www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 275 1 

The world first saw the power of space to transform warfare in the 1991 

Gulf War. In the years since, the U.S. military has come to depend 

heavily on space throughout its peacetime and combat operations. 

Satellites acquired by the Department of Defense (DOD) principally provide 

protected communications; data for position and timing, terrestrial and space 

weather, missile launch warning and tracking, and space situational awareness; 

and experiments and other research and development activities. Satellites for 

reconnaissance and surveillance are the domain of the National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO), under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

Today’s capabilities emerged over five decades of changing technologies 

and threats, factors that are now forcing earlier plans for legacy systems to 

be reconsidered. Technology has extended space progressively deeper into 

warfare, while potential adversaries are developing capabilities that could extend warfare into space. The former demands finding new arrangements to 

provide tactical space reconnaissance; the latter demands seeing more clearly 

how space is essential to the emerging joint fight. Exploiting the advances in 

technology calls for new capabilities, authorities, and processes; countering the 

advances in threats calls for assessing architectures, plans, and options to set 

priorities for mission assurance. 

Mission Assurance

The mission that needs to be assured depends on what is needed for the 

joint fight, and is not necessarily a space system.1 Some satellites enable terrestrial capabilities; some are integral components of those capabilities; some may 

protect those capabilities by denying enemy use of space; some may be important at first contact, while others contribute later. But, in every case, the measure 

of military merit and the significance of space is the contribution to the joint 

fight. The importance of space systems, like the importance of fighters, tanks, or 

submarines, derives from their role in winning the war—what General James P. 

Space and the Joint Fight 

by Robert L. Butterworth

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Robert L. Butterworth is President 

of Aries Analytics, Inc., a space 

consultancy. He has held government 

positions in the Defense Department, 

the Senate, and the White House, 

and recently served Air Force Space 

Command as Chief of Strategic 

Planning, Doctrine, and Policy.

Key Points

◆ Technology has extended space 

progressively deeper into warfare, 

while potential adversaries are 

working to extend warfare further into space. The former calls 

for new arrangements to provide 

tactical space reconnaissance; the 

latter demands recognizing where 

and how space is essential to the 

emerging joint fight.

◆ The measure of merit for military 

space is enhanced combat capability. Military space must evolve to 

the assured provision of uniquely 

essential space capabilities designed, acquired, and operated to 

enable combat effects that bring 

success on the battlefield. 

◆ Planning for tactical space reconnaissance largely reflects the efforts of previous decades to extract 

warfighting support from systems 

designed for other purposes and 

operated by another community. 

Substantial analytic work is needed 

to shape effective responses both 

to foreign threats (soon) and to 

budget exigencies (sooner).

February 2012

Cen

t

e

r

f

o

r Strategic ReS

EARCH
2 SF No. 275 www.ndu.edu/inss

Mullins, USAF (Ret.), called “the only truly meaningful 

measure of merit, enhanced combat capability.”2

This measure establishes priorities for investment 

and protection. It also corrects the common but misleading demand that we build and maintain a space force 

“second to none,” or “the best in the world.” What is 

wanted, more precisely, is a military capability that can 

assure national interests against any and all attackers. 

Space can be essential to that capability, and what the 

space force needs to do is determined by how the U.S. 

military plans to fight the war, not by what other countries might build and launch. Whether that would also 

include war in space depends on the military context and 

how U.S. commanders plan to defeat the plans and capabilities of others.

That said, in practice, military space programs have 

been planned and acquired somewhat apart from the 

planning for future combat forces. For varied technical, 

programmatic, and bureaucratic reasons, they do not fit 

conveniently into the procedures by which conventional 

force acquisition plans are adjusted by anticipated resources. At any given time, therefore, there is likely to 

be only a rough synchronicity between development 

programs for space and those for other force capabilities. Particularly when reduced budgets bring program 

cancellations and stretch-outs, there are likely to be some 

space programs in which there is too much investment, 

others in which there is too little, and perhaps one or two 

that may be superfluous relative to the force development 

programs they are intended to support. 

Deciding which space programs to cut, delay, or 

accelerate is not simply a matter of mirroring budgetary developments for major weapons programs. Space 

systems almost never serve a single need or customer, 

and they have often provided capabilities and met 

needs that were unanticipated when they were designed 

and launched.3

 Prudent decisionmakers must consider 

space not only as a component of existing capabilities 

but as an integrative enabler of the future joint fight. 

Cyber and drone technologies today, for example, are 

defining new military options that may supplant some 

legacy space functions, create needs for new ones, and 

compel new operational interfaces.

