U.S. International Trade Commission

Publication 4194 August 2010

Washington, DC 20436

Certain Ball Bearings and Parts 

thereof from Japan and 

the United Kingdom

Investigation Nos 731-TA-394-A and 399-A (Second Review) (Third Remand)
U.S. International Trade Commission

COMMISSIONERS 

 

Deanna Tanner Okun, Chairman 

Charlotte R. Lane 

Daniel R. Pearson 

Shara L. Aranoff 

Irving A. Williamson 

Dean A. Pinkert

Robert B. Koopman

Staff assigned

Address all communications to 

Secretary to the Commission 

United States International Trade Commission 

Washington, DC 20436

Acting Director of Operations

Jim McClure, Supervisory Investigator 

Catherine DeFilippo, Economist 

David Goldfine, Attorney 

Neal Reynolds, Attorney
U.S. International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436 

www.usitc.gov

Publication 4194 August 2010

Certain Ball Bearings and Parts 

thereof from Japan and 

the United Kingdom

Investigation Nos 731-TA-394-A and 399-A (Second Review) (Third Remand)
BLANKPAGE
CONTENTS

Page

Views of the Commission on Remand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Appendix A: Federal Register notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION ON REMAND

On April 12, 2010, the U.S. Court of International Trade (per Judge Barzilay) issued an opinion

in NSK Corp. v. United States, Slip Op. 10-38 (“NSK IV”), affirming-in-part and remanding-in-part the

Commission’s affirmative determinations in Certain Ball Bearings and Parts thereof from Japan and the

United Kingdom, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-394-A & 399-A (Second Review) (Second Remand), USITC Pub.

4131 (Jan. 2010). 

In NSK IV, the Court affirmed the Commission’s vulnerability analysis.1

 However, the Court

remanded the Commission’s findings on cumulation for the United Kingdom, concluding that the

Commission had failed to “demonstrate that some incentive likely would draw a discernible amount of

the subject United Kingdom goods specifically to the United States in the absence of the order.”2

 The

Court further explained that it “does not believe that the existing record, taken as a whole, can support an

affirmative discernible adverse impact finding.”3

 It stated that the “Commission may reopen the record

and obtain additional data on this issue in the next remand proceeding, if it so chooses.”4

 Finally, the

Court stated that the Commission’s analysis of likely impact and causation “nearly resembles the kind of

substantial evidence needed for the court to sustain an agency determination.”5

 Nevertheless, the Court

directed the Commission on remand to address the issue of whether “non-subject imports may prevent the

subject imports from achieving the requisite level of causation and, therefore, serve as an impenetrable

barrier that precludes the agency from affirmatively finding injury in this sunset review.”6

1

 NSK IV at 10-11. 

2

 Id. at 18. 

3

 Id. at 16.

4

 Id.

5

 Id. at 18. 

6

 Id. at 17. 
In order to comply with the Court’s remand order and instructions, we determine that, under

section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (“the Act”), revocation of the antidumping duty

order covering ball bearings (“BBs”) from the United Kingdom would not be likely to lead to

continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably

foreseeable time.7 8

 We also determine that revocation of the antidumping duty order on imports of BBs

from Japan would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the

United States within a reasonably foreseeable time. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Commission’s Original Injury Determinations and Its Sunset Review

Determinations

This appeal involves the second sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on ball bearings

from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. These orders were issued in

May 1989, after the Commission issued affirmative injury determinations for these countries.9

 The

Commission conducted its first sunset reviews of the orders in June 2000, issuing affirmative

7

 Chairman Deanna Tanner Okun did not participate in these reviews during the original

proceeding, and has not participated in these remand proceedings. 

8

 We continue to believe that the record supports our decision to cumulate subject imports from

the United Kingdom with subject imports from the other four subject countries. However, pursuant to the

Court’s remand instructions in NSK IV, we conclude that we are now compelled by the Court to determine

that U.K. subject imports are not likely to have a discernible adverse impact upon revocation, and

therefore may not cumulate U.K. subject imports with the other four subject countries. Thus, we

conclude that we are compelled to find that revocation of the order on subject imports from the U.K.

would not be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably

foreseeable time. See below, Parts III and IV. 

9

 Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from the

Federal Republic of Germany et al., Inv. Nos. 303-TA-19 & 20 and 731-TA-391-399 (Final), USITC

Pub. 2185 (May 1989).

2
 determinations for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.10 

On June 1, 2005, the Commission instituted its second sunset reviews of the ball bearings

orders.11 On August 31, 2006, the Commission issued its final determinations in these reviews.12 In its

determinations, the Commission unanimously determined that revocation of the antidumping duty orders

on ball bearings from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom would likely result in

continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.13 The Commission

determined that revocation of the antidumping duty order on ball bearings from Singapore would not

likely result in continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a

reasonably foreseeable time.14 

B. The Court of International Trade’s Decision in NSK I

In September 2006, the Japanese and U.K. respondents appealed the Commission’s affirmative

determinations for ball bearings from Japan and the United Kingdom to the Court of International Trade. 

On September 9, 2008, the Court (per Judge Barzilay) issued its decision in NSK Corp. et al. v. United

States, Court No. 06-334, Slip Op. 08-95 (“NSK I”).

15 In that decision, the Court affirmed the

Commission’s sunset determinations for Japan and the United Kingdom in part, and remanded them in

part. Among other things, the Court affirmed the Commission’s findings that there was a reasonable level

of likely overlap of competition between the subject imports and the domestic industry, that the

10 Certain Bearings from China et al., Inv. Nos. AA1921-143, 731-TA-341, 343-345, 391-397 &

-399 (Review), USITC Pub. 3309 (June 2000). 

11 70 Fed. Reg. 31531 (June 1, 2005). 

12 71 Fed. Reg. 51850 (Aug. 31, 2006). 

13 USITC Pub. 3876 at 36-37.

14 USITC Pub. 3876 at 1, 36-37.

15 NSK Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008). 

3
 United States remained an attractive market for subject imports, that the volumes of the subject imports

were likely to be significant upon revocation of the orders, and that the subject imports would likely have

significant adverse price effects upon revocation.16

Nonetheless, the Court remanded the Commission’s affirmative determination with instructions to

address three issues. First, the Court specifically concluded that, under the Federal Circuit’s decision in

Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States (“Bratsk”),

17 the Commission should have performed a nonsubject import analysis based on Bratsk.

18 Since the Court found that the Bratsk triggering factors were

satisfied, it specifically instructed the Commission to undertake an analysis based on the Bratsk

decision.19

The Court also instructed the Commission to reconsider its vulnerability and impact findings in

light of the domestic industry’s “restructuring” activities during the period of review (“POR”).20 The

Court directed the Commission to perform “a more thorough examination” of this issue, “given the

amount of information that suggests global restructuring had the effect of depressing certain economic

measures of industry performance relied upon {by the Commission} to cast the U.S. market as

vulnerable.”21 Third, the Court instructed the Commission to reconsider its discernible adverse impact

analysis for the United Kingdom in light of the “significant rise in non-subject imports and large scale

restructuring within the ball bearing industry.”22 Accordingly, on October 8, 2008, the Commission

16 NSK I at 17-18, 23-38. 

17 444 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

18 NSK I at 7-14. 

19 NSK I at 11. 

20 NSK I at 22.-23 

21 Id. at 23.

22 Id. at 20. 

4
 instituted its remand proceedings for the sunset reviews for ball bearings from Japan and the United

Kingdom.23 

C. The Commission’s Remand Determination

The Commission issued its first remand determinations on May 4, 2009.24 The Commission

again unanimously decided to cumulate the subject imports from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the

United Kingdom.25 It also unanimously determined that revocation of the antidumping duty orders on

ball bearings from the cumulated countries would likely result in continuation or recurrence of material

injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.26 

In its remand determinations, the Commission addressed the three issues remanded by the Court. 

On Bratsk, the Commission found that non-subject imports did not replace subject imports during the

POR, and that non-subject imports were not likely to replace subject imports upon revocation.27 The

Commission also found that, even with a significant volume of non-subject imports in the market,

revocation of the ball bearings orders would result in significant price competition among the domestic,

23 The Commission published its notice of initiation for the remand proceeding in the Federal

Register at 73 Fed. Reg. 62317 (Oct. 14, 2008). The Commission reopened the record to obtain certain

foreign production, capacity, and shipment information for non-subject imports in order to address the

Court’s Bratsk instructions on remand. In reopening the record, the Commission sent questionnaires to

76 foreign producers and 58 importers of non-subject ball bearings. The Commission did not reopen the

record on any other issue. The Commission also permitted parties to comment on the Court’s remand

instructions and on the new information obtained on remand. The Commission prepared a supplemental

staff report regarding the information gathered from non-subject producers in the remand proceeding. On

March 23, 2009, comments on the remand were filed by petitioner Timken, the Japanese respondents

JTEKT Corp. and Koyo Corp. of U.S.A., (collectively “JTEKT”), and the U.K. respondents NSK

Corporation, NSK Ltd., and NSK Europe Ltd. (collectively “NSK”). 

24 Certain Ball Bearings and Parts thereof from Japan and the United Kingdom, 731-TA-394A

& 399A, (Second Review) (Remand), USITC Pub. 4082 (May 2009). 

25 USITC Pub. 4082 at 1-2.

26 Id. 

27 Id. at 37-41. 

5
 subject and non-subject merchandise, and that this price competition among the domestic, subject and

non-subject suppliers in the market would have a significant adverse effect on the prices and sales

volumes of an already vulnerable domestic industry.28

With respect to its determination to cumulate the imports from the United Kingdom, the

Commission determined that U.K. subject imports would likely have a discernible adverse impact on the

domestic industry upon revocation, notwithstanding the domestic industry’s restructuring efforts and the

sizeable presence of non-subject imports in the U.S. market.29 Finally, the Commission again determined

that the domestic industry was in a vulnerable condition, given that almost all of the indicia of the

industry’s condition fell during the period of review.30 Accordingly, the Commission determined that

revocation of the orders on the Japanese and U.K. subject imports would likely result in the continuation

or recurrence of material injury to the domestic industry.

D. The Court’s Decision in NSK III

 On August 31, 2009, the Court issued its decision in NSK Corp. v. United States, Court No. 06-

334, Slip Op. 09-91 (“NSK III”).

