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Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem

President

Dr. Brian A. Maher

Vice President

Strategic Studies Department

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director

James D. Anderson

Director of Research


JSOU Report 05-8

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2005

The War

on Terrorism

Countering Global

Insurgency in the

21st Century

James A. Bates
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the Joint Special 

Operations University. 

*******

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.

af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 0-9767393-8-0
To my wife of thirty-one years, Sherry Lynn, 

for walking with me through life, encouraging 

me to dream, and allowing me to be a professional Special Forces soldier; to my brothers 

and mentors in Special Forces: Jeff Riker, Walt 

Shumate, J.C. Clark, J.D. Pruitt, Billy Cole, 

Wade Ishimoto, Billy Waugh and Edward 

Brodey; and to the war we should have been 

allowed to win. 

vii

Foreword

Countering global insurgency will be a critically important 

mission for our nation in the 21st Century. Previous insurgencies were only marginally threatening to American interests because of the regional focus and intrinsically limited scale of 

those insurgencies. But the technologies that enable the prosperity 

of a global marketplace and enhance the lives of those who participate in that marketplace also provides our insurgent enemies with 

the means to directly threaten our nation and way of life. 

Today’s Global War on Terrorism places us in an unfamiliar environment that many have called the first global insurgency. In this 

global insurgency, as in other insurgencies, our shadowy opponents 

will not confront us in the open. Rather they will attack our vulnerabilities, the exploitable seams that inherently exist between coalition 

partners, government agencies, and military commands. In these 

attacks, 21st Century global insurgents will use terrorism and other asymmetric tactics as their principle method to penetrate those 

seams, create divisiveness, and ultimately disrupt our functionally 

oriented defenses. 

Although aspects of this struggle differ greatly from previous 

struggles, much of it is similar to conflicts in which we have been 

triumphant in the past. While we must 

transform to meet the nuances of this 

threat, there are traditional capabilities in our existing security establishment that are well suited to confront a 

global insurgency as well as emerging 

peer competitors. Key programs within 

this establishment, such as Security 

Assistance, and supporting doctrinal 

concepts, such as Foreign Internal Defense, provide many of the tools needed 

to develop and implement a successful engagement strategy against 

these threats. Of particular importance are the interagency aspects 

of these concepts. Interagency cooperation is more critical than ever 

While we must transform 

to meet the nuances 

of this threat, there are 

traditional capabilities 

in our existing security 

establishment that are 

well suited to confront a 

global insurgency ...
viii

before, allowing us to maximize limited resources, avoid duplication, 

and leverage expertise across functional and regional structures. Interagency cooperation can close the seams that exist in both national 

and international bureaucracies. 

Mr. Bates’ vision of national interagency structure provides a 

conceptual framework for developing our engagement strategy in the 

Global War on Terrorism. This framework integrates every instrument of national power at the global, multi-regional, regional and national level with those of our partners and allies. He argues that to be 

successful within this framework, we must leverage the capabilities 

of our coalition partners and allies while respecting their sovereignty 

and the constraints under which they must operate. We must understand that supporting relationships will be situationally dependent. 

The Department of Defense cannot and should not always be in the 

lead. We must find common ground with our coalition partners and 

allies and assure unity of effort and purpose.

Mr. Bates has taken his 30 plus years of experience in the area 

of unconventional warfare, irregular conflict, and support to Host 

Nation’s Internal Defense and Development Strategy. He combines 

this experience with current national strategy and emerging concepts and doctrine to provide an excellent starting point for continued debate on this critically important subject. I challenge the reader 

to consider his views and add to the discussion. This article is by 

no means the final word on this subject; rather, it is an important 

contribution to the national and international discussions that help 

us focus our collective efforts to defeat the global insurgency that 

threatens us all. 

