Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Review of the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons’ Untimely Releases of Inmates
 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-03 May 2016 
 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Following news reports that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had confined 

an inmate for 13 months past his correct release date, the Department of Justice 

(Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated an examination of the 

BOP’s process for ensuring federal inmates are released on their correct release 

dates and the incidences of releases before or after the correct release date due to 

staff error between 2009 and 2014. We found that of the 461,966 inmate releases 

between 2009 and 2014, the BOP categorized 157 as untimely due to staff error. 

We also learned that the BOP classifies a far greater number — 4,183 — as 

untimely for other reasons. 

According to the BOP, the vast majority of non-staff error “untimely” releases 

were due to situations that are beyond its control, such as amended sentences that 

result in shorter sentences than the time an inmate had already served. Also, data 

and information we reviewed indicates that other entities inside and outside the 

Department may sometimes contribute to untimely releases. Although BOP officials 

told us that it was highly unlikely that staff error on the part of a Department entity 

contributed to any of the 4,183 cases, they could not rule out the possibility and we 

found that the BOP does not always have complete information about the 

circumstances of untimely releases to which other entities contribute. We therefore 

concluded that the Department should work with all relevant entities, both within 

and outside the Department, to review the full range of possible reasons for 

untimely releases and how to address those that are in any way preventable. 

With regard to the 157 untimely releases that BOP categorized as due to staff 

error, 152 were late releases and 5 were early releases. We found that three of the 

late releases and three of the early releases involved an error resulting in more 

than 1 year of over- or under-served time by the inmate. Table 1 displays the 

number of days of over- or under-served time for the 157 untimely releases. 

Table 1 

Number of Untimely Releases from Prison Caused by Staff Errors, 

By Days Over- or Under-served, 

2009 – 2014
 

Days Over or Under Served 2009–2014 Percent of Total 

0 to 30 Days 91 60% 

LATE RELEASE 31 Days to 1 Year 58 38% 

1+ Years 3 2% 

0 to 30 Days 1 20% 

EARLY RELEASE 31 Days to 1 Year 1 20% 

1+ Years 3 60% 

Source: OIG analysis of untimely releases identified by BOP as due to staff error, 

calendar years 2009 – 2014 

While the 157 untimely releases due to staff error was rare compared to the 

461,966 releases by BOP during the 6-year period of our review (an error rate of 

i 
 

0.03 percent), the consequences of an untimely release can be extraordinarily 

serious. Late releases from prison deprive inmates of their liberty, while early 

releases can put communities at risk if the inmates are dangerous. Early releases 

also can harm an inmate and the inmate’s family, particularly if the inmate’s efforts 

to gain employment and reestablish ties with the community are interrupted by a 

re-arrest for the purpose of completing the sentence. 

Late releases also are costly: in addition to BOP costs associated with the 

unauthorized period of incarceration, there is the potential for significant 

compensatory judgments to those inmates who suffered an unconstitutional 

deprivation of their liberty. For the 152 late releases, we estimated the total cost 

to the BOP, exclusive of litigation and settlement costs, to be approximately 

$669,814. In addition, between 2009 and 2015, the Department settled four 

lawsuits by inmates alleging untimely release, one for $90,000; another for 

$120,000; another for $295,000; and the fourth for $175,000. This does not 

include additional costs the Department incurred as a result of these cases, such as 

salary costs expended to handle the lawsuits. 

Additionally, untimely releases, whether early or late, contravene judicial 

sentencing orders, yet the BOP does not have in place a process to consider 

whether to notify the sentencing court of an untimely release. We found that, for 

late releases, the BOP notifies the relevant U.S. Probation office but does not 

separately notify the sentencing court or the U.S. Attorney’s Office that handled the 

case. For early releases, we found that BOP policy requires Wardens to notify “the 

appropriate Judicial Official(s)” when an inmate who is deemed to be a threat to the 

community is released early and when any inmate is released more than 30 days 

early. Despite this policy, we found no such notifications occurred for the four 

untimely early releases of 30 days or more that we reviewed. 

We found that 127 of the 157 untimely releases due to staff error were the 

result of errors made at BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation Center 

(DSCC). (The DSCC performs the vast majority of sentence computations the BOP 

uses to determine an inmate’s release date.) The other 30 untimely releases were 

the result of staff errors at non-DSCC entities, such as BOP institutions, BOP 

Residential Reentry Management field offices, Residential Reentry Centers 

(previously known as Community Corrections Centers), and private contract 

prisons. 

Prior to 2005, when the BOP consolidated sentence computation functions in 

the DSCC, individual BOP facilities across the country had performed sentence 

computation. The BOP transitioned sentence computations to the DSCC in order to 

consolidate BOP sentence computation functions, reduce costs, and ensure 

consistent application of laws and BOP policies. This change also helped reduce the 

number of untimely releases caused by staff error. Based on BOP data, we 

determined that during the 6-year period from 1999 and 2004 there were 

approximately 344 untimely releases due to staff error (around 0.1 percent of all 

releases) compared to 157 (around 0.03 percent of all releases) between 2009 and 

2014. 

ii 
 

 

 

We concluded that the most common sentence computation errors resulted 

from incorrect application of jail credit, incorrect determinations of primary 

jurisdiction between federal and state custody, and errors relating to concurrent 

versus consecutive sentences for defendants with multiple unexpired incarceration 

sentences. We also found that poor communication with outside entities — 

including local jails, courthouses, state departments of corrections, Native American 

reservations, the U.S. Marshals Service, and others — resulted in DSCC staff not 

obtaining complete and accurate sentencing information or interpreting sentencing 

information incorrectly, leading to untimely releases. 

The BOP has several processes in place to prevent untimely release. One is 

to conduct a final release audit 12 months prior to an inmate’s scheduled release 

date to discover and correct any errors and to have the ability to account for any 

reduced sentence time. However, we found that in some cases 12 months is not 

early enough to discover and correct the error and prevent the untimely release. 

Specifically, 14 of the 19 errors discovered by final release audits might not have 

resulted in untimely releases had the audits occurred 18 months before the 

inmate’s scheduled release date. Had the final release audit occurred 24 months 

prior to the release date, an additional 4 of the 19 errors might have been 

discovered in time to prevent the untimely release. Therefore, we recommend that 

BOP explore and implement additional sentence calculation processing or auditing 

strategies, taking into account that conducting final release audits only 12 months 

before an inmate’s projected release date has led to preventable untimely releases. 

We also noted that the DSCC holds education events that bring together 

officials from the DSCC as well as outside the BOP (including U.S. District Court 

Judges, Federal Public Defenders, and U.S. Probation Office staff) to inform them 

about topics relating to DSCC operations, such as sentence computations. In our 

judgment, these events could help prevent untimely releases if the BOP included 

factors that can affect its ability to release inmates on time, including showing 

attendees how conflicting information can lead to incorrect sentence computations. 

This report contains three case studies profiling inmate releases that were 

more than 1 year late. The report also makes seven recommendations for the BOP 

to help reduce untimely releases due to staff error. 

iii 
 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1

The BOP Has Limited Information about the Causes of Releases 

Untimely Releases Due to Staff Error, While Rare in the Context
 

of All Inmate Releases, Occurred Over 150 Times in a Recent
 

Early Releases Result in Costs to the Department and the Taxpayer, 

as well as Potential Harm to Inmates, Their Families, and 

Background ........................................................................................ 1
 

The BOP’s Processes for Computing and Verifying Inmate Sentences ........... 1
 

Documentation of Untimely Releases ...................................................... 3
 

Reviews of the DSCC............................................................................ 4
 

Scope of the Review............................................................................. 4
 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW .............................................................................. 5
 

Considered Untimely That Are Not Attributed to BOP Staff Error ................. 5
 

6-Year Period, Resulting in Significant Harm ............................................ 8
 

Their Communities............................................................................. 13
 

The Causes of Untimely Releases Vary .................................................. 13
 

Case Studies of Releases Over 1 Year Late ............................................ 22
 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 25

 Conclusion........................................................................................ 25

 Recommendations ............................................................................. 25
 

APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW ........................................ 27
 

APPENDIX 2: BOP REVIEWS OF THE DESIGNATION AND SENTENCE 

COMPUTATION CENTER........................................................... 28 

APPENDIX 3: THE ODAG AND BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT ........... 29 

APPENDIX 4: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE ODAG AND BOP’s RESPONSE ................... 32 
 

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION 

Background 

Following news reports in late 2014 about an inmate’s lawsuit against the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for confining him 13 months beyond his correct 

release date, the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) initiated a review of the BOP’s processes for ensuring inmates are 

released on their correct release date.1

 We found that of the 461,966 inmate 

releases between 2009 and 2014, the BOP categorized 157 as “untimely” due to 

staff error and a far greater number — 4,183 — as untimely for other reasons. As 

discussed in this report, according to the BOP, the vast majority of non-staff error 

untimely releases were due to situations beyond its control, such as amended 

sentences that result in shorter sentences than the time an inmate had already 

served. 

Because the incident giving rise to this review resulted from BOP staff error, 

we focused on analyzing untimely releases that the BOP attributed to staff error. 

The BOP identified 157 such cases, including 148 cases attributable entirely to the 

BOP or others under its direct control, such as employees of private contract 

prisons. The remaining nine cases were due to a combination of factors including 

BOP staff error, and we discuss these later in the report. 

The BOP’s Processes for Computing and Verifying Inmate Sentences 

Each year, the BOP conducts approximately 153,309 initial computations and 

91,475 updates to existing computations to determine inmate release dates, and 

the Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC), located in Grand 

Prairie, Texas, performs the vast majority of them. The DSCC, which consists of 

approximately 330 employees, was created in 2005 to consolidate all BOP sentence 

computation functions into one office to reduce costs and to ensure consistent 

application of laws and BOP policies. Prior to 2005, individual BOP facilities across 

the country had performed sentence computations. Between 2005 and 2010, the 

BOP phased out sentence computation functions at BOP-operated facilities and 

transferred these functions to the DSCC.2 

1

 Paul McEnroe, “Lost in Federal Prison – and Held 13 Months Too Long,” Star Tribune, 

October 11, 2014, http://www.startribune.com/lost-in-federal-prison-and-held-13-months-toolong/278868951/ (accessed March 9, 2016). KTTC staff, “Man Kept Imprisoned 13 Months Past His 

Release Seeks Lawsuit,” KTTC, October 13, 2014, 

http://www.kttc.com/story/26776178/2014/10/13/man-kept-imprisoned-13-months-past-his-releaseseeks-lawsuit (accessed March 9, 2016). Associated Press, “Man Held 13 Months Too Long Sues 

Prison System,” Washington Times, October 11, 2014, 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/11/man-held-13-months-too-long-sues-prisonsystem/ (accessed March 9, 2016). The BOP settled the inmate’s civil suit for $175,000. 

