ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 299 1 

China’s ongoing modernization program is transforming the country’s 

nuclear arsenal from one consisting of a few liquid-fueled, silo-based 

missiles carrying single warheads to a larger force of more advanced 

mobile solid-fueled missiles, some of which are capable of carrying multiple 

warheads. Perhaps most significant for its nuclear policies, China is also on the 

verge of fielding its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, having already 

completed four nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and with a fifth 

vessel currently under construction.1

Though China has prioritized political control of its nuclear weapons and 

maintained a distinctly restrained nuclear posture, Beijing’s emerging fleet of 

SSBNs will pose new challenges to Chinese command and control policies. But 

which military organization will ultimately command China’s sea-based nuclear 

forces? Some experts have predicted that the newly formed People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) Rocket Force, the successor to the former Second Artillery, will 

assume control of the emergent SSBN force, though such a move would entail 

substantial revision of China’s bureaucratic structures.

This article examines options for command and control of China’s seabased nuclear deterrent. It begins by examining evidence that the Rocket Force 

and its predecessor were assigned exclusive control of the country’s land-based 

arsenal. Next, it describes three notional command and control structures for 

China’s future SSBN fleet, which allocate varying degrees of control to the 

PLA Navy and Rocket Force. Each of these command and control models 

implies different requirements for the PLA’s personnel policies, institutional 

organization, and physical infrastructure. The article then examines some of 

the operational, bureaucratic, and political factors that will likely influence the 

future command and control structure of China’s SSBN force. It closes with a 

China’s Future SSBN 

Command and Control 

Structure

By David C. Logan

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

David C. Logan was a Research 

Intern in the Center for the Study 

of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, at 

the National Defense University, 

and is a graduate student in the 

Woodrow Wilson School of Public 

and International Affairs at Princeton 

University.

Key Points

◆ China is developing its first credible sea-based nuclear forces. This 

emergent nuclear ballistic missile 

submarine (SSBN) force will pose 

unique challenges to a country that 

has favored tightly centralized control over its nuclear deterrent. The 

choices China makes about SSBN 

command and control will have 

important implications for strategic 

stability.

◆ Despite claims that the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force 

will be responsible for all Chinese 

nuclear forces, Chinese SSBNs 

currently appear to be under the 

control of the PLA Navy. However, 

China may choose to revise its 

command and control structures as 

its SSBNs begin armed deterrent 

patrols. There are three broad command and control models, allocating varying degrees of authority to 

the PLA Navy or the Rocket Force.

◆ China’s decisions about SSBN command and control will be mediated 

by operational, bureaucratic, and 

political considerations. A hybrid 

approach to command and control, 

with authority divided between the 

navy and the Rocket Force, would 

be most conducive to supporting 

strategic stability.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS

November 2016
2 SF No. 299 ndupress.ndu.edu

discussion of the implications of China’s SSBN command and control choices for strategic stability.

Current Chinese Nuclear 

Command and Control

China’s nuclear deterrent has historically consisted 

of a comparatively small and immature force of landbased ballistic missiles. For decades, the nuclear forces 

of the former Second Artillery consisted primarily of a 

few dozen silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs). China ostensibly developed the capabilities 

to support a nuclear triad, but those latent technical 

capabilities never materialized into significant air- or 

sea-based legs. China’s force of H-6 intermediate-range 

bombers would be capable only of striking regional targets and is not believed to be assigned an active nuclear 

mission.2 China constructed one Type 092 Xia-class 

SSBN. However, that ship was armed with very shortrange JL-1 (CSS-N-3) submarine-launched ballistic 

missiles (SLBMs) and is not believed to have ever conducted a deterrent patrol.3 China has opted for a system 

of tightly centralized command and control of this limited arsenal. The ability to authorize a nuclear strike is 

vested solely within the Central Military Commission 

(CMC), China’s highest military decisionmaking body, 

and Beijing is believed to have maintained a practice 

of keeping warheads unmated from their missiles and 

stored in separate locations.4

China’s emergent SSBN force is poised to change 

not only the configuration of China’s nuclear arsenal but 

also the policies that guide it. China has already completed four Type-094 Jin-class SSBNs, with a fifth hull 

currently under construction. U.S. military leaders have 

estimated that China may eventually deploy as many as 

eight of these second-generation vessels.5 There is conflicting information about whether these vessels have 

already begun conducting deterrent patrols, but the Department of Defense estimates that such patrols will begin this year.6 Though its fleet of Type-094 vessels has 

only recently become operational, China reportedly has 

already begun developing a follow-on class of Type-096 

SSBNs as well as a third-generation JL-3 SLBM, which 

would expand the striking range of the sea-based leg of 

the deterrent.7

There has been very little information about the 

command and control of this emergent SSBN force. 

Some U.S. experts and nonauthoritative Chinese commentators have predicted that the newly formed Rocket 

Force would ultimately control all of China’s nuclear missiles, including the emergent SSBN force and any future 

strategic bomber force.8 However, open-source evidence 

argues against past or current Rocket Force control over 

other components of China’s nuclear forces.

First, language in China’s Defense White Papers 

and other official documents suggests that the Rocket 

Force does not currently control China’s sea-based 

nuclear forces and that the navy and the air force may 

both be assigned a nuclear mission set. As noted by one 

Chinese nuclear expert, the 2013 Defense White Paper 

explicitly attributes control of only the land-based Dongfeng ballistic missiles and Changjian cruise missiles to the 

former Second Artillery Force.9 References to China’s 

SLBM, the JL-2 (CSS-NX-14), are notably absent. 

