## NO. 12-07-00393-CV IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

JESS IE J OH NSO N A ND WIF

E, ILA STE EL JOHNSON, § APPEAL F ROM THE S EVE

NTH APPELLANTS
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TO M CO NN ER AN D W IFE, LI SA CO NN ER, § SMI TH CO UN TY

, T EXAS APP ELL EES OPINION In th e ir su it f or re fo rm a tio n o f a

de e d, Jes si e John so n a

nd I la Ste e l John so n, wh o s old proper ty to Tom Conner and L isa Conner, appe al the trial c ourt’s orde r g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

the Conners. In one issue, the Johnsons co n tend that the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt beca

use t here wer e disputed fa ct issues reg ardingtheir cla im of mutual mist ake in t he e xec uti on

of the de e d. We a ff

ir m.

B ACKG ROUND Th e J ohns on s li ste d f

or ty a c re s o f l and

that th e y ow ne d n e ar Wh ite ho us e in S mith Co un ty with rea l estate ag ent El aine Burg ess. Bur g ess s howed the proper ty to the Conners. She later drew up a fa rm and ranc h contra ct on a printed form promulg ated by the Texas Re al Estate Commissi on, which wa s signe d by

both the J ohnsons a

nd the Conners. Unde r the re levant sec tion for the issue be fo re us , th e c on tr a c t in

its pr int e d f

or m sa id a s f

oll ow s:

R E SE R V A T IO N S: Sel l er res erves t he f ol l ow i ng m i neral , w ater , roya l t y, t i mber, or other i n ter ests:2

Bu rge s s , o nth e b l an k

l i n e b el o w t h ats t at em en t , wr o t e b y h an d th e f o l l o wi n g:

N one of t he above ar e avai l abl e t o be c onve yed . Th e de e d c onve ying the pr op e rt y , wh ic h wa s pr e pa

re d ba se d on the te rm s of th is con tr a c t, contained the following clause :

R E S E R V A T IO N S F R O M A N D E X C E P T IO N S T O C O N V E Y A N C E A N D W A R R A N T Y :

T hi s co nveyance i s m ad e and accep t ed s ub ject t o t he f o l l o wi n g m at t ers , t o t he ext ent s ame ar e i n e f

f ect at t hi s t i me: Any an d al l ea s eme n t s , ri g h t s of way , an d pre s cr i pt i v e r i g h t s , wh et h er of r ec or d or no t ; al l present l y record ed res t ri ct i o ns, res ervat i o ns, co venant s, co nd i t i o ns, oil and gas l eases, m ine ral s everances, and other i nst rume nt s, other t han l i ens and co nveyances , t hat af

f ect t he p rop ert y , ri ght s o f ad joini ng o wners i n any wall s and fen c e s situa te d o n a c o m m o n b o u n d a ry; a n y d isc re p a n c ie s, c o n fli c ts o r sh o rta g e s in
ar ea or b oundar y l i ne; any encr oachment s o r over l appi ng of i mp r ovement s ; t axe s f or 2004, t h e pay men t of w h i ch G r an t ee a s s u mes , a n d s u bs equ en t a s s es s men t s f or t h at a n d pr i or y ea r s du e t o c h an g e i n l an d u s ag e, own er s h i p or bot h , t h e pay men t of
w hich G ran t ee assum es.

I mmediately

following this section of the dee d, the g rantingclause provides that

G rant o r, f

o r t he co nsi d erat i o n he re inb ef o re s t at ed and s ub ject t o t he rese rva t i o ns f

ro m an d ex ce p t i o ns t o co nv eya nc e and w arra nty , st ated he rein, gran t s, se lls, a n d c o n v e ys to G ra n te e the p ro p e rty, to g e the r w ith a ll a n d sing u la r th e rig h ts and a pp ur t ena nce s t her et o i n a ny wi s e bel ongi ng t o hav e a nd hol d i t t o G r ant ee.
The Johnsons s igne d the deed at closi ng
. L ess than two y ear s later, the Johnsons learned that the Conners we re r ece iving pa y ments under a