31 In NSK III, the Court remanded the same three issues that had

previously been remanded for further explanation in NSK I. First, the Court observed that the

Commission must examine whether “subject imports are more than a mere minimal or tangential factor in

the material injury to the domestic industry that is likely to continue or recur in the absence of the

28 Id. at 41-42. 

29 Id. at 21-26. 

30 Id. at 34-38. 

31 NSK Corp. v. U.S., 637 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). In an interim decision, NSK

Corp. et al. v. United States, Slip Op. 08-145 (Dec. 29, 2008) (“NSK II”), the Court examined the Bratsk

and Mittal decisions in response to requests from the Commission and defendant-intervenor The Timken

Company (“Timken”) that it reconsider its instructions to require a Bratsk-style analysis, due to the

issuance of the Mittal decision. 

6
 antidumping duty order,” given the significant presence of non-subject imports in the market.32 Second,

the Court instructed the Commission to perform a more detailed assessment of the industry’s

vulnerability, taking into account the industry’s restructuring efforts during the period.33 Finally, as part

of its cumulation analysis for the United Kingdom, the Court ordered the Commission to reconsider the

impact of the industry’s restructuring efforts and of non-subject imports on this analysis.34

E. The Commission’s Second Remand Determination

The Commission issued its second remand determinations on January 5, 2010.35 The

Commission issued a lengthy and detailed factual and legal analysis specifically addressing the Court’s

remand instructions.36 The Commission again unanimously decided to cumulate the subject imports from

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.37 It also unanimously determined that

revocation of the antidumping duty orders on ball bearings from the cumulated countries would likely

result in continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.38 

In its second remand determinations, the Commission addressed the three issues remanded by the

Court in NSK III. With respect to its determination to cumulate the imports from the United Kingdom,

32 NSK III at 29. The Court clarified that it did not intend to require the Commission to perform a

particular replacement/likely replacement benefit analysis pursuant to Bratsk on remand. Instead, the

Court indicated that NSK I “made clear that ‘the only duty imposed on the ITC is to ensure that the

subject imports, and not non-subject imports or some other factor, would be substantially responsible for

injury to the domestic industry.’” NSK III at 13. 

33 NSK III at 30. 

34 Id. at 30. 

35 Ball Bearings from Japan and the United Kingdom, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-394-A & 399-A,

(Second Review) (Second Remand), USITC Pub. 4131 (Jan. 2010). 

36 The Commission’s second remand determination was 83 pages in length. 

37 USITC Pub. 4131 at 1-2.

38 Id. at 1-2.

7
 the Commission determined that subject imports from the United Kingdom would likely have a

discernible adverse impact on the domestic industry upon revocation, notwithstanding the domestic

industry’s restructuring efforts and the sizeable presence of non-subject imports in the U.S. market.39

Furthermore, the Commission again determined that the domestic industry was in a vulnerable condition,

and that revocation of the orders on Japanese and U.K. subject imports would likely result in the

continuation or recurrence of material injury to the domestic industry.40 

With respect to the non-subject import analysis, the Commission determined that revocation of

the antidumping duty orders covering imports of the subject ball bearings from Japan and the United

Kingdom, when cumulated with the other subject countries, would likely result in the recurrence or

continuation of material injury to the domestic bearings industry.41 The Commission found that the

subject imports remained well-suited to compete more aggressively on price with both the domestic and

non-subject bearings, that the subject producers were export-oriented, and that subject producers

possessed significant available capacity that was likely to be used to increase their exports to the United

States.42 The Commission also found that producers in the subject countries were among the largest

exporting countries in the world, that the U.S. market remained an attractive one for exporters, that

subject imports were substitutable to a significant degree with both the domestic and non-subject

bearings, and that they would therefore likely compete at more aggressive pricing levels upon revocation

of the orders.43 Accordingly, the Commission concluded that subject imports were likely to be more than

39 Id. at 21-40. 

40 Id. at 40-54. 

41 Id. at 54-83.

42 Id. at 71-76. 

43 Id. at 76-83. 

8
a minimal or tangential factor with respect to the material injury to the domestic industry that is likely to

continue or recur in the absence of the antidumping duty orders, notwithstanding the significant presence

of non-subject imports in the U.S. market.44

F. The Court’s Decision in NSK IV

In NSK IV, the Court first affirmed the Commission’s vulnerability finding. In so doing,

the Court concluded that the Commission reasonably relied upon the significant declines in the

domestic industry’s capacity utilization rates, its productivity rates, and the on-going cost

structure and profitability levels, along with declines in the industry’s net sales revenue and

market share during the period of review.45

Nevertheless, the Court remanded the issue of U.K. cumulation, stating that the Commission had

failed to “demonstrate that some incentive likely would draw a discernible amount of the subject United

Kingdom goods specifically to the United States in the absence of the order.”46 The Court further

explained that it “does not believe that the existing record, taken as a whole, can support an affirmative

discernible adverse impact finding.”47 It stated that the “Commission may reopen the record and obtain

additional data on this issue in the next remand proceeding, if it so chooses.”48 

In remanding to the Commission on the issues of likely impact and causation, the Court

concluded that “the facts of this case necessitate that the Commission confirm that subject imports likely

will reach the requisite level of causation despite the significant presence of, and seemingly impenetrable

44 Id. at 82-83. 

45 NSK IV at 10-11.

46 Id. at 18. 

47 Id. at 16.

48 Id.

9
barrier imposed by, non-subject imports in the United States market.”49 The Court stated that “[n]onsubject imports have ‘become a significant and price-competitive factor’ in the United States ball bearings

market,” and that they “may prevent the subject imports from achieving the requisite level of causation

and, therefore, serve as an impenetrable barrier that precludes the agency from affirmatively finding

injury in this sunset review.”50 51

G. Current Remand Proceeding

On June 2, 2010, the Commission instituted this third remand proceeding for the sunset reviews

for ball bearings from Japan and the United Kingdom.52 The Commission declined to reopen the record

on remand because the existing record contained a complete data set with respect to the capacity,

production, and shipment levels of the U.K. ball bearings industry as well as comprehensive information

relating to other factors bearing on the discernible impact finding for the United Kingdom. Indeed, the

record contained as complete a data set as the Commission typically obtains in five-year reviews, with no

significant gaps or deficiencies. In fact, the Court did not identify any deficiencies with the record

evidence or any specific data that the Commission might seek to collect on this issue on remand pertinent

to the issue of cumulation. 

49 Id. at 17. 

50 Id. at 17. 

51 The Court noted that it “appreciates the Commission’s continued vigor in resolving these

issues and the diligence with which it has addressed these difficult questions thus far.” NSK IV at 17. 

The Court stated that “[i]ndeed, assuming that the {Commission} had correctly cumulated the subject

imports, the Commission’s analysis of the two remaining issues nearly resembles the kind of substantial

evidence needed for the court to sustain an agency determination.” Id. at 17-18. The Court cautioned that,

“[w]hen it addresses these two issues on remand, the Commission should avoid the use of deficient price

comparison data and certain conclusions that the court found unsupported by substantial evidence in the

agency’s cumulation analysis of the Second Remand Determination.” Id. at 18.

52 The Commission published its notice of initiation for these remand proceedings in the Federal

Register at 75 Fed. Reg. 30856 (June 2, 2010).

10
II. THE DOMESTIC LIKE PRODUCT AND THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

We reaffirm the Commission’s prior findings concerning the domestic like product and the

domestic industry in these reviews, which were not at issue in the litigation, and adopt them in their

entirety here.53 Accordingly, we again determine that the domestic like product includes all ball

bearings, as defined within the scope of the order and that the industry consists of all domestic producers

of ball bearings.54

III. CUMULATION

In accordance with the Court’s remand instructions, we have also reviewed the Commission’s

prior findings concerning the cumulation of the subject imports of ball bearings from the United Kingdom

with the subject imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. In its original and prior two remand

determinations, the Commission unanimously determined that the subject imports from each of the five

countries at issue, including the United Kingdom, were likely to have a discernible adverse impact on the

industry if the orders were revoked. 

As instructed by the Court, we have reconsidered the issue relating to the likely discernible

adverse impact of the subject imports from the United Kingdom, taking into account the Court’s remand

instructions in NSK IV. We continue to maintain that the existing record supports our finding that subject

imports of ball bearings from the United Kingdom are likely to have a discernible adverse impact on the

domestic industry if the antidumping duty order were to be revoked.55 

53 USITC Pub. No. 3876 at 5-13. 

54 USITC Pub. No. 3876 at 5-13. 

55 Domestic producer Timken continues to argue that U.K. subject imports are likely to have a

discernible adverse impact on the domestic industry if the order is revoked. See Timken’s Third Remand

Comments at 1-2. We note, however, that Timken has not explained how the Commission can make such

a finding on the existing record and in conformity with the Court’s remand instructions. 

11
Nevertheless, in light of the Court’s remand instructions that the existing record taken as a whole

cannot support an affirmative discernible adverse impact finding with respect to subject imports from the

United Kingdom, we conclude that we are compelled in this third remand determination to find that.

subject imports from the United Kingdom would not likely have a discernible adverse impact upon

revocation. Given that we have determined not to reopen the record because the record as a whole

contained the full information necessary to address this issue, the Court’s remand instructions give us no

leeway on this matter, and we have no alternative but to comply with them. Since we now are

constrained by the Court’s remand instructions to find that subject imports from the United Kingdom are

not likely to have a discernible adverse impact upon revocation, we are therefore also compelled to find

that subject imports from the United Kingdom cannot be cumulated with subject imports from the other

four subject countries under the statute.56 We would not have made these findings in the absence of the

Court’s conclusion in NSK IV that the record taken as a whole cannot establish that subject imports from

the United Kingdom would likely have a discernible adverse impact upon revocation. Nevertheless, we

have made these findings in order to comply with the Court’s remand instructions. 

IV. REVOCATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING DUTY ORDER ON BALL BEARINGS FROM

THE UNITED KINGDOM IS NOT LIKELY TO LEAD TO CONTINUATION OR

RECURRENCE OF MATERIAL INJURY WITHIN A REASONABLY FORESEEABLE

TIME

As discussed above, given that we are constrained by the Court’s remand instructions to find that

subject imports from the United Kingdom are not likely to have a discernible adverse impact upon

revocation, we are therefore also compelled not to cumulate subject imports from the United Kingdom

with subject imports from the other four subject countries. Moreover, the Court’s statement that the

56 Accordingly, in these remand views, to comply with the Court’s instructions, we shall only

cumulate imports of ball bearings from the remaining four subject countries (France, Germany, Italy, and

Japan). 