 
1

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

The War on Terrorism

Countering Global Insurgency in the 21st Century 

James A. Bates

Overview 

I

n this paper, the author argues that if we are to be victorious 

in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the nation must again 

become experts in the application of Security Assistance (SA) utilizing the principles of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Internal 

Defense and Development (IDAD) engagement, now. If the nation 

continues to ignore SA/FID/IDAD support as an applicable tool for 

the GWOT, then the strategic engagement strategy will be next to 

impossible to formulate and execute in the short term and will exact 

harsh retribution internationally, nationally, politically and militarily in the long term for the nation. 

SA/FID/IDAD engagement has unfolded in a distinct pattern 

over the past 50 years. From the late 70s thru the 80s, policymakers 

saw a strategic rationale for these security cooperation engagement 

options and the Department of Defense reconstituted SA/FID/IDAD 

engagement doctrine, concepts and organizations. The Department 

of State and Department of Defense developed an effective approach 

for support to Host Nations (HNs) IDAD Strategy and implemented it 

in El Salvador. The result was a successful engagement strategy in 

El Salvador. 

In the 90s policymakers went through a 

period of total abandonment of the SA/FID/

IDAD mission and the strategic rationale 

faded. These capabilities atrophied. During 

this period of remission, the nation should 

have utilized its interagency intellectual and 

military expertise to analyze ongoing mutations of global insurgencies-based incidents 

and developed a cogent SA/FID/IDAD engagement strategy for the 

future. 

We must with great haste reeducate and retrain a new generation of advisers and trainers to think like the threat and help the HN 

formulate and execute a plan to counter that threat. This strategic 

and regional engagement strategy within our national interagency 

framework must stress: analysis, selectivity, SA/FID/IDAD engageIn the 90s policymakers went through a 

period of total abandonment of the SA/

FID/IDAD mission ...
2

 JSOU Report 05-8

ment and concentrate on the principle phases of FID in support of 

our allies. 

For total victory we must revaluate the national spectrum of the 

GWOT and put in place the correct regional engagement strategy 

options and force emphasis in the appropriate place. Early regional 

engagement provides the foundation for stabilization so that future 

military engagements may not be required. By setting the conditions 

for success, we will successfully protect our nation from present and 

future global insurgency-based events. 

Introduction

What one section of the American Government has tried to 

set into motion is a program of covert operations organized in 

terms of different policy from that which guides government’s 

overt actions. Analysis and experience prove this double deal to 

be impossible. One of the two results follow: either the desired 

effects of the covert operations is cancelled out by the counterinfluence of the overt actions; or the covert operations degenerate into irresponsibility and adventurism.

– James Burnham, 19521 

This paper adds to the growing debate concerning the challenges of 

the United States strategic engagement strategy and recommends 

options for the emerging 21st Century. This author envisions a national interagency structure to integrate every instrument of national 

power. This structure will focus, collaborate and coordinate at four 

strategic levels, global, multi-regional, regional and national, and 

will implement three regional engagement strategy options. These 

are Conflict/Unilateral Operations, Support to Insurgencies and Security Assistance (SA) utilizing the principles of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) that will effectively facilitate the execution of the global 

war on terrorism (GWOT). 

The author’s means for ensuring victory in the GWOT depends 

on first defining and understanding the type of war we are engaged 

in. To accomplish this we must implement the appropriate global, 

multi-regional, regional, and national analysis and the appropriate 

regional engagement strategy options to counter these terrorists’ 

threats and actions. 

In February 2002, the U.S. published its first National Strategy 

for Combating Terrorism. It called for “a strategy of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups” that will disrupt, deter, over 

time degrade, neutralize and ultimately destroy terrorist organizations.2 Since then, governments and public audiences continue to 
3

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

debate the strategic and regional engagement strategy and its effectiveness despite continued progress. President Bush characterized this conflict as “different from any other war in our history.” 3

The extent of the debate reveals the differences between known and 

perceived thoughts and the efforts required by the U.S., its allies 

and coalition partners to counter terrorist groups in today’s global 

environment. 

