The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: Working Paper: Burning Down the House: 

Mortgage Fraud and the Destruction of 

Residential Neighborhoods 

Author: Ann Fulmer 

Document No.: 229912 

Date Received: March 2010 

Award Number: N/A 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies. 

 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 
D R A F T 

Burning Down the House: 

Mortgage Fraud and the Destruction of Residential Neighborhoods 

Mortgage fraud is bank robbery without a gun.1

 It is a high-yield,2 low risk 

enterprise that has been reported in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa,3

Canada,4 New Zealand,5 Australia,6 and England.7 In the United States, it is committed 

by organized international and domestic rings,8 street gangs,9 terrorists,10 drug 

traffickers,11 real estate agents,12 closing attorneys,13 appraisers,14 mortgage brokers,15

 

1

 The targeted victims distinguish mortgage fraud from predatory lending. In predatory lending cases the borrower is 

victimized by the illegal practices of the lender or its agents with respect to fees and disclosures relating to the cost of the 

loan. It is unfortunate that the media, consumer activists, legislators and law enforcement personnel frequently conflate 

mortgage fraud with predatory lending since it adds unnecessary confusion to an already complex issue and diverts 

attention and badly needed resources from the fight against true mortgage fraud. 

2

 The average “take” on a bank robbery is approximately $3,000.00. By contrast, the average straw borrower receives a 

“cut” of at least $10,000 and the orchestrator’s “take” in a mortgage fraud transaction frequently exceeds $100,000. In a 

few cases the orchestrator’s take was in excess of $1 million dollars, and in one, the perpetrator, who later fled the 

country, received $7 million in “profit” from the same-day flip of a mansion. 

3

 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Industry Assessment Based on Suspicious Activity 

Report Analysis,” November 2006 at 10. http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports/pdf/mortgage_fraud112006.pdf 

(accessed March 8, 2009). 

4 See, e.g., “Due Diligence: The Growing Problem of Mortgage Fraud), CBC News, November 9, 2006. 

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/mortgage-fraud/ (accessed January 4, 2010). 

5 See, e.g., Anne Gibson, “Agents on Charges for House Fraud Sale,” New Zealand Herald, December 26, 2006. 

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/property/news/article.cfm?c_id=8&objectid=10361509 (accessed January 4, 2010). 6 See, e.g., “Australia Targeted by Card Skimming Gangs,” October 14, 2009. 

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/10/14/2714003.htm?section=australia (accessed January 4, 2010). 7 See, e.g., Richard Edwards and Myra Butterworth, “Toxic Debt Could Have Come from Massive Mortgage Frauds,” The 

Daily Telegraph, March 10, 2009. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/4970457/Toxic-debtcould-have-come-from-massive-mortgage-frauds.html (accessed January 4, 2010). 8 See, e.g., U.S. v. Bowens, 2:07-CR-00544 (D.Ariz. 2007) (defendants convicted of scheme conducted over five years in 

three states involving 19 properties and 10 vehicles). 9 See, e.g., David Jackson, “Mortgage Fraud is the Thing to Do Now,” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 5, 2005. 10 See, e.g., U.S. v. Omar, 2:06-CR-756, superseding indictment (D. Utah 2006), and Patrick Poole, “Mortgage Fraud 

Funding Jihad,” FrontPageMag.com, April 11, 2007. 

http://www.frontpagemagazine.com/articles/Read.aspx?GUID=2FB5D093-D93D-404B-B4CD-AEEA3DB9CEBF

(accessed March 8, 2009). 

11 See, e.g., United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement press release, Nov. 19, 2008. 

http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0811/081119newyork.htm (accessed March 8, 2009). 12 See, e.g., U.S. v. Rice, 1:2002-CR-00691 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 13 See, e.g., U.S. v. McFarland, 1:04-CR-224 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (superseding indictment); U.S. v. Sprouse, 3:07-CR-211 

(W.D. N.C. 2007) (fourth superseding indictment). 

14See, e.g., U.S. v. Ross, 5:06-CR-40068 (Kan. 2006) (first superseding indictment). 15See, e.g., U.S. v. Hooker, 2:05-CR-80897 (E.D. Mich. 2005).

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
bank executives,16 ministers,17 teachers,18 policemen,19 and, frequently, neophyte 

property investors.20 

In the federal courts, mortgage schemes are charged as bank fraud,21 mail fraud,22

and wire fraud23 and, depending on the specific structure of the scheme, conspiracy to 

commit bank fraud,24 money laundering,25 aggravated identity theft,26 bankruptcy 

fraud,27 and/or false statements.28 A handful of states have statutes that address 

mortgage fraud as a specific crime,29 but in most state courts it is charged, if at all, a

theft or gra

s 

nd larceny. 

 

Although the variety of schemes is infinite and limited only by the human 

imagination,30 they are generally classified as either fraud-for-profit or fraud-for housing. 

16 See, e.g., U.S. v. Gordon, 08-21103-Jordan (S.D. Fla. 2008) (bank’s managing director altered individual’s credit data 

to inflate mortgage pools’ apparent quality and value upon sale to investors); U.S. v. Levine, 1:09-CR-00554 (N.D. Ga. 

2009) (executive vice president in charge of bank’s community redevelopment lending department accused of knowingly 

over-valuing bank assets (loans to flippers) in reports to the OCC and the FDIC; the defendant is expected to plead guilty 

in January, 2010).. 

17 See, e.g., U.S. v. Sailor, 1:08-CR-105, superseding information (N.D. Ga. 2008). 18 See, e.g., U.S. v. Sprouts, 2:08-CR-0051 (W. D. Pa. 2008). 19 See, e.g., U.S. v. Culp, 3:08-CR-00055 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 20 “Investor” borrowers on known fraud loans typically report that they were lured into the scheme by perpetrators who 

offered hands-off “turnkey” investment programs. The perpetrators promised to acquire the properties at less than market 

value with cash back to the borrower/investor at closing, to rehab the properties, to find tenants at a monthly that would 

provide passive monthly income in excess of the mortgage payment, and to manage the property for a year, after which 

the property could be sold at a profit. After the properties were purchased, the perpetrators severed all contact with the 

investors, who then discovered that the purchase price was substantially above market value, that properties had not 

been rehabbed (or that only cosmetic repairs had been made and that the value of the work was inflated), that the 

properties could not be rented at an amount sufficient to service the mortgage, much less for a monthly profit, and that the 

property could not be sold for what was owed on the mortgage. These novice investors also report that they believed the 

perpetrator’s claims because they had watched A&E’s “Flip This House” program and/or the Carleton Sheets “no money 

down, cash back at closing” infomercials, which gave them the impression that real estate investing was both easy and 

profitable, and which made the schemes proposed by the perpetrators seem both legal and credible. 

