Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

A Review of ATF’s Undercover
 

Storefront Operations
 

Oversight & Review Division 16-06 September 2016 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................... iv
 

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1
 

I. Methodology .......................................................................................... 3
 

II. Organization of the Report........................................................................ 3
 

III. Summary of Findings............................................................................... 4
 

CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND............................................................................ 6
 

I.	 ATF Storefront Policies ............................................................................. 6
 

A.	 2001 Order Governing Undercover Operations .................................... 6
 

B.	 2011 Order Governing Undercover Operations and the Undercover
 

Review Committee ......................................................................... 7
 

C.	 March 2013 Revisions to Storefront Policy and Guidance....................... 8
 

D.	 2013 Manual for ATF Storefront Investigations .................................. 10
 

II.	 ATF’s Monitored Case Program ................................................................ 11
 

III.	 Firearms Trafficking Enforcement............................................................. 13
 

A. Federal Firearms Laws and Regulations............................................ 13
 

B. ATF’s National Tracing Center......................................................... 14
 

C. National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN)................... 15
 

CHAPTER THREE ATF UNDERCOVER STOREFRONT OPERATIONS............................ 16
 

I.	 The Wichita Storefront – Operation Bandit Trading (2010-2011) ................... 17
 

A.	 Initiation..................................................................................... 17
 

B.	 Planning ..................................................................................... 18
 

C.	 Operations .................................................................................. 20
 

D.	 Oversight.................................................................................... 22
 

E.	 Vulnerable Persons ....................................................................... 22
 

F.	 Closure and Results ...................................................................... 23
 

II.	 The Pensacola Storefront – Operation Pensacola Periodicals (2011)............... 24
 

A.	 Initiation..................................................................................... 25
 

B.	 Planning ..................................................................................... 26
 

C.	 Operations .................................................................................. 28
 

D.	 Oversight.................................................................................... 31
 

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E. Vulnerable Persons ....................................................................... 32
 

F. Closure and Results ...................................................................... 34
 

III. The Milwaukee Storefront – Operation Fearless (2012)................................ 35
 

A. Initiation..................................................................................... 35
 

B. Planning ..................................................................................... 38
 

C. Operations .................................................................................. 40
 

D. Oversight.................................................................................... 42
 

E. Vulnerable Persons ....................................................................... 43
 

F. Closure and Results ...................................................................... 45
 

G. ATF’s Review of Operation Fearless ................................................. 47
 

IV. The St. Louis Storefront – Operation Hustle City (2013) .............................. 48
 

A. Initiation..................................................................................... 48
 

B. Planning ..................................................................................... 51
 

C. Operations .................................................................................. 53
 

D. Oversight.................................................................................... 54
 

E. Vulnerable Persons ....................................................................... 55
 

F. Closure and Results ...................................................................... 56
 

V. The Brockton/New Bedford Storefront – Operation Fugazi (2012-2013) ......... 57
 

A. Initiation..................................................................................... 57
 

B. Planning ..................................................................................... 58
 

C. Operations .................................................................................. 59
 

D. Oversight.................................................................................... 60
 

E. Vulnerable Persons ....................................................................... 61
 

F. Closure and Results ...................................................................... 61
 

CHAPTER FOUR OIG ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................... 63
 

I. The Undercover Storefront Operation as an Investigative Technique.............. 63
 

II. Evaluation of ATF’s Use of Storefronts ...................................................... 66
 

A. Initiation and Planning .................................................................. 67
 

B. Objectives, Strategy, and Targeting ................................................ 70
 

C. Safety and Security ...................................................................... 73
 

D. Oversight.................................................................................... 75
 

1. Field Division Supervision ..................................................... 75
 

ii 
2. Headquarters Supervision and the Monitored Case Program ....... 77
 

3. Informants ......................................................................... 79
 

E. Criminal Intelligence and Lead Generation........................................ 81
 

III. Vulnerable Populations........................................................................... 82
 

A. Persons with Intellectual or Developmental Disabilities ....................... 82
 

B. Juveniles .................................................................................... 85
 

CHAPTER FIVE OIG CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................... 87
 

ATTACHMENT A ............................................................................................A-1
 

ATTACHMENT B ............................................................................................B-1
 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In this review the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) use of undercover 

storefront operations – an investigative technique in which law enforcement 

operates a fake business or establishment from a location where illicit 

merchandise is exchanged or services are rendered. In 2013 ATF’s use of 

undercover storefront operations came under scrutiny after news reporting 

about a storefront operation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin described numerous 

problems, including the theft of firearms, improper handling of sensitive 

information, and the alleged targeting of persons with disabilities. These and 

other reports about flaws in ATF’s storefront operations prompted members of 

Congress to request the OIG to initiate this review. 

The OIG examined five ATF undercover storefront operations to: (1) 

determine whether there are any systemic deficiencies in ATF’s storefront 

policies; and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of ATF’s Monitored Case Program 

(MCP) as an oversight tool for the storefront operations. ATF established the 

MCP to provide for heightened management scrutiny of the agency’s most 

sensitive cases. We selected five undercover operations that continued or began 

after the inception of the MCP; these operated in Boston, Milwaukee, Pensacola, 

St. Louis, and Wichita. The storefront in Boston was mobile and operated from 

a cargo van. In addition, due to allegations that ATF was targeting persons with 

disabilities for enforcement action, we examined this issue at ATF’s storefront in 

Portland, Oregon, as well as the other storefronts identified above. 

Our review determined that while undercover operations can be an 

important component of ATF’s efforts to fight violent crime, ATF failed to devote 

sufficient attention to how it was managing its undercover storefront operations. 

It lacked adequate policies and guidance for its agents, and in some cases 

supervision, necessary to appropriately address the risks associated with the use 

of this complex investigative technique. Although we did not find overarching 

problems with ATF’s storefront policies as revised following disclosure of 

problems with the Milwaukee storefront, we determined that ATF should make 

additional changes to further improve them. We also found that ATF needed to 

make adjustments to its MCP to better focus on the most significant risks in 

ATF’s investigative operations, including storefronts. 

We found no evidence that ATF targeted or used individuals with 

intellectual or developmental disabilities in its storefront investigations because 

of their disability. However, we determined during the course of this review that 

the Department of Justice (DOJ) had failed to apply Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which prohibits discrimination 

against persons with disabilities, to its federal law enforcement activities. This 

Act imposes important compliance responsibilities on DOJ’s law enforcement 

components, which include ATF, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 

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Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). 

When we inquired with ATF and the other DOJ law enforcement components 

about their compliance responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act, we found 

that they lacked policies that addressed the Rehabilitation Act’s applicability to 

law enforcement operations. The OIG raised this important issue with the Office 

of the Deputy Attorney General and, on September 3, 2015 the OIG wrote to 

the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to request quarterly updates 

on DOJ’s efforts to ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. The OIG 

intends to carefully monitor DOJ’s progress in meeting its significant duties 

under the Act. 

We provided 13 recommendations to assist ATF with its storefront 

operations. ATF concurred with all of them and has committed to their full 

implementation. They address the following issues: initiation, planning, safety 

and security, oversight, intelligence, vulnerable populations, revisions to the 

Storefront Investigations Manual, and training. In addition to strengthening 

ATF’s policies, improving the MCP, and helping ATF and DOJ to meet their 

obligations under federal disability law, the recommendations will assist ATF to 

address three other areas of concern we identified during the review. The first 

involves predication and targeting. We believe ATF must do a better job in 

future storefront operations defining the crime problem that the storefront is 

designed to address and explaining how the strategy underlying it will lead to 

the apprehension of persons warranting federal prosecution. Our 

recommendations request ATF to make clear in the storefront initiation 

paperwork how the storefront will be targeted and how the resulting 

prosecutions will serve a substantial federal interest. 

Second, ATF underestimated the level of experience, training, and 

expertise necessary to manage and oversee its storefront operations, which led 

to mistakes. Undercover storefront operations are complex and require the 

management of significant manpower and financial resources. ATF’s assignment 

of inexperienced and shifting staff to run and supervise these operations without 

adequate Headquarters support and oversight had predictably negative 

consequences. Our recommendations request that ATF’s Undercover Branch 

designate undercover agents/case agents with significant storefront expertise to 

work on-scene for the initial period of each storefront’s operation to assist with 

planning, set-up, and early operations; that ATF minimize the turnover of 

supervisors during the operations; and that at least one undercover agent or the 

case agent on a storefront team have completed advanced undercover training, 

including training on storefront operations, before the storefront becomes 

operational. 

Third, and closely related to the second issue above, is the problem told 

to us about ATF Headquarters’ historic reluctance to intrude on the domain of its 

Special Agents-in-Charge. We believe that in addition to supplementing the 

expertise available for storefront operations, ATF Headquarters units - the 

Special Operations Division and its Undercover Branch - need to be stakeholders 

in future operations and provide active oversight of them. ATF undercover 

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storefront operations should not proceed unless experts within these units 

concur that they are properly designed and are being implemented 

appropriately. We have included recommendations in our report to encourage 

this oversight. 

We believe that our recommendations will strengthen ATF’s undercover 

operations. Undercover operations have been and should continue to be an 

important tool in ATF’s fight against violent crime. Accordingly, ATF leadership 

should take steps to ensure that such operations are managed expertly and 

appropriately. 

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CHAPTER ONE
 

INTRODUCTION
 

For many years, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) has used 

undercover operations to collect evidence of criminal wrongdoing in 

investigations targeting problems as diverse as public corruption, human 

trafficking, and financial fraud. In some cases, the use of the undercover 

technique has afforded agents and prosecutors information about criminal 

organizations and conspiracies that they otherwise would not have been able to 

obtain, and has resulted in highly publicized successes. Examples of these cases 

include the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) infiltration of the Bonanno 

crime family in Operation Donnie Brasco, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives’s (ATF) infiltration of numerous violent motorcycle 

gangs. The effectiveness of undercover operations has led numerous federal 

law enforcement agencies outside of DOJ to utilize them, as have state and local 

police departments. 

While the rewards from undercover operations can be considerable, the 

operations also present significant risks, such as danger to the undercover 

agents, harm to innocent third parties, and the potential to infringe on 

constitutional rights, which necessitate rigorous supervision and oversight. If 

not managed correctly undercover operations have the potential to cause 

significant harm. To address such concerns DOJ established Attorney General 

Guidelines for FBI undercover operations in 1981 that create detailed 

authorization procedures and requirements to ensure that these operations are 

properly designed and implemented. Although the Undercover Guidelines were 

written for the FBI, DOJ requires all of its law enforcement components to 

comply with them. The Department also has established risk management 

guidelines that address what are classified as “sensitive investigative activities,” 

which can include activities during undercover operations.1 

One variation on the undercover technique is the undercover storefront 

operation. In these cases, law enforcement operates a fake business or 

establishment from a location where illicit merchandise is exchanged or services 

are rendered.2 These operations may or may not be open to the public and 

have proven to be especially effective in cases that focus on stolen property and 

1 The policies of the Department’s law enforcement components use different definitions 

of “sensitive investigative activities,” owing to the components’ differing missions. 

2 Undercover operations can vary according to the degree of government involvement in 

providing the opportunity to commit crimes. In some situations, such as undercover infiltrations 

of criminal organizations, the government may exercise little control and instead rely on the 

observations of the undercover agent. In contrast, in “sting” operations, the government creates 

a crime scenario, such as an illegitimate business, targeted on providing an opportunity for 

criminal conduct. Undercover storefront operations are a type of “sting” undercover operation. 

See David C. Larson, Undercover Operations: Law and Policy Guide (Thomson Reuters 2014) 41­

50. Mr. Larson was formerly a legal counsel at the FBI. 

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contraband, such as narcotics. In the mid-1970s, many of the FBI’s undercover 

operations were storefronts that took in stolen property. According to 

representatives of the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), it 

currently is uncommon for their agents to participate in storefront operations 

that are open to the public, though they may utilize an office or other location to 

conduct undercover meetings with suspects. They explained that they did not 

need to use public storefronts to identify new suspects or to gather intelligence. 

These agencies also may participate in task forces with state and local law 

enforcement agencies that are using undercover storefront operations. 

ATF has used undercover storefront operations to target illegal firearms 

traffickers and to address other crimes involving firearms. From 2004 through 

2013, ATF established 53 storefront operations, with a high of 12 operations 

started in 2010.3 ATF’s storefront operations often involved the creation of an 

apparently legitimate business such as a retail store or tattoo parlor, coupled 

with use of a confidential informant or undercover agent to disseminate 

information that persons operating the business were interested in purchasing 

illegal firearms, narcotics, or other contraband. 

ATF’s use of undercover storefront operations declined markedly in 2013, 

however, following controversy surrounding a storefront operation in Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin, codenamed “Operation Fearless.” ATF had opened this storefront 

operation in 2012 under the direction of its field division based in St. Paul, 

Minnesota. ATF established only a single storefront in 2013, and none were 

established or operational in 2014 and 2015. The Operation Fearless storefront 

came under scrutiny after news reporting described numerous problems with it, 

including the theft of firearms, improper handling of sensitive information, and 

the alleged targeting of persons with disabilities.4 These reports prompted 

Members of Congress to write to former ATF Director B. Todd Jones and ask for 

detailed information about the storefront. 

At Director Jones’ request, ATF’s Office of Professional Responsibility and 

Security Operations (OPRSO) commenced an internal review to evaluate the St. 

Paul Field Division’s handling of Operation Fearless. OPRSO completed an 

internal report on March 21, 2013, that identified numerous deficiencies with the 

Operation, including inadequate planning, poor security practices, and lack of 

proper supervision. The report also described problems with ATF’s management 

of relations with the storefront landlord and with ATF’s “Monitored Case 

Program,” which ATF implemented in July 2011 in the aftermath of Operation 

Fast and Furious to better oversee its sensitive investigations. 

Members of Congress also contacted the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

about Operation Fearless and other storefronts and requested that the OIG 

3 All of the ATF storefronts referred to in this report were open to the public. 

4 See, e.g., John Diedrich and Raquel Rutledge, “ATF’s Milwaukee Sting Operation Marred 

by Mistakes, Failures,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, January 29, 2013. 

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conduct an investigation. Their correspondence highlighted public reporting 

about the theft of ATF property, including firearms; the misidentification of 

suspects; ATF’s failure to protect sensitive information; the siting of storefronts 

near schools and churches; and allegations that ATF was utilizing juveniles and 

persons with disabilities in the undercover operations. The OIG opened its 

review in February 2014, and subsequently expanded it as described below. 

I. Methodology 

Our review examined five ATF undercover storefront operations to: (1) 

determine whether there are any systemic deficiencies in ATF’s storefront 

policies; and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of ATF’s Monitored Case Program 

(MCP) as an oversight tool for the storefront operations. The MCP provides for 

heightened management scrutiny of ATF’s most sensitive cases. We initially 

selected four undercover operations that continued or began after the inception 

of the MCP. These were conducted in Milwaukee, Pensacola, St. Louis, and 

Wichita. We later decided to add a fifth storefront from ATF’s Boston Field 

Division that also was initiated after the inception of the MCP because, unlike the 

other four storefronts which were in fixed locations, it was mobile and operated 

from a cargo van. We believed that this variation presented potential issues 

that warranted separate examination. In addition, due to allegations that ATF 

was targeting persons with disabilities for enforcement action, we examined this 

issue at ATF’s storefront in Portland, Oregon, as well as the other storefronts 

identified above. 

To complete our review, we conducted 85 interviews, including agents, 

prosecutors, ATF leadership, and the Chiefs of Police in Milwaukee and St. Louis, 

and the Sheriff of Escambia County, Florida. We reviewed approximately 8,000 

documents that we obtained from ATF and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. These 

included investigative case files, correspondence, and internal memoranda that 

related to the storefront operations. We also examined thousands of e-mails, 

primarily from the accounts of ATF staff. 

II. Organization of the Report 

This report is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is this 

Introduction. Chapter Two provides background information about ATF’s policies 

on undercover storefront operations, the MCP, and federal firearms laws and 

regulations. Chapter Three presents information about each of the five 

storefront operations that our review examined. Chapter Four presents our 

analysis of various topics concerning the storefronts, including safety, oversight, 

and targeting of criminal suspects. Chapter Five presents our conclusions and 

recommendations. Appendix A contains a response to the report from the Office 

of the Deputy Attorney General. Appendix B contains a response to the report 

from the Deputy Director for ATF. 

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III. Summary of Findings 

Overall, we determined that the events giving rise to the controversy 

surrounding ATF’s undercover storefront operations were avoidable and were 

caused primarily by poor management, insufficient training and guidance to 

agents in the field, and a lax organizational culture that failed to place sufficient 

emphasis on risk management in these inherently sensitive operations. 

Although our review did not find overarching problems with ATF’s storefront 

policies as revised following disclosure of problems with the Milwaukee 

storefront, we determined that ATF should make additional changes to further 

improve them. We also found that ATF needed to make adjustments to its MCP 

to better focus on the most significant risks in ATF’s investigative operations, 

including storefronts. At the end of this report, we make several 

recommendations to address the deficiencies in storefront operations that we 

identified. ATF has informed the OIG that it concurs with the recommendations 

and is committed to their full implementation. 

We found no evidence that ATF targeted or used individuals with 

intellectual or developmental disabilities (I/DD) in its storefront investigations 

because of their disability. However, we determined in the course of this review 

that DOJ had failed to apply Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 

U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act), which prohibits discrimination against 

persons with disabilities, to its federal law enforcement activities. This Act 

imposes important compliance responsibilities on the Department’s law 

enforcement components, which include ATF, the FBI, the DEA, and the U.S. 

Marshals Service (USMS). In April 2015, the OIG raised this important issue 

with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and, on September 3, 2015 the 

OIG wrote to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to request 

quarterly updates on the Department’s efforts to ensure compliance with the 

Rehabilitation Act.5 The Department provided its first update on October 30, 

2015. In that update, the Department acknowledged that the Rehabilitation Act 

applies to federal law enforcement activities and indicated that it has requested 

that the DOJ Office of Legal Policy (OLP) determine if policy guidance is 

necessary. According to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, OLP has 

started working with the Office of Legal Counsel to develop legal guidance on 

the Department’s obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. The Department 

provided a second update on February 19, 2016, that added little new 

information other than that OLP was meeting regularly with various components 

in the Department to discuss how the Department should proceed. On June 21, 

2016, the Department provided its third update and reported that a working 

group has begun drafting guidance that will set out the Department’s legal 

requirements under the Rehabilitation Act. The Department provided its latest 

update on September 2, 2016 which explained that the working group is 

5 The ODAG told us that it presented these issues to the Department’s Office of Legal 

Policy (OLP) for consideration in May 2015. 

4
 
continuing its efforts to develop guidance. The OIG intends to carefully monitor 

the Department’s progress in meeting its significant duties under the Act. 

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CHAPTER TWO
 

BACKGROUND
 

I. ATF Storefront Policies 

ATF’s policies on undercover storefront operations have changed markedly 

over time. When ATF joined the Department in 2002, storefront operations 

were governed by an ATF order issued in 2001 that addressed the agency’s 

undercover operations but did not differentiate storefront operations from other 

“sting” activities. ATF issued a new order in 2011 that separately addressed 

storefront operations and required that ATF’s Undercover Review Committee 

(URC) evaluate and authorize them as appropriate. In March 2013, in response 

to its internal investigation of Operation Fearless, ATF issued revised, interim 

guidelines for storefront operations. Also in 2013, and building on the earlier 

guidelines, ATF issued a storefronts manual containing detailed guidance for 

conducting these undercover operations. 

In this section of the report, we provide an overview of ATF’s policies and 

guidance for storefront operations since 2001. These were the policies in place 

at various times during the storefront operations covered by our review. 

A. 2001 Order Governing Undercover Operations 

On October 26, 2001, ATF issued Order 3250.1A (the “2001 Order”) 

containing policy and instructions relating to informant usage, undercover 

operations, and ATF’s URC. The 2001 Order cancelled three prior ATF directives, 

including a 1997 order governing informant use and undercover operations. 

Among other provisions, the 2001 Order provided guidance for a category 

of undercover investigations that included “sting/storefront operations,” which 

the Order defined as “undercover operations that serve to attract criminals who 

are predisposed to violate Federal statutes within ATF’s purview.” It stated that 

such operations “may be conducted from a storefront, warehouse, residence, 

vehicle, or other location as the operation dictates,” and noted that historically 

they have catered to “walk in” violators as opposed to scheduled undercover 

contacts with known offenders. ATF described the use of the storefront 

technique as “sensitive” in light of the possibility “that a person may commit 

additional criminal acts because of the nature of the operation,” and the Order 

therefore cautioned agents to be alert to this possibility and to not encourage 

criminal activity. According to the 2001 Order, the goal of storefront and sting 

operations was to target “illegal traffickers of stolen firearms or explosives who 

operate outside the scope of local authorities” and who are “worthy of federal 

interest.” 

Headquarters authorization was required before initiating a storefront 

operation. The 2001 Order required that a Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) for 

Field Operations approve each storefront operation. The Order required that a 

memorandum be prepared under the DAD’s name and sent to the Chief of ATF’s 

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Special Operations Division for final authorization. The memorandum was 

required to include information about the participating law enforcement 

agencies, projected costs, proposed staffing, duration, security precautions, and 

anticipated problems. The 2001 Order also required a written agreement with 

agencies that participated in joint undercover operations with ATF. However, 

the 2001 Order did not require that storefront operations be approved by the 

URC. At that time, URC approval was only required for certain enumerated 

sensitive circumstances, and storefronts were explicitly excluded, without 

explanation, from that category. 

The Undercover Branch (UCB) at ATF Headquarters played a limited role 

under the 2001 Order. It was generally tasked with supporting “undercover 

investigations by enhancing undercover agent safety and operations security”, 

and specifically for storefront investigations, was required to contact the 

assigned case agent “to determine what support, if any, [was] deemed 

necessary.” UCB support could include assisting with undercover agent 

selection, creating undercover identities, and disseminating “lessons learned” 

from prior operations. The role of the UCB did not significantly change under 

subsequent orders, including the undercover order that currently is in effect. 

Under the 2001 Order, ATF expected its field division management to 

provide oversight after operations commenced. The Order indicated that the 

Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) of 

the field office conducting an operation was expected to attend all planning 

sessions, and the SAC was personally required to meet with and ensure the 

support of the U.S. Attorney and the local prosecutor. In addition, the SAC, 

ASAC, or Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) was expected to participate in regular 

progress meetings with other participating agencies. 

B.	 2011 Order Governing Undercover Operations and the 

Undercover Review Committee 

On November 17, 2011, ATF issued Order 3250.1B (the “2011 Order”) 

containing policy and instructions relating to ATF’s undercover operations and 

the URC. The 2011 Order cancelled the Informant Use and Undercover 

Operations chapters of the 2001 Order but retained much of its text. The 2011 

Order included several modifications and significant additions that we describe 

below. 

First, the 2011 Order specifically defined “storefront operations” in 

substance as businesses operated and financed by the ATF, either solely or in 

partnership with others, where undercover agents or confidential informants 

(CIs) act as employees of the business. The 2011 Order listed various examples 

of storefronts, including second-hand stores, pawn shops, military surplus 

stores, tattoo parlors, pool halls, barber shops, and wholesale or retail 

warehouses. The 2011 Order also added significant guidance on the acquisition, 

use, and disposition of legal merchandise offered for sale in storefront 

operations. 

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Second, the 2011 Order expanded the responsibilities of ASACs and RACs. 

Like SACs, ASACs and RACs became responsible under the 2011 Order for 

coordinating any storefront with the U.S. Attorney and the local prosecutor. 

Third, the 2011 Order sought to enhance agent expertise by 

recommending that case agents and undercover agents who are inexperienced 

in storefront operations maintain regular contact, as necessary, with an 

experienced counterpart. 

Most significantly for purposes of this review, the 2011 Order modified the 

approval process and oversight necessary for storefronts by requiring 

headquarters approval and authorization from the URC, and enrolling all 

storefronts in ATF’s MCP.6 The written application that had to be filed before a 

storefront operation could begin operations was required to include information 

such as a synopsis of the operation and its goals, any available statistical data 

(e.g., crime statistics for the locality), information about CIs or cooperators, and 

the projected costs and proposed staffing for the operation. The 2011 Order 

also mandated that a DOJ representative participate in all URC meetings for 

certain high-risk undercover investigations, including storefronts.7 In addition, 

due to the inclusion of storefronts in the MCP, field divisions were required to 

prepare a written “initial submission” and either 30-day or 90-day “updates” on 

the storefront to be sent to ATF Headquarters staff for review. Briefings were 

also required under the MCP – the case agent and first-line supervisor assigned 

to a monitored case were required to report at least monthly to field division 

management, and the SAC was required to report with the same frequency to 

the supervising DAD of Field Operations at ATF Headquarters. 

C. March 2013 Revisions to Storefront Policy and Guidance 

Following the public controversy surrounding Operation Fearless, former 

ATF Assistant Director (AD) and current Deputy Director Ronald B. Turk issued a 

memorandum entitled, “Revisions to Storefront Policy and Guidance” (“Turk 

Memorandum”). Turk told the OIG that the memorandum was ATF’s response 

to its internal investigation into Operation Fearless. The Turk Memorandum was 

issued on March 21, 2013 – the same day as ATF’s internal report on Operation 

Fearless – and stated that the ATF had initiated a review of its storefront 

operations after recently identifying weaknesses in its storefront policies, 

procedures, and oversight. The Turk Memorandum explained that the review 

would result in adjustments to current ATF Orders and the issuance of a new 

manual providing guidance on storefront operations. As described in the next 

subsection, the manual was issued in late 2013. 

6 We describe the MCP in detail in Section II below. 

7 In addition to the DOJ representative, the 2011 order stated that the URC would include 

the appropriate DAD, the Chief of ATF’s Special Operations Division, the SAC of ATF’s Undercover 

Branch, the Chief of ATF’s Operations Security Branch, an ATF Associate Chief Counsel, and others 

as deemed appropriate and necessary by the appropriate DAD. 

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The Turk Memorandum outlined new policies that ATF expected to 

establish in forthcoming ATF Orders and that since have been included in the 

storefront operations manual, such as new requirements for the contents of 

storefront proposals. It provided that any proposed storefront must have a 

“clear and rational strategy” and document the intended targets of the 

operation, and specified that the objective of the storefront “must always be to 

reduce gun violence and illegal gun trafficking, not burglaries or property 

crimes.” The Memorandum also detailed a number of other requirements 

needed for approval of a storefront, such as an established end date, notification 

requirements for local law enforcement, mandatory training of agents 

participating in storefront operations, written concurrence from the U.S Attorney 

on the storefront plans, and the presence of generally experienced supervisors 

and undercover agents. The Memorandum required substitution of experienced 

supervisors for acting supervisors who were overseeing ongoing storefront 

operations. The adjustments to current ATF Orders have not been finalized.8 

The Turk Memorandum also imposed immediate changes to certain ATF 

storefront procedures, including the following security requirements: 

1) Storefronts must have both an inside cover team, or supporting law 

enforcement personnel stationed covertly inside the storefront area, 

and an outside surveillance team of supporting law enforcement 

personnel. The outside surveillance team must interdict anyone 

believed to have violated firearms laws who attempts to leave the 

storefront with a firearm; 

2) Storefronts must establish daily procedures for removing from the 

storefront all material that could compromise operational security; and 

3) Storefronts must not display drug paraphernalia or pornography on the 

storefront premises. 

Lastly, the Turk Memorandum established numerous new requirements 

for the operation of storefronts. For example, agents were required to enter 

ballistic information into the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network 

(NIBIN) as the firearms are purchased.9 NIBIN checks can assist in promptly 

identifying whether a firearm has previously been used in a crime. Oversight 

was strengthened as well: the Turk Memorandum mandated that an ASAC or 

SAC conduct on-site inspections at the beginning and mid-way points of the 

investigation and complete monthly file reviews of the case. Personnel who 

oversee the MCP from ATF Headquarters also were required to scrutinize the 

storefronts, such as reviewing the contents of case reports and identifying 

8 ATF has advised the OIG that it intends to revise the ATF Orders after it completes a 

review of this OIG report. 

9 We describe NIBIN in Section III.C. below. 

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whether agents were late in submitting the reports, and Special Operations 

Division staff were assigned to conduct on-site inspections of the operations. 

D. 2013 Manual for ATF Storefront Investigations 

ATF issued an “ATF Storefront Investigations” manual (“Manual”) in 2013 

that provides comprehensive guidance on storefronts and establishes additional 

scrutiny and oversight of storefront operations. The Manual includes many of 

the interim guidelines from the Turk Memorandum, and represents ATF’s current 

policy on storefronts. 

The Manual includes four sections that contain specific guidance for 

conducting storefront operations: Storefront Guidelines, Case Initiation/Set-Up, 

Operational Aspects, and Special Operations Division. The first section – 

Storefront Guidelines – describes the information that must be included in 

storefront proposals that are sent for review to the supervising DAD, Undercover 

Review Committee (URC), and Chief of the Special Operations Division. For 

example, each proposal must clearly define the purpose for initiating the 

operation and the targeting strategy. The proposal should also include the 

results of an analysis of violent crime statistics, including the criminal use of 

firearms in the area of operation for the proposed storefront. These 

requirements expanded upon those contained in ATF’s Undercover Operations 

Order. 

Section 2 of the Manual, Case Initiation/Set-Up, provides guidance about 

partnering with other agencies to conduct a storefront, the requirements for 

siting the storefront, and operational security for the location. This includes 

guidance stating that cover teams are “an operational necessity and safety 

requirement” and personnel sufficient for both an inside and outside cover team 

are required in ATF storefront operations. In addition, Section 2 describes the 

expectations for the selection of a case agent, support staff, and oversight from 

field office management and ATF Headquarters. Agents also must confer with 

the U.S. Attorney and State prosecutor to ensure their concurrence with the 

proposed operation. 

Section 3 of the Manual describes the requirements for several 

operational aspects of a storefront, including monitoring crime in the storefront’s 

vicinity during the investigation and conducting interdictions, generating 

business at the storefront, conducting monthly status reviews, and planning for 

winding down and closing a storefront. 

Section 4 describes the role of ATF’s Special Operations Division (SOD), 

which includes the UCB, in planning and conducting storefront operations. 

According to the Manual, SOD is expected to provide subject matter experts for 

all aspects of a storefront, such as type, location, operational security, 

undercover guidance, and use of props and merchandise. The Manual identifies 

the specific branches in SOD that will provide these experts, and describes their 

respective functions. The UCB is responsible for assisting agents with 

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establishing their false identities, setting up the business establishments, and 

obtaining any necessary licenses and permits, among other duties. 