2

 Due to existing contracts, several private contract institutions continued to perform 

sentence computation functions after 2010. Currently, there are four private contract institutions that 

continue to perform sentence computations: Big Spring Correctional Center, Big Spring, Texas 

(contract ends March 2017); Reeves County Detention Center I/II, Pecos, Texas (contract ends 

Continued 

1 
 

   

               

   

   

   

   

       

   

 

 

The DSCC divides sentence computation responsibilities among teams that 

compute the sentences for federal inmates sentenced in 1 or more of the 94 federal 

judicial districts. Within each team, Classification and Computation Technicians and 

Specialists (CC staff) perform the day-to-day sentence computation functions of the 

DSCC, including calculating inmate release dates.3 As shown in the Figure, these 

functions are divided into three main steps (two for sentences less than 13 months) 

and take place at different phases of an inmate’s incarceration. In addition to these 

steps, sentence computation updates are performed when a change to an inmate’s 

sentence occurs after the initial computation and certification audit. 

Figure
 

Sentence Computation Steps 

Sentences Less
 

Than 13 Months
 

Final Release Audit*

(12 months before release)

Certification Audit*

(Immediately after initial computation)

Initial

Computation

(upon being sentenced)

Inmate Released

Inmate

Requiring a

Sentence

Computation

Sentences Greater

Than 13 Months

Updates to

Computation

New Information

Affecting an

Inmate’s Sentence

* The certification and final release audits follow the same procedure except that they ordinarily occur 

at two different stages of the inmate’s incarceration. 

Source: OIG analysis of sentence computations functions at the DSCC 

Initial Sentence Computation 

The CC staff calculates an inmate’s release date at the beginning of the 

inmate’s incarceration. During initial computations, the CC staff reviews a variety 

of source documents and SENTRY, the BOP’s primary database for storing inmate 

information, to calculate the inmate’s projected release date.4 If any necessary 

January 2017); Reeves County Detention Center III, Pecos, Texas (contract ends December 2016); 

and Taft Correctional Institution, Taft, California (contract ends August 2017). These institutions will 

transfer their sentence computation responsibilities to the DSCC when their current contracts end, the 

last of which will be in 2017. 

3

 Classification and Computation Specialists and Technicians perform many of the same 

functions, but Specialists have more experience than Technicians, often answer the Technicians’ 

questions regarding sentence computation, and can conduct the full range of sentence computation 

tasks. The DSCC provides CC staff basic and advanced training, on-the-job training, and quarterly 

training. 

4

 Source documents include: a Judgment and Commitment Order describing the term of 

imprisonment and any other punishment the inmate faces; a Prisoner Custody, Detention, and 

Disposition Record (USM-129) from the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), which notes where the USMS 

has moved the inmate after sentencing and before the BOP assigns the inmate to a facility and 

includes the inmate’s time in custody during this period; and a pre-sentence report from the U.S. 

Probation Office in the sentencing jurisdiction, which usually includes the date the inmate was arrested 

and what dates the inmate was held in custody prior to sentencing. Other source documents that may 

Continued 

2 
 

 

source documents are missing or incomplete, the responsible staff member will try 

to obtain them by contacting the appropriate state, local, federal, or other entity. 

Certification Audit 

The CC staff performs a certification audit after an initial computation and 

after computation updates to review the work of the staff member who conducted 

the computation, analyzing the same source documents. As an almost immediate 

check on the work of the staff member who conducted the initial computation or 

update, the staff member who performs a certification audit must be different from 

the staff member who performed the initial sentence computation. If information is 

missing, the staff member conducting the audit will typically direct the staff 

member who conducted the initial computation (or his or her replacement) to 

obtain the information. 

Final Release Audit 

Performed 12 months before an inmate’s release date, the final release audit 

is designed to ensure that the sentence computation is correct, for example, that all 

updates have been incorporated, so that the inmate is released on his or her 

correct release date.5 Because CC Specialists are more experienced than 

Technicians, only CC Specialists conduct final release audits. This audit is a final 

check on the initial computation and the certification audit, as well as any 

computation updates. The staff member conducting this audit will review the same 

source documents as those reviewed for the initial computation and certification 

audit. Similar to the certification audit, if necessary documentation is missing, the 

staff member conducting the final release audit will typically direct the staff 

member who conducted the initial computation to obtain the documentation. 

Documentation of Untimely Releases 

The BOP uses two forms to document untimely releases: the Untimely 

Release Notification (BP 558) and the Late Release Notice for United States 

Probation Service (BP 623). When an untimely release occurs, the BOP requires an 

employee from the office where the error occurred to complete a BP 558 form to 

document the untimely release, including an explanation of the reasons it happened 

and what has been done to make sure the mistake is not made again. If an inmate 

is subject to supervised release following a sentence from which the inmate was 

released late and accumulated over-served time, DSCC staff is also required to 

complete a BP 623 form and send it to the U.S. Probation Office. In this way, the 

be used are the sentencing court’s statement of reasons for the sentence and the inmate’s National 

Crime Information Center report. 

5

 Final release audits occur 12 months before an inmate’s release to allow any decrease in the 

inmate’s sentence that results from an error found by the audit to more likely be absorbed by the 

12 months than to result in an untimely release. 

3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

BOP notifies the U.S. Probation Office that a court may consider the inmate’s overserved time in calculating the prison time for a term of supervised release.6 

Reviews of the DSCC 

In addition to auditing individual sentence computations, the BOP’s Program 

Review Division (PRD) conducts reviews of the DSCC and the DSCC conducts 

internal reviews of itself. The PRD conducts program reviews of all BOP programs 

in regular cycles where the cycle length depends on the rating the program 

received from the previous review. The PRD evaluates several areas of the DSCC, 

including sentence computations. The DSCC also conducts internal reviews, 

including reviews to assess actions taken to address areas of concern found during 

the PRD reviews. 

Last, the DSCC conducts monthly audits, which it refers to as “perpetual” 

audits, for each sentence computation team. The perpetual audits review 

170 (10 per team) randomly selected sentence computations that have undergone 

certification audits. The results of these perpetual audits provide information for 

quarterly reports and are the basis for in-house training. See Appendix 2 for 

additional details about the PRD and DSCC program review process. 

Scope of the Review 

In this review, we examined untimely releases of BOP inmates between 

calendar years 2009 and 2014 that the BOP classified as resulting from staff errors. 

Our report focuses on assessing the reasons for the untimely releases due to BOP 

staff error, the impact on the inmates, and their associated costs. We interviewed 

BOP officials, reviewed public and internal BOP documents, and analyzed data. 

During our assessment we also discovered releases that the BOP classified as 

untimely, due to a variety of reasons other than staff error, which can involve 

entities outside of the BOP. Although an in-depth analysis of the untimely releases 

not due to staff error was beyond the scope of this review, we describe the 

information we received regarding these as well. We offer recommendations at the 

conclusion of this report to assist the BOP and the Department in preventing and 

appropriately addressing untimely releases. Appendix 1 provides additional details 

about our methodology. 

6

 Supervised release is a type of post-confinement monitoring overseen by federal district 

courts with the assistance of federal Probation Officers. A sentencing court is authorized (in some 

cases, required) to impose a supervised release in addition to imprisonment. While on supervised 

release after reentry into the community, an offender must abide by certain terms, some mandated by 

statute and others imposed at the court’s discretion. Supervised release may be revoked if an 

offender violates a term. Upon finding such a violation, the court typically has discretion as to 

whether to require the offender to serve all or part of the supervised release term in prison. If an 

inmate who was released late and is subject to supervised release violates the terms of supervised 

release, the BOP will apply any time the inmate over-served toward the supervised release violation 

sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

The BOP Has Limited Information about the Causes of Releases Considered 

Untimely That Are Not Attributed to BOP Staff Error 

We found that the BOP categorized 157 releases that occurred between 2009 

and 2014 as untimely due to staff error, and a far greater number — 4,183 — as 

untimely for other reasons (a total of 4,340). BOP officials stated that most, if not 

all, of the untimely releases not attributed to staff error are beyond the BOP’s 

control, either because an entity other than the BOP was responsible for or 

contributed to making the release untimely or because the untimely release was 

likely not preventable. For example, a BOP official told us that in many of these 

cases an inmate was released following a retroactive action that reduced his or her 

sentence to less time than he or she already had served. Under the BOP’s current 

definition, any time served beyond the revised sentence is counted as “over-served 

time” and any release for which there is over-served time is counted as “untimely.” 

We also observed that non-BOP entities can contribute to an untimely release even 

in instances where there is also BOP staff error. It was beyond the scope of this 

review to fully examine or assess untimely releases not attributed to staff error; 

however, we are concerned that because the BOP does not always have complete 

information about the circumstances of untimely releases that other entities 

contribute to, steps that could be taken to prevent them won’t be identified. 

We discussed with BOP officials the circumstances that might result in 

untimely releases that are not due to staff error and some of the actions the BOP 

takes to address these untimely releases. We found that while the Designation and 

Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) reviews every untimely release to determine 

whether there was staff error and classifies it into a general category by cause, the 

DSCC focuses on identifying actions that could prevent future BOP staff errors, 

rather than on understanding all possible contributing factors, including those 

outside of the BOP’s direct control.7 For this reason, the BOP does not 

systematically obtain the information it would need to determine with certainty the 

role other entities may have played. BOP managers told us that collecting this 

information would be laborious and that it may not be helpful in preventing 

untimely releases because, they believe, the vast majority of untimely releases are 

due to some form of technicality, such as the example of a retroactively reduced 

sentence provided above. Additionally, BOP managers stated that without 

thoroughly re-reviewing the 4,183 untimely releases not due to staff error, they 

could not be certain that any given untimely release could not have been prevented 

by one of the agencies involved. 

Table 2 summarizes the BOP’s classification and explanation of the untimely 

releases that occurred between fiscal year (FY) 2009 and 2014 and that it considers 

not due to staff error. 

7

 One BOP manager indicated that any trend, regardless of whether it was due to staff error, 

would also be identified during the DSCC’s review process. 

5 
 

 

Table 2 

Number of Untimely Releases by Cause, Not Including Staff Error 

FYs 2009 – 2014
 

BOP 

Classification Definition/Explanation 

Number 

of 

Untimely 

Releases 

Federal Court 

Order/Amended 

Judgment 

An order that was revisited and modified for either a legal or a 

judicial reason. Occasionally, these orders will be modified to 

include reducing the sentence. If the offender has already 

served more time than the new sentence imposes, the inmate 

becomes an immediate release and may have over-served time. 

1,874 

Federal 

Ineffectual 

Sentence 

An ineffectual sentence occurs when the statutory release date 

is earlier than the date the sentence was imposed. This happens 

when a court sentences an offender based on Sentencing 

Guidelines and imposes terms that do not account for the period 

of time that the offender was held in official detention, instead of 

imposing a “time served” order. 

596 

U.S. Parole 

Commission 

Decisions 

A U.S. Parole Commission decision may cause an untimely 

release when the statutory release date is earlier than the date 

of the Commission’s decision. 

165 

“E-Des” Cases 

Submitted Late 

by the U.S. 

Marshals 

Service or U.S. 

Probation Office 

This is a relatively new category of untimely release that the 

BOP began tracking in the fourth quarter of 2014. It occurs 

when the statutory release date is later than the date the 

sentence was imposed but earlier than the date the BOP 

received all the documents necessary to designate the inmate. 

49 

Untimely 

Releases with 

No Department 

Involvement 

Any outside local or state agency that provides pre-sentence jail 

time and new or updated sentencing information after the 

inmate is in BOP custody may contribute to the inmate receiving 

credit the BOP did not previously provide. On occasion, a state 

entity might have its sentence overturned and vacated after the 

federal sentence has been computed, and the BOP then has to 

adjust the inmate’s creditable time. 