2118 U.S.C. § 1344. 22 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 23 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 

2418 U.S.C. § 1349. 25 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18 U.S.C. §1957. 26 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A). 27 18. U.S.C. § 157 and 18 U.S.C. § 152 (concealment of assets and false oaths to a trustee). 28 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (false entries, reports and transactions) and 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false reports and financial statements). 29 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 8-16-102. Enacted in 2005 and known as the Georgia Residential Mortgage Fraud Act, it was the 

first state or federal statute to specifically define and criminalize mortgage fraud. It is a RICO predicate and carries a 

sentence of up to twenty years imprisonment. Since then, a number of states have passed laws criminalizing mortgage 

fraud, including: Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2320), Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-76-103), Florida (Fl. Stat. Ann. § 

817.545), Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Mortgages, § 7-402), Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.822), Mississippi, (Miss. 

Code Ann. § 97-23-107), Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.372), North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-118.10 et seq.), 

and Texas (Tex. Code Ann. § 402.032). California joined these states in 2009, but the maximum sentence under its 

statute is only 1 year. Cal. Penal Code § 532f(h). 

30 Common schemes include: the use of “straw” (or nominee) buyers, mischaracterization of the intended use of the 

property (owner-occupied or second home instead of investment), undisclosed seller contributions to the borrower’s down 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The object in a fraud-for-profit scheme is to obtain residential mortgage loan proceeds 

and/or physical and legal control of residential properties. Lenders and law enforcement 

agencies have traditionally focused on for-profit schemes because they involve organized 

rings, industry insiders,31 multiple properties,32 and millions of dollars in losses. 

In fraud for-housing schemes, the object is to obtain a loan that would have been 

made on materially different terms, or would not have been made at all, had the lender 

known the truth.33 Fraud-for-housing schemes have largely been ignored because of the 

industry belief that they involved a small percentage of individual borrowers who were 

merely “stretching” to buy a home which they intended to pay for and, until the 

“mortgage meltdown,” there weren’t a lot of these cases and the majority of these loans 

were repaid. But by tolerating fraud-for-housing, the line between acceptable and illegal 

practices was blurred, fraud of all types was tacitly encouraged34 and millions of 

fraudulent loans were made. 

 

payment (borrowers with little financial investment are at higher risk of default), undisclosed or fictional second mortgages 

from the seller (lender unknowingly extends 100 percent financing), “buy and bail” (underwater borrower buys comparable 

property nearby and lets mortgage on old residence go into default and foreclosure), builder and developer bailouts (straw 

buyers and undisclosed seller concessions, which inflate the sales price, are used to unload excess inventory),.flipping 

(perpetrators collude with real estate agents and/or appraisers to fraudulently inflate the sale price in a rising market), 

flopping (real estate agents and investors collude to deflate the short sale price in a declining market before flipping flip it 

at an inflated value to co-conspirators or straw buyers), modification fraud (borrowers understate their income and 

property value in hopes of getting a debt reduction), forced modifications (distressed borrowers sell the property to family 

members, friends, or a corporation owned by the borrower and the property is re-conveyed to the borrower), deed or title 

theft (deeds of conveyance and satisfaction are forged and perpetrators sell the property to a straw buyer who obtains a 

mortgage with 100 percent of the proceeds going to the perpetrator), and settlement agent fraud (escrow or settlement 

agent absconds with loan proceeds instead of paying off existing liens and mortgages). 31 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Financial Crimes Report to the Public,” May 2005. 

http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report052005/fcs_report052005.htm#d1 (accessed March 6, 2009). 32 See, e.g., U.S. v. Alcindor, et. al., 1:05-CR-0269 superseding indictment (N.D. Ga., 2005) (orchestrator Phil Hill 

convicted in case involving 234 single family houses, condominiums and mobile homes) and U.S. v. McFarland, 1:04-CR224, superseding indictment (N.D. Ga., 2004) (McFarland, a closing attorney, was convicted on a 165 count indictment 

involving 85 properties). 

33 Material terms include: loan amount, interest rate, and the size of the borrower’s down payment. Misrepresentations 

relating to a borrower’s income and employment, source and amount of the down payment, the seller’s contribution to the 

borrower’s settlement costs, the borrower’s intent with respect to occupancy, and the value of the collateral property are 

used to mask increase the borrower’s apparent creditworthiness in order to induce the lender to grant the loan and on 

terms more favorable to the borrower, i.e., at a lower interest rate, a lower down payment, and/or with a waiver of 

mortgage insurance. 34 There are numerous instances of borrowers who report that they were told by a mortgage professional to lie about their 

income and were told that was acceptable because so long as they repaid the mortgage the lender wouldn’t care. One 

effect of the industry’s attitude is found in what became a common practice among otherwise honest real estate agents: 

raising the contract purchase price to disguise a seller’s contribution to the borrower’s down payment. The agents 

justified their conduct as “taking a little from column ‘A’ and putting it in column ‘B’” in a “net-net” transaction that would

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Scope of Mortgage Fraud 

As early as 2004 the Federal Bureau of Investigation was characterizing mortgage 

fraud as “pervasive and growing.” 35 Chris Swecker, the FBI’s then-Assistant Director 

of the Criminal Division, testified to Congress that: 

 “Mortgage fraud losses adversely affect loan loss reserves, profits, liquidity 

levels and capitalization ratios, ultimately affecting the soundness of the financial 

institution. [I]f fraudulent practices become systemic within the mortgage 

industry and mortgage fraud is allowed to become unrestrained, it will ultimately 

place financial institutions [and the stock market] at risk... [i]nvestors may lose 

faith and require higher returns from mortgage backed securities [and that] 

may...result in higher interest rates and fees paid by borrowers and limit the 

amount of investment funds available for mortgage loans. 36..... “ 

That statement was as prescient as it was unheeded and short of the mark. As the FBI’s 

Deputy Director testified on March 20, 2009, what has occurred is “far worse” than what 

even Mr. Swecker imagined.37 Mortgage fraud is now at epidemic levels and is placing 

significant strains on the Bureau’s resources.38 The FBI’s caseload has expanded to over 

2,000 active cases, including 43 corporate fraud cases relating directly to the financial 

crisis and 200 new investigations in the first quarter of 2009 alone.39 

The torrent will not abate any time soon: the number of mortgage fraud-related 

suspicious activity reports (“SARs”) reports filed with the Crimes Enforcement Network 

 

allow the deal to close with no harm being done to anyone. From a lender’s perspective the transaction was fraudulent 

because the risk of default posed by the borrower was understated (the less a borrower invests, the more likely he is to 

default), and the loan-to-value ratios were skewed. When large numbers of loans like this were pooled, the 

misrepresentations continued on to the ratings agencies and investors because the fact that these loans did not meet 

investor guidelines was obscured by the structure of the underlying mortgage transactions. 

35 Statement of Assistant Director Chris Swecker before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and 

Community Opportunity, October 7, 2004. http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/swecker100704.htm (accessed March 

29, 2009). 

