The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 

Author(s): Charles M. Katz; Vincent J. Webb 

Document No.: 205003 

Date Received: April 2004 

Award Number: 98-IJ-CX-0078 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies. 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 
Police Response to Gangs: 

A Multi-Site Study 1 

Prepared for 

the 

National Institute of Justice 

by 

Charles M. Katz 

Vincent J. Webb 

Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology 

December 2003

Phoenix, Arizona

1

 This research report was funded by the National Institute of Justice, Grant No. 1998-IJ-CX-0078. The 

opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the National 

Institute of Justice. 
Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i

Notes...............................................................................................................................xviii

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................xviii

Authors .......................................................................................................................xviii

Research Goals and Objectives ........................................................................................ i

Research Design and Methodology.................................................................................. i

Research Results and Conclusions..................................................................................ii

Executive Summary ...........................................................................................................iii

Study Sites....................................................................................................................... v

Study Design .................................................................................................................. vi

Field Observations.....................................................................................................vii

Interviews with Gang Unit Officers, Unit Managers, and Stakeholders...................vii

Document Reviews ..................................................................................................viii

Police Gang Units as an Indirect Response to an Objective Problem..........................viii

The Absence of Control and Accountability................................................................... x

Information as the Principal Commodity of Gang Units ............................................... xi

Strategic and Structural Decoupling of Gang Units.....................................................xiii

Police Gang Units and Community Policing ................................................................ xv

Toward Improving the Effectiveness of Police Gang Units ........................................ xvi

Chapter 1. Studying the Police Response to Gangs ............................................................ 1

The Contemporary Gang Problem .................................................................................. 6

Police Response to Gangs: Theoretical, Policy, and Organizational Rationales .......... 13

Prior Research Examining the Police Response to Gangs ............................................ 18

The Present Study.......................................................................................................... 25

Reasons for Establishing Gang Units........................................................................ 26

Alternative Organizational Forms ............................................................................. 27

Gang Unit Officers .................................................................................................... 28

Gang Unit Functions and Activities .......................................................................... 29

Compatibility of Gang Units with Community-Oriented Policing ........................... 30

Chapter 2. Setting and Methods ........................................................................................ 32

Study Setting ................................................................................................................. 32

Police Departments Studied ...................................................................................... 35

A Multi-Methodological Research Design ................................................................... 36

Field Observations..................................................................................................... 36

Interviews with Gang Unit Officers .......................................................................... 41

Document Reviews ................................................................................................... 44

Interviews with Non-Gang Unit Personnel and Stakeholders................................... 47

Data Analysis ............................................................................................................ 48

Verification................................................................................................................ 49

Report Narrative............................................................................................................ 50
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study ii

Chapter 3. Historical Analysis of Gangs and Gang Control in Four Cities ...................... 54

Inglewood, California.................................................................................................... 55

Response to Gangs: Late 1960s Through 1980......................................................... 58

Response to Gangs: 1981 Through 1989 .................................................................. 61

Response to Gangs: Late 1990s Through 1999......................................................... 65

Albuquerque, New Mexico ........................................................................................... 74

Response to Gangs: 1980 Through 1994 .................................................................. 77

Response to Gangs: 1998 Through 1999 .................................................................. 86

Las Vegas, Nevada........................................................................................................ 91

Response to Gangs: 1980 Through 1986 .................................................................. 92

Response to Gangs: 1987 Through 1990 .................................................................. 97

Response to Gangs: 1991 Through 1998 ................................................................ 104

Phoenix, Arizona......................................................................................................... 109

Response to Gangs: 1970 Through 1983 ................................................................ 109

Response to Gangs: 1984 Through 1994 ................................................................ 113

Response to Gangs: 1991 Through 1999 ................................................................ 116

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 122

Chapter 4. Scope and Nature of the Current Gang Problem in Four Cities .................... 128

Inglewood.................................................................................................................... 129

Documented Gang Crime........................................................................................ 130

Perceptions of the Gang Problem............................................................................ 131

Albuquerque ................................................................................................................ 134

Documented Gang Crime........................................................................................ 137

Perceptions of the Gang Problem............................................................................ 137

Las Vegas .................................................................................................................... 140

Documented Gang Crime........................................................................................ 143

Perceptions of the Gang Problem............................................................................ 144

Phoenix........................................................................................................................ 152

Documented Gang Crime........................................................................................ 153

Perceptions of the Gang Problem............................................................................ 154

National Youth Gang Center Data .............................................................................. 159

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 162

Chapter 5. Form, Function, and Management of the Police Gang Unit.......................... 165

Organization of Gang Control in Police Departments ................................................ 165

Gang Control Functions .............................................................................................. 172

Intelligence .............................................................................................................. 172

Enforcement and Suppression ................................................................................. 174

Prevention and Education........................................................................................ 176

Differentiating Organizational Configurations ........................................................... 177

Gang Unit Control and Management .......................................................................... 184

Written Policies and Procedures ............................................................................. 184

Documenting Gangs, Gang Members, and Gang Crime......................................... 191

Formal Goals and Objectives .................................................................................. 195

Expected Outcomes................................................................................................. 199

Performance Measures ............................................................................................ 201

Supervision of Gang Unit Personnel ....................................................................... 205
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study iii

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 213

Chapter 6. The Gang Unit Officer................................................................................... 219

Officer Characteristics................................................................................................. 219

Becoming a Gang Unit Officer ................................................................................... 222

Gang Unit Officer Status............................................................................................. 227

Gang Unit Officer Training......................................................................................... 236

Inglewood................................................................................................................ 236

Albuquerque ............................................................................................................ 237

Phoenix.................................................................................................................... 238

Las Vegas ................................................................................................................ 239

Training Quality ...................................................................................................... 241

Officer Perceptions of the Job..................................................................................... 242

Problems Associated with Joining the Gang Unit................................................... 242

Officer Perceptions of Role..................................................................................... 246

Evaluating Gang Unit Officers.................................................................................... 251

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 253

Chapter 7. On the Job...................................................................................................... 257

How the Gang Unit Officers Spent Their Time .......................................................... 257

Enforcement ............................................................................................................ 260

Investigation ............................................................................................................ 265

Intelligence .............................................................................................................. 268

Education and Prevention........................................................................................ 294

Administrative, En Route, and Non-police Related Time ...................................... 297

Gang Unit Officer Contacts......................................................................................... 299

Mobilization of Gang Unit Officers ........................................................................ 299

Individuals Contacted by Gang Unit Officers......................................................... 300

Suspicion Stops ....................................................................................................... 304

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 308

Chapter 8. Organizational Environment: Internal Stakeholder Perceptions ................... 313

Nature and Scope of Local Gang Problems ................................................................ 316

Why Gang Units Exist ................................................................................................ 321

Internal Stakeholder Contacts with Gangs .................................................................. 326

Stakeholders’ Relationships with Gang Units............................................................. 331

Perceptions of Police Roles..................................................................................... 331

Contact and Information Sharing ............................................................................ 335

Communication and Relationships ......................................................................... 337

Perceived Benefits................................................................................................... 344

Perceptions of Gang Unit Activities and Effectiveness .............................................. 347

Gang Unit Activities................................................................................................ 348

Gang Unit Effectiveness.......................................................................................... 350

Perceived Problems in Gang Units.......................................................................... 352

Perceived Factors Affecting Approaches to Gang Control ..................................... 357

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 362

Chapter 9. Organizational Environment: External Stakeholder Perceptions .................. 364

Nature and Scope of Local Gang Problems ................................................................ 365

Perceived Causes of Gang Problems........................................................................... 368
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study iv

Impact of Gangs on External Stakeholders ................................................................. 370

Stakeholder Contacts with Gangs ............................................................................... 371

Relationships with Gang Units.................................................................................... 374

Perceptions of Police Role ...................................................................................... 375

Communication and Relationships with Gang Units .............................................. 376

Perceived Gang Unit Activities and Performance....................................................... 380

Perceived Effectiveness........................................................................................... 383

Perceived Problems ................................................................................................. 385

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 390

Chapter 10. Police Gang Units in a Time of Community Policing................................. 393

Community Policing and the Response to Gangs ....................................................... 395

Albuquerque ............................................................................................................ 395

Inglewood................................................................................................................ 398

Las Vegas ................................................................................................................ 400

Phoenix.................................................................................................................... 404

Stakeholder Perceptions of Community Policing ....................................................... 407

Albuquerque ............................................................................................................ 407

Inglewood................................................................................................................ 412

Las Vegas ................................................................................................................ 415

Phoenix.................................................................................................................... 420

Gang Unit Officers’ Perceptions of Community Policing .......................................... 425

Albuquerque ............................................................................................................ 426

Inglewood................................................................................................................ 429

Las Vegas ................................................................................................................ 432

Phoenix.................................................................................................................... 438

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 445

Chapter 11. Conclusion and Implications ...................................................................... 448

Police Gang Units as an Indirect Response to an Objective Problem......................... 449

Absence of Direction, Controls, and Accountability .................................................. 451

Information As The Principal Gang Unit Commodity................................................ 456

Strategic And Structural Decoupling Of Gang Units.................................................. 459

Gang Units and Community Policing ......................................................................... 467

Citizen Input ............................................................................................................ 468

Geographic Focus.................................................................................................... 469

Prevention................................................................................................................ 470

Partnerships ............................................................................................................. 470

Formal Problem Solving ......................................................................................... 472

Management Tactics ............................................................................................... 473

Final Thoughts............................................................................................................. 475
Table of Exhibits

Exhibit 1.01 Establishment of police gang units.............................................................. 14

Exhibit 2.01 Study site characteristics ............................................................................. 34

Exhibit 2.02 Data collection: Data types, sources, and dates........................................... 38

Exhibit 3.01 Albuquerque street gangs (1990 and 1993)................................................. 81

Exhibit 3.02 Gang locations in Albuquerque ................................................................... 81

Exhibit 3.03 Gang members’ primary activities in Albuquerque .................................... 82

Exhibit 3.04 Numbers of gangs and gang members in Albuquerque (1994)................... 83

Exhibit 3.05 Las Vegas gangs and gang member activities ............................................. 96

Exhibit 4.01 Inglewood’s eight largest gangs (1999) .................................................... 129

Exhibit 4.02 Annual statistics: Gang-related crimes in Inglewood (1989-1998)........... 130

Exhibit 4.03 Mean change in Inglewood gang activity.................................................. 131

Exhibit 4.04 Albuquerque gang demographics (1998, 1999) ........................................ 135

Exhibit 4.05 Albuquerque’s fifteen most influential/dangerous gangs (1998) .............. 136

Exhibit 4.06 Las Vegas gangs and gang members (1994 through 1999)....................... 141

Exhibit 4.07 Las Vegas’s eleven largest gangs (1998) .................................................. 143

Exhibit 4.08 Gang activity in Las Vegas – 1994 through 1998 ..................................... 143

Exhibit 4.09 Numbers of gangs and gang members in Phoenix (1990-1999) ............... 152

Exhibit 4.10 Phoenix gang types and affiliations (2000) ............................................... 152

Exhibit 4.11 Gender of Phoenix gang members and associates, by age (2000) ............ 153

Exhibit 4.12 Gang activity in Phoenix (2000)................................................................ 154

Exhibit 4.13 Number of gangs by city and year............................................................ 160

Exhibit 4.14 Number of documented gang members by city and year .......................... 160

Exhibit 4.15 Gang member characteristics by city (percentages) .................................. 161

Exhibit 4.16 Number of gang member-based homicides by city and year .................... 162

Exhibit 5.01 Gang unit organizational locations and staffing........................................ 171

Exhibit 5.02 Functions and responsibilities of Phoenix gang unit squads ..................... 187

Exhibit 5.03 Functions and responsibilities of Las Vegas gang unit squads ................. 190

Exhibit 5.04 Police gang unit criteria for identifying gang members ............................ 192

Exhibit 5.05 Police definitions of a gang by city and gang unit .................................... 194

Exhibit 5.06 Gang unit managers’ expectations of informal outcomes (percentages)... 200

Exhibit 5.07 Managers using performance measures for evaluations (percentages) ..... 203

Exhibit 6.01 Characteristics of gang unit officers by city.............................................. 220

Exhibit 6.02 Ratings of enforcement, intelligence, and prevention activities by city.... 249

Exhibit 6.03 Performance measures used to evaluate gang unit officers....................... 252

Exhibit 7.01 Average minutes per 8-hour shift allocated to activities ........................... 260

Exhibit 7.02 Average number of mobilizations per 8-hour shift, by medium ............... 300
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study ii

Exhibit 7.03 Gang unit contacts: Averages per 8-hour shift .......................................... 301

Exhibit 7.04 Phoenix intelligence requests .................................................................... 302

Exhibit 7.05 Suspicion (field) stops by city ................................................................... 305

Exhibit 7.06 Results of gang unit suspicion stops by city.............................................. 306
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study i 

Abstract 

Research Goals and Objectives 

This research report describes assumptions, issues, problems, and events that have 

been characterizing, shaping, and defining the police response to local gang problems in 

the United States. In particular, this research had five objectives: 

1. To identify and examine the factors that have led to the creation of specialized 

police gang units, and to examine how those factors have influenced the units’ 

responses to the gang problems in their communities; 

2. To examine alternative ways in which police agencies have organized 

resources to respond to their local gang problems; 

3. To examine the relevant beliefs of gang unit officers, and how their beliefs 

might have affected the police response to gangs; 

4. To identify the activities that gang unit officers have been engaging in, and to 

clarify conceptually the roles of specialized police gang units within their 

departments; 

5. To assess the goodness of fit of the police response to gangs with the 

community-oriented policing paradigm. 

Research Design and Methodology 

We gathered data for this study from four communities in the southwestern region 

of the United States: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Inglewood, California; Las Vegas, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study ii 

Nevada; and Phoenix, Arizona. In total, 470 hours were spent in the field observing gang 

unit officers; interviews were conducted with 65 gang unit officers, 20 gang unit 

managers, and 68 stakeholders; and we examined 175 official documents and 285 

newspaper articles. The qualitative data were analyzed using QSR NUD*IST. 

Research Results and Conclusions 

Our analyses pointed to five major conclusions. First, although all cities in our 

study had gang problems at the time that their respective police departments established 

gang units, in creating the gang units, the police departments typically were responding to 

political, public, and media pressure – not directly to the objective reality of the gang 

problem. Second, the data showed that few formal mechanisms had been instituted for 

controlling and managing gang units and their officers, or for holding them accountable. 

Third, the most important benefits to actors in the gang units’ environments were related 

to the production and dissemination of gang intelligence. Fourth, the police had 

structurally and strategically decoupled gang control efforts from the rest of their police 

organizations. Fifth, gang units and gang unit officers were not practicing community or 

problem-oriented policing. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study iii 

Executive Summary 

Traditionally, the police response to gangs and gang-related problems has been to 

assign responsibility for control to existing departmental units, such as patrol, juvenile 

bureaus, community relations, investigations, and crime prevention (Huff 1993; Needle 

and Stapleton 1983). Then in the 1980s, police departments began to establish specialized 

units for gang control, including what is commonly referred to as the police gang unit. A 

police gang unit is a secondary or tertiary functional division within the parent police 

organization, with at least one sworn officer whose sole function is to engage in gang 

control efforts (C. Katz, McGuire and Roncek 2002). 

In 1999, the Law Enforcement and Management Administrative Statistics survey 

reported that among large agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, special gang units 

existed in 56 percent of all municipal police departments, 50 percent of all sheriff’s 

departments, 43 percent of all county police agencies, and 20 percent of all state law 

enforcement agencies (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001, Table C). These findings 

suggested that an estimated 360 police gang units existed throughout the country. The 

recency of this phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that more than 85 percent of all 

specialized gang units had been established after the mid-to-late 1980s (C. Katz, McGuire 

and Roncek 2002). 

Although specialized police gang units represented a new feature in the landscape 

of American policing, this change was embedded in a broader trend. Police organizations 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study iv 

had increasingly been creating specialized units to address specific law enforcement 

issues such as repeat offenses, domestic violence, and hate crimes. Such specialized units 

were said to be created in order to focus departmental resources, energy, and skills on 

specific community problems. Additionally, creation of specialized units served as a 

symbolic act, showing the community, potential offenders, and police officers that the 

police department was taking particular problems seriously (Meyer 1979; Scott 1995). 

For similar reasons, many police officials and gang scholars had been calling for 

consolidation of gang control functions within police departments. They argued that 

assigning primary responsibility for addressing the gang problem to a specialized unit 

would increase the technical efficiency and effectiveness of the police department’s 

response. They pointed out that consolidation of gang control functions would permit 

officers to develop highly technical skills, with training and experience, that otherwise 

would not be possible. They claimed that consolidation would also allow police 

organizations to distribute gang-related work rationally, better enabling police 

departments to develop and coordinate responses to community gang problems (Burns 

and Deakin 1989; Huff and McBride 1993; Jackson and McBride 1986; Rush 1996). 

This report is concerned with advancing our understanding of how police gang 

units have been responding to community gang problems. Although researchers have 

begun documenting programs and activities performed by police gang units, studies thus 

far have relied on surveys of police leaders. Little research has examined the realities and 

experiences of those actually working day-to-day within police gang units. The research 

reported here describes the assumptions, issues, problems, and events that have been 

characterizing, shaping, and defining the police response to the gang problem. In 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study v 

particular, this research has five major objectives: 

1. To identify and examine the factors that have led to the creation of specialized 

police gang units, and to examine how those factors have influenced the units’ 

responses to the gang problems in their communities; 

2. To examine alternative ways in which police agencies have organized 

resources to respond to their local gang problems; 

3. To examine the relevant beliefs of gang unit officers, and how their beliefs 

might have affected the police response to gangs; 

4. To identify the activities that gang unit officers have been engaging in, and to 

clarify conceptually the roles of specialized police gang units within their 

departments; 

5. To assess the goodness of fit of the police response to gangs with the 

community-oriented policing paradigm. 

Study Sites 

Data for the study were gathered from four communities in the southwestern 

region of the United States: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Inglewood, California; Las 

Vegas, Nevada; and Phoenix, Arizona. We selected these cities for two reasons. First, 

although researchers have found that police departments across the country claim gang 

problems, Southwestern police departments have been significantly more likely to 

respond by establishing specialized police gang units (Curry et al. 1992, 65). Studying 

Southwestern cities allowed us to focus our efforts where specialized gang units were 

most likely to be the local response to a gang problem. 

Second, these cities were selected because they represent a variety of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study vi 

organizational configurations. The Phoenix Police Department’s gang unit was located in 

the Organized Crime Bureau; the Inglewood Police Department’s gang unit was located 

in the Criminal Investigation Bureau; the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s 

gang unit was located in the Special Operations Division; and the Albuquerque Police 

Department’s gang unit was located in the Special Enforcement Bureau. The 

organizational variety at the sites allowed us to examine the different ways in which gang 

units fit organizationally into their parent police departments, and how organizational 

configurations might influence the police response to gangs. 

Study Design 

Our research design was constructed to gain a comprehensive view of how and 

why police were responding to the gang problem. In particular, our study brings together 

multiple sources of data (i.e., field observations, in-depth interviews, and documents) to 

focus upon a single point, and to help explain, clarify, and corroborate issues of question 

(Lincon and Guba 1985; Merriam 1988). 

Exhibit 2.2 Data collection: data types, units, and dates, by study site 

Albuquerque Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

Data Type No. Date No. Date No. Date No. Date Totals 

Field observation (hours) 

Gang units 80 Aug 1999 80 May 1999 160 June-July 

1999 

150 June-Aug 

2000 

470 

Interviews

 Police managers 3 Aug-Dec 

1999 

4 May-June 

1999 

6 July-Aug 

1999 

7 Sept-Oct 

2000 

20 

Gang unit officers 3 (9) Aug-Dec 

1999 

3 May-June 

1999 

31 July-Aug 

1999 

22 Sept-Oct 

2000 

59 (65)

 Stakeholders 21 Aug-Dec 14 May-June 19 July-Aug 15 May-Aug 69 

1999 1999 1999 2000 

Documents 

Official documents 36 June-Aug 40 May-June 51 July-Aug 48 June-Oct 175

1999 1999 1999 2000 

 Newspaper articles 42 April 1999 30 April 1999 112 April 1999 101 June 2000 285 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study vii 

Field Observations 

Altogether, between May 1999 and August 2000, researchers spent approximately 

470 hours in the field accompanying gang unit officers: 80 hours of field observation in 

both Albuquerque and Inglewood, 150 hours in Phoenix, and 160 hours in Las Vegas. 

We were interested in the beliefs of the gang unit officers, how the officers spent their 

time, and the types of persons with whom they had contact. For this reason, we spent the 

majority of our time with gang unit officers, rather than with gang unit managers or 

civilian personnel. 

Interviews with Gang Unit Officers, Unit Managers, and Stakeholders 

We also collected data from in-depth interviews with gang unit officers and their 

managers. When interviewing officers, we sought their subjective perceptions concerning 

the realities of their working situations – what must be done to effectively perform the 

job, and what they actually did while on the job. Our interviews with gang unit 

supervisors and other individuals in the chain of command focused on organizational 

constructs of the gang unit – for example, the background of the gang unit, personnel 

selection, measures of success, and budgetary issues. In total, we interviewed 65 gang 

unit officers and 20 managers (exhibit 2.02). 

We also interviewed personnel outside the gang units who were identified as 

stakeholders. Many were direct beneficiaries of the gang units, and at the same time, they 

were potentially important members of the gang units’ environments who could help to 

legitimize the units’ existence. We were interested in understanding their perceptions of 

local gang problems and of their gang units, and of the ways in which their own activities 

might have been influenced by their respective gang units. Further, we believed that these 

individuals might have a different view of the gang problem and different opinions on 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study viii 

how the gang unit should respond to the city's gang problem. We were especially 

interested in the stakeholders’ assessments of the effectiveness of their gang units. Sixtyeight individuals identified as stakeholders were interviewed for this study. 

Document Reviews 

More than 175 official documents produced by the gang units and the police 

departments were reviewed during the present study. These included the gang units’ 

standard operating procedures (SOPs), annual reports, intelligence, training and task 

force bulletins and updates, interoffice communications, statistics kept by the gang units, 

grants obtained by the gang units, booklets produced by the gang units, and arrest 

statistics obtained from the police departments. The present study also used 285 articles 

obtained from local newspapers, dating back to 1995 in Albuquerque, 1981 in Inglewood, 

1984 in Las Vegas, and 1978 in Phoenix. The newspaper articles provided an historical 

account of the development of the gang units in terms of their organizational mandates 

and roles, and provided insight into the various external forces that may have affected the 

gang units’ responses to community gang problems. 

Police Gang Units as an Indirect Response to an Objective Problem 

Each of the four cities that we examined had a documentable gang problem at the 

time that each police department established its gang unit. However, the development of 

the gang units, in each case, was an indirect rather than a direct response to the problem 

of local gangs and gang violence. These police departments were responding to political, 

public, and media pressure when they created their gang units – not directly to the 

objective reality of a community gang problem. 

Much prior research has argued that local police officials, along with media, have 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study ix 

socially constructed gang problems, demonizing minority and other marginalized youth, 

in an effort to campaign for additional resources. Without question, each of the cities we 

studied had a real gang problem with attendant crime and violence; in no case was a gang 

problem being constructed by the police department as a means of achieving ends such as 

additional financial or human resources. 

Furthermore, we found no evidence suggesting that the police had created the 

gang units to control marginalized populations whom they perceived as threatening; 

rather, we found evidence to the contrary. Much of the data suggested that minority 

communities played a major role in shaping the nature of the police organizations’ 

responses to gangs. 

In almost all of the communities, we found evidence that once gang violence had 

become a public reality, community members began to criticize the police for lack of 

action. In a number of cases, citizens held widespread rallies, meetings, and protests, 

demanding that police do something about the gang problem. These kinds of events 

typically were followed by local policymakers conducting public inquiries, media reports 

on gang incidents, additional public outcry, and policy decision-making. We found that 

although a real gang problem had preceded the creation of the gang unit in each 

community, in establishing the units, the police departments were not responding purely 

as agencies seeking to enhance operational efficiency and effectiveness. Instead, the 

specialized units that we studied had been created by the departments in response to 

pressures building within their institutional environments. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study x 

The Absence of Control and Accountability 

Our examination of the gang units, and of the police departments within which 

they were located, showed that few formal mechanisms had been instituted for 

controlling gang units and their officers, or for holding them accountable. 

First, with the exception of Las Vegas, the gang units in this study lacked special 

policies, procedures, or rules guiding officer behavior, and the few policies and 

procedures that did exist were modest in scope and nature. The fact that some units did 

not have so much as a mission statement spoke to the little direction that the parent police 

organizations gave to their units. Instead, unit functions and activities were largely driven 

by the unit supervisor or even by an officer who had been with the unit for a long time. 

Second, the gang unit officers whom we studied were, for the most part, poorly 

trained on gang-related matters. Although all officers received mandated broad police 

training, most gang units did not require training specific to their officers’ positions, at 

least not beyond basic elements such as documenting gang members, using the gang 

information system, and an introduction to gang culture. As a consequence, officers were 

primarily trained by their on-the-job experiences. This method was found to result in 

several problems affecting their criminal investigations, dissemination of intelligence, 

and capacity to provide reliable information to policymakers and community members.

 Third, in addition to a shortage of policies, procedures, and training, the gang 

units that we studied lacked adequate performance measures. Specifically, we found that 

the police departments we studied rarely engaged in evaluation-oriented activities with 

their gang units, and when they did, the units’ performance and effectiveness were 

typically judged using global, subjective evaluation standards. Many of the participants 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xi 

whom we interviewed assessed the local gang problem as substantial and gave positive 

evaluations to their gang units, but they were hard-pressed to offer specific evidence of 

the units’ effectiveness. Interestingly, when asked about the gang units’ utility, 

stakeholders and police managers frequently mentioned the value of the information that 

the units developed; however, they rarely commented on the gang units’ impact on the 

amelioration of local gang problems. Consequently, management decisions about the 

configuration of the gang units, or even about whether or not to institute one, were 

necessarily premised on other than hard, objective data. 

Similarly, gang unit managers, as well as gang unit officers, were often unable to 

provide standard performance measures for evaluating gang unit officers. A few did give 

us measures, but these did not directly reflect job-specific tasks performed by the gang 

unit officers; instead, they were measures of the most general employee characteristics 

such as work attendance, tardiness, or turning in reports on time. Regardless of the 

function of the unit or the role of the officer within the unit, police managers did not 

appear to rely even on traditional performance measures such as officer clearance rates, 

numbers of arrests made, or amount of intelligence collected or distributed. This casual 

approach to performance measurement, we found, contributed to a sense of autonomy 

and lack of accountability within the gang units. 

Information as the Principal Commodity of Gang Units 

A principal finding of our research was that although a great deal of cultural and 

organizational emphasis was placed on enforcement, gang units actually engaged in a 

wide variety of activities, and enforcement played a relatively modest role. Gang unit 

officers, as well as some internal stakeholders, clearly placed substantial value on 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xii 

suppression-oriented enforcement. The data strongly indicated that suppression activities 

legitimated the gang units in the eyes of gang unit officers and most stakeholders. But in 

spite of this, almost no one other than the gang unit officers themselves seemed to believe 

that gang unit suppression efforts were effective at reducing the communities’ gang 

problems. 

We concluded that the disconnect between the perception of suppression as an 

essential function and the perception that suppression activities were ineffective might 

have been a consequence of the limited number of contacts that occurred between gang 

unit officers and gang members. Specifically, we found that overall, officers averaged 

only one to three gang member contacts per eight hours worked. Furthermore, of the 

contacts that gang unit officers did have with gang members, most did not result in an 

arrest, but rather in intelligence gathering. Given that gang unit officers were not 

arresting and confining gang members, at least not enough of them to have a substantial 

impact on crime, the units’ stakeholders might not perceive gang unit suppression activity 

as being particularly effective. 

The production and dissemination of gang intelligence turned out to be the most 

highly valued benefit to stakeholders in the gang units’ environments. Stakeholders 

internal to the police organizations frequently pointed to the importance of this 

information for solving crimes, and external stakeholders referred to the importance of 

the intelligence to their own agencies’ gang suppression, intervention, and prevention 

efforts. Although we found that typically few resources were dedicated to the production 

and dissemination of intelligence, from the perspective of the actors in the gang unit’s 

environment, this was clearly the gang units’ most vital activity. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xiii 

Strategic and Structural Decoupling of Gang Units 

Most of the police departments that we studied had decoupled their gang control 

efforts, both strategically and physically. This resulted in several negative consequences, 

limiting the capacity and effectiveness of the units. Among other things, we found that 

gang units were not responsible for performing core policing activities. Gang unit 

officers, for example, were generally not responsible for responding to calls for service or 

for performing other tasks normally associated with routine patrol activity. Instead, they 

engaged in a buffet style of policing, picking and choosing what to do and when to do it. 

Similarly, in most of the gang units studied, officers were highly selective when 

accepting cases for investigation, whether they worked in a primary or auxiliary 

investigative capacity. Gang unit officers typically investigated incidents only when a 

high probability existed of obtaining valuable intelligence, or when the cases were 

considered by the department to be high-profile, with gang involvement. This typically 

meant that gang unit officers focused their investigative activities on crimes such as 

homicides, drive-by shootings, and aggravated assaults. For the most part, such strategic 

decisions were not made by a superior, nor were they guided by a well-articulated vision 

of what the gang unit should be doing to achieve its goals. Rather, in most of the units, 

operational activities carried out by the officers tended to be decided upon in accord with 

the unique workgroup subculture that existed within each gang unit, a subculture that 

reflected internally shared beliefs about the nature of the local gang problem and the 

appropriate response to that problem. 

Three of the four gang units operated from off-site facilities that were deemed 

secret locations. Even other police officers and criminal justice stakeholders were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xiv 

unaware of the gang unit locations; those few who did know the locations were unable to 

enter the offices independently, because the facilities were always secured and only gang 

unit officers were permitted access. Although various justifications were offered, the 

principal rationale offered for the secret, off-site locations was the need to protect gang 

unit officers from possible gang retaliation. In some instances, we found that the 

espoused need for secrecy took on cold war, spy-like dimensions, with gang officers 

professing that regular precinct stations or police headquarters were subject to penetration 

by gangs, purportedly rendering intelligence files vulnerable to destruction and 

manipulation. 

The decoupling of gang units from the rest of the police organization posed 

several problems that affected their responses to their local gang problems. We found that 

decoupling led gang unit officers to isolate themselves from the rest of the police 

organization and from the community and citizens. This was found to reduce the gang 

units’ capacity to provide information to and receive information from others outside the 

units. The use of off-site and secretive locations promoted gang unit and officer 

autonomy, to the detriment of all. Formal and informal supervision was minimal in most 

sites. This resulted in the organizational character of the gang unit being shaped by 

default by the workgroup subculture, which was sometimes at odds with the mission of 

the larger law enforcement agency, or sometimes even with the law itself. This problem 

was exemplified by findings from the recent investigation of corruption in the Los 

Angeles Police Department’s Rampart Command Area. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xv 

Police Gang Units and Community Policing 

Our final goal was to assess the fit of community policing with the police 

response to gangs, in the form of gang units. In general, we found that the gang units that 

we studied rarely sought citizen input, and had rarely formed partnerships with 

community groups, local businesses, or other local or state agencies. When they had 

partnered with others, it had typically been with criminal justice personnel. These 

partnerships were established and maintained for the express purpose of exchanging 

gang-related intelligence. None of the gang unit officers in any of the study sites 

appeared to value information that non-criminal justice agencies might provide, nor did 

they recognize potential value in sharing their own information and knowledge with noncriminal justice personnel. 

The gang units that we studied engaged in few activities such as prevention or 

problem-oriented policing that are normally associated with community policing,. 

Officers in all of the units believed that it was not particularly their responsibility to 

address underlying problems related to gang crime. They argued that their job was 

essentially reactive in nature – that they were to respond to real problems, after they 

occurred. 

We observed little evidence of police gang units initiating or participating in 

formal problem solving. There appeared to be two main reasons for this. First, with gang 

units decoupled from their parent organizations, linkages were generally not in place with 

community and other key stakeholders who could facilitate their participation in formal 

problem-solving processes. Second, most gang unit officers were untrained to use the 

SARA model or any other formal problem-solving models; some were only vaguely 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xvi 

aware that these existed. Consequently, we found that the gang units simply did not 

routinely consider formal problem-solving strategies as a means to address their local 

gang problems. 

The data also indicated that gang units and gang unit officers were not held 

accountable for gang control efforts in particular geographic areas of their communities. 

Only one of the four sites, Phoenix, permanently assigned squads and officers to specific 

geographic areas. In Phoenix, the gang unit squads were assigned to precincts, and 

individual officers were assigned to particular gangs within their precincts. The Phoenix 

gang unit officers argued that this increased their familiarity with their assigned 

neighborhoods and their knowledge about particular gangs, which in turn was helpful in 

their investigations of gang-related crimes. 

Toward Improving the Effectiveness of Police Gang Units 

Specialized gang units have emerged as a popular strategy for addressing 

community gang problems. This study suggests that such units have opportunities to 

become more effective than they now are. 

First, gang units need to be tightly coupled with core policing technologies. The 

units need to be both physically and operationally connected to patrol and investigative 

units to better facilitate the flow of intelligence. Second, gang units need more 

managerial controls and accountability. With better direction in the form of policies and 

procedures, supervision, and training, gang units will have greater direction and capacity 

to focus their resources and skills on community gang problems. Third, gang units should 

incorporate many of the organizational features and operational strategies found in 

community policing. Enacting such features as community embeddedness, formal 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xvii 

problem solving, and geographic accountability we believe would create not only more 

effective gang units, but also more legitimate gang units in the eyes of the public. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study xviii 

Notes 

Acknowledgements 

We thank all of the officers, administrators, and staff members in the 

Albuquerque, Inglewood, Las Vegas, and Phoenix Police Departments for their 

assistance in this project and for volunteering to participate in this study. The 

information, advice, and support received from these individuals made this project both 

educational and enjoyable. We would also like to thank Scott H. Decker, Cheryl L. 

Maxson, Gary French, and Winnie Reed for their helpful advice and support along the 

way. 

Authors 

Charles M. Katz is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology at 

Arizona State Univeristy West. His research interests include policing gangs, program 

evaluation, and police organizational theory. 

Vincent J. Webb is a Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Arizona 

State University West. His research interests include criminal justice policy and program 

evaluation, gang intervention strategies, police problem solving strategies and practices, 

and communities and crime. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 1 

Chapter 1. Studying the Police Response to Gangs 

That’s what they wanted – and that’s what they got. 

– Former Los Angeles CRASH Unit officer 

By the mid-to-late 1980s, Los Angeles, California had become widely recognized 

as the epicenter of the nation’s growing gang problem. The city had about 280 gangs with 

26,000 members who were becoming increasingly involved in violence and narcotics 

trafficking (Spergel and Curry 1990). Between 1984 and 1992, the number of gang 

homicides skyrocketed from 200 to 800 homicides per year (Maxson 1999). The 

seriousness of the phenomenon was highlighted in media reporting, both locally and 

nationally. Local news programs frequently led with gang-related stories in which 

innocent bystanders had been shot and killed in drive-by shootings. The movie industry 

was producing popular films such as Colors and American Me, portraying L.A. gang 

members as bloodthirsty, minority males who were involved in high-level drug sales 

(Hagedorn 1998). 

As a consequence, a deep fear of gangs gripped the city. The Los Angeles Times 

reported that residents in gang neighborhoods were barring their windows and chaining 

their doors, sleeping in bathtubs or on the floor, to protect themselves from night-time 

drive-by shootings. People avoided wearing clothing in colors associated with gangs to 

prevent being misidentified by rival gangs (J. Katz 1990). There was talk from the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 2 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that the Crips in Los Angeles were well on their 

way to bringing together all Crip sects across the nation into “one major organization 

with a chief executive officer-style leadership structure” to enhance the gang’s ability to 

traffic drugs (Brantley and DiRosa 1994, 3). In fact, the problem in the city became so 

bad that some FBI officials publicly announced that gangs represented a serious threat to 

the national sense of security. 

In response, then-Police Chief Daryl Gates declared a war on gangs, claiming that 

he would “obliterate” violent gangs and “take the little terrorists off the street” (Burrell 

1990); he urged President Ronald Reagan to do the same (Los Angeles City News 

Service 1988). As part of his war, Chief Gates allocated additional officers and staff to 

the police department’s anti-gang unit, the Community Resources Against Street 

Hoodlums (CRASH). Within 5 years, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had 

about 200 sworn officers assigned to the CRASH unit (Spergel 1995). 

Once in full swing, the unit reacted decisively and aggressively, sweeping through 

gang neighborhoods. Take, for example, Operation Hammer, a series of gang sweeps 

carried out in the worst neighborhoods in Los Angeles. The sweeps were characterized by 

the unit moving through neighborhoods, arresting gang members for the slightest 

infractions, including wearing colors, flashing signs, jaywalking, and curfew violations. 

In fact, the unit was making so many arrests that year – close to 25,000 – that LAPD had 

to create a mobile booking facility at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum to process all 

of the arrestees (Burrell 1990). 

By the late 1990s, LAPD’s response to gangs appeared to be working. For 

example, in the Rampart Area, one of the regions hardest hit, gang crimes dropped from 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 3 

1,171 in 1991 to 464 in 1999 – a reduction that exceeded the city-wide decline for all 

other violent crime over the same period (Chemerinsky 2000a). As a consequence, Chief 

Gates and the police department rapidly developed a reputation for being tough on gangs, 

and the CRASH unit became a national model. Police departments across the country 

were contacting LAPD for advice on responding to their own gang problems. LAPD 

began formally training officers from other police departments on LAPD’s operational 

strategies and tactics for policing gangs, gang members, and gang crime. 

With the CRASH unit’s success, however, came problems. CRASH unit officers 

developed a subculture that embodied the war-on-gangs mentality advocated by their 

chief. The subculture was characterized by a mindset in which officers saw all young 

Hispanic and African American males as gang members, believing that any and all efforts 

to remove them from the community could and should be used. Under the guise of 

protecting the community, CRASH officers began resisting supervision, flagrantly 

ignoring policies and procedures that they believed were inhibiting their ability to 

respond to the gang problem (Chemerinsky 2000b, 1). 

This subculture eventually gave rise to the Rampart Scandal, in which Rampart 

CRASH unit officers in Los Angeles were found to be engaging in hard-core criminal 

activity. Officers admitted to attacking known gang members and falsely accusing them 

of crimes they had not committed. The officers argued that “if the suspect didn’t commit 

this crime, he did another for which he didn’t get caught” (Chemerinsky 2000b, 27). 

The ensuing investigation revealed that officers were routinely choking and 

punching gang members for the sole purpose of intimidation. In one case, officers had 

used a gang member as a human battering ram, forcefully thrusting his face repeatedly 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 4 

against a wall. In several other instances, officers had planted drugs on gang members to 

make arrests. Corrupt sergeants and lieutenants in the Division had promoted these 

activities, giving awards for misdeeds. One officer had even received an award for what 

emerged as the shooting of an unarmed, innocent person (CNN.com 2000a). As a 

consequence, approximately 10 years after it had been fully staffed and promoted as the 

ideal in anti-gang enforcement, LAPD’s gang unit was shut down because of corruption, 

the use of excessive force, and civil rights violations. 

Such happenings were not unique to Los Angeles. Police gang units across the 

country were coming under close scrutiny for overly aggressive tactics and other police 

misconduct. 

� In Las Vegas, gang unit officers were found guilty of participating in a driveby shooting. Two officers, one driving and the other hanging outside a van, 

had driven around a well-known gang neighborhood until they found a group 

of gang members loitering on a street corner. The officer hanging outside the 

van shot six times into the crowd, killing a 21-year-old male. The incident 

sparked an FBI investigation into all unsolved drive-by shootings and gang 

killings dating back 5 years, in the belief that some may have been the work of 

rogue gang unit officers (Hynes 1997). 

� In Chicago, gang unit officers were found by federal prosecutors to be 

working hand-in-hand with four Chicago street gangs to transport cocaine 

from Miami to Chicago. The officers were providing gang members with 

security, pointing out undercover officers, and revealing the names of 

confidential informants working with the police. Officers were also found to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 5 

be supplying weapons and mediating disputes between gangs over the street 

prices that should be charged for drugs (Lightly and Mills 2000). 

� In Houston, gang task force officers were discovered to be using unauthorized 

confidential informants, engaging in warrantless searches and entries, and 

firing weapons on unarmed and unassaultive citizens. These practices 

culminated in the death of Pedro Oregon Navarro, who was shot nine times in 

the back by gang task force officers during a raid, later believed to be guided 

by misinformation. Subsequent investigations found that such rogue activity 

in Houston had become common practice (Bardwell 1998; Grazcyk 1998). 

The above incidents could have occurred in any major U.S. city that had created a 

specialized police gang unit in response to growing concerns about gangs and gangrelated problems. Although questions about how police should respond to gangs, and why 

they respond in the ways that they do, have been hotly debated in the media and by 

policymakers and academics (e.g., Burns and Deakin 1989; Huff and McBride 1990; 

Jackson and McBride 1986; and Weisel and Painter 1997), a number of questions remain 

unanswered. Why do police agencies organize their responses to gangs in certain ways? 

Who are the people who elect to police gangs? How do they make sense of gang 

members – individuals who spark fear in most citizens, and why are they interested in 

this particular class of offender? What are their jobs really like? What characterizes their 

working environments? How do their responses to the gang problem fit with other 

policing strategies, such as community policing? 

These questions are especially relevant for police executives who develop and 

oversee responses to gangs, as well as for academics and policymakers across the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 6 

country, and they are the focus of this report. Our goal is to provide a detailed description 

of policing gangs as done by four Southwestern police agencies – Albuquerque, New 

Mexico; Inglewood, California; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Phoenix, Arizona. Before we 

turn our attention to these cities, however, we will provide an overview of the gang 

problem and discuss what is currently known about police gang control efforts. 

The Contemporary Gang Problem 

The United States has seen a dramatic resurgence of gangs, gang members, and 

gang crime over the past 20 years. In the 1970s, one was hard-pressed to find cities with 

gang problems. In 1976, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards 

and Goals went so far as to state: 

Youth gangs are not now or (sic) should not become a major obstacle (sic) 

of concern.... Youth gang violence is not a major crime problem in the 

United States...what gang violence does exist can fairly readily be 

diverted into ‘constructive channels’ especially through the provision of 

services by community agencies (as cited by Spergel 1995, 9). 

