U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Review of the Security and 

Emergency Planning Staff’s 

Management of 

Background Investigations 

September 2005 

Report Number I-2005-010 
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U.S. Department of Justice i

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Department of Justice’s (Department) Security and Emergency 

Planning Staff (SEPS) is the primary office responsible for developing, 

implementing, and ensuring compliance with security policy throughout 

the Department. SEPS has direct responsibility for managing 

background investigations on 27,000 of the Department’s 103,000 

employees. SEPS has delegated to personnel security staff in the 

components the authority to adjudicate background investigations and 

reinvestigations for their employees and contractors, and the authority to 

grant waivers so new employees can begin work. In total, 20 components 

have delegated adjudication authority – 7 have the authority for 

employees and contractors, and 13 have the authority only for 

contractors.1

Overall, SEPS has four responsibilities related to background 

investigations in the Department: (1) managing background 

investigations of political appointees, attorneys, and other personnel 

whose investigations are not delegated to the components; (2) granting 

clearances for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) 

materials for all Department employees; (3) providing policy guidance 

and training on background investigations; and (4) providing oversight of 

the components’ background investigation programs.2 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to 

examine SEPS’s management of its background investigation program. 

Specifically, we reviewed SEPS’s administration of the background 

investigations and security clearances it manages, SEPS’s role in 

establishing Department policy on background investigations, and 

SEPS’s oversight of the background investigations delegated to 

components. 

 1 The Department components with delegated authority to manage the 

background investigations of employees and contractors are the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP); Drug 

Enforcement Agency (DEA); Executive Office for United States Trustees (EOUST); 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); National Drug Intelligence Center; and United 

States Marshals Service (USMS). See Appendix I for additional information on 

components with delegated authority. 

2 SCI is a security classification that is more restrictive than Top Secret, often 

covering information that deals with intelligence sources, methods, or activities. 
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U.S. Department of Justice ii

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

In fiscal year (FY) 2004, SEPS met federal regulatory requirements 

for adjudicating background investigations within 90 days in 85 percent 

of the cases it processed.3 Further, in response to a SEPS survey, 

Department components expressed satisfaction with the service SEPS 

provided on SCI clearances and clearance verifications for Department 

employees and contractors. SEPS achieved these results despite the fact 

that, after September 11, 2001, SEPS’s workload of background 

investigation adjudications and SCI clearances more than doubled. 

Because it received no additional resources to process this workload, 

SEPS prioritized its background investigation adjudications and 

redirected its resources to the highest priority cases. In FY 2004, SEPS 

adjudicated 99 percent of its highest priority cases (those of political 

appointees and attorneys) within the required 90 days. 

However, SEPS did not adjudicate lower priority background 

investigations within the required time. Further, SEPS did not fully meet 

other important responsibilities related to policy and oversight. 

Specifically, the Department’s personnel security policy – contained in 

DOJ Order 2610.2A (August 21, 1990) and more than 40 memorandums 

issued over the past 15 years – is inconsistent, outdated, and not 

available in electronic form. In addition, SEPS has not implemented an 

effective oversight program to ensure that components with delegated 

authority to adjudicate background investigations comply with 

regulations and policy. 

We also found that SEPS has limited ability to electronically track 

background investigation files. First, SEPS has no capability to maintain 

electronic copies of background investigation files. Instead, it relies on 

an outdated inventory system to track its own paper personnel security 

files, which are maintained in one location. We believe this is an 

important vulnerability, as all the files could be lost in a fire or other 

disaster. Second, there is no Department-wide database to track 

background investigations. This hinders SEPS’s ability to effectively 

monitor the background investigation process in Department 

components with delegated authority. 

 3 Adjudication is defined as the final decision on an individual’s suitability to 

hold a particular position. 
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U.S. Department of Justice iii

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Moreover, new standards for background investigations contained 

in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

(Intelligence Reform Act) will significantly change the standards the 

Department must meet in completing background investigations. The 

Intelligence Reform Act requires that, by December 2009, 90 percent of 

background adjudications must be completed within 20 days and 

90 percent of field investigations within 40 days. To meet those 

standards, SEPS will have to greatly expedite its processing of 

adjudications from its FY 2004 performance levels. In FY 2004, SEPS 

completed only 46 percent of adjudications within 20 days. SEPS’s 

oversight workload will also increase because it must ensure that the 

components with delegated authority comply with the requirements in 

the Intelligence Reform Act. 

In the next sections, we provide more detail regarding these 

findings. 

SEPS’s Personnel Security Operations 

SEPS’s Processing of Background Investigations and SCI 

Clearances. Federal regulations require that the Department adjudicate 

background investigations and report the results to the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM) within 90 days of the completion of the 

field investigation. In FY 2004, SEPS processed 85 percent of its initial 

employee adjudications within the required 90 days. 

SEPS accomplished these results even though its workload 

increased significantly in the last 5 years. From FY 2000 through 

FY 2004, SEPS’s background investigation workload almost doubled, 

from 7,018 actions (such as initiating investigations of new employees or 

reinvestigations of current employees) in FY 2000 to 13,509 actions in 

FY 2004. Overall, SEPS processed 55,197 actions on background 

investigations during those 5 fiscal years. In addition, SEPS’s SCI 

workload increased by 150 percent from calendar year (CY) 2000 through 

CY 2004. In CY 2000, SEPS cleared or verified clearances for 2,061 

Department staff. In CY 2004, SEPS cleared or verified clearances for 

5,166 Department staff. 

Because SEPS did not receive additional staffing or resources 

commensurate with its increased workload, it redirected its existing 

resources to process adjudications and clearances in priority order. 

SEPS’s four highest personnel security priorities are adjudication of 

background investigation cases involving political appointees and 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

attorneys, processing requests for SCI access, certification of clearances 

to other agencies, and processing waivers.4 

For political appointees and attorneys, in FY 2004 SEPS completed 

over 99 percent of the adjudications within the required 90 days. There 

are no established timeliness standards for SEPS’s three other highest 

work priorities. Therefore, to examine SEPS’s performance in these 

areas, we reviewed correspondence between SEPS and OPM, and a 

customer satisfaction survey conducted by SEPS. OPM and component 

officials who commented on these topics in SEPS’s survey reported that 

they were generally satisfied with how quickly SEPS provided SCI 

clearances and clearance verifications, and processed waiver requests. 

Although SEPS almost always adjudicated its highest priority cases 

within the required 90 days, it did not always adjudicate lower priority 

background investigation cases within that time. For example, in 

FY 2004 SEPS adjudicated about 80 percent of the background 

investigations for non-priority employees and only 54 percent of 

employee reinvestigations in the required time. We also found that 

SEPS’s performance of its other mission responsibilities – related to 

providing policy guidance and oversight – was lacking. 

SEPS’s Policy Guidance. The Department’s personnel security 

guidance is inconsistent and outdated. SEPS has not issued a complete 

revision of the Department’s personnel security policy, known as DOJ 

Order 2610.2A, since it was issued in 1990. The original order remains 

in effect, but to reflect changes in security regulations and policy that 

occurred over the past 15 years, SEPS has issued over 40 memorandums 

to revise, amend, or supplement the guidance in the original order. 

Some of the guidance has been amended more than once in separate 

memorandums, making it difficult for users to readily determine which 

guidance is current. 

Further, SEPS staff informed us that some of the guidance 

contained in the order and memorandums is outdated because it has not 

been revised to reflect current security requirements. In December 2004, 

 4 Federal regulations permit agencies to grant waivers from the background 

investigation requirements of Executive Order 10450 for a limited period of time, 

allowing new applicants to begin working while their investigations are still in progress. 

Agencies granting waivers must document which parts of the investigation have been 

initiated or completed before the individual begins work. See 5 C.F.R. § 732.202(a). 
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U.S. Department of Justice v

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

in response to an inquiry related to a prior OIG review, SEPS officials told 

us that SEPS had begun consolidating and updating the order. But, as 

of July 2005, the revision was not complete. Among the reasons for 

delays in completing the revision, SEPS told us that it was waiting for 

comments from OPM on the draft and for guidance from the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) on new personnel security requirements 

introduced by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), 

which was issued by the President in August 2004 and is scheduled to 

be initiated in stages starting in October 2005. 

Also, SEPS has not effectively used available technology to make 

security policy and guidance widely and readily accessible. We examined 

the Personnel Security page of SEPS’s intranet site and found that it 

contained only a list of SEPS’s Personnel Security Group’s functions. It 

did not contain any of the Department’s personnel security policies – or 

even a complete list of the current policies. The Security Policies page 

did not include a personnel security section. It did contain the new 

Security Programs Operating Manual, but no other personnel security 

guidance was included. 

SEPS’s Oversight of Components With Delegated Authority. SEPS 

has not implemented an effective oversight program to ensure that 

components with delegated authority to adjudicate background 

investigations comply with regulations and policy. OPM has delegated to 

SEPS the responsibility for overseeing all Department background 

investigations, including any field investigations that are conducted by 

Department components rather than by OPM, and all adjudications. 

SEPS has retained direct responsibility for managing background 

investigations for all political appointees, Department attorneys, 

employees of the United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO); employees of 

the Department’s Offices, Boards and Divisions; and certain other 

designated positions. To the FBI, SEPS has delegated authority to 

conduct the field investigations on all of the Department’s political 

appointees and attorneys as well as on the FBI’s own employees and 

contractors. To the ATF, SEPS has delegated authority to conduct field 

investigations on its employees who are not political appointees or 

attorneys and on its contractors. In addition, SEPS has delegated to 

personnel security staff in the components the authority to adjudicate 

background investigations and reinvestigations for their employees and 

contractors, and the authority to grant waivers so new employees can 

begin work. In total, 20 components have delegated adjudication 

authority – 7 have the authority for employees and contractors, and 13 

have the authority only for contractors (see Appendix I). 
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U.S. Department of Justice vi

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

The personnel security compliance reviews SEPS conducts of 

components to which it has delegated authority to manage background 

investigations are limited in number and scope. Additionally, limited 

enforcement authority and the lack of a centralized Department-wide 

database of background investigation files hinder SEPS’s ability to 

ensure that components and personnel comply with policies and 

regulations related to personnel security. 

SEPS’s primary method for evaluating the components’ personnel 

security operations is its on-site security compliance review.5 However, 

with only three Security Specialists and an annual travel budget of 

$60,000, SEPS reviews about 1 percent of Department offices annually. 

From 2002 through 2004, SEPS reviewed an average of 39 offices per 

year. At that rate, it would take SEPS 75 to 90 years to inspect all of the 

Department’s 3,000 to 3,500 offices. 

Moreover, the scope of each compliance review includes only a 

small portion (about 4 hours of the review) dedicated to examining 

personnel security operations.6 The personnel security portion of the 

review primarily checks that required paperwork was present, that 

reinvestigations were initiated on time, and that mandatory annual 

security training was completed. The compliance reviews do not examine 

the quality of either the components’ field investigations or the 

adjudications of employees’ and contractors’ clearances because such 

reviews would mean less time for higher priority physical and 

information technology security oversight.7

Even when compliance reviews identify security violations, SEPS 

has limited enforcement authority to ensure that components and 

 5 SEPS also receives an annual statistical report from OPM on the Department’s 

performance in meeting the 90-day adjudication standard. 

6 The on-site security reviews examine several security areas, such as building 

security and information security, in addition to personnel security. 

7 SEPS can also ask OPM to conduct an in-depth review of a component’s 

management of its background investigation operations. The last review SEPS 

requested was of the ATF when it transferred to the Department in 2003. 
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U.S. Department of Justice vii

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

individuals comply with policies and regulations.8 As a consequence, 

compliance reviews continue to identify violations already reported to the 

component on past reviews. For example, one recent repeat violation has 

involved a component’s granting security clearances for employees who 

do not require access to classified material. 

Because the Department has no centralized personnel security 

database, SEPS has limited capability to centrally monitor the 

background investigation status of all Department employees. Instead, 

each component keeps its own database, and the systems are not 

interoperable. SEPS therefore cannot effectively monitor the 

components’ compliance with pre-hiring and reinvestigation regulations, 

adherence to policy on national security clearances, or the completeness 

and timeliness of background investigation processing. For example, 

SEPS cannot effectively identify and track all the Department employees 

who are overdue for reinvestigation, nor can it perform effective oversight 

to ensure compliance with personnel security regulations. 

SEPS’s File Tracking System and Paper Files. SEPS uses an 

inventory management program called TRAQ to identify the location of 

each background investigation file. The version of TRAQ used by SEPS is 

outdated, at full capacity, and does not include needed capabilities. For 

example, TRAQ lacks quality control features to prevent the entry of 

erroneous information (such as nonsensical dates), cannot provide SEPS 

with management reports on the data in the system, and has no 

capability to maintain electronic copies of scanned security documents. 

Because SEPS cannot maintain electronic copies, all SEPS 

background investigation files are maintained in paper form in one 

location. Likewise, files related to SCI clearances are also maintained in 

one location. This represents a significant vulnerability. The loss of the 

paper records would severely disrupt case processing and clearance 

verification. 

 8 SEPS has the option to withdraw a component’s delegation of authority to 

adjudicate background investigations and grant security clearances if SEPS determines 

that the component is not in compliance with security regulations and policies. 

However, if that occurs, the responsibility for conducting the adjudications would fall to 

SEPS. Given SEPS’s current resource limitations, assuming the additional workload if 

a delegation were withdrawn would be impractical. SEPS has never withdrawn a 

component’s delegation of authority to adjudicate background investigations. 
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U.S. Department of Justice viii

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Changes Directed by the Intelligence Reform Act and HSPD-12 

The Intelligence Reform Act imposes progressively tighter 

timeliness requirements for adjudications and field investigations that 

may overwhelm SEPS’s current limited capabilities. The Intelligence 

Reform Act requires that, by December 2009, 90 percent of adjudications 

on background investigations and reinvestigations of individuals 

requiring national security clearances must be completed within 20 days. 

Further, 90 percent of the field investigations must be completed 

within 40 days. 

To meet the new timeliness standards, SEPS will have to 

significantly expedite adjudications. For example, in FY 2004, SEPS 

adjudicated only 31 percent of employee reinvestigations and only 

21 percent of contractor background investigations within 20 days. The 

Intelligence Reform Act also will require SEPS to ensure that the 

Department components with authority to conduct field investigations 

meet timeliness standards for those investigations. SEPS is not well 

positioned to meet these challenges. 

HSPD-12, issued by the President in August 2004 and scheduled 

to be initiated in stages beginning October 27, 2005, expands SEPS’s 

oversight responsibilities to include reviews of components’ hiring 

practices for contractors who are investigated and hired directly by the 

field offices where they will be working. Currently, SEPS reviews only the 

investigations of contractors hired centrally through components’ 

headquarters. The lack of a centralized database prevents SEPS from 

easily verifying whether each of these contractors received the proper 

background check or even whether they are still employed. HSPD-12 

also requires the recertification of identification cards for all employees 

and contractors. With its current resources, processes, and authority, 

SEPS will have difficulty both in meeting the performance requirements 

of the Intelligence Reform Act and HSPD-12, and in providing oversight of 

the Department’s compliance with those requirements. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

In this report, we make six recommendations to help improve 

SEPS’s performance of its personnel security responsibilities and better 

position the Department to meet the requirements of the Intelligence 

Reform Act and HSPD-12. 
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U.S. Department of Justice ix

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

We recommend that the Department: 

1. Develop a Department-wide plan for implementing the personnel 

security requirements of the Intelligence Reform Act and HSPD-12, 

and identify the resources that will be needed to enable the 

Department to meet the new requirements. 