36 Id. 37 Statement of Deputy Director John S. Pistole before the House Financial Services Committee, March 20, 2009. 

http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress09/pistole032009.htm (accessed March 29, 2009. 38 Id. 39 Brent Kendall, “FBI Ramps Up Probes of Financial, Mortgage Fraud,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2009. 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123756681453396825.html (accessed March 24, 2009). The FBI reported a total of 1,204 

open mortgage fraud cases at end of FY 2007, a 47 percent increase over FY 2006 and a 176 percent increase from FY 

2003. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “2007 Mortgage Fraud Report,” April 2008. 

http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud07.htm (accessed March 8, 2009). The case load increased to 1,644 

by February 2009. FBI, “Mortgage Fraud”. http://www.fbi.gov/hq/mortgage_fraud.htm (accessed March 8, 2009). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(“FinCEN”) rose 1,411 percent between 1997 and 2005, 40 and by double digits each year 

between 2002 and the present.41 FinCEN received over 63,000 mortgage-related SARs 

in fiscal year 2008 and an additional 28,000 reports in the first five months of fiscal yea

2009.

r 

 

42 

The sobering reality is that the figures cited above capture only the tip of the 

iceberg. We can only guess at the true scope of fraud because the majority of entities 

with relevant information relating to mortgage fraud activities are not required to file 

SARs.43 There is no “safe harbor” to protect voluntary reporters against civil or criminal 

actions for libel, slander, or unauthorized disclosure of confidential information relating 

to mortgage transactions and borrowers.44 A large number of lenders whose victimization 

is just now surfacing have closed their doors or gone bankrupt so there is no one to report 

it to authorities, and the substantial adverse financial consequences for fraudulently 

originated loans discourage lenders from investigating and reporting fraud. 45 It is, 

literally, the “F” word of the financial services industry and may not be spoken of in 

polite banking company. 

40 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Industry Assessment Based on Suspicious Activity 

Report Analysis,” November 2006, p 4. http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports/pdf/MortgageLoanFraud.pdf 

(accessed March 8, 2009). 

41 FinCEN reported a 33 percent increase between 2002 and 2003 and a 92 percent increase between 2003 and 2004. 

Id. The most recent report shows an increase of 44 percent between 2005 and 2006, and an additional 37 percent 

increase between Q1 2006 and Q1 2007. FinCEN, “Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Update of Trends based upon an Analysis 

of Suspicious Activity Reports,” April 2008 at 21. 

http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/MortgageLoanFraudSARAssessment.pdf (accessed March 8, 2009). 42 Testimony of Deputy Director John S. Pistole to the House Financial Services Committee, March 20, 2009. 

http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress09/pistole032009.htm (accessed March 29, 2009. FinCEN is on track to receive 

more than 70,000 reports in FY 2009. FBI, “2008 Mortgage Fraud Report ‘Year in Review,’”, June 2009. 

43 Only “financial institutions” as defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (primarily federally regulated and insured banks and 

thrifts, credit unions, life and annuity insurers, and cash-based business such as pawnshops and casinos) are required to 

file Suspicious Activity Reports with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network because this statute’s focus is money 

laundering. 

44 Other potential sources of useful information relating to mortgage fraud include mortgage and title insurance 

companies, due diligence providers, and investors in the secondary market. 45 These disincentives include financial risk (repurchase of fraudulent loans, increased loan loss reserve requirements for 

portfolio loans, and denial of mortgage and title insurance claims). Lenders also face reputational risk and potential 

negative shareholder actions. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Economic Cost to Lenders 

While a comprehensive loss figure is impossible to obtain, we do know that fraud 

in residential mortgages is very expensive to lenders. An analysis of two million closed 

loans revealed that loans originated in fraud are eight times more likely to default, and 20 

times more likely to enter into the foreclosure process, within the first year of 

origination.46 The loss severity to lenders from foreclosures due to “natural” events47 has 

historically ranged from 15 to 40 percent of the original mortgage amount, depending on 

the length of time that elapses between origination and default, and, until the mortgage 

meltdown and economic collapse, hovered at an average of approximately $30,000 per 

loan. In contrast, losses from foreclosures on fraudulently originated loans range 

conservatively from 40 to nearly 100 percent, depending on the type of scheme, the time 

lapse between origination and default, and the amount by which the mortgage was 

inflated.48 Average loss amounts today are rising because the damage caused by 

collateral value inflation at origination is being compounded by severely depreciating real 

estate market values.

Here’s what we do know about the cost of fraud: 

• The FBI estimates fraud’s dollar cost from the amounts reported in SARs. Although 

that figure stood at $1.5 billion during fiscal year 2008, the FBI acknowledges that 93 

percent of the reports it received failed to indicate a specific dollar loss.49 

 

46 Derek Stanford, PhD., “2007 Risk Metrics Validation Study.” http://interthinx.com/pdf/RiskMetricValStudy.pdf (accessed 

March 25, 2009). See also BasePoint Analytics press release, February 12, 2007 (fraud accounts for up to 70% of all 

early payment defaults). 

47 “Natural” or “conventional” foreclosures occur primarily because of death, divorce, job loss and unexpected medical 

expenses. 

48 Investigation of fraudulent mortgage loans show that loss severity ratios approach 100 percent in cases involving “air 

loans” (no building on the secured property) and “double sold” note schemes (one mortgage note is sold to multiple 

investors simultaneously; since only the first sale is recorded, the other investors’ interest is not recorded and thus is 

unsecured). 

49 Testimony of Deputy Director John S. Pistole to the House Financial Services Committee, March 20, 2009. 

http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress09/pistole032009.htm (accessed March 29, 2009). This omission may be due, in 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
• When measured by the loss claimed by lenders in civil and criminal prosecutions, the 

figure stood at $5.4 billion at the end of 2008, with an additional $3.1 billion reported 

in the first half of 2009.50 Lawsuits provide an incomplete measure of the cost 

because fraud investigations and prosecutions are extremely resource intensive and 

produce little perceived return on investment.51 Cash-strapped lenders and 

overwhelmed federal prosecutors are unwilling to pursue any but the largest cases.52 

• Rather than being a relatively uncommon and harmless form of fraud that could 

safely be ignored,53 it is increasingly clear that the incidence of fraud-for-housing 

was extensive: 

o Quality control audits and post-foreclosure fraud investigations indicate that 

as much as 60 percent of all Alt-A originations through 2008 contained 

material misrepresentations of the borrower’s income, employment, assets, 

and/or collateral value, representing a potential aggregate loss of $218 billion. 

o QC audits and investigations also reveal that as much as 50 percent of 

conforming54 loan originations from 2007 and 2008 failed to meet 

 

part, to lender confusion about when to state a dollar loss. While bank regulators instruct lenders to omit a dollar loss 

unless an actual loss has been realized, the FBI cannot judge the relative size and importance of the case or determine 

whether it meets prosecutorial thresholds when the amount is not stated. Without this critical information, these SARs 

receive a low investigative priority and the perpetrators are free to ply their trade unhindered for additional years. 50 MortgageDaily.com “FraudBlogger Index.” http://www.fraudblogger.com/FraudIndex.asp (accessed March 8, 2009). 51 Disincentives include: 1) the judiciary’s view of mortgage fraud as a victimless financial crime and the imposition of 

relatively light sentences, see, e.g., U.S. v Trester, 1:05-CR-00086 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (maximum sentence in “flipping” 

case involving 800 residential properties and severe damage to neighborhoods was forty-six months); 2) the lender’s 

expense for providing copies of documents and making personnel available to work with law enforcement and travel to 

and testify at trial, and c) the likelihood that restitution will not be made because the defendants either spent or hid the 

illicit proceeds and do not have the means to generate the legitimate income necessary to meet a restitution order that 

may total several million dollars. 

