U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Review of the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives’ Disciplinary System 

September 2005 

I-2005-009 
U.S. Department of Justice i

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

INTRODUCTION 

 The Department of Justice’s (Department) Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) conducted this review to assess the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) disciplinary system. This is the 

fourth in a series of OIG reviews of the Department components’ disciplinary 

systems.1 In this review, we examined the consistency and reasonableness 

of the reporting and investigation of alleged misconduct, adjudication of 

misconduct cases, and implementation of the discipline imposed by the 

ATF. We also reviewed the timeliness of the ATF’s disciplinary system for 

processing misconduct cases. We examined the case files for 230 closed 

ATF employee misconduct cases from fiscal year (FY) 2002 through 

FY 2004, reviewed discipline-related policies and procedures, interviewed 

ATF officials, and surveyed 860 ATF employees. Finally, at the request of 

the ATF, we also evaluated a pilot project intended to improve the 

adjudication of misconduct cases. 

All ATF employees are required to promptly report any allegations or 

information concerning misconduct to the ATF Investigations Division. After 

the alleged misconduct is reported, the ATF uses one of two separate 

processes to investigate and adjudicate the allegation − a centralized process 

intended to address more serious misconduct and a decentralized process 

intended only for minor misconduct.2 In the centralized process, allegations 

of misconduct are investigated by the ATF Investigations Division or the 

OIG, which document the results in a formal report of investigation. The 

report of investigation is reviewed by the ATF’s Professional Review Board, 

which proposes a letter of clearance or discipline consistent with discipline 

proposed in similar past cases. Since June 2003, the ATF has been 

operating a pilot project, under the centralized process, in which final 

decisions on proposed discipline have been made by the “Bureau Deciding 

 1 The three previous OIG reports are Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 

Disciplinary System, I-2004-008, September 2004; Review of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration’s Disciplinary System, I-2004-002, January 2004; and Review of the United 

States Marshals Service Discipline Process, I-2001-011, September 2001. 

2 Although the ATF does not define serious or minor misconduct, based on ATF 

Orders 2130.1, 2750.1C, and 8610.1A, we understand more serious misconduct to include 

theft of government property, misconduct related to attendance or leave (such as false 

statements or fraud), and misuse of government-owned vehicles. In contrast, minor 

misconduct includes tardiness for work, insubordination, and failure to complete work 

assignments. The ATF refers to more serious misconduct as “integrity issues.” 
U.S. Department of Justice ii

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Official.” Prior to June 2003, the Professional Review Board proposed 

discipline and local managers made the final decisions. Of the 

230 disciplinary case files we reviewed, 154 were investigated and 

adjudicated under the centralized process (77 by the Bureau Deciding 

Official and 77 by local management officials). 

In contrast to the centralized process for more serious misconduct, 

minor misconduct is handled through the decentralized process in which 

local managers are responsible for investigating and adjudicating allegations 

of misconduct. The ATF’s Employee Labor Relations Team (ELRT) provides 

support and advice to the local managers in these cases. Of the 

230 disciplinary case files we reviewed, 76 were investigated and 

adjudicated under the decentralized process. 

Under both processes, any discipline that involves suspension, 

reduction in pay, or removal is documented on an Office of Personnel 

Management Standard Form-50 (SF-50) that is permanently retained in the 

employee's official personnel folder. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

Our review found deficiencies in the reporting, investigation, 

adjudication, and implementation of the ATF’s disciplinary system that 

reduce its ability to ensure that misconduct is consistently, reasonably, and 

timely addressed.3 Specifically, we found that misconduct was not always 

properly reported, and misconduct investigations handled in the 

decentralized process were not thorough. We also found that errors in the 

ATF’s disciplinary database reduced the reliability of the database for use in 

identifying prior discipline imposed in similar cases. In some cases, the ATF 

could not demonstrate that the discipline imposed had been implemented. 

Further, the ATF has not established standards to measure the performance 

of the timeliness of disciplinary actions. Even so, the average time the ATF 

took to investigate and adjudicate misconduct cases was within the range of 

the processing times for the other three Department components we have 

reviewed. Our findings are discussed in greater detail below. 

 3 We defined timeliness as whether policies and procedures in place ensured timely 

disciplinary results and how often the disciplinary system met formally established time 

and performance standards. We defined consistency as whether the policies and 

procedures in place were followed; whether the disciplinary system processed similar 

misconduct cases using uniform standards; and whether the disciplinary system imposed 

uniform penalties for similar misconduct across the ATF and within the same location. We 

defined reasonableness as how thorough the investigations and adjudications appeared; 

how objective and independent the process for investigating and adjudicating misconduct 

cases appeared; and how logical or appropriate the penalties for the misconduct appeared. 
U.S. Department of Justice iii

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Reporting and Investigation of Misconduct Allegations 

We found that ATF employees did not consistently report allegations 

of misconduct to the ATF Investigations Division, as required by ATF 

Order 2130.1. We also found that the ATF did not consistently report 

allegations of misconduct to the OIG, as required. In response to our 

employee survey, 75 out of 345 respondents stated that they had observed 

misconduct that they did not report to the Investigations Division or the 

OIG. We also found that in 59 of 230 disciplinary case files we reviewed, the 

allegations of misconduct were not reported to the ATF Investigations 

Division. Instead, these allegations of misconduct were reported to local 

managers or ELRT staff. 

In addition, of the 230 case files we reviewed, 47 misconduct 

allegations were not reported to the OIG for review as required. Six of the 

cases that were not reported to the OIG involved allegations of serious 

misconduct, but these cases were investigated and adjudicated through the 

decentralized process without the benefit of a review by the ATF 

Investigations Division or the OIG. 

We also found that the ATF did not thoroughly investigate each 

allegation of misconduct. Our review of the case files for the 76 cases 

handled under the decentralized process found no evidence of any 

investigation having been conducted in 16 of the files. Documentation in 

the remaining 60 files appeared inadequate to ensure a reasonable 

investigative result. An ELRT specialist we interviewed stated that there are 

no standards or guidance for the decentralized investigative process. In 

contrast, all of the 154 misconduct allegations investigated under the 

centralized process resulted in formal reports of investigation. We reviewed 

17 of these reports and concluded that these investigations were thorough 

and complete. 

Adjudication of Misconduct Cases 

We found that the ATF did not reasonably and consistently adjudicate 

misconduct cases. Under the decentralized process, a local manager can 

propose and decide the penalty for the same case.4 This occurred in 13 of 

the 76 decentralized cases we examined. We believe that allowing the same 

local manager to propose the discipline and decide the penalty for a case 

removes the checks and balances necessary to ensure reasonable results. 

 4 This can only occur for cases resulting in discipline of a 14-day suspension or less. 
U.S. Department of Justice iv

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

The ATF has not established a time limit on the consideration of prior 

misconduct in adjudicating discipline cases. This results in inconsistent 

consideration of prior misconduct to adjudicate the penalty for new 

misconduct. For example, in one case, the proposing official considered 

misconduct that resulted in discipline 6 years prior to the current 

misconduct. In another case, the proposing official did not consider prior 

misconduct that resulted in discipline less than 2 years before the new 

misconduct. In contrast, each of the other three Department components 

whose disciplinary systems we reviewed have established time periods to 

ensure that the consideration of prior misconduct is consistent. 

We also identified errors in the ATF's disciplinary database that 

reduced the ATF’s ability to identify accurately discipline imposed in similar 

prior cases. The ELRT and the Professional Review Board rely on the 

database to identify discipline imposed in similar prior cases to ensure 

consistency. However, we found that in 52 of 230 disciplinary case files we 

reviewed, the charge or discipline recorded in the case file (specifically in the 

proposal and the decision letters) did not match the charge or discipline 

recorded in the ATF’s disciplinary database. As a result, the data on prior 

misconduct cases used as part of the ATF’s process for determining 

proposed discipline was not always complete or accurate. Consequently, 

the ATF could not ensure the consistency or reasonableness of discipline 

proposed for similar misconduct. 

We also found that the ATF incorrectly categorized misconduct in 

some cases, which resulted in inconsistent disciplinary actions. In 31 of the 

230 disciplinary case files we reviewed, an offense for which a specific 

charge was available (such as misuse of a government vehicle or granting 

prohibited persons access to firearms) was instead labeled as the nonspecific offense "poor judgment." In addition, the ATF has no guidance to 

establish the specific types of misconduct that may be included in the broad 

charge of poor judgment. Because less stringent penalties were imposed for 

the general offense category of “poor judgment,” we found that in some 

cases individuals who committed similar misconduct received inconsistent 

discipline. 

The deciding official has the authority to mitigate (reduce) the 

proposed discipline based on the applicable Douglas Factors or information 

in the response to the proposed discipline provided by the employee.5 We 

 5 The 12 Douglas Factors can be used to mitigate a proposed penalty and include 

information such as the employee’s past disciplinary record and the nature and 

seriousness of the offense. For example, a long-term employee with no prior disciplinary 

history and an excellent performance record may receive a mitigated penalty, while an 

(Cont’d.) 
U.S. Department of Justice v

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

found that the ATF’s deciding officials mitigated proposed discipline in 38 of 

the 230 disciplinary case files we reviewed. However, in 21 of those 

38 mitigations, the deciding official did not adequately detail the reasons for 

mitigating the proposed discipline in the decision letter, as required. This 

occurred under both the centralized process (18 cases) and the 

decentralized process (3 cases). Because the deciding official did not 

adequately document the reasons to mitigate the proposed discipline, we 

could not assess whether the reductions were reasonable. 

Implementation of Discipline Imposed 

The ATF could not demonstrate that the discipline imposed in the 

decision letter had been carried out in every case. Discipline that includes 

suspension, reduction in pay, or removal ordered by a local deciding official 

or by the Bureau Deciding Official is implemented with an SF-50 that is 

permanently retained in the employee's official personnel folder. However, 

the ATF could not provide the required SF-50 in 14 cases, involving 

12 suspensions and 2 removals. Consequently, the ATF could not 

demonstrate that the employees had been disciplined or that the employees’ 

pay had been withheld for the 12 suspension cases. Although the ATF did 

not provide SF-50s for the two cases involving removals, we subsequently 

verified, with the assistance of an ATF official, that the two employees had 

been removed from service. 

Timeliness of the ATF’s Disciplinary System 

Overall, the ATF has not established timeliness standards or goals to 

measure the performance of its disciplinary system. However, we found 

that the average time the ATF took to process misconduct cases was within 

the range of the average time for the other three Department components 

whose disciplinary systems we have reviewed. The ATF averaged 277 days 

to investigate and adjudicate allegations of misconduct. In comparison, the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons averaged 198 days and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration averaged 334 days. 

Review of the Bureau Deciding Official Pilot Project 

At the request of the ATF, we also reviewed the pilot project it has 

operated since June 2003 to assess whether using a single Bureau Deciding 

Official improved the consistency, reasonableness, and timeliness of 

disciplinary decisions under the centralized process. We concluded that 

 

employee committing the same offense who has been disciplined previously and has a poor 

work record would not. See Appendix I for a description of the Douglas Factors. 
U.S. Department of Justice vi

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

discipline imposed by the Bureau Deciding Official was more consistent, 

reasonable, and timely than the discipline imposed by local managers. 

While the Bureau Deciding Official ensured consistency with his prior 

decisions in all similar ATF cases, local managers were required only to 

ensure consistency with their own prior decisions, not with decisions made 

by other numerous managers located throughout the ATF. Thus, we found 

that the Bureau Deciding Official (one individual) is more likely to produce 

consistent decisions. 

Additionally, we found that the Bureau Deciding Official’s decisions 

were more reasonable and timely. The Bureau Deciding Official more 

thoroughly documented his reasons for mitigating proposed penalties. Prior 

to the pilot project, local mangers reduced the proposed penalty in 15 of 

77 cases without adequately documenting the reasons for the mitigation in 

their decision letters. The Bureau Deciding Official reduced the proposed 

penalty in only 3 of 77 cases without adequate explanation in the decision 

letter. The Bureau Deciding Official also adjudicated his cases more 

quickly, averaging 63 days from proposal to decision, compared to the local 

managers’ average of 111 days. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

We concluded that improvements are needed to address the problems 

we found in the ATF’s disciplinary system. The ATF did not ensure that all 

misconduct was properly reported and thoroughly investigated. The 

documentation and tracking of misconduct cases was incomplete and 

inconsistent, which prevented the ATF from ensuring that consistent 

penalties were proposed. In addition, the decision to mitigate proposed 

discipline was not always sufficiently justified, and the implementation of 

penalties for misconduct was not always documented. Because of these 

deficiencies, we concluded that the ATF system is less effective than it 

should be for ensuring that discipline is consistent and reasonable. 

