Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice 

OVERSIGHT INTEGRITY GUIDANCE 

Review of the U.S. Department of 

Justice’s Preparedness to Respond 

to Critical Incidents Under 

Emergency Support Function 13 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 20-025 February 2020 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Executive Summary 

Review of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Preparedness to Respond to 

Critical Incidents Under Emergency Support Function 13 

Introduction 

Each year the United States encounters numerous 

critical incidents that require a national-level response, 

including natural disasters and other catastrophic 

events such as acts of terrorism. In 2017, for example, 

the United States experienced four major hurricanes 

and other seasonal threats, including floods, tornadoes, 

and wildfires that caused an estimated $306 billion in 

damage. The National Response Framework (NRF), 

part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

(FEMA) National Preparedness System, is a selfdescribed “guide to how the Nation responds to all 

types of disasters and emergencies.” Established in 

2008, the NRF contains Emergency Support Functions 

(ESF) that coordinate and organize federal departments 

and agencies to manage resources and deliver core 

capabilities needed during a response to a critical 

incident. 

The NRF designates the U.S. Department of Justice 

(Department, DOJ) as the primary agency for 

Emergency Support Function 13 (ESF-13)–Public Safety 

and Security. According to the NRF’s ESF-13 Annex, 

ESF-13’s mission is to provide federal public safety and 

security assistance to state, local, tribal, territorial, and 

other governmental organizations overwhelmed by the 

results of an actual or anticipated natural or manmade 

disaster. In October 2008, the Department assigned 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) as the lead coordinating agency for 

ESF-13. 

ESF-13 functions include facility and resource security; 

security planning and technical resource assistance; 

public safety and security support; and support to 

access, traffic, and crowd control. As the ESF-13 lead 

coordinating agency, ATF coordinates the integration of 

federal resources across 10 FEMA regions to support a 

full range of incident management activities requiring a 

coordinated federal response. 

The Office of the Inspector General conducted this 

review to assess the Department’s and its components’ 

ability to meet their responsibilities under ESF-13 and 

execute ESF-13 activities in response to “any natural or 

manmade incident, including terrorism.” We also 

examined actions that the Department has taken in 

response to a recommendation we made in our 2010 

Review of the Department’s Preparation to Respond to a 

[Weapons of Mass Destruction] Incident as they related 

to ESF-13. 

Results in Brief 

We found that the Department made several 

improvements to the ESF-13 program since issuing its 

ESF-13 funding and staffing policy in 2012, including 

some made in response to our 2010 report. We also 

found the following areas in need of improvement: the 

development of policy and guidance regarding the role 

of the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO) 

in ESF-13 activations, sustainable staffing and funding 

for the program, and knowledge and awareness of the 

program among the Department’s partner agencies. 

The Department Has Taken Steps to Improve Its 

Preparedness to Support Critical Incidents Under an 

ESF-13 Activation 

ESF-13 has established a permanent headquarters 

within DOJ, staffed field positions, and developed a 

National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS Plan) to 

provide guidance to agencies supplying personnel and 

resources for ESF-13 activations. ESF-13 has also 

incorporated lessons learned from recent hurricane 

seasons. For example, ESF-13 personnel are working 

to develop closer relationships with other federal 

agencies managing related ESF activations. They are 

also deploying earlier, at the onset of natural disasters, 

and have provided deploying personnel with critical 

equipment needed to carry out their responsibilities. 

The Department Must Clarify and Update Emergency 

Response and Sustainment Policies to Improve 

Efficiencies and Effectiveness in Responding to a Critical 

Incident Under an ESF-13 Activation 

Although the ESF-13 program has matured over time, 

the Department lacks ESF-13 policies in several key 

areas. For example, we found that, while the NRF’s 

ESF-13 Annex assigns the Attorney General the 

authority to appoint an SFLEO, there is no Department 

policy or guidance establishing the role of the SFLEO, its 

relationship to ESF-13, or the SFLEO’s coordination with 

ESF-13 when both are activated. Although the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed an SFLEO 

Deployment Plan originally to respond to the 2006 

hurricane season, we found that the FBI’s current 

SFLEO Deployment Plan duplicates the ESF-13 CONOPS 

Plan. In addition, we found that members of the FBI’s 

SFLEO cadre lacked knowledge of the ESF-13 CONOPS 

Plan and that the FBI has not exercised the SFLEO 

position in FEMA National Level Exercises or in ESF-13 

Table Top Exercises. 

Hurricane Harvey in 2017 was the only critical incident 

for which the Department appointed an SFLEO during 

the scope of our review. ESF-13 officials considered the 

Hurricane Harvey response efforts an overall success, 

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Executive Summary 

Review of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Preparedness to Respond to 

Critical Incidents Under Emergency Support Function 13 

but they also told us that the Department’s 

appointment of an SFLEO during the response resulted 

in initial confusion and duplication of effort. To avoid 

confusion and duplication of effort during future ESF-13 

activations for which an SFLEO is appointed, we believe 

that the Department should develop policy or guidance 

to clarify the SFLEO’s role, to enhance his or her 

effectiveness, and to prevent confusion and delay. 

In addition, we identified concerns with the 

Department’s policy for funding and staffing of the 

ESF-13 operation. For example, funding is based on 

fiscal year (FY) 2012 budget numbers, which has 

affected the program’s ability to address equipment 

shortfalls, prepare for activations, and deploy rapidly to 

assist other federal partners. 

ESF-13 is funded partially through contributions made 

by the other DOJ law enforcement components to ATF. 

During the scope of our review, the other components 

often did not deliver this funding until late in the fiscal 

year, affecting ESF-13 and ATF operations. Specifically, 

during the period between the beginning of a fiscal year 

and delivery of funds by the other components, the 

program’s capacity to provide timely support to federal 

operations during critical incidents was reduced. In 

addition, ATF had to make up for the ESF-13 funding 

shortfall using funds appropriated for its own primary 

mission. This has resulted in operational impacts to 

ATF, including delayed personnel hires, reduced 

training, and delayed technological and equipment 

upgrades. 

Finally, the Department’s ESF-13 staffing policies are 

unclear and do not address potential competing 

priorities among DOJ’s law enforcement components 

when responding to critical incidents. A continued lack 

of Department engagement on these policy issues could 

pose challenges to the ESF-13 program, potentially 

limiting the program’s capacity to respond efficiently 

during critical incidents and its ability to meet future 

needs. 

ESF-13 Must Increase Federal Law Enforcement 

Officers’ Situational Awareness and Improve Support 

Agencies’ Program Knowledge to Foster More Effective 

Operations During Critical Incidents 

We found that law enforcement agencies supporting 

ESF-13 activations require more situational awareness 

to respond to critical incidents. Specifically, some 

agencies and deploying personnel lacked important 

information about the environmental hazards they 

would encounter at the disaster area. Further, 

information packets provided to deploying Federal Law 

Enforcement Officers (FLEO) contained only basic 

information about equipment needs, resulting in some 

FLEOs arriving at a disaster site without proper 

resources to operate in disaster conditions. 

We also found that deployed FLEOs need more 

information about the scope and application of their 

legal authorities. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and 

in response to a congressional report, the Department 

and ESF-13 implemented several improvements to 

increase FLEOs’ knowledge of their legal authorities and 

to better prepare them to respond to a critical incident. 

We found that ESF-13 Quick Response Team personnel 

and ESF-13 support agency emergency management 

officials still wanted more information about the scope 

and application of the FLEOs’ legal authorities, such as 

rules of engagement and how to respond to criminal 

activities. 

Finally, we found that supporting agencies and FLEOs 

lacked knowledge of the ESF-13 program, potentially 

inhibiting their responses. Specifically, we found that 

deployed personnel had misconceptions about their 

roles as ESF-13 responders, believing that they would 

be performing search and rescue work rather than 

providing force protection for other federal emergency 

responders. In addition, we found anecdotally that 

some federal agencies deployed personnel for ESF-13 

activities but assigned them tasks to support internal 

agency priorities that may have been outside of the 

ESF-13 command structure and mission assignment. 

Some deployed team leaders lacked knowledge of the 

FEMA Incident Command Structure concept, leading to 

miscommunications and misunderstandings about task 

and mission priorities during deployments. 

Recommendations 

We make seven recommendations to improve the 

Department’s preparedness to respond to critical 

incidents under ESF-13 and to ensure the sustainment 

of the program. Our recommendations include creating 

policy and guidance for the SFLEO position, reviewing 

funding and staffing requirements to determine 

appropriate levels that meet current and future ESF-13 

program needs, and developing methods to improve 

situational awareness and knowledge of ESF-13 support 

agencies and FLEOs supporting ESF-13 activations. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1 

Background..........................................................................................1 

Historical Perspective: Hurricane Katrina Response .................................. 2 

Federal and DOJ Policies Establishing a Response to Critical Incidents ......... 3 

ESF-13 Organizational Structure and Plan ................................................6 

FBI SFLEO Deployment Plan ...................................................................7 

Previous OIG Review of the Department’s Preparedness to Respond to 

Disaster ...............................................................................................7 

Scope and Methodology of the OIG’s Review ............................................8 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW ...............................................................................9 

The Department Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Preparedness to 

The Department Must Clarify and Update Emergency Response and 

Sustainment Policies to Improve Efficiencies and Effectiveness in 

ESF-13 Must Increase Federal Law Enforcement Officers’ Situational 

Awareness and Improve Support Agencies’ Program Knowledge to Foster 

Support Critical Incidents Under an ESF-13 Activation ............................... 9 

Responding to Critical Incidents Under an ESF-13 Activation .................... 10 

More Effective Operations During Critical Incidents.................................. 25 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................... 32 

Conclusion ......................................................................................... 32 

Recommendations............................................................................... 33 

APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW........................................ 35 

Standards .......................................................................................... 35 

Data Collection and Analysis................................................................. 35 

Interviews.......................................................................................... 35 

Site Visit and Observation .................................................................... 36 

Policy and Document Review ................................................................ 37 

APPENDIX 2: HURRICANE KATRINA REPORTS ............................................... 38 

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Report from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs........................................................................... 38 

Report from the House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee 

to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina........ 39 

White House Lessons Learned Report .................................................... 39 

APPENDIX 3: LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES RELATING TO CRITICAL 

INCIDENT RESPONSE.............................................................. 41 

Legislation ......................................................................................... 41 

Directives .......................................................................................... 41 

APPENDIX 4: ESF-13 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE..................................... 44 

ESF-13 Structure During Steady State Operations................................... 44 

ESF-13 Structure During an Activation................................................... 47 

APPENDIX 5: ESF-13 ACTIVATIONS SINCE FY 2008 AND THE ACTIVATION 

PROCESS .............................................................................. 50 

ESF-13 Activations Since FY 2008 ......................................................... 50 

ESF-13 Activation Process.................................................................... 51 

APPENDIX 6: ORGANIZATION OF THE SENIOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 

OFFICIAL’S STAFF .................................................................. 53 

APPENDIX 7: FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON OF ESF-13 AND THE SENIOR 

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL.................................... 54 

APPENDIX 8: THE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT.............. 56 

APPENDIX 9: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE ..................... 58 

APPENDIX 10: ATF’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT.................................. 60 

APPENDIX 11: OIG ANALYSIS OF ATF’S RESPONSE ......................................... 64 

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INTRODUCTION 

Background 

Each year the United States encounters numerous critical incidents, such as 

“any natural disasters or manmade incident, including terrorism,” that require a 

national level response.1 In 2017, for example, the United States experienced four 

major hurricanes and other seasonal threats such as flooding, tornadoes, and 

wildfires. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the 

extreme weather events of 2017 caused an estimated $306 billion in damage, 

making 2017 the most expensive year on record for natural disasters. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through the National 

Response Framework (NRF), the nation’s guide to responding to all types of 

disasters and emergencies, designates the U.S. Department of Justice (Department, 

DOJ) with primary responsibility for Emergency Support Function 13 (ESF-13)– 

Public Safety and Security.2 According to the NRF, ESF-13 provides federal public 

safety and security assistance to state, local, tribal, territorial, and other 

governmental organizations overwhelmed by the results of an actual or anticipated 

natural or manmade disaster.3 In October 2008, the Department assigned the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) as the lead coordinating 

agency for ESF-13. As the ESF-13 lead coordinating agency and when directed by 

FEMA, ATF coordinates the integration of federal public safety and security 

resources to support disaster area response activities. 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

undertook this review to assess the Department’s 

ability to meet its responsibilities under the NRF 

and execute ESF-13 activities in response to 

emergency or disaster situations requiring the 

capabilities of the federal government. We 

assessed Department policies and guidance; 

planning, preparation, training, and execution 

processes; and coordination among DOJ law 

enforcement components and non-DOJ support 

agencies in support of ESF-13 activations from 

fiscal year (FY) 2008 through FY 2018. 

Special Agents provide force protection fo r 

an ESF-13 Federal Operational Support 

mission in Puerto Rico during Hurricane Maria 

SU pport, 2017. 

Source: ATF/ ESF-13 

1 As of the issuance of this report, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has not 

activated ESF-13 for any mass shootings. 

2 ESF-13 is one of 14 ESFs designated under the NRF. See below for more information about 

the other ESFs and associated annexes. 

3 First established in 2008, the NRF describes specific authorities and best practices under 

which “the Nation” responds to natural disasters, as well as other emergencies, including terrorist 

attacks. Under the NRF, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of FEMA have the 

authority to activate various emergency support functions, including ESF-13. 

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Historical Perspective: Hurricane Katrina Response 

In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast, 

causing over $125 billion in losses; damaging over 275,000 homes; and directly 

resulting in the deaths of over 1,300 people. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 

two congressional oversight reports and a White House report detailed the federal 

response and highlighted areas for improvement.4 Collectively, the reports 

emphasized several challenges that federal law enforcement faced during the 

response to Hurricane Katrina, including unclear roles and responsibilities; 

identification of dual lead agencies; and legal authorities, such as peace officer 

deputation for Federal Law Enforcement Officers (FLEO). The reports also criticized 

lack of planning by and inefficient command structure of the federal law 

enforcement response, including co-Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officials 

(SFLEO) from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

which led to confusion in the early stages of the federal response.5 In U.S. Senate 

testimony, the Director of DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center stated that, 

“In most cases in the National Response Plan (NRP), the FBI has got the lead 

because it’s a terrorist-related action, and they have to do the criminal 

investigation. No one had thought about a natural disaster.”6 While the reports 

covered the entire federal response to Hurricane Katrina, they featured key details 

and recommendations for the federal government’s law enforcement role in 

response to critical incidents. For example, the White House report called for more 

effective coordination and communication between the SFLEO functions and 

ESF-13, recommended consolidating the ESF-13 federal law enforcement response 

under the leadership of DOJ, and gave the Attorney General the sole authority to 

designate an SFLEO.7 For further details on these reports and their 

recommendations, see Appendix 2. 

4 S. REP. NO. 109-322, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (August 2006), 440, 

www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt322/CRPT-109srpt322.pdf (accessed January 24, 2020). 

H.R. REP. NO. 109-377, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee 

to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (February 2006), 

www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML12093A081.pdf (accessed January 24, 2020). 

Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 

Learned (February 2006), www.library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf (accessed 

January 24, 2020). 

5 According to the 2004 National Response Plan (NRP), which was in effect during Hurricane 

Katrina, the SFLEO was responsible for directing law enforcement operations during a national 

incident. We further discuss the role of the SFLEO later in this report. 

The NRF replaced the NRP in 2008. Unless otherwise specified, throughout our report we refer 

to the NRF, 3rd edition, published in 2016. 

6 S. REP. NO. 109-322, 449. 

7 At the time of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the NRP assigned ESF-13 jointly to DHS and DOJ, making 

it the only ESF with dual leads. An updated version of the NRP, developed in 2006, assigned ESF-13 solely to 

DOJ. Subsequently, in 2008, DOJ formally designated ATF as the lead coordinating agency for ESF-13. 

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Federal and DOJ Policies Establishing a Response to Critical Incidents 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) and Presidential Policy 

Directive 8 (PPD-8) establish policy to prepare the nation against threats to the 

nation’s security, including acts of terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, and 

catastrophic natural disasters. HSPD-5, issued in February 2003, directed the U.S. 

government to establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident 

management, “to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”8 PPD-8, issued in March 2011, 

directed the establishment of a National Preparedness Goal and a National 

Preparedness System to build on and improve capabilities necessary to prevent, 

protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from national 

security threats.9 For ESF-13, HSPD-5 and PPD-8 provide the foundation for the 

NRF and describe how federal, state, and local law authorities will ensure a safe and 

secure environment within a disaster area. See Appendix 3 for information about 

legislation and directives related to critical incident responses. 

The NRF and the ESF-13 Public Safety and Security Annex 

In January 2008, the DHS Secretary replaced the NRP with the interagencycoordinated NRF, which guides the government’s response to all types of disasters 

and emergencies.10 The NRF describes the principles, roles and responsibilities, 

and coordinating structures that deliver the core capabilities required to respond to 

an incident, as well as the manner in which response efforts integrate with those of 

the other mission areas.11 The NRF defines ESF-13’s core capabilities as facility and 

resource security; security planning and technical resource assistance; public safety 

and security support; and support to access, traffic, and crowd control. The NRF is 

supported by 14 ESF annexes, which group federal resources and capabilities into 

functional areas that are most frequently needed during a national response.12 The 

NRF identifies a primary agency and coordinator for each ESF. 

8 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents, 

February 28, 2003, www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-security-presidential-directive-5 (accessed 

January 24, 2020). 

9 Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness, March 30, 2011, www.dhs.gov/ 

presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness#wcm-survey-target-id (accessed January 24, 

2020). 

10 The NRF is a subset of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which guides all 

levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work together to 

prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from natural or manmade critical incidents. 

NIMS provides shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities 

described in the National Preparedness System. See Appendix 3 for a further discussion of PPD-8’s 

National Preparedness System. 

11 The Response mission area is one of five National Planning Frameworks as directed by 

PPD-8. The other four mission areas include Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, and Recovery. 

12 For more information about the 14 Emergency Support Function Annexes, see FEMA, 

“Emergency Support Function Annexes,” www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/25512 

(accessed January 24, 2020). 

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The ESF-13–Public Safety and Security Annex (ESF-13 Annex) identifies DOJ 

and ATF as the primary agency and lead ESF coordinator for public safety and 

security. The ESF-13 Annex also defines ESF-13’s purpose to “provide federal 

public safety and security assistance to local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal 

organizations overwhelmed by the results of an actual or anticipated 

natural/manmade disaster or an act of terrorism.”13 In addition to the 

Department’s law enforcement components—including ATF; the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA); the FBI; the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP); and the U.S. 

Marshals Service (USMS)—the ESF-13 Annex also identifies several ESF-13 support 

agencies that assist the Department in fulfilling ESF-13’s roles and missions. These 

ESF-13 support agencies include the U.S. Departments of Defense, Homeland 

Security, State, Interior, and Treasury and the National Guard Bureau.14 The 

ESF-13 Annex also states that the Attorney General may appoint an SFLEO during 

an incident requiring additional coordination of all federal law enforcement assets. 

The Attorney General, through the FBI, maintains a cadre of trained individuals to 

serve as the SFLEO, as appropriate. We further discuss the SFLEO’s appointment, 

purpose, and functions below in the Results of the Review. 

Collectively, the NRF and the 

ESF-13 Annex generally define ESF-13’s 

critical tasks and mission categories (see 

the text box). Personnel deployed in 

support of ESF-13 (FLEOs) form Quick 

Response Teams (QRT) when activated to 

support a disaster response. According to 

the ESF-13 Annex, FLEOs activated to 

support a Direct Federal Assistance 

mission must have express statutory 

authority, including arrest authority, to 

enforce local, state, tribal, and territorial 

laws. 

