m a policy adviser responsible for economic and environmental issues at the Helsinki Commission. 

Although the headlines have been occupied with other matters as of late, the issue 

of nuclear pollution remains highly topical. Just last week, a diver off the coast of Canada 

may have discovered a nuclear weapon lost by the United States in 1950. Even though 

it appears this weapon is likely not a threat, it highlights the continued relevance of the 

issue, especially in the Arctic, where the concentration of nuclear material is significant. 

While the Arctic has in recent years received greater attention on the Hill, the issue 

of Arctic nuclear pollution has been noticeably less present. At today’s briefing, we hope 

to gauge the level of danger associated with this threat, as well as examine the interests 

of the United States, Russia and other Arctic Council nations towards the region. Ideally, 

we will come away with a better understanding of what needs to be done in order to mitigate any potential environmental damage to the Arctic and beyond. 

We are grateful to have such distinguished panelists with us here today. Not only 

do they offer a diversity of subject area expertise on the Arctic, but they are from three 

separate Arctic Council nations, hailing from Norway, the United States and Denmark, 

respectively. 

First we have Nils Bohmer all the way from Oslo, Norway to be with us today. Mr. 

Bohmer is the managing director of the Bellona Foundation, a nongovernmental organiza-
2 

tion with offices in Norway, Russia and Belgium that focuses on Arctic environmental 

issues. As a nuclear physicist, Mr. Bohmer is Bellona’s resident expert on radioactive 

waste, nuclear accidents and nuclear power. 

Next we have Julia Gourley, who, in her capacity as U.S. Senior Arctic Official at 

the State Department, serves as the primary U.S. representative to the Arctic Council. 

Ms. Gourley is responsible for a wide range of environmental, economic and political 

issues related to U.S. foreign policy interests in the Arctic. With the United States holding 

the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2016, she has undoubtedly had a very busy 

year. 

Finally, Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen joins us from CSIS’s Europe program, where he is 

currently a visiting fellow. Mr. Rahbek-Clemmensen is also an assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern Denmark and is an expert on Arctic governance 

and geopolitics. 

I’d like now to give the floor to our panelists. Mr. Bohmer, if you would please start 

us off. I know the Bellona Foundation has been a leader on this subject, so I think we 

could all benefit enormously from hearing your insight on the current state of play and 

recommendations moving forward. 

Mr. BOHMER. Thank you, Paul. 

My name is Nils Bohmer. I am the nuclear physicist and also the general manager 

of the Bellona Foundation. I have been working with nuclear waste issues in Russia since 

1993, so it’s been a couple of decades with interesting times. 

Next slide, please. Next slide. 

The Bellona Foundation has an office in Murmansk, open since 1994. A colleague of 

mine, Mr. Alexander Nikitin, was arrested and threatened with espionage back in 1995 

because of a report we wrote about the Russian Northern Fleet. All of the information 

was taken from open sources. And, after a five-year-long legal battle, he was totally 

acquitted in the Russian Supreme Court back in 2000. And that has made us quite recognized in Russia. 

And I think also the reports that we have written about the subject, especially in the 

1990s, were very factual-based, and were also given a lot of credit by the Russian side; 

we were not only criticizing, but also documenting facts, and using those reports to create 

international attention, which has led to a lot of economic support to the cleanup that has 

been going on in that area over the latest decades. 

Next slide. 

Also, our focus has been, since we are relatively close to Russia, it has also been very 

important for us to be on the ground in Russia—not only to look at satellite photos or 

Google maps, reading reports from Russia, but it’s important for us to be on the ground 

to learn what is happening there. 

Russia has, among other things, 10 nuclear power plants, mostly in the western part 

of Russia. They have their nuclear weapons complex in the middle of Siberia—Mayak, 

Seversk and Zelenogorsk. And they also have an Arctic presence, mainly with their 

nuclear submarines. And especially the Kola Peninsula in northwest Russia has been very 

important because that has given Russia ice reports, which have been important for the 

strategic nuclear submarines to enter into the Barents Sea. 

There has also been a lot of dumping in the Arctic, especially Barents Sea and the 

Kara Sea, but also in the Japanese Sea. 
3 

Next slide. 

In the 1990s, when Bellona started our work in northwest Russia, there was also a 

lot of focus on all of the laid-up submarines. There were about 70 to 80 nuclear submarines lying at shore, with the spent nuclear fuel inside; no plans for how to deal with 

the spent nuclear fuel. Run-down entities also included Chernobyl-type reactors; it was 

fairly accepted that none of these reactors could be upgraded to Western safety standards. 

There was a lot of dumped radioactive waste, submarine accidents, and also a large 

amount of legacy waste, especially in the west—the coastal naval base at Kola Peninsula. 

Next slide, please. 

But during the two decades since the early 1990s, there have been a lot of improvements in the situation. The picture you see here is an RTG, which is a radioisotope 

thermoelectric generator using radioactive waste, which creates heat, and they use that 

heat to create electricity, which then can be used to power lighthouses and radio beacons 

in the Arctic. The Soviet Union manufactured about 2,000 of these sources. In Russia, 

nearly all of the reactors—RTGs placed in Russian territory, most of them in the Arctic— 

have now been replaced with solar panels. And RTGs have been shipped to storage in 

Siberia, in Mayak. 

In northwest Russia, 120 nuclear submarines have been decommissioned and the 

spent nuclear fuel has been taken out. The spent fuel has been shipped to reprocessing 

in Mayak. And the bulk of the reactors have actually been brought onshore, at the Kola 

Peninsula. The dumping ended in 1994. And the safety for NPPs, the nuclear power 

plants, has been improved. But at the same time, they have prolonged the lifetime for 

those reactors, with some up to 30 years extra, but with maybe too little attention and 

too little focus on the safety upgrades. And, as I said, onshore compartments have been 

built. 