Entering the fourth year of the GWOT, the engagement strategy of the U.S., its allies and coalition partners and the rest of the 

world, continues to evolve.4 Afghanistan and Iraq were examples of 

ruling regimes that have sponsored, supported and gave sanctuary 

to transnational terrorists. As a result, these regimes have been neutralized and replaced, but will our stabilization strategy for these two 

counties prove successful for the long term? 

To paraphrase Ralph Peters, author of When Devils Walk the 

Earth, we must understand the mentalities of two basic types of terrorists, the practical and the apocalyptic. 

We must be able to differentiate between the 

“traditional” politically-oriented terrorists 

with specific goals and the far more dangerous religious terrorists that are irreconcilably 

hostile to the U.S. and the West.5 The terms 

threat, enemy, insurgents, and terrorists, are 

synonymous within this paper with reference 

to traditional insurgents and transnational 

insurgents. The term traditional and practical terrorist is synonymous within this paper 

with reference to traditional insurgents. The 

terms radical, violent fundamentalists, and religious apocalyptic terrorists are synonymous within this paper with reference to transnational insurgents. 

The global war against these transnational and traditional insurgents includes an internal struggle within the Islamic faith between 

radical, violent fundamentalists and the non-violent Muslim. The 

traditional insurgent’s objective is not mindless violence, revenge or 

profit.6 The transnational insurgents follow an ideology that influences their strategy and base of support as they proclaim to work 

toward a definite stated goal; in reality they desire the apocalyptic 

destruction of nation states7 and replacement of the current world 

order with an Islamic Caliphate.8 We must perceive these threats 

as insurgencies: “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow 

of constituted governments through use of subversion, and armed 

conflict.” 9

We must be able to 

differentiate between 

the “traditional” 

politically-oriented 

terrorists with specific goals and the 

far more dangerous 

religious terrorists ...
4

 JSOU Report 05-8

Defining Engagement Options 

“I don’t think they play at all fairly,” Alice began, in a rather complaining tone, “and they all quarrel so dreadfully one can’t hear 

oneself speak—they don’t seem to have any rules in particular; 

at least, if there are, nobody attends to them—and you’ve no 

idea how confusing it is all the things being alive ...”

Alice, in Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll10

Decisions about whether and how to intervene in external and internal conflict are matters of national policy. We must fight transnational and traditional insurgents’ networks and their support, through 

the integrated use of “every instrument of national power—diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence 

and military”11 to achieve short and long term goals that serve our 

national interests. These decisions are influenced by a number of 

considerations. Among the most important is a systematic analysis 

of the situation. Such a systematic analysis depends on identifying 

and asking the right questions and developing and implementing the 

appropriate strategic and regional engagement strategy options. In 

the broadest terms, the following might be considered: 

• Co-opt the insurgents by helping and supporting the Muslim 

world to achieve social, economic and religious progress. 

• Persuade the insurgents support structure it is wrong to kill 

innocents. Encourage them to accept responsibility they have 

so far completely avoided. An example might be to invoke the 

Islamic religious and western religious dogma, using religious 

leadership, including “Mullahs” and the Pope, to adopt a stance 

against using religion in the name of warfare. 

• Coerce the insurgents through punishing attacks: for example 

cultural, economic and military actions. 

• Deter the insurgents’ action by threatening something of great 

value. What does an insurgent value? His cause, organization, 

family, clan or tribe? 

• Deny the insurgents further sponsorship, support and/or 

sanctuary by ensuring other nation states accept responsibility and take action against these transnational and traditional 

internal threats within their sovereign territories. 

• Subvert from within the insurgents’ organization the sponsorship, support and sanctuary given by other nation states and/

or transnational organizations. 
5

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

• Destroy the insurgents, both physically and organizationally: 

for example neutilize, dismantle or destroy the organization’s 

structure and resources. 

• Replace the insurgents’ organization by subverting the sponsorship, support and sanctuary given by other nation states 

and/or transnational organizations. 