52 While the author knows of no per se loss thresholds for bank fraud cases apart from those required to confer 

jurisdiction, United States Attorneys generally will not open a case unless the aggregate loss exceeds $1 million. This 

approach is more reasonable than it might initially appear because: a) the number of potential cases are virtually 

limitless; b) mortgage fraud cases are increasingly difficult to prove because the bankruptcy, failure, and consolidation of 

lending entities has made critical witnesses and documentation inaccessible; and c) because of the perceived difficulty,

except in the most egregious cases, of overcoming public hostility towards mortgage lenders and their lending standards 

and practices. 

53 Some experts argued that loans in fraud-for-housing cases posed only “technical compliance issues” and posed little 

risk to lenders because they “never default.” See, e.g., First American CoreLogic. “Mark Fleming on Fraud Prevention,” 

Mortgage Banking, August 2005. 

https://www.corelogic.com/documents/20050801_Mortgage_Banking_Interview.pdf. (accessed March 6, 2009). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
underwriting guidelines relating to the borrower’s income, employment, assets 

and/or collateral value, putting Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae at risk of losing 

as much as $500 billion. 

• Mark Zandi, Chief Economist for Moody’s Economy.com, calculates that the fallout 

from 15 million “sketchy” loans made between mid-2004 and mid-2007 will cost the 

U.S. financial system $625 billion.55 

As staggering as these figures are, they are still likely to be low because mortgage fraud 

didn’t stop in mid-2007 when the financial markets collapsed. It got worse and, after a 

slight lull in 2008, fraud risk indicators appear to be poised for a rebound in 2009 and 

beyond:56 

• An analysis of loans originated between July 1 and December 31, 2007, after 

underwriting guidelines were tightened in the wake of the mortgage meltdown, found 

critical fraud risk indicators pointing to significant inflation of the borrower’s income 

in more than 42,000 mortgage applications representing $11 billion in potential 

loans.57 Recognizing the threat posed by borrowers who misrepresent their income, 

many lenders now verify borrower income directly with the Internal Revenue Service, 

but investigations show that an increasing number of borrowers today are filing 

returns that fraudulently overstate taxable income in order to qualify for a purchase 

mortgage, to refinance an existing loan or to obtain a mortgage modification under 

 

54 A conforming loan is a loan that is eligible for purchase by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The maximum eligible loan 

amount was less than $417,000 for much of the boom years, but was raised to $625,500 in high-cost areas in mid-2008 

pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. The maximum amount is $938,250 in Alaska, Hawaii, 

Guam and the US Virgin Islands. Fannie Mae, “Loan Limits for Conventional Mortgages.” 

https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/refmaterials/loanlimits/

55 Mark Zandi, “When Will It End,” Moody’s Economy.com Regional Financial Review, at 15 (September 2008). 

http://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/When-Will-It-End.pdf (accessed March 8, 2009). 56 Intethinx, Q2 and Q3 2009 Mortgage Fraud Risk Reports. http://www.interthinx.com/pdf/09_Q2MFRI_FNL.pdf and 

http://www.interthinx.com/pdf/09_Q3MFRI_FNL.pdf (accessed January 4, 2010). Interthinx is a leading provider of fraud 

and compliance risk management systems for the residential mortgage lending industry. 57 Interthinx press release, March 13, 2008. http://interthinx.com/press/FraudBytes_042808/ (accessed March 24, 2009). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the federal Hope for Homeowners and Making Home Affordable programs. The 

returns are amended to reflect the borrower’s true income after the loan is closed. 

• Freddie Mac executives have said publicly that loans originated in 2008 were the 

“worst in history,” with an alarming number of those loans completing the 

foreclosure process less than one year from origination.58 This suggests an 

explanation for the sharp rise in first- and early-payment defaults, both of which are 

closely correlated with fraud in the origination of the mortgage. 59

• Many of the lenders and brokers in the subprime space who were displaced during the 

collapse of the residential mortgage industry have formed new companies and are 

obtaining FHA Direct Endorsement authority, despite their histories of bankruptcies, 

criminal convictions, and sanctioning by state regulators.60 There is a clear 

correlation between mortgage fraud and non-bank/brokered originations,61 and this 

“subprime creep” may be responsible for the alarming increase in first-payment 

defaults – a sure sign of fraud -- in FHA-insured loans originated in 2008. 62

• Lenders who perform QC audits on current originations which have been approved by 

TOTAL Scorecard, the FHA’s automated underwriting system (“AUS”), 63 are 

privately reporting that 60 percent of these loans contain obvious indications of fraud. 

This may provide further evidence of subprime creep, but it is also evidence that too 

 

58 Various Freddie Mac representatives at Mortgage Bankers conferences in 2008. 59 A first payment or “instant” default is defined as a loan that goes into default without a single payment being made. An 

early payment default (EPD) is generally defined as a loan that goes into default within 90 to 180 days after origination. A 

study by BasePoint Analytics in 2007 found that up to 70 percent of all EPDs were originated in fraud. BasePoint 

Analytics press release, February 12, 2007. 

60 Chad Terhune and Robert Berner, “FHA-Backed Loans: The New Subprime,” BusinessWeek, November 19, 2008. 

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_48/b4110036448352.htm?chan=top+news_top+news+index+-

+temp_top+story (accessed March 27, 2009). 61 A one unit increase in non-bank originations within a given census tract increases, by a factor of 4.8, the likelihood that 

the tract contains mortgage fraud. Cary Collins, Ann Fulmer, Keith Harvey and Peter Nigro, “"Mortgage Fraud’s Impact 

on Housing Markets: An Atlanta Case Study in Neighborhood Collateral Damage," 2009 (working paper). 

62 Dina ElBoghady and Dan Keating, “The Next Hit: Quick Defaults,” Washington Post, March 8 2009. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/07/AR2009030702257.html

(accessed March 25, 2009). 

63 For an explanation of what the FHA system does and does not do, and what elements of an application are evaluated, 

see http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/lender/total_faqs.pdf (accessed January 4, 2010). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
many underwriters are relying on automated underwriting tools as a substitute for due 

diligence and critical analysis. The FHA tool, like those of Fannie Mae64 and 

Freddie Mac, has a limited function: to examine loan characteristics such as the loanto-value and debt-to-income ratios and determine whether the loan will meet 

eligibility guidelines for insurance (FHA) or purchase (Fannie and Freddie). The 

problem is that the borrower’s qualifications and loan characteristics can be 

fabricated or misrepresented. Automated underwriting tools passively accept the 

information submitted on the application and thus are unable to detect fraud. During 

the boom -- and even today -- many loan originators used the AUSs as decisioning 

tools without subjecting the underlying data to verification,65 which has exposed the 

GSEs and the FHA to significant levels of fraud risk. 

• FBI field agents report an increase in fraud relating to low-income HUD housing 

grants and are expecting to see more as Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds 

begin to be disbursed. The stabilization programs will provide a bonanza for the 

career fraudsters, who no doubt are already positioned to take advantage of the 

opportunity to snap up federally-subsidized bargains in foreclosed housing stock that 

will eventually be recycled into new fraud schemes. 