Video featuring the official song of the newly formed 

Rocket Force similarly includes references to the Dongfeng and Changjian missiles but no reference to China’s 

sea-based weapons.10 In discussing the nuclear counterattack role of the Second Artillery, the 2013 Defense 

White Paper goes on to say that “if China comes under a 

nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the PLASAF 

[PLA Second Artillery Force] will use nuclear missiles 

to launch a resolute counterattack either independently 

or together with the nuclear forces of other services" (emphasis added).11 This comports with older references to the 

Second Artillery specifically being assigned control over 

land-based missiles.12 China’s 2008 Defense White Paper stated that “the Navy is equipped with strategic missile nuclear submarines, attack nuclear submarines, and 

conventional propulsion submarines.”13 The 2013 Science 

of Military Strategy, a PLA textbook vetted by PLA leadership and widely believed to largely represent the strategic thinking of the Chinese military, specifically directs 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 299 3 

the PLA Navy to prepare a sea-based nuclear capability: 

“The Navy should, according to the requirements of ‘nuclear-conventional dual-use equipment and dual warfare 

[核常兼备, 双重作战],’ quicken the development and 

equipment of a new-type strategic nuclear submarine to 

form, to a certain extent, a sea-based nuclear counterstrike capability.”14 Reports following the establishment 

of the new Rocket Force have reiterated that it controls 

land-based missile units and has not assumed control of 

other elements of China’s nuclear forces.15

In addition, China’s Defense White Papers also employ language that appears to attribute a nuclear mission 

set to the navy and air force. Both services are assigned 

the role of “strategic deterrence,” a concept that, within 

the White Papers, appears linked to the nuclear mission.16 The Second Artillery is uniquely described as “a 

core force for China’s strategic deterrence.”17 The opening section of the 2015 Defense White Paper, in describing the main responsibilities of China’s armed forces, 

includes the requirement “to maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack.”18 Elsewhere, 

the paper states that “the PLASAF will strengthen its 

capabilities for strategic deterrence and nuclear counterattack.”19 Every mention of “strategic deterrence” that 

implies a specific military capability appears linked to 

the nuclear mission set. Significantly, the army is not assigned a task of strategic deterrence. To the extent strategic deterrence is connected with the nuclear mission set, 

it is logical such a role would not be assigned to the army 

given that China’s land-based nuclear weapons have always been controlled exclusively by the Second Artillery.

Second, the Rocket Force appears to have neither the 

command and control architecture nor the organizational 

structure necessary to support command of sea-based nuclear weapons. Although recent military reforms sought 

to improve the ability of the PLA to conduct complex 

joint operations, the newly formed Rocket Force appears 

to remain largely outside the integrated command and 

control structures of the theater commands, instead appearing to maintain the same highly centralized systems 

of the former Second Artillery.20 Rocket Force command 

architecture appears not to overlap with the other services. Though the Rocket Force has dispatched liaison officers to the theater commands, there do not appear to be 

any Rocket Force units or organizations that assume the 

task of coordinating with other services or commanding 

non–Rocket Force units. In addition, nonauthoritative 

online sources claim that the navy’s submarine academy 

in Qingdao features 1-year majors associated with nuclear 

missile submarines, and faculty at the academy frequently 

publish on nuclear missile submarine issues.

The Rocket Force and Second Artillery were assigned control of only land-based missiles despite PLA 

development and deployment of its abortive Type-092 

Xia-class SSBN. Though that vessel is not believed to 

have ever conducted a deterrent patrol, it did put out to 

sea.21 Together, the sailing of the previous generation of 

SSBNs and a dearth of any evidence pointing toward 

Rocket Force involvement suggests the Rocket Force 

was not assigned control of China’s sea-based nuclear 

deterrent. Despite China’s continued progress toward a 

more credible sea-based deterrent and the recent military 

reforms, there is little evidence to suggest that the Rocket 

Force has gained responsibility for China’s SSBN force.

Notional Command and Control 

Structures

There are three notional command and control 

structures for China’s emergent SSBN fleet, which allocate varying degrees of command authority to the 

PLA Navy and Rocket Force. In the first model, the 

navy maintains operational control over both SSBNs 

and their associated SLBMs. In the second model, the 

Rocket Force enjoys operational control over China’s 

sea-based nuclear weapons and the SSBNs that carry 

them. In the last model, the navy has operational control of the SSBNs themselves, but the Rocket Force has 

strategic command over the nuclear weapons carried on 

the SLBMs. Each model implies different requirements 

for physical communication infrastructure, personnel 

selection and training, and organizational design. In all 
4 SF No. 299 ndupress.ndu.edu

models, the CMC would maintain the sole authority to 

authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

In the first model, the PLA would vest full operational control of SSBNs and SLBMs with the navy, 

though this model would entail the greatest change in 

China’s approach to nuclear command and control and 

would require the creation of significant new bureaucratic 

structures and processes. In this model, as with the hybrid model described below, the PLA Navy would retain 

operational control of the SSBNs. However, the navy 

would see its role in the nuclear mission greatly enhanced 

by gaining responsibility for the nuclear weapons themselves. The navy could contend that its experience operating submarines outweighs its lack of experience with 

the nuclear deterrent mission. The operating patterns of 

SSBNs, it could argue, are intimately tied to the vessel’s 

ability both to survive and to strike its targets.

Navy control of China’s sea-based nuclear weapons 

might well require the creation of a personnel reliability 

program within the navy. Though China reportedly has 

established such programs at its nuclear facilities, it is 

unlikely that navy personnel have been subjected to the 

same screening process that members of the Rocket Force 

undergo.22 In addition, while China’s longstanding practice of keeping missiles unfueled and warheads unmated 

substantially reduced the likelihood of an accidental, unauthorized, or injudicious launch, China has been slow to 

adopt the safety and security techniques common to other 

nuclear states. As recently as the 1990s, China’s personnel 

reliability program was reported to consist of little more 

than an investigation into the individual’s political background, apparently without corresponding investigations 

into the potential for financial coercion, psychological instability, or substance abuse.23 This may have changed with 

the deployment of land-based mobile nuclear ICBMs. 

