Docket No. 94677–Agenda 15–March 2003.

In re MARRIAGE OF SORYIA COLLINGBOURNE, Appellant,  								and GEOFF B. COLLINGBOURNE, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 22, 32003.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the

court:

	Soryia Collingbourne, the custodial parent of the parties’

minor son Tyler, filed a petition in the circuit court of Kane County

for leave to remove Tyler from the State of Illinois to

Massachusetts. The circuit court granted the petition for removal,

finding that the best interests of Tyler would be served by allowing

him to move to Massachusetts with his mother. A majority of the

appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s decision

to grant the petition for removal was against the manifest weight

of the evidence. 332 Ill. App. 3d 665. For the reasons that follow,

we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

	Soryia and Geoff Collingbourne were married on June 13,

1985. As a result of the marriage, two children were born to the

parties: Geoffrey, born January 11, 1986, and Tyler, born January

10, 1991. The parties’ marriage was dissolved on September 1,

1999. The judgment for dissolution of marriage incorporated a

marital settlement agreement, which provided that although Soryia

and Geoff were to have joint custody of the children, Soryia was

awarded sole physical custody of Tyler, and Geoff was awarded

sole physical custody of Geoffrey. The marital settlement

agreement also incorporated a joint parenting agreement. The joint

parenting agreement reiterated that although the parties were

awarded joint custody of both children, the physical custody of the

children was split between the parents. The joint parenting

agreement specifically provided that both parties were to have

equal rights and responsibilities for the major decisions in

connection with the education, recreation, health care and religious

training of the children. However, the agreement left day-to-day

decisions with respect to the children within the sole discretion of the custodial parent. The joint parenting agreement also set forth

the visitation schedule between the parents and the children. Each

parent was to have both children every other weekend, and the

parties agreed to have the children on alternate holidays. The

agreement also allowed additional visitation, as authorized.

	On June 15, 2001, Soryia petitioned the circuit court of Kane

County for the removal of Tyler, then 10 years of age, from Illinois

to the State of Massachusetts. In her petition, Soryia alleged that

she had become engaged to Mark Rothman, who resided in

Sharon, Massachusetts. For the past 11 years, Mark had owned

and operated his own business in Sharon, Mark Rothman &

Associates, and his business prevented him from relocating from

that geographic area. Soryia also alleged in her petition that upon

moving to Sharon, she would become an employee of Mark’s

business, earn an annual base salary of $75,000, and, due to a

series of incentives, had the potential to increase her income up to

$100,000 per year. Soryia stated that she was currently employed

by PetAg, Inc., with a base annual salary of $50,000. Soryia

alleged, however, that her employment with PetAg was “in

jeopardy due to the company’s severe financial difficulties.” Soryia

stated that PetAg plant workers “have had their pay cut up to

50%,” and that because “[c]ompany bonuses have been terminated

due to said financial problems,” she did not receive her quarterly

financial bonus.

	Soryia further alleged in the petition that, in addition to the

better financial opportunity that the move to Massachusetts would

provide, she would also not be required to travel on overnight

business trips, as she was frequently required to do as part of her

employment with PetAg. Soryia also stated that in her new position

she could structure her work hours so that she could be home with

Tyler before and after school. Soryia contrasted this with her

current work arrangement, which required Tyler to spend one hour

in the morning and two hours after school in day care. During the

summer months, Tyler’s time in day care increased to nine hours

per day, coinciding with Soryia’s work schedule. Soryia alleged

that Tyler “expressed his displeasure” with this situation.

	In addition, Soryia alleged that under her current work

arrangement, it was difficult for Tyler to engage in extracurricular activities. According to Soryia, if she and Tyler were allowed to

move to Massachusetts, Tyler could become involved in many

extracurricular activities, including sports, music, theater, and

dance. Soryia also alleged that Tyler would reap an academic

benefit from the move, based upon her opinion that the Sharon

school district was “significantly better” than the Hampshire school

district in which Tyler was currently enrolled.

	Soryia further alleged in the petition that Tyler’s residence and

community would be enhanced, as the move would allow Tyler to

live in a three-bedroom, 3,000 square foot home, surrounded by

woods. At the time Soryia filed the petition, she and Tyler were

living in a two-bedroom apartment in Huntley, which afforded

Tyler with limited access to children of his own age.

	Soryia also alleged in the petition that Geoff “has not actively

participated” in Tyler’s day-to-day life, and that on numerous

occasions Geoff has worked on Saturdays rather than spend his

entire scheduled visitation time with Tyler.

	In sum, Soryia alleged that as a result of the financial and other

opportunities offered by the move, the quality of both her and

Tyler’s lives would be significantly enhanced. Soryia alleged that

bettering the quality of life for both herself and Tyler was the only

motive for her move. As evidence of her good faith, Soryia

proposed a visitation schedule that would provide Geoff with more

time with Tyler than he had under the existing visitation

arrangement, with visitation periods of an extended duration. With

respect to visitation between Tyler and his brother Geoffrey, Soryia

noted that Geoffrey was nearly 16 years old and that he and Tyler

did not share many of the same interests and did not spend a

substantial amount of time together. Nevertheless, under the

proposed visitation schedule, Soryia asserted, they would also have

an increased amount of visitation time together.

 	On July 12, 2001, Geoff filed his answer to Soryia’s removal petition. Geoff denied that he was not actively involved in Tyler’s

life, and also denied that he chose to work on Saturday rather than

spend scheduled visitation time with Tyler. Geoff did admit,

however, that due to his profession as an electrician, he sometimes

had to work on Saturday mornings during the summer, and that

this conflicted with the scheduled visitation.

	It was Geoff’s position that Soryia was seeking to improve

only the quality of her own life, and that Tyler’s quality of life

would be adversely affected if Tyler were separated from his father,

brother, extended family, friends, and the community in which he

had been raised. Geoff also stated that both his fiancee, Carol

Lynn, and his sister, Lori Price, had offered to provide occasional

day care for Tyler. In addition, Geoff observed that the Hampshire

park district could provide Tyler with the opportunity for several

extracurricular or after-school activities. Geoff maintained that

Soryia’s proposed visitation schedule would deny him ongoing

contact with Tyler, and would deny Tyler contact with his brother.

Geoff maintained that his objections to Tyler’s removal were in the

child’s best interests, and requested that the court deny the removal

petition. Geoff further stated that if Soryia chose to move to

Massachusetts without Tyler, Tyler’s physical custody should be

transferred to him and a visitation schedule between Tyler and his

mother should be entered.

	The circuit court held a hearing on Soryia’s petition over

several days during the month of August 2001. Soryia testified that

she is employed as a national sales manager by PetAg, Inc., which

is located in Hampshire. Soryia earned an annual base pay of

$50,000, which, in the past, had been increased by quarterly

bonuses pegged to the company’s profits. For example, in the year

2000, Soryia earned a $6,000 bonus. However, because the

company has experienced financial difficulties, no bonuses were

paid in 2001. According to Soryia, her job routinely required her

to travel on overnight business trips. However, due to the

company’s financial problems, her travel had decreased. As

examples of the company’s financial problems, Soryia stated that

the corporate credit card that employees used to cover travel

expenses was discontinued due to nonpayment, merchandise

vendors required that the company pay up front for purchases, and

some plant workers experienced a 50% cut in pay. Soryia stated

that in an attempt to seek other employment she had placed her

resume on a web site. However, she also admitted that she did

nothing else to seek other employment in this geographic area.