DOJ ESF-13–Public Safety and Security, 

Program Funding, and Staffing Policy 

Memoranda 

The Department delineated policies 

regarding ESF-13 response in a 

succession of memoranda. In an 

October 16, 2008 memorandum, then 

ESF-13 Critical Tasks and Mission 

Categories 

Critical Tasks 

• Establish a safe and secure environment. 

• Provide and maintain on-scene security; 

meet the protection needs of the 

affected population while eliminating or 

mitigating the risk of further damage to 

persons, property, and environment. 

Mission Categories 

• Federal Operational Support: ESF-13 

resources provide direct support to 

other federal departments and 

agencies. 

• Direct Federal Assistance: ESF-13 

resources support state or local law 

enforcement departments or agencies. 

Sources: NRF, 3rd edition, and ESF-13 

Annex 

Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip reaffirmed the Department’s acceptance as the 

ESF-13 primary agency and formalized ATF as DOJ’s ESF-13 lead coordinating 

13 Emergency Support Function 13–Public Safety and Security Annex, June 2016. 

14 The ESF-13 Annex also designates departments with FLEOs, in addition to those listed 

above, as ESF-13 support agencies. The Department of Defense and the National Guard Bureau 

perform liaison roles during an ESF-13 response. 

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agency.15 On May 12, 2012, then Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued a 

memorandum stating that, as the ESF-13 primary agency, DOJ is responsible for 

organizing law enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities and resources 

during incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.16 Additionally, the 

memorandum directed the DOJ law enforcement components that have a role 

during an ESF-13 activation to share responsibility for the Department’s ESF-13 

program, with ATF providing “the bulk” of the financial and staffing requirements 

for the ESF-13 program.17 For FYs 2012 and 2013, the memorandum directed the 

DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS each to provide $360,000 in annual funding and two 

detailees to support the Department’s ESF-13 program. The memorandum stated 

that the Department would reevaluate the funding and staffing requirements at the 

end of FY 2013. 

As a follow-up to Deputy Attorney General Cole’s memorandum, Assistant 

Attorney General for Administration Lee Loftus issued a memorandum on May 21, 

2012, that restated the annual funding requirement and established permanent 

staffing for the Department’s ESF-13 program.18 Specifically, the memorandum 

established a staff ceiling of 33 personnel, with ATF providing 13 permanent staff 

and 12 contracted support staff and the other law enforcement components 

providing the remaining 8 permanent staff. According to the memorandum, the 

DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS would each provide ATF two detailees on a nonreimbursable, full-time basis for 2 years. The memorandum directed that the 

components fill these positions by the end of FY 2012. 

In correspondence during August 2012, the Justice Management Division 

(JMD) advised the DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS that the Attorney General had directed 

them to continue their funding and staffing requirements, as stated in the two 2012 

memoranda, for FY 2014 and beyond.19 

15 Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, memorandum for Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Bureau of Prisons; Drug Enforcement Administration; 

Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Marshals Service, Emergency Support Function-13 (ESF-13), 

Public Safety and Security, October 16, 2008. 

16 James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, memorandum for 

Heads of Law Enforcement Components, ESF #13 Staffing and Funding, May 12, 2012. 

17 Cole, memorandum for Heads of Law Enforcement Components. 

18 Lee Lofthus, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, memorandum for Chief 

Financial Officers of Law Enforcement Components, ESF #13 Staffing and Funding, May 21, 2012. 

19 We reviewed four emails from JMD budget staff directing each component to continue its 

funding and staffing requirements. We did not receive any additional formal DOJ directives affecting 

this action in response to our data and document requests. JMD, email to ATF, FY 2014 AG Final 

Decisions, August 23, 2012; JMD, emails to BOP and USMS, FY 2014 AG Final Decisions–ESF #13, 

August 23, 2012; JMD, email to DEA, FY 2014 AG Final Decisions–DEA, August 23, 2012; and JMD, 

email to FBI, FY 2014 AG Final Decisions–ESF #13, August 23, 2012. 

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ESF-13 Organizational Structure and Plan 

ESF-13 Structure and Activations 

In 2012, ATF established a National Coordination Center (NCC) Branch within 

its Special Operations Division, Office of Field Operations at ATF headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. A National Coordinator leads the NCC, which, in addition to a 

national headquarters, consists of 10 field sites co-located with FEMA regional 

headquarters. The ESF-13 NCC operates in two modes: steady state operations 

and activations.20 During steady state operations, the ESF-13 national 

headquarters and field staff prepare for potential ESF-13 activations. These 

preparations include planning and conducting training exercises with FEMA during 

National Level Exercises, as well as ESF-13 Table Top Exercises and information 

briefings with the ESF-13 support agencies.21 Steady state operations also include 

liaising with ESF-13 support agencies, as well as with FEMA and state emergency 

management offices. The ESF-13 NCC also holds After Action Reviews and annual 

meetings with ESF-13 support agencies. When FEMA activates ESF-13, the NCC 

provides functional support and assistance to ESF-13’s Forward Support Team, as 

well as its QRTs. ESF-13 was activated 45 times during calendar years 2008 

through 2018. Since the establishment of the NCC in 2012, ESF-13 has deployed 

over 4,700 FLEOs, ESF-13 staff, and support personnel in support of 

34 activations.22 See Appendix 4 for information about the NCC organizational 

structure and field site locations. See Appendix 5 for a description of ESF-13 

activations and process. 

ESF-13 National Concept of Operations Plan 

The ESF-13 National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS Plan) reiterates 

the official designation of ATF as the Department’s ESF-13 lead coordinating agency 

and provides a framework for the Department, through ATF, to fulfill its obligations 

as the primary agency for ESF-13–Public Safety and Security. The CONOPS Plan 

memorializes standard operating procedures that guide ESF-13 national, field, and 

20 Steady state occurs when ESF-13 is not activated via the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Assistance Act of 1987, as amended (Stafford Act) or other activations from FEMA. 

For information on the Stafford Act, see Appendix 3. 

21 National Level Exercises, part of FEMA’s National Exercise Program, are a 2-year cycle of 

exercises across the nation that examine and validate the ability of government, private industry, and 

nongovernmental organizations to protect against, respond to, and recover from a major disaster. 

A Table Top Exercise facilitates understanding of concepts, identifies strengths and shortfalls, 

and stimulates discussion of issues resulting from a hypothetical situation. Applications include 

assessing plans, policies, and procedures or types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, 

response to, or recovery from a defined incident. Participants discuss issues in depth and develop 

decisions through slow-paced problem solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous decision-making 

that occurs under actual or simulated emergency conditions. 

Since FY 2014, ESF-13 has participated in five FEMA National Level Exercises and conducted 

nine internal Table Top Exercises. 

22 ESF-13’s data metrics for the number of deployed personnel began with Hurricane Sandy 

support in 2012. 

6 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

steady state operations and coordination. The CONOPS Plan addresses mission 

authorities and policies; execution, including activation, coordination, deployment 

protocols, and transition from response to 

recovery operations; and administrative and 

command functions. The CONOPS Plan 

groups standard operating procedures into 

several annexes that cover National and Field 

Operations and Coordination, Advisory 

Board/Stakeholder Committee, Legal 

Authorities, Training Plan, Deployment 

Staffing procedures, and Regional Plans. The 

ESF-13 staff updates the CONOPS Plan and 

standard operating procedures based on past 

crises and lessons learned so that creative or 

nontraditional solutions may be brought to 

bear to address challenges presented by 

future disaster response. 

QRT personnel provide force protection for an 

Urban Search and Rescue mission during Hurricane 

Michael support, 2018 . 

Source: ATF/ ESF-13 

FBI SFLEO Deployment Plan 

According to an FBI internal issues paper, in 2006 the FBI initially drafted a 

hurricane response plan and developed training to assist and prepare its senior 

executives to serve as an SFLEO.23 In 2012, the FBI’s hurricane response plan 

evolved into an FBI all-hazards response plan, called the SFLEO Deployment Plan, 

to support the appointment of an SFLEO. The SFLEO Deployment Plan describes 

the SFLEO’s responsibilities and the SFLEO staff’s organizational structure and 

identifies FBI support assets to assist the SFLEO and staff in their mission. The 

primary role of the SFLEO is “coordinating federal law enforcement resources with 

other incoming resources in an effort to reconstitute local and state law 

enforcement and public safety operations as soon as possible and to maintain or 

restore civil order so that disaster relief resources can operate without interference 

and in the most effective and efficient manner possible.”24 The SFLEO Deployment 

Plan also states that the SFLEO oversees public safety operations and will provide 

“strategic guidance” to ESF-13 regarding the deployment and prioritization of law 

enforcement resources. See Appendix 6 for the SFLEO organizational structure. 

Previous OIG Review of the Department’s Preparedness to Respond to 

Disaster 

In May 2010, the OIG reviewed the Department’s preparation to respond to a 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incident.25 The OIG concluded that the 

23 FBI issues paper, Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO) and Emergency Support 

Function 13–Public Safety and Security (ESF 13) Issues Currently Under Review by DOJ, June 4, 2012. 

24 FBI SFLEO Deployment Plan, June 2016. 

25 See DOJ OIG, Review of the Department’s Preparation to Respond to a WMD Incident, 

Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2010-004 (May 2010), www.oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/e1004.pdf 

(accessed January 24, 2020). 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Department was not adequately prepared to coordinate federal law enforcement 

activities if called upon to ensure public safety and security in accordance with the 

NRF, including during an ESF-13 activation. Specifically, the OIG found a lack of 

awareness regarding the Department’s ESF-13 responsibilities and ATF’s authority 

to serve as the lead coordinating agency for those activities. Additionally, ATF had 

not assigned adequate staff to ensure that required ESF-13 planning and 

coordination activities occurred, did not provide adequate ESF-13 training to its own 

staff or personnel from ESF-13 support agencies, and lacked comprehensive 

information on law enforcement resources that agencies could deploy during an 

incident. 

Scope and Methodology of the OIG’s Review 

This review assessed the Department’s and its components’ ability to meet 

their responsibilities under the NRF and execute ESF-13 activities in response to 

emergency or disaster situations requiring the capabilities of the federal 

government. Our fieldwork occurred from April 2018 through May 2019 and 

consisted of policy and document reviews, data analysis, interviews, and a site visit 

to the ESF-13 NCC to observe activities during Hurricane Lane in 2018. In order to 

assess and evaluate the Department’s ability to respond to ESF-13 activations, our 

data analysis covered FY 2008 through the end of the 2018 hurricane season, 

November 30, 2018. We interviewed the Office of the Deputy Attorney’s 

Emergency Preparedness and Crisis Response Coordinator; ESF-13 staff, including 

the National Coordinator and 5 of the 10 ESF-13 Regional Law Enforcement 

Coordinators; as well as deployed FLEOs who supported ESF-13 activations during 

the 2017 and 2018 hurricane seasons. We also interviewed emergency 

management officials within DOJ, including those employed by the DEA, FBI, BOP, 

and USMS, as well as non-DOJ ESF-13 support agencies that contribute personnel 

and resources during an ESF-13 activation. We also interviewed the program 

managers for ESF-8 and ESF-9 to assess ESF-13’s support to these federal 

entities.26 For more details about our scope and methodology, see Appendix 1. 

26 ESF-8 is Public Health and Medical Services; ESF-9 is Search and Rescue. 

8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

The Department Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Preparedness to Support 

Critical Incidents Under an ESF-13 Activation 

As noted in the Introduction, the OIG concluded in its May 2010 report that 

the Department was not adequately prepared to coordinate federal law enforcement 

activities if called upon to ensure public safety and security in accordance with the 

National Response Framework (NRF), including ESF-13.27 Specifically, the OIG 

found a lack of awareness regarding the Department’s ESF-13 responsibilities and 

ATF’s authority to serve as the lead coordinator for those activities. In addition, 

ATF had not assigned adequate staff to ensure that the required ESF-13 planning 

and coordination activities occurred and did not provide adequate ESF-13 training 

to its own staff or personnel from ESF-13 support agencies. The report further 

found that ATF lacked comprehensive information on law enforcement resources 

that agencies could deploy in response to a critical incident.28 

One of the OIG’s recommendations in its 2010 report was that the 

Department ensure that it is prepared to fulfill its emergency support function 

responsibilities under the NRF. The recommendation included reviewing the 

designation of ATF as the Department’s lead agency to coordinate public safety and 

security activities, approving a National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS Plan), 

and staffing national and regional coordinator positions.29 The Department took 

several actions in response to this recommendation that, together, improved the 

ESF-13 program. In 2012, ATF created an ESF-13 National Coordination Center 

(NCC) Branch within its Office of Field Operations. The Department, through the 

ESF-13 staff, created the CONOPS Plan and associated annexes. The CONOPS Plan 

serves to guide ESF-13’s functions during activations and provides guidance to 

ESF-13 support agencies that support ESF-13 activations with Federal Law 

Enforcement Officers (FLEO) and equipment. 

Throughout our fieldwork, we identified other steps that the Department has 

taken since our 2010 report that have improved its ESF-13 program, particularly in 

the area of coordination with and outreach to other agencies. For example, ESF-13 

staff increased outreach and coordination with the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s (FEMA) national response coordinators, ESF-13 support agency 

emergency management offices, and program managers and liaisons responsible 

27 See DOJ OIG, Review of the Department’s Preparation to Respond to a WMD Incident, 

Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2010-004 (May 2010), www.oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/e1004.pdf 

(accessed January 24, 2020). The OIG closed all recommendations related to this report after 

receiving evidence that the Department had taken actions that the OIG deemed sufficient to 

implement each recommendation. 

28 According to ESF-13’s National Coordinator, at the time of this review the development of a 

law enforcement resources capabilities handbook was not complete. 

29 See DOJ OIG, The Department’s Preparation to Respond to a WMD Incident, 42. 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

for ESF-8 and ESF-9 operations.

Coordinators (RLEC) and Field C

respective regions, including th

Emergency Operations Center (

Response Coordination Center 

told us that the management 

and coordination of ESF-13 

functions has greatly improved 

over the years. 

We also found additional 

areas in need of improvement 

to help ensure that the 

Department is fully prepared to 

fulfill its ESF-13 responsibilities 

under the NRF. In the 

following sections, we discuss 

the need for clearly defined 

and updated ESF-13 response 

and sustainment policies, as 

well as additional ESF-13 

programmatic knowledge 

within the Department and its 

ESF-13 support agencies. 

30 Also, ESF-13 Regional Law Enforcement 

oordinators now maintain active liaisons within their 

e FEMA Regional Administrators and State 

SEOC) staffs. A senior official from FEMA’s National 

obile Command Center vans from the DEA, USMS, and FBI provide 

vital commun ications during Hurricane Harvey support, 2017 . 

Source: FBI 

The Department Must Clarify and Update Emergency Response and 

Sustainment Policies to Improve Efficiencies and Effectiveness in 

Responding to Critical Incidents Under an ESF-13 Activation 

We found that unclear and incomplete Department policies and guidance 

have led to overlapping critical incident response roles and responsibilities between 

the ESF-13 program and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Senior Federal 

Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO). This overlap created delays, confusion, and 

mission duplication during the 2017 Hurricane Harvey response, which was the only 

appointment of an SFLEO since Hurricane Katrina in 2005.31 We also found that 

Department policies establishing ESF-13 funding and staffing requirements pose 

challenges for the program’s sustainability and continued improvement. We believe 

30 ESF-8 and ESF-9 are federal entities for which ESF-13 provides the most direct support 

during a disaster declaration. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services manages ESF-8– 

Public Health and Medical Services. ESF-13 Quick Response Teams (QRT) provide force protection to 

ESF-8’s Federal Medical Response Teams. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through 

FEMA, manages ESF-9–Search and Rescue. ESF-13 QRTs provide force protection to Urban Search 

and Rescue Task Forces. For more information on entities that may be deployed during a federal 

response, see FEMA, “Emergency Support Function Annexes,” www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/ 

documents/25512 (accessed January 24, 2020). 

31 During the response to Hurricane Katrina, DHS and DOJ performed as co-SFLEOs. See the 

Introduction for more details. 

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that the Department’s ability to efficiently and effectively respond to future critical 

incidents requiring an ESF-13 activation could be limited if Department policies and 

guidance are not updated. 

Department Policy Does Not Establish the Mission, Role, and Functions of the 

SFLEO, Which Could Create Delays and Confusion During DOJ Responses to Critical 

Incidents 

According to the NRF, the Attorney General may appoint an SFLEO during a 

critical incident requiring additional coordination of all federal law enforcement, 

public safety, and security operations with intelligence or investigative law 

enforcement operations directly related to the incident.32 However, we found that 

the Department does not have policies and guidance that establish the SFLEO 

position, mission, or coordination with the Department’s ESF-13 program when 

both are activated in response to a critical incident. We also found that the FBI 

maintains an SFLEO cadre, but that the cadre does not train or exercise during 

FEMA National Level Exercises or ESF-13 Table Top Exercises.33 In addition, the 

FBI did not coordinate the development of its SFLEO Deployment Plan with ESF-13. 

We believe that the Department’s lack of policy and guidance regarding the 

appointment and role of an SFLEO, as well as the lack of training or joint 

participation in exercises between the FBI’s SFLEO cadre and ESF-13 staff, could 

create delays, cause confusion, or result in duplicative efforts during a DOJ 

response to a critical incident. We further found that those consequences were 

experienced during the DOJ response to Hurricane Harvey in 2017. 

The Department Has Not Defined the SFLEO Position or Mission in Policy 

Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the U.S. Congress found that the 

National Response Plan (NRP), predecessor to the current NRF, offered no insight 

into how an SFLEO should interact with ESF-13. Congress also found that there 

was confusion as to whether DOJ or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) would lead the law enforcement response during a natural disaster.34 As a 

result, Congress recommended that the NRP clarify the relationship between an 

32 NRF, Public Safety and Security Annex (ESF-13 Annex). 

33 The SFLEO cadre consists of FBI senior executives that have been designated by the 

Attorney General to fill the position of SFLEO in response to a domestic emergency or major disaster. 

34 Congress further noted that the ambiguity of the SFLEO role contributed to the 

untimeliness of the federal public safety and security response and impeded strategic coordination of 

incoming law enforcement resources. S. REP. NO. 109-322, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still 

Unprepared (August 2006), 440, www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt322/CRPT-109srpt322.pdf (accessed 

January 24, 2020), 454. 

In hearings following Hurricane Katrina, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee expressed concerns about the lack of clarity regarding which agency would lead the 

federal law enforcement response to a natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law 

Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006), 18–19, www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG109shrg27025/pdf/CHRG-109shrg27025.pdf (accessed January 24, 2020). 

11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SFLEO and ESF-13.35 Beginning with the January 2008 NRF edition, DHS assigned 

both the SFLEO and ESF-13 functions to DOJ. As discussed in the Introduction, in a 

2008 Deputy Attorney General memorandum the Department reaffirmed ATF’s role 

as DOJ’s ESF-13 lead coordinating agency.36 During this review, we found that 

between 2012 and 2014 the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) and the 

FBI had considered which component would perform the SFLEO functions, the 

SFLEO’s role and relationship to ESF-13, and required training for an SFLEO. 

