NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SHANNA A.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, K.H., K.H.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0130 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD530257

The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa

By Lauren J. Lowe

Counsel for Appellee DCS

FILED 9-20-2018
SHANNA A. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Shanna A. ("Mother") appeals the superior court order 

severing her parental rights to her two children, born in 2013 and 2014, 

respectively. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The Department of Child Safety ("DCS") took the children into 

custody in August 2016 after it received a report alleging, among other 

things, that Mother was using heroin and opiates and had a meth lab in her 

home. When investigators visited her home, they found hazardous 

conditions, including pill bottles and cleaning supplies within the children's 

reach. Mother admitted to investigators she was using prescription drugs 

without a prescription. The superior court found the children dependent 

as to Mother and placed the children with their paternal grandmother.

¶3 Under a case plan of reunification, DCS offered Mother 

substance-abuse testing through TASC, substance-abuse treatment through 

TERROS, self-referral for parenting classes, domestic violence classes and a 

parent-aide referral upon 30 days of sobriety. The court also ordered her to 

submit to urinalyses and hair-follicle testing.

¶4 When Mother appeared for her intake appointment at 

TERROS, she refused treatment, telling personnel there that she did not 

have a substance-abuse problem. Nevertheless, she tested positive for 

morphine during that appointment. A few weeks later, Mother selfreferred to Community Bridges, where she reported that she was 

experiencing withdrawal symptoms and that her drugs of choice were 

Percocet and heroin. She told personnel there that she had a four-year 

history of opiate use, had been using heroin for the previous six to nine 

months, and recently had turned to opiates once again to cope after DCS 

removed her children. Community Bridges diagnosed her with "opioid use 

disorder, severe" and offered her individual and group substance-abuse 
SHANNA A. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

counseling, addiction medicine appointments, supportive case 

management services and nursing services.

¶5 Mother did not participate in substance-abuse treatment

through Community Bridges for longer than several weeks; her last 

appointment with a physician there was on November 1, 2016, despite 

numerous attempts thereafter by Community Bridges to contact Mother to 

resume services. According to Mother, she quit participating with 

Community Bridges because the medical staff there prescribed her a 

medication that she "felt like [she] didn't need to be taking."

¶6 Mother was required to submit to random urinalyses about 

once a week through TASC. Through February 9, 2017, however, she 

submitted only 15 of the required 22 samples, all of which were negative. 

On February 9, she submitted a urine sample that tested negative, but did 

not submit to a court-ordered hair-follicle test. Thereafter, Mother stopped 

complying with the TASC drug-testing regime. She called TASC only 

sporadically and did not submit to any testing again until June 23, 2017.

¶7 There was additional evidence that she resumed drug use in 

the meantime. Police stopped a vehicle in January 2017 and found straws 

used to snort Xanax. Mother was a passenger in the car and, although she 

was not cited, she admitted she used straws to snort the drug. In April 2017, 

she was cited for possession of drug paraphernalia after she admitted that

she possessed straws used to snort Xanax and was unable to produce a 

prescription for the drug. And in May 2017, Mother's doctor's office 

reported to police that someone had tried to call in a fraudulent Xanax 

prescription for Mother. Meanwhile, DCS offered Mother a second 

TERROS referral in April 2017, but she failed to complete the required 

intake, and the agency closed the referral unsuccessfully in July 2017.

¶8 Mother failed to participate in any of the individual 

counseling that had been recommended for her. The DCS case manager 

referred her for counseling in February 2017, but Mother did not attend the 

intake appointment and did not participate in any of the counseling.

¶9 Mother participated in scheduled visits with her children and 

was generally appropriate at those visits. But she missed 13 one-on-one 

sessions with parent aides, and, according to the DCS case manager, her 

participation in parent-aide sessions was "[e]xtremely minimal." 

¶10 At a hearing on June 6, 2017, the court ordered DCS to refer 

Mother for a hair-follicle test that day. Mother provided a urine sample on 
SHANNA A. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

June 23, which tested negative, but she did not provide a hair sample, and

did not submit to another drug test until November 2, 2017.

¶11 Over Mother's objection, the superior court in June 2017 

granted DCS's motion to change the case plan to severance and adoption. 

DCS moved for termination, and the court set the severance hearing for 

December 13, 2017.

¶12 With the severance hearing scheduled, Mother was closed out 

of parent-aide services unsuccessfully in August 2017 because of her failure 

to participate. She was arrested in October 2017 and charged with driving 

under the influence with minors in the car. She claimed she had drunk just 

one beer, but a breath test showed an alcohol content of 0.131. She also 

tested positive for cocaine in two separate urinalyses and a hair-follicle test 

in November. After those results, DCS referred Mother to TERROS for a 

third time, but she failed to attend an intake appointment.