12
record, as it stands, cannot establish that subject imports from the United Kingdom would likely have a

discernible adverse impact upon revocation necessarily compels us to determine that subject imports from

the United Kingdom alone would not be likely to have significant volume and/or price effects if the order

were revoked and that revocation of the order on subject U.K. imports would not be likely to lead to the

continuation or recurrence of material injury in the event of revocation within a reasonably foreseeable

time. Accordingly, we determine that revocation of the antidumping duty order on subject imports from

the United Kingdom would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to a

domestic industry within a reasonably foreseeable time.

V. REVOCATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING DUTY ORDER ON BALL BEARINGS FROM

JAPAN IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF

MATERIAL INJURY WITHIN A REASONABLY FORESEEABLE TIME

We have again reviewed the record of this proceeding, the Court’s remand instructions, and the

comments of the parties relating to the Court’s instructions. Having taken these steps, we determine that

revocation of the order on BBs from Japan would likely result in the continuation or recurrence of

material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time. We discuss our

reasons for this determination below.

A. Conditions of Competition

We reaffirm the Commission’s prior findings concerning conditions of competition in the United

States market for ball bearings during the period of review. In its original determinations, the

Commission found that the ball bearings market was not characterized by a regular and measurable

business cycle and that the industry included a number of production facilities owned by large

multinational firms.57 The Commission also found that the industry had restructured and consolidated its

57 USITC Pub. 3876 at 38-39. 

13
operations since the first reviews; in particular, the record showed that some producers relocated facilities

overseas, some closed production facilities or lines, and two producers added domestic production lines to

produce more customized bearings.58 

 The Commission further found that the capacity, production, shipment levels and market share of

the domestic industry declined considerably during its second period of review.59 Finally, the

Commission found that the subject and domestic ball bearings were substitutable and that, while bearings

are often described as “custom” or “standard” bearings, there was no clear dividing line between the two

categories.60 We adopt the Commission’s findings in their entirety here,61 except to the extent that we

supplement and revise them in this opinion.

In NSK I, the Court affirmed several of the Commission’s findings relating to conditions of

competition in the ball bearings market.62 In particular, the Court affirmed that the Commission

reasonably analyzed the impact of subject imports on the industry as a whole, rather than on certain

aspects of the industry’s operations. In doing so, the Court noted that it is “well-settled that the ITC

bears no obligation to perform a market segmentation analysis.”63 

The Court also affirmed the Commission’s finding that there was a significant degree of

substitutability between domestically produced bearings and subject imports.64 In this regard, the Court

noted that a “clear majority of respondent purchasers and importers reported that subject bearings were

58 USITC Pub. 3876 at 39-40.

59 USITC Pub. 3876 at 40. 

60 USITC Pub. 3876 at 41-42 & 46.

61 USITC Pub. 3876 at 38-42.

62 NSK I at 21-27. 

63 Id. at 23-25.

64 Id. at 25. 

14
interchangeable with the domestic like product.”65 The Court also confirmed that the record established

that the “United States remains an attractive market for subject producers of ball bearings,” that the record

indicates “there is an incentive to shift available capacity to capture U.S. sales” as a result of the fact that

“higher prices {are} available in the U.S. market as compared to other foreign markets,” and that “price is

an essential factor in purchase decisions.”66 The Court also agreed with the Commission’s finding that

demand for ball bearings was not expected to increase significantly within the foreseeable future.67 

Finally, the Court confirmed that it was appropriate for the Commission to rely primarily on

value-based measures when assessing the volumes of the subject imports, stating that the Commission

prefers value-based measures for this purpose due to the “wide variety of ball bearings” within the scope

of the review. 68 The Court stated that “case law confirms that the {Commission} may assign more

weight to value versus quantity in administering reviews under the antidumping statutes.”69 

As discussed below, we have taken these conditions of competition, and others, into account

when analyzing the issues before the Commission in this third remand determination.

B. Likely Volume of Cumulated Subject Imports

In its original determinations, the Commission found the volume of subject imports to be both

increasing and significant.70 We adopt the Commission’s prior findings on this issue, except to the extent

65 Id. at 25 and 27. 

66 Id. at 32-33 and 34-35.

67 Id. at 38.

68 NSK I at 19 (citing Am. Bearings Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 28 CIT 1698, 1705; 350 F.

Supp. 2d 1100, 1108-10 (2004).

69 NSK I at 19. 

70 USITC Pub. 2185 at 68-69. 

15
we revise or supplement them in this opinion. 

In the first reviews, the Commission found that the subject import volume was likely to be

significant. While acknowledging that some factors might indicate that additional significant subject

import volume was not likely upon revocation, the Commission found that a “relatively small increase in

the volume of cumulated subject imports would be significant” within the reasonably foreseeable future if

the orders were revoked.71 In finding that the volume of the subject imports was likely to be significant,

the Commission emphasized that subject import volume measured by value was higher than in the

original investigations, subject imports were entrenched in the highest volume portion of the market, and

that members of the fragmented domestic ball bearings industry would import subject merchandise to

complement their domestic production if the orders were revoked.72

Despite the orders, we find that cumulated subject imports have maintained a significant presence

in the U.S. market during the period examined in these reviews, although possessing somewhat lower

market shares than in the first reviews and in the original investigations. Subject imports from France,

Germany, Italy, and Japan accounted for 13.7 percent of U.S. consumption by value in 1998.73 In 2000,

cumulated subject imports from these four countries accounted for 12.5 percent of U.S. consumption by

value; by 2005, cumulated subject imports from these four countries had grown (albeit slightly) to 12.7

percent of U.S. consumption by value.74 

71 USITC Pub. 3309 at 60. 

72 USITC Pub. 3309 at 60-61. 

73 CR/PR at Table BB-I-1.

74 By value, cumulated subject imports fell from 12.5 percent of U.S. BB consumption in 2000 to

12.0 percent in 2001 and 11.2 percent in 2002, and then increased during the next three years from 11.3

percent in 2003 to 12.4 percent in 2004 and 12.7 percent in 2005. CR at Staff Table 4 (attached to these

remand views as Attachment 1). 

16
Several factors indicate that subject producers from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan have the

ability and incentive to increase exports to the United States to significant levels if the orders were

revoked. Although subject producers’ capacity and production have fallen during the review period,

capacity utilization has risen,75 and the cumulated subject producers have substantial excess capacity

which could be easily directed at the U.S. market if the orders were revoked. Cumulated subject

producers had *** BBs in excess capacity in 2000, *** excess capacity in 2001, *** BBs in excess

capacity in 2002, *** BBs in excess capacity in 2003, *** BBs in excess capacity in 2004, and *** BBs

in excess capacity in 2005.76 In 2005, apparent U.S. consumption totaled *** million BBs, meaning that

the subject countries’ excess capacity alone could satisfy approximately *** percent of apparent U.S.

consumption.77 In other words, the subject producers had sufficient excess capacity to ship significant

additional volume to the U.S. market upon revocation of the orders. 

Moreover, we find that subject producers from the four cumulated countries generally have

continued to ship to the United States in significant volumes despite the orders, especially in the latter

part of the review period when cumulated subject imports increased by value. By value, cumulated

subject imports fell from *** in 2000 to *** in 2001, *** in

75 Subject producers’ cumulated capacity dropped from *** BBs in 2000 to *** BBs in 2001,

*** BBs in 2002, *** BBs in 2003, and *** BBs in 2004 and 2005. CR at Staff Table 5 (attached to these

remand views as Attachment 2). 

 Subject producers’ production fell from *** BBs in 2000 to *** BBs in 2001, *** BBs in 2002,

2003, and 2004, and *** BBs in 2005. CR at Staff Table 5. 

 Subject producers’ capacity utilization increased irregularly during the review period, increasing

from *** percent in 2000 to *** percent in 2001, dropping to *** percent in 2002, increasing to ***

percent in 2003 and *** percent in 2004, and falling slightly to *** percent in 2005. CR at Staff Table 5. 

76 Derived from Staff Table 5.

77 CR/PR at Table C-2.

17
2002, *** in 2003, and then increased to *** in 2004, and *** in 2005.78 The ongoing and significant

presence of subject imports in the U.S. market demonstrates the continued importance of the U.S. market

to subject producers and further shows that subject imports already have distributors and customers in

place for their products.

Furthermore, producers in France, Germany, Italy, and Japan are highly export-oriented, ranking

among the largest BB exporters in the world. In terms of BB global exports, by value, *** ranked first,

*** ranked second, *** ranked fourth, and *** ranked fifth in 2004.79 By value, total exports for BB

producers from these four cumulated countries increased irregularly from *** in 2000 to *** in 2005.80 

In fact, total exports from these four cumulated countries were almost as high as total commercial home

market shipments throughout the period examined in these reviews.81 Since 2003, the value of both total

commercial home market shipments and total exports for the cumulated countries have increased.82

78 Staff Table 4. 

79 In 2004, Japan exported $*** BBs, Germany exported $*** BBs, Italy exported $*** BBs,

and France exported $*** BBs. CR/PR at Table BB-IV-11. We recognize that the data used to compile

Table BB-IV-10 through Table BB-IV-17 represent imports and exports for HTS heading 8482.10 (ball

bearings), which are not exactly comparable to the BB imports subject to the scope of the review. 

80 By value, total subject exports for BB producers dropped from $*** in 2000 to $*** in 2001

and 2002, and then increased from $*** in 2003 to $*** in 2004 and 2005. Staff Table 5. 

81 In 2000, by value, total exports for cumulated subject producers were *** while home market

shipments by subject producers in their home countries were ***. In 2001 and 2002, by value, total

exports for cumulated subject producers were *** while home market shipments were ***. In 2003, by

value, total exports for cumulated subject producers were *** while home market shipments were ***. In

2004, by value, total exports for cumulated subject producers were *** while home market shipments

were ***. In 2005, by value, total exports for cumulated subject producers were *** while home market

shipments were ***. Staff Table 5. 