The Manual also includes an appendix that lists 20 “Best Practices” that 

offer additional guidance and reminders in areas of intelligence collection, 

targeting, site selection, collaboration, contingency planning, and oversight. 

Thus, ATF’s policies on undercover storefront operations have evolved 

over time both in breadth and particularity. ATF’s storefront manual represents 

ATF’s most comprehensive and thorough effort to date at providing guidance 

and detailing the required oversight for agents who are utilizing the storefront 

investigative technique. 

II. ATF’s Monitored Case Program 

The problems identified in Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver 

led ATF to institute new procedures for sensitive operations, including 

storefronts.

10 In July 2011, ATF Headquarters’ Office of Field Operations (OFO) 

established a “Monitored Case Program” (MCP) to enable ATF leadership to 

better oversee investigations, inspections, and special operations that present 

significant risks. According to the OFO Memorandum that announced the MCP, 

the new program was designed to “ensure close investigative, operational, and 

strategic coordination, as well as enhanced communication between the field 

and involved headquarters personnel . . . .” In May 2013, ATF codified the MCP 

in a 15-page ATF Order that describes the Program’s requirements. ATF O 

3200.1 (ATF’s MCP Order). 

Cases are included in the MCP based on criteria that are focused on 

activities that ATF has determined warrant close scrutiny. These include 

investigations with well-identified risks, such as those with a documented 

international crime nexus or that involve trafficking more than 50 firearms, as 

well as those that present broader security concerns, such as investigations that 

have “a widespread or critical impact on public safety.” ATF has adjusted these 

criteria over time. For example, in August 2012, ATF increased the limit on cash 

funds that can be used in an investigation without MCP oversight from $50,000 

to $100,000, and no longer required all investigations involving wiretaps to be 

included in the MCP. ATF determined that such a level of funding and the use of 

wiretaps in certain circumstances – such as where the ATF is a minimal 

participant in another federal agency’s wiretap investigation – did not present 

sufficient risk to warrant automatic addition to the MCP. However, 

investigations that involve undercover storefront operations were and continue 

to be required to be included in the MCP. 

10 See U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, A Review of ATF’s 

Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters (September 2012). 

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For cases within the MCP, there are reporting requirements on ATF field 

divisions. Agents must prepare a written “initial submission” and periodic 

“updates” that are sent to OFO for review. To assist agents with their written 

reporting responsibilities, ATF has developed standard report templates that 

collect case information, such as investigative goals, the number of firearms 

seized, and the resources expended. At the outset of this review, the initial 

submission template requested information about undercover storefront 

operations, though it was limited to accounting information such as the amount 

of funds and articles received at the storefront. The update template did not 

expressly request information about storefront operations. ATF has revised the 

MCP report templates several times based on the preferences of OFO leadership, 

and recently completed additional revisions based on recommendations from 

this review and our review of ATF's Operation Fast and Furious.

11 

The MCP also requires agents to furnish oral briefings to ATF leadership. 

The case agent and first-line supervisor assigned to a monitored case report are 

required to provide such a briefing at least monthly to field division 

management, and the SAC is required to brief the supervising DAD of Field 

Operations at ATF Headquarters on the same basis. ATF’s field divisions are 

grouped into three regions, each of which is overseen by a DAD. In accordance 

with MCP guidance that ATF issued in August 2012, the briefings and other 

reporting from the field division to ATF Headquarters address “progress, plans, 

problems” in each case. The ATF Director and Deputy Director also receive 

briefings each month on select monitored cases. 

The MCP Order also requires ATF leadership to provide enhanced 

supervision of MCP matters. For example, SACs must “achieve and maintain indepth personal awareness and accountability for all matters and all 

developments in a monitored case.” ATF O 3200.1. According to ATF’s MCP 

Order: 

Special Agents-in-Charge (SAC) or Deputy Assistant Directors 

(DAD) may not assume that appropriate direction and control has 

been established and is being followed. Rather, it is the role of the 

SAC and DAD to ask tough questions and delve into investigative 

details and plans. As an organization, we must establish with 

certainty that we have critically reviewed apparent and foreseeable 

risks, that our plans to mitigate those risks are sound, and that 

Bureau leadership is aware of the issues and proposed courses of 

action. 

11 In our recent report, A Review of the Department of Justice’s and ATF’s Implementation 

of Recommendations Contained in the OIG’s Report on Operations Fast and Furious and Wide 

Receiver (February 2016), the OIG recommended that ATF revise these templates to collect 

information that will better assist ATF to assess risk. ATF completed the revisions in February 

2016. 

12
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Id.

12 

Oversight of the MCP’s implementation and administration is a primary 

responsibility of OFO’s Investigative Support Branch (ISB). ISB personnel 

organize Headquarters briefings, evaluate and process the written MCP reports, 

and review case information. According to the Chief of the ISB, the role of his 

staff is to monitor cases in the MCP but not to provide case direction. ISB 

typically oversees 12 to 16 monitored cases within each of ATF’s 3 regions. 

III. Firearms Trafficking Enforcement 

As noted, firearms traffickers are a frequent target of ATF storefront 

operations. We summarize below the federal criminal statutes and pertinent 

ATF investigative guidelines that typically apply in firearms trafficking 

investigations. We also summarize the role and capabilities of ATF’s National 

Tracing Center (NTC) and ATF’s National Integrated Ballistic Information 

Network (NIBIN). 

A. Federal Firearms Laws and Regulations 

The Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. § 921, et seq.) is the primary 

federal law that regulates the firearms industry and firearms owners. ATF, 

which was transferred from the Department of the Treasury and established as a 

separate component within the DOJ in January 2003, has primary jurisdiction 

over the administration and enforcement of the Gun Control Act. The other 

major federal law regulating firearms is the National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 

U.S.C. § 5801, et seq. This law limits the availability, and taxes the 

manufacture and distribution, of machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, shortbarreled rifles, sound suppressors (silencers), and other similar weapons that 

became prevalent during the Prohibition era. The National Firearms Act also 

requires that these specified weapons be registered with the ATF, and that 

owners notify the ATF when they are transported across state lines. 

ATF defines “firearms trafficking” as the unlawful diversion of firearms “for 

the purpose of profit, power, or prestige, in furtherance of other criminal acts or 

terrorism.” A firearms diversion is the movement of a firearm from lawful 

commerce into the illegal marketplace through an illegal method or for an illegal 

purpose. ATF’s principal guidance for firearms trafficking investigations is 

provided in the Firearms Enforcement Program Order, ATF Order 3310.4B, and 

the Firearms Trafficking Investigation Guide, ATF Publication 3317.1. 

The Firearms Enforcement Program Order defines common firearms 

trafficking terms, establishes general investigative procedures and 

12 ATF developed the MCP in response to problems identified in Operation Fast and 

Furious. As our report on Operation Fast and Furious noted, the kind of headquarters and field 

supervision now required under the MCP was absent in Operation Fast and Furious. 

13
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

responsibilities for managers and agents, describes ATF’s regulatory and 

enforcement relationship with Federal Firearms Licensees (FFL), and discusses 

several investigative techniques.13 The Firearms Trafficking Investigation Guide 

is a comprehensive reference that assists criminal investigators in identifying 

signs of illegal firearms trafficking and in thoroughly investigating illegal firearms 

trafficking violations. The Guide defines common firearms trafficking terms, 

identifies relevant investigative resources, describes firearms trafficking 

indicators, summarizes relevant legal information, provides investigative 

checklists for particular types of trafficking investigations, and suggests 

measures state and local law enforcement can take to address firearms 

trafficking. 

B. ATF’s National Tracing Center 

A firearms trace refers to tracking the history of a “crime gun” – a firearm 

that is illegally possessed, used in a crime, or suspected to have been used in a 

crime. The history includes identifying the source of the firearm (the 

manufacturer and/or importer), the chain of distribution (the wholesaler and/or 

retailer), and the first unlicensed purchaser of the firearm. ATF’s National 

Tracing Center (NTC) conducts firearms traces that allow it to link suspects to a 

firearm in a criminal investigation, identify potential firearms traffickers, and 

detect domestic and international patterns in the sources and kinds of crime 

guns. 

Trace requests can be made by any federal, state, or local law 

enforcement agency in the United States or abroad and are submitted by 

completing a specific ATF form that requires the requester to provide 

information about the circumstances of the firearm recovery, the agency making 

the request, the firearm (such as serial number, manufacturer, type, caliber, 

and model), and the possessor of the firearm. If the trace is successful, ATF 

provides the requester the identity of the first unlicensed buyer of the firearm, 

the FFL from which the firearm was purchased, and the date of purchase. Since 

January 2005, trace requests can be submitted through eTrace, a secure, 

Internet-based system that allows users from accredited domestic and 

international law enforcement agencies to submit requests, monitor the progress 

of the trace, and receive results electronically. The NTC considers eTrace to be 

the most efficient method for law enforcement to submit trace requests, and to 

receive and analyze data. 

ATF procedures for tracing firearms are found in ATF’s Firearms 

Enforcement Program Order, Order 3310.4C. While providing procedures for 

traces, Order 3301.4C contains no express guidance on when agents should 

13 An FFL is a person, partnership, or business entity that holds a license issued by ATF 

that allows it to “engage in the business” of dealing, manufacturing, importing, or repairing 

firearms. 

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seek traces on firearms recovered during the course of ATF investigations.14 We 

found the absence of express guidance concerning given that on January 16, 

2013, the President issued a memorandum requiring all federal law enforcement 

agencies to trace “at the earliest time practicable” all firearms recovered during 

the course of criminal investigations and taken into federal custody. ATF’s Order 

does not incorporate this language. In its 2013 Storefront Investigations 

Manual, ATF advised agents to address the timing of traces at the initiation of 

the case but did not specify a time limitation or other expectation concerning 

when traces should be performed. The Manual mandated that all recovered 

firearms be traced “up to the first retail distributor.” This type of trace does not 

require ATF agents to contact the FFL as would otherwise normally occur during 

a trace. During interviews, multiple ATF agents told the OIG that contacting the 

FFL during a trace could potentially expose the undercover operation in a 

situation where a retailer, or an employee of a retailer, was involved in illegal 

firearms trafficking. The Manual recognizes this possibility by noting that 

consideration should be given to “inadvertent notification” when dealing with 

long-term undercover operations. 

C. National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) 

In 1999, ATF established the National Integrated Ballistic Information 

Network (NIBIN) to provide federal, state, and local partner agencies with an 

automated ballistic imaging system. To use NIBIN, firearms examiners or 

technicians enter evidence – such as spent bullets or cartridge casings – into a 

computerized system that contains digital images of ballistic evidence from 

crime scenes or crime gun test fires. The evidence is then compared against 

previous entries in the NIBIN database in an attempt to identify the associated 

firearm or find other investigations involving that firearm. 

In 2001, the DOJ and Treasury directed their law enforcement 

components to enter ballistic information into NIBIN. On March 21, 2013, 

former Assistant Director Turk issued a memorandum requiring ATF personnel to 

enter ballistic information promptly into NIBIN for all firearms purchased in 

storefront investigations. ATF’s 2013 Storefront Investigations Manual noted 

that entering ballistic information from all recovered firearms is “a good practice 

and investigative strategy” and that all ballistic firearm and ammunition 

information must “be submitted for NIBIN analysis in a timely manner (not at 

the end of the case) . . .” unless otherwise authorized by the supervising DAD 

and the URC. 

14 Order 3301.4C does require entry of seized firearms in N-Force within 10 days, at 

which point the firearms are traced automatically. However, agents have the option of deferring 

traces until the completion of the case. N-Force is ATF’s case management database. 

15
 
 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER THREE
 

ATF UNDERCOVER STOREFRONT OPERATIONS
 

In this section of the report we describe five ATF undercover storefronts 

that operated after the initiation of ATF’s Monitored Case Program (MCP) in July 

2011. We evaluated storefronts in Wichita, Pensacola, Milwaukee, and St. Louis, 

as well as a mobile storefront that ATF’s Boston Field Division deployed in two 

communities in southern Massachusetts. ATF ceased storefront operations in 

2013 following controversy surrounding the Milwaukee storefront and as of June 

2016 ATF has not resumed using them. The five storefronts and their operating 

dates are presented in the following diagram. 

DIAGRAM I: Select ATF Storefront Operations 2010-2013 

Source: OIG 

In each of the storefront operations, we reviewed the following issues: 

initiation, planning, operations, oversight, vulnerable persons (juveniles and 

persons with disabilities), and closure of the storefront and its results. In 

addition, we identified many issues that cut across these topics, including agent 

undercover expertise, the role of confidential informants, criminal intelligence, 

public and agent safety, targeting, and others. These issues also are discussed 

in detail in the descriptions below. 

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I. The Wichita Storefront – Operation Bandit Trading (2010-2011) 

ATF operated an undercover storefront in Wichita, Kansas from November 

30, 2010, to September 20, 2011. The City of Wichita had a population of 

approximately 380,000 at that time, and in 2010 and 2011 had a rate of violent 

crime roughly double that of the U.S. average. According to ATF agents and 

staff from the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) in Wichita, the city had at that time, 

and continues to have, serious problems with gang-related crime and gun 

violence. The storefront, which masqueraded primarily as a clothing store, was 

located in a small strip mall on a major thoroughfare in central Wichita. 

A. Initiation 

The ATF case agent and two undercover agents assigned to the storefront 

told us that they were responsible for conceiving of and planning the Wichita 

storefront. One of the undercover agents was a task force officer (TFO) 

assigned to ATF from the local sheriff’s office; he stated that he had attended a 

training presented by ATF undercover agents that prompted him to suggest that 

ATF consider opening a storefront in Wichita. The agents in Wichita said that 

they discussed the idea and concluded that a storefront operation likely would 

be successful because ATF had used the technique effectively elsewhere and, 

according to one agent, it was “an investigative technique that hadn’t been tried 

in Wichita in decades” and would be unfamiliar to local criminals. The ATF 

undercover agent said that he had been working on many stolen firearms cases 

in Kansas and believed that the storefront would be an effective tool to recover 

stolen firearms in Wichita. He also stated that the storefront would provide a 

safer environment to conduct firearms transactions than a hotel room or other 

less-secure location that he was accustomed to utilizing. According to the case 

agent, the local ATF office was responsible for 70 counties in Kansas and the 

agents wanted to devote more of their efforts to combating crime in Wichita. He 

stated that the storefront afforded them that opportunity. 

Before opening the storefront the agents said that they sought advice 

from other ATF agents who had worked on storefront operations. The case 

agent stated, however, that he never received instruction from ATF managers 

about whom to consult to properly operate a storefront, and had no contact with 

the Undercover Branch at ATF Headquarters. Instead, the agents relied upon 

their own contacts, including an agent who had previously been assigned to 

ATF’s Enhanced Undercover Program. None of the agents or RAC assigned to 

the storefront had prior storefront experience, though the two undercover 

agents had worked on numerous undercover operations previously. Both the 

SAC and ASAC, who were based at the ATF field division office in Kansas City, 

stated that they did not have contact with the Undercover Branch concerning 

the Wichita storefront. 

The case agent and undercover agents told us that they conferred with 

the USAO and local law enforcement to obtain their support. Staff from the 

USAO told us that they recalled meeting with ATF while the agents were 

planning the storefront and that the USAO supported the operation. The former 

17
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Acting U.S. Attorney and Criminal Chief said that he believed that ATF’s proposal 

was a “great idea” and that it “fit in real well” with the USAO’s priorities, which 

included firearms prosecutions. The case agent also stated that ATF met with 

leaders from the Wichita Police Department and Sedgwick County Sheriff’s 

Department and requested manpower to assist with surveillance outside of the 

storefront. These agencies agreed to provide support. 

On September 21, 2010, ATF’s Wichita field office submitted a storefront 

proposal to ATF Headquarters through the SAC of the Kansas City Field Division. 

The proposal stated that the storefront would target suspects who violate state 

and federal firearms laws, such as felons in possession of firearms, or who use 

firearms in relation to drug trafficking or a federal crime of violence. It did not 

identify specific targets, such as particular violent gangs, that were determined 

to be worthy of federal interest. However, the proposal discussed stolen 

firearms investigations that the Wichita field office had conducted and that an 

objective of the storefront was to recover stolen firearms. The Chief of ATF’s 

Special Operations Division at ATF Headquarters approved the proposal without 

apparent changes on September 27 following review by the supervising DAD. 

ATF’s undercover operations policies at the time did not require authorization of 

storefronts by ATF’s URC, and the URC did not evaluate the Wichita proposal. 

B. Planning 

While the authorization memo for the Wichita storefront indicated that the 

anticipated location would be “just north or just east of the downtown area,” it 

did not specify a particular location. After receiving Headquarters’ authorization 

to proceed, the ATF agents assigned to the storefront said that they evaluated 

numerous commercial properties that were available for lease in Wichita. ATF 

subsequently entered into a 12-month lease on a property beginning on 

November 1, 2010. According to the case agent, the agents selected a site 

close to downtown Wichita because it was on a major thoroughfare that had 

substantial foot and vehicular traffic and was nearby areas with crime problems. 

It also had several other features that appealed to the agents, including its 

proximity to a hospital, affordability, and that its interior layout allowed for the 

concealment of audio and video equipment. The agents said that there were no 

sites available at the time in the most crime-ridden areas of Wichita, which 

primarily were residential. The ATF RAC in Wichita told us, however, that the 

site’s proximity to high-crime areas was not a major factor in the selection 

decision for the storefront location, as it was more important to be in a high 

visibility location, and it would have been difficult to place a commercial 

operation in a residential setting. The ATF undercover agent said that the 

agents rejected several locations because they were too close to a school or 

church.15 

15 Agents made this determination independently; at the time ATF lacked guidance 

concerning the siting of storefront operations. 

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In preparation for the storefront’s opening in late November 2010, the 

agents made numerous modifications to the storefront property to enhance its 

security, including adding an alarm system and shelving that limited access 

through windows. Staff from ATF’s Special Operations Division at Headquarters 

assisted with the installation of audio and visual equipment. The case agent 

stated that as the storefront preparations proceeded he consulted with the 

Division Tactical Advisor (DTA) for ATF’s Kansas City Field Division, who 

provided advice on the operational plan for the storefront and assisted with 

security issues. In mid-November, ATF agents and local officers assigned to the 

storefront participated in a training with the DTA to rehearse tactical operations, 

such as a response to a robbery attempt or hostage situation. The training did 

not address general storefront operations, and none of the agents had prior 

storefronts experience. 

We asked the agents about their assigned security responsibilities within 

the storefront in case of emergency, including the representation in the proposal 

memorandum that “[a] covert cover/react team room will be built into the 

storefront. The storefront will operate with (2) agents acting in undercover roles 

while (1) agent monitors from the covert/react room.” The case agent stated 

that no personnel were assigned to a react team inside the storefront because it 

was not possible to secret them into the storefront without being seen. Instead, 

the case agent monitored the storefront from a nearby apartment that was 

equipped with audio and visual equipment, and between two and four agents 

and TFOs provided surveillance and security coverage from outside the 

storefront. The case agent said that that the DTA preferred that the agents 

furnish a react team inside the storefront but they were not able to follow his 

request. The case agent also stated that the RAC approved the security 

arrangements for the storefront. 

ATF Division and Headquarters managers who authorized the storefront’s 

opening stated that they were not aware that the only agents inside the 

storefront were the two undercover agents. The SAC and supervising DAD told 

us that they were unaware and should have been informed of the deviation from 

the proposal memorandum. The SAC stated that the change from the 

memorandum should have been briefed to the ASAC, and that the ASAC should 

have informed him. The ASAC told us that he believed that one agent either 

would be in the storefront or monitoring the storefront from an apartment, but 

the lack of an inside react team would not have been a concern for him given 

the other security arrangements that were in place at the storefront. The SAC 

also stated that the agents could avoid compromising safety by increasing 

physical surveillance outside the storefront. The DAD stated, however, that he 

would not have approved the storefront if he had known that there was not a 

react team inside the storefront as in his view, an inside react team was 

necessary to provide sufficient protection. 

We also asked agents whether they had planned for the possibility of a 

known felon or other prohibited person leaving the storefront with a firearm. 

The case agent told us that the agents were not provided guidance on the issue 

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and that he could not recall “any specific strategy on it.” He said that in the 

event that someone left the storefront with a firearm that the agents did not 

want him to possess, he believed that ATF would request local law enforcement 

to conduct surveillance on the person and later stop him. Although the RAC told 

us that he recalled discussing this scenario with the agents, none of the other 

agents remembered it. Like the case agent, the ASAC stated that ATF would 

request local law enforcement to conduct surveillance on the person and later 

stop him. 

The agents further stated that with the exception of one instance where 

they maintained surveillance on a convicted felon who left the storefront with a 

firearm, they did not recall any circumstances where they allowed a known 

prohibited person to exit the storefront in possession of a firearm. The agents 

stated that in this instance, they suspected the individual of manufacturing 

short-barrel shotguns, and they maintained surveillance on him until he 

returned to the storefront with the firearm that he had originally shown them. 

C. Operations 

ATF opened the storefront on November 30, 2010. According to the case 

agent, the storefront’s hours of operation typically were Tuesday through Friday 

from approximately 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., though the agents sometimes 

opened the store on other days for appointments with subjects to purchase 

firearms. The front merchandise in the store included clothing, shoes, candles, 

incense, and other miscellaneous items. Agents promoted the storefront by 

handing out business cards advertising this merchandise at a local bar. 

With the help of the unwitting informant discussed below, word about the 

storefront’s interest in buying firearms and other illicit items got out quickly. 

Agents purchased their first firearm on December 2. ATF documents show that 

agents purchased numerous firearms and other illicit items as the storefront 

continued operation into 2011. By mid-January they had purchased 19 

firearms, including a short-barrel shotgun, and by mid-April had acquired 116 

firearms, approximately 7 ounces of cocaine, and 4 ounces of 

methamphetamine.

16 We did not find that there were any guidelines as to what 

the storefront should purchase or from whom, and we found that agents 

purchased firearms from juveniles as well as adults. 

The agents told us that they negotiated prices of the firearms, and when 

they were unsure of an appropriate price they researched the firearm on the 

internet using a computer that was set-up in the storefront. They also stated 

16 It was anticipated in the original proposal that the storefront would purchase narcotics, 

though this was not the focus of the operation. While the quantities of drugs purchased were 

relatively small, we found no evidence that DEA was consulted regarding the sources from which 

they were obtained and any potential federal drug interest in them or organizations with which 

they might be affiliated. In this review we did not examine the handling of drug evidence by the 

storefronts. 

20
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

that they did not find evidence – such as the firearms being in their original 

packaging – that their customers were purchasing firearms at retail 

establishments and then bringing them directly to the storefront for sale at a 

higher price. However, we identified one firearm that subsequent traces showed 

was purchased at another establishment the same day that it was sold to the 

storefront, and two others that were later determined to have been purchased 

14 and 25 days prior to the date of their sale to the storefront. 

We asked the agents about any procedures they adopted to guard against 

the storefront creating incentives for its customers to steal firearms and sell 

them at the storefront. The case agent told us that they did not have a plan to 

address this, and we found no documentation reflecting any contemporaneous 

consideration of the issue. The case agent stated that traces on the firearms 

were not completed until close to the end of the investigation. The RAC 

subsequently told the OIG that the agents were checking local police department 

databases to determine whether any of the firearms that they purchased had 

been stolen, but that they delayed running NIBIN checks or traces through ATF’s 

National Tracing Center because of concerns that an FFL may inadvertently 

disclose their searches. ATF e-mail showed that the agents began NIBIN checks 

approximately 4 months after the storefront opened, though we did not see any 

documentation confirming earlier checks with the local police databases. The 

ASAC and SAC both told us that they expected that the firearms would be traced 

as the agents purchased them. The SAC stated that it was important to run the 

traces to try and ascertain the source of the firearms and to determine if they 

had been stolen. 

We also asked about the role of confidential informants at the storefront 

and the collection of criminal intelligence. The agents said that they did not rely 

on informants because they did not want to risk exposing that the storefront 

was an undercover operation. However, shortly after the storefront opened a 

nearby resident, Daniel James, approached the agents and offered to arrange 

firearms deals for them.17 For the next 9 months James functioned as an 

unwitting informant for ATF. He identified persons willing to sell firearms or 

drugs and brokered purchases for the agents approximately 40 times. For many 

deals the agents paid James a finder’s fee of between $20 and $50 or gave him 

merchandise from the storefront. 

We did not find that the storefront generated any significant criminal 

intelligence. According to the case agent, except for persons who sold narcotics 

and firearms at the storefront, ATF developed only one new case based on 

information obtained from the storefront and cultivated one cooperating 

defendant. The case agent told us that ATF did not have the manpower to 

conduct surveillance on many of the suspects to identify their sources of supply 

or to develop new leads, and there was no other monitoring employed to assist 

in this. We also found that ATF did not prepare an after-action report on the 

17 Daniel James is a pseudonym. 

21
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

storefront or otherwise prepare any written intelligence products that evaluated 

intelligence obtained from the storefront, such as information collected on local 

gangs. 

D. Oversight 

We found little involvement from ATF Headquarters with regard to 

supervision of the storefront, and limited oversight in Wichita. The RAC in 

Wichita had no storefront or long-term undercover experience, and agents said 

that he did not provide much guidance over the storefront. The agents said that 

they met with him each day that the storefront was open but that he added little 

of substance to the operation. The agents said that there were no regularly 

scheduled meetings with the ASACs or SAC but they did attend some briefings 

with them and believed the RAC kept them informed about the operation. The 

ASACs confirmed that the RAC regularly informed them about events at the 

storefront. Our review of ATF e-mails showed that the case agent provided few 

written updates to the RAC or other supervisors. The agents were 

complimentary of the SAC and the oversight he provided, however. According 

to the case agent, the SAC “knew what his agents were doing.” When we asked 

the SAC about his approach to storefronts, he stated: 

[W]hether it's a storefront case or some other investigation that's 

significant, SACs and ASACs need to pay attention and engage people on 

many, many different levels. . . . I was hands-on engaged in cases where 

I’d seen absentee ASACs and absentee SACs lead to a lot of problems. 

And you better be in N-Force. You better be looking in there. You better 

call your local partners. You better call the U.S. Attorney’s Office. And 

you better be engaged and not just take the word of somebody at a lower 

level that everything is hunky-dory. 

We further found that ATF headquarters oversight was limited. The SAC 

told us he believed he discussed the storefront with the supervising DADs while 

providing them with status updates on the division’s cases. The Wichita field 

office provided its first and only MCP briefing paper after the inception of the 

MCP on the Wichita storefront to ATF Headquarters on August 12, 2011. The 

paper summarized the status of the investigation and explained that the agents 

anticipated closing the storefront within approximately 3 weeks and conducting 

60 to 65 arrests in mid-September. The RAC did not recall the Wichita field 

office participating in any MCP briefings. The Assistant Director of Field 

Operations at ATF Headquarters instructed that the storefront be removed from 

the MCP when the storefront ceased operations in September 2011. 

E. Vulnerable Persons 

We asked agents about their approach to vulnerable persons, such as 

those with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) and juveniles. They 

stated that under no circumstances were they targeting persons with I/DD for 

use in the storefront or for enforcement action, and that they had no knowledge 

of any storefront subject being disabled. During their planning for the 

22
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

storefront, however, the agents did not discuss how to deal with persons with 

I/DD in the event that they entered the storefront. 

With respect to ATF’s use of Daniel James as an unwitting informant, the 

case agent told us that he appeared “relatively intelligent” and that his behavior 

did not indicate the presence of an I/DD. The undercover agents also stated 

that they did not observe conduct indicating that James suffered from a 

disability or had a low IQ. James was arrested at the close of the storefront, 

pled guilty to drug and firearms offenses, and was sentenced to 3 years in 

prison. We reviewed numerous videotapes that ATF recorded of James while he 

was in the storefront and did not observe conduct that we considered 

uncharacteristic of someone who was trafficking narcotics and firearms. 

Likewise, the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) who prosecuted James told us that 

he reviewed all of ATF’s tapes of James and found that he was “able to negotiate 

very well with people” and that “[he] obviously knew what he was doing.”18 In 

addition, we identified no evidence that the ATF agents referred to James in a 

way that would indicate that they believed he was disabled. 

We also asked about how the agents managed their interactions with 

juveniles. We found that the agents purchased firearms from juveniles, and one 

juvenile in particular was responsible for approximately 15 percent of all 

firearms that the agents purchased. The agents said that they did not discuss 

how to handle juveniles who entered the store, and were not provided any 

guidance on the issue from their supervisors. The agents told us they did not 

ask juveniles to leave the premises. The SAC further told us that he did not 

recall a “specific plan” concerning how to handle juveniles in the storefront. 

F. Closure and Results 

The storefront closed on September 20, 2011. The case agent said that 

there was a consensus among them that the storefront had operated for a 

sufficient time, and the term of the undercover TFO’s assignment to ATF was 

coming to an end. One agent told us that the storefront team was “burned out” 

from the work and that they believed that the storefront had achieved success. 

Arrests began the day of the closure and on that day three persons who had 

previously agreed with agents at the storefront to participate in a home invasion 

were taken into custody.

19 Agents told us that no injuries were sustained at the 

storefront, no customers ever indicated an intention to commit an imminent act 

of violence, and there were no burglary attempts, though the storefront was 

vandalized on a couple of occasions during the operation. 

18 The AUSA told us that after James was arrested, the USMS informed him that he was 

behaving strangely while in custody, such as continuously talking to himself. The AUSA said that 

he brought the matter to the attention of the court. 

19 In an ATF “home invasion” undercover operation, ATF agents provide an opportunity for 

suspects to commit an armed robbery of a fictitious drug “stash house.” 

23
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

According to ATF documents, the operation resulted in the purchase of 

243 firearms, including 7 illegal short-barrel shotguns and 7 firearms with 

obliterated serial numbers, 13.9 ounces of cocaine, and 13.5 ounces of 

methamphetamine. While not every seller was prosecuted, the operation 

resulted in plea agreements in federal court with 47 defendants, 31 of whom 

had a prior felony conviction, 24 of whom had a prior arrest for a violent crime, 

and 23 of whom were gang members. There were no multiple defendant or 

organizational prosecutions apart from the case arising out of the home 

invasion. The Government lost one case at trial and voluntarily dismissed lesser 

drug charges against three other persons. Sentences ranged from probation to 

15 years. The storefront did not result in any state charges.20 Agent cashier 

expenditures to fund the operation and to purchase firearm and drug evidence 

totaled approximately $245,000.21 

The ATF agents and majority of prosecutors we interviewed told us that 

the storefront was successful and led to the incarceration of many dangerous 

criminals. One prosecutor described that storefront as “a necessary and 

successful investigation.” The case agent stated that it was “a great 

investigative tool” that resulted in “[removing] a lot of crime guns off the 

street.” However, some AUSAs expressed skepticism about the large number of 

prosecutions that the storefront generated, as evidenced by the number of 

defendants who received probation (7) or sentences of approximately 1 year or 

less (13). One AUSA said that, due to limited resources, he typically attempts 

to prosecute cases that will result in a sentence of at least 5 years. The case 

agent also told us that he believed that some of the defendants were “marginal.” 