¶13 The superior court heard evidence on the motion to sever on 

December 13, 2017, and February 1, 2018. The court granted the motion, 

severing Mother's parental rights to her children under Arizona Revised 

Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 8-533(B)(8)(a) and – (b) (2018) (nine months' time 

in care and six months' time in care, respectively).

1 Mother timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the 

Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) (2018), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) 

and -2101(A)(1) (2018).

DISCUSSION

¶14 The right to custody of one's child is fundamental but not 

absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 

(2000). The superior court may terminate a parent-child relationship upon 

clear and convincing evidence of at least one of the statutory grounds set 

out in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12. Additionally, the 

court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in 

the child's best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). 

"Because the [superior] court is in the best position to weigh evidence and 

assess witness credibility, we accept [that] court's findings of fact if 

reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a 

severance order unless it is clearly erroneous." Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 

234 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2016). 

 

1 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of a statute or rule.
SHANNA A. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶15 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), parental rights may be 

terminated when

[t]he child has been in an out-of-home placement for a 

cumulative total period of nine months or longer pursuant to 

court order . . . and the parent has substantially neglected or 

wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the 

child to be in an out-of-home placement.

The circumstances at issue under this statutory ground for severance are 

those "existing at the time of the severance." Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. 

Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007).

¶16 On appeal, Mother does not contest the court's findings that 

the children have been in out-of-home placement for more than nine

months. She does not argue DCS failed to comply with its obligation to 

offer her appropriate reunification services, nor does she dispute the court's 

finding that termination of her rights is in the best interests of the children. 

Instead, she argues only that the evidence does not support the court's 

finding that she substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances that caused the children to be taken into care.

¶17 Mother concedes she "has not completely overcome her 

difficulties," but argues she "has made appreciable efforts to remedy the 

circumstances that caused" the children to require care. She points to 

evidence that she participated in parenting classes and consistently 

participated in visits with her children, and that at trial, no one questioned 

her interactions with her children during those visits. She also points out 

that she is employed and earns enough to provide for her children. She 

contends that her job "often meant that she was unable to attend drug 

testing and some other services that were only available at the same time as 

her work hours."

¶18 The court found that Mother missed about half the required 

weekly urinalyses from September 2016 through March 2017, and 

thereafter, tested just once in June 2017 and three times in November 2017. 

It also found Mother submitted a hair-follicle sample in November 2017 

that was positive for cocaine, as were urine samples she submitted about 

the same time. The evidence supports these findings. And the case 

manager reported that during the entire proceeding, Mother failed to 

complete any substance-abuse treatment.

¶19 Although Mother argues her work schedule effectively 

prevented her from undergoing weekly random drug tests, her testimony 
SHANNA A. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

that she worked from 11 a.m. to 11 p.m. four days a week was inconsistent 

with other contemporaneous accounts she gave to a parent aide. She also 

missed several tests on days when her claimed work schedule did not 

conflict with the drug-testing regime. Further, Mother did not offer 

evidence that she asked to have her drug testing moved to a different 

provider that could accommodate her schedule.

¶20 Beyond Mother's failure to comply with drug testing, the 

court also found that she never participated in drug-counseling services 

offered through TERROS. She participated in counseling through 

Community Bridges from September through November 2016, but then 

stopped going regularly. Community Bridges tried without success to 

contact her in January 2017 to have her come for services. The court also 

found that although Mother was referred for individual counseling, she did 

not complete an intake appointment.

¶21 The evidence recited above supports the superior court's 

findings that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy 

the circumstances that caused her children to remain in the care of the State. 

Although she participated in visits and is bonded with the children, the 

superior court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that evidence did 

not outweigh evidence that she persistently disregarded the opportunities 

she had to attend drug-abuse counseling and to participate in drug testing.

¶22 Mother's substance abuse is what caused the children to be 

taken into care, and, as the superior court found, her drug use continued to 

be "a major obstacle to family reunification." The record supports the 

court's conclusion that she substantially neglected or willfully refused to 

remedy her persistent abuse of drugs. Although she argues to the contrary, 

we will not accede to her request that we reweigh the evidence. Mary Lou 

C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8.
SHANNA A. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶23 Because substantial evidence supports the superior court's 

findings and conclusions, we affirm its order severing Mother's parental 

rights.2

 

2 Because we affirm the superior court's decision under the statutory 

nine-month ground for severance, we need not address the six-month 

ground. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 27.