• Wholesale flipping, where foreclosed properties are purchased in bulk then sold to 

investors who flip the property to “end buyers” are on the rise, fueled by the bloated 

 

64 Fannie Mae’s AUS is known as “Desktop Underwriter,” which is a misnomer because it doesn’t perform critical 

underwriting functions. Sound underwriting practices require verification of application data, scrutiny for patterns and red 

flags that indicate fraud, and critical analysis to ensure that the loan “makes sense” given the borrower’s financial profile 

and stated use. The process can be very time consuming if performed manually and speed was one of the selling points 

to the industry when this product was rolled out. For an illuminating article on Fannie’s system, see Michael D. Larson, 

“Secrets of the Automated Underwriting System Revealed at Last,” Bankrate.com (February 3, 2000). 

http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20000203.asp (accessed January 4, 2010). Freddie Mac’s AUS is known as 

“Loan Prospector.” 

65 Many lenders feel that they do not need to use automated fraud detection technology because they now require full 

documentation in support of the application. These lenders ignore the fact that desk-top technology allows for the 

fabrication or forgery of every document needed to support an application and close the loan. . 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
inventory of foreclosed properties held by the FDIC and banks. Although these 

properties can be purchased for literally pennies on the dollar, many are seriously 

dilapidated, or uninhabitable, and the price to the end buyer (often an investor) is 

illegally inflated. 

• Short sale flipping, where the price is fraudulently deflated in order to generate the 

“profit” on the sale to the end-buyer is also on the rise. These transactions frequently 

are presented to the distressed borrower as a way to avoid foreclosure, and are 

marketed to the end buyers as the ultimate in “get rich quick” investment programs. 

• Another area of major growth for fraud is in reverse mortgages. FHA-insured Home 

Equity Conversion Mortgages (“HECMs”), available only to those who are 62 years 

old or older, do not now account for a large share of the market, but they will: the 

total number of persons aged 65 or older will surpass 88 million by 2050.66 Since 

nearly 80% of seniors own their homes, this demographic represents trillions of 

dollars in untapped home equity.67 With that kind of money in play, and with HUD’s 

decision to allow HECM funds to be used for purchases, we should not be surprised 

that the fraudsters are already moving into this space: a title insurance company 

recently reported privately that the developer of a failed condo conversion project68 in 

Florida, working in collusion with a loan officer, an appraiser and a settlement agent, 

recruited immigrant seniors, recorded deeds of conveyance and sham purchase money 

mortgages and obtained HECM loans for the seniors at inflated values. The 

 

66Press release, U.S. Census Bureau, August 14, 2008. http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/population/012496.html (accessed July 2, 2009). 67 Donald L. Redfoot, Ken Scholen and S. Kathi Brown, “Reverse Mortgages: Niche Product or Mainstream Solution,” 

December, 2007. http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/2007_22_revmortgage.pdf (accessed July 2, 2009). 68 Condo conversion projects in many instances represent flipping on steroids (instead of flipping one property at a time, 

fraudsters purchased entire apartment complexes and flipped hundreds of units in a short period of time). Condo 

conversions are so toxic that mortgage insurance giant Radian recently announced it would no longer insure ANY 

attached condominiums. Radian Guaranty e-Bulletin 2009-01, p. 2, March 10, 2009. 

http://radian.biz/pdf/Radian_eBulletin_2009-01.pdf (accessed March 29, 2009). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
developer got out from under his debt obligations and made a profit, but many of the 

seniors were impoverished and had no funds for furniture, utility service or even 

groceries, much less the homeowner association dues needed for maintenance or to 

pay property taxes. When these mortgagors eventually default,69 U.S. taxpayers will 

have to pick up the tab. 

Potemkin Villages: Fraud’s Collateral Damage to Communities and Local 

Governments 

Mortgage fraud is not a victimless financial crime. A fraudulently acquired home sets 

off a long-lasting spiral of ever-widening destruction, regardless of whether it’s in the 

urban core or in the most exclusive suburbs, in a poor neighborhood or a rich one. If the 

home is acquired in an organized for-profit or investment scheme, it is likely to remain 

vacant and untended. These properties are pillaged by the perpetrators, and later 

vagrants, who strip them of appliances, heating and air conditioning systems, doors and 

fixtures, copper plumbing and wiring. 

Abandoned and derelict properties eventually attract squatters,70 even in houses that 

last sold for half a million dollars or more. In the winter, the squatters light fires to stay 

warm. When they overload the fireplace, or start them on the floor because there is no 

fireplace, the house burns down. The fraudsters, keeping watch from a distance, may file 

a property insurance claim and immediately get a check for thousands of dollars for 

temporary living expenses.71 

 

69 Default events include failure to maintain the property and failure to pay property taxes. 

70 See, e.g., Jonathan Mummolo and Bill Brubaker, “As Foreclosed Homes Empty, Crime Arrives,” Washington Post, April 

27, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/26/AR2008042601288.html (accessed January 

5, 2010). There are organized efforts in some cities that encourage squatting as a means to extract revenge on lenders. 

See, e.g.,Squat 2 Own, http://www.squat2own.com/, and John Leland, “With Advocates’ Help, Squatters Call 

Foreclosures Home,” The New York Times, April 9, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/us/10squatter.html

(accessed January 5, 2010). 

71 See, e.g., U.S. v. Jackson, 1:02-CR-00030 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (defendant stole sister’s identity to complete fraudulent 

purchase of a home which burned and was declared uninhabitable; Jackson used the assumed identity in an attempt to 

obtain casualty insurance proceeds). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The insurers and the county will inspect what’s left of the structure. If the structure is 

severely damaged the county will order the owner to secure and repair or raze the house. 

If the fraudsters used a stolen identity the county will not be able to complete service of 

the notice because the “owner” is fictitious. If the lender refuses to foreclose, it is not 

legally responsible for the physical condition of the property and it may enter into a legal 

limbo and linger as a dangerous eyesore for years. If the neighbors are persistent, the 

county may eventually raze the structure, but the damage to the community will not be 

erased when the ruin is finally removed. If the structure is a total loss and the state has a 

“valued policy” law which requires payment of the face value of the policy, the insurer 

will be forced to pay inflated claims for structural and personal property losses, resulting 

in an additional economic windfall to the fraudsters and a larger loss to the insurer. 

If the fraudsters are sophisticated enough to know that they need to avoid an early 

payment default, which would provoke the lender into scrutinizing the mortgage 

transaction and lead to discovery of the fraud, the home may be rented,72 turned into an 

assisted living facility, or used as a half-way house for convicted felons re-entering 

society. In upscale neighborhoods, the perpetrators and their criminal associates – check 

kiters, assault and batterers, burglars, fugitives, pimps, money launderers and drug 

traffickers– may move in and begin conducting “business” from their homes. These are 

not “day” people, nor are they much concerned with yard work or maintenance, so it’s 

not long before even the casual observer can see the physical neglect and discern that 

there’s something wrong. Obviously deteriorating properties ruin the “curb appeal” of 

the neighborhood and, since home purchases are motivated in part by an emotional 

 

72 Investigations reveal that Section 8 HUD housing vouchers are sometimes used to obtain renters. In those cases the 

government is subsidizing the fraudsters directly. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
resonance with the house and the neighborhood, potential buyers decide to look 

elsewhere and sales prices begin to stagnate. 