Although the RAC was very complimentary of the storefront and the agents 

assigned to it, stating that it’s “a great technique” and that the agents “did a 

great job,” he also cautioned that the storefront “was a very manpowerintensive operation” and that “it consumed the whole office.” As with other 

storefront operations we examined, we found that ATF did not prepare an afteraction report on the storefront, including assessing whether the substantial 

investment of resources was reasonable in light of its impact on other Field 

Office operations. 

II.	 The Pensacola Storefront – Operation Pensacola Periodicals 

(2011) 

ATF operated an undercover storefront in Pensacola, Florida, from 

February 2011 through October 2011. Pensacola had a population of 

20 Near the end of the case, the case agent and an AUSA visited the local district 

attorney’s office to discuss possible state prosecutions of some of the storefront subjects. These 

cases concerned narcotics violations that did not meet federal prosecution guidelines. According 

to the case agent, the district attorney’s office did not accept any ATF storefront referrals for 

prosecution. No juveniles were prosecuted. 

21 An audit of the handling of these funds, or those in the other storefront operations, was 

beyond the scope of this review. 

24
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

approximately 52,000 at that time, and in 2010 and 2011 had a rate of violent 

crime roughly 1.7 times the U.S. average. In response to a sharp increase in 

local gun violence in 2010, the Escambia County Sheriff approached ATF about 

opening an undercover storefront to help address the rising violence. The RAC 

of ATF’s Pensacola Resident Office was receptive to the idea and the offices 

began planning the operation. The eventual storefront was located in Escambia 

County immediately west of the Pensacola city limits. For approximately 9 

months, it operated as a second-hand store that sold various types of secondhand merchandise such as clothing and electronics. 

A. Initiation 

After the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office (ECSO) proposed conducting 

the storefront operation in early to mid-2010, ATF consulted with the USAO for 

the Northern District of Florida and the Office of the State’s Attorney. The RAC 

told us that he believed the success of the storefront depended upon these 

offices being engaged in the operation, and that he therefore sought their input 

at the earliest stages of planning. According to the RAC, the U.S. Attorney and 

the Florida State’s Attorney indicated their support for the operation in early 

meetings and assigned an AUSA and Assistant State’s Attorney from their 

respective offices to assist the operation. The Escambia County Sheriff, who 

also attended these early meetings, told us that the U.S. Attorney and State’s 

Attorney provided significant input into the operation, such as reviewing the 

storefront’s operational plan. The AUSA and Assistant State’s Attorney attended 

several early planning meetings with representatives from ATF and ECSO where 

they discussed, among other things, the operation’s strategy and the potential 

federal and state crimes that could be pursued. Other topics included gun 

walking, the risk that the storefront would draw criminals into the community 

and lead to the creation of crime, and residents’ response to the storefront once 

the existence of the undercover operation was made public. The AUSA told us 

that the Pensacola storefront was “the most pre-planning that I’ve ever seen in 

an operation.” 

On February 17, 2011, ATF’s Tampa field office submitted a storefront 

proposal to ATF Headquarters’ Special Operations Division. The proposal 

described the Pensacola office’s coordination on the operation with the USAO, 

local law enforcement, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and 

stated that ECSO had committed to being “full partners” with ATF by providing 

investigators and backstopping in support of the storefront.

22 The proposal also 

described the Pensacola office’s efforts since 2008 to combat the sale and 

distribution of guns to prohibited persons in secondary gun markets in northwest 

Florida, and how the storefront would be a continuation of those efforts. ATF 

had been identifying illegal firearms sales through the use of a confidential 

informant (CI) who would contact individuals selling firearms at local flea 

22 NCIS was included as a potential partner in the storefront due to the large naval 

presence in the Pensacola area, but ultimately did not participate in the operation. 

25
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

markets and in a local periodical and indicate that he was a convicted felon or, 

with regard to operations at the flea markets, that he was a convicted felon or 

an out-of-state resident, and that we was looking to purchase firearms. The 

sale of a firearm to a person the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe 

is a convicted felon or, with limited exceptions, who does not reside in the state 

is a violation of federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922). According to the storefront 

proposal, this strategy resulted in 5 federal convictions and approximately 82 

guns being removed from these secondary markets. 

The proposal, however, went on to note that it was “inherently more 

difficult to investigate” the sale of stolen firearms because “those who steal 

firearms . . . trade or sell the firearms to known and trusted individuals. Those 

individuals in turn avoid overt sale of the stolen firearms at flea markets, gun 

shows or periodicals.” The proposal explained that the primary CI used in those 

earlier investigations had experience operating second-hand stores, and that 

ATF intended to use this same CI for the storefront operation. The objective of 

the storefront, which would be known as “Anything for a Buck,” was to “identify 

violent criminals, prohibited individuals, and gang members in the community 

who are involved in the illegal possession and sale of firearms, and to gather 

enough evidence against them to obtain a successful prosecution in federal 

court.” 

The RAC told us that he learned during a conversation with his supervisor 

from ATF’s Tampa field office that the proposal had been approved by ATF 

Headquarters. The storefront became operational in February 2011 and 

continued operations until October 2011.23 

B. Planning 

As described above, the storefront operation was an outgrowth of ATF’s 

previous undercover activities targeting the secondary firearms market in 

northwest Florida. The ATF case agent told us that the advantage of the 

storefront was that it would provide law enforcement with a “safe place” to 

purchase firearms in an undercover capacity instead of continuing to purchase 

firearms in parking lots or other locations that presented greater risks. Focusing 

on two Pensacola neighborhoods with high crime rates, the RAC and the ECSO 

supervisors scouted locations for the storefront for nearly a year before making 

a final selection. Both the RAC and the primary ECSO Lieutenant assigned to 

the case stated that they wanted a location with a month-to-month lease in 

order to minimize costs. The RAC told us that he identified a space during a 

drive through one of the neighborhoods under consideration and immediately 

contacted the landlord. According to the RAC, after being satisfied with the cost, 

rental period, and suitability of the space, he authorized the case agent to lease 

the property in an undercover capacity. 

23 The only document we identified indicating ATF Headquarters’ approval of the 

storefront operation is a copy of the proposal with the signature of the Special Operation Division 

Chief dated May 24, 2011. 

26
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The case agent told us that one of the attractive features of the location 

was its close proximity to the Sheriff’s office and to a hospital. However, the 

case agent also told us that although he was familiar with the geographic area, 

ATF did not conduct a security assessment of the surroundings to identify 

potential risks to the operation. The RAC acknowledged to us that a more 

comprehensive understanding of the surroundings prior to the operation 

commencing would have been a good idea. On that point, the RAC told us that 

he learned after the operation concluded that a Salvation Army facility was 

located within 1,000 feet of the storefront’s property line. The RAC had been 

aware of the facility but not its proximity to the storefront. He said the 

Salvation Army is considered a church under Florida state law and that this 

particular facility also contained a daycare center.24 According to the RAC, there 

were no incidents during the storefront’s operation that created safety concerns 

among the personnel involved with the case or at the Salvation Army facility. 

The physical space for the storefront, which consisted of a main store 

area with a small back room, required limited modifications. Ballistic drywall 

was added to a preexisting retail counter and mirrors were added to give agents 

better visibility throughout the store. ECSO technical personnel installed the 

necessary video and audio recording equipment, including a pole camera outside 

the store. The Wi-Fi connection that was installed allowed real-time audio and 

video of activities in the storefront to be transmitted to the ATF and ECSO 

offices. The RAC told us that after consulting with technical personnel in ATF’s 

Tampa field office, he determined it would be more cost-effective for ECSO 

personnel to install the surveillance equipment. He also told us that because the 

ECSO technical personnel were closer, they would be able to respond more 

quickly to troubleshoot any problems with the equipment. 

Prior to the storefront opening, ATF agents and ECSO officers met on 

several occasions to discuss security procedures, such as where to position 

themselves when customers were in the store and where to secure the firearms 

in the store. They created an operational plan that described the specific 

security procedures for the storefront. For example, the plan listed daily 

procedures for opening and closing the storefront, how purchased firearms 

would be secured, and how the undercover agents would provide cover for one 

another during daily operations. The case agent told us that it was standard 

procedure for at least one member of the storefront team to be in the back 

room during transactions with customers so that at least that team member 

would have access to a long gun and other tactical equipment. This team 

member was also responsible for monitoring activities in the store and being 

prepared to provide assistance as needed. Storefront personnel periodically met 

during the course of the operation to review security procedures. 

24 ATF found out about the daycare when the State’s Attorney’s Office advised that the 

state crimes committed at the storefront were within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, which 

would enhance the severity of the crime. F.S.A. § 893.13. 

27
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ATF Division Tactical Agents (DTA) from the Tampa field office did not 

visit the storefront to conduct a formal review and provide tactical approval until 

after the store opened. However, prior to this visit, the RAC sent photographs 

of the storefront to his supervisors in Tampa. According to the RAC, the DTAs 

reviewed these photographs and made recommendations for improving the 

security of certain aspects of the storefront, such as placing a chain behind the 

counter to dissuade customers from entering that area. The case agent told us 

that during the visit, the DTAs reviewed various tactical scenarios with storefront 

personnel and discussed how they should respond. The ASAC in the Tampa field 

office told us that he anticipated the DTAs would be a resource to the storefront 

but would not be consulted on tactical decisions during operations. 

The planning for the Pensacola storefront did not include an outside cover 

team that would be responsible for responding to emergency situations involving 

the store. One of the undercover agents who worked at the storefront and who 

possessed extensive undercover experience told us that he felt it was better not 

to have a dedicated outside cover team because they are often identified as law 

enforcement, or “burned,” by criminals. If this were to occur, it could create 

suspicion about the legitimacy of the storefront. The agent also told us that in 

the event of an emergency, the outside cover team would have to enter through 

the front door, creating a potentially dangerous cross-fire situation. An ECSO 

undercover officer who was part of the storefront team told us that he agreed 

with this agent’s assessment. The ECSO officer also said that he did not believe 

it would have been feasible to have an inside “rescue” team because it would 

have been difficult to bring the team into the store every day and keep them in 

the back room without drawing attention. 

According to personnel at the storefront, the lack of an outside cover 

team did not mean the store was unprepared to handle an emergency situation. 

For example, the case agent told us that the storefront team always had an 

ECSO radio available in the back room and that ECSO personnel could respond 

to an emergency in the storefront within minutes given their office’s close 

proximity to the store. The case agent told us that on some occasions – such as 

when the storefront team knew that a subject was bringing a firearm to the 

store – the team would request that personnel from ECSO conduct surveillance 

or act as an outside cover team. Another team member told us that the live 

video and audio feeds of the storefront to ATF and ECSO offices, together with 

the presence of ECSO patrols in the surrounding area, provided an additional 

measure of security in the event of an emergency situation. Both the RAC and 

the ECSO Lieutenant overseeing the operation echoed this and told us that they 

frequently watched the live feed on the storefront from their offices and 

occasionally on laptop computers while parked outside of the storefront 

monitoring activities. 

C. Operations 

ATF opened the storefront in early February 2011. According to the 

operations plan, the storefront was open from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday 

through Friday. The storefront operated as a second-hand store and carried 

28
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

various types of second-hand merchandise, such as clothing and electronics. 

The storefront was usually staffed by three undercover agents and the CI. As 

described above, the CI had previously worked with ATF undercover personnel 

in Pensacola and had significant prior experience operating second-hand stores 

and flea market booths.25 

As noted above, the primary objective of the storefront was to identify 

individuals in the community who were involved in the illegal possession and 

sale of firearms. In order to do this, ATF spread the word in the community that 

the store was looking to purchase firearms with “no questions asked” and to 

then resell the weapons at high markups to a “connection” abroad. ATF also 

planned to use the storefront as a location for the CI to purchase firearms from 

individuals who advertised firearms for sale in local periodicals and who had 

been contacted and informed by the CI that he was a felon interested in 

purchasing firearms.

26 We were told by ATF that conducting the transaction in 

the store was far safer than doing so in a parking lot or other makeshift location. 

In addition to firearms, the storefront purchased narcotics and stolen 

property, both priorities for ECSO. However, the case agent told us that 

purchases of stolen property were limited to items that could be traced back to a 

victim by, for example, connecting the property to police reports. The case 

agent told us they were wary of purchasing items that appeared to be stolen 

solely for the purpose of selling the items to the storefront. 

The case agent’s daily routine typically included stopping by ATF’s 

Pensacola office each morning to check out any cash or other supplies needed 

for the storefront and to talk to the RAC about the storefront’s schedule for that 

day. The case agent then met the other undercover agents and the CI at the 

storefront at 10:00 a.m. to open the store. At the end of each day, the 

firearms, narcotics, and property that had been purchased were removed from 

the store and logged into evidence at ATF’s or ECSO’s offices. According to the 

case agent, they did not leave overnight at the store any evidence, equipment, 

or other items that might suggest it was affiliated with law enforcement. The 

case agent told us that he usually returned to the ATF office at the end of the 

day and briefed the RAC on the day’s activities. 

There was minimal customer traffic in the storefront at the beginning of 

the operation. During the first 3 months, the storefront team purchased 16 

firearms and conducted 7 narcotics transactions and 1 transaction involving 

stolen property. The case agent described this period as “slow,” stating that 

many potential customers appeared to be “suspicious” of the storefront. 

25 In February 2012, several months after the storefront closed, the CI was arrested after 

brandishing a weapon during a dispute in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. The CI was federally 

charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ultimately sentenced to 6 months in 

prison. 

26 Storefront records documented at least five instances during the operation where 

individuals refused to sell firearms to the CI after being informed that he was a convicted felon. 

29
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

However, after the team purchased 19 firearms during the month of May, traffic 

increased significantly, and over the next 3 months the team purchased a total 

of 177 firearms. The case agent attributed the increase to customers becoming 

more “comfortable” with the storefront. Another factor included the RAC’s 

decision to approve a request to modify the storefront’s hours of operation, 

permitting it to open at irregular hours – such as Saturdays and by appointment 

– in order to create the appearance that it was neither a legitimate business nor 

associated with law enforcement. Also, an ESCO officer contacted a drug dealer 

who he had been investigating prior to joining the storefront and told him that 

he was now working at the storefront and asked that he stop by to sell some 

narcotics. The ECSO officer told us that business began to increase after this 

contact and that he believed it improved the storefront’s credibility on the 

street. 

The case agent told us that the team began opening the storefront on an 

appointments-only basis toward the end of the operation and described this as 

the “winding down” of the operation. Business at the storefront diminished 

throughout September and into October, when the storefront eventually closed. 

Storefront personnel purchased 33 firearms in September and 10 firearms in 

October. 

The team used several methods to identify customers entering the 

storefront. For example, photographs of customers taken from video stills were 

often shown to ECSO detectives familiar with members of the community and 

storefront personnel occasionally followed subjects to establish their identity or 

their sources for firearms and narcotics. 

According to the case agent, the prices they paid for particular items were 

set in different ways. For narcotics, the case agent deferred to one of the 

undercover ECSO officers with significant experience as an undercover narcotics 

officer. For firearms, the team frequently consulted a “blue book of gun values” 

to help establish prices. However, the case agent told us that the gun market is 

very similar to a “used-car market” and value was often difficult to establish. 

We identified several measures the storefront team took to protect 

against the operation creating crime in the community. For example, the ECSO 

Lieutenant supervising the storefront told us that his officers reviewed crime and 

arrest statistics “multiple times a day” to ensure the storefront was not creating 

crime; one ECSO sergeant was specifically assigned this responsibility. 

Similarly, ATF personnel conducted NCIC traces as soon as possible on all 

firearms that were purchased in order to determine if the guns were recently 

stolen. The case agent told us they identified very few instances of this. 

Storefront personnel also limited their purchases of stolen property so as 

not to create a market in stolen goods, and when they had concerns that 

particular customers were stealing items in order to sell them to the store, the 

team developed tactics to deter those customers from returning. For example, 

when agents realized that a firearm purchased from two suspects at the 

storefront had been recently stolen, an undercover agent told the suspects that 

30
 
 

 

 

 

he had discovered an electronic tracking device inside the grip of the firearm, 

accused the sellers of being informants for law enforcement, and told them they 

were no longer welcome in the store. 

Storefront personnel also coordinated with other law enforcement offices 

on the arrests of certain individuals prior to the storefront operation closing. For 

example, storefront personnel worked with law enforcement in another 

jurisdiction to have a suspect with an outstanding warrant arrested as he 

travelled through that jurisdiction. 

The storefront was burglarized once and several other break-ins were 

attempted. These incidents were captured by surveillance cameras and at least 

one of the suspects was identified and prosecuted. According to storefront 

personnel, most of the items stolen during the burglary were used as store 

inventory and not valuable. The store was not alarmed, a decision that the RAC 

told us was based on the lack of properties in the neighborhood that had alarm 

systems and the concern that having one would have made the individuals they 

were targeting suspicious. Following the burglary, the team replaced the door 

to the store and installed wire mesh over the other points of entry. The case 

agent told us that the burglary actually increased the storefront’s credibility with 

potential customers and cited one suspect as stating he was convinced the store 

was not associated with law enforcement based, in part, on the fact they did not 

contact the police after the burglary. 

The initiation and planning documents for the storefront operation did not 

address how the team would handle prohibited possessors who attempted to 

leave the storefront with firearms. According to the RAC, both he and the team 

members were nevertheless attuned to the issue and he trusted them to take 

appropriate action in those circumstances. The case agent told us that the 

storefront team understood that if a prohibited possessor left the store with a 

firearm that the individual “must be taken down.” This occurred in one instance 

when a felon attempted to leave the storefront with a firearm after negotiating 

on price with undercover personnel. To prevent the felon from leaving armed, 

the undercover personnel increased the amount of their offer and purchased the 

gun. In another instance, a felon who had previously sold multiple firearms to 

undercover personnel at the store refused to sell a pistol despite several offers. 

The storefront team contacted ECSO about pursuing the felon; however, the 

felon coincidentally was arrested by the Pensacola Police Department later that 

evening in an unrelated traffic stop. The pistol was discovered in the felon’s 

vehicle during the stop. 

D. Oversight 

The RAC and an ECSO Lieutenant were primarily responsible for the dayto-day supervision of the storefront. The Lieutenant told the OIG that he and 

the RAC were practically “attached at the hip” and in constant communication 

with the storefront team. The RAC echoed this, describing the storefront as a 

“true partnership” with ECSO. As described earlier, the case agent told us that 

he briefed the RAC each morning about the storefront’s schedule for the day and 

31
 
 

usually briefed the RAC in the evening about the day’s activities. The primary 

undercover ECSO officer told us that he met on almost a daily basis with the 

ECSO Lieutenant overseeing the storefront. 

The RAC said that he kept the ASAC and SAC informed of all 

developments regarding the storefront, and that the SAC was “very involved” in 

the supervision of the operation. The RAC and the ASAC told us they 

communicated regularly about storefront activities and in particular focused on 

indications the activities correlated with any increase in local criminal activity. 

As described earlier, the USAO and the State’s Attorney’s Office were 

consulted frequently about the storefront, especially during the planning phase 

of the operation. The assigned AUSA and Assistant State’s Attorney continued 

to have weekly meetings with ATF and ECSO after the storefront became 

operational. The AUSA told us that he would use these meetings as an 

opportunity “to watch some of the videos and [see] what was going on in the 

operation.” He said that he would sit down and discuss with the storefront team 

any concerns he had with operations and possible corrective actions. About 

these meetings, the AUSA told us, “I welcomed that. I mean, it’s not all the 

time that they invite us to go over and sit down and see what they’re doing and 

critique it.” By way of example, the AUSA said the CI initially was not explicitly 

stating to potential sellers that he was a convicted felon during firearms deals, 

and might instead just state he could not purchase firearms in a store. The 

AUSA told the storefront team that to make the cases prosecutable, the CI had 

to be “crystal clear” and explicitly state he was a convicted felon. According to 

the AUSA and the RAC, the storefront team adopted this suggestion. 

As described in Chapter Two, ATF issued its MCP requirements on July 19, 

2011. ATF’s Tampa field office submitted its first monitored case briefing on the 

Pensacola storefront operation on August 8, 2011; the last report was submitted 

in December 2011 after the storefront had ceased operations. The August 

submission described the activities of the storefront to that point in time and 

reported that the Pensacola office intended to continue the storefront at its 

present location for another 60 days. The RAC told us that he recalled preparing 

the initial MCP briefing paper with the case agent, but said that no one at ATF 

knew what to expect from the program given that it had only recently been 

initiated. The RAC did not recall receiving any feedback in response to the MCP 

submissions. 

E. Vulnerable Persons 

We asked storefront personnel about their approach to vulnerable 

persons, such as juveniles and those with intellectual and developmental 

disabilities (I/DD). They told us that juveniles were discouraged from entering 

or hanging out in the storefront, and that juveniles were not targeted. However, 

storefront personnel also told as that at least two juveniles in fact sold firearms 

to undercover officers at the store. For example, in May 2011 an individual later 

identified by a CI as a 16-year old juvenile sold two firearms to an undercover 

agent. The RAC also learned that the juvenile had a prior juvenile felony 

32
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

conviction, was a suspect in a recent shooting, and was the defendant in a 

charging document filed by the State’s Attorney’s Office for possession of a 

firearm by a felon/delinquent. Although according to the case agent the juvenile 

was not “encourage[d]” to sell more firearms, he in fact did sell 10 additional 

firearms to undercover personnel during the course of the storefront. The case 

agent told us that because the juvenile claimed he had access to numerous 

firearms, the team decided “we’d rather get them in our possession than have 

him out there with” the guns. The case agent also told us that because the 

State’s Attorney’s Office had responsibility for prosecuting juveniles, he deferred 

to the ECSO Lieutenant on handling those cases. The juvenile was ultimately 

prosecuted by the State’s Attorney’s Office in connection with his sales to the 

storefront and sentenced to 3 years confinement. 

The agents told us that they also did not target persons with I/DD or 

otherwise use them to further the storefront operation. However, one individual 

prosecuted as a result of sales to storefront personnel was later diagnosed as 

being “on the breakpoint of Borderline Mental Retardation and Mental 

Retardation.” 

The undercover agents first made contact with this defendant through an 

advertisement in a local periodical in which the defendant had listed firearms for 

sale. At the undercover agents’ direction, the CI telephoned the defendant and 

over the next several months purchased numerous firearms from him. 

According to storefront personnel, they did not observe any signs that the 

defendant was intellectually or developmentally disabled. One team member 

described the defendant as “normal” and each member of the team told us the 

defendant actively negotiated the transactions with the undercover agents. 

Similarly, the AUSA who prosecuted cases arising from the storefront told us 

that he “never thought” the defendant “had any kind of mental issues.” 

Storefront personnel and the AUSA told us about two details relating to 

the defendant’s interactions with the storefront. The first was that the 

defendant was always accompanied by his father, mother, or fiancée during 

interactions with undercover agents. The second was that the defendant often 

appeared under the influence of narcotics when dealing with undercover agents. 

The undercover ECSO officer with significant narcotics experience described the 

defendant in this way: 

A young guy, always came in there with his fiancée or his parents. 

I don’t remember thinking that he was mentally challenged. I 

remember thinking that he was really, really on pills. When you 

talk to somebody that’s on pills, and I mean, you can just see it. 

He couldn’t hardly, you know, I don’t think it was his mental 

capability where he couldn’t hold himself up. It was his drug 

addiction, really high all the time. I mean, nose running, you 

know, stuff like that. Now, as far as how he was, you know, as far 

as IQ, I wouldn’t be able to tell you. But he didn’t seem mentally 

challenged to me. I just [thought] he was just on drugs. 

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The defendant was charged by federal prosecutors with four counts of selling a 

firearm to a convicted felon and one count of selling a firearm and ammunition 

to a convicted felon. He ultimately pled guilty to all five counts and was 

sentenced to 3 years of probation, including 6 months of home detention. 

F. Closure and Results 

During an October 2011 meeting to discuss the status of the storefront, 

representatives from ATF, the USAO, the State’s Attorney’s Office, and ECSO 

reached consensus that the time had come to close the operation. According to 

witnesses who attended the meeting, the State’s Attorney expressed his opinion 

that the storefront had been operational long enough, had succeeded in seizing 

a significant amount of firearms, and had experienced limited problems or 

incidents. The Escambia County Sheriff told us that he agreed with the decision 

and said he was concerned the team was becoming fatigued by the amount of 

work the storefront required. The case agent told us that no one opposed 

closing the storefront and said that by this time the storefront team was only 

opening the storefront on an appointments-only basis. 

According to ATF records, undercover personnel purchased approximately 

260 firearms during the operation – 54 of which were reported stolen – and 

conducted over 100 drug transactions. Twenty-two defendants were charged in 

federal court based on activities at the storefront and 55 were charged in state 

court. Of the federal defendants, 15 were charged with being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and four were charged exclusively with selling firearms 

to a felon (the CI). Each of the 22 federal defendants pled guilty and 21 were 

sentenced to time in prison. The sentences ranged from 12 to 180 months. The 

state defendants were primarily charged with offenses relating to dealing in 

narcotics and stolen property. At least 27 of the state defendants had 

previously been convicted of a felony. 

Witnesses involved in the operation were unanimous in the view that the 

Pensacola storefront was a success. The Escambia County Sheriff told us that in 

addition to measurements such as the number of weapons seized and 

individuals successfully prosecuted, the operation also succeeded in terms of 

management and oversight. The Sheriff said the mutual cooperation between 

ECSO, ATF, and the state and federal prosecutors through every step of the 

operation was one of the most important features of the storefront. He also 

noted that Escambia County experienced virtually no violent crime during the 

period the storefront was operational, though it coincided with another anticrime operation his office conducted jointly with the USMS.

27 

The AUSA told us the storefront was considerably more successful than he 

had anticipated and that he was surprised by how many individuals brought 

firearms and narcotics into the store to sell. The AUSA also said that he 

27 We did not independently examine the crime rate during the period the storefront was 

operational, or what happened to the rate after the operation was concluded. 

34
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

believed ATF did an excellent job conducting and managing the operation, and 

that the agents presented very well organized and prepared cases for 

prosecution. The RAC told us that the operation demonstrated the ability of law 

enforcement at all levels in the Pensacola area to work seamlessly together on 

an operation, and said that he believes the relationships built during the 

operation would make the law enforcement community in Pensacola increasingly 

effective in future years. 

III. The Milwaukee Storefront – Operation Fearless (2012) 

ATF operated an undercover storefront, known as Operation Fearless, in 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin from February 8, 2012, to September 22, 2012. As we 

described in the Introduction, the storefront came under scrutiny after news 

reporting described numerous problems with it, including the theft of firearms, 

improper handling of sensitive information, and the alleged targeting of persons 

with disabilities. ATF’s Office of Professional Responsibility and Security 

Operations (OPRSO) conducted an internal review to evaluate the St. Paul Field 

Division’s handling of the operation. OPRSO issued a non-public report on March 

21, 2013, that identified numerous deficiencies, including inadequate planning, 

poor security practices, and lack of proper supervision. The report also 

described problems with the MCP. We include a brief summary of OPRSO’s 

findings in this section following the OIG’s description of the operation from 

initiation to closure. 

A. Initiation 

The idea for Operation Fearless was formulated in late summer 2011 

during another ATF investigation in Milwaukee, known as Operation Smokin’ 

Piston. Operation Smokin’ Piston involved untaxed cigarettes and targeted 

members of the Outlaws and Black Pistons motorcycle gangs believed to be 

involved in firearms and narcotics trafficking. The case agent told us that she 

considered using numerous investigative techniques in that case, including an 

undercover storefront. In July 2011, two ATF undercover agents with 

experience investigating the Outlaws travelled to Milwaukee to provide guidance 

and advice to personnel involved with Operation Smokin’ Piston. According to 

the Milwaukee ATF personnel who met with them, the undercover agents 

advised that any investigation involving undercover tobacco sales was unlikely 

to be successful due to ATF’s prior use of tobacco to infiltrate the Outlaws in 

other parts of the country. They recommended that Milwaukee instead conduct 

a storefront investigation and use the storefront as means for the Milwaukee 

undercover agent to infiltrate the Outlaws. 

Over the next few months, the ASAC, RAC, case agent, and lead TFO 

discussed the prospective storefront on multiple occasions. The case agent and 

lead TFO travelled to Cleveland in August 2011 to observe an ongoing ATF 

undercover storefront and meet with individuals involved with that storefront. 

Of the agents assigned to Operation Fearless, only the case agent had prior 

storefront experience. One of the undercover agents had received training on 

35
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

storefront operations. The Operation Fearless case file was opened shortly after 

the case agent and TFO returned to Milwaukee, and the case agent began 

drafting a proposal memorandum for the storefront in September 2011. 

According to the case agent, the initial goal of the operation was to use 

the storefront as cover for the primary undercover agent to affiliate with 

members of the Outlaws. The case agent therefore sought to locate the 

storefront near the Outlaws’ territory in police District Two on the south side of 

Milwaukee. However, in October 2011, the ASAC determined that the storefront 

should target violent crime more generally in the city and not be focused solely 

on the Outlaws.28 The ASAC told the OIG that he believed the storefront was 

more likely to be successful with this broader focus and that they would limit its 

potential effectiveness if placed in police District Two. For these reasons, the 

ASAC suggested to the case agent that the target of the storefront be 

broadened to include Districts Five and Seven on the north side of Milwaukee, 

which historically have had the most firearms violence in the city. 

The USAO for the Eastern District of Wisconsin was first informed of the 

potential storefront investigation in September 2011. Both the U.S. Attorney 

and the AUSA involved with the case told the OIG that they were unfamiliar with 

the storefront technique at that time and were initially skeptical of its utility. 

They said their skepticism was alleviated after speaking with AUSAs in other 

districts who had worked with ATF on storefront operations and who described 

them as effective. The U.S. Attorney told the OIG that he communicated to ATF 

his concern, in part based on Operation Fast and Furious, about ensuring the 

safety and security of the community during the operation and that he wanted 

to ensure that no gun walking would occur. Ultimately, the USAO supported the 

broader storefront proposal and agreed to prosecute cases resulting from it. On 

the local side, ATF informed the Milwaukee District Attorney’s Office of the 

storefront in late spring 2012 and provided periodic updates to the office 

throughout the operation. 