Next slide. 

Today there are about 20 to 25 nuclear submarines, operating out in the Barents Sea, 

both strategic submarines but also multi-purpose attack submarines. And there is also, 

as we speak, being built eight new nuclear submarines in the shipyard in Severodvinsk, 

and one more will start being built in December. So the Russian navy is heavily focusing 

on building new submarines, new infrastructure, and on being much more present in the 

Arctic. 

Next slide. 

Also, the Northern Sea Route put a lot of focus on the nuclear icebreaking capability 

in Russia. There are today five nuclear icebreakers in operation, and three more are being 

built. During recent years, there have been several fires, and also at least one incident 

of a coolant leak from one of these reactors onboard a nuclear icebreaker, showing that 

there is risk for accident also on the civilian naval fleet. 

And the picture you see here shows plans for some gigantic icebreakers that the Russians are planning to build in a decade or two. And the rationale behind building all these 

new icebreakers is to export gas from the Arctic facilities in Yamal over to Asia. And, of 

course, the Northern Sea Route would be a much more effective way of transporting that 

gas instead of going all the way around Europe. 

Next, please. 
4 

But even though there has been a lot of work done, there is still a lot of remaining 

work. This picture shows the storage for the spent nuclear fuel from about 100 nuclear 

reactor cores in Andreeva Bay—40, 50 kilometers away from the Norwegian border. 

There has been a lot of work done on infrastructure, building new cranes, new equipment, new roads, and new electricity at that facility. Next year they will be starting to 

remove that fuel from that facility. That work could also prove risky, because you see 

these tanks have been leaking water inside. Some of the fuel has been corroding, so a 

lot of this fuel is not possible to take out. It has not been possible to take them out for 

inspection, so we don’t know what kind of condition this spent nuclear fuel is in. 

What we fear is that when you start to pull the fuel element out of those compartments where they are stuck, that you could risk the bottom falling out of the cylinder and 

you get a lot of uranium and you could have a critical accident, which then could lead 

to radioactive release to the atmosphere. So that is three to four years coming now, which 

will be very critical in figuring out how to safely withdraw that fuel from Andreeva Bay. 

And also some of the old nuclear icebreakers are going to be dismantled, some of which 

contain a lot of nuclear material. 

Next slide, please. 

Russia also dumped—or they don’t call it ‘‘dumped,’’ they call it ‘‘stored’’—especially 

when it comes to the reactor, they ‘‘store.’’ That is a way to treat reactors which have 

had a critical accident. So the reactors created radiation problems onshore, and then they 

made the decision to store them in the Kara Sea, close to Novaya Zemlya. And the depth 

of some of these reactors is only 40 meters deep, so it’s technically easy to retrieve them 

if you have funding for that. 

The main focus on the Russian side are now the K–27 and the K–159, which sank 

outside of Murmansk Fjord in 2003. The reason—especially the reason for K–27 is that 

it’s buried under quite shallow water, 30 meters, and it also contains very highly enriched 

uranium. The Russian scientists say that if as little as eight liters of water comes into 

the reactor’s core, then you could start a chain reaction, and that could start an uncontrolled heat production in that reactor. And it could then have such a massive explosion 

that you will expose the radioactivity inside the reactor to the air, and it could cause both 

contamination of the water but also contamination of the atmosphere. So that is one of 

the reasons why they are very focused on retrieving the K–27. But at the moment they 

don’t have enough technical domestic capabilities to do that, and they’re also lacking 

funding to do that. So they are trying to get countries like Norway to be a part of a 

funding proposal to lift those submarines. 

Next slide. 

What are the potential threats to the Arctic? Of course, as I said, the nuclear icebreakers have recently had a lot of fires and coolant accidents, meaning that there could 

be more severe accidents onboard those. The Russian submarines have a long history of 

accidents and fire. Most famous is the Kursk in 2000. That could happen again, either 

with one of the old submarines they have in operation or with some of the new submarines they will put in operation quite soon. 

There could also be leakage from the dumped material in the Kara Sea. About 90 

percent of the radioactive material dumped is contained within seven of the reactors with 

the spent nuclear fuel, so it’s fairly easy to recover 90 percent of the radioactive material 

by raising those. But, at the same time, that dumped material is dumped in the middle 
5 

of an area where there is a lot of oil and gas, and there have been many oil and gas 

expeditions to try to find new oil and gas fields. And, of course, if you have radioactive 

waste and you could either drill in one of the drums with radioactive waste or you could 

have some kind of accident, which then of course will make that kind of situation risky. 

So even though there has been a lot of work done, like most of the submarines have 

been dismantled, there is still a lot of old legacy waste to be taken care of. And also there 

are new nuclear submarines and new nuclear icebreakers coming. So I think that for decades to come we will have a situation with a risk of Arctic pollution from Russian sources. 

And I think that concludes my speech. 

Mr. MASSARO. All right. Well, thank you very much, Nils, for that fascinating presentation. 

I’d like now to give the floor to Julia. Thank you, Julia. 

Ms. GOURLEY. Thank you, Paul. And thanks for inviting me here to talk to you about 

nuclear pollution in the Arctic. As you heard from Nils and from Paul, it’s a topic with 

a rich history in the Arctic, but also in the Arctic Council, which is the body I work in 

and which the United States is chairing, as Paul mentioned. 

My focus will be more on the environmental and health aspects of nuclear pollution 

in the Arctic. In fact, one of the working groups at the Arctic Council, called the Arctic 

Monitoring and Assessment Program, has, over the life of the Council, produced four 

successive scientific assessments of nuclear pollution in the Arctic. And its most recent 

one, concluding in 2015, was just released in published form earlier this year. 

