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IRAN’S POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 5, 2015 

Serial No. 114–83 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DeSAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

ANDREW R. ARTHUR, National Security Subcommittee Staff Director 

SHARON CASEY, Deputy Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

RON DESANTIS, Florida, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

WILL HURD, Texas 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, 

Ranking Member 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on November 5, 2015 ........................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Thomas McInerney, Lieutenant General, USAF, Retired, Member of the 

Iran Policy Committee 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Mr. Jonathan Schanzer, Vice President for Research, Foundation for Defense 

of Democracies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Mr. Steven Bucci, Director, Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, 

The Heritage Foundation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 22 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24 

Mr. Alireza Nader, Senior International Policy Analyst, Rand Corporation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 35 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 37 


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IRAN’S POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY 

Thursday, November 5, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Hice, Hurd, Lynch, 

Kelly, and Lawrence. 

Also present: Representative Welch. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

This hearing will conduct oversight over the enhancement due to 

the Obama administration’s nuclear deal of Iran’s current capabilities to project power by reviewing Iran’s own military arsenal, as 

well as its financing, training, and arming of proxy groups throughout the Middle East. The hearing will also examine how the U.S. 

should be prepared to defend its national security interests in the 

Middle East and at home against Iran’s advancement in power projection as a result of sanctions relief. 

It has been reported that Iran’s defense budget makes up one- third of its national $300 billion budget. If these estimates are accurate, an influx of $100 billion due to sanctions relief would increase Iran’s single-year budget by a third, providing it with substantially increased financial resources to further its foreign policy 

agenda. 

It is well known that Iran projects power in the Middle East 

through the funding of foreign terrorist organizations, hostile governments, and political activist movements, and by arming militant 

groups and offering training facilities. Iran has long been a supporter of the Lebanese group Hezbollah, the, ‘‘vanguard of resistance to Israel.’’ Hezbollah is perhaps Iran’s most effective terrorist 

organization within the region and of course was responsible for 

killing more than 240 Americans at the Marine Corps barracks in 

Beirut in 1983. 

With Iran’s financial and military assistance, Hezbollah has become a prominent influence in Lebanese politics. The State Department estimates that Iran has given Hezbollah hundreds of millions 

of dollars and trained thousands of Hezbollah troops at Iranian 

training facilities. 


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In 2014, the U.S. intelligence community Worldwide Threat Assessment argued that Hezbollah has, ‘‘increased its global terrorist 

activity in recent years to a level that we have not seen since the 

1990’s.’’ 

Further Iranian funding of Hezbollah would be, of course, of serious concern to the U.S. and our allies. 

Hamas has also consistently received funds, weapons, and training from Iran. People talk about Iran being a Shiite power. They 

are absolutely willing to arm Sunni groups like Hamas. And then 

when you have decent Shiite governments like in Azerbaijan, Iran 

is opposed to that. Iran has frequently assisted Shiite militias and 

terrorists in Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. For these reasons, Iran has 

been designated by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984. 

Iran is maintaining and expanding an advanced ballistic and 

cruise missile program that poses a threat to U.S. forces, interests, 

and allies in the gulf region and beyond. The recently signed nuclear accord does not limit Iran’s ability to continue to develop its 

ballistic and cruise missile programs. The potential influx of funding as a result of sanction relief may facilitate the advancement of 

Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile programs which will result in 

Iran posing an even more lethal threat to the United States and 

our allied assets in the region. 

Our military leaders understand the threat posed by Iran. During his confirmation hearing in July for JCS Chairman, Marine 

Corps General Joe Dunford said, ‘‘my expectation is that regardless 

of there being an agreement or not, Iran will continue to be a malign force and influence across the region.’’ 

Retired Marine Corps General Jim Jones further elaborated on 

this threat during testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee hearing last month. He said, ‘‘it is a regime that artfully dodges its commitments, generates international friction to 

exert greater domestic control on its citizens, constantly hardens its 

grip on the country. The mullahs’ government seriously violates 

human rights, U.N. Security Council resolutions and international 

law. They reject the right of Israel to exist by opposing and actively 

undermining the Middle East peace process. And Tehran remains 

the chief antagonist of democracy and liberalization across the Middle East where a better future for millions of people struggles to 

emerge. Its goal is the consolidation of the revolution, which is 

martially enforced at home by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps and prosecuted abroad by the Quds Force and Iran’s many 

proxy groups.’’ 

And I think it is worth pointing out that under the agreement 

with the Obama administration, the international sanctions on the 

Quds Force are actually lifted. 

Sanctions relief will exacerbate Iran’s ability to pursue a nefarious foreign policy agenda. Israeli officials have warned that 

Tehran will direct billions of dollars it will reap from the end of 

economic sanctions toward its anti-Israel proxies in the region. Iranian officials often call for Israel’s destruction. Short of that, proxy 

forces like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad provide Tehran with a shield against a possible Israeli military strike 

on its nuclear program. 


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And I would note today in the ‘‘Wall Street Journal,’’ we have on 

the front page Iranian hacking surges in the U.S. And so here you 

have an agreement. We claim that Iran is going to start to change 

its ways and they are not going to have a military use of nuclear 

energy, but yet how are they responding to that? They are hacking 

inside the United States. 

So Iran’s foreign policy will remain at odds with U.S. interests. 

And so with this understanding, we must turn to the tasks of protecting U.S. national security issues and the job of standing by our 

closest allies in the region. 

And so we are delighted to have such a great group of witnesses 

here for our hearing, and I will recognize them in a minute. But 

before I do that, I would like to recognize the ranking member of 

the Subcommittee on National Security, Mr. Lynch, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

holding this important hearing. 

I also want to thank our witnesses for helping the committee out 

with its work. 

There is no doubt that Iran is a destabilizing force in the Middle 

East, and I agree with the quote by General Dunford that they will 

continue to be so in the future. 

The United States first placed Iran on its terrorist list in 1984 

due to its support of Lebanese Hezbollah. In its most recent country terrorism report, the State Department found that throughout 

2014 Iran did continue to support terrorist groups, including 

Hezbollah, and providing financing, training, and arms to Iraqi 

Shia militias and even some Afghan fighters to bolster Bashar alAssad in Syria. 

Iran has also detained American hikers and journalists, and 

most recently is reported to have arrested two American citizens on 

unspecified charges. 

It is clear that we cannot trust the Iranian regime, but that is 

precisely why the Obama administration has worked so hard to reduce their nuclear weapons capabilities. I believe that the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear 

agreement, offers us the most viable path toward limiting Iran’s 

nuclear program and preventing its future development of a nuclear weapon. 

In referencing the nuclear arms race between the United States 

and the Soviet Union in his 1960 inaugural address, President 

Kennedy remarked that, ‘‘sincerity is always subject to proof’’ The 

Iran nuclear agreement does not require us to simply rely on the 

sincerity of the Iranian leadership. Rather, it depends entirely on 

proof in the form of a robust nuclear inspections and verification 

regime conducted by IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. To be clear, the lifting of nuclear-related United Nations and 

European Union sanctions will only occur after IAEA verification 

that Iran has complied with its end of the deal. 