82 Staff Table 5.

18
Moreover, BB producers from the cumulated subject countries maintain a wide and diverse

presence in markets throughout Europe, Asia, and the United States, and they have demonstrated the

ability to shift exports relatively quickly from one market to another on an annual basis during the period

 examined in these reviews.83 The United States is an especially attractive market for subject imports

since U.S. prices for BBs generally are higher than in those markets outside the United States.84

Moreover, the U.S. market is attractive due to its size; the United States is the second largest market in the

world for BB imports.85

Given the relatively weak demand for BBs over the period of review and the fact that demand is

not projected to increase substantially within the reasonably foreseeable future, the export-orientation of

the subject producers, their total exports, production capacity, current volumes in the U.S. market, the

high degree of interchangeability between subject imports and the domestic like product,86 and the

83 We recognize that 15 foreign producers/exporters reported that shifting BB sales between the

United States and alternative markets was “difficult” while three firms characterized the shift as “easy.” 

CR at BB-II-9. Nevertheless, the data collected by the Commission in these reviews demonstrate that BB

producers from the cumulated countries are able to shift markets relatively easily. See, e.g., CR/PR at

Tables BB-IV-12 to BB-IV-15 & BB-IV-17. 

84 CR/PR at BB-V-7.

85 CR/PR at Table BB-IV-10. Throughout the period examined in these reviews, the United

States ranked second only behind Germany in terms of the value of BB global imports. The United States

had BB global imports valued at $860.1 million in 2000, $745.5 million in 2001, $698.5 million in 2002,

$690.8 million in 2003, and $781.3 million in 2004. CR/PR at Table BB-IV-10.

86 In these second five-year reviews, more than 80 percent of purchasers found that the domestic

like product and subject imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan were substitutable. In these

reviews, *** out of *** responding purchasers and *** out of *** responding importers considered

domestically produced BBs and subject imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan to be “always” or

“frequently” interchangeable. CR/PR at Table BB-II-4. *** purchasers and *** importers found BBs

from the four cumulated subject countries to be “always” interchangeable with U.S.-produced BBs, ***

purchasers and *** importers found BBs from the various subject countries to be “frequently”

interchangeable with U.S.-produced BBs, *** purchasers and *** importers found BBs from the various

subject countries to be “sometimes” interchangeable with U.S.-produced BBs, and only *** purchasers

and *** importers found BBs from the various subject countries to be “never” interchangeable with U.S.-

produced BBs. CR/PR at Table BB-II-4.

19
incentive created by higher prices in the United States than in other markets, we conclude, based on the

record of these reviews, that the volume of subject BB imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan,

would likely be significant in the reasonably foreseeable future if the orders were revoked.87

C. The Likely Price Effects of the Cumulated Subject Imports 

In its original determinations, the Commission found evidence of underselling and found that

subject imports were suppressing prices for the domestic like product.88 

In the first reviews, the Commission found that, in the event of revocation, subject imports would

have significant price suppressing and price depressing effects within a reasonably foreseeable time.89 

The Commission reasoned that given the “combination of slackening demand and the high degree of

substitutability between the domestic like product and subject imports, any increases in subject imports

87 We note that, in NSK I, the Court held that the Commission reasonably found that the subject

producers (which included U.K. subject producers) had sufficient excess capacity to increase their exports

significantly to the United States upon revocation. The Court noted that the record showed that “the

subject countries could potentially capture an additional *** percent of U.S. consumption by utilizing

their excess capacity.” NSK I at 30. “Viewed in this context,” the Court agreed that “the subject

producers do indeed possess a significant level of excess capacity.” Id. Furthermore, in NSK I, the Court

confirmed that the United States “remains an attractive market for the subject producers’ ball bearings”

because the United States is the “second largest destination for imported ball bearings.” Id. at 32-33. The

Court also found that, “with higher prices available in the U.S. market as compared to other foreign

markets, there is [an] incentive to shift available capacity to capture U.S. sales.” Id. at 33. Emphasizing

that the subject producers are “among the world’s top exporters” and “have at their disposal a significant

level of excess capacity,” the Court found that the Commission’s likely volume finding was reasonable. 

Id. We recognize that the Commission’s prior finding of likely significant volume, which the Court

affirmed in NSK I, was based upon data relating to the five cumulated subject countries, including the

United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the factors we rely on here are consistent with, and similar to, the findings

affirmed by the Court in NSK I. 

88 USITC Pub. 2185 at 68-69. During the original period of investigation, the subject imports

undersold the domestic like product in 69.4 percent of comparisons, at an average underselling margin of

35.8 percent. Derived from Second Remand Table A-1, Appendix A. 

89 USITC Pub. 3309 at 62. 

20
were likely to result in price declines.”90 The Commission also observed that the likelihood of significant

price effects was heightened by the fragmented nature of the domestic BB industry, explaining that

“[t]here are many suppliers able to meet purchasers’ non-price concerns, such as engineering support and

customization, leaving price as the primary remaining area for competition.”91 The Commission

explained that “[t]he limited pricing data collected in the course of these investigations do not give clear

evidence of patterns of underselling or overselling, though the data do indicate that underselling occurred

in more than half of the transactions covered.”92 The Commission further explained that “even modest

additional volumes of subject imports would have significant price suppressing and depressing effects”

within a reasonably foreseeable time “especially in light of conditions of competition existing in the

domestic BB industry.”93 

Similarly, the limited pricing data collected in the current reviews do not give clear evidence of

significant patterns of underselling or overselling with the orders in place.94 Nevertheless, the record in

these reviews indicates that price is an important factor in purchasing decisions for BBs.95 Furthermore,

more than 80 percent of purchasers found that the domestic like product and subject imports are

90 Id. 

91 Id. at 63.

92 Id. 

93 Id. 

94 CR/PR at Table BB-V-2. Consistent with the Court’s instructions, we have not relied on this

underselling data as a basis for finding that the cumulated subject imports are likely to have significant

adverse effects on domestic prices upon revocation of the orders. 

95 In responses to the Commission’s questionnaires regarding the importance of price as a factor

in purchasing decisions, 43 purchasers reported that price was very important, 6 purchasers reported that

price was somewhat important, and none reported that price was not important. CR/PR at Table BB-II-2. 

Purchasers made comparisons on a number of factors regarding their importance in purchasing decisions. 

Although quality was identified by purchasers as the most important factor when selecting a bearing

supplier, purchasers ranked price as the second most important factor. CR/PR at Table BB-II-1. 

21
substitutable.96 Therefore, if the orders were revoked, subject imports would likely be priced aggressively

to gain market share, and would undersell the domestic like product by substantial margins, as they did in

the original investigations, so as to significantly suppress domestic prices.97 As noted above, the volume

of subject imports is likely to increase significantly in the reasonably foreseeable future if the

antidumping duty orders are revoked. At these likely volumes, the subject imports from the cumulated

countries would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of the domestic like product.

We find that the significant volumes of subject imports are likely to suppress the price increases

necessary to compensate for the domestic industry’s increasing costs. Over the period of review prices

generally increased for domestic product, but not enough to offset the increases in cost of goods sold, as

evidenced by the 5.1 percentage point increase in the ratio of cost of goods sold (“COGS”) to net sales.98

In the event of revocation, we find it likely that increasing volumes of subject imports would prevent

domestic producers from recouping cost increases. Demand for BBs is relatively price inelastic, and the

96 As discussed previously, in these second five-year reviews, more than 80 percent of purchasers

found that the domestic like product and subject imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan were

substitutable. In these reviews, *** out of *** responding purchasers and *** out of *** responding

importers considered domestically produced BBs and subject imports from France, Germany, Italy, and

Japan to be “always” or “frequently” interchangeable. CR/PR at Table BB-II-4. *** purchasers and ***

importers found BBs from the four cumulated subject countries to be “always” interchangeable with U.S.-

produced BBs; *** purchasers and *** importers found BBs from the various subject countries to be

“frequently” interchangeable with U.S.-produced BBs; *** purchasers and *** importers found BBs from

the various subject countries to be “sometimes” interchangeable with U.S.-produced BBs; and only ***

purchasers and *** importers found BBs from the various subject countries to be “never” interchangeable

with U.S.-produced BBs. CR/PR at Table BB-II-4.

97 Our record reflects that U.S. prices are generally higher than in other markets. CR/PR at BBV-7.

98 CR/PR at Table C-2. Over the period of review, the price of steel bar, the primary raw

material in BBs, increased from $342 per ton in 2000 to $617 per ton in 2005. CR/PR at BB-V-1. 

22
U.S. market for BBs is characterized by a fair degree of price competition.99 The domestic like product

and subject imports are generally substitutable, and BBs represent a relatively small share of the cost of

the downstream products in which they are ultimately used.100 Given these conditions, we find that the

likely significant volumes of subject imports would likely have significant price effects within a

reasonably foreseeable time if the orders were revoked.

Accordingly, on the basis of the record in these reviews, including information collected in the

original investigations and the earlier reviews, we find that revocation of the antidumping duty orders on

BB imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan would be likely to lead to significant underselling by

the subject imports and significant price depression or suppression within a reasonably foreseeable

time.101

99 USITC Pub. 3876 at 46-47. 

100 Id. at 47.

101 In NSK I, the Court questioned certain aspects of the Commission’s underselling analysis,

expressing its concern that the Commission’s underselling analysis was “based on a relatively small

sample of price comparisons” for the subject and domestic merchandise. Id. at 35. Nonetheless, the

Court ultimately affirmed the Commission’s findings that the subject imports were likely to significantly

undersell the domestic like products and were likely to have significant adverse effects on domestic prices

upon revocation of the orders. Id. at 33-38. The Court found that the Commission reasonably determined

that, due to the high degree of substitutability between subject imports and the domestic like product, the

“subject imports would likely be priced aggressively to gain market share, and would undersell the

domestic like product by substantial margins so as to significantly suppress domestic prices.” Id. at 37. 

In NSK I, the Court also found that the Commission reasonably determined that “significant

volumes of subject imports are likely to suppress the price increases necessary to compensate for the

domestic industry’s increasing costs.” Id. at 37-38. The Court also concluded that the Commission

reasonably found “there {was} a strong likelihood that competitive pricing will be a significant factor in

purchasing decisions,” given that “demand for ball bearings is not expected to increase dramatically

within the foreseeable future.” Id. at 34-35 & 37-38. The Court also found “that there {was} sufficient

evidence to support the ITC’s determination that price is an essential factor in purchase decisions,” noting

that price was reported to be the second most important factor after quality in the purchase decision and

the large majority of purchasers reported that price was a “very important” factor in the purchase

decision. Id. at 34-35. Given these considerations, the Court held that it was reasonable for the

Commission to determine that “removal of the orders would likely lead to significant underselling and

price suppression within the foreseeable future.” Id. at 38. 

