U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

 Review of the USMS Office of 

Internal Investigations 

March 2010 

I-2010-003 

EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

In this review, the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) examined the operation of the United States 

Marshals Service’s (USMS) unit that is responsible for the processing and 

investigation of allegations of employee misconduct. This unit – the 

Office of Internal Investigations (OII) – is a part of the USMS’s Office of 

Inspection. The OIG focused on OII’s investigation of allegations of 

employee misconduct, OII’s staffing, and the USMS’s management and 

support of OII. 

We found that from fiscal year (FY) 2004 to FY 2009, OII did not 

meet its 90-day standard for completing misconduct investigations in 

51 percent (499) of the cases it closed. Of the 499 investigations that 

exceeded the standard, 52 (10 percent) took over 9 months, and 18 of 

those took more than a year to complete. Further, we found that OII is 

increasingly unable to keep up with its workload. We concluded that OII 

has not met its timeliness standard for completing misconduct 

investigations primarily because of persistent understaffing. During our 

review period, OII had only three of its seven investigator positions filled. 

We compared the structure and staffing of the USMS OII to 

internal investigations offices in other Department agencies and 

determined that OII is under-resourced, has lower-graded investigator 

positions, and lacks adequate administrative and analytic support. The 

lack of adequate staffing in OII results in investigators having caseloads 

three to five times larger than those of investigators in other Department 

agencies’ internal investigations offices. 

We also found that Deputy U.S. Marshals generally lack interest in 

applying for OII investigator positions. Current and former OII 

investigators and USMS management in headquarters and the districts 

provided several reasons for this reluctance, including the low grade level 

of the position, the fact that serving in a headquarters rotation is not 

required as part of a USMS career path or to obtain a promotion in the 

agency, the high cost of living in the Washington, D.C., area, and a 

negative perception of internal affairs work. 

The USMS Office of Inspection and OII have previously noted the 

problems with understaffing of investigator positions, both verbally and 

formally to USMS senior management. From 2006 until 2009, the USMS 

took limited steps to address the OII understaffing problems. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

i 
In May 2009, USMS senior management approved a request from 

the Chief of the Office of Inspection to advertise for temporary OII 

investigator positions to assist with the caseload. However, through July 

2009 OII was able to attract only three temporary investigators for 90-

day assignments. While the temporary investigators were able to help 

OII with approximately 70 investigations, our review found that the total 

number of open cases was not reduced during the time the investigators 

were at OII. The Chief of the Office of Inspection and the USMS Deputy 

Director told us the temporary positions were only a short-term solution 

and OII needed a solution for the long term. The USMS had also 

reassigned a Deputy U.S. Marshal to OII as an investigator in 2008 when 

OII only had two investigator positions filled. However, the USMS did not 

use this approach to fill any other vacant positions in OII. 

After the OIG initiated this review, the USMS organized a working 

group to examine the chain of command and organizational structure of 

OII. The working group issued a report in November 2009 that included 

recommendations to: (1) elevate all OII investigator positions from a 

GS-13 to a GS-14, (2) elevate the Chief of OII from a GS-14 to a GS-15 

and possibly elevate the Chief of the Office of Inspection to a Senior 

Executive Service position, (3) increase the number of investigative and 

administrative positions in OII to support the work of the investigators, 

and (4) retain a centralized OII office structure for now, but consider a 

future regionalization of the office. 

The Deputy Director directed the USMS Human Resources Division 

to determine if the OII investigator position’s duties and responsibilities 

fit the criteria for a GS-14 upgrade. In January 2010, the USMS 

upgraded 5 of the 10 investigator positions in the Office of Inspection 

from GS-13 to GS-14 by making them non-supervisory team leader 

positions. At that time, the decision on how to allocate the upgraded 

positions between OII and another component, the Office of Compliance 

Review, had not yet been made. However, the USMS subsequently 

informed the OIG that the decision would be up to the Chief of the Office 

of Inspection. 

We believe that upgrading some OII investigator positions should 

help the USMS attract more candidates. However, it is not clear that OII 

will be able to fully staff the remaining GS-13 positions. We believe that 

additional actions are required to ensure that sufficient resources are 

allocated for internal investigations both in the short and the long term. 

In this report, we make two additional recommendations to help 

the OII improve its important mission of investigating employee 

misconduct in a timely manner: 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

ii 
 

	 

	 

	 

1. Continue to pursue short-term strategies to staff the vacant OII 

investigator positions, such as by temporarily assigning 

investigators to OII, until the positions can be filled by 

permanent employees. 

2. Develop a strategic plan to ensure that OII has sufficient 

resources to perform its mission in the long term. The plan 

should be based on a careful analysis of: 

	 whether OII’s structure should remain centralized or be 

regionalized; 

	 the appropriate staffing levels of OII (including investigator, 

administrative, and analytic positions), based on the 

investigative caseload and reasonable investigator case 

assignments; and 

	 the feasibility of and plan for creating a career path for 

Deputy U.S. Marshals that includes a headquarters tour of 

duty. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

iii 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 1
 

APPENDIX I: COMPARISON OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

APPENDIX III: THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE’S 

APPENDIX IV: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MARSHALS 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW ......................... 6
 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW............................................................... 8
 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................... 26
 

COMPONENTS’ INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICES .................. 28
 

APPENDIX II: USMS OII WORKING GROUP REPORT...................... 29
 

RESPONSE ..................................................................................... 32
 

SERVICE’S RESPONSE ................................................................... 34
 
 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

The mission of the United States Marshals Service (USMS) includes: 

 providing for the safety of judges and other court personnel; 

 apprehending criminals; 

 exercising custody of federal prisoners and providing for 

their security and transportation to detention facilities; and 

 ensuring the safety of endangered government witnesses and 

their families.1 

The USMS has over 400 offices in the 94 judicial districts, and a 

headquarters in Washington, D.C. The President appoints a U.S. Marshal 

in each of the 94 districts. 

The Department of Justice’s (Department) fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget 

request included 5,544 authorized positions for the USMS, which was an 

increase of 772 positions over FY 2009.2 Congress enacted a budget for the 

USMS of $1,152.4 million and the 5,544 requested positions 

The USMS website states that the USMS is committed to the highest 

standards of ethical behavior as a law enforcement agency and is committed 

to upholding the highest levels of integrity for its law enforcement officers as 

well as its administrative employees.3 Under USMS policies, when an 

employee’s misconduct interferes with the USMS’s ability to carry out its 

mission and uphold its ethical standards, the USMS may take disciplinary 

action, which can range from a letter of reprimand to dismissal.4 

The USMS discipline process is separated into two phases: 

investigation and adjudication. The USMS’s Office of Internal Investigations 

(OII), which is located within the Office of Inspection, investigates allegations 

1 U.S. Department of Justice FY 2010 Budget and Performance Summary, Part 

Two: Summary Information by Appropriation, U.S. Marshals Service, 113. 

2 U.S. Department of Justice FY 2011 Budget and Performance Summary, Part 

Two: Summary Information by Appropriation, U.S. Marshals Service. 

3 USMS webpage, Ethics and Integrity, www.usmarshals.gov/ethics/index.html 

(accessed December 30, 2009). 4 Examples of misconduct include failure to follow USMS policy, misuse of a 

government-issued credit card, driving under the influence, and loss of USMS credentials. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

of misconduct.5 The Employee Relations Team, under the Human 

Resources Division, coordinates the adjudication phase of the process.6 

This report focuses on the investigation phase of the USMS discipline 

process. 