2. Develop a Department-wide database with imaging capability to 

enable uniform processing and tracking of employee and 

contractor personnel security actions, permit central oversight of 

personnel security operations, and reduce the vulnerability caused 

by reliance on paper records. 

We recommend that SEPS: 

3. Once OPM provides the necessary policy decisions, expeditiously 

issue an updated Department personnel security policy, DOJ 

Order 2610.2A. 

4. Develop a plan for conducting routine oversight of components 

with delegated authority that provides reasonable coverage and 

ensures that the background investigations and adjudications 

meet established standards for quality and timeliness. 

5. Institute an annual report to the Deputy Attorney General to 

describe the performance of the Department and each component 

in adjudicating background investigations and in complying with 

Department personnel security regulations and policies. 

6. Establish procedures to identify the policies, documents, and other 

information necessary for personnel security operations, and in 

coordination with the Department’s Office of the Chief Information 

Officer, make the documents available through the SEPS web site. 
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U.S. Department of Justice i

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 1

General Requirements for Background Investigations......................... 1

SEPS’s Organization........................................................................... 4

SEPS’s Direct Responsibilities Related to Background Investigations.. 6

SEPS’s Responsibilities for Policy Guidance...................................... 10

Authorities Delegated by SEPS to the Components........................... 10

SEPS’s Oversight of Components With Delegated Authority .............. 11

Recent Developments and Impending Changes in Background 

Investigations................................................................................... 14

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF OIG REVIEW ............. 17

Purpose of the OIG Review ............................................................... 17

Scope............................................................................................... 17

Methodology..................................................................................... 17

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW............................................................ 20

Workload and Priorities.................................................................... 20

Adjudication Timeliness ................................................................... 22

Policy Guidance ............................................................................... 26

SEPS’s Oversight of Components With Delegated Authority .............. 29

The Department’s Resource Requests for SEPS ................................ 37

SEPS’s File Tracking System ............................................................ 37

No Centralized Background Investigation Database.......................... 40

Timeliness Requirements of the Intelligence Reform Act.................... 43

Requirements of HSPD-12................................................................ 47

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................... 50

APPENDIX I: Components With Delegated Authority.......................... 54

APPENDIX II: SEPS’s Organization .................................................... 56

APPENDIX III: The Justice Management Division’s Response............. 57

APPENDIX IV: The OIG’s Analysis Of JMD’s Response ....................... 60
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U.S. Department of Justice 1

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

BACKGROUND 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to 

examine the Department of Justice’s (Department) Security and 

Emergency Planning Staff’s (SEPS) background investigation program. 

Specifically, we evaluated SEPS’s management of four program areas: 

(1) managing background investigations of political appointees, 

attorneys, and other personnel whose investigations are not delegated to 

the components; (2) granting clearances for access to Sensitive 

Compartmented Information (SCI) materials for all Department 

employees; (3) providing policy guidance and training on background 

investigations; and (4) providing oversight of the components’ 

background investigation programs. 

General Requirements for Background Investigations 

All federal agencies must ensure that only trustworthy individuals 

are hired to work in national security or public trust positions.9 The 

primary means for determining whether an individual is trustworthy is 

the background investigation, authorized by Executive Order 10450 and 

5 C.F.R. Parts 731, 732, and 736. The background investigation is not 

an evaluation of the subject’s character, but is instead a determination of 

the likelihood that a particular person will adhere to all Department 

security requirements in the future. 

Each federal agency determines the required security level of each 

position according to the duties that the employee holding the position 

will fulfill. Once the security level of a position has been determined, an 

investigation appropriate to that level is supposed to be conducted. 

There are several types of background investigations, each varying in 

scope and complexity. All background investigations begin with a 

request to the employee to fill out a questionnaire targeted to the 

 9 National security positions either involve the protection of the United States 

from foreign aggression or espionage, or require regular access to classified material. 

See 5 C.F.R. § 732.102. Public trust positions involve policy making, major program 

responsibility, public safety and health, law enforcement duties, fiduciary 

responsibilities, or other duties demanding a significant degree of public trust, and 

positions involving access to or operation or control of financial records. See 5 C.F.R. 

§ 731.106(b). 
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U.S. Department of Justice 2

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

OPM Faces Backlog of Cases Pending 

Investigations 

There are currently no statutory timeliness 

requirements for the completion of the 

investigation portion of the background 

investigation process. Instead, OPM sets 

internal deadlines of 120 days for the 

completion of initial background investigations 

and 180 days for the completion of 

reinvestigations. In February 2005, OPM 

reported that nearly 186,000 investigations 

had exceeded these self-imposed timeframes. 

Futhermore, OPM estimated that 

approximately 8,000 full-time-equivalent 

investigators would be needed to clear this 

backlog and provide timely service for new 

requests. OPM testified at a June 2005 

hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee that with the 

hiring of new investigative contractors and the 

transfer of investigators from the Department 

of Defense to OPM, they now have 8,000 

investigators available to work on this issue. 

OPM Faces Backlog of Cases Pending 

Investigations 

There are currently no statutory timeliness 

requirements for the completion of the 

investigation portion of the background 

investigation process. Instead, OPM sets 

internal deadlines of 120 days for the 

completion of initial background investigations 

and 180 days for the completion of 

reinvestigations. In February 2005, OPM 

reported to the Government Accountability 

Office that nearly 186,000 investigations had 

exceeded these self-imposed timeframes. 

Furthermore, OPM estimated that 

approximately 8,000 full-time-equivalent 

investigators would be needed to clear this 

backlog and provide timely service for new 

requests. OPM testified at a June 2005 

hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee that with the 

hiring of new investigative contractors and the 

transfer of investigators from the Department 

of Defense to OPM, they now have 8,000 

investigators available to work on this issue.

OPM Faces Backlog of Field Investigations 

There are currently no statutory timeliness 

requirements for the completion of the field 

investigation portion of the background 

investigation process. Instead, OPM sets 

internal deadlines of 120 days for the initial 

field investigations and 180 days for the 

completion of field reinvestigations. In 

February 2005, OPM reported to the 

Government Accountability Office that nearly 

186,000 field investigations had exceeded 

these self-imposed timeframes. Furthermore, 

OPM estimated that approximately 8,000 fulltime-equivalent investigators would be needed 

to clear this backlog and provide timely service 

for new requests. An OPM official testified at a 

June 2005 hearing of the Senate Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

that with the hiring of new investigative 

contractors and the transfer of investigators 

from the Department of Defense to OPM, OPM 

now has 8,000 investigators available to work 

on this issue. 

position’s responsibilities.10 

This is usually followed by an 

in-person interview with the 

applicant and, in most cases, 

a number of interviews with 

the applicant’s colleagues and 

personal associates. 

Currently, there are no 

federal timeliness 

requirements for the field 

investigation portion of the 

background investigation 

process.11

The Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM), through 

contracts with private 

companies, conducts the vast 

majority of field investigations 

of federal employees and 

contractors.12 The Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

conducts the field 

investigations for all of the Department’s political appointees and 

attorneys. SEPS is responsible for managing the background 

investigations of political appointees, attorneys, and personnel in the 

Offices, Boards and Divisions (see Appendix I.). Depending on the nature 

of the position to be filled, either OPM or the FBI conducts the field 

 10 For instance, national security positions require completion of the SF-86 

“Questionnaire for National Security Positions,” and public trust positions require 

completing the SF-85P “Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions” or the SF-85 

“Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions.” Some Department components use their 

own forms that incorporate required questions contained in the standard forms. 

11 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 enacted 

timeliness requirements for the field investigative portion of the process that must be 

met beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2007. These changes are discussed in greater detail 

below. 

12 Components with law enforcement personnel, such as the United States 

Marshals Service (USMS) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF), may use their investigators to conduct investigations on some of their own 

contractors. In addition, some contractors’ clearances may be transferred from other 

agencies. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 3

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

investigations for SEPS. In FY 2004, SEPS submitted more than 3,133 

requests to OPM for field investigations.13 These investigations ranged in 

cost from $425 to $3,300 each, depending on the type of investigation 

requested and whether an expedited processing premium was paid. 

At one time, OPM estimated that its investigations took 35 days, 75 

days, or 120 days, depending on the premium paid for expedited 

processing. However, OPM has not been able to meet those processing 

estimates since FY 2001 and, for FY 2004, changed its categories from 

completion estimates to “priority,” “accelerated,” and “standard,” with 

priority having the most expedited completion. In FY 2004, OPM’s 

priority (formerly categorized as 35-day) cases took an average of 100 

days, accelerated (formerly 75-day) cases took an average of 227 days, 

and standard (formerly 120-day) cases took an average of 324 days.14

A SEPS adjudicator reviews the information collected during the 

OPM or FBI field investigation and makes the final determination on 

whether the applicant is suitable. Adjudicators rely on standards 

established by the Central Intelligence Agency, OPM, the Department, 

and the Department’s components to evaluate the information provided 

by the field investigation.15 These standards encourage adherence to a 

“whole person” approach to reviewing the issues presented by each 

individual case. Under that approach, when the investigation identifies 

derogatory information about the person, the adjudicator should 

consider factors such as the relevance of the information to position 

responsibilities, the circumstances surrounding the derogatory 

information, and the person’s candor in disclosing relevant information. 

Federal regulations require that the adjudication be completed and the 

results transmitted to OPM within 90 days after receipt of a completed 

investigative case file.16 

 13 In FY 2004, SEPS submitted 495 requests for field investigations to the FBI. 

14 The FBI’s field investigations averaged 197 days in FY 2004. 

15 These standards include Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/4; the 

OPM Suitability Processing Handbook; Department guidance entitled, “Annex D: 

Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information”; 

and DOJ Order 2610.2A (August 21, 1990). 

16 See 5 C.F.R. § 732.302(b). 
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U.S. Department of Justice 4

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Federal law further requires that employees and contractors 

holding a security clearance who have been employed in their jobs for 

certain periods of time be subject to a reinvestigation to verify that they 

are still suitable for their positions. Reinvestigation is required once 

every 5 years for individuals possessing a Top Secret clearance, once 

every 10 years for individuals possessing a Secret clearance, and once 

every 15 years for individuals possessing a Confidential clearance.17 

Individual federal agencies may impose additional requirements to 

expand the number of individuals subject to reinvestigation or to require 

more frequent reinvestigations. 

The Department requires all its employees to be reinvestigated 

once every 5 years.18 For contractors, the Department only requires 

reinvestigations for individuals holding national security positions; these 

reinvestigations are required on the same schedule as those of 

employees. The Department does not require that contractors in public 

trust positions be reinvestigated, but some components, including the 

ATF and USMS, require that these contractors be reinvestigated. 

SEPS’s Organization 

SEPS is the primary office responsible for developing, 

implementing, and overseeing compliance with security policy 

throughout the Department.19 SEPS is a unit of the Justice Management 

Division (JMD), the administrative component of the Department. The 

director of SEPS, who is formally known as the Department Security 

Officer, reports to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Human 

Resources and Administration and to the Assistant Attorney General for 

Administration. 

SEPS has direct adjudicative responsibility for background 

investigations on certain Department employees. In addition, SEPS has 

delegated adjudicative responsibility to some components for their 

employees, but it retains oversight responsibility over the delegated 

functions. Consequently, SEPS has four responsibilities related to 

 17 See 50 U.S.C. § 435b(a)(7). 

18 See DOJ Order 2610.2A, ¶13 (August 21, 1990), and Department Security 

Officer memorandum FY 2001 Reinvestigation Program (January 16, 2001). 

19 See DOJ Order 2600.2C (November 28, 2003). 
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U.S. Department of Justice 5

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

background investigations in the Department: (1) managing background 

investigations for political appointees, attorneys, and other personnel not 

delegated to the components; (2) granting clearances for access to SCI 

materials for all Department employees; (3) providing policy guidance 

and training on background investigations; and (4) providing oversight of 

the components’ background investigation programs.20 

SEPS staff is divided into 4 groups, which are further subdivided 

into 10 sections. (See Appendix II for a SEPS organizational chart.) In 

FY 2005, SEPS had 84 employees and 7 contractors, and a budget of 

$10 million. SEPS’s personnel security and compliance review functions 

are carried out by four sections in the Personnel Security Group (PERSG) 

and the Office of Information Safeguards and Security Oversight. 

Within PERSG, the Operations Section is responsible for 

conducting adjudications of completed background investigations and 

maintaining investigation files on Department employees. The Policy, 

Training, and Oversight Section is responsible for drafting and 

distributing official Department policy on all background investigation 

and reinvestigation matters. In FY 2005, PERSG had 17 employees and 

3 contractors.21 Five of the employees were adjudicators whose positions 

were funded by the components for whom they adjudicate 

reinvestigations. 

Within the Office of Information Safeguards and Security 

Oversight, the Compliance Review Section (CRS) is responsible for 

conducting compliance reviews of all Department offices to determine 

their adherence to Department security policy. In FY 2005, CRS had 

three employees, including the chief. The Technical Security Section is 

responsible for the security of technology used to store and transmit 

classified information. Personnel in the Technical Security Section also 

manage SEPS’s background investigation inventory software. 

Prior External Reviews Involving SEPS Staffing and Structure. Two 

external reviews since FY 2001 relating to SEPS’s responsibilities have 

 20 SCI is a classification that is more restrictive than Top Secret, often covering 

information that deals with intelligence sources, methods, or activities. 

21 PERSG has lost several staffers through attrition in recent years. While it 

has been given authorization to fill some of the vacancies, it did not receive any 

accompanying funding, so overall staffing levels have decreased. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 6

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

reported that SEPS has inadequate resources and have made 

recommendations for improving the processing of background 

investigations. However, we found that these recommendations had not 

been implemented. First, in March 2002, the Webster Commission 

report raised concerns about SEPS’s inadequate resources and lack of 

standing within the Department hierarchy.22 In a footnote to the 

discussion of its recommendation to create an Office of Security within 

the FBI that reports to the Director, the Webster Commission stated: 

[SEPS] is responsible for developing security policy and 

overseeing its implementation in Department components, 

such as the FBI. Although we have not examined SEPS in 

detail, the program seems to suffer from many of the structural 

weaknesses that led us to recommend creation of an Office of 

Security in the [FBI], weaknesses such as inadequate 

resources and insufficient stature within the Department’s 

structure. We recommend that the Department address this 

issue.23 

On July 15, 2004, a report issued by the National Archives and 

Records Administration’s Information Security Oversight Office expressed 

concern that the Department had neglected to address the Webster 

Commission’s recommendation. The new report recommended that the 

Department move SEPS out of JMD and commit sufficient resources to 

its security programs. In his October 13, 2004, response to the National 

Archives and Records Administration report, the Assistant Attorney 

General for Administration agreed on the need for additional resources 

but declined to move SEPS out of JMD, stating that being a part of JMD 

did not hinder SEPS from fulfilling its responsibilities.24 

SEPS’s Direct Responsibilities Related to Background Investigations 

SEPS retains direct responsibility for background investigations for 

all employees of the Department’s Offices, Boards and Divisions, all 

employees of the United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO), all political 

 22 The Webster Commission was convened to examine the FBI’s security 

programs following the detection of espionage by FBI agent Robert Hanssen. 

23 See Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs, A Review of FBI Security 

Programs, March 31, 2002, p. 93, n. 34. 

24 Since this response, however, SEPS has not received additional resources. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 7

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

appointees, all attorneys, and certain other designated positions.25 SEPS 

is also responsible for the background investigations of some contractors. 