Milwaukee Police Chief Edward Flynn told the OIG that the Milwaukee 

Police Department (MPD) and ATF have had a collaborative and positive 

relationship throughout his nearly 8-year tenure and that he had no reservations 

with ATF’s request for two MPD officers to be detailed to ATF to support a 

storefront operation. Chief Flynn told us that he was briefed on the storefront in 

its early stages and that he supported placing the storefront on the north side of 

Milwaukee, which he said was “awash” in firearms and gun violence. Chief Flynn 

did not recall any mention of the Outlaws motorcycle gang. 

On November 21, 2011, the SAC for the St. Paul Field Division, which 

oversees the Milwaukee office, submitted a memorandum to ATF Headquarters 

seeking authorization for a “Surplus Shop” storefront that would operate as a 

retail business selling items such as cigarettes, t-shirts, and motorcycle parts, as 

28 In 2010 and 2011, Milwaukee had a rate of violent crime more than double the United 

States average. In this period Milwaukee had a population of approximately 600,000. 

36
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

well as a side-business purchasing firearms, illegal drugs, and stolen items.29 

The memorandum stated that the objective of the storefront was “to identify 

gang members in the community who are involved in the illegal possession and 

sale of firearms, and to gather evidence against them to obtain a successful 

prosecution in Federal court.” According to the memorandum, this goal would 

be obtained through the undercover purchase of firearms and other contraband 

at the storefront. One ATF agent in Milwaukee told us that the agents’ purchase 

of narcotics enhanced their credibility with criminals. Despite the ASAC’s 

previous determination that the storefront should target violent crime 

throughout the city, the memorandum identified police District Two as the 

proposed storefront location and stated that it would target “violent crime and 

gang crimes on the south side of Milwaukee, specifically District 2.” The 

memorandum included a summary of the street and motorcycle gangs operating 

in District Two and the pertinent crime statistics. The memorandum did not 

reference Districts Five or Seven and did not provide any crime statistics for 

those jurisdictions, though ATF had statistics for those Districts as well. We 

were unable to determine what caused the proposal to specifically target crime 

in District Two and to state that District Two would be the storefront location , 

though as noted below the storefront did not end up in that District. 

In late November or early December 2011, the case agent identified a 

commercial property that she believed was suitable from a security standpoint 

for a storefront operation on East Meinecke Avenue in police District Five. The 

case agent told us that her survey of the surrounding neighborhood raised no 

security or public safety concerns and that she considered the location ideal 

because it was in neutral gang territory and was accessible from both the north 

and south sides of the city. The primary undercover agent, acting in an 

undercover capacity, signed a lease for the property on December 12, 2011. 

The St. Paul Field Division did not inform ATF Headquarters that the lease 

was for space located in District Five, and not in District Two. According to the 

ASAC, the location change was dictated entirely by operational considerations 

and he did not consider the change problematic because ATF Headquarters was 

not familiar with the City of Milwaukee. However, he also told the OIG that if 

the situation arose again, he would include general crime statistics for the City 

of Milwaukee in the storefront proposal memorandum instead of statistics 

specific to District Two. 

The storefront proposal was approved by the DAD via e-mail on 

November 22, 2011, the day after the authorization memorandum was 

submitted. Written approval followed on December 19, 2011, when the DAD 

and the Chief of the Special Operations Division noted their approval on the 

memorandum without comments or modifications. On December 19, 2011, the 

Milwaukee Field Office submitted its first Monitored Case Briefing Paper for the 

29 We determined that ATF did not consult with DEA about its investigative findings while 

the storefront was in operation. 

37
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

storefront. The paper focused on District Two and described various street and 

motorcycle gangs operating in that area, but did not mention that the storefront 

was actually located in District Five. The ASAC told the OIG that the focus of 

the storefront had changed by this time and the paper should have been 

updated to reflect that. The URC convened on January 9, 2012, and approved 

the storefront on the basis of the November memorandum. No personnel from 

the St. Paul Field Division attended the URC meeting and no materials relating to 

the Milwaukee storefront were considered other than the authorization 

memorandum. The URC’s approval was transmitted to the field office on 

February 6, 2012. 

B. Planning 

ATF and MPD personnel assigned to the storefront began physically 

modifying the leased space in January 2012 to fit the needs of the operation. 

ATF technical personnel installed 15 surveillance cameras and 12 microphones 

throughout the building. Merchandise for the storefront was obtained primarily 

from ATF personnel in Portland, Oregon, who had recently concluded a 

storefront operation. Some merchandise also came from an MPD investigation. 

ATF’s Undercover Branch (UCB) assisted the storefront by providing undercover 

identities for agents involved in the operation and putting agents in Milwaukee in 

contact with other ATF agents who had conducted storefront operations. In 

addition, ATF Columbus Field Division personnel with storefront experience 

travelled to Milwaukee in January to view the storefront and provide advice. 

The Milwaukee agents told the OIG that security planning for the 

storefront was handled in several ways. According to the case agent, the initial 

step in the security evaluation was locating a building that met the operation’s 

needs. The case agent stated that the building that had been selected in late 

November or early December 2011 was ideal for a number of reasons. First, the 

building itself was large enough for the cover team to share the space inside the 

building. Second, there were multiple entrance points to the building and, given 

the residential character of the neighborhood, the cover team was able to enter 

and exit the building without an escort. Third, the neighborhood had little foot 

traffic and a commercial building across the street closed in the early afternoon. 

The ASAC told the OIG that this lack of foot traffic was important in minimizing 

risk to the public. The RAC also noted that the location was not close to any 

areas where children would gather, such as a school or daycare center. 

The RAC stated that ATF personnel in Milwaukee determined that six law 

enforcement officers – two undercover agents and four members of the cover 

team – were required to staff the storefront. The cover team was located inside 

the storefront building and there was no outside cover team. The RAC told us 

that the DTA for the St. Paul Field Division, who visited the storefront in late 

January to view the location and conduct tactical training, concurred with this 

assessment and recommended a four-person cover team. According to the 

ASAC, this was “standard operating procedure” and an outside cover team 

“wasn’t routinely done” in other ATF storefronts. The ASAC also said that, given 

the layout of the building and the ease with which the cover team could exit, 

38
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

many of the benefits of an outside cover team could be accomplished by the 

inside cover team in Operation Fearless. The DTA told us that he provided 

advice on the use of a cover team, but could not recall why an outside team was 

not used. As discussed below, the absence of an outside cover team became a 

potential factor in a dangerous situation that played out during the operation of 

the storefront. 

The DTA’s tactical training also included discussion of other security and 

safety issues relevant to the storefront, such as planning for the rescue of an 

undercover agent. Agents told us that the storefront team frequently discussed 

safety issues and contingency plans, though nothing was put in writing. These 

discussions included strategies for reacting to an attempted robbery of the 

storefront and “blue on blue” situations, where local police unknowingly enter or 

raid the storefront as part of an investigation. The case agent described as a 

result of these discussions the decision to enter the storefront location and the 

undercover agents’ identities into a law enforcement deconfliction database in 

order to alert the storefront team to any potential police activity. Also, as a 

result of these discussions, the TFOs assigned to the storefront were assigned 

MPD radios as a way to alert MPD in case of an emergency. 

We asked agents about the potential for the storefront to generate crime 

and how this issue affected their planning and operation of the storefront. The 

agents told us they were attentive to the issue and recognized that the 

storefront could create incentives for people to commit crimes. The case agent 

told the OIG that they decided to avoid purchasing personal property based on 

other storefronts’ experience with this activity creating a market for stolen 

goods. Agents told us that they also reviewed the crime reports on an ongoing 

basis for the neighborhood surrounding the storefront to ensure there was no 

increase in local crime, though we did not find any instances where they 

changed their operations as a result. Agents also told us that all firearms 

purchased through the storefront were immediately entered into the National 

Crime Information Center (NCIC) to determine if they were stolen.30 However, 

the case agent told us that the firearms were not traced immediately and that 

they decided to postpone tracing “until the conclusion of the investigation so 

that nobody got tipped off.” 

On the issue of gun walking, the authorization memorandum for the 

operation stated, “Under no circumstances will firearms sales or walking of 

firearms take place.” Agents told us that they believed they were required to 

purchase all firearms from any known felon or other person prohibited from 

possessing a firearm, a status agents would learn from criminal history checks 

conducted as they identified individuals before or while they were at the 

storefront. The RAC told us that both the ASAC and USAO were adamant that 

30 The NCIC is a computerized database containing criminal justice information that is 

accessible to law enforcement agencies nationwide. 

39
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

no guns be allowed to walk. This issue was of heightened concern due to the 

controversy surrounding ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious. 

In early January 2012, ATF contacted the FBI about participating in 

Operation Fearless. The ASAC stated that he thought this would be a good 

opportunity to strengthen the relationship between ATF and FBI locally, and he 

briefed the SAC on the proposal. The FBI agreed to participate and detailed an 

agent to the operation’s cover team. The FBI agent joined the storefront in midJanuary and helped set up the storefront and assisted on the cover team in its 

early operations. However, the FBI agent told us he had a number of concerns 

about the operation’s tactical planning and security, such as the undercover 

rescue plan being insufficiently detailed. The FBI agent told the OIG that his 

concerns were not taken seriously by ATF personnel and were never addressed 

in any meaningful way. The agent was also concerned that any intelligence 

developed during the storefront’s operation would not be used due to ATF’s 

decision not to disseminate such information until the operation concluded. The 

FBI agent communicated these concerns and others to his FBI supervisors, one 

of whom told the OIG that she shared the agent’s concerns and became 

“uncomfortable” with the entire operation. ATF and FBI supervisors met to 

discuss the FBI’s concerns, which included security issues and intelligence 

dissemination, but no resolution was reached. The FBI subsequently decided to 

end its participation in the storefront. The FBI agent’s last day working on it 

was February 28, 2012, meaning that the FBI’s active participation while the 

storefront was operational lasted less than 3 weeks. The decision to withdraw 

from the storefront was made by the FBI ASAC and SSA, and neither the ATF 

SAC nor ATF Headquarters were informed or required to be informed of the FBI’s 

withdrawal from the operation. 

C. Operations 

The storefront opened to the public on February 8, 2012. In the first few 

months of the operation, ATF sought to attract customers by sending the 

undercover agents to various parts of Milwaukee to advertise the storefront. 

Agents visited bars, parking lots, and street corners in high crime areas and 

passed out flyers for the legitimate goods to be sold at the storefront. They 

sometimes brought store merchandise with them, such as sneakers or jerseys, 

and conducted transactions with people they encountered. The undercover 

agents also paid individuals to hand out or post flyers in an attempt to attract 

business to the storefront. 

ATF struggled to attract criminals to the storefront during its initial 

months of operation. Undercover agents did not purchase their first firearm 

until May 2012 and purchases totaled only five by the end of June. In May 

2012, the case agent began using a confidential informant (CI) in an attempt to 

attract more targets to the storefront that the CI knew were involved with drug 

and firearms trafficking. The CI proved effective in this regard, but was also 

unreliable and interjected himself into deals at the storefront despite being 

40
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

repeatedly instructed by the agents not to do so. ATF eventually stopped using 

the CI due to these issues.31 

Business at the storefront increased significantly in July 2012. Agents 

purchased 23 firearms during that month, compared to 5 firearm purchases in 

the prior 5 months. The trend continued into August and September when 54 

and 62 firearms were purchased, respectively. One agent attributed the 

increase in activity to word finally spreading that the storefront was buying 

firearms. The increase in business created an overwhelming administrative 

workload for the storefront team, yet the ATF and MPD did not increase the staff 

size assigned to the operation. As a result, agents struggled to meet 

administrative deadlines set by ATF policy for completing reports and logging 

evidence. See ATF Order 3270.10C § 3.b; ATF Order 3400.1B § 2.b. We also 

were told by many of the agents that the lack of resources and personnel also 

hindered the agents’ ability to pursue leads, conduct adequate surveillance on 

suspects, and develop intelligence. According to one agent, this situation was 

especially problematic during the takedown phase of the operation when the 

team lacked intelligence on certain suspects. The period of increased activity 

also created a financial strain for ATF. According to the Acting RAC, he 

struggled on a daily basis to obtain enough money to buy guns and drugs to 

keep the storefront operating. 

It was during this period of increased activity at the storefront that agents 

were confronted with a potentially dangerous situation. On July 13, 2012, a 

known felon entered the storefront for a pre-arranged narcotics transaction with 

the primary undercover agent. According to an ATF report of investigation, 

during the meeting the felon showed the agent a silver revolver and armor 

piercing bullets. The agent immediately attempted to purchase the revolver 

from the felon, who stated that he “would sell it for $250.00, but he wanted to 

keep it at that time because he needed it to go and retaliate against some 

people that had shot his cousin recently.” The felon stated he would bring the 

gun to the storefront for the agent to purchase after he handled that situation. 

The felon then left the storefront with the revolver. 

The undercover agents on duty immediately closed the storefront and 

informed the cover team of the situation. A TFO contacted an MPD lieutenant, 

MPD neighborhood task force, and MPD’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit to inform 

them about the felon’s statements, including where the shooting would be likely 

to occur. ATF also notified the local District Attorney of the situation. According 

to the TFO, MPD saturated the neighborhood where the threatened retaliation 

was to occur and also attempted to locate the felon. However, he was not 

located and agents did not obtain any information suggesting the retaliatory 

attack was carried out. The undercover agent reestablished contact with the 

felon in the following weeks, including the periodic exchange of text messages 

31 Three state prosecutions for drug offenses at the storefront were later dropped by the 

Milwaukee District Attorney’s Office because ATF had lost contact with the CI who had been 

directly involved in the transactions. 

41
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and at least one face-to-face meeting on July 30 in which agents paid the felon 

$50 to pass out flyers advertising the storefront. While there also was 

discussion about another possible firearms transaction that did not occur, there 

was no further mention of the gun and bullets that had been discussed with the 

felon previously, and ATF did not attempt to arrest him. The case agent stated 

that given the amount of time that had elapsed, combined with the absence of 

word of a shooting involving the felon in the community, the storefront team 

decided that the immediate threat had passed and they would focus on 

“perfect[ing] criminal charges on” the felon. Ultimately, the felon was arrested 

by local authorities in Minnesota on November 17, 2012, on charges unrelated 

to the storefront. Multiple team members told the OIG that the lack of an 

outside cover team limited the storefront team’s ability to follow and ultimately 

interdict the felon on July 13. The Acting RAC called the lack of an outside cover 

team “an obvious flaw” that was exposed by this incident. 

D. Oversight 

Oversight of Operation Fearless was impacted by substantial turnover 

among supervisors; in fact, the operation was managed most of the time by 

supervisors who were in acting capacities. The ASAC who initiated the operation 

was transferred to another field division in early February 2012 just before the 

storefront became operational. The RAC was named Acting ASAC at that time 

and an agent who had no involvement in the initiation of the storefront became 

the Acting RAC. Then, in late July 2012, just as the storefront was beginning to 

attract more customers, the Acting ASAC was transferred to another ATF office 

and a second Acting ASAC was placed over the operation. This second Acting 

ASAC was located in St. Paul, had no prior involvement with the storefront, and 

was the lone ASAC for the entire St. Paul Field Division, which then had 62 

agents covering 278 counties in the states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the 

Dakotas. ATF did not assign a permanent RAC and ASAC to Milwaukee until 

after the storefront had ceased operations. Further, the DAD who originally 

approved the operation left his post in early March 2012 and the position 

remained vacant until mid-June. The SAC for the St. Paul Field Division was the 

only supervisor who remained in his position for the entirety of the operation. 

Both agents and supervisors told us that the turnover in supervisors 

negatively affected the operation. In addition to creating a sense of instability, 

many of the incoming supervisors were not adequately briefed on the storefront. 

The second Acting ASAC told us that he knew little about the storefront prior to 

becoming Acting ASAC and had limited conversations with his predecessor about 

the operation. Likewise, the Acting RAC stated that he had little knowledge of 

the storefront prior to assuming his position and initially had little involvement 

with the storefront even after becoming Acting RAC. He stated that his 

predecessor, who became the first Acting ASAC, had primary responsibility for 

dealing with the storefront while he worked on other matters in the Milwaukee 

office. The Acting RAC said his involvement in the storefront increased 

significantly after the first Acting ASAC departed. When we asked the SAC 

about the turnover in supervisors, he told us that in hindsight he should have 

requested that ATF Headquarters send an experienced ASAC to oversee the 

42
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

storefront after the initial ASAC was transferred in February 2012. The SAC said 

the initial ASAC’s anticipated involvement in and supervision of the storefront 

was an important factor in his approval of the operation. 

Personnel turnover also impacted the amount of day-to-day supervision 

during the course of the storefront. The case agent told us that she was in 

constant contact with the initial RAC during the early phases of the storefront 

and also in regular communication with the initial ASAC. However, that contact 

diminished after the initial ASAC departed and the RAC became Acting ASAC. 

The case agent told us that the Acting RAC, who continued to carry his own 

caseload, was not as available as a full-time supervisor, and that she, the case 

agent, did not meet with the Acting ASAC as often as she did when he had been 

her RAC because she was attempting to adhere to the chain of command. That 

agent said that after the Acting ASAC was replaced with yet another Acting 

ASAC, she had very little contact with that level of supervision. 

According to the SAC, his primary source of information about the conduct 

of Operation Fearless was the weekly updates provided by the responsible ASAC 

and the monthly MCP updates. The MCP updates, typically provided in 

PowerPoint slides, included an overview of the narcotics and firearms purchases, 

profiles of potential defendants, an accounting of funds expended to date, and a 

summary of the operation’s goals. The SAC stated that he had little, if any, 

interaction with the case agent and the Acting RAC who had assumed immediate 

supervision over the operation. 

As part of the MCP, the SAC was required to provide monthly briefings 

and written materials about the storefront to the DAD and ATF Headquarters 

staff. With the exception of the initial MCP briefing, the SAC was the only 

person from the St. Paul Field Division with knowledge of the storefront who 

participated in the MCP briefings. An ATF Headquarters staff member attended 

the briefings and took notes, which primarily consisted of information that was 

included in the PowerPoint slides used to brief the SAC. Our review of the notes 

from these briefings reflect that few problems or issues were discussed 

regarding Operation Fearless until September 2012, when the primary 

undercover agent’s firearms were stolen (as discussed in Section G below). The 

case agent, Acting RAC, and Acting ASAC each told the OIG that they received 

almost no feedback from the MCP briefings. 

E. Vulnerable Persons 

We asked agents about their approach to vulnerable populations during 

the storefront operation. Agents stated that they did not target or interact with 

juveniles, and we found no evidence that contradicted this. Agents also told us 

that they did not target persons with I/DD for enforcement action or otherwise 

use them to further their investigation. However, one defendant prosecuted as 

a result of the storefront was diagnosed as “mildly mentally retarded” during a 

court-ordered evaluation following the storefront operation. This defendant, a 

prior felon, was indicted in federal court on eight counts, including charges of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm and charges relating to the distribution 

43
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

of various narcotics. The defendant ultimately pled guilty to one count of being 

a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to probation for 4 years 

with 6 months’ home confinement. 

The primary undercover agent told the OIG that the undercover agents 

first met this defendant when they were distributing flyers for the storefront in a 

Wal-Mart parking lot in District Five. The primary undercover agent stated that 

the defendant called the number on the flyer and asked for a job. After 

declining to hire the defendant on a number of occasions, the primary 

undercover agent gave him $10 to distribute advertising flyers for the 

storefront. The agent stated that he hoped the defendant would be able to 

generate business for the storefront given the defendant’s connections to the 

neighborhood. For the remainder of the storefront, the ATF undercover agents 

intermittently paid the defendant to distribute flyers. The defendant also visited 

the storefront frequently and would often spend significant amounts of time 

speaking with the undercover agents. The storefront log that was maintained by 

the agents indicates that the defendant visited the storefront on at least 40 

separate occasions. The undercover agents told the defendant that they wanted 

to purchase narcotics and firearms; according to the agents, the defendant 

replied that he could help them. During the course of the storefront, the 

defendant arranged at least 10 deals between his associates and the undercover 

agents, including the sale of at least 9 firearms. For each transaction he 

brokered, agents paid the defendant in either cash or merchandise from the 

storefront. The defendant also sold narcotics or firearms directly to the agents 

on at least 5 occasions. 

Agents described the defendant to the OIG as an “unwitting informant” 

used to generate business for the storefront, and told us that they saw no signs 

that he was intellectually or developmentally disabled. The primary undercover 

agent described the defendant as “completely normal” and stated he was very 

surprised to learn of the defendant’s diagnosis. The case agent described the 

defendant as “articulate” and stated that he was always inserting himself into 

deals at the storefront. Other storefront team members echoed these 

descriptions, and added that that the defendant appeared “lonely” and 

considered the undercover agents at the storefront his “friends.” 

One of the TFOs assigned to the storefront stated that he used a program 

available to MPD personnel to research the prior criminal history of all suspects 

identified in connection with the storefront. The TFO stated that he used this 

program as a general practice out of both safety concerns for the undercover 

agents and to ensure that a potential target of the storefront could be 

prosecuted. The TFO stated that the criminal histories are “fairly detailed” and 

he noticed no red flags in the defendant’s file reflecting that mental capacity was 

raised as a defense in any of his prior criminal cases. The AUSA who initially 

handled the defendant’s case told the OIG that he did not notice any I/DD issues 

when interviewing the defendant during a debriefing. During our investigation, 

which included a review of storefront videos, we found no evidence that the 

agents believed that the defendant was intellectually or developmentally 

44
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

disabled. In addition, we found no evidence that the agents targeted individuals 

because of their I/DD. 

F. Closure and Results 

ATF closed the storefront following the theft of an undercover agent’s 

firearm from his vehicle and the discovery during the investigation of that 

incident that the storefront’s cover had been compromised. The undercover 

agents assigned to the storefront typically parked their government-owned 

vehicles in a secure parking garage and then drove an undercover vehicle to the 

storefront. However, on September 13, 2012, the primary undercover agent 

parked his government-owned SUV in the parking lot of a coffee shop, where he 

was picked up by another undercover agent and driven to the storefront in an 

undercover vehicle. The primary undercover agent told the OIG that he parked 

at the coffee shop because he had to leave the storefront early that day and the 

coffee shop was closer to the storefront – about one mile away – than the 

secure parking garage. The case agent stated that the storefront team had 

used the coffee shop for “occasional parking” throughout the course of the 

operation. When the primary undercover agent returned to his governmentowned SUV at approximately 3:25 p.m., he found it burglarized. Among other 

items, three ATF-issued firearms were stolen, including an M-4 .223 caliber rifle. 

These firearms had been stored in a locked vault in the rear of the SUV. ATF 

later concluded that the firearms had been stored in the vehicle in accordance 

with agency policy. 

The theft was immediately reported to MPD and ATF initiated a separate 

investigation, led by the Acting RAC, that focused on the stolen firearms. The 

day after the theft, a suspect entered the storefront and sold the primary 

undercover agent one of the stolen firearms. The suspect also gave the 

undercover agents descriptions of the other stolen firearms and told them he 

would bring them to the storefront. However, the suspect never produced the 

firearms and undercover agents at the storefront were unable to recover the 

remaining two stolen firearms. 

One of the witnesses interviewed by the Acting RAC during his 

investigation of the stolen firearms stated that he knew of individuals “who were 

selling guns to some ‘White, Undercover, ATF person.’” The Acting ASAC told us 

that this information, coupled with the circumstances of the theft, led him to 

conclude that the storefront’s operational security had been compromised and 

informed his SAC of his assessment. Similar concerns were expressed by the 

U.S. Attorney who, after learning of the theft, contacted the SAC to request that 

the storefront be shut down. The SAC told us that after he was informed of the 

theft, he directed all ATF personnel in Milwaukee to focus on recovering the 

stolen firearms, and that after learning the information from the interview 

indicating a possible compromise, he immediately ordered the storefront closed. 

The storefront was closed on September 22, 2012. The SAC told the OIG 

that he instructed personnel in Milwaukee that the undercover agents should not 

return to the storefront and that it should be emptied out as soon as possible. 

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This instruction was communicated to the relevant personnel by the new RAC 

who had recently arrived in Milwaukee. The case agent stated that law 

enforcement equipment and records and other sensitive materials were removed 

from the storefront over the next week. However, some of these items 

remained and much of the storefront’s merchandise and electronic equipment 

was not immediately removed because the agents were “working through [the] 

logistics” of how to move the items and where to distribute them. The agent 

also said the storefront was kept largely intact in anticipation of a tour by MPD 

command staff. 

On October 10, 2011, agents discovered that the storefront had been 

burglarized and that much of the merchandise was stolen, including clothing, 

televisions, and DVD players. A DEA money counting machine and an ATF 

tactical ballistic bunker were also stolen.

32 ATF estimated the value of the stolen 

property to be in excess of $39,000. Surveillance cameras still present in the 

storefront were examined, but it was determined that they had ceased working 

on October 7, 2011, when electrical power to the building was lost after the 

electrical meter had been vandalized.33 Months after the agents discovered the 

burglary, the landlord of the property found an ATF operational plan in the 

building.34 

ATF records show that the undercover agents purchased 144 firearms 

from 22 defendants during the course of the storefront. Undercover agents also 

purchased narcotics in 68 separate transactions. Overall, 31 defendants were 

arrested, 15 on federal charges and 16 on state charges. Thirteen of the 15 

federal defendants had prior felony convictions, and all pled guilty. Six cases in 

state court were ultimately dismissed. Three of the dismissals involved 

mistaken identification by the undercover agents, including one individual who 

was incarcerated at the time of the alleged crime. The other three cases were 

dismissed after the state prosecutor discovered that ATF had lost all contact with 

the confidential informant involved in the underlying transactions at the 

storefront as noted above.

35 

Though most ATF personnel we interviewed expressed disappointment 

about how the storefront ended, they also considered the operation a success in 

32 A tactical ballistic bunker is a shield used to protect against bullets and other 

projectiles. Two unidentified males turned in the stolen tactical ballistic bunker to an MPD police 

station shortly after the burglary. They reportedly found the bunker in a nearby alley. The DEA 

money counter machine had been loaned to ATF for the operation and was never recovered. 

33 The storefront building was damaged during the period of ATF’s lease and, according to 

the landlord, some property belonging to the landlord was also taken. Upon learning the true 

identity of his tenant, the landlord demanded compensation from ATF for all damaged and missing 

property. This resulted in a lengthy and contentious dispute between the landlord and ATF. ATF 

ultimately paid the landlord $25,000 to settle the claim. 

34 OPRSO was not able to determine who was responsible for the security breach of 

leaving the operational plan at the storefront site. 

35 We did not track the results of the other 11 state cases. 

46
 
 

 

terms of the number of firearms seized and felons prosecuted. The SAC added 

that he considered Operation Fearless to be a “good operation” even with the 

shortcomings later identified. However, there were not organizational cases 

investigated or made as a result of the storefront operation, and it does not 

appear that ATF attempted to determine through reviewing crime statistics or 

otherwise whether and to what extent it made an impact on the crime problems 

it was intended to address. 

G. ATF’s Review of Operation Fearless 

As noted earlier, following Congressional inquiries and media attention 

regarding Operation Fearless, former ATF Director Jones ordered ATF’s Office of 

Professional Responsibility and Security Operations (OPRSO) to conduct a 

management review of the operation. OPRSO issued its report on March 21, 

2013. The report made numerous findings concerning the planning and 

management of Operation Fearless, including the following: 

•	 The storefront’s insufficient staffing contributed to operational 

deficiencies. 

•	 Nearly half of the reports of investigation were not timely 

completed. 

•	 Evidence was not handled in accordance with ATF policy. 

•	 Operational planning concerning blue-on-blue situations, or 

situations involving the presence of uniformed law enforcement at 

the storefront, was insufficient. 

•	 Planning for interdicting and arresting targets away from the 

storefront was insufficient, as evidenced by the failure to interdict 

the felon who left the storefront armed. 

•	 “[T]he practice of purchasing every firearm presented for sale, 

regardless of expense, was a deficient and risky practice and 

reflected a misunderstanding of [ATF] policy regarding firearms 

transfers.” 

•	 A marijuana plant was improperly used as a prop during the 

operation. 

•	 The misidentification of storefront targets was attributed to the 

failure of agents to conduct sufficient investigation to confirm the 

undercover agents’ initial identifications. 

•	 Deficient operational security for the storefront contributed to the 

storefront’s burglary and jeopardized officer safety. 

•	 Deficient management of the lease of the storefront premises 

compounded the operational security problems. 

•	 In connection with a dispute involving the landlord and a utility 

company, the case agent improperly opened the landlord’s mail and 

47
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

another agent improperly impersonated the landlord in a phone 

conversation with the utility company. 

•	 The case agent and first-line supervisors failed to report problems 

with the storefront to management, resulting in the failure of the 

MCP to identify and correct deficiencies in the planning and 

management of the case. 

•	 The SAC, ASACs, and Field Management staff administering the 

MCP failed to “critically or proactively inquire[] whether the 

operation was as free from problems as was being reported.” 

Based on its review, OPRSO recommended that ATF should develop 

comprehensive guidelines and “best practices” for undercover storefront 

operations, and made numerous recommendations in this regard. As discussed 

earlier, this led to the revised 2013 storefront policy and guidance. In addition, 

OPRSO recommended that several of its findings be referred to the Assistant 

Director for appropriate disciplinary or corrective action. This recommendation 

led to one supervisor being issued a letter of reprimand and five other 

individuals being issued memoranda of caution.36 

IV. The St. Louis Storefront – Operation Hustle City (2013) 

ATF operated an undercover storefront in St. Louis, Missouri from January 

30, 20013, to June 12, 2013, in an area of the city beset with violent crime. 

According to FBI crime statistics, St. Louis is one of the most violent cities in 

America, with a rate of homicide and other violent crime that far exceeds that of 

communities with comparably sized populations. In 2012, the City had a 

population of approximately 320,000 within the much larger metropolitan area. 

In October 2012, ATF’s Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information (OSII) 

prepared an assessment that found that St. Louis had the highest rate of violent 

firearms-related crime for cities with populations over 250,000, and that much 

of this crime was concentrated in several police districts, including District Five 

where ATF located its storefront. 

A. Initiation 

In response to the level of violence in St. Louis, ATF began planning in 

approximately September 2012 for a major enforcement operation that involved 

a large but temporary influx of ATF personnel into the St. Louis region, referred 

to as “the surge.” The SAC for ATF’s Kansas City Field Division, which oversees 

ATF operations in St. Louis, told us that ATF had experienced success with 

“surge operations” in other cities where crime-related violence was a severe 

problem. ATF assigned approximately 80 agents from around the country to 

participate in operations with local law enforcement in St. Louis and East St. 