The Office of Internal Investigations 

OII is responsible for processing and investigating allegations of 

misconduct and for maintaining records associated with misconduct 

allegations. In addition, OII manages the USMS’s Shooting Review Board, 

which reviews the facts and circumstances surrounding any USMS 

employee’s discharge of a weapon. The OII staff is composed of: 

 One GS-14 Chief Investigator (Inspector), who supervises the office 

and also conducts employee misconduct investigations. 

 Seven GS-13 Deputy Marshal (GS-1811) investigators who conduct 

employee misconduct investigations. As of January 15, 2010, only 

three of the seven investigator positions were filled. 

 Two administrative support positions, which are assigned to the 

Office of Inspection and are shared between OII and the Office of 

Compliance Review. 

Investigating USMS Employee Misconduct 

When an allegation of misconduct is reported to OII, it initially 

forwards the allegation to the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) in accordance with OIG reporting procedures.7 Allegations of 

misconduct by USMS employees also can be reported directly to the OIG. 

5 The Office of Inspection is centralized in headquarters and is composed of OII and 

the Office of Compliance Review. The Office of Compliance Review conducts internal 

compliance reviews of USMS districts, divisions, and program areas. 

6 The Human Resources Division reports separately from the Office of Inspection to 

the USMS Deputy Director and the Director through the Associate Director for 

Administration. The Human Resources Division coordinates the adjudication of 

misconduct cases only, and it forwards the investigative case files, either to the district or 

division involved or to the agency Proposing and Deciding Officials, for determination of 

discipline. 

7 OIG Memorandum, Guidelines for Reporting Allegations of Misconduct to the OIG, 

July 1, 1998. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

2 
 

 

 

The OIG reviews all allegations to determine whether to: 

(1) investigate the allegation; (2) return the allegation to OII as a monitored 

referral, with the understanding that the OIG will review the completed OII 

investigation; or (3) refer the allegation back to OII for it to handle on its 

own as it deems appropriate. 

When the OIG refers an allegation back to OII, the Chief of OII reviews 

the allegation and determines if it is: (1) performance-related (for example, 

employee tardiness) that can be referred back to the district or division 

where the allegation originated for action, (2) misconduct (for example, 

misuse of a government credit card) that should be investigated by OII, or 

(3) a matter that can be closed administratively.8 

From FY 2004 to FY 2009, OII referred an average of 16.5 percent of 

allegations back to the districts and administratively closed an average of 32 

percent of allegations each year. A small number of allegations were 

eventually handled by other law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation or the Department’s Civil Rights Division. 

USMS guidelines state that OII “will complete all investigations within 

90 days.” After completion of the investigation, the OII investigator submits 

the case file to the Chief of OII for review. OII then forwards the completed 

case file to the Employee Relations Team in Human Resources for 

coordination of adjudication. 

From FY 2004 to FY 2009, OII received a total of 2,995 allegations of 

employee misconduct, or an average of 499 allegations a year. Over the 

same 6-year time period, OII investigated approximately 37 percent of the 

allegations, an average of 184 OII investigations initiated each year. Table 1 

presents the number of employee misconduct allegations reported to OII 

and the number of cases that were initiated by OII, from FY 2004 through 

FY 2009. 

8 OII can close an allegation administratively, through what is called a discretionary 

closure, either before or after conducting an investigation, when it is determined that the 

evidence is insufficient for USMS to find misconduct, or when the allegation is against a 

contractor, which are investigated by the contractor’s employer, not the USMS. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

3 
   

Table 1: Allegations Reported to OII and 

OII Investigations, FY 2004 – FY 2009 

FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 Total 

Allegations 

reported 477 465 550 632 430 441 2,995 

Investigations 

initiated by 

OII 

154 111 223 199 187 228 1,102 

Source: The USMS. 

Figure 1 presents how the 2,995 misconduct allegations received from 

FY 2004 to FY 2009 were handled. 

Figure 1: Allegations Reported to OII, by Category, 

FY 2004 – FY 2009 

7%

37%

33%

16%

7%

OIG Investigation

OII Investigation

Discretionary Closure

(administratively closed)

District/Division Referral

Other

Note: The “other” category includes allegations handled by other law enforcement 

agencies or not categorized in the USMS database. 

Source: The USMS. 

Figure 2 on the next page outlines the USMS misconduct reporting 

and investigation process. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

4 
Figure 2: USMS Employee Misconduct Investigation Process 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

5 
 

 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW 

The review focused on OII’s process for investigating allegations of 

employee misconduct, OII staffing, and USMS management and support 

to OII. Our review included interviews, data analysis, and document 

reviews. We also examined the USMS employee misconduct investigation 

process and compared the internal investigations office structure and 

staffing with those of three other Department law enforcement 

components: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We conducted our fieldwork from October 

2009 through December 2009. 

Interviews 

We interviewed a total of 50 officials and staff members at USMS 

headquarters and district offices. We randomly selected 30 of the 

94 district offices and 2 headquarters divisions, and interviewed the 

Chief Deputy U.S. Marshals (and 1 U.S. Marshal) of those districts and 

USMS Assistant Directors by telephone regarding their interaction with 

OII and their view of the USMS misconduct investigation process. We 

also interviewed officials from ATF, the DEA, the FBI, and the 

Department’s OIG Investigations Division. The following table lists the 

positions of individuals interviewed. 

Table 2: Interviews 

Organization Position 

USMS, headquarters Deputy Director 

Associate Director, Administration 

Assistant Director (3) 

Chief, Office of Inspection 

Chief, OII 

Chief, Office of Labor and Employee Relations 

OII Investigator (3) 

USMS, district offices United States Marshal 

Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal (30) 

Former OII Investigator (5) 

Deputy U.S. Marshal on temporary assignment to OII (3) 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

6 
 

Organization Position 

Other federal agencies 

and OIG Investigations 

Division 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Internal Affairs 

Division, ATF 

Deputy Chief Inspector, Office of Professional 

Responsibility, DEA 

Section Chief, Internal Investigations, FBI 

Special Agent in Charge, Investigations Division, OIG 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Investigations Division, 

OIG 

Data Analyses and Document Reviews 

We analyzed USMS data on allegations of employee misconduct 

investigations from FY 2004 through FY 2009. The data included the 

number of reported allegations, the number of investigations conducted, 

and the time taken to complete those investigations. In determining the 

timeliness of OII’s investigations, we analyzed only the investigations that 

were conducted by OII, rather than those conducted by the OIG or those 

referred back to the districts or divisions. 

We also reviewed USMS Directives, budget documents, annual 

reports, organizational charts, position descriptions, memoranda, policy 

guidance, and briefing materials. In addition, we reviewed data and 

documents related to the internal investigations offices of ATF, the DEA, 

and the FBI. We present data on the investigations conducted directly by 

those agencies’ internal investigations offices, not cases referred to the 

field or to the OIG for investigation. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

7 
 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

OII did not meet its 90-day timeline for over half of the 

misconduct investigations it initiated during the past 

6 years. The primary reason is that since 2002 OII has 

been unable to fill its investigator positions. 

Consequently, each OII investigator has a caseload that 

is three to five times higher than those of internal 

investigators in other Department agencies. While the 

USMS recently upgraded some OII investigator positions 

to attract applicants, additional actions are required to 

ensure that adequate resources are dedicated to USMS 

internal investigations. 

OII does not meet the established timeframe for investigating 

employee misconduct primarily because of insufficient staffing. 