At present, therefore, SEPS is responsible for the background 

investigations of approximately 27,000 of the Department’s 103,000 

employees, as well as for 7,000 contractors. 

As part of its responsibilities, PERSG obtains the required 

paperwork from political appointees who do not require Senate 

confirmation and certain other employees and contractors, schedules 

background investigations with OPM or the FBI, submits requests for FBI 

name checks, adjudicates the completed files, and processes waivers.26, 27 

As Figure 1 shows, for certain categories of cases one of the 

Department’s components initiates, receives, and evaluates the field 

investigation before the personnel file is sent to SEPS for adjudication. 

For political appointees requiring Senate confirmation, the Office of Legal 

Policy (OLP) provides SEPS the background investigation file after Senate 

review. For attorneys, the Office of Attorney Recruitment and 

Management (OARM) initiates and reviews the FBI field investigation. 

For its employees who are not attorneys or political appointees, the 

Executive Office of the United States Attorneys (EOUSA) conducts an 

internal review of the OPM investigation before forwarding the file to 

 25 For example, SEPS manages the background investigations of the officials 

responsible for overseeing personnel background investigations at components. 

26 The FBI’s National Name Check Program (NNCP) disseminates “information 

from the FBI’s Central Records System (CRS) in response to requests by federal 

agencies, congressional committees, the federal judiciary, friendly foreign police and 

intelligence agencies, and state and local criminal justice agencies.” [Testimony of 

Robert J. Garrity, Jr., Acting Assistant Director, Record Management Division, FBI, July 

10, 2003.] The FBI records maintained in the CRS consist of administrative, applicant, 

criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for law enforcement purposes. The NNCP 

electronically searches the requested name checks through the Universal Index (UNI) 

located within the CRS, where individual names have been indexed to all investigative 

and administrative cases. The names, including spelling variations, are searched 

phonetically against the UNI records and matches are retrieved. The primary difference 

between the National Crime Information Center, which search for state and local arrest 

information and dispositions, and the NNCP is that the NNCP identifies subjects of any 

ongoing federal investigations and searches all FBI records and classifications for 

references to individuals. 

27 Federal regulations permit agencies to grant waivers from the background 

investigation requirements of Executive Order 10450 for a limited period of time, 

allowing new employees to begin working while their investigations are still in progress. 

Agencies granting waivers must document which parts of the investigation have been 

initiated or completed before the individual begins work. See 5 C.F.R. § 732.202(a). 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 8

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

SEPS. Figure 1 shows the typical work flow for these responsibilities. 

PERSG is responsible for initiating reinvestigations from this caseload of 

27,000 employees and 7,000 contractors. Currently, all stages of the 

background investigation are paper-based and manual, no imaging 

functions are available to convert paper documents to digital files, and 

none of the stages for managing background investigations or 

reinvestigations are automated. PERSG tracks the physical location of 

its files using an inventory management software application called 

TRAQ.28 Only SEPS uses the software; none of the components has 

access to TRAQ. 

 28 TRAQ is not an acronym; it is the full name of the software application. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 9

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Figure 1: Background Investigation (BI) Process 

SEPS 

Adjudicates the BIs

SEPS 

Initiates BIs with OPM for 

JMD Contractors and With 

FBI for Political Appointees 

Not Requiring Senate 

Confirmation and 

Designated Positions

OPM 

Investigates and Forwards Results

FBI 

Investigates and Forwards Results

P H A S E S

Adjudication Preadjudication Investigation Initiation

Files of Regular Employees (Except 

EOUSA’s), Designated Positions, and 

Political Appointees Not Requiring 

Confirmation Go Directly to SEPS

White 

House/OLP

Initiates BIs for 

Political 

Appointees

Notes

“Regular Employees” refers to personnel who are not attorneys or political appointees.

“Designated Positions” refers primarily to high-level officials and officials responsible for 

overseeing personnel background investigations at components.

OARM is the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management.

OLP is the Office of Legal Policy, which serves as the liaison to the White House on political 

appointments.

SEPS May Approve NSI Clearances

Senate

Reviews Files 

of Political 

Appointees 

Requiring 

Confirmation

OARM

Reviews 

Files of 

Attorneys

SEPS May Approve SCI Clearances

OARM

Initiates BIs for 

Attorneys

Other Hiring 

Components 

Initiate BIs for 

Regular 

Employees

EOUSA

Reviews Files of 

Regular 

Employees

EOUSA 

Initiates BIs

for Regular 

Employees

OLP

Source: OIG 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 10

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

SEPS’s Responsibilities for Policy Guidance 

PERSG is responsible for interpreting federal policies and guidance 

on all issues related to background investigations and reinvestigations. 

PERSG is also responsible for issuing Department policies for all 

Department components to follow. DOJ Order 2610.2A, dated 

August 21, 1990, is currently the official Department policy on 

background investigation and reinvestigation procedures.29 However, 

from 1990 through 2005, SEPS has issued over 40 separate update 

memorandums to supplement or amend the order. PERSG also provides 

formal training on the guidance and adjudicative standards for 

background investigations and reinvestigations, and provides informal 

guidance, primarily over the phone or via e-mail, to component staff. 

Authorities Delegated by SEPS to the Components 

SEPS has delegated to components’ personnel security staff the 

authority to adjudicate background investigations and reinvestigations 

for their employees and contractors, and the authority to grant waivers 

so new employees can begin work before their investigations are 

complete. In total, 20 components have delegated adjudication 

authority – 7 have the authority for employees and contractors, and 13 

have the authority only for contractors (see Appendix I). 

Approximately 76,000 employees, as well as a large number of 

contractors, work in the components with delegated authority.30 SEPS 

also has delegated to some components the authority to grant security 

clearances up to and including the level of Top Secret, upon an 

individual’s successful completion of an investigation. When delegating 

authority to a component, SEPS issues a memorandum that specifies the 

authorities being delegated as well as any restrictions imposed. The 

memorandum specifies that SEPS retains oversight of the delegated 

areas. 

 29 On September 15, 1994, the 1990 DOJ Order was amended to change two 

sections, but the original order was not reissued. 

30 SEPS is able to verify the number of Department employees because all 

employees are paid through the National Finance Center payroll system and are tracked 

through headquarters personnel and security offices. However, SEPS cannot determine 

the number of Department contractors because contractors are not tracked centrally 

through either personnel or security offices. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 11

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

SEPS’s Oversight of Components With Delegated Authority 

Although SEPS delegates to components the authority for 

background investigations, it remains responsible for overseeing the 

function. As described below, the various elements of SEPS’s oversight 

of the components with delegated authority are carried out by CRS and 

PERSG. 

CRS Oversight Functions. SEPS’s primary oversight mechanism is 

the security compliance review conducted by its Compliance Review 

Section (CRS). CRS’s three Security Specialists are responsible for 

conducting security compliance reviews of the Department’s 3,000 to 

3,500 offices and sub-offices worldwide. They travel to components’ 

locations, conduct the security compliance reviews, write reports 

describing the results of the review, and follow up with components that 

require corrective action. In selecting offices to review, CRS considers: 

(1) whether the office handles classified information; (2) whether SEPS 

has ever reviewed the office or when it last reviewed; (3) whether the 

office recently moved into a new building; and (4) the size of the office 

(larger offices are typically reviewed more often). CRS also considers 

input it receives from Security Programs Managers on potential security 

risks or problems at offices in their components. CRS issues a list of the 

offices it plans to review to the components’ Security Programs Managers 

at the beginning of each fiscal year. 

Each review typically lasts 2 to 3 days and covers physical, 

personnel, contractor, information, computer, and communications 

security as well as safety and health and continuity of operations and 

occupant emergency plans. The highest priority of the review is ensuring 

that the physical security of Department offices is adequate and in 

compliance with applicable regulations.31 Only a small portion of most 

 31 SEPS defines physical security as “the application of physical barriers and 

control procedures as preventive measures or countermeasures against threats to 

resources and information.” SEPS Security Program Operating Manual, revised May 

2005, p. 89. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 12

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

compliance reviews (3 to 4 hours) is dedicated to reviewing personnel 

security issues.32 

Before visiting a site, the CRS staff reviews a sample of background 

investigation files maintained by the component’s headquarters office. 

The CRS staff estimated that, for large offices, it requests up to one third 

of the employee files for review and a higher percentage for smaller 

offices. While on site, Security Specialists use checklists for each of the 

security disciplines to guide them in conducting interviews with relevant 

security officials and recording findings and observations. The Personnel 

Security Checklist covers the following areas: (1) the minimum 

requirements of a waiver; (2) the background investigation requirements 

for temporary appointments; (3) the number of national security and 

public trust positions; (4) resignation and reinstatement procedures; 

(5) reinvestigation processes; (6) national security information access, 

training, and security clearances; and (7) SCI access procedures. The 

CRS staff asks for a roster of locally hired contractors, and checks the 

files kept on site. CRS will also talk to the General Services 

Administration about shared contract staff, such as janitors. Security 

Specialists interview the individual responsible for conducting security 

clearance briefings, and may also interview one or more employees with 

security clearances, to ensure that employees who access classified 

materials have received required training and signed required disclosure 

forms. 

The CRS staff compiles its findings, observations, and 

recommendations into written reports and sends them to the 

component’s Security Programs Manager for corrective action.33 CRS has 

no requirement to issue reports within a particular time frame, but CRS 

has established an internal goal of issuing its reports approximately 4 to 

6 weeks after the completion of the site visit. 

 32 The physical security portion of the review typically lasts the longest and 

requires walking around the perimeter of the building and examining exterior and 

interior doors, windows, locks, alarms, security cameras, guard services, 

magnetometers, X-ray equipment, and air intake valves; documenting security 

weaknesses with a digital camera; and often meeting with the building manager to 

discuss building and office access control procedures. 

33 Findings are direct violations of federal regulations, public laws, or 

Department security policy that require corrective action, while observations are the 

CRS staff’s suggestions on improving security. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 13

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

There are no Department regulations or orders that establish 

requirements for the security compliance reviews or CRS’s authority for 

enforcing its security findings.34 SEPS has not established a formal 

performance measure for the number of security reviews it conducts 

each year, but has an informal internal goal of 60 reviews a year. SEPS 

also established an internal requirement for Security Programs Managers 

to respond in writing to CRS’s findings within 60 days of the report 

publication date. CRS staff may conduct a follow-up review after 

components respond to ensure that recommendations were addressed.35 

PERSG Oversight Functions. In addition to the CRS compliance 

reviews, PERSG also conducts some oversight of the components with 

delegated authority. PERSG receives yearly reports from OPM on the 

percentage of adjudications each component is completing within 90 

days, as regulations require. PERSG can also request that OPM perform 

an appraisal, or substantive audit, of a component’s ability to perform 

suitability adjudications. For example, PERSG requested an appraisal of 

the ATF’s performance following its transfer to the Department. OPM 

certified that the ATF was performing these duties well. The results of 

this appraisal led to PERSG’s decision to delegate to the ATF the 

authority to perform investigations and adjudications, and to grant 

security clearances up to and including the level of Top Secret. 

Oversight Enforcement Mechanisms. If any of the oversight 

mechanisms described above indicates that a component is not adhering 

to Department security policy, SEPS may recommend that the 

Department Security Officer modify or revoke the component’s delegation 

of authority. The revocation option, used rarely, is the only sanction 

available to SEPS to ensure that components with delegated authority 

follow policy. It was last used in 2000 to transfer the responsibility for 

conducting field investigations from the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) to OPM. This decision was made after an OPM 

review of the DEA’s program revealed that many of the investigations the 

 34 DOJ Order 2600.2C, issued November 28, 2003, establishes the 

Department’s security programs and the associated responsibilities. However, the 

Order does not mention CRS. 

35 CRS officials told us that they try to schedule follow-up reviews concurrently 

with regular security compliance reviews. During follow-up reviews, CRS focuses on the 

areas that it previously found deficient, as well as any new issues or security 

vulnerabilities that have surfaced since the original review. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 14

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

DEA conducted did not meet government standards for sufficiency or due 

process.

Recent Developments and Impending Changes in Background 

Investigations 

Three recent developments have the potential to significantly affect 

background investigations and clearances. These developments are the 

passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

(the Intelligence Reform Act, Pub. L. 108-458), the issuance of Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), and OPM’s e-Clearance 

initiative. 

The Intelligence Reform Act. On July 22, 2004, the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 

Commission) released a report documenting numerous intelligence and 

security failures throughout the federal government and made over 40 

recommendations for reforming the intelligence community and the 

intelligence-related activities of the United States government. Included 

among them was a recommendation that “[a] single federal agency 

should be responsible for providing and maintaining security clearances, 

ensuring uniform standards – including uniform security questionnaires 

and financial report requirements, and maintaining a single database.”36 

Several of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations were 

incorporated into the Intelligence Reform Act. These provisions have two 

major goals – to consolidate background investigations and the issuance 

of security clearances under a single government agency and to 

significantly reduce the time it takes to complete investigations. The Act 

first requires the President to name a single agency to be responsible for 

government-wide oversight of the security clearance process. This 

agency will also be responsible for standardizing and streamlining the 

process across agencies and ensuring reciprocal recognition of security 

clearances across agencies. In June 2005, the President assigned this 

role to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Act also 

prohibits individual agencies from imposing any investigative or 

adjudicative requirements beyond those outlined in any Executive Orders 

establishing security requirements for access to classified information.

 36 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 

Commission Report, W.W. Norton & Co., 2004, p. 422. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 15

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

In addition to designating an oversight agency, the Act requires the 

President to designate a single federal agency to be responsible for 

conducting background investigations on all federal employees and 

issuing all security clearances.37 These investigations are to be 

conducted in accordance with the standards to be developed by OMB. 

The investigating agency is also expected to create a single, governmentwide database to store information on the background investigations and 

clearance status of all federal employees. 

In addition, the Act sets strict deadlines for the completion of 

various phases of the investigation. The Act mandates that, by the end 

of 2006, 80 percent of investigations must be completed within an 

average of 90 days and adjudications within an average of 30 days, for an 

overall average of 120 days for a case to be completed. By the end of 

2009, 90 percent of investigations must be completed in an average of 40 

days and adjudications in an average of 20 days, for an overall average of 

60 days for a case to be completed. 

HSPD-12. On August 27, 2004, President Bush signed HSPD-12, 

which requires a standardized form of official identification for both 

government employees and contractors. Implementation, in stages, will 

begin on October 27, 2005. The Office of the Chief Information Officer 

was designated to coordinate implementation for the Department, with 

SEPS providing input on personnel security issues. The directive states 

that official identification cards necessary to access government offices 

should be issued only to those employees with certain pre-employment 

background checks completed and that the validity of these checks must 

be updated or verified every 5 years. OMB is responsible for issuing 

government-wide implementation guidance on the directive. 

Originally, the minimum requirement for issuing an identification 

card was that all National Agency Checks be completed, with additional 

paper inquiries completed after employment.38 This type of background 

investigation is called the NACI (National Agency Checks with Inquiries). 

 37 As of the date of publication, the President had not designated an agency to 

fill this role. 

