U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Review of the United States 

Marshals Service’s 

Apprehension of Violent Fugitives 

July 2005

I-2005-008 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

i

EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

The Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 directed the creation 

of fugitive apprehension task forces and encouraged the Department of 

Justice (Department) to focus on apprehending violent federal and state 

fugitives. In fiscal year (FY) 2001, the Department changed its strategic 

plan and shifted the focus of its fugitive apprehension efforts from all 

federal fugitives to violent federal and violent state fugitives.1 The United 

States Marshals Service (USMS), the federal government’s primary 

agency for apprehending fugitives, is principally responsible for carrying 

out the Department’s strategy. To apprehend fugitives of all types, 

Deputy Marshals in the 94 federal judicial districts (district) work 

individually or as members of warrant squads, district fugitive task 

forces, or Regional Fugitive Task Forces (RTF).2 The Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review to evaluate the performance 

of the USMS in apprehending violent fugitives.3 

To evaluate the USMS’s performance, we analyzed trends in 

fugitive apprehensions using data from the USMS’s Warrant Information 

Network (WIN) from FY 2001 to 2004. We also compared the number of 

violent fugitives apprehended to the amount of time (measured in staff 

years) that USMS personnel spent on fugitive investigations. In addition, 

to examine the effectiveness of the RTFs, we compared the number of 

violent fugitive apprehensions in the 15 districts included in the 

5 existing RTFs to the number of violent apprehensions in the other 

79 districts. We also surveyed all of the USMS district offices about their 

violent fugitive apprehension efforts. 

 1 The Department’s FY 2000-2005 Strategic Plan, published in September 2000, 

focused the Department’s apprehension efforts on federal fugitives, and the FY 2001-2006 

Strategic Plan, published in November 2001 to address the events of September 11, focused 

the Department’s apprehension efforts on violent federal and state fugitives. 

2 There are currently 5 RTFs encompassing 15 districts. The RTFs were created 

under the authority of the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 to reduce the number 

of violent fugitives at large by promoting cooperation among federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies. In October 2004, the Department proposed creating 6 additional 

RTFs encompassing 43 districts. 

3 The term “violent fugitives” includes both violent federal fugitives and violent state 

fugitives. We defined “fugitives apprehended” as those arrested by the USMS, arrested by 

another agency at the direction of the USMS, or who surrendered. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

ii

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

The performance of the USMS in apprehending violent fugitives 

improved from FY 2001 to FY 2004. During that period, the USMS 

increased the number of violent fugitives it apprehended by 51 percent. 

We also found that the USMS became more efficient in apprehending 

violent fugitives. The number of violent fugitives apprehended per staff 

year increased from 18 violent fugitives in FY 2002 to 21 violent fugitives 

in FY 2004.4 We concluded that the USMS’s performance improved 

primarily because the USMS increased the staff time dedicated to violent 

fugitive investigations by 21 percent and because the five RTFs created 

by the USMS were more efficient and effective at apprehending fugitives.5 

Despite its improved performance, the USMS was unable to reduce 

the number of violent federal fugitives at large. From FY 2001 through 

FY 2004, the number of violent federal fugitives who remained at large 

increased by 3 percent to 14,419 fugitives.6 The Deputy Marshals we 

interviewed said that the number of violent federal fugitives sought by 

the USMS increased because the increased number of federal task forces 

throughout the country generated more federal fugitives. We found that 

the USMS also investigated more federal fugitives referred from other 

federal agencies, and that state and local law enforcement agencies 

requested more assistance from the USMS in apprehending fugitives. 

Although the increase in the number of violent federal fugitives is 

not fully within the USMS’s control, we identified three factors within the 

USMS’s control that, if addressed, would improve its effectiveness at 

apprehending violent federal fugitives. The factors are that (1) not all 

districts assigned violent federal fugitive investigations to the RTFs and 

 4 The USMS could not provide data on the amount of time its personnel spent on 

fugitive investigations in FY 2001. 

5 Most recently, the USMS used its RTFs and district task forces to coordinate 

Operation FALCON (Federal and Local Cops Organized Nationally). Operation FALCON 

involved more than 900 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and resulted in 

the arrest of 10,340 fugitives from April 4 through 10, 2005. The USMS focused Operation 

FALCON’s efforts on apprehending fugitives wanted for gang-related crimes, homicide, 

crimes involving use of a weapon, crimes against children and the elderly, crimes involving 

sexual assaults, and other crimes of violence. 

6 The number of violent state fugitives under investigation by the USMS and still at 

large could not be determined because of incomplete data in WIN. As Marshals in 52 of 88 

districts who responded to our survey reported, most districts did not routinely enter state 

fugitive investigations in WIN when an investigation was opened. Deputy Marshals were 

not required to, and in many districts did not, enter state fugitive investigation data into 

WIN until after they arrested the fugitive. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

iii

other task forces; (2) the USMS did not fully change its focus from 

apprehending all federal fugitives to apprehending violent federal and 

state fugitives; and (3) most USMS districts did not enter data regarding 

their state fugitives in WIN when the investigations were opened so that 

the USMS could more effectively focus its resources on apprehending 

violent fugitives.

Reasons for Improved Performance 

The performance of the USMS in apprehending violent fugitives 

improved for two main reasons. First, from FY 2002 to FY 2004, the 

amount of time that Deputy Marshals and other personnel devoted to 

fugitive investigations increased by 21 percent, from 911 staff years to 

1,104 staff years. The additional staff time devoted to fugitive 

investigations came from both new staff and staff redirected from other 

functions. The second reason for the USMS’s improved performance was 

that the RTFs provided a more effective approach to apprehending violent 

fugitives. According to USMS personnel we interviewed, the wider 

geographic coverage of the RTFs, coupled with the Deputy Marshals’ and 

task force officers’ authority to cross district boundaries to pursue 

fugitives, resulted in the USMS apprehending more violent fugitives. 

Because of these two factors, not only did the USMS apprehend 

more federal fugitives – an increase of 51 percent from 14,348 to 21,600 

– but it increased its overall efficiency. The increase in the number of 

violent federal fugitives apprehended was larger than the 21-percent 

increase in resources. Our analysis of the USMS’s data also confirmed 

that the RTFs provided a more effective method of apprehending violent 

fugitives than district fugitive task forces, warrant squads, and Deputy 

Marshals working individually. While the USMS overall achieved a 

51-percent increase in apprehensions, the number of violent fugitives 

apprehended in RTF districts increased by 67 percent from FY 2001 

through FY 2004, as compared to a 45-percent increase in non-RTF 

districts over the same period. We also found that RTF districts achieved 

greater increases in their efficiency at apprehending violent fugitives. 

From FY 2002 through FY 2004, the RTF districts increased the number 

of violent fugitives apprehended per staff year from 17 to 22 fugitives, 

while the non-RTF districts increased the number of violent fugitives 

apprehended from 18 to 20 fugitives per staff year. 

More Violent Federal Fugitives at Large 

Despite the increased number of USMS violent fugitive 

apprehensions, the number of violent federal fugitives still at large 

increased by 3 percent during the last 4 years, from 14,046 in FY 2001 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

iv

to 14,419 in FY 2004. Several factors beyond the control of the USMS 

contributed to the increase in the number of violent federal fugitives at 

large. The Deputy Marshals we interviewed stated that the increased 

number of federal task forces throughout the country generated more 

federal investigations. In addition, the USMS investigated more federal 

fugitives referred from other federal agencies. Also, after the Department 

changed its focus from apprehending all federal fugitives to 

apprehending violent federal and violent state fugitives, state and local 

law enforcement agencies requested more assistance from the USMS in 

apprehending fugitives. 

Factors That Limited Violent Fugitive Apprehensions 

Although the increase in the number of violent federal fugitives is 

not fully within the USMS’s control, we identified three factors within the 

USMS’s control that, we believe if addressed, would improve its 

effectiveness at apprehending violent federal fugitives. First, not all 

districts assigned violent federal fugitive investigations to the task forces; 

second, the USMS did not fully shift its focus from apprehending all 

federal fugitives to apprehending violent fugitives; and third, most USMS 

districts did not enter data regarding their state fugitives in WIN when 

the investigations were opened so that the USMS could more effectively 

focus its resources on apprehending violent fugitives. We believe that by 

addressing these three factors, which we discuss in more detail below, 

the USMS could further improve the overall effectiveness of its fugitive 

apprehension program and help achieve the Department’s strategic 

objective of reducing the number of violent fugitives at large. 

Not All Districts Assigned Violent Federal Fugitive Investigations to 

Task Forces. We found that many districts did not assign violent federal 

fugitive investigations to the RTFs and other USMS task forces that operated 

in their districts. Moreover, the USMS had no written guidelines on whether 

the RTFs, other task forces, or the districts’ warrant squads should 

investigate violent federal fugitives. As a result, some Marshals did not 

assign violent federal fugitive investigations to task forces operating in their 

districts. Of the 88 districts that responded to our survey, 77 reported that 

they had RTFs or other task forces operating in their district. But of those 

77 districts, 21 – including 7 RTF districts – reported that they assigned 

25 percent or less of their violent federal fugitive investigations to the task 

forces. Overall, 33 of the 77 districts reported that they assigned 50 percent 

or less of their violent federal fugitive investigations to the task forces. 

Some Marshals we interviewed stated that they were reluctant to 

assign their violent federal fugitive investigations to the RTFs because the 

Marshals did not have supervisory authority over the RTFs. Other Marshals 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

v

stated that they retained the more complex violent fugitive investigations to 

develop the investigative capability of district Deputy Marshals. Other 

Marshals stated that they were concerned that assigning all violent federal 

fugitive investigations to the task forces could undermine the morale of 

Deputy Marshals assigned to the district. 

Focus Not Fully Shifted to Violent Fugitive Investigations. We found 

that the USMS had not fully shifted its focus to apprehending violent 

fugitives as directed by the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 and 

Department policy. We also found that the USMS had not established any 

performance goals related to the apprehension of violent fugitives. Instead, 

the USMS continued to track and report on its apprehensions of all federal 

fugitives. 

The USMS was, to some extent, limited in its ability to shift its 

focus to apprehending violent fugitives because it is required to pursue 

all fugitives for whom it is responsible, whether or not they are known or 

suspected to be violent. Our analysis showed that 80 percent of USMS 

fugitive investigations in FY 2004 involved fugitives not known to be 

violent. Consequently, the “due diligence” requirement to pursue all 

fugitives limits the USMS’s ability to fully shift its efforts to apprehend 

those who are violent.7 

We also found that the RTFs did not limit the state fugitive 

investigations they accepted to only violent fugitives. To encourage the 

participation of state and local law enforcement agencies, the USMS 

accepted state fugitive investigations that did not involve violent fugitives. 

As a result, in FY 2004, 69 percent of the state fugitives apprehended in 

the RTF districts were not considered violent. 

State Fugitive Investigations Not Entered in WIN. We found that not 

all USMS districts entered state fugitive investigations in WIN when they 

accepted them. In response to our survey, 52 of the 88 districts that 

responded reported that they did not do so. Because some districts did not 

record all state fugitive investigations in WIN until the investigations were 

closed, if at all, the USMS could not ensure its efforts were sufficiently 

focused on violent fugitives. In addition, it could not fully assess its 

progress at apprehending violent fugitives or assess the impact of accepting 

 7 “Due diligence” requirements are designed to ensure that a prosecution may 

proceed under the federal Speedy Trial Act. Under 18 U.S.C. §3161 (h)(3)(B) the 

government must be able to demonstrate that a defendant’s whereabouts were unknown 

either because the defendant was avoiding apprehension or because the defendant’s 

whereabouts could not be determined after due diligence.
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

vi

investigations not classified as violent on the performance of its fugitive 

apprehension program. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The improvement achieved by the USMS fugitive apprehension 

program – a 51-percent increase in apprehensions over a 4-year period – 

represents a significant contribution to the Department’s efforts to 

reduce crime and improve public safety. However, because the number 

of violent federal fugitives at large has continued to increase, further 

improvements are needed. 