Today almost every city in the United States with a population of more than 

100,000 reports a gang problem. Gangs are prevalent in many small and medium-sized 

cities, as well. For example, 81 percent of cities with populations of 50,000 to 99,999 and 

59 percent of cities with populations of 25,000 to 49,000 report having an active youth 

gang problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 1999, Table 4). 

Public concern about the nation’s gang problem has escalated substantially. Prior to 1985, 

national polls examining community problems did not register gangs or gang problems as 

a major concern; however, by 1994, gang violence ranked as the third most important 

issue facing America – behind education and drugs and before crime in general (Bureau 

of Justice Statistics 1995, Table 2.3). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 7 

Some have argued that public fear has been a consequence of media portrayals of 

gangs. Between 1983 and 1999, the number of gang stories reported in major newspapers 

increased from fewer than 50 a year in 1983 to about 900 a year in 1999 (McCorkle and 

Miethe 2002). Many of the stories reinforced common beliefs about gangs, emphasizing 

violent behavior associated with gangs and gang members. Television news programs 

and the front pages of newspapers often showed the outcome of the most recent episode 

of gang violence, and how it had affected neighborhood residents or resulted in the injury 

or death of an innocent bystander (Klein 1995a). Media coverage focused on the role of 

gangs and gang members in the distribution of crack cocaine. News shows broadcast that 

super gangs such as the Crips and Bloods were migrating to smaller, less urban 

communities where there was less competition in drug sales and where they could 

maximize profits in the drug market (McCorkle and Miethe 2002). Before long, the 

public began to characterize gang members as violence-prone minority youths – youths 

who were disinterested in conventional values and morals, and who were willing to kill to 

protect their drug businesses. 

Although many of these images and perceptions were the product of media 

generalization and sensationalism, most researchers agree that gang behavior had in fact 

changed over the past two decades, particularly with regard to violence. In the past, gangs 

had rarely engaged in fights; when they did, the fights hardly ever resulted in serious 

injury. The use of firearms was an extremely isolated event (Thrasher 1927; Whyte 1943; 

Miller 1962; Klein 1971). Many academics reported that prior to the 1970s, the most 

prevalent offenses committed by gang members involved loitering, theft, truancy, and 

disturbing the peace (Spergel 1995; Hagedorn 1998). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 8 

During the 1980s, however, it became clear to researchers that the level of gang 

violence was changing for the worse. Gangs were increasingly fighting one another with 

firearms, and serious injuries were no longer considered isolated events. In Chicago, for 

example, the number of gang-motivated homicides increased five-fold between 1987 and 

1994, from 51 to 240 (Compiler 1996). Similarly, from 1984 to 1995, the number of 

gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County quadrupled, from 212 to 807. The rise in 

violence was not restricted to large cities, but also affected several smaller communities. 

In Omaha, Nebraska, for example, between 1986 and 1991, the number of gangmotivated homicides rose from none to 12 (C. Katz 1997). 

Over the same time period, researchers began to find consistent evidence that 

gang members were responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. Much of this 

research relied on official data collected by the police. For example, Walter B. Miller 

(1982) reported that although gang members represented only 6 percent of youths 10 to 

19 years old in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles, they represented 11 percent of 

all arrests in those cities, 40 percent of arrests for serious crimes, and almost 25 percent 

of arrests for juvenile homicides. Similarly, Paul Tracy (1978) found that gang members 

in Philadelphia were arrested at significantly higher rates than non-gang members. He 

reported that 63 percent of delinquent gang members were chronic recidivists (i.e., had 

been arrested five or more times), compared with only 27 percent of delinquent nongang members. 

Charles Katz, Vincent Webb, and David Schaefer (2000) examined how offense 

patterns differed between documented gang members and non-documented delinquent 

youth with similar characteristics. They found that documented gang members were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 9 

significantly more likely to have engaged in serious delinquency and were significantly 

more criminally active than the delinquent comparison group. In particular, they found 

that documented gang members were about twice as likely to have been arrested for a 

violent, weapon, drug, or status offense; they were arrested for these offenses about four 

times as often as non-documented delinquent youth. 

Similar patterns have emerged when comparing self-report data from non-gang 

members and from gang members in the general population. Much of this research has 

been conducted through longitudinal studies of delinquent behavior, such as the Seattle 

Social Development Project and the Rochester Youth Development Study. Both studies 

gathered self-report data from randomly selected youth in local schools (Battin-Pearson 

et al. 1998). For example, in Seattle, researchers examined differences among gang 

members, non-gang delinquent peers, and non-gang, non-delinquent peers. The data 

showed that gang members were about twice as likely to self report both violent and 

nonviolent offenses, and about ten times more likely to self report violent and nonviolent 

offenses, when compared with their non-gang, non-delinquent peers. 

The Rochester study yielded similar results with a slightly different methodology. 

The researchers first divided their sample into two groups: gang members and non-gang 

members. Next, the researchers divided those in the non-gang group into four subgroups, 

based on the extent of their self-reported contact with delinquent peers. Analysis of the 

data indicated that although increased association with delinquent peers was related to 

offense rates, “being a member of a gang facilitates delinquency over and above that 

effect” (Battin-Pearson et al. 1998, 5-6). 

Similarly, policymakers, media officials, and academics have seen an increase in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 10 

drug trafficking among gang members, an increase that they argue has fueled violence 

among gangs. Two explanations have been suggested for increasing gang involvement in 

drug sales (Fagan 1996). First, in the early 1980s, crack cocaine use escalated 

dramatically, and a new drug market emerged. Because the new market had not yet 

stabilized, violence was often used as a regulatory mechanism. Second, at about the same 

time, the economic infrastructure of many inner cities collapsed. Manufacturing jobs 

declined, and service and technology jobs, which began to drive the new economy, were 

being created in suburban communities (Howell and Decker 1999). The economic 

restructuring of the nation left unqualified and geographically isolated urban minority 

youth without the means or opportunity for employment. The new crack cocaine market 

provided opportunities for inner-city youth to make money. It also led to the transition of 

many youth groups into gangs with the organizational capacity to control local drug 

markets (Fagan 1996; Howell and Decker 1999). 

The extent to which gangs are organized for the purpose of drug trafficking is not 

clear. On one hand, a number of researchers have argued that gangs are organizationally 

structured, engaging in operational strategies that enhance their potential for profiting 

from drug sales. For example, Taylor (1990), Sanchez-Jankowski (1991), and Venkatesh 

(1997) in their observational studies of gang members in Detroit, Boston, New York City, 

Los Angeles, and Chicago found that gangs are highly rational and organizationally 

sophisticated; similar to any other capitalist enterprise, they have an established 

leadership hierarchy and formal rules and goals that guide their actions. These authors 

have maintained that membership in gangs is motivated by a common interest in profiting 

from criminal activity, and that the corporate-like structure of gangs provides an ideal and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 11 

highly effective organization for the distribution of drugs. 

Jerome Skolnick (1990) examined this issue at length in his study of gang 

members in California. He found that gang members often were driven to outside drug 

markets in an effort to enhance profitability in the drug trade, and that this resulted in 

frequent violent conflicts between gangs over the control of territory. Because of the 

violent nature of the drug trade, Skolnick argued, gang membership offers advantages to 

those interested in selling drugs – protection, a controlled drug market, and a stable 

source of products to sell in the retail market. 

An alternative perspective is offered by Malcolm Klein (1995a) and others, who 

have argued that although gang members are intimately involved in the drug market, they 

do not have the organizational capacity to control and manage drug trafficking. For 

example, Fagan (1989) and Decker and Van Winkle (1994), who interviewed gang 

members in Los Angeles, San Diego, Chicago, and St. Louis, found that although many 

gang members sold drugs, most did not join a gang expressly for this purpose. Instead, 

they joined for social interaction and neighborhood identification. Additionally, the 

researchers reported that gangs in these communities were not well-organized for the 

distribution of drugs, that most members were unable to identify occupational roles in the 

selling of drugs, and that many did not know who supplied drugs. Similar findings were 

reported by Hagedorn (1988), who interviewed 47 gang members in Milwaukee. Of the 

gang members interviewed, only a few were identified as actual drug dealers. The 

majority, Hagedorn argued, sold drugs periodically, along with other income-producing 

activities, simply as a means of survival. Furthermore, he claimed that gang members 

lacked the needed resources, skills, and commitment to form a corporate-like 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 12 

organization for the purpose of profiting from the drug market. Hagedorn reported that 

gang members felt that it was “too much of a hassle” to be strongly committed to an 

organizational goal (1988, 105). 

Either way, as gangs, gang members, and gang crime increasingly were perceived 

as a public safety threat, policymakers and researchers began to call for gang control 

strategies. Since the early 1990s, a massive mobilization of personnel and resources has 

been directed at controlling the nation’s gang problem. County attorneys’ offices have 

created vertical prosecutorial gang units to increase conviction rates and sentence lengths 

in cases involving gang members (Johnson et al. 1995); state legislatures have enacted 

criminal statutes to enhance penalties for gang members who are convicted of gang 

offenses (McCorkle and Miethe 1998); and city councils have passed anti-gang loitering 

laws prohibiting gang members from coming into contact with one another on the streets 

(Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003). Some communities have called out the National 

Guard to patrol streets and to work with police to round up criminally active gang 

members (Brokaw, Ewing and Greenburg 1989). 

Of all of the responses devised by local communities to control gangs, the 

establishment of specialized police gang units has become the most common suppression 

strategy. Although substantial research has examined gangs, gang members, and gang 

crime, unfortunately, little of it has addressed police gang control efforts. The paucity of 

research in this area is surprising, given the central role that police in general, and 

specialized police gang units in particular, must play in community gang reduction 

efforts. In the section that follows, we discuss what is currently known about the police 

response to gangs. In particular, we discuss the rationale of police gang units, the growth 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 13 

and development of police gang units, and the limitations of prior research that has 

examined the police response to gangs. 

Police Response to Gangs: Theoretical, Policy, and Organizational 

Rationales 

Historically, the police response to gangs and gang-related problems has been to 

assign responsibility for control to existing units such as patrol, juvenile bureaus, 

community relations, investigations, and crime prevention (Huff 1993; Needle and 

Stapleton 1983). In the 1980s, however, many police departments began to establish 

specialized units for gang control, including what is commonly referred to as the police 

gang unit. A police gang unit is a secondary or tertiary functional division within a police 

organization, with at least one sworn officer whose sole function is to engage in gang 

control efforts (C. Katz, Maguire and Roncek 2002). 

In 1999, the Law Enforcement and Management Administrative Statistics 

(LEMAS) survey reported that among large agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, 

special gang units existed in 56 percent of all municipal police departments, 50 percent of 

all sheriff’s departments, 43 percent of all county police agencies, and 20 percent of all 

state law enforcement agencies (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999, Table C). These 

findings led to an estimate of approximately 360 police gang units in the country. The 

recency of this phenomenon is illustrated by the fact that more than 85 percent of the 

specialized gang units were established within the past 10 years (C. Katz, Maguire and 

Roncek 2002). 
19 

Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 14 

Exhibit 1.01 Establishment of police gang units 

35

30

25

20

Number Created 

15

10

5 

0 

2 1 

8 

35 

1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-1998 

Year Created 

The creation of police gang units has been one part of the national response to the 

gang problem. In 1988, Irving Spergel and David Curry (1993) surveyed 254 

professionals in 45 cities to assess the response at that time. They found that suppression 

techniques employed by police were the strategy most often cited by respondents. This 

trend appeared strongest in the newer gang cities, however, where police suppression was 

relied upon almost exclusively. 

With the suppression approach, Klein (1995a) argues, enforcement officials see 

their primary responsibility as responding to gang street crimes. In other words, officials 

believe that they are expected to deal with the crimes most likely to come to the public’s 

attention – crimes such as assaults, drive-by shootings, drug sales, and graffiti. Prevention 

and treatment strategies, on the other hand, are low priorities. In fact, these police 

officials view gang crime prevention and treatment as completely outside the scope of 

their responsibility. The underlying assumption of the suppression strategy is based on 

deterrence theory: that swift, severe, and certain punishment will lead to the reduction of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 15 

gang-related activity among current gang members, as well as to a reduction in the 

number of individuals who want to participate in gangs and gang behavior in the future. 

Accordingly, Klein (1995a, 160) argues that the “assumption of all this is that the targets 

of suppression, the gang members and potential gang members, will respond ‘rationally’ 

to suppression efforts [and] will weigh the consequences of gang activity, redress the 

balance between cost and benefit, and withdraw from gang activity.” 

To understand the police response to the gang problem, one must first understand 

the developments that have shaped and justified the shift toward suppression-oriented 

strategies. First, policymakers no longer believe that the social intervention approaches of 

the 1960s and 1970s are successful in dealing with gang problems. Social intervention 

took many forms, all based on the assumption that gang membership was the byproduct 

of a socially deprived community, and that the values and norms of gang youths could be 

changed by re-orienting the youths’ attitudes, values, and expectations toward 

mainstream society. Social intervention approaches usually relied on a detached case 

worker who was assigned to work with gangs and gang members, in order to steer the 

youths away from delinquency and encourage them toward more socially acceptable 

activities such as athletic teams, club activities, and fundraisers (President’s Commission 

on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967). Many have argued that this 

approach did not reduce delinquent activity; instead, it may have led to increased group 

cohesiveness that, in turn, may have led to increased delinquency. Additionally, some 

critics claimed that the assignment of a case worker enhanced the local reputation of 

particular gangs, helping to attract new members and leading to a growing gang problem 

in areas employing the detached workers (Klein 1971; Spergel 1995). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 16 

Second, as discussed above, many policymakers and others believe that the scope 

and nature of the gang problem have changed dramatically. In 1983, only 45 percent of 

cities with populations of 100,000 or more reported a gang problem (Needle and 

Stapleton 1983), whereas, by 1992, this figure had risen to over 90 percent (Curry, Ball 

and Fox 1994). These studies illustrate that gangs no longer are only a big city problem; 

they have also become prevalent in many small and medium-sized cities (Office of 

Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention 2003). A number of studies have found that 

gang members are disproportionately responsible for delinquency, crime, drug use, and 

drug dealing when compared with non-gang members (Howell and Decker 1999; C. 

Katz, Webb and Shaefer 2000; Klein 1995a; Spergel 1995). As a result, many local 

officials believe the gang problem will only get worse, and that the way to stop it is to 

remove gang members from society through the criminal justice system. 

The third reason for the shift to suppression-oriented strategies is the combined 

effect of disenchantment with social intervention strategies and increasing public 

acknowledgement that the gang problem has grown. Citizen surveys have confirmed that 

residents are fearful of gangs (J. Katz 1990), and that the public believes that dealing with 

gang-related problems should be a top police priority (Webb and C. Katz 1997). State and 

federal legislators have responded by allocating additional funds for suppression-oriented 

interventions (Klein 1995b; McCorkle and Miethe 1998). Municipal and state agencies 

have received additional funding, usually through federal grants, for interagency task 

forces, information tracking systems, and overtime pay for police to target hard-core gang 

members. With implementation of community policing in many agencies, public pressure 

to address gang problems have forced the departments to prioritize gang control efforts. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 17 

Although specialized police gang units represent a new feature in the landscape of 

American policing, they are embedded in the larger trend toward creating specialized 

units that address specific law enforcement issues such as repeat offenses, domestic 

violence, and hate crimes. Such specialized units are said to be created in order to focus 

departmental resources, energy, and skills on specific community problems. Additionally, 

the approach is offered as a symbolic act to show the community, potential offenders, and 

police officers that the police department is taking a particular problem seriously (Meyer 

1979; W. Scott 1995). 

For similar reasons, it appears, many police officials and gang scholars have 

called for consolidation of gang control functions within police departments (e.g., Burns 

and Deakin 1989; Huff and McBride 1993; Jackson and McBride 1986; Rush 1996). 

They have argued that assigning primary responsibility for addressing the gang problem 

to a specialized unit will increase the technical efficiency and effectiveness of the police 

department’s response. They point out that consolidation of gang control functions will 

permit officers to develop highly technical skills through training and experience, that 

otherwise would not be possible. They claim that consolidation also allows police 

organizations to distribute gang-related work rationally, better enabling police 

departments to develop and coordinate responses to community gang problems. 

The creation of a specialized police gang unit also symbolizes police commitment 

to combating the gang problem, and projects an image of police as leaders in the battle 

against gangs (Klein 1995a; Spergel 1995). This image is further conveyed through 

naming protocols. For example, San Bernardino County’s interagency task force is called 

SMASH (San Bernardino County Movement Against Street Hoodlums); the Los Angeles 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 18 

Police Department gang unit is called CRASH (Community Resources Against Street 

Hoodlums); and the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department’s gang unit is called GET 

(Gang Enforcement Team) (Spergel 1995, 192-3). Such acronyms express a Hollywood 

image of police at war with gangs, and imply that the gang problem can be solved by 

intensifying our efforts to combat them (Pillsbury 1988). 

Prior Research Examining the Police Response to Gangs 

Much of the research to date that examines the police response to gangs relied 

upon news media reporting. Media accounts of police responses to gangs have typically 

involved journalistic depictions of police agencies and their most recent efforts to control 

gang behavior. Much of the information is obtained from police executives or their 

spokespersons, commenting on a particular agency’s tough stance. Even some of the 

most recognized pieces of gang scholarship have had to rely on such media accounts as 

their primary source of information, due to a lack of academic scholarship on this topic 

(Klein, Maxson and Miller 1995; Spergel 1995). 

The few studies that have examined the police response to gangs are typically 

focused at the macro level. This research relies on mail surveys of police leaders, asking 

whether their communities had a gang problem; if so, respondents were asked to identify 

their department’s particular strategies for dealing with gangs. Such studies reported that 

departments claiming to have a gang problem were significantly more likely to have 

established a specialized gang unit (Curry et al. 1992; Needle and Stapleton 1983). Based 

on this data, a number of researchers have made inferences and assumptions about why 

police had responded to gangs in the ways that they had. In particular, many researchers 

have claimed that the relatively rapid development and growth of police gang units 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 19 

seemed more or less natural, given the spread of gangs and gang members across 

America’s communities (Burns and Deakin 1989; Huff and McBride 1993; Jackson and 

McBride 1986). They point out that according to surveys of police, almost every major 

city and most medium-sized cities have gang problems (Curry, Ball and Decker 1996). 

As Huff explains (1993, 401), “Gangs pose a significant challenge to law enforcement 

agencies as well as to citizens, schools, and the quality of life in our communities.” 

Within this body of research, others have specifically argued that special police 

gang units were created as a consequence of the growing amount of gang crime, 

including drug trafficking, that accompanied the rise in the numbers of gangs and gang 

members (Burns and Deakin 1989; Jackson and McBride 1986). For example, some 

academics have pointed to the fact that nationally, gang crime incidents reported by the 

police increased 8- to 12-fold just between 1991 and 1993 (Curry, Ball and Decker 1996). 

Most of the above arguments have been based on supposition; however, Weisel 

and Painter (1997) examined this issue directly in their study of the police response to 

gangs in five cities. Although the authors relied primarily on data from police leaders, 

they also conducted brief interviews with police gang control specialists in each city to 

gain a deeper understanding of each community’s response to gangs. The interview data 

revealed that most police agencies had responded to gang problems because of wellpublicized gang homicides and fights. They reported that the police departments in their 

study typically had responded by establishing specialized units that emphasized 

suppression. Many police officials, policymakers, and researchers maintain that the 

emergence of specialized gang units is a rational police response (a gang unit) to an 

environmental contingency (a community gang problem). They explain that specialized 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 20 

police gang units have been created as a result of rational considerations on the part of 

police agencies, that their organizations are faced with real gang problems, and that 

through specialization, they can more effectively and efficiently control gang-related 

crime. 

A few researchers examining the police response to gangs have proposed an 

alternative perspective, arguing that establishment of specialized police gang units has 

been a response to moral panic, not to environmental contingencies. For example, 

Marjorie Zatz (1987) examined the police response to gangs in Phoenix, Arizona, using a 

variety of data obtained from community members, media reports, and court records. She 

reported that there was no serious gang problem in Phoenix at the time that the gang unit 

was established, but that police officials constructed the gang problem in an effort to 

campaign for federal resources. She argued that the police department, along with news 

media, constructed an image of gang members as dangerous, crime-prone Chicano youth 

– an image that fit with the Anglo notion of gang members. At the same time, police 

officials were claiming that if they were not given resources to combat it, the gang 

problem was sure to escalate. She found that official court data and interviews with social 

service agents indicated that gang members did not pose a significant threat to the 

community, and that the police department claims of a serious gang problem were 

exaggerated. 

McCorkle and Miethe (1998) examined legislative records, media reports, and 

official crime data in Las Vegas, Nevada, to assess whether that city’s response to gangs 

was the consequence of moral panic. Examining the objective threat posed by gangs, the 

authors reported that gang members accounted for a relatively small proportion of arrests 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 21 

for violent crimes and an even smaller proportion of drug arrests in the city. When 

describing factors that led to moral panic, the authors reported that at the time that the 

specialized police gang unit was established, the police department had a tarnished public 

image, and was in desperate need of additional resources. Accordingly, McCorkle and 

Miethe suggested that police officials in the Las Vegas Police Department linked national 

reports of a growing gang problem to local concerns about escalating crime in order to 

divert public attention away from problems within the local department and to justify an 

infusion of financial resources. 

Archbold and Meyer (1999) extended the research above by including data 

obtained from police officials. In particular, their study of a specialized police gang unit 

in Cedar Springs included data obtained from observations of gang unit officers, in-depth 

interviews with police officials, and official documents and newspapers. Their analysis 

suggested that a series of homicides committed by local youths, coupled with the 

emergence of a gang problem in nearby large cities, had resulted in a heightened public 

fear of gangs. Archbold and Meyer further explained that in response to the community’s 

fears, the police department began to document minority youth in the community as gang 

members. As the number of documented gang members rose, so did media reports and 

the community’s fears about gangs. The authors reported that the perceived problem 

eventually spun out of control, resulting in community panic, even though there was no 

actual evidence of any gang-related activity in the city. The authors reported that within 

about 8 months, they believed the gang unit was no longer active due to the lack of gangrelated action in the city. 

Most academics examining this issue have argued that the police response to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 22 

gangs in communities across the country is the result of police officials becoming 

actively involved in the social construction of gang problems at the local level. Zatz 

(1987) and McCorkle and Miethe (1998) reasoned that in order for local agencies to have 

access to some forms of federal or local money, they had to demonstrate a gang problem 

within their communities. These researchers, along with Archbold and Meyer (1999), 

found that construction of the problem was accomplished by the police creating a public 

image of minority and other marginalized youth as gang members – an image that the 

researchers argued is consistent with Anglo society’s perception of those who are 

dangerous and violent, and who pose a social threat. 

Charles Katz’s (2001) fieldwork in Junction City is one of the few exceptions. He 

argued that much of the previous research examining the police response to gangs failed 

to consider the perspective of the police and their constituencies, as well as the general 

environment within which the police work. Specifically, to explain the police response to 

gangs in the city, he used a multi-methodological approach that relied on observations of 

the gang unit, interviews with gang unit officers and executives in the police department, 

interviews with internal and external stakeholders of the gang unit, documents produced 

by the police department, and review of newspaper articles. In the police department 

studied, he found that the gang unit was created under pressure from influential 

community stakeholders. Creation of the gang unit was the department’s attempt to 

maintain its organizational legitimacy and to communicate to its institutional 

environment that it was responding to the local gang problem. He further found that once 

created, the gang unit was required to incorporate often competing ideas and beliefs into 

its organizational structure and operational strategy, in order to project an image of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 23 

operational effectiveness, even when it was otherwise unable to demonstrate success. 

Katz concluded that an institutional perspective of policing, rather than the social 

constructionist perspective, might be the more appropriate theoretical framework for 

understanding the police response to gangs. 

Much of the above research examining the police response to gangs has relied 

upon qualitative case study methodologies focusing on a single city, limiting 

generalization of the findings. Although this methodological approach has advantages, it 

is geographically limited, restricts the number of variables that can be examined, and 

cannot quantitatively assess the relative importance of different community and 

organizational characteristics that might influence the response to gangs. 

Katz, Maguire and Roncek (2002) attempted to examine the factors that 

influenced creation of specialized police gang units in about 300 large cities in the United 

States. In particular, they examined the impact of the number of gangs, gang members, 

and gang crime on the creation process, along with other factors related to crime (violent, 

property, drug, weapons, assault arrests), social threat (percent African American, percent 

Hispanic), resource dependencies (external funding to support the police response to 

gangs), organizational characteristics (agency size, vertical and functional 

differentiation), and environment (population size and region). The authors found no 

relationship between the size of a community gang or crime problem and the creation of a 

gang unit. Instead, they found that specialized gang units were most likely to be created 

in communities that had larger Hispanic populations. They reasoned that police 

organizations might be creating gang units when the community feels threatened by a 

minority group – particularly Hispanics. They also found that police departments that had 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 24 

received funding for gang control efforts were significantly more likely to have 

established a specialized police gang unit than agencies that had not received funding. 

They noted that there might be a number of explanations for this finding; however, they 

posited that some gang units might have been created prior to receiving external funding 

for the purpose of justifying the need for more resources, as found by Zatz (1987) and 

McCorkle and Miethe (1998). 

All of this demonstrates that although a discussion of the police response to gangs 

has begun to emerge, several deficits in our understanding remain. First, the body of 

literature has been methodologically limited. Policymakers and academics have used 

anecdotal evidence to understand the police response to gangs, or alternatively, they have 

conducted single-shot, qualitative case studies, limiting the generalizations that can be 

drawn from their research. 

Similarly, most research to date has failed to include information from the police 

organization itself and from stakeholders in the organizational environment. We lack 

research that systematically examines the police response to gangs from the perspective 

of the police organization. When attempting to understand how and why a police 

organization responds to a gang problem, it would seem important to consider how the 

organization and those in the organization make sense of their reality. Similarly, it would 

seem important to consider how sovereigns might affect the police response to gangs. As 

noted above, research that does not consider the institutional environment will fail to 

fully capture how an organization conceptualizes, comprehends, and makes sense of the 

social system in which it operates (Weick 1995; Weick and Roberts 1993). 

A second limitation to this body of literature is its narrow focus on factors that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 25 

affect the establishment of police gang units. Researchers as yet have failed to examine 

what gang unit officers actually do, and how such factors as gang unit culture, training, 

and the impact of organizational mandates affect the day-to-day activities of gang unit 

officers. Research that examines the organizational structure and administrative oversight 

of gang units, and their effect on gang unit officer behavior is also missing from the 

literature. Incidents in Los Angeles, Chicago, Las Vegas, and Houston suggest that such 

factors may well have important consequences for the administration of police gang 

units. 

Last, little research has examined the role of community-oriented policing in the 

control of gang behavior. Community policing has altered how police and policymakers 

think about how police work should be organized and performed. The dialog about the 

response to the gang problem thus far has been focused on the core function of police 

work – patrol – and has rarely attended to how broader organizational changes in policing 

may have affected other specialized police functions, such as gang control efforts. 

The Present Study 

This report is concerned with advancing our understanding of how police gang 

units respond to community gang problems. Although researchers have begun to 

document programs and activities performed by police gang units, these studies to date 

have relied on surveys of police leaders; as a result, little research has examined the 

realities and experiences of those working day-to-day within a police gang unit. The 

research reported here describes assumptions, issues, problems, and events that have 

characterized, shaped, and defined the police response to the gang problem. In particular, 

this research has five major objectives: 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 26 

1. To identify and examine the factors that have led to the creation of specialized 

police gang units, and to examine how those factors have influenced the units’ 

responses to the gang problems in their communities; 

2. To examine alternative ways in which police agencies have organized 

resources to respond to their local gang problems; 

3. To examine the relevant beliefs of gang unit officers, and how their beliefs 

might have affected the police response to gangs; 

4. To identify the activities that gang unit officers have been engaging in, and to 

clarify conceptually the roles of specialized police gang units within their 

departments; 

5. To assess the goodness of fit of the police response to gangs with the 

community-oriented policing paradigm. 

Reasons for Establishing Gang Units 

Achieving the first objective will help us understand the reasons for which police 

gang units are established. Research to date has neglected this question, shedding little 

light on why the police have been responding to the gang problem as they have over the 

past 15 years (cf. Zatz 1987; McCorkle and Miethe 1998; C. Katz 2001; C. Katz, 

Maguire and Roncek 2002). The research reported here systematically examined factors, 

situations, and events that have given rise to police gang units. For each community that 

we studied, this included 1) examining the nature and extent of the gang problem prior to 

the establishment of a gang unit, 2) identifying significant events that preceded the 

decision to establish a gang unit, and 3) identifying internal and external pressures placed 

on the police department that might have influenced the decision-making process. 

We also considered how the above factors might have influenced the gang units’ 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 27 

responses to the community gang problems. Although limited research has examined 

influential factors in the creation of gang units and how these factors affected established 

units’ organizational structures and operational strategies, little additional research has 

been conducted to confirm earlier findings. Our intent is to examine how the gang units’ 

responses might be affected by the same factors that led to the units’ creation in the first 

place. Pinpointing factors that motivate the establishment of gang units will lead to a 

better understanding of why gang units respond to community gang problems in the way 

that they do. 

Alternative Organizational Forms 

The second objective of our research is to deepen our understanding of the 

different ways in which police agencies organize resources for responding to the local 

gang problem. A variety of organizational configurations are in use, yet little attention 

has been paid to the implications of differing configurations for shaping specific 

responses. In some agencies, the gang unit is a sub-unit of the investigations bureau; in 

others, it is a sub-unit within a larger organized crime unit. A standalone gang unit is 

another frequently occurring configuration. 

The specific configuration and location of a unit within its parent organization 

might affect the organizational perception of the nature of the problem, and may also 

shape the specific programs and practices of the unit. For example, a unit located within 

an investigation bureau may be more likely to support and engage in incident-driven 

investigations than a unit located within an organized crime bureau. It may be more likely 

to view gangs as groups of individuals engaging in occasional, nonsystematic criminal 

behavior. Specific responses might include investigating gang-related offenses using 

traditional investigative techniques or assisting other units with investigations of gang­
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 28 

related incidents. On the other hand, a gang unit located in an organized crime bureau 

probably would perceive gangs as groups of individuals who organize to engage in 

systematic criminal activity. Such a unit might pattern its responses after those used to 

address non-gang-related organized crime. The research reported here provides detailed 

information on alternative gang unit configurations, as well as insight into how different 

configurations pattern gang unit responses. 

Gang Unit Officers 

The third objective of this study is to examine how the beliefs of gang unit 

officers influenced their responses to the gang problem. Several previous studies have 

examined police culture and its affect on the police response to special populations1

, but 

little research has specifically addressed the belief systems of gang unit officers. 

Accordingly, we examined such issues as what officers in gang units considered to be the 

realities of their work situation, what the unit officers believed they must do to perform 

effectively, and the officers’ perceptions of gang members in their community. Similarly, 

we examined such issues as the construction of officers’ attitudes and beliefs, including 

how training had shaped those attitudes and beliefs. 

We also focused on the impact of the larger organizational culture in which the 

gang unit officers worked on the response to gangs. Anecdotal evidence has suggested 

that a police department's organizational culture might significantly influence the types of 

activities engaged in by gang unit officers (Freed 1995; Klein 1995a). Accordingly, we 

were interested in examining informal organizational expectations that may have 

influenced the gang units’ responses to their community gang problems. 

Gang unit officers often act as primary claim makers, educating the public about 

the scope and nature of community gang problems; therefore, we wanted to examine the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 29 

officers’ perceptions of the problem, and we collected data specifically related to these 

perceptions. We were interested in the officers' perspectives on the typical gang member, 

the primary activities in which gang members engage, and changes in gang-related crime 

over time. Related to this, we examined how officers cognitively constructed their images 

of community gang problems. We compared the officers’ perceptions to official data 

retrieved from the police department, in an effort to assess how closely those perceptions 

matched departmental data. 

Gang Unit Functions and Activities 

The fourth objective was to understand exactly how specialized police gang units 

responded to community gang problems. Despite the importance of documenting the 

activities of gang unit officers for the purposes of planning and performance 

measurement, little attention has been given to understanding what gang unit officers 

actually do. Accordingly, this study examined such issues as how officers spend time, the 

types of problems that gang unit officers face on the job, and the types of actions that 

gang unit officers take while interacting with citizens and other criminal justice officials. 

We also focused on how the gang unit's formal organizational properties 

influenced gang unit officers’ responses to the gang problem. In particular, we were 

interested in understanding how the officers were officially directed to conduct 

themselves. We examined how formal documents such as departmental and unit Standard 

Operating Procedures (SOP) and other official documents influenced the units’ responses 

to gangs. 

The study also examined how the social system or environment in which the gang 

units operated influenced their responses to the gang problem. Researchers to date have 

focused primarily on how gang members and their activities influence the police response 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 30 

(Rush 1996; Weisel and Painter 1997); few have identified other powerful factors within 

the gang units’ environments that might also shape that response. Accordingly, this study 

examined how the gang units’ operational activities were influenced by those in their 

institutional environments, including, but not necessarily limited to, key community 

stakeholders, citizens, criminal justice officials, and gang members. 

Compatibility of Gang Units with Community-Oriented Policing 

The fifth objective of this study is to examine the compatibility of the police 

response to gangs with community-oriented policing. The growth of police gang units 

paralleled the development of community-oriented policing, yet there has been an 

absence of attention paid by scholars and policymakers to the role of the gang unit in 

furthering community-oriented policing goals and objectives. 

Several important questions remain unanswered. For example, do suppressionoriented gang unit activities facilitate or hinder the police-community co-production of 

public safety? Does a strong emphasis on community-oriented policing facilitate gang 

unit performance by improving intelligence-gathering capacity through improved 

community relations? How do gang unit officers perceive community-oriented policing 

and their role within it? This study attempted to answer these and related questions about 

the compatibility of the police response to gangs with community-oriented policing, by 

examining the views of police managers, gang unit officers, and gang unit stakeholders. 

In addition, we assessed the characteristics and features of the four gang units selected for 

our study against the backdrop of the principal features of community-oriented policing 

that have been previously identified by police scholars. 

After reviewing the literature on the emergence and functioning of gang units as a 

principal police response to community gang problems, we identified what we considered 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 31 

to be critical gaps in the research to date. We set an ambitious agenda for answering some 

of the more compelling questions, and then moved forward to develop a productive 

methodology. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 32 

Chapter 2. Setting and Methods 

Ultimately, my sense of the report is that the Board of Inquiry was created 

by the management of the Los Angeles Police Department to study the 

Rampart Scandal and it is the management account: it minimizes the 

problem and spares management of criticism. What is desperately needed 

is external investigations and accounts to learn the full magnitude of the 

problems and to propose the needed comprehensive reforms to ensure that 

this never happens again. 

– Erwin Chemerinsky, Independent Auditor of the Los Angeles Police 

Department Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal 2000, 11. 

This chapter describes the methodological strategies used in this study. In 

particular, we describe the settings in which the study took place, explain the 

characteristics of the police departments and the gang units that were examined, and 

discuss the approaches that were used to collect data. 

Study Setting 

Data for the study were gathered from four communities located in the 

Southwestern region of the United States: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Inglewood, 

California; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Phoenix, Arizona. We selected these cities for our 

study for two major reasons.2

 First, although police departments across the country claim 

to have gang problems, researchers have found that police departments in the 

Southwestern have been significantly more likely than others to respond to the problem 

by establishing specialized police gang units (Curry et al. 1992, 65). Selecting these cities 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 33 

allowed us to focus our efforts where specialized gang units were most likely to be the 

police response to gang problems. 

Second, the gang units in these four cities presented a variety of organizational 

configurations. The Phoenix Police Department gang unit was located in the Organized 

Crime Bureau, the Inglewood Police Department gang unit was located in the Criminal 

Investigation Bureau, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department gang unit was 

located in the Special Operations Division, and the Albuquerque Police Department gang 

unit was located in the Special Enforcement Bureau. These sites allowed us to examine 

how gang units fit organizationally into police departments, and how differing 

organizational configurations might influence the police response to gangs. 

Exhibit 2.01 shows the characteristics of each city, all four of which are located in 

the largest metropolitan areas of their states. Phoenix is by far the largest, with a 

population well over one million residents. Las Vegas and Albuquerque are each 

moderately sized cities with about half a million residents. Inglewood is the smallest, 

with about 100,000 residents, although it is the most urban and ethnically diverse of the 

cities. Located in the heart of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, Inglewood is 12 miles 

southwest of downtown Los Angeles and one mile from the Los Angeles Airport. 

Inglewood’s population is about 47 percent black and 46 percent Hispanic. Inglewood is 

also more economically stressed than the other cities. In comparison, it has higher levels 

of unemployment, more female-headed families with children, lower levels of home 

ownership, and lower incomes. This is in part due to the faltering local economy, which 

supports few major employers. Among the largest employers are Hollywood Park Race 

and Casino, two local hospitals, and two retail stores – The Price Club and Home Base. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 34 

Exhibit 2.01 Study site characteristics 

Albuquerque Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

Population * 

Race or ethnicity (%)* 

White 

Black 

American Indian 

Asian 

Hawaiian 

Other 

Mixed 

Hispanic (all races - %)

Unemployed (%) *

Homeowners (%) *

Female-headed families with children (%)*

448,607 112,580 478,434 1,321,945 

71.59 19.10 69.85 71.02 

3.08 47.13 10.36 5.09 

3.88 0.68 0.74 2.01 

2.24 1.13 4.78 2.00 

0.10 0.36 0.44 0.13 

14.77 27.37 9.74 16.38 

4.30 4.20 4.05 3.72 

39.90 46.00 23.60 34.10 

3.10 7.40 4.10 2.90 

60.40 36.30 59.10 60.70 

9.09 18.16 8.53 9.37 ** Per capita income (%) $14,013 $11,899 $14,737 $14,096 ** Below poverty level (%) 

1999 crime rate (per 1,000 pop.) 

Total 

Violent 

Property 

Size of police department (sworn officers) 

Size of gang unit (sworn officers) 

13.97 9.83 11.46 14.17 

91.46 38.87 99.96 71.59 

11.71 11.98 12.81 7.71 

79.75 26.89 87.14 63.87 

851 210 2,244 2,617 

9 4 41 36 

Organizational location of the gang unit Special Criminal Organized Organized 

Enforcement Investigations Crime Crime 

Bureau Bureau Division Bureau 

* U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000, Census of Population and Housing. 

** U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, Census of Population and Housing (2000 census data not available). 

In contrast, the other three are fairly typical of Southwestern cities. All three are 

comprised predominately of white residents, but have substantial Hispanic communities. 

Each of the three cities has experienced a massive increase in population over the past ten 

years. Between 1990 and 2000, Albuquerque grew by 18.9 percent, Las Vegas grew by 

73.9 percent, and Phoenix grew by 17.5 percent. All three have enjoyed strong 

economies, and are characterized by relatively low rates of unemployment, fewer femaleheaded households with children, and relatively high levels of homeownership and 

income. The strength of their economies can be attributed in large part to new and 

booming industries. The economies of Albuquerque and Phoenix are grounded in such 

sectors as computers, electronics, and communications, all of which have provided an 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 35 

increasing number of job opportunities for residents. Similarly, Las Vegas, whose 

economy is based on hotels, gaming, and recreation, benefited from the strong national 

economy over the past 20 years, which led to a massive increase in tourism and the 

construction of several billion-dollar casinos, providing tens of thousands of jobs for 

residents and migrants. 

The magnitude and character of the crime-related problems faced by each city 

vary considerably. Las Vegas has the highest total crime rate, and Inglewood has the 

lowest. All four cities experienced about the same rates of violence with the exception of 

Phoenix, which was about 35 to 40 percent lower than the others. There were, however, 

substantial differences in property crime rates. Las Vegas had the highest rate with about 

87 property crimes reported per 1,000 population, followed by Albuquerque (80 per 

1,000), Phoenix (64 per 1,000), and Inglewood (27 per 1,000). 

Police Departments Studied 

The police agencies in the four cities varied in size, enabling us to study large, 

medium-sized, and small departments. Two of the agencies could be characterized as 

large municipal police departments. At the time of this study, the Phoenix Police 

Department employed about 3,300 persons, of whom 2,532 were sworn police officers. 

This made Phoenix the 10th largest police agency in the United States. Similarly, the Las 

Vegas Metropolitan Police Department employed 3,150 persons, including 1,990 sworn 

police officers. The agency was responsible for policing the city of Las Vegas and all 

unincorporated areas within Clark County. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 

Department was the 12th largest local police department in the country. 

Both of these large departments had sizable gang units – about four times larger 

than the average gang unit in the United States (Curry et al. 1992).3

 In Phoenix, the gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 36 

unit was staffed with about 38 gang unit officers. Officers were assigned to one of five 

gang squads located within the police department’s Organized Crime Bureau. The unit 

was staffed with one crime analyst and one police assistant. Similarly, in Las Vegas the 

gang unit was staffed with 49 officers and 11 civilians. The gang unit was located in the 

police department’s Special Operations Division. 

One of the agencies included in the study was moderately sized. The Albuquerque 

Police Department employed 1,222 persons, of whom 865 were sworn police officers. 

The Albuquerque gang unit was comprised of nine police officers and one part-time 

civilian volunteer. The unit was located in the department’s Special Enforcement Bureau. 

One small agency was also included in the study. The Inglewood Police Department 

employed approximately 210 sworn police officers. The Inglewood gang unit, located in 

the police department’s Criminal Investigation Bureau, was staffed with three officers. 

A Multi-Methodological Research Design 

The research design for this project was constructed to gain a comprehensive view 

of how and why police responded to the gang problem. In particular, the present study 

brings together multiple sources of data (e.g., field observations, in-depth interviews, and 

documents) to focus on a single point and to help explain, clarify, and corroborate issues 

of question (Lincon and Guba 1985; Merriam 1988). 

Field Observations 

Altogether at the four sites, we spent approximately 470 hours in the field 

accompanying gang unit officers, between May 1999 and August 2000. We were 

interested in such issues as the beliefs of gang unit officers, how gang unit officers spent 

their time, and the types of persons with whom the gang unit officers had contact; 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 37 

therefore, we spent the majority of our time with gang unit officers, rather than with gang 

unit managers or civilian personnel. 