We recognize that the Commission’s finding of likely significant price effects, which the Court

previously affirmed in NSK I, was based upon those effects from five cumulated subject countries

including the United Kingdom. As discussed above, in these views, we have determined not to cumulate

subject imports from the United Kingdom with those imports from the remaining four subject countries

23
D. The Likely Impact of the Cumulated Subject Imports on the Industry

1. The Court’s Remand Instructions in NSK IV

In assessing likely impact and causation, which the Court characterized as the two remaining

issues, the Court concluded that “the facts of this case necessitate that the Commission confirm that

subject imports likely will reach the requisite level of causation despite the significant presence of, and

seemingly impenetrable barrier imposed by, non-subject imports in the United States market.”102 The

Court emphasized that “[n]on-subject imports have ‘become a significant and price-competitive factor’ in

the United States ball bearings market, amply increased their market share in terms of value at the

expense of domestic and subject ball bearings, and have undersold the domestic like product and subject

imports in at least two-thirds of the possible price comparisons.”103 The Court concluded that “[i]n view

of these data, the non-subject imports may prevent the subject imports from achieving the requisite level

of causation and, therefore, serve as an impenetrable barrier that precludes the agency from affirmatively

finding injury in this sunset review.”104 The Court noted, however, that because it “finds that the

(France, Germany, Italy, and Japan). Nevertheless, as explained above, the factors that we relied

previously upon in our pricing analysis, which the Court sustained, remain present for the four cumulated

subject countries including the high degree of substitutability between the domestic like product and

subject merchandise, the importance of price in purchasing decisions, the finding that demand for ball

bearings is not expected to increase dramatically within the foreseeable future, and the finding that likely

significant volumes of subject imports are likely to suppress the price increases necessary to compensate

for the domestic industry’s increasing costs. 

102 NSK IV at 17. 

103 Id. at 17. 

104 Id. 

24
{Commission} did not support its cumulation determination with substantial evidence, it cannot address

the merits of these remaining issues.”105

As noted above, the two remaining issues referenced by the Court are the issues of likely impact

and causation. The Court characterized the question of likely impact as “whether the cumulated subject

imports likely will have a significant adverse impact on the vulnerable domestic industry in the absence of

the antidumping duty orders.”106 The Court characterized the causation inquiry as requiring the

Commission “to determine whether the cumulated subject imports constitute more than a minimal or

tangential cause of injury to the domestic industry which will likely continue or recur in the absence of

the antidumping duty orders.”107

The Court noted that it “appreciates the Commission’s continued vigor in resolving these issues

and the diligence with which it has addressed these difficult questions thus far.”108 The Court stated that

“[i]ndeed, assuming that the {Commission} had correctly cumulated the subject imports, the

Commission’s analysis of the two remaining issues nearly resembles the kind of substantial evidence

needed for the court to sustain an agency determination.”109 The Court cautioned that, “[w]hen it

105 Id. 

106 Id. 

107 Id. Consistent with its opinion, in its remand instructions, the Court directed the Commission

to “decide whether the cumulated subject imports likely will have a significant adverse impact on the

vulnerable domestic industry in the absence of the antidumping duty orders.” Id. at 19. The Court further

directed the Commission to “determine whether the cumulated subject imports constitute more than a

minimal or tangential cause of injury to the domestic industry that will likely continue or recur in the

absence of the antidumping duty orders, given the significant presence of, and seemingly impenetrable

barrier imposed by, non-subject imports in the United States market.” Id. The Court also ordered that “in

completing its analysis of the causation and likely impact inquiries on remand, the Commission must

address the court’s concerns expressed in NSK III over the agency’s redetermination of those issues.” Id. 

108 NSK IV at 17. 

109 Id. at 17-18. 

25
addresses these two issues on remand, the Commission should avoid the use of deficient price comparison

data and certain conclusions that the court found unsupported by substantial evidence in the agency’s

cumulation analysis of the Second Remand Determination.”110

2. The Parties’ Arguments

Timken’s Arguments. Domestic producer Timken argues that cumulated subject imports will

likely have a significant adverse impact on the vulnerable domestic industry upon revocation.111 As an

initial matter, Timken asserts that non-subject imports have not operated as a “seemingly impenetrable

barrier” to subject imports, especially given that the U.S. market share maintained by subject imports

during the POR, even with orders in place, already is significant.112 

In presenting its arguments on likely impact, Timken emphasizes that subject import volumes are

likely to be significant if the orders were revoked. Timken notes that the Court sustained the

Commission’s finding of likely significant volume in NSK I.

113 Timken asserts that, in the event of

revocation, subject imports are “likely to be dumped at the same levels as during the original

investigation,” as the Commerce Department has found.114 Moreover, Timken underscores that the

domestic industry is vulnerable, with, for example, its operating income more than 10 times smaller at the

end of the POR than compared to the original investigation.115 Thus, according to Timken, “if the orders

are revoked, subject imports are likely to enter in significant volumes at much greater levels of dumping,

which will put even more pressure on domestic producers’ prices and, consequently, sales, revenues, and

110 Id. at 18. 

111 Timken’s Third Remand Comments at 12-15. 

112 Timken’s Third Remand Comments at 12-13. 

113 Timken’s Third Remand Comments at 13. 

114 Timken’s Third Remand Comments at 15. 

115 Timken’s Third Remand Comments at 14. 

26
profits.”116

Respondents’ Arguments. Japanese respondent JTEKT argues that, in the event of revocation of

the orders, “unrestrained subject imports will be unable to overcome non-subject imports and therefore

cannot cause more than ‘minimal or tangential’ injury to the domestic industry.”117 First, JTEKT

contends that “subject producers will be unable to reduce their prices sufficiently to overcome nonsubject imports.”118 In this regard, JTEKT asserts that the “magnitude of non-subject import underselling

is so large that it cannot be overcome by subject imports,” that “subject producers would have to sell

below their variable costs of production to displace non-subject imports,” and that the “frequency of

subject import underselling is not significant.”119 Second, JTEKT argues that the Commission improperly

relied upon a comparison of the more aggressive volume and underselling patterns exhibited by subject

imports during the original investigations prior to the imposition of the orders.120 According to JTEKT, a

“simple comparison of pre- and post-order subject import behavior does not demonstrate that subject

imports will be able to compete effectively against non-subject imports.”121 Third, JTEKT contends that

the “continued presence of subject imports in the U.S. market also does not demonstrate that subject

imports will be able to compete effectively against non-subject imports.”122 JTEKT emphasizes that

“[f]or all subject countries, exports to the U.S. market constituted only *** precent by quantity of subject

producers’ total production,” and that “[s]uch a correlation is particularly tenuous in

116 Timken’s Third Remand Comments at 15. 

117 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 2.

118 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 3.

119 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 3-7.

120 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 8-10.

121 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 8. 

122 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 10. 

27
this proceeding in light of the long-term decline in the subject countries’ production capacity that has

occurred in tandem with the growth of non-subject capacity.”123

 Finally, JTEKT argues that subject producers have no incentive to compete aggressively to

displace non-subject imports in the U.S. market since, according to JTEKT, the “export-orientation of

subject producers is focused on markets other than the United States,” and that “subject producers have

no reason to aggressively compete against their own U.S. production facilities.”124

In presenting its own arguments on likely impact, U.K. respondent NSK asserts that “as JTEKT’s

examination of the pricing data conclusively demonstrates, the level of underselling engaged in by nonsubject imports effectively blocks subject imports from re-entering the U.S. market upon revocation of the

antidumping duty orders, even as the level of underselling engaged in by subject imports is not

significant.”125 NSK contends that, “as JTEKT also demonstrates, subject producers have little incentive

to ship BBs to the United States because it would be nonsensical for them to sell at prices well below their

variable production costs in an effort to compete against, and regain market share from, non-subject

imports.”126 According to NSK, “subject producers also have little incentive to ship BBs to the United

States because it would be nonsensical for them to compete aggressively against their own U.S.

production facilities, which they purposefully positioned in the United States to be responsive to the

demands of their U.S. customers.”127

123 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 10-11. 

124 JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 12-13. 

125 NSK’s Third Remand Comments at 11. 

126 NSK’s Third Remand Comments at 11. 

127 NSK’s Third Remand Comments at 11-12. 

28
3. Analysis

We have considered the Court’s remand instructions and the relevant record evidence concerning

the role of non-subject imports in the U.S. market as it relates to the issues of likely impact and causation. 

 Having reviewed the record evidence on these issues in detail, we determine that revocation of the

antidumping duty orders covering imports of the subject ball bearings from Japan when cumulated with

the other subject countries (France, Germany, and Italy) will result in the likely recurrence or continuation

of material injury to the domestic bearings industry. In doing so, we adopt and incorporate by reference

our prior findings on these issues, except insofar as modified below. 

Before specifically addressing the Court’s remand instructions, we emphasize that it is a

fundamental principle that the Commission does not weigh causes of injury when assessing whether the

subject imports have caused, or are likely to cause, material injury to a domestic industry.128 In this

regard, the U.S. Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit have consistently stated that the

Commission need not determine that the subject imports are the sole, principal, or even major cause of

material injury or likely injury to an industry.129 Even if non-subject imports or some other factors are

likely to cause material injury to the domestic industry upon revocation of an order, subject imports can

128 Statement of Administrative Action, Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (“SAA”), S. Rep. 96-249

at 74 (July 1979) (“Current law does not, nor will section 735, contemplate that the effects from less-thanfair value...imports be weighed against the effects associated with other factors...which may be

contributing to overall injury to an industry.”); Taiwan Semiconductor Industry v. United States, 23 CIT

410, 416, 59 F. Supp.2d 1324, 1330 (1999)(the “‘by reason of standard’ is consistent with a requirement

not to weigh causes contributing to overall injury”)

129 See, e.g., NSK III at 7 (the Commission “need not determine that the subject merchandise is

the ‘sole or principal cause of injury.’”) (quoting NSK I, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1365); Nippon Steel Corp. v.