We identified several areas in which the USMS can improve its 

apprehension of violent federal fugitives in order to reduce the number of 

violent federal fugitives at large. Some Marshals failed to assign violent 

federal fugitive investigations to the RTFs and other task forces. Because 

the RTFs were more effective and efficient, assigning violent fugitive 

investigations to them could improve the USMS’s apprehension effort. 

Further, the assignment of investigations involving fugitives not classified 

as violent to the RTFs and other task forces hindered the effectiveness of 

the USMS’s efforts to focus those resources on apprehending violent 

fugitives. Limiting the number of investigations involving fugitives not 

classified as violent that the RTFs and other task forces undertake would 

enable them to better focus on violent fugitives, as directed in the 

Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 and Department policy. Also, 

the failure of districts to enter information in WIN when state fugitive 

investigations are opened by the USMS prevented the USMS from 

effectively focusing on violent state and federal fugitives. By entering 

data on state fugitive investigations when the investigations are opened, 

the USMS can better ensure its efforts are sufficiently focused on violent 

fugitives and fully assess its progress at apprehending violent fugitives at 

large. 

The Department’s October 2004 Fugitive Apprehension Report

proposed the creation of six additional RTFs. Our analysis of the fugitive 

apprehension data indicates that the six new RTFs can be expected to 

apprehend more violent fugitives, and we believe the creation of new 

RTFs is warranted. 

Therefore, to further improve the USMS’s effectiveness in 

apprehending violent fugitives and to reduce the number of violent 

federal fugitives at large, we recommend that the USMS: 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

vii

1. Establish goals and measures to track the USMS’s performance 

in apprehending violent fugitives and its progress in reducing 

the number of violent fugitives at large. 

2. Require districts to enter state fugitive investigations in WIN 

when the investigations are opened by the USMS. 

3. Establish criteria for districts to ensure that violent federal 

fugitive investigations are assigned to the RTFs and other task 

forces. 

4. Analyze WIN data to ensure that the districts appropriately 

focus on violent federal and state fugitive investigations. 

5. Consider creating the six RTFs proposed in the Department’s 

October 2004 Fugitive Apprehension Report. 

 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST.................................................................................. i

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 1

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY .............................................. 10

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW..................................................................... 12

 Apprehension of Violent Fugitives................................................... 12

 Factors That Limited Violent Fugitive Apprehensions...................... 17

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................. 28

APPENDIX I: Methodology...................................................................... 30

APPENDIX II: District Questionnaire..................................................... 37

APPENDIX III: USMS’s Response to Draft Report.................................. 45

APPENDIX IV: OIG Analysis of USMS’s Response.................................. 48
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

1

BACKGROUND 

The United States Marshals Service (USMS) has several important 

mission, including protecting the federal judiciary; housing and transporting 

federal prisoners in custody; and ensuring the security, health, and safety of 

Government witnesses.8 In addition, the USMS is the federal government’s 

primary agency for apprehending fugitives. In carrying out this 

responsibility, the USMS maintains a record of all federal arrest warrants 

and has the authority to “investigate such [federal and state] fugitive 

matters, both within and outside the United States, as directed by the 

Attorney General.”9 

Fugitive Apprehension Policy 

The Attorney General’s 1988 Policy on 

Fugitive Apprehension in Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and Drug Enforcement 

Administration Cases states that the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) shall have 

apprehension responsibility for all arrest 

warrants resulting from their own 

investigations. However, the DEA may 

delegate apprehension authority to the USMS 

if it does not apprehend the fugitive within 7 

days of the issuance of an arrest warrant. The 

FBI does not routinely transfer fugitive 

investigations to the USMS. As noted in the 

U.S. Department of Justice’s (Department) 

October 2004 Fugitive Apprehension Report, 

the USMS is currently reviewing the 1988 

policy in light of the transfer of the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) to the Department in January 2003.10 Like the FBI, the ATF currently 

does not routinely delegate fugitive investigations to the USMS. 

 8 Recent Office of Inspector General reviews in these areas include Review of the 

United States Marshals Service Judicial Security Process, I-2004-012 (March 2004), and 

Administration of the Witness Security Program (March 2005). 

 

9 28 U.S.C. § 566(a). 

10 The revised fugitive apprehension policy for the Department is currently in draft 

form. In addition, the USMS and the ATF are working on a draft Memorandum of 

Understanding concerning the referral of ATF fugitives to the USMS. 

Fugitive: A fugitive is any 

individual for whom a warrant 

for arrest has been issued; who 

has escaped from the custody 

of federal, state, or local law 

enforcement or correctional 

authorities; for whom a 

warrant for arrest, or 

equivalent document, has been 

issued by a foreign 

government; or who has 

escaped from the custody of 

foreign law enforcement or 

correctional authorities, and 

for whom the United States has 

received a request for 

assistance in locating or 

apprehending. 

Source: U.S. Department of Justice 

Fugitive Apprehension Report,

October 19, 2004. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

2

Although the Attorney General’s 1988 policy does not apply to law 

enforcement agencies in other federal departments, the USMS has 

Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with a number of agencies to 

assume apprehension responsibility for their fugitives. The USMS currently 

has MOUs with the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue 

Service, the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Inspector 

General (OIG), the Department of Veterans Affairs’ OIG, the Department of 

Education’s OIG, the Department of Agriculture’s OIG, and the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency, among 

others. 

In addition, the USMS has MOUs with state and local law 

enforcement agencies to assist in apprehending their fugitives. This 

authority to investigate non-federal fugitive felons derives from 28 U.S.C. § 

566(e)(1)(B), which states that the USMS is authorized to “investigate such 

fugitive matters, both within and outside the United States, as directed by 

the Attorney General.” Since this authorization was passed in 1988, the 

Attorney General has repeatedly authorized the USMS to participate with 

state and local law enforcement authorities in the investigation, pursuit, 

and arrest of fugitives wanted on state as well as federal charges. 

Types of Fugitives 

Federal fugitives are categorized based on whether they are wanted for 

a felony or non-felony (misdemeanor and some bench warrants) and 

whether the USMS has primary apprehension responsibility.11 The USMS 

designates violent fugitives as those on its 15 Most Wanted list, Major Case 

list, and fugitives whose underlying or current offense is homicide, 

kidnapping, assault, aggravated assault, robbery, arson, an “over-the-wall” 

escape, or involves weapons or explosives as violent fugitives. 

The USMS established the 15 Most Wanted fugitive program in 1983 

to prioritize investigations of the country’s most violent federal and state 

fugitives. These fugitives tend to be career criminals with histories of 

violence or whose current offenses pose a significant threat to public safety. 

Current and past fugitives in this program include murderers, sex offenders, 

drug kingpins, organized crime figures, and individuals wanted for highprofile financial crimes. The USMS established its Major Case fugitive 

program in 1985 to broaden the 15 Most Wanted fugitive program. Much 

like the 15 Most Wanted fugitive program, the Major Case fugitive program 

prioritizes the investigation of the country’s most dangerous federal and 

 11 18 U.S.C. § 3156 (3) (3) defines “felony” as an offense punishable by a maximum 

term of imprisonment of more than 1 year. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

3

state fugitives. Individuals who escape from custody are automatically 

elevated to Major Case status. There are approximately 300 Major Case 

investigations at any given time. 

Types of Investigations 

Deputy Marshals execute warrants and apprehend federal and state 

fugitives in the 94 federal judicial districts. The amount of time that Deputy 

Marshals spend on fugitive investigations depends on a number of factors, 

including the number of fugitive investigations assigned to them, additional 

district responsibilities beyond fugitive investigations, and the type of 

investigative entity they are assigned to in the district. The four types of 

investigative entities are: 

Individual Investigators. Each district usually has a number of 

Deputy Marshals assigned to conduct fugitive investigations. These Deputy 

Marshals have certain fugitives for whom they are responsible for 

investigating and must balance these investigations with other duties – such 

as court security and transporting prisoners. The individual Deputy 

Marshals do not work routinely with state and local law enforcement or 

other federal agencies. 

Deputy Marshals working individually operate within a single district. 

If a fugitive under investigation leaves the district, the Deputy Marshal 

transfers responsibility for the fugitive investigation to another district by 

sending a collateral lead to the district to which the fugitive fled. A 

collateral lead is sent electronically through the USMS’s Warrant 

Information Network (WIN), by facsimile, or by telephone. The lead provides 

background information on the fugitive, summarizes the investigation, and 

specifies how quickly the responding district must act. The district that 

initiated the collateral lead can request that the receiving district act on the 

lead immediately, within 48 hours, within 5 days, or within 10 days 

depending on the urgency of the investigation. 

District Warrant Squads. Warrant squads are teams of district 

Deputy Marshals that conduct fugitive investigations within a district. 

Deputy Marshals assigned to warrant squads usually have additional 

district responsibilities, but fugitive investigations are their primary 

responsibility. Warrant squads work within a district and do not routinely 

work with state and local law enforcement or other federal agencies. 

District Fugitive Task Forces. A district fugitive task force includes 

law enforcement personnel from other federal agencies, as well as deputized 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

4

state and local law enforcement personnel.12 Like a district warrant squad, 

a district fugitive task force operates within the boundaries of the district. 

Deputy Marshals are assigned to district fugitive task forces on a rotating 

basis and have minimal district responsibilities other than fugitive 

investigations. 

Regional Fugitive Task Forces. The Presidential Threat Protection Act 

of 2000 directed the Attorney General to create permanent Regional Fugitive 

Task Forces (RTF) consisting of federal, state, and local law enforcement 

personnel to apprehend the most dangerous fugitives. This Act provided the 

following language: 

Sec. 6. FUGITIVE APPREHENSION TASK FORCES 

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS – There are authorized to 

be appropriated to the Attorney General for the United States 

Marshals Service to carry out the provisions of this section 

$30,000,000 for fiscal year 2001, $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2002, and 

$5,000,000 for fiscal year 2003. 

Although the Act authorized funding for FY 2001, there was no funding 

appropriated. However, in FY 2002, Congress appropriated $5,825,000 for 

the “establishment of dedicated fugitive task forces on both coasts as 

proposed by the Senate.” In FY 2003, Congress appropriated $2,916,000 to 

“establish two additional centrally-managed fugitive task forces in the 

heartland.” The FY 2004 Conference language included an ear-mark of 

$11,476,000 for “all costs related to the regional fugitive task forces located 

in New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Atlanta.” Also included in this 

amount was $2 million for the “establishment of a new regional task force in 

the District of Columbia metropolitan area and $300,000 shall be for a task 

force in Billings, Montana.” The five RTFs that are currently established are 

described below: 

1. The New York/New Jersey RTF became operational in May 2002 

and covers the Southern and Eastern districts of New York and the 

district of New Jersey. 

2. The Pacific Southwest RTF became operational in July 2002 and 

covers the Central and Southern districts of California. 

3. The Great Lakes RTF became operational in July 2003 and covers 

the Northern, Central, and Southern districts of Illinois; the Northern 

district of Indiana; and the Eastern district of Wisconsin. 