The observation period at each site was initially determined by the number of 

officers in the gang unit, the shifts that the gang unit operated, and the patterns in which 

officers were assigned to squads within the gang unit. The relatively small size of the 

Albuquerque and Inglewood gang units and the large size of the Phoenix and Las Vegas 

gang units led us to plan for 80 hours of observation at each of the two smaller sites and 

160 hours of observation at each of the two larger sites. In principle, however, we were 

guided by a type of non-probability judgmental sampling known as maximum variation 

sampling. This technique is guided by the idea of “sampling as widely as possible within 

the specified sociocultural [gang unit] context until exhaustion or redundancy is reached” 

(Snow and Anderson 1993, 22). Thus, we planned to spend as much time as possible with 

each unit and its officers, until we believed that what we were observing had become 

redundant and that we had developed a full understanding of that unit’s operation. If we 

did not achieve these two objectives within the time originally set aside, we expected to 

extend our time in the field. However, this did not occur, and in the end, 80 hours of field 

observation were spent each in Albuquerque and Inglewood, 150 hours of field 

observation were spent in Phoenix, and 160 hours of field observation were spent in Las 

Vegas. 
2000 

Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 38 

Exhibit 2.02 Data collection: Data types, sources, and dates 

Albuquerque Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

Data Type No. Date No. Date No. Date No. Date Totals 

Field observation (hours) 

Gang units 80 Aug 1999 80 May 160 June-July 150 June-Aug 470 

1999 1999 

Interviews

 Police managers 3 Aug-Dec 4 May-June 6 July-Aug 7 Sept-Oct 20

1999 1999 1999 2000 

 Gang unit officers 3 (9) Aug-Dec 3 May-June 31 July-Aug 22 Sept-Oct 59 (65)

1999 1999 1999 2000 

 Stakeholders 21 Aug-Dec 14 May-June 19 July-Aug 15 May-Aug 69 

1999 1999 1999 2000 

Documents

 Official documents 36 June-Aug 40 May- 51 July-Aug 48 June-Oct 175

1999 June 1999 2000 

1999 

 Newspaper articles 42 April 1999 30 April 112 April 101 June 285 

1999 1999 2000 

We also developed a ride-along sampling plan, seeking to cover all shifts in which 

at least one gang unit officer was assigned and to observe all of the squads (or persons) 

within the gang unit. Our goal was to obtain a representative sample, by time, of the 

various subpopulations (e.g., squads that worked different areas of the city, squads that 

worked different shifts) and behaviors (e.g., squads that were responsible for different 

functions or activities) that existed within a gang unit. For example, if 10 percent of the 

sworn officers assigned to the unit were scheduled to work graffiti detail during the day 

shift, approximately 10 percent of field observation time was spent with that detail. In 

contrast to many previous police observational studies, ours was designed not to oversample busy days, active locations, or hectic time periods; rather, we were interested in 

obtaining a sample of ride-alongs that closely approximated the distribution of officers by 

shift and squad, to provide an unbiased view of the gang unit and its activities. 

In Inglewood and Albuquerque, the gang units were too small for the assignment 

of officers to squads, and all officers worked the same shift. At these sites, the field 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 39 

observer’s time was divided equally among the officers in the unit. For example, in 

Inglewood, three officers were assigned to the gang unit, one of whom declined to 

participate in the ride-along portion of the study. As a result, forty consecutive field 

observation hours were spent with one officer, followed by forty consecutive hours with 

the second officer. A similar strategy was used in Albuquerque where the gang unit was 

staffed with three officers during the period when field observation data were being 

collected.4 

In Las Vegas and Phoenix, after the sampling plan was developed and approved 

by gang unit supervisors, the field observer selected a squad for observation, based on 

convenience. The squad sergeant was notified, and he assigned the field observer to a 

particular set of officers who worked together, after which time the field observer asked 

permission to ride along with another set of officers in the same squad, until the allotted 

time for observation in that particular squad was completed. Often in the larger squads, 

only one day of data was collected with a particular set of officers. Thus, the sampling of 

officers in a particular squad was based on the convenience of the field observer and the 

officer, not on random selection. 

The vast majority of our field research was conducted in the summer. This 

undoubtedly had an impact on the data. As has been shown in past research, in general, 

youth are more likely to hang out on the streets, engage in unsupervised activity, and 

engage in criminal activity during the summer months. Researchers have found that 

during the summer, gangs and gang members are more active, and gang crime is much 

more pronounced. As a consequence, the interaction between our population (the gang 

unit) and the season probably resulted in data that are biased toward the activities most 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 40 

likely to take place during the busy season for gang unit officers. 

Using an ethnographic research method, we accompanied officers during their 

regular shifts, which averaged 8 to 10 hours in length. A notebook and pencil were used 

to record field notes, consisting of descriptive and reflective data. During data collection, 

a time diary was also kept to record all activities that took place during a ride-along. The 

time diary was constructed at the level of the episode, so that at minimum, the primary 

activity (what was happening), temporal location (the time the episode began and ended), 

secondary activity (other activities happening at the same time as the primary activity), 

location of the activity (where the activity was taking place), and contacts (who was 

present during the activity) were recorded (Harvey 1999, 19). In the case of a ride-along 

with partners, the driver was designated as the primary subject of the observation. 

At the same time, other descriptive data were recorded. This included 

observations and discussions that took place on the job, the roles played by gang unit 

officers in the field, informal relationships that developed between the gang unit officers 

and those in their internal and external environments, and decisions made by gang unit 

officers. Close attention was also given to conversations between the gang unit officers 

and those with whom they had contact. This listening typically took two forms. The first 

was listening and interviewing, by comment. If a conversation was taking place, and the 

field researcher was in a position to question those in the conversation about a particular 

comment or phenomenon, the researcher would do so. The second method of listening 

was eavesdropping. This often took place in the office or field when officers were 

discussing such issues as a case they were working, department politics, or their opinions 

about a particular person or departmental policy. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 41 

Much of the field data came as a consequence of gang unit officers acting as 

teachers. They were at times unclear about the field researcher’s prior knowledge and 

experience with policing and gangs, and often went to great lengths to teach the 

researcher the ropes. They offered descriptions of the gang unit and its role within the 

community, and shared their knowledge about local gangs and gang activity.

 The longer that the field researcher spent with each of the gang units, the more 

the researcher participated in what was viewed as gang unit work. This included 

detaining suspects, searching vehicles and houses, documenting gang members in gang 

intelligence systems, collecting witness information, and filling the role of lookout. All of 

this information and experience played a major role in interpreting and understanding the 

police response to gangs in each site. 

Reflective data were recorded throughout the researcher’s time in the field.. 

These notes included “personal thoughts, speculations, feelings, problems, ideas, 

hunches, impressions, and prejudices” (Bogdan and Biklen 1992, 121). In a sense, these 

notes served as potential hypotheses to be tested. Reflective as well as descriptive data 

were continually analyzed as the study progressed. This constant comparative method 

allowed for adjustment and modification of our observational focus over the course of the 

study for the purpose of checking and testing emerging ideas (Lofland and Lofland 

1995). 

Interviews with Gang Unit Officers 

In-depth interviews with gang unit officers gave us insight into the officers’ daily 

lives and furthered our understanding of the gang problem from their perspectives.5

 In 

particular, interviews were used to elicit the officers’ subjective views of the realities of 

their work situations, what they must do to effectively perform their jobs, and what they 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 42 

actually did on the job. The interview schedule was structured to ensure that the 

interviewer asked the same questions, in the same way, of each gang unit officer, while 

keeping the questions open-ended to allow for discovery. We also encouraged the 

officers to introduce outside information not explicitly called for by the interview 

schedule. 

In each police department, interviews were conducted with gang unit officers 

during normal working hours. The interviews focused on five major areas: officer 

characteristics and background, goals and objectives of the gang unit, primary activities 

performed by gang unit officers, officer perceptions of the gang problem, and 

community-oriented and problem-oriented policing practiced within the police 

department and gang unit. We also conducted interviews with individuals in the chain of 

command: the chief of police or designate, bureau commanders, lieutenants in charge of 

the gang unit, and sergeants who supervised gang unit officers. These interviews focused 

on organizational constructs, such as the background of the gang unit, decisions regarding 

personnel selection, measures of success, and budgetary issues. 

Interviews took approximately two hours to complete. Each session was recorded, 

then transcribed and entered into a computer software program. If an officer did not want 

the interview session documented with a tape recorder, we were prepared to use paper 

and pencil; this occurred only once. The interviews complemented our field observations, 

allowing us to gather data on matters that had not necessarily been discussed in the field. 

Ninety gang unit officers in total were officially assigned to the four gang units 

that we studied. Of these, 76 were available for interview. Ten of the officers who were 

not available were from the Phoenix Police Department; three were on administrative 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 43 

leave due to an injury, one was gone for a family emergency, and one had been 

temporarily assigned to another agency. The remaining five officers who were 

unavailable for interviews in Phoenix were all assigned to a Federal Bureau of 

Investigation gang task force. Although the Phoenix Police Department gave permission 

to interview these officers, the Federal Bureau of Investigation declined our request. In 

addition to the Phoenix officers, three officers in Las Vegas and one in Inglewood were 

unavailable for interviews. The officer from Inglewood was on disability leave, and the 

three officers in Las Vegas had either been transferred to another unit or were on 

temporary assignment to another local police department. 

Of the 76 gang unit officers who were available to be interviewed, 65 

participated, for an 85 percent participation rate. Three Las Vegas officers refused to be 

interviewed, and eight officers could not be reached to schedule interviews (four in 

Phoenix and four in Las Vegas). Of the 65 officers that were interviewed, nine were from 

Albuquerque, three from Inglewood, 22 from Phoenix, and 31 from Las Vegas. 

As mentioned above, we also interviewed supervisors in the gang unit and police 

managers in the unit’s chain of command. In all, we interviewed 20 police managers and 

supervisors. We interviewed four police managers in Albuquerque—the sergeant and 

lieutenant in charge of the gang unit, the division commander, and the chief of police. In 

Inglewood we interviewed four officers in the chain of command, specifically, the 

sergeant who supervised the gang unit (although he was physically assigned to the 

robbery unit), a lieutenant in charge of the Criminal Investigations Division, a captain in 

charge of the Detective Bureau, and the chief of police. In Las Vegas we interviewed six 

police managers: the bureau commander, two section supervisors, and three sergeants 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 44 

who supervised gang unit officers. Two supervisors in the Las Vegas gang unit could not 

be reached for interviews. In Phoenix, we interviewed all six gang unit sergeants and the 

lieutenant in charge of the gang unit. 

Document Reviews 

Official documents. More than 175 official documents produced by the police 

departments and the gang units were used for the present study. These included the gang 

unit’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), annual reports, intelligence, training and 

task force bulletins and updates, interoffice communications, statistics kept by the gang 

units, grants obtained by the gang units, booklets produced by the gang units, and arrest 

statistics obtained from the police departments. 

No central repository existed for these documents in either the gang units or the 

police departments, so we relied on four general strategies to collect them. First, we 

generated a master list of official documents that we wanted to review. Although we 

realized that at some sites, many documents on the list might not be available or might 

not even exist, we believed that the master list would provide a general framework for 

obtaining official documents, ensuring consistency across sites. The master list was 

presented to one individual in each gang unit, typically a crime analyst or supervisor, 

whom we asked to provide the requested information. 

Second, we made it generally known that we were seeking documents related to 

the history and development of the gang unit. We asked individuals such as 

administrative assistants, crime analysts, and officers who had worked in the gang unit 

for a long period of time for these documents. Third, several documents were obtained 

when we questioned officers about particular areas of interest. Occasionally, when asked 

a question that he could not answer, an officer would help us attempt to find a document 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 45 

that might contain the information requested. Last, documents were collected as they 

presented themselves in the field. For example, new policies and directives, crime 

statistics, and any other documents observed in the field that pertained to the gang unit 

were collected. 

The documents served as both primary and secondary research materials. They 

served as primary research materials in that they documented how officers in the gang 

units had been directed to conduct themselves. In other words, the official documents 

produced by the gang units or the police departments were expressive of the gang units’ 

organizational arrangements, and they might also provide historical context. For example, 

examination of a gang unit's Standard Operating Procedures from one year to the next 

could serve as a source of data communicating a gang unit's official mandate, but also 

would document how that mandate had changed over time. 

Official documents such as sign-in sheets and bulletins distributed by the gang 

unit and police department served as secondary research materials. Documents such as 

gang informational bulletins helped define not only the community with which the gang 

unit was trying to communicate, but also those to whom the unit looked for assistance. 

These documents shed light on the common practices and beliefs of the gang unit, and 

illustrated how the unit had changed over time. Statistics kept by the gang unit revealed 

the current scope of the local gang problem and might assist in constructing the realities 

of the community's gang problem or at least realities as documented by the police 

department. Accordingly, these documents provided a rich source of support for the 

findings derived from our observations and interviews (Jorgensen 1989; Marshall and 

Rossman 1995). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 46 

At the completion of the project, participants assured us that all available 

documents had been presented to us. Since the police departments and gang units did not 

have central repositories or a method of cataloguing documents (and because of the hardto-define population), however, it was not possible to assess the representativeness of the 

sample of documents collected. An examination of the data indicated that some types of 

documents might have been more representative of their population than others. For 

example, although some types of documents (e.g., statistical gang crime reports) were 

produced at regular intervals and appeared representative, other types of documents (e.g., 

interoffice memoranda) were produced at irregular intervals; because of the time that 

passed between the creation of the gang unit and the collection of the data, it was not 

possible to assess their representativeness. 

Newspaper articles. The present study used 285 articles obtained from local 

newspapers. These dated back to 1995 in Albuquerque, 1981 in Inglewood, 1984 in Las 

Vegas, and 1978 in Phoenix. The articles provided an historical account of the 

development of the gang units in terms of their organizational mandates and roles, and 

gave researchers insight into the various external forces that may have affected the gang 

units’ responses to community gang problems. A newspaper serves as a forum for the 

community to speak about its concerns; as such, newspaper articles often are a rich 

source of data on how the community feels about and expects from the gang unit that 

serves it. We counted on the newspaper articles for the public perspective on the 

community’s gang problem, and a variety of opinions about how the problem should be 

approached and how each gang unit should respond to its local gang problem. 

Two methods were used to locate articles related to the gang units. First, we 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 47 

conducted a computer search using the Lexus newspaper indexing system with the key 

terms “gang,” “unit,” and “police.” Although these search terms brought up several 

hundred articles for each site, many of which provided only vague references to the gang 

unit, only those articles that provided insight into the police response to gangs were 

extracted. The second method was simply to read the local newspaper during our time in 

the field, clipping articles that offered insight into the police response to gangs in the 

community. 

Interviews with Non-Gang Unit Personnel and Stakeholders 

We interviewed non-gang unit personnel and stakeholders, since many were 

direct beneficiaries of the gang unit’s work; at the same time, they potentially served as 

important members of the gang unit environment who could help legitimize the gang 

unit’s existence. We were interested in understanding their perceptions of the local gang 

problems, their gang units, and the ways in which their own activities might be 

influenced by their gang unit. We believed that these individuals could offer yet another 

view of the gang problem, and different opinions about how the gang unit should respond 

to the city's gang problem. Finally, we were interested in obtaining stakeholder 

assessments of the effectiveness of their respective gang units. 

The stakeholder interview schedule contained about 20 questions focusing on five 

major issues: 1) their perceptions of the local gang problem, 2) the nature of the 

relationship between the respondent's unit or agency and the gang unit, 3) the influence of 

the gang unit on the respondent's unit or agency, 4) advantages of the working 

relationship with the gang unit experienced by the respondent’s agency or unit, and 5) 

problems that the agency or unit may have had with the gang unit. The interview 

schedule was designed to obtain subjective reactions, positive and negative, from those 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 48 

who had contact with the gang unit. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. 

Two methods were used to determine which internal stakeholders (i.e., colleagues 

within the gang unit’s parent police department who interact with gang unit officers) 

would be interviewed. First, over the course of our field time with the gang unit, we kept 

a log of individuals with whom the gang unit had professional contact. Second, during 

interviews we asked gang unit officers for the names of individuals whom they thought 

we should contact in order to learn more about the unit. 

Interviews were also conducted with external stakeholders, individuals outside the 

police department who worked in some capacity or were interdependent with gang unit 

officers. These included both criminal justice and non-criminal justice agency personnel. 

With respect to criminal justice officials, individuals such as county attorneys, probation 

and parole officers, and jail and corrections personnel were interviewed. Non-criminal 

justice personnel such as non-profit administrators and leaders of various special interest 

groups were also interviewed. This sample was comprised of individuals who had either 

been identified by gang unit officers as persons who had frequent contact with the gang 

unit, or who were seen or heard of as having had contact with or influence on the gang 

unit during the observational portion of the study. The sample included individuals and 

organizations that were viewed favorably and unfavorably by gang unit officers. 

We interviewed a total of 68 individuals stakeholders, 21 in Albuquerque, 14 in 

Inglewood, 18 in Las Vegas, and 15 in Phoenix. Every stakeholder asked to participate in 

the study volunteered and was interviewed. 

Data Analysis 

Data analysis was based on field notes, the time diary, primary informant 

interviews (gang unit officers), secondary informant interviews (stakeholders), and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 49 

official and unofficial documents (e.g., gang unit SOPs, newspaper articles). These data 

were subjected to both qualitative and quantitative data analysis. For the quantitative 

analysis, time diary data were entered into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 

Sciences). We used this data to examine such issues as how gang unit officers allocated 

time, the number and length of contacts made by gang unit officers, and how gang unit 

officers were mobilized. 

For the qualitative analysis, we relied on strategies outlined by Schatzman and 

Straus (1973). From the inception of the study, data were continually reviewed and 

organized, both chronologically and categorically. This “analytic cycle” allowed us to 

continuously test emerging ideas, as well as to identify patterns, relationships, and 

processes. Additionally, the constant comparative method was used to analyze the data 

after the completion of data collection. This process involved “unitizing” and 

“categorizing” information units (Glaser and Strauss 1967). We identified and coded 

these categories and units of meaning after carefully reading the field notes, interviews, 

and documents collected during the study. To assist in the process, all data (except 

documents obtained from the police department) were entered into a computer using the 

NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theory-building) 

program. The NUD*IST software allowed us to code data so that “chunks of data” could 

be selected and organized into meaningful categories and patterns. 

Verification 

A number of prior studies have found that the police subculture is beset with 

secrecy and fear of outsiders (Westley 1970; Skolnick 1994). As a result, Mastrofski and 

Parks (1990) argue that data obtained through direct observation of police may be 

contaminated. First, they argue that observed officers may alter their behavior out of fear 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 50 

of being misinterpreted by the observer. In particular, police may feel that the observer 

might not understand the true nature of police work and will not consider the many 

hidden complexities that police must take into consideration when making a decision. 

Second, the authors argue that because observers are viewed as outsiders by the police, 

information presented by the police to the observer – usually in the form of 

conversations, interviews, or debriefings – may not be reliable or valid. The authors claim 

that the officers’ desire to conform or appear competent, as well as the officers’ mistrust 

of how the observer will understand and use a truthful response, may have a significant 

impact on the information that is presented to the observer. 

Qualitative researchers have not reached consensus on the matter of how to 

address these issues, but several techniques are generally accepted for ensuring the 

accuracy of observer interpretations. Following the advice of Merriam (1988), we used 

three strategies to ensure reliability and validity in the present study. First, we brought 

together multiple sources of data (observations, interviews, and documents) and focused 

them on a single point. This process was used to help explain, clarify, and corroborate 

issues of question. Second, we repeatedly observed gang unit personnel over an extended 

period of time. Specifically, gang unit officers were observed for a minimum of 80 hours 

at each site. Third, gang unit officers were included in many phases of the research 

project, and were frequently used to verify and interpret research findings. 

Report Narrative 

Similar to the findings in prior ethnographic research, for the most part, ours are 

presented in words rather than numbers. We rely on thick and rich descriptions to present 

our research findings, including the use of short and long text-embedded quotations that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 51 

display the data for the reader (Creswell 1994). Our purpose is to communicate a deeper 

understanding of how the police responded to gangs, and why they responded to gangs in 

the ways that they did. 

In the past, some academics have criticized ethnographers, as well as those who 

practice more traditional research methods, for reliance on single data sources and 

methods. Critics have called for researchers in general, and ethnographers in particular, to 

use multiple data sources and methods in an effort to include the perspectives of a variety 

of actors who exist within a particular social setting (Snow and Anderson 1993, 34). This 

multi-perspectival strategy is an attempt to gain a more holistic, multidimensional 

perspective of a social phenomenon. 

Therefore, we have tried to include in our study a number of actors who have 

stakes in responding to the local gang problems. But we have also included the 

perspectives of gang unit officers themselves through field observations and semistructured interviews; it is their world, after all, that we are trying to understand. This is 

not to say that all participants’ voices are heard equally. Some informants are more 

articulate, more outspoken, and more participative than others. As Snow and Anderson 

suggest, we did try to present a cross-section of voices representative of all of those with 

whom we came into contact. 

The interviews with the gang unit officers, police managers, and internal and 

external stakeholders were conducted with a tape recorder.6

 The audiotapes were later 

transcribed by a professional transcriptionist; quotations from interviews are the actual 

words used by our subjects. In the field, it was not possible to record conversations with a 

tape recorder or other electronic device; we used paper and pencil to record these 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 52 

conversations. The researchers made their best effort to manually record the words of 

those observed completely and accurately. In some situations, it was either not possible 

or not appropriate to document conversations in real time. In this case, the field 

researcher documented the conversation and his comment following the shift. 

Consequently, some quotations from the field are the researcher’s reconstruction of 

conversations and comments. 

We would not deny that our descriptions and interpretations of the data are 

subject to contamination. We are merely researchers of the police response to gangs, not 

the responders. Our education, experiences, and understanding of police culture and 

organization, among many other factors, influenced how we interpreted and gave 

meaning to what we saw, read, and heard. We believe that what we have presented here 

is accurate and true in all essential ways. Snow and Anderson (1993) point out that 

ethnography is not subject to the whims of the researcher, but is constrained by the data 

collected and methodological strategies employed in the study. In other words, we have 

not fabricated how the officers spent their time, their career histories, the number and 

types of contacts they had in the field, or their actions or conversations. Instead, we have 

let the data speak for itself. We have never altered the statements of the subjects, even 

when they were not as articulate as we would have liked or when they were particularly 

profane. 

With this said, we did use editorial discretion when to maintain confidentiality. 

When necessary to use names, they are pseudonyms. Also, very few women participated 

in the study, so to maintain their confidentiality, the generic pronoun he is consistently 

used throughout the text. In those cases where a particular characteristic of a subject 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 53 

would identify a subject, we either omitted the characteristic or altered it in a way that 

maintained the confidentiality of the subject. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 54 

Chapter 3. Historical Analysis of Gangs and Gang Control in 

Four Cities 

So what started out as just kind of informal protection or some kind of security, 

maybe it had something to do with self-esteem, as well, because the whole thing 

with the zoot suit apparel was something that they picked out of Gone With the 

Wind. They really liked stuff, with the hat, and I mean, it was just a whole thing 

they made up themselves, where they could kind of dress up and feel good about 

themselves. 

– Inglewood police officer. 

The four cities we studied – Albuquerque, Inglewood, Las Vegas, and Phoenix – 

are located in the Southwestern United States, where gangs have been predominately 

comprised of Mexican Americans and Mexican Nationals. This differentiates our 

research from that conducted in communities where the character of the gang problem 

has been substantially African American (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles) or Asian 

(San Francisco, Seattle). In this chapter, we describe the context of gangs and their 

activity, identify characteristics of area gangs and gang members, and explain the 

historical police response to the gang problem, in each of the four cities. 

We examined gang behavior within an historical context in order to determine 

how communities and police have perceived it over time. In describing how police have 

responded to gangs historically, we focused on the organizational and environmental 

factors that influenced their responses, and the conditions that ultimately gave rise to each 

department’s gang unit. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 55 

Inglewood, California 

Of our four sites, Inglewood was the first to have developed a gang problem. 

Most Inglewood police managers, gang unit officers, and stakeholders with whom we 

talked recalled gangs having begun to emerge as a public concern in the mid-1960s to the 

early 1970s. However, a few older Hispanic police officers argued that the gang problem 

started much earlier. These officers shared stories told by their parents and grandparents, 

suggesting that gangs in Inglewood could be traced back to the Zoot Suit Riots in June 

1943, or perhaps even earlier. 

Historical accounts of gangs in Southern California supported their claims. 

Bogardus (1926) studied gangs in Los Angeles in the early 20th century, and Rubel 

(1965) reported that gangs had been part of barrio life in the Southwest since the 1890s. 

Research indicates that most Mexican American gangs of this time were comprised of 

young people from families working as agricultural laborers. Historians claim that the 

public had considered gangs at their worst as “aggressive youth” who had become 

involved in fights; at their best, gangs had been considered respectable, participating in 

neighborhood athletic clubs and aligning themselves closely with local churches (Moore 

1985, 5). Of special interest to us, this body of research noted that the police had not 

concerned themselves with gangs or gang-related activity during this early period (1985). 

In the 1920s, the number of Mexicans immigrating to the Southwest substantially 

increased. Vigil (1988) notes that during this period, between 1.5 and 2 million Mexican 

immigrants relocated to the United States, almost all of them to the Southwest, doubling 

the population of Mexican Americans. Over the following 20 years, according to Vigil, a 

cultural shift took place within the Mexican American community, driven by severe 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 56 

economic stress, conflicting cultural values, and class immobility. Second-generation 

Mexican American youth who were seeking identities, support, and excitement joined the 

gangs affiliated with their barrios. Others joined gangs because they felt pressured to do 

so. One officer we interviewed illustrated this point, explaining what it was like for his 

father in Inglewood during this period: 

I found out from my father...in the ‘30s, my dad was living in a particular 

part of town...where the gangs, the vachutos, the vatos, the old zoot 

suiters, [were] very active, and they were controlling that particular 

neighborhood. ...my dad was not a member of this gang, and I forget what 

they were, but he lived in the middle [of] the block, and his choice then, as 

young people’s choices are now, in the inner city or whatever you want to 

call it, is if you don’t make peace with the surrounding gang, you are 

going to get your ass kicked every day, or worse. And even if you do, once 

you leave, then the other team is going to assume you are a part of this 

gang anyway and kick your ass, or worse. So you don’t have any choice 

but to kind of hang with these guys, and use the safety that they provide 

for you. So that’s what happened with my dad and dealing with this gang. 

By the early 1940s, gangs in the Los Angeles area had become embedded in 

barrio life, where a strong gang subculture had developed. Rules and norms guided 

members’ beliefs and actions, and they began to differentiate themselves by their style of 

dress. Gang members frequently wore “zoot suits,” characterized by baggy pants and a 

broad- shouldered jacket, typically accompanied by a wide-brimmed hat. Zoot suits not 

only differentiated gang youth from others in the Mexican community, but they 

symbolized ethnic and barrio pride for Mexican youth. Although zoot suiters were known 

to drink and use drugs such as marijuana and heroin, neither the public nor the police 

viewed them as dangerous or a threat to the community (Vigil 1990). 

By 1943, however, the Anglo community, the police, and the media began to 

view zoot suiters as deviant. Rumors started that zoot suiters were bloodthirsty savages, a 

trait inherited from their Aztec ancestors (Moore 1985). Others accused zoot suiters of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 57 

being responsible for local homicides and of attacking vulnerable white women. Military 

personnel started to harass them for wasting cloth needed for the war effort (Covey et al. 

1997). Resentments boiled over in June 1943, during a 5-day period known as the Zoot 

Suit Riots. During the riots, service members, citizen mobs, and police officers chased 

and beat anyone wearing a zoot suit (Vigil 1992). Most gang researchers today regard the 

Zoot Suit Riots as the turning point for Hispanic gangs. They argue that the riots led to 

further social isolation of the Mexican community, reinforced notions that Mexican youth 

gangs were a serious problem, and crystallized Mexican youth groups into gangs for the 

purposes of protection and support (Moore 1978). 

The Inglewood officer whose father told him about the zoot suiters also related a 

story told by his mother about how the riots touched his father’s life, and explained the 

impact on gang culture in Inglewood and the surrounding areas: 

There was a... I believe it was a sailor that was killed, and it was done by 

this Mexican gang, or group, this 46th Street Gang. My dad was arrested 

by LAPD, but fortunately he was not there at the Sleepy Lagoon...because 

he was out with my mom, they went to a movie. She told me that, “Hey, I 

knew there was going to be trouble, I said, ‘You are going with me to the 

movie,’ and saved him.” 

Nevertheless, he was arrested by LAPD and held for 3 days and beat up as 

a result. It was “round up the usual suspects” kind of thing, and they just 

hauled everybody in and beat them up and tried to get interviews out of 

them, and, you know, eventually they let him go because he had a good 

story. 

So getting back to your original question, where [gangs] began [in 

Inglewood], I think what happened back then...there had been a lot of 

violence between the Mexican gang members and the military. There was 

a real strong military, with World War II and that kind of thing, so and 

these zoot suiters just looked completely out of place, they were very 

foreign, and it was easy to pick on them. And some of them were 

downright criminals, there is no doubt about it, but it just kind of took off. 

So the Latino community at that time was kind of closed off from 

everything else. We were not able to participate in all the fruits of the 

system. We were foreigners, we looked different, they were looked down 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 58 

upon. My parents were not allowed [to speak Spanish], they were 

punished if they spoke Spanish in the schools. My dad told me years ago 

about his mouth being washed out with soap because he used a Spanish 

word. So this zoot suit kind of thing, this gang, you know, forming these 

little strongholds, these little cliques, was a bonding kind of thing to 

protect them from the outside, because we had nothing at the time. So 

what started out as just kind of informal protection or some kind of 

security, maybe it had something to do with self-esteem as well, because 

the whole thing with the zoot suit apparel was something that they picked 

out of Gone With the Wind. They really liked stuff, with the hat and I 

mean, it was just a whole thing they made up themselves, where they 

could kind of dress up and feel good about themselves. 

Response to Gangs: Late 1960s Through 1980 

Few of the individuals we interviewed held such an historical perspective as the 

officer quoted above. Instead, most officers told us that the gangs in their communities 

had started in the 1960s and 1970s: 

Well, our gang unit was initiated in 1980, so I would assume it was way 

before then... [Interviewer: First gangs?] It was the Inglewood Family, 

Bloods, a lot of Blood gangs. 

Probably like in 1970, ’72...Inglewood Family.... [Interviewer: Black, 

Hispanic?] Well, that’s true. I forgot about that. Good point. Nineteen 

sixty-six is when Inglewood 13 started. That was a Hispanic gang. Well, 

gangs as we know them now, the Crips and the Bloods, they started 

around ’68 or so. They started even before I got here. 

All police officials whom we interviewed agreed that gang activity in the 1960s 

and 1970s had centered on neighborhood clashes and turf issues. Most believed that gang 

violence then had been moderate compared with today. Two police managers who had 

been with the department for well over 20 years spoke to this point: 

That was the beginning of the gangs...it was black gangs. It was Bloods, 

primarily Inglewood Family, up in the North end. They were punks, they 

were not challenging the police. The guns that they had back then, they 

were stolen, they were just pieces of junk. It was more warring around 

with themselves, intimidating the neighborhood kind of a thing. 

[Interviewer: What fueled the gangs in the ‘70s?] You know, that is a very 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 59 

good question, because gangs in Southern California had been around for 

a long time. I was born in Compton, raised in Wilmington, known as 

Willimas, down in the harbor area, and I was around gang members, 

Latino gang members, because that was part of life. The vatos, the 

vachutos, we used to call them, the old-timers. I had an uncle who had 

tattoos and stuff and had done time in prison... [Interviewer: The old time 

barrio gang, but without the violence?] Yes, although they were violent. I 

mean, we were well aware that there had been murders and certainly 

major assaults and this kind of thing, but it was always, you didn’t see it 

that much. It occurred at night, or it occurred in the bad businesses, or the 

bad parts of town kind of thing. You didn’t mess with these guys because 

you knew they were trouble... 

However, a veteran gang unit officer who had helped start the gang unit disagreed. He 

argued that the gangs in the 1970s had been much worse than today’s gangs: 

There was more street activity per se then, because the gangs were just 

starting to distinguish between their territories, and there were a lot of 

drive-bys, a lot of rivalry, a lot of fighting, a lot of killing because of the 

territory. But now, they have all kind of settled down into their own little 

areas. They know where to cross, where not to cross, they all have their 

little territories. That’s why we see a lot less drive-bys, a lot less street 

violence, than we used to. 

In 1980, the Inglewood Police Department established a gang unit. However, the 

institutional memory about factors that had led to the creation of the unit was fuzzy, at 

best. Some officers focused on the growing magnitude of Inglewood’s gang problem. 

They pointed out that the police department, prior to the gang unit, had had few resources 

to respond to gang-related problems. They said that there had been little understanding of 

gangs in the city, or nationally for that matter, and that specialized knowledge had been 

necessary in order to coordinate the police department’s responses to gangs. A senior 

officer who was with the department when the gang unit was created explained: 

Well, I think here in Inglewood it was the just absolutely rapid 

quadrupling and tripling, just growth of gangs that seemed to explode in 

the late 70s and early 80s, and we just realized all of a sudden that not 

only did we have hundreds, we had thousands of gang members in the 

city, and probably hundreds of different gangs, and so it was born out of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 60 

the necessity to understand the gangs, identify the gangs, identify the gang 

leaders, and stuff like that. It was specifically an intelligence gathering as 

opposed to an enforcement unit, and remains an intelligence gathering unit 

today. 

Not everyone interviewed believed that the gang problem had been the impetus 

for the creation of the gang unit. One officer explained that the police department had 

established the gang unit only after the hiring of a new chief from Compton, California. 

The new chief, this officer stated, had been appalled that Inglewood did not have a gang 

unit, and had believed that such a unit was essential for the department’s crime control 

efforts. Still another officer, one of those responsible for establishing the original gang 

unit, argued that the media had played a large role in its creation: 

The media had a lot to do with starting the gang unit. We were always in 

the media with gang problems, and this led to politicians [pressuring us 

so] that we had to do something about it. The media has caused problems 

for the PD and forced the PD to focus on gangs. Gang problems affect 

local economy. No business, no shoppers – you have to do something. 

Gang unit has been aggressive, but behind the scenes. They give 

intelligence to other units. 

When the gang unit was created in 1980, it was placed in the Office of Special 

Enforcement and staffed with two officers, one of whom remains with the unit today. 

From our interviews, we gathered that the chief had not given the gang unit a strict 

mandate or mission. Instead, unit officers had determined their own responsibilities. 

However, the two officers were known to have been involved already in the collection, 

processing, and dissemination of gang intelligence. Over time, they had been compiling 

files and pictures of local gang members. The placement of these two officers in the new 

unit formalized a process already in place, and allowed the officers to pursue this work 

full-time. 

Both police managers and officers explained that Inglewood’s response had been 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 61 

limited to two officers because of the small size of their police department. They 

explained that in the 1980s, although more than 4,000 gang members had been active in 

the city, only a few more than 200 police officers had been available to respond to all law 

enforcement needs. Therefore, the department simply had not had enough resources to 

assign more gang unit officers. 

Response to Gangs: 1981 Through 1989 

Beginning in the 1980s, Inglewood’s gang problem began to change. In particular, 

the number of gangs, gang members, and gang crime had rapidly escalated, according to 

police officers. Some officers thought this was the time when they had begun seeing 

younger people joining the same gangs that their parents had. According to senior 

officers, during the 1980s, gang violence had increased because of gang involvement in 

street-level drug distribution. The following statement was representative of many 

officers’ recollections on this point: 

I blame it primarily on the cocaine traffic. That’s what fueled this thing 

and really got it going, but what is really chilling is I was watch 

commander before I came here, patrol watch commander, so we are 

briefing, part of our ritual is, you know, you read the crimes, wanted 

suspects, and this kind of thing. We are reading the name of a wanted 

suspect, and I am thinking, “That can’t be, how old is this guy?” You 

know, 20 or 17 or whatever it was. Saying, “Boy, that is funny, because I 

remember that name.” I did a little digging, and it would be the son of one 

of the guys that we were always chasing around, one of the founding 

members of the gangs. And now he is doing the same exact stuff his dad 

was, and I am looking and there is a really strong resemblance. And I am 

thinking, “Another generation. There we go.” So it changed, and I saw 

that. Now obviously the weapons and the sophistication and again the drug 

trade, the money that fuels that thing just kept it going... 

Despite the general perception that the nature of the gang problem was changing 

in the 1980s, little evidence suggested that the response to gangs changed with the 

problem. For example, officers were unable to pinpoint any major organizational changes 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 62 

that had taken place at this time, and newspaper articles reflected little activity on the part 

of the gang unit. Asked about the apparent absence of discussion about the police 

response to gangs, most police officials attributed it to the nature of the gang unit – the 

unit worked in the background and was rarely on the front lines of the war on gangs. 

Instead, gang unit officers were said to have quietly and diligently collected data, making 

it available for use by other units within the police department. 

From its inception, the Inglewood gang unit did not engage in enforcement. 

Officers, both within and outside the gang unit, believed that if gang unit officers 

engaged in suppression activity and arrested gang members, it would be more difficult for 

them to gather future intelligence. Therefore, when gang unit officers had intelligence 

about criminal activity, whether it was a one-time event or an ongoing conspiracy, gang 

unit officers turned the intelligence over to other units for action. 

The gang unit at this time participated in formal partnerships and task forces – 

activities that earned them little recognition. Their participation in such activities might 

have been driven by the few resources available to the gang unit. By participating in 

formal organizational arrangements with other units and departments, they were able to 

use and acquire resources that otherwise would not have been obtainable. For example, in 

1985, the gang unit had participated in Operation Valentine, a task force comprised of 

members from the Inglewood Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, 

the Sheriff’s department, the district attorney’s office, the county probation department, 

and the California Youth Authority. The Task Force focused on gang members who 

trafficked drugs in the south Los Angeles area (United Press International 1985). This 

effort brought the unit into partnership with much larger and better resourced agencies, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 63 

and provided a mechanism for Inglewood to access and bring resources to bear on their 

own gang problem. 

Likewise, for 3 months in 1987, the gang unit had teamed with the department’s 

motorcycle officers to target gang member vehicles. A California law stipulated that if a 

vehicle’s registration had been expired for more than a year, police could seize the 

vehicle. The gang unit wanted to take advantage of this law to reduce the number of 

vehicles available to gang members for “partying,” drive-by shootings, and incursions 

into enemy territory. Gang and motorcycle officers interviewed by the local paper 

indicated that gang members drove distinctive vehicles, making them easy to identify. 

Over the 3-month period, 1,000 citations were issued “for such violations as 

driving without a license, loud radios, and driving without a seatbelt. More than 90 

vehicles [were] impounded. Eleven stolen cars [were] recovered, along with drugs, guns, 

beepers, and other paraphernalia” (Rotella 1987). Although police acknowledged that 

only about 40 percent of those pulled over turned out to be gang members, they argued 

that the action had had a profound impact on gang activity. A lieutenant in charge of the 

gang unit pointed out that the number of drive-by shootings had been reduced from a few 

each week to about one per month. 

The police department also reached out to non-criminal justice agencies to help 

with gang control efforts. In 1988, the Community Affairs Division invited clergy and 

ministers from Inglewood and South Los Angeles to discuss their potential roles in 

combating gangs. The meeting was attended by Inglewood’s Chief of Police, the Los 

Angeles County Sheriff and city attorney, and Inglewood’s juvenile judge, all of whom 

encouraged religious congregations to unite across government boundaries to help with 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 64 

prevention, intervention, and suppression of gang activity (Los Angeles Times 1988). In 

late 1988, Inglewood’s city council unanimously approved a Serious Habitual Offender 

Program, sponsored by the State of California. The program was designed to identify 

repeat offenders and to inform the district attorney’s office, so that attorneys could follow 

targeted youths’ cases in order to seek the maximum penalty if the youth was convicted 

(Martin 1988). The Repeat Offender Program (ROP) unit, placed in the Inglewood Police 

Department, was responsible for coordinating activities among the department and other 

police agencies to encourage aggressive prosecution of repeat offenders. ROP was the 

liaison between the police department, the probation, parole, and district attorney’s 

offices, and the courts, and was responsible for facilitating revocation of probation and 

parole for ROP offenders (Easley 1995). 

The Serious Habitual Offender Program was another attempt to control gang 

crime. Four non-gang criteria were used to identify repeat offenders: 1) a record of five 

arrests, with three of the arrests occurring within the last year, including three arrests on 

felony charges; 2) 10 arrests, with three occurring within the last year, including two 

arrests on felony charges; 3) 10 arrests with three within the last year, including eight on 

charges of petty theft, misdemeanor assault, or narcotics use; and 4) 10 arrests within the 

last year, including one on multiple felony charges (Martin 1988). Approximately 71 

percent of those certified as Serious Habitual Offenders had been involved in gangs 

(Easley 1995). 

A year later, in 1989, the Gang Intelligence Unit began to collect data on gangrelated crime. The collection of data resulted from the work of a committee comprised of 

chiefs of police within Los Angeles County who had advocated for a county-wide gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 65 

reporting system. The committee of chiefs determined that a designated number of gangrelated crimes (primarily crimes against persons) would be tracked and reported to the 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, which would then be responsible for 

compiling and disseminating the data (Easley 1996). 

Despite all of the Inglewood Police Department’s efforts to combat gangs in the 

late 1980s, 1989 was still one of the most violent years on record. According to the 

department, gang violence and drug dealing were related to the homicide rate increasing 

by 50 percent that year, making it the second most deadly 12 months in the city’s history. 

Of 46 homicides, about half were attributed to gangs and drugs. In the same year, the 

number of officer-involved shootings increased, from three in 1988 to 11 in 1989. 

Inglewood ranked third in the county in number of officer-involved shootings, just below 

the Los Angeles Police and Sheriff’s Departments, both of which had substantially larger 

jurisdictions and departments than Inglewood (Lacey 1990). 

Response to Gangs: Late 1990s Through 1999 

To respond to increasing violence in the 1990s, the Inglewood Police Department 

began to take a more suppression-oriented approach toward gang control. It is interesting 

to note that in strengthening its response to gangs, the department decided to create new 

specialized units rather than to expand the existing gang unit. In January 1990, for 

example, the police department established the Anti-Crime Team (ACT). This unit was 

funded by a voter-approved property tax assessment, with the proceeds to be used to hire 

20 officers to combat gangs and drugs. ACT was staffed with 17 officers, two sergeants, 

and one lieutenant. This was a substantial allocation of resources for one unit, given that 

the size of the entire agency at the time was only 187 officers; the new officers 

represented more than a 10 percent increase in the size of the department (Rotella 1989). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 66 

ACT’s mission was to perform directed patrols in known gang areas, and to work 

in concert with the gang unit to target hard-core gang members (1989). However, the unit 

also focused on a number of other problems, such as chronic prostitution, drug dealing, 

robberies, shakedowns, violence, and vandalism. Although the ACT team was created for 

the specific purpose of suppressing gangs, gang members, and gang activity, it devoted a 

large proportion of its time to providing directed patrols in non-gang areas that were also 

identified as having substantial and chronic problems (Easley 1993). 