36 Under ATF policy, a letter of reprimand is a formal disciplinary action; a memorandum 

of caution is not, and the document is not included in an employee’s official personnel folder. 

48
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Louis, Illinois for a 4-month period beginning in April 2013. These efforts 

included the storefront, historical investigations, assistance to the St. Louis 

Police Department (SLPD) with shooting incidents, and other initiatives targeting 

violent offenders, the tracing of firearms, and the use of confidential informants 

and undercover agents. ATF transferred an ASAC from the Denver Field Division 

to oversee the surge operation. 

The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri told the OIG that he 

supported ATF’s surge and believed that the City of St. Louis merited federal 

assistance. He stated that one of the justifications for the expenditure of federal 

law enforcement resources to combat violent crime was present when the level 

of violence in a community was overwhelming local authorities. 

ATF agents told the OIG that they began discussing whether to use the 

undercover storefront technique while planning for the surge operation. ATF’s 

RAC in St. Louis said that the Kansas City Field Division had used the storefront 

technique in other cities within the Division, including Wichita, and believed it 

would work well in St. Louis. In addition, one of ATF’s most experienced 

undercover agents worked in St. Louis at the time and told us that he was eager 

to participate in a storefront operation and advocated for its use due to the level 

of violence in the city. The RAC, undercover agents, and case agent told us that 

they did not have prior storefront experience, though the undercover agents told 

us that they had received training on storefronts as part of an ATF advanced 

undercover course. 

Before deciding whether to initiate a storefront, agents in St. Louis 

consulted with other agents within ATF who had participated in storefront 

operations, the USAO, and the SLPD. The agents told us that they received 

positive feedback about the idea from all three sources. The RAC said that ATF 

staff had several meetings with the USAO in St. Louis prior to seeking 

authorization from ATF Headquarters.37 The U.S. Attorney told us he supported 

using a storefront based on experiences he had with the technique as a state 

prosecutor, and that he had suggested its use to his own staff before ATF 

recommended it to him.38 The RAC also told us that SLPD supported the 

storefront and that ATF would not have undertaken such an operation without 

SLPD’s cooperation and assistance. 

ATF entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the SLPD 

prior to commencing storefront operations in which SLPD committed to providing 

officers and staff to assist with the development of criminal intelligence, 

37 ATF also provided a briefing to state prosecutors after the storefront became 

operational. 

38 The U.S. Attorney also stated that while he agreed with and supported ATF’s use of a 

storefront, he did not believe that he specifically authorized it and accordingly did not provide a 

concurrence letter to ATF. ATF policy at the time did not require written concurrence from the 

U.S. Attorney to conduct a storefront operation, a requirement that was added in the March 2013 

Turk Memorandum issued following Operation Fearless, as described above. 

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including the identification of suspects. The Chief of the SLPD, Samuel Dotson, 

signed the MOU. He told us that it was important to him to “try to get as many 

cases as we can into the federal system” because the state courts routinely 

impose suspended sentences and probation and “[t]hose outcomes don't keep 

people safe.” The Chief of the Violent Crime Unit at the USAO expressed similar 

concerns. She told us that the state judges in St. Louis “are very lenient on gun 

crimes” and that her office repeatedly has seen referrals for prosecution where 

the subject has received four or five suspended sentences from state judges. 

By November 2012, ATF decided to include the storefront in the surge and 

the RAC and a case agent began to prepare a proposal to ATF Headquarters. 

The agents told us that a key consideration in their decision to proceed with the 

storefront was safety for the agents and the public. They stated that a 

storefront provided a secure location for them to meet with criminals and 

minimized risk to the public. They also stated that they favored the storefront 

technique because they believed that it would result in the seizure of firearms 

from violent offenders. 

Agents told us that they inspected several possible storefront locations. 

ATF intelligence analysts had collected crime statistics by police district in St. 

Louis and the agents focused their search for a suitable property in areas that 

were the most violent. They eventually settled on a site in St. Louis’ Jeff Vander 

Lou neighborhood in police District Five. According to the RAC, the area had the 

highest crime rate in the city. Chief Dotson told us that the storefront was in 

the “right spot” and that the surrounding neighborhood was “challenged by 

violence.” 

In late November 2012, the SAC for the Kansas City Field Division 

submitted a memorandum to ATF Headquarters seeking authorization for a 

storefront that would operate as a tattoo parlor and retail clothing store. The 

memorandum identified two primary objectives for the storefront: “the 

gathering of criminal intelligence” and “the investigation and prosecution of 

violent armed criminals, firearms traffickers, armed drug traffickers, repeat 

offenders, and gang members.” Agents told us that they expected to obtain 

intelligence about activities in the area from dealing with persons who visited 

the storefront. They also stated that the storefront was targeted on dangerous 

criminals collectively and not specific individuals, though ATF hoped to attract 

members of gangs who were known to operate in the vicinity of the storefront 

location. Prior to the start of storefront operations, ATF undercover agents had 

made drug purchases from members of a particularly notorious local gang and 

hoped to attract them to the storefront. Chief Dotson told us that due to the 

level of violence in the neighborhood surrounding the storefront, a narrow focus 

on a few individuals was not advisable and that “a larger net was actually a good 

thing in St. Louis.” ATF agents, staff from the USAO, and Chief Dotson also 

stated that targeting particular gangs and their leadership in St. Louis is difficult 

because the structure of gangs there is far more diffuse and less organized than 

in some other major cities, such as Los Angeles or Chicago. 

50
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ATF’s Undercover Branch (UCB) assisted with processing the storefront 

proposal at ATF Headquarters, including facilitating a meeting of the Undercover 

Review Committee (URC) on December 14, 2012. ATF Headquarters approved 

the proposal on December 20, 2012, and ATF staff in St. Louis entered into a 

year-long lease for the storefront the same month. Agents told us that they had 

no conflicts with the landlord during the operation of the storefront. 

B. Planning 

As part of ATF’s planning for the storefront, agents completed a security 

assessment before operations commenced. The SAC told us that numerous 

agents were involved in the assessment, including the St. Louis RAC, the case 

agent, the undercover agents, and the DTA for the Kansas City Field Division. 

The RAC told us that the assessment evaluated security from the perspective of 

the agents as well as the public generally. We interviewed the DTA who told us 

that he reviewed an operational plan for the storefront, visited the storefront 

and examined its layout, and provided advice to the agents concerning the 

possibility of a critical incident inside the storefront, such as an attempted 

robbery. However, the DTA said that he did not evaluate the possibility of a 

shooting on the sidewalk in front of the storefront. The RAC told us that he 

evaluated that possibility, and that the agents on the outside cover team would 

have been responsible for handling such a situation. 

Our review discovered that the Boys and Girls Club of Greater St. Louis 

(“Club”) is located approximately 600 feet from the site of the former storefront. 

The Club provides after-school programs for children, and OIG staff observed 

children being dropped-off at the Club from a school bus during a visit to the 

storefront location. The view between this drop-off site at the Club, as well as a 

large portion of the Club’s façade, and the storefront was unobstructed during 

the period when the storefront was operational. With the exception of the RAC 

and one agent assigned to the outside cover team, ATF staff told us that they 

were not aware that the Club was near the storefront. The RAC told us that he 

did not consider the proximity of the Club to the storefront to be problematic 

because it was an urban environment and in the Jeff Vander Lou neighborhood 

the children likely were safer with the ATF agents close-by. However, the DTA 

said that the Club’s presence would have been a concern to him if he had known 

about it, and that conducting operations when “children are coming or going is 

never a good idea.” ATF Headquarters staff, including participants on the URC, 

said that the proximity of the Club should have been disclosed to them. 

Moreover, the supervising DAD in the Office of Field Operations who participated 

in the URC told the OIG that he was not aware of the Club and that he would not 

have approved the storefront unless it was closed during periods when children 

were at the Club or the Field Division presented a compelling reason why the 

storefront could not be sited elsewhere. 

Agents told us that they developed contingency plans if a known felon or 

other person prohibited from possessing a firearm attempted to leave the 

storefront with a firearm. Agents indicated that they were under verbal 

instructions from their supervisors to interdict such persons. They stated that 

51
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

on one occasion, however, a known felon with a firearm evaded them. They 

said that he entered the storefront and showed the undercover agents a firearm, 

which the agents offered to purchase. He refused and then exited the 

storefront. One of the agents followed him but he escaped in an unidentified 

vehicle that was parked in an alley adjacent to the storefront. 

As a result of its security assessment, ATF made a number of physical 

modifications to the storefront, including the installation of an alarm system and 

adding locks to doors. The agents also stated that after the storefront became 

operational, they did not leave sensitive items such as ATF paperwork, firearms, 

or other evidence in the storefront overnight. According to the agents, there 

were no robbery attempts at the storefront, no threats of violence, and no thefts 

or burglaries. 

Members of the storefront team told us that the controversy surrounding 

Operation Fearless in Milwaukee impacted their planning for the storefront. 

After news reporting about Operation Fearless appeared in late January 2013, 

which was after ATF Headquarters had approved the St. Louis storefront but 

before it was operational, the RAC and agents met to discuss the errors 

identified from the news reporting, such as the reported lack of security at the 

storefront and carelessness in handling of law enforcement sensitive documents, 

and that they committed not to repeat them in St. Louis. Staff from the USAO 

also inquired with ATF about the reported errors made in Operation Fearless. 

This included a call from the U.S. Attorney to former Director Jones, in which the 

U.S. Attorney was provided assurances that the errors in Operation Fearless 

would not be repeated in St. Louis. 

We asked agents about the potential for the storefront to generate crime 

and how this issue affected their planning and operation of the storefront. 

Agents told us that they discussed the issue after the concerns about the 

Milwaukee storefront became public, and that they recognized that the 

storefront could create incentives for people to commit crimes, such as stealing 

firearms and then selling them at the storefront. Agents stated that to address 

this problem they promptly completed firearms traces to see if the firearms had 

been stolen or recently purchased. ATF Headquarters’ guidance issued to 

remedy problems identified from the Milwaukee storefront required agents to 

promptly enter information into NIBIN and to perform traces. This practice was 

not followed in the Wichita and Milwaukee storefronts, both of which predated 

the guidance. Agents in these storefronts told us that they delayed running 

traces out of concern that an FFL may learn of the trace and disclose it to the 

purchaser. The St. Louis agents said that they identified one seller who had 

purchased two firearms and then brought them directly to the storefront and 

sold them there, and that they subsequently refused to purchase additional 

firearms from this individual. The undercover agents also told us that they 

always attempted to bargain down the price of the firearms and not to overpay 

for them so as not to provide an incentive to steal guns for a large sum of 

money. 

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C. Operations 

ATF records show that the storefront opened on January 30, 2013, and 

that agents purchased three firearms that day. ATF’s UCB provided some 

logistical support for the opening, such as “backstopping” the false identities of 

the undercover agents.39 However, agents told us that the UCB did not provide 

training to the case agent or the undercover team assigned to the storefront. 

The case agent also told us that he was never provided written guidance on how 

to manage a storefront operation. 

Agents stated that the storefront was open Tuesday through Friday from 

approximately 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., and that they used Mondays to 

complete reports and other administrative matters. Typically, 7 to 10 agents 

and detectives from the SLPD worked at the storefront. These included 2 

undercover agents, 2 to 3 agents and a detective assigned to an “inside cover 

team” which was positioned in a room adjacent to the public areas of the 

storefront, and 2 to 4 agents and detectives assigned to an “outside cover team” 

stationed in vehicles around the storefront. The case agent, who was assigned 

to the inside cover team, was responsible for administrative matters, including 

the processing of evidence. The agents told us that they had no prior storefront 

experience, though one of the undercover agents had extensive undercover 

experience. Both undercover agents had received some limited storefront 

training in an ATF advanced undercover course. 

Although ATF originally contemplated operating the storefront as a tattoo 

parlor and clothing retail establishment, agents said that after the problems in 

Operation Fearless became public they received instructions from their 

supervisors to limit the operation to tattooing services, apparently because of 

the risk of theft of undercover goods. The agents in St. Louis said that they 

retained a confidential informant with a tattoo license, who they learned about 

from ATF agents in Kansas City who had recently used him in an undercover 

storefront operation that masqueraded as a tattoo parlor. According to the 

agents in St. Louis, the informant functioned as a “prop” to give the St. Louis 

storefront legitimacy as a tattoo parlor and, while he did perform some tattoo 

services, he was not involved in any drug or firearms transactions at the 

storefront. We did not find evidence that contradicted these statements. 

Our review of ATF’s file on the informant showed that an ATF agent in 

Kansas City had most recently completed a suitability review of him on January 

7, 2013, approximately 3 weeks prior to the opening of the St. Louis storefront. 

The agents in St. Louis said that they did not thereafter vet the informant and 

39 “Backstopping” involves the provision of documents and information to support the 

undercover agent’s fictitious identity. 

53
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

did not check any criminal databases to determine whether he had any arrests 

during the period when he was working in the St. Louis storefront.40 

Serious allegations regarding the informant’s conduct while he worked for 

ATF in Kansas City arose approximately 3 weeks before the St. Louis storefront 

closed in mid-June 2013. A subject in another ATF case provided information 

indicating that the informant had been using cocaine and methamphetamine and 

selling narcotics while he was in Kansas City. When ATF agents from the Kansas 

City office interviewed the informant in St. Louis about the allegations, he 

admitted to using narcotics but denied selling them. He further disclosed that 

his girlfriend had revealed to a subject in the Kansas City storefront that he 

worked for law enforcement there. The RAC overseeing the St. Louis storefront 

told us that he knew about the allegations at the time but did not consider 

polygraphing the informant, and that he did not recall the girlfriend’s disclosures 

being a concern. The SAC and ASAC who supervised ATF operations in St. Louis 

received reports describing the interviews of the subject and informant. They 

stated that they believed that the USAO in St. Louis had been informed of the 

allegations. Other agents in the St. Louis storefront, including the case agent, 

told us that they were unaware of the drug abuse allegations and of the 

girlfriend’s disclosure. They stated that the girlfriend lived with the informant in 

St. Louis and that she occasionally visited him at the storefront. The ASAC 

supervising the surge and the storefront told us that he was unaware of any 

allegations concerning the informant consuming or trafficking in drugs either in 

St. Louis or Kansas City, or that the informant’s girlfriend had disclosed that he 

had worked with law enforcement, and that he should have been informed of 

that information. We also found that the derogatory information above was not 

included at that time or thereafter in ATF’s file on the informant, and was not 

raised in MCP briefings to staff at ATF Headquarters. 

Approximately 4 months following closure of the St. Louis storefront for 

unrelated reasons discussed below, the informant was charged with first degree 

sexual assault on a minor in another state, at which time ATF terminated its 

relationship with him. Agents who worked with the informant told us that they 

saw no indication that the informant had a fondness for children. 

D. Oversight 

We asked the agents about supervision of the storefront operations and 

were told that both field division and headquarters staff provided oversight. 

Agents told us that the RAC provided day-to-day supervision and was intimately 

involved in the operation. The case agent said that he spoke with the RAC at 

least once each day, and that the RAC often attended a briefing that the agents 

held each morning to prepare for the day’s events at the storefront. The ASAC 

overseeing the surge operations stated that he received a briefing at least twice 

40 At the time of the storefront’s operation, ATF policy required agents to conduct 

informant suitability reviews in January and July of each year. ATF O 3252.1. ATF’s current policy 

requires suitability reviews every 90 days. 

54
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a week about the storefront. The SAC told us that he spoke with his supervisors 

daily about the surge and, because the storefront was included in the MCP, he 

received a formal briefing about it each month from the RAC and case agent, as 

well as an MCP written submission that updated basic information about the 

operation, such as the amount of firearms and drugs that were purchased. 

The SAC stated that as required by the MCP he provided monthly briefings 

and written materials about the St. Louis storefront to the Office of Field 

Operations (OFO) DAD – the former SAC in St. Paul who oversaw Operation 

Fearless. The SAC or a designee from the Kansas City Field Division participated 

in six briefings for the DAD. An OFO staff member attended these briefings and 

told us that she recorded in her notes the questions that the DAD asked.41 Our 

review of these notes revealed that the DAD asked few questions. The SAC told 

us, however, that he had numerous discussions with the DAD about the 

storefront outside of the monthly MCP briefings he provided. 

In addition to briefings for the DAD, field division staff provided four 

briefings to former Director Jones. These occurred approximately 1 month after 

the storefront opened, twice midway through the operation, and 2 weeks after 

the storefront closed. OFO staff prepared written briefing materials for the 

Director with the assistance of the field division that presented information 

about the operation’s “progress, plans, and problems.” With each briefing, staff 

noted no problems with the storefront, and explanations about its progress 

generally were limited to reciting the amount of firearms and narcotics 

purchased and the number of suspects identified. Notes from the briefings 

showed that the Director and Deputy Director asked questions about the 

storefront related to anticipated charges against the defendants and liability 

issues regarding the work of the tattoo artist. 

Additional oversight was provided by the Undercover Branch (UCB), which 

conducted an on-site inspection of the St. Louis storefront in May 2013. 

Following the controversy surrounding Operation Fearless, the UCB organized 

inspections of its ongoing storefronts in accordance with the March 2013 Turk 

Memorandum. The inspection did not find any problems with the storefront 

operations. As with the MCP, the inspection did not identify issues with the 

confidential informant or of unevaluated risks related to the storefront’s 

proximity to the Boys and Girls Club. 

E. Vulnerable Persons 

Agents told us that they did not target persons with I/DD for enforcement 

action or otherwise use them to further their investigation. We found no 

evidence that contradicted these statements. Agents also said that they did not 

allow juveniles into the storefront and when found they were asked to leave. 

41 In addition to recording this information, OFO staff told us that to assist with oversight 

of the operation they reviewed entries that the storefront agents made in ATF’s case management 

system (N-Force). 

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F. Closure and Results 

ATF operated the storefront for approximately 20 weeks. The last event 

at the storefront was the arrest on its last day of operations, June 12, 2013, of a 

notorious gang member who was a person of interest in several homicides and 

shootings and had sold guns to the storefront on March 5 and April 6, 2013. 

The same day, ATF also arrested four persons who had visited the storefront 

previously and who had agreed to participate in a home invasion. Agents told 

us that the decision to close the storefront coincided with the end of the surge 

operations in St. Louis and was influenced by limitations on funding. The 

storefront was not closed due to the issues with the confidential informant 

described above. Agents stated that they wanted to complete arrests of the 

storefront defendants while agents assigned to the surge were still in St. Louis. 

Cash expenditures on the storefront totaled approximately $260,000. 

ATF records show that the storefront resulted in 235 undercover 

purchases, including 129 firearms, 363 grams of heroin, 153 grams of cocaine, 

and 26 grams of methamphetamine. Overall, 32 defendants were arrested, 25 

on federal charges and 7 on state charges. All of the federal defendants either 

pled guilty or were convicted at trial, 18 of the 25 had prior felony convictions. 

The federal sentences imposed ranged from 12 months and 1 day to 144 

months. 

With the exception of the home invasion mentioned above, the storefront 

operation did not generate new cases apart from ones against persons who 

entered the storefront. Agents told us that they lacked the manpower to 

identify the sources of supply for the drugs and firearms of the subjects who 

visited the storefront. ATF also was unsuccessful in developing new informants 

from the operations. 

Although one of the key objectives of the storefront was the collection of 

intelligence, we did not find evidence that the storefront generated intelligence 

about gangs or other criminal organizations that operated in the vicinity of the 

storefront and that was preserved by ATF. Nor did the storefront generate 

actionable intelligence about any gun trafficking organizations. ATF did not 

prepare an after-action report for the storefront or create any written 

intelligence products based on the information that the agents learned.42 

However, ATF developed historical evidence against individual subjects who 

entered the storefront based on their unlawful trafficking of firearms and/or 

narcotics there, and conducted traces on all firearms that the undercover agents 

purchased. ATF’s National Integrated Ballistics Imaging Network (NIBIN) 

program conducted an examination that linked one of the firearms purchased 

42 ATF did prepare an after-action report for its surge operation in St. Louis that included 

a 1-page description of the storefront; the report assessed crime statistics and concluded that the 

surge was “very successful.” With regard to the storefront, the report found that “[p]lanning, 

budgetary considerations and manpower allocations are all critical aspects related to storefront 

operations.” 

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during the storefront investigation to a homicide. This information was shared 

with the SLPD. An ATF agent told us that he believed that the information 

helped to solve the case. Agents also told us that they worked closely with the 

SLPD to identify suspects who entered the storefront, and that they did not have 

problems with misidentifications of these individuals. 

Agents and others involved with the storefront told us that they believed 

the storefront operation was a success. Chief Dotson told us that he believed 

that the storefront contributed to reducing crime on a short-term basis and that 

if ATF proposed another storefront in St. Louis he would support it. The Chief of 

the USAO Violent Crime Section also stated that she believed the storefront was 

worth the effort based on the number of firearms that ATF recovered and the 

number of defendants charged who were previously convicted felons. 

V.	 The Brockton/New Bedford Storefront – Operation Fugazi (2012­

2013) 

In addition to the four storefronts that operated from fixed locations, our 

review examined a mobile storefront that ATF conducted south of Boston in 

Brockton and New Bedford, Massachusetts using a cargo van. These cities are 

located approximately 25 and 60 miles respectively to the south of Boston and 

have populations of roughly 95,000 each. ATF agents told us that within ATF’s 

Boston Field Division, Brockton and New Bedford had significantly more crime 

than surrounding communities and were plagued by gang violence. In 2012, 

the cities had combined rates of violent crime that exceeded the national 

average by approximately 300 percent. ATF operated its mobile storefront from 

August 13, 2012 to September 26, 2013, but ceased operations during the 

winter months when few people were outdoors. 

A.	 Initiation 

ATF documents and e-mails show that the two agents who co-managed 

the storefront started discussing the possibility of using a storefront in early 

2012. They told us that they were attracted to the storefront technique because 

they believed it could be an effective way to fight violent crime without having 

to rely on confidential informants. One of the co-case agents stated that he had 

become frustrated with problems caused by his informants and wanted to try a 

new investigative technique that did not involve them. He said that a storefront 

appealed to him because it was staffed exclusively with law enforcement 

personnel. A supervisor who oversaw the storefront for a period told us that 

one of its advantages was that it provided a means to introduce undercover 

agents to a target directly without a middleman. 

Following these preliminary discussions the agents began exploring the 

possibility of using a vehicle rather than a building for their undercover 

operation. One of the co-case agents said that he began contacting colleagues 

he met when he attended the ATF academy as a new agent and asked them 

whether they had experience with storefront operations. He said that he 

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received a lot of feedback, including advice from an agent who had used a 

mobile storefront. The co-case agent said that he liked the mobile storefront 

option because the expense was significantly less than for a fixed location and it 

allowed agents to move the storefront to new crime “hot spots” at times that the 

agents selected. In addition to this potential benefit, the RAC based in 

Bridgewater who oversaw ATF operations in Brockton and New Bedford told us 

that he believed that the mobile storefront was not as labor-intensive as a fixed 

location storefront and that he would not have to devote an entire ATF agent 

group to the operation for several months. He said that the mobile storefront 

could operate for a few hours 2 or 3 days a week and his agents would remain 

available for other duties during off-hours. 

Before preparing a proposal to ATF Headquarters, agents met with an 

AUSA in the USAO in Boston. The AUSA told us that he conferred with his 

supervisors about the storefront and that they agreed to proceed with the 

investigation provided that it was closely supervised by ATF with advice from the 

USAO. ATF also obtained support from the Brockton and New Bedford Police 

Departments, which assigned task force officers to the operation. 

By late April 2012, the case agents had completed a proposed 

authorization memorandum for the storefront, which the SAC for ATF’s Boston 

Field Division forwarded to ATF Headquarters on April 25. The memorandum 

stated that the objective of the storefront was to identify gang members 

involved in the illegal possession and sale of firearms, monitor the activities of 

criminal “impact players,” and gather evidence against such persons through the 

undercover purchases of firearms and narcotics. Agents told us that they hoped 

either to purchase firearms at the location where the mobile storefront was 

parked, or make arrangement with subjects who visited the storefront to 

purchase the firearms elsewhere. Following review by its Undercover Review 

Committee, ATF Headquarters approved the operation on May 10, 2012, on 

condition that: (1) the vehicle used in the operation include a GPS tracker and 

kill switch (which could be used to track and disable the vehicle if it was stolen 

or the agents were about to be overcome); and (2) personnel assigned to the 

operation receive vehicle assault training. 

B. Planning 

The lack of a fixed location for the storefront reduced some of its planning 

requirements. For example, agents did not have to invest effort redesigning the 

interior of a building. The co-case agents and RAC told us that their planning for 

the storefront, such as the selection of merchandise and security preparations, 

did not involve discussions with the UCB at ATF Headquarters. One of the case 

agents told us that the UCB had no role in the operation. However, the RAC for 

Brockton and New Bedford who oversaw the storefront had extensive 

undercover training and experience, including work on storefront operations, 

and he assisted the agents with planning the storefront. The co-case agents 

assigned to the mobile storefront had no previous storefront experience or 

training. 

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C. Operations 

After obtaining authorization for the storefront, ATF leased a cargo van 

and obtained cigarettes and footwear that had been seized in other law 

enforcement operations. Agents sold these items from the back of the van, 

which was equipped with audio/video-recording cameras. The storefront 

typically operated 2 days per week during the afternoon. Two undercover 

agents staffed the van while approximately 10 other agents and task force 

officers, including an ATF Group Supervisor, were assigned to two cover teams 

and other units that scouted areas to park the van. ATF records showed that 

the van was deployed 31 times between August and December 2012, and 27 

times between May and September 2013. 

We asked the agents about how they selected the sites where the van 

operated. The RAC told us that “targeting is everything” to the success of a 

storefront and that it was important for these operations to be driven by criminal 

intelligence. Agents told us that the task force officers assigned to the 

storefront provided important information about locations in Brockton and New 

Bedford where gang members were known to frequent, and that data from 

firearm shot sensors in both cities identified areas where firearms had recently 

been discharged. Agents used this information when making location selections. 

There was no general advertising employed in the operation, which utilized a 

standard rental van. In addition, agents said that before deploying the van, the 

task force officers would perform surveillance in target areas looking for known 

criminals. The RAC said that one of the benefits of the mobile storefront was 

that it could move on short notice to areas where these persons were present. 

However, both the agents and the AUSA assigned to the storefront said that it 

was very difficult to target the leadership of the local gangs because they were 

unlikely to approach a van. One of the case agents told us that the agents 

hoped that contacts from the van would lead to later contacts with gang leaders. 

Agents also stated that they performed a security assessment each time 

that they deployed the van, which included the task force officers conducting 

pre-operational surveillance. Agents said that they did not put the van near 

playgrounds, schools, or housing projects. While the agents said that they 

wanted the van to be in locations where pedestrians were present, they 

positioned it so that it was separated from the most heavily travelled areas. 

Thus, the van typically would be positioned in the back of a parking lot rather 

than immediately adjacent to a sidewalk. 

Our analysis of the locations where the van operated identified one 

instance where agents parked the van for no longer than 20 minutes in an area 

that was adjacent to a school. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on September 11, 

2012, agents stopped the van and met with a person whose associates later 

contacted the agents about exchanging drugs for merchandise. One of the case 

agents told us that “obviously a school should be taken into consideration” and 

that he did not recall learning that the van had parked near a school. An agent 

who was operating the van at the time said that he had no recollection of the 

school or of any children being present when agents stopped the van, and that if 

59
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

children had been present it would have alerted him. The agents told us that if 

children approached the van they were encouraged to leave. 

Once the van was in place agents assigned to the cover teams watched to 

see if individuals in the vicinity of the van appeared to be preparing to rob it. In 

that case, the agents planned on shutting down the van and leaving the area 

before a robbery could occur. The agents said that in the event of a robbery, 

their plan was to allow the perpetrators to leave the scene and have the 

surveillance team and local police arrest them away from the storefront. Agents 

said that they did not encounter any threats of violence while operating the van 

and that there were no robbery attempts or thefts. They also stated that to 

their knowledge no persons who were prohibited from possessing a firearm left 

the storefront with a firearm. 

D. Oversight 

We also asked the agents about supervision of the storefront. Agents 

said that ATF managers closely monitored the storefront. They said that the 

assigned RACs who oversaw it had an “intimate knowledge” of the operations 

and that they participated on one of the cover teams for the storefront. A RAC 

who later became the ASAC and Acting SAC overseeing the storefront said that 

there was a lot of “dialogue back and forth” with supervisors within the Boston 

Field Division about the operation and that they were fully informed about it. 

The storefront also was included in the MCP, though not until February 

2013 after problems became public concerning Operation Fearless in Milwaukee. 

Agents told us that they submitted paperwork in September 2012 seeking to 

include the storefront in the MCP, but the supervising DAD at ATF Headquarters 

rejected the request. One agent told us that Headquarters staff did not believe 

that the mobile storefront met the criteria for a monitored case.43 ATF 

Headquarters reversed this decision on February 4, 2013, following a review of 

other existing storefront operations in the wake of publicity surrounding the 

Milwaukee storefront, and agents submitted their first MCP briefing 

memorandum to Headquarters the same day. Agents thereafter provided 

monthly written submissions and oral briefings to Division supervisors as 

required by the MCP, who in turn briefed the DAD. All MCP briefing papers 

indicated that no problems had been encountered or were anticipated with the 

operation. 

The ATF Director and Deputy Director received briefings on the storefront 

in February and June 2013. After receiving the briefing in February, the Director 

temporarily suspended the storefront until he could obtain information about 

how the agents were targeting the operation. Agents from the Boston Field 

Division told us that the February briefing was provided by Headquarters staff 

and that they did not participate in it. The Boston agents told us that they 

furnished the requested information and that the Director agreed to lift his 

43 Storefront operations have been included in the MCP since its inception in July 2011. 

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suspension within approximately 2 weeks. The Director’s suspension did not 

affect use of the van, however, because the agents were not deploying it during 

the winter months. 

We asked agents whether Operation Fearless had other effects on the 

storefront besides its addition to the MCP. They told us that it did not 

significantly impact their operation, though it did result in some changes. They 

stated that ATF Headquarters’ decision to prohibit acting supervisors from 

overseeing storefronts following Operation Fearless made scheduling the 

storefront operations more difficult. For example, an acting supervisor who had 

been providing oversight for a brief period beginning in 2013 had to be replaced 

by ATF supervisors from outside the Brockton and New Bedford areas. Agents 

also had to begin unloading the van following each use and placing the 

merchandise and other equipment in a secure storage unit. 