From a health perspective and an environmental perspective, the good news is that 

the levels of anthropogenic or manmade radioactivity in the Arctic attributable to identifiable releases is low, and it’s generally declining, which means that the risks to human 

health are likewise decreasing. And the releases that I’m talking about here that AMAP 

looked at are atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in the 1950s and 1960s and the fallout 

resulting from that, nuclear fuel processing, historical dumping of radioactive waste—Nils 

was just talking about that—and, more recently, accidents at the Chernobyl and the 

Fukushima power plants. 

The reduction in risk to health and the environment is predominantly due to the natural decay in the radionuclides. The half-lives are being reached in some cases. The natural decay is ongoing. 

And just to repeat a little bit of what Nils just said, good progress has been made 

in Russia on several fronts that have reduced risks to human health and the environment, 

including the decommissioning of radioisotope thermoelectric generators, or RTGs; nuclear 

submarines, such as the Kursk, the nuclear-waste vessel Lepse, which was used for 

unloading and temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear icebreakers between 

1963 and 1981, and since 1981 it’s been used as a floating storage unit for damaged spent 

nuclear fuel and solid and liquid radioactive wastes and related equipment. Its decommissioning has been a high priority for the Russian Government, and it’s working toward that 

goal, which is a very good development; and, of course, the K–159 nuclear submarine that 

sank in 2003, that Nils also talked about, in the Barents Sea. As far as we know, there’s 

no current leakage from the two reactors, although, of course, there is always concern 

about future leakage of highly enriched uranium and the conditions Nils was describing. 

Russia is also managing and remediating temporary waste storage sites in Gremikha 

and Andreeva Bay on the Kola Peninsula, also that Nils talked about. In fact, nearly all 
6 

the spent nuclear fuel at the Gremikha facility has been removed, though the activity in 

Andreeva Bay is slow, and the same with the Mayak site, which I’m not even sure is 

under way yet, in northwestern Russia. 

So that was sort of the good news, as good news can get, on the nuclear front in 

Russia. In terms of the areas of concern, there are still some, of course, very troubling 

things to think about that will require vigilant monitoring for the foreseeable future. For 

example, the Arctic remains vulnerable to radioactive pollution from distant sources. The 

Fukushima disaster a few years ago generated a small and thankfully insignificant uptick 

in background atmospheric radiation levels in the Arctic, but it certainly underscores the 

importance of vigilance and that nuclear accidents in far-flung parts of the world can certainly affect the Arctic. And radiation can disperse very, very, very far distances. 

Another area of concern is related to legacy radioactive waste dumped in the Barents 

and Kara Seas, which could increase contamination levels in local Arctic waters if the 

drums deteriorate; highly dense sources of radioactivity from incomplete decommissioning 

of nuclear facilities and equipment and radioactive storage and substandard conditions in 

parts of the Arctic—parts of Russia—certainly continue to warrant long-term monitoring 

as well. 

Interestingly—well, as everyone knows, there’s a lot of oil and gas in the Arctic. Nils 

showed a map of some of the areas where Russia is exploring off Novaya Zemlya. Extraction activities themselves often result in what’s called TENORM, or technologically 

enhanced, naturally occurring radioactive materials. And although the science suggests 

that the risks from TENORM associated with oil and gas extraction are negligible, it’s 

the produced water from these industrial practices that warrant further study, especially 

given that offshore activities will certainly pick up again when the prices of oil and gas 

come down. 

And parts of the Arctic are also rich in uranium deposits, especially in Canada and 

Greenland. And while there’s no significant uranium mining and milling happening in 

those areas, if that changes, then, of course, the potential environmental and health 

impacts, including with respect to TENORM, will require more scientific study, because 

they’re really not very well understood. 

Then a new and sort of growing area of research is tied to—of all things—the effects 

of climate change on the remobilization of radioactivity in the Arctic, which happens 

mainly through changes in the hydrologic cycle, the water cycle, thawing permafrost and 

declining snow cover and wildfires, all of which can disrupt the landscape sufficiently to 

trigger releases of naturally occurring and anthropogenic, manmade, radioactivity sources. 

So warming conditions in the Arctic could also release a significant amount of radon 

gas and associated radionuclides, which could, of course, be of concern to human health 

in local areas in Russia. 

I wanted to also talk for a minute about other Arctic Council activity, other than the 

Arctic Monitoring Assessment Program’s health assessment, which just came. The Council 

has six working groups, of which AMAP is one. Another one, called the Emergency 

Prevention Preparedness and Response, or EPPR, working group works on, among other 

things, accidental releases into the Arctic environment of pollutants in general, focusing 

in particular on chemical and, to a lesser extent, biological and naturally occurring pollutants. 
7 

Its focus right now is largely on oil-spill response in the marine environment because 

it’s a more immediate concern, frankly, although we’re having a pause in oil and gas 

development now, which is kind of allowing for a good opportunity to develop expertise 

in oil-spill response and other things like preparedness—prevention of oil spills and that 

sort of thing. 

But EPPR also has deep expertise in radiological matters in the Arctic. And among 

its work products, it’s developed projects to address gaps in the knowledge base, bestpractice guidance, local emergency response plans, and risk-assessment methodologies for 

radiological accidents. It also has conducted actual tabletop exercises for radiological 

emergencies, training programs, and is focused in particular in Russia, because that’s 

where, of course, the largest nuclear threat in the Arctic is. 

Through EPPR, our head of delegation to that working group is the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. And NNSA has actually co-sponsored with Russia for many 

years a number of projects, including with Cooperative Threat Reduction funding, that 

include radiation exercises, radiological equipment upgrades, facility risk analyses, and 

site-specific information to aid first responders. 