Given that SSBNs must deploy with warheads already 

mated to their missiles, the need to ensure personnel reliability and negative control—guarding against an unauthorized launch—is even greater.24 Chinese academics 

have written on the unique command challenges presented by submarines, as well as the desirable characteristics of 

submarine commanders and corresponding methods for 

evaluating candidates for submarine command positions, 

but there does not yet appear to be an institutionalization 

of such processes.25

Parallel nuclear command and control systems within 

the Rocket Force and the navy would likely also require 

an institutional mechanism to coordinate targeting assignments. For decades, China has only needed to develop 

targeting plans based on a small land-based nuclear force 

operated by a single branch. However, China’s emergent 

SSBN force and the continued growth in its overall nuclear arsenal will require planning for strikes involving a few 

hundred nuclear weapons deployed across two domains 

and operated by two independent services. This need arises 

for several reasons. First, Chinese leadership would want to 

avoid multiple redundant strikes against the same target, 

especially if only a few nuclear weapons survive an initial 

strike. Second, if a nuclear counterstrike is directed at targets with military value, the PLA may need to better coordinate target selection to ensure operational “synergies,” 

such as ensuring penetration of ballistic missile defense 

systems and avoiding warhead fratricide and target overkill. 

Finally, China will have to plan targeting assignments with 

an eye to the survivability of the nuclear launch platform, 

especially for its SSBNs. Initiating a nuclear strike would 

both intensify the adversary’s efforts to eliminate Chinese 

nuclear forces and expose the location of Chinese units undertaking the launch. The need to remain invisible is likely 

even greater for SSBNs. Their patrols far away from China’s shores and their high acoustic signature heighten their 

vulnerability.26 China’s SSBNs will be loaded with multiple 

missiles, meaning they are likely to be counted on to conduct follow-on strikes.

It is unclear what body is currently responsible for developing and disseminating targeting plans. Some experts 

have argued that any operational and targeting plan would 

be developed by the CMC, with approval provided by the 

standing committee of the Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) Politburo.27 However, while any decision to launch 

a nuclear strike must be reviewed and approved by political leadership, others suggest that targeting responsibility 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 299 5 

may be concentrated within the Rocket Force. American 

experts have described the Second Artillery chief of staff 

as the “most senior strategic targeting position within the 

CCP, CMC, and PLA.”28 To the extent that the Rocket 

Force is responsible for devising targeting plans, navy 

control of China’s emergent SSBN fleet would require 

the creation of new organizational structures to coordinate Rocket Force and navy nuclear forces. However, 

if targeting responsibilities are already vested within a 

PLA-wide institution such as the CMC, there may be 

less need for bureaucratic reshuffling. For instance, John 

Lewis and Xue Litai have argued that China’s nuclear 

forces are commanded through the Strategic Forces Bureau within the General Staff ’s Operations Department, 

which provides a direct line of control from the Central 

Military Commission to brigade-level units in the field.29

This could provide a ready forum through which to coordinate nuclear targeting plans.

In the second model, the Rocket Force would make 

a play for control of China’s SSBN force and its SLBMs, 

arguing that its experience operating nuclear weapons 

should outweigh the navy’s experience operating submarines. This model would give the Rocket Force control of 

China’s sea-based deterrent, including both operational 

control of SSBNs and the missiles they carry. In this 

model, the navy would exercise administrative control 

over SSBNs and their associated personnel, but operational control would be transferred to the Rocket Force. 

Senior Rocket Force staff would be responsible for target 

selection and assignment. The Rocket Force would also 

determine the tempo and location of deterrent patrols 

and exercise operational command of vessels on patrol.

The Rocket Force might argue that its experience vetting and training personnel and providing the CMC effective negative control qualifies it to control all the country’s nuclear forces. The navy, it might contend, would have 

to develop redundant and untested bureaucratic structures 

and operating procedures and that, given the failures of 

the previous generation Xia-class vessel, the navy hardly 

has much more experience operating SSBNs. Indeed, in 

an article earlier this year outlining the recent reforms to 

the Rocket Force, Song Zhongping, a former instructor 

at the PLA Second Artillery Engineering University and 

well-known commentator on China’s nuclear forces, predicted that the newly formed Rocket Force would eventually control all of China’s nuclear forces, stating, “I think 

it’s just a matter of time.”30

Such a model would still require substantial coordination between the Rocket Force and the navy even if the 

PLA Navy had no command authority over SSBNs. Selection of patrol areas must consider the marine operating 

environment and the antisubmarine warfare capabilities 

that might be deployed there. Rocket Force officers do 

not possess the necessary training or expertise to make 

such evaluations, which might necessitate emplacement 

of navy officers within the Rocket Force chain of command. In addition to the inherent need for navy expertise 

in conducting any SSBN deterrent patrols, the particular 

design characteristics of China’s SSBNs will require additional coordination with PLA Navy assets. Given their 

high acoustic signature and China’s unfavorable maritime 

geography, China’s sea-based fleet will have to depend on 

the PLA Navy for protection, especially in transiting the 

various maritime chokepoints that separate China from 

the open ocean.

This model might also require the construction of 

new communications infrastructure. Given the challenges of radio propagation through water, communications 

with deployed submarines often depend on special very 

low frequency (VLF) radio facilities. If the Rocket Force 

had operational control over SSBNs, it might have to 

construct new VLF facilities to communicate with deployed SSBNs.31

A third hybrid model could see the Rocket Force 

exercising strategic command over China’s nuclear weapons while devolving lower-level tactical and operational 

control of SSBNs to naval commanders. In this dual 

command structure, the navy would be responsible for 

force provision, determining deterrent patrol areas, and 

exercising operational command of SSBNs while on patrol. However, the SLBMs housed on these vessels could 

only be launched on receipt of an order by the CMC 
6 SF No. 299 ndupress.ndu.edu

delivered through the Rocket Force to the navy’s SSBNs. 

The Rocket Force would be responsible for warhead handling and storage, target selection and deconfliction, and 

the nuclear personnel reliability program. 