United States, 345 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the dumped imports “need not be the sole or

principal cause of injury. As long as its effects are not merely incidental, tangential, or trivial, the foreign

{like} product meets the causation requirement.”); Celanese Chems. Ltd., v. United States, 31 CIT 279,

286 (2007) (there is no “need to show that the subject imports are the sole, or even the major, cause of

injury”) 

29
also be a cause of such injury to the domestic industry, as long as they represent more than a minimal or

tangential cause of the material injury that is likely to be suffered by the industry upon revocation.130 As a

result, if the record shows that subject imports are likely to be more than a minimal or tangential

contributor to the injury that will likely continue or recur upon revocation, the Commission may issue an

affirmative injury or likely injury finding, even if the non-subject imports or some other factor are likely

also to be a significant cause of injury to the domestic industry upon revocation of the order.131 

We are particularly mindful of these principles in these five-year reviews. Under the statute

governing five-year reviews, our task is not to determine whether non-subject imports were a larger cause

of material injury to the domestic industry than subject imports during the review period. Instead, our

analysis is prospective in nature, and, as discussed above, if the record establishes that subject imports are

likely to be more than a minimal or tangential contributor to the injury that will likely continue or recur

upon revocation, the Commission may issue an affirmative injury or likely injury finding, regardless of

whether the non-subject imports or some other factor are likely also to be a significant cause of injury to

the domestic industry if the order were revoked. 

As an initial matter, we again find that the domestic industry is in a vulnerable condition and is

therefore susceptible to likely material injury from the cumulated subject imports from France, Germany,

130 SAA at 885 (factors other than subject imports may be causing injury to the industry but “also

may demonstrate that an industry is facing difficulties from a variety of sources and is vulnerable to

dumped or subsidized imports. . . If the Commission finds that an industry is vulnerable to injury from

subject imports, it may determine that injury is likely to continue or recur, even if other causes, as well as

future imports, are likely to contribute to future injury”).

131 Taiwan Semiconductor Industry v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-1331 (the

Commission needs to establish that “the subject imports themselves made a material contribution to the

overall injury” of the industry; the fact “that the injurious effects from other sources may be greater than

the effect of the subject imports is not determinative {of the causation issue}, so long as the Commission

reasonably finds that the subject imports contribution to the overall harm is material”).

30
Italy, and Japan, if the orders covering the cumulated subject imports are revoked. As we previously

explained, there were substantial declines in nearly all domestic industry operational and financial

performance indicators during the POR.132 As discussed above, in NSK IV, the Court affirmed the

Commission’s vulnerability analysis in our second remand views.133 We hereby adopt and

incorporate that analysis in its entirety in these remand views.

Having again found the domestic industry to be vulnerable, we turn to the Court’s instruction for

us to “decide whether the cumulated subject imports likely will have a significant adverse impact on the

vulnerable domestic industry in the absence of the antidumping duty orders.”134 Upon reviewing the

Court’s instructions on this issue as well as the pertinent record evidence, we find that revocation of the

orders will likely have a significant adverse impact on the vulnerable domestic ball bearings industry. 

Given our findings of the subject imports’ likely significant volume, likely significant underselling and

likely significant price effects, the substitutability between domestic and subject bearings, and the

domestic industry’s vulnerability, it necessarily follows that revocation of the orders would likely have a

significant adverse impact on the domestic industry. 

Next, we address the Court’s instruction for us to “determine whether the cumulated subject

imports constitute more than a minimal or tangential cause of injury to the domestic industry that will

likely continue or recur in the absence of the antidumping duty orders, given the significant presence of,

and seemingly impenetrable barrier imposed by, non-subject imports in the United States market.”135 

Initially, under the statute, our obligation is to assess whether the subject imports are likely to have a

132 USITC Pub. 3876 at 47-48.

133 NSK IV at 10-11. 

134 NSK IV at 19. 

135 NSK IV at 19. 

31
significant impact on the domestic industry upon revocation, not whether the subject imports will take

market share from the non-subject imports, or otherwise adversely affect the non-subject imports.136 We

perceive the Court to be instructing us to address a specific inquiry with respect to this statutory criterion. 

In particular, we understand the Court’s “seemingly impenetrable barrier” inquiry as a request that we

address whether any impediment imposed by the significant presence of low-priced non-subject imports

in the U.S. market will likely inhibit the subject imports from capturing additional market share from the

domestic industry such that the subject imports are thereby precluded from having a likely significant

adverse impact on the condition of the domestic industry if the orders were revoked. Based upon the

totality of the record in these five-year reviews, we do not find this scenario to be likely for the reasons

discussed below. 

First of all, even with the price and volume disciplining effects of the antidumping duty orders in

place, and notwithstanding the significant presence of low-priced non-subject imports in the U.S. market,

the subject imports have maintained a significant presence in the U.S. market since the imposition of the

orders and have continued to do so during the POR. As discussed above, despite the orders, the U.S.

market share held by cumulated imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan ranged from 11.2 to 12.7

percent during the POR.137 During the final three years of the POR (i.e., 2003-2005), we note that

subject imports increased (by value) by $69.0 million dollars, or by 24.6 percent, notwithstanding the

presence of non-subject imports in the U.S. market.138 Upon revocation, the subject producers will have

the ability to increase substantially their U.S. market penetration. In the final year of the POR (i.e, 2005),

136 19 U.S.C. §1675a(a)(1), (2), (3) & (4).

137 CR at Staff Table 4.

138 By value, cumulated subject imports fell from *** in 2000 to *** in 2001, *** in 2002, and

*** in 2003, and then increased to *** in 2004 and *** in 2005. Staff Table 4. 

32
the subject producers’ excess capacity alone could satisfy approximately *** percent of apparent U.S.

consumption, meaning that subject producers possessed the ability to capture an additional *** percent of

the U.S. BB market.139 

As we explained previously, in the event of revocation, the subject imports would likely revert to

their more aggressive volume140 and underselling141 strategies from the original investigations prior to the

imposition of the orders, when subject imports captured as much as 19.1 percent of the U.S. market.142

Moreover, as we previously found, and as the Court affirmed in NSK I, the record shows that there is a

high degree of substitutability between the domestic like product and subject merchandise, that price is an

important factor in purchasing decisions, that demand for ball bearings is not expected to increase

139 CR/PR at Table C-2.

140 As discussed in our prior remand determination, we note that the orders have had some

restraining effect on the volumes of the subject imports, as one would expect. See USITC Pub. 4131 at

70-71. For example, after the orders were put in place in 1989, the subject imports lost 6.4 percentage

points of market share, with their market share level falling from 19.1 percent in 1987 to 13.7 percent in

1998 to 12.7 percent in 2005, for an overall decline of one-third of their market share since the orders

were imposed. Id. Nevertheless, during the first and second period of reviews, subject imports from the

four cumulated countries (i.e., France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) have retained a significant share of the

U.S. market, with their U.S. market share measured in value ranging from 13.6 to 13.7 percent during the

first review, and ranging from 11.2 percent to 12.7 percent during the second review. CR/PR at Table

BB-I-1.

141 As discussed in our prior remand determination, the orders also have had a restraining effect

on the pricing practices of the subject imports. For example, during the original period of investigation,

the cumulated subject imports from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan undersold the domestic product in

69.4 percent of all price comparisons, and had a simple average underselling margin of 35.8 percent. 

During the second period of review, however, the subject imports undersold the domestic producers in

only 48.4 percent of the available price comparisons, and had an average underselling margin of 29.6

percent. Derived from Second Remand Table A-1, Appendix A & CR at Tables H-1 to H-19 , Appendix

H. Given these changes in the underselling patterns of the subject imports, we find that the orders had a

restraining effect on the frequency and level of underselling by the subject imports during the period of

review and that revocation of the orders will allow the subject imports to compete more aggressively on

price. 

142 CR/PR at Tables BB-I-1 & C-2. 

33
dramatically within the foreseeable future, and that likely significant volumes of subject imports are likely

to suppress the price increases necessary to compensate for the domestic industry’s increasing costs.143 

Given that the domestic industry still supplies the majority of the U.S. market, the non-subject imports

would not impair the subject imports’ ability to gain significant market share at the expense of the

domestic industry. In this respect, the cumulated subject imports will likely constitute more than a

minimal or tangential cause of injury to the domestic industry. 

Indeed, even if subject imports were unable to take any market share whatsoever away from nonsubject imports upon revocation, the record nevertheless indicates that subject imports would likely be

well-positioned to capture significant additional market share from the domestic industry if the orders

were revoked. The record does not support the proposition that the domestic industry is assured some

fixed share of the U.S. market. To the contrary, it indicates that the collective market share of imports

(both subject and non-subject) has changed over time, and has grown significantly since the original

investigations, whereas the domestic industry’s market share has shrunk substantially during that time.144

In other words, the subject imports will likely have an adverse impact on the domestic industry if they

capture market share away and/or revenue from the industry upon revocation, even if subject imports are

unable to take any market share and/or revenue away from non-subject imports. 

We find that the subject imports will likely be well-positioned to compete more aggressively on

volume with the domestic bearings in the market in order to recapture market share if the orders are

revoked. First, as discussed earlier, the record shows the subject imports are highly substitutable with

143 NSK I at 37-38. 

144 CR/PR at Table BB-I-1.

34
domestic bearings.145 In particular, *** of *** responding purchasers, and *** of *** importers reported

that the subject imports were “always” or “frequently” interchangeable with the domestic like product.146

Moreover, as discussed above, subject imports have maintained a stable and significant presence in the

U.S. market since imposition of the orders (ranging from 11.2 to 12.7 percent of the U.S. market during

the POR), indicating not only that they retain a significant interest in the U.S. market, but also that they

maintain significant marketing and sales operations that can be used to take advantage of the revocation

of the orders. We also find that other evidence indicates that the subject imports are likely to ship

significant additional volumes of bearings to the United States upon revocation of the orders. Notably,

subject producers had substantial excess capacity throughout the second period of review, with available

capacity of *** million bearings in 2005, the final year of the period,147 which was approximately

equivalent to *** percent of apparent U.S. consumption in 2005.148 Given their continued significant

interest in the U.S. market, and the fact that the U.S. market remains an attractive one for exporters as a

result of its size and pricing levels, we find it likely that the subject producers will use their significant

amounts of available capacity to increase significantly their exports to the United States upon revocation

of the orders.149

We also find that the subject imports will likely be well-positioned to compete more aggressively

145 We note that the Court affirmed the Commission’s finding concerning the high degree of

substitutability between the subject and domestic bearings in NSK I. NSK I at 25-27.

146 CR/PR at Table BB-II-4. 

147 CR/PR at Tables BB-IV-4-BB-IV-7 & Table BB-IV-9. 

148 Apparent consumption in the U.S. market was 816.0 million ball bearings in 2005. CR/PR at

Table C-2. 