38 The minimum National Agency Checks required are the Security/Suitability 

Investigations Index, Defense Clearance Investigation Index, FBI Name Check, and the 

FBI National Criminal History Fingerprint check. The minimum Inquiries required are 

of employment, education, residence, references, and checks of law enforcement 

databases where the applicant has lived.
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U.S. Department of Justice 16

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

As of FY 2004, OPM reported that the NACI process was taking an 

average of 89 days to complete. In August 2005, OMB reduced the preemployment requirement. Currently, although the NACI must be 

initiated before a new employee enters on duty and the fingerprint check 

completed, an agency can issue an identification card if it has not 

received the remaining elements of the NACI within 5 days. 

e-Clearance Initiative. OPM has proposed a transition to electronic 

recordkeeping to minimize the burden of background investigations. It is 

focusing on three specific improvements to the paper-based 

recordkeeping process. The first element of this program, called e-QIP, 

would provide automated online versions of the different background 

investigation questionnaires. Under OPM’s current system, an individual 

must fill out the security questionnaire from scratch each time an 

investigation is required, and OPM must manually enter the data into its 

system. Once fully implemented, e-QIP would allow for electronic 

transmission of the forms to appropriate agencies and for maintenance of 

historical data. OPM has further proposed the creation of an electronic 

version of the form used to update the original application, a change that 

it envisions would save both time and money when reinvestigations are 

required. 

The second element calls for a government-wide database that 

would allow personnel security staff to verify the clearances of 

individuals in most government agencies.39 The ultimate goal is for the 

system to display clearance information in real time. The third element 

of the initiative calls for the imaging of all documentation related to 

background investigations. Imaging would allow for electronic 

transmittal of records to the appropriate offices, eliminating mailing 

delays. It would also allow OPM to maintain historical information. 

Providing quick access to previous investigations would minimize 

requests for duplicate investigations, thereby saving time and money. 

OPM has asked all government agencies that conduct background 

investigations to image the files of completed background investigations. 

 39 OPM currently uses a program called the Clearance Verification System. As 

described by SEPS, agencies provide updated information to OPM on their employees’ 

clearance levels approximately once every 6 months. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 17

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF OIG REVIEW 

Purpose of the OIG Review 

The OIG conducted this review to examine SEPS’s background 

investigation program. Specifically, we evaluated SEPS’s management of 

four program areas: (1) managing background investigations of political 

appointees, attorneys, and other personnel whose investigations are not 

delegated to the components; (2) granting clearances for access to SCI 

materials for all Department employees; (3) providing policy guidance 

and training on background investigations; and (4) providing oversight of 

the components’ background investigation programs. 

Scope 

This review focused on the operations of SEPS’s Personnel Security 

Group and the Compliance Review Section. We examined functions that 

are currently SEPS’s responsibility and also analyzed several areas that 

will become SEPS’s responsibility once enacted legislation takes effect. 

Our scope did not include reviewing individual files to evaluate the 

quality of the field investigations and adjudications, nor did we evaluate 

SEPS’s performance in its other areas of responsibility, such as physical 

security, communications security, and technical security. 

Methodology 

Interviews. We interviewed Security Programs Managers from 12 

components, as well as staff from SEPS, the FBI, the ATF, the OIG, JMD, 

and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. 

Interviews With Security Programs Managers. We conducted 

telephone interviews with Security Programs Managers from the following 

components: the FBI, ATF, BOP, USMS, DEA, EOUSA, Executive Office 

of the United States Trustees (EOUST), Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR), OIG, Criminal Division, and Civil Division. 

Interviews With SEPS staff. We interviewed the Director and 

Executive Officer of SEPS. From the Personnel Security Group, we 

interviewed the Assistant Director. We also interviewed the Chiefs of the 

Operations and the Policy, Training, and Oversight sections. From the 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 18

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Office of Information Safeguards and Security Oversight, we interviewed 

the Assistant Director. From the Compliance Review Section, we 

interviewed all three Security Specialists, including the CRS Chief. We 

also spoke with two former Security Specialists. From the Technical 

Security Section, we interviewed the managers of the software application 

used to track background investigations. 

Interviews With FBI staff. We interviewed the Unit Chief and staff 

from the National Name Check Section of the Records Management 

Division at FBI Headquarters. 

Interviews With ATF staff. We interviewed the Chief of the ATF’s 

Personnel Security Branch and two individuals from the Software 

Management Branch, Information Services Division. 

Interviews With OIG staff. We interviewed the OIG’s Personnel 

Security Specialist and Security Programs Manager, who is one of the 

former Compliance Review Section staff members. 

Interviews With JMD staff. We interviewed the Chief Information 

Officer, the Deputy Chief Information Officer, a contractor working in 

conjunction with the Office of the Chief Information Officer, and an 

employee from JMD’s Management and Planning Staff. 

Interview With the Office of the Deputy Attorney General staff. We 

interviewed an Associate Deputy Attorney General. 

Site visits. In early March 2005, the OIG review team 

accompanied the CRS Chief on a security compliance review of the ATF 

and USMS in Louisville, Kentucky. The compliance review included two 

ATF offices – the Louisville field division and a sub-office located in 

Lexington, Kentucky – and the USMS’s office in the federal courthouse in 

Louisville. We also attended a May 2005 Security Programs Managers 

training conference. 

Documentation review. We reviewed numerous documents, 

including internal SEPS documents, Department security policies, 

security updates and notices to Security Programs Managers from SEPS, 

budget requests, customer satisfaction surveys, position descriptions, 

external reports on security and SEPS, congressional testimony, pending 

legislative changes to personnel security, OPM’s timeliness and workload 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 19

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

requirements for the Department, and online information regarding 

SEPS. 

Data analysis. After requesting data from SEPS’s background 

investigation inventory software, we analyzed the data using SPSS 

software and Microsoft Excel and Access. Our data analysis included 

timeliness, background investigation processing, reinvestigation 

compliance, and projections for current and anticipated SEPS workload. 

We provided the analyzed data and our interpretation to SEPS for 

concurrence prior to issuance of the draft report. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 20

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

In FY 2004, SEPS met federal regulatory requirements 

for adjudicating background investigations within 90 

days in 99 percent of its highest priority cases (political 

appointees and attorneys) and in 85 percent of cases 

overall. SEPS also generally met Department needs for 

processing SCI clearances and providing clearance 

verifications. However, SEPS did not fully meet other 

important responsibilities related to policy and 

oversight. The Department’s personnel security policy, 

amended by more than 40 memorandums issued over 

the past 15 years, is inconsistent, outdated, and not 

widely and readily accessible. In addition, SEPS’s 

program of security compliance reviews and its 

enforcement authority are too limited to ensure that 

components with delegated authority comply with 

regulations and policy. Also, because SEPS relies on 

outdated technology to manage its own files and there is 

no Department-wide database of background 

investigation information, SEPS has limited ability to 

manage and oversee the background investigation 

process across the Department. 

Workload and Priorities 

From FY 2000 to FY 2004, portions of SEPS’s background 

investigation workload more than doubled, particularly in the areas of 

granting clearances and the initiation and adjudication of contractor 

background investigations (see Table 1). In response to the increasing 

background investigation caseload, PERSG designated four of its 

responsibilities as being its highest priorities: (1) adjudication of the 

background investigations and reinvestigations of political appointees 

and attorneys; (2) adjudication of requests for access to SCI material; 

(3) certification of clearances to other agencies; and (4) processing 

requests for waivers. As lesser priorities, SEPS adjudicates background 

investigations for other new employees, adjudicates reinvestigations for 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. Department of Justice 21

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

employees, adjudicates all contractor cases, and develops policy 

guidance.40

Table 1: SEPS’s Background Investigation (BI) and Reinvestigation (RI) Workload 

FY 2000-2004 

 

FY 

2000 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

Percentage 

Change 

2000-2004 

Employees

BI Initiations 1,286 1,675 2,382 2,004 1,784 38.7 

Waivers 558 876 1,081 1,224 1,142 104.7 

BI Adjudications 1,188 1,795 1,407 1,698 2,237 88.3 

Clearance Actions Taken 382 536 892 1,140 1,609 321.2 

RI Initiations 1,321 3,000 2,454 3,051 2,422 83.4 

RI Adjudications 1,508 1,421 1,743 2,266 1,983 31.5 

Contractors

BI Initiations 291 326 821 984 1,263 334.0 

BI Adjudications 446 421 579 784 1,033 131.6 

RI Initiations 21 8 25 24 12 -42.9 

RI Adjudications 17 14 14 25 24 41.2 

TOTAL ACTIONS 7,018 10,072 11,398 13,200 13,509 92.5 

Source: PERSG TRAQ 

SEPS’s SCI clearance workload also increased dramatically from 

2000 to 2004. PERSG retains the sole authority within the Department 

to grant SCI clearances and to confirm these clearances for personnel 

who require SCI access to other components or other federal agencies. 

Table 2 shows SEPS’s SCI clearance workload from calendar years 2000 

through 2004. 

Table 2: SEPS’s SCI Clearance Workload for 

Calendar Years (CY) 2000-2004 

 

CY 

2000 

CY 

2001 

CY 

2002 

CY 

2003 

CY 

2004 

Percentage 

Change 

2000-2004 

SCI Clearances Processed 1,251 2,196 2,457 3,129 3,113 148.8 

SCI Clearances Verified 810 1,261 1,667 2,005 2,053 153.5 

TOTAL ACTIONS 2,061 3,457 4,124 5,134 5,166 150.7 

Source: SEPS CRS 

 40 PERSG places less emphasis on the adjudication of these routine 

investigations because waivers are granted for more than half of the new employees the 

Department hires to fill positions other than law enforcement officer positions. The 

waivers allow the employees to begin work before their background investigations are 

complete. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 22

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Adjudication Timeliness 

We found that SEPS’s adjudication of background investigations 

was generally timely. We examined SEPS’s processing of 55,197 actions 

on background investigations for which it retained authority during the 5 

fiscal years from FY 2000 through FY 2004 (see Table 1). The percentage 

of adjudications of initial background investigations for employees and 

contractors processed by SEPS within 90 days for each of the fiscal years 

is shown in Table 3. In FY 2004, SEPS adjudicated 85 percent of all 

employee background investigations within 90 days. 

Table 3: SEPS Background Investigation Adjudications 

Completed Within 90 Days 

FY 2000-2004

Percentage completed in 90 days 

 FY 

2000 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

Employees 94 90 73 75 85 

Contractors 83 81 60 73 96 

Source: PERSG TRAQ 

In discussions with SEPS staff responsible for adjudications, we 

asked why some cases were not processed within 90 days. SEPS staff 

explained that some cases were delayed because SEPS lacked the staffing 

needed to perform all adjudications within the required time and that, in 

other cases, decisions were delayed pending the receipt of documentation 

or until issues related to the applicant’s suitability were resolved. For 

example, when a background investigation identified credit issues, a final 

decision on the adjudication might be delayed until the employee 

documented 3 months of on-time payments. 

Staffing and Resources Not Increased Commensurate With 

Workload. As described in the background section, two previous 

external reports from the Webster Commission and the National Archives 

and Records Administration found significant shortfalls in SEPS staffing. 

SEPS requested additional staffing both before and after those reviews. 

Between FY 2000 and FY 2005, SEPS’s annual budget requests included 

additional staff and provided extensive performance and workload 

measures to justify the requests. For example, SEPS provided studies 

comparing its staffing levels to those of three other Department 
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U.S. Department of Justice 23

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

components with comparable adjudications responsibilities and to other 

components or agencies with comparable security responsibilities. As 

Table 4 shows, in 2001 SEPS had the smallest ratio of adjudications staff 

to background investigation caseload.41 Despite the recommendations 

from these reports, SEPS did not receive the requested additional 

resources, except for one additional position in the CRS. 

Table 4: PERSG’s 2001 Comparison of Its Staffing Levels to 

Three Department Components

 

Caseload (Employees 

and Contractors) Adjudicators 

Average Cases Per 

Adjudicator 

SEPS 33,000 9 3,667 

BOP 51,143 17 3,008 

DEA 22,700 26 873 

INS* 41,000 47 872 

Source: PERSG 

* On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was 

transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. 

SEPS’s Workload Management. Despite its low staffing levels, 

SEPS has taken several steps to manage its increasing case workload 

more effectively. These steps include redirecting personnel assigned to 

other duties to adjudications, and identifying and focusing its available 

resources on its highest priority cases. Specifically, PERSG staff stated 

that they relied on a combination of staff redirected from other duties, 

overtime from adjudicators, and assistance from employees in other 

sections of SEPS with prior adjudicative experience. For example, 

because they had experience as adjudicators, the PERSG Chief for Policy, 

Training, and Oversight and a Security Specialist from this section were 

assigned, as needed, to process requests for SCI clearances and other 

adjudication cases. Also, the Operations Section scheduled one day a 

week when all PERSG staff devoted the entire day to adjudicating 

backlogged cases. The size of the adjudications backlog has diminished 

since October 2003 (see Table 5).

 41 SEPS must also process the SCI clearances of all Department components. 

In CY 2004, there were 5,166 cases, as shown in Table 2. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 24

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Table 5: PERSG FY 2004 Adjudication Pending Caseload 

 Employee Cases Contractor Cases 

Months 

Not Yet 

Screened by 

SEPS* 

Pending 

Adjudication

Not Yet 

Screened by 

SEPS* 

Pending 

Adjudication Total 

Oct. 2003 1,072 698 98 286 2,440 

Nov. 2003 1,039 682 72 287 2,367 

Dec. 2003 1,143 677 35 272 2,399 

Jan. 2004 970 679 63 200 2,112 

Feb. 2004 1,073 675 – – 1,748 

Mar. 2004 846 694 50 76 1,742 

Apr. 2004 853 683 – – 1,536 

May 2004 933 703 58 169 2,032 

June 2004 1,059 562 101 165 2,052 

July 2004 1,112 570 95 98 1,973 

Aug. 2004 968 547 89 91 1,786 

Sept. 2004 1,005 545 98 98 1,881 

PERCENTAGE 

CHANGE -6.3 -21.9 0.0 -65.7 -22.9 

Source: SEPS 

*These cases refer to those that PERSG had not yet reviewed. 

SEPS does not operate on a fee-for-service basis (i.e., the 

components do not directly reimburse SEPS for the cost of the services it 

provides). However, since 1992, Department components have 

contributed funding to enable SEPS to hire staff dedicated to managing 

reinvestigations. Of the nine adjudicator positions, five are assigned to 

reinvestigations and are paid for proportionally by the components. The 

components also contribute to a fund from which SEPS pays staff 

overtime for conducting adjudications. In FY 2004, the components 

agreed to contribute $22,000 to the overtime fund.42

Also, as described previously on pages 20 and 21, SEPS 

established priorities for the processing of cases. The priorities were (in 

order) political appointees, attorneys, other FBI investigations (i.e., not 

political or attorney positions), OPM national security information (NSI) 

 42 SEPS is compensated directly only for its costs incurred; money that is not 

used is returned to the components. Actual costs were not available for FY 2004. Total 

overtime costs have never exceeded the initial overtime fund contributions. SEPS does 

not track adjudication overtime separately from other overtime. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 25

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

investigations, other OPM investigations, employee reinvestigations, and 

contractors. Our review of the processing times for cases involving these 

categories of employees found that SEPS is processing the highest 

priority cases first (see Table 6).43 For example, based on records 

contained in TRAQ, we determined that SEPS processed over 99 percent 

of its highest priority cases (political appointees and attorneys) within 

90 days. 

Table 6: SEPS Adjudication Processing by Priority Level 

 Percentage Completed in 90 days 

Adjudication Priorities 

(Highest to Lowest) 

FY 

2000 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

Political appointees 100 100 100 100 —

Attorneys 99 99 99 99 100

FBI NSI investigations 100 88 94 92 96

OPM NSI investigations 92 91 85 74 79

Other OPM investigations 91 85 48 62 81

Employee reinvestigations 84 83 59 48 54

Contractors 83 81 60 73 96

Source: PERSG TRAQ 

To determine whether SEPS met OPM timeliness expectations, we 

reviewed FY 2004 correspondence between PERSG and the OPM 

Investigations Program Specialist assigned to the Department’s oversight. 