The U.S. strategic nuclear command and control architecture provides a ready model for this kind of hybrid 

structure. Operational control for the various legs of the 

U.S. nuclear triad is vested within the commander, U.S. 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), a joint functional combatant command that is also responsible for 

space, global strike, missile defense, and counter–weapons of mass destruction operations.32 Under USSTRATCOM, the individual components of the U.S. nuclear 

triad are organized as single-Service function task forces, 

with separate task forces for land-based ICBMs, strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines, as well as 

supporting elements such as aerial refueling tankers and 

mobile command and control assets.33 The commanders 

of these respective task forces exercise tactical control 

over them, while USSTRATCOM retains operational 

control. The organize, train, and equip functions for the 

U.S. SSBN fleet are performed by two fleet commanders, 

Fleet Forces Command (formerly Atlantic Fleet) and 

Pacific Fleet. USSTRATCOM is responsible for selecting individual targets and assigning them to the units 

under its command. Such a model would comport with 

the PLA’s steady drive toward greater jointness.

The Rocket Force could even go beyond the hybrid 

model and extend control over missile launch by placing specially trained Rocket Force launch officers aboard 

SSBNs. These launch officers could be assigned exclusive control over the codes and keys necessary to launch 

SLBMs. Security measures could even include biometric 

identification to ensure that theft of codes or keys would 

be insufficient to initiate an unauthorized launch.

Such a model would represent a compromise between the two services but could also bring certain 

operational benefits. The hybrid model could ease the 

challenges of coordinating operations between SSBNs 

and supporting navy vessels. Chinese SSBNs could deploy and be commanded as part of SSBN task forces, 

including both the SSBN itself and the other navy vessels necessary to protect it either in transit to its patrol 

area or during its deployment in near-shore bastions. A 

single navy commander could be granted operational 

control of the entire task force and command and control executed using existing PLA Navy command structures and communications infrastructure.

Operational, Bureaucratic, and 

Political Considerations

China’s choice of command and control structures 

for its future sea-based nuclear weapons will be guided 

by a confluence of factors, including operational imperatives, bureaucratic politics, and political constraints. 

Some of these factors are common to all nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleets, while others are unique to 

or mediated by China’s distinctive views about nuclear 

weapons and the organization of its military.

In general, ballistic missile submarines must pursue two separate and at times contradictory operational imperatives. First, they must ensure survivability 

by operating undetected by adversary antisubmarine 

warfare (ASW) assets. Second, they must ensure that 

their operating zones place the vessel’s SLBMs within 

range of their targets. While land-based ballistic missiles face similar operating tensions, they can be more 

pronounced for SSBNs operating beyond the protective cover of the nation’s territory and with increased 

likelihood of interacting with the adversary’s assets. For 

less advanced systems like those of China, the tension 

between ensuring survivability and ensuring range to 

target is even more pronounced. The JL-2 SLBM has 

an estimated range of only 7,000 kilometers, meaning 

Chinese SSBNs would have to reach the western Pacific in order to target the continental United States. 

However, this requires China’s noisy SSBNs to transit 

a very unfavorable maritime environment potentially 

flooded with adversary ASW capabilities. The U.S. ballistic missile defense architecture imposes an additional 

constraint on the operating patterns of Chinese SSBNs. 

Chinese experts have argued that ensuring penetration 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 299 7 

of U.S. ballistic missile defense capabilities is one of the 

primary drivers of China’s push for a sea-based nuclear 

deterrent.34 Existing U.S. national and theater ballistic 

missile defense assets are oriented against missiles approaching from the north and west of the country. Missiles approaching from the south would bypass ballistic 

missile defense capabilities, but this would require Chinese SSBNs to transit to the South Pacific.

Operations by Chinese SSBNs will, at least in the 

near term, require substantial support from other navy 

assets. The high acoustic signature of China’s SSBNs, 

coupled with China’s unfavorable maritime geography, 

means that the vessels are highly vulnerable to ASW operations and will have to be protected by other Chinese 

ships or submarines. China is largely ringed by countries 

friendly to the United States, with only a few maritime 

chokepoints separating China’s near seas from the open 

ocean. China’s SSBNs are reportedly very noisy, having 

an acoustic signature as loud as the Soviet Victor-III 

SSBNs first deployed in the late 1970s.35 Some experts 

have even argued that design features of the Jin-class, 

including oversized missile compartments and many 

flood openings, limit the extent to which its acoustic 

signature can be reduced through conventional quieting 

techniques.36

The involvement of other navy assets will be required 

regardless of whether the country’s leadership opts for 

bastion or open ocean deployments. Adopting a bastion 

posture would require China to use surface vessels and 

attack submarines to close off waters near China’s shores, 

such as the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, or the South 

China Sea.37 Notional open ocean deployments might 

also require at least temporary escorts. Chinese SSBNs 

are too noisy to make it to and through the various strategic chokepoints separating China’s near seas from the 

open ocean. But some have suggested that China might 

use other navy vessels to safely escort its SSBNs to strategic chokepoints before setting the vessels free to conduct 

open ocean patrols.38 Both of these deployment patterns 

would require substantial coordination with other naval 

assets. This would likely place China’s SSBNs in close 

proximity to both Chinese submarines escorting them 

and adversary submarines searching for them.

The unique features of Chinese nuclear strategy ease 

at least one operational requirement: that of developing 

and executing complex nuclear targeting plans. China is 

believed to have adopted a countervalue nuclear strategy 

in which threatening the destruction of a handful of the 

adversary’s largest cities is thought to be sufficient for 

maintaining strategic deterrence. Such a strategy implies 

simple targeting against a few soft targets. Developing a 

second leg of the nuclear triad will require some amount 

of interservice planning and coordination. But the kind of 

complex, joint, multiplatform targeting embodied by the 

U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan is unnecessary. 