• Ignore the insurgent’s actions and pursue U.S. agenda thru 

our own initiatives. 

These options can be applied individually or in combination 

against each part of an insurgent’s system. Interactions between the 

effects and execution on different parts of the insurgent’s system 

must be continually evaluated to preclude unintended consequences 

or failure. 

There has been a great deal of analysis of the insurgents’ motivation, generally focusing on chronic problems in Muslim society. Often cited are the lack of political participation, economic mismanagement, corruption and demographic trends in Muslim society.12 While 

it may be beyond our national capabilities 

and resources to solve all these problems, 

we must encourage and support Muslim 

societies to solve these problems. The answer lies in looking at the social system 

that supports and sustains the insurgents, then devising and executing a sustained engagement strategy that addresses and attacks every part of 

that system in an appropriate fashion. 

Defining Strategy Options

Implementation of the three regional engagement strategy options 

(Conflict/Unilateral Operations, Support to Insurgencies and SA utilizing the principles of FID) to defeat the insurgents requires dealing 

appropriately with each of the unique parts of the insurgent’s system. We must address the process as follows: think holistically and 

systematically across the elements of national power, and analyze 

the external and internal interrelated global and multi-region dimensions as they affect the regional theaters of operations. For example, 

the diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, 

intelligence and military effects. The analytical results would confer and influence the collective strategic and regional engagement 

strategy options and execution. Applications of the three key GWOT 

engagement strategy options are depicted in Figure 1. 

The answer lies in looking at the social system 

that supports and sustains the insurgents ...
6

 JSOU Report 05-8

1. Conflict/Unilateral Operations: Find, Fix, and Finish = Direct Action. This option will be used continuously. 

2. Support to Insurgencies and/or Surrogates thru UW. We 

must be prepared to conduct support to Insurgencies or 

Surrogates as needed. Support to Insurgencies or Surrogates will deter, disrupt, undermine, neutralize and/or replace regimes that sponsor, support and give sanctuary to 

transnational and traditional insurgents. 

3. SA utilizing the principles of FID in conjunction with support to Host Nations (HNs) Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy provides the most productive and 

far-reaching option, used wisely, for long-term success in 

the GWOT. The U.S. must employ and properly execute the 

three phases of FID: Indirect, Direct and Combat Operations for victory in the GWOT. We must utilize advisers and 

trainers to provide assistance to the HNs government.14

4. The principal tool HNs utilize in their IDAD Strategy is 

Counterinsurgency (COIN). If we want to suppress or destroy these transnational and traditional insurgents, then 

we must reeducate and retrain a new generation of advisers 

and trainers to think like the threat and help the HN formulate and execute a plan to counter that threat. 

5. The Department of Defense as a whole does not generally 

understand or execute COIN well. Our historical successes 

are General Crook during the 1880s, U.S. Marines’ experiFigure 1. Three key GWOT engagement strategy options. 13
7

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

ences in South America in the 1920s and 1930s15 the Phoenix Project in Vietnam during 1968-72 and El Salvador in 

the 1980s. These are too few and for the most part forgotten 

and not understood today. 

U.S. Support to Host Nations Internal Defense 

and Development Strategy

The role of the U.S or any external power in assisting HNs IDAD 

strategy to defeat transnational and traditional insurgencies is by 

advising, training and assisting the indigenous forces in establishing governmental control within their national borders. The critical 

unstated assumption in FID and IDAD doctrine is that the supported HN governments must be and remain legitimate.16 A HNs IDAD 

Strategy encompasses the full range of measures taken to promote 

its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, terrorism 

and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions. Examples 

are the diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and military organizations that respond to the 

needs of the HN society.17 The HNs IDAD campaign can be seen as 

four overlapping, sometimes simultaneous, phases of a synchronized 

effort to attain broader goals.18 The following is a short overview for 

consideration: 