1,499 

TOTAL 4,183 

* The statutory release date is the date that a person must be released at the expiration of his 

or her term of sentence, less any time deducted for good conduct. 

** Designation is the process of determining which BOP institution is to house an inmate. The 

BOP is solely responsible for determining where a federal offender will serve his or her sentence. 

To make a designation, the DSCC must first receive all sentencing material regarding the 

offender, including documents from the sentencing court, the U.S. Probation Office, and the U.S. 

Marshals Service (USMS). “E-Designate” is a system whereby the materials needed to designate 

inmates are shared between agencies electronically. 

*** This table reflects the BOP’s classification of untimely releases not due to staff error. We 

did not review the documentation associated with them or attempt to confirm the BOP’s 

classification. The USMS noted that without reviewing the particulars of each of the 49 E-des 

cases, it could not verify that they were due to late submission. 

Source: Untimely releases the BOP identified as not caused by staff error, FYs 2009 – 2014 

The BOP explained that at the department level, the U.S. Marshals Service 

(USMS) and the U.S. Parole Commission, respectively, can contribute to causing 

untimely releases through either having custody of or granting parole for BOP 

inmates. Non-Department entities such as local and state agencies that had 

6 
 

 

 

 

 

 

custody of an inmate prior to the BOP’s custody can cause or contribute to untimely 

releases because the length of an inmate’s sentence may be affected by overturned 

or vacated state sentences. To correctly update an inmate’s release date, the BOP 

must receive timely and accurate sentencing information. 

As shown in Table 2, the BOP attributed as many as 3,969 of the untimely 

releases during our review period to court orders and sentencing technicalities at 

the federal, state, or local level.8

 In addition to the situation described above about 

a release that was technically untimely even though no staff error contributed, 

DSCC officials presented examples to us of ways that sentencing orders can be 

written that leave room for the kind of confusion in computing sentences that can 

result in an untimely release. For example, on occasion sentencing orders are 

written in a manner that could appear to contravene governing law, such as 

sentences that appear to credit time spent in service of another sentence when the 

statute governing sentence calculation does not allow it.9 This can create confusion 

about the point at which the beginning of the sentence should be calculated, 

thereby potentially leading to an untimely release. 

One DSCC official told us that, when a sentencing judge’s order is 

ambiguous, BOP Classification and Computation staff (CC staff) will try to reach the 

court for clarification. However, if the CC staff is unsuccessful in obtaining the 

information necessary to fully understand the order so that it can complete the 

computation within the DSCC’s established time frame, the staff must interpret the 

order according to what it thinks the judge’s intention is and move on to other 

cases. Another example a DSCC official described is that sometimes a judge may 

include instruction in a sentencing order about how to account for jail credit in a 

specific sentence. When this occurs, it can create a difference between what the 

inmate’s sentence would be if the calculation was based on the judge’s order and 

what the sentence would be if the BOP followed BOP policies, which, according to 

the BOP, are based on federal statute and case law.10 We note, however, that 

addressing such issues only on a case-by-case basis rather than through systemwide changes precludes the implementation of changes that could prevent this type 

of error. 

In the OIG’s judgment, the fact that the BOP classified 4,340 releases (nearly 

1 percent of all releases) as untimely during the period of our review, but only 

8

 The 3,969 includes Federal Court Order/Amended Judgment, Federal Ineffectual Sentence, 

and Untimely Releases with No Department Involvement. 

9

 See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). 

10 According to the BOP’s Legal Resource Guide to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (2014), 12, 

the BOP is solely responsible for calculating federal terms of imprisonment. This guide lists the BOP’s 

policies for calculating the terms of imprisonment as Program Statements 5880.28, Sentence 

Computation Manual (CCCA of 1984); 5880.30, Sentence Computation Manual ("Old Law" Pre-CCCA1984); 5880.33, District of Columbia Sentence Computation Manual; and 5110.16, Administration of 

Sentence for Military Inmates. The guide notes that “occasionally, a ‘Judgment and Commitment’ may 

direct the defendant’s term of imprisonment to be calculated in a manner contrary to law.” In 1992, 

the U.S. Supreme Court held that a district court cannot award jail credit at sentencing (see United 

States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992)). 

7 
 

 

comprehensively assessed the 157 that it attributed to BOP staff error, 

demonstrates a need for further review of all untimely releases. We believe the 

BOP should be a central participant in such a review, but we also believe the review 

must include the many entities within and outside the Department that have roles 

in writing, interpreting, and executing judicial orders and other sentencing 

documents. Coordinated action is needed to identify and implement changes that 

would broadly address the significant problem of untimely release. 

For such a review to provide a better understanding of the causes of 

untimely releases, information about the circumstances surrounding each untimely 

release, including, where applicable, the role that non-BOP entities played, must be 

available. However, in reviewing untimely release documentation, we found that 

the details of the circumstances that led to untimely release are not always 

complete enough to determine the cause of each case. This is especially true when 

a non-BOP entity may have contributed to the untimely release. The specific details 

needed to fully assess the untimely release are known only to the non-BOP entity 

that was directly involved, and the BOP does not uniformly have or include this 

information in its untimely release documentation. Improving the documentation of 

untimely releases, potentially by having all the agencies that contributed to a given 

untimely release provide explanatory information, may be a necessary first step 

toward a review. 

Untimely Releases Due to Staff Error, While Rare in the Context of All 

Inmate Releases, Occurred Over 150 Times in a Recent 6-Year Period, 

Resulting in Significant Harm 

Based on BOP data, we determined that between 2009 and 2014 there were 

157 total untimely releases due to staff error out of the 461,966 total inmates 

released, representing 0.03 percent of all releases during that 6-year period.11 We 

found that of the 157 untimely releases, 152 were late releases and 5 were early 

releases. Of the five early releases, three occurred in 2009 and were early by 

955 days, 730 days, and 368 days, respectively; one took place in 2014 and was 

31 days early; and one took place in 2013 and was 7 days early. 

As shown in Table 3, of the 152 late releases during this period, 60 percent 

resulted in over-served time of less than 30 days and 40 percent resulted in overserved time of more than 30 days. Three of the inmates over-served by more than 

1 additional year: these inmates over-served 928, 541, and 406 days, 

11 We found that 148 of these 157 untimely releases were due entirely to BOP staff 

error. The remaining 9 fell into the following categories: 2 resulted from a combination of BOP staff 

error and over-served time due to a sentence reduction or an ineffectual sentence (we excluded overserved days due to sentence reductions and ineffectual sentences from our analysis); 4 resulted from 

a combination of BOP staff error and USMS actions that we could not determine as staff error; 

2 resulted from a combination of BOP staff error and either U.S. Probation Office or sentencing court 

actions that we could not verify were staff error; and 1 case in which we could not determine whether 

the BOP, the USMS, or both were responsible for the untimely release. The information we received 

from each agency about these untimely releases was not always detailed or conclusive enough to 

allow us to definitively determine the role of each agency or whether staff error was a contributing 

factor. 

8 
 

 

 

respectively. In addition, Table 3 shows that the percentage of releases that were 

late was relatively constant between calendar years (CY) 2009 and 2014. 

Table 3 

Late Releases Caused by Staff Error, by Year and Number of Days Late
 

CYs 2009 – 2014
 

DAYS LATE 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 

0-30 16 19 13 16 15 12 91 

31-90 8 6 4 5 8 6 37 

91-365 5 2 5 3 2 4 21 

365+ 0 1 0 0 2 0 3 

Total Untimely Releases 29 28 22 24 27 22 152 

Percentage of All Releases 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%

Source: OIG analysis of untimely releases identified by the BOP as caused by staff 

error, CYs 2009 – 2014 

Untimely Late Releases Result in the Deprivation of Freedom and Contravene the 

Sentencing Court’s Order 

Untimely late releases are unjust. The length of a prison term is intended to 

be commensurate with the crime and other relevant facts of the case, as 

determined by the sentencing judge. When inmates are released later than their 

correct release date they are deprived of their freedom without just cause during 

the days they are over-serving. In the case that was the impetus for this review, a 

former BOP inmate filed suit and alleged he was falsely imprisoned because he was 

incarcerated beyond his release date.12 The BOP settled with the inmate, and his 

case was dismissed. When untimely late releases occur, the harm to the inmate 

can be significant and irreparable. 

Additionally, untimely releases, whether early or late, result in incarceration 

for less or more time than contemplated by the sentencing court. However, we 

found that while the BOP program statement contains a notification policy, it is not 

comprehensive and the BOP does not have in place a process to consider whether 

the sentencing court, as opposed to other offices within the court system, should be 

notified of an untimely release. 

The BOP program statement setting forth the notification policy and 

requirements states: 

In any case involving an inmate’s untimely release (including court 

ordered releases that are not acted upon in a timely manner) of 

30 days or more and/or has been identified as a threat to the 

community [sic], the Warden must forward a personal letter to the 

12 Hickman v. United States, 14-cv-03041 (D. Minn.), filed July 30, 2014. 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

appropriate Judicial Official(s) providing details of the untimely 

release.13 

To satisfy this policy for late releases, a BOP official told us that it completes 

and forwards a “BP-623: Late Release Notice for United States Probation Service” 

form to the appropriate U.S. Probation Office. The BOP sends these notices for all 

late releases, including those of less than 30 days. The BOP does not separately 

notify the sentencing court, and it does not notify the U.S. Attorney’s Office that 

handled the case. One BOP official told us that the BOP does not notify the 

sentencing judge for untimely late releases because the term of imprisonment has 

been satisfied. With regard to notification to the inmates themselves, BOP Program 

Statement 5800.15 requires that a roster of sentence computation changes be 

given to unit teams each day, and that a copy of the inmate’s sentence 

computation be sent to the inmate’s file and the inmate. The Program Statement 

does not indicate if inmates are to be made aware that they have been held beyond 

their correct release date for any reason, and it was beyond the scope of this 

review to determine if that is done as a matter of practice. 

For early releases, BOP officials told us that the BOP notifies the sentencing 

court specifically in cases in which an inmate has been released more than 30 days 

early, because of the threat the incorrectly released inmate may pose to the public 

safety of the community. However, we found that no such notifications occurred 

for the four early releases of 30 days or more that we reviewed. For three of these 

four cases, a BOP official told us that they did not notify the sentencing court 

because the inmates were returned to custody prior to the notification letter being 

drafted.14 In the fourth case, a BOP official cited as the basis for not notifying the 

sentencing court the fact that the error resulting in the inmate’s early release was 

not identified until after the inmate’s correct release date had passed. 

Given the sentencing court’s inherent interest in ensuring that its orders are 

obeyed, in our judgment the Department should ensure that its components 

consider whether, in cases of early or late release due to staff error or any other 

reason, notification to the sentencing court would be appropriate. Such an effort 

would require that the BOP consult closely with other Department components, 

particularly the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, about the 

circumstances under which it might be appropriate to notify the courts and/or the 

specific U.S. Attorney’s Office that handled a case that led to an untimely release. 

13 BOP Program Statement 5800.15, Correctional Systems Manual, January 1, 2009, 

Chapter 9, section 906. 

14 As discussed later in the report, of the five inmates mistakenly released early, one was out 

of custody for 14 days prior to being returned to custody, one for 5 days, and one for less than a full 

day. For the other two inmates, the correct release date passed while they were out of custody — one 

after 6 days and the other after 30 days. 