n oil and g as lea se the C o n n er s had executed on the fo rt y a c re s. Th e John so ns su

bs e qu e ntl y

br ou g ht s uit

a g a ins t th e Conne rs a sk ingthe tr ia l c ourt to ref orm the deed convey

ing the land to the Conners beca use the deed did not re flec t the provisions of t he contract. The Conners filed a traditional motion for summ ary judgme nt in which they argued that the dee d was unambiguous a nd conveyed all of the estate owned by the J ohnsons at the time they signe d it . A s th e ir

on ly summa ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e , th e y a tta c he d a

c op y of the deed . In th e ir response , the J ohnsons argued that the sa les contra ct stated that no minerals we re be ing c onvey ed, they thought they

wer e sig ning a

deed that reser

ved to them their minera ls, and the Conners thoug ht3

they wer e obtainingno minerals. There fore , they alleg ed, the deed was not in compliance with the contra ct and was executed by mutual mist ake. A s summary judgme nt evidence , they

prese nted the aff idavit of Elaine B urg ess and the sa les contra ct. The tria l court gra nted the Conners’ motion for

summa ry jud g me nt, fi nd ing that the de e d th e John so ns signe d w a s unambi g uo us and c on ve y e d a ll of their e state in the land, includingtheir minera l interest. This appea l followed.

S UM M ARY J UDGMENT In their sol e i s sue, the Johnsons contend that the trial court e rre d in gr anting summary judgme nt in favor of

the Conners be cause they raised a fact question on the i ssue of mutual mist ake in the execution of the dee d. They contend, ther efor e, that they are entitled to refor

mation. Stand ard of Review We reviewthe trial court’s summary judgme nt de novo. V

alenc eOp e ra ting

Co. v . D or se tt , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). The movants for traditional summary judgme nt must show that there is no g enuine issue of m ater ial fac t and that they are entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. SeeT EX
. R. C IV
. P. 166a(c) . When review ing a summary judgme nt, we take as true a ll ev i d ence fa vo ra ble to the no nmo va

nts , an d we ind

ulg e e ve ry re a so na

ble inf e re nc e and re so lve any

do ub ts i n the nonmovants’ fa

vor. V alence Ope ratin g Co. , 164 S.W .3d at 661. W h en defe ndants move for summary judgme nt, they

must neg ate at least one e ssential ele m en t o f the nonmovants’ ca use of action or prove all essential ele ments of an a ffirmative defe nse. Randal l’s Food Markets, In c. v. Johns on , 89 1 S. W. 2 d

6 4 0 , 6 4 4 ( T e x. 1 9 9 5 )

. O n c e th e mo v an ts e s ta b li s hth e ir

r igh t t o s u mm ary j u d gm en tas a m at t er

o f l aw , t h e b urd en s h i ft s t o th e n o n m o v an t s t o p re s en t e v i d en ce ra i s i n g a g enuine issue of materia l f act, there by prec luding summary judgme nt. See City of Houst on v. Clear Cre ek Ba sin A uth. , 5 89 S.W. 2d 67 1, 67 8- 79 (T e x. 19 79 ). Ev ide nc e is co nc lus ive on ly if re a so na ble people could not differ

in their conc lusions. City of Keller v. Wilson , 1 6 8 S. W. 3 d 8 0 2 , 8 1 6 ( T e x. 2005). The Deed Whether a de ed is ambig uous is a question of law f or the c ourt, which we revie w de novo. Go re Oi l Co . v . Ro os th , 1 58 S.W. 3d

59 6, 59 9 ( Te x. Ap p. –E a stl and 20 05 , n o p e t.)