Although the ATF lacks timeliness goals or standards to measure the 

discipline system’s performance, the average time the ATF took to 

investigate and adjudicate misconduct cases was within the range of the 

average processing times of other Department components we have 

reviewed. 

Based on our review of the ATF’s pilot project using a Bureau 

Deciding Official, we believe that the use of the single official would produce 

more consistent, reasonable, and timely disciplinary results, and that 

establishment of a permanent Bureau Deciding Official is warranted. 
U.S. Department of Justice vii

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

To help improve the ATF’s disciplinary system, we make nine 

recommendations. We recommend that the ATF: 

1. Remind all employees on an annual basis, particularly local 

managers and ELRT staff, that any allegation or information 

concerning misconduct must be promptly reported to the ATF 

Investigations Division or the OIG. 

2. Require that all investigations of alleged misconduct be conducted 

or reviewed by the ATF Investigations Division before the 

misconduct case can be adjudicated. 

3. Properly categorize misconduct to accurately reflect the underlying 

misconduct, rather than applying generic charges such as “poor 

judgment.” 

4. Establish data entry and quality control standards and procedures 

for all information entered in its automated disciplinary database 

and for all documentation collected and maintained in the 

disciplinary case files. 

5. Require that each decision letter that reduces the proposed 

discipline adequately document the reasons for the mitigation. 

6. Establish a time period for how far back prior discipline should be 

considered. 

7. Prohibit the same individual from serving as the proposing and 

deciding official for the same misconduct case. 

8. Establish policies and procedures, including management reviews, 

to ensure that discipline imposed is consistently implemented. 

9. Establish time standards and performance measures for the 

investigation and adjudication phases for the centralized and 

decentralized disciplinary processes. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST .............................................................................i

BACKGROUND .....................................................................................1

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY............................................17

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW.................................................................21

Reporting and Investigation of Misconduct Allegations........................... 21

Adjudication of Misconduct Cases ......................................................... 28

Implementation of Discipline Imposed ................................................... 34

Timeliness of the ATF’s Disciplinary System .......................................... 35

Review of the Bureau Deciding Official Pilot Project ............................... 40

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................43

APPENDIX I: Douglas Factors............................................................45

APPENDIX II: ATF’s Response to Draft Report...................................47

APPENDIX III: OIG Analysis of ATF’s Response .................................52
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

1

BACKGROUND 

A federal agency may impose discipline when an employee’s 

misconduct interferes with the agency’s ability to carry out its mission. 

Laws and regulations governing the discipline of federal employees are 

found in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978; Title 5, Code of Federal 

Regulations, Part 752, Adverse Actions; and 5 United States Code, Chapter 

75, Section 7501-7504, 7511-7514. These laws and regulations establish 

the legal framework for federal agencies to address employee misconduct 

through disciplinary actions (penalties ranging from letters of reprimand to 

suspensions of 14 days and less) and adverse actions (suspensions of 

greater than 14 days, demotions, and removals).6 In addition to formal 

disciplinary action, agencies may also impose informal discipline, such as 

letters of caution. 

Agencies have discretion in determining disciplinary penalties; the 

only requirement is that the penalty be reasonable. To help determine 

reasonableness, in a 1981 decision the Merit Systems Protection Board 

established 12 factors, known as the Douglas Factors, for agency officials to 

consider when determining disciplinary actions.7 The Douglas Factors 

include information such as the employee’s past disciplinary record and the 

nature and seriousness of the offense. The Douglas Factors may be used to 

mitigate (reduce) a proposed penalty. For example, a long-term employee 

with no prior disciplinary history and an excellent performance record may 

receive a mitigated penalty, while another employee committing the same 

offense who has been disciplined previously and has a poor work record 

would not. See Appendix I for a description of the Douglas Factors. 

 6 In the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), letters of 

admonishment and reprimand or any suspension of 14 days or less are defined as 

disciplinary actions. Furloughs of 30 days, reductions in pay or grade, suspensions more 

than 14 days, or removals are defined as adverse actions. 

 

7 The Merit Systems Protection Board is an independent, quasi-judicial agency in 

the executive branch that was established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978, which was 

codified by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Public Law 95-454. The Civil Service 

Reform Act which became effective January 11, 1979, replaced the Civil Service 

Commission with three independent agencies: (1) the Office of Personnel Management, 

which manages the federal work force; (2) the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which 

oversees federal labor-management relations; and (3) the Merit Systems Protection Board. 

The Merit Systems Protection Board assumed the employee appeals function of the Civil 

Service Commission and was given new responsibilities to perform merit systems studies 

and to review the significant actions of the Office of Personnel Management. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

2

Overview of the ATF 

The ATF’s mission is “to conduct criminal investigations, regulate the 

firearms and explosives industries, and assist other law enforcement 

agencies” as part of the U.S. government’s effort to counter terrorism, 

reduce violent crime, and protect the public.8 To support its mission, the 

ATF employs approximately 5,000 staff, each assigned to one of the ATF’s 

seven directorates. Field Operations is the largest directorate and has 

primary responsibility for administering the ATF’s 23 Field Divisions.9

Overview of the ATF’s Disciplinary System 

 The ATF currently uses two separate processes to investigate and 

adjudicate employee misconduct cases. The first is a centralized process, 

administered by headquarters officials. This process routes relatively 

serious misconduct cases through the Investigations Division, the 

Professional Review Board, and the “Bureau Deciding Official” for 

investigation and adjudication. The second process is decentralized in 

which local managers investigate and adjudicate minor misconduct cases, 

with the assistance of the Employee Labor Relations Team (ELRT) located in 

headquarters. 

Prior to June 2003, the ATF relied on local managers to decide 

discipline for misconduct cases in the centralized process. Since June 

2003, the ATF has been testing a pilot project in which a single Bureau 

Deciding Official decides discipline for all misconduct cases in the 

centralized process. The ATF modeled this disciplinary process on the Drug 

Enforcement Administration’s centralized process for handling employee 

misconduct cases.10 The use of local deciding officials in the centralized 

process has been temporarily suspended until ATF management determines 

whether it will formally implement the Bureau Deciding Official pilot project. 

Figure 1 provides a general overview of the ATF’s disciplinary system. 

 8 ATF Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009. 

9 Effective January 24, 2003, the ATF was transferred from the Department of 

Treasury to the Department of Justice. The ATF was established as a separate component 

within the Department of Justice pursuant to Title XI of the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, Public Law 107-296, on January 17, 2003. 

 

10 See Internal ATF Memorandum, “Bureau Deciding Official,” June 2, 2003. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

3

START 

Allegation of Misconduct Reported 

to the Investigations Division 

Open ID 

Investigation? 

ID Investigates & 

Compiles Report of 

Investigation 

ELRT Advises Manager on 

Collection of Supporting 

Documentation 

Yes

Local Manager Proposes 

Discipline with ELRT 

Input 

All ID & OIG Investigations 

Sent to the Professional 

Review Board

PRB Proposes 

Discipline or Clearance 

Local Management 

Decides Discipline with 

ELRT Input 

 Prior to 

 June 2003 

Local Manager 

Decides 

Discipline with 

ELRT Input 

Bureau Deciding 

Official Decides 

Discipline or Issues 

Clearance 

June 2003 

to Present 

PRB Specialist or ELRT Specialist Creates Official Discipline File & Updates Disciplinary Database 

ID Refers Case to 

Local Manager for 

Resolution 

No

ID Reports Allegation to OIG 

Open OIG 

Investigation? 

Yes No

LEGEND 

Centralized Process 

Decentralized Process 

Centralized Process Prior 

to June 2003 

OIG Investigates & 

Compiles Report of 

Investigation 

ID – Investigations Division 

OIG – Office of the Inspector General 

PRB – Professional Review Board 

BDO – Bureau Deciding Official 

ELRT – Employee Labor Relations Team 

Source: Based on ATF Orders and interviews with ATF officials

Figure 1: Official ATF Disciplinary System 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

4

The Reporting of Misconduct Allegations. ATF Order 2130.1 

requires that any allegation or information that the ATF’s standards or rules 

of conduct have been violated must be promptly reported by the employee 

having the information to the ATF Investigations Division. The Order also 

requires that any questions about whether the information or allegation is a 

matter for administrative handling or investigation will be resolved by 

discussion between the appropriate administrative official and the ATF 

Investigations Division. 

In fiscal year (FY) 2004, the ATF Investigations Division received and 

reviewed 781 misconduct allegations; 86 resulted in ATF Investigations 

Division investigations. The ATF Investigations Division typically receives 

misconduct allegations via telephone or e-mail. The allegations are recorded 

on incident reports (ATF Form 8600.39). These incident reports summarize 

and document such information as when the allegation was reported, who 

reported the allegation, the circumstances surrounding the allegation, and 

the investigator recording the information. Information from the incident 

reports are entered into the ATF Investigations Division’s data management 

system. 

The ATF is required to report allegations of misconduct to the 

Department of Justice’s (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG). 

The ATF Investigations Division is required to report any allegation of 

serious misconduct to the OIG immediately and subsequently provide the 

related incident report. The ATF also informs the OIG of misconduct 

allegations not categorized as serious but, by mutual agreement, does so 

when an OIG Special Agent visits the ATF Investigations Division’s offices, 

usually on a weekly basis. The OIG Special Agent collects, reviews, and 

discusses any misconduct allegations or issues relating to recent incident 

reports. After reviewing an incident report, the OIG determines whether an 

allegation requires (1) an OIG investigation; (2) an OIG review of the 

completed ATF investigation; or (3) no further involvement by the OIG. 

If the OIG determines it will not investigate the allegation, the ATF 

Investigations Division’s Special Agent in Charge reviews the allegation and 

determines whether the case will be (1) investigated by the Investigations 

Division; (2) referred to local management for an investigation that will be 

monitored by the Investigations Division; or (3) labeled “no action,” requiring 

no further involvement by the Investigations Division. 

The misconduct allegations investigated by the OIG or the ATF 

Investigations Division generally are the more serious allegations. Those 

offenses include embezzlement; attempted bribery; acceptance of bribes, 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

5

gifts, or gratuities; extortion; fraud against the government or conspiracy to 

commit the foregoing offense; lying under oath; refusal to cooperate with an 

administrative or other inquiry when required to do so by law or regulation; 

falsification of criminal investigative reports; theft of government funds or 

property; excessive tardiness or other misconduct related to attendance or 

leave; criminal, dishonest, infamous, or notoriously disgraceful conduct; 

refusal to furnish testimony; misuse of a government-owned vehicle; abuse 

of narcotics or other controlled substances; and discourteous conduct to the 

public confirmed by an immediate supervisor’s report of four such instances 

within any 1-year period or any other pattern of discourteous conduct. 

When the ATF Investigations Division determines allegations are not 

serious, it refers them to local management for investigation or labels them 

“no action.” According to ATF Order 8610.1A, “certain minor infractions of 

the rules of conduct may be investigated by the appropriate [local ATF] 

manager.” Minor misconduct allegations include tardiness for work, 

insubordination, and failure to complete work assignments. The label “no 

action” allows local managers to handle the allegation in a manner that they 

believe is appropriate. In these cases, local managers may choose not to 

pursue the allegation (for example, if the allegation does not provide enough 

information to warrant investigation) or may contact the ELRT for advice 

and assistance as they proceed with the investigation and adjudication 

under the decentralized process. 

The Centralized Process 

The centralized disciplinary process is administered by officials and 

staff at ATF Headquarters. The centralized process currently involves three 

headquarters entities: (1) the ATF Investigations Division, (2) the 

Professional Review Board, and (3) the Bureau Deciding Official. 