We determined that 51 percent, or 499 of the 976, investigations 

OII initiated and closed between FY 2004 and FY 2009 were not 

completed within the USMS’s established timeliness standard. According 

to USMS policy, OII will complete internal misconduct investigations in 

90 days (3 months).9 Of the 499 investigations that exceeded the 

standard, 52 (10 percent) took over 9 months, and 18 of those took more 

than a year to complete. Figure 3 depicts the months taken to complete 

investigations initiated from FY 2004 through FY 2009. 

9 USMS Directives, General Operations, 2.2 Critical Reporting Requirements, 

Misconduct Investigations, D.1.b(1). 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

8 
 

 

 

 

 

Cases

200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

179 175

OII Standard

155

143

117

63

46

25 21

10 11 13 18

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 12+

Months


 

Figure 3: OII Investigations by Case Duration, 

FY 2004 – FY 2009
 

Source: USMS OII data. 

Table 3 presents the number of investigations initiated and 

completed from FY 2004 through FY 2009, the number of those 

investigations that were completed within 90 days and the number that 

took longer to complete. OII has not met the timeliness standard in more 

than half of investigations in all but 1 year since FY 2004.10 Although 

the results shown in Table 3 indicate slightly better performance in 

FY 2008 and FY 2009, that improvement is due to the exclusion of open 

investigations from the results. As of October 1, 2009, 12 investigations 

initiated in FY 2008 and 114 investigations initiated in FY 2009 

remained open. Once those investigations are closed, OII will have 

10 USMS Guidelines require OII to complete misconduct investigations in 

90 days. In comparison, according to their respective internal guidelines, the DEA has 

180 days to complete a misconduct investigation, and the FBI has 180 days to complete 

both the misconduct investigation and adjudication of the case (the FBI does not 

apportion the 180-day timeframe between the investigation and adjudication phases). 

ATF does not have an established timeframe. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

exceeded the 90-day standard for the majority of investigations initiated 

in both of those years.11 

Table 3: OII Investigations Initiated and Completed, 

FY 2004 – FY 2009 

OII Misconduct 

Investigations 

Investigations 

Completed Within 90 

Days or Less 

Investigations 

Completed in 91 

Days or More 

Initiated Completed Number Percent Number Percent 

FY 2004 154 154 59 38% 95 62% 

FY 2005 111 111 48 43% 63 57% 

FY 2006 223 223 121 54% 102 46% 

FY 2007 199 199 94 47% 105 53% 

FY 2008 187 175 87 50% 88 50% 

FY 2009 228 114 68 60% 46 40% 

Total 1,102 976 477 49% 499 51% 

Note: This table displays the cases that closed by the end of FY 2009. As of October 1, 

2009, 12 investigations initiated in FY 2008 and 114 investigations initiated in FY 2009 

remained open. 

Source: The USMS. 

In addition to not meeting its timeliness standards, OII is falling 

behind in its cases. At the close of FY 2004, there were 55 investigations 

that remained open. At the end of FY 2009, there were 126 

investigations that remained open, which represents an increase of 

129 percent. While the number of allegations received and investigations 

initiated by OII fluctuated between FY 2004 and FY 2009, the increase in 

investigations remaining open indicates that OII is not able to keep up 

with its investigative caseload. Figure 4 on the next page depicts the 

number of OII investigations that remained open at the end of each fiscal 

year from FY 2004 through FY 2009. 

11 All 12 open investigations initiated in FY 2008 have exceeded the timeliness 

standard. Consequently, once these 12 investigations are complete, OII will have 

exceeded its timeliness standard for 53 percent of investigations initiated in FY 2008. 

Of the 114 open investigations initiated in FY 2009, 60 percent had already been open 

longer than 90 days as of October 1, 2009. Therefore, it is no longer possible for a 

majority of investigations initiated in FY 2009 to meet the standard. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

10 
                       

 

Open OII Cases

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

End FY End FY End FY End FY End FY End FY

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

126

55 57

66

33

41

 

 

Figure 4: Open OII Investigations at the End of 

the Fiscal Year, FY 2004 – FY 2009 

Source: The USMS. 

We believe that OII is not meeting its timeliness standard mainly 

because it does not have a full complement of investigators in OII. 

According to the Chiefs of the Office of Inspection and OII, although 

authorized seven investigator positions OII has not been fully staffed 

since at least 2002. The USMS was not able to provide a precise record 

of its staffing level for the OII investigator positions for prior years. 

However, we interviewed the current and former Chiefs of the Office of 

Inspection and OII whose assignments in the Office of Inspection 

spanned 2002 to the present, and they all told us that the office was 

never fully staffed during their assignments in OII. During our review 

between October 2009 and December 2009, OII had only three of the 

seven authorized investigator positions filled.12 We were told that since 

2003 OII has never had more than five of the seven investigator positions 

filled. 

Because of this understaffing, OII investigators are assigned very 

large caseloads. During our review period, each of the 3 OII investigators 

had a caseload of at least 40 open investigations. This workload far 

exceeded the typical caseload for investigators in the Department’s other 

12 As of January 15, 2010, OII had only three of the seven investigator positions 

filled. However, one of the investigators was on extended medical leave, and OII only 

had two working investigators. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

11 
 

 

 

 

law enforcement components’ internal investigations offices. When we 

compared the workload of USMS OII investigators to the workload of 

investigators in ATF, the DEA, and the FBI, we found that OII 

investigators have caseloads three to five times larger than investigators 

in those other law enforcement components.13 ATF, the DEA, and the 

FBI told us their internal investigators were assigned 15 or fewer cases at 

a time. These components’ internal investigations units had 

considerably more staff to perform investigations, in addition to 

administrative and analytic support personnel. Table 4 presents the 

caseloads and staffing levels at the USMS and the other components. 

Table 4: Number of Cases and Staffing Levels of the USMS 

Compared to ATF, the DEA, and the FBI 

Investigators’ open 

caseload 

Staff positions in internal 

investigations office 

USMS 40+ cases 

10 total: 

7 Investigators 

1 Supervisor/Manager 

2 Support (shared positions) 

ATF 10 to 15 cases 

23 total: 

12 Investigators 

3 Use of Force Investigators 

3 Supervisors/Managers 

5 Support 

DEA 12 cases 

52 total: 

29 Investigators 

7 Supervisors/Managers 

16 Support 

FBI 7 to 8 cases 

26 total: 

10 Investigators 

4 Supervisors/Managers 

12 Support 

Note: Caseloads include only the cases conducted by the internal 

investigators. 

Sources: The USMS, ATF, the DEA, and the FBI. 

OII misconduct investigations are also affected by a requirement 

that the investigators serve as the acting OII duty agent on a rotational 

13 See Appendix I for a complete comparison of the internal investigations 

offices of USMS, ATF, the DEA, and the FBI. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

12 
 

basis and one OII investigator also processes missing property paperwork 

as a collateral responsibility.14 Each month one OII investigator is 

assigned as the duty agent to answer calls from the districts and respond 

to incidents in which USMS personnel discharged firearms or used force. 

Because OII is staffed with only three investigators, each must serve as 

the duty agent every third month. 

Duty agent responsibilities can require a significant amount of 

time. For example, when a shooting incident occurs, the duty agent 

must fly immediately to the district and coordinate with local law 

enforcement officials as a representative of the USMS. In FY 2009 there 

were 41 firearm discharges, of which 20 qualified as shooting incidents. 

Consequently, each OII investigator had to respond approximately six 

times over the fiscal year, interrupting work on their investigative 

caseloads for about 3 to 4 days each time. Other use of force incidents 

may not require that the investigator respond in person, but the duty 

agent must evaluate documents, coordinate with district or division 

offices, and generate correspondence notifying relevant divisions of the 

incident. One OII investigator has the collateral duty to process all 

missing property paperwork in addition to their regular investigative 

duties and duty agent responsibilities. Overall, these tasks are timeconsuming and significantly reduce time spent on the misconduct 

caseload. 