Another Arctic Council working group, called the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, or ACAP for short, focuses on pollution remediation in general. Its past work has 

included demonstration projects on the ground in Russia to mitigate things like black 

carbon, mercury, persistent organic pollutants, obsolete pesticides, and these RTGs, these 

radionuclide thermo-reactor generator things—long name. [Laughs.] RTGs for short. 

And, of course, legacy hazardous waste in the Russian far east is something that we 

are concerned about in the Federal Government and in Alaska, because it’s potentially 

problematic for Alaska. A lot of pollutants get into the environment. They can be transported, and there’s not much space in the Bering Sea between the Russian far east and 

Alaska. 

So EPA, which is our head of delegation to that working group, has invested small 

amounts of resources in pollution remediation just across the Bering Strait. They also at 

EPA led some work under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with Russia on 

spent nuclear fuel containment, and also worked with DOD on some projects under what 

was the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation forum, or AMEC, which no longer 

exists, but was a useful sort of mil-to-mil forum for environmental cooperation between 

the U.S., Russia, Norway and the U.K. 

I’ll wrap up by noting that the effects of climate change in the Arctic extend to other 

pollutants than the ones that I talked about, and even to diseases. Earlier this year, 

Russia—some of you may have heard Russia experienced a mass die-off of reindeer in the 

Yamal Peninsula, which was directly a product of, or reaction to, thawing permafrost that 

exposed animal carcasses—reindeer carcasses—containing anthrax. And the local reindeer 

population on the peninsula became exposed. About 2,500 of them died. The anthrax then 

crossed into the human population, and 28 people were hospitalized for anthrax and one 

young boy died from it. 

So there are certainly a lot of things that happen in the Arctic related to climate 

change that aren’t completely in the headlines just yet. In fact, there are other graveyards 

on the permafrost throughout the Arctic, including Alaska and probably Canada and 

Greenland, that—you know, bodies that have been buried that contain other diseases like 
8 

smallpox and influenza and other diseases that could also potentially become exposed 

through thawing permafrost. 

There are all kinds of incidents like this that can become, in a way, a greater immediate concern than radiation problems, to the extent that contained radioactive waste on 

the seabed doesn’t become dislocated through oil and gas activities or earthquakes or 

whatever. 

People don’t really think about these kinds of consequences in rapidly warming Arctic 

conditions, but through the Arctic Council we are definitely focused on them and we’ll continue to be focused on them, including environmental and scientific monitoring, for the 

foreseeable future. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MASSARO. Well, thank you very much, Julia. And what an anecdote on the end 

there. My goodness. 

OK. Well, let me give the floor now to our last briefer, Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen. Jon, 

the floor is yours. 

Mr. RAHBEK-CLEMMENSEN. Thank you. And, first and foremost, thanks a lot for the 

invitation to speak here today about such a timely topic and to such a distinguished 

audience. 

I’m going to say a little bit about the link between geopolitics and nuclear waste 

management. And I’m basically going to say three things. First I’m going talk a little bit 

about what you would call the fundamentals of nuclear waste management. Then I’m 

going to talk a little bit about the geopolitics of the Arctic and Arctic cooperation as it 

is right now. And then I’m going to present two possible models for how you can expand 

nuclear waste governance in this region. 

If you take the first point, what are the most fundamental dynamics of nuclear waste 

management? The first and most fundamental point, which I think the two previous 

speakers also highlighted, is that it’s all about getting Russia onboard. It’s in Russia that 

we see significant waste. It’s in Russia that we have problems handling waste. And it’s 

in Russia that we really have low-hanging fruit. 

And if we look at the history of governance in this area, we see two things. We see 

that Russia has, on the one hand, been very unwilling to engage in cooperation with other 

nations when it comes to issues like this that are adjacent to defense and military affairs. 

But there has been some cooperation over the past 25 years. And Julia mentioned AMEC 

before, which I’ll come back to again in a moment. 

And I think the key to get Russia engaged in this area is funding. If the Western 

countries can come with funding for technology development, if Western countries can 

come with actual expertise, and if Western countries can implement action cleanups, then 

it’s actually possible to engage Russia. And Russia has thus far actually been willing to 

cooperate in this area. So funding seems to be absolutely key. 

Another necessary condition seems to be geopolitics. And it’s no secret amongst any 

of us that in the past three years there’s been some tension between Russia and the 

Western countries following the Ukraine crisis and the invasion of Crimea. The Arctic has 

been somewhat isolated from fallout from the Ukraine crisis. There has been a slight 

uptick in tensions. We’ve seen military exercises both by NATO, and especially by Russia, 

that’s held a couple of fairly large flash exercises in the Barents Sea. 
9 

Russia has expanded its military infrastructure in the region, although one should 

hesitate to ascribe that to the Ukraine crisis, because I think most analysts would argue 

that Russia would have expanded its military infrastructure either way. But on the other 

hand, there has been a lot of cooperation in the region, especially when it comes to civilian 

and diplomatic areas. So a lot of the work in the Arctic Council more or less continues 

as it did before. The Arctic Council was able to create a very productive declaration in 

2015 up in Iqaluit. The continental shelf process continues as it has thus far before the 

crisis. 

So in that sense we see two tracks in Russia’s policy. On the one hand, there are 

military tensions. There is a military buildup. But on the other hand, civilian and diplomatic cooperation continues. 

We don’t know the future of East-West cooperation, especially after the presidential 

election. And perhaps we are moving towards a rapprochement. Perhaps we are moving 

towards a new Russia reset, although I’m sure that they won’t call it that. [Laughter.] 

Basically, there are two models for how you can do nuclear waste management, and 

they more or less depend on the relationship between Russia and the United States. So 

I’ll just go through them quickly. 