The ATF Investigations Division investigates the misconduct 

allegation and compiles the investigations report. The Investigations 

Division is located within the Office of Professional Responsibility and 

Security Operations. The Investigations Division is responsible for 

investigating, tracking, and reporting all allegations of misconduct involving 

ATF employees, as set forth in ATF Order 8610.1A. The Investigations 

Division’s other responsibilities include tracking and investigating accidents 

involving government-owned vehicles and shooting incidents involving ATF 

employees. In addition to the Special Agent in Charge and the Assistant 

Special Agent in Charge, at the time of this review, the Investigations 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

6

ID Investigates & 

Compiles Investigative 

Report 

All ID & OIG Investigations 

Sent to the Professional 

Review Board

PRB Proposes 

Discipline or Clearance 

Bureau Deciding 

Official Decides 

Discipline or Issues 

Clearance 

June 2003 

to Present 

PRB Specialist Creates 

Official Discipline File & 

Updates Disciplinary 

Database 

Division had a staff of approximately 12 investigators to conduct internal 

investigations.11 Staffing fluctuates primarily based on caseload.

The Investigations Division opened 127 misconduct investigations in 

FY 2002, 91 in FY 2003, and 86 in FY 2004. 

Workload, case complexity (with the more complex 

cases typically being assigned to more senior 

investigators), and seriousness of the allegation 

influence the prioritization and internal 

assignment of investigations. The Special Agent 

in Charge monitors the progress of the 

Investigations Division’s open investigations by 

conducting monthly briefings with the 

investigators assigned and recording the case 

status in a management control log. Allegations 

referred to local management for monitored 

investigation are tracked separately. 

ATF Order 8610.1A, “Internal and Other 

Investigations,” describes requirements for the 

Investigations Division’s misconduct 

investigations. Each investigation must result in 

a case file with a report on the investigation and 

relevant exhibits. Before an investigation is 

closed, the case file contents are reviewed and 

approved by the Special Agent in Charge and the 

Assistant Director of the Office of Professional 

Responsibility and Security Operations. 

Incomplete investigations are returned to the investigator for additional 

investigation and documentation. Once approved, the completed case file is 

forwarded to the Professional Review Board. At this point, the centralized 

process’s investigation phase ends and the adjudicative phase begins. 

The Professional Review Board proposes discipline or clearance. 

On August 1, 1995, ATF Brief 2750.1 officially established the Professional 

Review Board “to ensure that allegations of employee misconduct are fairly 

reviewed and expeditiously handled and that penalties for misconduct are 

fairly administered.” The Professional Review Board is charged with 

reviewing “incidents of misconduct” that are the subject of an investigation 

by the Investigations Division or the OIG and are documented in a report of 

 11 One of these 12 investigators is also the Shooting Review Coordinator and serves 

as the lead investigator for shooting incidents. 

Centralized 

Process 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

7

investigation. Prior to the Professional Review Board’s creation in 1995, all 

misconduct cases were adjudicated by local management. 

The Professional Review Board is currently located within the ATF’s 

Management Directorate and consists of four members and one Chair. All 

five members have an equal vote in the proposal process; however, the Chair 

administers the process and signs all resulting proposal letters. 

The Chair is a full-time, permanent, grade 15 position. The remaining 

four members serve on the Professional Review Board in addition to their 

permanent, full-time senior management assignments. This duty is 

temporary and usually lasts from 12 to 18 months. The ATF tries to stagger 

the rotation of Professional Review Board membership to ensure that it has 

enough experienced voting members serving at all times. 

The Deputy Director of the ATF selects the four Professional Review 

Board members from a pool of grade 15 and Senior Executive Service 

supervisors and managers nominated by the seven ATF Assistant Directors. 

At least two Professional Review Board members serving at any one time 

must be series 1811 Criminal Investigators, and one member must be a 

series 1854 Inspector. At least one, but no more than two, members must 

be in the Senior Executive Service. For those cases involving misconduct by 

a Senior Executive Service employee, the Senior Executive Service 

Professional Review Board member serves temporarily as the Chair. 

The Professional Review Board is assisted by three Employee 

Relations Specialists.12 The specialists assist in researching and preparing 

background information on each case and attend Professional Review Board 

meetings in an advisory/support capacity. The specialists are also 

responsible for collecting, entering, and maintaining case-related 

information in the disciplinary case file database. 

Additionally, the Professional Review Board receives assistance, as 

required, from representatives of the ELRT, the Office of Chief Counsel, and 

the ATF Office of Equal Employment Opportunity. These representatives 

review each Investigations Division investigation file and attend the 

Professional Review Board meetings to provide counsel or guidance on 

 12 One full-time, federally employed Employee Relations Specialist; one full-time, 

contract Employee Relations Specialist; and one part-time, contract Employee Relations 

Specialist are assigned to the Professional Review Board. These three specialists were 

permanently assigned in the summer of 2003. Previously, these positions were assigned to 

the Employee Labor Relations Team, which provided support to the Professional Review 

Board on an as-needed basis. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

8

certain cases or proposed penalties as required. These representatives do 

not vote. 

When the Professional Review Board receives a completed 

investigation file from the Investigations Division, the file is assigned to one 

of the three specialists for tracking and processing throughout the proposal 

and decision-making phases. A copy of the investigation file is also provided 

to each of the five Professional Review Board members and other 

participants (such as the Office of Chief Counsel) at least one week in 

advance of the scheduled meeting. 

The Professional Review Board meets approximately every 6 weeks to 

review and determine proposed penalties (if warranted) on all investigation 

files that have accumulated during that time. During the scheduled 

meeting, the Professional Review Board proposes discipline for all 

investigation files that have been distributed to the members. Generally, 

the Professional Review Board adjudicates up to 15 cases per meeting. If an 

unusually large number of investigation files come in from the 

Investigations Division, the Professional Review Board may schedule an 

additional meeting to avoid a backlog. 

Prior to the meeting, the Professional Review Board specialists 

compile a summary of each subject’s investigation file and disciplinary 

history, as well as information on past discipline proposed for similar cases. 

The Chair meets with the specialists and other headquarters officials who 

serve as advisors to the Professional Review Board to review this information 

and determine how best to initiate discussion of the case during the 

scheduled meeting. 

During the meeting, the five voting members discuss and determine 

which charges addressed in the investigation file are supportable and then 

vote on a proposed penalty. While a majority vote is all that is required, the 

Professional Review Board attempts to obtain unanimous agreement on the 

proposed penalty. 

On rare occasions (perhaps two to three cases per year), the 

Professional Review Board postpones a vote. Generally, this is done 

because the investigation file does not contain sufficient information for the 

Professional Review Board to vote on the case or because the Professional 

Review Board is aware that information on a related case is forthcoming. 

When this occurs, the Professional Review Board may request that the 

Investigations Division provide a supplemental investigation or that the 

investigator in charge of the case answer the Professional Review Board’s 

questions. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

9

After the Professional Review Board adjourns, the specialists draft a 

proposal letter for each case discussed during the meeting.13 If the 

Professional Review Board decides on a letter of clearance (the allegation 

could not be sustained on the evidence presented), caution, admonishment, 

or reprimand, the specialists draft the letter and forward it to the Bureau 

Deciding Official for review, signature, and issuance to the employee. 

If the Professional Review Board proposes a suspension, a reduction 

in pay or grade, or a removal, the specialist drafts the proposal letter and 

submits it to the Chief of the ELRT for a “technical review to determine the 

adequacy of the record and to ensure uniformity of proposals.”14 Proposal 

letters involving discipline exceeding a 14-day suspension, a reduction in 

pay or grade, or a removal are also forwarded to the Office of Chief Counsel, 

where they are reviewed for “legal sufficiency.” After review, the proposal 

letter is signed by the Chair. The signed proposal letter and a copy of the 

investigation file are provided to the employee and the deciding official. 

Employees are required to sign an acknowledgement of receipt form 

indicating that they have received the proposal package. At this point, the 

proposal phase of the centralized process ends, and the decision phase 

begins. 

 

The Bureau Deciding Official decides discipline or issues 

clearance. On June 2, 2003, ATF Brief 2141.1 established the Bureau 

Deciding Official pilot program to promote consistent and prompt 

adjudication of proposals issued by the Professional Review Board. Under 

the pilot program the ATF Director appoints one permanent, full-time, grade 

15 or Senior Executive Service manager as the Bureau Deciding Official. 

The Bureau Deciding Official is assigned to the Office of the Director and 

 13 Some misconduct cases may raise concerns about the applicability or specificity 

of current policies or procedures. When the Professional Review Board encounters such a 

concern during a case, it can issue a “management referral.” This is a policy or procedure 

recommendation made directly to local management or, in some cases, to ATF management 

overall. As with the proposal letter, the specialist drafts it and the Chair reviews, signs, 

and issues it. Management referrals are not disciplinary in nature and may be issued 

independently or in conjunction with proposed discipline. According to the Professional 

Review Board Chair, a management referral addresses a breakdown in policies and 

procedures requiring management attention or oversight. The Professional Review Board 

may propose discipline for an employee and simultaneously issue a management referral, if 

an individual’s misconduct is identified, as well as related management issues. The 

Professional Review Board issues few management referrals each year, approximately three 

or four in FY 2004. 

14 According to ATF Brief 2750.1, the ELRT must concur with proposed disciplinary 

actions, and both the ELRT and the Office of Chief Counsel must concur with proposed 

adverse actions. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

10

serves as the deciding official for all Professional Review Board proposals 

except for those designated as “management referrals.” 

The Bureau Deciding Official pilot program fully centralized the 

process for determining final discipline for those misconduct allegations 

investigated by the Investigations Division and adjudicated by the 

Professional Review Board. The ATF’s Executive Staff originally was to 

determine whether the pilot program should be implemented on a 

permanent basis by December 2003.15 Instead, the Executive Staff decided 

to extend the pilot program indefinitely for additional evaluation. 

The Bureau Deciding Official becomes actively involved in the 

adjudication phase of the centralized disciplinary process once the 

Professional Review Board has issued a proposal letter to the employee. A 

Professional Review Board specialist then delivers a copy of the 

Investigations Division’s investigation file and the Professional Review 

Board’s proposal letter to the Bureau Deciding Official. Once employees 

receive a proposal letter recommending a suspension, demotion, or removal, 

they have the opportunity to respond orally via telephone, in writing, or 

both. The Bureau Deciding Official reviews these responses. 

The time allowed for the response depends on the facts and 

circumstances of the case. The employee is given the opportunity to review 

the material relied upon by the Professional Review Board to support the 

proposed discipline, to prepare an answer, and to secure affidavits. At least 

7 days is given, although 15 days is typical.16 

Any oral response by the employee is recorded by a Professional 

Review Board specialist, and the employee has an opportunity to comment 

on the specialist’s written summary before the Bureau Deciding Official 

renders his decision. The Office of Chief Counsel also is present during oral 

responses (conference call) for cases involving a proposed adverse action. 

Once any oral or written reply has been submitted by the employee, 

the Bureau Deciding Official reviews it and, using a Douglas Factors 

worksheet (see Appendix I for the Douglas Factors), considers the mitigating 

or aggravating factors that the employee’s reply presents. As part of the 

 15 The Executive Staff consists of the Director, the Deputy Director, seven Assistant 

Directors, and nine Deputy Assistant Directors. 

16 The Bureau Deciding Official monitors this employee response period in a case 

log, using the date on which the Bureau Deciding Official receives a faxed copy of the 

employee’s signed proposal receipt as the starting date for the reply period. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

11

review process, the Bureau Deciding Official may reference the subject’s 

official personnel folder to review factors such as job performance, 

promotion eligibility, and any prior disciplinary actions. The Bureau 

Deciding Official also considers the level of discipline that the ATF meted 

out for similar types of offenses in the past, based on a consistency review of 

previous cases. The Bureau Deciding Official documents each of the factors 

that was considered on the Douglas Factors worksheet and then signs and 

dates the form. The Bureau Deciding Official can mitigate the Professional 

Review Board’s proposed penalty, but may not increase it. 