Chinese plans envision conducting nuclear strikes only in 

response to having already suffered a nuclear attack. Some 

experts have even suggested that a nuclear counterstrike 

might be undertaken several days after absorbing an adversary’s first strike.39 Given China’s comparatively small 

and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, it may be impossible for 

leadership to know how many or which weapons might 

survive to conduct a retaliatory strike. This suggests that 

there may be fewer requirements for coordination between the various legs of China’s nuclear arsenal. For example, rather than drafting complex targeting schemes, 

the CMC reportedly maintains a list of potential targets 

ranked according to their perceived value depending on, 

among other factors, the target’s value to the enemy, vulnerability, and mobility.40

Decisions about command and control of China’s 

SSBN fleet will also be mediated by bureaucratic politics, including the time-honored tradition of interservice 

rivalry. The emergent SSBN fleet may represent a prime 

opportunity to bolster a service’s resources and prestige, 

especially in an era of slower economic growth and corresponding slowdowns in defense spending. The respective 

institutional interests and political power of the Rocket 

Force and the navy will influence the design of China’s 

SSBN command and control system.

The services may view the nuclear mission as a valuable growth area. Nuclear deterrence may command 
8 SF No. 299 ndupress.ndu.edu

greater prestige than other mission sets within the Chinese military. In christening the newly established Rocket 

Force, Xi Jinping extolled its importance to Chinese national security, describing it as “a fundamental force for 

our country’s strategic deterrent, a strategic pillar for our 

country’s great power status, and an important cornerstone in protecting our national security.”41 The nuclear 

deterrent mission may also represent a reliable source of 

resources. China has dedicated substantial resources to 

undertaking a nuclear modernization program designed 

to ensure the credibility of its second-strike capability.

However, China’s distinctive views of nuclear deterrence may impose a relatively low ceiling on both the size 

of its nuclear arsenal and the mission set to which it is 

assigned. Chinese leaders have generally believed that nuclear deterrence is obtained early along the nuclear curve 

and that deterrence is largely insensitive to the shape and 

configuration of nuclear arsenals. China has been undertaking a nuclear modernization program, including 

a modest expansion of the number of nuclear weapons 

capable of hitting the continental United States, but the 

modernization efforts are attributed to concerns about 

maintaining a credible second-strike capability. China 

has instead historically opted for a “lean and effective” 

force, and Chinese leadership has shown little interest in 

developing a nuclear warfighting capability.42 The implied 

limits on the nuclear mission may make it less attractive 

to commanders seeking to expand the resources and prestige of their service.

It is unclear whether the Rocket Force or navy possess institutional preferences for the nuclear mission set. 

A disproportionate number of recent senior leaders of the 

Rocket Force and Second Artillery have served in Base 52, 

the premier conventional base opposite Taiwan, suggesting 

an institutional bias toward the conventional mission.43 Indeed, most of the dramatic growth in China’s missile forces 

has come among the conventional units; 80 percent of the 

Rocket Force’s missiles and half its personnel are assigned 

to conventional units.44 While the navy has never undertaken an operational nuclear patrol, its senior leadership 

is composed mostly of officers with experience on surface 

vessels with comparatively less representation of officers 

with experience on submarines.45

China’s particular political and strategic views toward 

nuclear weapons will also impose constraints on the operational command and control of SSBNs. In the nuclear 

domain, Chinese leadership has generally prioritized negative control over operational flexibility, opting for a system 

of highly centralized command and control to minimize 

the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch. The Central 

Military Commission, the highest-level PLA decisionmaking body, is the only entity that can authorize a nuclear 

strike. Some experts have even described a “skip echelon” 

command and control system whereby the CMC can 

communicate directly with launch brigades in the field.46

The PLA has shown a preference for centralizing control 

over high-value and strategic military assets, including 

even the Rocket Force’s conventional units. In 2010, two 

short-range ballistic missile units controlled by the army 

were transferred back to the control of the Second Artillery. China’s preference for strict centralized control of the 

country’s nuclear weapons may accentuate the path dependency of any initial force assignments.47

China’s prioritization of negative control over operational flexibility may argue for a division of command 

authority such as in the third model. The concentration of 

operational control and launch authority within a single 

service would likely streamline command and control 

from the CMC staff to deployed launch units. This would 

decrease the requirements for onerous interservice coordination and increase the positive control of China’s seabased nuclear weapons. However, China’s prioritization 

of political control over operational flexibility might cause 

leadership to decide against a highly efficient command 

structure. Instead, China may opt for dividing responsibility for vessel operations and launch authority between 

two different services, which would reinforce negative 

control and further reduce the likelihood of an accidental, 

unauthorized, or injudicious launch.48

Despite China’s historic preference for negative 

control, some American experts have argued that its 

ongoing modernization efforts may lead to operational 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 299 9 

capabilities that could reduce longstanding constraints 

on China’s nuclear policies and present new options 

for employing its nuclear forces. These observers posit 

that this could lead to an alteration of Chinese nuclear 

policies.49 This may be most pronounced with regard to 

China’s sea-based nuclear weapons. A recent article in 

the journal Fire Control and Command Control by members of the PLA Navy Submarine Academy identifies the 

difficulty of maintaining reliable communications with 

deployed ballistic missile submarines, arguing that “relevant command departments must draw up war plans and 

contingency plans in advance and consider ahead of time 

all manner of complex situations in order to ensure the 

smooth completion of the missile attack mission.”50 This 

language intimates a prioritization for positive control—

that is, a desire to ensure that nuclear missiles are always 

launched on a legitimate order, even if it potentially increases the likelihood of an unauthorized launch. Still, 

official Chinese writings state that alerting and firing 

of nuclear weapons must be ordered by the CMC, and 

there is little evidence that China’s political leadership 

has undergone such a change in its views toward nuclear 

deterrence.51

China’s Future SSBN Force and 

Strategic Stability

China’s choice of command and control structure for 

its SSBNs will have important implications for strategic 

stability between China and the United States. Other 

experts have written thoughtfully on the importance of 

various operational choices related to deterrent patrol 

patterns, predelegation of launch authority, and interactions with conventional assets.52 The internal command 

dynamics of China’s SSBNs are no less important.