 12 The Department’s October 2004 Fugitive Apprehension Report stated that there 

were 83 district fugitive task forces. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

5

4. The Southeast RTF became operational in September 2003 and 

covers the Northern and Middle districts of Georgia. 

5. The Capital Area RTF became operational in 2004 and covers the 

District of Columbia’s District Court and Superior Court, the district 

of Maryland, and the Eastern district of Virginia. 

Like district fugitive task forces, RTFs include law enforcement 

personnel from other federal agencies, as well as deputized state and local 

law enforcement personnel. In contrast to district fugitive task forces that 

operate exclusively within a district, each RTF operates in two or more 

districts. The Deputy Marshals and other federal, state, and local law 

enforcement personnel serving on the RTFs can cross district boundaries 

during an investigation. The management of the RTFs also differs from that 

of district task forces and warrant squads. While individual U.S. Marshals 

supervise warrant squads and district task forces in their districts, the 

Investigative Services Division in USMS headquarters oversees the five 

RTFs. 

Each RTF maintains an office in each of the districts in which it 

operates. Supervisory Inspectors from the Investigative Services Division 

direct the administrative and operational functions of the RTF; maintain 

communication among the RTF offices, the district offices, and 

headquarters; and supervise the RTF staff, including Deputy Marshals, 

federal and deputized state and local law enforcement personnel, and 

analysts. A limited number of Investigative Services Division Inspectors 

assigned to RTFs also conduct fugitive investigations. The majority of USMS 

personnel assigned to RTFs are Deputy Marshals who participate on the 

RTF either full or part time on a rotational basis. Once assigned to the RTF, 

these Deputy Marshals continue to work on their existing district fugitive 

investigations as well as any new investigations assigned to them through 

the RTF, but they are usually not assigned additional investigations directly 

by their district. 

In the October 2004 Fugitive Apprehension Report, the Department 

proposed the creation of six additional RTFs based on the prevalence of 

criminal activity in specific areas of the country. They are: 

1. Southwest RTF – based in Houston, Texas, and covering eight 

districts in Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma; 

2. Florida/Caribbean RTF – based in Miami, Florida, and covering five 

districts in Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

6

3. Carolinas RTF – based in Charlotte, North Carolina, and covering 

four districts in North Carolina and South Carolina; 

4. West Central RTF – based in St. Louis, Missouri, and covering 13 

districts in Missouri, Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, 

North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming; 

5. Northern Pacific RTF – based in San Francisco, California, and 

covering eight districts in California, Guam, Idaho, Hawaii, Oregon, 

and Washington; and 

6. New England RTF – based in Boston, Massachusetts, and covering 

five districts in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 

and Connecticut. 

Headquarters’ Support for Fugitive Investigations 

The USMS’s Investigative Services Division provides investigative and 

administrative support for fugitive investigations and oversees the five RTFs. 

It also designates which fugitive investigations are 15 Most Wanted Cases or 

Major Cases. The Investigative Services Division includes the Analytical 

Support Unit and the Technical Operations Group, which provide analytic 

and tactical support for fugitive investigations. 

The Analytical Support Unit maintains WIN, which is the USMS's 

central law enforcement information system. Through WIN, users are able 

to enter, collate, and retrieve fugitive and warrant information, including 

photographs. Users manage investigative information; access the National 

Crime Information Center; suspend, close, and delete warrant records; 

assign investigations to staff; share fugitive investigation information among 

districts, including collateral leads; and generate reports.13 The Analytical 

Support Unit distributes WIN data in a monthly report, informing districts 

of their number of federal warrants and rate of clearance. Using the report, 

districts can determine where they rank compared to other districts in the 

apprehension of fugitives, and USMS headquarters can monitor the 

districts’ performance. 

 

The WIN data used for the analysis in this report is a subset of 

selected variables from the WIN system and is structured so that each 

record represents one warrant and contains information such as type of 

 13 The National Crime Information Center, maintained by the FBI, is a 

computerized index of criminal justice information, such as criminal records and 

information on fugitives, stolen properties, and missing persons, and is available to federal, 

state, and local law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

7

warrant, underlying criminal offense, current offense, the agency that 

initiated the warrant, court records, and related internal correspondence. A 

single fugitive may have multiple warrants, each of which is represented in 

a separate record in this dataset.

The Technical Operations Group includes the Electronic Surveillance 

Unit, which provides covert investigative and intelligence support to fugitive 

apprehension and other investigative efforts, such as telephone monitoring, 

electronic tracking, and audio-video recording. Electronic Surveillance Unit 

personnel prepare court orders, serve as expert witnesses, and train law 

enforcement officers in the use of electronic surveillance. 

The Management and Budget Division supports the USMS fugitive 

apprehension program by providing personnel support to districts. District 

personnel report their duty hours, including those hours dedicated to 

fugitive investigations, to the Management and Budget Division through the 

standard USM-7 form. The Management and Budget Division uses the 

information to assign the districts personnel, including administrative 

personnel and Deputy Marshals. 

Performance Measures for Fugitive Apprehension 

The USMS measures its performance in terms of the number of 

federal fugitives apprehended or cleared. Apprehensions include: 

• Physical arrest – The USMS is the lead agency in the 

apprehension and Deputy Marshals arrest the fugitive. 

• Directed arrest – A USMS investigation provides enough 

information to allow another law enforcement agency to make an 

arrest in a location that is not easily accessible to USMS personnel. 

• Surrender – Fugitives turn themselves in to the USMS or other 

authorities. 

Clearances include: 

• Arrest by other agencies – A physical arrest, directed arrest, or 

surrender that results from an investigation by an agency other 

than the USMS. 

• Lodged detainer – When a fugitive is imprisoned by a law 

enforcement agency other than the USMS, the USMS advises 

prison officials that the prisoner is wanted on other charges and 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

8

requests continued detention of the prisoner or notification of the 

prisoner's impending release. 

• Dismissal – A federal magistrate or judge dismisses the warrant. 

• Return of the warrant to the original agency – The DEA or the 

FBI requests that the warrant be returned. 

• Purging of the warrant – The warrant is removed from WIN 

because the USMS believes that any further action on the warrant 

would be “impossible or unreasonable.” For example, if the fugitive 

is believed to be dead, then the warrant is purged. 

According to the Department’s FY 2004 Performance and 

Accountability Report (Performance Report), the USMS’s target was to 

apprehend or clear 49 percent (86,652) of all federal fugitives in FY 2004. 

The actual number of federal fugitives apprehended or cleared was 79,740, 

or 47 percent of the year’s total. The Performance Report noted that the 

number of state and local fugitives apprehended or cleared by the USMS 

increased by 26 percent from FY 2003 to FY 2004, making it difficult for the 

USMS to keep pace with a growing federal fugitive workload. The USMS 

attributed the increased workload of state and local fugitives to 

investigations conducted by the RTFs and other USMS-led fugitive task 

forces. Chart 1 shows the projected and actual number of federal fugitives 

apprehended or cleared from FY 2001 through FY 2004. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

9

Chart 1: Number of Federal Fugitives Apprehended or Cleared 

Department-wide from FY 2001 through FY 2004

71,368

73,097

81,652

79,740

70,901

78,260

86,652

FY 2001

FY 2002

FY 2003

FY 2004

Actual Projected

Source: FY 2002 – FY 2004 Department Performance and Accountability Reports 

Note: In FY 2002, the USMS changed its performance measure from warrants 

apprehended or cleared to fugitives apprehended or cleared. For this reason, the 

projected target of fugitives apprehended or cleared for FY 2001 is not available. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

10

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Purpose and Scope 

The OIG initiated this review to evaluate the performance of the USMS 

in apprehending violent federal and state fugitives from FY 2001 to 

FY 2004.14 Although the ATF, the DEA, and the FBI conduct fugitive 

investigations, this review is limited to the USMS’s efforts. Our review 

focused specifically on violent federal and state fugitives because locating 

and apprehending the most violent fugitives is the main priority of the 

USMS’s fugitive apprehension program.15

Methodology 

The following is a summary of the methodology used to examine the 

performance of the USMS in apprehending violent federal and state 

fugitives. A detailed methodology is included in Appendix I. 

 

We examined the performance of Deputy Marshals working 

individually or as members of warrant squads, district fugitive task forces, 

or RTFs in apprehending federal and state violent fugitives from FY 2001 to 

FY 2004, as well as the reasons for any differences in performance. We also 

surveyed each of the 94 USMS district offices on a range of topics pertaining 

to their fugitive apprehension activities. We received responses from 88 of 

the 94 (94 percent) districts. The questionnaire is included in Appendix II. 

To examine the different approaches to fugitive apprehension, we 

visited 12 of the 15 districts that are part of the 5 RTFs, as well as 5 nonRTF districts. We interviewed Marshals, Chief Deputy Marshals, warrant 

squad supervisors, Task Force Supervisory Inspectors, Inspectors, Deputy 

Marshals involved with the Electronic Surveillance Unit, Deputy Marshals 

who investigate fugitives, WIN data administrators, and representatives from 

other federal, state, and local agencies who worked with the districts and 

RTFs to investigate and apprehend fugitives. We also conducted interviews 

with USMS headquarters personnel. 

 14 Previous OIG reviews of the USMS fugitive apprehension program are Follow-up 

Inspection of the United States Marshals Service’s Fugitive Apprehension Program, I-2000-02 

(January 2000) and Inspection of the Fugitive Apprehension Program in the United States 

Marshals Service, I-94-04 (September 1995). 

15 U.S. Department of Justice Fiscal Years 2003-2008 Strategic Plan, p. 2.97. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

11

To compute the number of apprehensions per staff year, we reviewed 

USMS headquarters and district personnel time and attendance data on 

hours spent investigating fugitives. These hours included time for 

administrative staff as well as Deputy Marshals. We requested data from 

the USM-7 database for all time spent by USMS staff investigating fugitives 

for FY 2001 to FY 2004; however, the USMS could provide data only from 

FY 2002 to FY 2004. We calculated staff years by dividing the number of 

hours worked in a district or grouping of districts by 2,087 hours (the Office 

of Personnel Management equivalent of one “full time equivalent” work 

year). To compute the number of apprehensions per staff year, we divided 

the number of clearances or apprehensions of fugitives by the staff years 

applied to fugitive investigations. We also analyzed data from two separate 

databases: 

The Electronic Surveillance Unit database. We analyzed this database 

and examined the number of fugitive investigations in which Electronic 

Surveillance Unit personnel assisted, as well as the number of arrests that 

resulted from this assistance. 

The Warrant Information Network (WIN). Our analysis of WIN 

consisted of two parts – the number of fugitives apprehended and the 

number remaining at large. We examined warrants in WIN received before 

October 1, 2004, and cleared between September 30, 2000, and October 1, 

2004. In our analysis, one warrant equaled one fugitive, even if a fugitive 

had multiple warrants in the system.

 Although WIN contained a field that captured whether a district task 

force or RTF apprehended a fugitive, we learned that USMS personnel did 

not consistently enter data in this field when a task force was involved. 

Therefore, we analyzed RTF performance based on the districts that 

constituted the RTFs as a whole (for example, the Pacific Southwest RTF 

comprises the Southern and Central districts of California). Any analysis 

regarding fugitives cleared or apprehended is based on the performance of 

the districts participating in the RTFs because we could not analyze 

individual RTFs’ performance separately from that of the districts in which 

they operated. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

12

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

Apprehension of Violent Fugitives 

The USMS’s performance in apprehending violent fugitives 

improved significantly from FY 2001 to FY 2004.16 The 

number of violent fugitives apprehended by the USMS 

increased by 51 percent during this period, and the 

number of violent fugitives apprehended per staff year 

increased from 18 in FY 2002 to 21 fugitives in FY 2004. 