After determining the appropriate penalty, the Bureau Deciding 

Official renders a final decision. The Professional Review Board specialist 

drafts a decision letter detailing the reasons, especially when mitigation has 

occurred, for the discipline that is being imposed, including projected dates 

when the punishment will take effect. The Chief of ELRT reviews the 

decision letters imposing disciplinary action; the Office of Chief Counsel 

reviews those imposing adverse actions. After these reviews are complete, 

the Bureau Deciding Official signs the decision letter and sends it to the 

employee.17

Local managers decide discipline with ELRT input. Prior to June 

2003, local managers were responsible for making final disciplinary 

decisions. Reliance on local managers to decide discipline for the 

centralized process was suspended after the Bureau Deciding Official pilot 

project became operational in June 2003. Prior to June 2003, when the 

Professional Review Board proposed a penalty in a misconduct case, the 

assigned ELRT specialist identified and notified the appropriate local 

manager – usually the Special Agent in Charge or Assistant Special Agent in 

Charge – that he or she must serve as the deciding official for the case. The 

ELRT specialist then sent a copy of the proposal letter and the 

Investigations Division investigation file to the deciding official to reference 

when determining the appropriate penalty. 

 17 The Bureau Deciding Official also reviews and signs any letters of clearance, 

caution, admonishment, or reprimand proposed by the Professional Review Board. The 

employee does not have an opportunity to reply to a letter of clearance, admonishment, 

caution, or reprimand. However, an employee may grieve the action as specified in the 

letter. A copy of the signed letter and receipt, along with any other related or supporting 

documentation, is then placed in the employee’s disciplinary file. The disciplinary files are 

maintained by the ELRT at ATF Headquarters for approximately 4 years before they are 

archived. The ATF’s disciplinary system database (also referred to as HR Connect), 

maintains this information indefinitely. Copies of letters of reprimand can be maintained in 

the employee’s official personnel folder for up to 2 years. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

12

ID Investigates & 

Compiles Investigative 

Report 

All ID & OIG Investigations 

Sent to the Professional 

Review Board 

PRB Proposes 

Discipline or Clearance 

 Prior to 

 June 2003 

Local Manager 

Decides 

Discipline with 

ELRT Input 

ELRT Specialist Creates 

Official Discipline File & 

Updates Disciplinary 

Database 

Prior to June 2003, the Professional Review Board forwarded all 

proposal letters, including letters of clearance, caution, admonishment, and 

reprimand, to the local manager acting as the deciding official for review, 

signature, and issuance to the employee. 

The local deciding official could contact the 

ELRT specialist to discuss any issues or 

concerns with the case. 

If the Professional Review Board 

proposed a suspension, reduction in pay, or 

removal, the local deciding official was 

responsible for considering the subject’s 

oral and or written reply, applying the 

Douglas Factors, and deciding what 

discipline to impose. Once the deciding 

official determined the penalty, the assigned 

ELRT specialist drafted the decision letter 

for review, signature, and delivery to the 

employee. 

The Decentralized Process 

Misconduct allegations that are not 

investigated by Investigations Division or 

the OIG are handled through a separate, decentralized disciplinary process. 

The decentralized process involves minimal involvement or control by 

headquarters entities, except for the ELRT’s advice and assistance, and 

relies primarily on local management to conduct the investigation, proposal, 

and decision phases of the process. The evidence collection, proposal and 

decision may all be handled by the same official in cases that result in 

discipline involving a suspension of 14 days or less. Approximately 630 ATF 

supervisory-level employees are eligible to propose or decide misconduct 

cases in the decentralized process. 

Centralized Process 

Prior to June 2003 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

13

ELRT Advises Manager 

on Collection of 

Supporting Documentation 

Local Manager Proposes 

Discipline with ELRT 

Input 

Local Management 

Decides Discipline with 

ELRT Input 

ELRT Specialist Creates 

Official Discipline File & 

Updates Disciplinary 

Database 

ID Refers Case to 

Local Manager for 

Resolution

 Specialists assigned to the ELRT provide assistance and guidance to 

local management in the decentralized process. The ELRT falls under the 

Personnel Division, within the Management Directorate. The Chief of the 

ELRT oversees a staff of four employee relations specialists, two labor 

relations specialists, one administrative assistant, and two part-time 

students.18 

 ELRT specialists provide advice to local 

management throughout the decentralized process on 

how to identify and report misconduct, provide the 

necessary types of documentation to substantiate the 

alleged charges, and prepare and draft proposal and 

decision letters. While ELRT specialists provide advice 

to local management, it is important to note that they 

serve only in an advisory capacity and cannot overrule 

or directly challenge actions taken by local 

management. 

The ELRT advises managers on collection of 

supporting documentation. The decentralized 

process does not require local management to conduct 

structured misconduct investigations, such as those 

required and produced by the Investigations Division 

in the centralized process. On the basis of the ELRT’s 

advice, the local manager may collect voluntary 

statements from the subject or witnesses and gather 

supporting documents, such as e-mails, records, 

reports, or activity logs, depending on the charges. 

There is no written guidance indicating how this 

supporting documentation should be collected. Our interviews with local 

management showed that different offices employ different methods of 

determining who collects the supporting documentation for the case and 

who reviews the documents and evidence collected. 

 Once documentation supporting an allegation of misconduct has been 

collected and reviewed, the documentation is forwarded to the ELRT for its 

review and inclusion in a disciplinary file. If the ELRT believes that the 

documentation is insufficient to justify disciplinary action, it will 

recommend that additional information be gathered, if possible, or it will 

 18 The six ELRT specialists are each assigned certain ATF district, regional, and 

Headquarters offices for which they provide services. These services include assistance 

with misconduct-related discipline, employment suitability, performance management, the 

employee union contract, and performance appraisals. 

Decentralized Process
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

14

close the case. If the case is closed, no case-related information is created 

or entered into the disciplinary case file database, and no disciplinary file is 

created. If sufficient documentation is collected to substantiate the charges, 

then the ELRT assists local management with the adjudication phase of the 

decentralized process. 

Local manager proposes discipline with ELRT input. For 

decentralized cases, the ATF permits a wide range of specified officials to act 

as both the proposing and deciding official for cases that result in 

disciplinary actions (suspensions of 14 days or less). Local management 

usually determines who will serve as the proposing official for the case. The 

proposing official and the ELRT normally discuss and agree on what the 

penalty should be. The ELRT recommends an appropriate level of proposed 

discipline based on the employee’s disciplinary history, as well as 

information on past discipline proposed for similar cases. The proposing 

official considers the ELRT’s recommendations and determines the 

appropriate proposed penalty. 

 Once the proposing official has determined the proposed penalty, the 

ELRT specialist either drafts the proposal letter or reviews the proposing 

official’s draft to ensure it meets the standards for content and language. If 

a proposed penalty appears unreasonable, the ELRT discusses this with the 

proposing official. However, the proposing official has the final authority to 

determine the level of discipline that will be proposed in the letter. The 

Chief of the ELRT reviews all proposal letters, and the Office of Chief 

Counsel reviews proposal letters involving adverse actions. Once the 

proposing official signs the proposal letter, it is issued to the employee. 

Letters of caution, admonishment, or reprimand are issued directly to the 

employee without a proposal letter. 

Local manager decides discipline with ELRT input. According to 

the ELRT, the same individual can serve as both the proposing and deciding 

official on the same case where a 14-day suspension or less is being 

imposed, unless the individual requests not to serve in both capacities. If 

the role of deciding official is filled by someone other than the proposing 

official, the deciding official receives a copy of the proposal letter and the 

supporting documentation to reference during the decision-making process. 

 The deciding official is not required to hear the subject’s oral 

response. This responsibility may be delegated to someone else, as long as 

they are “administratively superior to and organizationally separate from the 

employee.”19 This individual is responsible for providing a written record of 

 19 ATF Order 1150.4, “Delegation Order,” dated April 16, 1996. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

15

the employee’s response for consideration in the case. Once the deciding 

official receives any oral or written reply from the employee, the deciding 

official must consider any mitigating factors that could affect the level of 

discipline to be imposed. The deciding official cannot increase the proposed 

penalty, but may mitigate the proposed penalty, if appropriate. 

 As in the proposal phase, the ELRT specialist may advise the deciding 

official on the appropriate level of discipline, but the deciding official 

ultimately determines what the penalty will be. Any major disagreements 

between an ELRT specialist and the deciding official can be elevated to 

higher ranking officials for resolution. Once a decision has been made, the 

ELRT specialist assists the deciding official in preparing a decision letter. 

According to ATF Order 2750.1C, the Chief of the ELRT reviews all decision 

letters. The Office of Chief Counsel reviews all decision letters involving 

adverse actions. The deciding official signs the decision letter and issues it 

to the employee. 

Disciplinary Files and Database 

Once a decision has been rendered on an employee misconduct case, 

the Professional Review Board or ELRT specialist responsible for the case 

creates an official disciplinary file. The ELRT maintains all of the ATF’s 

official disciplinary files from the centralized and decentralized disciplinary 

processes. These files contain all official adjudicative and grievance 

documentation, as well as evidence sustaining misconduct allegations 

handled through the decentralized process.20 The disciplinary files are 

maintained at ATF headquarters for approximately 4 years; older files are 

archived. The Investigations Division maintains its employee misconduct 

investigation files separately. The Investigations Division’s investigation 

files can be cross-referenced with the disciplinary files by employee name. 

 ELRT specialists are also responsible for entering and maintaining 

case-related information from their assigned employee misconduct cases in 

the disciplinary system database. There are no established standards or 

procedures for entering, maintaining, or reviewing case information in the 

database. Our interviews with Professional Review Board and ELRT 

specialists indicated that information can be entered as it becomes 

 20 According to ATF Order 2750.1C, “Adverse Action and Discipline,” July 11, 1989, 

a record of the following documents shall be maintained by the ELRT: “(1) the notice of 

proposed action, (2) the answer of the employee if written, and/or a summary therof [sic] if 

made orally, (3) the notice of decision and reasons therfor [sic], and (4) any order effecting 

the action, together with any supporting material.” 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

16

available, at specific phases of the process, or at the end of the adjudicative 

process. 

To officially close an employee misconduct case, the discipline must 

be imposed.21 This is done either by placing a copy of a letter of reprimand 

in the employee’s official personnel folder or initiating a Standard Form-50 

(SF-50) for suspensions, reductions in pay, or removals.22 Letters of 

reprimand remain in an employee’s official personnel folder for up to 

2 years. The SF-50 becomes a permanent part of the employee’s official 

personnel folder and serves as documentation that the employee officially 

received the punishment set forth in the decision letter. 

 21 Misconduct cases involving letters of caution and admonishment are considered 

closed once the employee receives the letter. 

22 The SF-50 is the official Office of Personnel Management document that effects 

United States government employee actions. Thus, all discipline that results in a change to 

the employee’s pay, grade, or employment status must be implemented using an SF-50. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

17

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Purpose 

The OIG conducted this review to assess the effectiveness of the ATF’s 

system for investigating allegations of employee misconduct and for 

disciplining employees who are found to have committed misconduct. 

Specifically, we reviewed the consistency and reasonableness of the 

reporting and investigation of alleged misconduct, adjudication of 

misconduct cases, and implementation of the discipline imposed by the 

ATF. We also reviewed the timeliness of the ATF’s disciplinary system for 

processing misconduct cases. Also, at the request of the ATF, we evaluated 

a pilot project intended to improve the adjudication of the centralized 

process misconduct cases. 

Scope 

We reviewed allegations of misconduct by ATF employees that 

resulted in disciplinary action or clearances in FY 2002 through FY 2004. 

We excluded discipline cases that were still open as of September 30, 2004. 

Methodology 

Background. To better understand the ATF’s disciplinary system, we 

reviewed policies, procedures, briefing documents, personnel case logs, and 

other documents relating to the ATF’s disciplinary system. We also reviewed 

OIG Investigations Division data relating to the ATF’s disciplinary system, 

previous OIG reports concerning Department disciplinary systems, a 

Department of the Treasury OIG report on the ATF’s disciplinary system,23

and federal and Department-wide laws and regulations applicable to 

disciplinary systems.