The USMS has experienced an increase in these incidents over the 

last 6 years. Table 5 lists the number of shootings, other use of force 

incidents, and missing property incidents handled by OII investigators 

each fiscal year from FY 2004 through FY 2009. 

14 “Missing property” includes loss of badges, credentials, or firearms and some 

vehicle accidents. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

13 
 

Table 5: OII Collateral Duty Workload, 

FY 2004 – FY 2009 

Fiscal Year Shooting 

Incident 

Other Use of 

Force 

Missing 

Property 

FY 2004 7 80 155 

FY 2005 21 104 199 

FY 2006 17 93 188 

FY 2007 20 167 131 

FY 2008 17 231 268 

FY 2009 20 290 252 

Notes: “Other use of force” includes use of physical control, 

chemical munitions or irritants, stun guns or Tasers, and 

expandable batons. The “shooting incident” numbers are only those 

firearms discharges in which the OII duty agents had to respond. 

Source: The USMS. 

Further, according to Office of Inspection management, OII lacks 

adequate administrative and analytic support to help its investigators 

with misconduct investigations. OII and the Office of Compliance Review 

(another unit under the Office of Inspection) share two administrative 

support personnel. Consequently, OII investigators must perform 

administrative duties related to the misconduct investigations, such as 

compiling case files and entering data into the investigative database. 

According to Office of Inspection management, the large caseloads of OII 

investigators mean they spend a considerable amount of time performing 

these administrative duties. 

In comparison, we found that ATF, the DEA, and the FBI have 

more support personnel in their internal investigations offices, including 

a mix of administrative and analytic support. ATF has four management 

analysts and a project coordinator; the DEA has seven program analysts, 

two intelligence research specialists, and seven administrative assistants; 

the FBI has seven conduct review specialists and five conduct review 

assistants. 

The Chief of the USMS Office of Inspection told us that he would 

like to have additional support personnel and be fully staffed. He said 

this would also allow the office to conduct “proactive” analysis on 

misconduct and use of force incidents, identify trends in misconduct, 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

14 
 

   


 

 
 

8.0

7.0

6.0

5.0

4.0 Applicants Per

3.0 Position

2.0

1.0

7.3

6.3

2.2 2.5

1.3 1.6

0.5

0.0
 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 

and assist in compiling and analyzing the data for the Office of 

Inspection Annual Report. 

OII has not attracted sufficient staff for its investigator positions. 

We found that OII has trouble attracting sufficient staff for the 

investigator positions. In 2003, OII advertised 3 investigator positions 

and received 22 applications. However, in 2009, OII advertised two times 

for a total of six positions and received a total of three applications. 

Lacking applicants, and not being able to mandate that staff be assigned 

to the Office, OII was unable to fill these investigator positions. 

Figure 5 shows the steady decline in applicants responding to OII 

investigator position announcements. 

Figure 5: Applicants per OII Investigator Position Announcement, 

FY 2003 – FY 2009 

Source: The USMS. 

Current and former OII investigators and USMS managers in 

headquarters and the districts, including 30 Chief Deputy U.S. Marshals 

we interviewed, described several reasons for Deputy U.S. Marshals’ lack 

of interest in applying for the OII investigator positions. The reasons 

they raised are described in the following sections. 

The grade of the OII investigator position is low. 

The USMS’s OII investigator positions have not been upgraded like 

other Deputy U.S. Marshal positions have been over the years. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

15 
 

 

 

 

 

 

According to the USMS Associate Director of Administration, in the 

1980s the journeyman level of a Deputy U.S. Marshal was a GS-9, a 

supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshal was a GS-11, a Chief Deputy 

U.S. Marshal was a GS-12 or GS-13 in larger districts, and the OII 

investigator position was a GS-13.15 Currently, the journeyman level of a 

Deputy U.S. Marshal is a GS-12, the supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshal is 

a GS-13, and the Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal is a GS-14 or GS-15 in 

larger districts. The OII investigator position remains a GS-13. 

 The OII investigator positions are not similar in grade to 

investigator positions at ATF, DEA, and FBI internal affairs offices, which 

are graded at a GS-14 level. The heads of these offices told us they 

believed it was important to have higher-level positions in internal affairs 

because the investigators must often interview senior officials and deal 

with sensitive information. These officials also told us that they want to 

attract investigators who are considered “seasoned.”16 

Assignment to headquarters is not required for career advancement in 

the USMS. 

No established career track or path for Deputy U.S. Marshals 

requires them to work in USMS headquarters, which hampers 

headquarters offices’ ability to attract candidates. Additionally, 

according to the USMS Deputy Director and other USMS managers, 

starting around 2003 the USMS created additional non-supervisory 

GS-13 level positions in the districts. Consequently, Deputy U.S. 

Marshals do not have to work in headquarters to advance to this level.17 

Prior to 2003, there were no non-supervisory GS-13 level positions 

available in the districts, which allowed headquarters units such as OII 

to attract more applicants that wanted to be promoted. In addition, 

because serving as an OII investigator is not required for career 

15 The grade level of General Schedule (GS) employees in the U.S. Civil Service 

is established according to a position description that details the range and complexity 

of the duties and responsibilities of the position. The OII investigator position has been 

a GS-13 since 1986. 

16 ATF, the DEA, and the FBI require internal investigators to have supervisory 

experience. 

17 The number of GS-13 positions in the field increased because of the 

upgrading of the supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshals and the creation of Judicial 

Security Inspectors, Witness Security Investigators, and other positions related to 

enforcement of the Adam Walsh Act. 

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16 
advancement, USMS staff members do not want to give up the criminal 

investigative work they currently perform. 

In contrast, other law enforcement components require agents to 

serve assignments in internal affairs or other headquarters units for 

career advancement. For example, FBI Special Agents who seek 

promotion to senior level positions are required to have worked in the 

agency’s Internal Investigation Section or to have conducted internal 

investigations in the field by acting as an “Assistant Inspector in Place.” 

ATF and DEA Special Agents are not required to work in the internal 

affairs offices, but accepting an assignment to headquarters is part of 

their career path requirement. In addition, when DEA employees apply 

for higher-level positions, their work in internal investigations offices can 

help elevate their ratings on certain criteria, improving their chances for 

promotion. 

The prospect of a USMS headquarters assignment is also 

financially unattractive to many potential applicants. Accepting an 

assignment as an OII investigator may mean relocation to the 

Washington, D.C., area. We were told that USMS staff members view the 

Washington, D.C., metropolitan area as an expensive place to live 

(especially relative to other locations in which Deputy U.S. Marshals are 

assigned) that requires long commutes to work. Many of the Chief 

Deputy U.S. Marshals we interviewed told us that USMS staff would be 

more attracted to the investigator positions if the positions were located 

outside of the Washington, D.C., area, something that would be possible 

if OII were structured regionally rather than centralized. 

USMS staff can be promoted while remaining in the districts 

during their entire careers. For example, only 5 of the 30 Chief Deputy 

U.S. Marshals we interviewed had ever worked in USMS headquarters. 

The USMS Deputy Director told us, “USMS employees typically stay in 

one location or area [as they move up], while other agencies transfer staff 

in and out or up to headquarters.” He stated, “To go away from this 

would require a cultural shift in the USMS.” Consequently, relocating to 

Washington, D.C., for a GS-13 position that is not essential for career 

advancement is not an attractive prospect for most USMS employees. 