10
 
 

 

 

 

 

Untimely Releases Result in Abrupt Reentry of Inmates into Society 

When the BOP discovers that an inmate is erroneously over-serving time on 

an existing sentence, the inmate is immediately released to minimize the number of 

days over-served. Unfortunately, this may result in the release of inmates who are 

less prepared to reenter society than would have been the case if no error had been 

made. The BOP has a variety of programs geared toward preparing inmates for 

successful reentry; some are planned around an inmate’s release date. For 

example, according to the BOP’s Program Statement, participation in the Release 

Preparation Program begins 30 months prior to release and covers programming in 

six core areas: (1) Health and Nutrition, (2) Employment, (3) Personal Finance and 

Consumer Skills, (4) Information and Community Resources, (5) Release 

Requirements and Procedures, and (6) Personal Growth and Development.15 With 

some exceptions, all inmates in the BOP’s custody are required to participate in the 

Release Preparation Program.16 

In addition to an untimely released inmate’s inability to participate in the 

Release Preparation Program, an official from the Administrative Office of the U.S. 

Courts told us that an abrupt release makes the inmate’s reentry, as well as the 

jobs of those who assist with the inmate’s post-release supervision process, much 

more difficult. One DSCC official we spoke with suggested that abrupt reentries 

into society would be especially difficult for inmates who had been in prison for a 

long time. 

Untimely Late Releases Result in Significant Monetary Costs to the Taxpayer 

There are a number of significant monetary costs that result from untimely 

releases due to staff error, including the daily cost of incarcerating inmates beyond 

their correct release dates as well as any litigation and settlement costs.17 We 

found that between 2009 and 2014, inmates over-served a total of 8,917 days due 

to staff error, at an estimated total cost of nearly $669,814 (see Table 4), exclusive 

of litigation and settlement costs. In aggregate, inmates over-serving time due to 

staff error in medium security facilities cost the BOP the most, at approximately 

$254,313; inmates over-serving time in administrative facilities cost the BOP the 

least, at approximately $6,364.18 

15 BOP Program Statement P5325.07, Release Preparation Program, December 31, 2007, 

paragraph 10.b. The BOP’s Release Preparation Program is the subject of an ongoing OIG review. 

16 Inmates not required to participate include those committed for psychological study and 

observation (to assess their need for psychological treatment or services), those serving a sentence of 

6 months or less, those with a death sentence, those confined in an administrative maximum security 

institution, those with a “Will Deport Order,” state inmates, deportable aliens, and inmates arriving at 

their initially designated institution with less than 6 months remaining on their sentence. 

17 It was beyond the scope of our review to analyze the monetary costs resulting from 

untimely releases not due to staff error. 

18 The BOP’s daily cost to house inmates depends on the security level: the higher the 

security level of the inmate, the greater the cost. Administrative facilities are institutions with special 

missions that house inmates at all security levels. Inmates are assigned to administrative facilities for 

Continued 

11
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                        484

                                   3,474

                                    3,487

                                    1,390

                                         77

                                             5

                                    8,917

Table 4 

Estimated Incarceration Costs of Late Releases Due to 

Staff Error, by Security Level 

CYs 2009 – 2014
 

Number of Inmates Total Days Over‐Served Total Cost to BOP

Minimum 18 $                 28,365

Low 64 $                249,648

Medium 45 $                254,313

High 21 $                130,810

Administrative 2 $                     6,364

Unknown 2 $                       314

Total 152 $                669,814

Source: OIG analysis of untimely releases identified by BOP as caused by staff 

error, CYs 2009 – 2014 

In addition to the cost of incarceration, under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 

1946, inmates may also seek monetary damages from the federal government for 

time over-served. 

19 An inmate’s first step in seeking compensation for being held 

beyond the correct release date is to file an administrative claim with the BOP. If 

the BOP denies the claim, or the inmate is dissatisfied with the BOP’s settlement 

offer, the inmate may file suit in federal court. 

Between 2009 and 2015, the federal government settled four lawsuits filed 

by inmates alleging untimely release.20 These settlements were for $90,000; 

$120,000; $295,000; and $175,000.21 According to the BOP, these were the only 

administrative or litigation settlements for untimely releases that the federal 

government paid during this period. This does not include additional costs the 

Department incurred as a result of these cases, such as salary costs expended to 

handle the lawsuits. 

reasons other than security level, such as to be near a court where they are required to be present. 

To calculate the cost of an untimely release, we used the average daily cost to house an inmate at the 

inmate’s security level during the year the inmate was released. There were two inmates who overserved a total of 5 days for whom the BOP could not identify the security level. We based the average 

daily cost on the fiscal year average of the total daily cost per inmate per day by security level, as 

provided by the BOP. We determined the number of days by the total number of over-served days for 

all late releases, by security level. 

19 Title VI of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 

28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680. 

20 One additional lawsuit, filed between 2009 and 2014, was dismissed. In general, the 

relevant U.S. Attorney’s Office handles litigation for untimely release lawsuits. 

21 These settlements were paid out of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Judgment Fund. 

12
 
 

 

 

 

 

Early Releases Result in Costs to the Department and the Taxpayer, as well 

as Potential Harm to Inmates, Their Families, and Their Communities 

After an untimely early release occurs, the USMS locates and apprehends the 

inmate and then transports the inmate to a BOP facility to undergo intake 

processing. These actions cost the BOP and the USMS time and resources. 

The potential harm can also be significant for the inmate, his or her family, 

and the community. For example, they may suffer harm if the inmate is rearrested 

after he or she has gained employment and reestablished ties with family and 

community. Also, the community into which the inmate is released early may be 

placed in danger if the inmate pursues criminal activity upon release. Though these 

potential harms exist, we determined that for the five early releases between 2009 

and 2014, none of the inmates was rearrested, charged with, or convicted of any 

crimes during the time he or she was in the community before the correct release 

date. Additionally, none of the inmates mistakenly released was free for more than 

30 days: three were out of custody for no more than 14 days; for the other two, 

the correct release date passed while they were out of custody — one after 6 days 

and the other after 30 days. 

The Causes of Untimely Releases Vary 

We found that most untimely releases due to staff error between 2009 and 

2014 were the result of mistakes at the DSCC. However, other BOP entities and 

possibly the USMS also made mistakes that led to untimely releases. Of the 

157 untimely releases between 2009 and 2014 that were within the scope of our 

review, the BOP classified 127 as the result of errors made at the DSCC and 30 as 

the result of errors at non-DSCC entities. 

Untimely Releases as a Result of DSCC Staff Error 

Even among untimely releases due to staff error, it was not possible to 

classify each untimely release by a single, mutually exclusive cause because some 

untimely releases were due to a combination of factors. Rather than comparing 

types of errors, we sought to highlight the mistakes that, if addressed, could make 

the most difference for reducing the number and severity of untimely releases. 

Below we explain the most significant types of errors and how they occurred. 

In our review of each of the 127 untimely releases that the BOP classified as 

being due to DSCC staff error, we identified certain mistakes as most significant 

either because they occurred the most frequently or because they tended to result 

in a significant number of days over served. Specifically, misapplication of jail 

credit resulted in 59 of the 127 untimely releases — the most of any type of error 

we identified in our analysis. Our analysis also found that errors in identifying 

primary jurisdiction and consecutive versus concurrent sentences tended to result 

in a significant number of days over served. Specifically, the average number of 

days over served in untimely releases due to errors in identifying primary 

jurisdiction was 169 and those due to errors in determining consecutive versus 

concurrent sentences was 102 — the highest of any error type that we identified in 

13
 
 

 

 

 

 

our analysis. Below, we elaborate on the errors we believe are most significant 

based on our analysis of the 127 errors that occurred at the DSCC. 

	 Misapplication of 

Jail Credit. Example of Misapplication of Jail Credit Resulting in Correctly computing Untimely Release

an inmate’s release One untimely release was the result of the CC staff not date depends on following up on documentation that should have led the staff 

accurately	 member to contact a local jail. A CC staff member reviewed a 

determining the document that indicated the inmate may have been arrested 

for a probation violation, but the arrest was not verified in the amount of jail credit document. This should have led the staff member to contact the inmate has that the jail where the inmate would have been held to ask should be applied to whether the arrest had actually taken place and, if so, how 

the sentence. Jail many days the inmate had spent in jail. If the staff member 

credit, also referred had contacted the jail, he would have discovered 

approximately 1 month of additional jail credit. After the to as prior-custody inmate made an informal request to review his release date, credit, is typically the the DSCC discovered and applied the additional jail credit. 

amount of time the Ultimately, the error resulted in a late release of 13 days. 

inmate spent in local, 

state, or federal custody after the date of offense and before commencement 

of the federal sentence. Once applied, this credit reduces the amount of time 

inmates must serve in the BOP. When it is not applied — or is applied 

incorrectly — it can result in an incorrect release date computation. We 

found that incorrect jail credit calculation by DSCC staff caused, in whole or 

in part, 59 of the 157 untimely releases within our scope between 2009 and 

2014, making it by far the most frequent staff error-related cause of 

untimely releases during this period. 

Most of the DSCC staff we interviewed said that determining jail credit is the 

most difficult part of sentence computation because accurate calculation 

requires obtaining and analyzing information from other entities that held the 

inmate prior to BOP custody. Local jails, courthouses, state departments of 

corrections, and Native American reservations are some of the entities that 

DSCC staff may need to contact to obtain this information. 

We found three common causes of jail credit error attributable to BOP staff: 

(1) not following up to obtain or verify jail credit information; (2) failing to 

account for relevant information in the documents; and (3) not following up 

on relevant documentation in a timely fashion, the consequences of which 

are most pronounced for inmates with shorter sentences. See the text box 

above for an example of an untimely release caused by misapplication of jail 

credit. 

	 Incorrect Interpretation of Source Documents. As stated above, the CC 

staff analyzes documents to determine an inmate’s date of release. 

Misinterpretation of one or more of these documents can lead to an incorrect 

release date computation. We identified two categories of errors stemming 

from a misinterpretation of source documents that were more frequent than 

others, which resulted in, on average, longer over-served time than other 

14
 
 

 

 

 

errors: (1) misidentification of primary jurisdiction and (2) misidentification 

of concurrent versus consecutive sentences. 

o	 Primary Jurisdiction. Several complications can arise when computing the 

sentence of an inmate subject to the authority of multiple jurisdictions. 

While complicated, especially when an inmate has multiple state and 

federal sentences and has been arrested and released by multiple state 

and federal authorities, correctly determining which jurisdiction has 

“primary jurisdiction” is essential for accurately computing an inmate’s 

sentence. Generally the authority, whether federal or state, that first 

arrested the inmate has primary jurisdiction over the case. For example, 

if an inmate with federal and state charges pending is arrested by federal 

agents, the inmate is under primary federal jurisdiction. However, if the 

inmate posts federal bond and is released to state authorities, the primary 

jurisdiction can change to state jurisdiction. Primary jurisdiction can also 

be transferred if an inmate had been released on bail or parole, state 

charges are dismissed, or state and federal authorities make an 

agreement regarding custody.22 

Incorrect determinations of primary jurisdiction often result in inaccurate 

application of jail credit or an incorrect sentence start date, which can 

lead to an untimely release. We found that 9 of the 157 untimely 

releases within the scope of our review were the result, in whole or in 

part, from an incorrect determination of primary jurisdiction. These 

untimely releases resulted in an average of 169 days of over-served time, 

which is much higher than the average of 59 days of over-served time for 

all other untimely releases between 2009 and 2014. We describe a 

primary jurisdiction error below in Case 2 under Case Studies of Releases 

over 1 Year Late. 

o	 Concurrent versus Consecutive Sentences. If an inmate has been 

convicted of more than one crime, the two or more sentences can run 

concurrently (at the same time) or consecutively (one sentence begins 

after the other ends). We found that nine of the untimely releases within 

the scope of our review were, in whole or in part, the result of an 

incorrect determination of concurrent versus consecutive sentences. 