	Soryia testified that she resided with Tyler in a two-bedroom

apartment in Huntley, and that Geoff lived with Geoffrey in a single-family home in nearby Hampshire. According to Soryia,

upon the dissolution of their marriage the parties agreed to split the

physical custody of the boys because Geoffrey is very active in the

community and in sports, and has had a very close relationship with

his father. Soryia testified that she had exercised all of her visitation

with Geoffrey, but, that due to work commitments, Geoff had

missed a portion of between 15 and 20 Saturdays of his visitation

with Tyler in the year 2000. Soryia further stated that Geoff’s

visitation with Tyler was otherwise consistent, and that the parties

often spent time with the children during the weekdays that was in

addition to that set forth in the joint parenting agreement. Soryia

testified that under the agreement, Geoff would care for Tyler

when her employment required her to make overnight business

trips, which averaged about two times per month. In September

2000, however, Geoff accepted a new job that required him to

leave home very early in the morning. Because she did not want

Tyler to get up so early and be dropped off at day care for several

hours before school started, Soryia hired a baby-sitter to stay with

Tyler in their apartment on the nights that she traveled, and to then

take him to school in the morning. According to Soryia, Geoff did

not object to this arrangement.

	Soryia testified that she believes that Tyler’s relationship with

his father is “very important,” and that she has strived to further

this relationship, as well as Tyler’s relationship with Geoff’s

extended family. For example, Soryia stated that it was a tradition

that the children spend holidays and family events with Geoff’s

family, and that if those occasions fell on her scheduled weekends,

she would nevertheless allow the children to stay with Geoff.

Soryia stressed that she does not want to limit Geoff’s access to

Tyler.

	With respect to Tyler’s extracurricular activities, Soryia

explained that although Tyler’s school day ended at 2:30 p.m., it

was difficult for him to become involved in extracurricular

programs offered by the school or the Huntley or Hampshire park

districts because most programs ended in the early afternoon and

required that a parent pick up the child at that time. Because

Soryia’s work day extended until 5 p.m., she was unable to

accommodate this time schedule. As another result of Soryia’s work schedule, Tyler had to attend day care for an hour in the

morning before school and for approximately two to three hours

after school. Soryia testified that it was only after she picked up

Tyler from day care that a period of time commenced within which

Tyler would do homework, go to the park, or participate in other

activities in which he was interested. For example, in the previous

fall Soryia was able to enroll Tyler in a dance program that held

classes in the evening. Tyler apparently enjoyed the program, and

Geoff attended the dance recitals. Soryia also testified that Tyler

had not participated in any extracurricular activities over the

summer because he had to attend day care during the hours that

she worked. According to Soryia, Tyler is unhappy in day care.

	Soryia stated that on one occasion, after the removal petition

had been filed, Tyler told her that Geoff’s sister, Lori Price, had

offered to watch him periodically so that he did not have to go to

the day care center every day. Soryia stated that she did not speak

with Lori, and that she told Tyler that discussions about his care

were between her and his father. Soryia further testified that on a

different occasion Tyler informed her that Geoff’s new wife, Carol

Lynn, had also offered to provide some child care. Soryia testified

that she thought it was “inappropriate” for these offers to be

relayed through Tyler, and that they should be discussed between

the parties. Soryia stated that she did not accept the offer.

	With respect to Tyler’s education, Soryia stated that Tyler

attends Hampshire Elementary School and had just completed the

fourth grade. According to Soryia, in the past year Geoff had not

attended Tyler’s parent-teacher conferences and rarely attended

activities at Tyler’s school. Soryia confirmed that Geoff

occasionally attended such events in the past. Soryia stated that

although the Hampshire schools, in her opinion, are “adequate,”

she believed that Tyler would receive a better education in Sharon,

Massachusetts. Soryia testified that as part of her research into the

Sharon school system, she reviewed statistics which she purchased

over the Internet, contacted the Sharon schools, and spoke with

the Sharon school superintendent. Based upon her research, Soryia

was of the opinion that the Sharon school district could offer Tyler

not only a superior education, but also greater opportunities for

extracurricular activities. Soryia explained that, based upon her research, she believed that the ACT and SAT scores earned by

Sharon students were higher than those of students in Hampshire,

that the student-teacher ratio in the Sharon schools is lower than

that in Hampshire, and that the percentage of Sharon students who

go on to attend a four-year college is higher than in Hampshire.

Soryia stated that these facts were very important to her, as her

ultimate goal is that Tyler attend college. In addition, Soryia stated

that the Sharon school system has an after-school “community

enrichment” program where students are transported from the

school to various sites to engage in activities such as videomaking,

horseback riding, and cooking. Further, if Tyler were allowed to

move, Soryia stated, the school he would attend is located seven

minutes from Mark’s home. Tyler could take the bus, or Soryia

could drive or walk him there.

	Soryia also testified that although Tyler is still in elementary

school, his brother Geoffrey attends high school. Because Tyler

and his brother have a five-year age difference, they also have

different interests. According to Soryia, Geoffrey is very active in

soccer, and has played both on local teams and on teams which

have traveled to soccer meets in different cities and states over the

weekends. Soryia described the relationship between Tyler and

Geoffrey as a “love-hate relationship.”

	Soryia further testified that she became engaged to Mark

Rothman earlier in the year, after a relationship of about 11⁄2 years.

Mark resides in Sharon and, for the past 11 years, has owned and

operated his own business, Mark Rothman & Associates. Soryia

stated that Mark is a manufacturer’s representative for various

companies involved in the pet supply and home decor field, and

that his territory is the New England area exclusively. According

to Soryia, she and Mark discussed the possibility of his moving to

Illinois and concluded that it would be impossible because of the

business. Mark offered to employ Soryia in his business in a

position similar to her position at PetAg, but at an increased annual

salary of $75,000. The hours of the job would be structured so that

she would work only during Tyler’s school hours and be at home

with him when he returned. Soryia stated that the offices for the

business are in Mark’s home, which has three bedrooms and is

located on 1.5 acres, with a large yard in a wooded area. According to Soryia, the home is approximately 30 minutes from

the Boston, Massachusetts, and the Providence, Rhode Island,

metropolitan areas. Soryia testified that she and Mark had not yet

set a wedding date because she could not move to Sharon without

the court’s permission to take Tyler with her.

	Soryia stated that she met with Geoff on three occasions to

speak with him about the enhanced opportunities offered by the

move to her and Tyler, and to attempt to arrive at an

understanding. Soryia further stated that she had also discussed a

proposed visitation schedule with Geoff, and had emphasized to

him that she would do whatever it would take to make the move

work for everyone involved. According to Soryia, the proposed

visitation would be at least as extensive as presently exists.