• Preparation Phase 

– Delineate the “DIFFERENT” operational areas 

– Establish Information and Intelligence data bases 

– Estimate and obtain operational and substainment requirements 

– Organize, train and equip forces 

– Perform analysis and plan operations 

• Development Phase 

– Isolate the insurgents from the population using Populace 

and Resource Control (PRC) measures, saturation patrolling 

and/or combat operations 

– Implement short and long term civil and military civic action 

programs 

– Organize and develop paramilitary self-defense forces 

– Suppress the insurgent infrastructure thru Information Operations (IO) 

– Continue PRC, Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) activities to mobilize the population 

• Offensive Phase 

– Engage the operational areas; for example PRC measures, 

IO, CA/PSYOP programs, and/or Combat Operations 
8

 JSOU Report 05-8

– Destroy, disperse or clear insurgent forces from the area 

– Destroy or suppress the insurgent infrastructure 

– Reestablish HN governmental control 

• Completion Phase 

– Continue the developmental stage activities 

– Transfer area consolation activies to appropriate HN civil 

agencies 

– Pass PRC security responsibilities to the local police forces 

and paramilitary 

– Expand consolidation operations into adjacent HN areas19

The final objective for the HNs’ IDAD strategy is developmental 

work which provides for “building viable security, economic, military, 

and social institutions that respond to the needs of society” and is 

the basis of economic prosperity for the populace.20 Applying FID/

IDAD engagement in a global conflict that crosses multi-region, regional, national and cultural boundaries will be a challenge. Analysis 

of these transnational and traditional insurgents will highlight those 

challenges and suggest potential engagement strategy options. 

These transnational and traditional insurgencies must be viewed 

as complex and differing systems in order to construct analyses and 

develop collective strategic, multi-regional and regional engagement 

strategy options for each. From a national interagency perspective, the Systems of Systems analysis that Combatant Commands 

such as the European Command use to explore the notion of Effects Based Operations, this process is essential to incorporate in the 

analysis process. This approach constructs national templates of the 

risk countries from the context of all elements national power and 

is essential in order to integrate the diplomatic, economic, financial, 

information, law enforcement, intelligence and military effects with 

engagement strategy options to counter these wider global threats. 

Analysis of these transnational and traditional insurgencies will 

yield characteristics of each component of the insurgents’ system 

that will suggest potential vulnerabilities and methods of engagement. This analysis will propose appropriate strategic, multi-regional 

and regional engagement strategy options that will have devastating 

effects on the different parts of the insurgents’ system to deter, neutralize, defeat or destroy them. 

Command and Control Recommendations

As stated prior, a National Inter-Agency Coordination and Planning 

(NIACP) structure must be established at the national level with the 

responsibility to focus, collaborate, coordinate and synchronize national interagency planning and engagement for the execution of 
9

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

all GWOT activies.21 The application of a NIACP would ensure the 

synergy of diplomatic, economic, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and military integrated action. The challenge this 

hypothesis poses for all levels of national power is the authority and 

the appropriate national, interagency, strategic and regional engagement strategy guidance and the tools necessary for the execution 

of these complex, interrelated activities of a rapidly changing global 

environment. 

This proposed NIACP structure would require an equivalent of a 

Goldwater-Nichols Act for the national interagency construct. The 

result would be national interagency coordination based on common words and common 

understandings. In this national interagency 

concept the Department of State (DoS), DoD, 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department 

of Justice (DoJ), Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), Department of Commerce 

(DoC), Department of Agriculture (DoA), Department of Transportation (DoT), Department of Energy (DoE) and Department of Labor (DoL), among others 

would coordinate their activities in a national construct eliminating 

overlapping and redundant control. This would create the ability to 

apply the correct synchronized application of national power. The 

appropriate strategic, global, multi-regional, regional and national 

engagement strategy options in a coherent, responsive and executable manner. 