Not requiring a headquarters or internal investigations assignment 

in the career path for Deputy U.S. Marshals may also contribute to a 

negative perception of internal affairs work. USMS staff in the districts 

told us that OII is sometimes viewed as the “rat squad” that looks for 

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additional misconduct or problems when conducting investigations.18 

Although USMS OII investigators and managers told us that experience 

in OII is invaluable and helps tremendously if they become supervisors 

or managers, our interviews with field staff indicate this opinion is not 

widely shared among the USMS workforce. 

In contrast, we were told that the view of internal affairs work at 

the other Department agencies is more positive. By requiring a 

headquarters or internal investigations unit rotation as part of a career 

path, the agencies have been able to overcome negative perceptions that 

affect recruitment efforts. 

ATF, DEA, and FBI officials also stressed that internal 

investigations are considered necessary to maintaining the integrity of 

the agency, and their employees understand the reason for the 

investigative process. They said that in their agencies, internal 

investigation positions are highly sought and the investigators gain a 

breadth of experience that helps them in management positions when 

they return to the field. 

In sum, we found that the low grade level of the investigator 

positions (GS-13), the fact that serving a headquarters rotation is not a 

required part of the USMS career path, the high cost of living in the 

Washington, D.C., area, and a negative perception of internal affairs 

work combine to make it difficult to attract applicants for the position. 

USMS has not generally used its ability to reassign staff to the OII. 

Although OII has not been able to attract sufficient applicants, the 

USMS does have the ability to reassign staff to satisfy the needs of the 

agency. USMS policy states: 

28 CFR 0.111, 0.138, and 0.153 vests in the Director of the USMS the 

authority to take final action in matters pertaining to the employment, 

direction and general administration (including appointment, 

assignment, training, promotion, demotion, compensation, leave, 

classification, temporary hiring of experts and consultants, separations 

18 In addition, we were told that some Deputy U.S. Marshals interested in 

working in OII might not apply because they must apply to the Office of Inspection as 

an investigator, therefore could be assigned to either OII or to the Office of Compliance 

Review where they would be required to perform compliance reviews. 

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and approval of staffing requirements) of personnel in general schedule 

grades GS-1 through GS-15 . . . .19 

However, the USMS has generally not used this authority to direct staff 

to OII assignments. As described below, the USMS has only reassigned a 

staff member to OII in one instance. 

Lengthy misconduct investigations and continued OII understaffing 

have consequences across the USMS. 

Lengthy investigations can delay promotions and career 

progression of employees under investigation, which can damage 

employee morale, and hinder the USMS’s ability to appropriately manage 

its workforce. 

Employees’ careers are halted during misconduct investigations. 

The USMS delays promotions for employees who are the subjects 

of ongoing misconduct investigations. We found this to be the most 

common concern about the length of investigations among all the USMS 

staff and managers we interviewed. According to USMS policy, “If a 

supervisory official learns that an employee who is up for a promotion, 

incentive award or other favorable personnel action may face 

investigation due to allegations of misconduct, the official will inform the 

Chief, Employee Relations Team, so that such reward may be withheld 

temporarily.”20 

Prior to consideration by the Career Board, USMS employees 

applying for promotions have their names searched in OII’s database to 

determine if they are subjects of any open investigations. In September 

2009, 68 out of the 362 (19 percent) employees who submitted an 

application to the Career Board for consideration were the subjects of 

investigations and were automatically deemed ineligible for 

consideration. These employees may incur financial losses and forfeit 

career advancement even if they are ultimately cleared of misconduct. 

These consequences are particularly troubling if otherwise qualified 

employees are considered ineligible for promotion due to an investigation 

that remained ongoing because OII lacked the resources to complete its 

work within established timeframes. The consequences of these 

19 USMS Directive 3.1 - Employment: Personnel Authority and Actions. 

20 USMS Directive 3.3, Performance & Related Matters, Discipline and Adverse 

Actions. 

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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

19 
prolonged misconduct investigations and delayed promotions can affect 

the morale of employees under investigation. 

The USMS’s ability to manage its workforce is hampered. 

Chief Deputy U.S. Marshals told us that lengthy investigations 

may also hinder district and division leadership’s ability to manage their 

workforce and carry out the USMS’s mission. The restriction on 

promoting employees who are the subjects of investigations affects the 

USMS’s ability to promote qualified candidates. Further, depending on 

the nature of the allegations, the USMS may temporarily reassign 

employees from mission-related operations to administrative duties while 

the misconduct investigations are ongoing. Each of these outcomes can 

result in the underutilization of staff resources and lower productivity. 

Prolonged investigations can also allow misconduct to go 

undeterred for a long period of time. Moreover, several Chief Deputy 

U.S. Marshals told us that they believed that when a significant lapse 

occurs between misconduct and the resulting penalty, it reduces the 

effectiveness of the discipline process as a deterrent to misconduct. 

USMS staff we interviewed also told us that the delays caused by OII’s 

lengthy investigations and the lack of any action to reduce the delays 

have led to the perception that the disciplinary process is not a top 

priority for the agency. 

Limited actions have been taken to improve OII’s ability to 

complete investigations expeditiously. 

Between 2006 and 2009, Office of Inspection and OII managers 

requested assistance from the USMS leadership, but the USMS took 

limited action to remedy the understaffing in OII. These actions included 

reassigning one investigator to OII, approving temporary investigators for 

OII, and conducting several reviews to identify solutions to OII’s 

understaffing. These actions are detailed in the section below. 

Initial requests to upgrade OII positions were not approved. 

The current and former Chiefs of the Office of Inspection and OII 

said that staffing shortages existed in OII since approximately 2003, and 

that requests were made to senior USMS management for assistance and 

additional resources to allow the office to better attract applicants as 

early as 2006. The Chief of the Office of Inspection who led the office 

from 2006 to 2008 stated that he had verbally brought the understaffing 

problem to the Deputy Director’s attention on several occasions and 

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submitted a formal report to senior management about the problem in 

2006.21 According to the former Chief, the 2006 report described OII’s 

chronic staffing shortages and recommended elevating the OII 

investigator position from a GS-13 to a GS-14 to help attract candidates 

to serve in OII. He stated that he did not receive a response to the 

proposal before he left the Office of Inspection in 2008. 

The current Chief of the Office of Inspection told us that after he 

assumed that position in December 2008 he requested a formal response 

to the former Chief’s proposal, and the USMS Deputy Director at the time 

told him in January 2009 that the USMS did not plan to upgrade the 

positions. The Chief said he continued to request assistance to address 

the understaffing problems in OII.22 

The USMS assigned one investigator to OII in July 2008. 

In July 2008, the USMS used its authority to reassign staff one 

time to assist OII. This investigator was assigned to OII during a tour of 

duty in headquarters without having applied to OII. At the time, OII had 

been reduced to only two investigators. The reassigned investigator was 

originally given a temporary assignment to OII, but he was made a 

permanent investigator 3 weeks after starting in OII. He worked in OII 

until November 2009, when he transferred back to a USMS district. 

The USMS did not use this approach to fill any other OII vacant 

investigator positions. The Deputy Director told us he was concerned 

about forcing an assignment on USMS personnel. 

OII received approval to recruit temporary investigators in May 2009. 

In an attempt to alleviate the large caseloads of OII investigators, 

the Chief of the Office of Inspection requested, and in May 2009 received, 

approval to advertise for investigators to serve short-term assignments to 

assist OII with misconduct investigations. The Office of Inspection 

advertised these temporary positions on three occasions: 

21 The OIG could not obtain a copy of this report because neither OII, the former 

Chief, nor the current Deputy Director had a copy. 

