NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1740

___________

REZA FARZAN,

 Appellant

v.

JUDGE PATRICIA CLEARY, Retired Judge; JUDGE KATIE A. GUMMER; JUDGE 

CLARKSON S. FISHER; JUDGE THOMAS W. SUMNERS, JR.; JUDGE PAUL 

INNES; CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER; ATTORNEY GENERAL GURBIR S. 

GREWAL; MICHELLE SMITH, Superior Court Clerk; CHRISTINE G. HANLON, 

County Clerk; NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE; MONMOUTH COUNTY 

HALL OF RECORDS; JANE DOE 1 THROUGH 10; JOHN DOE 1 THROUGH 10; 

JUDGE JOSEPH QUINN

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-19-cv-00705)

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 5, 2024

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 29, 2024)

_________

OPINION*

_________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant, Reza Farzan, was subject to foreclosure proceedings in New 

Jersey state court. In 2019, he commenced this civil rights action in the District Court 

against the state-court judges, government officials, and offices involved in the 

foreclosure proceedings, claiming that they had violated numerous federal and state laws. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The District Court granted 

their motions and dismissed the amended complaint on the ground that Farzan’s claims 

were barred by New Jersey’s claim-preclusion rules. Farzan moved for reconsideration 

and sought leave to file a second amended complaint, but the District Court denied his 

requests. He appealed. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over 

the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint. See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 

377 (3d Cir. 2016). We review the District Court’s orders denying reconsideration and 

leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 

446 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2012); Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 

(3d Cir. 2001). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Erie 

Telecomms, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988). 

We will affirm on the alternative ground that, based on the allegations in the 

amended complaint, the defendants were entitled to immunity. Specifically, Chief Justice 

Stuart Rabner and Judges Patricia Del Bueno Cleary, Katie A. Gummer, Clarkson S. 

Fisher, Jr., Thomas W. Sumners, Jr., Paul Innes, and Joseph P. Quinn were entitled to 

absolute judicial immunity because the actions of which Farzan complains were taken in 
3

their judicial capacities, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–57 (1978); New 

Jersey Superior Court Clerk Michelle Smith and Monmouth County Clerk Christine 

Hanlon were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for fulfilling their responsibilities as 

employees of the New Jersey Judiciary,1 see Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 

(3d Cir. 2018); the New Jersey Office of Foreclosure, an “arm” of the New Jersey 

Judiciary, was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for fulfilling its obligation to docket 

litigants’ filings and judicial orders related to foreclosure actions, see id.; and Attorney 

General Gurbir S. Grewal was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for his alleged 

actions relating to Farzan’s complaints, see Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 

297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002). Given that all of the defendants were immune from 

Farzan’s suit, dismissal was proper. 

Moreover, the District Court acted within its discretion in denying Farzan’s 

motion for reconsideration. “[A] judgment may be altered or amended if the party 

seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening 

change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available 

when the court granted the motion [to dismiss]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of 

law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. 

v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Farzan did not show that the District 

1 Farzan also named the “Monmouth County Hall of Records” as a defendant, but, 

according to defendant Hanlon, there is no governmental entity by that name. Br. in 

support of Mot. to Dismiss 3–4, ECF No. 19-1. Moreover, Farzan does not appear to 

pursue any claims against this defendant in his brief. Therefore, we deem such claims 

abandoned. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).
4

Court overlooked any factual or legal matters that affected its disposition of the matter. 

In fact, he did not challenge the District Court’s application of New Jersey’s claim 

preclusion rules at all; instead, he continued to dispute the facts surrounding the 

assignment of his mortgage and note. To the extent that he requested leave to file a 

second amended complaint in order to present evidence that in 2010, the New Jersey 

Judiciary included his name in the “Group 3 List,” this fact would not have affected the 

District Court’s determination that Farzan’s claims were barred, and Farzan did not 

provide any justification for his failure to discover the information sooner.2

 See Cureton, 

252 F.3d at 272–73. 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

3

2 To the extent that Farzan argued in his motion for reconsideration that the District Court 

erred in staying this matter pending our ruling in Farzan’s related action, Farzan v. J.P. 

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 19-3925, 2022 WL 17336211, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 

2022), we discern no error in the court’s implicit decision not to reconsider that ruling. 

See Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607, 608–09 (3d Cir. 1967). 

 

3 Appellant’s motion to file separate reply briefs is granted.