These errors resulted in an average of 102 days of over-served time, as 

compared to the average of 63 days of over-served time for all other 

untimely releases between 2009 and 2014. We also found instances 

where the DSCC staff mistakenly used the incorrect sentence type even 

when the correct sentence type was indicated in the documentation. 

22 In the BOP’s comments to this report, the BOP stated that “DSCC staff determinations of 

sentence computations may be further complicated when federal sentencing courts expect the federal 

government to take a defendant into custody immediately upon sentencing, which is contrary to the 

training DSCC staff receive and the computation system utilized at the DSCC.” 

15
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

DSCC Communication with External Entities to Obtain Jail Credit Information 

All of the CC staff members we interviewed, as well as many of the other 

DSCC staff members with whom we spoke, told us that communication with entities 

outside the DSCC to obtain jail credit information can be challenging and that poor 

communication with such entities could lead to incorrect release date computations. 

As mentioned above, these entities include local jails, courthouses, state 

departments of corrections, Native American reservations, the USMS, and others. 

We identified several factors that can make communication with external 

entities difficult. First, it is not always apparent who has the information the DSCC 

staff member needs. CC staff members told us that, while phone numbers for most 

entities are available online, whom to talk to and what communication method they 

prefer or require is not always apparent. Second, CC staff members told us that 

the information external entities provide the DSCC may simply be incorrect or 

contrary to information they previously provided, requiring additional clarification. 

Third, CC staff members told us that entities vary in their use of terminology. For 

example, some entities, particularly local jails, use the term “time served” to 

indicate that the inmate was released after serving all of his or her time. In 

contrast, the BOP commonly uses this term to indicate all the time the inmate has 

served up until that point. DSCC officials told us that such terminology differences 

could lead to a misunderstanding and misapplication of jail credit. 

Finally, CC staff members told us that difficulty with establishing contact with 

some external entities could lead to an incorrect sentence computation and 

untimely release. Such a scenario is of particular concern for inmates with short 

sentences. For example, a CC staff member who was computing a sentence for an 

inmate sentenced to serve 4 months failed to timely follow up with a jail, leading to 

an untimely release. The staff member was not able to contact the jail on 

January 9 — the day sentence computation was started — and did not attempt to 

contact the jail again or complete the sentence computation within the 30-day time 

frame for short sentences. On March 3 of the same year, the DSCC discovered that 

the sentence computation had not been completed. Once the DSCC successfully 

contacted the jail, added the additional jail credit, and completed the computation, 

the inmate had already over-served 2 days. A senior DSCC official told us that, 

especially because of the short sentence, the DSCC staff member should have 

continued to try to contact the jail in the days after January 9. 

CC and other DSCC staff members told us that experience computing 

sentences at the DSCC plays the most important part in being able to successfully 

communicate with external entities regarding jail credit. Over time, CC staff 

members develop a rapport with the officials with whom they regularly 

communicate. They also obtain direct phone numbers, e-mail addresses, preferred 

communication methods, and other helpful information not always available online. 

We learned that experienced CC staff members keep this information using their 

individual rolodexes, electronic documents, or other methods, and share this 

information with their teammates only on an ad hoc basis. 

16
 
 

 

 

 

However, several DSCC staff members told the OIG that it would be useful to 

have a master document that combines all of the knowledge gained from the 

team’s experience communicating with external entities in the jurisdictions the 

team covers. We also believe that such a document could be useful if DSCC team 

members had immediate access to edit its content to keep it up to date. In 

addition to serving as a more complete list of contacts than each staff member 

would have separately, it would also assist with retaining knowledge that may 

otherwise disappear as a result of staff turnover. 

Establishing professional relationships is crucial for CC staff members who 

must obtain accurate and timely information from staffs working at a wide variety 

of federal, state, and local entities. We found that the CC staff does not receive 

training focused on establishing and maintaining professional relationships.23 We 

believe such training could improve interactions between the DSCC staff and staffs 

at external entities and could lead to improved access to jail credit information. 

Training may also improve information sharing between DSCC teammates, with a 

common goal of ensuring that inmate release dates are calculated correctly. 

Though the DSCC does not have training focused on establishing and maintaining 

professional relationships, DSCC managers do counsel and train staff members 

responsible for errors that led to an untimely release on how the mistakes occurred 

and how to avoid them in the future. However, we found that the DSCC does not 

track such counseling or training in an employee’s personnel file, which would allow 

a later reassessment if the same staff member had made a similar error. 

Untimely Releases as a Result of Non-DSCC Staff Error 

The BOP attributed 30 late untimely releases (out of the 157 in the scope of 

our review) between 2009 and 2014 to entities other than the DSCC. Our review of 

the untimely release forms (BP 558 and 623) for these cases indicated that of the 

entities that were in whole or in part responsible for these untimely releases, BOP 

institutions were responsible for 14; BOP Residential Reentry Management field 

offices for 6; Residential Reentry Centers, previously known as Community 

Corrections Centers, for 3; private contract prisons for 3; and a BOP regional office 

for 1.24 

23 Training in interpersonal communication styles could help alleviate computation mistakes. 

One CC staff member described the importance of building and maintaining a good rapport with 

representatives from external entities by telling us that a point of contact with whom he had 

developed an effective working relationship refused to take calls directly from the DSCC staff after 

having a negative interaction with another DSCC employee. This example shows how poor 

interpersonal communication among CC staff members can impede timely and accurate sentence 

computations. A DSCC manager noted that the teams often work with the same jurisdictions 

regularly; therefore, building rapport can assist teams in obtaining the information necessary to make 

accurate calculations. 

24 In one of the six untimely releases we attributed to errors of Residential Reentry 

Management field offices, the error occurred at the local jail to which the field office had assigned the 

BOP inmate. For 3 of the 30 untimely releases, the BOP attributed error to non-DSCC staffs; but we 

could not determine whether the USMS, a BOP institution, or both were responsible. BOP 

documentation indicated that the USMS was at least partially responsible, but the USMS told us that 

Continued 

17
 
 

 

 

 

 

The forms for each untimely release, known as Untimely Release Notification 

(BP 558) and Late Release Notice for United States Probation Service (BP 623), 

described the reason for the untimely release. Based on our assessment of each 

narrative, we determined that the four most common descriptions of untimely 

releases due to non-DSCC staff error were: 

1.	 Notification or Information Failures. This includes untimely notifications 

as well as failures to update, send, or use the correct information. For 

example, in one situation an inmate incorrectly lost good time credit after a 

staff member credited it to the wrong inmate. By the time the error was 

discovered and the good time reapplied, the inmate had over-served 3 days. 

2.	 Releases the Day After the Correct Release Date, Sometimes without 

Explanation. In some of these cases, the BOP was unable to provide us 

additional information regarding the staff errors that caused the late release 

or to determine with certainty whether the untimely release was in fact the 

result of staff error. For example, in one of these cases, after the DSCC 

updated a sentence computation and notified the facility that the inmate 

should be released that day, the institution did not release the inmate until 

the next day and the untimely release report offered no explanation for the 

delay. According to the BOP, generally when an institution cannot release an 

inmate on the day he or she is supposed to be released, it can be due to 

transportation issues, medication requirements, lack of release plans, or 

incomplete victim and witness notification or Adam Walsh Child Protection 

and Safety Act of 2006 review requirements. 

3.	 Sentence Computation Errors, Primarily by BOP Institutions That 

Computed Inmate Sentences Prior to the DSCC’s Existence, and One 

Computed by a Contract Facility That Had Yet to Transition Its 

Sentence Computation Functions to the DSCC. For example, a private 

contract facility staff member incorrectly computed an inmate’s sentence by 

misidentifying and misapplying jail credit, resulting in 281 days over-served, 

the most significant late release due to non-DSCC error. 

4.	 Failures to Properly Monitor Inmate Release Dates. In one situation, 

institution staff failed to run an inmate release roster containing the 

scheduled release dates of individual inmates, resulting in one inmate overserving 1 day. 

A BOP official told us that the causes of untimely releases are not always 

identifiable because official documentation sometimes provides inadequate 

descriptions. We believe that not having thorough and accurate descriptions of the 

its records did not indicate that the USMS was responsible for the over-served time. This lack of 

clarity underscores the need for an assessment of untimely releases at the Department level that 

would allow for a better understanding of how multiple agencies can contribute to untimely releases so 

that effective solutions for preventing them can be developed. 

18
 
 

 

 

 

events leading to untimely release hinders the BOP in identifying and addressing 

their underlying causes. 

The Transition of Sentence Computation Responsibility to the DSCC Appears to 

Have Reduced the Number of Untimely Releases 

The BOP transitioned sentence computations to the DSCC in 2005 in order to 

consolidate all BOP sentence computation functions, reduce costs, and ensure 

consistent application of laws and BOP policies. According to the BOP’s information, 

the transfer also appears to have reduced the number of untimely releases due to 

staff error. As shown in Table 5, between 1999 and 2004 — the 6 years before the 

DSCC was created in 2005 — there were approximately 344 untimely releases due 

to staff error (approximately 0.1 percent of the total number of inmates released 

during the period), compared to 157 during the 6 years between 2009 and 2014 

that are the subject of this review (approximately 0.03 percent of the total number 

of inmates released during this period).25 

Table 5 

Untimely Releases Due to Staff Error before and after 

Creation of the DSCC
 

FYs 1999 – 2004 and CYs 2009 – 2014 

Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total Grand Total % of All Releases

1999 18 9 11 15 53

2000 22 17 6 45

2001 22 19 22 22 85

2002 16 14 12 16 58

2003 17 10 16 11 54

2004 19 16 14 49

2009 8 11 11 2 32

2010 10 5 10 3 28

2011 9 3 4 6 22

2012 3 6 8 7 24

2013 5 4 10 9 28

2014 8 3 5 7 23

0.10%

0.03%

Quarter

Pre‐DSCC

Post‐DSCC

344

157

Sources: BOP-provided information for FYs 1999 – 2004 and OIG analysis of 

untimely releases due to staff error as identified by the BOP, CYs 2009 – 2014 

25 The BOP told us that it was unable to provide untimely release information for the fourth 

quarters of 2000 and 2004 because it had retained some untimely release records for analysis and 

destroyed others as part of the Records Information Disposal Schedule (they were older than 6 years). 