The OPM Specialist noted that SEPS’s performance (85 percent of 

adjudications completed in less than 90 days) and that of the 

Department as a whole (87 percent completed in less than 90 days) 

“exceed[ed] compliance expectations” and was “meeting” an “important 

goal.” We also reviewed a recent PERSG customer service survey and 

conducted an additional survey of 12 Security Programs Managers. All 

12 indicated that they were generally satisfied with the service SEPS 

provided in processing background investigations and security 

clearances. Separately, in SEPS’s own customer service survey of 

 43 Contractor cases were sometimes processed faster than other higher priority 

cases because, although cases are generally processed according to priority, SEPS also 

reviews field investigations as they are received to identify cases for which there are no 

potentially derogatory issues and adjudicates those cases as quickly as possible. 

Because over 90 percent of contractors are hired for lower risk positions with limited 

background checks that result in no derogatory information, those cases can be quickly 

adjudicated. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 26

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Security Programs Managers, PERSG’s responsiveness in obtaining SCI 

access and certifying national security clearances to other components 

and agencies were the two highest rated elements.44

Overall, we believe that SEPS has taken reasonable steps to use 

the resources available to manage its case processing workload, and 

OPM and the components have been generally satisfied with SEPS’s 

performance. SEPS met regulatory timeliness requirements 85 percent 

of the time in FY 2004 for the background investigations for which it is 

directly responsible and is meeting Department needs by processing SCI 

clearances and clearance verifications as quickly as possible. In only 

15 percent of the employee cases and 4 percent of the contractor cases 

did SEPS not meet OPM’s timeliness requirements. However, as we 

discuss in greater detail below, the Intelligence Reform Act and HSPD-12 

directed changes that will, when implemented, require faster processing 

times and increase the number of case processing stages that SEPS must 

accomplish to complete background investigations. 

Policy Guidance 

The Department’s personnel security policy, amended by more 

than 40 memorandums issued over the past 15 years, is inconsistent, 

outdated, and not widely and readily accessible. SEPS, which is 

responsible for issuing policy and providing guidance for the 

Department, issued the last complete revision of the Department’s 

security policy, known as DOJ Order 2610.2A, in 1990. Although the 

basic order has not been updated, from 1990 through 2005 SEPS issued 

more than 40 memorandums that revised or supplemented the order. 

Because the changes have been issued in a piecemeal fashion, there is 

no single, consolidated document that contains all current guidance for 

component security officials and other Department employees to consult. 

Despite the many revisions and supplements, the guidance has not 

been updated to reflect recent changes in the security environment, 

according to PERSG staff. For example, the guidance does not require 

the reinvestigation of all contractors, which SEPS has long considered 

 44 There are no regulatory timeliness requirements for these processes, but they 

are often time-sensitive. SEPS reported that it currently has two employees who 

manage clearance certifications as a collateral duty, one for 65 percent of duties, and 

one for 25 percent. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 27

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

necessary to ensure the Department’s security.45 In customer service 

surveys conducted by the OIG and SEPS, Security Programs Managers 

and adjudicators expressed frustration with having to work with 

outdated and confusing materials. In responses to our survey, for 

example, Security Programs Managers pointed out that SEPS’s 

memorandums often modify or correct prior memorandums, making it 

difficult to determine whether the order or one of the various 

memorandums is the correct guidance. In PERSG’s 2004 customer 

service survey, Security Programs Managers rated PERSG lowest in the 

area of policy guidance. 

According to SEPS employees, SEPS has not consolidated the 

updates it has issued into a revised policy because its staff in the Policy, 

Training, and Oversight Section were dedicated to processing SEPS’s 

background investigation caseload. In December 2004, in response to an 

inquiry related to another OIG review, SEPS officials told us that they 

had begun consolidating and updating the existing guidance on 

employees. However, as of July 2005, the revised DOJ Order 2610.2A 

was still undergoing review. Moreover, SEPS had not worked on new 

requirements for contractors – and for visitors – since March 2005. 

Further, SEPS staff told us that the order cannot be finalized until OPM 

approves SEPS’s proposed minimum level of background investigation for 

hiring public trust employees. SEPS was also waiting for OMB guidance 

on implementation of HSPD-12 since this guidance may supersede 

SEPS’s proposed changes to both DOJ Order 2610.2A and contractor 

policy. 

Limited Use of Technology. SEPS has not effectively used available 

technology to disseminate policy and guidance. We examined SEPS’s 

presence on the Department’s intranet and found that the Personnel 

Security page consisted solely of a list of tasks that PERSG handles. 

Although adjudicative guidelines were available on the SEPS site as an 

appendix to the Security Program Operating Manual and several relevant 

regulations and executive orders were listed on the Security Policies 

page, the Personnel Security page did not contain a link or crossreference to this information. Further, that page did not provide 

 45 SEPS has taken initial steps to draft a reinvestigation policy for all 

Department contractors, but inadequate staffing and potential changes in federal 

standards under HSPD-12 have delayed the drafting. SEPS had already identified a 

need for a review of contractor reinvestigation guidance when we interviewed SEPS 

officials in March 2004. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 28

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Department personnel security policies, did not identify the names or 

dates of Department policies currently in effect, and did not provide 

answers to commonly asked questions. Because this information was 

not readily available on the intranet, PERSG and CRS staff provided 

guidance by answering case-specific questions from components or faxed 

copies of memorandums upon request. 

We also examined the CRS section of the SEPS intranet and found 

that with the exception of the Security Program Operating Manual issued 

in May 2005, it contained only limited and outdated information. When 

we interviewed CRS staff in February 2005, they noted that they had 

requested that copies of the checklists used to conduct compliance 

reviews, the package of information sent to Security Programs Managers 

when a compliance review is announced, and training materials be 

posted on the web site. 

PERSG’s 2004 customer service survey also identified 

shortcomings in online guidance. In particular, several components 

commented on SEPS’s failure to use the intranet effectively. For 

example, one component stated that “PERSG is behind the times when it 

comes to posting information to the DOJ intranet. It would be helpful if 

personnel security information was made available.” 

Our interviews with SEPS staff identified three reasons for the 

delays in posting information. First, SEPS gave no priority to the posting 

of information on its web site. Second, SEPS did not clearly define 

internal responsibilities and approval processes for posting information. 

Third, SEPS officials did not follow up to ensure that approved 

information was posted to the web site.

In June 2005, we contacted an official from the Department’s 

Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) to determine what the 

procedures for posting information on the web site were.46 An OCIO 

 46 A 2005 Departmental restructuring transferred the e-Gov staff from the 

Department’s library to the OCIO. The e-Gov staff is responsible for posting information 

from the Offices, Boards, and Divisions on the intranet. Individual offices are 

responsible for approving content prior to submitting documents to be posted; the 

e-Gov staff converts that content to a format appropriate for posting, and ensures that 

information is also accessible to disabled users. Many of the larger components or 

offices have the ability to post information directly, without contacting the e-Gov staff 

for assistance. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 29

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

official stated that approved information submitted in the required 

format would be posted within a few days of receipt. In July 2005, we 

revisited the web site to determine whether SEPS had begun posting 

information. We found that the May 2005 Security Program Operating 

Manual had been posted. However, other information that CRS staff told 

us in February 2005 had been submitted for internal SEPS approval was 

still not on the web site. 

SEPS’s Oversight of Components With Delegated Authority 

SEPS has not implemented an effective oversight program to 

ensure that components with delegated authority to adjudicate 

background investigations comply with regulations and policy regarding 

personnel security. SEPS has delegated to 20 components the authority 

to perform adjudications and grant security clearances for employees or 

contractors, but SEPS remains responsible for conducting oversight to 

ensure that the components are carrying out their delegated authority in 

accordance with Department regulations. SEPS receives an annual 

statistical report from OPM on the Department’s performance in meeting 

the 90-day adjudication standard. However, SEPS’s primary method of 

overseeing components’ operations is the security compliance reviews 

conducted by CRS. The CRS reviews are limited both in number and in 

scope of the examination related to personnel security. Further, both 

SEPS and the components’ Security Programs Managers have limited 

authority to ensure that corrective actions are taken. 

SEPS Conducts Few Security Compliance Reviews. Overall, SEPS 

inspects less than 1 percent of Department offices each year. According 

to the CRS Chief, SEPS’s internal goal is to conduct 60 security 

compliance reviews each year. However, with a staff of only three 

Security Specialists and an annual travel budget of $60,000, CRS has 

been unable to meet this goal. In the past 3 years, CRS has achieved its 

goal of conducting 60 reviews only once, completing an average of 39 
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U.S. Department of Justice 30

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

compliance reviews each year (Table 7).47 At that rate, it would take 

SEPS approximately 75 to 90 years to inspect all of the Department’s 

estimated 3,000 to 3,500 offices. 

Table 7: CRS Reviews Conducted in Calendar Years 2002-2004

Year 

Component Offices Reviewed 

(Number of Reviews Conducted) 

Total 

Reviews 

Percentage of 

Department 

Offices 

2002 Civil Division (1), Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services (1), Criminal Division (2), Civil Rights 

Division (1), DEA (19), Environmental and Natural 

Resources Division (1), EOUST (4), FBI (14), INS (6), 

Office of Justice Programs (1), OIG (1), Tax Division (1), 

USAO (4), USMS (5) 

61 2.0 

2003 ATF (1), Executive Office for Immigration Review (1), 

EOUST (1), FBI (3), JMD (1), USAO (8), USMS (4) 

19 0.6 

2004 ATF (4), BOP (1), Criminal Division (1), Community 

Relations Service (1), DEA (3), Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (3), EOUST (5), FBI (5), USAO (8), 

USMS (6) 

37 1.2 

Source: CRS 

Similar to the adjudication staffing studies discussed earlier, in 

2002 a CRS Security Specialist conducted a study that compared the 

number of SEPS Security Specialists with the number of Security 

Specialists in other security compliance review offices within and outside 

the Department. According to the CRS comparison, in 2002 CRS had 

two Security Specialists to conduct reviews of the Department’s 

approximately 3,000 offices. In contrast, CRS’s data indicated that the 

FBI had 37 security staff to conduct reviews of its 500 offices and the 

DEA had 6 security staff to conduct reviews of its 100 offices. Those 

staffing levels provide a staff-to-workload ratio of 1,500 offices per 

Security Specialist for SEPS, as compared with 13.5 for the FBI and 16.7 

for the DEA. CRS has gained one additional Security Specialist since 

2002 and currently has three Security Specialists. However, this still 

 47 During 2002, SEPS staff conducted inspections of overseas offices. Because 

most overseas offices are housed within an embassy in which the Department of State 

retains responsibility for physical security and security conditions are identical for 

Department components in the embassy, SEPS was able to conduct multiple 

component reviews at most locations and expedite each review. The number of reviews 

was lower in 2003 because SEPS was tasked by Congress to conduct physical security 

surveys of Department offices in buildings operated by the General Services 

Administration nationwide in order to assess the buildings’ physical security 

vulnerabilities. In response to the congressional mandate, CRS conducted 137 physical 

security building inspections. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 31

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

leaves SEPS’s staff-to-workload ratio at 1,000 offices per Security 

Specialist. 

SEPS also receives annual reports from OPM on component 

compliance with the regulatory requirement that adjudications be 

completed within 90 days. In response to the OPM reports, the CRS site 

visits, or other information, SEPS may request that OPM conduct an indepth review of components’ management of background investigations. 

This occurs infrequently. According to SEPS, the most recent OPM 

review it requested was of the ATF when that component transferred 

from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice.48 

PERSG has the option of requesting OPM appraisals of the component 

programs more frequently, but told us that they recognized from the 

difficulty they experienced in obtaining a review of the ATF process that 

OPM has to balance these requests with its own heavy workload of 

investigations. 

Personnel Security Issues Receive Minimal Attention. In addition 

to conducting few security compliance reviews, CRS also devotes little 

time to personnel security issues during each review. During the 2-day 

security review we participated in, CRS staff spent about 4 hours on 

personnel security issues. CRS staff confirmed that 3 to 4 hours per 

review was typical. That includes both time spent reviewing background 

investigation files before the site visit and time spent reviewing personnel 

security issues on site at the office under review. 

Because components’ background investigation files are 

maintained centrally, prior to each site visit Security Specialists spend 2 

to 3 hours reviewing background investigation files of select employees 

from the office that will be reviewed. We accompanied a Security 

Specialist on a file review to observe the procedure. The Security 

Specialist selected 30 personnel files (26 employees and 4 contractors) 

out of the approximately 150 employees assigned to the office under 

review. CRS reviews the files to determine whether investigations have 

been initiated and adjudicated within the timeframes required by 

regulations, waivers have been appropriately requested and approved, 

required reinvestigations have been initiated, required paperwork (such 

as nondisclosure agreements and security clearance justifications) have 

 48 OPM found the ATF capable of conducting its own field investigations and 

adjudications for its staff and contractors. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 32

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

been placed in the file, and the requested clearance level is appropriate 

for the level of classified information accessed by the employee. 

Component security officials in field offices have limited 

involvement in background investigations. Therefore, SEPS Security 

Specialists typically spend only about an hour on personnel security 

issues while on site. During that time they question security staff and 

other employees to determine how employees and their supervisors are 

notified of pending reinvestigations, whether training is provided on 

handling classified material, what information security staff and 

managers have on personnel clearance levels, and how background 

investigations of locally hired contractors and interns are conducted. 

The security compliance review reports that we examined identified 

a limited number of problems related to administrative personnel 

security. The 20 reports issued in FY 2003 contained a total of 4 

findings (direct violations of federal regulations) and no observations 

(vulnerabilities not directly covered by federal regulations) related to 

personnel security.49 The findings were: (1) required reinvestigations 

had not been initiated for some employees; (2) an employee was in a 

sensitive position without a completed and favorably adjudicated 

background investigation on file; (3) employees who did not need access 

to national security information had been given national security 

clearances; and (4) memorandums requesting security clearances lacked 

accurate need-to-know justifications. CRS staff stated that the 

deficiencies cited in the FY 2003 reports are typical of what they found in 

more recent site visits. 

Security Specialists do not review the quality of the adjudication or 

investigation of employees’ and contractors’ background investigations or 

reinvestigations, nor do any other personnel in SEPS. CRS staff 

explained that they do not examine files for substantive issues or to 

determine whether there are investigations or disciplinary actions 

pending, as such in-depth reviews would mean less time for higher 

priority physical and information technology security oversight. Instead, 

Security Specialists ensure only that the required paperwork (e.g., signed 

 49 In contrast, the 20 reports issued in FY 2003 contained a total of 2 findings 

and 78 observations related to physical security. CRS staff stated that because there 

are few federal or Department standards on physical security, important security issues 

are often addressed in observations. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 33

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

disclosure forms for cleared employees) is included in employees’ files 

and that reinvestigations are timely.50

When asked whether they were concerned that no personnel at 

SEPS perform any qualitative reviews of components’ adjudications, 

SEPS officials confirmed that they were. They stated that it is not 

currently possible for SEPS to ensure that components effectively identify 

national security concerns during adjudications. However, SEPS officials 

noted that other case processing and security oversight issues remained 

a higher priority. 