However, at the conclusion of our fieldwork, the Department still did not have 

SFLEO policies addressing these issues. The ODAG’s Emergency Preparedness and 

Crisis Response Coordinator acknowledged the continued lack of DOJ policy related 

to the SFLEO position but said that he envisioned that the SFLEO’s role could be 

larger than merely coordinating law enforcement activities and could expand 

beyond the response efforts to include recovery efforts. Several other DOJ officials 

we spoke to, including members of the FBI’s SFLEO cadre, the FBI’s Crisis 

Management Unit Chief, and ESF-13’s National Coordinator, all agreed that DOJ 

policy further defining the SFLEO position would be helpful. 

We found that during the 2017 hurricane season ESF-13 officials questioned 

the appointment of an FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) as SFLEO, rather than an 

official from another agency more familiar with ESF-13. The NRF’s Terrorism 

Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex states that, since the FBI is the 

lead agency for terrorism investigations, an FBI SAC would normally serve as the 

SFLEO during an act of terrorism.37 However, the NRF does not address an SFLEO 

appointment for a natural disaster such as a hurricane. An ESF-13 Senior 

Emergency Management Specialist told us that a response to a natural disaster 

would not have an investigative aspect and thus would not require an FBI SAC to 

serve as the SFLEO; rather, the Department could draw from any of its law 

enforcement components. The ODAG Emergency Preparedness and Crisis Response 

Coordinator agreed that officials from other agencies, such as the U.S. Marshals 

Service (USMS) or the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), could serve as an 

SFLEO. 

35 S. REP. 109-322, 617. 

DHS developed updated versions of the NRP and its associated Public Safety and Security 

Annex to assign both ESF-13 and the SFLEO to DOJ, identifying the Attorney General as the authority 

to appoint an SFLEO. The current NRF does not provide details about the relationship between an 

SFLEO and ESF-13. DHS, National Response Framework, June 2016. 

36 Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, memorandum for Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Bureau of Prisons; Drug Enforcement Administration; 

Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Marshals Service, Emergency Support Function-13 (ESF-13), 

Public Safety and Security, October 16, 2008. 

37 The annex states, “When a terrorism incident is designated an Incident of National 

Significance by the Secretary of Homeland Security in coordination with the Attorney General, an FBI 

SAC will become the SFLEO.” 

The current NRF does not contain language about the SFLEO; however, the ESF-13 Annex to 

the NRF states that the Attorney General may appoint an SFLEO during an incident “requiring 

additional coordination of all federal law enforcement, public safety, and security operations with 

intelligence or investigative law enforcement operations directly related to the incident.” 

12 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In addition to confusion about which DOJ component would provide the 

SFLEO, ESF-13 NCC staff told us that they did not know the scope of the SFLEO’s 

mission, role, or functions or the relationship of the SFLEO to the ESF-13 

framework. The ESF-13 NCC cited Hurricane Harvey as an example, in view of the 

fact that ESF-13 had already been activated and deployed personnel were 

conducting response operations within the disaster area at the time of the SFLEO 

appointment. Further, the SFLEO appointment in response to Hurricane Harvey did 

not include input from ESF-13’s National Coordinator. He told us that while ESF-13 

should not be part of the process of selecting the specific person who would serve 

as SFLEO, the Department should consult with the ESF-13 NCC to obtain situational 

awareness to evaluate the need for an SFLEO during a critical incident. The SFLEO 

for Hurricane Harvey also told us that he received no communication or guidance 

from the Department regarding his mission or role when he was appointed. He said 

that he initiated operations based on the FBI’s SFLEO Deployment Plan, which 

caused confusion on the part of the ESF-13 personnel. We further discuss the FBI’s 

SFLEO Deployment Plan, as well as the initial delays and confusion created by a 

lack of SFLEO policies during DOJ’s response to Hurricane Harvey below. 

Finally, we found internal confusion in the FBI’s SFLEO cadre about the 

SFLEO’s role during an activation. Some believed that the SFLEO would make 

decisions about the allocation of law enforcement resources, while others viewed 

the SFLEO as a liaison role. SFLEO cadre and ESF-13’s NCC staff also told us that 

the SFLEO cadre does not participate in FEMA National Level Exercises or train with 

the ESF-13 staff. The ESF-13 National Coordinator believed that his role was to 

provide pre-activation training to the SFLEO cadre on the role and functions of 

ESF-13 and define the type of intelligence and information that would flow from the 

ESF-13 staff to the SFLEO during an activation. He further stated that, by 

establishing a baseline of familiarity of the ESF-13 program, the Department could 

create a “bench” of individuals from which the Attorney General could select an 

SFLEO. This would include an FBI SAC for a response to an act of terrorism, as well 

as senior law enforcement agents from the other DOJ law enforcement components 

for other critical incidents. Highlighting the importance of pre-training the SFLEO 

cadre, the ESF-13 National Coordinator emphasized that ESF-13 should not be 

attempting to educate an SFLEO during a critical incident. Both the FBI’s SFLEO 

cadre and ESF-13’s National Coordinator recognized that mutual training would be 

beneficial. However, as of the end of our fieldwork, neither the Department nor the 

ESF-13 program managers had taken any actions in this regard. 

The FBI’s SFLEO Deployment Plan Duplicates the Department’s ESF-13 

CONOPS Plan 

We found that the FBI has an SFLEO Deployment Plan to support the 

deployment of the FBI senior executive designated by the Attorney General to fill 

the position of SFLEO in response to a critical incident. According to ESF-13 staff, 

the FBI did not coordinate its current SFLEO Deployment Plan, which was updated 

in 2016, with ESF-13. We reviewed the FBI’s SFLEO Deployment Plan and found 

that it duplicates several of the responsibilities established in the ESF-13 CONOPS 

Plan. For example, the FBI’s SFLEO Deployment Plan directs the SFLEO to: 

13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• develop the potential deployment package of federal law enforcement assets, 

• determine the number and type of committed law enforcement resources, 

• identify gaps and implement actions to fill the gaps with appropriate 

resources, 

• assess the state of law enforcement in the affected region, 

• coordinate with FEMA, and 

• coordinate with state and local law enforcement. 

Based on our review of the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan, we found that each of the FBI 

SFLEO Deployment Plan responsibilities listed above duplicates the ESF-13 CONOPS 

Plan and the functions of the ESF-13 staff. (See Appendix 4 for ESF-13’s 

organizational structure during steady state and activation and Appendix 7 for a 

functional comparison of ESF-13 and SFLEO functions.) 

In addition to the duplicative plans, we found that the FBI’s SFLEO cadre 

lacked familiarity with the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan and has not participated in training 

with the ESF-13 staff. While FBI executives assigned to the SFLEO cadre receive 

crisis management training throughout their careers and are generally aware that 

an ESF-13 program exists, SFLEO cadre members that we interviewed were largely 

unfamiliar with ESF-13’s capabilities and the CONOPS Plan, which outlines the 

functions of the ESF-13 NCC and field assets. Specifically, SFLEO cadre members 

were not familiar with the roles and responsibilities of ESF-13 RLECs; Field 

Coordinators; or, when activated, ESF-13’s Field Coordination Center (FCC). SFLEO 

cadre members told us that during a critical incident they would be working with 

local law enforcement, such as county or city authorities, to develop law 

enforcement requirements for federal asset assistance. However, ESF-13 field staff 

told us that during an activation the ESF-13 Field Coordinator facilitates public 

safety and security coordination with local law enforcement authorities at the state 

level and through the SEOC. Therefore, if an SFLEO was not aware of ESF-13’s 

functions, the SFLEO could inadvertently bypass established processes whereby 

states request federal law enforcement support. Doing so could duplicate or 

commit additional ESF-13 assets to already filled gaps. 

The Department’s Response to Hurricane Harvey Encountered Initial Delays 

and Confusion 

On August 30, 2017, for the first time since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 

Attorney General appointed an SFLEO to assist in the response to Hurricane 

Harvey. Although ESF-13 field staff acknowledged the professionalism and 

experience that the SFLEO brought to the response efforts, several also believed 

that the SFLEO appointment was not necessary. Specifically, the ESF-13 NCC staff 

told us that by the time the SFLEO and staff arrived in Houston and began to 

coordinate with local authorities, ESF-13 had been activated and Quick Response 

Teams (QRT) had deployed to implement ESF-13’s Direct Federal Assistance 

mission to fill state and local law enforcement gaps. We found that the SFLEO staff 

did not arrive in Houston until 6 days after the ESF-13 activation (see the text 

14 
 

box).38 According to ESF-13 field staff 

and the SFLEO, there was an initial period 

of confusion and delay, lasting about 

1 day, which resulted from a lack of 

knowledge about each other’s response 

functions and the relationship between 

the SFLEO and ESF-13. To mitigate the 

initial confusion and lack of 

understanding, ESF-13 assigned a liaison 

who educated the SFLEO and his staff on 

the ESF-13 program. According to the 

liaison, once the SFLEO understood the 

extent of ESF-13’s capabilities and 

mission, he was able to work more 

effectively within the ESF-13 framework. 

We also found that while the 

SFLEO’s presence and actions may have 

expedited requests for federal assistance, 

in doing so it may have duplicated 

ESF-13’s efforts. The SFLEO told us that 

his mission focused primarily on the City 

of Houston and Harris County, Texas, 

where he worked directly with the local 

authorities in identifying law enforcement 

requirements for federal assistance. According to ESF-13 field staff, local 

authorities were to use the State of Texas Assistance Request (STAR) system for 

requesting law enforcement aid; however, they also told us that the Houston law 

enforcement officials were unfamiliar with the STAR system.39 Instead of 

submitting their law enforcement requirements through STAR, the Houston officials 

used the SFLEO as a conduit. The SFLEO told us that he frequently communicated 

with local authorities to assess their needs and sought ways to expedite the federal 

assistance process by communicating federal assistance requirements directly to 

the ESF-13 FCC prior to the submission of the requests through STAR. 

According to ESF-13 field staff, the RLECs and Field Coordinators, as part of 

their normal functions, coordinate with emergency management authorities at 

FEMA’s Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and state law enforcement 

at the SEOC. The SEOC personnel are responsible for identifying law enforcement 

gaps and requesting federal assistance. Additionally, the ESF-13 RLECs and Field 

38 To support the SFLEO, the FBI deployed its own support staff and resources, including 

approximately 40 personnel, an FBI health and safety unit, and the FBI’s mobile command vehicles. 

The cost of the SFLEO and staff deployment was approximately $1.5 million, according to the FEMA 

Mission Assignment for the SFLEO. In comparison, a deployment of 200 ESF-13 QRT personnel was 

$2.5 million, according to a 2017 FEMA Mission Assignment for ESF-13. 

39 The STAR system allows Texas local jurisdictions to request additional assistance from the state 

when their resources have been depleted or a gap has been identified. When the state cannot fulfill 

requirements with internal state assets, the state may request assistance from the federal government. 

Hurricane Harvey Timeline 

August 25, 2017 

• Hurricane Harvey makes landfall in 

Texas. 

• FEMA activates ESF-13. 

August 28 

• FEMA issues the first Direct Federal 

Assistance Mission Assignment to 

ESF-13. 

August 30 

• The Attorney General appoints the 

SFLEO, an FBI SAC from San Antonio. 

August 31–September 2 

• The SFLEO and staff arrive in Houston, 

Texas. 

September 9 

• ESF-13 response operations end. 

Sources: 2017 ESF-13 After Action Report 

(AAR), 2017 FBI AAR, ESF-13 FEMA Mission 

Assignment, OIG interviews with the SFLEO 

15 
 

 

 

 

According to ESF-13 staff, while the law e

Harvey accomplished its mission, and despite the

SFLEO experienced in crisis management, the re

ensuring that the SFLEO and ESF-13 functioned 

together effectively. We believe that the 

Department must establish policy identifying the 

mission, role, and functions of the SFLEO, as 

well as clarify and update its emergency 

response policy and guidance to address critical 

roles and responsibilities overlapping between 

ESF-13 and an SFLEO. This clarification, as well 

as mutual training, would help to avoid initial 

confusion, delays, and mission duplication 

during future disaster responses and enable the 

Department to create a cadre of individuals, 

familiar with ESF-13, from which the Attorney 

General could select an SFLEO. When we asked 

the ODAG’s Emergency Preparedness and Crisis 

Response Coordinator about the lack of clear, 

updated DOJ policies pertaining to the SFLEO, he told us that the ODAG plans to 

bring together relevant DOJ components to develop Department-level guidance for 

the SFLEO position and its relationship with ESF-13. 

ESF-13 Funding and Staffing Policies Limit the Program’s Growth in Preparing for 

and Responding to Critical Incidents 

As discussed in the Introduction, in a May 2012 memorandum the Deputy 

Attorney General established funding reimbursement and staffing requirements to 

support the Department’s ESF-13 program for FY 2012 and FY 2013.40 We found 

that a lack of dedicated funding and periodic capital improvements has hindered 

ESF-13’s effectiveness and timeliness of support during an activation. Specifically, 

reimbursements from the DEA, FBI, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and USMS to 

ATF have remained static, at 2012–2013 levels. Also, the 2012 memorandum does 

not specify when the DOJ law enforcement components must reimburse ATF for 

ESF-13 operations. As a result, insufficient and untimely reimbursement of funds 

 

40 James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, memorandum for 

Heads of Law Enforcement Components, ESF #13 Staffing and Funding, May 12, 2012. 

 

 

Special Agent provides force protection for a 

waterborne Search and Rescue mission during 

Hurricane Harvey support, 2017. 

Sou rce: FBI 

Coordinators told us that a state’s emergency management office directs its local 

authorities to identify and request additional law enforcement assistance through 

the SEOC, rather than directly to the federal government. If local requests for law 

enforcement assistance do not go through the SEOC, the state may not have the 

opportunity to utilize other state and local law enforcement resources prior to 

requesting federal assistance. Although the circumstances surrounding Hurricane 

Harvey allowed for the SFLEO to assist in expediting federal assistance 

requirements, the roles and functions of requesting federal assistance rest with the 

affected state, FEMA, and ESF-13 working in coordination. 

nforcement response to Hurricane 

 Department’s deployment of an 

sponse faced initial challenges in 

16 
 

 

requires ATF to utilize its own direct funding to address ESF-13’s equipment 

shortfalls, pre-activation preparation requirements, and other systemic issues to 

maintain and improve the program. Finally, we found that ESF-13 staffing policies 

do not address competing priorities among DOJ’s law enforcement missions when 

the components are simultaneously supporting ESF-13 response operations. 

ESF-13’s Funding Structure Places Most of the Burden on ATF and Has Not 

Kept Pace with Program Requirements 

We found that the Department has 

not adjusted ESF-13 program funding FY 2012 and FY 2013 ESF-13 Program 

levels since FY 2012. While the Deputy Costs 

Attorney General’s 2012 memorandum For FY 2012 and FY 2013, ESF-13 

stated, “ATF will provide the bulk of the steady state expenses totaled $3.06 million 

financial and staffing support,” it also and $3.82 million, respectively. 

directed DOJ’s other law enforcement Working Capital Fund transfers and 

components to support ESF-13.41 For reimbursements to ATF from DOJ’s other 

FY 2012 and FY 2013, the Department law enforcement components for FYs 2012 

directed ATF to contribute $2,250,000 and 2013 resulted in ATF’s final cost share 

and $3,394,000, respectively, and the of $0.55 million in FY 2012 and 

$2.25 million in FY 2013. 

DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS to each 

provide $360,000 for each fiscal year. Source: ATF Financial Management 

Division See the text box for ATF’s actual cost 

share for FY 2012 and FY 2013. In 

August 2012, the Department directed the DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS to continue 

their annual contributions into FY 2014 and beyond.42 The ODAG’s Emergency 

Preparedness and Crisis Response Coordinator told us that the Department 

continually reevaluates ESF-13’s funding; however, in the 7 years since the Deputy 

Attorney General issued the 2012 memorandum, the Department has not adjusted 

the funding levels despite changes in program requirements to prepare for and 

execute ESF-13 operations. Since the Department assigned ESF-13 to ATF, ATF is 

responsible for the majority of the program’s funding and any subsequent 

reprogramming of its budget to meet ESF-13 needs and requirements. 

We analyzed ATF’s ESF-13 budget data from FY 2012 through FY 2018 and 

found that the ESF-13 program averaged $3.6 million in annual steady state 

operational costs. Of those costs, ATF contributed $1.7 million (47.4 percent), on 

average, each fiscal year. Collectively, the DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS reimbursed 

ATF $1.4 million (40.2 percent) each fiscal year. In addition, from FY 2012 through 

FY 2016, the Department funded $3.1 million (12.4 percent) of ESF-13 steady state 

operations through its Working Capital Fund/Unobligated Balance Transfers 

41 Cole, memorandum for Heads of Law Enforcement Components. 

42 Justice Management Division (JMD), email to DEA, FY 2014 AG Final Decisions–DEA, August 

23, 2012; JMD, email to FBI, FY 2014 AG Final Decisions–ESF-13, August 23, 2012; JMD, email to 

BOP and USMS, FY 2014 AG Final Decisions–ESF-13, August 23, 2012. 

17 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

$5,000,000 

E 

~ ti $4,000,000 0.0 0 0 U 

~ ~ ro n, 

r;4 ,Ji $3,000,000 

LL >­ VI -0 UJ (lJ 

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f-

$1,000,000 

$-

USMS 

FBI 

DOJ 

DEA 

BOP 

ATF 

2012 

$360,000 

$360,000 

$1,064,257 

$360,000 

$360,000 

$552,899 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

$360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 

$360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 

$131,759 $496,017 $1,421,416 $8,182 $- $-

$360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 

$360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 $360,000 

$2,248,750 $1,809,252 $2,283,619 $2,149,614 $1,463,198 $1,390,142 

DOJ and DOJ Law Enforcement Components' Cost Share 

(WCF/UBT).43 We found that DOJ’s WCF/UBT funded the initial purchase of 

government vehicles, office alterations and furnishings, and startup funding for 

ESF-13 program contracts and services. See Figure 1 for the Department’s and its 

law enforcement components’ annual cost shares in supporting ESF-13’s steady 

state operations for the 7-year period we examined. 

Figure 1 

DOJ ESF-13 Steady State Annual Cost Shares, FY 2012–FY 2018 

Source: ATF Financial Management Division 

Overall, we found that steady state costs decreased 45 percent, from 

$5.15 million in FY 2015 to $2.83 million in FY 2018, due primarily to reduced 

contract, service, and infrastructure costs beginning in FY 2016 as the program 

completed its initial buildup.44 Beginning in FY 2017, the Department no longer 

43 DOJ’s WCF is a revolving fund authorized by law to finance a cycle of operations. The WCF 

provides centralized performance of common administrative services, such as computer services, 

telecommunications, and financial services. Any DOJ component can request WCF services. DOJ JMD, 

“Department of Justice Working Capital Fund (WCF),” www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/955471/download 

(accessed January 24, 2020). 

44 Costs associated with contracts and services include 12 contracted positions (2 located at 

ESF-13 headquarters and 10 in field locations), as well as information technology services. 

Infrastructure expenses include General Services Administration and commercial rent and alterations; 

(Cont’d) 

18 
provided ATF with WCF/UBTs and reimbursements to ATF for ESF-13 steady state 

expenses included only funds from the DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS. 

ESF-13 Funding Streams Impact Current Readiness and Hinder Future 

Improvements 

While the total costs for ESF-13 steady state operations have decreased, we 

found that ESF-13’s indirect funding limits its ability to purchase basic deployment 

gear and personal protective equipment (PPE) for deploying ESF-13 personnel.45 

According to the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan and Deployment Orders, personnel deploying 

in support of ESF-13 “are required to bring appropriate clothing, gear, and 

subsistence items to ensure they are self-sustaining for 72 hours” and must be 

“equipped with protective clothing necessary for the disaster environment.”46 

However, we found that during the 2017 hurricane season ESF-13 QRT personnel 

deployed to disaster areas without basic gear such as sleeping bags or cots. We 

also found that QRT personnel deployed without PPE, including personal flotation 

devices and waders, which placed 

them at risk of drowning and 

resulted in some of them wading 

without protection in hazardous 

environments such as sewage and 

chemicals. To address ESF-13 

resource shortfalls, DEA and FBI 

officials told us that they utilized 

their direct funding to purchase gear 

for their deploying personnel. 