19
 
 

 

 

BOP Processes to Prevent Untimely Releases 

The DSCC staff members we interviewed, including the Chief of the DSCC, 

told us that because people perform sentence computations, mistakes are 

inevitable. There is the possibility of human error at every step of the sentence 

computation process, from initial computation to final release audit. We identified 

several crucial measures the BOP has in place that help prevent untimely release, 

including certification and final release audits that double check the initial sentence 

computation, program reviews of DSCC operations that can result in operational 

improvements, and processes through which inmates can request a review of their 

release date. We found that while these measures help to reduce untimely releases 

due to staff error, they did not eliminate them. As described below, we also 

identified one additional measure the DSCC could take to help prevent untimely 

releases due to staff error. 

Certification and Final Release Audits 

Between 2009 and 2014, 29 of the 157 staff errors that resulted in untimely 

releases were discovered by certification audits and 19 were discovered by final 

release audits. We found that final release audits are likely to prevent an untimely 

release, but only if they occur early enough before an inmate’s release date that 

any reduced sentence time can be accounted for. Currently, the DSCC performs a 

final release audit 12 months before an inmate’s projected release date. Yet for 14 

of the 19 errors discovered by final release audits, the untimely release may not 

have resulted if the final release audit had occurred 18 months before the inmate’s 

release date instead of 12 months.26 Similarly, 18 of the 19 errors may not have 

resulted in untimely release if the final release audit had occurred 24 months prior 

to the release date.27 

Program Reviews 

The BOP’s Program Review Division (PRD) and the DSCC routinely conduct 

program reviews of the DSCC to evaluate trends and identify deficiencies in its 

operations. Program reviews have resulted in changes to DSCC operations that can 

help prevent untimely releases. Two PRD reviews, conducted in August of 2009 

and September of 2011, rated the DSCC as “acceptable.” However, a September 

2013 review rated the DSCC as “deficient.” The PRD’s report stated that the 

“deficient” rating reflected in part that “initial sentence computations are not always 

computed and audited within established time frames” and not all source 

documents “support the sentence computation.” To address the former finding, 

DSCC documentation indicated that the DSCC filled at least four vacant positions 

26 We based this determination on the number of over-served days for each inmate. Each of 

the 14 inmates had less than 6 months of over-served time when the error was discovered during the 

final release audit, meaning that conducting the final release audits 6 months earlier may have 

allowed the BOP to avoid the untimely releases. 

27 These four inmates had between 6 and 12 months of over-served time at the time the final 

release audit discovered the error. 

20
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

following a period of low staffing levels that the BOP attributed to sequestration and 

a hiring freeze, and DSCC Section Chiefs began having bi-weekly meetings with 

managers to ensure the timely completion of certification audits. The DSCC also 

identified specific teams that had difficulty meeting time frame requirements and 

placed special emphasis on assisting those teams in complying with the established 

timeframes. To address the latter finding, according to documentation the BOP 

provided, the DSCC established a tracking system to identify sentence computation 

errors and trends, including the tracking of missing source documents; devised a 

method to assist in naming and saving of source documents; and used bi-weekly 

meetings to discuss the findings of the tracking system’s error report. In 

September 2014, the PRD closed the 2013 review, stating in a memorandum that 

the DSCC had resolved all of the deficiencies to the PRD’s satisfaction and had put 

in place administrative controls to prevent recurrence. We did not independently 

assess the actions the DSCC took that resulted in the PRD closing the review. 

Perpetual Audits 

“Perpetual audits” are another process the DSCC uses to improve operations 

and sentence computation accuracy, whereby every month the DSCC staff checks 

170 sentence computations (10 for each DSCC team). A DSCC official said that, as 

a matter of practice, the DSCC uses perpetual audits to identify common mistakes 

and then conducts training to help DSCC staff avoid making them. In this review, 

we assessed the monthly perpetual audits that the DSCC conducted between 

October 2013 and November 2014. Our assessment identified an overall sentence 

computation error rate of greater than 5 percent for 12 out of 13 months examined. 

A DSCC official confirmed that the DSCC considers error rates greater than 

5 percent to be high. One month’s overall error rate was 12 percent. The DSCC 

told us that to address the high error rates it expanded training for DSCC 

employees throughout the year by including in the training more complex 

computation situations and additional information about verifying state information 

and by conducting training more frequently. The BOP told us that these actions 

resulted in an error rate of 2.4 percent and an overall rating of “good” on the PRD’s 

January 2015 program review. 

Educational Events 

We also found that the DSCC conducts educational events related to DSCC 

operations, such as sentence computation, that may have unmet potential for 

preventing untimely release. Some of these events bring together officials from the 

DSCC and non-BOP officials including U.S. District Court Judges, federal Public 

Defenders, and U.S. Probation Office staff. At these events, the non-DSCC 

attendees request the topics that are discussed, such as sentence computation, the 

interaction of federal and non-federal sentences, judicial recommendations, and a 

general understanding of the role of the DSCC. The DSCC conducted 13 of these 

educational events between 2009 and 2014. 

Historically, the DSCC has not used these events explicitly for the purpose of 

educating the participants on the means to prevent untimely release, even though 

they may sometimes offer information that could be helpful in preventing them. 

21
 
 

 

 

 

During this review, a DSCC manager expressed the opinion that these education 

events have the potential to help reduce the number of untimely releases. For 

example, showing criminal justice officials how conflicting information can lead to 

an incorrect sentence computation may prompt them to adjust the way they record 

information. The official also told us that the DSCC has no formal participant 

feedback process for these events. 

We agree that these events could provide a useful forum to discuss topics 

and share information that could help avoid untimely releases, including topics and 

information identified by DSCC staff (as opposed to non-DSCC attendees) as 

pertinent to the effort to prevent untimely releases. The DSCC could further 

capitalize on these events if it were to identify and invite participation from nonBOP officials whose actions contribute to ensuring timely inmate releases, but who 

have not previously taken part in these events. We also note that as valuable as 

these events may already be, the DSCC is missing an opportunity to further 

enhance their impact and effectiveness by not collecting feedback from participants, 

which it could use to tailor content to participant needs and interests. 

Inquiries by Inmates, Their Families, and Advocates 

Inmates, their families, and other advocates have used formal and informal 

inquiry processes to help bring to light errors made during the sentence 

computation process. Inmates can, in writing or orally, informally request that the 

BOP review their release date. Between 2009 and 2014, 54 of the 157 errors that 

resulted in untimely releases were discovered through inmates’ informal requests 

for review. 

Inmates may also at any time file a formal administrative remedy request 

relating to any aspect of their confinement, including their release date. 

Administrative remedy requests that challenge a release date have three increasing 

levels of review: (1) the inmate’s institution, (2) the regional office, and (3) the 

Central Office. Between 2009 and 2014, 6 of the 157 errors that resulted in 

untimely releases were discovered through the administrative remedy process, 

3 were discovered as a result of an attorney’s inquiry, and 1 was discovered as a 

result of a family’s inquiry. 

Case Studies of Releases Over 1 Year Late 

Below we describe the three untimely releases that resulted in inmates 

spending particularly significant amounts of over-served time in prison. We 

describe why these late releases occurred, what was done to prevent the mistake 

from happening again, and the cost to the BOP. In each case, the BOP released the 

inmate as soon as the error was discovered and the sentence correctly computed. 

Case 1: Misapplication of Jail Credit Resulting in 928 Days of Over-served Time 

When the DSCC performed the initial sentence computation for this inmate, it 

did not obtain the relevant state sentencing documents that would have led it to 

apply jail credit to the inmate’s federal sentence. The DSCC did not discover the 

22
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sentence computation error during the certification audit. Instead, the inmate’s 

inquiry about his release date brought the error to the attention of a BOP regional 

office. A total of 3 days passed from the date the inmate made the inquiry until the 

inmate was released. DSCC officials we spoke to said they did not know why the 

staff did not obtain state sentencing information during the initial sentence 

computation. The inmate was improperly confined in prison for 928 days, or nearly 

3 years, past the correct release date. The result was a serious deprivation of the 

inmate’s liberty and a violation of the court’s sentencing order. There also was an 

additional cost to taxpayers of $66,732 for incarcerating the inmate in a medium 

security facility for this additional period. The BOP offered no compensation to the 

inmate, and the inmate did not seek monetary relief. DSCC officials told us that 

they took no additional action as a result of this error because the staff members 

responsible for it were no longer employed by the BOP when the error was 

discovered. 

Case 2: Incorrect Primary Jurisdiction Determination Resulting in 541 Days of 

Over-served Time 

When the DSCC performed the initial sentence computation for this inmate, it 

was unaware of a key document, specifically an amendment to a state judge’s 

previous order that resulted in the release of the inmate from state prison. It was 

only when the inmate challenged the sentence computation that the DSCC staff 

discovered the error by finding a reference to the amendment in the online Public 

Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system and, as a result, released the 

inmate.28 DSCC officials told us that the CC staff was not aware of the missing 

document because staff members do not search PACER when they perform 

sentence computations. DSCC managers told us that the DSCC staff uses PACER 

only for verifying court orders and reviewing dockets when responding to inquiries 

and not for sentence computations because doing so would be too cost and labor 

intensive.29 As a result of not being aware of the amendment, the DSCC staff 

incorrectly computed the inmate’s sentence based on primary state jurisdiction 

instead of primary federal jurisdiction. This resulted in jail credit not being applied 

to the inmate’s sentence and the inmate being improperly confined for 541 days, or 

nearly 1.5 years, past the correct release date, a serious deprivation of the inmate’s 

liberty and a violation of the court’s sentencing order. The error also resulted in an 

additional cost to taxpayers of approximately $40,428 for incarcerating the inmate 

in a medium security facility for this additional period. The BOP offered no 

compensation to the inmate, and the inmate did not seek monetary relief. DSCC 

officials told us that as a result of this untimely release they provided training on 

the late discovery of information and primary jurisdiction to the team that worked 

on this inmate’s sentence computation. 

28 PACER is an electronic public access service that allows users to obtain case and docket 

information online from federal courts. 

29 The BOP stated that the DSCC staff annually conducts approximately 153,309 initial 

computations and 91,475 updates to existing computations. Because PACER currently charges 

10 cents for every page viewed, viewing one page for each inmate would cost approximately $24,478. 

This underestimates the total cost because dockets are often longer than one page. 

23
 
 

Case 3: Misinterpretation of a Judge’s Sentencing Order Resulting in 406 Days of 

Over-served Time 

This inmate was initially convicted on two counts that were to run 

consecutively. A judge subsequently reduced both counts to a combined 

76 months. However, in updating the sentence, the DSCC staff misinterpreted the 

judge’s sentencing order to mean that only the longer of the two counts was to be 

reduced to 76 months. Both the DSCC staff member performing the computation 

update and the staff member performing the certification audit to the update made 

this mistake. As a result, the DSCC scheduled the inmate’s release for a 

significantly later date than it should have. The DSCC discovered the error during 

the final release audit, approximately 12 months prior to the inmate’s incorrect 

release date. Ultimately, the inmate was improperly confined for 406 days, or over 

1 year, past the correct release date. This resulted in a serious deprivation of the 

inmate’s liberty and a violation of the court’s sentencing order. It also cost 

taxpayers approximately $31,619 to incarcerate the inmate in a low security facility 

for this additional period. The inmate filed a lawsuit against the BOP that ended in 

a settlement of $175,000. The DSCC Chief’s note on the BP 558 form indicated 

that staff members responsible for the error were reminded to clarify with their 

supervisor any sentencing order that may be ambiguous. 