The two most significant factors explaining these 

improvements were that the USMS increased staff time 

dedicated to fugitive investigations and created five RTFs, 

which we found were effective in increasing violent 

fugitive apprehensions. 

As shown in Chart 2, from FY 2001 to FY 2004 the USMS increased 

the number of violent fugitives apprehended from 14,348 to 21,600, a 

51-percent improvement. 

Chart 2: Violent Fugitive Apprehensions, FY 2001 to FY 2004

14,348 15,627

21,600

17,505

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Source: USMS WIN Database 

We also found that the USMS became more efficient in apprehending 

violent fugitives. The number of violent fugitives apprehended per staff year 

increased from 18 violent fugitives in FY 2002 to 21 violent fugitives in 

 16 The term “violent fugitives” includes both violent federal fugitives and violent 

state fugitives. We defined “fugitives apprehended” as those arrested by the USMS, 

arrested by another agency at the direction of the USMS, or who surrendered.
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

13

FY 2004.17 We examined how the USMS achieved these improvements. We 

determined that the USMS achieved the increases because the USMS 

increased the staff time dedicated to fugitive investigations by 21 percent. 

In addition, the USMS improved its effectiveness at apprehending fugitives 

by creating 5 RTFs encompassing 15 districts. 

Staff Time Dedicated to Fugitive Investigations Increased 

From FY 2002 to FY 2004, the USMS increased the amount of time 

that Deputy Marshals and other personnel devoted to fugitive investigations 

by 21 percent, from 911 staff years to 1,104 staff years (Chart 3). 

Chart 3: Amount of Time Spent on Fugitive Investigations 

(in Staff Years), FY 2002 to FY 2004 

182 190 216

485 514

655

221 210

177 56 38

23

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Staff Years

RTF districts Non-RTF districts Overhead and administrative support Electronic Surveillance Unit

Source: USMS Management and Budget Division 

 Note: The USMS could not provide data for FY 2001. 

The additional staff years dedicated to fugitive investigations included 

the time of both new and existing USMS staff. From FY 2002 to FY 2004, 

the total number of Deputy Marshals assigned to the districts, the RTFs, 

and the Electronic Surveillance Unit increased by 13 percent (Table 1). 

 17 Most recently, the USMS used its RTFs and district task forces to coordinate 

Operation FALCON (Federal and Local Cops Organized Nationally). Operation FALCON 

involved over 900 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and resulted in the 

arrest of 10,340 fugitives from April 4 through 10, 2005. The USMS focused Operation 

FALCON’s efforts on apprehending fugitives wanted for gang-related crimes, homicide, 

crimes involving use of a weapon, crimes against children and the elderly, crimes involving 

sexual assaults, and other crimes of violence. 

911 953 

1,104 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

14

Table 1: Increases in USMS Personnel, FY 2002 to FY 2004 

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Deputy Marshals assigned to 

USMS districts 2,392 2,750 2,688 

Investigative Services Division 

employees assigned to the RTFs 20 24 31 

Employees assigned to the 

Electronic Surveillance Unit 31 36 47 

 Source: USMS Management and Budget Division and Investigative Services Division 

Some of the increased resources were directed to USMS units that 

provide support to fugitive investigations. For example, the number of 

Deputy Marshals and other staff in the Electronic Surveillance Unit, which 

provides investigative and intelligence support for fugitive investigations, 

increased by 52 percent (from 31 to 47) from FY 2002 to FY 2004. With the 

increase in staff, the Electronic Surveillance Unit assisted in 81 percent 

more fugitive investigations from FY 2001 to FY 2004, which resulted in a 

111-percent increase in apprehensions (Chart 4). The unit’s personnel also 

said that the increase in staffing enabled them to give state and local law 

enforcement personnel greater access to the USMS’s electronic surveillance 

capability. However, the Electronic Surveillance Unit database did not 

distinguish between federal and state fugitive investigations before 

October 2004. This has since been corrected. 

Chart 4: Electronic Surveillance Unit Investigations and 

Apprehensions, FY 2001 to FY 2004 

1,084

723

1,265

988

1,142

926

1,965

1,529

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Investigations Apprehensions

Source: USMS Electronic Surveillance Unit 

The increase in personnel also allowed the USMS to generate and 

respond to a growing number of collateral leads. Collateral leads are 

district-to-district requests for fugitive investigation assistance that take 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

15

priority over other USMS fugitive apprehension responsibilities. From 

FY 2003 to FY 2004, the number of collateral leads received by the districts 

increased by 61 percent, from 4,372 to 7,028 leads. 

Five RTFs Created 

We concluded that the establishment of the five RTFs also contributed 

to the increase in violent apprehensions because they provided a more 

effective approach to apprehending violent fugitives. The Assistant Director 

of the Investigative Services Division, the Marshals, and the Deputy 

Marshals we interviewed stated that the RTFs were the primary reason for 

the increased number of violent fugitive apprehensions. The effectiveness of 

the RTF was also cited by representatives from other federal agencies we 

interviewed, who stated that they often brought their agencies’ fugitive 

investigations to the RTFs. In RTFs, Deputy Marshals are able to work more 

closely with state and local law enforcement partners who are familiar with 

the local jurisdictions and informants in the geographic area covered by the 

RTF. The Deputy Marshals’ authority to cross district, state, and local 

boundaries to pursue fugitives also improved the RTF partners’ ability to 

apprehend violent fugitives. 

The state and local task force members we interviewed stated that 

working with the USMS task forces increased their effectiveness in 

apprehending violent fugitives. State and local members of RTFs cited 

several benefits, including: 

• Greater electronic and financial surveillance capability; 

• Access to federal law enforcement databases, such as those 

maintained by the Social Security Administration, the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development; 

• Expert Deputy Marshals dedicated to fugitive apprehension; 

• Access to law enforcement officers familiar with the local 

jurisdictions and informants; 

• More resources, such as overtime pay, vehicles, cellular phones, 

and equipment; 

• One geographic location for the various law enforcement agencies 

to meet and share information; 

• The ability to request USMS assistance across state or local 

boundaries; and 

• Training opportunities and technical assistance. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

16

Our analysis of WIN supports the conclusion that the RTFs were a 

significant reason for the increase in the number of violent fugitives 

apprehended. When we compared the number of violent fugitives 

apprehended in RTF districts to the number apprehended in non-RTF 

districts, we found that violent fugitive apprehensions increased by 

67 percent in the RTF districts, compared to a 45-percent increase in nonRTF districts from FY 2001 to FY 2004 (Chart 5). 

Chart 5: Increase in Violent Fugitive Apprehensions in RTF Districts 

and Non-RTF Districts, FY 2001 to FY 2004 

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Apprehensions in RTF districts 

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

Apprehensions in non-RTF districts

RTF districts Non-RTF districts

Source: USMS WIN database

We also found that the RTF districts became more efficient over time 

in apprehending violent fugitives and apprehended more violent fugitives per 

staff year than non-RTF districts. In the RTF districts, the number of 

violent fugitives apprehended increased from 17 to 22 violent fugitives per 

staff year from FY 2002 to FY 2004, while the non-RTF districts 

apprehended 18 violent fugitives per staff year in FY 2002 and 20 per staff 

year in FY 2004 (Table 2). 

Table 2: Violent Fugitive Apprehensions per Staff Year in RTF and 

Non-RTF Districts, FY 2002 to FY 2004 

Districts FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Non-RTF Districts 18 20 20 

RTF Districts 17 18 22 

 Source: WIN database and USMS Management and Budget Division 

RTF districts – 67-percent increase 

Non-RTF districts – 45-percent increase 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

17

 Factors That Limited Violent Fugitive Apprehensions 

Despite the increase in violent fugitive apprehensions, the 

number of violent federal fugitives at large increased. 

Specifically, from FY 2001 through FY 2004, the number 

of violent federal fugitives at large increased by 3 percent, 

to 14,419 fugitives. Several factors beyond the control of 

the USMS contributed to the increase in the number of 

violent federal fugitives at large. However, we identified 

three factors that were within the USMS’s control that 

contributed to the increase. First, not all districts 

assigned violent federal fugitive investigations to the task 

forces and RTFs; second, the USMS did not fully shift its 

focus from apprehending all federal fugitives to 

apprehending violent federal and state fugitives; and 

third, most districts did not enter data on their state 

fugitive investigations in WIN when the investigations 

were opened so that they could focus on apprehending 

violent fugitives. 

Although the USMS increased the number of violent fugitives it 

apprehended from FY 2001 to FY 2004, the number of violent federal 

fugitives at large increased by 3 percent during the same period, from 

14,046 to 14,419 (Chart 6). 

Chart 6: Number of Violent Federal Fugitives at Large, 

FY 2001 to FY 2004 

14,046 14,387 14,419 14,699

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

 Source: USMS WIN database 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

18

Several factors beyond the control of the USMS contributed to the 

increase in the number of violent federal fugitives at large.18 We found that 

the USMS conducted more fugitive investigations on behalf of other federal 

agencies, including investigations for the ATF and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

From FY 2001 to FY 2004, the number of fugitive investigations that the 

USMS conducted for other federal agencies increased by 62 percent, from 

3,106 to 5,037. The increasing number of investigations resulted in 

39 percent more apprehensions of felony fugitives for other federal agencies, 

increasing from 4,836 in FY 2001 to 6,712 in FY 2004 (Chart 7). 

Chart 7: USMS Felony Fugitive Investigations and 

Apprehensions for Other Federal Agencies, FY 2001 to FY 2004 

3,106

4,836

3,422

5,412

3,695

5,910

5,037

6,712

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Investigations Apprehensions

Source: OIG District Survey and USMS WIN database 

Note: The number of apprehensions is greater than the number of investigations because 

apprehensions include individuals who surrendered to the USMS before investigations were 

begun and because one investigation may result in multiple apprehensions. 

Some of the Deputy Marshals we spoke with identified other external 

factors that may have contributed to the increased number of violent federal 

fugitives at large. Several Deputy Marshals stated that an expansion in the 

number of investigations that are pursued by United States Attorneys’ 

Offices resulted in more violent federal fugitives sought by the USMS. Two 

Supervisory Inspectors suggested that the increased number of federal task 

forces of all types had generated more federal fugitives. Examples of federal 

task forces cited by the Supervisory Inspectors included the FBI’s Violent 

 18 The number of state fugitives under investigation by the USMS and still at large 

could not be determined because, as 52 districts reported in our district survey, districts 

did not routinely enter state fugitive investigations in WIN when they opened the 

investigations. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

19

Crimes Task Forces, the ATF’s Project Safe Neighborhoods Task Forces, and 

the DEA’s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces. Another 

reason for the increased number of violent federal fugitives at large is that 

the task forces investigated more state fugitives. Since the USMS has the 

authority to investigate federal and state fugitives anywhere in the United 

States and outside the country, state and local law enforcement agencies 

had more incentive to request the USMS task forces’ assistance with their 

violent fugitives. State and local district task force members whom we 

interviewed stated that working with the USMS increased their effectiveness 

in apprehending violent fugitives. 

Factors Limiting the Apprehension of Violent Federal Fugitives 

Although we recognized that the increased number of federal fugitives 

was not fully within the USMS’s control, we identified three factors within 

the USMS’s control that also contributed to the increase and limited the 

effectiveness of the USMS in apprehending violent fugitives. The factors 

were that not all districts assigned violent federal fugitive investigations to 

the RTFs and other task forces; the USMS did not ensure that the districts 

and RTFs focused sufficiently on violent fugitive investigations; and not all 

districts entered data regarding their state fugitives in WIN when the 

investigations were opened. By not entering the data, the USMS could not 

fully assess its progress at apprehending violent fugitives at large. 