E. Vulnerable Persons 

We also asked agents about any interactions they had with persons with 

I/DD. They told us that they did not target such persons for enforcement action 

and did not utilize them in the storefront. The agents said that they did not rely 

on confidential informants of any sort during their operations. They also stated 

that they had no recollection of ever meeting a person who they believed to 

have an I/DD at the locations where the storefront operated. Agents said that 

children would at times approach the van but their presence was discouraged, 

such as by artificially raising the price of the goods, and young children would be 

asked to leave. 

F. Closure and Results 

ATF closed the mobile storefront in late September 2013. The co-case 

agents told us that by that time they believed that they had operated the van 

for a sufficient period to determine that it did not appear likely that they would 

be able to identify firearms traffickers. ATF records show that the agents 

purchased 4 firearms, 45 grams of heroin, 77 grams of cocaine, 44 grams of 

marijuana, and a numerous assorted prescription pills, such as OxyContin and 

Percocet. ATF recommended 24 defendants for prosecution on narcotics 

charges. Of these proposed defendants, approximately 10 were submitted to 

the USAO for review and all were declined, primarily due to the lack of a 

sufficient criminal record or gang involvement needed to satisfy federal 

prosecution guidelines. According to ATF, the State accepted 22 of 24 proposed 

defendants for prosecution, and either a complaint or indictment has been 

presented for each of the defendants for narcotics offenses. One defendant was 

indicted on firearms and narcotics charges. None of the cases target 

organizations. As of March 2016, 8 defendants had pled guilty to narcotics 

charges and been sentenced to terms ranging from probation to 24 months 

incarceration. The defendant indicted on firearms and narcotics charges pled 

guilty and was sentenced to 6 to 7 years. ATF documents indicate that 

approximately half of the defendants are gang members. We did not seek to 

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independently verify gang participation. Agent cashier expenditures totaled 

approximately $24,000. 

One of the co-case agents told us that he was disappointed that ATF was 

unable to develop firearms cases from the storefront. The agents explained the 

result in part based on Massachusetts’ strict firearms laws and that the criminals 

in Brockton and New Bedford ultimately were not willing to sell their firearms. 

The agents purchased all firearms that were offered for sale to them. The AUSA 

told us that in Massachusetts “it’s very difficult to get people to part with their 

guns.” Despite the very limited results, the agents told us that they considered 

the storefront a success because they were able to bring narcotics charges 

against persons with lengthy criminal records that included violent crimes. 

In addition to the lack of firearms charges, one of the co-case agents said 

that the storefront did not achieve its objective of generating intelligence about 

gang and firearms activities. He said that the storefront did not lead the 

undercover agents to firearms traffickers or other sources of firearms-related 

intelligence. The first RAC who supervised the storefront told us, however, that 

he did not believe that intelligence gathering was an objective of the storefront. 

Instead, he stated that the focus of the storefront was on identifying and 

arresting violent individuals. 

We asked the agents whether there were important lessons to be gained 

from their experiences with the storefront. A RAC who supervised the storefront 

for a period told us that he believed that the storefront would have had a better 

chance of success if the agents had spent additional time investigating the 

individuals who visited the storefront and used them to build cases against 

significant targets. He said that “the likelihood of bumping into an individual 

that just happens to be walking down the street as you’re selling product out of 

the back of a van that’s willing to trade you a gun for sneakers is nil.” He stated 

that the operation “morphed more into a numbers game” concerning how many 

people had visited the van and that the agents should have devoted less time to 

operating it. The AUSA assigned to the case told us, however, that the objective 

of the storefront had always been to use contacts from the storefront to collect 

evidence against more significant targets, but that the storefront was not 

successful in attracting individuals who had relationships with such persons. 

One of the co-case agents also stated that, in hindsight, the storefront may 

have been more successful if ATF had used a reliable informant to introduce 

criminals to the undercover agents. 

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CHAPTER FOUR
 

OIG ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 

In this section of the report we analyze the ATF undercover storefront 

operations included in our review. We first discuss the benefits and inherent 

limitations of undercover storefront operations generally, followed by an 

assessment of numerous issues that arose in the operations we examined, 

including security, targeting, and oversight. We pay special attention to 

whether ATF’s Monitored Case Program (MCP) was an effective oversight tool for 

the storefronts and whether ATF’s storefront policies contain systemic 

deficiencies. We also assess ATF’s approach to two vulnerable populations in 

the context of storefront operations: those with intellectual disabilities and 

juveniles. 

I.	 The Undercover Storefront Operation as an Investigative 

Technique 

The use of undercover storefront operations is not unique to ATF. Many 

law enforcement agencies have successfully utilized the storefront investigative 

technique, including federal agencies such as the FBI. Storefronts have shown 

to be especially effective in cases that involve stolen or contraband items. For 

example, in 2012, the FBI operated a sham financial services storefront in North 

Miami, Florida where undercover agents accepted fraudulently obtained tax 

refund checks. The case led to numerous federal prosecutions. State and local 

law enforcement agencies similarly have obtained favorable results from use of 

the storefront technique. In Operation Oliver Twist, the Seattle Police 

Department’s Major Crimes Task Force set up a storefront in 2012 with the 

assistance of the FBI that fenced stolen property. Undercover officers purchased 

drugs and over 900 stolen items during the operation, including vehicles, stolen 

firearms, and explosives. The operation led to the arrest and prosecution of 

numerous criminals, including multiple federal prosecutions. While we do not 

believe that numbers of arrests standing alone are dispositive, such operations 

have generally been viewed as very successful in addressing specific crime 

problems in a targeted way. 

Officials at FBI Headquarters told us that the FBI’s use of storefront 

operations was infrequent, however, and that they could not recall recent 

authorizations for use of the technique. DEA officials told us that DEA did not 

utilize storefronts that were open to the public. They stated that storefronts can 

be effective at identifying persons who are committing crimes, but that DEA 

already had sufficient criminal intelligence to identify targets for its 

investigations and therefore it did not need to rely upon storefronts to build its 

cases. 

We also asked ATF managers about their views concerning the storefront 

technique and, more generally, the importance of undercover operations to 

ATF’s mission. They told us that undercover operations are very important to 

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ATF’s efforts to fight violent crime and that they allowed the agency to build 

cases that otherwise would not be possible. Former ATF Director Jones testified 

to Congress about the importance of undercover operations to the agency: 

Of all of the activities undertaken by ATF agents in the field, none is 

more risk-laden – or potentially more valuable – than undercover 

work. ATF agents working undercover have infiltrated and brought 

down notorious motorcycle and street gangs, thwarted murder-forhire plots, and removed thousands of guns from the hands of 

criminals. 

Both Jones and Acting Director Brandon also have testified that undercover 

storefront operations are “a valuable investigative technique” and have 

described large numbers of defendants and firearms recoveries that ATF has 

obtained from use of the technique. The vast majority of ATF leaders and 

agents we interviewed during our review expressed confidence in the 

effectiveness of storefront operations to reduce violent crime and to make 

communities safer. Those who expressed reservations about the technique 

referred primarily to problems related to resources, which we discuss further 

below. 

Whether employed by ATF or another investigative agency, we found that 

undercover storefront operations have a number of advantages and inherent 

limitations. Safety, evidence quality, and the potential for enhanced intelligence 

and evidence gathering were the benefits most frequently cited to us. Agents 

told us that agent and public safety were key considerations in their decision to 

propose the use of the storefront technique. They said that in contrast to typical 

street encounters with criminals, the storefront afforded them the ability to 

better control their interactions and that the presence on-site of a react team 

and the use of other safety measures helped to ensure safety in the event of a 

confrontation. 

Another important benefit of the storefront operations that agents and 

prosecutors described to us was the high quality of the evidence that the 

storefronts generated. ATF made audio and visual recordings of their firearms 

and drug purchases from the defendants, which we were told limited factual 

disputes during the prosecution phase of the cases. Agents also told us that the 

storefront provided them with an opportunity to interact more extensively with 

criminals and to obtain criminal intelligence. They said that the storefront 

provided a justification for the undercover personnel to be in locations where 

they otherwise likely would be identified as law enforcement officers, which 

enhanced their ability to gather evidence. 

Our review also determined that storefront operations have inherent 

drawbacks that should not be mistaken for mismanagement. We believe that 

this is an important point that provides valuable context for our critique of ATF’s 

storefronts later in this report. First, storefronts are resource intensive due 

largely to safety considerations. With the exception of ATF’s mobile storefront, 

we found that they typically occupied the work of an entire ATF agent group, 

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which totaled approximately 8 to 10 agents, full-time for the duration of the 

storefront. This did not include the assistance of local law enforcement, which 

often contributed multiple task force officers. The expenditure of agent and 

officer time in the operation of the storefront makes less time available for 

following up on leads and devising and pursuing additional investigative 

strategies, and for working on other potentially important cases. Also, cash 

outlays excluding salaries and overtime exceeded $200,000 for each of the fixed 

storefront operations, though these expenditures were much less for the mobile 

storefront, for which the total outlay was approximately $30,000. 

Second, storefronts that are open to the public and not operated in 

conjunction with other investigative techniques, such as the use of confidential 

informants, can face challenges with targeting and attracting high-value 

criminals. Agents told us that it was difficult to employ the storefront technique 

against leaders of criminal organizations because they were unlikely to visit the 

storefront in the first instance, and even less likely to be seen committing 

criminal acts there, owing to their wariness of law enforcement. Because agents 

are limited in their ability to influence the movements of criminal subjects, 

public storefronts thus include an element of chance that its visitors may not 

include the targets of the investigation. If the location is misplaced or if the 

storefront offers products or services that do not appeal to the targets, the 

storefront has less probability of engaging them and hence less likelihood of 

success. Attempts to compensate for such drawbacks by expanding the 

targeting objectives to include broad categories of offenders can create other 

risks and lead to allegations of federal law enforcement “trolling” for low-level 

offenders and pursuing cases that do not have a substantial federal interest. 

This is particularly true with regard to street crimes and other offenses, such as 

low-level drug and gun offenses, that are generally the province of local law 

enforcement and local prosecutors. It also can lead to law-abiding local 

residents visiting what otherwise appears to be a legitimate business, potentially 

placing them in harm’s way because of the illegal activity that is also occurring 

at the storefront. In light of such limitations, the head of the FBI’s undercover 

program told us that storefronts were “a crude tool to target a crime problem” 

and that any storefront employed by the FBI would have to have predicated 

targets.44 

Third, storefronts have the capacity for incentivizing criminals to commit 

additional crimes, potentially increasing criminal activity in the neighborhood 

where the storefront is located. For example, a storefront specializing in 

firearms purchases may prompt criminals to steal firearms in order to sell them 

at the storefront. Although precautions can be taken to mitigate this problem, 

such as promptly tracing firearms after they are purchased, crime generation 

remains an inherent risk of the storefront technique. 

44 A “predicated target” is a person or organization that is the focus of an investigation 

and for which evidence or information of criminal wrongdoing exists. 

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In addition to the general strengths and weaknesses of the storefront 

technique, we also asked about the added value that federal law enforcement in 

particular provides to storefront operations. Agents, prosecutors, and police 

officers we interviewed identified four benefits of federal participation: 

manpower, funding, undercover expertise, and federal sentences. Agents told 

us that they believed that the local law enforcement agencies that they worked 

with lacked the manpower and financial resources to staff a storefront for 

months-long periods as ATF did with its operations. We also found that several 

of ATF’s agents had a tremendous wealth of undercover experience and were 

true experts in undercover operations. We found that these agents provided 

important guidance to their colleagues during the operations. 

Lastly, we were told that the availability of lengthy federal sentences, as 

compared to state or local penalties, for firearms and associated narcotics 

offenses was an important benefit of federal participation in the storefront 

operations.45 While the availability of longer federal sentences may undoubtedly 

be the case in many jurisdictions, we do not believe that this rationale, standing 

alone, should be the basis for supporting a storefront operation that targets 

street-level crimes and street-level criminals. As has been well-documented, 

the federal prisons are substantially over-capacity and consuming an evergrowing share of the Department’s budget, and adding to that population lowlevel offenders who could be, and traditionally have been, prosecuted by state 

and local prosecutors simply because federal sentences are significantly longer is 

inconsistent with the Department’s strategic plan and its Smart on Crime 

initiative.

46 

II. Evaluation of ATF’s Use of Storefronts 

We evaluated five ATF undercover storefronts that operated after ATF’s 

initiation of its Monitored Case Program (MCP) in July 2011. With the exception 

of the mobile storefront, the operations we examined resulted in numerous 

federal prosecutions for firearms and narcotics offenses, though at considerable 

investment of manpower and financial resources. They did not, however, result 

in criminal enterprise prosecutions or lead to the development and dissemination 

of intelligence products for use in future cases. In addition, we did not find 

evidence that ATF examined the impact of the operations to determine if they 

had achieved measurable success on the specific crime problems that they were 

designed to address. For example, ATF did not prepare after-action reports for 

the storefronts we examined (though a more general review was done of the 

45 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides for a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence 

when a defendant uses or carries a firearm in connection with a felony drug trafficking offense 

covered by the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq.), regardless of the quantity or 

type of narcotics involved. 

46 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Top Management and 

Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Justice, Memorandum for the Attorney General 

and Deputy Attorney General (November 10, 2015). 

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surge in St. Louis, of which the storefront was a part, and included a brief 

discussion of the storefront operation). 

Despite these shortcomings, we did not identify circumstances that cause 

us to recommend that ATF eliminate undercover storefront operations as an 

investigative technique that is available to its agents. However, we do believe 

that there are significant steps that should be taken to improve the use of this 

technique as part of ATF’s effort to address crime problems such as the illegal 

possession of firearms and violent crimes. In particular, ATF needs to increase 

its support to agents involved in these complex operations, and ensure that the 

investigations are properly targeted and result in prosecutions that serve a 

substantial federal interest. 

Overall, our review identified a number of problems with ATF’s storefront 

operations that resulted from inexperience, lack of specialized training, poor 

planning, and lack of oversight. While we did not substantiate claims that ATF 

knowingly was targeting persons with I/DD for enforcement action or use in its 

storefronts, we determined that DOJ was failing to apply the Rehabilitation Act 

of 1973 to its federal law enforcement activities, which requires prompt 

attention from the Department. Overall, we found that many of the new policies 

that ATF instituted following the controversy over Operation Fearless in 

Milwaukee should assist in addressing problems with ATF’s management of 

storefront operations. However, we found several areas where additional 

changes should be made and we make 13 recommendations to address those 

areas. If ATF is going to utilize undercover storefront operations – or any 

undercover operation – it must plan and manage them expertly. 

Below we discuss several areas of concern that we identified during our 

review. 

A. Initiation and Planning 

Our review examined the initiation of each of the storefront operations 

and ATF’s planning for them. We determined that the decisions that ATF staff 

made in the storefronts’ initial planning phases were highly consequential and 

greatly influenced how the storefronts functioned. These decisions concerned 

issues such as location, the selection of the case agent, and the service or 

merchandise offered at the storefront. ATF staff told us that preplanning and 

the initial gathering of criminal intelligence in support of the decision to initiate 

the storefront were critical to the storefronts’ success. 

Following the controversy surrounding Operation Fearless, ATF instituted 

new policies in 2013 that imposed predication requirements for the initiation of 

storefront operations. Before starting a storefront agents now must undertake 

“[a] detailed analysis of statistics concerning violent crime and the criminal use 

of firearms in the proposed area of operation . . .”, and furnish “documentation 

as to the intended targets [of the] storefront investigation.” Intelligence 

assessments also are required to “clearly identify a [] violent criminal target 

base.” We believe that these changes were necessary improvements and that 

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ATF should be able to furnish an evidence-based justification to initiate the 

storefront planning process. 

Our review of the pre-2013 storefront proposal documents revealed that 

some did not address many of the requirements now found in ATF policies, 

including predication and the need to specifically identify the crime problem that 

the storefront is intended to address. For example, the proposal for Operation 

Fearless misidentified the location and targets of the investigation, and the 

Wichita proposal was not clearly predicated to address specific individuals or 

gangs determined to be worthy of federal interest. We believe that ATF needs 

to standardize its storefront proposals and ensure that they include information 

that is necessary for ATF decision-makers to make informed judgments about 

whether to initiate a storefront operation, including whether there is a 

sufficiently well-defined and specific crime problem that the proposed operation 

is tailored to address. In this regard, future proposals should, at a minimum, 

account for the 2013 revisions to ATF’s storefront policies. 

Besides evaluating the proposal materials used to initiate a storefront, we 

asked ATF staff whether there were particular circumstances that justified use of 

the storefront investigative technique. For example, our review found evidence 

that storefronts may be well-suited to situations where both the local gang 

structure is decentralized and violent crime is highly concentrated 

geographically. We did not see any evidence of such consideration in the 

proposals that we saw, however. Additionally we found that ATF does not 

require agents to prepare an after-action report following completion of its 

storefront operations and otherwise has not preserved and evaluated its 

institutional knowledge about the circumstances where storefronts are most 

effective. We believe that ATF should require consideration of such 

circumstances in the initiation of a storefront operation, and preparation of 

after-action reports addressing such factors in future storefront operations. We 

also believe that ATF should conduct an assessment of information currently 

available to better determine when storefront operations would be most likely to 

be successful. The results of this examination should then be considered in the 

standardized storefront proposal. 

In addition to issues surrounding the initiation of storefront operations, 

our review identified a number of problems with ATF’s planning practices. We 

found that the agents assigned to the storefront operations often lacked 

undercover experience and advanced undercover training, and ATF at times 

overestimated their ability to plan and execute the operations. The agents’ lack 

of expertise and specialized training caused various missteps, such as 

inadequate security assessments, insufficient staffing, and the failure to trace 

firearms. Moreover, this deficit in experience was compounded by the absence 

of guidance from ATF Headquarters. Case agents told us that they had no 

written instructions on how to manage a storefront, and that the Undercover 

Branch (UCB) provided little assistance concerning administration of the 

storefront. One case agent described the role of the UCB in the operation he 

was assigned to as: “Minimal. None.” The Chief of the UCB told us that the 

UCB provides training and backstopping support for ATF’s undercover 

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operations, including training on storefronts in an advanced ATF course on 

undercover operations. Overall, we believe that the agents assigned to the 

storefront operations, including Operation Fearless in Milwaukee, were 

disadvantaged due to the failure of ATF Headquarters to furnish adequate 

guidance concerning the initiation and management of undercover storefront 

operations and to foster a working climate that sufficiently valued expertise in 

these particular operations. 

As with its policies concerning storefront initiation, ATF responded to 

problems with Operation Fearless by establishing policies that affected the 

storefront planning process. According to ATF’s new Storefront Investigations 

Manual (“Manual”), when a field division proposes a storefront operation the 

Special Operations Division (SOD) at ATF Headquarters will provide subject 

matter experts (SMEs) to assist with planning, including site selection, security, 

and guidance on supervision practices. In circumstances where the case agent 

or undercover agents lack storefront experience, the Manual provides that “the 

UCB will assign agents experienced in such operations to travel to and assist 

with the storefront prior to and during the operation.” We believe that these 

policies are commonsensical and overdue. Many of the problems that led to the 

controversy surrounding ATF’s use of storefronts could and should have been 

avoided through better planning and support from ATF Headquarters. ATF 

storefront SMEs should work on-site for at least portions of the planning and 

initial implementation of storefront operations. Future storefront proposals 

submitted to ATF’s Undercover Review Committee should account for the views 

of the SMEs and include a certification from SOD that it has reviewed the 

proposed operation, concurs that it complies with ATF policy, and that SOD 

supports the operation presented in the proposal. We believe that this degree of 

engagement from SOD is important to ensure that adequate expertise within 

ATF has been made available to the storefront. 

Our review further determined that early consultations with prosecutors 

and local law enforcement agencies were important to the storefront operations. 

We found that with each of the storefronts ATF agents discussed the operations 

with representatives of the USAO and local law enforcement to obtain their 

support. Agents told us that the storefronts could not have operated without 

manpower provided by local law enforcement, and that information sharing with 

the prosecutors, including state prosecutors, facilitated the cases during their 

prosecution phase. ATF’s new storefront polices impose various requirements 

regarding these local consultations. The USAO “must be involved in all 

preliminary discussions to ensure [its] concurrence with the proposed 

investigation,” and the U.S. Attorney must provide a written concurrence letter 

for the operation. Similar consultations are required with state prosecutors. 

And we believe that ATF should go beyond this to ensure that the agents and 

prosecutors are on the same page as to the goals of the storefront operation, 

and the means utilized to achieve them. There is a disconnect if agents believe 

that an operation is successful because it produces a number of low level drug 

cases that do not advance a federal law enforcement interest and that are not 

acceptable for federal prosecution. We found that the Pensacola storefront was 

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a model of federal-state cooperation, and that the AUSA assigned to the 

storefront was fully engaged in the details of the operation. 

Similarly, current ATF policy requires that an MOU must be executed with 

all participating agencies. According to the Manual: 

ATF has partnered with other agencies in many successful 

storefront operations. An instrumental part of these successes was 

solidified through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed 

to by all participating agencies. These MOUs outlined the 

objectives and goals of the investigation as well as the 

responsibilities and expectations of each participating agency. 

Manual at 2. 

As with the prosecutors, such MOUs are an important step in ensuring that 

expectations and goals are aligned among the participants in the operations. 

We also believe that ATF should share with DEA any significant 

intelligence it receives concerning narcotics transactions related to its 

storefronts. Although we found that ATF was deconflicting suspects, we did not 

identify instances where ATF was communicating with DEA about potential 

leads. We acknowledge that the quantities of narcotics typically purchased in 

storefront operations are below thresholds that normally would warrant DEA’s 

attention. However, information provided by ATF may assist in identifying 

members of drug distribution networks and otherwise provide evidence of 

criminal conduct by low level conspirators that could assist in identifying or 

developing cases against such organizations. 

B. Objectives, Strategy, and Targeting 

Our review determined that the objectives and strategy of an ATF 

storefront operation should be clearly defined and targeted on a specific, 

identified crime problem that is a priority for federal law enforcement, that is 

within ATF’s jurisdiction, and that is likely to be positively impacted through use 

of the storefront technique. 

We found that the authorization memoranda and agent explanations to us 

typically identified one or both of two broad objectives for the storefront 

operations: (1) the collection of criminal intelligence to enable ATF to identify 

violent criminals, persons prohibited from possessing firearms, and gang 

members; and (2) the gathering of sufficient evidence against such persons to 

prosecute them. The St. Louis storefront proposal expanded on the first 

objective and included “the gathering of criminal intelligence that involves both 

on-going criminal activity and future criminal acts occurring in the metropolitan 

area.” While these are worthy objectives, we found that they provided little 

insight into the value of the proposed storefront operation because they are not 

significantly distinguishable from an ATF agent’s routine job responsibilities. We 

believe that future proposals should include objectives that account for targeting 

factors unique to the storefront operation, such as gangs of special interest, and 

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should explain the strategy supporting it. Only the St. Louis and Boston Field 

Division proposals sufficiently accounted for targeting considerations. Foremost, 

an ATF storefront proposal should not contemplate use of techniques that 

amount simply to indiscriminate “trolling” for street criminals, for which there is 

little to no federal interest, and the storefront objectives and strategy should be 

written with sufficient precision to foreclose this possibility. As one expert on 

undercover operations recently wrote: 

The first step in minimizing virtually all the legal and policy risks 

associated with undercover operations (UCOs) is to ensure it is 

employed against the right targets or subjects. Indiscriminate 

casting of either too wide a net or too indiscriminate an inducement 

– even if it results in statistical success in terms of indictable 

subjects – may eventually lead even the strongest supporters to 

doubt the propriety of the undercover technique. Many believe, 

therefore, that the single most important factor in determining the 

success of an undercover operation is the proper selection of the 

subjects of the operation – i.e., those individuals or enterprises 

against whom the operation will be directed and from whom 

evidence will be sought. . . . Only one factor will virtually 

guarantee failure, or some result less than success: directing the 

operation at nonpredicated or poorly predicated subjects.47 

ATF’s new storefront policies take into account such concerns and 

emphasize the importance of targeting: 

The purpose of initiating a storefront operation should be clearly 

defined in the authorization memorandum for review by the DAD 

and [Undercover Review Committee]. This should include a clear 

strategy with specific criminal groups, streets gangs or criminal 

organizations identified, and focus on violations within ATF’s 

primary jurisdiction. 

Manual at 1. A targeted approach also is better aligned with the Department’s 

strategic plan, which requires that any federal prosecution serve “a substantial 

federal interest” and “that the defendant is not subject to effective prosecution 

elsewhere.”48 

Moreover, if storefront operations are intended to comprehensively target 

criminal organizations and larger community crime problems, we believe that 

the proposal should address the feasibility of investigative follow-up for leads 

that the storefront generates. While getting guns out of the hands of prohibited 

persons is a very worthwhile objective, we believe that to maximize the benefits 

from storefront operations ATF should pursue promising leads where practicable 

to identify sources of supply for firearms and narcotics traffickers. In some 

47 Larson, Undercover Operations at 56. 

48 U.S. Department of Justice, Strategic Plan – Fiscal Years 2014-2018, at 50. 

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circumstances, this may necessitate temporary cessation of storefront activities. 

As we discuss below, resource limitations affected the ability of ATF to do even 

basic follow-up investigations in the storefronts that we examined, and we 

recommend that ATF consider the potential for such investigation and the 

requisite resource needs to accomplish it in future operations. 

Our review found that ATF’s primary means of targeting was geographic 

through the siting of the storefronts, though it also relied in some cases upon 

the use of informants, unwitting informants, and promotional activities by 

undercover officers to engage subjects. Each of the storefronts targeted its 

operations, though in varying ways and degrees. For example, in St. Louis the 

storefront was located in a part of the city that was experiencing rampant 

violent crime and relied on an informant to assist in attracting criminals worthy 

of federal prosecution. In contrast, the Wichita storefront was not centrally 

located in a crime “hot spot.” Targeting was less developed with that storefront, 

though agents did utilize an unwitting informant to facilitate firearms purchases. 

In Milwaukee, agents resorted to randomly passing out flyers at a Walmart. We 

do not believe that such an untargeted tactic is appropriate or should be 

repeated in future storefront operations. 

We found that the mobile storefront demonstrated greater tactical 

flexibility than the fixed storefronts as it could move to particular targets, 

though the quality of these targets turned out to be low in the communities in 

Massachusetts where it operated. In light of what we found regarding the 

inherent limitations of the storefront technique to entice direct participation by 

the higher level participants in criminal enterprises and the absence of 

significant investigative follow up on the transactions that did occur, see Section 

I above, we were not surprised that ATF’s storefronts did not lead to the arrest 

of leading gang figures or the dismantling of criminal organizations. In the case 

of the mobile storefront, we agree with the agents who told us that it likely 

would have had greater success if the agents had focused more attention on 

subjects identified from leads that the storefront generated as opposed to 

operating the storefront on a continuous basis. We further believe that the use 

of innovative tactics should be encouraged within ATF and that while the mobile 

storefront did not obtain the results anticipated in Southern Massachusetts, the 

results could be quite different elsewhere and that the practical knowledge ATF 

gained from the experience might help to achieve that in appropriate 

circumstances. The comparative success of different targeting strategies should 

be an issue that ATF evaluates on an ongoing basis and addresses in particular 

storefront proposals in the future. 

Consistent with this conclusion, we believe significant changes in 

objectives or strategy, such as relocation of the storefront to focus on a different 

target base or criminal problem, should require reauthorization from ATF 

Headquarters, including the URC. In Operation Fearless, the strategic direction 

of the storefront differed significantly from the proposal that the URC reviewed. 

In such circumstances, ATF Headquarters should reevaluate the operation. 

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C. Safety and Security 

Our review examined safety and security procedures for each of the 

undercover storefronts. Again, we found that insufficient training and guidance 

from ATF Headquarters was a significant factor in the problems we identified. 

However, we also found that ATF agents and supervisors in the field, as well as 

officials at ATF Headquarters, were highly cognizant of the risks inherent in a 

storefront operation. This awareness was reflected in the planning and 

operation of the storefronts, and in our view, contributed to a safety record that 

does not include any acts of violence or physical injuries at the storefront 

operations that we examined as part of this review. 

However, we did identify several deficiencies in security planning that we 

believe are attributable to inadequate training and guidance for agents 

conducting and participating in storefronts, and their lack of undercover 

experience. For example, while agents told us that they evaluated public safety 

when they planned their storefront operations, in several instances we found 

that they did not conduct comprehensive assessments of the areas near the 

planned storefront in order to avoid proximity to vulnerable populations, such as 

children at schools or day care centers. In the Pensacola operation, the 

storefront was located in a neighborhood known by the agents and their 

supervisor as a high crime area. Yet, no one conducted a security assessment 

of the neighborhood to identify potential risks to the operation, and 

consequently no one learned that the nearby Salvation Army facility housed a 

day care center. 

Similarly, in St. Louis the storefront was approximately 600 feet from a 

Boys and Girls Club. Although its presence was observed by the RAC and at 

least one other ATF agent, no one above the RAC was ever advised of the Club’s 

proximity to the storefront. Also, this information was not shared within the 

storefront team. The lack of communication in this case is particularly troubling 

because the DAD for operations at ATF Headquarters told us that he was not 

aware of the Club and that he would not have approved the storefront unless it 

was closed during periods when children were at the Club or the Field Division 

presented a compelling reason why the storefront could not be moved 

elsewhere. We acknowledge the view of the RAC there who told us that he 

believed that the children near the storefront likely were safer with armed 

federal agents in the vicinity in what was a very dangerous neighborhood. 

Nevertheless, DOJ leadership – including the USAO and ATF Headquarters – 

should not have learned of the proximity of the storefront to the Club from the 

OIG; rather it clearly is a circumstance that should have been considered from 

the outset in determining the location of the storefront. 

We believe that ATF has taken steps to minimize the likelihood of such 

oversights occurring in the future. Following the controversy surrounding 

Operation Fearless and other storefronts, ATF issued its Storefront 

Investigations Manual, which includes a section devoted to site selection. In 

conjunction with the recommendations contained in this report, we believe that 

the guidance ATF has furnished on site selection and public safety issues will 

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assist in mitigating the risk that agents will make uninformed decisions that 

implicate public safety, including the decision as to where to site a storefront 

operation, in the future. 

We also found that ATF missed opportunities to correct errors in security 

planning through review by a tactical advisor who was specially trained in the 

storefront technique. In every storefront operation that we examined agents 

consulted with the DTA; however in a few instances the DTA was not consulted 

until after the operation had commenced and none of the DTAs had specialized 

storefront training. In addition, we identified instances where the DTA did not 

sufficiently account for risks concerning public safety outside of the storefront, 

such as a subject opening fire after exiting the storefront. Again, we believe 

that ATF has taken steps to address these problems. The Storefront 

Investigations Manual now provides that ATF Headquarters will provide subject 

matter experts to assist in setting up its storefronts, including security experts, 

and that the DTA must be involved in the site selection process. As we explain 

in the next Chapter, we recommend that ATF specially train a limited number of 

DTAs on the storefront technique and then use them to evaluate future 

storefronts. 