Interviews. We interviewed ATF officials and staff from the three 

offices involved with the operation of the disciplinary system. From the 

Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations, we interviewed 

the Assistant Director of the Directorate and the Special Agent in Charge of 

the Office of Investigations, as well as one Special Agent and two 

administrative staff from the Office of Investigations. From the Office of 

Management, we interviewed the Assistant Director of the Directorate, the 

Chief of the Employee Labor Relations Team, three Employee Labor 

 23 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, Integrity Oversight 

Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, March 2001. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

18

Relations Team Specialists, the Information Technology Specialist, the Chair 

of the Professional Review Board, and the Professional Review Board’s three 

Employee Relations Specialists. We also interviewed three current 

Professional Review Board members, a former Professional Review Board 

Chair, and the Bureau Deciding Official. We interviewed the Associate Chief 

Counsel and Deputy Associate Chief Counsel for the Administration and 

Ethics Division in the Office of Chief Counsel. In addition, we conducted 

telephonic interviews with six managers in ATF Field Offices who have 

served as proposing or deciding officials in misconduct cases. 

Data. The ATF also provided us with disciplinary case information 

from its database, HR Connect. The data we received came from a segment 

of the database that Employee Labor Relations Team and Professional 

Review Board Specialists use for processing disciplinary adjudications and 

also from a separate segment of the database that the Office of 

Investigations uses to track allegations of misconduct and internal 

investigations. Neither segment of the database is subject to formal quality 

assurance policies and procedures. Thus, for the purposes of our review, 

we relied primarily upon the case data in the physical case files, rather than 

case information pulled from the database. 

Disciplinary Case File Review. To evaluate both processes within 

the ATF’s disciplinary system, including the impact of the Bureau Deciding 

Official pilot program on the centralized process, we selected 230 case files 

to review. Of the 230 misconduct case files we selected: 

• 154 closed cases from the centralized process, 77 of which were 

decided by the Bureau Deciding Official. The other 77 closed cases 

we reviewed were adjudicated by local management prior to the 

initiation of the Bureau Deciding Official pilot project, and 

• 76 closed cases from the decentralized process. 

Investigative File Review. We verified the existence of the incident 

reports and investigative reports for all of the disciplinary case files that we 

reviewed. We collected timeliness data on the dates on which allegations of 

misconduct were reported and the dates on which the investigations were 

closed from the incident reports and investigative reports. We also 

requested that the OIG’s Investigations Division subjectively sample and 

review 17 reports of investigation to determine whether the investigations 

were thorough and complete. We also requested a review of the investigative 

portion of the 76 decentralized process disciplinary case files to determine 

whether the misconduct was reported to the OIG and whether the 

misconduct should have been reported to the OIG. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

19

 To support our analysis of disciplinary consistency, we compared case 

information from the ATF’s disciplinary database to the information in the 

disciplinary case files that we reviewed. We compared 134 database 

summary sheets that were in the case files that we reviewed to the 

disciplinary case file information to determine whether the database 

accurately reflected the misconduct charges and penalties in the case files. 

We also compared the misconduct case list provided to us from the 

disciplinary database to the case list from the investigative database to 

determine whether the disciplinary database’s case list was complete. 

Employee Survey. We conducted an e-mail survey of a random 

sample of ATF employees to determine their experience with and perception 

of the ATF’s disciplinary system. We sent surveys to 860 ATF employees 

and received 421 responses. 

SF-50 Review. To verify that the discipline imposed in the 

misconduct cases that we reviewed had actually been implemented, we 

requested that the ATF provide us with a copy of all SF-50s for suspensions, 

demotions, removals, and reductions in grade processed between FY 2002 

to FY 2004. We matched these to the cases in our sample. 

Definitions. We defined our evaluation criteria – consistency, 

reasonableness, and timeliness – based on the interpretations of these 

criteria used in three previous OIG reports examining Department 

disciplinary systems.24 We defined consistency, reasonableness, and 

timeliness as follows: 

• Consistency: Whether the policies and procedures in place were 

followed; whether the disciplinary system processed similar 

misconduct cases using uniform standards; and whether the 

disciplinary system imposed uniform penalties for similar misconduct 

across the ATF and within the same location.

• Reasonableness: How thorough the investigations and adjudications 

appeared; how objective and independent the process for investigating 

and adjudicating misconduct cases appeared; and how logical or 

appropriate the penalties for the misconduct appeared.

 24 These three OIG reports are Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Disciplinary 

System, I-2004-008, September 2004; Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Disciplinary System, I-2004-002, January 2004; and Review of the United States Marshals 

Service Discipline Process, I-2001-011, September 2001. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

20

• Timeliness: Whether policies and procedures in place ensured timely 

disciplinary results and how often the disciplinary system met 

formally established time and performance standards. 

 
U.S. Department of Justice 21

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION OF MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS 

ATF employees did not always report misconduct 

allegations to the ATF Investigations Division, as 

required by ATF policy. In addition, the ATF did not 

consistently report misconduct allegations to the OIG for 

review, as required by OIG policy. Also, the ATF’s 

misconduct investigations were not consistently 

thorough. 

 

Employees did not consistently comply with the ATF’s misconduct 

reporting requirements. 

ATF Order 2130.1 requires that “any allegation or information that 

the standards or rules of conduct have been violated must be promptly 

reported by the employee having the information” to the ATF Investigations 

Division.25 As an alternative, ATF Order 2130.1 states that employees can 

report misconduct directly to the OIG. Despite this reporting requirement, 

we found that ATF employees did not consistently report all allegations of 

misconduct to the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security 

Operations’ Investigations Division or to the OIG. Interviews with local 

management, ELRT specialists, and Investigations Division officials revealed 

that ATF employees often reported allegations of misconduct to their 

supervisors rather than directly to the Investigations Division and their 

supervisors did not consistently forward the complaints to the Investigations 

Division. 

Specifically, the ATF could not document that 59 of the 230 employee 

misconduct cases that we reviewed were ever reported to the Investigations 

Division, as required. All 59 of these cases were handled by local 

management using the decentralized process. The 59 cases included such 

misconduct charges as insubordination, absence without leave, misuse of 

credit card, and misuse of position. The Investigations Division had no 

record of an incident report corresponding to any of these cases, nor did the 

disciplinary case files maintained by the ELRT document a report of the 

initial misconduct allegation to the Investigations Division. 

 25 ATF Order 2130.1 requires ATF employees to report misconduct to the Office of 

Inspections, which has since been renamed the Office of Professional Responsibility and 

Security Operations, of which the Investigations Division is a part. 
U.S. Department of Justice 22

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Additionally, our employee survey confirmed that employees did not 

always report misconduct directly to the Investigations Division. Of the 

421 employees who responded to our survey, 69 said that they were 

unaware of their obligation to report misconduct. Out of 345 employees 

who were aware of the obligation to report misconduct, only 110 stated that 

they had reported misconduct that they had witnessed. Some of these 

employees did not report it directly to the Investigations Division, as 

required. Only 35 of the 110 survey respondents who reported misconduct 

allegations (32 percent) properly reported the misconduct to the 

Investigations Division or the OIG, in accordance with ATF Order 2130.1. 

Chart 1 indicates where our survey respondents reported misconduct. 

Chart 1: Survey Respondents’ Reporting of Misconduct Allegations 

Supervisor or Local 

Management, 68

ELRT, 7 OIG, 6

ID, 29

Source: OIG survey of ATF employees 

Although 68 of our survey respondents (62 percent) stated that they 

reported misconduct allegations directly to local management rather than 

the Investigations Division, local managers did not always report the 

allegations to the Investigations Division, as required. We were told in 

interviews and briefings that local management sometimes contacted the 

ELRT to discuss whether an allegation of misconduct could be handled 

through the decentralized process, without reporting the allegation to the 

Investigations Division. When this happened, ELRT specialists determined 

whether the misconduct allegation constituted more serious misconduct. If 

it did, the ELRT advised the manager to report the allegation to the 

Investigations Division so it could make a determination whether to conduct 

an investigation or refer it back to local management for action. If the ELRT 

did not believe the allegation met the criteria for more serious conduct, it 
U.S. Department of Justice 23

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

would begin to provide advice to local management on how to proceed. The 

ELRT specialists did not report misconduct allegations they received from 

local management to the Investigations Division, nor did they require 

documentation verifying that the manager had reported the misconduct 

allegation to the Investigations Division. 

The ATF did not comply with the OIG’s misconduct reporting 

requirements. 

Because the ATF was not in compliance with its own reporting 

requirements, it also was not in compliance with the requirement to report 

misconduct to the OIG. Of the 76 decentralized process case files we 

reviewed, 58 misconduct cases occurred after the ATF transferred to the 

Department in January 2003 and, thus, were subject to the Department’s 

OIG requirement to report allegations of employee misconduct to the OIG. 

Our review of case files, incident reports, and OIG records showed that 47 of 

these 58 cases were not reported to the OIG in accordance with OIG policy. 

An OIG memorandum dated March 26, 2003, OIG Investigative 

Procedures Relating to the ATF, requires that the ATF report allegations of 

employee misconduct to the OIG. Our review of the Investigations Division’s 

incident reports and OIG records showed that, for the time period reviewed, 

the Investigations Division reported all allegations that it received to the 

OIG. However, because local management sometimes reported misconduct 

allegations to the ELRT and not the Investigations Division as required, and 

the ELRT did not ensure that these allegations were reported to the 

Investigations Division or the OIG, the ATF could not ensure that it fully 

complied with the Department’s reporting requirement. 

The ATF’s noncompliance with internal and OIG reporting 

requirements altered the way in which the ATF’s disciplinary system 

operated. The ATF’s failure to ensure that all allegations of misconduct 

were properly reported enabled local managers to determine whether the 

allegations were serious or minor, in contradiction of ATF Order 8610.1A 

that delegates this authority to the Investigations Division. This, in turn, 

caused six misconduct allegations in our case file review that would 

normally be investigated or monitored by the Investigations Division under 

OIG oversight to instead be handled through the decentralized process 

without any report to the Investigations Division or the OIG. The ATF’s 

noncompliance with reporting policies increases the likelihood that similar 

types of misconduct may be handled inconsistently through both 

disciplinary processes and, thus, may be subjected to different investigative 

and adjudicative standards. Additionally, the ATF’s failure to ensure proper 

reporting of misconduct allegations inhibited both the ATF’s and the OIG’s 
U.S. Department of Justice 24

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

ability to compile, monitor, and report accurate statistics on ATF employee 

misconduct. 

Figure 2, on the next page, diagrams how the ATF’s discipline system 

actually works, in comparison to Figure 1 on page 3, which diagrams how 

the system is supposed to work according to ATF regulations and OIG 

policy. 
U.S. Department of Justice 25

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

START 

Employee Reports Alleged Misconduct to Local Manager 

(Employee May Report Directly to ID) 

Manager Evaluates 

Seriousness

Local Manager Reports 

Misconduct to ELRT 

Local Manager Reports 

Misconduct to the 

Investigations Division 

ID Reports Allegation 

to OIG 

Open OIG 

Investigation? 

Open ID 

Investigation? 

No 

ID Investigates & Compiles 

Report of Investigation 

All ID & OIG Investigations 

Sent to Professional Review 

Board 

PRB Proposes Discipline or 

Clearance 

Bureau Deciding Official 

Decides Discipline or Issues 

Clearance 

PRB Specialist or ELRT Specialist Creates Official Discipline File & Updates Disciplinary 

Database 

Yes 

Yes

ELRT Consultation 

Identifies 

Misconduct as 

Serious?

ELRT Advises 

Manager on 

Collection of 

Supporting 

Documentation 

No

Already 

Reported 

to ID? 

Yes 

No

Yes

ID Refers 

Case to 

Local 

Manager 

for

Resolution

Allegation 

Supportable? 

Local Manager 

Proposes Discipline 

with ELRT Input 

Local Manager 

Decides Discipline 

with ELRT Input 

Local Manager 

Decides 

Discipline with 

ELRT Input

June 2003 

to Present 

Prior to 

June 2003 

Yes

Process Ends; 

No File 

Created 

No 

Not 

Serious 

More 

Serious 

No

OIG Investigates 

& Compiles 

Report of 

Investigation 

Source: OIG interviews and briefings with ATF officials

Figure 2: The ATF’s Disciplinary System in Practice 
U.S. Department of Justice 26

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Investigations were not always thorough. 