. Th e pr ima ry duty of a c ourt wh e n c on str

uin g a de e d is to as c e rt a in the int e nt o f t he pa rt ie s f ro m a ll o f t

he langua g e in4

the dee d by the fundame ntal rule of construction known as the “four corne rs” r

ule. Lucke l v

. W hite , 819 S.W .2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). The intent that gover ns, howeve r, i s not the intent that the parties meant but failed to express but, rathe r, the intent that is expressed. Roo sth , 1 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t5 9 9

. If

a wr itt e n instrume nt is wor de d in su c h a wa y that a c ou rt may pr op e rl y g ive it a c e rt a in o r d e fi nit e leg al m eaning or i nterpre tation, it is not ambig uous. R & P Ent ers. v. LaGuarta, Gavre l & Ki rk, Inc. , 5 9 6 S. W. 2 d 5 1 7 , 5 1 9 ( T e x. 1 9 8 0 )

. A d e e d w il l b e c o n s tr u e d to c o n f

e r u p o n th e g r an te e the g reatest estate that the terms of the instrument will permit. See Lo tt v . L ott , 370 S.W .2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963); McMillan v. Dooley , 1 44 S.W. 3d 15 9, 18 5 ( Te x. Ap p. –E a stl and 20 04 , p e t. d e nie d) ; see also Jasper State Ban k v. Goodrich , 1 07 S.W. 2d 60 0, 60 2 (T e x. Civ

. Ap p. –B e a umo nt 1 93 7, wr it dis m.w .o .j. ) ( “ [T]he law c an in du lg e the pr e sumpt ion that the g ra

nto r ‘ int e nd s to c on ve y

the tr a c t to which he ha s titl e’ . .

. when that presumption does not do violence to the languag e of the deed.” ). A w arr anty

de e d w ill pa ss a ll o f t

he e state ow ne d by the g ra nto r a t th e tim e of

the c on ve y anc e un le ss there are rese rvations or exceptions that r educe the estate conveyed. Shar p v. Fowler , 151 Tex. 490, 49 3, 25 2 S .W .2 d 153, 15 4 ( Te x. 19 52 ); Cockrell v. Te x. Gulf Su lfur Co. , 157 Tex. 10, 15, 299 S.W. 2d 67 2, 67 5 ( Te x. 19 56 ); Le wis v . M idg e tt , 448 S.W .2d 548, 551 (Tex. Civ. App.–Ty ler 1969, no writ). See also Me lto n v . D av is , 443 S.W .2d 605, 60 8 (T ex
. C i v
. App.–Tyler 1969, wr it ref’ d

n. r. e .) (H e ld t

hat if a pp e lle e s h a d inte nd e d to re se rv e the dis pute d mine ra ls, the y c ou ld have do ne so by a pt l angua g e sp e c if

ic a lly and un e qu ivo c a lly e xpre ssi ng su c h int e nt; havin g fa ile d to do so , ti tle to the mineral e state in question passed to appe llants under the de ed.). The re servations clause of t he deed i ndicates that the J ohnsons sold the property subject to,

amon g o th er

m at t er s , “a l l p re s en t l y

re co rd edre s tri ct i o n s , re s erv at i o n s , co v en an t s , co n d i t i o n s , oil and g as lea ses, m inera l severa nces, a nd other instruments . . . that af fec t the proper

ty .” The g ranting clause conveyed to the Conners the proper ty and a l l rig hts the J ohnsons had in the prope rty

. See Cockre ll , 1 57 Te x. a t 15 , 2 99 S.W. 2d a t 67 5. Th e de e d d id n ot e xplic itl y re se rv e the min e ra l r ig hts

. See Melton , 443 S.W .2d at 608. The trial court corr ectly deter mined that the languag e used in the de e d s ig ne d by the John so ns in co nv e ying the fo rt y a c re s to the Conne rs wa s unambi g uo us , th e y did not reser ve the miner als, and they conveyed all of the estate the y owned at the time they executed the dee d in favor of

the Conners. The ref

ore, the trial cou rt corr ectly found that the Conner s established their r ight to summary judgme nt a s a matter of law based on the deed. T he burde n then5

shifted to the J ohnsons to present evide nce r aising a fa ct question. City of Houst on , 589 S.W .2d at 678-79. The Contract Whether a c ontrac t is ambiguous is a que stion of law for the court to de cide by looking at the contra ct as a

whole in light of

the circ umstances pr esent when the contra ct was e ntere d. Coker v. Coker , 6 50 S.W. 2d