	Soryia testified that she proposed that Tyler would visit with

Geoff for 8 to 10 weeks during the summer, and for one week each

in February and April to coincide with two vacation breaks given

by the Sharon school system. In addition, Geoff would have Tyler

for long holiday weekends such as Memorial Day, Labor Day, and

Columbus Day, as well as for Thanksgiving and Christmas break.

Soryia stated that she wanted to continue the tradition of having

Tyler spend the holidays with Geoff and Geoff’s extended family

in Illinois. Soryia testified that she would accompany Tyler on the

trips to Illinois until he got older, and that she would pay for all

transportation costs. Soryia estimated that, depending upon traffic

and other factors, the trip each way would take between 3 and 5 1⁄2

hours. She also stated that she had no objection to Geoff’s coming

to Sharon to visit with Tyler. Soryia also testified that she would

promote, at her expense, frequent phone calls and e-mails between

Tyler and Geoff, and that she would also provide Geoff with

information concerning Tyler’s school events. Soryia stated that

Tyler and Mark interacted “very nicely” together, but that she had

no intent that Mark replace Geoff as Tyler’s father. On cross-

examination, Soryia stated that she did not believe that Tyler’s

travel between Sharon and Hampshire would interfere with any

extracurricular activities in which Tyler may wish to participate.

	The next witness to testify was Mark Rothman, Soryia’s

fiancee. Mark stated that he has lived in Massachusetts his entire

life, and in Sharon for the past five years. He stated that he is self- employed as a manufacturer’s representative in the consumer

products industry, and that his sales territory is exclusive to New

England. Although he has owned his own business for 11 years,

Mark testified, his business is based upon 22 years of relationships

and contacts in the New England area, and, if he were to move, he

would have to completely start over in another area without the

benefit of such business connections. Therefore, Mark testified, he

is unable to move to Illinois.

	According to Mark, his business has doubled in size over the

past four to five years, and he has had trouble finding the right

people to help him grow the business. He stated that he discussed

with Soryia that if they were to get married and live in Sharon,

Soryia would be given the responsibility of running the pet supplies

division, at an annual base salary of $75,000 plus incentives.

According to Mark, Soryia would have no overnight business trips,

she would work out of their home, and she would be able to

structure her own work hours.

	Mark further testified that he gets along well with Tyler, and

that Tyler has traveled to Sharon on numerous occasions. During

those trips, Tyler visited museums and other historic and cultural

sites in Boston and Providence. Mark has also spent a great deal of

time with Tyler during Mark’s visits to Illinois. Mark stated that his

home is located in a subdivision that has many children in Tyler’s

age group, and described Sharon as an upscale suburban

community where “the education system is its highest priority.”

Mark testified that he personally visited the school that Tyler

would be attending in Sharon, and also met with some of the

teachers as well as the superintendent. According to Mark, the

school recently added millions of dollars of physical improvements,

including a new computer lab and gymnasium.

	Mark stated that he would actively promote the relationship

between Tyler and Geoff. Mark related that he and his own father

are “the best of friends” and that he therefore understands the value

of a close relationship between a father and a son. Mark testified

that he has the financial resources to promote visitation, computer

e-mails, and telephone calls between Tyler and Geoff.

	The final witness to testify on Soryia’s behalf was Amy Conry,

Tyler’s fourth-grade teacher. She described Tyler as “an above average student,” a “hard worker,” as “very well behaved,” and as

a “great kid.” Tyler’s teacher testified that her contact was with

Soryia when dealing with Tyler’s academic performance, and that

Soryia would routinely call her if she had concerns or questions

with respect to Tyler’s schooling. Conry stated that she

remembered Geoff attending one school open house, but that she

never discussed Tyler’s academic performance with him.

	The next witness to testify at the hearing was Geoff. He stated

that he lives in a three-bedroom, single-family home in Hampshire

with his son Geoffrey, his new wife Carol Lynn, and her six-year-

old son Tommy. The home has a backyard with a swimming pool

and a trampoline. According to Geoff, when Tyler stays over he

now shares a room with Tommy. Geoff stated that he is employed

as an electrician, and earns approximately $70,000 per year.

	Geoff testified that he has never missed a weekend visitation

with Tyler. Geoff did acknowledge, however, that he has, at times,

worked overtime hours during a portion of the Saturdays on which

he was scheduled for visitation with Tyler. During the time he was

working, the brothers were either alone together, or they were with

Soryia. Geoff testified that he now works overtime hours only on

those Saturdays that he does not have scheduled visitation with

Tyler. Geoff also stated that, immediately after the divorce, he had

been able to spend additional time with Tyler other than the

alternating weekends. Geoff described the situation at that time as

“very flexible,” and stated that if he wanted to see Tyler and spend

time with him, he could do so. In addition, Geoff often picked

Tyler up from his after-school baby-sitter and watched him until

Soryia picked him up after work. This arrangement ended when

Soryia took Tyler out of the baby-sitter’s care and placed him in

day care, about a year earlier. Geoff also stated that when Soryia

traveled overnight for her job, she at first left Tyler in his care. This

situation changed, however, when Soryia had a friend stay with

Tyler in their apartment during those trips. Geoff testified that he

no longer considers visitation time with Tyler to be as flexible as it

once was.

	According to Geoff, Tyler sees Geoff’s extended family about

once a month, and also on holidays and for family events. Geoff

testified that immediately after the divorce, Soryia would let Tyler attend all family events, but more recently Tyler has been unable to

attend events that do not fall on Geoff’s visitation weekend. Geoff

stated that Tyler and his brother Geoffrey have a “very good

relationship” and that they do things together like swim and use the

trampoline. Geoff stated that he engages in many outdoor activities

with the boys, such as swimming and skiing, and that he also has

supported Tyler’s interests by visiting Tyler’s dance class and

attending his dance recitals. Geoff also testified that he

accompanied Tyler to his school on the orientation day at the

beginning of the year and visited his classroom, and that he also

attended an open house at Tyler’s school. However, Geoff testified

that he had no opportunity to speak with Tyler’s teacher on either

occasion. Geoff testified that Soryia regularly keeps him informed

about Tyler’s academic progress.

	Geoff described his relationship with Tyler as “very close, very

loving,” and stated that Tyler is very affectionate towards him.

Geoff said that he is opposed to the move because he believes that

it is not in Tyler’s best interests to uproot him from his immediate

family, his extended family, and his friends. In addition, Geoff

expressed concern over Tyler having to travel long distances on a

regular basis, and observed that he would not be able to see Tyler

every other weekend. Geoff stated that his new wife, Carol Lynn,

has a “good” relationship with Tyler, and that Tyler’s relationship

with Carol Lynn’s son Tommy is “fair,” but “getting better.” Geoff

admitted that he made negative comments about Mark in front of

the children, and expressed regret over the statements. Geoff also

testified that he has no personal animosity towards Soryia.