149 In this regard, we note that the Court has already affirmed our finding that the subject imports

are likely to ship significant volumes of bearings to the United States upon revocation of the orders. NSK

I at 28-31.

35
on price with the domestic bearings in the market in order to recapture market share if the orders are

revoked. As the Court stated in NSK I, the record establishes that price is an “essential factor in

purchas{e} decisions” in the market150 and that “demand is not expected to increase dramatically within

the foreseeable future.”151 Thus, as the Court stated in NSK I, the record also establishes that “there is a

strong likelihood that competitive pricing will be a significant factor in purchasing decisions.”152 Given

these conditions of competition, it is likely that competitive pricing will be a significant factor for

purchasers when they assess whether to purchase the subject or domestic bearings in the future. 

Accordingly, we find that these conditions indicate that subject imports would have a strong incentive to

compete more aggressively on price against the domestic bearings, should the orders be revoked.

Moreover, the record indicates that the subject imports will be able to compete successfully on

price with domestic bearings upon revocation of the orders.153 For example, the majority of purchasers

reported that the domestic bearings were generally priced higher than subject imports, meaning that

subject imports were perceived by most industry participants as being priced lower than domestic

bearings during the second period of review.154 The record also indicates that, if the orders are revoked,

the cumulated subject imports are likely to become more aggressive on price when competing with the

domestic bearings. In this regard, during the original period of investigation, the subject imports

150 NSK I at 24-25, 34-35 & 37-38; CR/PR at Table BB-II-1 & BB-II-5.

151 NSK I at 38; CR/PR at Table BB-II-1. 

152 NSK I at 38; CR at BB-II-11 to BB-II-12. As the Court noted in NSK I, the “more

substitutable a product, the more likely {it is that} price will play a significant role in purchasing” when

purchasers are choosing between various suppliers. NSK I at 35.

153 NSK III at 18.

154 CR at BB-V-7. Pursuant to the Court’s remand instructions, we do not rely upon the price

comparison data (e.g., CR/PR Tables BB-V-I to BB-V-2) covering the POR in these second reviews. 

NSK IV at 18-19. 

36
undersold the domestic like product in 69.4 percent of comparisons, at an average underselling margin of

35.8 percent.155 We conclude that revocation of the orders is likely to result in the same more aggressive

underselling patterns exhibited by the subject imports during the period of investigation.156 157

155 Derived from Second Remand Table A-1, Appendix A. 

156 As discussed above, JTEKT and NSK argue that subject producers will be unable to reduce

their prices sufficiently to overcome non-subject imports. See e.g., JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at

3; NSK’s Third Remand Comments at 11. Moreover, JTEKT asserts that the “magnitude of non-subject

import underselling is so large that it cannot be overcome by subject imports,” that “subject producers

would have to sell below their variable costs of production to displace non-subject imports,” and that the

“frequency of subject import underselling is not significant” compared to the underselling by non-subject

imports. JTEKT’s Third Remand Comments at 3-7. Under the statute governing five-year reviews,

however, the issue is not whether, in the event of revocation, the subject imports would likely have more

significant price effects than non-subject imports. Rather, the issue is whether subject imports would be

likely to have significant effects on prices for the domestic like product if the orders were revoked, which

respondents’ arguments simply disregard. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(3). As discussed above, the factors

that we relied previously upon in our pricing analysis, which the Court sustained in NSK I, are again

present for the four cumulated countries at issue, including the significant underselling and significant

price effects by subject imports found by the Commission in the original investigations, the high degree

of substitutability between the domestic like product and subject merchandise, the importance of price in

purchasing decisions, the finding that demand for ball bearings is not expected to increase dramatically

within the foreseeable future, and the finding that likely significant volumes of subject imports are likely

to suppress the price increases necessary to compensate for the domestic industry’s increasing costs. 

Therefore, if the orders were revoked, subject imports from the four cumulated countries (France,

Germany, Italy, and Japan) would likely be priced aggressively to gain market share, and would likely

undersell the domestic like product by substantial margins so as to significantly suppress and/or depress

domestic prices, regardless of whether non-subject imports also would likely have significant price effects

on the domestic industry if the orders were revoked. 

157 As discussed above, JTEKT argues that the Commission improperly relied upon a comparison

of the more aggressive volume and underselling patterns exhibited by subject imports during the original

investigations prior to the imposition of the orders. According to JTEKT, a “simple comparison of preand post-order subject import behavior does not demonstrate that subject imports will be able to compete

effectively against non-subject imports.” JTEKT Third Remand Comments at 8. Under the statute

governing five-year reviews, however, the Commission is directed to examine the volume and pricing

behavior by subject imports during the original investigation, when those imports were last unrestrained

by the effects of the orders. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(1)(a); see also, SAA at 884 (“[t]his consideration is

important, because this period is the most recent time during which imports of subject merchandise

competed in the U.S. market free of the discipline of an order. . . . If the Commission finds that pre-order .

. . conditions are likely to recur, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a likelihood of continuation or

recurrence of injury.”). Moreover, as discussed above, the issue in five-year review is not whether

subject imports will be able to “compete effectively against non-subject imports,” as JTEKT contends. 

Rather, the statutory inquiry that we are called upon to follow – and which we followed in these five-year

reviews – is whether subject imports are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the domestic

industry if the orders were revoked. 

Notwithstanding JTEKT’s protestations to the contrary, as shown above, the Commission did not

37
In other words, once the orders are revoked and the subject imports resume a more aggressive

pattern of underselling, it is likely that they will thereby take market share from the domestic industry,

even though the non-subject imports are priced lower than the domestic bearings or the subject imports. 

This situation will force the domestic producers to yield market share to subject imports or reduce their

prices in order to meet the prices of the subject imports and retain their market share. In either case, the

subject imports are likely to be more than a minimal or tangential cause of the injury to the domestic

industry because revocation of the order will result in the domestic industry losing significant additional

amounts of market share or reducing their prices significantly to maintain their existing market share.158 

rely exclusively upon a comparison of the volume and pricing behavior by subject imports pre- and postorder in finding likely significant volume and price effects. In support of its finding of significant likely

volume, as discussed above, the Commission relied upon myriad record evidence including the relatively

weak demand for BBs over the period of review and the fact that demand is not projected to increase

substantially within the reasonably foreseeable future; the export-orientation of the subject producers; the

subject producers’ total exports, production capacity, and current volumes in the U.S. market; the high

degree of interchangeability between subject imports and the domestic like product; and the incentive

created by higher prices in the United States than in other markets. In support of its finding of significant

price effects, as discussed above, the Commission also relied upon myriad record evidence including the

significant underselling and significant price effects by subject imports found by the Commission in the

original investigations; the high degree of substitutability between the domestic like product and subject

merchandise; the importance of price in purchasing decisions; the finding that demand for ball bearings is

not expected to increase dramatically within the foreseeable future; and the finding that likely significant

volumes of subject imports are likely to suppress the price increases necessary to compensate for the

domestic industry’s increasing costs. 

158 JTEKT and NSK argue that subject producers have no incentive to compete aggressively to

displace non-subject imports in the U.S. market since, according to them, subject producers have no

reason to aggressively compete against their own U.S. production facilities. See e.g., JTEKT’s Third

Remand Comments at 12-13; NSK’s Third Remand Comments at 11. We note, however, that prior

decisions of the U.S. Court of International Trade have indicated that the mere existence of corporate

affiliations between subject foreign producers and their U.S. affiliates does not necessarily establish that

subject imports are not likely to have significant adverse effects on the domestic industry upon revocation 

See e.g., Nucor Corp. v. U.S., 605 F.Supp.2d 1361 at 1378-1382 (CIT 2009); Timken Corp. v. U.S., 310

F.Supp.2d 1327 at 1337-38 (CIT 2004). Moreover, notwithstanding the existing affiliations between

certain subject producers and their related U.S. producers, the subject producers have, as a whole,

maintained a significant presence in the U.S. market since the orders were first imposed, which indicates,

in our view, they are not likely to be deterred from increasing their shipments to the U.S. market once the

orders are revoked. In addition, even if a subject producer chose not to compete in the U.S. market in a

manner that was directly in competition with its affiliated producer, the subject producer would not be

precluded from competing in an aggressive manner with other non-affiliated producers in the market, or

from seeking to obtain additional market share from those other non-affiliated producers.

38
VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, in order to comply with the Court’s remand order and instructions in NSK IV, we

determine that revocation of the antidumping duty order on imports of ball bearings from the United

Kingdom would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the

United States within a reasonably foreseeable time. We also determine that revocation of the

antidumping duty order on imports of ball bearings from Japan, when cumulated with the subject imports

from France, Germany, and Italy, would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury

to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time. 

As a result, we find that the existence of these affiliations will not be likely to cause the subject producers

to compete in a manner that would not have a significant adverse impact on the industry upon revocation

of the orders.

39
BLANKPAGE
APPENDIX A

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE

A-1

30856 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 105 / Wednesday, June 2, 2010 / Notices 

112, Washington, DC 20436, telephone 

202–205–2000. Hearing impaired 

individuals are advised that information 

on this matter can be obtained by 

contacting the Commission’s TDD 

terminal on 202–205–1810. Persons 

with mobility impairments who will 

need special assistance in gaining access 

to the Commission should contact the 

Office of the Secretary at 202–205–2000. 

General information concerning the 

Commission may also be obtained by 

accessing its Internet server at http:// 

www.usitc.gov. The public record for 

this investigation may be viewed on the 

Commission’s electronic docket (EDIS) 

at http://edis.usitc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Anne Goalwin, Esq., Office of Unfair 

Import Investigations, U.S. International 

Trade Commission, telephone (202) 

205–2574. 

Authority: The authority for 

institution of this investigation is 

contained in section 337 of the Tariff 

Act of 1930, as amended, and in section 

210.10 of the Commission’s Rules of 

Practice and Procedure, 19 CFR 210.10 

(2010). 

Scope of Investigation: Having 

considered the complaint, the U.S. 

International Trade Commission, on 

May 25, 2010, ordered that— 

(1) Pursuant to subsection (b) of 

section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 

amended, an investigation be instituted 

to determine: 

(a) Whether there is a violation of 

subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 337 in the 

importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, or the sale within 

the United States after importation of 

certain lighting products that infringe 

U.S. Patent No. D570,038, and whether 

an industry in the United States exists 

as required by subsection (a)(2) of 

section 337; 

(b) whether there is a violation of 

subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 337 in the 

importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, or the sale within 

the United States after importation of 

certain lighting products by reason of 

infringement of U.S. Copyright 

Registration No. VA 1–399–618 or U.S. 