Several emergency managers 

expressed a need for additional 

funding to purchase ESF-13 

equipment in advance of a critical 

incident, but they also had concerns 

as to who should pay for the 

equipment. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

logistics personnel unload Gator Boxes containing ESF-13 equ ipment and 

supplies during Hurricane Michael support, 2018. 

Source : ATF/ ESF-13 

motor vehicles, including supplies and maintenance costs; and investigative equipment. By FY 2016 

and beyond, infrastructure costs were primarily General Services Administration rent and vehicle 

supplies and maintenance. 

45 PPE means clothing, helmets, goggles, or other garments or equipment designed to protect 

the wearer’s body from injury or infection. For ESF-13 deployments, PPE could include hip/chest 

waders, personal flotation devices, immersion suits, and bump helmets. In poor air quality 

environments, PPE could also include facemasks or air respirators. 

46 ESF-13 National CONOPS Plan, May 2016, Annex B, Field Operations and Coordination. 

Sample ESF-13 Mission Briefing Package used during Hurricane Maria, September 27, 2017. 

During Hurricane Sandy, ESF-13 developed Mission Briefing Packets to provide information to 

ESF-13 support agencies and their deploying QRTs. Beginning with the 2018 hurricane season, ESF-13 

changed the name from Mission Briefing Packets to Deployment Orders. Throughout this report, we use 

the term Deployment Orders. Each deploying QRT will receive its own Deployment Order. 

19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In addition to limiting its ability to purchase deployment gear and PPE, we 

found that ESF-13’s indirect funding also limits its ability to provide timely force 

protection responses to other federal critical incident response entities, such as 

ESF-8 and ESF-9. As described above, ESF-8, which is managed by HHS, supports 

Federal Medical Response Teams; DHS, through FEMA, manages ESF-9, which 

provides the Search and Rescue function. Both ESF-8 and ESF-9 have direct 

funding from their respective departments that allows them to pre-deploy their task 

forces ahead of a disaster declaration. ESF-8 staff told us that they require force 

protection before they begin response support operations. For example, ESF-8 

deploys its support teams 3–4 days ahead of the projected landfall of a hurricane to 

provide medical support as soon as possible. Unlike ESF-8 and ESF-9, the ESF-13 

program does not have direct funding to pre-deploy assets or to purchase basic 

deployment gear and PPE without a FEMA Mission Assignment and associated 

funding authorization. Based on our interviews with ESF-13 staff, we found that 

ESF-13 has worked with FEMA to mitigate these issues. Specifically, ESF-13 staff 

worked with FEMA Regional Administrators to obtain “surge funding,” which in some 

instances allows the ESF-13 to conduct a limited pre-deployment of assets when 

the declaration of an emergency is imminent.47 However, surge funding may not 

always be available. As a result, ESF-13 staff requested and obtained funding 

assistance from ATF’s Office of Field Operations to pre-deploy command and control 

personnel in advance of arriving QRT personnel.48 We further discuss the ESF-13 

funding limitations below. 

We also found that, although FEMA Mission Assignments authorized ESF-13 

staff and QRT personnel to purchase basic deployment and PPE to support ESF-9 

missions, these efforts did not result in deployed ESF-13 QRT personnel receiving 

PPE prior to deploying in support of the 2018 hurricane season. For example, 

according to ATF’s Special Operations Division Chief, approximately 80 percent of 

the QRT personnel deployed to support Hurricane Florence did not have immersion 

suits. ESF-13 staff told us of delays between receiving procurement authorizations 

and the actual receipt of the items; without a previously approved FEMA Mission 

Assignment or funding, ESF-13 staff cannot purchase basic deployment and PPE, 

which places deployed QRT personnel in an unsafe position. 

In addition to limitations resulting from ESF-13’s indirect funding, we found 

that ESF-13 lacks a capital improvement plan to address systemic issues during 

critical incident responses. We reviewed ESF-13 After Action Reports (AAR) dating 

back to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and found that communication and lodging 

47 According to FEMA Directive 125-2, Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) Pre-Disaster Declaration 

(Surge) Funding, May 6, 2015, prior to an emergency or major disaster declaration, FEMA may issue 

Federal Operational Support Mission Assignments for federal activities required to prepare for a 

reasonably likely and imminent declaration. FEMA may not issue Direct Federal Assistance Mission 

Assignments prior to an emergency or major disaster declaration. 

48 According to ESF-13’s National Coordinator, ATF’s Special Operations Division would front 

available funding to ESF-13 to allow for the pre-deployment of command and control staff so they 

could prepare for the arrival of ESF-13 QRT personnel as long as there was a “good indication” that 

FEMA would make a disaster declaration. 

20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

concerns have consistently plagued the ESF-13 program. According to QRT 

personnel supporting ESF-13’s 2017 and 2018 hurricane responses, communication 

was a significant issue and public communications in particular were “extremely 

limited.” In September 2018, ATF’s Special Operations Division Chief drafted for 

ATF’s Director of Field Operations a memorandum outlining ESF-13’s funding 

profile. The Division Chief also provided the Director of Field Operations with a 

draft copy of a capital investment plan as an option to address legacy issues, such 

as communications and lodging.49 ATF proposed purchasing personal portable 

radios and mobile broadband kits to address incompatible communication systems 

among its law enforcement partners, as well as personal global positioning systems 

to maintain accountability of deployed QRT personnel and teams. ATF also 

proposed the purchase of portable housing for its ESF-13 deployed personnel, as 

well as incremental purchases of PPE and an inventory tracking system to account 

for property during disaster activations. According to ATF officials, the ATF Deputy 

Director briefed the Deputy Attorney General on these proposals on two occasions, 

once in October 2018 and again in December 2018. However, we found no 

changes in ESF-13 funding as a result of these efforts. 

Finally, we reviewed similar ESF 

programs with steady state functions 

comparable to that of ESF-13 and found 

that these programs receive dedicated 

funding either through congressional 

appropriations or from their respective 

department. This dedicated funding 

provides training and support during 

steady state operations and funding for 

pre-positioning of support teams to a 

disaster area prior to a formal Stafford 

Act disaster declaration (See Appendix 3 

for more information on the Stafford Act). 

We found that the Department has 

unsuccessfully attempted to acquire 

direct congressional funding for ESF-13 

(see the text box). The ODAG’s 

Emergency Preparedness and Crisis 

Response Coordinator told us that the 

The Department’s Unsuccessful 

Attempts to Obtain Direct Funding for 

ESF-13 

We found that the Department 

attempted to obtain direct funding for 

ESF-13 in FY 2011 and FY 2013. In 

FY 2011, the Office of Management and 

Budget approved the Department’s request 

for $1.228 million and included it in the 

President’s budget request; however, 

Congress did not approve the Department’s 

request. In FY 2013, the Department 

attempted to obtain $7 million in direct 

funding for ESF-13; however, the Office of 

Management and Budget again did not 

approve the Department’s request and did 

not it add to the President’s budget 

request. 

Source: DOJ JMD budget staff 

49 Chief, Special Operations Division, ATF, memorandum for Assistant Director, Field 

Operations, ATF, Summary of the Funding Profile of Emergency Support Function #13 (ESF #13), 

September 19, 2018. The memorandum highlighted increasing ESF-13 costs due to an evolving and 

expanding role, FEMA’s maturation of the overall ESF concept, and a more comprehensive application 

of pre-disaster declaration service. The memorandum stated that ESF-13 lacks an adequate supply of 

PPE for deploying QRTs and ESF-13 funding has not kept pace, causing ATF to have to find available 

base funding. ATF recommended three options: (1) increase funding contributions by the other DOJ 

law enforcement components; (2) establish a 3–5 year capital investment plan; or (3) establish 

annual DOJ-direct appropriated funding for ESF-13, eliminating the requirement for ATF allocations 

and contributions from the other law enforcement components. 

21 
 

 

 

 

Department should explore other ways to fund ESF-13, such as by creating a surge 

fund or through a direct funding line. 

Untimely Reimbursements to ATF Hinder Its Law Enforcement Mission 

We found that the DOJ policy memoranda, discussed in the Introduction, do 

not specify when the DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS must provide their annual 

reimbursement for ESF-13 support to ATF. Based on our analysis of ATF data, 

since FY 2013 ATF has not received reimbursements from the DOJ law enforcement 

components until nearly 8 months into each new fiscal year, which results in ATF 

having to use its own funds to support ESF-13 activities before receiving full 

reimbursements from the other DOJ components. See Figure 2. 

Figure 2 

Percent of Fiscal Year that ATF Did Not Receive ESF-13 Support 

Reimbursement, FY 2013–FY 2018 

FY Component 

BOP 

DEA 

FBI 

USMS 

BOP 

DEA 

FBI 

USMS 

BOP 

DEA 

FBI 

USMS 

BOP 

DEA 

FBI 

USMS 

BOP 

DEA 

FBI 

USMS 

BOP 

DEA 

FBI 

USMS 

2013 2014 2016 2017 2015 

4th 

FY Quarters 

43.8% 

Percent of Year 

without 

Reimbursement 

54.2% 

81.3% 

75.0% 

54.2% 

77.1% 

2018 

1st 2nd 3rd 

Notes: Each component’s corresponding color indicates the length of 

time until it reimbursed ATF for ESF-13. The FBI provided its FY 2013 

reimbursement to ATF during the 4th quarter, FY 2012. 

Source: ATF Financial Management Division 

22 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Historically, peak hurricane season, which often requires ESF-13 support, 

occurs from mid-August to late October, a period during which the federal 

government closes one fiscal year and begins another.50 Hurricanes in 2012, 2016, 

2017, and 2018 all required ESF-13 support and all occurred during the fiscal year 

changeover. According to the Chief of ATF’s Financial Management Division, delays 

in receiving ESF-13 reimbursements require ATF to transfer its own direct budget 

funds into the Department’s ESF-13 program to fund ESF-13 budget shortfalls. He 

also said that funding ESF-13 steady state programmatic needs, including the predeployment activities and equipment shortfalls discussed above, coupled with 

fronting funds at the beginning of the fiscal year, hinders ATF’s ability to support its 

own law enforcement operations. The Chief of ATF’s Financial Management Division 

told us that, because of providing its own funds to ESF-13, ATF’s Office of Field 

Operations, for example, has carried an unfunded requirements list for several 

years. This list includes Special Agent safety items such as ballistic vests, global 

positioning system trackers, and concealed body recorders. 

The ODAG’s Emergency Preparedness and Crisis Response Coordinator 

acknowledged to us that the Department should review ESF-13’s funding to ensure 

the program’s future sustainability. He also stated that the Department has been in 

conversations with its law enforcement components about ending the components’ 

reimbursement requirements and seeking direct funding for ESF-13. 

The Department Must Develop and Enforce Clearer ESF-13 Staffing 

Memoranda to Avoid Misinterpretation 

We found that the Deputy Attorney General’s May 2012 memorandum does 

not specifically address ESF-13 staffing requirements in the event of multiple 

disaster declarations or competing component missions during an ESF-13 

activation. The 2012 memorandum directed each law enforcement component to 

provide two detailees by the end of FY 2012 to support the ESF-13 program. 

However, we found that ATF has had to compensate for a shortfall in positions 

during periods when the other law enforcement components did not provide the 

support personnel that the memorandum directed them to provide. For example, 

one ESF-13 Regional Law Enforcement Coordinator (RLEC) had provided dual 

coverage across two FEMA regions since the issuance of the memorandum because 

the FBI had not fulfilled its staffing requirement.51 Although FEMA never activated 

this region in response to a critical incident, the ESF-13 National Coordinator told us 

that the vacancy has reduced ESF-13’s ability to deploy a qualified RLEC in support 

of an activation. ESF-13 staff noted that RLEC vacancies are critical when multiple 

disaster events occur simultaneously or concurrently because the vacancies affect 

ESF-13’s ability to cover multiple deployment positions at its Field Coordination 

Centers (FCC) or FEMA’s RRCCs, all of which are 24-hour operations. ESF-13 staff 

50 The federal government’s fiscal year ends on September 30 of each year. 

51 The additional requirement of covering another FEMA region increased the ESF-13 RLEC’s 

footprint from 4 to a total of 10 states and territories. 

23 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

also expressed concerns that state authorities may wonder why they do not have 

their own assigned RLEC. 

ESF-13 staff also expressed concern about whether sufficient staff has been 

identified to respond in the event of multiple concurrent disaster events. In March 

2013, the Deputy Attorney General directed ATF, DEA, FBI, BOP, and USMS to 

identify up to 5 percent of their law enforcement capability that would be available 

to respond to an ESF-13 activation.52 Although the DOJ law enforcement 

components have supported the personnel requirements when ESF-13 has 

requested Federal Law Enforcement Officers (FLEO), we found that the Deputy 

Attorney General’s directive does not address the potential need to exceed the 5 

percent limit in the event of multiple disaster declarations or competing component 

missions. For example, ESF-13 staff told us that the USMS’s Incident Management 

Teams (IMT) are an invaluable asset during an ESF-13 activation. The IMTs 

consistently deploy with ESF-13 staff to establish FCCs and begin preparations to 

receive QRT personnel. However, according to the USMS, it has only four IMTs, 

each of which also performs USMS direct support missions.53 In another example, 

during the 2017 hurricane season the FBI deployed over 350 FLEOs to support two 

major hurricanes. However, investigations of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

incidents and counter-terrorism operations are FBI priorities. If a WMD incident or 

act of terrorism were to occur during an ESF-13 activation, these FBI FLEOs may 

not be available for ESF-13 support. 

In sum, we found that the Department’s ESF-13 funding and staffing policies 

and practices may hinder the program’s ability to prepare for and respond to future 

natural or manmade disasters. This potentially endangers the lives and health of 

DOJ personnel deployed during an ESF-13 activation. We believe that current 

funding also limits ESF-13’s ability to provide timely support to federal assets that 

require force protection to complete their response mission and does not allow 

improvements to address historical deficiencies and advance the program to meet 

future needs. In addition, while we acknowledge that vacancies will periodically 

occur for a variety of reasons, we believe that ESF-13 staffing policies should 

address baseline minimums and establish DOJ priorities when the federal 

52 The purpose of the memorandum was to ensure that the Department was ready to respond 

to an ESF-13 activation. The memorandum also recognized the importance of components 

maintaining their ongoing internal responsibilities and critical missions while supporting ESF-13 

functions and stated that, in the event of a national crisis involving a terrorism event, those 

responsible for investigating the matter may not be required to participate in an ESF-13 response. 

James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, memorandum for Director, 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Administrator, Drug Enforcement 

Administration; Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons; and 

Director, U.S. Marshals Service, Support to Emergency Support Operations (ESF) #13 During a Crisis, 

March 16, 2013. 

53 In a USMS internal 2017 Hurricane Season AAR, the USMS stated that the 5 percent 

staffing requirement was difficult to meet due to staffing shortages. USMS IMT teams are 

predominately Deputy U.S. Marshals; however, some positions are professional staff personnel. IMT 

functions are collateral duties. 

24 
government is faced with multiple critical incidents competing with inherent 

component mission requirements. 

ESF-13 Must Increase Federal Law Enforcement Officers’ Situational 

Awareness and Improve Support Agencies’ Program Knowledge to Foster 

More Effective Operations During Critical Incidents 

Since 2008, the number of ESF-13 

activations has increased 350 percent, requiring 

the deployment of more FLEOs to provide public 

safety and security. For example, when four 

major hurricanes struck the southeastern United 

States and its territories in 2017, ESF-13 activated 

over 2,660 FLEOs as part of its QRTs to support 

ESF-13 response activities.54 However, we found 

that deployed FLEOs often lack adequate 

situational awareness of the disaster area and 

information on the equipment they will need to 

accomplish their mission effectively and safely.55 

We also found that ESF-13 support agencies lack 

sufficient knowledge about the ESF-13 program, 

such as ESF-13’s mission and functions. We 

believe that improving FLEOs’ situational 

awareness prior to their arrival at a disaster area 

and providing them with a better understanding of 

the ESF-13 program itself will improve ESF-13’s 

effectiveness during activations. 

Deployed Personnel Supporting ESF-13 

Requirements Need More Situational Awareness Upon Activation 

The ESF-13 National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS Plan) states that the 

mission of the ESF-13 Field Support Team (FST) is to “quickly develop public safety 

and security situational awareness” within the disaster area.56 Upon activation and 

receipt of a FEMA Mission Assignment, ESF-13’s National Coordination Center (NCC) 

staff issues Deployment Orders to the ESF-13 support agency emergency 

management offices.57 The ESF-13 Deployment Orders include general information 

54 FEMA activated ESF-13 five times in 2017; only three events required deployment of FLEOs. 

55 ESF-13 defines situational awareness as the combination of critical information regarding 

environmental hazards and criminal intelligence. 

56 ESF-13 National CONOPS Plan, May 2016. 

The ESF-13 FST is the forward deployed element of the ESF-13 NCC that works with the FEMA 

Regional Response Coordination Centers and State Emergency Operations Centers in coordinating 

FEMA Mission Assignments and allocating resources within the disaster area. See Appendix 5 for more 

information about ESF-13 activations. 

57 For each deploying QRT, ESF-13 will issue Deployment Orders specific to that team’s mission. 

25 

QRT personnel support an Urban Search 

and Rescue miss ion with the aid of a high water 

vehicle during Hurricane Florence support, 2018. 

Source: ATF/ ESF-13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

about the potential mission, legal authorities, and use of force authority for the 

deploying FLEOs. However, we found that the ESF-13 support agencies and deployed 

FLEOs require more situational awareness of the disaster area, such as the 

environmental hazards they may face and the equipment they will need during the 

critical incident response.58 We also found that FLEOs need more clarifying 

information about legal authorities beyond what is included in the ESF-13 Deployment 

Orders. 

ESF-13 Support Agencies and Deploying Personnel Are Not Always Aware of 

Hazards and Equipment Needs in a Disaster Area 

Disaster area situational awareness has been a recurring theme within 

ESF-13’s AARs since Hurricane Sandy in 2012.59 For example, ESF-13 identified a 

need for collection and dissemination of disaster area information to enhance the 

safety of deployed FLEOs. Although the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan, last updated in May 

2016, directed the FST to develop disaster area situational awareness, we found 

that during the 2017 hurricane season ESF-13 support agencies and deployed 

FLEOs still lacked adequate disaster area situational awareness prior to arriving on 

scene. ESF-13 support agencies and deployed FLEOs told us that prior to arrival 

FLEOs lacked information on criminal activity, hostile threats, and potential hazards 

such as high water and downed electrical wires within the disaster area. Multiple 

FLEOs told us that any prior situational awareness had come from FLEOs that had 

deployed ahead of them or from FLEOs with prior ESF-13 experience, rather than 

from the ESF-13 staff. 

We also found that ESF-13 Deployment Orders did not include sufficient 

information about equipment that FLEOs should have for their deployment. 