22 The current USMS Deputy Director told us he had not seen the 2006 report 

and did not know why the previous Deputy Director made the decision to not upgrade 

the OII investigator positions. 

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 On May 15, 2009, the Office of Inspection advertised 

10 positions (at GS-12 or higher) for a 120-day temporary duty 

assignment to OII. Travel, per diem, and lodging costs were to 

be paid by the Office of Inspection. However, there were no 

applicants for the temporary positions. 

	 On May 28, 2009, a second announcement advertised the 

10 positions and shortened the duty assignment from 120 days 

to 90 days in an effort to attract applicants. In addition, 

selectees were offered two trips back to their home duty station 

during the 90-day assignment. OII received two applications in 

response to this announcement, both of which were approved 

for selection. These investigators finished their temporary duty 

assignments and returned to their district office on October 2, 

2009. 

	 On July 23, 2009, OII again advertised 10 positions for 90-day 

assignments with the same benefits as the second 

announcement. OII received only one application, which was 

approved for selection. The investigator completed his 

temporary duty assignment and returned to the district office 

on November 17, 2009. 

The three temporary investigators who worked in OII initially 

assisted the permanent OII investigators and, after obtaining some 

experience, were assigned less complex misconduct cases to handle 

independently. The Chief of the Office of Inspection stated that the 

temporary investigators were able to help with approximately 70 cases. 

However, he said that the assignments were only for 90 days, which 

limited the temporary investigators’ ability to develop the expertise to 

conduct investigations independently. Additionally, he noted that this 

initiative created an “administrative burden” because OII had to secure 

lodging for the temporary investigators, process travel vouchers, and 

manage financial reimbursement agreements with each district. 

The three temporary investigators told us that the experience was 

positive, but that by the time they felt capable of providing significant 

assistance to OII, their temporary assignments were complete. Overall, 

our review found that the use of temporary investigators to some extent 

has been helpful to OII, but it did not enable OII to reduce the number of 

open cases overall (see Figure 4 on page 11). 

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Efforts to reclassify OII investigator positions and restructure OII and 

began in June 2009. 

The Chief of the Office of Inspection told us that in June 2009 he 

started drafting a justification to reclassify the GS-13 OII investigator 

position as a GS-14. He said that sometime in the fall of 2009 the USMS 

Deputy Director verbally approved upgrading four of the seven 

investigator positions in OII to GS-14. Also, in September 2009, USMS 

senior management directed the Office of Inspection to draft a plan to 

restructure OII and submit it to the Deputy Director. On September 19, 

2009, the Chief of OII submitted a proposal that included data and 

information comparing the operational differences between OII and 

internal affairs offices in three other Department law enforcement 

components. The proposal also provided two draft organization charts 

for a restructured OII, one a centralized model and the second a regional 

OII model. 

The Office of Inspection did not receive a specific response on the 

proposal. When we interviewed the Deputy Director in January 2010, he 

told us that after reading the proposal, USMS senior management 

decided to convene a working group to develop additional options for 

restructuring OII and solving the staffing problem. He said that in 

October 2009 he had instructed the USMS Associate Director for 

Administration to form a working group to address the understaffing 

issues in OII. The Associate Director for Administration selected a 

Deputy Assistant Director and three Chief Deputy U.S. Marshals who 

had worked in internal investigations to comprise the working group. 

The group issued its report in November 2009. (Appendix II contains 

that report.) 

The report recommended elevating all OII investigator positions 

from a GS-13 to a GS-14, the Chief of OII from a GS-14 to a GS-15, and 

possibly elevating the Chief of the Office of Inspection to a Senior 

Executive Service position in the future.23 It also recommended 

increasing the number of investigative and administrative positions in 

OII. In addition, the report recommended that OII retain a centralized 

office structure for the next several years and be reevaluated in the 

future for possible regionalization. In December 2009, the USMS 

Associate Director told us that USMS senior management had not made 

any decisions regarding the recommendations of the working group. 

23 Currently, the GS-13 investigators reporting to the two GS-14 Chief 

Inspectors, who in turn report to the GS-15 Chief of the Office of Inspection. 

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After the OIG completed fieldwork for this review, in December 

2009 the USMS Human Resources Division began reviewing the grade 

level of the OII investigator positions. On January 21, 2010, the USMS 

decided to upgrade 5 of the 10 investigator positions in the Office of 

Inspection from GS-13 to GS-14 and to upgrade the two Chief positions 

from GS-14 to GS-15.24 The new GS-14 investigator positions are 

considered non-supervisory team leaders, thereby qualifying for the 

GS-14 level. The USMS advertised for the five GS-14 and the two GS-15 

positions on January 22, 2010, with a February 5, 2010, closing date. 

The Chief of the Office of Inspection told us that he was pleased 

that the positions had been upgraded. However, at that time it was 

unclear how the positions would be allocated between the two offices 

within the Office of Inspection, OII and the Office of Compliance and 

Review. Subsequently, the USMS told the OIG that the decision on how 

to allocate the positions was up to the Chief of the Office of Inspection. 

Our review concluded that the upgrading of some of the OII 

investigator positions should help the USMS attract more candidates for 

current vacancies. However, it remains unclear whether OII will be able 

to fill vacant investigator positions that remain below the GS-14 grade 

level. The Chief of the Office of Inspection told us in March 2010 that 

only one person had applied for OII’s five GS-13 vacancies. 

More temporary investigators were recruited in December 2009. 

At the same time USMS management was considering the 

restructuring of OII and reclassification of investigator positions, in 

December 2009 OII received approval to recruit another 10 temporary 

investigators to serve 90-day rotations. OII received 16 applications in 

response to its announcement and was able to fill all 10 temporary 

positions. The 10 temporary investigators started work in January 2010 

and will complete their terms in April 2010. The Chief of OII believed 

that the increase in applications was attributable both to several USMS 

staff interested in the temporary positions having become eligible to 

apply after they attained GS-12 status in the field and to the general 

24 The Office of Inspection currently has 10 authorized GS-13 investigator 

positions (7 OII investigators and 3 Office of Compliance Review investigators) and 2 

authorized GS-14 Chiefs (Chief of OII and Chief of the Office of Compliance Review). 

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24 
 

 

knowledge that the USMS was considering upgrading the GS level of the 

OII investigator positions.25 

Although OII received more applications for the temporary 

investigator positions, and these investigators are expected to help 

complete more cases, the Chief of OII believes this is not a long-term 

solution to the understaffing problem. He noted that temporary 

assignments last only 90 days, the assignments created an 

administrative burden for OII, and the office is still not filling the vacant 

full-time investigator positions. The Deputy Director also told us in 

January 2010 that USMS senior management saw this as a short-term 

solution until OII was fully staffed. 

25 Deputy U.S. Marshals were required to have reached the GS-12 level prior to 

applying for the temporary investigator position. Seven of the 16 applicants had 

reached this eligibility level in September 2009. 

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25 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The USMS OII has not been fully staffed since 2002 and has been 

severely understaffed for at least 3 years. As a result, from FY 2004 to 

FY 2009, the majority of OII’s misconduct investigations were not 

completed in accord with the USMS timely standards. When we 

compared OII to other Department agencies’ internal investigations 

offices, we found that OII’s investigators have caseloads three to five 

times larger than the other agencies’ investigators. 