Specifically, the IAEA must monitor and verify that Iran has met 

a variety of the stipulations required by the agreement. For instance, Iran must reduce its total uranium stockpiles by 97 percent, from 10,000 kilos to 300, immediately. It must also reduce the 

number of centrifuges from 19,000 to about 6,000, which Iran has 


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reportedly already begun to do so. The IAEA must also verify that 

Iran does not produce or retain any weapons-grade uranium, and 

the little low-enriched uranium remaining is to be for commercial 

and scientific uses only. 

The IAEA must monitor and verify the dismantling of the heavy 

water reactor at Iran’s water plant in Arak so that it will not 

longer be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium. These are just 

a few of the substantial physical and verifiable reductions that Iran 

must undertake. 

The Treasury Department estimates that upon implementation 

of the agreement, Iran will have access to between $100 billion and 

$125 billion in foreign exchange assets held in the U.S., EU, and 

mostly Asian banks, a lot of which is already obligated, including 

nearly $20 billion owed to China. 

In all, experts anticipate Iran to use the vast majority of these 

funds to pay down current debt obligations and domestic needs estimated to be over a half a trillion dollars. These needs include as 

much as $200 billion in necessary oil infrastructure investments 

and the purchase of commercial aircraft to replace a deteriorated 

domestic fleet. 

There is still the danger that Iran may direct a portion of repatriated funds to finance terrorist activity or further destabilize the 

Middle East. That is why it is critical that the agreement leaves 

in place our sanctions pertaining to terrorist financing, human 

rights, and weapons of mass destruction. As noted by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, the many U.S. sanctions 

that will remain include those specified by Executive Order 13224 

issued by President Bush following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 

authorizing the U.S. Government to block the assets of foreign entities and individuals to support terrorist organizations. 

Chief among them is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 

which the State Department has deemed the regime’s primary 

mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad. Iran’s 

designation as a state sponsor of terrorism will also stay in effect 

along with the array of sanctions that accompany it, from export 

controls and prohibitions on arms sales to withholding economic assistance. 

The nuclear agreement also includes a snapback mechanism to 

reimpose sanctions in the event that Iran cheats. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing with today’s witnesses how we might build upon the Iran nuclear agreement, the 

purpose of which is stated in the preface of the agreement that we 

can all support, and that is, quote—and I am quoting from the 

agreement—that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. Thank you. 

I will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members 

who would like to submit a written statement. 

We are going to recognize our panel of witnesses. We look like 

we are going to have votes called in about an hour, so my hope is, 

if you stay to the 5 minutes, we will then do our questioning and 

hopefully we can get everyone or definitely most people in because 


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I would hate to have to recess and come back. I know you guys 

have a lot to do. 

So first, I am pleased to welcome Lieutenant General Thomas 

McInerney, United States Air Force, retired, member of the Iran 

Policy Committee; Dr. Jonathan Schanzer, Vice President for Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Dr. Steven 

Bucci, Director of the Center for Foreign and National Security Policy at the Heritage Foundation; and Mr. Alireza Nader, Senior 

International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Welcome to 

you all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So if you would please stand and raise your right 

hands. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. DESANTIS. Witnesses, thank you. Please be seated. 

All witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Your entire written statement will be made part of the record, 

so please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Lieutenant General 

McInerney, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS McINERNEY 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, 

members of the Subcommittee on National Security, thank you for 

the opportunity to give you my concerns on this important subject 

to our Nation’s current and future national security in the Middle 

East. 

The Iran nuclear agreement or, as it is officially titled, The Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Agreement, is the most dangerous nuclear 

agreement ever signed by an American President. Its impact on 

Iran’s ability to dominate the Arabian peninsula and force project 

in the future is profound. 

I harken back to my days on active duty when I commanded a 

U.S. Air Force Europe task force to a CENTO exercise in Iran in 

1977, composed of 12 F–4’s and six 111’s flying out of Shiraz, Iran. 

The Shah of Iran was highly motivated in expanding stability in 

the region until the Carter administration threw him under the 

bus, as the current administration has done in Egypt, Libya, and 

Syria, as well as enabling the Iranians to make Iraq a proxy with 

our withdrawal in 2011. 

I say this for the following reasons. 

Having read the document in full, one can make a reasonable 

case that it limits Iranian nuclear weapons development over the 

short term with some reasonable oversight procedures. However, 

these are just words similar to what Neville Chamberlain produced 

in September 1938 and yet a year later, World War II started and 

60 million lives were lost. My point is that words might be acceptable if we believe that Iran was a trustful partner in this agreement. Yet the mullahs have never observed an agreement in the 

past. 

This agreement should be a formal treaty in accordance with our 

Constitution. 

The Senate has not yet had a vote to approve it. 


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There is no coupling with the agreement and Iran’s proxy force 

projection of its radical Islamic terror activities globally. 

Iran has already made violations of the agreement even before 

it was approved. These violations include the visit of General 

Soleimani to Moscow where he met President Putin and leaders in 

violation of U.N. sanctions to discuss the sale of the S–300 SAM. 

They intentionally violate agreements and nothing happens. 

The Iranians launched a nuclear capable IRBM on 10 October 

2015 in violation of U.N. Security Council resolution 1929. No action has been taken against them. 

Now, several months after the agreement was reached in July, 

the Russians projected forces into Syria to keep Bashar al-Assad in 

power and attack the Free Syrian Army’s forces supported by the 

U.S.-led coalition. The PRC is now supporting the Assad government. Is something wrong with this picture of Iranian bad behavior 

being supported by Russia and China after the agreement was 

signed? 

Israel who has the most to lose with this agreement is now facing a third intifada instigated by Iran. 

In the meantime, with a growing radical Islamic threat, this administration has been unilaterally disarming the U.S. military ever 

since they came into office starting in April 2009 with the cancellation of the F–22, the next generation bomber, the missile defense 

system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and withdrawing prematurely from a stabilized Iraq, which has resulted in the creation 

of ISIS in 2009. 

The administration shifted U.S. policy shortly after the President’s Cairo speech where he had Muslim Brotherhood members in 

the front row. President Mubarak was not invited, which resulted 

in the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamic organization, taking 

over Egypt until the Egyptian people and General el-Sisi threw 

them out. 

It further created instability in the Middle East by attacking 

Libya to remove Colonel Qaddafi without congressional authorization. This resulted in the deaths of four Americans on 11 September 2012 when the U.S. consulate was attacked. No American 

military response was forthcoming. 

Today a land and air bridge from Iran goes through Iraq that the 

Russians and Iranians are using to reinforce Syria in violation of 

the U.N. Security Council. 

This is the most dangerous situation ever in the Middle East. I 

am skeptical of the Iranians agreeing to follow this nuclear agreement. They will continue to force project forces throughout the region to spread radical Islam, which the administration calls violent 

extremism. I know not the ideology of violent extremism, but I do 

know the ideology of radical Islam, the Koran, Hadith and Sharia 

Law. 

In summary, I am very concerned we have signed an agreement 

that will rival Neville Chamberlain’s failed agreement and encourage more Iranian force projection. 

Who could have predicted 7 years ago we would leave a vacuum 

for Russian reemergence into the region and Iran would be the de 

facto hegemon? 