In late 1990, community members became emotionally charged about the city’s 

gang problem – a rare event in a city with little community cohesion. Much of the 

concern might have resulted from a renewed surge in local gang-related activity. In 1990, 

the city tied its own record for the highest number of homicides in a single year. Of the 

55 homicides, 33 were gang-related (60 percent). Inglewood experienced more gang 

homicides, felony assaults, rapes, robberies, and burglaries in 1990 than in any other year 

between 1989 and 1998 (exhibit 4.02). 

The community’s concern about the gang problem peaked following the 1990 

killing of three high school students in an off-campus shooting, and a robbery of several 

cafeteria workers at a junior high school. School board members and members of the 

Inglewood High School Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) met to express their concerns 

and to debate potential responses. The president of the PTA asked the school board, 

“How would you feel if you had to fight gang members to get to your office? How would 

you feel if when you left at 5:30 in the evening, you had to fight gang members up and 

down the street? This is what our children have to deal with on a daily basis.” By the end 

of the emotion-charged meeting, the school board and PTA members had agreed to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 67 

revive an anti-gang task force comprised of community members. They had also 

organized a march to protest recent violence in the city (Lacey 1990). 

Gangs in Inglewood continued to be especially violent through 1994. During this 

period, an intense feud broke out between two rival Hispanic gangs. Drive-by shootings 

became commonplace, and students had to rely on alternative methods, including rides 

from teachers, counselors, and parents, to get home from school. Gang members were so 

emboldened that they carried out many slayings in daylight, in front of witnesses. On a 

few occasions, shooters told witnesses their street names, confident that the witnesses 

were terrified enough not to testify against them. 

Young gang members were just as involved in violence as older gang members. 

In two drive-by shootings, two 14-year-olds were shot; one died and the other, shot five 

times, survived. Despite the gang unit’s focus on collecting intelligence, little was known 

about how this feud started. In 1992, during the height of the feud, about 84 percent of all 

homicides in Inglewood were gang-related (Millican 1992). 

A short time later, another gang war started between an Inglewood gang and a 

gang from the Crenshaw district of Los Angeles. Violence between the two gangs peaked 

in January 1994, after two days of shooting left 11 people gunned down and five, 

including a 2-year-old girl and a 14-year-old cheerleader, dead. At the following week’s 

city council meeting, 150 citizens protested, demanding a solution. They did not feel safe 

going out at night, no matter the reason. Many complained that they could no longer walk 

home from work, but had to find rides with others. Some people complained that even 

their choice of clothing was limited by the gang war; they feared that wearing blue or red 

might cause them to be mistaken for gang members and shot. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 68 

Interestingly, police officials addressing the public did not seem to be trying to 

calm their fears. Instead, police were blunt in their commentary on the nature of the 

problem. For example, one sergeant told the crowd attending council meeting that in 

most cases, gang members were not the victims of gang violence; victims, he explained, 

were frequently ordinary citizens. He stated, “Gang members seem to be satisfied if they 

shoot anybody in the enemy’s territory. It’s just random. We aren’t dealing with brain 

surgeons here.” Similarly, in an announcement made a week before the meeting, the chief 

stated that it would be “appropriate for Inglewood residents to remain at home after dark 

to avoid violence” (Richardson and Dillow 1994). 

As the gangs were becoming increasingly violent, police were attempting to 

initiate a number of suppression strategies. First, in the summer of 1991, the police 

department announced that it would perform regular gang sweeps in known gang hotspots for the purpose of “discouraging criminal gang activity through high-profile 

enforcement” (Ford 1991). On the first night of the sweeps, 50 officers from the 

Inglewood Police Department, the county probation department, and the California Youth 

Authority patrolled one neighborhood, resulting in 26 arrests for probation violations, 10 

impounded vehicles, and 55 traffic tickets (Los Angeles Times 1991). 

Then in 1992, the Gang Intelligence Unit was relocated organizationally from the 

Office of Criminal Investigations to the Office of Special Enforcement. The Anti-Crime 

Team and the Transit Safety Team (TST), both of which focused on gangs, were already 

located there. This move brought all three units dealing with gangs and gang activity 

together under one administrative umbrella. The rationale for the change was to help the 

unit better coordinate with other street enforcement units on its gang control efforts. Even 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 69 

with this change, however, the gang unit’s function continued to center on collecting 

gang and gang activity data. The unit still did not engage in enforcement activity, which 

was left to ACT and the TST. 

In 1992, the Inglewood gang unit received funding for computer equipment 

needed in order to access the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department’s Gang Reporting 

Evaluation and Tracking (GREAT) system. The GREAT system enhanced the unit’s 

ability to collect and disseminate intelligence more systematically on Inglewood gangs, 

gang members, and gang crime (Easley 1993). 

In the same year, the police department began to use the Street Terrorism 

Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act to suppress gang activity. The STEP Act, a 

statute enacted by the California legislature in 1988, permitted longer sentences for any 

convicted individual who had been documented as a member of a criminal street gang. 

The Transit Safety Team, whose mandate was to address safety issues related to public 

transportation, coordinated the STEP program. The TST was responsible for 

collaborating with the gang and ROP units to gather evidence on street gangs engaged in 

continuing criminal enterprises. An officer would then present the evidence to a judge, 

who would issue a judicial order if the gang met the criteria spelled out in the STEP Act. 

The unit could then notify members of the criminal street gang in writing that the 

provisions of the Act would be applied if any member was convicted of a gang crime 

Easley 1993). It is unclear, however, how well this strategy was received by those in the 

police department or the courts. 

Maxson and Allen (1997), in a qualitative study of the Inglewood Police 

Department, argued that by 1994, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office was 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 70 

no longer encouraging police agencies to make use of the statute, and was discouraging 

agencies from certifying new gangs under the STEP Act. In particular, they reported that 

the county attorney’s office believed that certifying STEP gangs simply required too 

much paperwork, and that the “three strikes” law of 1994 minimized the STEP Act’s 

usefulness. Consequently, the researchers reported, after 1994, gangs in Inglewood were 

“STEPped” only when there was no other option. 

The gang unit’s own data, however, suggested that although gang members were 

rarely arrested on charges related to the STEP Act from 1989 through 1998, the number 

of gang members who were STEPped began to increase in 1994. The reason for the 

increase is unclear, but it could be any or all of the following: 1) those arrested for a 

STEP Act charge had been certified in another jurisdiction, but had committed a crime 

and been arrested in Inglewood on a gang-related charge; 2) those arrested on a STEP 

Act charge had been certified prior to the County Attorney’s office discouraging officers 

from certifying gangs through the STEP Act; or 3) police officials were simply ignoring 

the County Attorney’s office request and were proceeding with STEPping gang members 

through the county court system. 

In March 1994, following a gang-related killing spree that had taken the lives of a 

number of children and innocent bystanders, renewed community complaints resulted in 

the creation of a city curfew ordinance. The police chief explained that after these 

killings, citizens had wanted to know why so many young people were on the streets at 

night, and whether something could be done. As part of the police department’s 

commitment to community policing, he had worked with the city council to create the 

new curfew ordinance, requiring juveniles to be accompanied by parents or to have a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 71 

specific destination after 10 p.m. Sunday through Thursday nights, and after 11 p.m. 

Friday and Saturday nights. The ordinance had been considered one of the toughest in the 

country, implemented with the help of a cadre of officers, reservists, and civilians. In 

particular, on Friday and Saturday nights police officers and community members 

participated in curfew sweeps. Police officers and police reservists used large vans to 

pick up juveniles, and community volunteers assisted officers with paperwork and 

fingerprinting. 

Some community members believed that the curfew program was successful. 

They cited the fact that during the first three weekends, more than 48 juveniles had been 

rounded up; a little more than half of them turned out to be suspected gang members (Los 

Angeles Times 1994). Some young people argued that the program would have little, if 

any, effect on gang violence. They pointed out that many gang members were not 

juveniles, that most juvenile gang members would not be deterred by the new ordinance, 

and that gang violence does not occur only at night. The local paper supported some of 

their points, noting that five of eleven weekend shootings had occurred between 7:00 and 

8:30 p.m.

Also in 1994, the police department increased the number of officers allocated to 

the gang unit. The original two officers were joined by one sergeant, three investigators, 

and one “on-loan” patrol officer. By this time, the role of the unit had begun to crystallize 

within the police department. The gang unit was given three functions: 1) collecting and 

maintaining intelligence on gangs, gang members, and gang crime in the city; 2) 

disseminating gang-related intelligence to investigators within the department; and 3) 

disseminating intelligence to officers and staff in other area police departments. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 72 

The gang unit now was also engaging in prevention and intervention activities. 

Officers had started a midnight basketball league in an effort to provide gang members 

with a pro-social activity and to bring members of various gangs together to get to know 

one another. Gang unit officers personally contacted gang members throughout the city to 

participate, and along with patrol officers, they monitored games to assure that there 

would be no problems. Additionally, gang unit officers worked with the Employment 

Development Department to provide job opportunities for gang members. In spring of 

1994, gang unit officers passed out fifty job applications to gang members; 10 gang 

members were placed in jobs over the summer (Easley 1995). 

In 1995, the Inglewood Police Department received about $790,000 from the 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), allocated for responding to 

youth firearms violence. The Inglewood Youth Firearms Violence Initiative (IYFVI) 

lasted 18 months, focusing on reducing firearms violence among gang members in the 

Darby-Dixon neighborhood, identified as one of the worst neighborhoods in the city. 

According to an evaluation report by Maxson and Allen (1997), the program had three 

components: 

1. A civil court injunction to enjoin targeted gang members from engaging in 

specified nuisance activities, 

2. A six-officer task force to support development and enforcement of the 

injunction, and to monitor target locations, and 

3. A probation officer to increase arrests of repeat offenders. 

Two evaluation teams, one local and the other national, examined the impact of 

the COPS project. Interestingly, the findings and conclusions of the two reports differed 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 73 

substantially. 

The local evaluation was led by Maxson and Allen (1997), who found that an 

injunction had been filed successfully against 29 members of the Crenshaw Mafia 

Gangsters, and that probation officers had successfully performed their duties, conducting 

160 probationer searches. They also reported that the police department’s task force had 

failed to properly implement the project, and that members of the police department had 

needlessly interfered with the project’s progress. Specifically, they reported, the task 

force had not focused its patrol efforts in the targeted neighborhood, and the funding for 

the task force had been expended before the injunction was issued. Further, the district 

attorney placed within the police department had not been provided with critical and 

timely information. The researchers found that gang unit officers had refused to 

cooperate with the district attorney, making it more difficult for him to obtain the 

injunction against the gang. Maxon and Allen also reported that Part 1 crimes, total 

violent crime reported, robbery reports, and assault reports in the targeted area had not 

declined during the project, but instead had increased significantly when compared with 

the same period one year earlier. 

In contrast, the national evaluation team, led by Tim Bynum, reported that 

although the initiative had had its problems, the program had ultimately been successful 

(Bynum 1998). Similarly to Maxon and Allen, he found that the district attorney had had 

a difficult time working with the gang unit. He explained that this had occurred because 

the district attorney had little experience working with police; therefore, the gang unit 

officers had not accepted him. Bynum also pointed out that almost no arrest activity had 

occurred after the courts granted the injunction. Observational data indicated that for a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 74 

short time after the injunction was granted, many patrol officers had not known about it, 

or about those targeted by the project. Rather than relying on general crime categories, as 

Maxon and Allen had, Bynum examined the change in gun crimes in the targeted areas. 

He found that 12 months after the program had been initiated, gun crimes for both 

juveniles and adults had declined by 50 percent. Bynum inferred that this might have 

been a result of the substantial number of searches and gun seizures conducted by the 

probation officer. Overall, Bynum’s impact evaluation of the project declared it 

successful. 

In October 1997, the Inglewood gang unit was relocated once again, this time, 

from the Office of Special Enforcement back to the Criminal Investigations Bureau, 

where it had been in 1991. The unit was staffed with four investigators, who were 

remotely supervised by a sergeant located in the homicide unit. Officers indicated that the 

unit was moved back to the investigations bureau in order to work more closely with 

other investigative units. It provided those units with substantial intelligence for use in 

investigating robberies, homicides, assaults, and property crimes. That same year, the 

Inglewood police department disbanded the Repeat Offender Profile and Evaluation 

(ROP) unit (Easley 1998). 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 

From interviews with police officers and stakeholders and our review of 

departmental documents, it appeared that the gang problem in Albuquerque had begun in 

the mid-1970s. Police documents suggested that prior to this time, members of what were 

called “neighborhood groups” had been involved in drug use and property crime. The 

neighborhood groups had existed in Albuquerque barrios as far back as people could 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 75 

remember, having been established originally for the purpose of protecting their 

neighborhoods. The groups were territorial and received family support. Many police 

officers commented that it had not been uncommon for families to have had a long 

tradition of involvement in a group, going back generations. One police manager 

recalled: 

But we have, as you know, a long tradition of gangs, especially Hispanic 

gangs, that grandpa was in..., dad was in..., and I’m in.... [They were] 

involve[d in] a lot of territorial disputes. It [was] very often Hispanic on 

Hispanic. Both sides [were] Catholic. Both sides live[d] in neighborhoods 

that adjoin[ed] each other, but the barriers have been up for years for 

territories. 

Although the neighborhood groups had rarely engaged in violence, some police 

officers began considering them a potential threat. Veteran police officers mentioned that 

the department started monitoring the groups in the 1960s, assigning two officers from 

the intelligence unit to identify group members. This response had been developed in 

consultation with the Los Angeles police and sheriff’s departments. As one officer 

explained: 

Originally it was two officers that went to the chief of police.... They went 

to him, and they had attended a conference out in California and they saw 

what was going on out there. Our chief at that time did not want to admit 

that we had a gang problem or gang issue, so he wouldn’t even let them 

call themselves a gang unit. They were called a street group information 

team, and it started out of this division because this is where the 

intelligence division was. The idea was to gain information. And the two 

detectives went out and basically spent a lot of time on the streets in areas 

that were known for gang activity and documented a lot of that activity, 

and then they grew from there. 

Then we got into the ‘70s and ‘80s, we got more sophisticated about it. 

We got some people trained; went out to Los Angeles and did a lot of 

cooperative training with them, and established a very proactive gang unit. 

But the nexus was actually just intelligence gathering. You know, find out 

the scope of the problem, and then when they found it out, they were like, 

wow! This turned into a nightmare. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 76 

In the mid-to-late 1970s, Albuquerque police officers had observed that California 

gang members were beginning to migrate to the city, especially members of the 

California-based gangs, Happy Homes and 18th Street. Established neighborhood groups 

saw the migrating gangs as a threat. This eventually led to conflict, which in turn led the 

California gang members to move to the west side of the city. Police officials claimed 

that conflict with California gangs had motivated various neighborhood groups to begin 

calling themselves gangs, and they began to develop identifying symbols such as hand 

signs, styles of clothing, and turf-defining graffiti (Albuquerque Police Department 

1999). 

The first known police report documenting the nature and extent of a gang 

problem in Albuquerque was compiled by a school squad officer in 1979. He reported 

that in the summer of 1978, gang activity had begun to increase in the South Valley and 

Westgate areas of the city. According to his report, gang members were getting involved 

in activities ranging from petty misdemeanors to violent felonies. The officer did not 

provide data on the numbers of gangs, gang members, or gang crimes, but he concluded 

that Albuquerque’s gang problem at the time was not as serious as the problem in Los 

Angeles. However, he argued, if the city chose not to respond, it risked having a more 

substantial gang problem in the future: 

In Los Angeles these gangs are more organized and hard-core compared to 

the gangs we are now seeing in Albuquerque. Gangs in Los Angeles are 

holding up people in the street, breaking into homes and shops, extorting 

money from businessmen for “protection,” shooting people from moving 

automobiles, torturing victims before killing them, and terrorizing entire 

neighborhoods and schools. This is far more frightening and threatening 

than youth gang activity in Albuquerque, but it can happen! If we continue 

to overlook this problem, all schools and neighborhoods will eventually 

see more and more of this type of activity (Montano 1979, 1). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 77 

Response to Gangs: 1980 Through 1994 

In the 1980s, Albuquerque police officials began noticing that black street gang 

members were immigrating from California. They associated the incoming gang 

members with one of two gangs: the Bloods or the Crips. Memoranda from that period 

indicated that gang members were not as turf oriented as they had been in the past, but 

rather, membership was revolving around the sale of drugs. In particular, the police 

believed that the Bloods and Crips were coming to Albuquerque to sell crack cocaine.7 

Our review of police documents suggested that the drug market in Albuquerque had not 

been well-organized at that time. The new gangs from California had both the skills and 

the desire to operate from Albuquerque, where they could make greater profits than in 

Los Angeles. Police reports also suggested that competition for greater profits had caused 

an increase in violence, as each gang tried to capture territory and market share from the 

others: 

...Albuquerque had a big influx of gang members and gang activity, and it 

became very apparent to the chain of command of the police department 

and the citizens that Albuquerque was starting to get a gang problem that 

was outside of just the local gangs. We had the Bloods and the Crips that 

were moving in from California.... Gangs just started popping up in 

different places and becoming more prevalent in the drive-by shootings 

and the armed robberies and such as that. And the wearing of the colors..., 

they were wearing all blue or all red. It was very prevalent in the 

neighborhoods (Albuquerque Police Department 1999). 

Police officials claimed that from 1985 through 1990, Albuquerque gangs had 

been deeply involved in drug trafficking, so much so that the department’s research 

analysts and planners had written to the federal government, pleading for resources to 

assist in their gang and drug control efforts. They wrote that Albuquerque gangs were 

consolidating into “illicit conglomerates” for the purpose of distributing crack cocaine. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 78 

The analysts indicated that the gangs had international connections with the capacity to 

traffic large quantities of drugs, and that they were equipped with sophisticated automatic 

weapons. They wrote: “The problem is only worsening as law enforcement officials in 

the Albuquerque area have indicated that along with west coast criminal gangs, 

Midwestern chapters of the Crips, the Bloods, and the Jamaican Posses have also begun 

infiltrating the fertile drug market in New Mexico” (Turpen 1990, 4). 

In March 1989, the Albuquerque Police Department created a specialized gang 

unit. Staffed with five officers, the unit operated from a substation under the direction of 

a field commander, and its officers assumed responsibility for gang intelligence-related 

activities. Within 6 months, other field commanders were clamoring for the unit’s 

assistance and for their own gang units. In response, the chief allocated another three 

officers to the unit and placed it in the Field Services Bureau, making the unit more 

accessible to patrol managers and officers. About this same time, the police department 

purchased the GREAT software information system to facilitate collection, processing, 

and dissemination of gang intelligence. The chief later expanded the functions of the 

gang unit, adding primary responsibility for conducting gang-related investigations to the 

unit’s intelligence function. 

Gang unit officers told us that by 1991, Albuquerque was experiencing increased 

gang activity, and the gang unit quickly became overburdened with investigations. The 

unit was assigned another four officers, bringing the total to eight. As the gang unit 

continued performing intelligence and investigative functions, officers also worked to 

raise public awareness of the gang problem. That year, gang unit officers made more than 

75 presentations to civic groups, neighborhood associations, and city, county, state, and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 79 

federal law enforcement officers. The expanded unit was also able to conduct directed 

patrols in known gang hot-spots and to organize neighborhoods to suppress gang activity 

(Albuquerque Police Department 1992). 

That same year, the United Way of Greater Albuquerque created the New Mexico 

Gang Strategies Coalition in order to sponsor a gang prevention and intervention proposal 

for a grant offered by the New Mexico Youth Authority. The Coalition included 30 task 

force members representing youth service agencies such as schools, police, corrections, 

and social services. They met monthly to discuss anti-violence initiatives and other city 

agency activities directed toward juveniles. However, much of their time was eventually 

devoted to a gun buy-back program in which individuals received gift certificates and 

other items in exchange for their handguns (Youth Resource and Analysis Center 1994). 

By 1992, the public had begun to recognize the seriousness of Albuquerque’s 

gang problem. The City of Albuquerque Planning Department surveyed 1,000 adults 

living in the metropolitan area to examine citizen perceptions of quality of life and 

satisfaction with city services. When residents were asked an open-ended question about 

what they least liked about living in Albuquerque, problems with gangs and youth ranked 

second, just behind traffic congestion. Asked what they thought was the biggest issue or 

problem facing Albuquerque residents at that time, they responded that gang and youth 

problems were the biggest issue (22 percent), followed distantly by high crime rates (14 

percent), and a poor educational system (13 percent). Not surprisingly, Hispanics were 

much more likely than members of other ethnic groups to perceive a serious gang 

problem in the city. Twenty-eight percent of Hispanics stated that the gang or youth 

problem was the most serious issue faced by the city, compared with 19 percent of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 80 

Anglos (Research & Polling, Inc. 1992). 

The scope and nature of the gang problem in Albuquerque was not systematically 

examined until 1994, when the mayor established a special council. The Mayor’s Council 

on Gangs was mandated to “mobilize, coordinate, and focus the major institutions of the 

community on preventing youths from engaging in violence and gang involvement, on 

intervening to divert current gang members to productive alternatives, and on suppressing 

the spread of criminal activities and violence involving youth by effective law 

enforcement” (Youth Resource and Analysis Center 1994). The Council was comprised 

of 30 members who represented agencies responsible for administering prevention, 

intervention, and suppression programs throughout the city. As one of the Council’s first 

actions, it commissioned an ad hoc study to examine Albuquerque’s gang problem. 

Much of the Council’s final report consisted of data obtained from the city’s gang 

unit. According to that report, as of 1993, the police and sheriff’s departments had 

documented 3,253 gang members living within city limits. However, the Council also 

reported that the police department’s own gang unit was estimating that there were 

actually 6,000 to 7,000 gang members living in the area. As seen in exhibit 3.01, the 

Council reported 111 active street gangs were in Albuquerque in 1990, of which 61 were 

Hispanic, 31 were black, and 19 were white. By 1993, the number had grown to 155 

gangs, of which 87 were Hispanic, 37 were black, 20 were white, and 10 had members of 

mixed or other racial backgrounds (Mayor’s Council on Gangs). 
---

Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 81 

Exhibit 3.01 Albuquerque street gangs (1990 and 1993) 

1990 1993 

Street gangs (#) 111 155 

Gang members (#) 3,253 

Gang ethnicity (%) 

Hispanic 55.0 56.1 

Black 27.9 23.9 

White 17.1 13.0 

Asian 0.0 0.6 

Multi 0.0 6.4 

Data from the Mayor’s Council on Gangs, no date. 

Analysis of the locations of documented gang members demonstrated that the 

gang problem had been largely concentrated in one area (exhibit 3.02). Sixty-four percent 

of gang members were living in the southwestern part of the city, followed by 15 percent 

in the northwestern area, 11 percent in the southeast, and 5 percent in the northeast. 

Approximately 5 percent of the documented gang members were residing in unidentified 

areas (Mayor’s Council on Gangs). 

Exhibit 3.02 Gang locations in Albuquerque 

Northeast UNK 

Sout heast 

11% 

Nothwest 

15% 

5% 5%

Sout hwest 

64% 

The Albuquerque gang unit reported on the types of activities associated with 

each gang in the city at this time. In particular, the unit identified gangs as generally 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 82 

associated with one of three types: turf, drug, and tagger. Turf gangs, although involved 

at least somewhat in street-level drug trafficking, were thought to be primarily concerned 

with territorial issues. Drug gangs, on the other hand, were primarily involved in drug 

trafficking and other drug-related crimes, and tagger gangs were believed to be primarily 

involved in graffiti. Exhibit 3.03 shows that most Albuquerque gang members belonged 

to turf gangs (n=2,527), followed by drug gangs (n=575), and tagger gangs (n=130). 

Exhibit 3.03 Gang members’ primary activities in Albuquerque 

3000 2527 

2000 

1000 

Number of Gang Members 

575 

130 

0 

Turf Protecion Drug Sales Tagger 

Type of Gang Gang Member Belongs 

The data also suggested that primary gang activities varied based on location 

(exhibit 3.04). Gang members living in southwestern Albuquerque were almost 

exclusively associated with turf gangs; this was the area with the greatest number of 

documented gang members. Gang members in southeastern Albuquerque, an area with a 

moderate number of documented gang members, were most likely to be associated with 

gangs focusing on drug trafficking. Interestingly, members belonging to tagger gangs 

lived almost exclusively in the northeastern part of the city, the area with the fewest 

documented gang members (Mayor’s Council on Gangs). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 83 

Exhibit 3.04 Numbers of gangs and gang members in Albuquerque (1994) 

Northeast Northwest Southeast Southwest Unknown 

Type Gangs Members Gangs Members Gangs Members Gangs Members Gangs Member 

s 

Drug 4 47 3 11 21 327 6 170 2 20 

Turf 4 33 13 492 3 10 33 1,889 10 103 

Tagge 10 92 0 0 6 32 0 0 1 6 r 

Total 18 172 16 503 30 369 39 2,059 13 129 

The work of the Mayor’s Council on Gangs led to a number of public safety 

policy recommendations, all requiring increased spending. The mayor and the Council 

called for a 0.25-cent increase in property taxes that would raise an additional $21 million 

a year. The money would be used to put 150 new officers on the street, to create several 

gang prevention programs, and to build a 48-bed juvenile boot camp (McCutcheon 1995). 

Albuquerque’s business leaders were among the strongest advocates for the property tax 

increase. They argued that the gang problem had become serious enough to discourage 

new businesses from moving to the city. Interestingly, the police union opposed the tax. 

Union leaders believed that too little of the money was being earmarked for increasing 

the number of officers, and too much was being dedicated to intervention and prevention 

initiatives (Crowder and Heild 1995). 

Shortly after the mayor’s call to increase taxes to fund strategies for combating 

gangs, a series of articles in the local paper began documenting the nature of crime in the 

city. One article proclaimed that Albuquerque had one of the worst violent crime 

problems in the country, ranking just behind two western cities, 14th in the country (Heild 

1995). Another article reported that in 1995, as the rest of the country was experiencing 

the biggest decline in 35 years in homicide rates, Albuquerque’s homicide problem was 

the worst that it had ever been. Many of these homicides, journalists wrote, were the 

consequence of increasing gang and drug activity (Juarez 1995). One front page article 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 84 

reported the grip that gangs had on the city, describing the migration of California gangs 

to New Mexico and the role of gang members in crack cocaine sales; it claimed that gang 

members were responsible for more than 200 drive-by shootings a year. It described the 

lives of barrio youth, and how difficult it was to escape the gang lifestyle (Crowder and 

Roybal 1995). 

Not long afterward, a drive-by shooting resulted in the death of a 17-year-old 

youth in one of the city’s worst neighborhoods. In response, the police chief announced a 

30-day “in your face” anti-gang action plan. The plan called for 25 to 50 officers to patrol 

the neighborhood around the clock, using horses, bikes, motorcycles, and gang, canine, 

and patrol units. He called upon the fire department to watch over neighborhood schools. 

At a news conference unveiling the plan, the chief also announced that he would expand 

the department’s gang unit (Domrzalski 1996). When it ended, the action was proclaimed 

to have been a success. Police announced that they had made 444 stops, resulting in 290 

traffic tickets, 17 felony and 44 misdemeanor arrests, the confiscation of two guns, and 

the recovery of three stolen vehicles. They reported that no drive-by shootings had 

occurred in the neighborhood during the 30-day period, and that neighborhood residents 

were experiencing a decline in their fear of crime and an increase in their quality of life 

(1996). 

The police chief followed through on his pledge to expand the gang unit, 

increasing the total number of officers to 20. With the expansion came a broader mission. 

Now, along with its intelligence, investigation, and public awareness functions, the unit 

was directed to engage in street enforcement. About 14 officers worked nights, 

conducting directed patrols in areas with known gang problems; the other six officers 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 85 

worked during the day handling investigations and community presentations. The captain 

in charge of the unit expected it to be aggressive on the streets. In the words of one 

officer assigned to the unit at the time, the captain wanted his officers to “smash heads 

and have zero tolerance for gang members.” 

Although street enforcement had become an important function of the gang unit, 

officers continued to be held responsible for collecting and disseminating gang 

intelligence. The officers countered that the gang unit’s enforcement mandate made it too 

difficult for them to gather intelligence. They explained that enforcement resulted in a 

lack of rapport with gang members that prohibited the kind of relationships that could 

facilitate open communication between police and youth on the street. They tried to 

explain this to the command staff and other officers in the department, but the message 

was ignored. Eventually, the gang unit officers had become frustrated and stopped trying 

to gather intelligence altogether; instead, they explained, they spent their time stopping 

cars and writing tickets. 

In 1996, the police department commissioned a study to examine citizen 

satisfaction with police service delivery. The New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center 

surveyed 1,002 adult residents by telephone. Respondents were asked whether they 

thought that gangs were a “big problem,” “small problem,” or “no problem” in their 

neighborhoods. Approximately 9 percent of those surveyed indicated that they thought 

that gangs were a “big problem.” Examining the data by neighborhood showed that 

respondent perceptions varied greatly depending on the neighborhood in which the 

respondent lived. More than 25 percent of respondents living in the southwestern and 

central parts of the city believed that their neighborhoods had “big” gang problems, while 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 86 

less than 5 percent living in the northern and northeastern parts of the city believed the 

same (Mayor’s Council on Gangs). A comparison of the survey data on citizen 

perceptions of the location of gang problems with other police data showing addresses of 

documented gang members suggested that the gang problem in Albuquerque was, in fact, 

most serious in the southwestern and central parts of the city (exhibit 3.04). 

In October 1996, the New Mexico Gang Task Force was created, funded from 

money and property seizures resulting from drug cases throughout the state. The Task 

Force was comprised of members from the Albuquerque Police Department, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the New Mexico State Police, the Sheriff’s Department, 

and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (McClannahan 1997). Interviews with 

officers indicated that the Task Force had lasted only 2 years, due to problems with 

collegiality, lax work ethics, lack of leadership, and disagreements over priorities. 

By 1997, more of Albuquerque’s city and county agencies were beginning to 

focus on gang control efforts. For example, the city council approved a bill criminalizing 

recruitment of juveniles into street gangs; those convicted would face up to 90 days in jail 

and pay a $500 fine (Glover 1996). The county attorney’s office created its own gang 

unit, comprised of five prosecutors and eight support staff, to use vertical prosecution 

techniques focused solely on gang members (Daniels 1998). 

Response to Gangs: 1998 Through 1999 

In February 1998, the mayor and an acting police chief were searching for ways 

to free time for patrol officers to engage in community policing. They were reviewing the 

allocation of officers in the police department in an effort to place more officers on the 

street. They determined that far too many specialized units existed, and they asked the 

special unit supervisors whether they could manage with fewer officers. When the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 87 

supervisor of the gang unit responded positively, the chief reallocated six of the 20 gang 

unit officers to patrol (Contreras 1998). 

A few months later, a major gang war broke out in one of Albuquerque’s worst 

gang neighborhoods. Over a 2-week period, drive-by shootings occurred nightly, leaving 

one person dead. Neighbors were terrified to leave home after dark. In response to the 

shootings, neighborhood organizations, local businesses, and individuals collaborated to 

organize the Stop the Violence campaign, a series of anti-gang rallies protesting the gang 

war. During a 3-week period, five rallies were held (Kruger 1998). A week later, 

Albuquerque’s new police chief instituted a number of organizational changes. 

The reorganization was publicly linked to the movement to implement community 

policing, and to the effort to decentralize and generalize the organizational structure of 

the department. A few in the department have argued, however, that some of the changes 

under this umbrella were designed more to respond to escalating gang violence than to 

implement community policing. In the process, the new chief disassembled several 

specialized units, reallocating officers to patrol districts. For example, officers who had 

been assigned to centralized units that investigated crimes against persons and property 

were reallocated to district commanders, who then assigned the officers as they saw fit. 

The only units left untouched by the reorganization were homicide, narcotics, and vice. 

As part of this change, the gang and SWAT units were merged into one Metro 

unit, comprised of 20 SWAT-trained officers. The Metro officers were divided into five 

teams, four responsible for street enforcement and one composed of former gang unit 

officers responsible for gang intelligence. The chief placed the Metro unit within the 

Patrol Division, ensuring its accessibility to patrol commanders. Metro officers were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 88 

required to wear uniforms and to drive marked vehicles. 

As it turned out, the Metro unit was short-lived, disbanded by the summer of 

1999. A number of reasons have been proposed for the unit’s apparent failure. Many 

officers in the department believed that the Metro unit was simply not productive; its 

officers were not perceived to be hardworking or to be generating the amount of activity 

expected of a proactive, hard-charging unit. One officer stated, “They would not do shit. 

They would come in in the morning and would never be seen again.” Sergeants assigned 

to the Metro unit were said to either lack experience or to be near retirement; either way, 

they were seen as lacking focus and energy. Interestingly, Metro unit officers were 

scheduled to work from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., not ordinarily hours during which street 

enforcement is most needed. 

As the city’s gang problem escalated, the department was dealing internally with 

its gang unit problem. One police manager explained to us, however, that he believed that 

the disruptions and the ultimate failure of the Metro unit were caused by factors much 

more complex than a group of officers with a poor work ethic. He maintained that the 

new chief had modeled the Metro unit after the Los Angeles Police Department CRASH 

unit, with SWAT officers performing street-level enforcement in their down time, and 

gang unit officers working with SWAT officers to gather and disseminate gang 

intelligence. Contrary to the chief’s vision, Metro’s direct chain of command (i.e., 

captain, lieutenant, and sergeant in charge) believed that SWAT officers should not 

engage in street enforcement or gang control functions, and they had directly prohibited 

their officers from carrying out those kinds of actions. The new chief had aimed to 

expand the unit to a total of 50 officers, but whenever he assigned officers to the unit, the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 89 

Metro command staff would require them to undergo enhanced physical training tests 

that few could pass. The command staff believed that only the most elite officers should 

be allowed into “their SWAT unit.” 

According to this police manager, Metro’s command staff had not believed that 

the new chief’s idea was sound, and so they had ignored and defied his orders. Under 

their command, unit officers had performed only SWAT-related duties. In the unit’s final 

6 months of existence, the 20 Metro officers made only one felony arrest. According to 

gang unit officers and department managers, the chief would rather have reassigned poor 

performers to another unit, but departmental politics had prevented this option. Finally, 

the chief elected to disband the Metro unit entirely. Then shortly afterward, he recreated a 

gang unit with new officers and a more trustworthy chain of command. 

In August 1999, the reformed gang unit began operating with four officers; a few 

months later, another five were added. The unit adopted an operational strategy that 

emphasized intelligence gathering and dissemination. To facilitate this function, the unit 

was divided into two teams, each with four officers. One team was assigned to each of 

the two districts with the worst gang problems. The teams served as liaisons with district 

patrol officers, attending daily briefings and presenting gang intelligence, and they 

scanned for gang-related problems in their assigned districts. Once a problem was 

identified, the entire unit responded. 

The reformed unit was no longer required to investigate gang-related crimes, as 

its predecessor had been. The captain of the Special Enforcement Bureau believed that 

conducting investigations would overburden the unit and cause less intelligence to be 

gathered. He wanted the unit to serve as an auxiliary support team for other units 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 90 

conducting gang-related investigations, enabling gang intelligence to be used without 

forcing gang unit officers to assume specific case responsibilities. He stated: 

I didn’t want them overloading the gang unit with cases solely because 

they could, and this is what happened in the previous gang unit. Basically, 

they had case responsibility for anything that was gang related, with the 

exception of homicide. And I’m like, wait a minute, you know, that is 

probably the biggest case that we should be involved in now. Whether 

they want to be case agent or assisting agent, they need to be involved in 

those cases. Well, what happened was, I made the decision that we would 

have no specific case responsibility. 

However, we would liaison to anybody who did have a gang-related issue. 

And the whole idea was, let violent crimes investigators who investigate 

shootings and stabbings, let them do that job. That’s their job. Bring in the 

experts who have the information and let them assist in that job. But I 

didn’t want them doing, as I saw happen time and time again, where they 

would take a shooting and go, ok, these are two gangsters and the guy 

didn’t die, so let’s shoot it over to the gang unit. Well, the minute you tie 

them up investigating a shooting case, that is less time on the street, less 

time to gather intelligence, that is less time to be as effective as we need to 

be, and to create that information source that gives you that tactical and 

strategic information to go forward. 

So I said, no, we’re not going to have case responsibility, and I got the 

chief to agree to that. And I think it’s paid big benefits. Now, they will 

take stuff on their own, and I’ve left that door open for them. If they 

happen upon a drive-by, then they can take it, but always keep in mind 

that the more you take, the more that they are willing to give you. So be 

careful with that because you are cutting your effectiveness down. 

For a short period, the gang unit did not report to any bureau or division. Officers 

as well as department managers were unclear exactly where the unit belonged 

organizationally. Most managers were very reluctant to take responsibility for the unit. 

Eventually, however, the gang unit was placed in the Special Investigations Division with 

the narcotics and repeat offender units. A lieutenant advocating for the unit was also a 

friend of the new gang unit sergeant; he believed that gang members were often involved 

with narcotics and were typically repeat offenders. As such, he thought that the gang unit 

would complement the other units in Special Investigations. With this change, gang unit 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 91 

officers could again drive unmarked vehicles and wear street clothing.

 During this time, the police department received about 40 rape reports involving 

one street gang in Albuquerque. In almost all cases, a girl between the ages of 12 and 17 

had been invited to a party, urged to get drunk and high, and then raped. Some cases 

involved a single offender; others involved up to 15 offenders. Police had argued that the 

cases were too difficult to take forward because victims and witnesses refused to testify, 

and the girls were often considered “willing participants” (J. Jones 1999). Newspaper 

stories and police presentations on the rapes fueled the public perception that 

Albuquerque had a serious gang problem. 

Las Vegas, Nevada 

Police first identified a gang problem in Las Vegas in the late 1960s or early 

1970s. The problem was concentrated on the west and east sides of the city in 

neighborhoods with public housing and inexpensive apartment complexes. African 

American gang members resided primarily on the west side, while Hispanics resided 

primarily on the east side of the city. 

Initially, the emergence of local neighborhood gangs attracted little attention. 

Some of the officers with whom we spoke attributed this to the fact that, in the 1970s, 

Las Vegas had experienced a rapid increase in population. New job opportunities were 

resulting from the expanding casino industry, jobs that required little education and few 

skills. As a result, minority adults, mostly black and Hispanic, had moved to Las Vegas 

to work in the service industry, bringing with them children who were already members 

of Los Angeles gangs. 

Although no gang data were collected by the Las Vegas Police Department during 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 92 

this period, police officers recalled that immigrating gang members had become involved 

in criminal activity, and that most violence between gangs had involved issues of turf and 

respect. One police officer who had grown up on the west side of the city explained: 

Okay, growing up, the gang problem as I saw it as a young man was that it 

was pretty centralized. We had neighborhoods that were governmenthousing neighborhoods. We had gangs that were basically turf bound. In 

West Las Vegas, where I grew up, I was familiar with the Gerson Park 

Kingsmen. I used them as an example in one of our most notorious 

picturized turf gangs. They were comprised of mainly young African 

American males, with some females, but not many. It started out with 

things such as fights, turf battles over, you know, “you come into my 

neighborhood, you know, you’re gonna have to fight,” evolved into the 

more violent crimes. You know, the most violent crimes that gangs 

participate in is drive-by shootings, walk-up shootings. And you have the 

other spin-off crimes that were associated with the gang problem. In 

addition to the robberies, the sometimes gang rapes, those kinds, you also 

have car death. That was one of the things that I noticed when I became a 

police officer. 

In addition to African American gangs, you also had historical Hispanic 

gangs, which refer to the 28th Street Crips. I guess the Kingsmen were 

later aligned with the Crips. But 28th Street gang is a Hispanic gang which 

basically developed [from] a migration of the Hispanic people from the 

Los Angeles area. They were also very turf bound on the east side of Las 

Vegas. 

A second officer noted: 

I think that there were, historically, and I’m sure you’ve learned from 

Metro, that there were some gangs around, that there were a lot of, in the 

‘60s and the ‘70s, somewhat different types. You know, there were biker 

gangs and then the White Fence gang has been in existence here for quite 

a long time. I mean, for years and years and years and years. Probably its 

makeup has changed, but it has been here for a significantly long time. 

Then, historically, I believe then we got influences from California, 

whatever, and all the kind of other more organized gangs. 

Response to Gangs: 1980 Through 1986 

By all accounts, the gang problem began to escalate in the 1980s. The first two 

documented gang homicides had been recorded in 1980 (Flanagan 1997a), then in 1983, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 93 

two other gang homicide cases captured the attention of both police and the public. The 

first involved a 15-year-old African American male who shot and killed a rival gang 

member in front of 200 other partygoers in the north part of the city. By Las Vegas 

standards, this was an almost unimaginable crime. It had been committed in plain view of 

innumerable witnesses, and yet none were willing to testify (Las Vegas Sun 1984, Jul. 3). 

In the second case, an altercation in the street at a party occurred between two rival 

Hispanic gang members. The victim, unarmed and attempting to flee, was stabbed 

repeatedly and then was run over by a car (McCorkle and Miethe 2002, 126). 

Several reports from that period suggested that the gang problem had begun to 

escalate rapidly. For example, in 1984, police estimated that only 50 to 70 gang members 

were in the area, with fewer than 20 characterized as hard-core (Cornett 1983). A year 

later, in 1985, police recorded 15 gangs and approximately 1,000 gang members 

(Shetterly 1985). Police officials also stated that during this period, an increasing number 

of African American gang members were migrating to the city, and concurrently, police 

were witnessing an increase in the number of gang fights for control of territory. Some 

officers thought that the increasing violence had been related to gang members’ attempts 

to control drug territories; others believed that the gangs had been fighting over broader 

turf issues. One officer explained: 

I’ll tell you what happened. I remember in the early ‘80s there was all 

kinds of shit going on. All kinds of shooting on the west side, and we’re 

like – everybody was calling it the drug wars, because a lot of it involved 

the drug turf and shit like that. But looking back on it, I’ll bet you 

anything that a lot of that was establishing turf. I’d say when we really 

started to realize there was a problem was in the early ‘80s. 