CRS Has Limited Authority to Correct Problems. CRS has no 

formal authority to compel a component to correct a security violation.51 

The six current and former CRS Security Specialists we interviewed all 

commented that because of this limitation, CRS must carefully decide 

which compliance issues it pursues aggressively. For example, CRS 

found that the ATF obtains national security clearances for all its Special 

Agents, including those who work in offices that do not handle classified 

information. Nor does the ATF periodically review whether these security 

clearances are necessary.52 CRS informed us that this practice is not 

consistent with security regulations and therefore must be reported as a 

finding.53 CRS told us that it had reported this deficiency during prior 

reviews of ATF field offices, and on the site visit we observed, we noted 

that the Security Specialist again raised the issue. However, neither CRS 

nor the ATF Security Programs Manager had the authority to compel the 

 50 Reinvestigations are considered timely if the initiation paperwork is 

submitted by the end of the fiscal year in which the reinvestigation is due. 

51 For example, although CRS requests that components either implement 

changes required by their findings or report why the changes could not be implemented, 

of the 20 reports issued in FY 2003, 11 components responded within the requested 60 

days, 4 components responded after 60 days (ranging from 2 to 7 months after the due 

date), and 4 components did not respond to CRS at all. 

52 A waiver of the periodic review may be granted if the component can show a 

continuing need for all employees to be cleared. For example, SEPS granted the FBI a 

waiver because it demonstrated such a need. 

53 Under 28 C.F.R. § 17.12(d), each component head must “continuously review 

the requirements for personnel access to classified information as a part of the 

continuous need-to-know evaluation, and initiate action to administratively withdraw or 

reduce the level of access authorized, as appropriate.” SEPS interprets this regulation 

to require at least an annual review of employee security clearances to verify that the 

employee still requires access. 
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U.S. Department of Justice 34

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

ATF to either limit the number of clearances or obtain a waiver of the 

requirement that clearances be given only to those who must handle 

classified information. CRS staff stated that they will continue to report 

this issue, but that CRS’s priority is resolving more immediate physical 

security risks. 

While component Security Programs Managers provide assistance 

to CRS, both in identifying security weaknesses and addressing CRS’s 

site visit findings and observations, their authority is also limited. DOJ 

Order 2600.2C assigns Security Programs Managers 11 separate areas of 

responsibility for ensuring the security of their respective components, 

but it provides no specific instructions on the measures Security 

Programs Managers can take to enforce security requirements. In our 

survey of Security Programs Managers, several explained that they were 

unable to implement a CRS finding because there was a component 

policy that the Security Programs Manager could not change (such as 

some components’ policies of obtaining national security clearances for 

all law enforcement officers). 

PERSG Has Limited Authority to Correct Problems. Just as CRS 

has no formal authority to require components to comply with personnel 

security regulations, PERSG has no formal authority to require 

individuals to comply with personnel security regulations. Because 

SEPS cannot effectively identify and track all the Department employees 

who are overdue for reinvestigation, it cannot perform effective oversight 

to ensure compliance with that requirement. 

In its management of component background investigations, 

PERSG is responsible for ensuring that personnel submit the paperwork 

to initiate their background reinvestigations in a timely manner. To 

facilitate compliance for the 27,000 employees and 7,000 contractors for 

whom SEPS has retained authority, SEPS provides each component’s 

Security Programs Manager with a list of personnel whose 

reinvestigations must be initiated by the end of the fiscal year. SEPS 

maintains records of personnel who have not submitted the necessary 

reinvestigation paperwork in a timely manner (PERSG refers to these 

cases as the “backlog”), and forwards the backlog lists to the Security 

Programs Managers to follow up with the individuals. SEPS also 
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U.S. Department of Justice 35

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

provides a list to the OIG of personnel for whom it has not received the 

necessary reinvestigation paperwork.54

We asked SEPS staff and the Security Programs Managers about 

how backlogged cases are handled and, more specifically, how 

noncompliance is addressed for personnel with security clearances and 

for personnel in public trust positions. For personnel with security 

clearances, SEPS staff stated that personnel generally comply with 

SEPS’s requests for reinvestigation paperwork because SEPS can 

administratively withdraw clearances for failure to submit the 

paperwork.55 Security Programs Managers in our survey confirm that 

they do obtain paperwork from personnel who require access to classified 

information. In contrast, for personnel in public trust positions, which 

do not require a security clearance, SEPS staff stated that they have no 

sanctions comparable to the administrative withdrawal of a clearance. 

To obtain compliance, they send a memorandum to the OIG reporting 

personnel overdue for reinvestigation, and may also involve the Security 

Programs Managers. Security Programs Managers can initiate 

disciplinary procedures for noncompliance, but stated that it is a lengthy 

process. Both SEPS and the Security Programs Managers stated that 

they do eventually obtain compliance. 

Incorrect SEPS Data on EOUSA Reinvestigations. To confirm that 

overdue individuals are eventually submitting their paperwork, we 

reviewed TRAQ data to identify personnel more than 1 year overdue for 

reinvestigation as of March 2005. According to the TRAQ data, there 

were 399 Department personnel who were more than 1 year overdue for 

reinvestigation, of whom 357 were EOUSA employees. SEPS explained 

that this data was erroneous because EOUSA initiates its own 

reinvestigations and does not report the initiations to SEPS. 

Consequently, the individuals continue to be shown in TRAQ as overdue 

for reinvestigation. 

 54 SEPS also monitors and reports to Security Programs Managers and the OIG 

cases in which it believes an employee has entered on duty without the necessary 

waiver and initiation of a background investigation. SEPS informed us that some of 

these cases are due to a component’s slow reporting, but in other cases background 

investigations have not been initiated. For FY 2003 through FY 2005, these cases 

generally numbered fewer than 20 per year. 

55 Administrative withdrawals of national security clearances can occur for a 

variety of reasons, including a component’s determination that an employee no longer 

needs access to classified information. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

Because SEPS did not have complete and accurate data in TRAQ 

on the specific number of individuals in the Department that were more 

than 1 year overdue for reinvestigation, in May 2005 we requested 

information on a sample of 28 overdue cases to determine how many 

were actually overdue and how many were erroneous entries in which 

reinvestigations were not reported by the component. Of the 28 sample 

cases, 14 were erroneous entries that either had a reinvestigation 

initiated or in which the employee did not require reinvestigation for 

other reasons (such as that they were no longer employed by the 

component). Of the 14 cases in which the employee was actually 

overdue for reinvestigation, we found that half – including all the 

individuals holding NSI clearances – were less than 2 years overdue, but 

some public trust employees had been overdue for longer periods, 

including one individual who was more than 10 years overdue for 

reinvestigation. Overall, our analysis indicated that processing delays 

accounted for approximately half of the backlogged EOUSA cases. 

Nonetheless, even accounting for the erroneous EOUSA entries, most of 

the backlogged cases involved EOUSA employees.56 

Because SEPS cannot independently identify when EOUSA 

initiates reinvestigations, it provides an annual status report to EOUSA 

showing the individuals overdue for reinvestigation and requests that 

EOUSA initiate appropriate action. The status reports we reviewed did 

not specifically request that EOUSA provide a response, and the PERSG 

Chief of Operations told us that EOUSA often does not respond directly 

to the status reports. Consequently, SEPS often only learns that a 

reinvestigation has been initiated when EOUSA forwards the results of 

the OPM field investigation. 

The Department does not have a centralized database containing 

information on the status of background investigations and 

reinvestigations that can be accessed and updated by SEPS staff, the 

components for which it retains authority (such as EOUSA), or 

components with delegated authority. As we will discuss in greater detail 

beginning on page 40, SEPS’s inability to monitor and manage overdue 

reinvestigations is one example of the limitations of the Department’s 

current technological resources. 

 56 EOUSA employees represent 89 percent of the backlog (357 of 399 cases in 

FY 2004), and only 54 percent of the employees for whom SEPS has retained authority 

(14,535 employees of 26,906). If half of the apparent backlog represents a delay in 

reporting, 81 percent (179 of 221) of the backlog would be EOUSA employees. 
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The Department’s Resource Requests for SEPS 

Despite efforts to increase SEPS’s staff and secure funding for 

technology improvements, the Department has not received increased 

appropriations for SEPS. In its FY 2005 budget submission, SEPS 

requested three additional PERSG positions, six additional compliance 

review security specialists, $2,000,000 to replace the TRAQ database,

and $105,000 in additional travel money for CRS site visits. SEPS’s 

budget submission tied the need for additional funding directly to the 

Department’s counter-intelligence priority and the importance of 

ensuring that the Department hire and retain only trustworthy 

personnel. The request noted that PERSG staff had worked more than 

500 hours of overtime since October 1, 2002, but that PERSG was still 

backlogged. The request explained that the existing PERSG file tracking 

system, TRAQ, was at the end of its life cycle and at full capacity, and 

that a new Department-wide system was needed to enable SEPS to 

adequately monitor the Department’s personnel security program. The 

budget submission noted the Department’s growing presence overseas 

and the need to ensure that the Department’s most vulnerable facilities 

be reviewed at least every 5 years. 

The Department supported the budget request, and the Office of 

Management and Budget approved the personnel requests and 

$1,500,000 for the new database. Funding for these items was included 

in the appropriations bill approved by the House, but it was not included 

in the final version of the appropriations bill passed by Congress for 

FY 2005. PERSG has reduced its backlog since the budget submission, 

but as previously noted, it is not able to meet regulatory timeliness 

requirements at its current staffing level. Moreover, as discussed below, 

with the implementation of HSPD-12 and the Intelligence Reform Act, 

SEPS will face an increased workload, more stringent timeliness 

requirements, and an expanded oversight role. 

SEPS’s File Tracking System 

The file tracking system SEPS uses is outdated, at full capacity, 

and does not include needed capabilities. PERSG staff told us that they 

selected the system, an inventory management program called TRAQ, 

because it had a barcode-scanning capability that allowed PERSG to 

track the physical location of each personnel security file. Currently, 

PERSG’s TRAQ system contains information on approximately 27,000 

Department employees and 7,000 contractors. This represents 
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approximately one-fourth of the Department’s employees and an 

unknown percentage of its contractors. TRAQ contains no information 

on the approximately 76,000 employees who work in the components 

with delegated adjudicative authority. 

Because TRAQ was designed to be an inventory management 

system, SEPS has modified the TRAQ software extensively to accomplish 

its internal case monitoring tasks. SEPS regularly obtains management 

reports from TRAQ to set adjudication priorities, identify personnel due 

for reinvestigation, evaluate security clearance levels, and monitor its 

adjudicative backlog. However, according to SEPS’s technical staff, 

TRAQ does not provide needed capabilities and cannot be modified 

further. In a briefing prepared for the budget director on SEPS’s 

justification for its FY 2006 budget request, SEPS staff stated that the 

TRAQ vendor told SEPS it has pushed the system well beyond its limits 

and capacity and is at risk of losing data due to system crashes. SEPS 

staff further stated, “The application will eventually fail due [to] the 

amount of records the system is trying to manipulate.” TRAQ’s specific 

limitations include: 

• TRAQ cannot be modified to support continuity of operations. 

SEPS staff stated that because the system does not support 

scanned images, the paper files must be retrieved for each step in 

the background investigation process. We determined that in 

FY 2004, there were 13,509 transactions recorded in TRAQ for 

which paper files were needed. SEPS informed us that there were 

an additional 5,166 transactions on SCI clearances and clearance 

certifications, which are kept in separate paper files and not 

recorded in TRAQ.57 Four file room clerks are needed to manage 

the paper copies of the files. (See Tables 1 and 2 for workload 

statistics.) Further, all of SEPS’s paper files are maintained in one 

location. Because electronic copies have not been made, the loss 

of the paper records would severely disrupt case processing and 

clearance verification. For example, if a bioterrorist attack 

precluded access to the building housing the records, SEPS would 

lose access to a significant portion of the documents supporting 

 57 The 5,166 SCI clearance and clearance verifications took place in calendar 

year 2004. 
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the adjudication of employees’ background investigations and 

other suitability issues.58 

• TRAQ crashes and file corruptions occur frequently. Because the 

system is outdated and operating over its intended capacity, 

system crashes and file corruption are a common occurrence. 

SEPS did not keep a log of the frequency or duration of system 

malfunctions, but the SEPS technical staff we interviewed stated 

that, at times, system crashes occurred several times a day. 

Because SEPS has modified the system beyond its intended 

capabilities, it is no longer fully supported by the vendor. As a 

result, SEPS technical staff must troubleshoot TRAQ and maintain 

electronic and hard copy backups. 

• TRAQ has no internal quality control features. TRAQ lacks the 

quality control capabilities typically built into databases to ensure 

data accuracy. For example, TRAQ does not recognize when 

processing dates for cases are not sequential. Because the 

software lacks internal quality controls, SEPS pays a contractor to 

review the data entry for accuracy. 

• TRAQ is accessible only to SEPS personnel. Personnel security 

staff from the components cannot directly access TRAQ. As a 

consequence, they cannot obtain case processing status or verify 

clearances without faxing requests or telephoning SEPS 

adjudicators for updates. In their responses to the PERSG 

customer service survey and our survey of Security Programs 

Managers, a number of components stated that they want to 

access status information on particular cases without having to 

call PERSG. 

• TRAQ’s report-generating capabilities are limited. PERSG staff told 

us that TRAQ cannot easily generate ad hoc reports or reports that 

can be shared with components or other external agencies. 

Advanced programming skills are necessary to create new reports 

from TRAQ, and the layout cannot be modified to improve clarity. 

SEPS staff must export data from TRAQ into Microsoft Access to 

generate reports it routinely shares with the components, such as 

 58 SEPS could reconstruct the adjudicative decisions and personnel security 

files from backup copies of TRAQ and copies of material obtained from the investigating 

agencies, personnel and internal affairs offices and other sources, but the process 

would be time-consuming. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

reports on cases pending adjudication or requiring reinvestigation, 

and individuals who have been hired on waivers. 

No Centralized Background Investigation Database 

The Department has no centralized personnel security database 

that SEPS can use to monitor the background investigation status of all 

Department employees. Instead, components maintain information on 

the background investigations of their personnel in separate systems 

that are not interoperable or accessible to SEPS. Some components keep 

their records in Oracle databases, while others maintain their records in 

Microsoft Access databases or Excel spreadsheets. Further, these 

systems do not track the same information regarding the background 

investigation process steps to enable comparison across components. 

Based on our review of SEPS’s budget requests and our 

discussions with SEPS staff regarding their oversight program, we 

identified a number of areas in which the lack of a centralized database 

impedes SEPS’s ability to conduct oversight of the components’ 

background investigation processes: 

• SEPS cannot systematically monitor compliance with prehiring 

requirements. Components must initiate a background 

investigation and complete a waiver before personnel can enter on 

duty. SEPS monitors compliance with this requirement for its own 

workload by downloading biweekly National Finance Center data 

and comparing it to background investigations. While SEPS has 

this tool available for monitoring compliance in the components for 

which it has retained authority, it is not able to conduct 

comparable tests to monitor compliance in the components with 

delegated authority. 

• SEPS cannot systematically monitor compliance with 

reinvestigation requirements. Because EOUSA initiates its own 

reinvestigations, SEPS cannot determine which reinvestigations 

EOUSA has initiated until it receives the paperwork, often more 

than a year later. SEPS therefore cannot identify EOUSA 

personnel who have not completed reinvestigation requirements. 

SEPS also cannot systematically monitor compliance with 

reinvestigation requirements in the components with delegated 

authority, such as timely initiation of reinvestigations and timely 

adjudication of completed reinvestigations, because those 

components initiate and adjudicate their own reinvestigations. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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• SEPS cannot conduct random reviews of the completeness of 

component field investigations. CRS staff must notify components 

in advance to obtain rosters and paper copies of the files, and does 

not review the substance of the adjudicator’s decision. 