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Thank you for your time and God bless you all during these very 

difficult times for America. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. McInerney follows:] 


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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, General. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Schanzer for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER 

Mr. SCHANZER. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, 

members of the subcommittee, on behalf of FDD and its Center on 

Sanctions and Illicit Finance, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

Iran has long projected power through the financing of its proxies 

around the Middle East. This strategy figures prominently in Iran’s 

plans for regional hegemony. 

The nuclear deal signed this summer will now provide Iran with an estimated $120 billion in sanctions relief and another $18 billion in annual oil sales. The White House insists Iran will invest 

this windfall in roads, schools, hospitals, and other neglected infrastructure, but this is wishful thinking given Iran’s track record. 

Even if Iran earmarks only 10 percent for its proxies, we are looking at more than $10 billion in illicit finance. 

The beneficiaries of Iran’s largesse will include terrorist groups, 

Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Kata’ib Hezbollah, 

and other violent factions in Iraq and al-Sabireen, a new Shiite 

group in Gaza. 

On top of that, we can expect continued assistance to the Assad 

regime in Syria which continues to drop barrel bombs on its own 

population. And let us not forget the Houthis who continue to play 

a destabilizing role in Yemen. 

Iran’s sanctions relief will further benefit Iran’s hardliners who 

bankroll those terror groups and rogue regimes. This includes the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC, which will see many of 

its sanctioned entities de-listed in Europe. Sanctions relief will further benefit companies belonging to the Supreme Leader himself. 

I am referring here to Ali Khamenei’s economic empire known as 

EIKO. 

Mr. Chairman, all this raises troubling questions about the U.S. 

Treasury’s mission. It was a little more than a year ago when the 

New York Times’ David Sanger wrote about the Treasury sanctions 

team is President Obama’s favorite noncombatant command. The 

moniker was well deserved. The Office of Terrorism and Financial 

Intelligence played a crucial role, along with Congress in building 

the sanctions architecture that punished Iran for its nuclear mendacity, ballistic missile development, the funding of terror groups, 

human rights abuses, and the backing of rogue states. 

Above all else, Treasury’s mandate was to protect the integrity 

of the U.S.-led financial sector, but that mandate is now in jeopardy. The banks, businesses, and persons said to be de-listed have 

not earned it. Iran has provided no evidence that they have ceased 

their illicit activities, and once they are de-listed, the terms of the 

Iran deal forbid them from being re-listed, even if they commit new 

financial crimes. And the $120 billion in sanctions relief will flow 

regardless of Iran’s regional activity. In the end, Treasury’s principles were compromised to secure President Obama a diplomatic 

victory, and it is doubtful that this will be a lasting one. 

For Treasury’s mission to be taken seriously, it must now be able 

to resume its campaign against Iranian financial crimes and to 


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punish Iran for violations of the nuclear deal. How it will do this, 

given the constraints of the Iran deal, is unclear. 

Mr. Chairman, the road ahead will be challenging, but I offer 

several recommendations here for the committee’s consideration. 

Number one, Treasury needs to reaffirm its mission. Congress 

should request a road map from the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Treasury must now articulate how it plans to continue to be an effective noncombatant command under these new 

challenging circumstances. 

Number two, change the way Treasury designates. Treasury usually targets illicit financial actors by designating them pursuant to 

one executive order, such as terrorism or human rights or proliferation. But in the case of Iran, illicit actors are often guilty of many 

financial crimes. Congress should demand that Treasury designate 

more entities under multiple executive orders simultaneously, making it harder for them to de-list. 

Number three, enforce what we have left. Congressional oversight over what relevant sanctions architecture remains is crucial 

to stemming the flow of Iranian illicit finance. The rigorous enforcement of existing executive orders and the creation of new ones, 

when appropriate, will be vital to curbing Iranian support for terrorism. 

Number four, enforce and expand designations of IRGC-affiliated 

entities. Congress should direct Treasury to designate the IRGC in 

its entirety under Executive Order 13224 for its role in financing, 

directing, and supporting international terrorism. It is currently 

designated for proliferation and human rights purposes, while only 

the Quds Force, an IRGC subsidiary, is designated for terrorism. 

And number five, lower the threshold for IRGC designations. 

Congress should consider making it easier to designate IRGC companies. The Financial Action Task Force suggests that the threshold could be 25 percent controlled and that could include both 

members of the board and stakeholders. 

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of FDD and its Center on Sanctions and 

Illicit Finance, thank you again for inviting me to testify. If I have 

missed anything that you wish to discuss, I am happy to answer 

your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:] 


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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Dr. Bucci, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN BUCCI 

Mr. BUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee. I am Director of the Allison Center for 

Foreign and National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation. 

The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not 

be construed as representing any official position of The Foundation. 

I retired from the Army as a special forces colonel, having served 

as a human intelligence collector for DIA and as the Commander 

of 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group in the CENTCOM AOR. 

I later served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense. 

My focus here will be the threat that we face from Iran in their 

efforts to project power and impose its extreme and abhorrent will 

on the world. 

The majority of my written testimony is taken from The Heritage 

Foundation’s recently released 2016 Index of U.S. Military 

Strength. 

The immediate threat is the IRGC Quds Force terrorism. The 

IRGC is a very capable organization that matches its operational 

expertise in guerilla warfare, terror, and murder with an ideological purity that makes their only comparable analog the old Soviet 

Spetznaz. They have done operations around the Middle East and 

the world, including the attempted murder of the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington, D.C. 

Down the road, Iran will gain considerable capability in ballistic 

missiles. They will undoubtedly gain nuclear weapons eventually. 

They will definitely re-equip their conventional forces with the help 

of the Russians. The real key here, though, is the orders of magnitude greater and more dangerous terror events that the Quds 

Force can fund and execute given their share of the soon to be released $100 billion in new money. There is no sequestration pending for the IRGC. The windows of heaven or hell are about to open 

for them. 

Iran is an anti-Western revolutionary state that seeks to tilt the 

regional balance of power in its favor by driving out the Western 

presence, particularly the United States, undermining and overthrowing opposing governments, and establishing its hegemony 

over the region. It also seeks to radicalize Shia communities and 

advance their interests against Sunni rivals. Iran has a long record 

of sponsoring terrorist attacks against American allies and other 

interests. With regard to conventional capabilities, Iran’s ground 

forces dwarf the relatively small armies of the other Gulf states. 

Importantly, Iran has adopted a strategy that emphasizes irregular warfare, asymmetric tactics, and the extensive use of proxy 

forces. The IRGC has supported and collaborated with a wide variety of radical Shia and Sunni militant groups, as well as Arab, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Afghan groups that do not even share its 

radical Islamist ideology. The Quds Force has trained and armed 

numerous proxies, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shia 

militias, Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and 


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groups that have fought against the governments of Afghanistan, 

Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Yemen. 

Iran is the world’s foremost sponsor of terrorism and has made 

extensive efforts to export its brand of radical Shia Islamist revolution. 

One cannot discuss Iran’s abilities to project power without looking more closely at its main proxy. Hezbollah is a close ally of, frequent surrogate for, and terrorist subcontractor for Iran’s revolutionary Islamist regime. Tehran provides the bulk of Hezbollah’s 

foreign support, arms, training, logistical support, and money. Iran 

provides at least $100 million to possibly $200 million annually in 

financial support to Hezbollah. I expect this to grow substantially. 