39 1, 39 4 ( Te x. 19 83 ). I f a c on tr a c t is so wo rd e d th a t it c an b e g ive n a

c e rt a in or def inite leg al meaningor interpre tation, the n it is not ambig uous and the c ourt will construe the contra ct as a

matter of la

w. Id. at 393. When construinga contr act, the pa rties’ intent must be taken from the a g ree ment itself and the a g ree ment must be enfor ced as written. Ja c ob so n v . D P P artne rs Lt d. P’ ship , 245 S.W .3d 102, 106 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2008, no pe t.). In her a ffidavit, B urg ess stated that, when they listed the property , the J ohnsons “wer e ver y emphatic” that “they

wer e not selling their minera ls, which they owned.” S h e s ai d t h at when she sh ow e d th e pr opert y to th e Co nn e rs , s he tol d th e m th e John so ns we re no t se lli ngany of the ir minerals and thus no minera ls were to be conve y ed. She st ated that the offe r to purcha se wa s made with the knowledg e that the J ohnsons wer e to reta in the m inera ls. She explained that she adde d the wordingunder the “Reser vations” section in the contra ct to c larify that the J ohnsons were keeping their minera ls. She said that when the contra ct was rea dy to be signe d, she re iterate d to Mr. Conner that the J ohnsons were not selling their miner als. Bur g ess stated that at closing she tho u g ht the J ohnsons’ minerals had be en re serve d. She further explained that, in 2006, she learne d that the dee d did not reser

ve the miner als so she had a corr ection dee d drawn up. Bur g ess, i n her affidavit, attempted to cr eate an ambiguity stating that the languag e she use d in the contra ct meant that the J ohnsons were rese rving their minera ls. Howeve r, whe n Bur g ess had

an opportunity to state in the “Reser vations” section of the contra ct that the minerals wer e be ing

rese rved, she wrote “ none of the above a re a vailable to b e co n v ey ed.” We a ffor d the words contained in the a g ree m en t their plain, ordinar y , and g ener ally

acc epted mea

ning, unle ss the instrument require s otherwise. Natural Gas Clearingh ouse v. Midgard Energy Co. , 113 S.W .3d 400, 407 (Tex. A

pp.–Amarillo 2003, pet. denied)

. The operative word Bur g ess used in the contra ct was “available ,” which me ans “pr esent a nd rea dy for use , on hand, ac cessible.” A MER I C AN H ER I TA GE C OL L EGE D I C T I O N A RY 9 4 (3 d ed. 2000). This languag e, on its fac e, mea ns that the6

John so ns did

no t ha ve any min e ra ls t o c on ve y

to the Conne rs . T hat is the on ly re a so na ble interpre tation of the languag e used by Bur g ess in the contra ct. B urg ess’s interpr etation of the langua g e in the c ontr a c t, as e xpla ine d in her a ff ida vit , is not re a so na

ble

. An ambi g uit

y do e s not a

ri se simply beca use the pa

rties adva

nced c onfl i ct i ng interpre tations of the contra ct; rathe r for an ambig uity to exi st, both int erpr etations must be rea sonable. Jacobson , 245 S.W .3d at 106. Parol evidenc e is not admissible to rende r a contra ct ambiguous that, on its face , is capa ble of be ing g iven a def inite leg al meaning

. Id. A mutual mistake of fa ct occurs when the parties to an agr eeme nt have a common intention, but the written contra ct does not re fl ec t t h e i n t en t ion of the par ties due to a mutual mistake. N. Natural Gas v. Ch isos Join t V enture I , 142 S.W .3d 447, 456 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2004, no pet.). In order for the a ffirmat i v e d ef

en se of mutual mistake to be sustaine d on summary judgme nt, the de fe nd ants mus t r a ise fa c t is su e s sh ow ing th at th e c on tr a c tin g pa rt ie s w e re a c tin g un de r t

he same mi s un d e r s ta

n d in g o f th e s ame mate r ial fac t. Id. Where it is alleg ed that by rea son of mutual mis take , a

n a g re e me nt d oe s n ot e xpre ss t he real in ten ti ons o f t

he pa rt ie s, e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e is admissible to show the rea l ag ree ment. Id. A mutual mistake asser

ting a materia l f

act constitutes a g round for avoiding a contr act, but the mistake must be mutual rathe r t h an unilatera l. Holley v. Grigg , 6 5 S. W. 3 d 2 8 9 , 2 9 5 ( T e x. App.–Eastland 2001, no pe t