There’s one model for if U.S.–Russian relations improve, and there’s one model if we 

continue the status quo. If we see improved relations between Washington and Moscow, 

it becomes possible to develop what we’d call an extensive separate program for nuclear 

waste governance, basically a revamp of AMEC, as we talked about before. 

AMEC, the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, existed between 1996 and 

2006-ish, and it consisted of Norway, the United States, and Russia and the United 

Kingdom for some part of the period. And it was a relatively successful cooperation that 

focused on these issues. They had some very concrete results. It was possible to invest 

heavily in containers for storage of spent naval fuels. It developed programs in waste processing technologies and radiation monitoring and a lot of other very concrete issues which 

I’m sure Nils knows a lot better than I do. 

And there are basically two reasons why it was very successful. The first reason was 

that it engaged what you could call local stakeholders, especially Norway because Norway 

has a very big stake in nuclear waste management. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that 

Nils’s foundation is located in Oslo. And it goes back to, like, if you look at the Norwegian 

economy, when you think about the Norwegian economy, normally you think about oil and 

gas. But actually, fishing makes up a fairly substantial part of Norway’s economy. And 

if you do a lot of fishing in the Bering Sea, you do not want newspaper stories about 

nuclear waste in those seas; people do not want to eat radioactive fish. And Norway, 

therefore, became very engaged in AMEC, and Norway was able to engage various funds 

in Europe and in the Nordic countries, and generate significant funds and significant 

expertise for nuclear waste management. So that was the first thing, engage local stakeholders. 

The second thing was that here in the U.S. it was possible to link nuclear waste 

management, which is, I guess, basically an environmental issue, with national security, 

especially strategic arms control and nonproliferation. AMEC became closely linked to the 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and that created two advantages. First of all, 

it meant that it was possible to funnel funds from Nunn-Lugar to AMEC and use some 

of those funds to sponsor some of all these projects. And I can talk about why you can 
10 

make that connection and why nuclear waste management is important for strategic arms 

control. So that was one advantage, more funds. 

The second advantage was that it was also possible to circumvent Russian restrictions. Russia can be kind of bureaucratic once in a while and it’s—Norway at least experienced some problems with these projects when it came to importing different things to 

Russia. But the United States didn’t have the same problem because the Nunn-Lugar 

whole cooperation system was made in a way where these restrictions couldn’t apply, so 

that meant that Russia couldn’t—the Russian bureaucracy had a hard time blocking all 

of these projects. 

And in a more simple way, it was just easier to implement all of these projects in 

AMEC because there were fewer parties. Fewer parties means that it’s easier to make 

decisions and it’s easier to actually implement projects. 

But, of course, there were some downsides to this extensive separate program model. 

It depends on a beneficial geopolitical environment. And as you all may know, the 

Ukraine crisis has closed down most strategic arms control with Russia. And that means 

that if we continue with the status quo, perhaps we have to look at a more humble or 

more narrow approach. And that will be basically what Julia just talked about, projects 

within the Arctic Council. 

The Arctic Council, as I said before, has survived the Ukraine crisis, cooperation has 

continued, and the Arctic Council has a lot of existing programs that can be beefed up 

to engage with these issues. You have, as Julia said, the containment action program, the 

monitoring and assessment program and the protection of Arctic marine environment, and 

other working groups that already look at these issues. And they can just be used to— 

they can just be beefed up, basically. 

Another option is to create a separate working group. These working groups are fairly 

easy to develop, but it’s possible to create a new working group that could look specifically 

at nuclear waste management. And that approach has two advantages. It’s possible to do 

during the Ukraine crisis, if the Ukraine crisis continues, and you don’t have to invent 

a new framework, because the Arctic Council is an existing model. You can basically just 

plug and play into that model. 

But there are, of course, a couple of downsides to that approach. It’s more difficult 

to get funding. It’s more difficult to make issue linkage, which is one of the key ways you 

generate funding. And especially because when it comes to—if projects are put under an 

Arctic Council umbrella, it cannot be linked to national security because the Arctic 

Council doesn’t do security. And if you keep it in the Arctic Council, there will be more 

actors involved. The Arctic Council has eight members. It has a bunch of indigenous 

groups as members. And it has a bunch of observers as well, and governance is just a 

little bit more complicated. But yeah, that’s the key takeaway. 

It’s possible to do something about nuclear waste management, even during the 

Ukraine crisis. If U.S.–Russian relations improve, you can do a more extensive, separate 

model, which would probably be more efficient. But even under the status quo, you can 

operate with a smaller model under the Arctic Council. 

Mr. MASSARO. All right. Well, thank you very much, Jon. 

I guess we’ll move now to the Q&A section. I’ll start off with two questions and then 

I’ll open it to the floor for additional questions. 
11 

To begin, I guess this one is for anyone who would like to take the question. Has 

the United States made sufficient efforts to clean up our past issues with nuclear material 

in the Arctic and elsewhere, including nuclear submarines, the jettisoning of bombs, the 

Thule incident on Greenland, and any other related activity? Thank you. 

Why don’t we start with Nils? 

Mr. BOHMER. Well, I’m not going to answer that question. No. But I just would like 

to emphasize that there has been a lot of discussion lately about the U.S. reactor at 

Greenland with the melting of the Greenland ice, and how are you guys going to solve 

that. And as far as I understand, it’s a wait-and-see approach to that. I don’t think that 

is a good approach. I think at least the funding, some be made available so that it’s possible to do something with that reactor. So, it’s not only Russia that has Arctic nuclear 

challenges there. 

Mr. MASSARO. And with that we’ll go to Julia or—[laughter]—— 

Ms. GOURLEY. Luckily I don’t work at DOD. [Laughter.] I don’t have much sight on 

that except I have heard the term—the place in Greenland is called Camp Century. And 

it is the subject of lively debate right now. And I am happily ignorant of it all. 