Iran presents a significant threat to U.S. national security interests in the Middle East, to our key allies, and to our position as 

the balancer and influencer there. It has the ability to project 

power around the world and around the region, particularly in 

asymmetric forms. The recent collusion of Iran with Russia gives 

Iran additional abilities to move around the world and do significant mischief. As mentioned, there is no sequestration for the biggest purveyors of state-sponsored terrorism in the world. 

With respect to the Secretary of State and his comments, you 

cannot logically separate Iran’s terrorism from the JCPOA. It is a 

mistake to underestimate either the intentions or capabilities of 

Iran to do harm. Iran is not our partner, but they are a clear adversary. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Bucci follows:] 


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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Nader for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALIREZA NADER 

Mr. NADER. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear 

before you today to speak about the impact of sanctions relief on 

the Iranian regime’s policies at home and in the Middle East. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the 

P5 Plus 1 will no doubt provide Iran with significant sanctions relief and alleviate some of the stresses faced by the Iranian economy. But several factors will constrain the Iranian regime’s ability 

to substantially grow the economy and use newly found resources 

to achieve its foreign policy objectives. 

First, sanctions relief will not be granted unless Iran sharply reduces its nuclear capabilities. This means that Iran will be unable 

to use its nuclear program to expand its regional influence. Iran 

will only be rewarded economically once it has met its obligations 

under the nuclear agreement. 

Second, while the United States will lift secondary sanctions 

against Iran, primary American sanctions targeting the Iranian regime’s support for terrorism and its human rights abuses will remain, preventing Iran from gaining access to American capital, and 

most importantly, American technology and know-how. 

Although the nuclear agreement is expected to provide Iran with 

significant economic relief, the amounts involved are unlikely to 

greatly empower the Iranian regime at home or abroad. The regime 

is massively indebted due to its costly nuclear policies. It owes as 

much as $100 billion to Iranian banks and private firms. The 

Rouhani government was elected on a campaign to improve the 

economy, which will require Iran to spend at least $200 billion on 

its decrepit energy sector, in addition to tens of billions of dollars 

on domestic infrastructure, health care, and educational system. So 

while the lifting of U.S. secondary and European nuclear sanctions 

may enable Iran to increase its oil exports and give it access to $50 

billion to $100 billion held in escrow accounts, much of this money 

will be used to pay debts and invest in the country’s infrastructure 

and social services. 

In addition, because global oil prices are likely to remain low for 

the foreseeable future, oil exports will not enable Iran to get rich 

quickly. Iran faces stiff global competition, and its reentry into the 

global market is unlikely to pose serious competition to major oil 

producers such as Saudi Arabia. 

Even after the nuclear agreement, many foreign companies will 

be hesitant to trade with Iran due to remaining U.S. sanctions and, 

perhaps more importantly, due to the overall reputation of the Iranian regime. Iran is one of the most corrupt and least businessfriendly countries in the world. 

The Iranian regime’s asymmetric capabilities will remain the key 

challenge for U.S. interests, but increasing U.S. military leverage 

in Syria and Iraq and a political solution to the Syrian conflict decrease the regional instability, which the Iranian regime exploits. 

The United States should be willing to engage Iran diplomatically 

when it suits its own interests. 


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Iran appears ascendant in Syria today, but it is more eager to 

end its involvement in the conflict than it may appear. 

I have four recommendations for the United States, especially 

Congress. 

Congress has a vital role to play in ensuring Iran’s adherence to 

the nuclear agreement by engaging in vigorous oversight of the 

agreement’s implementation. Congress should be ready to impose 

new sanctions against Iran if it is found to be violating the agreement. Moreover, Congress should remain fully informed of the status of the nuclear agreement by holding frequent hearings regarding its implementation. 

However, Congress should not pass new legislation on terrorism 

and human rights abuses, especially as the nuclear agreement is 

implemented. Such steps could be viewed by U.S. partners and the 

international community as an attempt to undermine the nuclear 

agreement, endangering international enforcement of sanctions 

against Iran. 

The nuclear agreement will not end the rivalry between the 

United States and the Islamic Republic. The Rouhani government 

is very limited in its ability or willingness to reform Iran. A U.S. 

focus on democracy promotion would, therefore, be beneficial. 

The United States should make it easier for Iranian students to 

study at American universities, allowing them to gain an even 

more positive view of the United States and its values. U.S. programs that aim to increase cultural and sports exchanges between 

Iran and the United States should be expanded. 

Finally, U.S. diplomacy with Iran can help resolve regional crises 

while strengthening positive views of America within Iran. Therefore, the United States should lift restrictions against diplomatic 

engagement with Iranian diplomats. U.S. diplomacy with Iran does 

not confer legitimacy on the Iranian regime. Such legitimacy can 

only be conferred by the Iranian people. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share my views with the subcommittee. I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Nader follows:] 


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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Dr. Bucci, Mr. Nader stated in his written testimony that the 

amount of sanctions relief is, ‘‘unlikely to greatly empower the Iranian regime at home or abroad.’’ And he said that they will likely 

use it to pay down debts and follow through with President 

Rouhani’s promises to invest in the country. Do you agree that that 

is how Iran is likely to spend the money it receives from sanctions 

relief? 

Mr. BUCCI. With due respect to my colleague, Mr. Chairman, I 

think that is wildly optimistic. Clearly they will apply some of the 

money. That is a ton of money they are going to get suddenly injected into their economy. Some of it will go to pay some debts. 

Some of it will go to some infrastructure things. They have got a 

considerable domestic ferment there that they need to address. A 

regime that under the sanctions was spending as much money as 

they were spending on support of terrorism, to think they are not 

going to siphon off at least some of that money, maybe a big chunk 

of it, to upgrade that support of terrorism once they get this new 

money is delusional. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And their proxies like Hezbollah have cheered the 

agreement. I do not think they would do that unless they saw benefits for them as a result of it. 

Dr. Schanzer, Mr. Nader agrees with—this is with respect to the increase in oil exports of $1 million per year. He agrees with that, 

but he argues that Iran will use this additional income to pay debts 

and invest in the country’s infrastructure and social services. 

So what do you believe just based on the history of human rights 

abuses that we have seen under the Supreme Leader? We have 

seen the regime’s conduct. That oil money—what is your best guess 

as to what is going to happen with that? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Mr. Chairman, look, I would just say this as an 

overall observation that those who are proponents of the regime all 

of a sudden are also accountants and purport to know how Iran is 

going to spend its money. We have seen, during the time when Iran 

was building its nuclear weapons capability, that it was spending 

money, not paying down its debts, obviously. It was pursuing a 

reckless policy then. I do not expect it to change a policy of recklessness even though they have at least for now decided to curb 

their nuclear objective. So I would certainly expect to see oil funds, 

as well as the sanctions relief, flowing to groups like Hezbollah, 

Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, a lot of the other groups there that are 

fighting on behalf of the Iranians. I would expect to see the IRGC 

getting huge amounts of this. 