. ). When seekingrelief from a mutual mistake, the parties se eking ref ormation must of course prove what the true ag ree ment was, but their c ase is not made by proof that there was an ag ree ment which is at varianc e with the wr iting. Estes v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas , 462 S.W. 2d 27 3, 27 5 (T e x. 19 70 ). Th e y mus t go fu rt he r a nd e sta bli shthe fa c t th a t th e te rm s or provisions of t he wr iting that diffe r fr om the true a g ree ment made we re pla ced in the instrument by mutual mistake

. Id. We are further reminded by

our supre me cour

t that the doctrine of

mutual

m i stake must not routinely be ava ilable to avoid the re sults of an unhappy barg ain. Willi am s v. Gl as h , 789 S.W .2d 261, 265 (Tex. 1990). The J ohnsons, in their response t o the C onners’ motion for summ ary judgme nt, argued that the contra ct stated that no minerals were being conveyed and the deed, which was not in complianc e with the contra ct, was e x ecute d by mutual mistake. The J ohnsons specific ally stated they

believed they wer e re servingtheir minera ls in the forty acr es whe n they signe d both the real estate c ontrac t7

and the de ed. B urg ess, ac cordingto her a ffidavit attac hed to t heir re sponse, also thoug ht the John so ns we re re se rv ingthe ir min e ra ls a

nd e mph a size d th a t f

a c t to the Conne rs
. The Conner s eac h filed an a ffidavit in re ply to the J ohnsons’ resp o n s e to the motion for summary judgme nt. I n contra st to the J ohnsons, the Conners denied that any discussions about

m i n er al i n t er ests ever

took place a

nd stated that they

thought they

wer e purc hasing 100% of whate v e r th e Jo h n s o n s o w n e d

. T h is is n o t in c o n s is te n t w it h th e la n g u a g e in th e c o n tr a c t tha t no minerals we re a

vailable to be conveyed. The Conner s were entitled to assume under the contra ct that they would be re ceivingall of the e state that the Johnsons owned. The parties thus ha d differ ent understanding s about the mineral estate. The J o h nsons believed the deed should c ontain a rese rvation clause rese rving their minerals from the c onvey ance
. Th e Conne rs be lie ve d th e de e d a c c ur a te ly re fl e c te d th e status of

the min e ra l ti tle sin c e it on ly mentioned the minera ls that were alre ady rese rved of

rec ord. No pr ob a tiv e summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e d th a t th e part ies ha d th e same mis un de rs tand inga

bo ut wheth er the min e ra l e state wa s to be c on ve y e d. F or a mut ua l mi sta ke to exis t, there must be the sa

me mistaken belief

or assumption in the minds of t he gra ntors and g rante es named in the de ed. See Holley , 65 S.W .3d at 295. Two separate unilatera l mist akes in the minds of the g rantors a

nd g rante es do not cre ate a fac tual issue for a

mutual mist ake c ause of

action. The John so ns did

no t me e t th e ir

burd e n to pr e se nt e vid e nc e ra isi nga g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l fac t to prec lude summary

judgme nt. SeeCi

ty o f Ho uston , 5 89 S.W .2d at 678-79. We over rule the J ohnsons’ sole issue.

D I S P OS I T I ON Be cause the Conners prove d their entit lement t o summary judgme nt as a matter of law a nd the J ohnsons f

ailed to r aise a g enuine issue of materia l fac t, we af

fi rm the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. JA M ES T. WOR THEN Chief Justice Opinion delivere d July 9, 2008. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(PUBLISH)