According to ESF-13’s Deployment Orders, personnel must be “self-equipped with 

sustainment needs” for up to 72 hours. However, based on our review of 

Deployment Orders for the 2017 hurricane season, we found that the orders listed 

only food and water and were vague regarding the “protective clothing” necessary 

for the disaster environment. Deployed FLEOs told us that they lacked information 

as to what basic equipment they should bring with them. For example, some FLEOs 

told us that they deployed without the necessary basic equipment and gear, such 

as sleeping cots and flashlights, and had to purchase it on the way to the disaster 

area or once they arrived. A QRT team leader supporting Hurricane Harvey told us 

that due to the limited instructions her team brought only clothing and tactical 

vests; team members purchased equipment such as sleeping bags and life jackets 

on the way to the disaster area or once they arrived in Texas.60 

58 In addition to the DOJ law enforcement components, the ESF-13 annex identifies other 

federal departments or agencies with FLEOs or law enforcement resources as ESF-13 support agencies. 

59 Hurricane Sandy was the first ESF-13 activation under the newly established ESF-13 NCC. 

60 Our analysis of interviews with deployed FLEOs revealed that FLEOs assigned to tactical 

units were better equipped to be self-sustainable for 72 hours, compared to those assigned to nontactical units. However, ESF-13 FLEO deployments are based on requests for volunteers; therefore, 

deployed units may be a mix of tactical and non-tactical units. 

26 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ESF-13 NCC staff told us that, to improve situational awareness and increase 

communications, beginning with the 2018 hurricane season they provided the 

Deployment Orders directly to the QRT team leaders. Prior to 2018, ESF-13 

provided Deployment Orders only to the ESF-13 support agencies’ emergency 

management offices and relied on those offices to provide the Deployment Orders 

to their deploying team leaders. Based on our comparison of ESF-13’s 2018 

Deployment Orders with the 2017 orders, we found that ESF-13 had improved the 

list of equipment that FLEOs should have on hand at the disaster site.61 However, 

the Deployment Orders still did not provide initial information on the potential 

criminal threats and environmental hazards at the disaster site and stated only that 

FLEOs would receive an operational and situational awareness briefing upon arriving 

at the FCC. Finally, the ESF-13 National Coordinator told us that ESF-13 plans to 

establish a dedicated situational awareness section within the ESF-13 NCC to 

maintain awareness of the environmental conditions in the disaster area. 

Deployed FLEOs Need More Information About Their Legal Authorities and 

Limitations 

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released a report criticizing the 

Department’s delay in providing legal guidance to FLEOs and ensuring that FLEOs 

received deputation from the states.62 We found that the Department and ESF-13 have 

since implemented several improvements to increase FLEOs’ knowledge of their legal 

authorities and to better prepare FLEOs to respond to a critical incident, including: 

• obtaining an Office of Legal Counsel opinion in 2012 regarding state deputation;63 

• improving coordination between ESF-13, ESF-13 support agencies, and state 

legal counsels through a dedicated ESF-13 legal counsel; 

• formalizing special deputation procedures with the USMS Special Deputation 

Program;64 and 

61 Equipment listed in the ESF-13 2018 Deployment Orders included three uniforms suitable 

for warm climate operations, rain jacket/rain gear, body armor, holsters, handcuffs, flashlight, pistol, 

hat, sunscreen/insect repellant, sturdy boots or shoes, and a notepad. The Deployment Orders also 

indicated that ESF-13 was to provide the required equipment for Urban Search and Rescue missions. 

62 S. REP. 109-322, 617. 

The OIG’s 2010 WMD report found that the Department was still in the process of determining 

how deputation would be implemented during an ESF-13 activation. See DOJ OIG, The Department’s 

Preparation to Respond to a WMD Incident. 

63 The Office of Legal Counsel opinion outlined the circumstances in which FLEOs can enforce 

state laws and accept state deputation during Stafford Act declarations. See DOJ Office of Legal 

Counsel, Opinion, “State and Local Deputation of Federal Law Enforcement Officers During Stafford Act 

Deployments,” March 5, 2012, www.justice.gov/file/18311/download (accessed January 24, 2020). 

See Appendix 3 for more information on the Stafford Act. 

64 The USMS Special Deputation Program expedites special deputation requests for ESF-13 

and grants Title 18 authority to FLEOs, who would otherwise have restrictions regarding their arrest 

(Cont’d) 

27 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• developing an ESF-13 Legal Authority Memorandum, included with the 

Deployment Orders for each activation, that outlines each ESF-13 support 

agency’s federal authorities and identifies those FLEOs that require special 

deputation while deployed.65 

Despite these improvements, we found that ESF-13 QRT personnel and 

ESF-13 support agency emergency management officials still wanted more 

information. Specifically, they requested more information about the scope and 

application of the FLEOs’ legal authorities, such as rules of engagement and how to 

respond to criminal activities.66 This guidance is particularly important for FLEOs 

from support agencies with limited federal arrest authorities, including the BOP. 

FLEOs also stated that the State Peace Officer deputation process, particularly 

during Hurricane Harvey, was informal and conducted in a large gathering of other 

FLEOs. A BOP QRT team leader told us that he was not sure how “official” the 

process was because he did not recall receiving or signing any paperwork. Other 

deployed FLEOs told us that they had questions on their role when supporting state 

and local police in responding to criminal activity. Finally, we found that FLEOs had 

differing opinions regarding whom they would consult if they had questions about 

their legal authorities, ranging from their QRT team leader and local law 

enforcement to their agency counsel. 

Although we were repeatedly told that FLEOs have been able to accomplish 

their missions, we believe that providing additional information on disaster area 

situational awareness, including environmental hazards that FLEOs may experience 

while deployed, would ensure that prior to deployment FLEOs have enough 

information and the equipment they need to perform their mission effectively and 

safely. In addition, ESF-13 should further enhance FLEOs’ legal authority 

awareness so that deployed FLEOs are more informed of their legal limitations and 

authorities, particularly as they relate to state and local authorities. The ESF-13 

authority. Title 18 allows FLEOs to “seek and execute arrest warrants and search warrants, and make 

arrests without a warrant if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has violated or is 

violating federal law.” 

65 For ESF-13 activations requiring FLEOs, the ESF-13 legal counsel produces a Legal 

Authority Memorandum for that specific event. The ESF-13 Legal Authority Memorandum advises 

FLEOs that, when taking enforcement actions, such as use of force—regardless of whether they are 

operating under inherent authorities, special deputation authorities, or peace officer authorities—they 

are to follow their agency’s procedures or the Department’s procedures if receiving special deputation. 

66 While the ESF-13 Legal Authority Memorandum covers the arrest authorities of deployed 

FLEOs, including their authority while supporting state and local missions, it does not address the 

scope and application of FLEOs’ legal authorities while supporting state or local police missions, such 

as crowd control, vehicle or foot patrols, or vandalism or looting incidents. 

In response to a working draft of this report, ATF stated that it would be impossible to list the 

entire state and local criminal code within the ESF-13 Legal Authority Memorandum. ATF also stated 

that FLEOs in Direct Federal Assistance missions receive on-site briefings regarding the arrests they 

can make, as well as the resources that are available to FLEOs if they have questions. While we 

acknowledge that ESF-13 cannot list every state or local crime, we believe, based on our interviews 

with ESF-13 QRT personnel and ESF-13 support agency emergency management officials, that FLEOs 

need more information regarding the scope and application of their legal authorities. 

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legal counsel told us that, due to her coordination with ESF-13 support agencies, as 

well as state and local counsels, it was acceptable for FLEOs to have multiple 

sources for legal advice. However, we believe that ESF-13 should define legal 

points of contact that can provide authoritative federal, state, and local legal advice 

at the FLEOs’ requests. 

ESF-13 Support Agencies Lack Sufficient Knowledge of the ESF-13 Program 

The ESF-13 CONOPS Plan emphasizes the importance of ESF-13 support 

agencies being “fully aware of the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan.”67 However, emergency 

management officials from four of the six ESF-13 support agencies that we 

interviewed told us that they had not read the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan. One ESF-13 

support agency emergency management official told us that, even though he was 

aware of the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan, he had not read it and viewed it as an ESF-13 

internal document that did not apply to his agency. 

The ESF-13 CONOPS Plan also states that ESF-13 staff provide outreach and 

training to ESF-13 support agency emergency management officials to ensure 

familiarity with ESF-13’s processes. In addition, according to ESF-13 NCC and field 

staff personnel, ESF-13 provides training to ESF-13 support agencies through 

annual AARs, annual stakeholder meetings, and ESF-13 informational briefs during 

FEMA region meetings, when requested. Despite these efforts, we found that 

ESF-13 support agencies and FLEOs lack sufficient knowledge of the ESF-13 

program. For example, some deployed personnel that we interviewed had 

misconceptions about their roles as ESF-13 responders, believing that they would 

be performing “lifesaving rescue missions” rather than providing force protection for 

the federal emergency responders. 

Further, we found that some federal agencies did not know that they could 

not direct their personnel deployed for ESF-13 to do tasks that supported their own 

internal agency priorities. The ESF-13 CONOPS Plan states that FLEOs, once 

assigned to an ESF-13 activation, are under the operational control of ESF-13 staff. 

However, we found that some ESF-13 support agency leaders in the field were not 

clear about the ESF-13 mission and their support agency’s role. For example, in an 

internal DEA AAR following the 2017 hurricane season, the DEA identified a concern 

that field division leadership incorrectly assumed that their deployed ESF-13 FLEOs 

could support affected DEA offices concurrently with ESF-13 in response to a critical 

incident.68 In addition, we found anecdotally that some ESF-13 support agencies 

deployed personnel for ESF-13 activities but provided them with tasks to support 

67 ESF-13 National CONOPS Plan, May 2016, 13. 

68 The DEA stated that it identified this misunderstanding when it occurred and corrected it 

contemporaneously. Specifically, the DEA stated that when a supervisor from the Houston Field 

Division called the DEA’s Emergency Preparedness Section Chief to inquire about the parameters for 

the use of ESF-13 assets, the Section Chief clarified when ESF-13 could be used and resolved the 

misunderstanding. In addition, the DEA noted that it later provided guidance on the issue through its 

2018 DEA ESF-13 Concept of Operations, which states that DEA personnel responding as part of 

ESF-13 are not authorized to deviate from their ESF-13 Mission Assignment. 

29 
internal agency priorities, such as locating unaccounted for agency personnel or 

moving agency supplies, that may have been outside of the ESF-13 command 

structure and mission assignment.69 

We also found that some deployed 

QRT team leaders lacked knowledge of ESF-13 Support Agency Training 

the Incident Command System (ICS), DEA’s Back Country Skills training, 

leading to an increased risk of conducted twice per year, provides 

miscommunications and instruction intended to mitigate challenges 

encountered during a critical incident. misunderstandings about tasks and Special Agents learn base camp setup, use 

mission priorities during deployments.70 of chainsaws and safety equipment such as 

For example, during Hurricane Harvey in rope anchoring to support water crossings, 

2017, a USMS QRT team leader told us and land navigation skills. Special Agents 

that she felt “lost” during the response also receive medical training such as splint 

application and patient transportation. because she did not understand the 

various ESF-13 personnel roles or Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) Immigration and Customs ESF-13’s command structure and that Enforcement (ICE) training consists of both 

her experience made her realize that she classroom and field training. Agents learn 

needed to take ICS courses to gain a cardiopulmonary resuscitation and buddybetter understanding. This example system first aid, chainsaw and similar 

exhibits a lack of knowledge on the equipment operations, land navigation 

skills, rope skills, and field patrol fundamentals of operating within the techniques. Agents also receive a refresher 

National Incident Management System, in close quarter drills. 

specifically the ICS, as well as the Sources: DEA and ICE 

mission and functions of ESF-13. 

Finally, 12 of 16 deployed FLEOs that we interviewed told us that FLEOs need 

more education and training to understand the mission and purpose of the ESF-13 

program. Other FLEOs suggested that ESF-13 conduct on-site training and 

information briefings on, for example, how to support state and local law 

enforcement during a Direct Federal Assistance mission. Although some ESF-13 

support agency staff told us that it is difficult to train all FLEOs on the ESF-13 

program due to the number of FLEOs eligible to volunteer for deployment, we found 

that two ESF-13 support agencies provide some basic deployment skills to assist 

their deployed FLEOs (see the text box).71 According to the ODAG’s Emergency 

69 The Purpose Act requires that federal funds be used only for the purpose for which they 

were appropriated. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) states that “Appropriations shall be applied only to the 

objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.” When ESF-13 

activates under the Stafford Act, FEMA uses appropriated funds to reimburse ESF-13 missions, 

including travel, per diem, and some overtime expenses; the home department or agency continues to 

pay FLEO salaries. Therefore, if FLEOs assigned to support ESF-13 are asked to perform tasks for the 

home department or agency while actively deployed, then—depending on the facts and circumstances 

—the home department or agency could run afoul of the Purpose Act. 

70 The ICS is “a standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination of 

on-scene incident management that provides a common hierarchy within which personnel from 

multiple organizations can be effective.” 

71 In response to a working draft of this report, the DEA stated that in 2019 it replaced its 

Back Country Skills training with a Disaster Readiness Course, which the DEA created specifically to 

prepare its personnel to execute their ESF-13 duties. 

30 
 

 

 

Preparedness and Crisis Response Coordinator, QRT team leaders should have a 

baseline of knowledge and be able to inform QRT members of their missions and 

expectations. 

To ensure the future operational success of the Department’s ESF-13 

program, we believe that ESF-13 support agencies and their deploying FLEOs need 

more education and training on ESF-13’s mission and underlying functions prior to 

an activation, as well as on-site at a disaster area. Sustained training for ESF-13 

support agencies and FLEOs, including potential QRT team leaders, could help to 

reduce confusion and misunderstanding about what is expected of them during 

future ESF-13 activations. 

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Conclusion 

In our 2010 Review of the Department’s Preparation to Respond to a WMD 

Incident, we recommended that the Department ensure that it is prepared to fulfill 

its emergency support function responsibilities under the National Response 

Framework. During this review, we found that the Department and ATF, through 

the auspices of the ESF-13 staff, have taken steps to improve the ESF-13 program 

and prepare it for future ESF-13 activations. For example, the Department has 

established permanent staffing for ESF-13’s headquarters and 10 field offices. 

ESF-13 staff created a National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS Plan) to guide 

the program’s operational functions during activations and to educate ESF-13 

support agencies. We also found that ESF-13 has increased outreach and 

coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s response 

coordinators, ESF-13 support agency emergency management offices, and program 

managers and specialists responsible for ESF-8 and ESF-9 operations. We also 

identified several areas that the Department must improve upon to ensure the 

continued success of the ESF-13 program in providing public safety and security 

during critical incidents. 

First, although the Department assigned ATF as its lead coordinating agency 

for ESF-13 operations and, when requested, appoints a Senior Federal Law 

Enforcement Official (SFLEO), the Department has not developed policies or 

guidance defining the SFLEO’s role and functions or the SFLEO’s coordination with 

the ESF-13 program during critical incidents. We also found that the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) SFLEO Deployment Plan duplicates ESF-13’s 

responsibilities and functions as established in the CONOPS Plan and that the FBI’s 

SFLEO cadre is not familiar with the CONOPS Plan or with ESF-13’s role and 

capabilities. Additionally, we found that the Department’s SFLEO appointment in 

response to Hurricane Harvey and the lack of guidance about how the SFLEO is to 

interact with ESF-13 created initial confusion between ESF-13 and the SFLEO. We 

believe that, in order to prevent future confusion during ESF-13 activations and 

SFLEO appointments, the Department must ensure that the ESF-13 and SFLEO 

responses are coordinated. To improve efficiencies and effectiveness in responding 

to critical incidents, the Department should clarify and update policy and guidance 

to address the SFLEO appointment process as well as the SFLEO’s role and 

responsibilities in relation to ESF-13. 

Second, the ESF-13 funding and staffing policies that the Department 

established in 2012 limit ESF-13’s growth and ability to prepare for and respond to 

critical incidents. This includes ESF-13’s ability to purchase basic deployment gear 

and personal protective equipment and to provide timely force protection during a 

critical incident. Further, we found that DOJ funding polices do not specify 

timelines for the other DOJ law enforcement components’ annual reimbursements 

to ATF to support ESF-13 steady state operations. Over the past 6 fiscal years, this 

has required ATF to provide the initial funding of the Department’s ESF-13 program 

for up to 8 months at the expense of its own law enforcement mission. 

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Additionally, we found that existing DOJ policy does not address staffing 

requirements or potential multiple disaster declarations that could exceed the 

Department’s mandate that each of the other law enforcement components provide 

up to 5 percent of its law enforcement personnel for an ESF-13 deployment. To 

ensure that ESF-13 remains ready and capable to respond to future critical 

incidents under an ESF-13 activation, we believe that the Department must 

reevaluate its funding and staffing policies. 

Finally, we found that ESF-13 must increase situational awareness and 

improve program knowledge to ensure that Federal Law Enforcement Officers 

(FLEO) operate effectively during a critical incident. We found that deployed FLEOs 

lacked adequate situational awareness of the disaster area and knowledge of the 

appropriate basic deployment gear and safety equipment prior to deploying in 

support of an ESF-13 activation. We also found that FLEOs need more information 

about the scope of their federal legal authorities and, when applicable, their state 

authorities, to ensure that they are operating within the law and know whom to 

consult for legal advice. Additionally, we found that ESF-13 support agencies and 

FLEOs lack sufficient knowledge of the ESF-13 program, such as ESF-13’s purpose 

and role, which has created misconceptions regarding the missions that FLEOs are 

able to perform. While we acknowledge that ESF-13 and its support agencies have 

made efforts to address these issues, we believe that additional training prior to 

activation and situational awareness prior to deployment will assist in ensuring that 

ESF-13 is able to continue to accomplish its vital mission. 

Recommendations 

To improve the Department’s preparations for and ability to respond to future 

critical incidents during an ESF-13 activation, we recommend that the Department: 

1. Establish in policy or guidance the mission, role, and functions of the Senior 

Federal Law Enforcement Official, including qualifications, the appropriate 

components from which to select the official, and how a Senior Federal Law 

Enforcement Official coordinates with the ESF-13 program during a critical 

incident response. 

2. Ensure that the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official cadre participates in 

National Level Exercises, when applicable, and ESF-13 Table Top Exercises. 

3. Reevaluate ESF-13’s funding process and operational requirements to 

determine appropriate funding mechanisms and cost sharing. 

4. Reevaluate ESF-13’s staffing to determine appropriate permanent staffing 

requirements and responsibilities. 

As the Department’s ESF-13 lead coordinating agency, we recommend that 

ATF develop and implement processes to improve the effectiveness of the ESF-13 

program, including: 

5. Develop methods to improve situational awareness of deploying ESF-13 

personnel prior to their arrival at a disaster site. 

33 
 

6. Ensure that Federal Law Enforcement Officers are provided with legal 

guidance about how to respond to violations of state or local law when 

carrying out their ESF-13 mission within a disaster area, and identify a point 

of contact for Federal Law Enforcement Officers to consult for additional legal 

guidance during deployments. 

7. Develop a comprehensive training program that outlines ESF-13’s functions 

and addresses operational control and misconceptions to assist future ESF-13 

team leaders in preparing for and executing ESF-13 missions. 

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APPENDIX 1 

METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW 

For this review, the OIG analyzed the Department’s and its components’ 

ability to meet their responsibilities under the National Response Framework and to 

execute ESF-13 activities in response to emergency or disaster situations requiring 

the capabilities of the federal government. Our fieldwork, conducted from April 

2018 through May 2019, included data collection and analysis, interviews, 

observation of an ESF-13 activation, and document review and analysis. The 

following sections provide additional information about our methodology. 

Standards 

The OIG conducted this review in accordance with the Council of the 

Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspection 

and Evaluation (January 2012). 

