alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 48.30 Compensation for training. ( a ) Training shall be conducted during normal working hours; miners attending such training shall receive the rate of pay as provided in § 48.22(d) (Definition of normal working hours) of this subpart B.
( b ) If such training shall be given at a location other than the normal place of work, miners shall be compensated for the additional costs, such a mileage, meals, and lodging, they may incur in attending such training sessions.
Editorial Note on Part 250
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 250 appear at 77 FR 50891, Aug. 22, 2012.

§ 250.113 What procedures must I follow when welding? ( a ) Before you weld, you must move any equipment containing hydrocarbons or other flammable substances at least 35 feet horizontally from the welding area. You must move similar equipment on lower decks at least 35 feet from the point of impact where slag, sparks, or other burning materials could fall. If moving this equipment is impractical, you must protect that equipment with flame-proofed covers, shield it with metal or fire-resistant guards or curtains, or render the flammable substances inert.
( b ) While you weld, you must monitor all water-discharge-point sources from hydrocarbon-handling vessels. If a discharge of flammable fluids occurs, you must stop welding.
( c ) If you cannot weld in one of the designated safe-welding areas that you listed in your safe welding plan, you must meet the following requirements: ( 1 ) You may not begin welding until: ( i ) The welding supervisor or designated person in charge advises in writing that it is safe to weld.
( ii ) You and the designated person in charge inspect the work area and areas below it for potential fire and explosion hazards.
( 2 ) During welding, the person in charge must designate one or more persons as a fire watch. The fire watch must: ( i ) Have no other duties while actual welding is in progress;
( ii ) Have usable firefighting equipment;
( iii ) Remain on duty for 30 minutes after welding activities end; and
( iv ) Maintain a continuous surveillance with a portable gas detector during the welding and burning operation if welding occurs in an area not equipped with a gas detector.
( 3 ) You may not weld piping, containers, tanks, or other vessels that have contained a flammable substance unless you have rendered the contents inert and the designated person in charge has determined it is safe to weld. This does not apply to approved hot taps.
( 4 ) You may not weld within 10 feet of a wellbay unless you have shut in all producing wells in that wellbay.
( 5 ) You may not weld within 10 feet of a production area, unless you have shut in that production area.
( 6 ) You may not weld while you drill, complete, workover, or conduct wireline operations unless: ( i ) The fluids in the well (being drilled, completed, worked over, or having wireline operations conducted) are noncombustible; and
( ii ) You have precluded the entry of formation hydrocarbons into the wellbore by either mechanical means or a positive overbalance toward the formation.
----

| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  May 3, 2012 |   /s/ John M. Lowber         |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                    | John M. Lowber                    |
|                    | Secretary, Treasurer and Director |
|                    | GCI, Inc.                         |

----
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<PAGE>
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<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-KSB
FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATMENTS.
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§ 36.32 Electrical components and systems. ( a ) Electrical components on mobile diesel-powered transportation equipment shall be certified or approved under Part 18, 20 or 27 of this chapter, as applicable, and shall bear the certification number assigned by MSHA.
( b ) Electrical systems on mobile diesel-powered transportation equipment shall meet the requirements of Part 18 or 27 of this chapter, as applicable.
[47 FR 11372, Mar. 16, 1982]
###### Editorial Note on Part 250

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 250 appear at 77 FR 50891, Aug. 22, 2012.

#### § 250.830 Subsurface safety devices in injection wells—subsea trees.

You must install a surface-controlled SSSV or an injection valve capable of preventing backflow in all injection wells. This requirement is not applicable if the District Manager determines that the well is incapable of natural flow. You must verify the no-flow condition of the well annually.
### §14102. Leased motor vehicles

(a) General Authority of Secretary.—The Secretary may require a motor carrier providing transportation subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 that uses motor vehicles not owned by it to transport property under an arrangement with another party to—

(1) make the arrangement in writing signed by the parties specifying its duration and the compensation to be paid by the motor carrier;

(2) carry a copy of the arrangement in each motor vehicle to which it applies during the period the arrangement is in effect;

(3) inspect the motor vehicles and obtain liability and cargo insurance on them; and

(4) have control of and be responsible for operating those motor vehicles in compliance with requirements prescribed by the Secretary on safety of operations and equipment, and with other applicable law as if the motor vehicles were owned by the motor carrier.

(b) Responsible Party for Loading and Unloading.—The Secretary shall require, by regulation, that any arrangement, between a motor carrier of property providing transportation subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 and any other person, under which such other person is to provide any portion of such transportation by a motor vehicle not owned by the carrier shall specify, in writing, who is responsible for loading and unloading the property onto and from the motor vehicle.

(Added Pub. L. 104–88, title I, §103, Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 890.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 11107 of this title prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, §102(a).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1996, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of this title.
§ 3286.411 Certifying installation. ( a ) *Certification required.* When the installation work is complete, a licensed installer must visit the jobsite and certify that: ( 1 ) The manufactured home has been installed in accordance with: ( i ) An installation design and instructions that have been provided by the manufacturer and approved by the Secretary directly or through review by the DAPIA; or
( ii ) An installation design and instructions that have been prepared and certified by a professional engineer or registered architect, that have been approved by the manufacturer and the DAPIA as providing a level of protection for residents of the home that equals or exceeds the protection provided by the federal installation standards in part 3285 of this chapter.
( 2 ) The installation of the home has been inspected as required by § 3286.503, and an inspector has verified the installation as meeting the requirements of this part.
( 3 ) All installation defects brought to the installer's attention have been corrected.
( b ) *Recipients of certification.* The installer must provide a signed copy of its certification to the retailer that contracted with the purchaser or lessee for the sale or lease of the home, and to the purchaser or other person with whom the installer contracted for the installation work.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard Foust, Also Known as Injah Tafari, Appellant.