	On cross-examination, Geoff admitted that he neither

investigated nor considered any of the opportunities available to

Tyler in Sharon, and acknowledged that the move would not be in

Geoff’s own best interests. Geoff also admitted that during the

upcoming weekend he planned to take Tyler to an amusement

park, and stated that Soryia allowed him to do this even though he

was not scheduled for visitation that weekend. In addition, Geoff

admitted that he did not know the names of Tyler’s current or

previous teachers, and that he had not attended Tyler’s parent-

teacher conferences because Soryia “would always take care of

that” when they were married. Geoff also acknowledged that the visitation schedule proposed by Soryia provided him with visitation

that exceeded the time he currently had with Tyler, and stated that

Tyler has enjoyed his previous trips to Sharon.

	The next witness to testify on Geoff’s behalf was Gary Wright,

the principal of Hampshire Elementary School. Principal Wright

stated that the results of standardized testing done at the school

when Tyler was in the third grade revealed that Tyler met state

standards in all academic areas. In addition, the principal testified

that Tyler did not have any disciplinary or behavioral problems.

According to Principal Wright, the percentage of third-grade

Hampshire Elementary School students who either met or

exceeded state standards was higher than both the district and state

average, that the average Hampshire student-to-teacher ratio is

approximately 23 to 1, that extracurricular activities are offered

after school, and that there is an emphasis upon computers in the

classroom. Principal Wright acknowledged that the amount of

money spent per student at Hampshire Elementary School is less

than the state average, and admitted that the school district was

experiencing financial difficulties which may result in a future

deficit.

 	The next witness to testify was Carol Lynn Collingbourne, who stated that she and Geoff were married in July 2001. She

described the relationship between Geoff and Tyler as “very

loving,” stated that they are very affectionate towards each other,

and noted that they enjoy doing many fun things together. Carol

Lynn also testified that Tyler and his brother Geoffrey are “close,”

that they “have fun” doing different activities together, and that

Tyler looks up to his older brother. Carol Lynn also stated that the

relationship between Tyler and her son Tommy is “fine.” Carol

Lynn described her own relationship with Tyler as “very good,”

and stated that Tyler is a “loveable kid, very fun to be around,

happy-go-lucky.” She testified that on one occasion she told Tyler

that she would be willing to watch him for the day instead of his

going to day care. On another occasion she told Tyler that, on her

days off, she would be willing to watch him. Tyler then called

Soryia to ask his mother if this arrangement would be acceptable.

Carol Lynn herself then called Soryia because Tyler seemed upset after the conversation. Carol Lynn stated that Soryia did not accept

her offer.

	The final witness was Lori Price, Geoff’s sister. She lives in

Hampshire, about four blocks from Geoff. Lori testified that Geoff

has a “very close” and “very affectionate” relationship with his

children. According to Lori, her family spends a great deal of time

with Geoff and his family, and they all get together with their

extended family for social events on a regular basis. Lori testified

that in July 2001, she told Tyler that, if it was acceptable to his

parents, she would watch him for a few days per week instead of

him going to day care. Lori testified that this was the first time she

had offered to care for Tyler, even though Tyler was in day care

for several years. Lori also acknowledged that this offer came after

Soryia filed the petition for removal, although Lori denied that the

offer was related to the petition. Lori stated that Geoff told her that

her offer would not be accepted.

	The circuit court also conducted an in camera interview of Tyler. Tyler stated that he had accompanied his mother to

Massachusetts about four times and that he thought it was “okay.”

Tyler told the judge that he has been on an airplane “a lot,” and

that he usually likes traveling on them. Tyler expressed fear of

leaving his father, his family, and his friends, and stated that he told

his mother that he did not want to move to Massachusetts. Tyler

also stated that he “sometimes” gets along well with his brother

Geoffrey.

	Tyler also told the court that in the past his mother has had to

travel overnight for her job, and sometimes he stayed with his

father and sometimes with a baby-sitter. Lately, however, Tyler

stated, his mother had not been going on as many trips. Tyler

described day care as “boring” and stated that because he is one of

the older children he does not like to go to there. Tyler testified

that before his mother placed him in day care, he was watched by

a baby-sitter after school until his mother finished work.

	 On September 17, 2001, the circuit court entered a written

order granting Soryia’s petition to remove Tyler from Illinois to

Massachusetts. The court stated that its ruling was guided by the

requirements of section 609 of the Illinois Marriage and

Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609 (West 2000)) as well as this court’s decision in In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316 (1988). First, the circuit court found that neither Soryia nor Geoff

had an improper motive in requesting or objecting to Tyler’s

removal. In addition, the circuit court found that the general quality

of life for both Soryia and Tyler would be enhanced as a result of

the move. The court determined that Soryia met her burden of

proof on this issue “by demonstrating that the initial disruption

caused by the move would be outweighed by the benefits resulting

from the move.” The court observed that granting the petition for

removal would allow Soryia to marry Mark, and that she and Tyler

would be able to live in Mark’s home in Sharon. Soryia would then

obtain a job with a greater salary, and also be able to conform her

work schedule to Tyler’s school schedule. Tyler could then be

enrolled in a school system that Soryia believed offered Tyler

“superior opportunities” to those available in Hampshire. The court

also noted that the existing joint custody arrangement had already

resulted in a separation of the siblings, as they lived in separate

households and attended separate schools. Further, the court

observed, Geoffrey is five years older than Tyler, and it could be

reasonably assumed that their interests are different.

	The circuit court also considered the visitation rights of Geoff

and determined that a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule

could be reached if the move were allowed. The court stated that

the “arrangement proposed by Soryia is on balance a reasonable

and realistic method of handling an obviously disruptive event in

the life of this child.” The court considered the actual visitation

time available to Geoff and Tyler under the proposed visitation

arrangement as opposed to the existing visitation schedule, and

found that the arrangements were “comparable.” The court

determined that Tyler would be able to maintain a close

relationship with Geoff as a result of the extended periods of

visitation, even though the distance between them would limit the

frequency of that contact. The court also observed that Soryia

would be able to afford transportation to allow Tyler to visit his

father on a regular basis, and that Soryia offered to accompany

Tyler for visitation until he was old enough to travel alone. The

court also considered the time that would be spent by Tyler

traveling to and from Illinois, but found that the “time involved would not be substantially greater than it would be if Soryia were

to move to Central or Southern Illinois.”

	The circuit court concluded by observing that it had “tried to

make a reasoned assessment as to the best interests of this child. In

summary, this case, as in almost all removal cases, involves the

disruption of the lives of the parties and the children, in addition to

the extended family, soon after the initial turmoil and heartache

occasioned by the divorce itself. Here, the parties agreed that it

was in the child’s best interests to divide residential custody from

the outset. Geoff has began a new life with his present wife and her

son; Soryia wishes to do the same. Unfortunately, circumstances

dictate that in order for her to achieve this goal, it is necessary for

her to relocate.” The circuit court held that “the weight of the

evidence favors the removal in this case. The best interests of Tyler

lie in allowing Soryia to remove him to Massachusetts, subject to

the proposed visitation schedule. To do otherwise in this case

would in the court’s opinion result in a disservice to this child.”