Not All Districts Assigned Violent Federal Fugitive Investigations to Task 

Forces

We found that many districts did not assign violent federal fugitive 

investigations to the task forces that operated in their districts. In response 

to our inquiries, the USMS told us that there were no written USMS 

guidelines on whether the RTFs, other task forces, or the districts’ warrant 

squads should investigate violent federal fugitives. In the absence of USMS 

policy, Marshals can decide how to assign violent federal fugitive 

investigations in their district. Some Marshals did not assign violent federal 

fugitive investigations to task forces operating in their districts. 

Of the 88 districts that responded to our survey, 77 reported that they 

had RTFs or other task forces operating in their districts. Of those 

77 districts, 21 – including 7 RTF districts – reported that they assigned 

25 percent or less of their violent federal fugitive investigations to the task 

forces. Overall, 33 of the 77 districts reported that they assigned 50 percent 

or less of their violent federal fugitive investigations to the task forces 

(Chart 8). 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

20

Chart 8: Survey Responses on Assignment 

of Violent Federal Fugitive Investigations to Task Forces 

7

2 6

14

10

8

30

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100%

Percentage of violent federal fugitive investigations assigned to task forces

Number of districts

RTF districts Non-RTF districts

 Source: OIG District Survey 

During our field visits, we interviewed the Marshals and other staff 

from six of the seven RTF districts that assigned 25 percent or less of their 

violent federal fugitive investigations to the RTFs. We asked them why they 

did not assign more violent federal fugitive investigations to the RTFs. Three 

of the Marshals told us that they did not assign investigations to the RTFs 

because the districts did not control the RTFs. They believed that the RTF 

Supervisory Inspectors should be accountable to the Marshals in the 

districts that they served. Several other USMS personnel stated that a 

district’s lack of control over an RTF could hurt the district’s reputation and 

morale. For example, if Deputy Marshals or state and local personnel 

assigned to the RTF violate USMS policy and procedures, such actions 

would reflect poorly on the district.19 Headquarters officials told us that 

while the RTF Supervisory Inspectors report administratively to the USMS 

headquarters Investigative Services Division, they also report operationally 

to the affected district Marshals and Chiefs. However, we learned during 

our interviews in the districts that some Marshals and Chiefs had the 

perception that the RTF Supervisory Inspectors did not report to them 

operationally. 

Three Marshals in other RTF districts stated that they did not assign 

violent federal fugitive investigations to the RTFs because assigning these 

 19 The RTFs are staffed with Investigative Services Division Deputy Marshals on a 

full-time basis and with district Deputy Marshals who participate on a full-time or parttime basis through rotations from their district assignments. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

21

potentially more complex investigations to the RTFs reduced the opportunity 

for district Deputy Marshals to develop their investigative skills. One 

Marshal suggested that all district Deputy Marshals serve a rotation period 

on an RTF to work on the more complex investigations. Some district 

Deputy Marshals told the OIG that the assignment of complex violent 

federal fugitive investigations to the RTF created the perception that they, 

the district Deputy Marshals, did not have the capability to conduct those 

investigations. Some Marshals were concerned that this perception could 

undermine the morale of the district Deputy Marshals. 

We found that some of the districts that did not assign their 

investigations to the task forces were nonetheless assigning their Deputy 

Marshals to the task forces, thereby reducing the number of Deputy 

Marshals in the district available to conduct those violent federal fugitive 

investigations that the district retained. Of the 88 USMS district offices that 

responded to our survey, 17 districts indicated that the percentage of their 

Deputy Marshals assigned to a task force was higher than the percentage of 

their violent federal fugitive investigations assigned to those task forces 

(Table 3). 

Table 3: Comparison of the Assignment of Deputy Marshals and Violent 

Fugitive Investigations in 17 Districts 

District Percentage of Deputy Marshals 

Assigned to Fugitive Task Forces 

Percentage of Violent Federal Fugitive 

Investigations Assigned to Fugitive 

Task Forces 

A 100 90 

B 100 50 

C 100 37 

D 100 25 

E 63 40 

F 63 40 

G 61 55 

H 57 8 

I 53 25 

J 52 20 

K 50 19 

L 38 20 

M 38 0 

N 33 0 

O 31 0 

P 27 2 

Q 25 10 

Source: OIG District Survey and Interviews 

We asked the Marshals or Chief Deputy Marshals in eight districts 

that assigned a greater percentage of Deputy Marshals than investigations 

to task forces why they did so. They stated that they accepted the reduction 

in the number of Deputy Marshals available to work on their districts’ 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

22

violent fugitive investigations because they wanted to help ensure the 

success of the task forces. These Marshals and Chief Deputy Marshals said 

that they assigned district Deputy Marshals to the task forces even though 

the USMS did not have a policy requiring them to do so. 

Focus Not Fully Shifted to Violent Fugitive Investigations 

We found another factor limiting the USMS’s effectiveness was that 

the USMS had not adequately changed its focus to apprehending violent 

fugitives as directed. The Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 (Act) 

directed the creation of fugitive apprehension task forces and, subsequent 

to passage of the Act, congressional conference reports reflected the 

encouragement to the Department to focus on apprehending violent federal 

and state fugitives.20 In FY 2001, the Department’s FY 2001-2006 Strategic 

Plan changed the focus of the USMS fugitive apprehension program from 

apprehending all federal fugitives to apprehending violent fugitives, both 

federal and state.21 One measure of this change in policy was a 40-percent 

increase in the number of USMS violent fugitive investigations resolved by 

apprehension of the fugitive or administrative clearance of the warrant from 

FY 2001 to FY 2004.22 The number of other fugitives (fugitives not known to 

be violent) apprehended or cleared increased by 29 percent in that same 

period. In addition, the USMS significantly expanded its efforts to 

apprehend violent state fugitives and increased the number of violent state 

fugitives apprehended by 96 percent from 5,667 in FY 2001 to 11,130 in 

FY 2004. 

However, we also found that the change in focus was limited. Overall, 

the proportion of apprehensions that involved violent fugitives did not 

change significantly over the 4-year period – from 32.3 percent in FY 2001 

to 32.6 percent in FY 2004 (Chart 9). That indicated that although 

resources had expanded, the USMS’s efforts had not been effectively 

refocused from all federal fugitives to violent fugitives. We also found that 

the USMS had not established any performance goals related to the 

 20 Report No. H.R. 108-401, which accompanied the Department’s FY 2004 

appropriations (Pub. L. No. 108-199). 

21 The Department’s FY 2000-2005 Strategic Plan, published in September 2000, 

focused the Department’s apprehension efforts on federal fugitives, and the FY 2001-2006 

Strategic Plan, published in November 2001 to address the events of September 11, focused 

the Department’s apprehension efforts on violent federal and state fugitives. 

22 “Fugitives apprehended” were those arrested by the USMS, arrested by another 

agency at the direction of the USMS, or who surrendered. “Fugitives cleared” were those 

whose warrants were closed by means other than apprehension, such as dismissal of the 

fugitive’s warrant by a federal magistrate or judge. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

23

apprehension of violent federal and state fugitives. Instead, the USMS 

continued to track and report annually on the number of all federal fugitives 

apprehended or cleared. 

Chart 9: Federal and State Fugitives Apprehended by the USMS, 

FY 2001 to FY 2004 

14,348 15,627 17,505 21,600

30,041 32,097 37,206 44,661

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Violent federal and state fugitives Other federal and state fugitives

Source: USMS WIN database 

The Marshals and Chief Deputy Marshals that we interviewed stated 

that the USMS was limited in its ability to more rapidly or completely shift 

focus. They noted, for example, “due diligence” responsibilities that require 

the USMS to pursue all fugitives whether or not they are known or 

suspected to be violent.23 If the USMS does not pursue a fugitive for whom 

it is responsible, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial 

when the fugitive is apprehended. We found that the majority of the 

USMS’s fugitive investigations involved fugitives not known to be violent. Of 

the 176,753 federal fugitives recorded in WIN for FY 2004, only 34,586 

(20 percent) were violent federal fugitives. The USMS’s responsibility to 

pursue all fugitives limited its ability to fully shift its fugitive apprehension 

efforts to focus on violent fugitives. 

Another factor that limited the USMS’s ability to change its focus was 

that although the RTFs were established to investigate and apprehend the 

most violent fugitives, the RTFs did not restrict the state fugitive 

investigations they accepted to only violent fugitives. We found that 69 

 23 “Due diligence” requirements are designed to ensure that a prosecution may 

proceed under the federal Speedy Trial Act. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(3)(B) the 

government must be able to demonstrate that a defendant’s whereabouts were unknown 

either because the defendant was avoiding apprehension or because the defendant’s 

whereabouts could not be determined after due diligence. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

24

percent of the RTF districts’ state fugitive apprehensions in FY 2004 

involved fugitives not known to be violent. To maximize the effectiveness of 

the RTFs, the USMS encourages its state and local task force partners to 

bring their violent fugitive investigations to the RTFs. Task force 

supervisors told us that to encourage this participation, the RTFs accepted 

a wide range of state fugitive investigations considered important by state 

and local agencies, rather than insisting that the fugitives investigated by 

the RTF meet the USMS’s definition of a violent fugitive. The supervisors 

also told us that an investigation may involve circumstances that make a 

fugitive of particular concern, even though the fugitive was not violent. An 

RTF Supervisory Inspector cited one example of a fugitive wanted for forgery 

who created and supplied false identification documents to other fugitives. 

State Fugitive Investigations Not Entered in WIN

The USMS had no policy requiring that districts enter information 

regarding state fugitive investigations they accepted in WIN when they 

opened the investigation. In response to our survey, 52 of 88 districts 

reported that they did not enter data on their state fugitive investigations 

into WIN when the investigations were opened. These districts either did 

not enter state fugitive data in WIN at all, did so after the investigation was 

closed, or did so only if the investigation required specific USMS assistance. 

For example, many Deputy Marshals we interviewed stated that they only 

entered state fugitive information in WIN if they needed Electronic 

Surveillance Unit assistance or wanted to make the state fugitive a Major 

Case or Top 15 Most Wanted fugitive. Because the USMS does not record 

all state fugitive investigations in WIN when the districts open an 

investigation, it is not able to fully assess its progress at apprehending 

violent fugitives at large or effectively focus its resources on apprehending 

violent fugitives. 

 

Impact of the Limiting Factors on USMS Fugitive Apprehension Efforts

The three factors described above collectively limited the USMS’s 

efforts to focus its resources on apprehending violent fugitives. We found 

that the task forces such as the RTFs were significantly more effective and 

efficient in apprehending violent fugitives because they enabled the USMS to 

work more closely with state and local law enforcement personnel. The 

failure to assign violent federal fugitive investigations to the task forces 

while continuing to assign district personnel to the task forces meant that 

there were proportionally fewer resources to conduct the violent federal 

fugitive investigations in those districts. Consequently, the USMS achieved 

a much greater increase in its apprehensions of violent state fugitives and a 

less significant increase in apprehensions of violent federal fugitives. From 

FY 2001 through FY 2004, violent federal fugitive apprehensions increased 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

25

by 21 percent, while apprehensions of violent state fugitives increased by 

96 percent (Chart 10). 