The Office of Inspection has been requesting assistance to address 

OII’s staffing shortages since at least 2006. OII received approval in May 

2009 to advertise for a few temporary duty assignments to assist with the 

large caseload. The initiative was helpful, but provided only a short-term 

remedy and did not address the underlying problem of attracting 

applicants to the OII investigator positions. 

After the OIG initiated this review in October 2009 the USMS 

convened a working group to address the understaffing problems in OII. 

In January 2010 the USMS upgraded 5 of the 10 Office of Inspection 

investigator positions from GS-13 to GS-14 and two Chief positions from 

GS-14 to GS-15. However, it was unclear how to allocate the upgraded 

investigator positions between OII and the Office of Compliance Review. 

The USMS subsequently told the OIG that the Chief of the Office of 

Inspection could decide how to allocate the positions. 

We believe that upgrading some OII investigator positions is a 

positive step and should help to attract more candidates to the office. 

But it is not clear that OII will be able to fully staff the remaining GS-13 

positions. The OII’s ability to attract 10 investigators for 90-day 

rotations should also be helpful to temporarily alleviate the large 

caseload. Yet, as the experience with the previous temporary 

investigators showed, the limited duration of these assignments limits 

the contribution that the detailees can make. 

We believe that additional actions are required to ensure that 

sufficient resources are allocated for internal investigations, both in the 

short and the long term. 

Therefore we recommend that USMS: 

1. Continue to pursue short-term strategies to staff the vacant OII 

investigator positions until they can be filled with permanent 

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employees, such as by temporarily assigning investigators to 

OII. 

2. Develop a strategic plan to ensure that OII has sufficient 

resources to perform its mission in the long term. The plan 

should be based on a careful analysis of: 

	 whether OII’s structure should remain centralized or be 

regionalized; 

	 the appropriate staffing levels of OII (including investigator, 

administrative, and analytic positions), based on the 

investigative caseload and reasonable investigator case 

assignments; and 

	 the feasibility of and plan for creating a career path for 

Deputy U.S. Marshals that includes a headquarters tour of 

duty. 

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27 
 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX I: COMPARISON OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

COMPONENTS’ INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICES 

USMS ATF DEA FBI 

Staff in the 

agency at end 

of FY 2009 

4,902 5,071 9,560 32,914 

Misconduct 

allegations 

received 

FY 2008 = 431 FY 2008 = 379 FY 2008= 751 FY 2008 = 2,579 

FY 2009 = 441 FY 2009 = 333 FY 2009 = 629 FY 2009 = 1,408 

Investigations 

conducted by 

internal 

investigations 

office 

FY 2008 = 187 FY 2008 = 89 FY 2008= 751 FY 2008 = 162 

FY 2009 = 228 FY 2009 = 100 FY 2009 = 629 FY 2009 = 132 

Number and 

type of staff 

positions in 

internal 

investigations 

office 

10 total: 

7 Investigators 

1 Supervisor/ 

Manager

 2 Support (shared 

positions) 

23 total: 

12 Investigators 

3 Use of Force 

Investigators 

3 Supervisors/ 

Managers

 5 Support 

52 total: 

29 Investigators 

7 Supervisors/ 

Managers 

16 Support 

26 total: 

10 Investigators 

4 Supervisors/ 

Managers 

12 Support 

Caseload of 

Investigators 40+ cases 10 to 15 cases 12 cases 7 to 8 cases 

GS levels of 

Investigators GS-13 GS-14 GS-14 GS-14 

Requirement 

to work in 

headquarters 

or internal 

investigations 

for career 

progression 

No requirement to 

work in headquarters and no 

career path 

Work in headquarters required 

as part of career 

path 

Three years’ work 

in headquarters 

required as part of 

a career path 

Work in internal 

investigations or 

conduct of fieldlevel misconduct 

investigations 

required as part of 

a career path 

Notes: The DEA opens every allegation as an internal investigation; therefore, the 

numbers are equal. The caseloads include only the cases conducted by the internal 

investigators. 

Sources: The USMS, ATF, DEA, and FBI. The number of staff in the agencies was 

taken from FY 2009 U.S. Department of Justice Performance Report. 

U.S. Department of Justice 28 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 
RESTRUCTURING OF THE OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS 

The Office of Inspections Working Group met at USMS Headquarters in Arlington, VA 

the week of October 26, 2009. The group is comprised of the following individuals: 

Steve Conboy, DAD, JSD 

Reggie Bradshaw, CDUSM, DN I 

Lori Commins, CDUSM , E/MI 

Jim Umbach, ACDUSM , D/AZ 

Obse rva tions 

Currently, the reporting levels have the GS-13 Inspectors reporting to the GS-14 Chief 

Inspectors of all/OCR and they in turn answer to the GS-15 Chief of the 01. This 

structure has been in place off and on for approximately 15 years and has proven to be 

effective. It is imperative that the field Inspectors have a direct report who is readily 

accessible and most familiar with the mechanics/structure of the respective units. The 

01 Chief, having the experience, skill and knowledge wil l be able to discern which 

reported incidents rise to the level of importance for decisions such as immediate 

response or investigation necessary, referral to the district or notification/referral to the 

Deputy Director. 

Although a ll and OCR were regionalized over the past several decades, the obvious 

need for centralization outweighs any consideration for regionalizing the workforce at this 

time . Until the worklo ad is managed more effectively and efficiently, combining 

operational and administrative resources appears to be the most efficient way for the 

division to function in addressing the significant issues such as case backlog. 

Based on the number of 2008/2009 Merit Promotion Opportunity listing respondents, it 

has become apparent that recruiting personnel to fill the numerous vices in 01 is an 

issue. Coupled with the fact that the reporting memo for 0 11 is six years old (2003) and 

needs to be updated only compounds the fact that 011 is in need of immediate attention. 

Charge 

The committee was tasked by ADA Don Donovan with reviewing the current structure in 

the Office of Inspections (0 1), as it relates to the operation of the Office of Internal 

Investigations (011 ) and the Office of Compliance Review (OCR). Numerous interviews 

were conducted by committee members with prior and current Inspectors from 0 1 as well 

as other personnel who had insight into the inner workings of the 01. 

Specifically, two issues were brought to the forefront 

1. Should changes be made to the existing reporting levels and if so, what might 

they be regardi ng reporting and pay? 

2. Is it necessary to centralize the operations or is regionalization a viable option? 

APPENDIX II: USMS OII WORKING GROUP REPORT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

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Evaluation and Inspections Division 

29 
Recommendations 

1. The changes which should be made to the existing reporting levels regarding 

reporting and pay are: 

• Upgrade Inspectors from GS-13 to GS-13/14 levels via Merit Promotion. 

• Upgrade Chief Inspectors to GS-15 and rename them UDeputy Chief'. 

• Keep the Chief, 01 as a GS-15 with an eye towards possibly making the position a 

SES when the staff size increases or regional ization occurs. 

• Increase FTE Inspector positions from 10 to 18. 

• Increase FTE administrative positions to 8. 

• Inspectors may be assigned to 0 11 and OCR during their tour in 0 1. 

• Inspectors' assignment to 01 should be no longer than 4 years. 

• Deputy Chiefs' assignment should be no longer than 6 years. 