Data Collection and Analysis 

We analyzed ESF-13 data from FY 2008 through FY 2019 to assess and 

evaluate the Department’s response and support to critical incidents under an 

ESF-13 activation. 

We also analyzed ESF-13 activation data from FY 2008 through the 2018 

hurricane season, which ended on November 30, 2018. We analyzed this data to 

assess changes in the Department’s program. We also reviewed ESF-13’s 

deployment rosters for the 2017 and 2018 hurricane seasons to assess the extent 

of personnel deployments and the types of missions Federal Law Enforcement 

Officers were performing in support of ESF-13. 

In addition, we reviewed funding for the ESF-13 program from ATF and 

reimbursements from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and U.S. Marshals Service 

(USMS). We compared these funding sources to ESF-13’s steady state operational 

expenses to assess program funding trends. We also reviewed ATF-stated impacts 

to its operational funding as a result of having to provide additional funds to 

support the ESF-13 program. 

Interviews 

We conducted 55 in-person and telephonic interviews with more than 

90 individuals across the Department, its law enforcement components, and ESF-13 

support agencies. 

Department Interviews 

We interviewed the Office of the Deputy Attorney General’s (ODAG) 

Emergency Preparedness and Crisis Response Coordinator and ESF-13 National 

Coordination Center (NCC) staff, including ESF-13’s National Coordinator. We also 

interviewed five ESF-13 Regional Law Enforcement Officers (RLEC) and one Field 

Coordinator who supported Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

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Regions I and II, V, VI, VII, and IX.72 At the conclusion of our fieldwork, we 

conducted a follow-up interview with ODAG’s Emergency Preparedness and Crisis 

Response Coordinator to obtain additional information and gain insights to our 

initial findings and recommendations. We included his feedback in the Results of 

the Review. 

From the DOJ law enforcement components, we interviewed four emergency 

management chiefs responsible for their respective agency’s emergency 

management operations. This included the BOP’s Office of Emergency 

Preparedness, the DEA’s Office of Operations Management Security & Emergency 

Planning Section, the FBI’s Crisis Management Unit, and the USMS’s Office of 

Emergency Management. We also interviewed the USMS’s leadership responsible 

for its Incident Management Teams and Special Deputation program. We 

interviewed three members of the FBI’s Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official 

(SFLEO) cadre, including the SFLEO appointed by the Department during Hurricane 

Harvey in 2017 and two others who had received the FBI’s SFLEO cadre training. 

In addition, we interviewed 16 DOJ component personnel who deployed in support 

of ESF-13, including 11 who were Quick Response Team (QRT) team leaders and 

5 who were QRT team members. 

ESF-13 Support Agency Interviews 

We conducted interviews with the emergency management offices of four 

ESF-13 support agencies, which included the U.S. Departments of Homeland 

Security (DHS), Defense, State, and Health and Human Services (HHS) to obtain 

their level of interaction with ESF-13 and to identify areas for sustainment and 

improvement for future ESF-13 activations. Within DHS, we interviewed the 

leadership of FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center, as well as the 

Emergency Management Unit Chief and specialists for U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Preparedness Planner and legal advisor for 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. We also interviewed Department of Defense’s 

U.S. Northern Command liaison to ESF-13 and the Department of State’s 

emergency management officials, including those of the Department of State’s 

Diplomatic Security Service. We interviewed HHS’s ESF-8 (Public Health and 

Medical Services) and FEMA’s ESF-9 (Search and Rescue) management specialists 

to assess ESF-13’s support to these federal entities, as well as to compare and 

contrast funding and staffing requirements with that of ESF-13. We also 

interviewed the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s ESF-4 (Firefighting) leadership to 

compare and contrast ESF-4’s funding and staffing requirements to ESF-13’s. 

Lastly, we interviewed two ICE personnel who deployed in support of ESF-13 

activations during the 2017 hurricane season. 

Site Visit and Observation 

We visited ESF-13’s NCC during its support to operations during Hurricane 

Lane in August 2018. We observed how the NCC tracks deployed personnel. We 

also participated in two operational updates, which included an operational update 

72 One RLEC supports both FEMA Regions I and II. 

36 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

from the forward-deployed ESF-13 leadership and an informational update to 

ESF-13 support agencies that had personnel deployed supporting Hurricane Lane 

response operations. 

Policy and Document Review 

We reviewed policies, guidance, and documents related to the ESF-13 

program. We reviewed U.S. Senate and House Committee reports and the White 

House Lessons Learned Report pertaining to Hurricane Katrina to gain a better 

understanding of the history and origins of ESF-13’s assignment to DOJ, as well as 

the lessons learned during the activation and deployment of federal law 

enforcement resources supporting a critical incident. We reviewed national policies 

and documents, including FEMA’s National Incident Management System, National 

Response Framework and applicable annexes, and Response Federal Interagency 

Operational Plan, as well as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 and 

Presidential Policy Directive 8. See Appendix 3 for more information about 

legislation and directives related to critical incident response. 

We reviewed Department memoranda that established ATF as the 

Department’s ESF-13 lead coordinating agency and directed the initial program 

funding and staffing levels for the ESF-13 program. Additionally, we reviewed 

ESF-13’s National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS Plan) and its associated 

appendices and training and exercise briefing plans related to FEMA National Level 

Exercises and ESF-13 Table Top Exercises. We reviewed deployment 

documentation, such as FEMA Mission Assignments and ESF-13 Deployment Orders, 

as well as consolidated After Action Reports (AAR) for Hurricanes Sandy (2012); 

Matthew (2016); and Harvey, Irma, and Maria (2017). We also reviewed DOJ law 

enforcement component ESF-13 related policies, standard operating procedures, 

internal AARs, and the FBI’s SFLEO Deployment Plan. Finally, we reviewed the 

OIG’s Review of the Department’s Preparation to Respond to a WMD Incident 

(2010) to evaluate the Department’s progress in implementing the report’s ESF-13 

related recommendations. 

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APPENDIX 2 

HURRICANE KATRINA REPORTS 

Report from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

In August 2006, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs issued a report (Senate report), which stated, “The [federal] 

government’s initial response [to Hurricane Katrina] fell far short of what the Gulf 

Coast’s citizens could have reasonably expected.”73 The Senate report identified 

several areas for improvement as it related to the federal law enforcement 

response to Hurricane Katrina, including agencies identified as dual leads, unclear 

roles, a lack of understanding of responsibilities, and challenges acquiring proper 

legal authorities. 

At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and DOJ jointly shared responsibility for ESF-13, making ESF-13 the only 

ESF with two agencies designated as both coordinators and primary agencies. The 

Senate report identified this dual ESF-13 designation as the primary source of 

confusion and delayed response. The Senate report also noted that the 

Department was unclear about the roles it envisioned federal law enforcement 

performing during a natural disaster response and cited significant disagreement 

and confusion regarding the legal authority for DOJ Federal Law Enforcement 

Officers (FLEO) to enter a state and perform missions in support of state and local 

authorities. In addition, the Senate report identified a lack of understanding among 

the Department and its components about how requests for assistance from state 

and local authorities would be processed and assigned. Further, neither DHS nor 

DOJ effectively planned ahead of time for the disaster and DOJ in particular was 

slow to establish a chain of command to direct the response from its components, 

the Senate report found. 

The Senate report was also critical of the designation of a Senior Federal Law 

Enforcement Official (SFLEO), noting that the National Response Plan (NRP) had not 

defined the role of the SFLEO.74 The report criticized delays in the SFLEO 

appointment process and noted that the NRP offered “no insight” into how the 

SFLEO was supposed to interact with ESF-13 support agencies.75 According to the 

Senate report, this ambiguity contributed to delays in DHS and DOJ appointing an 

SFLEO, which eventually led to the appointment of two co-equal SFLEOs: a Special 

Agent from DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a Special Agent from 

DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation. While the Senate report noted that the 

SFLEOs developed a positive working relationship and their presence improved the 

73 S. REP. NO. 109-322, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (August 2006), 440, 

www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt322/CRPT-109srpt322.pdf (accessed January 24, 2020). 

74 According to the 2004 NRP, which was in effect during the Hurricane Katrina response, the 

SFLEO was responsible for directing law enforcement operations during a national incident. We 

further discuss the role of the SFLEO later in this report. 

75 The National Response Framework (NRF) replaced the NRP in 2008. Unless otherwise 

specified, throughout our report we refer to the NRF, 3rd edition, published in 2016. 

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law enforcement situation on the ground, it also noted that the co-SFLEO 

appointment created a convoluted command structure that both SFLEOs 

acknowledged would have been more effective with a single chain of command. 

Because of these findings, the report recommended that the NRP clarify the 

relationship between the SFLEO and ESF-13. 

Report from the House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 

In February 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 

issued a report (House report) that described the federal government’s various 

types of law enforcement support provided to state and local law enforcement in 

the effort to restore law and order after Hurricane Katrina.76 The House report 

found that a lack of interoperability between agency communications equipment 

hindered coordination. As a mitigating factor, the report mentioned the success of 

the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC), which was established during the 

response to serve as a clearinghouse for law enforcement requests. While 

highlighting that initial communication between responding agencies was lacking, 

the report acknowledged that the LECC proved to be a best practice in ensuring 

that law enforcement needs were identified and addressed as the response 

developed.77 The House report also noted that a lack of a general policy on how 

FLEOs were to be deputized as state or local peace officers created delays and that 

some agencies lacked information on the proper state and local procedures and 

authorities their FLEOs would need to adhere to once they were deputized. 

White House Lessons Learned Report 

Also in February 2006, the White House issued a report (White House report) 

that focused on the massive scale of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, as 

well as the challenges of establishing public safety and security in an austere 

environment.78 The White House report found that while federal support 

significantly improved the security environment in disaster areas, DHS and DOJ 

failed to plan for and did not anticipate certain challenges, such as the need for 

hundreds of FLEOs to receive deputation to enforce state and local laws. The White 

House report also found that DOJ and DHS would have benefited from a deeper 

76 H.R. REP. NO. 109-377, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (February 2006), 

www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML12093A081.pdf (accessed January 24, 2020). 

77 A state or local authority may establish a LECC when affected by an incident to the extent 

that its command, control, and/or administration are incapable of managing the law enforcement 

functions. The LECC functions as a clearinghouse for federal law enforcement assistance with the 

public safety and security mission. We did not review the LECC concept during our fieldwork for this 

review. 

78 Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 

Learned (February 2006), www.library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf (accessed 

January 24, 2020). 

39 
 

 

 

 

 

understanding of federal responsibilities to support state and local law enforcement 

during disaster responses. 

The White House report made four recommendations to improve the federal 

law enforcement response to disasters. The first recommendation focused on 

revising the NRP to ensure more effective coordination of both ESF-13 and the 

SFLEO functions. Specifically, to eliminate the confusion, delays, and dual authority 

caused by the joint designation of DHS and DOJ, the report recommended 

designating DOJ as the primary agency for ESF-13 and giving the Attorney General 

the sole authority to appoint an SFLEO. The second recommendation urged DOJ to 

lead the development of the federal government’s capability to surge law 

enforcement resources to a disaster zone, which included cataloguing federal law 

enforcement assets and coordinating with state and local law enforcement. The 

third recommendation directed DOJ to streamline deputation procedures and work 

with states to increase federal awareness of state peace officer authorities. Finally, 

the White House report recommended that DOJ coordinate with DHS to incorporate 

force protection into federal response planning to prevent disruption of operations 

and protect federal personnel and property.79 

79 In 2006, DHS issued a revised version of the NRP, which included changes identified in the 

Senate, House, and White House reports. For example, the 2006 NRP identified DOJ as the primary 

agency for ESF-13. 

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APPENDIX 3 

LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES RELATING TO CRITICAL 

INCIDENT RESPONSE 

Legislation 

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1987 (42 U.S.C. 

Chapter 68, Public Health and Welfare), As Amended 

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1987 

(Stafford Act) authorizes the federal government to provide assistance during an 

emergency or major disaster. An emergency or major disaster declaration 

authorizes implementation of Title IV or V of the Stafford Act, which outline various 

types of disaster relief assistance, to include potential activation of Emergency 

Support Functions.80 

The Stafford Act states, “the President may direct any federal agency, with or 

without reimbursement, to utilize its authorities and the resources granted to it 

under federal law...in support of State and local assistance response and recovery 

efforts.”81 This authority has been delegated to the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator, who, upon a federal disaster 

declaration, can authorize the issuance of mission assignments. Pursuant to the 

Stafford Act, expenditures incurred by federal agencies executing FEMA mission 

assignments may be reimbursed using the Disaster Relief Fund, a no-year account 

administered by FEMA. 

Directives 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidences 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), issued in February 

2003, called for the federal government to establish a single, comprehensive 

approach to domestic incident management. It established the Secretary of 

Homeland Security as the principal federal official for domestic incident 

management and called upon the Secretary to develop the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). HSPD-5 also 

established the Secretary as the lead official for coordinating with state and local 

authorities for a critical incident response. 

HSPD-5 further established that the Attorney General, acting through the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is responsible for coordinating the federal 

response to an act of terrorism. Additionally, HSPD-5 restated that the Attorney 

General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or 

80 ESF 13 is activated for Stafford Act declarations of emergency that require extensive public 

safety and security and where state, tribal, and local government resources are overwhelmed or are 

inadequate; for federal-to-federal support; or in pre-incident or post-incident situations requiring 

capabilities unique to the federal government. 

81 42 U.S.C. § 5170a (1987). 

41 
 

 

 

 

 

terrorist threats and that, acting through the FBI, the Attorney General “shall 

coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community 

to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United 

States.”82 

Originally issued in 2004 and most recently updated in 2017, NIMS guides all 

levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to 

work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from 

incidents. NIMS is designed to ensure a unified, national approach across all of 

these mission areas. NIMS provides a basis for key preparedness concepts, such as 

the Incident Command System (ICS), emergency operations centers, and other 

critical coordination elements. NIMS is centered around three concepts—flexibility, 

standardization, and unity of effort—and is designed to be scalable and adaptable to 

all hazards. 

The ICS is a standardized approach to the command, control, and 

coordination of on-scene incident management that provides a common hierarchy 

within which personnel from multiple organizations can be effective. The ICS was 

created to apply across various disciplines and organizations to foster effective 

collaboration during responses to critical incidents. The system is designed for use 

at all levels of government, as well as nongovernmental organizations and the 

private sector. The ICS specifies an organizational structure for incident 

management that includes five major functional areas: Command, Operations, 

Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. This structure integrates and 

coordinates a combination of procedures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and 

communications. Both ESF-13 and the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official 

staff are organized based on ICS principles. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), issued in December 

2003 and designed as a companion to HSPD-5, detailed how federal departments 

and agencies are to prepare for critical incident response. HSPD-8 affirmed that 

the NRP was to provide the structure and mechanisms for national level policy with 

regard to support provided to state and local authorities during critical incident 

response. 

Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness 

Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), issued in March 2011, replaced 

HSPD-8 and implemented several structural changes to the federal government’s 

existing systematic preparation for critical incident responses. PPD-8 established 

the National Preparedness Goal, which outlined core capabilities in the areas of 

Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery necessary to prepare for 

specific threats to the nation. Each capability features its own framework, which 

guides stakeholders in achieving the National Preparedness Goal. 

82 DHS, HSPD-5, February 2003. 

42 
 

 

 

 

The National Preparedness Goal is “a secure and resilient Nation with the 

[core] capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, 

mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats and hazards that pose the greatest 

risk.”83 The National Preparedness Goal is designed to prepare the nation for the 

risks that will severely stress our collective capabilities and resources. The core 

capabilities—Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery—are 

interdependent and require coordination and unity of effort and systems to achieve 

the National Preparedness Goal. 

PPD-8 also created the National Preparedness System, which is designed to 

guide domestic efforts at all levels of government and non-government sectors in 

achieving the National Preparedness Goal. The guidance, programs, processes, and 

systems that support each component of the National Preparedness System enable 

a collaborative, whole-community approach to national preparedness that engages 

individuals, families, communities, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based 

organizations, and all levels of government. 

83 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, September 2015. 

43 
 

 

 

 

 

-. 

Deputations/ Corrections 

Training Coordinator Coordinator (BOP) (USMS) 

I 

Chief Operations Chief Operations 

& Planning & Planning 

Team 1 Team 2 (FEMA) 

(Stakeho lders) 

RLECs at FEMA 

RLECs at FEMA Regions III, IV, 

Regions I, II, VII, IX, X 

V, VI , VIII DOD 

Liaison 

(Army) 

National 

Coordinator 

Budget Officer 

(ATF) 

I 

Operations 

Officer/CCR 

(NRCC) 

Program 

Manager 

( Contractor) 

Field 

Coordinators 

(Contractors) 

at all FEMA 

Regions 

iLegal Counsel 

I 

Program 

Analyst 

I 

Logistics Chief 

Branch Branch 

Projects -- Director Director Officer (Contractor) 

(Part-time) 

( Contractor) 

APPENDIX 4 

ESF-13 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 

ESF-13 Structure During Steady State Operations 

ESF-13 is composed of a National Coordination Center (NCC) located in 

Washington, D.C., and 10 field offices co-located with Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) regional offices. The NCC is responsible for 

establishing the all-hazards ESF-13 law enforcement planning for the 50 states, the 

District of Columbia, and 4 territories. During steady state operations, the NCC and 

its field offices support incident management planning activities and pre-incident 

interactions with state and local law enforcement authorities. The NCC has 

13 permanent personnel and 1 Department of Defense liaison assigned on a 

temporary basis. In Figure 3, each block represents a function and not necessarily 

a position filled by an individual staff member. 

Figure 3 

ESF-13 Steady State Organizational Structure 

Note: BOP=Federal Bureau of Prisons; COR=Contracting Officer’s Representative; DOD=Department 

of Defense; NRCC=National Response Coordination Center; RLEC=Regional Law Enforcement 

Coordinator; USMS=U.S. Marshals Service. 

Source: ESF-13 NCC 

Each ESF-13 field office is co-located with a FEMA regional office and consists 

of a Regional Law Enforcement Coordinator (RLEC) and contracted Field 

Coordinator. During steady state operations, the RLEC and Field Coordinator’s 

primary mission is to conduct liaison operations within their assigned FEMA region. 

44 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RLECs and Field Coordinators generally conduct liaison operations with the FEMA 

Regional Administrator’s staff, state-level emergency management offices, and 

federal government agencies.84 They also work with their respective state and local 

governments to develop and maintain regional ESF-13 support plans and assist in 

planning and executing regional- and state-level disaster preparedness training 

exercises. On an annual basis, the ESF-13 field staff provides an ESF-13 missions 

and functions informational brief during a FEMA Regional Conference. See Figure 4 

and Table 1 below for FEMA regions with ESF-13 field staff jurisdiction and 

assignments. 

Figure 4 

FEMA Regions 

Source: FEMA, “FEMA Regional Contacts,” September 17, 2018, www.fema.gov/femaregional-contacts (accessed January 24, 2020) 

84 RLECs and Field Coordinators may also liaise with local governments that may have direct 

interests in potential disasters, such as a potential earthquake along the New Madrid Seismic Zone. 

The New Madrid Seismic Zone, located in southeastern Missouri, northeastern Arkansas, 

western Tennessee, western Kentucky, and southern Illinois, is the most active seismic zone in the 

United States east of the Rocky Mountains. The zone includes major cities such as Memphis, 

Tennessee; St. Louis, Missouri; Little Rock, Arkansas; and Evansville, Indiana. Missouri Department 

of Natural Resources, “Facts About the New Madrid Seismic Zone,” www.dnr.mo.gov/geology/geosrv/ 

geores/techbulletin1.htm (accessed January 24, 2020). 