Because the mission to be assured is a joint fight 

capability, both mission assurers and potential attackers face the challenge of determining what the loss 

of a particular satellite would mean in combat. Links 

between specific space systems and specific combat 

support functions can be difficult to trace, and so can 

the terrestrial consequences of losing a satellite. Few 

satellites are single function, and their military role 

depends not only on the capabilities of the satellite 

but on the chain of ground stations, command and 

control nodes, and data processing and dissemination 

systems that make the satellite’s capabilities relevant 

to the warfighter. Those capabilities can also sometimes increase, as when new ground processing techniques create new applications for existing sensors in 

orbit. Finding reliable alternatives to space can also be 

difficult; options that were initially expected to serve 

as substitutes for a space capability can be difficult to 

test and, in times of stress, may be quickly oversubscribed or prove to depend on other satellite links that 

are themselves vulnerable. 

Synchronicity questions notwithstanding, military 

space is characterized by what the space systems can do 

in responding to military requirements to meet military 

needs under military exigencies in times of peace, crisis, 

and war. Consequently, the military needs assurance that 

those space systems providing uniquely essential help to 

the joint fight will be able to do so as long as needed, despite risks in the environment (collision, bursts 

of intense radiation), in design and fabrication, and 

from hostile action. Risk mitigation for environmental 

decisionmakers must consider space 

not only as a component of existing 

capabilities but as an integrative 

enabler of the future joint fight
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 275 3 

and engineering risks seems generally well understood 

(though problems still arise). Mission assurance is more 

heavily driven by developments in potential threats of 

hostile action. The military importance of space to U.S. 

forces makes space systems part of the enemy’s target 

set. In recent years, potential adversaries have demonstrated antisatellite capabilities, including jamming, laser probing, and direct-ascent kinetic intercepts. Preparations for cyber assaults are certainly underway, and 

the longstanding possibility of scorched-space nuclear 

bursts cannot be ruled out.

When mission assurance does call for protecting space-based capabilities, the options today are 

the same four that were formulated by Amrom Katz 

almost 50 years ago: make them invulnerable, make 

them replaceable, make them invisible, or prepare 

them to shoot back.4

 The “invulnerable” approach 

can include hardening satellite subsystems and components against thermal and electronic interference 

and attack, but it also refers to constellations that can 

remain functionally capable despite the loss of some 

constituent satellites. Military space architecture 

could, for example, hedge the risks of satellite failure 

by deploying constellations of systems that provide redundancy for combat-critical functions. The architecture might be able to make use of satellites operated by 

other governments and commercial entities in a “virtual armada,” involving the use of satellite data from 

allied and other government systems, preferably going 

beyond formal requests for copies of imagery to obtaining direct combat support in time of need.5

 Some 

military sensors might become “hosted payloads” on 

commercial or foreign government satellites.6

The “replaceable” approach pursues the same 

goal, seeking to reduce the strategic advantage an adversary might gain from attacking specific satellites. 

The concept includes augmentation and may aim to 

provide substitutes or surrogates for particular functions, rather than entire satellites. One of the intentions behind the Operationally Responsive Space 

program (though not part of the program as executed) was to provide options for the rapid launch of 

militarily essential capabilities to augment, replace, or 

sustain peacetime systems. 

Both of the other two options, “invisibility” and 

“shootback,” are undeniably appealing for special applications and situations.7

 But mission assurance for combat 

support seems sure to require relatively extensive deployments of satellites in various orbits, which argues against 

either of these options becoming the preferred approach. 

Shootback would require deployment of additional capability for space situational awareness and command 

and control, while invisibility is not a viable option due 

to considerations of technology, cost, and utility.

In sum, lest dependence become a vulnerability, 

military space must evolve to the assured provision of 

uniquely essential space capabilities designed, acquired, 

and operated to enable combat effects that bring success on the battlefield. To find those requirements, 

planning for space will have to become closely integrated with force development planning overall, both 

internally within DOD and across the national security 

space enterprise.

Tactical Reconnaissance

New demands for mission assurance are one kind 

of strong pressure, forcing changes in planning for 

legacy systems; another pressure for change arises from 

advances in technology that can bring space-based reconnaissance and surveillance to the foxhole. These advances permit developing a capability that for present 

purposes can be called tactical reconnaissance—essentially “that kind of reconnaissance performed during 

military space architecture could, 

for example, hedge the risks of 

satellite failure by deploying 

constellations of systems that 

provide redundancy for combatcritical functions
4 SF No. 275 www.ndu.edu/inss

combat (during the period of actual hostilities) in support of military activities which are neither those of the 

cold war nor those of the all-out central thermonuclear 

war.”8

 The great challenge for mission assurance is threat 

assessment; the great challenges for tactical reconnaissance are organizations and authorities. 

From the very early days, space-based reconnaissance and surveillance have been the purview of the 

National Reconnaissance Office, which was created to 

develop, acquire, and operate the Nation’s “spy satellites.” 