But one other thing that is incredibly important to note is that 

the IRGC controls roughly a third of the Iranian economy. And so 

when you talk about money that is going to flow to hospitals and 

schools and roads, what you are doing is you are sinking money 

into companies controlled by the IRGC. So it is simply a passthrough to this radical organization which will then go and finance 

all these radical groups around the region. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Lieutenant General McInerney, as a result of this deal, you 

sketched out kind of Iran’s malign influence. Does this deal make 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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their project in, say, Yemen easier for them or more difficult for 

them? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. It makes it much easier, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. How about their project—I know that they have 

designs on Bahrain. Is this better for Iran and their designs on 

Bahrain, or does it make their life more difficult with respect to 

those ambitions? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Again, better for their designs on Bahrain. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And we have talked about—and I think you have 

pointed this out in your testimony very well. You know, we talk 

about, hey, Iran—yes, they get this entire nuclear infrastructure. 

It is basically being kept in place. They got the heavy water reactor. But they have promised that there is not going to be any plutonium production. Yes, they have an underground facility at Arak, 

but they are going to—or in Fordow—excuse me. But they promise 

they are just going to do research there. So you have words on the 

paper. True. In your judgment, do you think it is likely that you 

will see the type of unfettered inspections that you need? I know 

in some of the military sites, they are essentially going to self-inspect. So are the words on the paper something that we would 

want to hang our hats on? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Mr. Chairman, they celebrated their 36th anniversary of seizing our embassy yesterday. I expect no changes in 

their conduct. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Let me ask you this. I think Dr. Schanzer made 

some good recommendations about what Congress can do in terms 

of the financing. What would you say—two-thirds of the American 

people I have seen do not think this is a good idea. What should 

Congress do? This was never passed by Congress. It is essentially 

an executive-to-executive agreement that will expire with the new 

administration. But in the meantime, what would you recommend 

that Congress do to combat the threat? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. I would increase the sanctions, as Dr. Schanzer 

mentioned. We have got to put bounds on that nation, and we are 

not. We are encouraging bad behavior. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Dr. Bucci, what should we do? If we agree with 

your testimony, we think this is a problem, we think Iran—the net 

effect of this, Iran is stronger, more and more of a malign force 

than they have already been. It hurts our national security interest. But yet, we cannot really—I mean, we voted the agreement 

down, but it did not matter. It is going forward as an executive 

agreement. 

Mr. BUCCI. Mr. Chairman, I think you ought to take whatever 

steps you think you can get away with to put the clamps back on, 

particularly the Quds Force people, General Soleimani. He is catting around the world going into Moscow to chat with Vladimir 

Putin, those kind of things that are now legitimate under this 

agreement. That is such a slap in the face of the people that have 

been killed by this man’s troops and his plots. Those kind of sanctions, very specific, very directive, at least ought to be put back in 

place. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I would venture to guess that Soleimani, of 

any living person, probably has more American blood on his hands 

than anyone. I mean, Osama bin Laden has been killed. He killed 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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at least hundreds of our troops in Iraq. I have heard as many as 

1,500. General, do you think that sounds reasonable, a reasonable 

estimate? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Well, I have heard a number between 500 and 

1,500. 

Mr. DESANTIS. You know, relieving international sanctions of 

somebody that is not just a malign influence but has actually killed 

a lot of Americans—and we have had people come to Congress who 

were wounded by these EFP’s that Iran was providing these Shiite 

militias. And it is not a story I think that is as well known as the 

Sunni insurgency during that time period. 

The one thing I would also mention—and we are working on 

some legislation, but because this was not ratified as a treaty or 

even passed this Congress as statutory law, what the President has 

agreed to cannot supersede State sanctions. It is not the supreme 

law of the land. And so we have States—I am from Florida that 

has pretty tough sanctions in terms of the investments in Iran and 

what can be done with the pension funds. And we are going to be 

introducing some legislation hopefully soon that will allow really 

saving the State sanctions, making it clear and really encouraging 

States that they should do what is right for their folks. And so 

those States and those States that have acted are really an important part of this right now, more important than we probably 

thought. 

With that, I am out of time, and I will recognize the ranking 

member, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

America has always been somewhat forward-looking, and I think 

the examples in our history where we have had tremendous loss of 

life within our Nation—you know, wars against Germany, against 

Japan, against Vietnam. And now we have got trade agreements, 

and we are trying to move forward with those relationships. 

And I think that while there is need for great caution here, no 

question about it—I do not trust the Iranian regime—I think there 

is an opportunity here that has been created not by just the United 

States but by P5 Plus 1. So we have got to consider the implications here. I think that the verification protocols have to be in 

place. They have to be robust. 

Mr. Nader, I want to ask you about the state of the Iranian economy and the impact of whatever money pours over—some say $100 

billion. Some say $200 billion—into the Iranian economy. 

We have had a chance to talk to the IAEA inspectors who have 

been in Tehran and around the country. They tell me that they are 

afraid to fly commercially within Iran because our sanctions, together with the Europeans and others—we have blocked basic commercial airline parts as part of our sanctions so that the IAEA inspectors—the way they operate is they fly directly on Lufthansa 

mostly from Germany into Tehran. They will not fly around the 

country because they are deathly afraid of the safety conditions of 

the Iranian commercial airlines. 

They have also indicated that this petrol economy—and Iran is 

basically gas and oil. That is a huge part of their economy. That 

has been devastated by the sanctions, which was the whole idea to 

get them to the table. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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What do you think the impact of this money—have any of the financial sanctions been lifted so far? Has any of the money gone to 

it? So nothing yet. So we have got a parade of horribles that might 

happen, but nothing has gone. 

And why is that? Why has no money gone to Iran yet? 

Mr. NADER. Well, first of all, Iran has not implemented the nuclear agreement. Once it implements the nuclear agreement and 

the IAEA verifies that Iran has taken these steps and they are 

verifiable, then Iran will meet with some sanctions relief. 

But I think it is important to recognize that a lot of U.S. sanctions are going to remain against Iran. You mentioned Iran’s civilian airlines. They have been without modern technology and parts 

for decades. Iran’s natural gas industry, which Iran has one of the 

biggest gas reserves in the world, cannot take advantage of the resources because of U.S. sanctions preceding the nuclear sanctions. 

So if you look at the long list of U.S. sanctions, a lot of sanctions, 

the primary sanctions will remain against Iran. A lot of companies 

will be hesitant to trade with Iran and deal with Iran. 

And when we look at Iran’s conventional military capabilities, 

under the JCPOA Iran will face a 5-year embargo on its conventional arms imports. It will face an 8-year embargo on its missiles. 

Even after that, the U.S. primary sanctions are going to deter a lot 

of foreign countries from selling equipment to Iran. Even before the 

nuclear issue became such a problem, Iran was having a difficult 

time importing sophisticated weapons because the Europeans and 

even the Russians and Chinese were hesitant to deal with Iran. So 

I think there are going to be a lot of restraints on Iran, on its economy moving forward. 

And finally, I want to say that, yes, this regime will support terrorism. It will deny human rights to its people. But it is important 

that we have a nuclear agreement which takes the nuclear capability away from the Iranian regime. And I think this is why this 

agreement is important. It is a strong nonproliferation agreement 

that will ensure Iran does not have a nuclear weapons capability. 

Mr. LYNCH. The latent capability of the Iranian regime really lies 

in oil and gas. There are some who say there is an oil glut now. 

That is why prices are down. But the natural gas piece there is a 

concern because there is a greater use around the world. You know, 

people are getting away from coal and oil to some respect, but natural gas—that could be a bonanza for Iran. 