• SEPS cannot verify that components are conducting required 

training on the handling of classified information. All components 

are required to ensure that personnel with security clearances are 

given initial training and refresher briefings. Security Programs 

Managers we surveyed reported they use a variety of tracking 

mechanisms, from databases to paper files, to ensure that 

components’ employees receive initial and refresher briefings as 

required. However, not all Security Programs Managers from 

components with field offices conducted direct oversight of field 

office practices. 

• SEPS cannot determine electronically whether components 

annually certify the need for access to classified information. 

SEPS uses a paper questionnaire to verify that personnel in the 

components that SEPS manages have justified the need to retain 

security clearances, and oversight of component compliance with 

this requirement is limited to the sites CRS visits. 

As described previously, TRAQ was not designed as a case 

management database and cannot be further expanded to provide SEPS 

with additional capabilities it needs to effectively oversee the components’ 

background investigation processes. SEPS’s compliance reviews cover 

only a small fraction of Department personnel each year. A Departmentwide database with imaging capability could reduce the risks inherent in 

a paper-based system and enable SEPS to better oversee components’ 

background investigations programs. 

Because this review focused on SEPS, we did not examine whether 

the components’ tracking systems are similarly limited in their 

capabilities to provide oversight of their internal processes. In our 

discussions with component Security Programs Managers and SEPS 

staff, however, we were informed that the DEA is the only component 

that currently maintains electronic copies of its background investigation 

files. Therefore, a Department-wide database with imaging capability 

could provide a security benefit to components with delegated authority, 

as well as to SEPS. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

SEPS has identified the need for a Department-wide database and 

has requested resources to develop one. The Department concurred with 

SEPS’s request, and in FY 2005, requested at least $2 million to replace 

TRAQ with a Department-wide system. However, the funding was not 

included in the FY 2005 Appropriations Act passed by Congress. 

In its FY 2006 budget request, SEPS has again sought requested 

funding for a Department-wide database, stating that a new Departmentwide personnel security database would: (1) allow the Department to reengineer its background investigation process to comply with the e-Gov 

initiative; (2) improve timeliness by electronically initiating, receiving, 

monitoring, and storing background investigations, reinvestigations, and 

security clearances; (3) improve communication and information sharing 

within the Department; (4) eliminate duplicate investigations, thereby 

saving time and money for Department components; (5) enable better 

enforcement of personnel security standards, and (6) support better 

oversight at the Department level. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

New standards for background investigations contained 

in the Intelligence Reform Act and HSPD-12 will 

significantly increase SEPS’ requirements for processing 

and oversight of background investigations. Meeting the 

new timeliness standards in the Intelligence Reform Act 

will require SEPS to significantly expedite background 

investigation adjudications. In addition, HSPD-12 

established additional processing requirements for 

contractors that will increase SEPS’s workload. SEPS 

will also be required to provide additional oversight of 

components with delegated authority to ensure that 

they comply with the standards. 

Timeliness Requirements of the Intelligence Reform Act 

The Intelligence Reform Act imposes progressively tighter 

timeliness requirements for adjudications and field investigations that 

will overwhelm SEPS’s limited capabilities. To meet the new timeliness 

standards, SEPS will have to expedite adjudications significantly. SEPS 

also must increase its oversight of the timeliness of field investigations 

conducted by the FBI and the ATF to ensure that they meet the new 

standards. At present, we believe that SEPS is not well positioned to 

meet these challenges. 

Adjudications. Currently, the only formal timeliness requirement 

is that adjudications of background investigations and reinvestigations 

are to be completed within 90 days.59 The Intelligence Reform Act 

shortened these timeliness requirements. By the end of 2006, 80 percent 

of adjudications must be completed within an average of 30 days, and by 

the end of 2009, 90 percent of adjudications must be completed within 

an average of 20 days. 

To meet the new timeliness standards, SEPS will have to greatly 

reduce the time it takes to complete adjudications. For example, 

according to data in TRAQ, in FY 2004 SEPS completed 59 percent of its 

adjudications of employees’ NSI background investigations within 

30 days, and completed 46 percent of its adjudications within 20 days 

(see Table 8). Thus, to meet the December 2006 timeliness standard of 

80 percent in 30 days, SEPS will have to greatly increase the number of 

 59 See 5 C.F.R. § 732.302(b). 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

adjudications it completes within that time. Meeting the standard for 

adjudications of employee reinvestigations and contractor background 

investigations will require even greater increases. In FY 2004, SEPS 

adjudicated only 31 percent of employee reinvestigations and only 21 

percent of contractor background investigations within 20 days. 

Table 8: How SEPS FY 2004 Adjudication Performance Compares to 

Intelligence Reform Act Timeliness Requirements* 

Percentage of SEPS 

Adjudications Completed within 90 Days within 30 Days within 20 

Days 

Standards

 Current 2005 100 — — 

 December 2006 — 80 — 

 December 2009 — — 90 

SEPS Adjudications in FY 2004

 Employee NSI Background Investigations 87 59 46 

 Employer NSI Reinvestigations 60 39 31 

 Contractor NSI Background Investigations 93 43 21 

Source: SEPS TRAQ 

* For personnel with Secret or Top Secret clearances 

Field Investigations. As of July 2005, there were no regulatory 

requirements regarding the timeliness of field investigations on 

background investigations. The Intelligence Reform Act requires that, by 

December 2006, 80 percent of field investigations be completed within 90 

days. By December 2009, 90 percent of field investigations must be 

completed within 40 days. As with adjudications, meeting the new 

standards will require that field investigations be significantly accelerated 

from current performance levels. 

The FBI and OPM conduct the field investigations on those cases 

for which SEPS retains adjudication authority. In FY 2004, the FBI took 

an average of 197 days to complete a field investigation for SEPS. The 

FBI completed approximately 25 percent of its NSI investigations within 

90 days and less than 10 percent within 40 days in FY 2004 (see 

Table 9). Although OPM’s actions are not within the control of the 

Department of Justice, we noted that the time it takes OPM to conduct 

field investigations for SEPS will also have to be significantly reduced to 

meet the new standards. In FY 2004, OPM’s highest priority cases took 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

an average of 100 days, and its routine cases took an average of 324 

days.60

Table 9: How FBI FY 2004 Field Investigation Performance 

Compares to Intelligence Reform Act Timeliness Requirements* 

Percentage of NSI Field 

Investigations Completed 

by FBI 

within 90 

Days 

within 40 

Days 

Standards

 December 2006 80 — 

 December 2009 — 90 

FBI Performance in FY 2004

 Employee NSI Background Investigations 24 8 

Source: SEPS TRAQ 

* For personnel with Secret or Top Secret clearances 

Oversight Implications of Timeliness Standards. Given its 

currently available methods of oversight, SEPS is not well positioned to 

meet the standards of the Intelligence Reform Act. The Act will require 

SEPS to ensure that the FBI and the ATF (the two Department 

components with authority to conduct field investigations) meet 

timeliness standards for those investigations. SEPS does not currently 

review the timeliness of these field investigations, since there were no 

regulatory timeliness requirements before the Act. The new timeliness 

standards will also apply to the adjudications conducted by Department 

components with the delegated authority to carry out those actions. 

Our review of SEPS’s oversight of components with delegated 

authority found that its primary oversight of components’ timeliness in 

adjudications is accomplished through OPM, which provides SEPS with 

an annual report on the Department’s overall compliance with the 90-

day adjudication standard, broken down by component. SEPS may then 

address any concerns OPM raised about timeliness with the component 

 60 The FBI’s field investigations for SEPS averaged 197 days in FY 2004. 
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directly.61 In addition, CRS examines the timeliness of the case 

processing in the particular files they select for review prior to field visits. 

However, as CRS has been conducting an average of less than 40 site 

visits each year, the information gained by those reviews was limited and 

anecdotal. 

To conduct effective oversight of the components’ compliance with 

the new requirements, SEPS will require additional data, beyond the 

annual compliance numbers provided by OPM, that will enable it to track 

cases as they progress to completion. As described above, the 

Department does not presently have the databases and other 

technological infrastructure to allow SEPS to effectively monitor and 

analyze the components’ performance at processing background 

investigations. 

Other Background Investigation Processing. Our review of the 

required timeframes established by the Intelligence Reform Act found 

that, as the law is written, no additional time is allowed for aspects of the 

background investigation process that are not included in the field 

investigation or adjudication phases. For example, there are three 

categories of cases for which an additional review is conducted between 

completion of the field investigation and SEPS’s adjudication: 

(1) political appointees undergoing confirmation, whose files are reviewed 

by the Senate; (2) attorneys, whose files are reviewed by the Office of 

Attorney Recruitment and Management; and (3) non-attorney personnel 

at the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, whose files are reviewed by EOUSA. 

Even in cases in which there is no additional review before the files 

are transmitted to SEPS, it can take several weeks to physically transmit 

the paper case files between the investigative and adjudication offices.

Table 10 shows the average time lapse between when field investigations 

were completed and when the case files reached SEPS for adjudication 

during the last 5 fiscal years. In some cases, the time needed for 

additional reviews between the field investigation and the adjudication 

would make difficult, or preclude, meeting the timeframes of the 

Intelligence Reform Act. 

 61 Correspondence an OPM Investigations Program Specialist e-mailed to 

PERSG concerning FY 2004 indicated that OPM was generally satisfied with the 

Department’s timeliness. (E-mail October 27, 2004, subject “Adjudication”; e-mail 

August 13, 2004, “Another Achievement for DOJ.”) 
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Table 10: Average Days Between Field Investigation Completion 

and SEPS’s Receipt* 

Field Investigation Reviewed 

Before Forwarding to SEPS

FY 

2000

FY 

2001

FY 

2002

FY 

2003

FY 

2004

Senate-confirmed political 

appointees 145 89 101 50 — 

Attorneys 52 37 48 73 43 

EOUSA cases 185 165 199 161 129 

Field Investigation Sent Directly 

to SEPS 40 38 26 19 10 

Source: SEPS TRAQ 

* For all employees 

Requirements of HSPD-12 

HSPD-12, issued by the President in August 2004 and scheduled 

to be implemented in stages beginning October 27, 2005, will expand 

SEPS’s oversight responsibilities to include monitoring identification card 

recertifications for all employees and contractors, and checking hiring 

practices for contractors who are investigated and hired locally. The 

directive establishes minimum government-wide background 

investigation requirements for entry on duty and requires an 

identification card recertification process every 5 years for employees and 

contractors. Although the Department and SEPS had not fully decided 

how to implement the Directive during our fieldwork, we can describe the 

impact of HSPD-12 requirements on SEPS’s oversight responsibilities. 

Pre-Employment Background Checks. HSPD-12 requires that 

agencies conduct several background checks in order to issue official 

identification cards to employees. The minimum National Agency Checks 

required are the Security/Suitability Investigations Index, Defense 

Clearance Investigation Index, FBI Name Check, and the FBI National 

Criminal History Fingerprint check. In addition, HSPD-12 requires that 

written inquiries be sent to verify past employment, education, 

residences, and references. It also requires a check of law enforcement 

databases for addresses where the applicant has lived. This background 

investigation is called the NACI (National Agency Checks with Inquiries). 

As initially issued, HSPD-12 required that all steps of the investigation 

except the paper inquiries be completed before employees could be 

issued identification cards. In FY 2004, this process took an average of 

89 days to complete, according to information that OPM provided to 

SEPS regarding the NACI process. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

In May 2005, Department officials from SEPS and the OCIO 

involved in implementation of HSPD-12 raised concerns about the length 

of time necessary to complete the NACI process. They were particularly 

concerned about delays encountered in the FBI Name Check process.62 

In August 2005, OMB amended the guidance on the directive to state 

that if the results of the National Agency Checks were not received within 

five days, only completion of a favorable fingerprint check would be 

required prior to issuance of a building access identification card. 

Identification Card Recertifications. HSPD-12 requires that 

background checks be verified every 5 years in order to renew each 

employee’s identification card. As described to us by OCIO staff, the 

recertification will not require a new NACI check. Instead, the office that 

issues the identification card will check the employee’s personnel 

security record to verify that an HSPD-12 certification was completed 

when the identification card was originally issued. As long as the check 

of the employee’s personnel record does not reveal any other prohibiting 

factors, the card may be recertified. 

One potential increase in SEPS’s reinvestigation workload could 

occur because the timeframes established by HSPD-12 for renewing 

identification cards do not coincide with existing OPM requirements for 

background reinvestigations. HSPD-12 guidelines require that 

identification cards be renewed no more than 5 years after issuance, 

whereas OPM’s standards consider a reinvestigation to be current if it is 

initiated within 5 years after the previous background investigation was 

completed. Therefore, an employee’s HSPD-12 identification card must 

be recertified before SEPS is required to complete a reinvestigation. 

SEPS officials told us that the possibility of requiring a reinvestigation 

before an HSPD-12 identification card is renewed had not been ruled out 

as of July 2005. However, if SEPS conducts these actions separately, the 

number of cases SEPS will have to track and manage each year will 

increase.63 Conversely, if the decision is made to conduct 

 62 According to the Section Chief of the FBI National Name Check Program, the 

FBI Name Check can take extended period of time because of a number of factors, 

including the steady increase in the number of routine and expedited requests that 

have resulted from government-wide changes to security, citizenship, and visa 

application policies; understaffing in the FBI’s National Name Check Program office that 

processes the name check requests; and the need for a manual review of case files that 

are identified by the FBI database as possible hits. 

63 According to TRAQ, about 2,400 employees were reinvestigated in each of the 

last 5 years. 
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

reinvestigations early so that they are completed concurrent with the 

HSPD-12 recertification, that would effectively shorten the reinvestigation 

cycle, which would in turn result in an increase in the number of 

reinvestigations that SEPS would have to conduct each year. 

Oversight of Contractors. Our review of the SEPS oversight 

program found that it will have to be expanded if it is to cover 

components’ compliance with all HSPD-12 requirements regarding 

contractors. Staff from SEPS and the OCIO confirmed that HSPD-12 

requirements will extend to certain contractors who are currently 

investigated and hired at the local level without centralized oversight. At 

present, SEPS obtains no case processing information on contractors 

hired locally by components. CRS security staff told us that when they 

visit a site that has locally-hired contractors, they request a roster and 

check the files kept on site. CRS will also talk to the General Services 

Administration about shared contract staff, such as janitors.64 The lack 

of a central Department-wide database prevents SEPS from easily 

identifying whether contractors from sites it has not visited have received 

the proper background check or even whether they are still employed. 

 64 Prior OIG reports found that these contractors’ employment status cannot be 

easily verified because they are not always paid through the centralized National 

Finance Center payroll system. See “Background Investigations Conducted by the 

United States Marshals Service,” OIG Evaluation and Inspections Division Report 

I-2005-002, February 2005. A May 2005 OIG Audit report indicated concern that the 

USMS could not document the background investigations of over half its locally hired 

contractors. See “United States Marshals Service's Use of Independent Contractors as 

Guards,” Audit Report 05-24, May 2005. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

As the Department’s primary security office, SEPS is responsible 

for adjudicating background investigations, initiating reinvestigations, 

and providing security clearances for approximately 27,000 of the 

Department’s approximately 103,000 employees and about 7,000 

contractors. In addition, SEPS is responsible for developing, 

implementing, and disseminating security policies to all Department 

components. It must also oversee the physical, personnel, contractor, 

information, computer, emergency preparedness and communications 

security programs of the Department’s 3,000 to 3,500 field offices. 