Conceived as a partnership between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD, the NRO’s mission emphasized national intelligence programs—that is, topics 

of interest and concern to the President (and later, Congress). At the outset, top priority was given to collecting 

data for strategic intelligence, such as indications and 

warning of attack, foreign research and development efforts, weapons capabilities, and major force movements, 

and the technologies available at the time best suited 

those topics. Though there was hot competition between 

the CIA part of the NRO (“Program B”) and the Air 

Force part (“Program A”),9

 their struggle concerned alternative management and programmatic options for accomplishing the NRO’s mission, not the mission itself. 

Outside the national reconnaissance arena, the Navy and 

Air Force pursued space programs providing other military support (principally communications and weather). 

By the early 1970s, advances in space reconnaissance technology led DOD to fund adjuncts and modifications that would make the national reconnaissance 

systems increasingly useful for tactical military operations. Desert Storm military operations against Iraq in 

1991 made plain the success of those efforts.10 Commanders quickly demanded more and better support 

from space, including broader and more frequent coverage, and more responsive command and control. The 

NRO, together with DOD and the Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI), worked hard to address these and 

other military needs during the mid- to late-1990s, 

holding innumerable interagency meetings to set and 

review requirements, including validation by DOD’s 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Still, the NRO, 

charged with meeting requirements established by the 

national intelligence community and also with providing military support, controlled the acquisition process, 

making the difficult “factory floor” decisions about 

sacrificing some promised performance goals to meet 

schedules and budgets. Those decisions seldom provided all the capability desired by defense interests. 

To be sure, national intelligence priorities included 

support to military operations. Like spies and other intelligence assets, the national reconnaissance systems 

could and did provide data important to military planners and operators. But they were not themselves military capabilities, and the differences become acute in the 

tactical arena. An NRO satellite and a military satellite 

might collect the same data from the same target, but the 

data would be used by different customers for different 

purposes.11 The military, for example, needs systems that 

can address multiple targets in strategic depth and that 

are resistant to enemy interference. National intelligence 

users often can be more patient and more selectively focused, and can depend on secrecy for both access and 

protection. While the complementarity can be extensive, 

the timeliness of data collection and the efficiency with 

which raw data are converted to actionable information are typically more important in military operations, 

while intelligence systems often need higher resolution. 

A representative problem for national intelligence users 

is collecting data that can help assess the plans, capabilities, and economic capacity of potential adversaries. A 

representative problem for military users is tracking enemy forces and determining fire control solutions. These 

an NRO satellite and a military 

satellite might collect the same 

data from the same target, but the 

data would be used by different 

customers for different purposes
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 275 5 

different needs and priorities lead to different investment 

decisions, operational procedures, and designs for satellites and constellations.12

Even as technology advanced and offered more 

support for tactical military operations, authority to use that technology moved more under the 

DCI’s control. In 1965, the NRO director reported 

to a three-person executive committee: the DCI; the 

President’s scientific advisor; and the Secretary of Defense, as chairman. Each of these members could appeal directly to the White House for redress for any 

particular decision. A decade later, the NRO director 

reported to a foreign intelligence committee chaired 

by the DCI. Another 10 years found the DCI overruling the technical decisions of the NRO director about 

the design of new programs. Moreover, the mid-1990s 

brought tighter budgetary control by the intelligence 

community staff, following the “forward funding” exposé triggered by construction of the new headquarters of the NRO.13

Tensions between national intelligence and tactical military needs have prompted several high-level 

reviews over the past 40 years, and each time the result has been what it is today: management rather than 

resolution, in the hope that “compromise and innovation” will continue to bridge the differences of view and 

perspectives. In 2001, the congressionally mandated 

“Rumsfeld Commission” recommended that “a successful approach to the organization and management [of 

national security space] must . . . [p]rovide methods for 

resolving the inevitable issues between the defense and 

intelligence sectors on the priority, funding and control of space programs.”14 Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld’s efforts to provide those methods, however, 

tried to reverse the tides of both technology and authority. Rather than trying to manage these long-recognized differences and trends through compromise and 

improvisation, Rumsfeld and staff set out to integrate 

fully the defense and national reconnaissance space 

programs. This leap into the past went nowhere beyond 

Pentagon press releases—DOD never fully integrated 

its own space programs, and the Intelligence Community simply said “no.”