The police department created a temporary two-officer detail to address gang 

problems in 1980, after the first two gang homicides had occurred. This detail was active 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 94 

only intermittently, however, its existence at any given time “depend[ing] on [the] 

immediacy of problems, school sessions and even the weather” (Shetterly 1985, May 9). 

In January 1985, as gang activity escalated the chief resurrected this detail permanently, 

renaming it the Gang Diversion Unit. Staffed with two uniformed officers, the unit was 

given a prevention-oriented mission: It was responsible for preventing youth from joining 

gangs and for talking youth already in gangs into getting out. The unit was also 

responsible for giving prevention-oriented presentations to school officials, social 

workers, and church leaders. 

News reports from the mid-1980s indicated that officers in the gang unit had 

made a point of emphasizing that they did not respond to calls for service, nor did they 

engage in any other enforcement activity. Instead, the officers spent time with gang 

members learning about gang culture, gang signs, and other gang lifestyle issues. They 

also worked with gang members who wanted legitimate employment opportunities. In the 

first 4 months of the unit’s existence, the two officers boasted, they had found four gang 

members jobs through police ties with local employers (1985, May 9). 

The Las Vegas Police Department, however, had begun to attract criticism for the 

prevention-oriented gang strategy. A Los Angeles lieutenant in charge of gang control 

publicly condemned Las Vegas’s strategy for not being more aggressive. In a local paper, 

the Las Vegas Sun, the L.A. lieutenant was quoted as having said: 

If that’s what they’re doing [to control gangs], in my opinion, they’re 

making a big mistake. Our posture is an aggressive one. We have 160 

guys out there in their face continuously. We initially took the same 

approach as the Las Vegas Police Department: We watched them, 

monitored them, kept files and didn’t try to stamp them out. But don’t go 

out there...with two guys, go out there and get heavy with them (Shetterly 

1985, May 9). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 95 

Las Vegas police officials countered that local gang members were a different 

breed than those in Los Angeles. Police spokespersons explained that gang activity in Las 

Vegas was primarily the consequence of boredom, trying to impress other youth, lack of 

job opportunities, and the desire to belong (Shetterly 1985, May 8). They also pointed out 

that the police were unaware of any gangs in Las Vegas being involved in the drug 

supply market (Shetterly 1985, May 9). 

Even with the creation of the Gang Diversion Unit, however, the gang problem in 

Las Vegas continued to grow. For example, in the first 4 months of 1986, between 15 and 

20 gang-related shootings, assaults, and attempted murders occurred, most of which 

occurred between black gangs in black neighborhoods (Beall 1986). Police officials 

explained that gangs at this time were ethnically homogenous. Of the 20 or 21 gangs in 

the city, 12 were comprised primarily of black gang members, six were comprised 

primarily of Hispanic gang members, and 2 or 3 were comprised of white gang members. 

Hispanic gangs were neighborhood-oriented and limited their activity to minor burglaries 

and vandalism within their turf (exhibit 3.05). White gangs, police noted, were of less 

interest because technically, they were not formal gangs, and they were engaging in few 

troubling activities other than satanic rituals. Black gangs were a much more serious 

problem. They operated outside their own neighborhoods, and they were becoming 

involved in narcotics trafficking and violent assaults. As a result, the police explained, 

they were spending most of their time monitoring and focusing on black gangs. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 96 

Exhibit 3.05 Las Vegas gangs and gang member activities 

Gang Sets Location Colors Activities Membership 

Blood Piru, Hoods, Nubians, 

Downtown Killers 

Primarily Westside, 

extensions into 

northwestern Las 

Vegas 

Red Drug sales, 

burglary, 

occasional 

armed robbery, 

turf protection 

150-200 

Crip GQs, Playboys, Warbabies, 

BTDs, Undercover Crips, 

Square Boys, Brave Black 

Brothers, Gerson Park 

Kingsmen 

Primarily North Las 

Vegas, extensions 

into Westside 

Blue (Gerson 

Park 

Kingsmen 

wear black) 

Drug sales, 

burglary, 

occasional 

armed robbery, 

turf protection 

320-350 

Hispanic Varrio 28th Street, Lil Locos, 

Vario North Town, Vario San 

Chucos, North Side Santos, 

Los Hermanos 

Primarily in 

northeast Las 

Vegas and North 

Las Vegas 

Non-specific, 

sometimes 

black 

Burglary, 

sometimes drug 

sales and turf 

protection 

250-300 

White Aces, Worlocks, Stoners, 

Henderson Aces 

Non-specific 

around Las 

Vegas; in 

Henderson, 

primarily in the 

northeastern part

of the city 

Non-specific Turf protection 

and satanism 

Unknown; 

probably 

fewer than 

100 

Adapted from Beall 1986. 

As the gang problems persisted, local African American stakeholders began to 

mobilize community members. More than 300 Westside residents joined together to urge 

the police to do something about gang violence in their neighborhoods. A meeting took 

place about 2 weeks after a drive-by shooting had wounded six bystanders and caused the 

death of a local paperboy. Residents told police that they felt like hostages in their own 

neighborhoods; they wanted the police to crack down on gangs and gang behavior. In 

turn, gang unit officers explained that they were using diversionary tactics to get gang 

youth back into schools and churches, and they urged the citizens to call the police 

whenever gang activity occurred in their neighborhoods (Joyce 1985). 

A few months later, in early 1986, a citizen action group calling themselves 

Citizens Interested in Today’s Youth (CITY) began meeting weekly to discuss the youth 

gang problem in the metropolitan area and to brainstorm about alternative prevention 

tactics. Within a month, the group was sponsoring a conference for 60 representatives 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 97 

from public agencies and private corporations. At the conference, members of CITY 

talked about current gang-related problems and facilitated discussions about strategies 

that might help to control gang crime. Police and juvenile court officers argued strongly 

that in order to prevent youth from engaging in gang crime, jobs and recreation programs 

were needed. They pointed out that most youths were joining gangs because they lacked 

jobs and educational opportunities, and that to succeed, gang-reduction efforts would 

need to increase the youths’ self-esteem and make them feel that they “belonged” 

(Shetterly 1986). 

Several other community-driven gang control intervention efforts were initiated 

around this time. For example, in neighborhoods that were complaining about gang 

members selling drugs, police-trained residents participated in the Crime Watch program 

(Beall 1986). The Juvenile Court Services Division created a program to divert youth 

from gang membership. Juvenile offenders listed as gang members were being required 

to participate in a probation program meant to “rehabilitate a gang member by working 

through his family, returning him to school, getting him a job and beginning to show him 

that his gang association will take him only to a jail” (1986). 

Response to Gangs: 1987 Through 1990 

In 1987, the gang problem shifted in nature. The kinds of activities engaged in by 

local, homegrown gangs were giving way to the more serious disruptions of the 

immigrating Los Angeles gangs. Local law enforcement officials were quoted in a 

newspaper article as saying that “gang activity [was] mushroom[ing] as Los Angeles 

street gang members...flooded into the Las Vegas Valley, bringing with them a 

seemingly boundless supply of narcotics and an unscrupulous brand of ‘machismo’” 

(Bates 1987). The officials went on to suggest that Las Vegas was virgin territory for Los 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 98 

Angeles gang members, who were seeking new places to market cocaine. Law 

enforcement officers from both Las Vegas and Los Angeles pointed out that the same 

rock of crack cocaine that sold for $10 in Los Angeles would sell for $20 in Las Vegas. 

Los Angeles gang members were migrating in droves to Las Vegas for the purpose of 

increasing the profitability of their street-level drug sales (1987). Although law 

enforcement officials were unable to estimate precisely the number of Los Angeles gang 

members in Las Vegas at the time, officials believed that in April 1986, about 900 known 

gang members were in the city; within 18 months, that number had risen to 4,000 (1987). 

Although some officers argued that gang migration in pursuit of drug profits accounted 

for much of the rise, others believed that the increase indicated that a greater number of 

local youth were joining gangs. One gang unit officer explained: 

We were seeing an increase in the Crip and Blood sets in the area of Las 

Vegas and just local gang neighborhoods were being created. We had had 

exposure to Latino gangs for several years prior to that, but the violence 

was not at a level that it was getting to. I’m talking late ’86, ’87. You have 

to understand that it normally takes bureaucracies a little while to establish 

“oh, we have a problem, so now we need to do something about it.” 

[Interviewer: Where did the gangs come from?] Believe it or not, we had 

influence from Southern California, but our little gangsters started their 

own sets and took information from Southern California. We have had 

some people come up here from Southern California and have influence; 

however, our little gangsters are just as nasty as their little gangsters are. 

And sometimes the local groups take great exception to the out-of-town 

groups coming in and trying to take over their territories. 

The police department responded to the increase in documented gang members by 

increasing the number of officers assigned to the Gang Diversion Unit. The unit doubled 

in size, increasing from two to four officers, who were given greater latitude with regard 

to policies and procedures. For example, officers wore plain clothes to help in building 

rapport with gang members. They had explicit permission to work anywhere in the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 99 

county to gather intelligence. The Gang Diversion Unit’s focus remained on gathering 

intelligence and on prevention-oriented activities (Bates 1987). 

Despite these efforts to control it, the gang problem continued to escalate. Most 

troubling to Las Vegas police was that inter-gang violence was often occurring in public 

areas frequented by children. On one occasion, six West Coast Bloods attempted to kill 

members of rival Gerson Park Kingsmen, firing a gun into a roller skating rink filled with 

more 300 children and parents. No gang members were injured, but during the panic that 

ensued, three non-gang teenagers were shot and another was injured from trampling. The 

shooting, police later discovered, was an act of revenge for an earlier drive-by shooting 

(Hyman 1988). 

Another incident occurred in a parking lot across the street from a local high 

school during a school-sponsored dance. Police believed that initially, a fight had broken 

out between two gangs. The fight resulted in 6 to 11 shots being fired, four students being 

injured (one with multiple fractures and another who was hit in the face with a baseball 

bat), and five windows and several cars being damaged (Schumacher 1988, Sep. 4). 

Three weeks later, another fight broke out between two gangs at a baseball field. 

A group of gang members on one side of the ball field began shooting across the field at 

members of a rival gang on the other side, and the rival gang returned their fire. It didn’t 

seem to matter to either gang that between them, a Little League baseball game was 

underway. Witnesses stated that the 7- and 8-year-old youngsters had dropped to the 

ground to avoid being shot, many crying uncontrollably. Those in attendance stated that it 

had been one of the most brutal things that they had ever seen. Their anger was 

exacerbated by the fact that police had failed to respond to their calls for help until more 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 100 

than a half hour later. Parents held a press conference at the field to make their feelings 

about the situation clear (Schumacher 1988, Sep. 30). 

Gang violence continued to increase, and city officials raced to respond. 

Government officials held public meetings to define the nature and scope of the city’s 

gang problem and to discuss potential solutions. In October 1988, when a county 

commissioner organized a meeting of 24 public officials to discuss the county’s gang 

problem, more than 70 citizens crowded into the small meeting room. Both public 

officials and citizens voiced concerns about gang violence running rampant throughout 

the city, exemplified by the gunfight during the Little League game. By the end of the 

meeting, both groups had agreed that they needed “more police, more state and local 

funding to fight gangs and drugs, and more parents taking responsibility for the illegal 

acts of their children (McCabe 1988). 

A few weeks later, the mayor organized a series of town hall meetings, one in 

each ward, to discuss public safety and community concerns about gangs (Koch 1988). 

At the meeting in Ward 3, comprised primarily of African Americans and the area where 

gang problems were said to be most serious, a police undersheriff told the audience that 

“youth gangs have created the most serious problem we have faced in the last two to 

three decades.” He also told the crowd that the gang problem was the department’s 

number one priority, and he discussed several of the efforts that the department was 

making to control the gangs (1988). In 1988, on two occasions the sheriff had 

substantially increased the resources available to the gang unit. In March 1988, the sheriff 

had expanded the unit from four to 18 officers, and officers had been assigned to both 

day and night shifts. The unit’s mission had also changed at this time, from a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 101 

concentration on prevention and intelligence to enforcement. In particular, the unit had 

become responsible for directed patrols in known gang areas. 

A police spokesperson stated that “the Metro gang unit will roam all of Clark 

County and give gang members an ultimatum from the sheriff. It is to cease their 

activities, leave town, or go to the penitentiary” (Las Vegas Sun 1988, Mar. 24). After its 

first 5 weeks, the unit was considered a smashing success. The local paper reported that 

more than 300 gang members had already been arrested, and the unit had confiscated 

$10,000 worth of crack cocaine and 25 handguns (Las Vegas Sun 1988, May 3). 

The sheriff had continued increasing the number of officers assigned to the gang 

unit, and it reached a total of 36 officers by December 1988. Police officials said that the 

rationale for expanding the unit was to prevent the number of gang killings from 

increasing further. With the added gang unit officers came diversification in gender and 

ethnicity. The unit had always been comprised of white males. Now the department was 

assigning female and black officers, in response to criticisms from black community 

leaders who complained that white male officers were making themselves up with black 

faces to go on sting operations – tactics that were offensive and unnecessary, according to 

the community, given that the department had black officers within its ranks. Females 

were assigned to the unit to interact with female gang members who were selling drugs; 

the department believed that female gang unit officers would help with investigations and 

other suppression-oriented activities (Tobin 1988). 

The concern demonstrated by political officials and the police department 

matched public opinion on the issue. A telephone survey conducted by the University of 

Nevada at Las Vegas examined the perceptions and attitudes of 1,214 randomly-selected 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 102 

Nevadans in late 1988. Seventy-seven percent of respondents expressed concern about 

gangs, compared with 67 percent in 1986 (Pappa 1989). Eighty-nine percent of those 

surveyed believed that the gang problem was worsening or might be out of control 

(McCorkle and Miethe 2002, 131). 

The next several years were marked by strategic realignments in gang control 

strategies employed by the city and state. Criminal justice policymakers began to shift 

resources from prevention and intervention-oriented strategies to suppression-oriented 

strategies. The state legislature enacted a new statute aimed at curbing gang violence. A 

Nevada statute addressing juvenile court waivers was revised, restricting the court’s 

jurisdiction in homicide cases. The legislature also enacted a drive-by shooting law, 

making it easier for police to arrest suspects, and lengthening sentences. Prison terms 

were doubled for anyone convicted of using a juvenile to sell illegal drugs, making it 

easier for public housing authorities to evict residents who engaged in unlawful activities, 

and penalties were increased for bringing weapons to school. Possibly the most dramatic 

legislative act was a statute subjecting documented gang members to stiffer penalties 

upon conviction of a gang-motivated crime (2002). 

As the legislature was considering various gang-related legislation, the police 

department was campaigning for more resources to combat gangs. First, the sheriff asked 

the state legislature for $1.2 million to hire another two sergeants and 16 officers for the 

gang unit (Wingard 1989). He then requested $250,000 from the federal government to 

pay officers overtime to patrol the Gerson Park Housing Project area, turf of the worst 

gang in the city (Koch 1988). 

Police began employing several suppression-oriented gang-reduction strategies. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 103 

They began sweeping gang neighborhoods in an effort to take gang members off the 

street. In a practice known as jamming, gang unit officers identified and stopped gang 

members on the street or in cars, hoping to find drugs, weapons, or a warrant outstanding. 

One well-publicized crackdown took place at the Nevada State Fair, where officers 

identified 45 gang members and arrested them all as a “preventive measure.” Police noted 

that “several gangs were congregating to fight each other and other fairgoers.... All were 

wearing gang colors, but were apprehended before any fights or disturbances...” (Las 

Vegas Sun 1989, Oct. 9). The gang unit reported that between December 1988 and 

August 1990, its 36 officers had made 1,200 gang-related arrests, recovered 200 

handguns, and executed 130 search warrants (Burbank 1990). 

During this period, the gang unit also opened a 24-hour telephone gang hotline in 

an effort to receive increasing gang intelligence. They hoped to receive anonymous tips 

about “future gang activity, gang harassment in schools, identification of gang members, 

and information on previous drive-by shootings” (Las Vegas Sun 1990). 

With the crackdowns, however, came renewed criticism from the African 

American community. Residents were concerned about the impact that gangs were 

having on their neighborhoods, but they were equally concerned about the excessive 

force used by officers, and at a public meeting, they asked the undersheriff what he 

intended to do about it. He responded that such behavior was unacceptable, and assured 

the crowd that the Internal Affairs Bureau would look into all allegations. He pointed out 

that in the past year, 229 officers had been reprimanded for behaviors ranging from 

discourtesy to excessive force, and that of the 229 officers reprimanded, 83 had 

ultimately lost their jobs (Koch 1988). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 104 

Less than a month later, 25 African American community leaders assembled at a 

church to complain that police harassment had occurred during the recent Martin Luther 

King Day parade. Community leaders believed that gang unit officers had harshly treated 

juveniles attending the parade, and that several non-gang members had been detained 

without reason for questioning. Gang unit managers explained that officers had attended 

the event to identify gang members and to prevent gang crime. Officers had observed two 

under-age youths drinking alcohol; searching them, the officers had discovered that they 

were carrying handguns. Concerned about a potential gang fight, they had then stopped 

and searched other possible gang members. Over the course of the entire day, a sergeant 

noted, the officers may well have stopped some youths who were not gang members. But 

he warned, “Sometimes we don’t know if people are in gangs until we stop and talk to 

them...but what if we were weren’t there and someone was shot?” (Austin 1989). 

Response to Gangs: 1991 Through 1998 

By 1991, most of the public in Nevada and across the country recognized that Las 

Vegas had a major gang problem. In October, the New York Times featured Las Vegas as 

one of a select number of western cities with a major gang problem. In the first nine 

months of the year, gang homicides and 135 shootings had marked a new high in local 

violent gang crime. The commander of the gang unit at that time commented that the 

gang problem was unmanageable. In 1991, the unit had documented 5,000 local gang 

members, compared with only 1,500 in 1988. He voiced his concern that the gang 

problem might spread to The Strip, where it would affect the tourism industry (Cohen 

1991). 

Gang unit data showed that the gang problem in Las Vegas had continued to 

worsen throughout the 1990s. For example, between 1994 and 1996, the number of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 105 

documented gang members increased by 45 percent, and the number of gang homicides 

increased from 12 to 39. Many police officials attributed the growth to government 

housing developments having been torn down and residents having been relocated to 

homes and apartments across the city (a move that police had advocated for years). This, 

police officials argued, led to the spread of gangs into neighborhoods that had not 

previously had a gang problem. It also led to the creation of new gangs, an outcome that 

police had not anticipated. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s (1998) gang 

unit noted this trend in its 1997 annual report: 

Many of the Housing Authority communities, which had cultivated local 

gangs, have been closed for reconstruction spreading many of the gang 

members throughout the Las Vegas valley into small geographic areas. 

The result is that one gang may be seen in numerous areas throughout the 

valley. This also increases the gangs’ ability to recruit from a larger group 

of potential members. 

A Las Vegas sergeant further explained: 

It used to be, before I came up here, it used to be, okay, you had Gerson 

Park Kingdom and they lived in Gerson Park. And you had the Piru 

Bloods that lived off of 1701 J Street. And if they said a guy came by with 

a red bandana and shot so and so, you’d haul ass over to Piru turf and 

chances are, that car would come rolling in. But when they started redoing 

all the projects and everything, they had to put these people somewhere. 

What they did, they start placing them in apartments, throughout the city 

or in rental homes or HUD homes. And guess what? You just planted a 

cancer. Because that person is going to have influence on people around 

him and he’s gonna be playing up the gang shit, and his homies are going 

to come over and kick it with him. And pretty soon, you’ll be over there 

drinking forties with him and smoking a joint. The next thing you know, 

bingo, now you’ve got a little pocket of Piru Bloods over here and one 

over here and one over here and one over here, and then it just starts 

growing like a cancer through the community. Well, that’s happened over 

the last 5 years. Since I have been here, we’ve seen the demise of one, 

two, three, four, five, six – six project dwellings torn down and rebuilt. All 

those gangsters have been displaced all over through this community. 

Henderson, everywhere, North Town, all over. 

By 1995, gangs had begun to expand into neighborhoods surrounding the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 106 

University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV) – an area that until then had had few crime 

problems. Students began to be afraid to walk in their own neighborhoods, particularly at 

night. In 1997, problems in the area peaked as police recorded nine violent homicides 

during one 8-month period (Puit 1997). 

City leaders blamed one another for not controlling the ever-increasing gang 

problem. Some blamed lack of parental supervision; others argued that school busing was 

the cause; still others criticized the way police were trying to handle the situation (Las 

Vegas Review-Journal 1997, Oct. 9). An FBI agent and several Los Angeles police 

officials pointed the finger at the continuing migration of Los Angeles gang members to 

Las Vegas. The FBI estimated that after 1994, following passage of California’s three 

strikes law, at least 5,000 gang members had moved from Los Angeles to Las Vegas. A 

Las Vegas police crime analyst noted that casino robberies were being committed by 

gang members from Los Angeles. Over one 2-year period, seven casino robberies had 

taken place, and Los Angeles gang members were suspects in five of them (Cogan 1998.) 

Not everyone addressing the issue in the 1990s was convinced that Las Vegas had 

a substantial gang problem, however. Richard McCorkle and Terance Miethe (1998), 

researchers at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas, examined legislative records, 

media accounts, and official city crime data. They concluded that the police department 

had been grossly exaggerating the local gang problem to fuel an effort to acquire more 

resources and to repair a poor image. According to their findings, while police officials 

were publicizing the growing gang problem, the department was suffering considerable 

financial pressure exerted by community growth, and it was under public scrutiny 

following the filing of several police misconduct charges. Accordingly, the authors 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 107 

argued, police officials had decided to link national reports of a growing gang problem to 

public concerns about increasing crime rates in Las Vegas, all in an attempt to justify 

requests for additional resources and to divert attention away from internal problems. 

In 1995, a new sheriff was elected to office. He had run on a platform that placed 

combating the gang problem among his highest priorities. Immediately after election, he 

reorganized the police department’s gang unit, reconfiguring it and changing its name to 

the Gang Investigations Section (GIS). The GIS included four units: intelligence, 

investigations, enforcement, and a task force. The task force was staffed with GIS 

officers who were assigned to work with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

and the FBI to investigate high-level narcotics gangs. As part of the reorganization, GIS 

officers had their titles upgraded to detective, which gave them an eight percent pay 

differential and the potential for driving a take-home vehicle. 

In early 1997, just a few years after the creation of the Gang Investigation 

Section, Las Vegas gang control efforts encountered a major stumbling block. Two gang 

unit officers committed a drive-by shooting, and the FBI conducted an investigation. As a 

result, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 

other local black organizations asked the FBI to look into all drive-by shootings that had 

occurred in the past 5 years. A local African American church leader said that for years, 

gang members had been claiming that they were being blamed for shootings committed 

by the police (Hynes 1997). The FBI concluded that the shooting had been an isolated 

incident, taking place late at night after another officer’s birthday party. The two police 

officers had left the party drunk, with the intent of harassing gang members and drug 

dealers. Their so-called “playful harassment” had become violent when one of the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 108 

officers opened the side door of their van and shot six times into a crowd of young people 

on a street corner, killing one gang member. The officer driving the van turned himself in 

24 hours after the shooting (Hynes 1997). The officer that shot and killed the youth 

turned himself in 36 hours later. 

Following this shooting, the African American community became even more 

vocal in their criticism of the police, claiming that officers were routinely abusing 

African American residents. African American community leaders were outraged when 

they learned that the driver of the van would not be charged for his part in the crime, 

especially since the sheriff had previously stated that typically, everyone in any vehicle 

used for a drive-by shooting would be charged (Las Vegas Review-Journal 1997, Jan. 

19). The anger sparked by this incident was not limited to the African American 

community. Police officers had become frustrated with the overall situation, and were 

angry with the public for its concern for the dead gang member. One officer 

anonymously sent this message to the newspaper: 

Lately you wrote an article concerning Metro and the 18th Street gang 

member who was shot. I really don’t think that you have any idea of the 

nature of the gang he represented, and personally I thought your comments 

are not based on true justice and equality. 

Before you read anymore, I am not in position to reveal my name. It is not 

that I am cowardly, it is just that I am connected with this whole thing and 

my supervisors would not think highly of me to expose an “implied” 

conflict-of-interest regarding theories brought about by exposing my own 

personal opinion. 

As for the poor, stupid, innocent gang member, that has spread hatred, 

vandalism, crime, and murderous-intent-through-profit-motive-legacy of 

his organization, all that I can say is what goes around comes around...and 

THE only good gang member is a dead gang member (Smith 1997). 

The officer who shot the youth was sentenced to life in prison without parole. The officer 

driving the van was never charged, although during federal grand jury proceedings, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 109 

several department officers testified that they had overheard the driver discussing the idea 

of doing a drive-by shooting at least six times (Las Vegas Journal-Review 1998). 

Afterward, the gang unit kept a low profile for several months, although the gang 

problem continued to be considered serious by the public as well as by criminal justice 

policymakers. In a statewide survey, residents were asked about their current priorities 

for legislative spending. About 80 percent of those polled favored additional funding for 

combating juvenile gang crime, ranking the issue among Nevada’s top public priorities 

(Chereb 1999). Somewhat later, in response to mounting public concern, the sheriff 

announced that over the following 5 years, he would allocate another 60 detectives and 

officers to the Las Vegas gang unit, bringing the total number to 100 (Puit 1998). 

Phoenix, Arizona 

Phoenix police records indicated that the gang problem in that city dated back to 

the early 1900s. At that time, only a few gang members had been positively identified, 

and they were rarely involved in activities requiring police attention. From the 1940s 

through the 1960s, the number of gangs increased, primarily in small, exclusively 

Hispanic neighborhoods. These gangs adopted a street culture represented by unique 

styles of dress and graffiti. They were not responsible for a disproportionate amount of 

crime; therefore, police did not focus on gang members as a crime control effort. They 

believed at the time that gangs were restricted to the Hispanic community and did not 

exist among other ethnic groups (McCort 1994). 

Response to Gangs: 1970 Through 1983 

By the mid-1970s, gang activity had increased in Phoenix. Gang unit officials 

argued that the Los Angeles gang problem had found its way into the public’s awareness, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 110 

which in turn influenced Phoenix’s barrio culture and gang activity. The police also 

believed that a series of movies recently produced had glorified the gang lifestyle, 

aggravating the local gang problem. 

Gang unit documents from this period indicated that a number of Phoenix gangs 

were emerging, taking “names that gave them their own identity such as Wedgewood 

Chicanos, Westside Chicanos, Mini Park, Sherman Park, Southside and Happy Homes” 

(Phoenix Police Department 1998). Although police officials claimed that the Hispanic 

gangs were not accounting for a significant amount of crime, the gangs were becoming 

more frequently involved in thefts, burglaries, disturbing the peace, assaults, and some 

drug trafficking, primarily marijuana and heroin. Police emphasized, however, that 

Hispanic gangs placed greater value on territory and neighborhood than on making 

profits, and that much of their activity in the mid-1970s was still confined to Hispanic 

neighborhoods located in the central and southern parts of the city (McCort 1994). 

Then in the late 1970s, several Phoenix neighborhoods were redeveloped in order 

to expand Sky Harbor International Airport. Hispanic gang members were among those 

relocated to other areas of the city. A former gang unit commander noted that the 

relocation had had a long-term impact, as the gang culture became diffused, resulting in 

more gangs and gang members locating throughout Phoenix. Gangs and gang crime until 

then had been concentrated within a few neighborhoods; redistribution of the gang 

population caused new gangs to emerge in other parts of the city. As many relocated gang 

members were forced to move into other gangs’ territories, turf disputes and violence 

increased substantially. The problems were concentrated on the west side in an area 

known as Maryvale, a middle-class, suburban community. The increase in gang-related 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 111 

problems attracted media attention. 

In 1978, the police department created a juvenile prevention squad, funded by a 

federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant. The squad was placed within 

the Community Relations Bureau. Eight officers were assigned to it, including one 

sergeant. The squad was responsible for responding to community relations issues 

involving gangs and for collecting gang intelligence (McCort 1994). Officers who were 

in the unit at the time explained to us that they had attended gang parties, had gotten to 

know gang members, and generally had worked with them in a friendly way in order to 

collect intelligence. The officers wore plain clothes, did not wear vests, and rarely made 

arrests. At the time that the squad was created, the department estimated that 34 gangs 

were active in the city, of which 23 were Hispanic and nine were black (1994). 

A year later, the Phoenix police chief began a public awareness campaign 

highlighting the city’s gang problem. He asked Hispanic community leaders to become 

involved, arguing that the problem was essentially restricted to Mexican American 

neighborhoods, and that gang members were hard-core criminals whose parents were 

Mexican immigrants. He stated that the police department had recorded 50 to 75 gangs 

and 10 gang-related homicides in 1979. The chief’s presentations often included vivid 

descriptions of his perceptions of gangs. Following are some of his comments: 

Youth gangs move into a neighborhood and take over the neighborhood, 

robbing homes, terrorizing other young people, declaring wars on other 

gangs. 

Youth gang arsenals routinely include sawed-off shotguns and pistols. 

Teen-age gang members under 17 years of age have become hardened 

drinkers, obtaining beer in all-night convenience stores from clerks who 

refuse to check ages of buyers. 

The typical gang member is 16 years old and dropped out of school as a 

freshman or at the beginning of his sophomore year. The Hispanic mother 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 112 

has little help in keeping her kid in school (Arizona Republic 1980, Jun. 

18; 1981, Oct. 17). 

Perhaps in part because the chief was Mexican American himself and he had strong 

connections with the Mexican American community, his presentations were taken 

seriously by the public. 

Others in the department disagreed that the gang problem was serious at that time. 

A career sergeant in the gang unit insisted that Phoenix did not have gangs and gang 

members until the late 1980s, and that earlier, there probably had been little reason to 

create a unit that focused on gangs. He told us that gang unit officers had spent most of 

their time monitoring car clubs. 

Marjorie Zatz (1987), a local professor at Arizona State University, examined the 

police response to gangs in Phoenix, reviewing data obtained from social workers, media 

reports, and court records from 1981 through May 1983. She ultimately claimed that 

when the gang unit was created, Phoenix had not been facing a serious gang problem. 

Instead, she concluded, police officials had established the gang unit and constructed the 

gang problem in an effort to campaign for federal dollars. She argued that the police 

department, through the media, had effectively constructed a social image of gang 

members as dangerous, crime-prone Chicano youth who threatened the safety of the 

Anglo community. She further asserted that the police department had warned the public 

that the gang problem would escalate if police did not respond. According to Zatz, data 

obtained from court records and social service agents indicated that at the time, gang 

members were not actually posing a significant threat to the community, and that the 

police department’s claims of a serious gang problem were being grossly exaggerated for 

the purpose of obtaining additional organizational resources. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 113 

Response to Gangs: 1984 Through 1994 

In 1984, Phoenix police officers began to notice black gang members migrating 

from southern California. Police documents state that they were migrating from Los 

Angeles for the purpose of distributing crack cocaine. Police noted that gang members 

were being sent to the city to explore the demand for the drug and to assess the potential 

for profitability. After it had been determined that Phoenix was ripe for the distribution of 

crack cocaine, the gangs had sent part of their “nationwide syndicate” to establish control 

over the Phoenix drug market (McCort 1994). As other black gangs became aware that 

the city was open, they also began to migrate to Phoenix, expecting to make money from 

drug dealing, property crime, prostitution, and gambling. Many of the immigrant gangs 

influenced the formation of local Crip and Blood sets, even “taking the names of 

confirmed gangs in the Los Angeles area such as 74 Hoovers, Corner Pocket Crips, 

...Bounty Hunter Bloods, and Blood Stone Villains...” (Phoenix Police Department 

1998, 8). 

Police documents showed that the rise in gangs and gang members had resulted in 

a street culture in which gang members were free to sell drugs on the street, establish 

crack houses, and engage in high-level drug trafficking. Likewise, the police found that 

levels of violence associated with the street-level drug trafficking and associated turf 

disputes increased. As quoted in a local newspaper, a county attorney explained: 

More [gang members] are coming (in from California) because the price 

of cocaine has dropped in California and they can make more money 

here.... But conflicts arise as the best sales locations, such as east Roeser 

Road, are gobbled up and put off limits to rival members. When you first 

come to an area there is room for everyone, (but) as territory fills up, 

people start fighting. It used to be there was plenty of room to sell drugs. 

Now there isn’t (Rossmiller 1989, Apr. 17). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 114 

Police estimated that in 1987 and 1988, 30 gang homicides had taken place, most 

of them tied to the drug trade (Rossmiller 1989, Mar. 7). In the summer of 1988, at least 

one drive-by shooting occurred each week in Phoenix for 12 consecutive weeks. In April 

1989, a pair of drive-by shootings by Crip gang members killed one teenage girl and 

injured five other people. A series of news articles appeared, updating the condition of 

those wounded and discussing more broadly the nature of the gang problem. As part of 

the public discussion, the police estimated that approximately 3,000 Hispanic and 500 

black gang members were then living in the city (Winter and Walsh 1989). Although the 

Hispanic gangs had more members, police were now most concerned about black gangs, 

because of their greater involvement in violence and drug trafficking (Rossmiller 1989, 

Mar. 7). 

During the first three months of 1989, the trend toward greater gang violence 

continued with six gang homicides, fourteen drive-by shootings, and nine aggravated 

assaults. At the same time, the city was experiencing a dramatic increase in non-gangrelated violence (Schultz 1989, May 13). Some police managers told us that the gang 

problem in the city had gotten serious enough for the police chief in Los Angeles to warn 

Phoenix’s police chief that he had better stop denying the problem and start responding. 

One police manager explained: 

Prior to this time, we were in great denial, we were denying a gang 

problem, and that was the biggest fault that we had, is that we were 

denying it.... Rumor has it that the chief was told, our chief, which was 

Rueben Ortega at the time, by a California chief at the time, and I think it 

was Gates, and I am not sure, says, “Hey, you got a problem, and admit 

you have a problem, and get on it.” He goes, “We did the same thing you 

guys are doing. We were denying we got a problem, but we [had] a 

problem, and then when we finally accepted the problem, it was too big to 

handle, where you guys got a chance to jump on it and curtail it, handle it, 

whatever, if you jump on it now.” And I think that’s what happened. He 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 115 

did, and he says, “Hey, we have a street gang problem that’s mostly 

involving black gangs involved in crack cocaine distribution,” and he 

formed, officially, formed two night-time gang squads. 

Over the next 18 months, there was a flurry of official activity. The Speaker of the 

State House of Representatives created a committee to examine the scope and nature of 

Arizona’s gang problem. A Guardian Angels chapter was established in the city and 

began to patrol city streets (Flannery 1989). At about the same time, the police chief 

initiated several departmental responses. First, he requested additional funding from the 

city council to dedicate $48,500 a month to overtime pay in order to place another 24 

officers on patrol in the South and Maryvale precincts, the areas with the most gang and 

non-gang crime. Before the chief’s request was presented to the council, the mayor made 

a friendly amendment, asked that funding be approved to hire 23 new officers for 

assignment to those areas (Schultz 1989). Within less than a week, the city council had 

approved the request (Harold 1989). 

Second, the chief created a second gang squad staffed with one sergeant and five 

officers, assigning both squads to the Organized Crime Bureau. The change in 

organizational structure meant a change in the operational strategy of the two gang 

squads, now totaling two sergeants and twelve officers. Although the squads were still 

responsible for collecting gang intelligence, they were no longer to conduct community 

relations activities. Instead, the squads focused on directed enforcement, including the 

investigation of violent gang offenses in the South and Maryvale precincts. 

Third, the Organized Crime Bureau reassigned one of the unit’s sergeants and two 

of its detectives to a federal task force. The task force was responsible for suppressing 

gang activity in the Phoenix Metropolitan area, and it was mandated to identify gangs and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 116 

gang members involved in the most sophisticated criminal enterprises, targeting them for 

intensive investigations. A departmental spokesperson noted at the time that although all 

gangs would be monitored, the task force would concentrate its attention on black gangs 

involved in high-level drug trafficking. In addition to the assigned officers, the task force 

included agents from the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Services, and the Alcohol, 

Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau. 

Fourth and last, in 1990, the chief established the Operation Safe Streets program 

(chapter 5), which assigned school officers to the gang unit seasonally, during the 

summer months. The school officers carried out directed patrols in known gang hot-spots 

during the summer, when police believed that gang activity was greatest. 

Response to Gangs: 1991 Through 1999 

The Phoenix Police Department initiated a number of gang control efforts in 1989 

and 1990; still, gang violence increased (Phoenix Police Department 1998). Between 

1990 and 1994, the number of documented gangs and gang members doubled, and the 

number of gang homicides increased from 3 to 27. Police officials noted that in 1992, 

gang-related violence surpassed domestic violence as the leading cause of homicide in 

the city, and the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention included 

Phoenix in its list of the top ten cities with gang problems (Winton 1993). Meanwhile, the 

escalating gang problem in Phoenix had eroded the public’s confidence in the police and 

other public institutions. 

Early in 1990, in the middle of the day, gunshots were heard outside an 

elementary school. For their protection, students were locked in their classrooms for over 

an hour. The following day, 150 parents came to the school to protest conditions in their 

neighborhood. They complained that their children no longer wanted to come to school 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 117 

for fear of being threatened, harassed, and assaulted by gang members. Some parents 

threatened to withdraw their children until problems were solved. They felt entitled to 

additional police protection in the South Phoenix neighborhood, but they found police 

reluctant to provide more service in this poor section of the community. At the meeting, 

one parent’s comments received an outburst of applause when he stated, “If this 

happened on the north side, you would have had the SWAT team, the National Guard....” 

(Kwok 1990). 

Responding to the increasing gang activity and the consequent increasing pressure 

on local government, the city council passed two ordinances in 1993. The first prohibited 

juveniles from possessing firearms without written permission from a parent. Next, the 

juvenile curfew ordinance was revised to facilitate arrests of juveniles who were on the 

streets past curfew. To assist with processing truancy arrests, police worked with the 

parks and recreation department to establish three juvenile disposition centers, located at 

three recreation department facilities, staffed by police along with parks and recreation 

personnel. The disposition centers allowed officers to make arrests more quickly, 

reducing the paperwork required at county booking facilities. The curfew program had its 

critics. Some public officials from the recreation department told us that this program, 

initiated to take gang members off the streets, had cost about $600,000 a year to run; yet 

in its first 2 months, only 519 youths had been detained and just a few of them had been 

gang members (Rossmiller 1993). 

In 1993, the mayor proposed a 0.1 percent sales tax increase to put still more 

officers on the street. The mayor’s plan, dubbed Zero Tolerance for Gangs, called for the 

hiring of 200 new officers, 10 of whom would be allocated to a new gang squad. The 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 118 

proposal was estimated to cost about $2 million (Kwok 1993). The public voted to 

approve the tax increase, and within 2 months the city council had ordered the creation of 

another gang squad, staffed with one sergeant and nine officers. This brought the total 

number of squads to three, with one lieutenant, three sergeants, and 22 officers. 

With the addition of the new officers, the unit was reconfigured with four squads: 

1) daytime investigations, staffed with one sergeant and four detectives, responsible for 

taking case dispositions on all gang-related violent crime; 2) intelligence, staffed with 

one detective, one civilian analyst, and one administrative assistant; and 3) two night 

squads, each staffed with one sergeant and nine officers, responsible for gang 

enforcement. 

Although there was little public disagreement about the scope and nature of the 

city’s gang problem at this time, a report from an Arizona Department of Juvenile 

Corrections official asserted that the focus on gangs was primarily the consequence of 

politicians, police, and media capitalizing on public fear of gangs. The authors of the 

report had been careful not to explicitly state that the city had no gang problem, but they 

did argue that politicians were using the issue for election purposes, and that media and 

police frequently reported inaccurate information, claiming with little or no evidence that 

incidents were gang-related. Their report concluded that Phoenix gangs were being 

scapegoated, mainly because they were largely comprised of minority youth (Veloz and 

Spivak 1993). 

After 1994, the violence among gang members began to de-escalate. Instead, 

police officials stated, the police themselves became the target. In early 1995, gang 

members were reported to have shot at officers more than 20 times, injuring three 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 119 

officers, in an attempt to control six Phoenix neighborhoods. One commander told a local 

reporter, “We’ve seen a startling increase in officers being shot at.... We’ve seen an 

increase in gangs trying to set up ambushes against officers. They have had plans of 

action to draw an officer in to kill him. They haven’t succeeded yet, but we are afraid it’s 

just a matter of time” (Hermann 1995). Two weeks later, another officer was shot and 

wounded during an ambush by gang members. Afterward, the police confiscated three 

Molotov cocktails from individuals in the area (Villa 1995). 

The mayor proclaimed that he was willing to take any and all action necessary to 

curb the gang activity. He supported the chief’s decision to assign 100 officers to patrol 

the two-square-mile south central neighborhood nightly (Pitzl and Villa 1995). Police 

officials claimed that this crackdown was aimed at the 40 to 60 members of the Westside 

Crips who were responsible for the ambushes (Moeser et al. 1995). In less than 24 hours, 

the police had made 83 arrests in the area, mostly for weapons, drug charges, and for 

outstanding warrants, and many of those arrested were identified as gang members. The 

crackdown lasted for a little over 2 weeks (Steckner 1995). 

In spite of its success, the police action was subject to criticism. Many in the 

community believed that the attacks on the police had been in retaliation for the deaths of 

two black men who had been shot by police. One of the deceased youths, a 22-year-old 

Westside Crip member, had become a neighborhood martyr after being shot by 13 

officers firing 89 rounds, 30 of which struck him. Residents claimed that the boy had not 

been carrying a gun at the time that he was shot; police claimed that the youth had 

pointed a handgun at them (Wagner and Moeser 1995, Mar. 24, final ed.; Mar. 24, sec. 

B). Other residents, community leaders, and politicians had pointed out that the police 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 120 

shootings were the natural consequence of years of police harassment (Steckner and 

Moeser 1995). In particular, they had argued, police had been routinely stopping 

residents in the area for no apparent reasons. For example, they said area bicyclists were 

routinely stopped for trivial violations such as not having reflectors (Casey 1995). Many 

of the residents made statements in the newspaper similar to the following comment from 

a 20-year-old black male from the area: 

They don’t like nobody. You can walk across the street and they’ll try to 

stop you just for that. It’s like you don’t count. I think just because they’re 

pushing everybody, people are getting sick of it. You can be at the ice 

cream truck and they’ll flash their lights on and take a look at you. Then 

they’ll laugh about it—like they don’t have any rules just because they 

have a badge. They suck. (Wagner and Moeser 1995, Mar 24, final ed.). 