Fraud tends to cluster geographically because once the first fraudulently inflated sales 

price is recorded in the deed, realtor, commercial appraisal and tax databases, it can be 

referenced as a comparable sale to support an artificially inflated appraisal for other 

nearby properties.73 Thus a single problem property quickly mushrooms into multiple 

problem properties. (Figure 1) Even in upscale neighborhoods it’s not long before the 

accumulating weight of vacant and neglected properties makes the area look blighted.74 

(Figure 2). 

By this point the original residents, justifiably concerned about their safety and the 

value of their homes, begin to flee. Multiple vacancies and properties on the market 

indicate an unstable and declining neighborhood, which drives away more potential 

buyers, and asking prices begin to drop significantly. The perpetrators may play on the 

owners’ fears to drive hard bargains and may threaten sellers if their offers are rejected.75 

When reputable real estate agents begin to sense that something peculiar is going on they, 

too, begin to flee the neighborhood because they rely on repeat business and referrals and 

 

73 One of the oldest tricks in the fraud book is to offer inexperienced or corrupt appraisers a ready-made list of 

“comparable” properties to help them in their evaluation. In reality these “comparables” are properties in the vicinity that 

were flipped by the perpetrators. When they’re accepted without question or investigation, fraudsters can drive the 

market. 

74 Kevin Wiggins, a now-convicted mortgage fraudster, fraudulently “flipped” five houses in one section of Atlanta’s 30310 

zip code in 2000. By 2008, he had flipped eighty-three more houses, all within a five mile radius. One street, Lucile 

Avenue, was particularly hard-hit: 18 houses were owner-occupied when Wiggins flipped two of them in 2000; other fraud 

rings moved in after Wiggins’ initial purchase and by 2008, 18 houses had been flipped, 15 of the flipped houses were 

vacant and only 3 houses were owner-occupied. Flipping continues on this street today. Several homes that were “sold” 

in 2007 and 2008 from the high $200s to over $400,000 have already been foreclosed. Post-foreclosure asking prices as 

of March 27, 2009, range from $18,905 to $99,000. 

75 Residents of fraud-inflicted neighborhoods in Atlanta have reported that they were threatened with Fair Housing 

complaints for questioning offers from potential buyers, who never set foot in the house, for as much as $200,000 above 

the asking price on condition that the seller kickback the “excess” to the buyer at or after closing. In an incident in Omaha,

Nebraska, according to local residents, the homeowner’s association was threatened with a Fair Housing complaint for 

attempting to enforce subdivision regulations against tenants and owners whose homes had been procured through 

alleged fraud. (For fraud related charges, see U.S. v. Williams, 8:09-CR-245 (D. Neb. 2009)). Residents of 

neighborhoods impacted by an alleged fraud ring in Dallas, Texas, who filed civil nuisance suits against the ring-leader, 

were counter-sued for $5 million for alleged harassment and racial bias. Tim Wyatt, “Neighbors Suspect Scam in Home 

Sales,” Dallas Morning News, December 17, 2005; 

http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/121805dnmetloanwar.2bb6980.html (accessed July 

2, 2009); for fraud related charges, see U.S. v. Farrington, 3:08-CR-00153 (N.D. Texas, 2008). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
do not want to lose potential customers by putting them into a troubled neighborhood. 

That leaves the field open for more fraud because the only agents who are able to close 

any sales are the ones who work in collusion with the perpetrators. Since these agents, 

are the only ones able to close any sales, frequently through the use of “creative 

financing,” they begin to pick up the new listings. When that happens, the fraudsters 

control the market and gain the ability to drive pricing in the broader neighborhood 

market. 

In the year or so before the wave of foreclosures begins, the quality of life for the 

remaining residents deteriorates substantially. Regardless of the relative poverty or 

affluence of the neighborhood, crime increases. More vacant homes pop up bringing 

weedy, overgrown lots, vandalism or gang graffiti “tags.” If the properties are occupied, 

the police are called upon to intervene in a rising tide of crime. Some crimes, like public 

intoxication and prostitution, are a nuisance and an offense to the community’s moral 

values.76 Some, like mail theft and auto break-ins, are relatively petty. But some, like 

gunfights, drug trafficking, and the conversion of McMansions into hydroponic 

marijuana farms, meth labs, and stash houses, are deadly serious. The criminal invasion 

robs the neighbors’ of their sense of safety and security, sparking additional flight and 

destabilization and a further erosion of property values. 

As the quality of life decays for the remaining law-abiding citizens, tax assessors add 

insult to injury by raising property tax assessments. County appraisers are rarely trained 

to recognize fraudulent transactions. While they may exclude the first few sales as 

outliers, additional sales at fraudulently inflated prices create the appearance that the 

 

76Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith. 2006. The impact of single-family mortgage foreclosures on neighborhood crime. 

Housing Studies 21(6): 851-66. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
appreciation is the result of legitimate market forces. Inflated values are accepted as 

legitimate market values, and fraud begins to corrupt the tax digests. (Figure 3) When a 

critical mass of sales is reached the neighborhoods are re-assessed. If the county 

appraisers fail to recognize the fraudulently inflated sales prices, the reassessment values 

will be inflated --- by as much as 30 percent--- in the impacted neighborhood and within 

a radius of several miles.77 This can occur even though property values are actually 

falling.78 Thus these neighborhoods become Potemkin Villages: their rising prosperity 

is a façade that exists only on paper. 

 Fraud’s inflationary effect on property tax assessments is pernicious and far 

reaching.79 When a foreclosure occurs due to a natural life-event such as job loss, death 

of a spouse, or divorce, every house within a one-eighth mile radius suffers a 1 percent 

drop in value.,80 The geographic clustering of foreclosures, which is common in 

mortgage fraud cases, amplifies that drop: if there are five such properties on the same 

street, the value of all homes within that radius will decline by 5 percent when they are 

eventually foreclosed.81 But even when the majority of sales are foreclosures, assessed 

tax values may, paradoxically, remain constant or even increase. This is because county 

appraisers are generally required to consider only sales that occur at fair market value. 

“Fair market value” is generally defined as the amount that a buyer is willing to pay, and 

 

77 Tax officials in Boulder County, Colorado, reported tax assessment inflation up to six miles away from the affected 

neigborhoods. “Price Was Not Right,” American City & County, December 1, 2009. 

http://americancityandcounty.com/technology/mortage-fraud-gis-analysis-200912/index.html (accessed January 11, 

2010). 

78 In the 30310 zip code in metropolitan Atlanta, which has been at the top of national fraud lists for several years, 

residents are being overcharged on property taxes by an estimated $10.36 million. Kevin Duffy, “Study: Poor 

Neighborhoods Face Unfair Property Taxes,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October 9, 2008. 79 The growth in assessed values in fraud neighborhoods was significantly higher over the full eight year time span 

studied. Andrew T. Carswell, “Effects of Mortgage Fraud on Property Tax Assessments”, Journal of Property Tax 

Assessment and Administration (2009, in press). 80 Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith, “There Goes the Neighborhood: The Effect of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures 

on Property Values,” p. 9, Woodstock Institute, June 2005. 