The NRO did, however, participate heavily in 

DOD’s successive efforts to design a major new program: 

a radar satellite that would serve both national and tactical reconnaissance needs. Unable to overcome essential 

differences in shaping the first “Space-Based Radar” program, the Air Force renamed the effort and tried again 

with the “Space Radar” program. Both efforts collapsed, 

unable to find the technology that could integrate the 

incompatible military and intelligence requirements into 

a single program. The entire “black-white integration” effort, which sought to fuse the management of the national intelligence space programs under the NRO (the 

“black”) with the military space programs of DOD (the 

“white”), then collapsed as well. This ironically proved 

what many supporters of the Space-Based Radar program had said earlier: the program “in fact, could become 

the poster child of horizontal integration development,” 

that is, of black-white integration.15 In 2005, a new director of the NRO was appointed, and, for the first time 

ever, the NRO director was not also appointed to be an 

Under or Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. Finally, in 

2011, a new agreement between the Secretary of Defense 

and DNI, characterized as an “amicable divorce,” further 

registered and formalized the distance between DOD 

and Intelligence Community space programs.16

These differences and divisions are thus not “management” problems, and management reforms cannot 

resolve them. Nor can they be obviated by reciting the 

solecisms of net-centricity.17 They are rooted instead in 

the advance and expansion of space technologies in the 

service of two communities with core mission needs that 

in 2005, for the first time ever, 

the NRO director was not also 

appointed to be an Under or 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
6 SF No. 275 www.ndu.edu/inss

diverge sharply. Yes, the national and tactical space reconnaissance systems can collaborate in many areas—national systems, for example, can help provide early information about enemy capabilities and dispositions, target 

selection, and battle damage assessment, while military 

space systems can support national reconnaissance and 

track potential threats (environmental and hostile). 

But what they have not been able to do, and cannot 

do now, is field a single space system that meets the divergent operational needs of two communities with different core missions. For over 40 years, military leaders 

complained about having too little influence on the design and operation of the national reconnaissance space 

architecture. Their complaints were met with important 

but essentially marginal improvements. Now, after 50 

years of national security space, the need is indisputable. 

Space systems are essential to virtually all military deployments and operations—particularly combat—and 

the earlier dedication to fielding only unitary programs 

under NRO control has reached an impasse.

Recognition of these differences and divisions was 

long resisted with solemn warnings that the Nation 

could not afford separate space programs for defense and 

intelligence. Lack of evidence never dinted the popularity of this bromide, but once space had become more 

fully integrated with military operations, it became clear 

that the Nation would pay a high price to keep pruning military needs to suit intelligence capabilities. As the 

Space (Based) Radar effort showed, forced union now 

could prove barren and impose costs in the most expensive terms: forgone military capability. 

For strategic planning, weapons development, overseas basing and deployments, international negotiations, 

and the like, the space systems serving military needs 

may be identical to those built for the national reconnaissance program. But what the military needs for combat is 

different from what the intelligence collector needs. The 

distinction is similar in some ways to that between a spy 

and a soldier—the spy’s job typically requires remaining 

undetected and avoiding or escaping from shootouts, 

while the soldier’s job may well require overt identification and the ability to win shootouts.

The realignment of responsibilities envisioned in 

the 2011 Memorandum of Agreement (DOD Directive 

5105.23) might benefit both the spy and the soldier. The 

agreement does not balance defense and intelligence 

authorities; the NRO director remains the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on space matters, and 

authority for space matters within DOD remains fractionated and fractious (the primary aspirants may meet 

in a defense space operations council, which includes 

the NRO director; the council may make recommendations to the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group, which 

in turn may make recommendations to the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense). But the new agreement might 

inspire military planners to develop a variety of spacebased systems, stimulating competition in innovation 

and production and yielding advanced field capabilities 

enabled by less vulnerable satellites that were produced 

more efficiently, thereby enriching the space technoindustrial base that supports the national security community overall. 

Yet the new arrangements seem unplanned, in these 

terms, and so could prove counterproductive. There is at 

present no visible initiative at the national level to ensure 

that sensible opportunities for cooperation and collaboration are pursued across the national space enterprise, 

that the consequences of particular decisions for other 

programs are taken into consideration, that timely action 

is taken to address emerging threats, and that the space 

programs collectively constitute a coherent contribution to the overall national security strategy. Parochialism could transform productive competition into useless 

duplication. Decentralization could encourage individual 

budget decisions that impose higher costs on the overall 

space systems are essential to 

virtually all military deployments 

and operations—particularly combat
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 275 7 

enterprise. Distributed authority could delay common 

action against common threats. Individual priorities 

could supplant national ones.

Proposals for collective management are probably 

not far away, if only because their absence presents a 

vacuum that Congress will naturally move to fill. To be 

expected are renewed calls for an executive committee 

similar to that of the 1960s, for joint committees and 

councils on research and common functional areas, for 

separate monolithic controls within the defense and 

intelligence space programs, for a national space council and/or strategy, for a Blue Ribbon review commission, and for special reports to Congress. Still, none of 

these procedural mechanisms promises a clear path to 

resolving the complex substantive issues at hand.