Six months after the 2-week crackdown, residents in the area were continuing to 

complain about police tactics. In particular, they complained to the city’s Human 

Relations Commission, a civil rights advisory group, about police use of discriminatory 

practices. Citizens argued that police were stereotyping all residents living in the area, 

treating them as criminals and gang members. The discussion prior to and during the 

meeting was so heated that one commissioner refused to attend, and another walked out 

during the meeting. The committee chair noted that the gulf between the police and the 

community was widening (Kwok 1995). 

As residents in the south central neighborhood continued to complain about their 

treatment in the name of gang control, the police department moved forward with a 

number of gang control initiatives. In 1995, the police department and county 

prosecutor’s office collaborated to create a repeat offender program to identify juvenile 

and adult gang members who were involved in frequent and serious crime. Upon arrest, 

individuals on the repeat offender list were handled by a special team of gang unit 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 121 

officers and were prosecuted by the ROP/Gang prosecutorial unit (Kossan 1995). 

In mid-1996, the police department received a $1 million grant from the Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to support gang control efforts in the 

city. The program allowed each precinct to develop its own gang reduction strategy using 

the SARA problem-solving model. The most common strategies included: 1) educating 

precinct residents about gangs, 2) conducting prevention activities with youth, 3) working 

with residents to collect gang intelligence, 4) increasing efforts to document gang 

members, 5) conducting directed patrols during periods of high gang activity, and 6) 

conducting demand-reduction operations (Fernandez 1997). 

Even with these efforts, however, Phoenix residents continued to demand that 

more resources be expended on the gang problem. In May 1996, the city conducted a 

community survey, randomly selecting and interviewing 703 residents. Respondents were 

asked to indicate whether they would or would not be willing to pay more to improve 

particular services. Programs to counter gang activities were found to be the highest 

public priority; 80 percent of the residents surveyed supported spending more for gang 

control efforts. Residents were also asked to rate (on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the 

highest) the city’s performance with regard to providing programs to counter gang 

activities. About 25 percent of the respondents rated the city at 1 to 4 (low), and 28 

percent gave ratings of 5 or 6 (moderate). Only 7 percent of those surveyed gave ratings 

of 9 or 10 (very high). The mean average rating, 5.4, was only slightly higher than the 5.2 

rating that the city had received in 1993 (Behavior Research Center Inc. 1996). 

In 1998, the police chief added another squad to the unit, for night enforcement in 

the northern part of the city. One officer who joined the squad at that time explained: 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 122 

I know when my squad came on that it was the citizens [who] were 

pushing for us...to work...the north zone...because...the other 2 or 3 

squads that were on at the time were so busy with the other 3 precincts [in] 

the south zone...that they rarely had [the] opportunity to go north to locate 

and find and document where these guys were living and whatever, to the 

point that they would go up there if there was...a shooting or a car load of 

gangbanger's were stopped and they needed to get documented, otherwise 

they never crossed north of Thomas. 

[Interviewer: Do you know who the major players were in arguing that 

another squad needed to be working up north?] I think it was the 

neighborhood associations. I don’t know exactly which one, but it was the 

neighborhood associations. In the past 3 to 6 years, the community-based 

policing with the city of Phoenix, has really taken a hold, and it’s given 

the citizens [a voice]...I think that the police department says, well, you 

know, we need to start going that direction. If that’s what the citizens 

want, then that’s what we’re going to do. 

Summary 

The histories of the police response to gangs in the cities that we studied were 

enormously complex. Single-factor explanations obscure that complexity, overlooking 

the the broader contexts within which the police responses to gangs developed. Our 

historical review and analysis revealed a variety of factors, some singular and some in 

combination, that shaped the police response to gangs in these cities. Each factor below 

was, to some degree, at work in all four sites, producing a gang response lifecycle. 

First, local gangs were an historical artifact that preceded the rise of the 

nationwide gang problem that took root in the 1980s and 1990s. All of the cities had had 

gang problems dating back at least to the 1960s; some had documented gangs dating back 

to the early 1900s. Before 1970, gangs in these communities were neighborhood oriented, 

with no affiliation with or attachment to other cities. It was generally acknowledged that 

gang behavior at this time was focused on issues of cultural and neighborhood identity. 

Although gang members occasionally engaged in violence, it typically remained inside 

the barrio, rarely involved anyone outside the gangs, and related to protecting turf and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 123 

reaffirming group or individual status. As such, there was little police focus on gangs, 

and when there was, the focus was limited to the collection of gang intelligence. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, all four cities had experienced an increase in gangs, gang 

members, and gang activity. With the exception of Inglewood, which bordered Los 

Angeles, police attributed the increases to the immigration of Los Angeles gang members 

into their cities. Generally, two explanations were given for the gang migrations. First, 

families from across the nation, including Los Angeles, were moving in ever-larger 

numbers to cities such as Albuquerque, Phoenix, and Las Vegas that offered 

employment and a better quality of life; along with local population increases came 

increases in the number of gang members and in gang activity. A second explanation 

posited that gang members migrated expressly for the purpose of selling drugs in these 

cities; gang members had engaged in market research and had learned that they could 

make greater profits away from Los Angeles. Supporters of both explanations agreed that 

gang violence had increased in each city along with increases in the numbers of gangs 

and gang members. 

In response, all of the police departments that we studied had consolidated gang 

control efforts and created small gang units. Although some agencies had already 

assigned staff to gang control, the creation of the designated gang units was intended to 

consolidate and focus resources and personnel on gangs, gang members, and gang crime. 

Each unit was mandated to carry out a “soft response.” The gang units were all made 

responsible for gang prevention efforts and/or for the collection of gang intelligence, but 

not (initially) for gang suppression activities. 

Even after the creation of police gang units, however, the gang problem in each 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 124 

city had continued to escalate, and gang violence had increased at a rapid pace. 

Additionally, each city had experienced a defining gang incident, crystallizing in the 

public mind the nature and magnitude of the gang problem. For example, in two of the 

cities, drive-by shootings left at least one innocent juvenile bystander dead and many 

others injured. In another city, a series of gang shootings occurred in a public setting, 

resulting in the deaths of several juvenile gang members. 

In all cases, the public responded with outrage and protests. Citizens, particularly 

from the minority community (typically the hardest hit by gang problems), gathered in 

public places to protest the violence. They met in public forums to voice their outrage to 

public officials, and they demanded that police respond to the gang problem with more 

resources, emphasizing suppression activities. They characterized inadequate responses 

as racist; some minorities claimed that if similar gang activity had been concentrated in 

white neighborhoods, the police would already have acted. More often than not, the 

public addressed their demands to elected officials, who in turn shaped the police 

response through the provision of resources. In three of the cities, public officials and 

citizens joined together to advocate for tax increases to fund gang control efforts. 

Police and city government officials also sponsored meetings with community 

leaders from businesses, churches, criminal justice agencies, and minority organizations 

to discuss the nature and scope of the problem. In a number of cities, local government 

leaders appointed groups that were commissioned to investigate the seriousness of the 

problem and to recommend responses. Media played a major role in defining the nature 

and scope of the cities’ gang problems. Journalists highlighted critical gang incidents, 

performed in-depth analyses of the cities’ gang problems, and commented on the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 125 

responses of criminal justice officials. As such, the media was pivotal in fostering 

dialogue about local gang problems and the official responses to those problems. 

Pressure placed on the police by citizens, public officials, and the media caused 

them to intensify their focus on gangs. All of the police departments studied had allocated 

more officers and funds to their gang units as gang problems had mounted. Increases in 

gang unit personnel were accompanied by changes in organizational strategy. In Phoenix, 

Albuquerque, and Las Vegas, the officers’ responsibilities were expanded to include gang 

suppression activities. In Inglewood, as the unit maintained its focus on intelligence, 

other units throughout the department were called upon to perform gang-related 

enforcement activities. Additionally, all of the agencies began to participate in multijurisdictional task forces, in one form or another, that focused on gangs. 

In three of the cities, the new emphasis on police suppression of gangs eventually 

gave rise to citizen claims that police were using excessive force. Residents made clear 

that although they wanted increased police protection, they did not want their children 

subjected to harsh physical treatment, and they themselves did not want to be 

unreasonably stopped and searched. However, as they were complaining about police 

harassment, the public continued to respond to signs of growing gang violence with 

demands that the police to do more to control the communities’ gang problems. 

A subsequent wave of gang violence and public outcry in each community had 

led lawmakers and police to respond to gangs still more severely. All of the police 

departments reacted with zero-tolerance law enforcement for gang members, and by 

initiating gang sweeps and saturating gang neighborhoods. City councils and state 

legislatures enacted ordinances and statutes addressing gang members and gang violence, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 126 

establishing juvenile curfews, prohibiting recruitment of gang members, and enacting 

more severe punishments for those convicted of gang crimes. 

We observed several other commonalities among the cities’ historical responses 

to gangs. As the gang problem had escalated in each community, police and lawmakers 

had responded more and more aggressively. Alternative or nontraditional approaches 

were rarely considered or implemented. In fact, the more serious the problem became, the 

more the community responded with intense, traditional crimefighting tactics. 

Interestingly, the police were not necessarily the primary advocates for suppressionoriented strategies; rather, the police department’s institutional environment had 

demanded the tactics. 

We also observed that the Los Angeles Police Department had had a profound 

effect on the police response to gangs in each city. Los Angeles police officials had 

publicly ridiculed some of the agencies for not being aggressive in responding to the gang 

problem. Los Angeles officials told local police leaders that they were making a mistake 

they would regret if they did not employ suppression-oriented tactics. Local police 

acknowledged that they were strongly influenced by the equipment, crime analysis 

techniques, strategies, and tactics that the Los Angeles Police Department used to 

respond to gangs. 

In each of the cities, the gang problem had worsened dramatically after gang 

members had been geographically displaced from their former neighborhoods. For 

example, in Las Vegas the gang problem spread after the gang unit successfully 

advocated for a public housing development to be demolished. Families deeply 

entrenched in the gang lifestyle were relocated all across Las Vegas, in effect distributing 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 127 

gangs and gang activity throughout the city. In Phoenix, a similar phenomenon occurred 

after the city reclaimed land from several adjacent neighborhoods in order to build an 

airport. Many families were displaced, and along with them, the neighborhoods’ gang 

members relocated across the city. Gang problems spread and intensified accordingly. 

Last, we found that as the gang problem escalated in each city, the public had 

consistently requested allocation of more funding for managing the problem. Of course, 

each agency that we studied had a finite budget and number of personnel, and they were 

unable to respond to the gang problem to the degree that the public demanded. Citizens 

and public officials successfully lobbied for tax propositions and bills for the select 

purpose of increasing the capacity to combat gangs, which in turn led to the creation of 

new and expanded police gang unit squads. In some communities, public officials 

successfully ran for office on the promise that they would respond to the gang problem 

with additional resources. We were interested to find that much of the increased funding 

for gang control efforts had come from local communities. Police departments received 

federal assistance only after they had committed considerable state and local money and 

personnel to the problem. 

Historically, then, we found that the four cities that were the objects of our study 

had traveled similar paths in the development of their gang problems, and had responded 

similarly in their initial attempts to control their problems. As we turned our attention to 

the current situation, we continued to observe similarities, but we found a number of 

distinctions among the cities, as well. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 128 

Chapter 4. Scope and Nature of the Current Gang Problem in 

Four Cities 

There is nothing more insidious than these gangs. They are worse than the 

Mafia. Show me a year in New York where the Mafia indiscriminately 

killed 300 people. You can’t. 

– Police Chief William Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department 

(Arizona Republic 2002). 

We examined the gang problems of the four study sites by analyzing official 

police gang data collected by the four police departments. In particular, we focus on 

recent trends in the numbers of gangs, gang members, and gang crimes in each city. We 

augmented this with interview data obtained from gang unit officers. The interview data 

is intended to provide context for quantitative data and to help examine whether the 

officers’ perceptions of their local gang problems are congruent with the objective threat 

posed by gangs, as represented by the gang units’ own data. Next, we used data from the 

National Youth Gang Center (NYGC) to compare the annual numbers of gangs, gang 

members, and gang homicides in each sample city. NYGC has collected gang data from 

all large U.S. police and sheriff’s departments since 1993 (with the exception of 1994). 

Note that when we refer to the “current” or “objective” gang problem in each city, 

our understanding of that is based on and limited by information provided by the police 

departments. Although we attempted to gather official police data from each department 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 129 

dating back 10 years or more for an examination of recent trends in gangs, gang 

members, and gang crime, many agencies had not collected this data or had not retained 

it. Some of the agencies were able to provide information for all 10 years, but others were 

able to provide only one year’s worth of data, and still others could provide official data 

only on some issues and for intermittent periods. 

Inglewood 

Inglewood Police Department’s gang information system indicated that in 1999, 

7,191 gang members and 31 “permanent” gangs were located in the city (exhibit 4.02). 

As such, about 6.4 percent of the city’s residents were documented as gang members. 

Data obtained from CALGANG, California’s gang information system, indicated that 

most gang members in Inglewood belonged to one of the city’s eight major gangs 

(exhibit 4.01). 

Exhibit 4.01 Inglewood’s eight largest gangs (1999) 

Gang Members 

(#) 

Primary ethnicity Affiliation 

Black P Stone 716 African American Bloods 

Crinshaw Mafia Gangsters 403 African American Bloods 

Inglewood Family 499 African American Bloods 

Inglewood 13 428 Hispanic Latin 

Lennox 13 1487 Hispanic Latin 

Raymond Ave. Crips 549 African American Crips 

Rollin 60s 1165 African American Crips 

Tepus 415 Hispanic Latin 

Inglewood gangs were geographically dispersed; almost all neighborhoods were 

claimed by at least one gang. A gang unit officer explained, “We have so many bad areas, 

whoever complains the most gets the treatment. The squeaky wheel gets the grease.” In 

general, Blood gangs such as Black P Stone, Crinshaw Mafia Gangsters, and Inglewood 

Family were in the northern half of the city, and Hispanic gangs, such as Lennox 13 and 

Inglewood 13, claimed turf in the southwestern area. Crenshaw Boulevard, located in the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 130 

southeastern corner of Inglewood, was claimed by Crip, Blood, and Latino gangs, 

resulting in a number of conflicts between the gangs. 

Documented Gang Crime 

Gang unit data were used to assess the magnitude of the gang problem from 1989 

through 1998. Gang members had been responsible for a substantial amount of the city’s 

violence and crime over the past 10 years (exhibit 4.02). 

Exhibit 4.02 Annual statistics: Gang-related crimes in Inglewood (1989-1998) 

Crime 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 

Homicide 

Gang- related 

incidents 

23 33 27 31 25 32 22 16 13 20 

Total incidents 45 55 48 37 44 46 41 28 24 35 

Gang- related (%) 51.1 60.0 56.3 83.8 56.8 69.6 53.7 57.1 54.2 57.1 

Felony assault 

Gang- related 

incidents 

259 329 377 339 275 253 232 249 216 166 

Total incidents 903 917 1063 1122 858 832 814 902 810 738 

Gang- related (%) 28.7 35.9 35.5 30.2 32.1 30.4 28.5 27.6 26.7 22.5 

Rape or attempted rape 

Gang- related 

incidents 

11 33 28 23 17 13 23 19 11 18 

Total incidents 69 103 69 65 68 47 60 61 61 33 

Gang- related (%) 15.9 32.0 40.6 35.4 25.0 27.7 38.3 31.1 18.0 54.5 

Robbery 

Gang- related 

incidents 

210 485 601 444 244 264 316 286 223 147 

Total incidents 1121 1488 1542 1342 1329 1071 1006 952 735 682 

Gang- related (%) 18.7 32.6 39.0 33.1 18.4 24.6 31.4 30.0 30.3 21.6 

Burglary 

Gang- related 

incidents 

8 49 87 75 51 49 69 71 53 31 

Total incidents 1672 1866 1998 1925 1561 1230 1096 1079 1088 941 

Gang- related (%) 0.5 2.6 4.4 3.9 3.3 4.0 6.3 6.6 4.9 3.3 

Street terrorism 

Gang- related 

incidents 

0 1 0 6 6 12 16 19 17 18 

Shootings - inhabited buildings 

Gang- related 

incidents 

54 40 45 37 51 38 31 24 23 23 

Documented gangs na na na na na na 31 31 31 31 

Documented gang 

members 

na na na na na na na na na 7191 

For example, 51 to 84 percent of homicides involved at least one gang member. 

Likewise, about 20 to 40 percent of felony assaults, rapes, and robberies were gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 131 

related. The data also indicated that about 3 to 6 percent of all burglaries were gang 

related. Recently, however, there had been only about 23 drive-by shootings annually. 

We examined the mean change in gang-related activity in Inglewood, comparing the 

average number of offenses from 1989 through 1993 with offences committed from 1994 

through 1998. The overall number of burglaries had fallen, but gang members were 

increasingly involved in them (exhibit 4.03). Conversely, the overall number of felony 

assaults had increased over the 10-year period by 6.3 percent, but gang members were 

less likely to be involved. Drive-by shootings had decreased by 40 percent between the 

two periods. Interestingly, the numbers of gang and non-gang homicides, rapes, and 

robberies had declined substantially, but the proportion of gang members involved in 

these offenses had not changed. 

Exhibit 4.03 Mean change in Inglewood gang activity 

1989-93 1994-98 Percent 

average average 

Homicide Gang-related incidents 

Total incidents 

Gang-related (%) 

Felony assault Gang-related incidents 

Total incidents 

Gang-related (%) 

Rape or attempted Gang-related incidents 

rape 

change 

139 103 -25.9 

229 174 -24.0 

60.7 59.2 -2.5 

1579 1116 -29.3 

3853 4096 6.3 

41.0 27.2 -33.7 

112 84 -25.0 

Total incidents 

Gang-related (%) 

Robbery Gang-related incidents 

Total incidents 

Gang-related (%) 

Burglary Gang-related incidents 

378 26.2 -30.7 

30.2 32.1 6.3 

1984 1236 -37.7 

6822 4446 -34.8 

29.1 27.8 -4.5 

270 273 1.1 

) 3.0 5.0 

Total incidents 9022 5434 -39.8 

Gang-related (% 66.7 

Street terrorism Gang-related incidents 13 82 530.8 

Shooting - inhabited Gang-related Incidents 227 139 -38.8 

building 

Perceptions of the Gang Problem 

The Inglewood gang unit officers all agreed that the city was facing a “major” 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 132 

gang problem. The officers were asked to describe the kinds of problems associated with 

Inglewood gang members and to estimate the percentage of total crime committed by 

them. All three officers stated that gang members were involved in everything. As one 

officer stated, “[Gangs are involved in] everything from petty theft to murder and 

everything in between.” Another officer reiterated that gangs were involved in “every 

kind of problem you can think of. I think they create terror for the community.” 

Asked to estimate the percentage of all crime committed by local gang members, 

officers’ estimates ranged from 75 to 86 percent. Although they all agreed that gang 

members committed the majority of crimes, two of the three officers argued that gang 

activity had become less violent over the past few years. The two disagreed, however, 

about the reason for the de-escalation. One believed that a prison-based gang had called 

for an end to violence, because it was having an impact on street-level drug trafficking. 

I would say [gang-related crime has become] less violent, but that can 

change at any time. What I mean by that is any little feud can spark up a 

war with a rival gang. We have had several homicides... [Interviewer: 

Why less violent recently?] For the Hispanic gangs in particular, the 

Mexican Mafia had something to do with that. What they did was, they 

basically monopolized all of the Hispanic gangs. They wanted to get a 

share of the revenue from the drug sales in the streets, and at the same 

time, they got some kind of a truce among Hispanic gangs in Southern 

California. They said that they would put on a green light...on any gang 

who would not comply with the Mexican Mafia’s orders. Since then, 

crime, gang-related crime, gang-related shooting around Hispanic gangs, 

stopped for a while. Then several gangs rebelled against them, and we 

went back to the old days. But they still seem to keep a little lid on it. 

The other officer suggested that new legislation directed toward gang members 

and career criminals was deterring gang members from engaging in violence. 

That’s a hard question. I don’t want to say they are less violent, but they 

are using high-powered rifles and sophisticated weapons, but crime has 

gone down, murders have gone down in the county of Los Angeles. But 

when they do get violent, it is violent... [Interviewer: What has the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 133 

reduction in crime been caused by?] I think they think twice with gang 

enhancement laws, three strike laws, so I think they think twice about 

doing a crime, but then the volatile portion comes when they do decide to 

do it, they know there are three strike laws.... 

The most veteran gang unit officer disagreed with the other two: 

[There has been] less street activity..., but it [has] become more violent. 

Because now we have gang members walking up on our other gang 

members, where they used to shoot from a car and hit you. It would 

usually be a non-life threatening wound. Now they come up, walk behind 

you, and shoot you in the head, so now it is more violent crime. 

The officers agreed that Inglewood gangs were not organizationally sophisticated. 

They emphasized that unlike organized crime groups, their street gangs did lacked the 

capacity for structured behavior and the ability to maintain a leadership hierarchy. 

Instead, officers believed, most gang members engaged in opportunistic crime with little 

centralized planning or direction. One officer explained, “They just, well, they really 

don’t have a common purpose. They have their own thing. Some want to sell dope, some 

want to do robberies, some want – they just pretty much do their own thing. Except when 

it comes to one of their rivals being shot, when they want to retaliate.” Another stated: 

Well, we don’t have any organized crime gangs. Organized crime gangs– 

we are talking about motorcycle gangs, I am talking about sophisticated 

gangs. Our gangs, like I said, are really– we have a few that will try to get 

organized, and they do move on and get into bigger and better things. 

That’s only a minimal amount of our gang members. Like I said, our gang 

members are street gangs. And they are terrorists, and they are robbers, 

and they are rapists, and they are murderers. They are opportunists, and 

that is, like I said, they are disorganized crime. 

It is interesting to note that the gang unit officers and police managers rarely 

mentioned any relationship between gangs and drug trafficking. Although officers 

discussed particular gang members and their involvement with street-level drug 

distribution, there were very few discussions about particular gangs that were involved in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 134 

more organized drug sales. The only exception was the Mexican Mafia, a prison gang 

that the police believed had close connections with street gang members for the purpose 

of drug distribution. 

Albuquerque 

In 1999, the Albuquerque Police Department’s GREAT system showed that there 

were 5,647 documented gang members in the city (exhibit 4.04). This represented a 25 

percent decline when compared with the number of gang members documented in 1998. 

Police officials explained that the apparent decline was actually the result of the gang unit 

having updated the department’s gang database, purging a large number of inactive gang 

members from the system. Also in 1999, the gang intelligence system showed that 

roughly 90 percent of Albuquerque’s documented gang members were male, while 10 

percent were female. These figures are similar to those from other police agencies across 

the country, both large and small, that show that nine out of every ten gang members 

recognized by the police are male. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 135 

Exhibit 4.04 Albuquerque gang demographics (1998, 1999) 

1998 1999 

Number of gang members 7535 5647 

Gender (%) Male 88.9 

Female 11.0 

Unknown 0.1 

Ethnicity (%) Hispanic 81.4 

Black 8.5 

White 7.6 

Native American 1.3 

Asian 0.6 

Unknown/other 0.6 

Age (%) 14 and under 0.6 

15-17 9.9 

18-24 64.8 

25-35 21.8 

36 and over 2.0 

Unknown 0.9 

Street gangs (#) 260 

Primary Hispanic 35 

ethnicity of Black 23 

gang (%) White 10 

Asian 1 

Multi-race 31 

Gang unit records showed that few documented gang members were under 18 

years old (10.5 percent) or over 36 years old (2.9 percent) (exhibit 4.04). Rather, the 

majority of gang members were between the ages of 18 and 24 years (64.8 percent), 

followed by those between 25 and 35 years old (21.8 percent). These findings are similar 

to those of Spergel and Curry (1990), Chesney-Lind et al. (1994), and C. Katz (1997), in 

that the majority of documented gang members were young adults rather than juveniles. 

In terms of ethnicity, 81.4 percent of documented gang members were Hispanic, 

8.5 percent were black, 7.6 percent were white, 1.3 percent were Native American, 0.6 

percent were Asian, and 0.6 percent were of another ethnic group or mix (exhibit 4.04). 

These figures illustrated that minorities were over-represented among documented gang 

members, when compared with their numbers in the general population. For example, 

Hispanics represented about 40 percent of Albuquerque’s population, but they 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 136 

represented more than 80 percent of documented gang members. Likewise, blacks 

comprised only 3 percent of the city’s population, but represented 8.5 percent of all 

documented gang members, while whites, who made up approximately 71 percent of the 

residents in Albuquerque, represented only 7.6 percent of documented gang members. 

In 1998, Albuquerque’s gang unit identified 260 local gangs. According to the 

unit, 35 percent were comprised primarily of Hispanic members, 23 percent primarily of 

black gang members, 10 percent primarily of white gang members, 1 percent primarily of 

Asian gang members, and 31 percent of the gangs were comprised of members from 

different ethnic backgrounds (exhibit 4.04). 

Of the 260 gangs, 15 were considered significantly more influential and/or 

dangerous than the others. The majority of influential gangs were comprised of Hispanic 

gang members; all but two had more than 100 members. Furthermore, all of the 

influential gangs were believed by the police to be involved in drug trafficking and 

violence. 

Exhibit 4.05 Albuquerque’s fifteen most influential/dangerous gangs (1998) 

Gang Members (#) Primary ethnicity Criminal activity 

Brewtown 113 Hispanic Drug trafficking and violence 

Rollers Only 7 Hispanic Drug trafficking, violence, and auto theft 

Barelas 254 Hispanic Heroin sales, auto theft, and armed robbery 

San Jose 895 Hispanic Heroin and crack sales and violence 

Los Padillas 163 Hispanic Crack cocaine trafficking 

18th Street 605 Hispanic Narcotics trafficking and violence 

14th Street 191 Hispanic Narcotics trafficking and violence 

Surenos 407 Hispanic Drug trafficking, carjackings, violence 

Duranes 151 Hispanic Narcotics trafficking and violence 

Los Carnales Locos 88 Hispanic Narcotics trafficking and violence 

South Side Locos 261 Hispanic Narcotics trafficking and violence 

Westgate Locos 414 Hispanic Drug trafficking, auto theft, and violence 

Uptown Kings 116 Hispanic Narcotics trafficking and violence 

Crips 165 Black Narcotics trafficking and violence 

Bloods 127 Black Narcotics trafficking and violence 

Albuquerque Police Department (1998), Gang Status Report for Albuquerque, NM. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 137 

Documented Gang Crime 

Unfortunately, the Albuquerque Police Department had never formally tracked 

the number of crimes committed by documented gang members. When we asked police 

administrators, managers, and officers why no data were collected on gang crime, all of 

them referred to the amount of time that it would take to collect the information. Some of 

those closely involved in managing the gang unit also claimed that people within the 

department could not agree on a definition of gang crime. The gang unit’s sergeant 

believed that they should use a “gang-related” definition, by which if either the offender 

or victim was a documented gang member, the incident would be recorded as a gang 

crime. The police chief believed that the sergeant’s method would portrayal the city’s 

gang problem inaccurately, giving the impression that the gang problem was more 

serious than it actually was. Instead, he wanted to use a “motive-based” definition, by 

which if a crime was committed for the furtherance of a gang, the incident would be 

recorded as a gang crime. Given the amount of time that data collection might take, and 

the disagreement about how to collect the data, it was simply easier for the unit not to 

collect the information. 

Perceptions of the Gang Problem 

Seven of the eight gang unit officers in Albuquerque believed that the city had a 

major gang problem. Asked to describe the types of problems that gang members caused, 

most officers gave general descriptions such as, “They are involved in everything.” A 

number of them specified violence, drug trafficking, and property offenses. For example, 

one officer stated: 

Pretty much anything from drive-by shootings to burglaries to drug-related 

problems to...you name the type of crime. Probably right now it’s become 

more drug-related. I think it’s financially more beneficial for them to be 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 138 

involved in anything that’s drug-related. I think they’ve gone away from 

just, what we call the “stupid crimes,” the drive-by shootings just for no 

reason. There’s a purpose for everything they do now and we’re aware of 

that. We see gang members that’s walking around with thousands of 

dollars on them, Rolexes, nice clothes, nice cars. Now I think it’s a profit, 

it’s a business, that’s what it is. 

Another officer agreed, saying, “Everything you can think of. Homicides, drug 

trafficking, drive-by shootings, beatings, robberies, burglaries, and any crime you can 

think of, they do.” Still another responded, “Everything. Everything that you can think of, 

but I think the biggest problem is drugs.” 

Estimating the percentage of total crime that the officers believed was committed 

by gang members, half of the officers estimated that gangs accounted for about 70 

percent of the crime in the city, and a quarter of the officers believed that about 30 to 55 

percent of the crime was caused by gang members. Six of the eight gang unit officers 

believed that gang activity had become more violent in recent years. Most officers who 

believed this attributed the problem to the availability of guns. One officer explained, 

“More violent, because the crimes that they are committing with weapons, instead of 

using a Saturday Night Special, they are using automatic weapons, assault rifles, and that 

type of stuff.” 

Another officer stated, “In recent years, it has been more [violent]. Everybody’s 

got guns.” The sergeant leading the gang unit agreed that the amount of gang violence 

attributed to gangs was high, depending on the type of gang violence, but pointed out that 

the department’s administration did not agree with his view. He explained: 

The crime stats seem to be down as far as drive-by shootings and things 

like that, but our gang homicides are up. Geez, anywhere from three to 

five drive-by shootings a week. And our homicides are running probably– 

the chief would probably tell you like seven percent. I would probably tell 

you 40 to 50 percent, at least, if not higher. At a certain part of this year, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 139 

nine out of ten homicides were, maybe not gang-motivated, but a gang 

member was involved. 

Two other officers disagreed. They maintained that gang violence had remained about the 

same in recent years. One stated, “I would say, about the same. It’s just changed. The 

sophistication level is different.” Another stated: 

Violence-wise, I think it has stayed probably the same. I don’t see it 

becoming more violent. The reason being, is because I think that they have 

slowed down on their drive-bys, so that it doesn’t draw attention to the 

neighborhoods, so they can be involved in more monetary crimes. See, if 

you are doing the drive-bys and the shootings, then you would draw more 

attention to that neighborhood. If you don’t do them – but then I don’t see 

a real large decrease, but I don’t see an increase. 

When we asked the officers whether they thought that Albuquerque gangs were 

highly organized or loosely knit, five officers stated that there were both highly organized 

and loosely organized gangs in the city. For example, one officer explained: 

...We have highly organized street gangs that even when they are in 

prison, formulate themselves into prison gangs, San Jose and Pirellis. 

They are probably involved in most of the drug transactions in 

Albuquerque and throughout the state of New Mexico. And we have 

loose-knit ones. It depends on where you are at. The little kids seem to be 

loose-knit. As they get older, they commit more crimes, and become more 

career criminal type. They tend to migrate toward the organization of most 

of our big, multi-generational street gangs that have been around forever. 

They can’t make a living anywhere else, because they are so tattooed up 

and their records are so bad. So they migrate towards that innerorganization of that street gang. [Interviewer: And are those the ones that 

you would consider the hard-core?] Yeah. 

Another officer stated: 

I don’t think they’re that highly organized. I think there’s specific ones 

like the real hard-core ones who are into hard drug trafficking or chop 

shops or something like that, I’d say they’re fairly organized. But most 

cases are not. Because you can have a gang in the Southeast and a gang in 

the valley who don’t even like each other. They fight all the time and 

they’re supposed to be the same gang. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 140 

Still another explained, “Depending on the gang that you’re looking at, and this is a 

rumor with no names, but there’s known gang members that are in fact in our state 

government for a certain gang. So they’re pretty organized.” 

Only one officer argued that the Albuquerque gangs were highly organized. He 

explained, “I think they are organized, I wouldn’t say like a mafia organization, but they 

are well organized. They do sell drugs, steal cars, for example, so they are well 

organized.” Another officer maintained that the gangs were semi-organized: “They are 

becoming – the word I would use is semi-organized. I want to say that they used to be 

somewhat of a loose-knit group. They were never organized such as your syndicate or 

mafia, but they’re kind of like in between. That is what we are starting to see.” 

Officers in the unit were somewhat inconsistent in how they categorized the 

organizational sophistication of gangs in the city, but they seemed to agree that some 

gangs were involved in higher levels of criminal activity than others. Almost none of the 

officers thought that gang members had formal organizational roles; they equated the 

organizational sophistication of the gangs with high levels of criminal activity. 

Las Vegas 

In 1994, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Gang Unit began 

collecting data pertaining to gangs, gang members, and gang crime. The number of gangs 

in Las Vegas had increased substantially from 119 in 1994, to 164 in 1999 (exhibit 4.06). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 141 

Exhibit 4.06 Las Vegas gangs and gang members (1994 through 1999) 

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

Gangs 119 146 159 167 179 164 

Gang members 3508 4263 5098 5805 6232 6608 

Gang associates 1387 1623 2051 2343 2580 2774 

Gang member ethnicity (%) 

Hispanic 34 39 41 42 43 na 

Black 40 37 35 35 34 na 

White 17 17 16 16 15 na 

Asian 8 7 6 6 6 na 

Other 1 0 0 0 1 na 

Gang member and associate ages (%) 

Under 13 1 

13-15 8 

16-17 18 

18-21 41 

22-24 19 

25 and older 13 

0 1 1 1 na 

7 6 4 2 na 

17 14 11 8 na 

43 41 40 37 na 

19 21 23 26 na 

14 17 21 26 na 

Data from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Gang Unit - Annual Reports, 1994 through 1998. 

Likewise, the number of gang members and associates increased almost twofold over that 

period. Specifically, the number of documented gang members increased from 3,508 in 

1994, to 6,608 in 1999, and the number of individuals associated with gang members, but 

not documented, increased from 1,387 to 2,774. 

As of 1998, most documented gang members in the city were Hispanic (43 

percent), followed by blacks (34 percent), whites (15 percent), Asians (6 percent), and 

others (1 percent). Examining the ethnicity of gang members over the 5-year period from 

1994 through 1998 showed that gang members had been increasingly coming from the 

Hispanic community, while the proportion of black gang members had substantially 

declined. The data showed no change in the proportion of gang members who were 

white, Asian, or other. 

The gang unit’s files also provided information on the ages of gang members and 

their associates. In 1998, only about 1 percent of documented gang members were under 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 142 

13 years of age, while 2 percent were between 13 and 15, 8 percent were between 16 and 

17, 37 percent were between 18 and 21, 26 percent were between 22 and 24, and 26 

percent were 25 or older. In other words, almost 90 percent of the documented gang 

members and their associates in Las Vegas were adults. It appeared, however, that this 

was a new trend. As recently as 1994, almost one-third of gang members had been 

juveniles. This finding was contrary to much of the literature, which suggests that a 

defining characteristic of emerging gang cities is that their gangs are largely comprised of 

juveniles (Spergel et al. 1994). This suggested that the gang problem in Las Vegas was 

far more serious and chronic than one might have expected, considering that the city had 

only relatively recently developed its gang problem. 

According to the gang unit’s database, there were 11 gangs in Las Vegas with at 

least 200 members; six were comprised primarily of Hispanic gang members and five 

primarily of black gang members (exhibit 4.07). Black gangs in Las Vegas typically 

claimed territory in the western part of the city and lived in public housing complexes. 

Police officials claimed that the black gangs were responsible for a disproportionate 

amount of street-level drug sales, particularly marijuana and crack cocaine. Hispanic 

gang members, located primarily in the eastern half of the city, were not as concentrated 

within the city as were black gang members. Police officials stated that although Hispanic 

gang members were involved in street-level drug trafficking, the majority of their 

criminal activity involved conflicts with other gangs that had claimed nearby territory. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 143 

Exhibit 4.07 Las Vegas’s eleven largest gangs (1998) 

Gang Members (#) Primary ethnicity 

18th Street 508 Hispanic 

28th Street 745 Hispanic 

Lil Locos 357 Hispanic 

Santana Chuco 776 Hispanic 

Varrio Naked City 240 Hispanic 

White Fence 207 Hispanic 

Donna Street Crips 279 Black 

Gerson Park Kingsmen 559 Black 

Piru Bloods 213 Black 

Rollin 60s 352 Black 

West Coast Bloods 267 Black 

1997 Annual Report: Gang Investigations Section 

Documented Gang Crime 

Exhibit 4.08 shows the kind of gang activity that was tracked in Las Vegas 

between 1994 and 1998. In 1998, the police department collected data on 196 drive-by 

shootings, 66 drive-by shooting victims, 27 non-drive-by shooting victims, and 22 gang 

members who had been killed. Of the 22 gang members who had been killed, 19 died in 

homicides, one died from suicide, and two died in another manner (e.g., natural death, 

traffic accident, etc.) The exhibit also shows that 526 gang-related felonies occurred and 

203 guns were recovered from gang members in 1998. 

Exhibit 4.08 Gang activity in Las Vegas – 1994 through 1998 

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 

Drive-by shootings* 433 527 327 276 196 

Drive-by shooting victims* Unk 119 140 93 66 

Shooting victims, other* Unk Unk Unk 77 27 

Dead gang members* 20 24 45 35 22 

Homicides 12 18 39 32 19 

Suicides 7 6 3 3 1 

Other 1 0 3 0 2 

Gang-related felonies** Unk 433 291 529 526 

Guns recovered from gang members** Unk 246 145 283 203 

* Data from Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Gang Unit Annual Reports, 1994 through 1998. 

** Data from an unpublished report provided by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Gang Unit. 

When we examined trends in gang activity over the past 5 years, the analysis 

illustrated that some gang-related activity had decreased substantially. In particular, the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 144 

number of drive-by shootings, and the number of victims injured from drive-by 

shootings, had decreased by about 50 percent over this period. On the other hand, the data 

showed that although the number of gang homicides had decreased from a peak in 1996, 

the number of gang homicides in 1998 was still higher than in 1994 and 1995. In 

addition, the number of documented gang-related felonies had increased and the number 

of guns recovered from gang members had been fairly uneven, increasing and decreasing 

from one year to the next. 

Perceptions of the Gang Problem 

As in Inglewood and Albuquerque, Las Vegas gang unit officers were asked to 

characterize the state of the current gang problem as major, moderate, or minor. Of the 31 

officers questioned, 45 percent (n=14) believed that the city had a major gang problem 

and 55 percent (n=17) believed that the city had a moderate gang problem. A number of 

the officers who believed that the city had a moderate gang problem compared the 

problem in Las Vegas with their perception of the problem in Los Angeles. Most of the 

officers’ comments were similar to the following examples: 

In Las Vegas, I would say that they’re a moderate problem compared to 

others [like] Los Angeles. I truly think that we’ve pretty much kept a 

pretty good thumb on the gangsters. We know what they are doing and we 

put a pretty good thumb on them. I don’t think it’s got out of control. A 

major problem would be out of control where you just have rampant 

robbing and murdering, and cops don’t go into the neighborhood because 

they are getting shot at and beat up. So I think we have pretty much a 

handle on it, because when we find out what is going on in an area, we 

take our guys and we go in there and take care of the problem through 

enforcement or task force or whatever. We’ve done that a bunch of times, 

and I think it’s working pretty good. 

At this stage, in Las Vegas, I would say [the gang problems are] moderate, 

and within 10 years, they’ll be major. We’ll be a little Los Angeles. 

I would say – I would not classify us – we do not have a major gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 145 

problem because we do not let it get out of control. Los Angeles, they 

have a major problem...the gangs run that city. But as far as us, we are a 

tourist city and we cannot afford to let gangs get control here so we are 

very, very strict. I’d say it’s a moderate problem. 

Many of the officers who claimed that the city had a major gang problem implied 

that the problem could not be thought of in any other way. They were adamant that if a 

person were to think of the problem as less than “major,” it would be tantamount to 

letting one’s guard down, which might result in a more serious gang problem for the city. 

One gang unit officer stated, “I’m going to say ‘major,’ because if you take it too lightly, 

you can get overwhelmed. You as a department or a city can become overwhelmed by the 

problem if you take it too lightly.” Another officer concurred: “I want to say ‘major,’ 

because we want our community not to be overrun with gang members.” 

Whether officers believed that the Las Vegas gang problem was of major or 

moderate magnitude, most believed that the problem was the result of gang migrations to 

the area. The officers recognized that Las Vegas did have some indigenous gangs with a 

longstanding presence in the community, but most were specific about attributing much 

of the serious gang activity in the city to gang members migrating from Los Angeles. For 

example, one gang unit officer explained, “...I mean we had some [gang members] from 

here. But the majority of the hard-cores and violent crimes are people moving from other 

jurisdictions.” A gang unit sergeant added, “Oh, there’s a big problem with [gang 

migration]. Every guy you see here on the corner slinging rock is an L.A. gangster.” Still 

another sergeant stated, “...We do have some well-established gangs here, some wellestablished violent gangs. But we’re also seeing all the time these California gangsters 

coming in. 18th Street originated in L.A., they’re 200 deep here now. I swear to God, it 

seems like everybody is from California. Off the top of my head, the last time I had 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 146 

anyone from somewhere else was Salt Lake City.” When we asked the officers directly 

whether they believed that migration was the cause of the local gang problem, almost 60 

percent (n=16) responded with an unqualified “yes,” and another 20 percent (n=10) 

responded that gang migration was at least partially responsible.8 

Three explanations were given for the large number of gang members moving 

from Southern California to Las Vegas. One was that gang members moved to Las Vegas 

to make money from the drug market. An officer stated: 

Because one thing, California is where the narcotics are. They’re bringing 

the narcotics in, and they’ve always tried to push their way in or buy their 

way in. They supply most of the narcotics to the gangs who are here. They 

try to control what happens here, too, giving them advice. We have two 

L.A. street gangs now that are fighting over Freemont Street, and they are 

trying to undercut each other in price and with violence. 

Another officer similarly argued: 

The money. Las Vegas, the gang, that’s why it’s a big problem here. You 

know, you go to Oregon or somewhere like that, they’re not going to have 

the problem like we have here. Because there is so much money here. 

They can take a kilo of cocaine from L.A. and bring it here and make 

twelve times the amount. They know there’s a lot of money here. You 

know, we get 20 to 30 million visitors a year. They know that. They know 

they can come here and get money. So they move here. 