24
 
 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 

Conclusion 

We found that of the 461,966 inmate releases between 2009 and 2014, the 

BOP categorized 157 as “untimely” due to staff error and a far greater number — 

4,183 — as untimely for other reasons. According to the BOP, the vast majority of 

untimely releases not due to staff error were due to situations beyond its control, 

such as amended sentences that resulted in shorter sentences than the time an 

inmate had already served, compared to the 157 it classified as due to staff error. 

Data and information we reviewed indicates that other entities may sometimes 

contribute to untimely releases. Additionally, we found that the BOP does not 

always have complete information about the circumstances of untimely releases 

that other entities contributed to. We believe that a review of untimely releases 

with participation from all relevant entities, both within and outside of the 

Department, is needed to assess the full range of causes of untimely releases and 

how best to address those that are in any way preventable. 

Our review focused on analyzing the 157 untimely releases that the BOP 

attributed to staff error. We found that untimely releases due to staff error are rare 

as a percentage of all inmate releases but, like all untimely releases, can cause 

very significant harms when they do occur. Late untimely releases inappropriately 

deprive inmates of their freedom, while early releases result in several potential 

harms to inmates, their families, and their communities. Both early and late 

untimely releases contravene court sentencing orders. Moreover, 6 of the 

157 releases we examined were untimely by more than a year: we identified early 

releases of 955, 730, and 368 days and late releases of 928, 541, and 406 days. 

While the causes of untimely releases due to staff error are varied, we found 

that most are the result of an incorrectly computed release date. These 

computation errors often occur due to the Designation and Sentence Computation 

Center (DSCC) staff either not getting complete and accurate information from nonBOP entities or not interpreting the information they receive correctly. Although 

the BOP has several processes in place to prevent untimely releases, we found that 

there were several steps the BOP could take to further reduce the possibility of 

untimely release. These include improving, through training and otherwise, the 

communication tools and skills of the DSCC staff members who must obtain and 

interpret information from wide variety of federal, state, and local entities outside 

the DSCC, and implementing additional sentence calculation processing or auditing 

strategies taking into account that conducting final release audits only 12 months 

before an inmate’s projected release date has led to preventable untimely releases. 

Recommendations 

To enhance understanding of the circumstances and causes of untimely 

releases so that the utility of cross-agency solutions for preventing them can be 

considered, we recommend that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG): 

25
 
 

 

 

 

 

1.	 Work with all relevant entities, both within and outside of the Department, to 

review the full range of possible reasons for all untimely releases, including 

those that may not be due to staff error but may still be preventable, and to 

identify opportunities to reduce the likelihood that they occur. 

We make the following recommendations for the BOP to ensure that 

appropriate notifications are made to the court in cases of untimely release and 

improve the DSCC’s ability to prevent and appropriately handle untimely releases: 

2.	 Work with the ODAG to establish a policy to identify under what 

circumstances it is appropriate to notify the relevant U.S. Attorney’s Office, 

court official(s), and the affected inmate of an untimely release for any 

reason, and the reason therefor, and develop a process to ensure that timely 

notification takes place as appropriate. 

3.	 Ensure that BOP staff members thoroughly and consistently describe and 

identify the cause of each untimely release in official documentation (such as 

BP 558 and 623 forms) and use this documentation to support the DSCC’s 

trend analysis for improving training and operations. 

4.	 Implement methods and training to address communication challenges in 

obtaining accurate and timely jail credit information from judicial as well as 

other necessary sources. 

5.	 To address the concerns identified in this report that conducting final release 

audits 12 months before an inmate’s projected release date has led to 

untimely releases due to BOP staff error, explore and implement sentence 

calculation processing or auditing strategies designed to decrease the 

likelihood of sentence calculation errors by BOP staff. 

6.	 Incorporate specific untimely release issues and possible solutions into 

education events, and establish a process for obtaining formal feedback from 

participants to ensure methods for preventing untimely releases are fully 

explored. 

7.	 Identify and invite participation from additional non-BOP officials who do not 

typically participate in education events, but whose actions could help to 

ensure timely releases, including U.S. District Court Judges, federal Public 

Defenders, and U.S. Probation Office staff. 

26
 
 

 

 

APPENDIX 1
 

METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW 

The OIG reviewed untimely releases between calendar years (CY) 2009 and 

2014. Our review entailed data analysis of BOP untimely release information and 

interviews with BOP officials knowledgeable about the BOP’s process for computing 

sentences. Of the 4,340 untimely releases that occurred during the scope of our 

review, we focused primarily on the 157 untimely releases that the BOP identified 

as having been the result of staff error and determined which entities contributed to 

the errors. We also reviewed information pertaining to the 4,183 untimely releases 

not due to staff error, such as the categories of causes for them, but we did not 

review individual cases. 

We obtained untimely release documentation, in the form of Untimely 

Release Notification (BP 558) and Late Release Notice for United States Probation 

Service (BP 623) for untimely releases due to staff error from CY 2009 through CY 

2014, for Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) and non-DSCC 

untimely releases. We compiled this data into a database and analyzed the 

descriptive statistics. The sample dataset included all untimely release cases the 

BOP classified as due to staff error during the period of our review; we excluded 

none from the statistical analysis. Our analysis incorporated a count of the number 

of cases, the number of total days inmates were released either before or after the 

correct release date, the average (mean) days under-served or over-served, and its 

associated standard deviation, among other common descriptive statistical 

methods. As part of this analysis, we used the narrative portion of the untimely 

release documentation forms to ascertain information about each untimely release, 

including the security level of the inmate, how the BOP discovered the error, and 

the primary factor that caused the error. We also obtained from the BOP the 

average per-inmate daily cost by security level and year and used it to estimate the 

costs of the untimely releases due to staff error within our sample. We also 

reviewed information obtained from e-mail correspondence and phone 

conversations with non-BOP entities such as the U.S. Marshals Service, the 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and the Administrative Office of the 

U.S. Courts. 

We conducted 28 interviews with BOP staff to learn about the BOP’s sentence 

computation process and perform a qualitative assessment of untimely releases. 

During these interviews, we inquired about a variety of topics, including explaining 

or providing context to the data analysis described above. These interviews 

included non-DSCC staff as well as DSCC staff at various levels within the 

organization and included Classification and Computation Technicians, Classification 

and Computation Specialists, management, and the DSCC Chief. 

27
 
 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 2
 

BOP REVIEWS OF THE DESIGNATION AND SENTENCE 

COMPUTATION CENTER 

Beyond audits of individual sentence computations, the BOP, as well as the 

Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC), conducts program reviews. 

The BOP’s Program Review Division (PRD), tasked with providing oversight of BOP 

program performance and compliance, reviews the DSCC to evaluate several areas, 

sentence computations being one of these areas. The PRD conducts program 

reviews on regular cycles: every 3 years when the DSCC has received an 

operational rating of “good or superior,” 2 years for a rating of “acceptable,” and 

1 to 1.5 years for a rating of “deficient.” When the PRD reviews the DSCC, it issues 

a report with any specific areas of deficiency and an overall operational rating. The 

DSCC must respond to the report within 30 days of issuance. Then, within 120 to 

150 days of the issuance of the report, the DSCC must conduct its own follow-up 

review and send a report to the PRD. The follow-up review shows the preliminary 

results of any actions taken in response to the program review’s findings. If no 

deficiencies are found in the PRD’s program review, then no response or follow-up 

review is required. 

During years without program reviews, the DSCC is required to conduct 

internal reviews of its programs, called operational reviews, in a process similar to 

that of the PRD’s program reviews. Operational reviews are also reported to the 

PRD and have a similar response and follow-up review process based upon the 

findings of the operational review. 

28
 
APPENDIX 3 

THE ODAG AND BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 

29
 

U. S. Department of Jnstice 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

Washington, D.C 20S}O 

May 18.2016 

Associate Deputy Attorney General 

MEMORANDUM FOR NINA S. PELLETIER 

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL 

EV ALVA TION AND INSPECTIONS DIVISION 

FROM: Carlos F. Uriarte eFtA 

Associate Deputy Attorney General 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

Raphael A. Prober tiff 

Associate Deputy Attorney General 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

Rae Woods {. F fA ~". Rw 

Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

Thomas R. Kane, Acting Director f2iff p, } 0< k 

Federal Bureau of Prisons 

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Report of the Office of the Inspector General: lIeview a/the 

Federal Bureau o.lPrisons' Untimely Release of Inmates 

We appreciate the review undertaken by the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) entitled lie view o/the Federal Bureau a/Prisons' Untimely lie/ease 0/ 

Inmates. The OIG report contains seven recommendations; the Department concurs with all 

seven, subject to the comments provided below outlining the Department's continuing concerns 

(which are largely definitional in nature). As certain of the recommendations arc directed to or 

otherwise involve the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), and as the balance arc 

directed to Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), this memorandum is being submitted jointly by 

ODAG and BOP. With regard to the OIG' s fornlal drati report provided on April 20. 2016. 

while neither ODAG nor BOP contest the underlying data or conclusions contained in the report, 

the report's presentation and imprecise use of the term "untimely release" continues to be 

significantly misleading and blurs the critical distinction between miscalculated prison sentences 

due to BOP stafT error (157). versus "untimely releases" for other. non-erroneous reasons 

(4.183). 
SUBJECT: Response to Draft Report oflhe Office of the Inspector General: Page 2 

Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Untimely Release of Inmates 

13y failing to clearly and consistently define terms and distinguish throughout the report between 

miscalculated sentences due to BOP staff error, and "untimely releases" for non-error reasons. 

the report fosters a misleading perception that the 4,183 cases reviewed by BOP as "untimely 

releases" are equivalent in nature with the 157 cases which actually resulted from BOP staff 

error, which is absolutely not the case. In fact, many ofthose 4,183 cases reviewed by BOP as 

"untimely releases" are entirely appropriate releases, as described in further detail below. Stated 

aftirmatively, OIG's review revealed 80P's accuracy rate for sentence calculations during the 

timeframe reviewed to be 99.97%. 

Recommendation 1: To the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, to work with all relevant 

entities, both within and au/side oflhe Department, to review the filII range ojjJossible reasons 

for all untimely releases, including those that may not he due (0 srqff error but may still be 

preventable, and to identify opportunities to reduce the likelihood that they occur. 

Response: ODAG concurs with Recommendation 1, and agrees to look at the full range of 

untimely releases, but will focus its efforts on trying to understand those untimely releases that 

are both preventable and improper. As discussed ill the report, the vast majority (4,183) of 

"'untimely releases" are the result of court initiated actions (i.e., original, amended, and/or 

vacated court orders), and are not errors of any type. It is, therefore, presumed that the courts' 

orders, and their consequences, were intentional. Insofar as calculation, and recalculation, of 

inmates' sentences consistent with valid court orders is in the ordinary course of business, there 

is no demonstrated need for ODAG to work to "reduce the likelihood" of preventing such 

occurrences. 

Recommendation 2: To BOP, to work with ODAG to establish a policy to identifY under what 

circum.<,>tances it is appropriate /0 notify the relevant U.S. Attorney's o,Uiee andlor court 

ofjicia/(s), and the affected inmate l?f an untimely release for any reason, and the reason 

(herefore. of an untimely release for llf~Y reason including but not limited to those caused by staff 

error. 