Acquiring capabilities to address the differences 

between national intelligence and military space systems, however, promises to be more than a bit complicated. Some desired attributes have long been evident 

in the shortcomings of the national systems “apps.” 

Combat forces need to train and exercise with the 

systems they will need in combat; to share data across 

units and functional activities, including allies and 

other coalition partners, from which to draw a userdefined operating picture; and to know when and how 

well their requests for space support will be satisfied. 

How can the capabilities of advanced intelligence satellites be protected if the same technologies are providing 

tactical reconnaissance? In addition, tactical reconnaissance will increasingly have to include space itself, as 

potential adversaries develop counterspace capabilities. 

Broadly speaking, the extension of military competition 

to space will compel extensive development of two new 

architectures: one to provide intelligence preparation of 

the space battleground and continuing tactical reconnaissance of it, and another to provide the command 

and control systems to make use of the improved “space 

situational awareness.” 

Here again, as with mission assurance, planning 

for military space must become far more tightly integrated with other elements of force development, both 

internally to DOD and across the national security 

space enterprise.

Forces-based Planning

However the authorities and processes for military 

space are finally arranged, and while management options are being explored, DOD’s space programs will be 

called on to show their military value to the future joint 

fight. At present, there seems to be no process within 

DOD that develops space requirements as part of planning the future joint fight, incorporates space as an integral part of development planning for combat forces, determines the space capabilities U.S. military forces would 

need to create the effects they would want to achieve, 

and reflects integrated plans for tactical operations, intelligence, technology, and space systems. Such a process 

would assess how space systems might address problems 

and deficiencies in the joint fight, or how planned systems might be made more effective through new applications or integration of space data, or the cross-domain 

trades among new systems and technologies that might 

reduce dependence on space.

To start determining operational requirements, 

one might look back to the time between the World 

Wars, a period defined by rapid change in military 

technologies when the basis for operational requirements could not be distilled from experience of a major 

war. During those years, U.S. forces conducted several 

experiments to determine doctrine, organizations, and 

force structure, including the Navy’s fleet experiments 

(how to use aircraft carriers), Mitchell’s ship bombing, and the Army’s Louisiana Maneuvers (mobility, how to use tanks). A series of experiments18 or 

tactical reconnaissance will 

increasingly have to include space 

itself, as potential adversaries 

develop counterspace capabilities
8 SF No. 275 www.ndu.edu/inss

demonstrations or explorations might be undertaken 

today to help planners better understand several important operational issues. It seems reasonable, for example, to expect that different types of sensors would be 

important at different phases of conflict (zero through 

five, as well as subdivisions of each).19 Presumably the 

need for and approach to mission assurance, including 

satellite protection, will change similarly. Perhaps, too, 

different approaches to command and control of the 

platform, the payload, data processing, and information dissemination might be better suited to different 

conflict phases and different space missions. Different 

sensor technologies, together with the nature of the 

mission, might affect the relative desirability of “direct downlink”—delivering sensor data directly to the 

warfighter—or of downlinking data to a central facility 

for processing and filtering before it is sent on to the 

warfighter. Experiments could also be used to check 

whether there might be some elasticity in initial data 

requirements (resolution, area coverage, frequency of 

revisit, and the like).

Another approach to determining some requirements is participation in combat “lessons learned” activities, and this approach could be used right away. 

The Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, for example, studies cases in which circumstances went badly for ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, with a view to recommending changes in 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (and sometimes 

more). Including space sensor and systems design engineers in this work might suggest different ways to 

get better combat outcomes by using different space 

systems, or different applications of current ones.20

The intent here is not to evaluate the current activities 

but instead to involve space experts with specialists in 

tactical terrestrial operations. 

Leadership for these activities seems best suited to 

U.S. Strategic Command. As the supporting command 

for regional wars being fought by geographic combatant 

commanders, it is well positioned to ensure a “joint fight 

first” approach to determining future space requirements. 

As the supported warfighting command for space and 

cyber, it already confronts the challenges of determining 

what cyberwar and space warfare might require, and how 

the powerful integration of space and cyber capabilities 

should be shaped.

In addition, organizational devolution and the increased specialization of space applications will require 

some mechanism in the national framework to foster 

collaborative as well as cooperative independent initiatives. At present there is no mechanism to integrate the 

planning and investment in satellite reconnaissance between the intelligence and defense communities across 

the national security enterprise. Moving toward an organizational resolution should probably wait until processes and programs for military space are further developed. But a manageable option to start now would be a 

national-level advisory board that has no formal authority but that has considerable influence and that reports 

to the Oval Office—a “President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board” for space. This group would examine 

space issues on its own initiative, perhaps to see whether 

important opportunities were being missed, and could 

also respond to government agencies’ requests for help 

with difficult technical or bureaucratic issues.21

Conclusion

Space systems enabled a revolution in American 

military affairs; the military now needs a revolution in 

military space planning. What should a warfighting 

space architecture involve? Do military demands on 

space systems change in different phases of conflict? 