But there’s also, you know, there’s also—we have the base at Thule, Greenland. And 

I think in the past there may have been some discovery of radiologicals in the ice underneath, so I think there might actually be some issues there as well. But DOD is dealing 

with it and I get to stay out of it. [Laughs.] 

Mr. MASSARO. Jon? 

Mr. RAHBEK-CLEMMENSEN. I’ll just chime in. For those of you who don’t know the 

background: During the Cold War the U.S. built a base under the sea—under the ice in 

Greenland with a nuclear reactor, which is very cool and very ‘‘Star Wars’’-y. [Laughter.] 

But it unfortunately didn’t work, because apparently ice moves, and when the base was 

left, the thought was that, OK, these nuclear materials will be stored in the ice and, 

therefore, will be safe in the long term. And in the meantime, we’ve had climate change 

and now there’s a big discussion about whether or not these nuclear materials will spill 

out and contaminate the environment. 

And I would just add that solving that issue also plays into a very complicated triangular dynamic between the United States, Denmark and Greenland where there’s a 

legacy of unfortunate incidents during the Cold War, which the autonomous government 

of Greenland holds against both the United States and Denmark. And it’s a very complicated political environment to operate in. So, if the United States wants to flip the bill 

on this one, I’m pretty sure that the government in Copenhagen would be very happy. 

Mr. MASSARO. Great. Well, thank you very much. 

And let me move on to the next question there. I think we can assume that all countries react more positively to, say, the urging or pressure from particular countries or 

institutions or in particular fora depending on the country. So, with regard to Russia and 

with regard to the nuclear pollution issue that they’re dealing with, what countries or 

institutions or fora do they react best to? Where’s the best place to pursue this? 

I guess we’ll start up with Nils again and move down. 

Mr. BOHMER. Well, how do you mean pursue? Do you mean by with funding or with 

technical questions or with how to—— 

Mr. MASSARO. Let me just say in general and leave it there. 
12 

Mr. BOHMER. OK. Well, OK, then I’ll start with the funding and see how we go. There 

is some funding put aside in the EBRD, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—there is a nuclear window there consisting of 150 million euros linked to the 

cleanup of the nuclear waste in the Arctic. And a lot of that will be going to deal with 

the waste in Andreeva Bay. So, I think that will be a good start, at least on the funding, 

because there is still a lack of funding. I think that it’s lacking 700 or 800 million euros 

in order to clean out the Andreeva Bay. And you could argue that, well, this is something 

Russia should do. It has had a strong economy and they’re, as you see, spending, building 

now eight to nine new nuclear submarines. Then they should also be doing that cleanup 

work themselves, they should afford that and prioritize that. 

But I think also that the Arctic Council is a good way. There’s no need to create 

another vehicle. We have the Arctic Council, I think that is a very good, good vehicle for 

the international agenda, but also the bilateral agenda. Norway, Russia has had very good 

cooperation on the nuclear issue also during the latest Crimea crisis, because Russia sees 

this as maybe soft policy and where they can cooperate with Norway. And Norway has 

their own interest, as I said, fisheries and also tourism are the two main income sources 

in Norway, so it’s important to keep the Arctic, especially the Norwegian part of the 

Arctic, clean from radioactivity. 

Mr. MASSARO. Right. 

Mr. BOHMER. So they have their own interests there. So also the Norwegian Government could be a part of this agreement. 

Mr. MASSARO. Either of you like to speak to that? 

Mr. RAHBEK-CLEMMENSEN. Yes. 

Mr. MASSARO. Great. 

Mr. RAHBEK-CLEMMENSEN. Yes. Well, I’ll just more or less second what Nils just said, 

that if I was the new Secretary of State, I would also go for an Arctic Council solution 

that just, in general, seems a lot more realistic. [Laughter.] 

That being said, the tectonic plates of U.S. foreign policy seem to be moving right 

now. And I would just also flag that if there’s going to be a rapprochement between Russia 

and the United States, then it would be possible that we could see a total change. In that 

case, it could be possible, as I said, to do something along the lines as AMEC. And that 

would not only be good for Arctic nuclear governance, but it would also—could also perhaps be a way for Russia and the United States to reengage one another in a fairly— 

on a concrete matter, which would help U.S.-Russian relations. And that’s what I have. 

Mr. MASSARO. Julia, you’d like to add something? 

Ms. GOURLEY. Yes, I think I completely agree as well. And AMEC was quite a useful 

forum. I agree with both of you. And it was a safe topic. You know, working on environmental issues is fairly safe between—on a mil-to-mil basis between Russia and the U.S. 

And in fact, we, DOD and Norway, sort of tried to emulate AMEC a little bit through 

something called the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, which is funded with defense, 

environmental international cooperation funding that DOD has called DEIC for short; 

defense, environmental international cooperation. The DEIC funding that was the basis 

for creating this Arctic security forces roundtable, which is the eight military—well, I 

sometimes say military—but the eight Arctic states plus the military engagement from— 

I think it’s France, Germany, Netherlands and U.K.—is sort of an attempt to focus again 

on environmental issues mil-to-mil. 
13 

I don’t think Russia is very excited about it, though, because Russia prefers to do 

all Arctic engagements among the eight, and in some cases among the five, coastal states. 

But I would also add that, as far as we understand from where we sit, we see, we hear 

that and observe, that Russia very much likes the BEAC, or Barents Euro-Arctic Council 

forum, and, maybe to a lesser extent, the Council of the Baltic Sea States as regional 

places to deal with Arctic issues as well. But I think the Arctic Council seems to be the 

favorite place for Russian engagement on Arctic issues with the other countries, including, 

in some cases, on nuclear issues. 