Thereafter, Geoff filed a notice of appeal.

	A majority of the appellate court panel reversed the judgment

of the circuit court. 332 Ill. App. 3d 665. The appellate majority

focused upon the circuit court’s finding that the evidence did not

establish that Tyler would experience a substantial direct benefit as

a result of the move to Massachusetts. According to the appellate

majority, the bulk of the evidence presented at the hearing by

Soryia “related to benefits [Soryia] would derive by moving to

Massachusetts, remarrying, and living with the man she loves.” 332

Ill. App. 3d at 671. The majority held that “it is insufficient to focus

only on the improvement of the custodial parent’s life. Rather, the

improvement in the custodial parent’s quality of life is only

important insofar as it increases and furthers the child’s quality of

life.” 332 Ill. App. 3d at 671. According to the appellate majority,

although Soryia presented evidence that she would derive a direct

benefit from the move by enjoying an increased standard of living,

residing in a larger home, and earning a greater income working for

Mark’s company, “an increased standard of living will occur in

almost every case of remarriage *** [and] cannot alone be

determinative.” 332 Ill. App. 3d at 671.

	The appellate majority then examined the revised visitation

schedule entered by the circuit court as a result of granting the

removal petition. The majority initially observed that Geoff “has

diligently exercised his visitation rights with Tyler,” and that it was

therefore reluctant to interfere with Geoff’s rights for inadequate

reasons. Although the appellate majority found that “the proposed

visitation schedule would allow substantial visitation with [Geoff]

for lengthy periods of time” (332 Ill. App. 3d at 671, 672), and was

“comparable to the bimonthly/every-other-holiday visitation

schedule in use” (332 Ill. App. 3d at 672), the appellate majority

determined that the modified visitation arrangement was not in

Tyler’s best interest. The majority expressed concern that the

schedule would require Tyler to be away from his Massachusetts

home during every school break for substantial periods of time, and

would therefore interfere with his family and social life in Sharon.

In addition, the appellate majority found that the 9 to 10 trips Tyler

would be required to make between Massachusetts and Illinois

each year were “time consuming” and “burdensome.” 332 Ill. App.

3d at 672.

	The appellate majority concluded that “the evidence presented

at the hearing, in conjunction with the factors set forth in Eckert, indicates that removing Tyler to Massachusetts is not in his best

interest. Although the move may provide an indirect benefit to

Tyler by virtue of the benefits that [Soryia] will experience by

marrying Mr. Rothman, we cannot conclude that this evidence

outweighs Tyler’s interest in maintaining a close relationship with

his father, natural brother, and extended family in Illinois.” 332 Ill.

App. 3d at 672.

	In dissent, Justice Bowman stated that, in his view, the

majority’s reasons for reversing the judgment of the circuit court

“amount to nothing more than a substitution of its factual findings

for those of the trial court.” 332 Ill. App. 3d at 672-73 (Bowman,

J., dissenting). First, the dissenting justice stated, the majority

failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s findings were contrary

to the manifest weight of the evidence, and that, contrary to the

suggestion of the majority, “there is no indication that [the circuit

court] placed too much emphasis on the ‘indirect benefit’ factor.”

332 Ill. App. 3d at 673 (Bowman, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissenting justice observed that although the majority found fault

with the circuit court’s determinations regarding the proposed

visitation schedule, “[t]he majority seems to forget that it is not our

job to second-guess the trial court’s decisions on such matters, but

only to determine whether they are against the manifest weight of

the evidence.” 332 Ill. App. 3d at 673-74 (Bowman, J., dissenting).

Justice Bowman observed that although the proposed visitation

schedule may be considered to be more inconvenient than the

current arrangement, it nevertheless “is a reasonable and realistic

method of handling an obviously disruptive event in Tyler’s life ***

[while allowing Tyler] to maintain a close relationship with his

father despite the physical distance between them.” 332 Ill. App.

3d at 674 (Bowman, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice

concluded by stating that he would “affirm the trial court because

the trial court was in the best position to observe Tyler, his parents,

and the other witnesses, and to evaluate their temperaments,

predilections and capabilities in determining Tyler’s best interest.”

332 Ill. App. 3d at 674 (Bowman, J., dissenting).

	We granted Soryia leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

	Section 609 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of

Marriage Act (Act) governs petitions for removal. 750 ILCS

5/609(a) (West 2000); In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316 (1988). The statute provides in relevant part:

			“The court may grant leave *** to any party having

custody of any minor child or children to remove such

child or children from Illinois whenever such approval is

in the best interests of such child or children. The burden

of proving that such removal is in the best interests of such

child or children is on the party seeking the removal.” 750

ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2000).

	Soryia contends that she has satisfied her burden of showing

that the removal of Tyler from Illinois to Massachusetts would be

in his best interests. Therefore, Soryia argues, the appellate

majority below erred in reversing the circuit court’s grant of the

removal petition. Soryia maintains that the appellate majority incorrectly required the parent seeking removal to prove that the

child would reap a direct benefit from the move, and improperly

refused to give weight to the substantial indirect benefits that flow

to a child as a result of the enhancement of the general quality of

life for the custodial parent.

	Geoff responds that the appellate majority below properly

reversed the circuit court’s grant of the removal petition on the

basis that the circuit court’s determination was against the manifest

weight of the evidence and allowed a manifest injustice to occur.

Geoff asserts that reversal was appropriate because Soryia’s sole

reason for seeking to remove Tyler from Illinois and move to

Massachusetts was so that she could marry and live with Mark. In

his pleadings to this court, Geoff argues that there “was no

demonstration of any real benefit to Tyler” resulting from Soryia’s

remarriage that would justify Tyler’s removal. Indeed, Geoff

observes, “even the trial court found that there was no direct

benefit to Tyler.” Geoff contends that, at best, the evidence

showed that Tyler would experience “neutral changes” from the

move. Geoff urges this court to clarify that in removal actions

“indirect benefits and direct benefits which inure only to the parent

who wishes to leave the state are not sufficient to meet the

petitioner’s burden and that indirect benefits to the child, without

more, are not sufficient.” Thus, Geoff urges us to require custodial

parents seeking to remove their children from Illinois to establish

that the children will experience a direct benefit from the move. We

disagree.

	In In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316 (1988), this court addressed the issue of a custodial parent’s right to remove a child

to another state. We noted in Eckert that the General Assembly had then recently amended section 609 of the Act to clarify that the

burden of proof in removal proceedings is on the party seeking

removal to show that the move would be in the child’s best

interests. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 325. Indeed, we emphasized that the best interests of the child is the “paramount question” which

must be considered in removal actions. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 325. We cautioned that a best interests determination “cannot be

reduced to a simple bright-line test,” and held that a ruling on the

best interests of a child “must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending, to a great extent, upon the circumstances of each case.”

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326. We also stressed that “[a] trial court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the child should not

be reversed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the

evidence and it appears that a manifest injustice has occurred.”