Given the above operational, bureaucratic, and political considerations, it appears possible that China might 

opt for a bifurcated command and control structure in 

which the navy controls China’s nuclear ballistic missile 

submarines and the Rocket Force controls its sea-based 

nuclear missiles. Such a structure would appear to require 

the least disruptive changes to the current bureaucratic 

structures of the PLA, best satisfy China’s preference for 

centralized control of nuclear weapons, and most comport 

with China’s distinctive approach to nuclear deterrence.

The political commissar model in the Soviet and 

Chinese militaries provides some precedent for a notional 

dual command structure, and the SSBNs operated by 

USSTRATCOM are commanded at the higher levels by 

an officially joint military command. In the Soviet Union, 

SSBNs were controlled by the navy, but the launch of an 

SLBM required the agreement of both the commander 

and the political commissar.53 The PLA has been known 

to assign political commissars who have spent years in 

one service to serve in units of another service. This provides some precedent for a bifurcated command structure.

However, a dual command and control structure is 

unprecedented in the history of nuclear ballistic missile 

submarines operated by other services, and such an official division of command authority would be unique 

and likely would face a number of challenges. In the end, 

Chinese leadership may find it simpler to opt for the default and vest control of SSBNs within the navy while 

attempting to craft the structures necessary for secure 

strategic command and control and personnel reliability. 

Regardless of the ultimate command and control 

structure, there are a number of steps China can take 

with regard to its SSBN fleet to enhance strategic stability. First, China should ensure that all or at least key 

personnel serving on its SSBNs are subject to thorough 

vetting as part of a personnel reliability program. Such 

programs should include investigations not only into 

people’s political backgrounds, but also their psychological well-being, indications of substance abuse, or vulnerability to political coercion.

Second, China should attempt to establish an operational firewall between the command and control structures of its SSBNs and those of the country’s other submarine forces. China is modernizing and expanding its 

fleet of conventionally armed attack submarines, which 

will likely feature heavily in any potential conflict with 

the United States.54 U.S. antisubmarine warfare efforts designed to counter China’s conventional submarine forces 
10 SF No. 299 ndupress.ndu.edu

might inadvertently jeopardize China’s sea-based nuclear 

weapons by either destroying the SSBNs themselves or 

the command and control infrastructure shared by China’s 

conventional- and nuclear-armed submarine forces.55 To 

minimize the chances of entanglement between those 

forces, China should develop separate command and control structures supported by nonoverlapping communications facilities. China should also deploy its SSBNs away 

from both enemy ASW assets and, potentially, its own 

conventional submarines. Beijing might establish separate 

basing and support facilities for its SSBNs as well. 

Third, China should adopt a cautious approach to its 

SSBNs, especially as it struggles to perfect quieting technology and operational practices. Some experts have suggested that, given the technical limitations of China’s current class of ballistic missile submarines, including the high 

acoustic signature and the short range of its missiles, the 

SSBN fleet may be intended more for training and technology demonstration. However, China’s expected fleet of 

five to eight SSBNs suggests that the vessels may be intended for actual deterrence operations. Until China has 

confidence in the survivability of its sea-based deterrent, it 

should avoid emphasizing its role in deterrent operations. 

In writing about the advantages of a sea-based deterrent, 

Chinese experts have noted a global trend of other nuclear powers shifting a greater share of their forces to their 

SSBNs, writing that “from a global perspective, sea-based 

nuclear forces will continue to occupy a greater proportion in national deterrence systems.”56 China should avoid 

adopting a similar approach and instead maintain most of 

its nuclear force in the form of its mobile land-based systems, which are currently more survivable.

In addition, Beijing should continue its policies of 

highly centralized control of nuclear weapons in its emergent sea-based force. Some experts have argued that 

China’s authoritarian political culture, like that of the former Soviet Union, will lead its leadership to opt for tight 

control of its SSBN force.57 In the context of SSBNs, this 

likely means, first and foremost, not delegating launch 

authority to lower-level commanders. China should also 

install advanced security features on its missiles, such as 

the permissive action links used by the United States, and 

ensure that launches can only be initiated by the simultaneous actions of multiple vetted and authorized crew 

members.

Nuclear ballistic submarines have long been viewed 

as the most survivable and, therefore, stable component 

of the notional nuclear triad. But the mere existence of 

SSBNs is insufficient to guarantee a second-strike capability or contribute to strategic stability. Much depends 

on the technical and operational characteristics of the 

vessels themselves, as well as the nuclear weapons they 

carry. Questions of command and control are especially 

salient for SSBNs given the communication difficulties, 

the independence of the crew, and the potential for interaction with the adversary. Especially in the interim, 

as China’s sea-based deterrent matures, Beijing should 

ensure that its command and control policies work to 

bolster and not undermine stability.

Notes 1 Department of Defense (DOD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC: 

DOD, April 26, 2016), 26.

2 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear 

Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 4 ( June 2016), 

5–6. U.S. defense officials have recently suggested that the PLA 

Air Force may be assigned to or working toward a nuclear mission, 

though details are scarce. See, for example, DOD, Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, 38; and 

Hans M. Kristensen, “Air Force Briefing Shows Nuclear Modernizations but Ignores U.S. and UK Programs,” Federation of American 

Scientists (FAS), May 29, 2013, available at <https://fas.org/blogs/

security/2013/05/afgsc-brief2013/>.

3 Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Chase, “China’s SSBN Forces: 

Transitioning to the Next Generation,” China Brief 9, no. 12 ( June 

2009).

4 For more information on China’s policies and practices for 

handling its nuclear warheads, see Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Nuclear 

Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute, 

March 12, 2010, available at <https://project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf>.

5 Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, USN, “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” 

April 16, 2015, 9, available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/

media/doc/Locklear_04-16-15.pdf>. 