Response: BOP agrees with this recommendation, and will work with ODAG to establish, or 

revise, its policy to identify under what circumstances it is appropriate to notify the relevant U.S. 

Attorney's oftices ancI/or c0U11 officials(s)_, nnrl the l'lfTected inmate, ancI develop a process to 

ensure that timely notification occurs. 

Recommendation 3: To BOP, to ensure that BOP slaf/members thoroughly and consistenlly 

describe and iJent(fy the cause of each untimely release in (~fJicial documentaliun (~'uch as 

BP 558 and 623 forms) and lise this documentation to support the DSCC's trend anaiysis{or 

improving training and operations. 

Response: BOP agrees with this recommendation and will explore methods fiJr consistently 

describing and identifying the cauge of untimely releases due to staff error in official 

documentation, for use in support of DSCC trend analysis tor improving training and operations. 

Recommendation 4: To BOP, 10 implement methods and Lraining fo address communication 

challenges in obtaining accurate and timely jail credit informationfromjudicial as lA-'ell as other 

30
 
SUBJECT: Response to Draft Report of the Omce of the Inspector General: Page 3 

Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Untimely Release of Inmates 

necessary sources. 

Response: BOP agrees with this recommendation aod will explore enhanced methods and 

training to obtain accurate and timely jail credit infonnation from judicial, as well as other 

necessary sources. 

Recommendation 5: To BOP, to address the concerns idenlf/ied in this report that conducting 

final rdease audits 12 months before an inmate's projected release date has led to untimely 

releases due to BOP staff error, explore and implement .'lenIence calculation processinx or 

auditing strategies designed to decrease the likelihood oj.'ienlence calculation errors by BOP 

staff 

Response: SOP agrees with this recommendation, and will explore and implement sentence 

calculation processing or auditing strategies designed to decrease the likelihood of sentence 

calculation errors by BOP staff. 

Recommendation 6: To BOP, incorporate specific untimely release issues and possible 

solutions into education events, and establish a process jor obtaining formal feedback from 

participants to ensure methods/or preventing untimely release are fully explored. 

Response: BOP agrees with this recommendation and will incorporate untimely release issues 

related to statI error into education events and request feedback from participants to ensure 

methods of preventing such. 

Recommendation 7: To BOP, identifY and invite parlicipalionjrom additional non-BOP 

officials who do not typically participate in education events, but whose actions could help to 

ensure timely releases, including Us. District Court Judges, federal Public Defenders, and Us. 

Probation Office staff. 

Response: BOP agrees with this recommendation and will explore identifYing and inviting nonBOP representatives from the referenced offices to participate in BOP educational events. 

Additionally, BOP's response to this recommendation will include BOPIDSCC staff 

pa11icipation in educational events coordin::Jted by those non-BOP offices~ 

31
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 4 

OIG ANALYSIS OF THE ODAG AND BOP’s RESPONSE 

The OIG provided a draft of this report to the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General (ODAG) and the BOP for their comments. The ODAG and BOP’s response is 

included in Appendix 3 of this report. Below, we discuss the OIG’s analysis of the 

ODAG and BOP’s response and the actions necessary to close the 

recommendations. 

Recommendation 1: Work with all relevant entities, both within and 

outside of the Department, to review the full range of possible reasons for all 

untimely releases, including those that may not be due to staff error but may still 

be preventable, and to identify opportunities to reduce the likelihood that they 

occur. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG and BOP Response: The ODAG concurred with the recommendation 

and stated that it agrees to look at the full range of untimely releases while 

focusing on trying to understand those untimely releases that are both preventable 

and improper. The ODAG referred to information in the report showing that the 

vast majority of releases that the BOP classifies as “untimely” are the result of court 

initiated actions rather than error, noting that there is no demonstrated need for 

the ODAG to reduce the likelihood of preventing non-erroneous occurrences. 

OIG Analysis: The ODAG’s planned actions are responsive to the 

recommendation, as long as its review includes a complete assessment of what 

constitutes a “preventable and improper” untimely release. 

In their comments, the ODAG and BOP referred to continuing definitional 

concerns with our report pertaining to distinguishing between untimely releases due 

to miscalculated prison sentences resulting from BOP staff error on the one hand, 

and those due to other non-erroneous reasons on the other hand. In this report, 

we use the term “untimely release” the way the BOP currently uses it, as a broad 

description of all instances in which an inmate was not released on his or her 

correct date, including when this occurs for non-erroneous reasons. The term 

therefore includes instances we refer to as technicalities, such as when the “correct 

date” is established retroactively because of a court’s sentencing adjustments. 

Because the BOP’s definition of “untimely release” blurs the distinction 

between proper and improper, and between preventable and unpreventable, we 

believe that examining, and possibly revising, the definition of untimely release 

could be a useful aspect of the ODAG’s assessment. But, at a minimum, the 

ODAG’s assessment should avoid artificially narrowing the universe of untimely 

releases at issue, since the intent of our recommendation is for the ODAG, BOP, 

and all other stakeholders to explore, collaboratively, all the ways untimely releases 

occur so that they can identify and implement methods to prevent them and avoid 

as many untimely releases as possible. 

32
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Additionally, we noted in our report that it was beyond the scope of our 

review to assess the circumstances of untimely releases not due to staff error, of 

which the BOP’s records indicate there were more than 4,000. To the extent that 

the ODAG and BOP’s joint response is intended to imply that any particular portion, 

or all, of those more than 4,000 untimely releases were not the result of an error, 

or not preventable, we emphasize our finding that “the BOP does not always have 

complete information about the circumstances of untimely releases to which other 

entities contribute.” Therefore, we do not believe that the ODAG should define the 

scope of the multiagency review at the outset in a manner that would categorically 

exclude cases about which the BOP lacks complete information. While we agree 

that there is no need — and no way — to prevent releases that are “untimely” only 

because of a retroactive sentence adjustment, we believe a full review is needed 

because of the wide range of factors that may contribute to untimely releases, 

some of which may currently be unknown to the ODAG, the BOP, or other 

stakeholders, and may be preventable. 

By August 31, 2016, please provide the ODAG’s plan for looking into the full 

range of untimely releases, including its framework for defining and identifying 

which untimely releases are preventable and improper, as well as a list of the 

agencies it plans to include in its review. 

Recommendation 2: Work with the ODAG to establish a policy to identify 

under what circumstances it is appropriate to notify the relevant U.S. Attorney’s 

Office, court official(s), and the affected inmate of an untimely release for any 

reason, and the reason therefor, and develop a process to ensure that timely 

notification takes place as appropriate. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG and BOP Response: The BOP stated that it agrees with this 

recommendation and that it will work with the ODAG to establish, or revise, its 

policy to identify the circumstances under which it is appropriate to notify the 

relevant U.S. Attorney’s Office and/or court officials(s), and the affected inmate, 

and will develop a process to ensure that timely notification occurs. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s planned actions are responsive to the 

recommendation. By August 31, 2016, please provide the policy and/or policy 

changes that identify the circumstances of untimely release under which it is 

appropriate to notify the relevant U.S. Attorney’s Office, court officials(s), and the 

affected inmate, including the reason for the untimely release, as well as 

documentation of the process that will ensure that timely notification occurs. 

Recommendation 3: Ensure that BOP staff members thoroughly and 

consistently describe and identify the cause of each untimely release in official 

documentation (such as BP 558 and 623 forms) and use this documentation to 

support the Designation and Sentence Computation Center’s (DSCC) trend analysis 

for improving training and operations. 

33
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG and BOP Response: The BOP stated that it agrees with this 

recommendation and will explore methods for consistently describing and 

identifying the cause of untimely releases due to staff error in official 

documentation. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s response is partially responsive to the 

recommendation. To be fully responsive to this recommendation, the BOP must 

also explore methods for consistently describing and identifying in official 

documentation the causes of untimely releases not due to staff error. We note that 

it will not always be possible to completely document untimely releases beyond the 

BOP’s control. However, it is still important to enhance such documentation where 

possible because this information can also be useful in trend analysis for improving 

training and operations. By August 31, 2016, please provide documentation of the 

methods developed for consistently describing and identifying the cause of all 

untimely releases. 

Recommendation 4: Implement methods and training to address 

communication challenges in obtaining accurate and timely jail credit information 

from judicial as well as other necessary sources. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG and BOP Response: The BOP stated that it agrees with this 

recommendation and will explore enhanced methods and training to obtain accurate 

and timely jail credit information from judicial as well as other necessary sources. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s planned actions are responsive to the 

recommendation. By August 31, 2016, please provide documentation of the 

enhanced methods and training explored — indicating which of them the BOP plans 

to implement — to obtain accurate and timely jail credit information from judicial as 

well as other necessary sources. 

Recommendation 5: To address the concerns identified in this report that 

conducting final release audits 12 months before an inmate’s projected release date 

has led to untimely releases due to BOP staff error, explore and implement 

sentence calculation processing or auditing strategies designed to decrease the 

likelihood of sentence calculation errors by BOP staff. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG and BOP Response: The BOP stated that it agrees with the 

recommendation and that it will explore and implement sentence calculation 

processing or auditing strategies designed to decrease the likelihood of sentence 

calculation errors by BOP staff. 

34
 
 

 

 

 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s planned actions are responsive to the 

recommendation. By August 31, 2016, please provide documentation of sentence 

calculation processing or auditing strategies that have been implemented and are 

designed to decrease the likelihood of sentence calculation errors by BOP staff. 

Recommendation 6: Incorporate specific untimely release issues and 

possible solutions into education events, and establish a process for obtaining 

formal feedback from participants to ensure methods for preventing untimely 

releases are fully explored. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG and BOP Response: The BOP stated that it agrees with the 

recommendation and that it will incorporate untimely release issues related to staff 

error into education events and will request feedback from participants to ensure 

methods of preventing such. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s response is partially responsive to the 

recommendation. To be fully responsive to this recommendation, the BOP must 

also incorporate into education events any untimely release issues identified in the 

ODAG’s multiagency review or by the BOP that are related to non-staff errors. In 

fact, because the purpose of these events is to educate representatives from 

criminal justice agencies outside of the BOP, these events are specifically an 

opportunity to inform representatives from other agencies about what they can do 

that would reduce the likelihood of untimely releases. By August 31, 2016, please 

provide a list of education events conducted or planned since the issuance of this 

report, a list of the untimely release issues incorporated into each event, and 

documentation of the process for requesting feedback. 

Recommendation 7: Identify and invite participation from additional nonBOP officials who do not typically participate in education events, but whose actions 

could help to ensure timely releases, including U.S. District Court Judges, federal 

Public Defenders, and U.S. Probation Office staff. 

Status: Resolved. 

ODAG and BOP Response: The BOP stated that it agrees with this 

recommendation and that it will explore identifying and inviting non-BOP 

representatives from referenced offices to participate in BOP educational events and 

that it will include BOP/DSCC staff in educational events coordinated by those nonBOP offices. 

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s response is responsive to the recommendation. 

By August 31, 2016, please provide documentation of which non-BOP 

representatives the BOP has invited or has identified to invite to BOP educational 

events, a list of planned events through 2017, and an indication of which events 

coordinated by non-BOP offices the BOP has identified for BOP/DSCC staff to 

participate in. 

35
 
The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity 

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, 

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and 

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s 

operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ 

OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or 

(800) 869-4499. 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

www.justice.gov/oig