How far behind are they? How long would it take—I know we 

have a lot of—there are already contracts in place with a lot of the 

European countries and the United States with Qatar, for example. 

They have already rebuilt their whole natural gas infrastructure, 

and they have not cornered the market, but they have got a huge 

advantage there. What would it require for Iran to sort of catch up? 

Because they are actually pre-LNG still back in Iran. They have 

not even come forward with that technology. So could you talk 

about how much time it might take them to catch up? 

Mr. NADER. Well, if you compare Iran to Qatar, it is years if not 

decades behind. And Iran and Qatar share a very large gas field, 

the South Pars gas field. And Qatar has really taken advantage of 

it because it is a close U.S. ally. It has access to liquefied natural 

gas technology through the United States, and Iran lacks that techVerDate Sep 11 2014 14:17 Jan 04, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22382.TXT APRIL

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nology. And I doubt that it will be able to catch up anytime soon 

because of U.S. primary sanctions against Iran. 

And I think a lot of European companies and even Asian companies will be reluctant to help Iran develop its natural gas resources. So Iran is years if not decades behind in its natural gas. 

And in terms of its energy sector, when you compare it to Saudi 

Arabia, for example, or Russia, it is also years and decades behind. 

I talked to an economist who had worked on Iran’s petroleum industry during the shah’s reign. At that time it was relatively modern, and when he saw Iran’s current status, he said it brought 

tears to his eyes as an engineer and scientist because how behind 

Iran had fallen because of the regime’s policies, because of its nuclear policies, and its reputation overall. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

I thank the chairman for the indulgence. I appreciate that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. No problem. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, each of our witnesses, for being here. 

It is my understanding from your testimony, what you have 

shared to this point—yes or no—would you agree that if the sanctions are lifted, that Iran will most likely, probably use a significant portion of that revenue to advance their military strategy? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. I concur with that, sir. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I do as well. 

Mr. BUCCI. Absolutely, yes. 

Mr. NADER. Yes. I think it will use some of it. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. All right. 

Dr. Bucci, let me go with you. Any idea how many American 

lives have been lost since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Mr. BUCCI. Total is up about 8,000 I think. 

Mr. HICE. Any idea of how many have been killed by specifically 

Iranian activity? 

Mr. BUCCI. The number that gets batted around that the General 

mentioned, up around 1,500, is generally associated with the use 

of the Iranian-provided shaped penetrators, the sort of enhanced 

IED’s that were provided to specifically the Shia militias. I think 

you need to go a little beyond that because it is not just the IED’s 

that kill people. There were bullets that killed people. There were 

advanced sniper rifles that were given to those same Shia militias 

by Iran that also killed American service members. So I would 

guess it is more than the 1,500 that people generally quote. 

Mr. HICE. All right, sir. If you had to give one weapon, what is 

the key weapon that has been used against Americans? 

Mr. BUCCI. The enhanced penetrator. 

Mr. HICE. Is that produced in Iran? 

Mr. BUCCI. Absolutely. 

Mr. HICE. In an interview with a British paper, ‘‘The Telegraph,’’ 

there were a couple of British military officers who allegedly said 

that Iran had paid Taliban fighters $1,000 each for each American 

soldier that they killed in Afghanistan. Is this accurate? 

Mr. BUCCI. I have not seen proof of that, Congressman, but I 

have seen pretty good proof that the Iranians were paying the 


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Taliban’s salaries, in some cases over $500 a month, which is a 

pretty hefty salary in Afghanistan. So whether they were doing it 

as a direct bounty or just the general funding of their operations, 

it is still pretty significant. 

Mr. HICE. So they are funding the Taliban soldiers against us. 

In your experience, what is the greatest threat Iran poses to 

American ground forces? 

Mr. BUCCI. The exportation of terrorism around the Middle East. 

None of our people are essentially safe anywhere in the Middle 

East that the Quds Force can reach them, and that is pretty much 

the entire region. 

Mr. HICE. Would you agree that regardless of an agreement 

being reached, that Iran is still going to be a significant threat to 

both American interests and our allies? 

Mr. BUCCI. Not only is it my opinion that they will be so, Congressman, the Iranians have said they will be. They have said they 

will not back off on any of those type of operations or policies regardless of this agreement. 

Mr. HICE. Specifically, what kind of threat does Hezbollah pose 

to Israel? 

Mr. BUCCI. They are the best supplied, the best equipped, the 

best organized. While they are tied up in Syria right now, that is 

frankly gaining them additional equipment and experience that 

they could then turn around and apply against Israel. So they are, 

by far, the biggest threat. 

Mr. HICE. And I would assume that same threat would carry 

over to America as well. 

Mr. BUCCI. Oh, definitely. 

Mr. HICE. So what level of support has Iran contributed to the 

funding, training, support, so forth of Hezbollah? 

Mr. BUCCI. Pretty much 100 percent of Hezbollah’s support 

comes directly from Iran. 

Mr. HICE. So is it fair to say that at least in your opinion if the 

sanctions are lifted, Hezbollah is going to see a significant boost in 

its financial backing? 

Mr. BUCCI. They will benefit. Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups around the Middle East—they will all gain from this 

largesse of the Quds Force. 

Mr. HICE. Dr. Schanzer, you had mentioned a while ago—and I 

would like to get a little more information about EIKO. Can you 

give a little bit more information as to what that is? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Absolutely. That is a $95 billion fund owned by 

the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. It includes a big chunk of the 

Iranian stock market, I think 5 or 10 percent, on top of that, significant real estate holdings, international holdings as well. We 

had sanctions on it. It is set to be de-listed now as a result of this 

deal. 

Mr. HICE. Again, I want to thank you for being here, each of you. 

My time has expired. I appreciate it very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan for 5 

minutes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 


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Mr. Nader, is it true that while this agreement was announced 

in July, it was technically adopted on October 18th, 2015? 

[Nonverbal response.] 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. So a couple questions. 

Iran is now expected to begin nuclear disarmament. Is that 

right? 

[Nonverbal response.] 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. So technically adopted October 18, 2015. So now 

the disarmament is expected to begin. 

And as I understand it, the next milestone would be implementation day. Is that correct? 

[Nonverbal response.] 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Can you explain what implementation day is? 

Mr. NADER. Sure. Once the nuclear agreement was adopted, 

which you mentioned, Iran is expected to implement the agreement 

over the next few months. That entails Iran undertaking actions 

that block all the paths toward nuclear weaponization. That means 

severely restricting its uranium enrichment program, reducing its 

centrifuges that spin uranium by two-thirds, by reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium by 97 percent, by reconfiguring the Arak 

facility that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. So that 

would block Iran’s plutonium weapons production. And also Iran 

would accept very intrusive inspections into its nuclear facilities. 

From the bottom up, the IAEA and the United States will have 

a very good idea of what Iran is up to. So when Iran is building 

these centrifuges in its factories, we will know where it is building 

them and what they are doing with the centrifuges. So if they want 

to pursue a covert program and take these centrifuges, we will 

know what is going on. And these actions are expected to give us 

about a year warning if Iran decides to produce breakout, meaning 

that if Iran races toward a nuclear weapon, if it decides to violate 

the agreement, then we will know and we will have the ability to 

respond whether economically, diplomatically, and militarily. 