Chart 10: Violent Fugitives Apprehended, FY 2001 to FY 2004 

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Apprehensions

All violent fugitives Violent state fugitives Violent federal fugitives

 Source: USMS WIN database 

The impact of failing to assign violent federal fugitive investigations to 

task forces is clearly demonstrated by the differing results achieved by the 

RTF districts. Because not all USMS district offices assigned their violent 

federal fugitive investigations to the RTFs, and because some RTFs accepted 

state investigations of fugitives not considered violent to encourage state 

participation, apprehensions of violent federal fugitives in some RTF 

districts actually declined. This was demonstrated by the differing results 

achieved by the New York/New Jersey and the Great Lakes RTF districts. 

The New York/New Jersey RTF districts increased only their violent state 

fugitive apprehensions during the 4-year period under review, while the 

Great Lakes RTF districts improved their performance in both violent federal 

and state fugitive apprehensions (Chart 11). 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

26

Chart 11: Percentage Change in Federal and State Violent Fugitive 

Apprehensions by RTF Districts, FY 2001 to FY 2004 

740

561

54 -34

-50

50

150

250

350

450

550

650

750

850

New York/New Jersey Great Lakes 

Violent federal fugitives Violent state fugitives

 Source: USMS WIN database

Both the New York/New Jersey and Great Lakes RTF districts 

increased their apprehensions of violent state fugitives by more than 

500 percent. Although the districts that made up the New York/New Jersey 

RTF sometimes requested the RTF’s assistance in fugitive investigations, 

they did not routinely use the RTF to conduct their violent federal fugitive 

investigations. In addition, Deputy Marshals assigned to the RTF brought 

with them their ongoing fugitive investigations (although the fugitives in 

these investigations were not always classified as violent). As a result, the 

number of violent federal fugitives apprehended in the New York/New 

Jersey RTF districts declined by 34 percent from FY 2001 to FY 2004. 

In contrast, the districts that made up the Great Lakes RTF assigned 

most of their violent federal fugitive investigations to the RTF. As a result, 

the Great Lakes RTF districts achieved a 54-percent increase in 

apprehensions of violent federal fugitives from FY 2001 to FY 2004. The 

Marshals in these districts stated that they gave priority to the violent 

federal warrants of the districts and sent the more serious, complicated 

warrants to the RTF for investigation. 

USMS Has Initiated Action to Better Manage Task Forces

The USMS Investigative Services Division personnel told us that the 

USMS is aware of the need for standardization and improvement of its task 

force operations and it is currently working on Standard Operating 

Procedures to direct task force operations. However, our review of the 

minutes of the March 2005 USMS Chief’s Investigative Advisory Board 

meeting indicated that the proposed Standard Operating Procedures do not 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

27

address how violent federal fugitive investigations will be assigned to the 

task forces.24 The minutes indicate that the USMS is considering directing 

the districts to enter violent state fugitives into WIN when an investigation is 

opened. However, the proposed Standard Operating Procedures allow for 

certain investigations not meeting the “violent fugitive” criteria to be 

accepted by the RTFs and the districts, but not entered in WIN until they 

are closed. If the USMS does not record all state fugitive investigations in 

WIN when the districts open the investigation, it will not be able to fully 

assess its progress at apprehending fugitives at large or assess the impact of 

accepting investigations not classified as violent on the performance of its 

fugitive apprehension program. 

The USMS headquarters staff also is studying ways to improve 

coordination between the RTFs and the districts they serve, and to balance 

the number of federal and state fugitive investigations. The participants at 

the March 2005 Chief’s Investigative Advisory Board meeting suggested the 

creation of coordinating committees that would include the Marshals and 

RTF supervisors in RTF districts. These committees would meet quarterly to 

facilitate coordination between the RTFs and districts and improve 

communication between the RTF and district supervisors. 

 24 The Chief’s Investigative Advisory Board is made up of senior career Deputy 

Marshals from selected districts. The Board, which meets several times a year, provides a 

field perspective on the development of policies and procedures relating to the 

apprehension of fugitives. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

28

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The performance of the USMS in apprehending violent fugitives 

improved significantly from FY 2001 to FY 2004. The number of violent 

fugitives apprehended by the USMS and its state and local partners 

increased by 51 percent from 14,348 fugitives in FY 2001 to 21,600 fugitives 

in FY 2004. The number of violent fugitives apprehended per staff year also 

increased from 18 violent fugitives per staff year in FY 2002 to 21 violent 

fugitives per staff year in FY 2004. The improvement achieved by the USMS 

fugitive apprehension program represented a significant contribution to the 

Department’s efforts to reduce crime and improve public safety. 

Our analysis showed two main reasons for the increases in the 

number of violent fugitives apprehended. First, the USMS increased the 

staff years it devoted to fugitive apprehensions by 21 percent, from 911 in 

FY 2002 to 1,104 in FY 2004, and became more efficient in its 

apprehensions. Second, Congress directed and the USMS created five RTFs, 

which were effective in increasing fugitive apprehensions. 

Notwithstanding these results, the number of violent federal fugitives 

at large increased by 3 percent from FY 2001 to FY 2004. We found several 

factors not within the USMS’s control that accounted for the increase in 

violent federal fugitives at large. The number of violent federal fugitives 

sought by the USMS increased because the increased number of federal 

task forces throughout the country generated more federal fugitives. We 

also found that the USMS investigated more federal fugitives referred from 

other federal agencies, and that state and local law enforcement agencies 

requested more assistance from the USMS in apprehending fugitives. 

We also identified three other factors, each within the USMS’s control, 

which contributed to the increase in the number of violent federal fugitives 

at large. These factors were that not all districts assigned violent federal 

fugitive investigations to the task forces; the USMS did not fully change its 

focus from apprehending all federal fugitives to apprehending violent 

fugitives; and most districts did not enter data regarding their state fugitive 

investigations in WIN when the investigations were opened so that the 

USMS could fully assess its progress at apprehending violent fugitives at 

large. By addressing these factors, we believe the USMS can improve its 

apprehension of violent fugitives and reduce the number of violent fugitives 

at large. 

The Department has proposed the creation of six additional RTFs. 

Our analysis of the fugitive apprehension data from the districts that make 

up the five existing RTFs compared to the non-RTF districts indicates that 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

29

the six new RTFs can be expected to apprehend more violent fugitives, and 

we believe the creation of new RTFs is warranted. However, to maximize the 

effectiveness of the RTFs and the fugitive apprehension program in general, 

we believe that the USMS needs to consistently assign violent federal 

fugitive investigations to the RTFs and focus more on apprehending violent 

fugitives. 

To further improve the USMS’s effectiveness in apprehending violent 

fugitives and begin to reduce the number of violent federal fugitives at large, 

we recommend that the USMS: 

1. Establish goals and measures to track the USMS’s performance in 

apprehending violent fugitives and its progress in reducing the 

number of violent fugitives at large. 

2. Require districts to enter state fugitive investigations in WIN when the 

investigations are opened by the USMS. 

3. Establish criteria for districts to ensure that violent federal fugitive 

investigations are assigned to the RTFs and other task forces. 

4. Analyze WIN data to ensure that the districts appropriately focus on 

violent federal and state fugitive investigations. 

5. Consider creating the six RTFs proposed in the Department’s October 

2004 Fugitive Apprehension Report. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

30

APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY 

 

We examined the performance of Deputy Marshals working 

individually or as members of warrant squads, district fugitive task forces, 

or Regional Task Forces in apprehending federal and state violent fugitives 

from Fiscal Year 2001 to FY 2004, as well as the reasons for any differences 

in performance. We did not separately analyze the performance of the 

proposed RTFs listed in the Department’s October 2004 Fugitive 

Apprehension Report because the Assistant Director for the Investigative 

Services Division told us that he would eventually like all 94 districts to be 

included in RTFs. Therefore, we considered all districts currently not part of 

an RTF as a single group. 

We conducted interviews with officials in United States Marshals 

Service headquarters – the Assistant Director and other personnel within 

the Investigative Services Division, as well as personnel within the Analytical 

Support Unit and the Management and Budget Division. To examine the 

differences in the various approaches to fugitive apprehension in the district 

offices, we visited 12 of the 15 districts that are part of the 5 RTFs, as well 

as 5 districts that are not part of an RTF. In each district, we interviewed 

the Marshal and Chief Deputy Marshal (when available), warrant squad 

supervisor (when available), Task Force Supervisory Inspector and 

Inspectors (if applicable), Deputy Marshals involved with the Electronic 

Surveillance Unit and the Financial Surveillance Unit, the WIN data 

administrator, and Deputy Marshals involved in fugitive investigations. We 

also interviewed representatives from other federal, state, and local agencies 

who worked with the districts and RTFs to investigate and apprehend 

fugitives. The districts and RTF offices we visited were: 

New York/New Jersey RTF: 

• District of New Jersey (Newark) 

• Southern district of New York (Manhattan) 

• Eastern district of New York (Long Island) 

Pacific Southwest RTF: 

• Central district of California (Los Angeles) 

• Southern district of California (San Diego) 

Great Lakes RTF: 

• Northern district of Illinois (Chicago) 

• Northern district of Indiana (Hammond) 

Southeast RTF:

• Northern district of Georgia (Atlanta) 

• Middle district of Georgia (Macon) 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

31

Capital Area RTF:

• District of Columbia – District Court and Superior Court 

• District of Maryland (Greenbelt and Baltimore) 

• Eastern district of Virginia (Springfield) 

We also conducted site visits in the following five districts: 

• District of Massachusetts (Boston) 

• District of Connecticut (New Haven) 

• District of Rhode Island (Providence) 

• Middle district of Florida (Orlando) 

• Southern district of Florida (Miami)

 

WIN Analysis. To analyze the USMS fugitive apprehension program 

from FY 2001 through FY 2004, we examined data from the Warrant 

Information Network database. We examined all warrants that were closed 

on or after September 30, 2000, and that were received on or before 

October 1, 2004. According to the Department’s FY 2004 Performance 

Report, the USMS compares information contained in WIN to a random 

sample of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information 

Center records to verify the accuracy of the information. USMS 

headquarters also coordinates with districts to verify that warrants are 

validated against the signed paper records. In addition to the internal check 

of the WIN data, the OIG conducted an audit of WIN in November 2002 in 

accordance with the Government Information Security Reform Act.25 This 

audit assessed the management, technical, and operational controls that 

protected WIN data from unauthorized use, loss, or modification. The OIG 

found significant vulnerabilities and made 28 recommendations to improve 

the security of the WIN database. Currently, the one recommendation that 

is still open is that the USMS enforce “Department-wide identification and 

authentication policies and ensure that only authorized personnel can login 

to the system.” 

Staff Year Analysis. To analyze the time spent by the USMS on 

fugitive investigations, we reviewed time and attendance data recorded by 

USMS personnel on the standard USM-7 form used by all USMS personnel 

to record the time spent on USMS duties, such as fugitive investigation, 

court operations, and prisoner transportation. Personnel assign their time 

to specific project codes. For example, if a Deputy Marshal investigated a 

federal felony fugitive for 3 hours, the time would be recorded under the 

appropriate federal felony project code. 

 25 Independent Evaluation Pursuant to the Government Information Security 

Reform Act Fiscal Year 2002, The United States Marshals Service’s Warrant Information 

Network I-2003-03 (November 2002).
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

32

We requested data from the USM-7 database for all fugitive 

investigation time for FY 2001 through FY 2004. However, the USMS could 

provide data only from FY 2002 through FY 2004. We also received a 

USM-7 project code guide, which contained a list of project code definitions. 