The NIACP’s responsibilities would provide the conduit for monitoring and coordinating global, multi-regional and focus the regional 

support for Ambassadors and their Country Teams and the Regional 

Combatant Commanders (RCCs) in a collaborative and coordinated execution of the GWOT. RCC’s Joint Inter-Agency Coordination 

Groups (JIACGs) must be established and structured at every Combatant Command as CENTCOM and PACOM has done. The NIACP 

would be the strategic and multi-regional link for the RCC’s JIACG 

coordination of all multi-regional and regional activities, and would 

insure relevant consistency of the global, multi-region and regional 

picture for multi-regional and regional engagement strategy. 

This recommendation would provide the foundation for planning 

and analysis in the collective national interagency construct: for example DoS, DoD and the RCCs to enhance and exploit the regional 

execution of the GWOT. As Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins 

stated in their RAND Study, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda,22 the article provides 

The result would be 

national interagency 

coordination based 

on common words 

and common understandings.
10

 JSOU Report 05-8

important insights into this problem. Each part of the insurgency 

system has unique characteristics and avenues of influence. The key 

is to see the insurgents as part of a complete and complex system, 

as shown below. 

From Figure 3-3 (RAND Study MR-1619, p. 15). 

Conclusion

The U.S. cannot discount or surrender to transnational and traditional insurgents. Our national policy, engagement strategy and 

forces must adhere to the theory of “Napoleon’s corporal”;the lowest 

level in the force needs to fully understand what is expected. The application of war for these strategic and regional engagement strategy 

options and the specifics of national interagency coordination must 

be clearly delineated or the men in the trenches will carry the mules 

that were intended to carry them. 

For total victory we must revaluate the national spectrum of the 

GWOT and place the correct engagement strategy options and force 

emphasis in the appropriate place. Unfortunately, support to HNs 

IDAD Strategy holds little appeal for the Nation since it offers few 

opportunities to exercise our best technology generate new requirements for expensive programs and does not give the immediate results that our leadership perceive Direct Action operations do. 

Defeating any transnational and traditional insurgency is a complex and long-term task, may take up to four U.S. election cycles, for 

which there is no smart weapon, silver bullet or critical node that will 

provide quick victory. The “war” against transnational and tradition-
11

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

al insurgents in support of our National and/or HNs IDAD Strategy 

will look like the chaotic and dirty “small wars”23 of the past. 

More important than the few military conflicts, we must have 

sustained and comprehensive SA/FID/IDAD Engagement that utilizes interagency and U.S. military advisers and trainers to “drain 

the global swamp” where transnational and traditional insurgents 

“breed.” Providing U.S. advisers and trainers to support the HNs 

IDAD Strategy will place a premium on educating the interagency 

and U.S. military forces to – THINK – not just execute Direct Action 

operations. 

The insurgents win when the U.S. and/or HNs either lack the will 

for a protracted campaign or when it neglects the complex insurgent 

system and focuses only on military aspects. While the military must 

focus on its area of competence, prosecuting the war must be a collective effort that is shaped by all the elements of national power in 

a collaborative construct to support a long term successful solution. 

The strategic engagement strategy must also avoid taking actions 

that damage the HN’s legitimacy or loses international credibility in 

the long run. 

We will not be able to kill or capture every disaffected individual 

who is a potential insurgent. Insurgents who are willing to sacrifice 

their own lives to attack us are unlikely to completely give up their 

struggle or ideology easily. Nor are we likely to solve all the underlying Muslim social frustrations that give rise to transnational and traditional insurgencies. The best we can expect if we continue to apply 

only Direct Action operations as the primary regional engagement 

strategy option is to reduce transnational and traditional insurgents 

incidents to a “tolerable” level, much the same as police departments 

do with inter-city street crime and counter-drug efforts. 