What functions must be maintained in wartime, and 

are they specific to particular satellites? If so, should the 

space systems enabled a revolution 

in American military affairs; the 

military now needs a revolution in 

military space planning
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 275 9 

approach be to protect those satellites or to augment or 

replace them with new launches or with orbiting “silent 

spares”? What is the architecture that can ensure that 

data collected separately from intelligence and defense 

platforms will be shared to meet both intelligence and 

military needs? Furthermore, how can the coordination 

of availability and tasking be similarly ensured across 

both intelligence and defense platforms and needs? 

What steps should be taken first, and what resources 

will be needed?

For combat, the military space architecture needs to 

function in “real time” as part of a kill chain as well as 

to support intelligence preparation of the battlefield. It 

needs redundancy and resiliency to assure critical mission capabilities despite mishap or hostile action. It 

needs to be used in training, exercises, and coalition activities. Its design must therefore be rooted in the operations and development planning of the fighting forces, 

and it likely will require different satellites and architectures, an acquisition system that is responsive to the 

strategy, and new relationships among service, departmental, and national organizations. Achieving this will 

require developing methods to evaluate alternatives (for 

example, supplemental satellites vs. national reconnaissance components vs. remotely piloted aircraft vs. piloted 

aircraft) in terms of overall combat effectiveness. Making 

a military space architecture work effectively will require 

procedures and standards to ensure cooperative interfaces between military and other national security space 

systems and activities.

The military perspective, however, is still seriously 

underdeveloped. Mission assurance has been a constant 

concern, beginning with the earliest Corona launches. 

But deciding how to protect which assets against which 

threats has become highly complex because of the variety of potential threats today, the enormous challenge 

to earlier thinking presented by cyber warfare, the difficulty of tracing satellite functions to combat capabilities, and the perceived plethora of work-arounds and 

alternatives to space support. Tactical reconnaissance is 

similarly unformed: space programs for military reconnaissance and surveillance have largely entailed efforts 

to extract warfighting support from systems designed 

for other purposes and operated by another community, and so to date they have been ancillary to force 

development plans and programs, even where the space 

contribution was important. 

Three years ago the commander of Air Force Space 

Command called on the defense and intelligence space 

communities to shift from the “one size fits all” approach—“to shift from a suboptimized ‘satellite, reconnaissance, intelligence, and warfighting, one each’ approach—to a new architecture that accommodates the 

needs of both, with platforms that are purpose-designed 

for specific war fighter or national intelligence needs, 

and, in my view, that makes individual satellites more affordable and easier to produce.”22

Answering this call is even more urgent today as 

national leaders look for ways to reduce budgets without sacrificing near-term military strength. Budget cutters can find space programs to be irresistibly attractive 

targets. Terminating or delaying these programs offers 

disproportionately large near-term savings compared 

with other major programs because so much of their lifecycle cost occurs during initial acquisition. Doing so is 

also appealing because it may have little or no effect on 

near-term military capabilities; acquisition of major new 

satellites can take years. Meanwhile, most legacy systems 

in orbit continue operating well beyond their expected 

design lives.

What makes space systems most vulnerable to 

budget sacrifice, however, is analytic vacuity—a continuing inability to explain military space in terms of 

enhancements to joint fight performance. Yes, the military space capability envisioned in this paper will require DOD to do more for mission assurance and tactical reconnaissance. Whether it will cost more than 

continuation of the legacy programs will depend on 

the results of future detailed assessments of space and 

the joint fight. But the first step is analysis, not procurement, and it is needed now. A continuing inability 

to explain military space in terms of enhancements to 
10 SF No. 275 www.ndu.edu/inss

joint fight performance can only dim the prospects for 

military space systems and for making future combat 

forces as strong as they should be.

Notes

1 The National Space Policy 2010 issued by the White House 

embodied this approach to mission assurance, emphasizing the maintenance of mission-essential functions. See “National Space Policy of 

the United States of America,” The White House, June 28, 2010, 9. 

The Defense Department and Intelligence Community’s subsequent 

National Security Space Strategy (unclassified summary, January 

2011) does not, however, and simply treats all space capabilities as 

equally important.

2 James P. Mullins, The Defense Matrix: National Preparedness 

and the Military-Industrial Complex (San Diego, CA: Avant Books, 

1986), 93.

3 E.C. “Pete” Aldridge, while Under Secretary of the Air Force 

and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, frequently 

responded to allegations that spy satellites were “gold plated” with the 

fact that “we have never flown capability that was not needed.” 