So in terms of implementation, once Iran implements the agreement, the nuclear program is going to be under very close monitoring and inspection. And that is what really the international 

community has asked Iran to do for the past 10 years. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you. 

I have heard estimates for the implementation day could be as 

soon as the end of the year or as far off as next spring. Is that correct? 

Mr. NADER. Yes. It could take a few months. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Now, the sanctions are not to be lifted until everything Iran has done has been physically verified as complete by 

the IAEA. Correct? 

Mr. NADER. Yes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Now, I understand that the implementation 

day—only nuclear-related sanctions will be removed. You mentioned it, but could you just restate what are some of the other— 

because I understand the remaining conventional arms and ballistics sanctions are to be removed in phases. So could you please give 

us some information on that? 

Mr. NADER. Yes. According to JCPOA, Iran will still face a 5-year 

embargo on the import of conventional weapons. So no country can 


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sell conventional weapons to Iran for 5 years. If they do, they will 

be punished and sanctioned. 

For 8 years, no other country can help Iran develop its missile 

program. If any countries or companies help Iran with its missile 

program, they will be punished and sanctioned. 

And once the nuclear sanctions against Iran are eased, you still 

have a number of U.S. sanctions that date from 1979 to the Iran 

revolution. Whether you are looking at the freezing of Iranian assets, Iran Sanctions Act that dates from the 1990’s, sanctions 

against the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force, those will remain. The American sanctions will remain against terrorism and 

human rights abuses. 

Although the European Union is expected to lift its nuclear sanctions against Iran, its human rights abuses sanctions will also still 

remain. And a lot of the European countries do care about human 

rights and look at human rights in terms of investing in Iran. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. So in the last few minutes I have, I agree with 

the statements that have been provided by our distinguished panel. 

There are some bad guys in Iran. They are not a friend of the 

United States. 

This nuclear agreement is directed toward a verified system of 

stopping Iran from getting the nuclear weapons. And we have just 

begun this process so that we can examine and verify before any 

sanctions will be lifted. Is that correct? 

Mr. NADER. Yes, exactly. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you. I yield my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the vice chair of the committee, Mr. 

Russell from Oklahoma, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, panel, for being here. 

Mr. Nader, you said both in your testimony and in answers to 

questions that no one that is on the terror and human rights lists 

will have sanctions lifted. Yet, I like General McInerney have read 

the entire agreement, have researched every single name on the 

sanctions list. I have personally discovered over 50 individuals and 

entities that have violated terror and human rights. Yet, they are 

listed for sanctions relief. For example, General Soleimani, General 

Salami, General Hajizadeh, the Quds Force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s shipping lines, 

a known shipper of weapons all over the region for terror. 

So my question is, since the agreement clearly says that these 

sanctions will be lifted, how can you state that? 

Mr. NADER. Those are the nuclear secondary sanctions. So the 

secondary sanctions under the nuclear sanctions that the United 

States has passed compel other countries and companies to stop 

trading with Iran. And in order to achieve the nuclear agreement, 

those secondary sanctions will be eased. 

But when you look at U.S. primary sanctions—for example, Iran 

is designated as a supporter of terrorism by the United States. It 

was designated in 1984. That puts a lot of sanctions against Iran 

and deters foreign companies and countries from trading with Iran. 

And there are a number of other sanctions that precede the nuclear 


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sanctions going back to 1979. There are many overlapping U.S. and 

international sanctions against Iran. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, and that is the concern. And I would invite 

all of the panel and even, Mr. Chairman, our committee to look at 

paragraph 37 of annex 2 in the agreement because Iran has a 

much different view about these sanctions liftings, and they believe 

that these individuals will be wide open for business. 

And in that regard, Dr. Schanzer, the Islamic Republic and 

Guard Corps, the Quds Force, and others—it has a vast array of 

business that it conducts. Can you very succinctly describe what it 

is, that its legitimate business reach is? We think it is nefarious, 

but yet, on the other hand, we see that it is conducting itself normal and it will be able to conduct enterprise in your hometown. 

Mr. SCHANZER. That is right. This was the point that I was trying to make earlier that the IRGC has deep penetration across just 

about every sector within Iran. This is construction. It is petrochemical. It is gas. Basically every major sector within Iran has 

IRGC companies that are set to benefit from this. This is one of the 

reasons why we have placed such a huge focus on targeting the 

IRGC itself, lowering the threshold for designating the IRGC businesses to make it harder for our money to flow there. 

But there is one other thing that I think is worth noting. We 

keep hearing that we have not lifted any sanctions yet. That is untrue. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I agree. 

Mr. SCHANZER. After the signing of the JPOA, the interim agreement, back in November of 2013, we began to provide Iran with 

$700 million per month. We lifted sanctions on gold, petrochemicals, auto, a range of other sectors, and that has allowed Iran to 

benefit from this deal even before we signed it. And so it is just 

simply not true to say that we have not provided them with sanctions relief to this point. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I appreciate that. 

And, General McInerney, you will not remember me, but we 

served together when you were the Joint Task Force Alaska Commander and I was the aide to General Sam Ebbessen when General Tom Fields was there. And it is good to see you again after 

all these years. 

Mr. MCINERNEY. You were dressed differently, sir. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I was indeed, sir. Thank you for being here. 

Sir, can you speak to Iran’s missile and cruise missile threats 

and the development of the underground silos and what the implication of that is? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Briefly, sir. They are missiles. The primary 

value is in the nuclear realm. So they are leading the problem in 

developing conventional. And we just noticed on the 10th of October, less than a month ago, that they launched an IRBM. And they 

are going to continue to progress. They are getting help from 

China, North Korea, and Russia. 

Now, their eventual goal is to put nuclear weapons on these. And 

we have seen the ability, when you then have that capability and 

then when you go to underground silos, as well as the Chinese 

have where they have roads underneath—you then have the ability 

for a nation like Iran to hold hostage Europe, the United States, 


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other parts of the world. And that comes back to then when them 

are negotiating. When you are negotiating and you are looking at 

a person you are negotiating with and he does not have to say it, 

but you know he has nuclear weapons that he can put on your cities, that changes the tone of the negotiations. And that is the direction that they are going to. Will it happen next week? No, but that 

is their long-term objective. And if they are still in power in 36 

years from now, we are in trouble. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank you for that, General. 

And, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but if we have a 

chance for a second round at the end, I would have some more 

questions. Thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. We have still got over 10 minutes on the vote, 410 

not voting. So I think we will be able to get through a couple more. 

So the chair now recognizes Ms. Kelly for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. I will keep it short. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Iran’s neighbors such as Israel and Saudi Arabia are concerned 

that the deal is not sufficiently strong and does not prevent Iran 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon. This was a serious concern that 

warranted consideration prior to enactment. However, now with 

the deal in place, it is imperative that we move forward and work 

to ensure that compliance is strictly enforced and any and all sanctions be implemented following noncompliance to ensure those 

fears remain unwarranted. 

Mr. Nader, what provisions of the deal hold Iran’s feet to the fire 

to ensure its compliance? 

Mr. NADER. There are many provisions, from Iran having to 

verify—or the IAEA having to verify that Iran has complied with 

their program to the future restrictions in place against Iran for 

the next 15 years, which is the duration of the program. And then 

even after 15 years, there are components of the program that last 

for 20 to 25 years giving the United States insight into Iran’s program and enable to reassure our allies the United States has provided them with the technology and weaponry to deter Iran’s military capabilities. For example, the United States has helped Israel 

develop a very sophisticated antiballistic missile defense system. 