Many officers mentioned that gang members moved from Los Angeles to Las 

Vegas because of the many opportunities that Las Vegas had to offer compared with 

other cities. Some officers believed that Las Vegas was considered a “fun city” that 

attracted young people looking for a good time. A number of the officers made comments 

similar to the following: “I think, from what I understood from the gang members I talked 

to, everyone likes to come to Vegas. It’s a recreational place. Sometimes they come and 

they maintain, and sometimes they come and they get in fights. But you’re gonna have – 

this is like a good spot for everyone to have a good time.” Others pointed out, “Las Vegas 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 147 

is the adult playground of the United States. So yes, we have a large prostitution and dope 

sell market; it’s gigantic. So it’s the place to go.” 

Likewise, some officers mentioned that Las Vegas had a number of job 

opportunities that other communities did not have. When asked why gang members 

migrate to Las Vegas from California, one officer responded: 

I could go into a tirade here. It’s always been a problem in Las Vegas. Las 

Vegas is the fastest growing community in the United States. We still 

grow by 3 to 4 thousand people a month. We have service jobs opening up 

with this many resorts that are opening constantly. So there’s a huge influx 

of people here. So, yes, we have a migratory problem here.... [T]he job 

market is huge. ...When you talk to the gang members from L.A., it’s just 

plain, in their words, too dangerous to live there anymore. The job market 

is stale there. We do have jobs all over; there is money in Las Vegas. So 

they come here...everybody comes to Las Vegas.... There’s tons of 

money and tons of work. 

Another officer similarly stated, “I suppose a lot of them come here as juveniles with 

their parents because there’s work.” 

Yet another explanation for the number of gang members migrating from Los 

Angeles was that individuals were receiving severe sentences under California’s “three 

strikes” law for third felony convictions. Some officers in the field commented that a 

number of gang members had moved to Las Vegas from Southern California because 

they already had two strikes against them, and they were avoiding being convicted again. 

A document produced by the gang unit examining gang trends in Las Vegas noted: 

According to LAPD, “We have seen extensive gang migration out of the 

city, but very little migration into the city.” The California third strike law 

(habitual criminal) is effective in California scaring many gang members 

with two strikes to relocate to other jurisdictions including Las Vegas (Las 

Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Gang Unit 1999). 

With regard to criminality, most of the officers (n=18) explained that gang 

members in Las Vegas engaged in a wide variety of crimes, and that they did not 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 148 

specialize in any one type. When asked about the types of crimes committed by gang 

members, most officers gave responses similar to the three below: 

From beer skips, petty larceny, all the way up to homicide. 

I can’t think of anything that they don’t get involved in. 

Name it, we got it. We’ve got destruction of private property with the 

tagging. All kinds of vandalism with anything, stolen vehicles, robberies, 

burglaries, murders, assaults, home invasions, sexual assault. There is 

nothing they don’t do. 

A modest number of officers (n=7), while agreeing that gang members engaged in 

a variety of criminal activities, felt that the major problem for residents was the fear and 

intimidation that gangs instilled in them: 

Well, the way I look at it, they disrupt the every day life. They make 

people afraid to walk the street at night. People, good people, living in the 

neighborhood who will not go out after dark. They’re – a perfect example, 

I had a friend of mine who used to work for one of the highway rental 

places here in town, and he worked day shift. And he said during day shift 

while everybody was in school, the neighborhoods, and the nicest people 

in the neighborhoods, but as soon as 3:00 came, all the nice people 

disappeared. And then all of a sudden, all of the gang members and 

shitbags come out. You know, people have to – well, I grew up on the East 

Coast and, you know, it’s a small town, but you could walk down the 

street and leave your front door unlocked. You know, you can’t do that in 

this town. You can’t go anywhere. You know, I think about what I’m 

going to do with my 3-year-old daughter when she’s got to go to school. I 

worry about where she’s going to go to school already, she’s only 3 years 

old. What high school is she going to go to? Every high school has 

problems. 

Well, I mean, to me, they cause, I mean, just being a regular citizen, they 

cause fear. I mean, we’ve had times when people were at the mall just 

shopping. Gang members go in there and steal something, and the next 

thing you know, they are in a shoot-out in the parking lot. So I think for 

the everyday citizen that just goes out and goes to the store or to work, or 

something like that, it’s a problem. Because it could happen to anybody, 

anywhere. 

A few officers gave more specific examples when asked about the types of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 149 

problems that gang members caused. For example, both gang unit officers assigned to the 

graffiti detail (n=2) mentioned the economic impact of graffiti. In addition, two other 

officers commented that gang members were involved in such activities as homicide, 

drive-by shootings, and street-level drug trafficking. 

When we asked the officers to estimate the percentage of total local crime that 

gang members accounted for, their responses were inconsistent. About 16 officers 

acknowledged that they were not sure of the answer, but seven of them estimated that 

about 50 percent of crime in Las Vegas was attributable to gangs, and nine other officers 

gave estimates ranging all the way from 5 percent to 85 percent. 

The “we don’t know” response contrasted sharply with the responses of officers 

in the other cities that we studied. Perhaps the Las Vegas officers were simply more 

willing to acknowledge that they did not know, possibly because such information about 

gang crime was not disseminated to gang unit officers, or perhaps the officers were 

simply not interested in the numbers. 

About 65 percent of the officers agreed that gangs had become more violent in 

recent years, and many reported that the number of drive-by shootings and other gunrelated offenses had increased. Another 20 percent believed that gang activity had 

decreased; these officers noted that gang crime typically fluctuated from year to year, but 

they were currently seeing less violence than in high gang crime years such as the early 

1990s. The remaining 15 percent believed that gang violence had been stable in the past 

few years; none offered a basis for this conclusion. 

Gang unit officers were asked whether they thought that Las Vegas gangs were 

highly organized or loosely knit. Of 32 respondents, 44 percent (n=14) believed that both 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 150 

kinds of gangs were present in Las Vegas; 38 percent (n=12) believed that most local 

gangs were loosely knit with little organization; 6 percent (n=2) believed that most local 

gangs were highly organized; and about 13 percent (n=4) believed that most local gangs 

fell somewhere between highly organized and loosely knit. Many officers thought that 

both kinds of gangs were focused on making money; however, they added that gangs 

involved in profit-making ventures were better organized than those primarily concerned 

with turf. 

I would say it would depend on the gang. I would say that, especially your 

gangs with ties to the East Coast and Southern California like that – very, 

very organized, making lots and lots of money. Some of the other gangs, 

Latino Street, they have ties to California...[they are] all about partying 

and respect and fighting and that kind of thing. The difference is if you 

send somebody to prison and they’ll come out and they might be rolling 

60. But you can work with – down the Street Crip and a West Coast 

Blood, “well, let’s just make money.” So when they come out and it’s all 

about money, it’s not so much about turf. It doesn’t mean we’re going to 

do a kickback, barbeque, have a beer together...it doesn’t mean I won’t 

shoot you next week. But it’s all about money. When you get to that stage, 

very well organized, extremely organized. The younger they are, the more 

loose knit they tend to be... 

Again, it depends on the gang that you’re talking about. We have some 

real organized gangs out there with traders and stuff like that, and they are 

bringing in money, however, they are getting it in. For the most part, most 

of them are pretty unorganized. 

A mixture of both. It is kind of hard to put a percentage on it, there is a lot 

of organized, especially the gangs that come up here out of California, that 

basically just come here to sell dope and then they leave. I would consider 

that organized, but a lot of them are disorganized, disillusioned. 

Those who argued that gangs were loosely organized tended to comment on a 

lack of communication between members and gang members not working in concert to 

accomplish goals. A number of the officers gave responses similar to those below: 

I wouldn’t say loose-knit groups, but I really don’t think they are too well 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 151 

organized. There are certain gangs in this town that are organized, but the 

majority of them are just a bunch of...guys. There are really too many of 

them going in different directions. And that’s why they are having 

problems. I mean, that’s why you’re getting a lot of them are shooting 

each other within their own gang now, because I think there’s too much of 

everybody pulling at it.... The gangs today really don’t have that much 

organization, I don’t think. 

Probably more loose knit than what we think. There are probably a lot of 

them that don’t even know each other. Like I said, the extremely large 

ones don’t know who they are. 

I think they vary. I think there are sets that are very organized and have 

connections nationwide. And then there are others that are just basically 

surviving. They are just basically together to keep from getting killed by 

other gangs. 

Two officers believed that local gangs were highly organized, but their supporting 

comments were not convincing. One officer stated, “They are highly organized. They are 

highly organized because they are getting older, and they are getting jobs and they are 

getting into positions to help each other.” The other officer simply explained, “Depends. 

But most of them are highly organized,” without further elaboration. 

Four officers believed that local gang structures were somewhere between loosely 

knit and highly organized. Most of these officers gave responses similar to the one below: 

They are not highly organized, but they are not loose knit. Our gangs are 

still primarily territorial, although that is changing. The biggest black 

gang, the Gerson Park Kingsmen, do not have a home right now, so they 

are all over Clark County. We’re going right back to the deal, they are 

starting to evolve from territorial into other deals. 

You can’t call them loose knit, though. They’re going to follow a core 

group and do for the gang. They’re still going to fly their colors. It is still 

all about colors in Las Vegas. They will actually run a dope house, they 

will actually have a gun house, they will actually have money accounts for 

their members that go to prison or defense funds. They are not very 

organized. They do not have a hierarchy, but they are not loose knit. 

Like I said, they are the most disorganized organized criminals there are. 

Because when you get a clique or a small faction of the main group that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 152 

are running together and committing crimes together, it is very organized. 

But in everyday gang world, it’s hit and miss. We might sit back all night 

tonight drinking forties, tomorrow we might drive down the road and see 

so-and-so from wherever, and catch him slipping and blow his fucking 

head off. 

Phoenix 

The Phoenix gang unit began documenting numbers of gangs and gang members 

in 1990, when it documented 150 gangs and 1,778 gang members and associates (exhibit 

4.09). By 1999, the number of gangs had more than doubled to 336, and the number of 

members had nearly quadrupled to 6,945. It is interesting to note that the number of 

documented gangs and gang members had risen steadily over this 10-year period. 

Exhibit 4.09 Numbers of gangs and gang members in Phoenix (1990-1999) 

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

Gang members 

& associates 

1778 2789 3265 3717 3478 3759 4136 5057 6776 6945 

Gang sets 150 253 na 298 320 381 319 357 341 336 

Exhibit 4.10 shows the number of gang members belonging to each type of gang, 

as classified by the Phoenix gang unit. In 2000, about 79 percent of gang members and 

associates belonged to gangs classified as primarily Hispanic, and another 16 percent 

belonged to Crip and Blood gangs, comprised primarily of African American members. 

A few gang members and associates (1.5 percent) belonged to gangs from the Midwest, 

such as the Gangster Disciples and Latin Kings. 

Exhibit 4.10 Phoenix gang types and affiliations (2000) 

Gang types Members Associates Total Percent 

Hispanic 5244 352 5596 78.7 

Crip 902 87 989 13.9 

Blood 161 7 168 2.4 

Other black 179 7 186 2.6 

Midwest 103 5 108 1.5 

Other 55 5 60 0.8 

No gang affiliation 3 5 8 0.1 

Total 6647 488 7115 100.0 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 153 

Gang unit statistics showed that most documented gang members and associates 

in Phoenix were adult males. Ninety-three percent were male; 7 percent were female. 

Only about 16 percent were juveniles. Like Las Vegas, Phoenix is a relatively new gang 

city, and the fact that most of its gang members were adults suggested that the problem 

had become more serious and chronic than was typical for new gang cities. 

Exhibit 4.11 Gender of Phoenix gang members and associates, by age (2000) 

15 & 16-17 Juveniles 18-25 26 & Adults Total Total 

under (%) over (%) members percentages 

Males 312 636 13.3 4616 1052 79.7 6616 93.0 

Females 80 95 2.5 296 28 4.6 499 7.0 

Total 392 731 15.8 4912 1080 84.2 7115 100.0 

Documented Gang Crime 

Contrary to the finding above, an examination of Phoenix gang crime trends 

indicated that the problem there did not appear to be serious or out of control. Since 1990, 

the gang unit had been collecting the data on numbers of gang homicides, aggravated 

assaults, and drive-by shootings. Gang crime was relatively infrequent early in the 1990s, 

increased substantially in the middle of the decade, and then declined in the late 1990s 

(exhibit 4.12). For example, gang homicides increased from three in 1990 to 27 in 1994, 

then declined to four in 1999. Similar patterns were observed for aggravated assaults and 

drive-by shootings. However, for both kinds of crime, at the end of the decade, gang 

activity declined to all-time lows. For instance, in 1999, there were 66 percent fewer 

gang-aggravated assaults than in 1990, and the number of drive-by shootings decreased 

by about 84 percent during this period. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 154 

Exhibit 4.12 Gang activity in Phoenix (2000) 

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

Homicides 

Gang-related 3 11 20 21 27 21 13 11 17 4 

Total incidents 128 128 136 158 231 214 186 175 187 216 

Gang-related (%) 2.3 8.6 14.7 13.3 11.7 9.8 7.0 6.3 9.1 1.9 

Aggravated assaults 

Gang-related 377 479 536 519 383 317 243 226 205 132 

Total incidents 6642 6954 7155 7872 7507 7272 6126 6048 5906 5766 

Gang-related (%) 5.7 6.9 7.5 6.6 5.1 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.5 2.3 

Drive-by shootings 171 118 134 155 98 114 108 86 73 28 

Total violent incidents 580 888 918 865 649 519 408 385 331 232 

To further analyze the magnitude of the gang problem in Phoenix, we examined 

the proportion of total gang-related incidents for homicides and aggravated assaults. 

Depending on the year, 2 to 15 percent of homicides were found to be gang related. Over 

the 10-year period from 1990 through 1999, there were 1,759 homicides in Phoenix, of 

which 159 (9 percent) were recorded as gang related. A similar trend was observed for 

aggravated assault, with 2 to 8 percent of all aggravated assaults involving a gang 

member, depending on the year; 67,249 aggravated assaults were reported overall, with 

3,417 (5 percent) recorded as gang related. 

Perceptions of the Gang Problem 

We asked 20 gang unit officers for their perceptions of the current gang problem. 

Seventy percent (n=14) believed that the city had a major gang problem, and 30 percent 

(n=6) described the gang problem as moderate. Although many officers offered little 

explanation for their opinions, a number of them who believed that the city had a major 

gang problem voiced concerns specifically about the impact of gang activity on the 

quality of life in Phoenix neighborhoods. 

I’d say they’re a major problem here. [Interviewer: Why] They’re a 

problem in the respect that they do basically terrorize their neighborhoods. 

And they take on their own neighbors and what-not like that. We have a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 155 

lot of “shots fired” calls, and we obviously respond to them and find 

nothing there. We have a lot of drive-bys that we know are gang related 

that has no victims, and don’t have enough information to really pinpoint 

who did it, but those are the things that happen continuously that are a 

major problem in the community. 

I think that any type of gang problem is a major problem, and I say that 

because gangs are city-wide like the police department is, but in these 

gang-ridden neighborhoods, you have a lot of good people out there that 

want to get on with their lives, whether they’re rich or they’re poor, and be 

left alone. When you have one or two gang members in a neighborhood 

creating a disturbance, graffiti in vehicles, shooting out windows, 

harassing people’s daughters, versus 30 gang members that are going to 

other gang neighborhoods and shooting them up.... 

The remaining officers (n=6) who classified the city’s gang problems as moderate 

emphasized two issues. One group noted that the seriousness of the gang problem 

fluctuated, and that currently, the gang problem was not as bad as at some other times. 

Again, gang activity, it’s hot and it’s cold. Right now I would say 

moderate, but at times, it has been major. 

It used to be they were a major problem. I’d say now, it’s moderate. Its 

kinda... it goes in waves. I mean right now we’re in the period where most 

of the old guys are in jail, most of the little guys are starting to get a little 

bit older, and in another year or two, the older guys are starting to get out 

of jail and the little guys are a little bit older, and they’re gonna start 

taking their orders, and its going to be right back there, you know, where 

we were four years ago, just chasing everybody, which is a good time. 

Another group of officers argued that the city’s gang problem was moderate, but only 

because the gang unit was working to keep the problem from escalating. 

...Gangs, I wouldn’t consider it a minor problem, but is it the biggest 

problem that’s happening in town? It’s the type of problem that if you 

don’t keep it in check, it can get out of hand. 

I want to give it “major,” but it’s not at this point. I think it’s one of those 

things that, if you don’t keep a tight grip on it, it would in no time expand 

on its own. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 156 

When we asked about the types of problems that gangs caused, most officers 

commented that gang members were involved in a wide assortment of activities ranging 

from graffiti to homicide. 

Just about the whole gamut of crimes. Stolen vehicles, drug sales, 

extortion, fraud schemes. 

A real wide variety – drugs, intimidation, assaults, agg[ravated] assaults, 

robbery, murder, and about every kind of crime that’s committed. 

A few focused on one problem area, about half pointing out that gang members 

frequently used weapons and engaged in violence. 

The biggest thing that I say they do is the drive-by shootings. Almost 

always their drive-by shootings target another gang member, but by virtue 

of them shooting from a moving vehicle, 50 percent of the time, the next 

door neighbor gets hit, the little baby inside the house gets hit. There’s all 

this collateral damage from the drive-by. They’re not hitting their 

designated target, and the bad thing with that is, these are innocent people 

that have nothing to do with the gang. If they drove by and shot and killed 

only that gang member, somehow I can understand a lot of it. But here’s a 

kid playing across the street, or recently an old guy gardening, and he gets 

shot because they were aiming at the guy two houses down. 

I think the street gangs are known for their weapon violations, either 

everyday assault, drive-by shootings, retaliation, home invasions, those 

type of crimes. 

The other half of this group expressed concern about the fear and intimidation gang 

members caused for their neighbors. For example, one officer remarked: 

I see...just a localized intimidation factor that some of these gangs have 

over their neighborhoods. You know, we’ve got some gangs that have 

been around since...that I’ve talked to members that have been around, 

you know, some guys that were in the gang in the late ‘50s. So you’ve got 

generations of almost control of some of these neighborhoods, and that 

I’ve seen as probably a major problem. That people don’t quite 

understand, I mean, if you don’t live in the neighborhood and they don’t 

see it, then they don’t understand that what these people go through in 

some of these small neighborhoods that are dominated by them. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 157 

Most officers concurred that a modest proportion of all local crime was 

attributable to gangs. Nearly all of them believed that gangs were responsible for 10 to 40 

percent of the city’s crime, a relatively small amount when compared with gang unit 

officers’ perceptions in the other cities that we studied. Only two officers stated that 

gangs were probably responsible for 50 percent or more of the city’s total crime, and 

another two officers could not answer the question. 

Most of the Phoenix officers agreed that local gang violence had declined over the 

past few years; however, they diverged on the reason for the decline. Some explained that 

gangs were becoming more business-like. 

Less violent, they’ve kind of restructured themselves. They’re looking 

more at the business end, whether it’s the chop shops, the selling the dope, 

extortion type stuff. It’s become more of a business. So we don’t openly 

see the drive-by shooting, the stabbings that we had in the past. We still 

have them, but most of the time upon investigating them, we’re finding 

out that there is a lot more of same-gang on same-gang violence. Where 

they’re taking out somebody for ripping them off for their own dope or 

whatever. 

Other officers believed that the decline in gang violence resulted from the gang unit’s 

suppression efforts. 

I believe in Phoenix, less violent and less numerous in occasion. 

[Interviewer: What’s the basis for your evaluation?] I just think since the 

first year I was on the department working the 41 area, I can remember 

where on Buckeye Road, where West Side City hangs out, I can remember 

violent crimes there nightly, to now where that street is pretty much a 

ghost town except for normal citizens. Gangs are not on that road 

anymore, and the city as a whole, I would say that the violent crime, or the 

crime rate, period, as far as gang members go, has normally gone down 

since then through enforcement. 

Another officer agreed: 

I would say less violent, because we as a unit have gotten more organized 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 158 

and much more directed at them. We also now have the benefit of simple 

statutes that we can use against them, like the criminal syndicate charge 

and the allegation of gang activity, for sentencing. We’re putting people 

away for a long time, and I think that’s kinda sending them a message. 

A small number (n=2) of the interviewed officers believed that gang violence had 

increased in recent years. One of them pointed out that the number of gang homicides had 

recently increased, and the other commented that drive-by shootings and other weaponsrelated offenses were on the rise. 

Another two officers believed that gang violence had remained stable in recent 

years. One of them, recently assigned, indicated that gang crime had held stable since he 

had been with the gang unit. The other stated that gang violence had held stable in recent 

years, and that for gangs to “take it to the next level, we’d have to see mass executions, 

buildings getting blown up, and that’s not happening.” 

We asked the officers whether they thought that local gangs were highly 

organized or loosely knit. Of the 19 respondents, about half (n=10) indicated that Phoenix 

had both highly organized and loosely knit gangs. Most of them thought that the local 

gangs could be placed on a continuum, with some exhibiting a high degree of 

organizational sophistication and others exhibiting very few signs at all of any 

organizational structure. 

I think it goes from loose knit to organized, depending on which gang 

you’re dealing with. If you are dealing with the Arian Brotherhood, the 

Hell’s Angels, the Mexican Mafia, you are dealing with a lot more 

organized group of people. If you’re dealing with the East Side LCM or 

Park South Crips or... I think they are a lot less organized. So it’s a pretty 

broad spectrum. 

I would say the top five gangs in Phoenix are pretty highly organized. The 

rest of them are trying to get organized, but they’re more like loose knit, 

almost fraternal, you know, just kinda hang out, claim a neighborhood, 

that type of thing. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 159 

Approximately 37 percent (n=7) of the officers believed that most local gangs 

were loose knit, showing few signs of organizational structure. They commented that 

Phoenix gangs did not have a leadership structure, held no regular meetings, and had no 

rules or guidelines to direct member behavior. Only one officer believed that most gangs 

in Phoenix were highly organized, explaining that many of them had formal leaders or 

“shot callers” who kept members in line and provided formal direction. In addition, one 

officer believed that most gangs were somewhere between highly organized and loose 

knit. He commented that most gangs had been less organized, but recently were 

becoming involved with prison gangs, resulting in more organization. 

National Youth Gang Center Data 

To compare numbers of gangs, gang members, and gang homicides in each of the 

four cities, we examined data from the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC). Each year 

NYGC, with fiscal support from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention (OJJDP), surveys 3,018 law enforcement agencies, including all police 

departments serving communities with a population of more than 25,000. Although each 

of the four sites that we studied used unique definitions when processing and collecting 

gang data, they were similar enough to allow comparisons of similar phenomena over a 

given period of time. 

In 2000, Phoenix documented 365 gangs, followed by 321 in Las Vegas, 90 in 

Inglewood, and 33 in Albuquerque (exhibit 4.13). Since 1993, the number of gangs in 

Phoenix and Las Vegas has climbed steadily—almost tripling in both cities. On the other 

hand, in Inglewood, the number of gangs grew substantially between 1993 and 1998, but 

then declined sharply through 2000. While the number of gangs reported by Albuquerque 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 160 

sharply increased and decreased between 1993 and 1997, the number of gangs that the 

city had reported since this time had remained roughly the same. 

Exhibit 4.13 Number of gangs by city and year 

1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

Albuquerque 65 222 na 30 31 33 33 

Inglewood 8 na 26 96 179 100 90 

Las Vegas 132 141 157 150 288 201 321 

Phoenix 140 160 324 167 341 336 365 

Exhibit 4.14 shows the number of gang members documented in each of the study 

cities for the years between 1993 and 2000. In 2000, Phoenix documented more than 

10,000 gang members, followed by Las Vegas with 8,800 gang members, Inglewood 

with about 7,000 gang members, and Albuquerque with 6,664 gang members. Between 

1993 and 2000, all of the cities experienced increases. The number of documented gang 

members in Albuquerque and Phoenix almost tripled; in Inglewood, the number 

increased six-fold; and in Las Vegas, the number more than doubled. 

Exhibit 4.14 Number of documented gang members by city and year 

1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

Albuquerque 2325 3834 na 500 7607 5000 6664 

Inglewood 1159 na 4532 3505 na na 6989 

Las Vegas 3812 5577 5098 5800 8000 6905 8800 

Phoenix 3800 3834 4223 7500 6047 6439 10452 

As part of the survey, agencies were asked to provide information on the gender, 

ethnicity, and ages of local gang members (exhibit 4.15). According to 2000 data, the 

majority of gang members in each city were male, with only one percent of gang 

members in Inglewood and Las Vegas being female; seven and ten percent were female 

in Phoenix and Albuquerque, respectively. Ethnically, Hispanics were most likely to be 

documented as gang members in each of the four sites. The trend was most pronounced 

in Phoenix and Albuquerque, where 70 percent or more documented gang members were 

Hispanic. Inglewood and Las Vegas had more African American gang members, with 45 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 161 

percent in Inglewood and 34 percent in Las Vegas. Few white gang members were 

documented in any of the cities. In Las Vegas, 15 percent were white, followed by 9 

percent in Albuquerque, 6 percent in Phoenix, and none in Inglewood. None of the four 

cities had more than a few gang members who were documented as Asian, Native 

American, or “other.” Most of the gang members in each city were adults. In Inglewood, 

fewer than 50 percent of the gang members were juveniles; in Albuquerque, Las Vegas, 

and Phoenix, fewer than 20 percent were juveniles. 

Exhibit 4.15 Gang member characteristics by city (percentages) 

Albuquerque Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

Gender 

Male 90 99 99 93 

Female 10 1 1 7 

Ethnicity 

African American 10 45 34 17 

Hispanic 70 54 43 76 

White 9 0 15 6 

Asian 7 0 5 0 

Native American 4 0 2 1 

Other 0 1 1 0 

Age 

Under 15 2 10 3 5 

15-17 8 35 8 11 

18-24 68 45 62 70 

Over 24 22 10 27 14 

2000 National Youth Gang Survey Data 

From 1996 through 2000, all four cities experienced wide swings in the number of 

gang homicides from one year to the next (exhibit 4.16). As of 2000, Las Vegas and 

Inglewood had experienced the most gang homicides, and Phoenix and Albuquerque had 

experienced the fewest. The number of gang homicides in Albuquerque dropped 

substantially over that time, falling from 30 in 1997, to 9 in 1999. Phoenix reported nine 

gang homicides in 1996, and only five in 2000. Inglewood experienced roughly the same 

number of gang homicides in 1996 (n=23), 1998 (n=28), and 2000 (n=24), with brief 

reductions in 1997 (n=11) and 1999 (n=15). The number of gang homicides in Las 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 162 

Vegas, however, peaked in 1996 and 1997, and has since declined to 11 in 1998, 19 in 

1999, and 28 in 2000. 

Exhibit 4.16 Number of gang member-based homicides by city and year 

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

Albuquerque na 30 23 9 na 

Inglewood 23 11 28 15 24 

Las Vegas 39 32 11 19 28 

Phoenix 9 na na na 5 

Summary 

The measurement of gangs, gang members, and gang crime is far from perfect, 

and relying on any one data source to gauge a community’s gang problem is hazardous, 

at best. For that reason, in trying to assess the extent of the gang problem in our study 

communities, we examined official data on the numbers of gangs, gang members, and 

gang crime; but we supplemented this with information obtained from local gang unit 

officers and data from the National Youth Gang Center. In particular, we interviewed 

officers about their perceptions of the scope and nature of their cities’ gang problems, and 

we analyzed data obtained from these departments as part of the annual National Youth 

Gang Survey. Although there were some inconsistencies, an examination of data from 

these various sources led to the following conclusions. 

All of the study cities had experienced dramatic rises in the number of 

documented local gang members. Documented gang members in each of the cities were 

typically male (90-99 percent), minority (85-100 percent) adults. With the exception of 

Inglewood, gang members lived in poor neighborhoods with a high proportion of 

minority residents, mostly in multi-family housing complexes. 

The data also suggested that in recent years, the number of gangs had increased in 

two of the cities (Phoenix and Las Vegas), and had decreased in two of the cities 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 163 

(Albuquerque and Inglewood). We found that police agencies in these cities rarely 

analyzed data on the social and organizational composition of gangs, other than tracking 

the number of gang members in each gang. However, two of the agencies (Albuquerque 

and Las Vegas) had performed some modest analyses of official data examining the 

primary ethnicity of gangs and the relationship of ethnicity with criminal involvement. 

This official data, along with interview data, suggested that African American gangs were 

more likely to be involved in organized drug sales and instrumental violence, and that 

Hispanic gangs were more likely to be involved in turf disputes and expressive violence. 

Gang unit officers also noted that most of the street gangs in their cities were not 

organizationally sophisticated; the more organized gangs tended to be prison gangs, 

motorcycle gangs, and drug gangs from Southern California. 

Gang crime data generally showed that gang violence in each of the cities studied 

was dramatically down. First, gang homicide data obtained from the NYGC indicated a 

substantial decline in gang homicides for three of the sites beginning in the mid-1990s. 

Specifically, Albuquerque had experienced a 66 percent decline in gang homicides, 

Phoenix had experienced a 50 percent decline, and Las Vegas had experienced a 30 

percent decline. Gang violence in Inglewood, however, had been stable since the mid1990s. Local data obtained from each agency showed a general decline in gang violence. 

The only exception was Albuquerque, where the gang unit, which was responsible for the 

collection of gang intelligence, had not collected data on gang crime because of 

differences in opinion between the gang unit and the Chief of Police about how to define 

gang crime. 

In addition, we found that the majority of the officers’ perceptions about local 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 164 

gang problems differed substantially from the official gang crime data recorded by their 

units. Except in Las Vegas, the vast majority of officers in each unit perceived that their 

cities had major gang problems, that gang members engaged in a wide variety of criminal 

behaviors, and that roughly 30 to 70 percent of all local crimes were probably attributable 

to gang members. (Las Vegas is excluded because most of those officers stated that they 

did not know the proportion of crime that was committed by gang members, and that 

such information was not pertinent to their jobs. However, most officers in Las Vegas did 

believe that the local gang problem had grown worse in recent years.) 

Data collected by the gang units indicated, however, that gang members actually 

contributed to a relatively small proportion of local crime, and that each city had 

experienced a dramatic reduction in gang crime, particularly violent crime, in recent 

years. Consequently, the gang units we studied were operating in a somewhat paradoxical 

context: more gang members, a heightened perception of local gang problems, but fewer 

(and in some cases, very few) actual incidences of gang crimes. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 165 

Chapter 5. Form, Function, and Management of the Police 

Gang Unit 

We explored the police response to gangs by examining the organizational 

structures, operational functions, and management of specialized police gang units. First, 

we describe how police departments structure or organize their resources to control 

gangs, focusing on where the gang units were placed within the police departments, 

administratively and physically. Second, we describe the functions or operational 

strategies of the gang units. In other words, with a broad stroke, we have described what 

the gang units were doing, or at least what they were supposed to be doing, according to 

departmental guidelines and expectations. 

Third, we discuss the organizational configurations of gang control efforts. 

Specifically, we examined how gang units were functionally, spatially, and temporally 

differentiated. Last, we describe how the police gang units were managed. In particular, 

we focused on the existence and adequacy of formal written policies and procedures, 

formal and informal goals and objectives, unit performance measures, and the extent of 

managerial supervision within the units. 

Organization of Gang Control in Police Departments 

As we discussed in chapter 1, specialized police gang units, at least in part, are 

created to focus departmental resources, energy, and skill on a community’s gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 166 

problem. The creation of a specialized unit to respond to a community’s gang problem 

would appear to make sense. First, as a means of achieving specific goals, the 

organizational tool of specialization has been used by police for well over a century. 

Local police agencies, for example, share the mission of protecting and serving the 

public. But since the creation of police, discrete divisions or units with distinct goals have 

been organized within local police agencies for contributing to that mission; for instance, 

a patrol bureau is responsible for patrol, and a detective bureau is responsible for 

investigations. As such, specialized units, such as a homicide units, burglary units, vice 

units, or even a gang units, allow the police to assign personnel and resources to focus on 

one goal or purpose. 

Second, public agencies commonly organize their resources according to specific 

clientele. School districts, for example, serve students of specific ages. Although some 

schools teach young children, others teach adolescents, and still others teach adults. 

Likewise, hospitals serve patients who have different health needs. One ward might serve 

pediatric patients, another might address burn victims, and another might focus on 

emergency medicine. Police agencies have also used specialization to serve specific 

“client” groups. For instance, vice units work with prostitutes and johns, narcotics units 

work to combat drug use and drug sales, and traffic units enforce traffic laws. 

Third, since the industrial revolution, work based on performing particular 

processes or tasks has been thought best to be grouped together. Classical organizational 

theory posits that greater effectiveness can be achieved when workers perform 

fragmented or highly specialized duties. Effectiveness is increased because specialized 

workers become more skilled at performing the specialty task; thus, in theory, they 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 167 

become more efficient, which in turn increases the productivity of the organization. 

It should not be surprising that police departments have chosen to create 

specialized gang units to focus, consolidate, and coordinate their gang control efforts, 

since a number of reasons have been offered to suggest that specialization is an effective 

and efficient means of organizing resources. However, not all of the gang units that we 

studied organized their units in the same way. Specifically, their administrative locations, 

organizational configurations, functions, and management structures varied considerably 

from one department to the next. 

This is at odds with much of the police research that suggests that on a general 

level, police agencies organize their resources similarly with regard to specialized units. 

For example, many large police departments have homicide units, auto theft units, and 

property crime units. These are typically located within an investigative division or 

detective bureau, and they are usually configured in similar manners – most often 

comprised of officers or detectives who report to a sergeant or some other supervisor. 

The units normally have an official mandate and specific goals, objectives, and 

performance measures; for example, they are often evaluated based on clearance rates. 

Additionally, these units have specific roles or functions within their departments, 

such as being responsible for investigating specific crimes, and they are not normally 

responsible for ancillary functions. For instance, they are not responsible for speaking to 

the public about the type of crimes they investigate; they are not responsible for directed 

patrols to deter individuals from committing the type of crimes that they investigate; and 

they are not responsible for collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence on 

those who have committed the crime or might commit the crime in the future. Most 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 168 

specialized units have clearly defined roles, and the activities that their officers perform 

are similar, specific, and focused, regardless of which police department is their parent 

organization. 

Contrary to this widespread uniformity among police special units, however, we 

found that the organization of gang control varied surprisingly among the four police 

departments selected for this study. In each of the four cities, we found police gang units 

located in different administrative groups within their police organizations (exhibit 5.1). 

In Albuquerque, after having been shuffled around the police department from patrol to 

investigations, the gang unit finally was placed in the career criminal section, located in 

the Special Investigations Bureau. One supervisor stated that the gang unit was placed 

there because it complemented the mission of the section. Other key players in the 

decision argued that it was in that section because the section supervisor was a friend of 

the new gang unit supervisor, and he took the unit as a favor. 

Inglewood’s gang unit was administratively located in the department’s robbery 

and assault section. As in Albuquerque, the gang unit was placed by necessity rather than 

because of any clear organizational strategy. The Inglewood gang unit was staffed with 

only three officers. As the span of control in the department was one supervisor for every 

five officers, police managers argued that it would be a “waste” to assign one sergeant to 

supervise the three officers. The unit supervisor explained: 

They are not actually a part of the robbery-assault section. It is just that the 

detective bureau as a whole is short-handed as far as supervisors go right 

now, so eventually the gang section will have a different supervisor. Right 

now, for lack of anyone else, it is going to need supervision, so I have got 

it. 

Both the Las Vegas and Phoenix police departments had placed their gang units 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 169 

administratively within their organized crime bureaus. In Las Vegas, the Gang Crime 

Section was organizationally located together with the criminal intelligence and special 

investigations sections. In Phoenix, the gang unit was similarly located with the 

intelligence and investigation squads (both of which focused on organized crime), a vice 

unit, and an internet crimes squad. In each case, the gang unit had been placed in an 

organized crime bureau because of that bureau’s existing capacity to collect and process 

intelligence. Police managers in each department explained that when the gang unit 

began to focus substantial time on intelligence gathering, administrators moved to avoid 

re-creating information management processes that were already being conducted 

successfully by other units in the police department. Each department insisted that its 

intelligence should be collected and stored according to protocols established by the 

federal government – protocols already being applied in the organized crime bureaus. 

Therefore, managers argued, because similar processes were going to be conducted and 

the same protocols would be observed by the gang units, it only made sense to place the 

units within the organized crime bureaus, where the information management 

infrastructure was already in place. 

The physical location of the gang units also played a role in the organization of 

departmental gang control efforts. Inglewood’s gang unit was located in the middle of the 

police headquarters building, next to the offices of all of the detectives, and just one story 

above all of the patrol officers. The unit had one of the largest spaces in the police 

department, and their offices were consistently open to other police officers. It was clear 

that all of the officers and detectives in the Inglewood department knew where the gang 

unit was located. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 170 

In Albuquerque, the gang unit was located at the Southeast Substation, where all 

units belonging to the criminal career section were housed. The substation was in the 

middle of an industrial section of the city, with almost no pedestrian or vehicle traffic. 

Although the Southeast Substation’s address and phone number were in the telephone 

book, the gang unit’s location at the substation was considered confidential information. 

The unit’s address was not disclosed to the public, and even many in the police 

department were unaware of its location. This resulted in no community members and 

few officers, other than those assigned to the substation, visiting the gang unit’s office. 

Both the Las Vegas and Phoenix gang units were located in off-site, secret 

locations. The Las Vegas gang unit was housed in the back of a county office building in 

the middle of downtown, and the office required a card key to enter. The Phoenix gang 

unit was also downtown, and an elevator key was necessary for access to the 9th floor of 

the office building where it was located. In each case, gang unit officers were generally 

the only ones working from the off-site location. Other police officers, if they even knew 

where the gang unit was located, needed assistance to enter the gang unit’s office. As a 

consequence, the gang units were physically located where contact with anyone outside 

the unit would be limited, including contact with the public and with other members of 

their own police departments. 

Officers in Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix gave several explanations for 

why the gang units were located in secret locations. Some pointed to the fact that they 

worked undercover and did not want to be exposed to the public, in particular to gang 

members. Other officers stated that they used unmarked vehicles and did not want their 

vehicles “burned,” making them too obvious to gang members. However, many officers 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 171 

stated that they had been placed in secure, off-site locations to protect them from gang 

members who might retaliate. In many conversations with officers, we heard that at the 

end of the day (or night), they simply felt more comfortable knowing that gang members 

would not be waiting for them after work. 

Interestingly, one of the officers in Inglewood – the only unit not secretly located 

– maintained that he was nervous about the possibility of a gang member following him 

home. As a result, he took several precautions. He explained that everyday on his drive 

home, he took an alternate route, and if he thought that someone one was following him, 

he would double back toward work to see if he was being followed. He stated that 

although he had never been followed, the possibility remained a concern. 

Exhibit 5.01 Gang unit organizational locations and staffing 

Albuquer Inglewoo Las Vegas Phoenix 

que d 

Administrative location of gang unit Career criminal Robbery and Organized Organized 

section assault section crime bureau crime bureau 

Physical location of gang unit Substation Headquarters Off-site Off-site 

Police supervisors assigned to unit 1.0 0 8 7.0 

Sworn officers assigned to unit 3.0 3 41 31.0 

Civilians assigned to unit 0.5 0 11 1.5 

Total personnel 4.5 3 60 38.5 

Squads assigned to intelligence 1.0 1 1 0 

Officers assigned to squad 3.0 3 11 0 

Civilians assigned to squad 0.5 0 11 0 

Squads assigned to enforcement 0 0 2 4.0 

Officers assigned to squad 0 0 15 24.0 

Squads assigned to street 0 0 2 1.0 

investigations 

Officers assigned to squad 0 0 11 2.0 

Civilians assigned to squad 0 0 0 1.5 

Squads assigned to prevention 0 0 0 0 

Officers assigned to squad 0 0 0 0 

Squads assigned to task force 0 0 1 1.0 

Officers assigned to squad 0 0 4 5.0 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 172 

Gang Control Functions 

We found that police gang units generally engaged in one or more of three 

principal police functions: intelligence, enforcement, and prevention and education. The 

relative emphasis placed on each function varied from department to department. The 

Inglewood gang unit was a single-function agency, generally engaging only in activities 

related to intelligence. Two of the units, Albuquerque and Phoenix, carried out activities 

related to more than one of these functions, and the Las Vegas gang unit was 

comprehensive, assuming at least some responsibility for activities related to all three 

functions. In the following sections, we briefly and broadly describe the different 

functions assigned to each police gang unit. A more thorough discussion of how each 

gang unit actually spent its time and their various forms of programming is discussed in 

chapter 7. 

Intelligence 

Police officials and researchers have identified intelligence – gathering 

information about gangs, gang members, and their activities, developing and maintaining 

gang databases and tracking systems, and disseminating data – as one of the most 

important functions carried out by specialized gang units (Bureau of Justice Assistance 

1997; Jackson and McBride 1993; C. Katz 2003; C. Katz, Webb and Schaffer 2000). Our 

research in the Albuquerque, Inglewood, Las Vegas, and Phoenix police departments 

indicated that each of their gang units did, in fact, perform an intelligence function. This 

finding is consistent with that of Klein (1995b), who found that intelligence gathering 

rather than enforcement, investigation, or prevention was the primary function of 83 

percent of the gang units across the country. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 173 

Although all four gang units engaged in some activities related to gang 

intelligence, the importance of this function to the gang units, and to their respective 

departments, varied. In Inglewood, intelligence gathering and dissemination was, for the 

most part, the sole activity performed by the department’s gang unit. Key stakeholders in 

that department, such as detectives working in the robbery and burglary units, attributed 

substantial value to gang unit intelligence that supported their investigative processes. 

Information such as monikers (street names), legal names, addresses, known associates, 

photographs, and gang affiliations were perceived as useful in conducting investigations, 

and detectives were quick to cite instances when intelligence from the gang unit had been 

instrumental in solving a crime and leading to an arrest. As such, it was not surprising to 

find that the gang unit officers themselves placed high value on the importance of 

collecting and processing intelligence. 