While we found that investigations conducted under the centralized 

process were generally thorough, investigations conducted under the 

decentralized process did not always exhibit sufficient evidence of a 

thorough investigation. The 76 decentralized process case files we reviewed 

did not contain sufficient evidence to show that the misconduct allegations 

were adequately investigated. In fact, 16 of the 76 case files that we 

reviewed contained no documentation at all to show that there had been 

any investigation into the alleged misconduct, even though discipline had 

been imposed. The remaining 60 decentralized process case files contained 

documentation of some informal evidence collection. The types of evidence 

maintained in these 60 case files varied widely. Some case files contained 

activity logs, time reports, or written guidance pertaining to the alleged 

misconduct. Others contained written statements from the employee being 

investigated that described the circumstances surrounding the alleged 

misconduct. One case file contained only a memorandum from the local 

manager who processed the case, describing a statement that he had 

obtained from the employee; the employee’s original statement was not 

included in the file. None of the decentralized process case files contained a 

report of investigation. Without a thorough investigation, the ATF may not 

have sufficient information to accurately determine whether misconduct 

actually occurred. 

ELRT specialists routinely advise local managers on what types of 

evidence must be collected to support an allegation of misconduct. 

However, the ELRT specialist we interviewed stated that the ATF has no 

written standards or guidance for the decentralized investigative process. In 

fact, ATF Order 2750.1 states only that the Chief of the ELRT must review 

the proposal and “copies of all materials upon which the proposal is based” 

before discipline greater than 14 days’ suspension can be proposed. The 

Order also states that the ELRT must maintain in the disciplinary file a 

record of “any order effecting the action, together with any supporting 

material.” The Order does not, however, provide any guidance on how 

supporting materials should be collected or what types of materials are 

appropriate. Instead, each ELRT specialist determines the appropriate level 

of evidence individually. Based on the ELRT’s advice, local managers collect 

evidence and send it to the ELRT via facsimile or e-mail for inclusion in the 

disciplinary file. The ELRT does not track what types of evidence have been 

recommended or when evidence is received from local management. 

In contrast to the investigations conducted by local managers, the 

OIG’s Investigations Division reviewed the investigations conducted by the 

ATF Investigations Division and concluded that they were thorough, 
U.S. Department of Justice 27

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

objective, and well documented in reports of investigations. An OIG Special 

Agent reviewed 17 reports of investigations and found that the 

investigations conducted by the ATF Investigations Division were thorough. 

The OIG Special Agent concluded that the ATF investigators interviewed 

relevant witnesses and examined necessary documents, and that the 

investigative reports contained the information necessary to understand the 

actions taken during the investigations. The OIG Special Agent rated all 

17 investigations reviewed as either very good or good. 
U.S. Department of Justice 28

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

ADJUDICATION OF MISCONDUCT CASES 

The ATF’s disciplinary system did not ensure consistent 

and reasonable adjudications. The disciplinary system 

unreasonably permitted a single individual to carry out 

the entire adjudicative process on cases handled under 

the decentralized process. Prior misconduct was not 

consistently considered when applying discipline, and 

errors in the ATF’s disciplinary database reduced its 

reliability in identifying prior discipline imposed in 

similar cases. Similar types of misconduct cases were 

not always charged consistently, and the disciplinary 

system did not impose consistent discipline for these 

cases. Finally, the ATF did not adequately document its 

reasons for mitigating some misconduct cases. 

Inadequate separation of responsibilities. 

In the decentralized process, the same official was permitted to 

propose and decide discipline for misconduct cases that resulted in a 

penalty of a 14-day suspension or less. Specifically, ATF Order 1150.4 

grants the authority to ATF officials to act as the proposing and deciding 

official for this category of cases. By contrast, the centralized process 

requires the Investigations Division to investigate misconduct allegations, 

the Professional Review Board to propose discipline, and the Bureau 

Deciding Official (or, previously, local managers) to decide discipline. 

Although ATF Order 1150.4 does not require local managers in 

decentralized cases to serve as both the proposing and deciding official on 

an individual misconduct case, the ELRT specialist we interviewed stated 

that, in her experience, local managers generally served in both capacities 

unless they raised a specific objection to the arrangement. 

Of the 76 decentralized process case files we reviewed, 19 cases 

resulted in proposed suspensions of 14 or fewer days. In 13 of these 

19 misconduct cases, the penalties were proposed and decided by the same 

individual, and grievances were filed in 4 of the 13 cases. The remaining 

63 decentralized process misconduct cases, which did not involve a single 

individual serving as both the proposing and deciding official, resulted in 

only 3 grievances. 

One of the grievances in a case in which discipline was proposed and 

decided by the same individual specifically alleged: 

“My immediate supervisor began a campaign of retribution against 

me.... [He] tried to dissuade me from filing the Grievance [sic].... I 
U.S. Department of Justice 29

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

request[ed] that the [supervisor] be instructed to cease his personal 

vendetta against me.” 

Another of these grievances expressed the employee’s concerns that the 

supervisor’s actions related to the misconduct case were “personallymotivated [sic] and vindictive.” 

Our previous reviews of three other Department components’ 

disciplinary systems revealed that those components do not use this method 

of adjudicating misconduct.26 In the other components we reviewed, the 

proposing and deciding official responsibilities are assigned to separate 

individuals or entities regardless of the severity of the discipline. The 

practice of combining the responsibilities of collecting evidence, proposing, 

and deciding discipline removes the checks and balances and objectivity 

normally in place in a disciplinary process. 

The ATF does not employ a consistent standard for considering prior 

misconduct when adjudicating misconduct cases. 

We also found indications that the ATF did not employ a consistent, 

standard methodology for considering past misconduct when determining 

the appropriate application of more severe discipline for repeat offenses. For 

instance, we found one case in which the proposed penalty was based, in 

part, on misconduct that resulted in discipline 6 years prior to the current 

misconduct. Conversely, we found a case in which prior misconduct was 

not considered, although the employee had received discipline less than 

2 years prior to the current misconduct. Our interviews with ATF officials 

confirmed that the determination to consider prior misconduct varied on a 

case-by-case basis, with no written standard to guide the decision. In 

contrast, our reviews of three other Department disciplinary systems 

revealed that prior misconduct cannot be considered if it occurred over 

2 years ago.27 

 26 The OIG reports include Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Disciplinary 

System, I-2004-008, September 2004; Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Disciplinary System, I-2004-002, January 2004; and Review of the United States Marshals 

Service Discipline Process, I-2001-011, September 2001. 

27 A small number of specific charges in the three Department components we 

reviewed are restricted to 1 year or 6 months. 
U.S. Department of Justice 30

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

The ATF did not accurately record misconduct cases in its disciplinary 

database. 

The ATF relies on its disciplinary database as its primary source of 

information for determining the consistency of penalties for similar 

misconduct.28 However, the ATF did not have sufficient internal controls to 

ensure that all information was entered or that the data was accurate. 

We examined summary sheets from the disciplinary database that 

were included in the 230 case files we reviewed and found that incorrect or 

incomplete data had been entered in the database. Of the 230 case files, 

134 files contained summary sheets from the disciplinary database. Of 

these 134 database summary sheets, 38 incorrectly identified whether 

misconduct had occurred. Additionally, we found that in 52 of the 

summary sheets, the charge or discipline recorded in the case file 

(specifically in the proposal and the decision letters) did not match the 

charge or discipline recorded in the disciplinary database. These 

inaccuracies prevent the ATF from successfully comparing similar 

misconduct cases to determine the consistency of proposed charges and 

penalties. 

The ATF did not always adjudicate its misconduct cases 

consistently. 

The charges that the ATF used to describe different types of 

misconduct were not always consistently applied. For example, 31 of the 

230 case files that we reviewed included the charge of “poor judgment.” 

These 31 poor judgment charges encompassed a total of 22 different types 

of misconduct, as shown in Table 1. 

 28 The ATF uses its disciplinary database to track all facets of a misconduct case. 

The disciplinary database is a segment of a larger human resources database, which also 

contains the Investigations Division’s database and the system for processing SF-50s. 
U.S. Department of Justice 31

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Table 1: Poor Judgment Cases 

Types of Misconduct 

Number of 

Cases 

1 Abusing the Public Transportation Incentive Program 1

2 Accepting Money from Contract Cleaning Crew 1

3 Accessing a Secured Area of an Airport for Unofficial 

Purposes 

1

4 Allowing a Confrontational Situation to Escalate 1

5 Allowing a Prohibited Person Access to Firearms 2

6 Allowing an Agent's Son on the Range During Firearms 

Qualifications 

1

7 Allowing Defendant Being Transported to Call His 

Girlfriend on the Phone 

1

8 Attempting to Obtain Prescription Drugs Under False 

Pretenses 

1

9 Conducting Internal Office Video Surveillance 1

10 Continuing Contact with Estranged Girlfriend Counter 

to Supervisor's Instructions 

1

11 Distributing a Political E-mail From ATF E-mail 

Account 

1

12 Drinking Beverages Found on Site During the 

Execution of a Search Warrant 

5

13 Failing to Accurately Report the Theft of an ATF-Issued 

Firearm 

1

14 Failing to Apply Reimbursements to Government Travel 

Card Expenditures 

1

15 Failing to Report Police Contacts to Supervisor 1

16 Harassing a Private Citizen 1

17 Instructing Subordinates to Engage in Internal Office 

Video Surveillance 

1

18 Misuse of a Government-Owned Vehicle 3

19 Operating a Privately-Owned Vehicle After Consuming 

Alcohol 

3

20 Providing a Prohibited Weapon to a Friend 1

21 Testifying in Court for an Acquaintance Without 

Supervisory Approval 

1

22 Viewing a Sexually Explicit DVD on a GovernmentOwned Computer 1

TOTAL 31

Source: OIG review of ATF disciplinary case files 

Some of the types of misconduct cited as poor judgment in these 

cases, such as abuse of the Public Transportation Incentive Program, 

misuse of a government-owned vehicle, and failure to apply reimbursements 

to travel card expenditures, were also sometimes categorized as other, more 

specific charges. We found that the cases involving poor judgment charges 
U.S. Department of Justice 32

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

sometimes appeared to result in more lenient discipline than the cases with 

more specific charges. For example, federal regulations require that 

government employees who willfully misuse a government-owned vehicle are 

subject to a mandatory 30-day suspension.29 The ATF has applied this 

mandatory penalty in cases involving the specific charge of “willful misuse of 

a government-owned vehicle.” Nevertheless, two “poor judgment” cases we 

reviewed involving misuse of a government-owned vehicle each resulted in 

only a 2-day suspension. Another similar vehicle misuse case classified as 

poor judgment resulted in a 4-day suspension. 

Mitigation of penalties is not adequately documented. 

During our review of misconduct case files, we found 38 misconduct 

cases in which the punishment was mitigated. Deciding officials may 

mitigate proposed penalties based on consideration of the Douglas Factors 

and any response provided by the employee. ATF Order 2750.1 describes 

what is to be documented in a decision letter, including a discussion of any 

mitigating factors. 

In 21 of the 38 cases that involved mitigation of the proposed penalty, 

the reasons for the mitigation were not adequately documented in the 

decision letter. The mitigations in these cases ranged from the reduction of 

a proposed 1-day suspension to a letter of reprimand for a poor judgment 

charge, to the reduction of a proposed removal to a 7-day suspension for 

charges of submitting fraudulent travel vouchers, accepting per diem from 

both the ATF and another government agency, and engaging in 

unauthorized outside employment. Chart 2 below shows how much 

mitigation was applied in the cases that we found were not adequately 

explained. 

 29 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b). “An officer or employee who willfully uses or authorizes the 

use of a passenger motor vehicle or aircraft owned or leased by the United States 

Government ... shall be suspended without pay ... for at least one month, and when 

circumstances warrant, for a longer period or summarily removed from office.” 
U.S. Department of Justice 33

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Chart 2: Mitigations with Insufficient Explanation 

3

1

3 3

2

9

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1 Day 2 Days 3 Days 4 Days 10 Days 14 Days

Amount of Mitigation

Number of Cases

Source: OIG review of ATF disciplinary case files 

The decision letters in these cases did not contain adequate 

explanations of why the punishment recommended by the proposing 

officials was mitigated. For example, some of the decision letters stated only 

that the Douglas Factors had been considered without giving explanation of 

which factors contributed to the mitigation and why. Other decision letters 

stated that the deciding official had considered the employee’s written or 

oral reply without citing specific reasons why the mitigation was 

appropriate. This occurred under both the centralized process (18 cases) 

and the decentralized process (3 cases). 
U.S. Department of Justice 34

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCIPLINE IMPOSED 

The ATF could not document that the discipline imposed 

had been implemented in all cases. 