4 Amrom H. Katz, “Preliminary Thoughts on Crises: More 

Questions Than Answers,” mimeo., March 1972, 7.

5 Beyond technical compatibility and operational familiarity, 

work on problems of legal, institutional, and domestic political relations at home and abroad would be needed at the outset.

6 Indeed, government “departments and agencies” are directed 

to “work jointly to acquire space launch services and hosted payloads 

arrangements that are reliable, responsive to United States Government 

needs, and cost-effective” (“National Space Policy,” 5). Geosynchronous 

commercial communications satellites might be useful as platforms for 

situational awareness, selected communications, research and development testing, or other purposes, depending on corporate business 

plans and fears of extortion. Better understanding of liability, technical 

compatibility, security, and related issues is needed. The Defense 

Department moved ahead with hosted payloads soon after the space 

policy was released (Turner Brinton, “U.S. Military Wants to Streamline 

Hosted Payload Process,” Space News, September 24, 2010) and issued a 

solicitation for “Commercial Flight of DoD Space Test Program (STP) 

Hosted Payloads (HPs),” Solicitation Number BAA-SMC-SD-011, on 

November 23, 2011. Meanwhile, the Air Force completed work on the 

CHIRP (Commercially Hosted InfraRed Payload) and launched it in 

September 2011 (see, for example, “SES-2 satellite with USAF hosted 

CHIRP completes testing,” December 22, 2011, available at <www.

airforce-technology.com/news/newsses-2-satellite-with-usaf-hostedchirp-completes-testing>). The continued interest in military hosted 

payloads was emphasized in the keynote address to the hosted payload 

summit delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary Greg Schulte on 

October 4, 2011 (“Hosted payloads are one of the ways to assure space 

capabilities . . . [and] are one way the U.S. government might address 

impending budget constraints.” Other agencies, of course, are pursuing 

these options as well; see, for example, “Hosted Payloads,” in the Space 

Commerce publication of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 

Administration, Department of Commerce, available at <www.space.

commerce.gov/general/commercialpurchase/hostedpayloads.shtml>.

7 Even then, they can do virtually nothing against a total space 

negation attack. The United States has far more to lose than any other 

country if space becomes unusable; satellites and their products have 

become central to civil, scientific, and commercial activities, while 

providing critical force multipliers for military operations. A “scorched 

space” attack, not so unthinkable after the attacks of 9/11, would hurt 

the United States more than any other country.

8 Amrom H. Katz, “Some Ramblings and Musings on Tactical 

Reconnaissance,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, March 1963), 1. As 

Katz went on: “If anyone wants to argue with this definition, let him 

write his own paper.” The distinction between reconnaissance and 

surveillance is without effect on the subject of the present paper, and 

so references to space-based reconnaissance or tactical reconnaissance 

are intended to include surveillance functions as well. The distinctions 

are presented clearly in the Air University space handbook; see Brian 

Crothers et al., “U.S. Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” chapter 13 of the AU–18 Space Primer 2d

 ed. (Maxwell 

Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2009), available at <http://

space.au.af.mil/au-18-2009/au-18_chap13.pdf>.

9 Robert Perry, Management of the National Reconnaissance 

Program, 1960–1965 (Chantilly, VA: National Reconnaissance Office 

History Office, Second Printing, 2001).

10 See remarks by then–Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., quoted in “The JDW Interview: Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.,” Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, February 9, 1991, 200. See also Robert L. Butterworth, 

“Space Systems and the Military Geography of Future Regional 

Conflicts,” Report No. 14 (Center for National Security Studies, Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, January 1992).

11 The GRAB and Poppy programs, while perhaps appearing 

initially to be exceptions, illustrate the point. For example, “Intelligence derived from the GRAB and Poppy systems supported a 

wide range of applications during the Cold War. It provided clues 

to locations and capabilities of Soviet radar sites, characteristics and 

locations of Soviet air defense equipment, ocean surveillance information for Navy commanders, and a more complete picture of the actual 

Soviet military threat.” Crothers et al., “U.S. Space-Based Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” 175. Also see Dwayne A. Day, 

“A flower in the polar sky: the POPPY signals intelligence satellite 

and ocean surveillance,” The Space Review, April 28, 2008, available at 

<www.thespacereview.com/article/1115/1>.