6 Language from the latest DOD report on the Chinese military 

suggested that China had not yet conducted deterrent patrols, but would 

begin soon: “China will probably conduct its first SSBN nuclear deterrent patrol sometime in 2016.” DOD, Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, 26. Other statements by 

U.S. defense officials, however, have suggested that Chinese SSBNs have 

already begun conducting patrols, though the vessels may not have been 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 299 11 

armed. See, for example, Kris Osborn, “Admiral Says China Outnumbers 

U.S. in Attack Submarines,” DODBuzz.com, February 26, 2015, available 

at <www.dodbuzz.com/2015/02/26/admiral-says-china-outnumbersu-s-in-attack-submarines/>; Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the 

Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Statement Before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016, available at <www.dia.

mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/653278/

statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment/>.

7 DOD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2016, 26.

8 See, for example, “Expert: PLA Rocket Force May Have Strategic 

Nuclear Submarine, Bomber,” China Military Online, January 8, 2016, 

available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-dailycommentary/2016-01/08/content_6850119.htm>; Kelsey Davenport, 

“China Elevates Nuclear Rocket Force,” Arms Control Association, 

March 3, 2016, available at <www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_03/

News/China-Elevates-Nuclear-Rocket-Force>; Shannon Tiezzi, “The 

New Military Force in Charge of China’s Nuclear Weapons,” The Diplomat, January 5, 2016.

9 “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” State 

Council Information Office, April 2013, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681_2.htm>.

10 “New Branch of PLA Shows off Missiles in Music Video,” 

Global Times, February 14, 2016, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/

content/968296.shtml>. 

11 “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.” 

12 For example, “China’s National Defense in 2008” [2008 年中国

的国防], Xinhua [新华], January 1, 2011, available at <www.mod.gov.

cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249949_4.htm>.

13 Ibid.

14 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], The Science of Military Strategy [战略

学] (Beijing: Military Academic Works, Academy of Military Science, 

2013) [军事科学出版社], 214.

15 Sun Kuaiji [孙快吉], “The World Looks on at the Creation of 

the Rocket Force” [放眼世界看火箭军建设], PLA Daily [解放军报], 

May 3, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/03/

content_143402.htm>.

16 Despite the connection between the nuclear domain and the 

concept of “strategic deterrence,” the two concepts do not appear to 

be synonymous within Chinese defense writings. For discussion of an 

increasingly expansive Chinese conception of “strategic deterrence,” 

see Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, China’s Evolving Approach to 

“Integrated Strategic Deterrence” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016); 

Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, “China’s Evolving Strategic Deterrence Concepts and Capabilities,” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1 

(Spring 2016), 117–136.

17 “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.”

18 “China’s Military Strategy,” State Council Information Office, May 26, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2015-05/26/c_134271001_2.htm>. 

19 Ibid.

20 David C. Logan, “PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2016), 57–62.

21 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: 

The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Hans M. Kristensen, “China SSBN Fleet 

Getting Ready—But for What?” FAS, April 25, 2014, available at 

<https://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/04/chinassbnfleet/>. 

22 Hui Zhang and Tuosheng Zhang, Securing China’s Nuclear Future (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School Project on Managing 

the Atom, 2014), 55.

23 Herbert L. Abrams, “Human Reliability and Safety in the Handling of Nuclear Weapons,” Science and Global Security 2 (1991), 339.

24 Generally, positive control refers to the ability to launch a nuclear strike whenever the authorized political decision has been made. 

Negative control refers to the ability to avoid unauthorized launches.

25 Pan Yutian [潘玉田] and Wu Mengmeng [吴猛猛], “Important Characteristics Uniquely Held by Submarine Command Officers” 

[潜艇指挥军官特有品质要素], Journal of Political Work [政工学刊], 

2015, 32–33. Both authors are affiliated with the PLA Navy Submarine Academy.

26 For an official unclassified depiction of the relative acoustic 

signatures of China’s submarines, see U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence 

(ONI), The People’s Liberation Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 

Characteristics (Washington, DC: ONI, August 2009), 20–23. For a 

discussion of the implications of the high acoustic signature of China’s 

SSBNs, see Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Noisy New Boomer,” Arms Control 

Wonk, November 24, 2009, available at <www.armscontrolwonk.com/

archive/202544/chinas-noisy-new-boomer/>.

27 John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making China’s Nuclear War 

Plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 5 (2012), 58.

28 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “Leadership Transitions in 

the Second Artillery Force at the 18th Party Congress: Implications 

for Roles and Missions,” Asia Eye, Project 2049 Institute, May 7, 2012, 

available at <http://blog.project2049.net/2012/05/leadership-transitions-in-second.html>. 

29 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China 

Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 

119–121. This bureau likely now resides within the Central Military 

Commission Joint Staff Department.

30 See, for example, “Expert: PLA Rocket Force May Have 

Strategic Nuclear Submarine, Bomber,” China Military Online, January 

8, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/08/content_6850119.htm>.

31 For discussions of China’s very low frequency facilities, see 

Wu Riqiang [吴日强], “China Does Not Need to Hurry in Allowing 

Its Strategic Nuclear Submarines to Patrol” [中国不必急于让战略

核潜艇战备巡航], Defense Times [国防时报], December 31, 2015, 

8; Bonnie Glaser and Matthew Funaiole, “Submerged Deterrence: 

China’s Struggle to Field an SSBN Fleet,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9, 

2016, available at <https://amti.csis.org/submerged-deterrence-chinasstruggle-field-ssbn-fleet/>. 

32 For an overview of the missions assigned to U.S. Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM), see “Mission and Priorities,” U.S. 

Strategic Command, April 2016, available at <https://www.stratcom.

mil/mission/>.