For the purposes of our review, we used data entered under project codes 

related to federal felony warrants, federal non-felony warrants, state 

warrants, RTF assignments, and other administrative functions. We 

eliminated project codes that were not relevant to our review or that were 

not related to fugitive investigations (such as project codes related to court 

security services). Besides time recorded by personnel in the 94 districts, 

the USM-7 database captures time recorded by USMS headquarters 

personnel as spent on fugitive investigations. We allocated this 

headquarters time to each of the districts based on the proportion of the 

district’s fugitive apprehension efforts to the overall USMS fugitive 

apprehension efforts. 

We calculated staff years by dividing the number of hours worked in a 

particular district or grouping of districts by 2,087 hours (the Office of 

Personnel Management equivalent of one “full time equivalent” work year). 

We did not calculate staff years allocated for state or federal fugitive 

investigations separately because the USM-7 data does not distinguish 

whether the time spent by Deputy Marshals on an RTF was for a federal or 

state fugitive investigation. 

We did not test the validity of the USMS time and attendance records. 

However, the USMS internally verifies USM-7 data each year, using a USMS 

budget model to identify anything out of the ordinary reported by the 

districts. The Management and Budget Division relies on district 

supervisors to verify the accuracy of the USM-7 forms before forwarding 

them to headquarters, and the Office of Inspections also conducts random 

compliance reviews to ensure that personnel comply with USM-7 policy, 

such as obtaining the proper supervisory signatures. No external audits 

have been conducted on USM-7 data. 

Electronic Surveillance Unit Database Analysis. To analyze the 

involvement of Electronic Surveillance Unit personnel in fugitive 

investigations, we reviewed the database that tracks the unit’s assistance 

with fugitive investigations and types of surveillance operations. We 

examined the number of fugitive investigations in which Electronic 

Surveillance Unit personnel assisted, as well as the number of arrests that 

resulted from this assistance. We were unable to determine from the 

database whether records pertained to federal or state fugitive 

investigations, or whether the investigations originated from a district or a 

task force. In October 2004, the Electronic Surveillance Unit added new 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

33

variables to its database to track who requested assistance and whether the 

investigation involved a federal or state fugitive. 

 

Electronic Surveillance Unit personnel stated that they conducted an 

annual check of WIN to verify the Electronic Surveillance Unit database 

numbers and to validate the number of arrests and arrest dates. We did not 

test the validity of the database. 

 

District Survey. To learn more about each district’s fugitive 

operations, we surveyed each of the 94 USMS district offices. We received 

responses from 88 of the 94 (93.6 percent) district offices. 

The survey contained 19 questions regarding the following: 

• Allocation of Deputy Marshals among RTFs, district task forces, 

warrant squads, and other; 

• Types of fugitive investigations conducted and by what entity; 

• How districts prioritized investigations and decided who would 

investigate the various types of fugitives; 

• Fugitives wanted by other federal components and agencies; 

• Collateral leads sent and received; 

• Assistance from the Electronic Surveillance Unit and the Financial 

Surveillance Unit; 

• Satisfaction with fugitive apprehension efforts; 

• WIN data entry; and 

• Open-ended questions regarding possible improvements or 

changes needed in the fugitive apprehension program. 

We used the responses from the survey to further understand the 

fugitive apprehension process, to verify information gathered during our 

interviews, and to increase our understanding about districts that we did 

not visit. 

Definitions 

In WIN, fugitive warrants are divided into general categories, as shown in 

Table 4. In our analysis, one warrant equals one fugitive, even if one 

fugitive had multiple warrants. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

34

Table 4: Category and Types of Federal Warrants 

Category of Warrant Types of Warrants within Each Category 

Escape 

Bond violation 

Parole violation 

Probation violation 

Agency without arrest power 

Other 

Foreign fugitive 

Other referred 

Class I felony 

Drug Enforcement Administration referred 

Traffic warrant Class II non-felony Misdemeanor warrant 

Class II felony Other federal agency with arrest authority 

Other State or local warrant 

 

Federal Felony Fugitives. We defined federal felony fugitives as those 

with Class I or Class II felony warrants. 

Federal Non-Felony Fugitives. We defined federal non-felony fugitives 

as those with Class II non-felony warrants. 

Violent Federal Fugitives. We defined violent federal fugitives as those 

fugitives who were designated in WIN as a 15 Most Wanted, Major Case, or 

Category 1 fugitive. (A Category 1 fugitive is one whose underlying or 

current offense is homicide, kidnapping, assault, aggravated assault, 

robbery, arson, an “over-the-wall” escape, or involves weapons or 

explosives.) Violent federal fugitives can be either Class I or Class II. 

 

State Fugitives. We defined state fugitives as those with a state or 

local warrant. Some local jurisdictions, most notably the cities of Chicago 

and New York, conduct state fugitive investigations based on probable cause 

rather than a warrant. The USMS Deputy Marshals sometimes participated 

in these investigations, but we included these fugitive investigations only if 

the USMS entered a subsequently obtained warrant in WIN. 

Violent State Fugitives. We defined violent state fugitives as those 

fugitives whose underlying or current offense was one used to designate a 

federal fugitive as a Category 1 fugitive. The offenses include homicide, 

kidnapping, assault, aggravated assault, robbery, arson, an over-the-wall 

escape, or an offense involving weapons or explosives. 

Fugitives Apprehended. We defined fugitives apprehended as ones 

who were physically arrested by the USMS, who were arrested by another 

agency under the direction of the USMS (directed arrest), or who 

surrendered to the USMS or another agency. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

35

Fugitives Cleared. We defined fugitives cleared as ones whose 

warrants were closed by means other than apprehension by the USMS, as 

defined above. This includes warrants cleared through arrests by other 

agencies, lodged detainers, dismissals, the return of the warrants to the 

originating agency, or the purging of the warrants. 

Clearances or Apprehensions by RTFs. Although WIN contains a field 

that captures whether a district task force or RTF apprehended a fugitive, 

we learned that USMS personnel did not consistently enter data in this field 

when a task force was involved. Therefore, we analyzed RTF performance 

based on the districts that constituted the RTFs as a whole (for example, the 

Pacific Southwest RTF comprises the Southern and Central districts of 

California). Any analysis regarding fugitives cleared or apprehended is 

based on the performance of the districts participating in the RTFs because 

we could not analyze individual RTFs’ performance separately from that of 

the districts in which they operated. 

Fugitives at Large. We defined fugitives at large in a particular fiscal 

year as those fugitives in WIN whose warrants were open at the end of the 

fiscal year, regardless of when the warrant was opened. 

Apprehensions per Staff Year. We divided the number of 

apprehensions of fugitives by the staff years applied to fugitive apprehension 

by a given group of districts. For example, for federal fugitives, we divided 

federal apprehensions in a group of districts in 1 year by total staff years 

applied to fugitive apprehension in that same group of districts. If a group of 

districts apprehended 100 federal fugitives and devoted 10 staff years to 

fugitive apprehension in 1 year, then that group of districts apprehended 10 

federal fugitives per staff year. This measure captures the number of 

fugitives apprehended per staff year. 

Average Number of Days for Fugitive Arrest. Prior to FY 2002, the 

Department measured the performance of the USMS fugitive apprehension 

program by “the average number of days for fugitive arrest” for Major Case 

fugitives and described the public benefit as follows: “The quicker a fugitive 

is captured; the less the public is exposed to further risk of crime.” The 

Department discontinued this measure in FY 2002 because “a warrant can 

become a major case at any point in its investigation, [so] the age of the 

warrant can dramatically skew the overall average number of days for 

fugitive arrest in the major case category.” The USMS never applied this 

now abandoned measure to all violent federal fugitive investigations. 

To determine whether the average number of days for fugitive arrest 

was a useful measure at all, we calculated the average number of days 

between the issuance of a warrant and the closure of the warrant from FY 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

36

2001 to FY 2004 for violent federal fugitives. We found that the average 

number of days that violent federal fugitives remained at large before 

apprehension varied from 111 to 113 days, even though half were 

apprehended within 12 days. Marshals and Deputy Marshals we 

interviewed told us that they often apprehend the newest fugitives first, or 

as one RTF Supervisory Inspector stated, “while the trail is still warm.” 

Even though half of the violent federal fugitives were apprehended within 12 

days, some remained at large for years. These investigations that span 

years explain why the average number of days for fugitive arrest is so much 

larger than the median of 12 days. The average time violent federal fugitives 

remain at large will not change significantly until the backlog of long-term 

fugitives is reduced. We agree with the Department’s conclusion that the 

average number of days for a fugitive arrest is not currently a useful 

measure of the performance of the USMS fugitive apprehension program 

and did not include this analysis. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

37

APPENDIX II: DISTRICT QUESTIONNAIRE 

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Evaluations and Inspections 

Division is conducting a nationwide evaluation of the Fugitive Investigations Program managed 

by the United States Marshals Service (USMS). As part of that review, we are conducting this 

survey of USMS districts to obtain input regarding the fugitive investigation efforts in your 

district, as well as any opportunities you see for improvement. 

Your input is very important to us, and we are counting on you to respond openly to the 

questions provided. We also value your narrative comments, and we encourage you to include 

them. 

 

Questionnaire Information

 Name: 

 Title: 

 District: 

 Years Served in the USMS: 

 Years Served in this District: 

Phone: 

 Fax: 

 E-Mail: 

PLEASE NOTE: For purposes of this questionnaire, the term “fugitive investigation” is defined 

as the effort to apprehend one fugitive, regardless of the number of warrants for that fugitive or 

the number of fugitives apprehended during one investigation. 

DIRECTIONS: This survey should be completed by the Marshal, the Chief Deputy Marshal, 

the Assistant Chief Deputy Marshal responsible for fugitive investigations, or the warrant 

squad supervisor. Unless otherwise noted, please answer the following questions as they relate 

to operations in your district, including all sub-offices. For questions regarding specific 

numbers, please answer to the best of your ability. If you are unable to provide specific 

numbers in certain sections, please indicate why. For those questions for which you cannot 

provide data, we will attempt to obtain the information from USMS-wide databases. 

To answer this questionnaire electronically, please click your cursor in the appropriate area 

and type your response. After you have completed the questionnaire, please save the 

document and e-mail it as an attachment to the following address: District.Survey@usdoj.gov. 

If you prefer, you may print out the questionnaire, fill it out manually, and mail or fax it to the 

following: 

 USMS Fugitive Investigations Questionnaire 

U.S. Department of Justice 

 Office of the Inspector General (E&I) 

 1425 New York Avenue, N.W. 

 Suite 6100 

 Washington, DC 20530 

 FAX: 202-616-4584 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

38

I. PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS

DEFINITIONS: 

• USMS regional fugitive task force (RFTF): Task forces created by the Presidential 

Threat Protection Act of 2000. They include the New York/New Jersey RFTF, the Pacific 

Southwest RFTF, the Great Lakes RFTF, the Southeast RFTF, and the Capital Area 

RFTF.

• USMS district fugitive task force: Task force led by USMS district personnel within a 

district.

• Other fugitive task force not led by USMS: Task force in which the USMS 

participates, but that is led by another law enforcement agency. For example, an FBIled Violent Crimes Task Force, or a DEA-led HIDTA Task Force. 

• District warrant squad: Entity within district that investigates fugitives, but not as 

part of any task force.

• Other deputy marshals: Deputy marshals within district who conduct fugitive 

investigations as one of several duties, but who are not members of a warrant squad or 

any task force.

1. For each question in the left column of the table, please respond based on the entity 

listed in the top row. If your district does not have a particular entity, please enter “N/A.” 

Your answers should reflect your current operations. 