We attempted to review all SF-50s documenting that the discipline in 

the 120 cases in our sample in which the employees were suspended, 

reduced in pay or grade, or removed was actually imposed.30 In 14 out of 

the 120 cases (12 percent), the ATF could not provide an SF-50 to verify that 

the punishment was implemented. The 14 cases for which the ATF could 

not provide SF-50s comprised 12 suspensions and 2 removals. The ATF 

could not adequately explain why no SF-50 was available for 13 of these 

cases. An ELRT specialist we interviewed confirmed that, at the time of the 

interview, no SF-50 had yet been initiated for 1 of these 14 cases. The 

decision letter for this case, imposing a 2-day suspension, was issued over 

7 months before our interview with the ELRT specialist. According to the 

specialist, the local manager who decided the case through the 

decentralized process did not initiate an SF-50 to implement the suspension 

before leaving that field office. The ELRT specialist emphasized that, while 

the ELRT encourages managers to implement discipline in a timely manner, 

local management is ultimately responsible for initiating the SF-50s. 

Because the ATF could not provide SF-50s in these cases, the ATF 

could not demonstrate that the employees’ pay had been withheld for the 

12 cases involving suspensions. Although the ATF could not provide SF-50s 

for the two cases involving removals, we subsequently verified with ATF 

officials that the employees had in fact been removed from service. 

 30 The SF-50 is the official document that effects United States government 

employee actions. Thus, each suspension, reduction in pay or grade, and removal related 

to the case files that we reviewed should have a corresponding SF-50 documenting that the 

penalties had been implemented.
U.S. Department of Justice 35

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

TIMELINESS OF THE ATF’S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 

The ATF has not established timeliness standards to 

measure the performance of its overall disciplinary 

system or its two current processes. However, the 

average time that the ATF took to investigate and 

adjudicate misconduct cases was in the range of other 

Department components that we have reviewed. 

The ATF has not implemented timeliness standards to measure its 

performance. 

The ATF has not implemented any timeliness standards to measure 

the performance of its overall disciplinary system. Timeliness data for the 

centralized process is collected and recorded in a monthly status report 

generated by the Investigations Division. 

However, timeliness data for the decentralized process is recorded in 

the disciplinary database only from the start of the adjudication and only for 

those cases in which discipline is proposed or imposed.31 We were unable 

to determine the timeliness of the investigations for this process because the 

ATF lacks any requirement that this type of information be uniformly 

collected and recorded by either field personnel or ELRT specialists who 

assist in decentralized process cases. As a result, the ATF cannot measure 

the timeliness or performance of its entire discipline system until it 

establishes formal data collection procedures and ensures that the 

procedures are followed. 

In our three prior reviews of Department components’ discipline 

systems, we recommended that the components institute timeliness 

standards to measure system performance. All three components concurred 

with the recommendations. As a result, the components have either 

established timeliness standards or are in the process of testing, analyzing, 

and determining what those standards should be prior to formal 

implementation. The United States Marshals Service’s Office of Internal 

Affairs has established a standard of 90 days and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration’s Office of Professional Responsibility has established a 

standard of 180 days for completing investigations of employee misconduct. 

The Bureau of Prisons is in the process of formalizing investigations 

timeframes. The Bureau of Prisons and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration are also working on developing formal timeframes for 

 31 The decentralized process does not track misconduct cases resulting in a letter of 

clearance. 
U.S. Department of Justice 36

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

adjudicating misconduct cases. The United States Marshals Service has 

formalized its adjudication timeframes. 

ATF investigative and adjudicative efforts were within the range of 

other three Department components that we have reviewed. 

Although the ATF does not require or track the timeliness of the 

discipline process, we calculated the timeliness of its disciplinary system 

based on our analysis of the 154 centralized process case files reviewed. 

On the average, it took the ATF 277 days to process a misconduct 

allegation – 112 days to investigate the allegation and 165 days to 

adjudicate the case. We were unable to incorporate the decentralized 

process cases into our calculations because the dates tracked in the 

decentralized process’s files were not comparable to the dates tracked by the 

centralized process. 

The Investigations Division’s investigation times, based on 133 reports 

of investigation that we reviewed, are shown in Chart 3, below. 

Chart 3: Processing Times for the Investigations Division’s 

Investigations 

14

36

24

18

10

7

4

19

0

10

20

30

40

Number of Cases

1 - 30 31 - 60 61 - 90 91 - 120 121 - 150 151 - 180 181 - 210 211+

Processing Time (In Days)

Source: OIG review of Investigations Division reports of investigation and incident reports

Some of the variation in the duration of the Investigations Division 

investigations may be attributed to the varying complexity of the misconduct 

investigations. Also, the time expended on each misconduct investigation 

may be affected by the Investigations Division’s prioritization of cases based 

on the severity of the offense and staff availability. 
U.S. Department of Justice 37

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 Our case file review indicated that the adjudication phase lasts, on 

average, 165 days. Under the centralized process, the proposal portion of 

the adjudication phase averaged 111 days from the completion of a report of 

investigation to the issuance of a proposal letter. The time expended to 

produce a proposal letter ranged from 32 days to 422 days. The average 

time expended to produce a proposal letter, based on our review of 

99 proposal letters, is shown in Chart 4. 

Chart 4: Processing Times for Centralized Process Proposals 

25

19

28

8 6

3

10

0

10

20

30

40

Number of Cases

31 - 60 61 - 90 91 - 120 121 - 150 151 - 180 181 - 210 211+

Processing Time (In Days)

Source: OIG review of centralized process case files 

Disciplinary decisions in the adjudication phase of the centralized 

process averaged 90 days to complete, following the issuance of a proposal 

letter. The ATF’s decision letter processing time ranged from 19 days to 

394 days. Chart 5 shows the amount of time expended on 93 disciplinary 

decision letters we reviewed. 
U.S. Department of Justice 38

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Chart 5: Processing Times for Centralized Process Decisions 

7

38

22

6 5

3 5

7

0

10

20

30

40

Number of Cases

1 - 30 31 - 60 61 - 90 91 - 120 121 - 150 151 - 180 181 - 210 211+

Processing Time (In Days)

Source: OIG review of centralized process case files 

Under the centralized process, letters of caution, admonishment, and 

reprimand, which are generally issued to employees without a proposal 

letter, averaged 119 days to produce, ranging from 56 days to 267 days. 

Additionally, our case file review showed that the ATF’s disciplinary system 

averaged 66 days to issue letters of clearance after an investigation is 

complete, ranging from 16 days to 145 days. 

While neither the ATF nor the Department requires specific time 

standards, the Department encourages managers “to act in a timely 

manner” on misconduct cases.32 To determine whether the time taken by 

the ATF to process misconduct cases was within the range of the other three 

Department components we have reviewed, we compared the average 

amount of time the ATF took to investigate and adjudicate misconduct cases 

to the other three Department components. We found that the average 

amount of time that the ATF expended to investigate and adjudicate 

misconduct cases was within the range of the other three Department 

components (Table 2). 

 32 U.S. Department of Justice Human Resources Order 1200.1, Chapter 3-1, 

Discipline and Adverse Actions, August 25, 1998. 
U.S. Department of Justice 39

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Table 2: Component’s Discipline Case Processing Times 

Component 

Average 

Investigation 

Processing Time 

Average 

Adjudication 

Processing Time 

Total Average 

Processing 

Time 

Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives 

112 days 165 days 277 days 

Federal Bureau of 

Prisonsa 94 days 104 days 198 days 

Drug Enforcement 

Administrationb 190 days 144 days 334 days 

United States 

Marshals Servicec Not reviewed 140 days Not available 

a Data based on the OIG’s 2004 review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ disciplinary system.

b Data based on the OIG’s 2004 review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

disciplinary system. 

c Data based on the OIG’s 2001 review of the United States Marshals Service’s disciplinary 

system. 

Source: OIG review of the ATF’s centralized process case files and previous OIG reviews 
U.S. Department of Justice 40

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

REVIEW OF THE BUREAU DECIDING OFFICIAL PILOT PROJECT 

In June 2003, the ATF established a Bureau Deciding 

Official to decide the punishment in every case in the 

centralized process, rather than relying on multiple 

deciding officials. We evaluated the Bureau Deciding 

Official pilot program and concluded that it was more 

timely, consistent, and reasonable than the process it 

replaced.

Prior to June 2003, the centralized process relied on local managers 

to serve as deciding officials for employee misconduct cases. In June 2003, 

the ATF implemented a pilot project establishing a single Bureau Deciding 

Official to adjudicate all cases under the centralized process. A 

June 2, 2003, memorandum from the Director of the ATF to all ATF 

employees stated that: 

In addition to providing a mechanism for ensuring consistent final 

decisions, the establishment of the Bureau Deciding Official should 

serve to enhance timeliness of the overall deciding official process. 

While managers currently serving as deciding officials must handle 

that responsibility in conjunction with their other wide-ranging daily 

responsibilities, the [Bureau Deciding Official] will have a singular 

focus on the prompt and fair adjudication of proposals received. 

To evaluate whether the single Bureau Deciding Official was an 

improvement, we performed a comparative analysis of disciplinary decisions 

in the centralized process before and after the creation of the Bureau 

Deciding Official. We found that the Bureau Deciding Official’s disciplinary 

decisions were timelier than the decisions made prior to the June 2003 

Bureau Deciding Official pilot project. For the time period reviewed, the 

Bureau Deciding Official pilot project improved the average disciplinary 

decision processing time by 43 percent. Based on 56 cases involving a 

decision prior to June 2003, the average time for local deciding officials to 

process a disciplinary decision was 111 days, ranging from 19 days to 

394 days. Based on 43 such cases that were decided by the Bureau 

Deciding Official after June 2003, the average time required for the Bureau 

Deciding Official to decide cases was only 63 days, ranging from 26 days to 

249 days. Chart 6 shows how long the centralized process took to issue 

decision letters, before and after the initiation of the Bureau Deciding 

Official pilot project. 
U.S. Department of Justice 41

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Chart 6: Centralized Process Decision Letter Processing Times 

 Source: OIG centralized process disciplinary case file review

The Bureau Deciding Official process also provides for more 

consistent decisions because the responsibility for deciding misconduct 

cases has been consolidated. According to the Merit Systems Protection 

Board, which hears employee appeals for misconduct cases involving 

suspensions of more than 14 days, reductions in pay or grade, or removals, 

deciding officials must issue disciplinary decisions consistent with their own 

prior decisions in their current duty station.33 Prior to June 2003, 

therefore, individual deciding officials were only required to ensure 

consistency with their prior decisions in similar cases and were not required 

to consider the decisions of other deciding officials or conform to an 

ATF-wide discipline standard. Because deciding officials must issue 

disciplinary decisions consistent with their own prior decisions, the Bureau 

Deciding Official is required to ensure consistency with his own prior 

decisions in similar cases. Moreover, because the Bureau Deciding Official 

is now responsible for all centralized process disciplinary decisions 

ATF-wide, the Bureau Deciding Official is better able to ensure consistent 

disciplinary outcomes throughout the ATF for the cases he adjudicates.34

 33 Wentz v. United States Postal Service, 91 MSPR 176, 187 (March 13, 2002). “To 

prove a disparate treatment claim with regard to the penalty of an act of misconduct, an 

appellant must show that a similarly situated employee received a different penalty.... The 

comparator employee must be in the same work unit... must have the same supervisors... 

and the misconduct must be substantially similar.” 

34 The Bureau Deciding Official’s effect on agency-wide consistency only applies to 

those misconduct cases handled through the centralized process, as local managers are 

(Cont’d.) 

6

3

13

25

11 12

7

0

5

0

2 1

5

0

7

2

0

10

20

30

Number of Cases

1 - 30

31 - 6061 - 90

91 - 120

121 - 150151 - 180181 - 210

211+

Pre-BDO BDO Processing Time (in Days)
U.S. Department of Justice 42

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

In addition, the policies and procedures guiding the Bureau Deciding 

Official process promote a more consistent method for handling misconduct 

cases than the guidance previously in place. For example, the Bureau 

Deciding Official is required to hear, via telephone, all employees’ oral 

replies to proposed discipline. All employees receive the same opportunity 

to reply to proposed discipline in the same format. In contrast, previously 

deciding officials could hear employees’ oral replies via telephone or in 

person. Deciding officials were able to delegate the responsibility for hearing 

an employee’s oral reply to another individual. That individual would then 

summarize the oral reply for the deciding official’s consideration. This 

process increased the likelihood that misconduct cases or employees could 

receive inconsistent consideration during the adjudication phase. 