12 “The important factor to recognize in this relationship 

[between strategic and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance operations] is that the function being supported determines if it is strategic 

or tactical, not the command that performs the mission or trains the 

crews. Neither is it the department nor agency that funds the platform.” And later: “While the Air Force is satisfying the surveillance 

and reconnaissance needs of the Army, it must also do the same for 

its own forces and possibly for the National Command Authorities 

and strategic planners. Some of the information will be of use to all 

organizations, but it is a mistake to believe there is a high degree of 

overlap. The fine detail required for targeting weapons is unnecessary 

for strategic planning. The technical information required to satisfy a 

research and development question may go far beyond the needs of 

a combat soldier or airman who only needs to know what is where, 

when, and how many.” See George E. Daniels, “An Approach to Reconnaissance Doctrine,” Air University Review (March–April 1982), 

available at <www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview_toc/

AUReview1982/AUReview1982Mar-Apr.htm>.

13 A former deputy director of the National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO) summarized the event this way: “In 1995 the NRO 

had a funding crisis. The NRO was found to have accumulated $3.8 

billion in forward funding (i.e., unused margin) across all NRO programs. The timing could not have been worse. The U.S. was involved 

militarily in Bosnia during a period of declining defense budgets. The 

discovery that a government agency had amassed $3.8 billion was 

greeted in Congress with both outrage and a sense of relief. There was 

outrage that the funds had been accumulated, but there was a sense 

of relief these newly identified funds could be reallocated to solve 

a funding gap related to ongoing military operations in Bosnia. At 

the same time, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, 

publicly fired the incumbent NRO Director and Deputy Director 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 275 11 

(DNRO and DDNRO), and installed Keith Hall as the New DNRO 

with a mandate to get the NRO back on firm financial footing;” Dennis Fitzgerald, “Commentary on: Kohler’s ‘Recapturing What Made 

the NRO Great—Updated Observations on “The Decline of the 

NRO,”’” National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice 

(2005), 59.

14 Report of the Commission to Assess United States Space 

Security Management and Organization (“Rumsfeld Commission”), 

January 11, 2001, 79.

15 “[Space-based radar], in fact, could become the poster child of 

horizontal integration development. The Air Force is grinding away 

on a concept of operations for space radar, and officials say they will 

get it right, with major implications for combat operations. ‘The same 

radar wave front that is collected for intelligence information can 

be vitally important to the warfighter,’ said [Under Secretary of the 

Air Force and Director of National Reconnaissance Office] Peter B. 

Teets.” Robert S. Dudney and Peter Grier, “New Orbit for American 

Space Power,” Air Force Magazine, February 2004, 43–44. 

16 Amy Butler, “USAF Eyes ‘Disaggregation’ for Future Sats,” 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 25, 2011. The formal 

document is DOD Directive 5105.23, signed on June 28, 2011, by 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

17 As argued by, for example, then–Brigadier General Katherine E. Roberts, “Reflections on the Integration of Black and White 

Space,” High Frontier 4, no. 4 (August 2008), 17–19.

18 “If there is only one outcome, or if there are multiple outcomes but they are indistinguishable, the event is a demonstration, 

not an experiment. If the meaning of the outcome is determined only 

after the experiment is over, then it is an exploration, not an experiment.” Brian McCue, “Wotan’s Workshop: Military Experiments 

Before the Second World War,” Occasional Paper, (Alexandria, VA: 

Center for Naval Analyses, October 2002), 4–5. Of similar interest is 

McCue, “The Practice of Military Experimentation” (Alexandria, VA: 

Center for Naval Analyses, February 2003), 5. An exercise is different 

still, and would be used for example to test the effectiveness or readiness of an operational force.

19 The current lexicon includes six phases of conflict: shape, deter, 

seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. See 

Chapter III, Part C, of Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation Planning, August 11, 2011.

20 One well-known example of improving space support is 

the Air Force initiative to mitigate the “sky-challenged” terrain in 

Afghanistan by providing quick access to more accurate GPS data, 

which significantly improved accuracy for the Small Diameter Bomb. 

See the account of Talon Namath by Brig. Gen. Jay Raymond, available at <www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/763.pdf>.

21 This board of outside luminaries would be quite different from 

the Overhead Reconnaissance Advisory Group mentioned in the 

recent defense/intelligence memorandum, though the two certainly 

need not be incompatible. The Group as of mid-November had not 

yet held its first meeting.

22 General C. Robert Kehler, commander, Air Force Space 

Command, notes for keynote address to GEOINT 2008 Symposium in Nashville, Tennessee, October 30, 2008. The gist of Kehler’s 

remarks was reported in Colin Clark, “Intel, AF Sats Must Go 

Separate Ways—Kehler,” DoD Buzz, available at <www.dodbuzz.

com/2008/11/16/intel-af-sats-must-go-separate-ways-kehler/>.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

Acknowledgments

This Strategic Forum benefited greatly from policy discussions 

with Elaine Bunn, comments by peer reviewers Captain Mark 

Redden, USN, and Colonel Patrick Frakes, USA, and editorial 

support by Dr. Phillip Saunders.
12 SF No. 275 www.ndu.edu/inss

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