45 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1 

FEMA Regions with ESF-13 Field Staff Jurisdiction and Assignments 

FEMA Region and 

Headquarters 

Locationa 

Jurisdiction Responsible DOJ Law 

Enforcement Component 

FEMA Region I 

(Boston, Mass.) 

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 

Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 

FBI 

(Jurisdiction Covered by 

FEMA Region II RLEC)b 

FEMA Region II 

(New York, N.Y.) 

New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin 

Islands ATF 

FEMA Region III 

(Philadelphia, Pa.) 

District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, 

Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia USMS 

FEMA Region IV 

(Atlanta, Ga.) 

Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 

Mississippi, North Carolina, South 

Carolina, Tennessee 

ATF 

FEMA Region V 

(Chicago, Ill.) 

Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Ohio, Wisconsin USMS 

FEMA Region VI 

(Denton, Tex.) 

Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 

Oklahoma, Texas ATF 

FEMA Region VII 

(Kansas City, Mo.) Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska DEA 

FEMA Region VIII 

(Denver, Colo.) 

Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South 

Dakota, Utah, Wyoming ATF 

FEMA Region IX 

(San Francisco, Calif.) 

Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, 

Pacific Islands ATF 

FEMA Region X 

(Seattle, Wash.) Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington DEA 

Note: DEA=Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI=Federal Bureau of Investigation; USMS=U.S. 

Marshals Service. 

a Lee Loftus, DOJ Assistant Attorney General for Administration, memorandum for Chief Financial 

Officers of Law Enforcement Components, ESF #13 Staffing and Funding, May 21, 2012, assigned a 

FEMA region to each DOJ law enforcement component. 

b The FEMA Region I RLEC position has been vacant since May 2012. The region is covered by the 

ESF-13 Field Coordinator and the ATF RLEC from Region II. 

Source: FEMA, “FEMA Regional Contacts” 

During steady state operations, non-DOJ ESF-13 support agencies participate 

in the ESF-13 Stakeholder Committee and the ESF-13 Advisory Board. The ESF-13 

Stakeholder Committee, with representatives from each federal department or 

agency that employs armed Federal Law Enforcement Officers (FLEO), meets every 

6 months or as needed to ensure FLEOs are current on ESF-13 policies, practices, 

and issues. The ESF-13 Advisory Board, with representatives from ATF; the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Federal 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP); U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), advises the ESF-13 National Coordinator on the formulation, 

review, and maintenance of ESF-13 policy, procedures, protocols, and best 

practices. ESF-13 support agencies may also participate in FEMA National Level 

Exercises and ESF-13 Table Top Exercises. During an ESF-13 activation, ESF-13 

support agencies provide general and specialized resources to assist in the ESF-13 

response. 

46 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Analyst 

Logistics 

Chief 

Program 

Analyst 

Virtual FCC 

Situational 

Awareness 

Unit 

NCC 

Coordinator 

IT Support 

(OST) 

Executive 

Officer 

FEMA NRCC 

LNO 

Field Support 

Team 

Coordinator 

FLEO Resource 

Coordinator 

Legal 

Counsel 

LE Authority 

Coordinator/ 

USMS Rep. 

USMS Special 

Deputation Unit 

(USMS HQ) 

ESF-13 Structure During an Activation 

Once FEMA activates ESF-13, the NCC provides national-level coordination of 

FLEOs in response to FEMA requirements to support the critical incident. The staff 

of the NCC will be composed primarily of ESF-13 staff, and, at times, personnel 

from ESF-13 support agencies may augment the NCC. In Figure 5, each block 

represents a function and not necessarily a position filled by an individual staff 

member. Depending on the size and scope of the critical incident, individual 

ESF-13 staff may cover several functions or each function could be the 

responsibility of a single ESF-13 staff member. The ESF-13 NCC also provides a 

Liaison Officer to FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center to coordinate with 

FEMA during the mission assignment process. 

Figure 5 

ESF-13 NCC Organizational Structure During an Activation 

Note: FCC=Field Coordination Center; LE=Law Enforcement; LNO=Liaison Officer; 

NRCC=National Response Coordination Center; OST=Operational Support Team. 

Source: ESF-13 National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS Plan), May 2016, Appendix A1 

Once activated, the ESF-13 RLECs and Field Coordinators form into a Field 

Support Team (FST). The ESF-13 RLEC for the affected FEMA region will typically 

deploy to the local FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC). The 

ESF-13 RLEC is responsible for developing liaison/working relationships, conducting 

and providing situational assessments and awareness, providing technical subject 

matter expert assistance, and coordinating the ESF-13 mission assignment process 

with FEMA RRCC staff. The Field Coordinator for the affected FEMA region deploys 

to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). The Field Coordinator is 

responsible for developing working relationships, conducting and providing 

situational assessments and awareness, providing technical subject matter 

expertise, and assisting the SEOC Operations Chief and the state’s ESF-13 

Coordinator with drafting Resource Request Forms for FLEO assistance. The 

remaining ESF-13 RLECs and Field Coordinators from the non-affected region will 

establish a Field Coordination Center (FCC) to perform functions within the FST/FCC 

as directed by the ESF-13 NCC. See Figure 6 below for the FST/FCC organizational 

structure. 

47 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

USAO ••••••••••••• FST Leader 

OPS Section 

Chief 

Planning 

Section Chief 

vcc 

Coordinator 

Situation/ 

Mapping Unit 

Leader 

Resource 

Un it Leader 

Documentation 

Unit Leader 

Safety Officer 

Billeting 

Transportation 

Equ ipment 

Coordinator(s) 

RRCC Liaison SEOC Liaison 

Admin/ 

Finance 

Section Chief 

Deputation Unit 

Federal/State 

Figure 6 

FST/FCC Organizational Structure During an ESF-13 Activation 

Note: CMC=Crisis Management Coordinator; OPS=Operations; USAO=U.S. Attorney’s Office; 

VCC=Virtual Command Center. 

Source: ESF-13 National CONOPS Plan, May 2016, Appendix B185 

Under the direction of the Field Support Team Leader, the FCC is responsible 

for all ESF-13 field operations and provides overall leadership and guidance to the 

deployed field support element. ESF-13 staff assigned to the ESF-13 FST/FCC 

performs tasks that include liaising with activated FEMA Incident Management 

Assistance Team(s), developing public safety and security situational awareness, 

establishing staging area(s), and preparing to accept ESF-13 Quick Response 

Teams (QRT).86 DOJ law enforcement components, as well as non-DOJ ESF-13 

support agencies may also augment the FST/FCC to ensure continuity of 

operations. Although the ESF-13 NCC staff initially identifies deployable ESF-13 

QRTs and provides the Deployment Orders upon activation, the ESF-13 FST/FCC 

determines the specific mission tasking that each ESF-13 QRT receives once 

arriving to the disaster area. 

Generally, an ESF-13 QRT consists of a supervisory agent or officer and 

24 FLEOs. ESF-13 QRTs may also include additional non-FLEO personnel such as 

85 Crisis Management Coordinators, provided by U.S. Attorney’s Offices, perform as Field 

Legal Advisors within their district upon an ESF-13 activation. 

The Law Enforcement Online Virtual Command Center provides near real-time status and 

progress information on mission assignments and tasking orders, internal ESF-13 mission tasks, and 

information updates. Additionally, it assists in reducing duplicate or repetitive information requests 

and providing greater situational awareness to all ESF-13 staff during large, complex, and multisite 

incidents. 

86 FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team(s) are pre-deployed to potential disaster 

locations or deployed to incident sites where it is anticipated that federal assistance may be required. 

Their mission is to support the initial establishment of unified command and to provide federal and 

state decision makers with situational awareness crucial to determining the level and type of federal 

support that may be required to cope with the event. 

48 
 

 

 

medical and communications specialists that provide support to the ESF-13 QRT. 

Non-FLEO personnel that perform functions such as communications and 

information technology support; Crisis Management Coordination and Incident 

Management Teams; intelligence research; and logistics, including mobile bunk 

housing, also support ESF-13 activations. According to the ESF-13 Annex, ESF-13 

support agencies include any department or agency with FLEOs. See Table 2 for 

ESF-13 support agencies that have provided FLEOs to support ESF-13 activations 

since 2008. 

Table 2 

ESF-13 Support Agencies That Have Provided Federal Law Enforcement 

Officers Since FY 2008 

U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

U.S. Department of Education Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency Criminal Investigation Division 

U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 

Customs and Border Protection, ICE, Transportation 

Security Administration–Federal Air Marshals Service 

U.S. Department of Housing 

and Urban Development Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish 

and Wildlife Service, National Parks Service 

U.S. Department of Justice ATF, BOP, DEA, FBI, USMS, OIG 

U.S. Department of State Diplomatic Security Service 

U.S. Department of the 

Treasury 

Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division, 

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 

Sources: ESF-13 Activations and Deployment Matrices 

49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C: 

,Q 

... 

ro 

.::! 

... 

u 

<( 

.... 

0 

... 

(I) 

..c 

E 

:::, 

z 

9 

8 

7 

6 

5 

4 

3 5 2 1 1 2 

0 

2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 

■ Unknown 2 3 5 1 

■ Regional 6 4 6 

■ National 1 

Activation Type by Year 

2 

1 

1 

4 

2 

7 

■ Unknown 

■ Regional 

■ National 

APPENDIX 5 

ESF-13 ACTIVATIONS SINCE FY 2008 AND THE ACTIVATION 

PROCESS 

ESF-13 Activations Since FY 2008 

Since the 2008 designation of DOJ as the primary agency for ESF-13 functions, 

the number of ESF-13 activations generally increased through 2018, from 10 activations 

in the first 4 years to 17 activations in the most recent 3 years. See Figure 7. 

Figure 7 

ESF-13 Activations, FY 2008–FY 2018 

Note: Performance metrics did not specify the type of activations for 

FY 2008 through early FY 2012. According to ESF-13 data, there were no 

ESF-13 activations in FY 2009. 

Source: ATF data 

An ESF-13 activation occurs as result of either a national or a regional 

activation request.87 An ESF-13 activation does not automatically require 

deployment of Quick Response Teams (QRT). Rather, the ESF-13 National 

Coordination Center (NCC) may activate only its staff to operate positions at the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Response Coordination 

Center (NRCC) or Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or at a State 

Emergency Operations Center to maintain awareness of the developing situation and 

to assist with the integration of federal assets in the event QRTs are subsequently 

required. National activations occur under the authority of FEMA’s NRCC. In 2012 

and 2016, Hurricanes Sandy and Matthew, respectively, were the only national 

87 National activations occur when FEMA activates its National Response Coordination Center 

and requests ESF-13 support. Regional activations occur when a FEMA region activates its Regional 

Response Coordination Center and requests ESF-13 support. 

Examples of ESF-13 activations during which only ESF-13 staff were deployed include 

presidential inaugurations; the Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore, Maryland, riots in 2014 and 2015, 

respectively; and Hurricane Hector in 2018. 

50 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ational Coordination 

ESF-13 Pre-Event Coord1nat1on 

(Advance Notice Event) 

• 

Center 

, Issued ',, : ~ • Partner agencies prepare rosters 

• 

Ass:~~:~t(s)~ · •· _....,.7 --7 "-'fi". ·············· forQRTs FEMA • If available, ESF-13 uses FEMA 

FEMA NRCC or RRCC :~~:~~~;~ing to deploy advance 

Activates ESF-13 

Deployment 

Orders 

Issued 

Request for 

Quick 

•t<fl-< - QRT-s Deploy __ _ 

Disaster Area 

• QRTs receive information briefing 

• QRTs receive U.S. Marshals Special Deputation and/or state peace 

officer deputation as needed 

• QRTs perform Federal Operational Support Missions and/ or Direct 

Federal Assistance Missions 

Quick Response 

Teams 

ESF-13 Support 

Agencies Liaison and 

Information Role 

Only 

activations. ESF-13 deployed on four national activations during 2017, including 

Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and Nate. There were seven national activations in 

2018, including Hurricanes Lane, Oliva, Isaac, Florence, and Michael and Typhoons 

Mangkhut and Yutu. Regional activations occur under the authority of FEMA’s 

RRCCs. In addition to responding for hurricane support, regional activations have 

occurred for presidential inaugurations; Super Bowl support; and natural disasters 

such as floods, snowstorms, and tornadoes. 

ESF-13 Activation Process 

When FEMA activates ESF-13, the NCC contacts ESF-13 support agencies to 

request QRTs. ESF-13, in coordination with requesting federal, state, local, tribal, and 

territorial authorities, defines the number of requested personnel through a Resource 

Request Form, which is then submitted to FEMA. If approved, FEMA funds the request 

through a Mission Assignment and ESF-13 support agencies select their personnel to 

fulfill the request. Once an ESF-13 support agency identifies its QRTs, the NCC 

provides Deployment Orders to the ESF-13 support agency and QRT team leaders. 

QRTs are responsible for deploying to the disaster area, where they receive follow-on 

information briefings and, if required, federal special deputation from U.S. Marshals 

and/or peace officer deputation from state and local law enforcement authorities 

before beginning their assigned missions. QRTs will demobilize and return to their 

home stations once response operations are completed. See Figure 8. 

Figure 8 

ESF-13 Activation Process 

Sources: ESF-13 National Concept of Operations Plan, May 2016, and OIG interviews with ESF-13 staff 

Figure 8 depicts a general outline of an ESF-13 activation process in response 

to a critical incident. For example, a presidential disaster declaration may occur 

51 
 

 

 

after an earthquake event; as part of the response efforts, FEMA may activate 

ESF-13. In some cases, such as an approaching hurricane, FEMA may activate 

ESF-13 prior to a presidential disaster declaration using surge funding to allow 

ESF-13 to pre-deploy personnel to the projected disaster area. Regardless of the 

time of activation—prior to or after a presidential disaster declaration—ESF-13’s 

mission, functions, and deployment structure remain the same. 

52 
 

 

 

Legal 

Advisor 

Operat ions 

LE Coordination 

Aviation 

ESF- 13 

Mission Assignment 

Senior Federal 

Law Enforcement 

Official 

Executive 

Officer 

Safety 

Officer 

Planning 

LECC 

Resources 

Situation Reports 

Incident Action Plans 

Mission Assignments 

Demobilization 

Liaison 

Officer 

Logistics 

Communications 

Medical 

Supplies 

Transportation 

Lodging 

Facilities 

Ground Support 

Aviation Support 

Media Rep. 

(If Required) 

Finance / 

Admin. 

Personnel 

Procurement 

Time Keeping 

Cost/Reimbursement 

Mission Assignment 

APPENDIX 6 

ORGANIZATION OF THE SENIOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 

OFFICIAL’S STAFF 

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Senior Federal Law 

Enforcement Official (SFLEO) Deployment Plan, the SFLEO staff is organized using 

the Incident Command System organizational concept. The staff’s composition is 

flexible and can be adjusted depending on the scope of the response. For 

additional support, an SFLEO may call upon FBI resources, such as aviation assets, 

tactical teams, forensic laboratory teams, operational medical staff, and 

communication specialists. See Figure 9. 

Figure 9 

SFLEO Organizational Structure 

Note: LE=Law Enforcement; LECC=Law Enforcement Coordination Center. 

Source: FBI SFLEO Deployment Plan, June 2016 

53 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 7 

FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON OF ESF-13 AND THE SENIOR 

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL 

The OIG analyzed the ESF-13 National Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS 

Plan) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Senior Federal Law Enforcement 

Official (SFLEO) Deployment Plan and found that the two documents include 

overlapping roles, functions, and responsibilities. However, the CONOPS Plan 

establishes ESF-13 as a permanent program that operates year-round whereas the 

SFLEO Deployment Plan indicates that the individual appointed as SFLEO will 

perform the role of the SFLEO only when activated in response to a particular 

incident. For example, in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) regions, ESF-13 maintains permanent staff who regularly liaise with FEMA 

and state disaster management specialists on topics relating to critical incident 

response and ESF-13 support. ESF-13’s permanent staff also engages with the 

ESF-13 support agencies throughout the year to provide education on the ESF-13 

process and updates to the ESF-13 program. In contrast, according to the FBI’s 

SFLEO Deployment Plan, officials who may potentially serve as SFLEO and their 

staff begin performing their functions once appointed. 

We also identified two major differences between the ESF-13 National 

Coordinator and SFLEO roles during a critical incident. First, the ESF-13 National 

Coordinator is located at the ESF-13 National Coordination Center in Washington, 

D.C., while the SFLEO is co-located with the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer, 

within the Unified Coordination Group at the disaster site.88 Second, the ESF-13 

National Coordinator specifically oversees ESF-13 operations whereas, according to 

the SFLEO Deployment Plan, the SFLEO, when deployed, “will perform functions on 

behalf of the Attorney General and the DOJ.”89 Table 3 below illustrates the core 

functions of each mission as identified in the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan and the SFLEO 

Deployment Plan. 

88 The Federal Coordinating Officer, appointed by the President, is responsible for the overall 

management of the federal response, short-term and intermediate recovery, and mitigation activities. 

The Federal Coordinating Officer is also responsible for establishing the Unified Coordination Group. 

The Unified Coordination Group executes unified command and leads incident activities at the 

field level to achieve unity of effort. Its purpose is to establish and achieve shared objectives. The 

Unified Coordination Group comprises senior leaders representing state and federal interests and, in 

certain circumstances, tribal governments, local jurisdictions, or the private sector. 

89 FBI, SFLEO Deployment Plan, June 2016. 

54 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-

Table 3 

Comparison of ESF-13 CONOPS Plan and SLFEO Deployment Plan Core 

Functions 

Task/Responsibility ESF 13 CONOPS SFLEO 

Deployment Plan 

Coordinate federal public safety and security assistance 

in response to critical incidents. Yes Yes 

Perform functions on behalf of the Attorney General as 

a member of the Unified Coordination Group. No a Yes 

Liaise with state and local emergency response officials 

during the steady state (pre-activation) period. Yes No 

Identify federal resources available for response. Yes Yes 

Establish liaison with FEMA’s National Response 

Coordination Center and Regional Response 

Coordination Center. 

Yes Yes 

Determine the type of resources needed to fill local law 

enforcement gaps. Yes Yes 

Support court and prison security operations. No b Yes 

Provide criminal intelligence to local jurisdictions 

receiving evacuees. No Yes 

Coordinate with federal law enforcement agencies to 

support state and local law enforcement. Yes Yes 

Establish Law Enforcement Coordination Center, if 

needed. Yes Yes 

a Since DOJ is the primary agency for ESF-13, ATF has been designated by the Attorney General as 

the lead coordinating agency for ESF-13. While both the SFLEO and ESF-13 are designated by the 

Attorney General, when activated the SFLEO acts as the Attorney General’s senior representative in 

the disaster area. 

b Although the ESF-13 CONOPS Plan does not explicitly state that ESF-13 will support court and 

prison security operations, personnel deployed for ESF-13 may engage in court and prison security 

operations if requested as part of their support to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 

authorities. 

Sources: ESF-13 National CONOPS Plan, May 2016, and FBI SFLEO Deployment Plan, June 2016 

55 
APPENDIX 8 

THE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

56 

US. Department of Justice 

Office of the Deputy Auorney General 

llfoll~. D.<:. 2aS» 

January 14, 2020 

TO: Nina S Pelletier 

Assistant Inspector GeueraJ 

Evaluation and Inspections 

FROM: Mark E. Michalic ~Cap, Emergency Preparedness and Crisis Response Coordinator 

SUBJECT: Response To Formal Oral\ Report On The Department Of Justice's Preparedness 

To Respond To Critical Incidents Under Emergency Support Function J3 

' 

This memorandum provides a response on behalf of the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General (ODAG) lo the Office ofthe Inspector General's (010) December 18, 2019, formal 

draft audit rep0rt entitlod, "Review of the Departmtnt of Justice's PreparednC$S to Respond to 

Critical lncidems Under Emergency Support Fwtct!on 13, Assignment Number A-2018-003." 