Our review also identified security lapses that resulted from poor internal 

communications. For example, in Wichita, the agents did not alert the SAC that 

they had opted to deviate from the terms of the storefront authorization 

memorandum and not use an inside react team. In addition, the SAC was 

unaware that the agents were not regularly tracing the firearms purchased at 

the storefront. In Milwaukee, agents changed the location of the storefront 

without notifying ATF Headquarters. In response to recommendations based on 

our review in this report and in our recent follow-up report concerning 

implementation of our recommendations contained in our review of Operations 

Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver, ATF has taken steps to improve reporting in 

its MCP. In future storefronts, agents will be required to answer specific 

questions in their MCP reports about changes in operations that warrant review 

by ATF’s URC, any problems with agencies that are participating in the 

storefront, and other significant issues, such as compliance with ATF’s Firearms 

Transfer Policy, informant unauthorized illegal activity, and whether the U.S. 

Attorney expressed any concerns about the storefront operation and how those 

concerns were addressed. 

Another important safety issue we inquired about during our review 

concerned ATF’s handling of known felons who appeared at the storefronts and 

then departed after agents learned that they were armed. Agents told us that 

they were under instructions to prevent persons whom they knew were felons 

from leaving the vicinity of the storefronts with firearms. We identified two 

instances where armed felons succeeded in eluding the storefront teams, but no 

other circumstances where agents should have detained storefront visitors. In 

both of these cases the agents knew the individual was prohibited from 

possessing a firearm, but the individual managed to exit the vicinity of the 

storefront without being stopped. In St. Louis, a known felon who had 

previously sold guns and drugs at the storefront came into the store with a gun. 

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The agents offered to buy it, but he declined because he said it belonged to 

someone else and that he might have to return it. The subject then quickly left 

the store and walked down an adjacent alley where his car and a driver were 

waiting. He departed before one of the outside cover agents who was following 

him could detain him. In Milwaukee, a known felon entered the storefront for a 

pre-arranged drug transaction armed with a revolver that he said contained 

armor piercing bullets. When the agents offered to buy the gun he said that he 

would sell it, but first he had to go shoot someone who earlier had shot his 

cousin. The subject left the store without interference from the agents. 

However, they immediately notified the Milwaukee Police Department, which 

mobilized a neighborhood task force – the Fugitive Apprehension Unit – and sent 

agents to the area where the subject advised the attack would take place. He 

was not located at the time and was not arrested until approximately 4 months 

later and there was no indication that the attack ever occurred. ATF agents and 

supervisors in Milwaukee acknowledged that the lack of an outside cover team 

severely limited the ATF’s ability to interdict the subject in this case. The 

Milwaukee RAC characterized the absence of an outside cover team as an 

obvious flaw in their operational plan that was exposed by this incident. 

We believe that future storefront operations must undergo a more 

rigorous security evaluation to avoid situations in the future such as occurred in 

Milwaukee. We recommend that agents prepare a written security plan that 

should be included with the storefront authorization memorandum. We 

elaborate on this recommendation in the next Chapter. 

D. Oversight 

ATF leaders told us that oversight was important to the success of the 

storefront operations. However, our review identified weaknesses in ATF’s 

supervision both locally and at ATF Headquarters. We found that undercover 

storefront operations require supervision that is active, expert, and stable, and 

that problems developed when one or more of these characteristics was lacking. 

1. Field Division Supervision 

Each of the storefronts we evaluated was supervised by a Group 

Supervisor or RAC, who reported to an ASAC and SAC within the respective ATF 

field division. A senior ATF executive with substantial storefront experience told 

us that successful storefronts typically have “good first line leadership, good 

strong Group Supervisors or Resident Agents in Charge.” Our review confirmed 

the accuracy of this observation. In most cases we found that field division 

supervisors were engaged in the operations and attentive to developments. For 

example, the St. Louis RAC met daily with members of the storefront team, and 

the RAC in Bridgewater often accompanied the agents and provided surveillance 

and backup to the mobile storefront. Agents said that the SAC overseeing the 

Wichita storefront was knowledgeable about their activities and was effective. 

However, we identified some instances where field division supervisors 

failed to make sufficient inquiries with agents assigned to the storefronts and 

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were not aware of significant events and issues. For example, the SAC of 

Operation Fearless told us that he was not aware that the FBI had withdrawn 

from the storefront until months afterwards, and the ASAC and SAC overseeing 

the Wichita storefront were unaware that agents were not performing NIBIN 

checks and lacked an inside cover team. The SAC of Operation Fearless told us 

that he believed oversight of the storefront was “bad” after the first ASAC 

assigned to the storefront departed the division for another assignment. 

Although there were instances in which storefront agents should have 

highlighted particular issues for their supervisors, it remains incumbent upon 

supervisors to ask sufficient questions to properly manage risk throughout the 

duration of such operations. Such vigilance is mandated by recent policies 

issued by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General that govern risk 

management. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, 

Baseline Risk Assessment and Mitigation Policies for Law Enforcement 

Operations in Criminal Matters (December 7, 2013)(requiring supervisors to 

assess risk during the course of investigations). The new storefront policies that 

ATF implemented in 2013 also emphasize the importance of active supervision. 

According to ATF’s Storefront Investigations Manual, the “complexity of 

storefront investigations requires active, routine involvement with Field Division 

leadership.” The first-line supervisor is required to be “actively involved in the 

day to day operations,” and ASACs and SACs must “maintain active awareness 

of the plans, progress and problems.” The ASAC and/or SAC also must conduct 

routine on-site inspections of the storefront and document them in the case 

management log. The MCP, which we discuss in greater detail below, also 

requires regular communication within the field division and with ATF 

Headquarters. 

We found that, in addition to lacking engagement, some supervisors did 

not have sufficient undercover or supervisory experience to be charged with the 

responsibility of managing a storefront. This problem was exacerbated by the 

lack of Headquarters guidance on storefront operations and the limited 

information provided to supervisors who joined storefronts already underway. 

The Acting RAC who oversaw Operation Fearless during critical phases of the 

investigation had limited ATF supervisory experience. Moreover, he told us that 

he was not relieved of his existing agent caseload while he managed an ATF 

group on an interim basis and was responsible for overseeing the storefront. 

The Acting RAC also stated that he had little knowledge of the storefront prior to 

assuming supervisory responsibilities and, in fact, had limited involvement in 

oversight of the storefront until the first Acting ASAC departed midway through 

the operation. Many supervisors in the operations we reviewed had not taken 

ATF’s advanced undercover training or had no significant experience with longterm undercover operations. Some agents told us that the supervision they 

received from their immediate supervisor was inadequate or involved little 

verbal communication. We believe that ATF underestimated the expertise and 

involvement required to properly manage these complex and dynamic 

undercover operations, and also failed to provide its agents with basic support, 

including written guidance and a proactive Headquarters undercover unit 

designed to assist with management issues. 

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ATF’s new storefront policies address some of these issues in part. They 

require that storefront supervisors must be experienced in managing “complex 

and long-term investigations,” and if necessary will be recruited from outside 

the originating field division for the duration of the investigation. In addition, 

acting supervisors are no longer permitted unless they have been “appointed 

specifically for the particular case based on training and experience.” 

In addition to sometimes resulting in a lack of experienced supervisors, 

turnover in supervision was another major problem that hindered the storefront 

investigations and led to instability and lack of continuity in leadership and 

oversight. One supervisor in the Boston Field Division told us that due to 

changes in supervisors, there were times when the mobile storefront could not 

operate because a supervisor was not available. In Operation Fearless, the 

position of DAD at ATF Headquarters remained vacant for 3 months, and for the 

bulk of the period when the storefront was operational both the RAC and ASAC 

were temporary replacement supervisors. One of the ASACs assigned to 

Operation Fearless told us that that the lack of consistent oversight caused 

problems in the investigation and resulted in “mixed messages or no message” 

to the agents. Another agent assigned to the storefront agreed that supervisory 

instability was a problem and stated that “[h]aving supervisors here from start 

to finish is crucial.” In contrast, the St. Louis storefront had consistent 

supervision and experienced few problems. Due to the importance of the case 

agent and group supervisor or RAC to the storefront, we believe that ATF should 

make best efforts to ensure that these staff selected to directly supervise such 

operations are expected to remain in place throughout the storefront’s planning 

and operational phases. 

2.	 Headquarters Supervision and the Monitored Case 

Program 

We determined that one of the primary failings of the storefronts that we 

examined was the absence of guidance and supervision from ATF Headquarters. 

We found that the proposal process for the storefronts and the MCP was not 

sufficiently structured to collect information on risks, and that some issues that 

warranted evaluation were overlooked. 

ATF did not develop its manual on Storefront Investigations until late 

2013 in the wake of the public controversy over Operation Fearless, and agents 

who worked on the storefronts told us that they did not have written guidance 

on how to manage a storefront operation prior to that time. They also reported 

little contact with Headquarters’ personnel other than to obtain technical 

assistance with audio and visual equipment and backstopping of their 

undercover identities. Agents reported that they sought out advice on their own 

initiative from other agents who had worked on storefront operations. 

We determined that ATF Headquarters did not furnish sufficient direction 

regarding the information that should be included in the proposal memoranda. 

Although ATF’s undercover operations policy specified general categories of 

information that must be included, such as the participating law enforcement 

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agencies and the projected funding, it omitted important risk-related 

information. ATF O 3250.1A. Examples include public safety considerations, 

whether informants would be used in the storefront, and planning on firearms 

interdiction. With the exception of proposals from within the same field division, 

we found that the storefront proposals were developed individually on an ad hoc 

basis and, though they shared some similarities, this resulted in substantial 

differences in format and, more importantly, the information presented. We 

believe that ATF needs to standardize its proposals for storefront operations and 

to tailor them to account for the requirements of the Storefront Investigations 

Manual and other guidance and ensure that all relevant safety and operational 

considerations are adequately addressed. 

ATF instituted the Monitored Case Program in July 2011. Although we 

believe that the MCP has fostered more consistent communications between ATF 

Headquarters and its field divisions concerning the agency’s most sensitive 

cases, as with its storefront proposal documentation, we determined that the 

MCP reporting requirements were not sufficiently probing and focused on issues 

that posed the highest risk to ATF and to the public. We found that many of the 

sections of the MCP reporting templates were devoted to the collection of 

accounting information. For example, the MCP initial submission template 

requested financial information about payments to confidential informants but 

did not inquire whether the informant had engaged in unauthorized illegal 

activity or committed other misconduct. Questions concerning storefronts were 

limited to inquiries about funds received at the storefront and items received or 

given in trade. 

Although both the initial and update submission templates requested 

information on “issues or problems” in the investigation, we found that field 

divisions at times failed to report significant developments. One senior ATF 

official who evaluated problems in Operation Fearless told us that it “became 

equally clear at Headquarters that we needed to independently verify 

information and not solely rely on what we were being told by field divisions.” 

However, our review of notes taken from Headquarters’ monitored case briefings 

showed that some DADs asked few questions, and in the case of Operation 

Fearless, that the supervision of the operation lacked a DAD for 3 months. 

Numerous problems in Operation Fearless were not identified through the MCP, 

including that the agents failed to detain a known felon who left the storefront 

with a firearm, and that the FBI had withdrawn from the storefront. We 

identified similar problems with communicating issues to headquarters regarding 

other storefronts. The same senior ATF official above stated that one of the 

“institutional weaknesses” with the MCP that became apparent following the 

controversy surrounding Operation Fearless was that it was “not being proactive 

enough.” 

We recognize that MCP briefings are not the only way that ATF 

management can learn about operations. We also acknowledge that it is not 

feasible for ATF Headquarters components to directly manage investigations in 

the field, and that ATF took steps following Operation Fearless to strengthen its 

oversight of storefront operations. For example, the Undercover Branch 

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instituted inspections of storefronts, and the Storefront Investigations Manual 

highlighted the role of staff from the Investigative Support Branch in identifying 

information “for potential ‘risk’ factors.” Our interviews with ATF leaders also 

revealed a shift in attitude as concerns the level of Headquarters oversight 

necessary in a storefront operation. For example, the Assistant Director of ATF’s 

Office of Field Operations told us that the questions he would ask today if he 

were a DAD would be more detailed and address issues such as whether the 

storefront had an outside cover team, a question he considered so fundamental 

to operational security that he had not thought he would have to inquire about 

it. 

We advised ATF that we believed that additional actions were necessary 

to strengthen ATF Headquarters’ oversight of storefront operations. First, in our 

recent follow-up report on Operation Fast and Furious, we recommended that 

ATF modify its MCP report templates to better focus on risk. In February 2016, 

ATF revised the “Storefront Investigations” section of the initial submission 

template and the update submission to identify whether any changes in 

storefront operations implicate issues presented in the storefront application to 

ATF’s URC. These include safety and risk factors identified in ATF’s Storefront 

Investigations Manual and in its Storefront guidance (“Revisions to Storefront 

Policy and Guidance,” March 21, 2013), including site selection, security 

assessments, and the role of other agencies. Second, we believe that the 

Undercover Branch should be more proactively engaged in ensuring the success 

of storefront operations and should devote a portion of its efforts to oversight 

and compliance duties, as it recently did by instituting inspections of storefront 

operations. ATF should seek to expand upon this initiative, and proactively 

share best practices and lessons learned with the field so that agents operating 

storefronts have the most timely and relevant information on how to address 

the myriad situations that may arise in such operations. 

3. Informants 

ATF’s use of confidential informants (CI) in the storefronts necessitated 

significant oversight which, in some limited circumstances, we found lacking.49 

Of the five storefronts we reviewed, only two, Hustle City in St. Louis and 

Pensacola Periodicals in Pensacola, planned for the use of a CI at the outset of 

the operations. ATF recruited a CI at the Milwaukee storefront after agents 

realized that they needed help attracting subjects to the location. The Boston 

and Wichita storefronts did not utilize CIs.50 Agents in those storefronts told us 

that they did not want to take the risk that a CI would expose the undercover 

operation. 

49 The OIG’s Audit Division has initiated an audit of ATF’s confidential informant program. 

50 Shortly after the Wichita storefront opened a customer, Daniel James, offered to 

arrange firearms deals for the agents in exchange for a small finder’s fee. The agents agreed and 

James functioned as an unwitting informant for ATF for the next 9 months. James helped broker 

approximately 40 gun purchases at the storefront. ATF also used an unwitting informant to 

generate business for the Milwaukee storefront. 

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Our review identified problems with ATF’s oversight of the CI in St. Louis, 

who functioned as a tattoo artist in the storefront. ATF had used the CI in 

another storefront in Kansas City prior to bringing him to St. Louis. The CI had 

an extensive criminal record that included prior narcotics dealing and use. 

Approximately 3 weeks prior to the closure of the St. Louis storefront ATF 

received allegations about the CI’s conduct while working at the earlier 

storefront. These included narcotics dealing, cocaine and methamphetamine 

use, and inappropriate sexual contact with subjects in the storefront 

investigation. ATF agents from outside St. Louis promptly interviewed the CI, 

who admitted the following actions while working at the earlier storefront: 

•	 Buying and using illegal drugs; 

•	 Sexual relationships with multiple storefront subjects; 

•	 Patronizing escorts and facilitating prostitution; and 

•	 His girlfriend divulging to a subject in another storefront operation 

that he was working with law enforcement. 

We were especially concerned with the last admission because ATF agents 

in St. Louis told us that the girlfriend accompanied the CI to St. Louis and was 

allowed to visit the storefront. Moreover, we did not believe that there was 

sufficient follow-up on the allegation that the CI had been dealing narcotics. We 

found that ATF did not consider polygraphing the CI on this issue, and had not 

run any background checks during the period when the CI was working in the 

St. Louis storefront.51 

Soon after Kansas City agents completed their interview of the CI, 

information about the results of the interview was sent to an ATF ASAC 

supervising St. Louis and to the SAC in Kansas City. However, this information 

was not included in the CI’s file, provided to the USAO, or reported to ATF 

Headquarters through the MCP. ATF’s case agent for the St. Louis storefront 

told us that he also was not made aware of the allegations, nor was the ASAC 

who supervised the surge and storefront made aware. 

We do not believe that ATF leadership in St. Louis properly managed or 

reported on the risks associated with the CI in the St. Louis storefront. We 

believe that ATF should have considered polygraphing him in order to probe the 

allegations further and also to ascertain whether his girlfriend had made other 

disclosures about the CI’s association with law enforcement while she was in St. 

Louis. We did not find comparable oversights in the other storefronts. 

51 As we described in our recent follow-up review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious, ATF 

has established a new policy reminding agents about the availability of polygraphs in selecting and 

managing informants. See U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, A Review 

of the Department of Justice’s and ATF’s Implementation of Recommendations Contained in the 

OIG’s Report on Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver (February 2016) at 15. We 

cannot say whether the new policy would have resulted in the CI in the St. Louis storefront being 

polygraphed. 

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However, we recommended to ATF in our recent follow-up on Operation Fast 

and Furious that it update its MCP reporting materials to better account for 

issues concerning CIs, especially unauthorized illegal activity.52 ATF has 

implemented that recommendation. 

E. Criminal Intelligence and Lead Generation 

A significant benefit of undercover storefront operations can be the 

generation of criminal intelligence. Agent interactions with criminals who visit a 

storefront may result in the development of leads for new cases and the 

collection of information about organizational criminal activity. In testimony 

before Congress in 2014, former ATF Director Jones identified the intelligence 

gathering capabilities of storefronts as one of their primary purposes, along with 

the removal of firearms from criminals. 

While several of ATF’s authorization memoranda for the five storefronts 

we examined and agents’ descriptions to us identified the collection of criminal 

intelligence as an objective of the operations, we found that none of the 

storefronts we reviewed gathered actionable intelligence on gun trafficking 

organizations. Our review found that the extent of ATF’s intelligence gathering 

at the storefronts was, with few exceptions, limited to the collection of basic 

information about subjects who entered the storefronts and the firearms that 

they sold to the undercover agents.53 Agents told us that due to resource 

limitations they typically were unable to investigate the sources of supply of 

firearms and narcotics for the traffickers who visited the storefronts, such as by 

conducting surveillance on them after they exited the storefronts, much less by 

conducting additional follow-up investigations. An agent at one of the 

storefronts told us that the intelligence the agents were able to collect about 

criminal activities in the neighborhood surrounding the storefront was “zero.” 

Moreover, we identified only three new cases that were “spin-offs” of the 

storefront investigations, two of which were home invasion cases targeted on 

one or more visitors to the storefronts, and there were no enterprise cases that 

resulted from the operations of any of the storefronts that we examined. 

In light of the paucity of strategic intelligence collected, we were not 

surprised to find that ATF did not produce any written intelligence products 

based on information obtained from the storefronts. We also found that ATF did 

not prepare after-action reports on the storefronts that could be used to refine 

the technique and further develop best practices. 

Overall, we did not find in the execution of the operations a practical 

appreciation within ATF for the importance of the intelligence cycle (planning, 

52 Id. at 12-13. 

53 We acknowledge that such isolated evidence may still be important in particular cases. 

For example, in St. Louis, evidence obtained about a firearm assisted in closing a homicide 

investigation. 

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collection, processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation).54 

ATF’s capacity to preserve intelligence is limited and relies heavily upon a case 

management system (N-FORCE) that is antiquated. An Intelligence Research 

Specialist who was assigned to one of the storefronts told us that she was not 

aware of any repository of gang intelligence within ATF where she could 

preserve the information that was obtained about gang members during the 

operation. When we asked ATF’s Assistant Director for the Office of Strategic 

Intelligence and Information, who oversees ATF’s intelligence operations, about 

the collection and dissemination of gang-related criminal intelligence, he stated 

that the information should be entered into GangNet, a national gang database 

that is maintained by a private contractor. In our interviews, no agent or 

analyst reported that they had received instructions to utilize GangNet, and we 

saw no evidence that any such information was ever entered into it. 

Dissemination of information also was a problem, as evidenced in the Milwaukee 

storefront. We found in that case that a lack of appreciation for the need to 

disseminate intelligence in a timely manner contributed to the FBI’s decision to 

withdraw from the storefront altogether. In short, we did not find that agents at 

the storefronts were fully briefed on ATF’s expectations regarding how they 

should manage criminal intelligence, or that the storefronts were designed or 

operated in a manner that resulted in the collection or use of such intelligence in 

pursuing criminal organizations. We believe these are significant issues that ATF 

needs to address in future storefront operations, and we make several 

recommendations in this report that will assist that effort. 

III. Vulnerable Populations 

A. Persons with Intellectual or Developmental Disabilities 

Our review examined allegations that ATF personnel targeted persons 

with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) during undercover 

storefront operations. The OIG received requests from members of Congress to 

examine these claims. In addition to investigating this issue in the five 

storefronts mentioned above – Pensacola, Wichita, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and 

Brockton/New Bedford – the OIG reviewed similar allegations involving ATF’s 

storefront in Portland, Oregon. The Portland storefront, known as Operation 

Kraken, operated from June 7, 2010, through March 2, 2011. 

We found no evidence that ATF targeted or recruited persons with I/DD in 

either the Brockton/New Bedford or St. Louis storefronts. However, the 

Pensacola, Wichita, Milwaukee, and Portland storefronts each had one or two 

persons who regularly frequented the storefront, provided assistance to the 

undercover agents at times, and who were later alleged to have an I/DD. For 

each of these storefronts, we interviewed agents, local law enforcement 

54 See generally David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, 

and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, 2nd ed. (U.S. Department of Justice, COPS Office 2009), at 

57. 

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personnel, and federal prosecutors who had contact with the identified 

individuals. In addition, we examined documents that referred to the 

individuals, such as agent reports, and reviewed video and audio recordings of 

the storefront operations, which allowed us to evaluate interactions with the 

undercover agents. We also spoke about issues surrounding interactions 

between law enforcement and persons with I/DD with subject matter experts at 

the Department’s Civil Rights Division (CRT) and The ARC, a national non-profit 

organization that serves people with I/DD and their families. Ultimately, we 

found no evidence that ATF targeted or used the identified individuals in its 

storefront investigations because of their disability. In fact, we found no 

evidence that the agents involved in the storefronts knew or even suspected 

that the identified individuals were intellectually or developmentally disabled.55 

Although we did not substantiate the allegations that ATF personnel 

targeted persons with I/DD, we found that neither ATF nor any other 

Department law enforcement component was aware of the legal obligations that 

apply to interactions with such persons. We consulted with representatives of 

CRT and were informed that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 

U.S.C. § 794, prohibits federal agencies from discriminating against persons due 

to their disability. According to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

(ODAG), the Department construes Section 504 to prohibit disability 

discrimination in federal law enforcement operations. 

ODAG’s interpretation of Section 504 is consistent with CRT’s 

longstanding application of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101 et seq., which prohibits disability discrimination at the state and local 

level. Title II of the ADA prohibits a “public entity” from discriminating against a 

“qualified individual with a disability,” Id. at § 12132, and was modeled after 

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.56 The Department has taken the position 

that Title II of the ADA applies to state and local law enforcement agencies and 

affects ”all of their operations, including arrests.”57 CRT’s Disability Rights 

Section also has issued detailed guidance concerning the application of Title II to 

the operations of state and local law enforcement and interprets the ADA to 

affect “virtually everything that officers and deputies do,” including receiving 

citizen complaints; interrogating witnesses; and arresting, booking, and holding 

suspects.58 ODAG informed us that the Rehabilitation Act covers all of the 

activities of federal law enforcement operations as the ADA does to all state and 

local law enforcement operations. 

55 For purposes of this review, we assumed that the individuals in question had an 

intellectual or developmental disability. 

56 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11 n.2, City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (No. 13-1412) (Section 504 “served as the model 

for Title II”). 

57 Id. at 11 

58 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Commonly Asked Questions About the Americans with 

Disabilities Act and Law Enforcement § I, http://www.ada.gov/q&A_law.htm (Apr. 4, 2006). 

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The absence of a prior Department-wide position on the applicability of 

the Rehabilitation Act to federal law enforcement activities resulted in a lack of 

attention to this issue from the Department’s law enforcement components. 

When we inquired with ATF and other Department law enforcement components 

about their compliance responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act, we were told 

that they were unaware of any such duties, and we found that the components 

lacked policies that addressed the Rehabilitation Act’s applicability to law 

enforcement operations.59 We also found that the Department had not issued 

any guidance to federal law enforcement agencies under the Rehabilitation Act 

as it had done with state and local enforcement agencies under the ADA. When 

we raised with ODAG the components’ lack of awareness of any responsibilities 

under the Rehabilitation Act regarding law enforcement activities, we were told 

that historically the Department primarily had addressed the Act in the context 

of litigation involving individuals’ claims, but had not focused on the broader 

need to address the Department’s overall compliance responsibilities, such as 

through the establishment of express policies, training, and oversight. 

Upon learning of these issues during the course of this review the OIG 

notified ODAG in April 2015 and, in a letter dated September 3, 2015, the 

Inspector General wrote to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 

and advised them of the OIG’s concern with the Department’s compliance with 

the Rehabilitation Act.60 The OIG requested quarterly reports from the 

Department commencing October 30, 2015, that describe its efforts to ensure 

that its law enforcement activities comply with the Act. The Department 

submitted its first response on October 30, 2015. According to the ODAG, the 

Department’s Office of Legal Policy (OLP) was working with the Office of Legal 

Counsel to develop legal guidance on the Department’s obligations under the 

Rehabilitation Act, and OLP was attempting to determine if policy guidance is 

necessary. The Department provided a second update on February 19, 2016, 

that explained that OLP was meeting regularly with various components in the 

Department to discuss next steps. On June 21, 2016, the Department provided 

its third update and reported that a working group has begun drafting guidance 

that will set out the Department’s legal requirements under the Rehabilitation 

Act. The Department provided its latest update on September 2, 2016 which 

explained that the working group is continuing its efforts to develop guidance. 

We believe the Department should promptly design and implement a 

comprehensive plan to ensure that its law enforcement and detention 

59 During the course of our review, ATF did introduce training on I/DD issues. On June 

24, 2015, the Acting Director of ATF announced mandatory “Intellectual and Developmental 

Disability Awareness Training” for all ATF law enforcement personnel. This training discusses 

various types of I/DD and provides instruction on identification of persons with I/DD. The training 

also provides ATF personnel with instructions on how to manage interactions between law 

enforcement and individuals with I/DD. It does not specifically address contact with persons with 

I/DD in the context of storefronts or other undercover operations. 

60 As previously noted, the ODAG told us that it presented these issues to the 

Department’s Office of Legal Policy (OLP) for consideration in May 2015. 

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components comply with the Rehabilitation Act and are implementing best 

practices to carry out the Act’s broad purposes. 

B. Juveniles 

We found that ATF’s approach to juveniles at the storefronts was 

inconsistent. Agents in Wichita and Pensacola told us that juveniles were 

permitted on the premises, and, in fact, a juvenile was one of the primary 

customers of the former storefront, providing 15 percent of the firearms 

purchased during the operation. By contrast, juveniles were prohibited at the 

St. Louis storefront and discouraged from visiting the mobile storefront in 

Massachusetts. An agent in St. Louis said that when juveniles came into the 

storefront they were told to leave. Agents in Milwaukee reported that juveniles 

did not attempt to visit the storefront. We found no evidence that ATF actively 

sought to incorporate juveniles into the storefront operations. 

We determined that there were few, if any, discussions in the planning 

and approval process concerning how the undercover agents would handle 

juveniles who sought to visit the storefronts. For example, the St. Louis RAC 

told the OIG that he could not recall a specific conversation in which he 

discussed prohibiting juveniles from the storefront. In his view it was common 

sense and understood by the agents. The agents in Wichita stated that prior to 

the start of operations they did not discuss the issue and were not provided any 

guidance from their supervisors. They said that it would have been helpful to 

have received guidance. However, an ASAC who supervised the Wichita 

storefront recalled that he had addressed the issue with the agents and 

informed them that he did not want juveniles to sell firearms at the storefront. 

The Kansas City SAC said he could not recall a “specific plan” concerning how to 

handle juveniles though he said he would like to think that if a small child came 

into the storefront that the undercover agents would not engage the child in a 

conversation about firearms trafficking, and that they would employ common 

sense. Overall, we found that in the absence of clear direction from their 

supervisors ATF undercover agents defaulted to their experience and common 

sense to make judgments on how to manage their encounters with juveniles. 

We found that neither the ATF nor the USAOs targeted juveniles for 

prosecution and understood that juvenile cases would be prosecuted locally 

consistent with general Department policies and procedures. For example, the 

AUSAs in Wichita told us that during the planning and prosecution phases of the 

storefront, they discussed with ATF presenting cases to the state district 

attorney’s office, including ones involving juveniles. The Kansas City SAC said 

he assumed that if ATF developed a case against a juvenile, it would be 

prosecuted at the local level. 

During our review some ATF agents and supervisors discussed the danger 

that juveniles can pose to the public. The Kansas City SAC told us that he 

assumed there could be a wide range of people coming into the Wichita 

storefront – including 16 or 17 year-olds who were “trigger-pullers” or engaged 

in firearms or narcotics trafficking. The case agent in the Wichita storefront said 

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that the undercover agents often purchased firearms from juveniles and that, as 

noted above, one juvenile alone was responsible for selling approximately 15 

percent of all firearms that the agents acquired in the operation. He stated that 

if juveniles had been prohibited it would have limited the storefront’s 

effectiveness. 

We believe that ATF should amend its Storefront Investigations Manual to 

provide guidance on undercover agent interactions with juveniles in the 

storefront setting. ATF’s approach will need to balance the important interests 

of removing firearms from juveniles and addressing participation in serious 

crimes by offenders of all ages while ensuring the safety of the storefront and its 

occupants. We believe that ATF field divisions should address in the storefronts’ 

planning and approval phases how juveniles will be handled when encountered, 

and anticipate issues concerning coordination with state authorities for any 

prosecutions. 

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CHAPTER FIVE
 

OIG CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 

Our review was prompted by allegations of ATF’s mismanagement of its 

undercover storefront operations. We examined a subset of these operations to 

determine whether there are systemic problems with ATF’s storefront polices 

and to evaluate the effectiveness of ATF’s Monitored Case Program as an 

oversight tool for the storefronts. We found that while undercover operations 

can be an important component of ATF’s efforts to fight violent crime, ATF failed 

to devote sufficient attention to how it was managing its undercover storefront 

operations. It lacked adequate policies and guidance for its agents, and in some 

cases supervision, necessary to appropriately address the risks associated with 

the use of this complex investigative technique. Following the controversy 

surrounding its Milwaukee storefront, code named “Operation Fearless,” ATF 

made substantial revisions to its storefront policies. We did not find overarching 

problems with ATF’s current storefront policies, though we believe ATF should 

make changes to improve them. We also found that ATF needed to make 

adjustments to the Monitored Case Program (MCP) to better focus on the most 

significant risks in ATF’s investigative operations, including storefronts. 