Mr. MASSARO. All right, great. Thank you very much. 

Let’s go ahead and open the floor to questions. Do we have any questions? 

All right, Scott. Jordan’s going to bring you a mic. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you. My name is Scott Cullinane, I work for the House Foreign 

Affairs Europe Subcommittee. 

Nils, as you were describing the various possible ways that the stored nuclear waste 

could leak out or contaminate the environment, I’m curious if there’s any real-time monitoring on that. If one of those scenarios you described began to happen, how long would 

it take for someone to notice it was happening? 

Mr. BOHMER. Well, there are several real-time monitoring equipment on the Kola 

Peninsula. So, you would, in theory—they are, in theory, online. So, in theory, you would 

know quite as soon as it happens. But I think that those online monitoring facilities will 

be taken offline very soon by the Russian authorities. 

Norway and Russia have an agreement on early warning on nuclear accidents; they 

have had that agreement for over 20 years, but it has never been used from the Russian 

side. They have now agreed on a new set of rules, ground rules, so that now Norway 

should be warned by Russia if any potential radioactive releases are coming. 

A couple of years ago, there was a fire on a nuclear submarine in Murmansk, which 

the Russian authorities did acknowledge; they claimed that the fire was put out, but the 

fire continued for 20 hours after authorities said that it was put out. So I think that, no, 

we will not know. We will read it in the media or we will find rumors on Facebook before 

that happens. 

And also, when it comes to the dumped material, which maybe has the most dramatic 

consequence if the water starts to leak into the reactors, there are no measurements 

there. There have been year-to-year Russian and sometimes Russian-Norwegian expeditions doing measurement around the wreck, making sure that there are no leakages out 

of that wreck, but there’s no online measurement of that dumped material. 

Mr. MASSARO. Julia, Jon, either of you like to add anything? OK, great. Thanks, 

Scott. 

Do we have any other questions? 

Alex? 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you very much. Alex Tiersky, also with the Helsinki Commission. 

As the global security and political-military affairs adviser at the Commission, I 

promise not to ask you the typical question about the frightening Russian military deployments in the region. I’ve heard the message that that is not a huge concern from some 

of you before. 
14 

What I would ask you is two words that I didn’t hear from any of you specifically, 

which actually surprised me and that are in the security realm, that are directly related 

to this issue of nuclear waste, which is theft or diversion. And I’m wondering what the 

fora are for discussing concerns about theft or diversion. 

I mean, I very carefully was looking at the pictures of Andreeva Bay. I’m not sure 

if I’m pronouncing it correctly. But it looks like a facility where you were talking about 

reactor cores as being stored, not a great deal of security. To what extent is this an issue? 

Is this an element of the discussion that you used to promote the cause of cleanup and 

proper storage of facilities? 

And Julia, if I could ask you, is this a point of discussion in the Arctic Council specifically on theft and diversion? Thank you. 

Mr. BOHMER. Well, I think that compared to what the situation was in the 1990s, 

the situation in northwest Russia has been much more improved when it comes to security issues or the risk of theft of nuclear material. It is much more difficult for me, for 

example, to get onto the nuclear bases than it used to be in the 1990s. I could more or 

less walk freely with no security and no security at all. I think, speaking about northwest 

Russia, I think that the material storage is much better guarded today than it was 10, 

15 years ago because the FSB has much more power now and there is a lot of bend and 

a lot of, also with U.S. assistance, on safety and security operations around the bases. 

There could be other areas in Siberia that are maybe less guarded where there has 

been less international attention. But I think northwest Russia is quite—it’s relatively 

secure. 

Mr. MASSARO. Yes? 

Ms. GOURLEY. As to the Arctic Council, we actually don’t discuss it there. And I don’t 

really know why. I think because, the best answer I can give is that the structure of the 

Council has been so environmentally focused and not so much on security matters. That 

said, the only explicit exclusion from the Council’s mandate is military security, so talking 

about national security, environmental security, health security kinds of issues are well 

within its mandate. 

So, getting to Jon’s point about the possible need for a new working group in the 

Arctic Council on nuclear security kinds of issues, that’s actually something worth 

thinking about. That would be an obvious topic to take up. 

Mr. MASSARO. Nothing to say on that one, Jon? All right, great. 

Any other questions? A chance to get your name in the Congressional Record. All 

right. 

Yeah, Mark, please? Jordan? 

Mr. MILOSCH. Hi, my name is Mark Milosch and I’m the Chief of Staff at the 

Commission. 

I’d like to pick up on the questions that Paul asked, which Paul and I talked about 

before, and maybe try to come at it from another angle or drill down a little further. 

On Camp Century, what occurred to me while you were talking about that was, 

maybe that’s actually helpful, if we wanted to approach the Russians about work that 

needs to be done in cleaning up a mess in the Arctic. If we have some work to do, too, 

maybe that sets it up in a more helpful way, where it’s not you need to do X, but it’s 

rather it’s we need to do something. So, if you had any thoughts on that, I’d be interested. 
15 

But the bigger question would be on what’s the best forum, organization? Part of 

thinking on that one was perhaps the U.S. is the worst figure to raise this issue because 

we’re the ones who—if the United States shows up and says you have a lot of work to 

do in the Arctic, you know, we’re the party they least want to hear that from. Maybe it 

comes better from some other country or in some kind of multilateral forum or from some 

kind of NGO. And at which point the question for us is, well, the Commissioners, Chairman would like to be constructively engaged on this. The Arctic Forum is really not a 

great one for our Helsinki Commission engagement or for our congressmen on the 

Commission to be engaged. So, any thoughts you have on that? 