With the tremendous influx of Headquarters GS-14 and GS-15 positions located 

regionally, assignments requiring personnel report to the Headquarters office in Arlington 

is often perceived as one of the least desirable managerial positions in the agency. The 

disadvantages to working in the D.C. metropolitan area fa r outweigh the advantages at 

the GS-13 grade level. Raising the grade level of this position will entice the fie ld to 

apply for the numerous vacancies. A GOV being assigned to each Grade 14 and 15 

operational FTE at HQ is on the horizon and should be helpful in attracting Inspectors. It 

should be duly noted that other DOJ agencies (ATF, DEA, FBI) Oil/OCR Inspectors, 

Chief Inspectors and Division heads are hired a grade higher than USMS personnel, that 

being GS-14, GS-15 and GS-15/SES respectively. However, the journeyman grade 

level fo r the other agencies is GS-13 versus the USMS GS-12. 

2. [n regard to the vi abi lity of the option of centralization versus regionalization: 

• 01 needs to remain centralized for the next several (4-5) years. 

However, should recruiting/retaining personnel for the D.C. metro area continue to be an 

issue, as part of a long term strategy OCRIOI may need to be regionalized. The process 

for doing so would occur in concert with the rotational assignments of the Inspectors. 

In doing so, regionalizing the offices would allow personnel the opportunity to work for 0 1 

in numerous satellite offices strategically located throughout the United States. This 

practice is quite commonplace in the agency as exemplified by the large number of [00, 

JSD, AFD and WSD personnel situated around the country. The timeframe for 

establishing regional offices is roughly 18 - 24 months, according to OCM with the PCS 

costs associated with same at roughly $11 5,000 for a GS-13 and $250,000 for a GS14115. 

Historically, the concept of regionalization v centralization of 0 1 varied from one USMS 

administra tion and both have worked for 0 1 in the past. The only concern with same is 

that OCR may not be as effective on a regional basis, i.e. individuals work more 

autonomously and in the OCR there is a greater need and emphasis on team 

collaboration. 

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30 
 

ACTION ITEMS TO ADDRESS THE OFFICE 

OF 

INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS BAC KLOG 

Presently the 011 is dealing with an exorbitant backlog which needs 10 be addressed 

immediately. Feedback the committee received from the variou s sources provided the 

following options: 

• TOY USMS personnel to HQ with a financial incentive (based on length of 

assignment). 

• Assign low-level cases to former 011 Inspectors or district upper management 

members who have been appropriately trained to handle cases of this nature. A 

cadre of 10 should initially suffice. 

• Hire additional personnel, like retired 01 DUSMs to work Use of Force/Lost 

Badge/Credential cases. 

• New business practices must be developed. It is unclear whether any alternatives 

other than standard operating procedures have been explored by the 01 

management. At a minimum, the Chief Inspector of 011 and Chief of 0 1 should be 

assigned cases, especially when subjects employees are grade GS-15 and 

above. 

• A position to address the cases received needs to be created quickly. The intake, 

review and prioritization of reported misconduct is vital to the process and can be 

an effective way to manage the backlog if done correctly. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

31 
U.S. Department of Justice 

United States Marshals Service 

Office of the Director 

March 26, 2010 

MEMORANDUM TO: Michael Gulledge 

Assistant [nspector General 

for Evaluation and Inspection 

FROM: I'( I john 

Direc

F. 

tor 

Clark 

0~

1 /) ~7 ' 

SUBJECT: Review of the USMS Office oflotemal r nvestigations. 

A·2009-007 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft audit report on your Review of 

the USMS Office of Internal Investigations. We have reviewed the report, and OUT comments 

regarding each of the recommendations are attached. 

Should you have any question or concerns regarding this responsc, please contact Isabel 

Howell, Audit Liaison, at 202-307-9744. 

Attachment 

APPENDIX III: THE U.S. MARSHALS 

SERVICE’S RESPONSE 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

32 
Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: 

Continue to pursue short-term strategies: to staff tbe vacant 01 I invtstigator positi.ons until 

tbey can be filled ",ith permanent employees, such as by tempc.rarily assigning 

investigators to on. 

Response: (Agree) Oll currently has ten criminal investigators from field offices temporarily 

assigned to the Office of Inspection (01). In addition, 01 is pursuing additional resources to train 

ten Chief Deputy United Stat"s Mmhals on conducting on investigations, with the ultimate 

intent to utilize them as auxiliary investigators on internal investigaHons. 01 will continue to 

explore other short-tenn strategies to staff the vacant Oil investigator positions. 

Recommendation 2: 

Develop a strategic plan to ensure that 011 has sufficjenl resources to pcrform its mission 

in the long term. The plan should be based on a careful analysis (Jf: 

• Whether Oil's struct-ure should remain centralized or be gjQ~aliz.cd ; 

• The appropriate staffing I~vcls of on (including investigator, administrative, and 

analytic positions), based on the investigative caseload and reasonable investigator 

case assignmcnts; and 

The feasibility of and plan for creating a career path for Deputy United States 

Marshals tbat includes a headquarters: tour of duty. 

Response: (Agree) 0 1 will undertake to conduct a careful analysis to develop a strateg.ic plan for 

0 11 perfonnance of its mission in the long Lerm. The analysis will include a review ofa 

centralized or regionalized structure, staffing levels, and the feasibility of creating a career path 

that includes a tour of duty to USMS Headquarters. Cteating a career path for Deputy 

United States Marsbals is a far more tasking commitment that would require restructuring 

current USMS personnel practices. The creation of a career path has budgeti ng and 

appropriation requirements that would prevent the implementation and development of a career 

path program. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

33 
APPENDIX IV: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE 

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE’S RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this 

report to the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) for its comment. The USMS’s 

response is included in Appendix III to this report. The OIG’s analysis of 

the USMS’s response and the actions necessary to close the 

recommendations are discussed below. 

Recommendation 1. The USMS continue to pursue short-term 

strategies to staff the vacant OII investigator positions until they can be 

filled with permanent employees, such as by temporarily assigning 

investigators to OII. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of USMS Response. The USMS concurred with the 

recommendation and stated that OII currently has 10 temporary 

investigators from field offices. In addition, the USMS stated that it is 

pursuing resources to train Chief Deputy U.S. Marshals to conduct 

misconduct investigations so that they can act as auxiliary investigators 

for internal investigations. OII will continue to pursue other short-term 

strategies to staff the vacant OII investigator positions. 

OIG Analysis. The actions described by the USMS are partially 

responsive to the OIG’s recommendation. The OIG notes that the 

temporary investigators are only committed for 90-day terms that end in 

April 2010. While there is a plan to train Chief Deputy U.S. Marshals to 

conduct misconduct investigations, the USMS is still pursuing resources 

for the training. Please provide the OIG with an update on the status of 

the training of Chief Deputy U.S. Marshals and any other short-term 

strategies to staff the OII investigator positions by July 1, 2010. 

Recommendation 2. The USMS develop a strategic plan to ensure that 

OII has sufficient resources to perform its mission in the long term. The 

plan should be based on a careful analysis of: 

 whether OII’s structure should remain centralized or be 

regionalized; 

 the appropriate staffing levels of OII (including 

investigator, administrative, and analytic positions), 

based on the investigative caseload and reasonable 

investigator case assignments; and 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

34 
	 the feasibility of and plan for creating a career path for 

Deputy U.S. Marshals that includes a headquarters tour 

of duty. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of USMS Response. The USMS concurred with the 

recommendation and agreed to conduct a study to develop a strategic 

plan to allow OII to perform its mission in the long term. The USMS 

stated that it will conduct a careful analysis of OII’s structure, 

appropriate staffing levels, and the feasibility of creating a career path for 

Deputy U.S. Marshals. The USMS noted that creating a career path for 

Deputy U.S. Marshals would require changing current USMS personnel 

practices. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the USMS are responsive to 

our recommendation. Please provide an update on the study to develop 

a strategic plan to staff the OII by July 1, 2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

35