To compensate for the increase in background investigation 

workload during FY 2000 through FY 2004, SEPS prioritized its 

responsibilities, placing the greatest emphasis on adjudicating 

background investigations and on processing and verifying SCI 

clearances. As a result, in FY 2004, it met federal regulatory 

requirements for adjudicating background investigations within 90 days 

in 99 percent of its highest priority cases and in 85 percent of cases 

overall. Department components also expressed satisfaction with the 

service SEPS provided on SCI clearances and clearance verifications for 

Department employees and contractors. However, SEPS did not process 

lower priority reinvestigations on time and did not fully meet other 

important responsibilities related to policy and oversight. Moreover, new 

standards for background investigations contained in the Intelligence 

Reform Act and HSPD-12 will significantly change the standards the 

Department must meet in completing background investigations. 

Policy Guidance. The policy guidance SEPS provides on the 

management of background investigations is inconsistent, outdated, and 

not widely and readily accessible. SEPS has not issued a complete 

revision of DOJ Order 2610.2A since 1990. Instead, SEPS has issued 

over 40 separate update memorandums between 1990 and 2005. 

Moreover, the guidance does not reflect changes in the security 

environment since September 11, 2001. SEPS’s personnel security staff 

told us that it has been unable to issue updated security policies and 

guidance because of limited staff, a small budget, and an increasing 

caseload. We also found that SEPS has not effectively used available 

technology, such as the Department’s intranet, to disseminate updates to 

policy and guidance. As a result, Security Programs Managers indicated 

in surveys that they find the guidance confusing. 
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Limited Oversight. CRS serves as the primary vehicle for 

conducting oversight of the personnel security operations of components 

with delegated authority for managing background investigations. 

However, we found that CRS reviews are limited both in number and in 

the scope of the examination related to personnel security. With only 

three Security Specialists in CRS, SEPS is generally unable to meet its 

goal of conducting 60 security compliance reviews each year. Even if it 

could complete 60 reviews, that would be about 2 percent of the 

Department’s offices. Further, personnel security constitutes a small 

portion of each review, and Security Specialists do not perform 

substantive reviews of adjudication or investigation quality. We 

concluded that this minimal oversight is insufficient to ensure that the 

Department is in compliance with personnel security regulations. 

SEPS also relies on outdated technology for case tracking. 

Because TRAQ is a stand-alone system unavailable to other components, 

SEPS employees and security officials in other components have no 

centralized source for background investigation data. Further, because 

TRAQ was not designed as a case management database, it lacks 

internal quality controls or image scanning capabilities. SEPS therefore 

must rely on manual quality reviews and paper-based background 

investigation files. The reliance on paper-based files, which are all stored 

in one location, presents a security risk in the event those records are 

destroyed or inaccessible. According to TRAQ managers, the application 

has reached system capacity and frequently crashes, causing file 

corruption. Further, because there is no Department-wide database of 

background investigation information, SEPS cannot perform systematic 

oversight of the components to identify weaknesses in the Department’s 

personnel security program, such as components’ failure to comply with 

NSI requirements. 

SEPS Not Well Positioned to Meet New Requirements. With its 

current resources, processes, and authority, SEPS will have difficulty 

both in meeting the performance requirements of the Intelligence Reform 

Act and HSPD-12, and in providing oversight of the Department’s 

compliance with those requirements. The Intelligence Reform Act 

requires that, by the end of 2006, 80 percent of NSI adjudications must 

be completed within 30 days, and by 2009, 90 percent of NSI 

adjudications must be completed within 20 days. SEPS will have to 

significantly improve its timeliness to meet the standards mandated by 

the Intelligence Reform Act, because in FY 2004, SEPS completed only 

59 percent of its NSI adjudications within 30 days. At current staffing 
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levels, SEPS will not be able to speed up adjudications to meet these 

requirements. 

Also, HSPD-12, which mandates a standardized identification card 

for government employees and contractors, will change the Department’s 

hiring practices. HSPD-12 will require that SEPS expand its oversight 

program to monitor the background investigation process for locally 

hired contractors. However, until a consolidated Department-wide 

background investigation database is implemented, SEPS has neither the 

technological infrastructure nor the staff to monitor compliance with 

these requirements. 

While we believe that SEPS has taken reasonable steps to use the 

resources available to meet its case processing workload, SEPS 

nonetheless cannot fully meet existing and future regulatory 

requirements. To effectively carry out its responsibilities, SEPS must 

improve its capabilities for managing background investigations, 

providing timely and accurate policy guidance for the Department, and 

conducting oversight to ensure the effective administration of the 

background investigation program in the Department. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

We make six recommendations to help improve SEPS’s 

performance of its personnel security responsibilities and better position 

the Department to meet the requirements of the Intelligence Reform Act 

and HSPD-12. 

We recommend that the Department: 

1. Develop a Department-wide plan for implementing the personnel 

security requirements of the Intelligence Reform Act and HSPD-12, 

and identify the resources that will be needed to enable the 

Department to meet the new requirements. 

2. Develop a Department-wide database with imaging capability to 

enable uniform processing and tracking of employee and 

contractor personnel security actions, permit central oversight of 

personnel security operations, and reduce the vulnerability caused 

by reliance on paper records. 
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We recommend that SEPS: 

3. Once OPM provides the necessary policy decisions, expeditiously 

issue an updated Department personnel security policy, DOJ 

Order 2610.2A. 

4. Develop a plan for conducting routine oversight of components 

with delegated authority that provides reasonable coverage and 

ensures that the background investigations and adjudications 

meet established standards for both quality and timeliness. 

5. Institute an annual report to the Deputy Attorney General to 

describe the performance of the Department and each component 

in adjudicating background investigations and in complying with 

Department personnel security regulations and policies. 

6. Establish procedures to identify the policies, documents, and other 

information necessary for personnel security operations, and in 

coordination with the Department’s Office of the Chief Information 

Officer, make the documents available through the SEPS web site. 
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APPENDIX I: Components With Delegated Authority 

Delegated Authority Related to Background Investigations 

Office of the Attorney General 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

Office of the Associate Attorney General 

(authority not delegated) 

With 

Delegated 

Authority?

With 

Delegated 

Authority?

Office of the Solicitor General Federal Bureau of Prisons 3

Office of the Inspector General 3 Drug Enforcement Administration 3

Office of Legal Counsel Federal Bureau of Investigation 3

Office of Legal Policy 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives 

3

Office of Intelligence Policy and Review U.S. Marshals Service 3

Office of Professional Responsibility 

INTERPOL - U.S. National Central 

Bureau 

3

Office of Legislative Affairs Executive Office for Immigration Review 3

Office of Intergovernmental and Public 

Liaison Office of the Pardon Attorney 

Office of Information and Privacy U.S. Parole Commission 3

Office of Public Affairs Executive Office for U.S. Trustees 3

Office of Dispute Resolution Community Relations Service 3

Justice Management Division Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 

Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys 3 Office of Justice Programs 3

Antitrust Division 3

Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services -- COPS 

Civil Division 3 National Drug Intelligence Center 3

Civil Rights Division 

3 Professional Responsibility Advisory 

Office 

Criminal Division 3 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee 

Environment and Natural Resources 

Division 3 Office on Violence Against Women 

Tax Division 3

Source: Department of Justice Public Website (http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/mission.htm) 
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Components With Delegated Authority to Conduct and Adjudicate 

Background Investigations and Reinvestigations 

With Delegated Authority 

to Conduct 

Field Investigations for:a

With Delegated Authority 

to Conduct 

Adjudications for: 

Components Employees Contractors Employees Contractors 

OIG 3

Executive Office for United States Attorneys 3

Antitrust Division 3

Civil Division 3

Civil Rights Division 3

Criminal Division 3

Environmental and Natural Resources 

Division 

3

Tax Division 3

Federal Bureau of Prisons 3 3

DEA 3 3

FBIb 3 3 3 3

ATFc 3 3 3 3

USMSd 3 3 3

INTERPOL 3

Executive Office for Immigration Review 3

U.S. Parole Commission 3

Executive Office for United States Trustees 3 3

Community Relations Service 3

Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services 

3

National Drug Intelligence Center 3 3

Source: SEPS 

a OPM conducts field investigations for all Department employees and contractors, 

except for political appointees, attorneys, and the specific categories of employees or 

contractors in the ATF, FBI, and USMS. 

b The FBI conducts field investigations for all of the Department’s political appointees 

and attorneys, as well as for its own employees and contractors. 

c The ATF conducts field investigations for all its employees and contractors except 

political appointees and attorneys. 

d The USMS conducts background investigations of Court Security Officers and some 

contractors who are hired directly by USMS Districts. 
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APPENDIX II: SEPS’s Organization 

Director

Security and Emergency Planning Staff

Deputy Director

Security and Emergency Planning Staff

Executive Officer

Security and Emergency Planning Staff

Assistant Director

Facilities and Personnel 

Protection Group

Associate Director

Emergency Management 

Operations and Policy Group

Assistant Director

Office of Information 

Safeguards and Security 

Oversight

Assistant Director

Personnel Security Group

Chief

Operations Section

Chief

Policy, Training, and 

Oversight Section

Chief

Classified 

Information Policy 

and Operations 

Section

Chief

Litigation Security 

Section

Chief

Technical Security 

Section

Chief

Compliance Review 

Section

Chief

Physical Security 

Systems and 

Operations Section

Chief

Justice Protective 

Service Operations 

Section

Chief

Operations Section

Chief

Policy Section

Source: SEPS 
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APPENDIX III: The Justice Management Division’s Response 
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APPENDIX IV: THE OIG’S ANALYSIS OF JMD’S RESPONSE 

On August 11, 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) sent 

copies of the draft report to the Assistant Attorney General for 

Administration with a request for written comments. The Assistant 

Attorney General for Administration provided the Justice Management 

Division’s (JMD) final written comments to us in a memorandum dated 

September 9, 2005 (Appendix III). 

JMD concurred with all six of our recommendations. However, we 

will require additional details regarding JMD’s proposed plans to assess 

their effectiveness in meeting the intent of the recommendations. Our 

analysis of JMD’s response to each recommendation follows. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: Develop a Department-wide plan for 

implementing the personnel security requirements of the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act) 

and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), and identify 

the resources that will be needed to enable the Department to meet the 

new requirements. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of JMD’s Response: JMD stated that the Department 

has an HSPD-12 plan that includes personnel security requirements 

imposed by that Directive. The Department’s final implementation plan 

was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget on August 27, 

2005. With respect to the Intelligence Reform Act, JMD stated that the 

Security and Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS) will develop a plan by 

September 30, 2005, to implement the personnel security requirements 

of that statute for adjudicating background investigations. 

OIG’s Analysis: To enable the OIG to assess these plans, please 

provide the OIG with copies of both implementation plans by October 3, 

2005. 

Recommendation 2: Develop a Department-wide database with 

imaging capability to enable uniform processing and tracking of 

employee and contractor personnel security actions, permit central 
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oversight of personnel security operations, and reduce the vulnerability 

caused by reliance on paper records. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of JMD’s Response: JMD stated that a Department-wide 

database to track both employee and contractor personnel security 

actions is part of the HSPD-12 plan and budget. The database will not 

include imaging capability, but JMD stated that copies of all of SEPS’s 

background investigations are maintained separately by the investigating 

agencies. JMD also stated that under the Office of Personnel 

Management’s (OPM) e-Gov initiative, all investigating agencies will 

eventually move to electronic records of background investigations and a 

paperless environment for their customers. 

OIG’s Analysis: By January 13, 2006, please provide the OIG with 

a copy of the plan for a Department-wide database for tracking employee 

and contractor personnel security actions that meets OPM’s requirement 

for a paperless process and that addresses the interoperability, oversight, 

and continuity of operations requirements identified in our review. As 

the response indicates that the imaging capability may be distributed 

among investigative agencies, the plan should include JMD’s proposal to 

ensure that JMD and the components with delegated investigative 

authority develop and implement compatible systems that meet OPM 

requirements. The plan should confirm that the systems will also 

provide electronic storage capability for documents generated by 

components with adjudicative responsibility. The plan should include 

details on how these systems will interact to enable SEPS to conduct 

centralized oversight of the timeliness and quality of investigations and 

adjudications. 

Recommendation 3: Once OPM provides the necessary policy 

decisions, expeditiously issue an updated Department personnel security 

policy, DOJ Order 2610.2A. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of JMD’s Response: JMD stated that by November 21, 

2005, it will circulate a revised DOJ Order 2610.2A for comment by 

components. 
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OIG’s Analysis: The action described by JMD is responsive to our 

recommendation. By January 13, 2006, please provide the revised DOJ 

Order 2610.2A. If the revision has not been completed, please provide a 

timeline for incorporating comments and issuing the updated Order. 

Recommendation 4: Develop a plan for conducting routine 

oversight of components with delegated authority that provides 

reasonable coverage and ensures that the background investigations and 

adjudications meet established standards for both quality and 

timeliness. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of JMD’s Response: JMD agreed that SEPS should 

include in its compliance reviews oversight of the quality and timeliness 

of those investigations. JMD also stated that, as our report notes, SEPS 

provides oversight of the components it has delegated adjudicative 

authority to through its Compliance Review Section’s security compliance 

reviews. JMD is seeking three additional positions in the FY 2007 

budget for the Compliance Review Section to enhance its ability to 

conduct effective oversight. In the meantime, JMD stated that SEPS will 

develop a plan by September 30, 2005, to ensure that personnel security 

issues receive more attention during security compliance reviews. 

OIG’s Analysis: Please provide the OIG with a copy of the plan for 

improving personnel security oversight by October 3, 2005. The plan 

should identify all additional elements that SEPS will introduce to ensure 

reasonable oversight of the quality and timeliness of the Department’s 

background investigations. Additional staffing, if received, would 

increase SEPS’s ability to conduct oversight. But even assuming the 

proposed doubling of SEPS’s Compliance Review Section employees 

occurs, a six-member staff will be able to review only a limited portion of 

the Department’s offices each year because these SEPS employees must 

address other security requirements as well. Therefore, the plan should 

identify any additional methods by which JMD can ensure personnel 

security issues receive sufficient attention. 

Recommendation 5: Institute an annual report to the Deputy 

Attorney General to describe the performance of the Department and 

each component in adjudicating background investigations and in 

complying with Department personnel security regulations and policies. 
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Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of JMD’s Response: JMD stated that following 

implementation of the enhanced oversight plan, the Assistant Attorney 

General for Administration will report annually to the Deputy Attorney 

General on the performance of each component with delegated authority 

in complying with the Department’s adjudication regulations and 

policies. 

OIG’s Analysis: The action described by JMD is responsive to our 

recommendation. By January 13, 2006, please provide written 

procedures describing how SEPS will report to the Deputy Attorney 

General on components’ compliance with all federal and Department 

regulations and policy for which it has oversight responsibility, including 

compliance with HSPD-12 and the Intelligence Reform Act requirements. 

Recommendation 6: Establish procedures to identify the policies, 

documents, and other information necessary for personnel security 

operations, and in coordination with the Department’s Office of the Chief 

Information Officer, make the documents available through the SEPS 

web site. 

Status: Resolved – Open 

Summary of JMD’s Response: JMD stated that SEPS is 

implementing this recommendation. 

OIG’s Analysis: The action described by JMD is responsive to our 

recommendation. By January 13, 2006, please provide: (1) the date by 

which existing materials will be posted to the web site if such posting is 

not already complete and (2) written procedures for SEPS’s coordination 

with the e-Gov staff within the Office of the Chief Information Officer to 

ensure that new materials are posted to the web site in a timely manner.