33 For more information on the organization of nuclear forces under USSTRATCOM and the various command relationships between 

those forces, USSTRATCOM, and the military Services, see “Task 

Forces,” U.S. Strategic Command, available at <www.stratcom.mil/

task_forces/>; Annex 3-72, Nuclear Operations of U.S. Air Force Doctrine: 

Presentation of Nuclear Forces (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis E. 

LeMay Center for Doctrine and Education, updated May 19, 2015), 

available at <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-72-D20-

NUKE-OPS-Force-Presentation.pdf>.

34 Tong Zhao, “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent,” CarnegieTsinghua Center for Global Policy, June 30, 2016, available at <http://

carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=63909>. For a technical discussion 

of the interaction between China’s SSBNs and the U.S. ballistic missile 

defense architecture, see Wu Riqiang, “Survivability of China’s SeaBased Nuclear Forces,” Science and Global Security 19 (2011), 91–120.

35 ONI, The People’s Liberation Navy, 22.

36 Christian Conroy, “China’s Ballistic-Missile Submarines: How 

Dangerous?” The National Interest, November 18, 2013. 
12 SF No. 299 ndupress.ndu.edu

37 For some discussion of possible deployment strategies and locations, including assessments of the acoustic conditions in the maritime 

zones near China’s shores, see Tian Jianwei [田剑威], “Type-094 

Nuclear Submarine: China’s ‘King of the South China Sea’” [094 型核

潜艇—中国“南海之王”], Communists [共产主义者], no. 8 (2014), 

60–61; Owen R. Cote, “Assessing the Undersea Balance Between the 

U.S. and China,” Security Studies Program Working Paper (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011), 4–11; Wu Riqiang [吴日强], “Have China’s Strategic Submarines Begun Patrolling?” 

[中国战略核潜艇开始战备巡航了吗?], Modern Ships [现代舰船], no. 

1B (2016), 33; Tong.

38 Tong.

39 Li Bin, “China and Nuclear Transparency,” in Transparency in 

Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions, ed. 

Nicholas Zarimpas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 51–53.

40 Lewis and Xue, 59.

41 Wang Shibin [王士彬] and An Puzhong [安普忠], “Founding Ceremony for Army Leading Organization, Rocket Force and 

Strategic Support Force Held in Beijing” [陆军领导机构火箭军战

略支援部队成立大会在京举行], China Military Online [中国军网], 

January 1, 2016, available at <http://cd.81.cn/content/2016-01/01/

content_6841020.htm>.

42 For more on Chinese views of nuclear weapons and Chinese 

nuclear strategy, see Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture

(New York: Routledge, 2014), 13–42; M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. 

Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of 

Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security

35, no. 2 (Fall 2010), 48–87. For evidence about the continued stability 

of those views, see Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China 

Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015), 7–50.

43 David C. Logan, “Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force,” 

forthcoming.

44 For estimates on delivery systems, see Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, 25; Kristensen 

and Norris, 2. For estimates on personnel assignment, see Jeffrey 

Lewis, “China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs,” in The Lure and Pitfalls 

of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, ed. Michael Krepon, 

Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 

May 2016), 105.

45 For information on recent leadership, including past career 

experience of PLA Navy leaders, see ONI, The People’s Liberation Navy, 

36–40; Jeffrey Becker, David Liebenberg, and Peter Mackenzie, Behind 

the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy (Alexandria, VA: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 2013), 57, 91.

46 Kenneth W. Allen and Jana Allen, Building a Strong Informatized Strategic Missile Force: An Overview of the Second Artillery Force 

with a Focus on Training in 2014, China Brief (Washington, DC: The 

Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 26.

47 See, together, Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: 

Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2012), 96; Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile 

Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, Project 2049, April 2011, 

available at <http://blog.project2049.net/2011/04/expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile.html>.

48 China’s highly centralized approach to commanding its strategic weapons, including nonnuclear assets such as conventional ballistic 

missiles, direct-ascent antisatellite weapons, and the DF-21D antiship 

missile, suggests the prioritization of political control over operational 

flexibility. 

49 See, for example, Chase and Chan, China’s Evolving Approach to 

“Integrated Strategic Deterrence.”

50 Yang Hongbo [杨洪波], Li Jianlin [李建林], and Hong 

Zhenqi [洪贞启], “Framework for an Auxiliary Decision-Making 

Support System for SLBM War Command” [潜射导弹作战指挥辅助

决策支持系统框架], Fire Control and Command Control [火力与指挥

控制] 40, no. 1 ( January 2015), 123.

51 “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces”; Cunningham and Fravel.

52 See, for example, Brendan Thomas-Noone and Rory Medcalf, 

“Nuclear-Armed Submarines in Indo-Pacific Asia: Stabiliser or Menace?” Lowy Institute, September 2015, available at <www.lowyinstitute.

org/files/nuclear-armed-submarines-in-indo-pacific-asia-stabiliser-ormenace_0.pdf>; Tong.

53 Jeremy Page, “When Sub Goes Silent, Who Has Control of Its 

Nuclear Warheads?” Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2014.

54 ONI, The People’s Liberation Navy, 18–20.

55 For a thorough discussion, see David C. Logan, “ConventionalNuclear Entanglement in China’s Missile Forces,” forthcoming. For 

some past discussion of the risks of entanglement, see Lewis and Xue, 

“Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,” 60–62; Thomas Christensen, 

“The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Missile 

Force Modernization and Its Implications for the United States,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (August 2012), 468; Michael 

Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, “U.S.-China Strategic 

Dialogue, Phase VIII Report,” Naval Postgraduate School, November 

2014, 10; Cunningham and Fravel.

56 Guo Wei [郭维], Yang Qingxuan [杨清轩], and Su Qiang 

[苏强], “Research on the Developments and Trends in Foreign Ballistic Missile Submarines” [国外弹道导弹核潜艇发展趋势研究], 

Ship Science and Technology [舰船科学技术] 37, no. 7 ( July 2015), 

233, as quoted in Tong.

57 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “China’s New Undersea 

Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” Joint Force 

Quarterly 50 (3rd Quarter 2008), 33.

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