USMS 

regional 

fugitive 

task force

USMS 

district 

fugitive 

task force 

Other 

fugitive task 

force not led 

by USMS 

USMS 

district 

warrant 

squad 

Other 

deputy 

marshals 

1a. If your district is included 

in an RFTF, how many 

Investigative Services Division 

personnel from USMS 

Headquarters are assigned to 

the RFTF in your district? 

1b. How many district deputies 

are normally assigned full 

time? 

 

1c. If the positions are 

rotational for the full-time 

deputies, how long is each of 

the rotations? 

 

1d. How many district deputies 

are normally assigned part time 

(i.e., they also perform other 

duties such as judicial security 

or prison transportation)? 

 

1e. If the positions are 

rotational for the part-time 

deputies, how long are each of 

the rotations? 

 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

39

II. TYPES OF FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED

DEFINITIONS: 

• Violent federal Class I warrants: Warrants for fugitives for which the USMS has 

primary apprehension responsibility and which involve fugitives with criminal histories 

or investigations of violent crimes; fugitives wanted for “over-the-wall” escapes as 

distinguished from camp or halfway-house escapes; or fugitives wanted on DEAinitiated warrants for DEA Class 1 and 2 offenders and other DEA serious offenders. 

• Non-violent federal Class I warrants: All other Class I warrants not included in 

category above.

• Federal Class II felony warrants: Felony fugitives for which another law enforcement 

agency has primary apprehension responsibility.

• Federal Class II non-felony warrants: Misdemeanor and traffic warrants for which 

the USMS has primary apprehension responsibility. 

• State and local warrants: Warrants originating from a local or state law enforcement 

agency. 

• Collateral leads: Information from another USMS district or from an RFTF regarding a 

fugitive who has fled to your district. 

2. For fiscal year 2004, please estimate to the best of your ability the percentage of fugitive 

investigations in your district that were conducted by the following entities. If your district 

does not have a particular entity, please enter “N/A” for the entire column. Row 

percentages should add up to 100 percent. 

USMS 

regional 

fugitive 

task force 

USMS 

district 

fugitive 

task force 

Other 

fugitive 

task force 

not led by 

USMS 

USMS 

district 

warrant 

squad 

Other 

deputy 

marshals TOTAL

2a. Violent 

federal Class I 

warrants 

 

100% 

2b. Non-violent 

federal Class I 

warrants 

 

100% 

2c. Federal 

Class II felony 

warrants 

 

100% 

2d. Federal 

Class II nonfelony warrants 

 

100% 

2e. State and 

local warrants 

 100% 

2f. Collateral 

leads received 

from another 

USMS district 

 

100% 

2g. Collateral 

leads received 

from a USMS 

RFTF 

 

100% 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

40

3a. Please describe how your district determines which fugitive investigations are 

assigned to the USMS regional fugitive task force. (If not applicable, please write “N/A”.) 

3b. Please describe how your district determines which fugitive investigations are 

assigned to the USMS district fugitive task force. (If not applicable, please write “N/A”.) 

3c. Please describe how your district determines which fugitive investigations are 

assigned to another fugitive task force not led by the USMS. (If not applicable, please 

write “N/A”.) 

3d. Please describe how your district determines which fugitive investigations are 

assigned to the USMS district warrant squad. (If not applicable, please write “N/A”.) 

3e. Please describe how your district determines which fugitive investigations are 

assigned to deputy marshals not assigned to a district warrant squad or task force. (If 

not applicable, please write “N/A”.) 

3f. Please explain how your district prioritizes between federal fugitive investigations 

and state and local fugitive investigations. (If not applicable, please write “N/A”.) 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

41

III. INVESTIGATIONS OF FUGITIVES

4. For the following fiscal years, please indicate the total number of Class I DEA fugitives 

for which your district held the warrant:

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Number of DEA fugitives 

5. For the following fiscal years, please indicate the number of Class I DEA fugitives for 

which the DEA transferred primary apprehension responsibility to the USMS using the 

DEA Form-202: 

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Number of DEA fugitives 

6. For the following fiscal years, please indicate the number of Class II federal felony 

fugitive investigations that your district conducted for each of the following law enforcement 

agencies that had primary apprehension responsibility. 

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

6a. Federal Bureau of Investigation 

6b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives 

6c. U.S. Secret Service 

6d. Housing and Urban Development 

6e. Social Security Administration 

6f. Immigrations and Customs 

Enforcement and Customs and Border 

Protection 

(in Department of Homeland Security) 

6g. Other Agency: 

6h. Other Agency: 

6i. Other Agency:

6j. Other Agency: 

* Formerly Immigration and Naturalization Service 

** Formerly U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Border Patrol 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

42

7. For the following fiscal years, please indicate the number of collateral leads that you 

received from other USMS districts: 

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Number of collateral leads from other 

USMS districts 

8. For the following fiscal years, please indicate the number of collateral leads that you 

received from a USMS RFTF: 

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Number of collateral leads from USMS 

RFTFs 

9. For the following fiscal years, please indicate the number of fugitive investigations 

conducted by your district of state or local fugitives: 

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Number of state or local fugitive 

investigations 

IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS

10. For the following fiscal years, please indicate the number of fugitive investigations 

conducted by your district for which you obtained assistance from the Technical Operations 

Group (TOG) (i.e., Electronic Surveillance Unit). 

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Number of fugitive investigations that 

included assistance from TOG 

11. For FY 2004, please indicate the number of fugitive investigations conducted by your 

district for which you obtained assistance from the Financial Surveillance Unit, which 

provides financial investigative tools to apprehend fugitives. 

12. Which of the following statements best describes how your district enters state and 

local fugitive investigations into the WIN database? Check one 

 Our district does not enter state and local fugitive investigations into WIN. 

 Our district enters state and local fugitive investigations into WIN when the 

investigations are opened. 

 Our district usually enters state and local fugitive investigations into WIN when the 

investigations are closed, unless we need an FID number from WIN to facilitate the 

investigation. 

 Our district enters state and local fugitive investigations into WIN when the 

investigations are closed. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

43

13. What district codes are used to identify your district, its sub-offices, and any task force 

locations when entering data into WIN? 

Code Description of district, sub-office, or task force location represented by 

the code 

053 Eastern district of New York – Brooklyn location 

A53 Eastern district of New York – Islip sub-office 

N53 Eastern district of New York – Regional fugitive task force office 

 

 

 

 

14. What task force codes are used to identify any task forces in your district when 

entering data into WIN? 

Code Description of district, sub-office, or task force represented by the code 

NYRT New York/New Jersey regional fugitive task force 

NETF New England task force (in District of Massachusetts) 

 

 

 

 

V. CONCLUSION 

15. How satisfied are you with the fugitive apprehension efforts of the following (check one 

in each row): 

Very 

Satisfied 

Somewhat 

Satisfied 

Somewhat 

Dissatisfied

Very 

Dissatisfied 

Not 

Applicable 

15a. Regional 

fugitive task force 

15b. USMS district 

task force 

15c. Other task force 

not led by USMS 

15d. USMS district 

warrant squad 

15e. Other deputy 

marshals 

15f. District’s efforts 

overall 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

44

16. Please explain below your satisfaction or dissatisfaction with fugitive 

apprehension efforts: 

17. Please list below any improvements or changes that you would like to see in your 

district’s fugitive apprehension efforts: 

18. Please list below what you believe works best in your district regarding its 

fugitive apprehension efforts: 

19. If you have any other comments regarding the fugitive apprehension efforts in 

your district, please include them below: 

Thank you again for your time and assistance with this questionnaire. 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

45

APPENDIX III: USMS’S RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

46
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

47
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

48

APPENDIX IV: OIG ANALYSIS OF USMS’S RESPONSE 

On June 13, 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) sent 

copies of the draft report to the United States Marshals Service (USMS) with 

a request for written comments. The USMS responded to us in a 

memorandum dated July 5, 2005. 

USMS Response 

The USMS agreed with the five OIG recommendations to further 

improve the USMS’s effectiveness in apprehending violent fugitives and 

reducing the number of violent federal fugitives at large. The USMS’s 

response also described the actions it has taken and plans to take to 

implement the recommendations. 

OIG Analysis of the USMS Response 

The actions undertaken and planned by the USMS to improve the 

USMS’s effectiveness in apprehending violent fugitives and to reduce the 

number of violent federal fugitives at large are responsive to our 

recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Establish measures and goals to track the 

USMS’s performance in apprehending violent fugitives and its progress in 

reducing the number of violent fugitives at large. 

Summary of USMS Response. The USMS agreed with the 

recommendation and will develop performance standards and measures of 

its progress in apprehending violent fugitives and reducing the number of 

violent fugitives at large by October 1, 2005. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 1 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by the USMS to develop performance standards and measures are 

responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a copy of the 

performance standards and measures by November 1, 2005. 

Recommendation 2: Require districts to enter state fugitive 

investigations in the Warrant Information Network (WIN) when the 

investigations are opened by the USMS. 

Summary of USMS Response. The USMS agreed with the 

recommendation and stated that to fully assess its progress in 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

49

apprehending violent fugitives, districts must enter state fugitive 

investigations into WIN as investigations are opened. Also, the USMS stated 

that additional administrative resources are required for entering all state 

fugitives into WIN. The USMS will develop procedural policy and guidelines 

regarding the entry of state fugitives into WIN by October 1, 2005. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 2 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by the USMS to develop procedural policy and guidelines and to 

request additional administrative resources to ensure that state fugitive 

investigations are entered into WIN when investigations are opened are 

responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a copy of the procedures 

and of all requests for additional resources by November 1, 2005. 

Recommendation 3: Establish criteria for districts to ensure that 

violent federal fugitive investigations are assigned to the Regional 

Fugitive Task Forces (RTF) and other task forces. 

Summary of USMS Response. The USMS agreed that establishing 

criteria for the referral of violent federal fugitive cases to the RTFs and other 

task forces is necessary. The USMS plans to establish procedural and 

policy guidance governing the assignment of violent federal fugitive cases, 

including collateral leads, to the RTFs and district task forces, and will 

make recommendations regarding these policies by October 1, 2005. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 3 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by the USMS to develop procedural and policy guidance governing 

the assignment of violent federal fugitive cases to the RTFs and district task 

forces are responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a copy of the 

recommendations regarding the procedural and policy guidance by 

November 1, 2005. 

Recommendation 4: Analyze WIN data to ensure that the 

districts appropriately focus on violent federal and state fugitive 

investigations. 

Summary of USMS Response. The USMS agreed with the 

recommendation and noted that the USMS already conducts some analyses 

using WIN data. The USMS plans to improve this effort by incorporating the 

performance measures created in response to Recommendation 1 and other 

pertinent information into improved WIN data analyses. These analyses are 

designed to improve the USMS’s effectiveness in apprehending violent 

fugitives and reducing the number of violent fugitives at large. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 4 is Resolved – Open. The actions 

planned by the USMS to improve WIN data analysis and develop new 
DRAFT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

50

reporting requirements are responsive to our recommendation. The USMS 

plans to implement this new analysis effort by December 1, 2005. Please 

provide a status report on the development of improved WIN analysis by 

November 1, 2005. 

Recommendation 5: Consider creating the six RTFs proposed in the 

Department’s October 2004 Fugitive Apprehension Report. 

Summary of USMS Response. The USMS agreed with the 

recommendation and will continue to request appropriations for staffing and 

funding to create additional RTFs. 

OIG Analysis. Recommendation 5 is Resolved – Closed. The actions 

planned by the USMS to request appropriations for staffing and funding to 

create additional RTFs are responsive to our recommendation.