And I would just add to that that maybe the answer is that it works better if it’s 

not framed as Arctic, but as the world’s oceans. I mean, there are a number of times U.S. 

bombers were going down, they had to jettison bombs during the Cold War and they’re 

at the bottom of the ocean today, or planes that went down, subs that—we didn’t scuttle 

them as far as I understand—but they went down. Or maybe it’s not framing it geographically more broadly, maybe it’s framing it thematically more broadly as cleanup rather 

than nuclear. 

Any thoughts you had on that would be helpful to us as Paul and I put our heads 

together, hopefully with you guys, and figuring out what would be a good way for the 

Chairman and Commission to be engaged on this. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BOHMER. If I may? 

Mr. MASSARO. Go ahead, Nils. 

Mr. BOHMER. No, I think maybe—I think your last comment was that we should 

maybe focus away from the Arctic and maybe have a more global approach. I think legacy 

waste is a very good expression, because you have legacy waste in Hanford, you have it 

in Sellafield in the U.K., you have it—a lot of it in Mayak. 

I think there has been a lot of focus, there has been a lot of work going on there. 

But I think that the legacy waste generally, a broader term, there is a lot of work to be 

done, both here in the U.S., also in the U.K., also in Russia. 

And I think also, coming back to AMEC, I think one of the good things or the reason 

for the success was that it was trilateral. You had Russia, U.S. and tiny, little, innocent 

Norway as a third part. And I think that also made sure that we could be this kind of 

go-between guy now between Russia and the United States. And I think that that is also 

a good way forward. 

For example, in the center, maybe Denmark could be this kind of—or maybe they 

are too heavily invested. Or maybe Norway should—but there, I think it also would be 

good if the U.S. put a bit more effort in cleaning up in the Arctic, whereas they also have 

some RTGs in Alaska in the Arctic that could be dealt with, but yes. 

Mr. MASSARO. Any other thoughts? 

Jon? 

Mr. RAHBEK-CLEMMENSEN. Yes, well, I’d like to say something about that because I 

think, actually, I think it’s a really good idea. I normally I leave the diplomatic tactics 

to the people who actually do it, people like Julia. But I think you’re quite right that if 

it can be framed as a project that’s not, as you say, finger-wagging against Russia, then 

you have a better chance of actually doing something productive and constructive in that 

regard. I think that part of your question was actually quite brilliant. 
16 

Regarding the second half of your question, would it be better if we didn’t talk about 

nuclear waste as an Arctic problem, but as a global problem? If I was being devil’s advocate, I would raise one concern. Whenever you have an Arctic issue, whenever someone 

begins to talk about the Arctic as a global issue, the alarm bells go off in Moscow and 

in Oslo and in Copenhagen, because these states—and in Ottawa as well—because these 

states really like to keep it as an exclusive club. And their biggest fear is that somehow 

the Arctic becomes a global issue, someone comes and takes the responsibility and the 

power to do things about the Arctic away from them and puts it in the U.N. or something. 

The greatest fear is an Arctic treaty. 

So, I think it’s a good idea, but I would raise that there would be a lot of legwork 

in it to convince a lot of these Arctic countries that perhaps this is not an attempt to take 

away their power. 

Mr. MASSARO. Excellent, thank you so much. 

Other questions? OK. 

Let me just ask a very short, very standard sort of follow-up question, and that’s, 

you know, you guys have given us these great presentations today, lots to think about 

and lots of thoughts and recommendations, too. What would be the number one or top 

three things that the United States Congress should be doing right now on this issue? 

Julia? 

Ms. GOURLEY. Well, certainly funding the or providing or reinvigorating the—— 

Mr. MASSARO. Money, right? [Laughter.] 

Ms. GOURLEY. Cooperative Threat Reduction program and encouraging the reinvigoration also of the AMEC forum. And the mil-to-mil cooperation, which is largely dead now, 

at least between Russia and the U.S., and I think all the allies and Russia, which is certainly the way it has to be. But finding these noncontroversial areas, you know, as we’ve 

done in the Arctic Council. We’ve been able to sort of carve it out in a way, I mean, not 

entirely away from the Ukraine issues, and certainly if things happen and go south on 

that front, all bets may be off for the Arctic Council, too, but finding ways to get mil-tomil cooperation back on track in areas that are nonthreatening and maybe not so controversial would seem like a number two after funding for various things like the Cooperative Threat Reduction program would be good places to start, I think, for Congress. 

Mr. MASSARO. Any other thoughts? 

Mr. RAHBEK-CLEMMENSEN. Yes. I’m not an expert on congressional politics. 

[Laughter.] But I think that this could be an area where perhaps a new administration 

doesn’t really have a set agenda and where it’s actually possible to move something and 

move some thinking in the State Department and in the White House. And I think that 

would be my takeaway, that and more money, of course. 

Mr. MASSARO. Nils? 

Mr. BOHMER. Well, I agree. And I think this important if you call it the Trump 

restart or whatever you think—[laughter]—no, but I think there’s a need for dialogue 

between Russia or Moscow and Washington on military issues. And if you can have some 

sort of military-environmental cleanup project, that could be this kind of soft project that 

could start up this dialogue. Because I think that dialogue has been very closed these 

couple of years. So, any project that makes this bilateral dialogue better would be very 

good. 
17 

And I think doing this environmental project is easier to do than arms reduction. 

Yeah. 

Mr. MASSARO. Well, great. If there are no more questions, all right, I’d like to thank 

our briefers one more time. Great presentations, great answers. 

Jon, very funny, ‘‘Star Wars.’’ 

And let me also thank Jordan Warlick, intern at the Helsinki Commission, who basically pulled this whole thing together. Thank you very much, Jordan. 

And with that, the briefing is concluded. 

Thank you. [Applause.] 

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the briefing ended.] 
18 

SLIDE PRESENTATION BY NILS BOHMER 
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