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 328. We explained that such deference was appropriate because “ ‘[t]he trier of fact had significant opportunity

to observe both parents and the child and, thus, is able to assess

and evaluate their temperaments, personalities, and capabilities.’ ”

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330, quoting Gallagher v. Gallagher, 60 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31 (1978). Accordingly, we held that “ ‘[t]he

presumption in favor of the result reached by the trial court is

always strong and compelling in this type of case.’ ” Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330, quoting Gallagher v. Gallagher, 60 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31-32 (1978).

	We also held in Eckert that, in determining what is in the best interests of a child, the circuit court should hear any and all

relevant evidence. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326. Because a child has an important interest in “maintaining significant contact with both

parents following the divorce,” we held that the “mere desire of the

custodial parent to move to another State, without more, is

insufficient to show that the move would be in the child[ ]’s best

interest.” Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 325. In order to assist a circuit court in determining a child’s best interests, we suggested several

factors which should be considered by the court in making this

ruling. First, the circuit court “should consider the proposed move

in terms of likelihood for enhancing the general quality of life for

both the custodial parent and the children.” Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27. Second, the circuit court should “consider the motives of

the custodial parent in seeking the move to determine whether the

removal is merely a ruse intended to defeat or frustrate visitation.”

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. Third, the court should assess “the motives of the noncustodial parent in resisting the removal.”

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. In addition, we observed that because “[i]t is also in the best interests of a child to have a healthy and

close relationship with both parents, as well as other family

members,” the circuit court should “carefully consider” the

visitation rights of the noncustodial parent. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. To this end, the circuit court must assess “whether, in a given

case, a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached

if the move is allowed.” Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. We defined a “reasonable visitation schedule” as one that “will preserve and

foster the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent.”

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. We also noted that “[w]hen removal to a distant jurisdiction will substantially impair the noncustodial

parent’s involvement with the child, the trial court should examine

the potential harm to the child which may result from the move.”

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 328.

	We have subsequently emphasized, however, that in

determining the best interests of a child in a removal action, the

Eckert factors “are not exclusive.” In re Marriage of Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 312, 321 (1996). Accordingly, a circuit court may validly

consider other relevant factors, as dictated by the specific

circumstances of each case, in arriving at a best interests

determination. In addition, no one factor is controlling. The

purpose of the factors set forth in Eckert are not to establish a test in which the parent seeking removal must meet every prong; rather,

the Eckert factors are to be considered and balanced by the circuit court in arriving at a best interests determination, “and the weight

to be given each factor will vary according to the facts of each

case.” Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 321.

	Soryia asserts that the circuit court properly applied our

decision in Eckert in granting her petition for removal, and that the appellate majority improperly reversed the circuit court’s judgment.

We agree. In this case, the circuit court conducted a thorough

hearing, heard extensive testimony, and issued a written opinion in

which it applied the Eckert guidelines to the facts presented and concluded that, upon balancing the various relevant factors,

removal was in Tyler’s best interests. We cannot say that the

circuit court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

	The first Eckert factor is the likelihood that the proposed move will enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial

parent and the child. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27. With respect to this factor, the circuit court held that Soryia met her burden of

proof “by demonstrating that the initial disruption caused by the move would be outweighed by the benefits resulting from the

move.” The circuit court acknowledged that by allowing Tyler to

be removed to Massachusetts, Tyler would be separated from his

brother Geoffrey, would be forced to leave his friends, and would

lose the closeness of his relationship with his father as well as his

extended family. However, the court also observed that by granting

Soryia permission to remove Tyler to Massachusetts, Soryia could

marry Mark, live in his home in Sharon, obtain employment with

a greater salary, enroll Tyler in a school system which she believed

offered her son superior educational and extracurricular

opportunities, conform her work schedule to Tyler’s school

schedule, and afford transportation allowing Tyler to spend as

much time with his father as before the move. Although the circuit

court found that Tyler did not derive a “direct” benefit from the

move, it also found that Tyler derived a substantial “indirect”

benefit from the enhancement of Soryia’s life should removal be

allowed.

	Geoff, echoing the apparent position of the appellate majority

below, urges us to hold that a custodial parent seeking to remove

a child must show a “direct” benefit to the child in order to sustain

the removal petition. Geoff also urges us to hold that any “indirect”

benefits that may flow to the child as a result of an enhancement in

the custodial parent’s quality of life are insufficient to justify a

child’s removal from this state. Accordingly, Geoff contends that

because the circuit court determined that Soryia had failed to show

that Tyler would reap a “direct” benefit from the move to

Massachusetts, the circuit court erred in granting the removal

petition, and the appellate court correctly reversed that judgment.

We disagree.

	As we emphasized in Eckert, the “paramount question” presented by removal cases is whether the move is in the best

interests of the child. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 325; see also 750 ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2000). In Eckert, we did not characterize the benefits a child may experience as a result of a move as “direct” or

“indirect,” and we find that such a distinction is not particularly

helpful in assisting the circuit court in making the important

determination of whether removal is in the child’s best interests. To

the contrary, this distinction may divert focus from the real issue of whether the child’s general quality of life will be enhanced by the

move. See Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27. We reiterate our holding in Eckert that in conducting a best interests inquiry in the context of a removal petition, a circuit court must “consider the proposed

move in terms of likelihood for enhancing the general quality of life

for both the custodial parent and the children.” (Emphasies added.) Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27; see also Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 322-23. Indeed, “[i]f only the direct benefits that affected children were

considered, rarely would a situation arise where removal would be

permitted where children were in a good environment with good

schools, good parents, and good friends.” In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499 (2000). The vast majority of cases from our appellate court have correctly interpreted our

decision in Eckert and, in determining the best interests of a child in removal actions, have appropriately considered the potential of

the move for increasing the general quality of life for both the

custodial parent and the child, including any benefit the child may

experience stemming from the parent’s life enhancement. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shaddle, 317 Ill. App. 3d 428, 434 (2000); Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 499; In re Marriage of Miroballi, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1098 (1991); In re Marriage of Carlson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1081 (1991); In re Marriage of Roppo, 225 Ill. App. 3d 721, 728 (1991); In re Marriage of Taylor, 202 Ill. App. 3d 740, 745 (1990); In re Marriage of Zamarripa- Gesundheit, 175 Ill. App. 3d 184, 189 (1988). It follows that what is in the best interests of the child cannot be considered without

assessing the best interests of the other members of the household

in which the child resides, most particularly the custodial parent.

	Indeed, absurd results would occur were we to accept the

contrary argument advanced by Geoff that a custodial parent

wishing to remove a child from Illinois must prove that the child

will experience a “direct” benefit as a result of the move, and that

proof the child will reap “indirect” benefits as a result of the

enhancement in the quality of life for the custodial parent is

insufficient to meet this burden. First, as stated, Geoff’s position

ignores the fact that the best interests of the child cannot easily be

severed from the interests of the custodial parent with whom the

child resides, and upon whose mental and physical well-being the child primarily depends. Because the principal burden and

responsibility of child rearing falls upon the custodial parent, there

is a palpable nexus between the custodial parent’s quality of life

and the child’s quality of life.