Therefore to be victorious in the GWOT, we must utilize an NIACP 

structure to focus, collaborate, coordinate and synchronize the four 

strategic applications (global, multi-regional, regional and national) 

and the implementation of the three regional engagement options 

(Conflict/Unilateral Operations, Support to Insurgencies and SA/

FID/IDAD Engagement Strategy) for global, multi-regional, regional 

and national execution of the GWOT. With this national interagency 

engagement strategy we will be able to disrupt, undermine, neutralize or destroy present transnational and traditional insurgencies and 

subsequent transnational and traditional insurgent conflicts that 

spill out onto the global stage from remaining pockets of oppression 

and sanctuaries. 

If we do not have the national resolve and perseverence to defeat and destroy these transnational and traditional insurgents then 
12

 JSOU Report 05-8

surely our children and grandchildren will suffer the catastrophe 

consequences of our ineptness and be forced to shoulder the burden 

of our failure to successfully prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Through our failure to act appropriately, Apocalyptic Forces will 

extract retribution and exact destruction upon our future generations. 

God Bless America. 

Guerrillas never win wars, 

but their adversaries often lose them!! 

Charles W. Thayer – 1963 24

Endnotes

 1. James Burnham, Containment or Liberation?, John Day Company, 

Inc, New York, 1952, p. 196. 

 2. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The 

White House, Washington, DC, Feb 2003, p. 2.

 3. For a good early perspective see Elaine M. Grossman, “Is the U.S. 

Military Ready to Take on a Non-Conventional Terror Threat,” Inside 

the Pentagon, 18 Oct 2001, Pg. 1. A global perspective, though still 

focused on conventional military operations is evident in Eliot Cohens 

article “World War IV,” Wall Street Journal, 20 Nov 2001. More detailed 

discussions can be found in Lt Col Andrew J. Smith (Royal Australian 

Army), “Combating Terrorism,” Military Review, Jan-Feb 2002, pp. 11-

18; or in Colin S. Gray, “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” 

Parameters, Spring 2002, Pp. 5-14. A general treatment can be found 

in T. Irene Sanders, “To Fight Terror, We Can’t Think Straight,” The 

Washington Post, 5 May 2002, p. B2.

 4. Terrorism will be defined consistent with the U.S. State Department’ 

annual report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, which is drawn from Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d). “The term terrorism means 

premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” “Transnational terrorism” will 

be defined consistent with Bard E. O’Neill in Insurgency and Terrorism, Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s. Inc., 

1990) p. 24 - terrorism carried out by autonomous, non-state actors to 

distinguish it from acts conducted by groups controlled by a sovereign 

state.

 5. Ralph Peters, “When Devils Walk the Earth”, Center for Emerging 

Threats, Oct 2001, Note: p. 1. 

 6. Ibid., p. 2. The actions of the practical terrorist, to whom we have 

grown accustomed, are calculated to change political circumstances. 

For all his violence, the practical - political - terrorist is a man of hope. 

He may be controlled. 
13

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

 7. Ibid., p.2. “while, for the apocalyptic, destruction is an end in itself, 

despite his extravagant statements about strategic objectives. The religious apocalyptic terrorist is a captive of his own rage, disappointments and fantasies. He must be killed.” p. 19 “It is impossible to 

content him. His agenda is against this world, not of it. Viewed closely, 

his vision is inchoate, intuitive and destructive without limit. It is reality that has not pleased him, and he wants to destroy reality.”

 8. The Caliphate envisioned would unite the Muslim world under one 

temporal and religious ruler, a Caliph who serves as the successor to 

the prophet Mohammed. 

 9. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (The Joint Staff, Washington DC, 12 Apr 2001), p. 

207.

 10. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland. Penguin Putnam Inc, New York, 

Dec 2000, p.83. 

 11. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The 

White House, Washington, DC, February 2003. p. 1.

 12. Bernard Lewis has written a series of useful articles over the last decade, including: “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly 

266, no. 3, (September 1990): p. 47-60; “The Revolt of Islam,” The 

New Yorker, 19 November 2001; and “What Went Wrong,” The Atlantic 

Monthly 289, no. 1 (January 2002). 