We appreciate the. professionalism and thoroughness of the OJG's Evaluation Team ~nd the 

opportunity to comment on the report's recommendations. 

The OIG's repart c-0ntains four recommendations that pertain to OOAG: 

Recommcndati()n 1: &tabUsh in policy or guidance the. mission, role, and fundions of the 

Senior Federal Enforcement Official, including 41ualification, the appropriate L-Ompooents 

from whkh to select rbc. official, and how a Senitr Federal Law Enforcemc.nt Official 

coordinates wlt.h the. ESF-13 program during a critical incident response. 

Recommendation 2: £.nsurc thi:tt the Seofor Federal Law Enfort-ement Officfal cadrt 

participates in National Level Exercises, when appli~ble, and ES"F·l3 Table Top 

Exercises. 

Recommendation 3: Reevaluate ESD-t31s funding process and operational requirement to 

determine appropriate fonding mL-cb11oisms and cost sharing. 

Recommendation 4: R.eevaluatc.ESF-13's staffug to determine appropriate perm.anent 

.staffing requirements and responsibilities. 
ODAG concurs with all four recommendations. ODAG will convene working group 

meetings in the near future consisting of representative from DOJ law enforcement and other 

appropriate components. Th<: meetings will focus on establishing DOJ-levcl policy or guidance 

pertaining to the mission, role, and functions of the Senior Federal Enforcement Official, and 

will also focus on training, funding. and staffing requirements as noted in the four 

recommendations. ODAG anticipates that the DOJ worki11& group will make its 

recommendations for implementation later this year. 

57 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 9 

OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General provided a draft of this report to the 

Department for its comment. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General’s (ODAG) 

response is included in Appendix 8 to this report. The OIG’s analysis of the ODAG’s 

response and the actions necessary to close the recommendations are discussed 

below. 

Recommendation 1: Establish in policy or guidance the mission, role, and 

functions of the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official, including qualifications, 

the appropriate components from which to select the official, and how a Senior 

Federal Law Enforcement Official coordinates with the ESF-13 program during a 

critical incident response. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG Response: The ODAG concurred with the recommendation and 

stated that it will convene working group meetings in the near future consisting of 

representatives from DOJ law enforcement and other appropriate components. The 

meetings will focus on establishing DOJ-level policy or guidance pertaining to the 

mission, role, and functions of the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official and will 

also focus on training, funding, and staffing requirements as noted in the four 

recommendations. The ODAG stated that it anticipates that the DOJ working group 

will make its recommendations for implementation later this year. 

OIG Analysis: The ODAG’s planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. By May 15, 2020, please provide a status update on the ODAG’s 

efforts to convene a working group to establish policy or guidance pertaining to the 

mission, role, and functions of the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official, to 

include position qualifications, from which components to select the official, and 

how a Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official coordinates with ESF-13 during a 

critical incident response. 

Recommendation 2: Ensure that the Senior Federal Law Enforcement 

Official cadre participates in National Level Exercises, when applicable, and ESF-13 

Table Top Exercises. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG Response: See the ODAG’s response to Recommendation 1 above. 

OIG Analysis: The ODAG’s planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. By May 15, 2020, please provide a status update on the ODAG’s 

efforts to convene working group meetings pertaining to the Senior Federal Law 

Enforcement Official cadre’s participation in National Level Exercises, when 

applicable, and ESF-13 Table Top Exercises. 

Recommendation 3: Reevaluate ESF-13’s funding process and operational 

requirements to determine appropriate funding mechanisms and cost sharing. 

58 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG Response: See the ODAG’s response to Recommendation 1 above. 

OIG Analysis: The ODAG’s planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. By May 15, 2020, please provide a status update on the ODAG’s 

efforts to convene working group meetings pertaining to the reevaluation of 

ESF-13’s funding process and operational requirements to determine appropriate 

funding mechanisms and cost sharing. 

Recommendation 4: Reevaluate ESF-13’s staffing to determine 

appropriate permanent staffing requirements and responsibilities. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG Response: See the ODAG’s response to Recommendation 1 above. 

OIG Analysis: The ODAG’s planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. By May 15, 2020, please provide a status update on the ODAG’s 

efforts to convene working group meetings pertaining to the reevaluation of 

ESF-13’s staffing to determine appropriate permanent staffing requirements and 

responsibilities. 

59 
APPENDIX 10 

ATF’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

60 

U.S. Department or Juslk:e 

Buteau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Fireanns and Explosives 

A.rsl.Jtant DlrCC/or 

600010:ADW 

8310 

)anuuy 22, 2020 

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Inspector Ocncral 

Evaluation and Inspections 

FROM: Assistant Director 

(Office or Professional Responsibility and Security Operations) 

SUBJECT: 010 Fonnal Draft Report· Bureau of Alcohol, Tobaoco, Firearms and 

Explosives' Response to lhc Review of tho Departments of Justioc's 

Preparedness to Respond lo Critical Incidents Under Emc:IJ!cncy Support 

Function 13 (ESF-13) (A-2018-003) 

This memorandum serves to transmit ATF's respo,se to the above-cited report. Attached is a summary 

of the status of the actions taken relative to the open recommendations, 

Should you have any questions or need additional infonnation, please contact the Chief of ATF's Audit 

Liaison Office, Adam Pallotto at (202) 648-8706. 

Attnchmcnt 

~~ B% 

co: Director 

Assistant Director (Field Operations) 

a,lcfCowisel 

Assistant Director, Audit Liaison Group, Justice Management Division 

Department of J usticc 
T F Response to tJte OJG's Review or Emergency Support Function 13 

U.S. Department of J ustice 

Bun:au or A !coho I, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives 

Assistant Direc1or 

Washington. DC 20226 

\llWW .atf.gov 

700000:RPM 

8310 

January 21 , 2020 

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Director 

Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations 

FROM: Assistant Dircc.tor 

Office of Field Operations 

SUBJECT: Review of the Depanment of Justice's Preparedness to Respond to 

Critical Incidents Under Emergency Suppon Function 13 (A-2018-

003) 

This memorandum responds to the recommendations contained in the Office of Insp«:tor 

General's (010) report titled "Review o f the. Oepanment of Justice's Preparedness 10 Respond to 

Critical lncide.nts Under Emergency Suppart Function 13" (A-2018-003). We welcome OIG's 

con..~tructive comments and appreciate the opportunity to respond. 

Recommendation# S.. De\'elop methods to improve si'tuational awareness of deploying 

ESF-13 personnel prior to their arrh'al at a disaster site. 

ATF concurs thal providing enhanced situational awareness information 10 deploying pe.rs.onncl 

is ooc.?ssa,y. In April 2019, prict 10 the OIG report being issued, ESF #13 added an additional 

contractor position to provide planning and siruational awareness support. The plans/siruatiooal 

awareness office.r i~ primarily responsible for coordinating the planning and situational 

awareness processes ofESF-13 during steady state and deploymenc operations. When a nacional 

ever.it occurs which c.ould possibly require an ESF- 13 activation,. a Situational Awareness SPOT 

Report is now gc:~ratcd and provided to all support agencies for their situational awareness for 

support aod planning purposes. During activations, the plans/situational awareness office£" 

provides situational awareness to internal staff, external partners,, and deploying personnel 

61 
Response- to the OlG's Review of Emergency Support Function 13 

through situation reports. In additio~ ESF· 13 is testing a new process for communication with 

Quick Response Team (QR1) Team Lcadtts during tJ,c initial stages oftl1eir deploymertt. Once 

the support agency provides a deployment roster to the ESF• l3 Law Enforcement Resources 

Coordinacor (L ERC), che support agency and the QRT Team Lcader recei\'e a copy oftbe 

deployment order. The QRT Team Leader is then contacted tclephonieally by chc Logistics 

Coordination Genier (LCC) who will " '"'k directly with the QRT Team Lcadc-r uncil !he l<am 

arrives in lheatc::r and report to the Incident Command Post (lCP) for in-processing and 

equipment issue (the LCC was established recently to impr-ove logistical coordination during 

ESF-13 activations). The QRT Team Lcader will be provided updated envitonmencal 

information, travel route infonnation. lodging information, rental car infonnation (if applicable), 

and updates on the overall law enforcement environment 

Reeornmendat.ion #6. Ensure th.at Federal Law Enforce.meat Offi~rs a re provided with 

le11al guid ance abuu_t bow to rnpond to '\iol.ution.s of tt.ale or local law when carrying out 

their ESF-13 mission within a disaster are-a and identify a point of cont.act for Federal Law 

Enforcement Offic•rs to consult for additlonal legal guidance during deploymtflts. 

ATF concurs with the spirit of this recommendation. ATF already provides comprehensive legal 

guidance to QR Ts tasked with Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) missions in a legal authority 

memorandum. which decaiJs the scope of their local arrest authorities. It would be impossible to 

detail how fedttal law enforcement officers (FLEOs) apply those aud1ori1ies given that the use of 

those authorities wiJl always be fact•specific based oo the siruation on the ground. and 

necessarily require, the use of discretion. Any attempt at laying our an application of such 

authorities could pocentiaHy lead to an unintended constraint on tbe use of such authorities. 

However, on future deploymenLS involving DFA missions. when possible, ESf # 13 will slrive LO 

utill'Ze QRTs from supporl agencies that typically wo,k closely with state and local law 

enfc.-cemenl agencies: to ensure Iha.I ESF # 13 ha.'i the most experieoc~ personnel responding on 

OF A mi$sions. 

In addition to the legal outhori<y memorandum, ESF 1113 and local authorities brief those QRTs 

on DFA missions regarding their arrest authorities and rcspoRSibiliries. Moreover. QRTs are 

partnered with and work alongside local authori1ies. so if any questions arise based on tllc facts 

on the ground. our local partners are tbere to assist with any questions/procedures per state law. 

FLEOs are also provided with contact iJ1fonnation for locaJ counsel when appropriate, and 

FLEOs always may re.acb out directly to their O\\>Ti agency counsel, with whom the ESF #13 

attorney closely coordinates. These three legal points of contact - local, agency, and ESF #13 

counsel - all provide authoritative, consistent, il.Dd accura.te legal advice during deployments. 

The ESF 1113 anomey aka visits support agencies and provides training regarding authorities 

during both federal 0pc:ra1ions suppOrt(FOS) and DFA missions. 

Following lessons learned from 2017, the legal authoricy memorandum is now included in the 

body of the deployment order, rather than as a separate attachment. Additionally, deployment 

or-dcrs arc sent directly 10 QRT Team Leaders rather than just support agency rcprcs.cotati"·cs in 

order 10 ensure that QRTs received them. Finally, ESF #13 has since added langu3&e 10 the legal 

authority memorandum and the body of the deployment order which provides che ESF #13 

-2-

62 
TF Responu to the OIG's Review or Emergency Support Function 13 

attorney's fi.111 contact inform.atfon should any questions arise regarding the scope o.r application 

of their auth,orities during the course of their deployment. 

Retomme.ndalion #7. Develop a comprehensi:ve training program that outlines ESF-13's 

functions and addRSses operational control and misconceptions to assist future ESF-13 

team leaders in prep.aring for and executing ESF-13 missions. 

ATF concurs with this recommendation. It has been a challenge providing adequate training to 

an unknown nationwide pool of FLEOS soorced by outside agencies. Sinee 2017, ESF #13 ha.s 

provided cornprehensive ESF # 13 on line traininig to all suppon agencies and directed 1hem to 

provide such uaining to all FLEOs. In order to bcner address these concerns, ESF #13 will 

d1:welop video bosed training to provide to QRT Team LeaderG with tl1e following pe.rtinent 

infonn•tion prior to deployment. This will provide• bi!.Seline of the ESF #13 program and 

mission re.quircmeots: 

• ESF 1113 Program Overview 

• QRTTeam Leader responsibilities 

• Depl,oyrm:nc Orders 

• Equipment Lists 

• Incident Command Post (ICP) (fonnerly referred to as Field Coordination Center (FCC)). 

briefings 

• FEMA Incident Command Structure 

• USMS Deputation 

• Missions - FOS and DF A 

We arc committed to ensuring that ESF #J 3 support agencies receive the training and 

fundamental understanding of the required mission and performance requirements. This videobased training will prO\'idc a mobile, consistent training experience to ensure that all QRT Team 

Leaders arc receiving the same infonnation to boCucr prepare 1hcm prior to deploying for ESF 

#13 missioRS. 

Please let me know ifl C30 be of further assistance on ,.his or any other matter. 

8> 

Thomas Chittum 

Attachments: None 

63 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 11 

OIG ANALYSIS OF ATF’S RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General provided a draft of this report to ATF for 

its comment. ATF’s response is included in Appendix 10 to this report. The OIG’s 

analysis of ATF’s response and the actions necessary to close the recommendations 

are discussed below. 

Recommendation 5: Develop methods to improve situational awareness of 

deploying ESF-13 personnel prior to their arrival at a disaster site. 

Status: Resolved. 

ATF Response: ATF concurred with the recommendation. ATF stated that it 

added a contractor position that is primarily responsible for coordinating ESF-13’s 

planning and situational awareness process during steady state and deployment 

operations.90 ESF-13 is now providing all support agencies with a Situational 

Awareness SPOT Report when a national event occurs that could possibly require an 

ESF-13 activation. During activations, the Plans and Situational Awareness Officer 

provides situational awareness reports to internal staff, external partners, and 

deploying personnel. In addition, ATF stated that ESF-13 is also testing a new 

communication process with Quick Response Team (QRT) team leaders during the 

initial stages of their deployment. ESF-13 staff will provide the QRT team leaders 

with a copy of the Deployment Orders and will coordinate with the team leaders 

until their team arrives in the disaster area. The team leaders will be provided 

updated environmental information, travel route information, lodging information, 

rental car information (if applicable), and updates on the overall law enforcement 

environment. 

OIG Analysis: ATF’s planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. By May 15, 2020, please provide examples of recent Situational 

Awareness SPOT reports provided to support agencies. Also, please provide an 

assessment of ESF-13’s new communication process and any materials provided to 

QRT team leaders to improve the situational awareness of deploying ESF-13 

personnel prior to their arrival at a disaster site. 

Recommendation 6: Ensure that Federal Law Enforcement Officers are 

provided with legal guidance about how to respond to violations of state or local law 

when carrying out their ESF-13 mission within a disaster area, and identify a point 

of contact for Federal Law Enforcement Officers to consult for additional legal 

guidance during deployments. 

Status: Resolved. 

ATF Response: ATF concurred with the spirit of the recommendation. ATF 

stated that it already provides comprehensive legal guidance to QRTs tasked with 

90 ATF referred to the additional contractor’s title as the Plans and Situational Awareness 

Officer. 

64 
 

 

Direct Federal Assistance missions in a Legal Authority Memorandum, which details 

the scope of the QRTs local arrest authorities. ATF also stated that it would be 

impossible to detail how Federal Law Enforcement Officers (FLEO) apply those 

authorities given that the use of those authorities will always be fact-specific based 

on the situation on the ground and necessarily require the use of discretion. Any 

attempt at laying out an application of such authorities could potentially lead to an 

unintended constraint on the use of such authorities. However, on future 

deployments involving Direct Federal Assistance missions, when possible, ESF-13 

will strive to utilize QRTs from support agencies that typically work closely with 

state and local law enforcement agencies to ensure that ESF-13 has the most 

experienced personnel responding on Direct Federal Assistance missions. 

In addition, ESF-13 and local authorities brief those QRTs on Direct Federal 

Assistance missions regarding their arrest authorities and responsibilities. 

Moreover, QRTs are partnered with and work alongside local authorities. If any 

questions arise based on the facts on the ground, ATF’s local partners are there to 

assist with any questions/procedures per state law. FLEOs are also provided with 

contact information for local counsel, when appropriate, and FLEOs always may 

reach out directly to their own agency counsel, with whom the ESF-13 counsel 

closely coordinates. These three legal points of contact—local, agency, and ESF-13 

counsel—all provide authoritative, consistent, and accurate legal advice during 

deployments. Following lessons learned from 2017, the Legal Authority 

Memorandum is now included in the body of the Deployment Orders, the 

Deployment Orders are sent directly to QRT team leaders, and ESF-13 provides the 

ESF-13 counsel’s full contact information on the Deployment Orders in case any 

questions arise regarding the scope or application of the QRTs’ authorities during 

the course of their deployment. 

OIG Analysis: ATF’s response is partially responsive to our 

recommendation. However, the response does not address ensuring that FLEOs 

receive guidance on how to respond to violations of state or local law when carrying 

out their ESF-13 mission within a disaster area. The OIG does not expect ATF to 

detail every scenario that a FLEO may encounter on the ground. However, ATF can 

provide an overview regarding violations of state or local law that FLEOs are more 

likely to encounter during their deployment. This would be particularly important 

for FLEOs from support agencies deployed from outside the jurisdiction, and that do 

not typically work with state and local law enforcement, or FLEOs from support 

agencies with limited federal arrest authorities. By May 15, 2020, please describe 

how ATF plans to ensure that FLEOs have the legal guidance discussed above and 

that they understand how to respond to violations of state or local law within the 

particular jurisdiction when carrying out their ESF-13 Federal Operational Support 

or Direct Federal Assistance mission within a disaster area. Also, please provide 

recent examples of deployment orders that include the ESF-13 counsel’s full 

contact information. 

Recommendation 7: Develop a comprehensive training program that 

outlines ESF-13’s functions and addresses operational control and misconceptions 

to assist future ESF-13 team leaders in preparing for and executing ESF-13 

missions. 

65 
 

 

 

Status: Resolved. 

ATF Response: ATF concurred with the recommendation and stated that 

ESF-13 will develop video-based training to provide to QRT team leaders with the 

following pertinent information prior to deployment. This will provide a baseline of 

the ESF-13 program and mission requirements: 

• ESF-13 Program Overview, 

• QRT Team Leader Responsibilities, 

• Deployment Orders, 

• Equipment Lists, 

• Incident Command Post (formerly referred to as Field Coordination Center) 

briefings, 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency Incident Command Structure, 

• U.S. Marshals Service Deputation, and 

• Missions–Federal Operational Support and Direct Federal Assistance. 

ATF stated that it is committed to ensuring that ESF-13 support agencies receive 

the training and fundamental understandings of the required mission and 

performance requirements. This video-based training will provide a mobile, 

consistent training experience to ensure that all QRT team leaders are receiving the 

same information to better prepare them prior to deploying for ESF-13 missions. 

OIG Analysis: ATF’s planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. By May 15, 2020, please provide a status update on ESF-13’s 

efforts to develop training that outlines ESF-13’s functions and addresses 

operational control and misconceptions to assist future QRT team leaders in 

preparing for and executing ESF-13 missions. Also, please consider including legal 

authority guidance training regarding responding to violations of state or local law 

and examples of situations that FLEOs may encounter on the ground when 

discussing pertinent baseline information for QRT team leaders. 

66 
 

 

-

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) is a 

statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter 

waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and to

promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s operations.

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ 

programs, employees, contractors, grants, or contracts please visit or call the

DOJ OIG Hotline at oig.justice.gov/hotline or (800) 869-4499.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530 0001

Website Twitter YouTube

oig.justice.gov @JusticeOIG JusticeOIG

Also at Oversight.gov