We also concluded that the Bureau Deciding Official’s decisions were 

more reasonable than the decisions previously made by local deciding 

officials. Prior to the creation of the Bureau Deciding Official, local 

managers mitigated the proposed punishment in 26 of the 77 disciplinary 

decisions we reviewed. Fifteen of the 26 cases that were mitigated did not 

contain adequate explanation of the mitigation in the decision letters. As 

discussed previously, some decision letters included only a broad statement 

that the deciding official had “considered the Douglas Factors” or the 

employee’s reply. Other decision letters stated that the deciding official felt 

that the mitigated punishment appropriately addressed the misconduct, but 

did not give any reason why the discipline was mitigated. 

In contrast, the Bureau Deciding Official mitigated the discipline 

proposed by the Professional Review Board in only 7 of the 77 cases we 

reviewed. Of those seven mitigations, three were not adequately explained 

in the decision letters, as required. These three inadequately explained 

mitigations were relatively minor, ranging from a 1-day mitigation to a 4-day 

mitigation of proposed suspensions. These results show that the 

introduction of the Bureau Deciding Official has reduced the incidence of 

undocumented mitigations in the centralized process. 

 

still able to impose discipline for cases investigated and adjudicated through the 

decentralized process. Based on information provided to us by the ATF, approximately 630 

local managers were eligible to propose or decide discipline through the decentralized 

process for the time period reviewed. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

CONCLUSION 

 Although the establishment of a Bureau Deciding Official improved 

the consistency, reasonableness, and timeliness of the adjudication of 

discipline cases under the centralized process, we conclude that further 

improvements are needed to address the problems we found in the ATF’s 

disciplinary system. 

 We found that the ATF does not ensure that all allegations of 

employee misconduct are reported to the ATF Investigations Division and 

the OIG, as required. The ATF’s failure to ensure consistent reporting 

enabled some serious misconduct cases to be investigated and adjudicated 

under the decentralized process, in which no formal investigation is 

required. 

 The ATF’s practice of allowing a single individual to serve as both the 

proposing and deciding official for an employee misconduct case removes 

the checks and balances normally in place in the disciplinary system and 

increases the likelihood for an unreasonable disciplinary result. Also, the 

ATF inconsistently considers prior discipline, and inconsistencies in the 

disciplinary database impede the ATF’s ability to ensure that discipline is 

consistent for similar misconduct cases. Deciding officials do not always 

thoroughly document their reasons for mitigating proposed discipline. 

 We found that the average time the ATF took to investigate and 

adjudicate misconduct cases was within the range of the processing times of 

other Department components we have reviewed. However, the ATF has not 

implemented timeliness standards or goals to measure the discipline 

system’s performance. 

 For the time period reviewed, the Bureau Deciding Official pilot 

project improved the timeliness, consistency, and reasonableness of 

disciplinary decisions in the centralized process. Based on our review of the 

pilot project, we believe the use of a Bureau Deciding Official will produce 

more consistent, reasonable, and timely adjudicative decisions. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

We provide nine recommendations to help the ATF better ensure that 

its disciplinary system is timely, consistent, and reasonable. The 

recommendations focus on ensuring compliance with misconduct reporting 
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requirements; thorough investigation of misconduct allegations; consistent 

and reasonable adjudication of misconduct cases; consistent 

implementation of discipline imposed; and timely system performance. We 

recommend that the ATF: 

1. Remind all employees on an annual basis, particularly local 

managers and ELRT staff, that any allegation or information 

concerning misconduct must be promptly reported to the ATF 

Investigations Division or the OIG. 

2. Require that all investigations of alleged misconduct be conducted 

or reviewed by the ATF Investigations Division before the 

misconduct case can be adjudicated. 

3. Properly categorize misconduct to accurately reflect the underlying 

misconduct, rather than applying generic charges such as “poor 

judgment.” 

4. Establish data entry and quality control standards and procedures 

for all information entered in its automated disciplinary database 

and for all documentation collected and maintained in the 

disciplinary case files. 

5. Require that each decision letter that reduces the proposed 

discipline adequately document the reasons for the mitigation. 

6. Establish a time period for how far back prior discipline should be 

considered. 

7. Prohibit the same individual from serving as the proposing and 

deciding official for the same misconduct case. 

8. Establish policies and procedures, including management reviews, 

to ensure that discipline imposed is consistently implemented. 

9. Establish time standards and performance measures for the 

investigation and adjudication phases for the centralized and 

decentralized disciplinary processes. 
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APPENDIX I: DOUGLAS FACTORS 

In Douglas v. Veterans Administration (1981), the Merit Systems 

Protection Board identified 12 relevant factors that agency management 

needs to consider and weigh in deciding an appropriate disciplinary penalty. 

The 12 Douglas Factors are: 

1. The nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to the 

employee’s duties, position, and responsibilities, including 

whether the offense was intentional or technical or inadvertent, 

or was committed maliciously or for gain, or was frequently 

repeated; 

2. The employee’s job level and type of employment, including 

supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, and 

prominence of the position; 

3. The employee’s past disciplinary record; 

4. The employee’s past work record, including length of service, 

performance on the job, ability to get along with fellow workers, 

and dependability; 

5. The effect of the offense upon the employee’s ability to perform 

at a satisfactory level and its effect upon supervisors’ confidence 

in the employee’s ability to perform assigned duties; 

6. Consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other 

employees for the same or similar offenses; 

7. Consistency of the penalty with the applicable agency table of 

penalties (which are not to be applied mechanically so that 

other factors are ignored); 

8. The notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the reputation of 

the agency; 

9. The clarity with which the employee was on notice of any rules 

that were violated in committing the offense, or had been 

warned about the conduct in question; 

10. The potential for employee’s rehabilitation; 
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11. Mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense, such as 

unusual job tensions, personality problems, mental 

impairment, harassment, or bad faith, malice or provocation on 

the part of others involved in the matter; and 

12. The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter 

such conduct in the future by the employee or others.
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APPENDIX II: ATF’S RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT 
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APPENDIX III: OIG ANALYSIS OF ATF’S RESPONSE 

On July 15, 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) sent 

copies of the draft report to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) with a request for written comments. The ATF responded 

to us in a memorandum dated September 2, 2005. 

ATF Response 

The ATF generally concurred with the nine OIG recommendations to 

help the ATF better ensure that its processing of employee misconduct cases 

is timely, consistent, and reasonable. The ATF’s response also described the 

actions it has taken and plans to take to implement the recommendations. 

OIG Analysis of the ATF Response 

The actions undertaken and planned by the ATF to better ensure that 

its processing of employee misconduct cases is timely, consistent, and 

reasonable are responsive to our recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: Remind all employees on an annual basis, 

particularly local managers and Employee Labor Relations Team (ELRT) 

staff, that any allegation or information concerning misconduct must be 

promptly reported to the ATF Investigations Division or the OIG. 

Status: Recommendation 1 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and described present efforts to remind employees of the 

reporting requirement. As corrective action, the ATF plans to include a 

reminder of the reporting requirement in required annual online training on 

the Standards of Ethical Conduct by November 1, 2005. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to remind its 

employees annually that any allegation or information concerning 

misconduct must be promptly reported to the ATF Investigations Division or 

the OIG are responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a copy of the 

revised online training on the Standards of Ethical Conduct by 

January 31, 2006. 
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Recommendation 2: Require that all investigations of alleged 

misconduct be conducted or reviewed by the ATF Investigations Division 

before the misconduct case can be adjudicated. 

Status: Recommendation 2 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and will establish a process for the review of ELRT 

(decentralized process) cases by the Investigations Division before any 

misconduct case is adjudicated. The ATF expects to develop written 

procedures for Investigations Division review by September 1, 2005. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to establish written 

procedures for the review of ELRT (decentralized process) cases by the 

Investigations Division before any misconduct case is adjudicated are 

responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a copy of the written 

procedures for Investigations Division review by January 31, 2006. 

 

Recommendation 3: Properly categorize misconduct to accurately 

reflect the underlying misconduct, rather than applying generic charges 

such as “poor judgment.” 

Status: Recommendation 3 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF generally concurred with the 

recommendation and will specifically charge employees with misuse of a 

government vehicle and other specific underlying misconduct when agency 

counsel determines that all of the elements of the underlying misconduct 

can likely be proven. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to specifically charge 

employees with misuse of a government vehicle and other similar charges 

when agency counsel determines that all of the elements of the underlying 

misconduct can likely be proven are responsive to our recommendation. So 

that we may evaluate the ATF’s implementation of this recommendation, 

please provide copies of the proposal and decision letters for all ATF 

disciplinary actions during the first quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2006 by 

January 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 4: Establish data entry and quality control 

standards and procedures for all information entered in the ATF’s 

automated disciplinary database and for all documentation collected and 

maintained in the disciplinary case files. 
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Status: Recommendation 4 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and plans to establish standard operating procedures and 

a checklist by December 31, 2005, for use by the employees who make 

database entries. As a quality control measure, the Chairman of the 

Professional Review Board will oversee a review of the records of 

approximately 500 cases entered into the database over the last 5 years 

during FY 2006. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to establish standard 

operating procedures and a checklist for use by the employees who make 

database entries are responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a 

copy of the standard operating procedures, the checklist, and a status 

report on the case file review by January 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 5: Require that each decision letter that reduces 

the proposed discipline adequately document the reasons for the mitigation. 

Status: Recommendation 5 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and, as directed by the Justice Management Division, the 

ATF will include adequate documentation of the reasons for any mitigation 

in future decision letters. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to include adequate 

documentation of the reasons for any mitigation in future decision letters 

are responsive to our recommendation. On January 31, 2006, please 

provide a copy of each decision letter reducing proposed discipline issued 

between now and January 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 6: Establish a time period for how far back prior 

discipline should be considered. 

Status: Recommendation 6 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF generally concurred with the 

recommendation and will establish a period of reckoning for dissimilar prior 

misconduct and other guidance regarding similar prior misconduct. This 

action will require approval by the ATF Executive Staff and will not be 

completed until after December 31, 2005. 
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OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to establish a period of 

reckoning for dissimilar prior misconduct and other guidance regarding 

similar prior misconduct are responsive to our recommendation. Please 

provide a status report and further documentation of the planned corrective 

actions by January 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 7: Prohibit the same individual from serving as the 

proposing and deciding official for the same misconduct case. 

Status: Recommendation 7 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and plans to revise ATF Order 1150.4 prohibiting the same 

individual from serving as the proposing and deciding official for the same 

misconduct case. This action will not be completed until after 

December 31, 2005. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to prohibit the same 

individual from serving as the proposing and deciding official for the same 

misconduct case are responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a 

status report and further documentation of the planned corrective actions 

by January 31, 2006. 

Recommendation 8: Establish policies and procedures, including 

management reviews, to ensure that discipline imposed is consistently 

implemented. 

Status: Recommendation 8 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and plans to use the standard operating procedures, 

checklist, and case file review developed in response to Recommendation 4 

to ensure that discipline imposed is consistently implemented. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to establish standard 

operating procedures and a checklist and to conduct a case file review are 

responsive to our recommendation. Please provide a copy of the standard 

operating procedures, the checklist, and a status report on the case file 

review by January 31, 2006. 

 

Recommendation 9: Establish time standards and performance 

measures for the investigation and adjudication phases for the centralized 

and decentralized disciplinary processes. 
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Status: Recommendation 9 is Resolved – Open. 

Summary of ATF Response. The ATF concurred with the 

recommendation and plans to establish time standards and performance 

measures for the investigation and adjudication phases of the centralized 

and decentralized disciplinary processes by December 31, 2005. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ATF to establish time 

standards and performance measures for the investigation and adjudication 

phases of the centralized and decentralized disciplinary processes are 

responsive to our recommendation. Please provide copies of the time 

standards and performance measures for the centralized and decentralized 

disciplinary processes by January 31, 2006.