In addition to ATF’s storefront policies and the MCP, our review examined 

allegations that ATF was targeting persons with I/DD for enforcement action or 

use in the storefronts. Although we did not find evidence to sustain this 

allegation, we found that the Department of Justice and its law enforcement 

components had failed to apply the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, 

et seq., to their federal law enforcement activities. We have brought this issue 

to the Department’s attention, and will carefully monitor the Department’s 

response and will make additional recommendations if necessary. 

Our review also identified three other areas of concern that merit 

comment. The first involves predication and targeting. We believe ATF must do 

a better job in future storefront operations defining the crime problem that the 

storefront is designed to address and explaining how the strategy underlying it 

will lead to the apprehension of persons warranting federal prosecution. As we 

explained in Chapter Four, the undercover storefront technique has limitations in 

its ability to attract the most senior and influential members of criminal 

organizations to participate directly in its operations. ATF storefront proposals 

should expressly identify the targets of the undercover operation and the 

information that establishes their priority status for federal law enforcement, 

and provide for sufficient resources to enable the follow-up investigation 

necessary to pursue any enterprise targets or larger crime problems that the 

storefront is intended to address. 

We do not suggest, however, that ATF should target only criminal 

organizations in its use of the storefront technique. ATF has demonstrated that 

storefronts can be successful in attracting convicted felons who possess 

firearms, and at times persons with multiple prior felonies. Some of these 

individuals, depending on the nature of their prior felonies and their activities 

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within the community, may present an imminent danger to the public and could 

be worthy targets for federal law enforcement, whether or not they belong to a 

particular group. For example, the St. Louis storefront demonstrated how the 

storefront technique can function effectively in a neighborhood that is 

experiencing extreme violence caused by criminals who are only loosely 

affiliated or unaffiliated with criminal organizations. We do not believe it is 

difficult to identify other similarly situated neighborhoods across the United 

States that would benefit from the removal of armed felons even if they are not 

gang members. In short, the goals of a storefront may vary depending on local 

crime circumstances, and ATF should ensure that its use of this technique is 

appropriately targeted to best address such situations and that they are 

consistent with a substantial federal law enforcement interest. And then, during 

and after such operations, ATF should evaluate the impact of the storefront on 

the crime problem that it was designed to address. 

Second, ATF underestimated the level of experience, training, and 

expertise necessary to manage and oversee its storefront operations, which led 

to mistakes. Undercover storefront operations are complex and require the 

management of significant manpower and financial resources. ATF’s assignment 

of inexperienced and shifting staff to run and supervise these operations without 

adequate Headquarters support and oversight had predictably negative 

consequences. ATF needs to consolidate its storefront expertise and ensure that 

it is fully engaged in each operation. ATF’s revision of its storefront policies and 

implementation of recommendations in this report should be a good first step in 

avoiding the repetition of past errors, and we make additional recommendations 

in this report to further that process. 

Third, and closely related to the second issue above, is the problem told 

to us about ATF Headquarters’ historic reluctance to intrude on the domain of its 

Special Agents in Charge. We believe that in addition to supplementing the 

expertise available for storefront operations, the Special Operations Division and 

its Undercover Branch need to be stakeholders in future operations and provide 

active oversight of them. The Undercover Branch’s initiative to inspect the 

storefronts following the controversy over Operation Fearless is a good example 

of the kind of Headquarters engagement that should be occurring. Our 

interviews revealed, however, that SOD and UCB staff primarily view their roles 

as providing assistance when requested rather than direction or oversight. ATF 

undercover storefront operations should not proceed unless experts within SOD 

and the UCB concur that they are properly designed and are being implemented 

appropriately. ATF Headquarters’ staff should be accountable for the success of 

these operations. 

Below we provide 13 recommendations to assist ATF with its storefront 

operations. They address the following issues: initiation, planning, safety and 

security, oversight, intelligence, vulnerable populations, revisions to the 

Storefront Investigations Manual, and training. ATF concurs with the 

recommendations and has committed to their full implementation. See 

Appendix B (Deputy Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

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Explosives, memorandum to Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, 

August 22, 2016). 

Initiation: 

Future storefront proposals should account for the significant revisions 

that ATF made to its storefront policies since 2013. Our review of proposal 

materials in the storefront operations we examined found that they lacked a 

standard format and in some cases omitted important information. We believe 

that the process of initiating a storefront would be more consistent and 

comprehensive if ATF would standardize its storefront application materials to 

address the categories of information that ATF policy currently identifies as 

necessary for managers to make informed judgments whether to initiate 

storefront operations, and to provide for appropriate investigative follow-up and 

case development. We also recommend that the application expressly account 

for the review of key actors within ATF by requiring their certification that they 

have evaluated the operation, find it consistent with ATF and DOJ policies, and 

concur with its implementation. 

Recommendation 1: ATF should develop a standard undercover 

storefront operations proposal template that: (1) incorporates requirements 

from the ATF Storefront Investigations Manual, such as target identification, 

statistical analysis, siting the storefront, and command staff experience; (2) 

specifies how prosecutions resulting from the storefront will serve a substantial 

federal interest; and (3) requires review and certifications from the Division 

Tactical Advisor, Division Counsel, Special Agent in Charge, and the Chief of the 

Undercover Branch. 

Planning: 

ATF’s Storefront Investigations Manual affords agents written instructions 

on the initiation and planning of storefront operations and is a significant 

improvement in ATF’s guidance. We believe, however, that ATF should provide 

additional support to its agents by assembling a packet of materials for use 

primarily by the case agent and group supervisor that includes copies of the 

various forms and other paperwork that must be completed to properly 

administer a storefront. This could include items such as sample MOUs with 

local law enforcement and guidance on leasing and evidence processing issues. 

Due to the critical role of the case agent, ATF should develop a storefront case 

agent job description. We also recommend that ATF prepare a checklist of 

issues that must be assessed before submitting a proposal to ATF Headquarters, 

and assign one or more subject matter experts from the Special Operations 

Division to the field division to review and provide input the proposal prior to its 

submission to Headquarters and to assist with the initial setup and operation of 

the storefront. 

Recommendation 2: ATF should develop a standard storefront 

informational packet that includes written guidance on job duties for the 

storefront case agent and a checklist of issues that should be addressed in every 

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operation, as well as best practices on how to address them. ATF should put in 

place procedures to ensure that the checklist is used as a guide for preparation 

of the storefront proposal and the MCP initial submission. See 

Recommendations 1 and 6. 

Recommendation 3: ATF’s Undercover Branch should designate 

undercover agents/case agents with significant storefront expertise to work onscene for the initial period of each storefront’s operation to assist with planning, 

set-up, and early operations. 

Safety and Security: 

Our review identified instances where security issues were not properly 

evaluated. Although ATF utilizes operational plans to memorialize its tactical 

security planning, our review of these documents for the storefronts showed 

that they were not sufficiently comprehensive. We recommend that the field 

division proposing a storefront be required to complete a written security 

assessment with the assistance of a trained tactical advisor, and include the 

assessment with the storefront proposal. 

Recommendation 4: ATF should require that a written security 

assessment be completed for each storefront with input from a Division Tactical 

Advisor trained on the storefront technique, and should encompass the vicinity 

surrounding the storefront. At a minimum, the assessment should include maps 

of the vicinity, a diagram and photographs of the proposed storefront, a 

description of security enhancements anticipated for the storefront, and an 

explanation of the security planning and training measures undertaken. The 

assessment should be added as an attachment to the storefront proposal. 

Recommendation 5: ATF should ensure that any Division operating a 

storefront has one or more Division Tactical Advisors who have been specifically 

trained on storefront security, and that they are consulted on a regular basis as 

issues arise during storefront operations. The Division Tactical Advisors also 

should assist in developing security best practices for storefronts that should be 

provided to ATF Headquarters and disseminated to the field as part of the 

standard storefront informational packets. 

Oversight: 

A problem that hindered some of the storefront investigations was 

turnover in supervision that resulted in a lack of continuity in oversight. We 

recommend that ATF mitigate this problem in future storefronts. 

Recommendation 6: ATF should develop mitigation strategies to 

minimize turnover of supervisors overseeing storefront operations, including 

requiring that best efforts to ensure that the case agent and supervising Group 

Supervisor or Resident Agent in Charge selected to directly supervise such 

operations are expected to remain in place during the planning and operational 

phases of the storefront. 

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Intelligence: 

We found that although ATF has identified the collection of criminal 

intelligence as an objective of its storefront operations, in practice ATF’s 

intelligence efforts were largely limited to the identification of subjects in specific 

transactions. We did not find that ATF provided for the follow-up investigation 

that would be required to pursue enterprise cases, that it prepared written 

intelligence products resulting from its storefront investigations, or that it 

required the preparation of after-action reports that critically evaluated the 

results achieved through these labor-intensive operations. We believe that 

these omissions represent lost opportunities to maximize the impact and 

effectiveness of the storefront operations. 

Recommendation 7: The Office of Strategic Intelligence and 

Information should develop guidance on intelligence protocols (collection, 

analysis, dissemination, etc.) for storefront operations. ATF’s administrative 

packet for storefronts (see Recommendation 2) should include this guidance. 

Recommendation 8: ATF should require that storefront proposals 

evaluate the necessity of appropriate follow-up investigation for leads generated 

by the storefront as needed to address any enterprise or larger crime problems 

sought to be addressed through the storefront, including an assessment of and 

provision for sufficient resources to carry out such plans. 

Recommendation 9: ATF should require the preparation of after-action 

reports for all storefronts, that includes statistical and other analysis of the 

impact of the storefront on the crime problem to which it was addressed. 

Vulnerable Populations: 

We found that the Department has not addressed its responsibilities 

under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 with regard to law enforcement operations, 

and that it should take prompt action to do so. We provide a recommendation 

concerning juveniles in our discussion below regarding the Storefront 

Investigation Manual. 

Recommendation 10: DOJ should promptly design and implement as 

expeditiously as possible a plan that ensures that its law enforcement and 

detention components comply with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and are 

implementing and providing training on best practices to carry out the Act’s 

broad purposes. 

Tracing Firearms: 

We determined that ATF’s Firearms Enforcement Program Order, Order 

3310.4C, which establishes ATF procedures for tracing firearms, does not 

require agents to perform traces on firearms taken into ATF’s custody “at the 

earliest time practicable,” as required in a memorandum issued by the President 

to all federal law enforcement agencies in January 2013. In addition, ATF’s 

Storefront Investigations Manual does not specify a time limitation or other 

91
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

expectation concerning when agents should perform traces in storefront 

operations. (We address revisions to the Manual in Recommendation 12 below). 

Recommendation 11: ATF should modify its Firearms Enforcement 

Program Order to require agents to complete firearms traces “at the earliest 

time practicable.” 

Storefront Investigations Manual: 

Below we provide several suggested revisions to the Storefront 

Investigations Manual based on findings from this report. 

Recommendation 12: The Storefront Investigations Manual should be 

amended to include the following: 

(1) A section that provides instructions on how to prepare the storefront 

proposal, including identification of how prosecutions resulting from the 

storefront will serve a substantial federal interest, and the supporting security 

assessment; 

(2) A section that discusses the importance of providing for appropriate 

follow-up investigation on promising leads generated by the storefront and 

requires evaluation of the availability of resources in order to accomplish this 

objective and to achieve the goals of the storefront; 

(3) A section that emphasizes the importance of intelligence sharing and 

appropriate coordination with the DEA regarding drug cases and individuals 

selling drugs to the storefront who may be connected to larger organizations or 

investigations; 

(4) A section on Intelligence that discusses the intelligence cycle and how 

intelligence collected from storefront operations will be processed; 

(5) A section on Oversight that discusses the requirements of the MCP 

and includes examples of information that should be identified as “problems” 

and included in MCP written “update” submissions; 

(6) A section on Confidential Informants that discusses considerations 

regarding the use of CIs in support of storefront operations; 

(7) A section on Vulnerable Populations that discusses considerations 

regarding interactions with persons with I/DD and juveniles, and includes 

provision for appropriate coordination with state law enforcement and 

prosecution authorities; and 

(8) A section that requires that firearms traces be completed “at the 

earliest time practicable.” 

Training: 

92
 
 

 

 

Our review identified instances where neither the undercover agents nor 

the case agent had completed advanced undercover training, including training 

on storefront operations. We believe that at least one agent on a storefront 

team should receive advanced undercover training before the storefront 

becomes operational. 

Recommendation 13: ATF should require at least one undercover agent or 

the case agent on a storefront team to have completed advanced undercover 

training, including training on storefront operations, before the storefront 

becomes operational. 

We believe that the recommendations above will strengthen ATF’s 

undercover operations. We emphasize, however, that the focus of this review 

was limited to ATF’s application of the storefront investigative technique, and 

our findings and conclusions concerning ATF’s conduct should not be construed 

expansively as a critique of the technique itself. Nevertheless, we do think that 

there are principles that we garnered from this review that extend beyond the 

context of undercover storefront operations. These include the need to 

recognize when specialized expertise is necessary, to train agents to identify 

risks that require evaluation by a supervisor, to focus undercover operations in 

those areas where there is a substantial federal interest, and to ensure that 

there is sufficient and consistent local supervision and Headquarters oversight of 

these sensitive and ever-changing operations. Undercover operations have 

been and should continue to be an important tool in ATF’s fight against violent 

crime. Accordingly, ATF leadership should take steps to ensure that such 

operations are managed expertly and appropriately. 

93
 
 

ATTACHMENT
 

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U. S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

Associate Deputy Attorney General Washington. D.C. 20530 

September 6, 2016 

MEMORANDUM 


TO: Michael Horowitz 

Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

FROM: Carlos Felipe Uriarte Cf'tl.... 

Associate Deputy Attorney General 

SUBJECT: Response: A Review of ATF's Undercover Storefront Operations 

We appreciate the review undertaken by the Department of Justice (DOJ or the 

Department), Office ofthe Inspector General (OIG) regarding the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives' (A TF) undercover storefront operations. As noted in the report, during 

its review, OIG raised concerns that the Department's law enforcement and detention 

components lacked policies to address their obligations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 

Act of 1973,29 U.S.c. § 701 et seq. (Rehabilitation Act). When OIG first raised this issue in 

April 2015, the Department quickly started a process of considering whether additional guidance 

on the Rehabilitation Act would be helpful to the Department's law enforcement and detention 

components. Accordingly, in May 2015, the Deputy Attorney General requested that the Office 

of Legal Policy (OLP) conduct a review of the Department's law enforcement and detention 

components' efforts to comply with the Rehabilitation Act and determine if additional policy 

guidance was necessary. The working group is now drafting Department-wide guidance to 

ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Act and to convey best practices for dealing with 

individuals with disabilities. 

The working group is comprised of representatives from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives; the Bureau of Prisons; the Drug Enforcement Administration, the 

Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Marshals Service; the Criminal Division, the Civil 

Division, the Civil Rights Division; and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys. Over the past 
year the working group has met regularly and intends to produce a final guidance document to 

the Deputy Attorney General this fall. Once this guidance is complete, each component will be 

responsible for developing policies and training consistent with the Department-wide guidance. 

The Department appreciates OIG's recommendation that it design and implement a plan 

to ensure that its law enforcement and detention components comply with the Rehabilitation Act 

and that the law enforcement components are implementing and providing training on best 

practices to carry out the Act's broad purposes. That is why the Department requested that OLP 

work with the Department's law enforcement and detention components to develop Departmentwide guidance, which will guide the components in the development of their own policies and 

training. 

cc: 	 Jonathan Wroblewski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Policy 

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ATTACHMENT
 

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B-1
 
• 	

V.S. Department of.'u.tlee 

Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco. 

Firearms and ExplOilives 

Offlce oj/he Dlrec/or 

AUG 2·2 	2016 

MEMORANDUM TO: 	 Inspector General 


United States Department of Justice 


FROM: 	 Deputy Director 

Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

SUBJECT: 	 The Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Response 

to the Office oflnspector General's Review ofUndercover Storefront 

Operations 

Thank you for allowing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) the 

opportunity to review and comment on the report entitled "A Review ofATF's Undercover 

Storefront Operations." ATF concurs with the recommendations directed at ATF and 

acknowledges the findings made by the Inspector General. Specifically, the report found that 

ATF's future storefront operations should better define the crime problem to be addressed by the 

storefront operation. Second, the Inspector General's report finds that ATF should ensure that 

staff assigned to storefronts have the experience, training, and expertise necessary to manage and 

oversee these sensitive operations. Third, the report finds that A TF Headquarters should have a 

larger role in the planning, operation and execution of storefront operations. Last, the Inspector 

General's report found the allegations that ATF's storefront operations had targeted or utilized 

vulnerable populations, such as minors and persons with intellectual or developmental 

disabilities (lIDO), were not accurate. 

As noted in your report, ATF has utilized the undercover storefront technique to "target illegal 

firearms traffickers and to address other crimes involving firearms.'" In utilizing this valuable 

investigative technique, A TF has consistently striven to improve the management and oversight 

ofthese operations. Notably, the Inspector General's report found that as a result ofits internal 

review ofthe storefront in Milwaukee ("Operation Fearless."), ATF implemented substantial 

improvements to the policies governing storefront operations. As a direct result ofthe 

operational deficiencies identified by ATF's internal assessment ofthat operation, ATF issued 

new comprehensive guidelines that sought to enhance the planning and execution of storefront 

operations, while fostering nation-wide consistency through better headquarters oversight. 

As the Inspector General's report further notes, the use of undercover storefront operations is not 

unique to ATF. This technique, or derivations ofthis technique, have or are currently being 

I Inspector General's Draft Report at 2. 
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Inspector General 

utilized by some federal, state and local law enforcement partners. The Inspector General 

acknowledges that when this undercover technique is utilized by an investigative agency, it can 

have several operational benefits, to include "[s ]afety, evidence quality, and the potential for 

enhanced intelligence and evidence gathering.,,2 

The Inspector General's report also recognizes that this technique has structural limitations that 

can impact the outcome ofthe operation. More specifically, the report finds that storefront 

operations are resource intensive operations that "typically occupied the work of an entire ATF 

agent group, which totaled 8 to 10 agents, full-time for the duration of the operation.,,3 Such 

demand on agent and officer resources posed a substantial challenge to allocating the time 

necessary to "followD up on leads and deviseD and pursueD additional investigative strategies, 

and [to] work on potentially important cases.,,4 ATF concurs that allocation of additional, 

sufficient resources to Divisions operating storefronts would have enabled ATF to more 

effectively use the strategic intelligence derived from the undercover operation. Nevertbeless, 

although limitations on investigative resources will consistently be an issue for an agency the 

size ofATF, we believe that A TF's past storefront operations have directly benefited public 

safety, and, with the enhancements recommended by the OIG, storefronts should remain an 

investigative option. In the five operations reviewed by the Inspector General, A TF was able to 

interdict over 780 firearms from entering illegal commerce and recommend approximately 120 

defendants for federal prosecution. While ATF agr!!es that enterprise-level cases and the 

development ofinvestigative leads against organization leaders should be a goal of our 

enforcement efforts, we concurrently believe that community-impact operations such as 

storefronts are an appropriate and necessary option in the catalog offederallaw enforcement 

techniques. Operations that directly benefit public safety, either predicated or broadly-targeted, 

should not be considered a "crude tool',5 of law enforcement. 

To ensure that undercover storefront operations are appropriately tailored to the challenges 

facing the community, ATF only conducts these operations in partnership with the state andlor 

local law enforcement agencies, state prosecutor and United States Attorney's Office that have 

jurisdiction over the community. In fact, the Inspector General's report notes that ATF agents 

engaged with prosecutors' offices and local law enforcement in each ofthe five storefront 

operations reviewed by their office. Such cooperation between federal, state and local law 

enforcement is a crucial component to A TF's enforcement efforts, and ensures that sensitive 

operations, like undercover storefronts, are directed towards communities where violent crime is 

prevalent. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on the Inspector General's report. A TF 

provides the following formal response to the recommendations contained in the Inspector 

General's draft report. 

2 [d. at 63. 

J [d. at 64. 

'/d. 

S /d. 
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Inspector General 

Recommendation #1: A TF should develop a standard undercover storefront operations proposal 

template that: (I) incorporates requirements from the ATF Storefront Investigations Manual, 

such as target identification, statistical analysis, siting the storefront, and command staff 

experience; (2) specifies how prosecutions resulting from the storefront will serve a substantial 

federal interest; and (3) requires review and certifications from the Division Tactical Advisor, 

Division Counsel, Special Agent in Charge, and the Chief ofthe Undercover Branch. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation. Moving forward, ATF will develop 

and utilize a standard template for agents who are proposing and seeking authorization to initiate 

an undercover storefront operation. This template will incorporate requirements contained in the 

Storefront Investigations Manual, including sections on target identification, statistical analysis, 

location ofthe storefront, and a prosecution strategy that ties the storefront operation to the 

Division's most recent Domain Assessment. As part of the approval process, this standardized 

template will require review and certifications from the Division Tactical Advisor (DTA), 

Division Counsel, the Special Agent in Charge, and the Chief ofthe Undercover Branch. This 

standardized template will then be submitted to the regional Deputy Assistant Director and the 

Undercover Review Committee (URC) for consideration and approval. 

Recommendation #2: ATF should develop a standard storefront informational packet that 

includes written guidance on job duties for the storefront case agent and a checklist of issues that 

should be addressed in every operation, as well as best practices on how to address them. ATF 

should put in place procedures to ensure that the checklist is used as a guide for preparation of 

the storefront proposal and the MCP initial submission. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation and will begin work on developing a 

standard storefront informational packet that will be included as part ofthe Storefront 

Investigations Manual. This informational packet will have written guidance that would serve as 

an operational checklist, outlining specific issues that need to be addressed during any storefront 

investigation. This guidance will also contain sections on best practices and recommendations to 

address commonly occurring issues in storefront operations. The informational packet and 

Storefront Investigations Manual will additionally include descriptions ofthe unique job duties 

ofthe principal undercover and the case agent. Procedurally, ATF will require each storefront 

proposal to submit the completed information packet to the URC to aid the committee's review. 

Recommendation #3: ATF's Undercover Branch should designate undercover agents/case 

agents with significant storefront expertise to work on-scene for the initial period of each 

storefront's operation to assist with the planning, set-up, and early operations. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation. The UCB will seek to identify a 

cadre of agents in the undercover program who possess experience in storefronts or other similar 

sensitive undercover operations. Should a Division subsequently request to initiate a storefront, 

the UCB will be able to provide an undercover agent with significant storefront experience to 

work on-scene for the initial period of each storefront operation. 
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Inspector General 

Recommendation #4: ATF should require that a written security assessment be completed for 

each storefront with input from a Division Tactical Advisor trained on the storefront technique, 

and should encompass the vicinity surrounding the storefront. At a minimum, the assessment 

should include maps ofthe vicinity, a diagram and photographs ofthe proposed storefront, a 

description ofsecurity enhancements anticipated for the storefront, and an explanation ofthe 

security planning and training measures undertaken. The assessment should be added as an 

attachment to the storefront proposal. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation. ATF will begin to develop a security 

assessment template with the assistance of current or former Division Tactical Advisors with 

experience running storefronts. This template will be incorpomted in the newly revised 

Storefront Investigations Manual/informational packet. The Storefront Investigations Manual 

will also be revised to require the security template to be completed by the appropriate DT A, and 

will serve as the written security assessment for each storefront. As suggested, this security 

assessment template will include maps of the vicinity, a diagram and photographs of the 

proposed storefront, a description of security enhancements anticipated for the storefront, and an 

explanation ofthe security planning and training measures undertaken. Procedurally, ATF will 

require submission ofthis assessment with each storefront proposal. 

Recommendation #5: ATF should ensure that any Division operating a storefront has one or 

more Division Tactical Advisors who have been specifically trained on storefront security, and 

that they are consulted on a regular basis as issues arise during the storefront operations. The 

Division Tactical Advisors also should assist in developing security best practices for storefronts 

that should be provided to A TF Headquarters and disseminated to the field as part ofthe standard 

storefront informational packets. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation. Moving forward, as part ofthe 

review and vetting process for each storefront proposal, ATF will assign to each approved 

proposal a Division Tactical Advisor with experience running storefronts to consult on 

operational security issues. In conjunction with the development ofthe security assessment 

template discussed above in recommendation #4, A TF will leverage the assistance ofthat same 

group of current or former Division Tactical Advisors with experience running storefronts to 

develop security best practices for inclusion in the revised Storefront Investigations Manual. 

Recommendation #6: A TF should develop mitigation strategies to minimize turnover of 

supervisors overseeing storefront opemtions, including requiring that best efforts to ensure that 

the case agent and supervising Group Supervisor or Resident Agent in Charge selected to 

directly supervise such operations are expected to remain in place during the planning and 

operational phases ofthe storefront. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation and will employ strategies to 

minimize turnover of supervisors and case agents directly involved in managing storefront 

opemtions. Consistent with merit promotion principles, A TF will emphasize strategies that 
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Inspector General 

ensure continuity among key personnel assigned to storefronts (and similar operations), and will 

consistently seek to improve such strategies. Existing strategies include requiring selecting 

officials in the field to communicate and obtain the concurrence oftheir overseeing deputy 

assistant directors (DADs) before selecting lateral applicants for vacancies. Similarly, other 

directorate DADs are expected to communicate with their counterparts in Field Operations when 

seeking to select lateral applicants for vacancies. Finally, ATF's merit promotion process allows 

the Chair ofATF's Merit Promotion Board to seek input from applicants' supervisors to factor 

into selection decisions. These strategies are designed to facilitate communication, as well as 

organizational and situational awareness, thereby enhancing ATF's operational effectiveness and 

risk mitigation. 

Recommendation #7: The Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information should develop 

guidance on intelligence protocols (collection, analysis, dissemination, etc.) for storefront 

operations. ATF's administrative packet for storefronts should include this guidance. 

ATF's Response: A TF concurs with this recommendation. The Office of Strategic Intelligence 

and Information (OSII), in coordination and consultation with the Office ofField Operations, 

will develop guidance on intelligence protocols for storefront operations. This guidance will be 

designed to serve as an intelligence template, so that Divisions looking to initiate and run a 

storefront operation will have the ability to both establish an intelligence collection plan and 

utilize information derived from the operation in the most efficient manner. A TF will include 

this guidance in the administrative packet for storefronts. 

Recommendation #8: A TF should require that the storefront proposals evaluate the necessity of 

appropriate follow-up investigation for leads generated by the storefronts as needed to address 

any enterprise or larger crime problems sought to be addressed through the storefront, including 

an assessment of and provision for sufficient resources to carry out such plans. 

ATF' s Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation, and will include guidance in the 

Storefront Investigations Manual/informational packet that will require each proposal to 

articulate a plan to assess the need for follow-up investigation. Allowing for variations in 

operational planning and execution, this guidance will generally suggest addressing specific 

investigative follow-up concerns during a daily out-brief and require the case agent to provide a 

written summation of specific matters for follow-up to Division management, e.g. the Resident 

Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge and Special Agent in Charge. 

Recommendation #9: A TF should require the preparation of after-action reports for all 

storefronts, that includes statistical and other analysis ofthe impact ofthe storefront on the crime 

problem to which it was addressed. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation and will develop guidance for the 

Storefront Investigations Manual that requires the completion of an after-action report at the 

conclusion of each operation. 
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Inspector General 

Recommendation #11: A TF should modify its Firearms Enforcement Program Order to require 

agents to complete firearms traces "at the earliest time practicable." 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation. ATF notes that existing policy 

requires that all recovered evidence be input into N-Force within ten days from the date of 

seizure (ATF 0 3111.1A Use ofN-Force, Para. 10). Once a firearm has been entered into NForce as seized property, those entries are "automatically traced as Routine Traces, unless the 

user prevents it by indicating as such within the system" (ATF 0 331 O.4C Firearms Enforcement 

Program, Chap. F. Para. 93). For example, if there is an operational or security concern, users 

may select an option within the N-Force system to prevent the trace from running 

automatically. To address this recommendation, ATF will amend the Firearms Enforcement 

Order to require agents to enter firearms seized as part of an ATF investigation into the N-Force 

system pursuant to the evidence policy and "as soon as practicable." Prior to submission, agents 

will be directed to assess both the safety and investigative impact ofsubmitting the trace request 

at that time. As is allowed under current policy, should agents determine that submission ofthe 

trace request would negatively impact the operation or agent/public safety, they may opt to delay 

submitting the trace. 

Recommendation #12: The Storefront Investigations Manual should be amended to include the 

following: 

(I) A section that provides instructions on how to prepare the storefront proposal, including 

identification of how prosecutions resulting from the storefront will serve a substantial 

federal interest, and the supporting security assessment; 

(2) A section that discusses the importance of providing for appropriate follow-up 

investigation on promising leads generated by the storefront and requires evaluation of 

the availability ofresources in order to accomplish this objective and to achieve goals of 

the storefront; 

(3) A section that emphasizes the importance of intelligence sharing and appropriate 

coordination with the DEA regarding drug cases and individuals selling drugs to the 

storefront who may be connected to larger organizations or investigations; 

(4) 	A section on Intelligence that discusses the intelligence cycle and how intelligence 

collected from storefront operations will be processed; 

(5) A section on Oversight that discusses the requirements ofthe MCP and includes 

examples ofinformation that should be identified as "problems" and included in the MCP 

written "update" submissions; 

(6) A section on Confidential Informants that discusses considerations regarding the use of 

CIs in support ofstorefront operations; 

(7) A section on Vulnerable Populations that discusses considerations regarding interactions 

with persons with IIDD and juveniles, and includes provision for appropriate 

coordination with state law enforcement and prosecution authorities; and 

(8) A section that requires that firearms traces be completed "at the earliest time practicable." 
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Inspector General 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation, and will begin to amend the 

Storefront Investigations Manual to incorporate the sections recommended by the Inspector 

General's report. 

Recommendation #13: ATF should require at least one undercover agent or the case agent on a 

storefront team to have completed advanced undercover training, including training on storefront 

operations, before the storefront becomes operational. 

ATF's Response: ATF concurs with this recommendation, and will further change the 

Storefront Investigations Manual to require the principle undercover agent on a storefront 

operation to have completed the advanced undercover training course, which includes training on 

storefront operations, before the storefront becomes operational. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity 

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, 

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and 

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s 

operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ 

OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or 

(800) 869-4499. 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

www.justice.gov/oig