 13. Developed by LTG William G. Boykin and James A. Bates – February 

2003. 

 14. Joint Pubs 3-07 p. III 10, and 3-07.1 p. V-4, V-29. Traditionally SA/

FID/IDAD engagement support with advisers and trainers to provide 

assistance to HNs IDAD COIN forces.

 15. Historical Small Wars Manual, NAVMC 2890, (Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington DC, 1 Apr 1987). 

 16. Government legitimacy rests in the minds of the people governed. They 

consent, or acquiesce to the government’s rule in return for a combination of physical security, meaningful participation in government 

decision making, and material reward. As Thomas Jefferson wrote: 

“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This does not mean legitimate governments must be liberal democracies or meet each requirement equally. So long as adequate mechanisms exist to satisfy the 

perceived needs of the governed, the people will regarded the government as legitimate. Despite its repressive nature, the population of the 

USSR seemed to grant the Communist governments legitimacy until 

it completely failed to meet their material needs. The current government of China appears maintain legitimacy by meeting the population’s security and material needs despite providing little meaningful 

participation in government decision making. 

 17. Historical Field Manual No. 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 20 Sep 1994), p. 

1-1.
14

 JSOU Report 05-8

 18. Historical Field Manual No. 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 20 Sep 1994), p. 

1-18.

 19. Historical FM 100-20 / AF 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity 

Conflict, (Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Air Force, 

Washington DC, 5 Dec 1990), Chapter 2, p. 2-1 / 2-25, Appendix C, p. 

C-1 / C-9. 

 20. JP 3-07, Department of Defense Joint Doctrine for Military Operations 

Other Than War (The Joint Staff, Washington DC, 16 June 1996), p. III 

9-10 and JP 3-07, Department of Defense Joint Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (The Joint Staff, 

Washington DC, 30 April 2004), p. B 1-2. 

 21. COL David Plumer, SOCCENT Desert Storm After-Action Report, p. 6. 

 22. Paul K. Davis, Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (RAND MR1619-

DARPA, Santa Monica, CA, 2002). Available at www.rand.org .

 23. Colonel C. E. Callwell, classic text Small Wars, University of Nebraska 

Press, 3rd edition 1906, reprinted 1996, p. 21. “Small war is a term 

which has come largely into use of late years, and which is admittedly 

somewhat difficult to define. Practically it may be said to include all 

campaigns other than those where both opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken 

to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world 

where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not 

meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations 

varying in their scope and their conditions.”

 24. Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla, Harper & Row, New York, 1963, p. 1. 
15

Bates: The War on Terrorism, Countering Insurgency 

About the Author 

James A. Bates is the Unconventional Warfare Studies Coordinator with the Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, FL. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University 

of California Sacramento at Sacramento, California and a Bachelor 

of Science degree from Liberty University at Lynchburg, Virginia. 

Mr. Bates has lectured at the Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, FL, the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, 

Hurlburt Field, FL, the U.S. JFK Special Warfare Center and School, 

Fort Bragg, NC, the U.S. Air Force Command and Staff College, Maxwell, AFB, AL, the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell, AFB, AL, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, the Alabama National Guard Staff Judge 

Advocate Military Law Symposium, Montgomery, AL, the Sherman 

Kent School, D.C. and USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL. 

Mr. Bates retired as a Special Forces Officer; his last assignment 

was Special Operations Command South. Mr. Bates enlisted as a 

Special Forces baby into the U.S. Army 13 June 1968 and devoted 

over 30 years of service to the Nation. During his service to the Nation, he spent over 22 years in Southeast Asia, over 2 years in the 

Middle East and 2 years in Central and South America. 

Mr. Bates served on Special Forces A, B and C Teams, United 

States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 

Joint Readiness Training Center and at the tactical, operational, 

joint and national levels. His combat experience includes: Vietnam 

(1969–1971), Lebanon (1982–84), and after 9-11 worked with Special 

Operations Command Central.