	This principle is illustrated in the case at bar. Upon dissolution

of the marriage, Soryia was awarded physical custody of Tyler and

has had to deal with all the day-to-day issues a single parent must

face, including the child’s physical and emotional well-being, the

child’s school performance, and the care of the child when he is not

in school and Soryia cannot be with him. In addition, as evinced by

the facts in the matter at bar, a single parent must also face a

myriad of financial, social, and scheduling pressures, including the

conflict between the parent’s work schedule and the parent’s desire

to have the child become involved in extracurricular activities in

which the child expresses an interest. At the time of the hearing on

the removal petition, Soryia planned to marry a man who would

provide her with love, economic security, and a comfortable home

in a desirable location, and also be a partner and helper in rearing

her child. It is in this new family structure that Tyler’s day-to-day

routine and emotional interaction would be formed and influenced.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that there is a nexus between the

quality of life of the custodial parent and the quality of life of the

child.

	Second, requiring a parent seeking removal to establish that

the child would “directly” benefit from the move, to the exclusion

of any “indirect” benefits experienced by the child, would mean

that the remarriage of a custodial parent would rarely, if ever,

provide a valid basis for removal. Requiring the custodial parent to

meet such a heavy burden of proof would not only de facto eliminate the balancing process set forth in Eckert, but also impermissibly “allow[ ] a noncustodial parent who enjoys a good

relationship with his child[ ] to veto the good-faith and reasonable

desire of the custodial parent to remarry and move out of State

without any consideration of what have been called the ‘indirect

benefits’ to the child[ ].” In re Marriage of Eaton, 269 Ill. App. 3d 507, 514 (1995). Such a result would also contravene the intent of

the General Assembly, as expressed in section 609 of the Act,

which allows a custodial parent to remove a child from Illinois upon a proper showing that such removal is in the child’s “best

interests.” 750 ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2000). We agree with those

courts that have held that the interests of the custodial parent

should not be automatically subordinated to those of the

noncustodial parent in a removal action. See Shaddle, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 435; Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 503; Eaton, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 517; In re Marriage of Branham, 248 Ill. App. 3d 898, 905 (1993). Indeed, “our society is a mobile one” (Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330) and “since a court has no power to require the noncustodial

parent to remain in Illinois, or to require members of the extended

family to remain in Illinois, some deference is due to the custodial

parent who has already determined the best interests of her child[ ] and herself are served by remarriage and removal. The best interests of children cannot be fully understood without also

considering the best interests of the custodial parent.” (Emphasis

in original.) Eaton, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 515-16.

	Our decision today, however, should not be interpreted as

standing for the proposition that any enhancement in the quality of

life of the custodial parent automatically translates into an

improvement in the quality of life for the child, or that such benefits

will always be sufficient to warrant removal. However, we

emphasize that because there is a nexus between the well-being of

the custodial parent and the child who is in this parent’s care, all

benefits afforded to the child as a result of the move must be

considered by the circuit court in making its best interests

determination. We caution, however, that in making this

determination, a circuit court should not limit its examination solely

to enhanced economic opportunities for the custodial parent. A

court must also consider other noneconomic factors resulting from

the move which are likely to contribute to, or detract from, the

well-being and happiness of the custodial parent and the child. We

reiterate our holding in Eckert that a custodial parent’s mere desire to move to another state, without more, is an insufficient basis for

removal. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 325. The burden of proof remains upon the custodial parent to establish that the move would be in

the best interests of the child. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330; 750 ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2000).

	As stated, the circuit court determined that Tyler would

experience substantial “indirect” benefits as a result of moving with

his mother to Massachusetts, and concluded that the evidence

presented on this specific factor favored the move. The court

observed that as a result of the move, Soryia would be able to

marry Mark and live in his home in Sharon. The creation of a new

family unit and the social environment of a traditional family setting

may be considered an important benefit to a child. The circuit court

also found that Soryia established that as a result of the move she

has the opportunity to become an integral part of a family-owned

business and substantially increase her income. An improvement in

the financial situation of the custodial parent will generally benefit

a child by enhancing the child’s standard of living. In addition, the

circuit court found that as a result of the move Soryia could

schedule her work hours around Tyler’s school day, and be

available to transport him to and from school and also

extracurricular activities. This is in contrast to the situation in

Illinois, where Tyler went from day care to school, and from school

back to day care, offering him little family life until after 5 p.m. The

flexibility of Soryia’s work schedule would benefit Tyler not only

by allowing his mother to spend more time with him, but also by

permitting his mother to withdraw him from a day care

environment in which he was unhappy and providing her the

opportunity to enroll Tyler in various activities that were

unavailable to him as a result of her work schedule. Soryia’s new

work arrangement would afford her the time, energy and means to

be a part of Tyler’s life in ways that had not been possible in the

past. In addition, the circuit court found that the move will allow

Tyler to attend a school system that Soryia believes will offer Tyler

academic opportunities superior to those available in Hampshire.

Although the circuit court found that the evidence pertaining to the

school systems in Sharon and Hampshire was “not conclusive,” the

court also found that the school system in Sharon “is at least

comparable to that of Hampshire.” In addition, the circuit court

found that the educational and cultural amenities are plentiful in the

area in which Soryia wishes to relocate. In assessing whether the

move to Massachusetts would enhance the quality of Tyler’s life,

the circuit court also observed that the existing joint custody arrangement “has already resulted in the separation of the siblings

in this case.” The court noted that the brothers already resided in

separate households, attended separate schools, and that the five-

year age difference between Geoffrey and Tyler underscored their

different interests.

	We conclude that, on this record, the circuit court

appropriately applied Eckert. The court considered and weighed the panoply of benefits flowing to Tyler as a result of the

improvements to the quality of life that would be realized by his

custodial parent as a consequence of the move. Based upon its

careful consideration of the evidence, the circuit court concluded

that the move to Massachusetts would enhance the quality of life

for both Soryia and Tyler. Therefore, with respect to this specific Eckert factor, the circuit court held that removal was in the best interests of Tyler. Because the determination of the circuit court

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate

majority below committed error in reversing the circuit court’s

judgment.

	The second and third factors set forth in Eckert require the circuit court to assess the motives of the custodial parent in seeking

the move and the motives of the noncustodial parent in contesting

the move. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. We agree with the circuit court that “[t]he evidence as to the motives of the parties in

requesting and opposing the proposed move make it clear that

neither party has an invalid motive for his or her actions.” The

record reveals that the parties are well-intentioned, concerned and

conscientious. Therefore, these two Eckert factors do not weigh against either party.

	The final Eckert factors deal with visitation rights. In Eckert, we stressed that because it is in a child’s best interests to have a

healthy and close relationship with both parents, as well as other

family members, the circuit court must carefully consider the effect

the proposed move would have on the visitation rights of the

noncustodial parent. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. We instructed the lower courts to assess whether, under the facts and circumstances

of a given case, a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be

reached if the move is allowed. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327. We also cautioned that “[w]hen removal to a distant jurisdiction will substantially impair the noncustodial parent’s involvement with the

child,” the circuit court should assess “the potential harm to the

child which may result from the move.” Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 328.