81 Interview with Dan Immergluck, Atlanta, Georgia, 2007. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
a seller will accept, in an arms-length transaction. Foreclosures are excluded because 

they are distress sales and the “price” is set by the mortgage balance, not market forces. 

When the lender in possession re-sells the property, the price is usually at a discount 

to the market because the lender needs to move the property quickly and the house most 

likely needs repairs, so the assessors disregard these sales as well. But because the 

mortgages were inflated through fraud, even the foreclosure prices are above market 

value. In hard-hit neighborhoods, the only “willing” buyers are likely to be the fraudsters 

because they don’t care about the quality of the neighborhood or the asking price, and 

they can “flip” the property back to the level of the previous (inflated) value to make a 

tidy “buy low, sell high” profit. Since the foreclosed values are not considered, and the 

only sales that appear to be at fair market value are the second (or third or fourth) wave of 

fraud, tax assessments rise or are sustained at artificially high levels. (Figure 3) 

In the immediate aftermath of the first wave of fraud, the sales prices of all properties 

within a quarter-mile rise by as much as 4 percent. 82 The fraud “bump” is welcomed by 

sellers and those who wish to finance their spending by tapping the equity in their homes, 

but the appreciation is illusory and does little except to increase the housing costs for new 

buyers and the tax burden for everyone else. In fraudulently inflated areas, new 

construction will be overpriced. When the market corrects as the fraudulent loans enter 

foreclosure and neighborhood values decline, newly constructed homes cannot be sold, 

the post-fraud purchasers will lose what equity they had, and those who tapped their 

equity may suddenly owe more than their homes are worth. If the borrowers used 

financing with negative amortization features or an adjustable interest rate, the 

 

82 Andrew T. Carswell, “Effects of Mortgage Fraud on Property Tax Assessments”, Journal of Property Tax Assessment 

and Administration (2009, in press). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
concentrated level of foreclosures and the drop in property values will make it impossible 

for them to refinance into more affordable loan terms. Nor will they be able to sell for 

what they owe. Trapped in loans they can no longer afford or justify economically, they 

default. And so begins a new wave of foreclosures and depreciation. 

The cascade of negative effects from dramatically rising foreclosure rates eventually 

spills over into local businesses and governments. As consumer spending declines and 

customers are forced to move, local businesses are forced to close, which reduces tax 

revenues and makes it more difficult and expensive for the remaining residents to acquire 

basic necessities. Government expenditures swell because of the increased demand for 

police, fire, code enforcement, building inspection and social services in these 

neighborhoods. Significant resources are also diverted into the materials, manpower and 

legal steps that are needed for the county to maintain, secure or raze vacant properties. 

Property tax delinquencies rise, raising the administrative costs of collections and further 

reducing revenues. When the neighborhood’s depreciation is finally reflected in the tax 

assessments and property tax revenues decline precipitously, governments whose 

spending was lifted by fraud during the boom suddenly find that they are heading toward 

a deficit. To forestall that eventuality, the governing authorities are forced to make 

painful cuts in budgets and services and hike property taxes, Police and fire department 

personnel and dispatchers may, ironically, be among the first to fall to the budget axe 

even as the need for their services climbs.83

Fighting Fraud: Why Law Enforcement Is Not The Answer 

 

83 “Budget Cuts Trigger Fire Alarm,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, December 4, 2008; CNN, "Firefighters on the 

Chopping Block," July 6, 2007.

http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/politics/2009/07/06/meserve.budget.firefighters.cnn (accessed July 6, 2009)." 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
For-profit mortgage fraud cases are extremely complex, involving dozens –or 

hundreds-- of transactions, dozens of individuals, and mountains of documents. Since the 

bank may be in one state, the property in another, and participants who are scattered from 

coast to coast, mortgage fraud cases require the coordinated effort of working groups and 

task forces from a variety of state and federal regulatory and criminal agencies. These 

investigations take, on average, a minimum of two years from initiation to indictment. In 

many cases, the subjects continue operating their schemes until the day they are indicted. 

Some have committed additional frauds after their arrest in order to generate the funds 

needed to pay their legal defense bills. A few have continued to operate their rings from 

the comfort of their prison cells.84 

In the cases that are filed, and for the sake of efficiency in securing the conviction 

of the orchestrators, prosecutors frequently negotiate reduced sentences for minor players 

who facilitated the crime but who did not collect much in the way of illicit profits in 

exchange for testimony against those who did. Other minor players, who are not the 

subjects of any investigation but have learned how easy it is to commit mortgage fraud, 

observe the relatively favorable treatment of their peers, decide that the risk is worth the 

reward, and develop their own very profitable rings. In this respect, fighting mortgage 

fraud is a Sisyphean task akin to fighting the mythical Hydra: several new rings may 

spring up for every ring whose “head” is lopped off. 

The economic collapse, and federal statutes of limitation, further impede 

prosecutors’ ability to bring perpetrators to justice. If the victim bank is a federally 

supervised financial institution, prosecutors have 10 years from the date of the offense to 

 

84 See, e.g., U.S. v. McLean, 1:03-CR-00222 (N.D. Ga. 2003) and U.S. v. Milton, 1:05-CR-493 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
file charges.85 But if the lender was a private mortgage bank charges must be filed within 

five years.86 Since the fraud may not be reported for several years after origination, and 

criminal investigations can take another two or more years to complete, the vast majority 

of cases from the boom are now beyond reach. 

Even when the statutes of limitation are not an issue, a further complication arises 

from the bankruptcy, closure and acquisition of so many lenders.87 Without access to 

loan documents or the witnesses needed to authenticate them and testify about corporate 

lending practices, prosecutors are severely limited in their ability to successfully try them. 

Local and state police agencies are positioned to play a critical role in the effort to 

prosecute fraud cases because they are much better equipped to handle the “one-off” 

cases that could be quickly brought to trial and serve as a warning to others. However, 

most jurisdictions are hampered by a lack of trained personnel, resources, and the 

absence of statutes that specifically criminalize the conduct.88 In a time of rising crime 

against property and persons in neighborhoods devastated by fraud, departments with 

reduced financial support find it difficult to justify the diversion of critical resources 

away from life-and-death matters. A further disincentive to the local police and 

prosecutors is that the general public does not understand how fraud affects them 

personally and so do not demand redress. Also, in today’s climate there is little sympathy 

for lenders, and prosecutors fear that, given the industry’s originations practices during 

the boom, there is a significant chance that the jury will vote to acquit. More insidious is 

 

85 18 U.S.C. § 3293. 

86 18 U.S.C. § 3282. In 2009 Congress expanded the definition of “financial institution” to cover private banks and 

mortgage brokers, who will now fall under the 10 year statute of limitations. However, the law is not retroactive and 

applies only to loans originated after May 20, 2009. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Public law 111-21. 