[831 NYS2d 911]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error co-ram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated February 3, 1986 *(People v Foust,*117 AD2d 616 [1986]), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 17, 1983.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Prudenti, P.J., Miller, Crane and Mastro, JJ., concur.
§ 203.87 What is in an engineering report? This report defines the development plan and capital requirements for the economic evaluation and must contain the following elements. ( a ) A description of the development concept (e.g., tension leg platform, fixed platform, floater type, subsea tieback, *etc.*) which includes: ( 1 ) Its size along with basic design specifications and drawings; and
( 2 ) The construction schedule.
( b ) An identification of planned wells which includes: ( 1 ) The number;
( 2 ) The type (platform, subsea, vertical, deviated, horizontal);
( 3 ) The well depth;
( 4 ) The drilling schedule;
( 5 ) The kind of completion (single, dual, horizontal, *etc.*); and
( 6 ) The completion schedule.
( c ) A description of the production system equipment which includes: ( 1 ) The production capacity for oil and gas and a description of limiting component(s);
( 2 ) Any unusual problems (low gravity, paraffin, *etc.*);
( 3 ) All subsea structures;
( 4 ) All flowlines; and
( 5 ) Schedule for installing the production system.
( d ) A discussion of any plans for multi-phase development which includes the conceptual basis for developing in phases and goals or milestones required for starting later phases.
( e ) A set of development scenarios consisting of activity timing and scale associated with each of up to three production profiles (conservative, most likely, optimistic) provided in the production report for your field (§ 203.88). Each development scenario and production profile must denote the likely events should the field size turn out to be within a range represented by one of the three segments of the field size distribution. If you send in fewer than three scenarios, you must explain why fewer scenarios are more efficient across the whole field size distribution.
#### In the Matter of Harvev H. Gordon, Respondent, against Joseph P. Plonski et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Huntingdon, Appellants.

In a proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the *694Civil Practice Act, to set aside the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Huntington denying petitioner’s application for a special exception permit in a business use district whereby a parcel of real property could be used for a two-bay gasoline service station, the members of said Zoning Board appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, entered November 23, 1959, granting the petition, annulling said decision, and directing said members to issue the necessary permit. Order reversed on the law and the facts, without costs, and petition dismissed, without costs. Findings of fact insofar as they may be inconsistent herewith are reversed, and new findings are made as indicated herein. The Town Board could have forbidden automobile service stations entirely in a business zone. Instead, it permitted them as a special exception, provided the Zoning Board should find that the use will not cause undue traffic or fire hazards and will not adversely affect property values, and provided such Zoning Board shall determine that the exception is reasonably necessary for the public health or general welfare or interest. The Zoning Board did not make the required findings, but found to the contrary. On this record we are unable to say that the board’s determination was unreasonable or arbitrary. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Ughetta, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Santa M. Maida, Respondent, v New York City Teachers’ Retirement Board et al., Appellants.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered May 20, 1977, granting application of petitioner-respondent to annul appellants’ determination that respondent’s disability was not job related and directing appellants to retire respondent on accident disability, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and vacated, and determination of appellants reinstated. The X rays, medical reports and certificates submitted to appellants’ medical board provided the medical board with a rational basis to conclude that the physical condition of which respondent complained was not job related. The *943determination therefore was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In the circumstances, we cannot say that the medical examination of respondent by physicians of the medical board was inadequate so as to require a remand for that purpose. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Birns, Silverman, Fein and Sullivan, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-6215

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
GREGORY ALLEN MILTON, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (CR-95-74; CA-00-31-7) Submitted: June 27, 2005 Decided: July 28, 2005 Before LUTTIG, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gregory Allen Milton, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Jack Bondurant, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Gregory A. Milton seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying as successive his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s order denying relief on his motion for post-conviction relief filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000), denying his motion to alter or amend judgment, and denying his motion for additional findings. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683, 688 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Milton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Milton’s motions to place his appeal in abeyance as moot, deny Milton’s motion requesting leave to file a supplemental informal brief, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal.- 3 - Additionally, we construe Milton’s notice of appeal and informal brief on appeal as an application to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Winestock , 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255 (2000). Milton’s claims do not satisfy either of these conditions. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16D0252. TOREY FOWLER v. THE STATE.

On July 12, 2012, the trial court revoked Torey Fowler’s probation. More than

three years later, on January 28, 2016, Fowler filed this application for discretionary

appeal. We lack jurisdiction because the application is untimely.

An application for discretionary review must be filed within 30 days of the

order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The filing deadline is jurisdictional, and

this Court is unable to accept an untimely application. See Crosson v. Conway, 291

Ga. 220 (1) (728 SE2d 617) (2012). While this Court is authorized to grant an

extension of time for the filing of an application for discretionary appeal, requestsfor

extensions must be filed “on or before the due date of the discretionary application.” 

Court of Appeals Rule 31 (g). Otherwise, we lack the authority to grant the request. 

See Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81, 85 (2) (a) (720 SE2d 170) (2011); OCGA § 5-6-39

(d).

As Fowler acknowledges, his application is untimely because he filed it more

than 30 days after entry of the revocation order. See OCGA § 5-6- 35 (d). Because

Fowler did not request an extension before the original due date, we cannot excuse

his noncompliance with the 30-day deadline. 

February 19, 2016
See Gable, supra; OCGA § 5-6-39 (d). Accordingly, the application is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

02/19/2016