	In the case at bar, the circuit court found that in the past Geoff

had “exercised his visitation in a regular manner,” but noted that

Soryia alleged that Geoff would often work on Saturday mornings

to the exclusion of his visitation with Tyler. The court also

observed that Geoff testified that “he has stopped this practice”

and is seeing Tyler for the entire weekend. The court then

compared the existing visitation arrangement with the visitation

schedule proposed by Soryia if the move were granted. Under the

existing arrangement, each of the parties has both of the children

on alternate weekends and alternate holidays. Under the proposed

visitation schedule, Tyler would visit Geoff for 8 to 10 weeks in

the summer, 1 week at winter break in February;, 1 week at spring

break in April, during the Thanksgiving and Christmas breaks, and

at any other times upon the agreement of the parties. The circuit

court found that in comparing the two visitation arrangements, the

actual time that Tyler and Geoff would be together was roughly

equivalent. In addition, the court found that the visitation schedule

proposed by Soryia is “a reasonable and realistic method of

handling an obviously disruptive event in the life of this child. Tyler

will be able to maintain a close relationship with his father even

though the distance between them will limit the frequency of the

contact.” We conclude that, under the circumstances presented, the

circuit court’s finding with respect to this factor was not manifestly

erroneous.

	In all instances, removal will have some effect on visitation.

The pivotal question is whether a reasonable and realistic visitation

schedule can be created. The record reflects that Soryia has

cooperated in visitation and has actively fostered Tyler’s

relationship with Geoff and his extended family. Although Geoff

stated during the hearing that his visitation with Tyler had recently

become somewhat less flexible, Soryia proffered unrebutted

testimony that reasonably explained the decrease in Geoff’s

unscheduled time with Tyler. Significantly, there was no testimony

that Geoff had ever been denied his scheduled visitation time with

Tyler. There is no indication in the record that Soryia will not continue to cooperate in a reasonable manner to preserve and

enhance Geoff’s relationship with Tyler.

	We agree with the circuit court that the visitation schedule

proposed by Soryia is realistic and reasonable. The circuit court

found that Geoff had been diligent with respect to the exercise of

his visitation rights. Although the nature of the relationship

between Geoff and Tyler will change under the proposed visitation

arrangement, becoming a long-distance relationship, the quality of

that relationship need not be adversely impacted. “Close

relationships can continue and even be enhanced when effort is

expended to establish a reasonable visitation schedule.” Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 504-05; Eaton, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 515; Taylor, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 61-62; Zamarripa-Gesundheit, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 189-90. Under the proposed arrangement, there is no decrease

in the amount of time that Geoff and Tyler will be able to spend

together; to the contrary, the visitation time is approximately

equivalent to that under the old arrangement.

	We caution, however, that a proposed visitation schedule

which provides a noncustodial parent with the same number of

visitation days as under the prior visitation arrangement does not

automatically lead to the conclusion that the quality of the

visitation between the child and the noncustodial parent will also

be the same. We emphasize that a circuit court must not only

evaluate the quantitative change in visitation, but must also

carefully assess the qualitative difference in visitation. In the matter

at bar, the former bi-monthly visitation would be replaced with a

schedule which allows for less frequent, but more extended,

contact between Tyler and Geoff. In its written opinion, the circuit

court correctly noted that although the visitation arrangements

were comparable in terms of the actual time Geoff and Tyler would

spend together, the relevant inquiry was not complete until it also

evaluated the qualitative change in Geoff and Tyler’s relationship.

The circuit court determined that, under the specific facts

presented, “Tyler will be able to maintain a close relationship with

his father even though the distance between them will limit the

frequency of that contact.” We conclude that, under the facts of

this case, the circuit court'’s holding on this issue was not against

the manifest weight of the evidence. A longer, uninterrupted period of visitation time may foster a more meaningful relationship

between father and son, and the extended length of the summer

visits may afford Tyler the opportunity to spend more

uninterrupted time with family and friends.

	In addition, both Soryia and Mark appear to be sincere in their

desire that Tyler have a continuing and meaningful relationship

with Geoff and Geoff’s extended family, and to do whatever is

necessary to assure this. Mark stated that because he had a very

close relationship with his own father, he understood the

importance of Tyler’s maintaining a close relationship with Geoff.

Both Soryia and Mark stated that they will have the financial means

necessary to ensure that Tyler maintains close contact with his

father and also his extended family. They stated that they would

pay for the costs of transporting Tyler to Illinois, and also pay for

long distance phone calls and e-mails so that Tyler could have

regular contact with Geoff between his visits.

	We note that although Tyler expressed a desire to remain in

Illinois and not move to Massachusetts, we believe that this a

natural response for a child of his age, and that it is not sufficient

to justify denying Soryia’s petition. We find that the proposed

visitation schedule ensures that Tyler will have about the same

amount of contact with his father and extended family in Illinois.  In addition, we observe that

Geoff harbored concerns about the length of time Tyler would have

to travel, which may extend from 3 to 5 hours each way. However,

as the circuit court observed in its written order, “the time involved

would not be substantially greater than it would be if Soryia were

to move to Central or Southern Illinois.”

	In the final analysis, we adhere to our statement in Eckert that a trial court’s examination of a removal petition should be guided

by the policies of the Act, one of which is to “ ‘secure the

maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding

the physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being of the

children during and after the litigation.’ ” Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 328, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 102(7), now 750 ILCS

5/102(7) (West 2000). We agree that policy is “best served when,

in addition to a favorable determination of all of the Eckert factors, the court considers the aspects of cooperation of both parents in

achieving as reasonable an expectation of normalcy and family life

for the child involved as can be achieved following a divorce,

which includes adjustments to stepparents in the event of the remarriage of one or both parents.” In re Marriage of Roppo, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 732.

	We note that “it is obvious that for the child the fact of the

divorce becomes the predicate of his subsequent relationship with

both parents, and that relationship can never be the same as it

would have been had the marriage remained intact. Adjustments

and accommodations must be made as a result of the divorce, the

whole point of which was to permit each parent to go on his or her

own way. Within reason, both parties must be permitted to do so,

and the child’s best interests must be served within that context.”

Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 230, 476 A.2d 828, 833 (1984). We recognize the importance of preserving a child’s

relationship with the noncustodial parent. However, as we set forth

in Eckert and reiterated in Smith, this factor must be weighed against the enhancement of the quality of life for the child as a

result of the remarriage of his custodial parent and the child’s move

to another state. In removal actions, the best interests of the child

are controlling. As stated, a trial court’s determination of what is

in the best interests of the child should not be reversed unless it is

clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence and it appears

that a manifest injustice has occurred. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 328. We conclude that, under the facts presented, the circuit court’s

determination that removal was in the best interests of Tyler was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the

appellate court erred in reversing the judgment of the circuit court.

 CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court

is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.