87 For a list of lenders that have ceased operations since 2006, see http://ml-implode.com/index.html#lists. 88 While all states have theft and larceny statutes that allow the authorities to pursue mortgage fraud cases, the 

procedural, jurisdictional and proof issues that must be worked through are akin to performing neurosurgery with a sledge 

hammer instead of a laser scalpel. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the possibility that some prosecutors are reluctant to pursue fraud cases because the 

“investors” and straw buyers are constituents, political contributors, or friends and 

relatives. 

 The harsh reality is that we will never have enough time, people or money to stop 

mortgage fraud by attacking it after the fact. There are not enough prosecutors to handle 

the frauds that we already know about, much less to identify, investigate and prosecute 

the thousands of new frauds being perpetrated every day. While vigorous prosecution at 

the state and federal levels is a critical component in the overall solution, the fact remains 

that prevention is the only cost-effective way to stem the tide. Although advanced 

automated fraud detection technology has been available to mortgage lenders since at 

least 1995, it was not utilized by the vast majority of lenders during the boom. Reasons 

offered by lenders include that it was “too expensive” or that they identified “too much” 

fraud and depressed origination volume. One has to wonder what the real reasons were, 

given the high likelihood that fraudulent loans would eventually default and be 

foreclosed, at an average loss of $30,000, compared to the cost of $15 or less per loan to 

run these tools during pre-funding. As long as lenders believe that some fraud is 

inevitable, that the incidence is insignificant, that it’s “just the cost of doing business,” 

and that the costs outweigh the benefits, lenders are unlikely to prioritize fraud 

prevention. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
CONCLUSION 

Seven million jobs have been lost since the Great Recession, sparked by mortgage 

fraud, began in 2007.89 Nearly two million homes have been repossessed by banks since 

200690 and nearly three million newly initiated foreclosures were reported through the 

third quarter of 2009. 91 $6.1 trillion in homeowner equity has been lost since 200692 due 

in large part to the deflationary impact of the enormous number of foreclosures. And the 

storm clouds continue to gather: By the end of the third quarter of 2009 nearly 10 

percent of all outstanding residential mortgages were at least 30 days past due,93 the 

highest level ever recorded. Nearly $19 billion worth of adjustable rate mortgages will 

reset by the end of 201194 Since most of these ARMs have negative amortization 

features and mortgage interest rates are rising, although still at historic lows, monthly 

payments will likely rise when they reset, sparking even more defaults, foreclosures and 

fraud as desperate homeowners try to escape their debts. 

In order to stabilize the economy and keep an already horrendous situation from 

becoming a death spiral we must stem the tide of foreclosures. To do that, we must stem 

the tide of mortgage fraud. We need to change the residential lending focus from 

detecting fraud in defaulted loans to preventing fraud. In order to do that, we must 

mandate that all loans be thoroughly screened for fraud before they are funded, remove 

 

89 Jonathan Weisman, “Report Raises Pressure on Obama to Focus on Jobs,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2010. 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126298709380022037.html?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTWhatsNews (accessed January 9, 

2010). 

90 Prashant Gopal, BusinessWeek.com, “Foreclosures Drop in May,” June 11, 2009. 

http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/jun2009/bw20090610_006548.htm (accessed June 17, 2009). 91 OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report, Third Quarter 2009 at 40. http://files.ots.treas.gov/482114.pdf (accessed 

January 9, 2010). 

92 Press release, Zillow.com, Feb. 3, 2009. http://zillow.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=159&item=103 (accessed June 17, 

2009). 

93Mortgage ankers Association, “National Delinquency Survey, Q3 2009,” 

http://www.mortgagemag.com/news/2009/1116/1000014073070.htm (accessed January 9, 2010). 94 Prashant Gopal, “Good News: Option ARM Resets Delayed,” BusinessWeek, April 16, 2009. 

http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/apr2009/bw20090416_103126.htm?chan=autos_real+estate+--

+lifestyle+subindex+page_real+estate+news (accessed June 17, 2009). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the legal barriers that impede the industry’s ability to fight fraud and craft protections for 

those who engage in the battle. We must train our underwriters to be critical in their 

analysis, give them sufficient time for careful consideration and reasoned judgments, and 

reward them for producing quality, sustainable loans. We must craft clear and specific 

laws that define and criminalize fraudulent conduct to provide a precisely focused 

weapon for law enforcement, and provide them with the support and training they need to 

wield it effectively. We must educate industry professionals and the general public as to 

where the line is drawn between acceptable and illegal practices, and to warn them of the 

consequences for crossing it. 

Fraud prevention has taken on a new urgency. As a result of its extensive 

intervention in the financial markets the federal government now purchases, insures or 

guarantees nearly 100 percent of loans originated today. The risk for fraud losses has 

thus been effectively shifted from the financial services sector to the taxpayer. If fraud is 

not contained it may well bankrupt the country. If we prioritize fraud prevention, we 

may yet save the country for our grandchildren, if not for ourselves. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 1 Kevin Wiggins properties, Atlanta, Georgia 30310

This figure illustrates fraud’s geographic concentration and spread over time. The 

occurrence in this area is worse than represented because there were literally dozens of 

rings operating in these neighborhoods, and only Wiggins’ transactions are shown. 

Used with permission of Brent Brewer. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 

Used with permission of Brent Brewer. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 2 Lucile Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30310 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Used with permission of Brent Brewer

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 3 1318 Lucile Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30310 

This figure represents a typical sales history for a fraudulently acquired property and the 

effect of fraudulent sales values on tax assessment values. Under Georgia law, the 

property is assessed as of January 1st of each year and thus assessment changes will not 

appear in the digest until the next calendar year. 

Date Purchaser Sales/Foreclosure/Tax values

10/03/00 FW to JK $ 99,000 

10/03/00 JK to LL $155,000 Classic same day flip 

 Tax value (100%) $ 53,400 

01/26/01 LL to MJ $305,000 Delayed flip 

 Tax value (100%) $ 98,800 

12/04/01 FORECLOSED $289,358 Early payment default 

 

05/07/02 WaMu to BBP $ 72,000 Backwards flip 

05/02/02 BBP to VM $ 95,000 (“sold” 5 days before purchase) 

VM’s mortgage $201,000 

Tax value (100%) $137,300 

07/01/03 FORECLOSED $221,000 

 Tax value (100%) $150,000 

01/28/05 Bank to KA $150,000 

03/21/05 KA to DS $320,000 Delayed flip 

 Tax value (100%) $168,200 

10/12/06 DS to IB $220,000 Transfer to avoid foreclosure 

 Tax value (100%) $234,000 

01/06/07 FORECLOSED $202,500 

 Tax value (100%) $243,800 

03/17/09 Last sale (by lender) $ 21,000 

 Tax value (100%) $166,500 

Last legitimate sale value (2000): $ 99,000 

Current value per last sale (2009): $ 21,000 

 Depreciation over 9 years: 80% 

Average value by sale price: $199,286 

Total amount of defaulted debt 

 as reflected in foreclosure values: $712,858 

Over-valuation in tax assessment based on 

last sale: 790% 

Over-valuation based on last legitimate 

 sale price (2000): 60%

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.