The same goes for Saudi Arabia and the GCC states. And while 

those allies have been concerned about Iran’s nuclear activities and 

have been concerned about the negotiations, as they should be because Iran poses a threat to them, they have come to see that the 

nuclear agreement can be beneficial to their interests. Saudi Arabia and the GCC have approved of the program and are working 

very closely with the United States to strengthen their conventional military capabilities against Iran. 

Ms. KELLY. A shortcoming of the deal many point to is that provisions expire at all. However, to my knowledge, no arms treaty or 

agreement has ever been without expiration. But in fact, even the 

much hailed Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty had an expiration 

date until it was renewed. Is that not correct? 

Mr. NADER. Yes. All nonproliferation treaties do have an expiration date. 

I think what is unique about JCPOA is it does last 15 years, but 

even after 15 years, the IAEA has a very close inspections regime 

against Iran’s nuclear program. Some of the measures last 20 and 


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25 years. From the time Iran mines uranium from the ground to 

the time it builds its centrifuges and takes them for enrichment, 

we will know what it is doing even after the agreement has expired. 

Ms. KELLY. Because these provisions do not extend into perpetuity, compliance with the agreement is even more dependent on 

Iran’s domestic politics and leadership. Moving forward, what must 

Congress do to ensure future Iranian regimes continue to abide by 

the agreement and we do not have to keep going back to the negotiating table and face a threat of a nuclear Iran? 

Mr. NADER. I do not think the Iranian political system is going 

to change any time soon. Ayatollah Khamenei still rules Iran as 

long as he lives. The Revolutionary Guards are a powerful force. 

But there are millions of Iranians who want change in their 

country. We saw in 2009 millions of Iranians come into the street 

in support of democracy. And moving forward, I think there is a 

lot the United States can do to foster democracy in Iran whether 

it is increasing exchanges between Iranians and Americans. And I 

think that is very important actually because the Iranians get to 

come here, see what the United States is like, and not be subject 

to their government’s propaganda. So strengthening civil society, 

public diplomacy, U.S. broadcasts to Iran can all be very helpful. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlelady yields back. 

The chair asks unanimous consent to welcome Mr. Welch of 

Vermont, who is not on the subcommittee, but to allow him to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. Welch, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much. 

I really appreciated the testimony and the points that you made. 

We had this fierce debate, obviously, about the nuclear deal. The 

majority of Congress was against it. The minority was for it. It has 

been implemented. I did support it but share a lot of the concerns 

that have been expressed. 

And in listening to the testimony and reading beforehand, there 

is an aspect of what you have said—and I will start with you, General McInerney—that, on the one hand, cautions us about the future, and we have got to take that seriously. But on the other 

hand, there is an aspect of it that I hear as a continuation of the 

fierce debate that we had about the deal itself. The deal is done. 

So that is not going to be undone realistically. 

So when you are talking about the sanctions relief, how is it that 

we would not comply on our part with the sanctions provisions that 

were part of the nuclear deal even as we are extremely wary and 

watchful about what Iran is doing to cause difficulties in an already difficult Middle East situation? In other words, what is the 

tool that we have? We have to comply with the agreement. Right? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. This administration does, yes, sir. 

Mr. WELCH. Would you just elaborate on that? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Well, this administration that signed it as an 

executive agreement is going to comply with relieving those sanctions when they meet their appropriate endpoints. 


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We think that we should put as a Congress additional sanctions 

on certain elements like the Quds Force, IRGC, et cetera. 

Mr. WELCH. Let me just understand this because I think it is important. A lot of people I think probably agree with you. But if the 

administration signed this agreement, what I am hearing you say 

is that the next administration is going to have its own option to 

review it and perhaps change it. Is that your suggestion? 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Yes. As a matter of fact, some of the candidates 

have already announced that they will cancel it. And that is a clear 

option. 

My personal course of action on this altogether would have been 

never to have the JCPOA but we should have continued the sanctions, which were very effective, and we have to, in the long run, 

look for regime change. Remember the difference that this government is. It is a radical Islamic government. If you look at Saddam 

Hussein, he was a Baathist. If you look at Bashar al-Assad, he is 

a Baathist. 

Mr. WELCH. Yes. I do not have that much time. So your view is 

that the stability that we need will come only through ultimately 

a regime change in Iran. 

Mr. MCINERNEY. Correct. 

Mr. WELCH. And, Dr. Schanzer, do you agree with that? 

Mr. SCHANZER. I am not going to speculate as to whether the 

next President would cancel the deal, but what I can tell you is 

that there are measures that can be taken in the interim —— 

Mr. WELCH. I am wondering whether you agree with General 

McInerney that regime change is ultimately the option that is the 

only option that will really assure us that there will be stability 

with respect to Iran. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Look, as long as this regime is in place, you will 

continue to see the sponsorship of terrorism in other proxies 

around the region. There is no question about it. We should be 

working toward regime change. 2009 was a huge missed opportunity. 

Mr. WELCH. Dr. Bucci? 

Mr. BUCCI. I would agree with that also, Congressman. This regime has stated publicly—they are actually quite honest about it— 

that they are not going to give up any of those things. They do not 

see that they have to with this deal, so they will not. And in fact, 

the deal will enable those efforts to be stronger and more widespread than they were before. So I think regime change is the only 

way it achieves stability in that country and in the region. 

Mr. WELCH. There were a number of people who agreed with you 

on that. A number of people disagreed, myself among them, partly 

on practical grounds. Regime change did not work out so great in 

Iraq. 

But the original sanctions that we had did not stop the nuclear 

program. They froze the Iranian assets overseas, but the Iranians 

proceeded even further along the nuclear program, which means 

that there is a judgment all of us have to make as to the effect of 

our actions. And what we hope it will accomplish will not necessarily be the case. 

General McInerney? 


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Mr. MCINERNEY. We with those sanctions, sir, needed to continue 

our covert operations, which I will just say that if we were in a 

closed session, we could talk about it. 

Mr. WELCH. My time is up. Mr. DeSantis, thank you very much 

for letting me participate. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Absolutely. 

I am going to recognize the vice chair. He has got one more question. We are all pretty much out of time on the votes, and so we 

will do this question and then I think we will wrap up the hearing. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Bucci, my last remaining question was for you. Could you 

speak to the recent activity of the Quds Force and its terrorist activity? And by recent, I mean within the last 2 to 5 years. 

Mr. BUCCI. Yes. They tried to kill the Saudi Ambassador here in 

Washington. I think that is within that time period. They hired one 

of the Shia militia groups in Iraq to rocket the *MEK camp that 

is there, people that were under our protection and the protection 

of the Iraqi Government. They are behind the cyber attacks that 

the chairman mentioned at the beginning of the hearing and the 

ones who did the attack on Saudi Aramco where they destroyed 

30,000 computers in one day using a very heavy-handed piece of 

malware. They have done operations in Latin America, Africa, and 

they are behind the Houthis in Yemen. So they are pretty busy fellows and very, very effective. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I would like to thank all of our witnesses 

for taking the time to appear before us today. 

If there is no further business, without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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