Copyright Registration No. VA 1–415– 

353, and whether an industry in the 

United States exists as required by 

subsection (a)(2) of section 337; 

(c) whether there is a violation of 

subsection (a)(1)(C) of section 337 in the 

importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, or the sale within 

the United States after importation of 

certain lighting products by reason of 

infringement of U.S. Trademark 

Registration Nos. 3,703,710; 3,703,711; 

3,700,479; or 3,700,480, and whether an 

industry in the United States exists as 

required by subsection (a)(2) of section 

337; and 

(2) For the purpose of the 

investigation so instituted, the following 

are hereby named as parties upon which 

this notice of investigation shall be 

served: 

(a) The complainant is: Blumberg 

Industries, Inc. d/b/a Fine Art Lamps, 

5770 Miami Lakes Drive East, Miami 

Lakes, Florida 33014. 

(b) The respondent is the following 

entity alleged to be in violation of 

section 337, and is the party upon 

which the complaint is to be served: 

Lights & More, Inc., 170 F.D. Roosevelt 

Avenue, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918. 

(c) The Commission investigative 

attorney, party to this investigation, is 

Anne Goalwin, Esq., Office of Unfair 

Import Investigations, U.S. International 

Trade Commission, 500 E Street, SW., 

Suite 401, Washington, DC 20436; and 

(3) For the investigation so instituted, 

the Honorable Paul J. Luckern, Chief 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. 

International Trade Commission, shall 

designate the presiding Administrative 

Law Judge. 

Responses to the complaint and the 

notice of investigation must be 

submitted by the named respondent in 

accordance with section 210.13 of the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure, 19 CFR 210.13. Pursuant to 

19 CFR 201.16(d)-(e) and 210.13(a), such 

responses will be considered by the 

Commission if received not later than 20 

days after the date of service by the 

Commission of the complaint and the 

notice of investigation. Extensions of 

time for submitting responses to the 

complaint and the notice of 

investigation will not be granted unless 

good cause therefor is shown. 

Failure of the respondent to file a 

timely response to each allegation in the 

complaint and in this notice may be 

deemed to constitute a waiver of the 

right to appear and contest the 

allegations of the complaint and this 

notice, and to authorize the 

administrative law judge and the 

Commission, without further notice to 

the respondent, to find the facts to be as 

alleged in the complaint and this notice 

and to enter an initial determination 

and a final determination containing 

such findings, and may result in the 

issuance of an exclusion order or a cease 

and desist order or both directed against 

the respondent. 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: May 26, 2010. 

William R. Bishop, 

Acting Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2010–13212 Filed 6–1–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation Nos. 731–TA–394–A & 399– 

A (Second Review) (Third Remand)] 

Ball Bearings From Japan and the 

United Kingdom 

AGENCY: United States International 

Trade Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of remand proceedings. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. International Trade 

Commission (‘‘Commission’’) hereby 

gives notice of its third remand 

proceedings with respect to its 

affirmative determinations in the fiveyear reviews of the antidumping orders 

on ball bearings from Japan and the 

United Kingdom. For further 

information concerning the conduct of 

this proceeding and rules of general 

application, consult the Commission’s 

Rules of Practice and Procedure, part 

201, subparts A through E (19 CFR part 

201), and part 207, subpart A (19 CFR 

part 207). 

DATES: Effective Date: March 27, 2010. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

James McClure, Office of Investigations, 

telephone 202–205–3191, or David 

Goldfine, Office of General Counsel, 

telephone 202–708–5452, U.S. 

International Trade Commission, 500 E 

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20436. 

Hearing-impaired persons can obtain 

information on this matter by contacting 

the Commission’s TDD terminal on 202– 

205–1810. Persons with mobility 

impairments who will need special 

assistance in gaining access to the 

Commission should contact the Office 

of the Secretary at 202–205–2000. 

General information concerning the 

Commission may also be obtained by 

accessing its Internet server (http:// 

www.usitc.gov). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background.—On April 12, 2010, the 

Court of International Trade (per Judge 

Barzilay) issued an opinion in NSK 

Corp. et al. v. United States, Slip Op. 

10–38 (‘‘NSK IV’’), affirming-in-part and 

remanding-in-part the Commission’s 

affirmative determination in Certain 

Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan 

and the United Kingdom, Inv. Nos. 731– 

TA–394–A & 399–A (Second Review) 

(Second Remand), USITC Pub. 4131 

(Jan. 2010). 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 105 / Wednesday, June 2, 2010 / Notices 30857 

In NSK IV, the Court affirmed the 

Commission’s vulnerability analysis, 

concluding that ‘‘the Commission has 

provided the rational connection 

missing from its previous 

determinations, and [therefore] the court 

sustains the agency’s vulnerability 

finding.’’ Slip Op. at 10–11. However, 

the Court remanded the issue of U.K. 

cumulation, concluding that the 

Commission had failed to ‘‘demonstrate 

that some incentive likely would draw 

a discernible amount of the subject 

United Kingdom goods specifically to 

the United States in the absence of the 

order.’’ Id. at 18. The Court further 

explained that it ‘‘does not believe that 

the existing record, taken as a whole, 

can support an affirmative discernible 

adverse impact finding,’’ and stated that 

the ‘‘Commission may reopen the record 

and obtain additional data on this issue 

in the next remand proceeding, if it so 

chooses.’’ Id. at 16. Finally, on the issues 

of likely impact and causation, the 

Court stated that the Commission’s 

analysis of the two remaining issues 

‘‘nearly resembles the kind of substantial 

evidence needed for the court to sustain 

an agency determination.’’ Slip Op. at 

18. Nevertheless, the Court directed the 

Commission on remand to address the 

issue of whether ‘‘non-subject imports 

may prevent the subject imports from 

achieving the requisite level of 

causation and, therefore, serve as an 

impenetrable barrier that precludes the 

agency from affirmatively finding injury 

in this sunset review.’’ Id. at 17. 

Under the remand schedule ordered 

by the court, the Commission was 

required to file by May 12, 2010, a status 

report advising the Court as to whether 

it will reopen the record on the U.K. 

cumulation issue. The Court also 

directed the parties to file a joint 

scheduling order by May 12, 2010. 

On May 12, 2010, the Commission 

filed the requested status report with the 

Court, advising the Court that it will not 

be reopening the record on the issue of 

the discernible adverse impact of the 

subject imports from the United 

Kingdom. On May 12, 2010, the parties 

also submitted a proposed joint 

scheduling order. Under the remand 

schedule ordered by the court, the 

Commission must file its third remand 

determination by August 25, 2010. The 

Court has directed the Plaintiffs, 

Plaintiff-Intervenors, and DefendantIntervenors to file their comments on 

the remand by September 29, 2010. 

Participation in the proceeding.— 

Only those persons who were interested 

parties to the reviews (i.e., persons 

listed on the Commission Secretary’s 

service list) and parties to the appeal 

may participate in the remand 

proceeding. Such persons need not 

make any additional filings with the 

Commission to participate in the 

remand proceeding, unless they are 

adding new individuals to the list of 

persons entitled to receive business 

proprietary information under 

administrative protective order. 

Business proprietary information (‘‘BPI’’) 

referred to during the remand 

proceeding will be governed, as 

appropriate, by the administrative 

protective order issued in the reviews. 

Written submissions.—The 

Commission is not re-opening the 

record in this remand proceeding. The 

Commission will permit the parties to 

file comments pertaining to the specific 

issues that are the subject of the Court’s 

remand instructions. Comments should 

be limited to no more than fifteen (15) 

double-spaced and single-sided pages of 

textual material. No appendices or other 

attachments are allowed. The parties 

may not themselves submit any new 

factual information in their comments 

and may not address any issue other 

than those that are the subject of the 

Court’s remand instructions. Any such 

comments must be filed with the 

Commission no later than June 15, 2010. 

All written submissions must conform 

with the provisions of section 201.8 of 

the Commission’s rules; any 

submissions that contain BPI must also 

conform with the requirements of 

sections 201.6, 207.3, and 207.7 of the 

Commission’s rules. The Commission’s 

rules do not authorize filing of 

submissions with the Secretary by 

facsimile or electronic means, except to 

the extent permitted by section 201.8 of 

the Commission’s rules, as amended, 67 

FR 68036 (Nov. 8, 2002). 

In accordance with sections 201.16(c) 

and 207.3 of the Commission’s rules, 

each document filed by a party to the 

investigation must be served on all other 

parties to the investigation (as identified 

by either the public or BPI service list), 

and a certificate of service must be 

timely filed. The Secretary will not 

accept a document for filing without a 

certificate of service. 

Parties are also advised to consult 

with the Commission’s Rules of Practice 

and Procedure, part 201, subparts A 

through E (19 CFR part 201), and part 

207, subpart A (19 CFR part 207) for 

provisions of general applicability 

concerning written submissions to the 

Commission. 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: May 27, 2010. 

William R. Bishop, 

Acting Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2010–13217 Filed 6–1–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

[OMB Number 1105–0086] 

Justice Management Division; Office of 

Attorney Recruitment and 

Management; Agency Information 

Collection Activities: Proposed 

Collection; Comments Requested 

ACTION: 60–Day Notice of Information 

Collection Under Review: Applications 

for the Attorney Student Loan 

Repayment Program. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ), 

Justice Management Division, Office of 

Attorney Recruitment and Management 

(OARM), will be submitting the 

following information collection request 

to the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review and approval in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995. The proposed 

information collection is published to 

obtain comments from the public and 

affected agencies. Comments are 

encouraged and will be accepted for 60 

days until August 2, 2010. This process 

is conducted in accordance with 5 CFR 

1320.10. 

Written comments and/or suggestions 

regarding the item(s) contained in this 

notice, especially regarding the 

estimated public burden and associated 

response time, should be directed to the 

Office of Management and Budget, 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Attention: Department of Justice 

Desk Officer, Washington, DC, 20530. 

Additionally, comments may be 

submitted to OMB via facsimile to 202– 

395–7285. Comments may also be 

submitted to the Department Clearance 

Officer, United States Department of 

Justice, Suite 1600, 601 D Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20530. 

Written comments and suggestions 

from the public and affected agencies 

concerning the proposed collection of 

information are encouraged. Your 

comments should address one or more 

of the following four points: 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agencies estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 


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