On the other hand, just because a gang unit had a formal intelligence function did 

not necessarily mean that the function was a central concern of the unit. For example, in 

Las Vegas, we found that the well-staffed gang unit carried out all three functions – 

suppression, prevention, and intelligence. However, it was evident that suppression 

activities were the officers’ top priority, and they were attributed the most importance by 

the gang unit’s officers. Relatively little emphasis was placed on the unit’s computerized 

gang intelligence database, in part because few officers had learned to use it. Apparently 

the officers had difficulty extracting information once it had been entered into the 

database; some referred to feeding intelligence information into the system as putting 

data into “a black hole in space.” The gang unit’s stakeholders spoke of the need for good 

intelligence; in contrast with Inglewood, for example, Las Vegas stakeholders were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 174 

critical of the fact that such intelligence was generally unavailable, and that they lacked 

access to the information they thought was contained in the intelligence system. 

In Phoenix, gathering and processing gang intelligence was reported to be 

important by gang unit officers. In practice, however, two civilian staff processed and 

disseminated the gang intelligence, and gang unit officers spent relatively little of their 

own time on intelligence-related activities (chapter 7). This could be accounted for in part 

by the fact officers placed greater value on the enforcement function than on intelligence. 

But they may also have spent relatively little time on intelligence because many of them 

were unfamiliar with how to use the gang database system. 

Gang unit stakeholders in Albuquerque affirmed the importance of the 

intelligence function by tying assessment of the gang unit’s value directly to the amount 

of information that the unit provided to others. Stakeholders in patrol and area command 

units recalled that in earlier days, the original gang unit had been valuable to the 

department as a dependable source of intelligence on gangs and gang members. However, 

it appeared that as the unit became more autonomous and institutionalized, it had focused 

less on intelligence and more on suppression, and as a result, stakeholders tended to 

devalue the unit’s contribution to gang control efforts. For stakeholders in Albuquerque, 

the gang unit’s most valuable commodity was the information it gathered and shared. For 

this reason, when the gang unit was resurrected, intelligence again became the unit’s 

primary function. 

Enforcement and Suppression 

Gang units’ suppression and enforcement activities are those most likely to 

capture the imaginations of the public and the media, as well as that of police officers 

looking for action on the streets. Symbolically, suppression activities communicate to the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 175 

public that their police department is taking the local gang problem seriously, and is 

mounting a forceful response. Whereas the intelligence function gave value to gang unit 

activities and legitimized the existence of the unit, from the perspective of many 

stakeholders, enforcement activities legitimized the unit in the eyes of the public, the 

media, and fellow police officers. Enforcement actions gave outsiders a degree of 

confidence that the unit was doing what a gang unit ought to. 

Suppression activities in the units that we studied were typically restricted to 

directed patrols in known gang areas. This meant that the majority of their enforcement 

activities were restricted to minority public housing districts and to parks and parking lots 

in the poorer neighborhoods that gang members were believed to frequent. Many of the 

officers explained that patrolling gang areas allowed them to keep an eye on gang 

members and gang activity, while at the same time providing them with the opportunity 

to develop personal relationships with gang members for the purpose of establishing a 

thorough intelligence network. 

The importance of suppression activities was a central value in the gang unit’s 

work group culture, even though the amount of time actually spent on such activities 

varied immensely from one gang unit to the next. The one exception to the centrality of 

suppression in the gang unit ethos was the situation in which the unit performed a single 

non-suppression function, such as intelligence, such as we found to be the case in 

Inglewood. The gang units in Las Vegas and Phoenix stood in marked contrast to 

Inglewood. Although the Inglewood gang unit had responsibility for intelligence, most of 

their resources were focused on enforcement. Compared with intelligence gathering, 

suppression activities were highly visible; when covered by the media, suppression 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 176 

actions publicly demonstrated that the department was combating the local gang problem. 

Of special interest was the finding that some of the gang units that we studied 

were devoting relatively little time to criminal investigation activities. The gang units’ 

involvement in criminal investigation tended to be indirect, performed largely as part of 

the intelligence function. As we previously mentioned, detectives in most of the sites that 

we studied were quick to point out the value and use of information provided by the gang 

unit in solving cases involving gang members. As a consequence, gang unit officers were 

occasionally called in by other specialized investigative units to assist in the investigation 

of crimes involving gang members. 

In two of the four sites, Las Vegas and Phoenix, the gang units had the primary 

responsibility for investigating serious gang-motivated crimes, with the exception of 

homicides and kidnappings. Gang unit officers in these units maintained that their 

expertise with gangs placed them in a unique position to investigate and solve crimes. 

The officers also believed that their involvement in gang-related investigations was 

essential for gathering worthwhile and timely intelligence. For these reasons, the Las 

Vegas Metropolitan Police Department gang unit wanted investigative responsibility for 

gang-motivated homicides, as well. However, the homicide bureau wanted to retain 

investigative responsibility, maintaining that their crime-specific expertise was required 

to investigate and solve homicides, whether gang-motivated or not. 

Prevention and Education 

The prevention function filled by the gang units that we observed was nearly 

nonexistent. In describing gang unit activities, we found that prevention and education 

was, at best, a residual category that included all activities other than intelligence or 

enforcement. Interestingly, none of the gang units had participated in this country’s most 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 177 

well-known prevention effort, the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) 

program. We found that in all four departments, the community relations unit or bureau 

conducted these kinds of formalized prevention efforts. 

When we asked officers in the gang units why their units were not responsible for 

prevention and education, they stated that although they believed these activities were 

worthwhile and should be performed by someone in the department, they thought that 

prevention and education should not be the responsibility of the gang units. Officers in all 

of the units agreed that enforcement-related activities should be their primary focus. 

Some officers argued that education and prevention activities would conflict with the 

purpose and other functions of the gang unit, while others stated that their unit’s 

resources were already strained, and they could not afford to be distracted from their 

“real job” of combating gang-related crime. 

These views were reflected when we asked the officers to rate the importance of 

enforcement, intelligence, and education activities. In two of the units, Inglewood and 

Phoenix, performing prevention talks and providing information to citizen groups about 

gangs ranked as the two least important activities that the unit performed. Similarly, in 

Albuquerque and Las Vegas, these two activities were ranked in importance to the gang 

unit just above dealing with gang graffiti, which received the lowest score in both 

departments. 

Differentiating Organizational Configurations 

We found that each of the gang units had a distinctive organizational 

configuration designed to facilitate their mandated function(s). In particular, we found 

that the organizational configuration of police gang units could generally be placed along 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 178 

a continuum of complexity based on the number of functions that the unit performed and 

how those functions were organized within the unit. At one end of the continuum was the 

single function gang unit, where responsibilities and tasks were not functionally, 

spatially, or temporally differentiated. A good example of this organizational 

configuration was Inglewood’s gang unit. The unit consisted of three officers who were 

assigned to collect, process, and disseminate gang intelligence for the entire police 

department, during a single daytime shift (10 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.) Although the unit did 

occasionally engage in auxiliary functions, for organizational purposes, it was mandated 

with a single function -- intelligence -- for which all of the officers in the unit were 

responsible. In fact, the unit’s organizational configuration was so simple that the 

department did not believe that the unit required an immediate supervisor. 

Further along the continuum was a somewhat more complex organizational 

configuration. This type of unit was responsible for multiple functions, but functions 

were not differentiated among the officers in the gang unit. This type of gang unit tended 

to perform two functions, such as intelligence and suppression, with one being primary 

and the other secondary. Here, we define the primary function as the focal activity of the 

unit, the one on which most of the unit’s efforts and resources were expended. The 

secondary function usually received far less attention and fewer resources, and was 

viewed as less important by gang unit officers. This type of unit also expected all of its 

officers to engage in all gang unit functions. In other words, gang control activities were 

diffused evenly throughout the unit, to be conducted by all officers. 

The Albuquerque Police Department’s gang unit was a good example of this type 

of unit. The Albuquerque unit was responsible for a combination of intelligence and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 179 

auxiliary investigative activities, with the emphasis on intelligence. The unit was staffed 

with one sergeant, three officers, and (at the time of our observation) one part-time 

civilian volunteer. All gang unit officers were responsible for gathering, processing, and 

disseminating gang intelligence, and were required to assist detectives with criminal 

investigations involving gang members. However, there was some functional and spatial 

differentiation of responsibilities within the gang unit. First, the sergeant assigned the 

civilian volunteer to process gang intelligence. In particular, the civilian collected all field 

investigation (FI) cards on documented gang members and entered the information in the 

gang unit’s computerized intelligence system. Second, gang unit officers were assigned 

to particular command areas and were responsible for conducting intelligence and 

investigative functions in their assigned areas. As such, they were to disseminate gang 

intelligence to the area commander and to other officers who worked in their areas, and 

they worked with the detectives who were assigned to investigate crimes in the same 

area. 

The Albuquerque gang unit was not temporally differentiated, with all of the 

officers working the same hours. On Tuesday, all officers worked from 10 a.m. to 6:30 

p.m., primarily to focus on paperwork and liaise with day and swing shift personnel. 

Wednesday through Saturday, the officers worked from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., the period 

perceived by gang managers to have the greatest amount of gang activity. During these 

days. officers were to liaise with swing shift officers and target gang members for the 

purpose of collecting intelligence. 

Next on the continuum was the Phoenix Police Department gang unit. This unit 

was assigned two functions: intelligence and enforcement. To perform these functions, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 180 

the unit was staffed with 39.5 personnel; 31 were sworn officers, 1.5 were civilians, and 7 

were supervisors. The activities of the gang unit were functionally, spatially, and 

temporally differentiated. In terms of functional differentiation, the unit was comprised of 

six squads. Four were dedicated to street enforcement; each squad was staffed with about 

six officers. These officers were primarily responsible for investigating serious gang 

crimes; their secondary function was to collect gang intelligence, performing directed 

patrols in known gang areas. The four squads were in turn spatially differentiated, with 

three squads assigned to one of three precincts -- Maryvale, South Mountain, or Central 

City -- and one assigned to both of the northern districts, Desert Horizon and Cactus 

Park. In terms of temporal differentiation, all of the squads worked from 3 p.m. to 1 a.m., 

but two of the squads were assigned to work Wednesday through Saturday, and two 

worked Saturday through Tuesday. All four squads worked during what managers 

perceived to be high-peak gang activity hours, and all worked on Saturday, the day that 

gang activity was thought to be greatest. 

The fifth squad was dedicated to street investigations, and was staffed with two 

officers and 1.5 civilians. This squad was functionally differentiated, in that its two 

civilian staff were responsible for processing and disseminating the unit’s gang 

intelligence for the entire city, while the two sworn officers worked with the district 

attorney’s office to collect evidence on all cases previously submitted by the gang unit. 

The two sworn officers in the street investigations unit also had secondary responsibility 

for investigating serious gang crimes; however, they only performed investigations when 

the gang crime took place during hours not worked by the enforcement squad, and if they 

were not too busy responding to requests by the county attorney’s office or administering 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 181 

the gang Repeat Offender Program (ROP). All of the officers and civilians in this squad 

worked Monday through Friday from roughly 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Managers stated that 

this squad worked the day shift, during the week, because their positions required them to 

work with stakeholders (e.g., the county attorney’s office, detectives) who also worked 

these hours and days. 

The sixth squad was part of a federal gang task force. The gang unit allocated five 

officers and one sergeant to the task force, that also included ten Federal Bureau of 

Investigations (FBI) agents, one parole officer, one investigator from the State 

Department of Corrections (DOC), one officer from the Mesa Police Department, and 

one officer from the State Department of Public Safety (DPS). The task force was 

responsible for gathering intelligence and conducting investigations on highly organized 

gangs throughout the metropolitan area. These officers worked various hours and days of 

the week, depending on the nature of the investigation. 

At end of the continuum, opposite the organizationally “simple” unit, is the 

organizationally “complex” unit, which is functionally comprehensive and highly 

differentiated. This gang unit performs intelligence, enforcement, and prevention, with 

each of these functions being assigned to highly specialized squads or details within the 

unit. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s gang section might serve as an 

example of an organizationally complex gang unit. Las Vegas’s gang section was 

responsible for intelligence and enforcement functions, and performed some prevention 

and intervention-oriented activities. These functions were covered by 41 sworn officers, 

11 civilians, and 8 supervisors, each of whom was assigned to one of six teams. 

Fifteen of the Las Vegas officers were assigned to one of the two enforcement 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 182 

teams. The teams were primarily responsible for two functions: enforcement and 

intelligence gathering. In particular, they were assigned the task of performing highly 

visible, directed patrols in known gang hot spots and collecting intelligence on gang 

members, gangs, and gang activity from gang members, patrol officers, and residents. 

Likewise, eleven officers were assigned to one of two investigation teams. These teams 

were charged with investigating all gang-motivated crimes, with the exception of 

homicides, sexual assaults, and high-profile take-over robberies such as casino robberies. 

When officers assigned to the investigation teams were not investigating gang-motivated 

crimes, they supplemented the efforts of the officers on the enforcement teams. 

Gang unit managers and the intelligence squad analyzed data on drive-by 

shootings to determine the hours that officers would be assigned to work. In particular, 

they were interested in increasing the probability that gang unit officers would be on duty 

during the hours that drive-by shootings most often occurred. This was intended to 

increase the enforcement squads’ presence during peak gang activity to increase 

deterrence, and decrease the likelihood that the investigative squads would be “called 

out,” in order to decrease overtime pay for investigating gang crimes. As a result, both of 

the enforcement and investigations squads worked from 3 p.m. to 1 a.m. One 

enforcement team and one investigation squad worked Wednesday through Saturday, and 

the others worked Sunday through Wednesday. 

Eleven officers and eleven civilians were assigned to the gang intelligence unit. 

Within the unit were three squads or details: intelligence, case submittal, and graffiti. All 

officers and civilians worked Monday through Friday from about 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

Similarly to Phoenix, these hours were chosen because the tasks performed by the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 183 

personnel required them to connect with stakeholders who worked during these same 

hours (e.g., county attorney’s office, business owners).

 Seven officers and eleven civilians worked within the intelligence squad, which 

was responsible for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating gang intelligence. Civilian 

staff worked with sworn officers to process all collected gang intelligence, maintain the 

gang information system, and disseminate gang intelligence to those who requested it. 

Additionally, sworn officers in the intelligence squad occasionally presented preventionoriented talks to school-aged youth, as well as to groups of community members, and 

they provided gang members with employment opportunities. 

Located within the gang intelligence unit was the case submittal office staffed 

with two sworn officers. These officers were responsible for preparing all gang cases, by 

both patrol and gang unit officers, for prosecution. This included case screening, sorting 

paperwork, evidence disposition, and search and seizures. As such, these officers tracked 

all gang cases through their conclusions and liaised with the county attorney’s office. 

Two officers were assigned to the graffiti detail. These officers were responsible for 

investigating all cases of gang graffiti, gathering intelligence on individuals who engaged 

in gang graffiti, and reporting gang graffiti to city services for removal. 

Last, the gang unit assigned four officers to the Southern Nevada Gang Task 

Force. The task force was a cooperative effort involving the Drug Enforcement Agency 

(DEA), the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department gang unit, Nevada Division of 

Investigation, and the Henderson Police Department. The task force was charged with 

enforcing drug laws as a means of targeting gangs involved in high-level drug sales. In 

particular, the task force targeted drug organizations that supplied drugs to street gangs, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 184 

in order to reduce the supply of drugs to the community. These officers, for the most part, 

worked from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, unless an investigation required 

an alternate schedule. 

Gang Unit Control and Management 

We examined gang unit control and management in the four departments that we 

studied by focusing on four topics: the existence and adequacy of written policies and 

procedures, the degree to which measurable goals and objectives were formally 

established, unit performance measures, and the extent to which personnel were 

supervised. Although our examination is not a comprehensive audit of gang management, 

we do examine several useful indicators of the managerial quality of the units. 

Written Policies and Procedures 

An analysis of interview data from gang unit officers, supervisors, and 

departmental executives, as well as a review of departmental documents, showed wide 

variations in the existence and adequacy of written policies and procedures governing the 

gang units that we studied. Inglewood’s gang unit was at one extreme with no written 

guidelines and no formal documentation of the unit’s functions, the activities that it was 

to engage in, or even a general statement of its mission or purpose. We asked all 

Inglewood gang unit officers, as well as all supervisors that we spoke with, for any 

written policies, procedures, or other guidelines governing the gang unit, but little could 

be found. The only written policies that we identified concerned the documentation of 

gang members and gangs, and these had been developed by the Los Angeles County 

Sheriff’s Department. As a consequence, in the absence of written guidelines, the 

Inglewood gang unit’s function was largely determined by departmental culture and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 185 

traditions that had been developed over time by previous gang unit officers. 

One of the three Inglewood gang unit officers had been with the unit for more 

than 20 years, since its creation. He provided the unit with stability and continuity in 

terms of expectations and functions. For example, a wide and deep consensus about the 

gang unit’s function was evident from interviews with gang unit officers, police 

executives, and internal and external stakeholders. In particular, nearly everyone was in 

agreement that the primary function of the gang unit was to collect, process, and 

disseminate gang intelligence. Almost no other function was ever mentioned. As a result, 

the officers in the unit were not conflicted about priorities or their role and function 

within the department. However, with this said, there were no written policies governing 

the unit or its officers. 

Similarly, in Albuquerque, no written policies or procedures existed for the gang 

unit, other than a few departmental documents that defined gangs and gang members. 

However, as stated in the previous chapter, at the time of our study the gang unit had 

been only recently resurrected. Interviews with police supervisors indicated that when the 

unit was created, there were few expectations about what the unit would do. The precise 

function of the unit was largely left up to the newly appointed sergeant who, in the 

beginning, directed officers toward activities involving intelligence gathering and 

dissemination. The sergeant also assigned a civilian volunteer to process gang 

intelligence. As such, although the unit did not have an official mandate or policies or 

procedures to facilitate operational activities, the unit’s supervisor assigned tasks with a 

common theme -- intelligence--to particular personnel, guiding the unit toward specific 

objectives. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 186 

After a short while, a consensus developed within the gang unit and among police 

executives that the function of the Albuquerque gang unit was twofold. First, the gang 

unit was responsible for gathering, processing, and disseminating gang intelligence. Each 

gang unit officer was assigned to a particular command area, where he was responsible 

for collecting gang intelligence and disseminating it to that area’s commander. Second, 

gang unit officers were responsible for assisting investigators in their assigned areas with 

criminal investigations involving gang members. As such, although gang unit officers did 

not have primary responsibility for gang investigations, they were responsible for 

working with investigators when their assistance was requested. 

Unlike the Inglewood and Albuquerque departments, the Phoenix Police 

Department did have written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), about four pages in 

length, that were regularly revised to provide guidance to the gang unit and its personnel. 

The department’s SOP stipulated the following as the purpose of the gang unit: 

To provide the Phoenix Police Department with investigative, 

enforcement, and intelligence support in combating street gang activity. 

This support meets a two prong Department need: 1) the need to carry out 

its mission to protect the public and suppress criminal activity, and 2) the 

need to accurately identify and regulate members of known street gangs 

believed to be involved in criminal activity (Phoenix Police Department, 

April, 2000: 1). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 187 

Exhibit 5.02 Functions and responsibilities of Phoenix gang unit squads 

Street Gang Enforcement Squad Street Gang Investigation Squad 

Utilize community resources through formalized 

plan to obtain intelligence on gang activity. 

Identify geographic areas experiencing violent 

gang behavior. Identify and document gang 

hierarchy and membership by established 

departmental criteria. 

Maintain a working relationship with Patrol and 

Detective Details for more effective coordination of 

effort and assistance in clearing Departmental 

Reports involving gang-related crimes. 

Conduct talks on gang activity on an as-needed 

basis to other law enforcement agencies. 

Gather and disseminate gang intelligence 

information to other law enforcement agencies in 

compliance with the Department’s criteria. 

Conduct initial and follow-up investigations on 

specific gang-related violent crimes and comply 

with Case Management regulations under 

Operations Order E-5. 

The Street Gang Investigator must identify 

geographic areas experiencing violent gang 

behavior; identify gang hierarchy and 

membership by establishing department criteria. 

The investigator must establish a working 

relationship with Field Officers and members of 

the judicial system for more effective 

coordination of effort, conduct follow-up 

investigations on gang related crimes in 

coordination with G.I.B., and assist in clearing 

Departmental Reports. 

Conduct talks on gang activity at the Phoenix 

Regional Training Academy and on an asneeded basis to other law enforcement 

agencies and the public. 

Gather and disseminate gang intelligence 

information to other law enforcement agencies 

in compliance with the department’s criteria. 

Monitor and respond to gang related incidents 

during the time the enforcement unit is off-duty. 

Maintain a working relationship with County 

Attorney’s Gang/R.O.P. Detail. 

Adapted from Phoenix Police Department Standard Operating Procedures 

The department’s SOP also clearly outlined many of the functions to be carried 

out by the squads in the gang unit. For example, the Phoenix Police Department’s SOP 

stated that five functions and responsibilities were to be performed by officers assigned to 

street gang enforcement squads, and seven were to be performed by officers assigned to 

the street gang investigations squad (exhibit 5.02). 

A quick examination of the above exhibit illustrates that although the squads were 

assigned to perform some similar functions, each had its own unique functions, as well. 

For example, both squads were responsible for gathering and disseminating gang 

intelligence and for using that intelligence to identify geographic areas with a substantial 

amount of violent gang activity. Both were also responsible for making presentations to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 188 

law enforcement officials on the nature of the local gang problem. However, although the 

street gang enforcement squad was responsible for coordinating and collaborating with 

other officers in the department to solve gang crimes, the gang investigation squad was 

also responsible for conducting investigations, case management, and collaborating with 

the county attorney’s gang/ROP detail. 

The Phoenix Police Department Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) governing 

the gang unit also discussed the role of the gang unit’s sergeant, and provided general 

direction to gang unit personnel. The SOP covered issues relating to the operation of 

vehicles, and set out detailed policies and procedures governing notification of the 

parents of juvenile gang members who had been contacted by gang unit officers. Many of 

the gang unit personnel possessed legislative documents that detailed the state law 

governing documentation of gangs and gang members by law enforcement agencies. 

Overall, the Phoenix gang unit was fairly well governed by written policies and 

procedures, with the department SOP clearly stating the purpose and functions of the unit 

squads, as well as providing policies and procedures to guide daily operations. 

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s gang unit had the most 

comprehensive policy and procedures manual. Approximately 50 pages in length, it 

focused on three major issues: 1) organizational objectives and goals, 2) general policies 

and procedures, and 3) specific procedures. Additionally, the manual provided definitions 

on gangs, gang members, and gang crime. 

The Las Vegas gang unit’s policy manual thoroughly discussed the configuration 

of the unit, detailing its rank and organizational structure, and providing a detailed 

description of each unit or squad or detail’s function. For example, as seen in exhibit 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 189 

5.03, the manual stated that the unit would be comprised of five sections: the gang 

intelligence unit, a case submittal office, investigative teams, enforcement teams, and the 

Southern Nevada Gang Task Force. As discussed in the prior section, the intelligence unit 

was responsible for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence; the case 

submittal office prepared gang cases for prosecution; the investigative teams were 

charged with investigating gang-motivated crimes; the enforcement teams were charged 

with gathering intelligence and patrolling gang hot spots; and the task force was 

responsible for targeting gangs involved in high-level drug trafficking. 

In addition to providing gang unit officers with guidance as to their functions and 

the activities that they were to perform, the Las Vegas unit’s policy manual described 

general issues pertaining to the coordination of training, the operation of the section’s 

library, the management of criminal intelligence information, and records retention. It 

also provided information pertaining to officer uniforms, property assigned to officers, 

personal appearance, and the issuance of departmental vehicles. The manual dedicated 

considerable space to specific procedures for disseminating gang intelligence, handling 

confidential informants, maintaining investigative files, making media releases, 

establishing seizure logs, and obtaining search warrants. Overall, Las Vegas’s gang unit 

was unique among the four that we studied in that its SOP was thorough and detailed in 

its presentation of policies and procedures governing gang unit officers. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 190 

Exhibit 5.03 Functions and responsibilities of Las Vegas gang unit squads 

Gang Intelligence Unit 

The gang intelligence unit is charged with information gathering, analyzing, and dissemination to include: 

1. Identifying new or emerging trends in gang modus operandi. 

2. To develop and maintain liaison with local law enforcement agencies. 

3. To ensure purges of gang members, associate gang members, and deceased gang members are removed 

from SCOPE. 

Case Submittal Office 

The Case Submittal Office is charged with preparing criminal cases initiated by Patrol and GIS for criminal prosecution 

at all levels of local government. 

1. Case screening 

2. Submittals 

3. Case closeouts 

4. Evidence disposition 

5. Seizures 

Investigative Teams 

The investigation teams are charged with enforcing federal, state, and county and city laws, ordinances and 

codes as violated by gang members. This will be accomplished through follow-up investigations of all gangmotivated crimes, except homicides, sexual assaults, and high-profile takeover robberies; proactive 

covert/overt investigations of street gang crime; monitor/maintain investigative case until final disposition; 

and assist victim/witness with case updates and disposition. 

Enforcement Teams 

The enforcement team is charged with two basic missions: 

1. To provide high visibility patrol-oriented activities and community interaction in identified hot spots; 

thereby, reducing the potential for escalation, prevention of violence, and reduction of fear. 

2. To provide continuous interaction and enforcement in concentrated gang turfs; thereby, complimenting 

patrol’s efforts in gathering much needed intelligence through field interviews, patrol and citizen contacts. 

Southern Nevada Gang Task Force 

1. The Southern Nevada Task Force (SNGTF) is a cooperative effort involving the Drug Enforcement Agency 

as the host agency, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Gang Investigation Section, Nevada 

Division of Investigation, and the Henderson Police Department. 

2. The focus of the task force is to use narcotics enforcement as a vehicle to prosecute and remove from our 

community violent gang members. The task force also targets mid- to high-level narcotic organizations which 

supply the street-level gang members. 

Adapted from the Las Vegas Police Department Standard Operating Procedures 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 191 

Documenting Gangs, Gang Members, and Gang Crime 

All four of the gang units were responsible for collecting gang intelligence for 

their departments. Each had established written policies for the documentation of gang 

members and gangs. The Las Vegas and Phoenix gang units also had formal policies for 

defining gang crimes. 

Albuquerque (in the early 1990s) and Inglewood (in 1989) adopted the Los 

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s Gang Reporting, Evaluation and Tracking 

(GREAT) system for its departmental gang information system. Along with it, both units 

adopted the Sheriff’s Department’s criteria for documenting gang members. Both 

departments still were still using those same criteria at the time of this study. 

In Arizona, in 1994, the state legislature implemented several gang-related 

definitions for the purpose of establishing a statewide standard for documenting gangs 

and gang members. In that same year, the Phoenix Police Department adopted the criteria 

established by its state legislators in an effort to be consistent with other agencies across 

the state and to increase the utility of gang intelligence within the state. Las Vegas was 

the only department that did not rely on an outside agency or institution to establish its 

criteria for documenting gang members. Rather, in 1993, the unit created its own 

criteria.9 

As seen in exhibit 5.04, all four of the gang units relied on many of the same 

criteria to document gang members. For example, all four agencies used self-admission, 

tattoos and clothing associated with gangs, and intelligence from reliable informants as 

criteria for documenting gang members. Additionally, three of the four units used hand 

signs associated with gangs, prior arrests with known gang members, and prior 

identification by another police agency as grounds for documentation. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 192 

Exhibit 5.04 Police gang unit criteria for identifying gang members 

Albuquerque Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

Self-admission Self- Self-admission a Self-admission 

admission 

Tattoos assoc. with Tattoos assoc. with Tattoos assoc. with Tattoos assoc. with 

gangs gangs gangs a gangs 

Clothing and colors Clothing and colors Clothing and colors 

b 

Clothing and colors 

Possession of gang Possession of gang 

graffiti graffiti 

Use of hand signs 

assoc. with gangs 

Use of hand signs 

assoc. with gangs 

Use of hand signs 

assoc. with gangs b 

Reliable informant Reliable informant Reliable informant b Reliable informant 

Associates with Associates with 

known gang known gang 

members members 

Prior arrest with Prior arrest with Prior arrests with 

known gang 

members 

known gang 

members 

known gang 

members b 

Statements from Statements from Statements from 

family members family members parents b 

Identified as a gang Identified as a gang Identified as a gang 

member by other member by other member by other 

law enforcement law enforcement law enforcement 

agency agency agency 

Attendance at gang Attendance at gang 

function function 

Identified by other Identified by other 

gang members gang members 

Participation in 

gang related crime a 

Any other Any other indicators 

circumstance when of street gang 

an officer can membership 

articulate obvious 

gang membership a 

Identified as an Identified as an 

assoc. by physical assoc. by physical 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 193 

evidence (e.g., evidence (e.g., 

photo, letter) b photo, letter) 

a

 Denotes status as a gang member; b Denotes status as a gang member associate 

Although both Albuquerque and Inglewood used criteria such as possession of 

gang graffiti, association with know gang members, attendance at gang functions, and 

identification by another gang member to document gang members, Las Vegas and 

Phoenix used physical evidence and any other indications that would suggest gang 

membership for that purpose. 

Both Las Vegas and Phoenix had two classifications of gang members for 

documentation purposes. In Las Vegas, the criteria for documenting gang associates and 

gang members were different. As seen in exhibit 5.04, primary evidence, such as selfadmission, wearing a tattoo associated with a gang, or participation in a gang crime, was 

needed to document an individual as a gang member. Secondary evidence, such as 

statements from parents or a reliable informant, could only be used to document an 

individual as a gang associate. 

In Phoenix, gang associates had to meet only one of the state legislature’s criteria 

to be documented, while gang members had to meet two or more of those criteria. The 

difference between gang associates and gang members was primarily one of 

recordkeeping. In particular, intelligence and records on gang associates could not be 

used by prosecutors in court, while intelligence on gang members could. Furthermore, 

gang associate records had to be purged from the unit’s gang database after being 

retained a shorter time than gang member records. (Issues related to purging are 

discussed in chapter 7.) 

Three of the four gang units defined gangs in similar terms. As seen in exhibit 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 194 

5.05, Albuquerque, Inglewood, and Las Vegas used almost identical criteria; a gang was 

defined as 1) a group of three or more persons, 2) with a common name, and/or common 

identifying signs or symbols, and 3) with members who were engaged in crime. 

Phoenix’s definition, created by the state legislature, was a variation using similar 

criteria. In Phoenix, a gang was defined as: 1) an association of persons who had at least 

one criminal street gang member, and 2) whose members engaged in the commission, 

attempted commission, facilitation, or solicitation of any felony act. Although Phoenix’s 

definition was perhaps broader, in that it did not require a certain number of members or 

a name or other identifiers common to all members, it did require the group or its 

members to be involved in felonious activity. 

Exhibit 5.05 Police definitions of a gang by city and gang unit 

Definitions: 

Albuquerque An organization, association, or group of three or more persons, formal or informal, that has a 

common name, and/or common identifying signs or symbols, whose members individually 

and/or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity. 

Inglewood A group of three or more persons who have a common identifying sign, symbol, or name, and 

whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 

activity creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation within the community. 

Las Vegas An ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or 

informal, who have a common name or common identifying symbol, whose members 

individually or collectively engage in a pattern of unlawful or criminal activity. 

Phoenix An ongoing formal or informal association of persons whose members or associates 

individually or collectively engage in the commission, attempted commission, facilitation, or 

solicitations of any felony act, and that has at least one individual who is a criminal street gang 

member. 

Defining criteria: Albuquerq Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

ue 

Three or more members X X X 

Common name, signs, symbols X X X 

Pattern of criminal activity X X X 

Association of persons one of X 

whom is a criminal street gang 

member 

Members engage or attempt to X 

engage in or facilitate a felony 

Two of the gang units had formal, written policies defining gang crimes. The 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 195 

Phoenix Police Department’s definition was motive based, more restrictive than 

definitions used in many other police departments, but clear and concise: “Any criminal 

act committed for the purpose of promoting gang status or personal status in a gang.” 

Las Vegas’s written policy defining gang crime was also motive based, but the 

examples accompanying it were of gang-related and gang-motivated crimes. It was also 

somewhat more complex and difficult to interpret: 

Crimes committed by gang members or associates, which by the nature of 

the crime would tend to benefit the gang or the status of a gang member 

within the gang. Examples include drive-by shootings; crimes committed 

as a part of an initiation for membership into a gang; or any violent street 

crime confirmed to be related and/or gang motivated, including all gang 

incidents associated with weapons and violent crimes involving juvenile 

gang members. [emphasis added]. 

Furthermore, the policy clearly stated that any violent crime involving a juvenile 

gang member would, by definition, be considered a gang crime. In chapter 7, we will 

discuss how these definitions affected the recording of gang crime and the assignment of 

officers to investigate particular crimes. 

Formal Goals and Objectives 

We found wide variations in the gang units’ formal goals and objectives. Neither 

the Albuquerque nor the Inglewood gang unit had formally established goals or 

objectives. When gang unit managers in these departments were asked to define their 

unit’s goals and objectives, they were unclear about what we wanted. Some answered by 

discussing their unit’s assigned functions; others listed common activities. For example, 

Inglewood managers stated that the unit’s goal was to collect and disseminate gang 

intelligence (a function). In Albuquerque, executives stated that their goals were to 

perform intelligence-related activities and to assist other detectives with gang-related 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 196 

investigations (also functions). Managers of these units were guided by the functions 

assigned to them, rather than to the purpose and expected outcomes of their work, and by 

the corresponding activities and processes that needed to be performed by the gang units. 

Although Phoenix had no goals or objectives among their standard operating 

procedures, the unit did have two administrative mechanisms for which unit goals had 

been set. The first was a monthly management report for the Bureau commander, 

generated by the lieutenant in charge of the gang unit. The report listed nine goals that 

were to be achieved by the gang unit, monthly and annually: 

1. Adjust case clearance rate on assigned gang follow-up investigations. 

2. Number of gangs successfully targeted for criminal investigation. 

3. Efforts to include community notification in [number set annually] percent of 

gang investigations. 

4. Notify Area Managers within 8 hours of any significant Organized Crime 

Bureau operation in their area. 

5. Percentage of parental follow-up contacts by gang squad’s following 

documented street contacts. 

6. Efforts to improve morale 

7. Provide a minimum of eight (8) hours per year of formalized training for 

[number set annually] percent of all OCB personnel. 

8. Number of documented efforts to improve internal communications within the 

Bureau. 

9. Developing innovative ways to absorb unanticipated costs, identify budgetary 

savings, and overall budget management. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 197 

Second, as part of Operation Safe Streets (chapter 7), the Phoenix gang unit 

established five goals and objectives that it strived to meet every summer (May 15th 

through August 15th): 

1. Reducing gang-related violent offenses by three percent during the summer 

months. 

2. Investigating 90 percent of the violent crimes involving criminal street gangs 

during the hours of OSS2000. 

3. Respond to 100 percent of the citizen complaints of criminal street gang 

activity in their neighborhood within 5 working days. 

4. Maximize the enforcement of all weapons violations though the use of 

“Project Exile” while utilizing all appropriate federal and state charges. 

5. Reduce the perceived fear that criminal street gangs have on the community 

by providing constant feedback of OSS2000 enforcement efforts to the 

affected neighborhood associations and Block Watch groups through the 

Precinct Area Team Managers (Phoenix Police Department, 2000:1). 

At the end of each summer, the unit submitted a report to police executives, as well as to 

area commanders, documenting the success or failure of the unit’s efforts. 

Over the year, the Phoenix gang unit set objectives and performance measures 

related to unit processes and outcomes, focusing on process-oriented measures such as 

the number of gang investigations and gangs targeted, the number of training hours 

provided to officers, and the number of efforts to improve internal communications 

within the Bureau. The unit also set outcome-based objectives such as the reduction of 

gang violence and of fear of gangs within the community. Of interest was the fact that the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 198 

gang unit in Phoenix had not referenced collecting, processing, or disseminating gang 

intelligence in any of its goals, objectives, or performance measures, although 

intelligence was one of its primary functions. 

Las Vegas was the only gang unit of the four to have formal goals and objectives 

within its SOP. The goal of the gang unit as set out in the department’s SOP was as 

follows: 

The Gang Investigation Section (GIS) of the Organized Crime Bureau 

(OCB) of the Special Operations Division (SOD) will be responsible for 

the lawful collection, analyzation, dissemination of intelligence 

information, and the follow-up investigation of gang-motivated crime, 

except crimes involving homicide, sexual assault, or high profile takeover 

robberies, such as casino robberies. 

The objectives of the unit were also in the unit’s SOP: 

The objectives of the Gang Investigations Section are to suppress street 

gang criminal activity through lawful arrests and prosecution, and to deter 

street gang criminal activity through the lawful collection, analyzation, 

and dissemination of intelligence information. Specific annual objectives 

will be written as per 5/102.32 of the Department Manual. 

As noted above, the gang unit also had yearly objectives. For the period of our 

observation, the gang had these five objectives: 

1. Through enhanced collection and communications and improved use of 

automated systems, the Gang Investigations Bureau will analyze and 

disseminate gang intelligence information such that a minimum of 55 percent 

of cases submitted for prosecution include such information. 

2. Through criminal investigations, use of technology, advanced surveillance and 

coordination with other agencies and department sections and bureaus, the 

Gang Investigation Bureau with (sic) affect an increase in the number of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 199 

weapon cases submitted for prosecution on violent gang members by 5 

percent from previous year statistics. 

3. Through seminars, public presentations, the citizen academy and media 

exposure, the Gang Investigation Bureau will affect an increase in the number 

of community groups educated on street gangs by 10 percent from previous 

year statistics. 

4. Through comprehensive, historical, and financial investigations, the Gang 

Investigation Bureau will participate in a multi-jurisdictional task force such 

that three violent gang organizations are investigated toward pursuing federal 

and state prosecution. 

5. Through interaction with patrol, proactive visible police presence, community 

interaction, tactical enforcement activity, and involvement in the Department 

of Housing and Urban Development’s Operation Safe Home, the Gang 

Investigation Bureau will affect a decrease of weapon related gang violence in 

selected gang corridors by 5 percent from the previous year statistics. 

The Las Vegas gang unit’s goals and objectives were generally comprehensive, 

and the objectives were updated annually. As in Phoenix, Las Vegas’s objectives related 

to both unit processes and desired outcomes, focused on increasing investigative use of 

gang intelligence, decreasing gang violence, the number of targeted gang investigations, 

the number of presentations to the public, and the number of weapons cases submitted for 

prosecution. Also as in Phoenix, however, Las Vegas did not focus on issues related to 

the collection or dissemination of gang intelligence. 

Expected Outcomes 

During our interviews with gang unit managers, we asked about the outcomes that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 200 

they expected from their gang units, formally and informally.10 In all four departments, 

the unit managers listed similar outcomes that they sought from their gang control 

officers’ efforts (exhibit 5.06). More than 60 percent of the managers in each department 

cited the reduction of gang crime as an important outcome, but within each department 

and among all four departments, they then became less consistent in their expectations. 

In Albuquerque, gang unit managers expected the gang unit to reduce fear of 

crime and increase perceptions of safety, whereas in Inglewood, managers were 

interested in increasing alternatives for youth. In Phoenix, managers stated that the gang 

unit should be increasing intelligence collected on gang members, and in Las Vegas, 

managers sought a reduction in the number of gangs and gang members and an increase 

in the number of gang convictions. 

Exhibit 5.06 Gang unit managers’ expectations of informal outcomes (percentages) 

Albuquerq Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

Expected outcomes: ue n=4 n=6 n=5 

n=3 

Decrease gang crime/violence 66.6 100 66.6 60 

Reduce fear of gang crime 33.3 

Reduce # of gangs 16.6 

Reduce # of gang members 16.6 

Increase perception of safety 33.3 

Increase intelligence on gang 40 

members 

Increase alternatives for youth 50 

Increase gang convictions 16.6 

Other/vague 16.6 

Accordingly, regardless of the units’ functions, goals, or objectives, the consensus of all 

gang unit managers in all four departments was that gang units should achieve reductions 

in gang crime. 

Of interest was the fact that the managers’ responses did not connect their desired 

outcomes to unit capacity or functions. For example, no explanation was given for why a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 201 

single-function unit (Inglewood) should achieve the same outcome(s) as a more 

comprehensive unit (Las Vegas). In addition, in both Albuquerque and Inglewood, the 

primary designated function was to gather and disseminate gang intelligence, activities 

that were not directly related to changing citizen perceptions of crime and safety nor to 

providing opportunities for youth, the outcomes sought by the Albuquerque and 

Inglewood gang unit managers. 

Performance Measures 

Of the four departments, only Las Vegas used formal performance measures to 

gauge unit success, tracking the numbers of gang members, reported drive-by shootings, 

deceased gang members, cases submitted, cases cleared, arrests (by type), seizures, cases 

initiated and assisted, weapons and narcotics recovered, and field interviews. The Las 

Vegas gang unit also used specific measures for tracking the success of its graffiti detail: 

the numbers of taggers, arrests, charges (by type), citations, search warrants, seizures, 

requests for service, classes instructed, cases handled, and field interviews, and the total 

amount of damage caused by graffiti. 

We interviewed managers about the measures they used, formally or informally, 

to evaluate gang unit performance. Gang unit managers in all four departments generally 

agreed on the importance of one specific performance measure of effectiveness: the 

amount of gang and non-gang crime (exhibit 5.07). Other than this outcome measure, 

most managers combined outcome and process measures. For instance, in Albuquerque, 

the managers tracked the number of cases submitted to the county attorney’s office, gang 

statistics, and the amount of reported graffiti. In Las Vegas, managers focused on the 

number of arrests and the amount of drugs taken off the streets by gang unit officers, as 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 202 

well as the number of gang members in the city and the amount of reported graffiti. 

In Phoenix, managers used process measures, such as the numbers of cases 

submitted to the county attorney’s office and of arrests made by the unit, and outcome 

measures, such as the number of individuals documented by the unit annually and the 

unit’s clearance and conviction rates. Only Inglewood focused exclusively on outcome 

measures. In addition to the amount of crime, managers in Inglewood examined citizen 

perceptions of safety and quality of life, and whether or not the city council was satisfied 

with their efforts. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 203 

Exhibit 5.07 Managers using performance measures for evaluations (percentages) 

Albuquerq Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

Performance measures: ue n=4 n=6 n=5 

n=3 

Crime/violence 66.6 75 100 40 

Citizen perception of safety 25 

Citizen perception of quality of life 25 

City council satisfaction 25 

Cases submitted to district attorney 33.3 20 

Gang statistics (vague) 33.3 

Amount of reported graffiti 33.3 16.6 

Gang members (as an outcome) 33.3 

Arrests 16.6 40 

Gang members documented (as an indicator 40 

of processes)

Amount of drugs taken off the streets 16.6 

Clearance rate 20 

Conviction rate 20 

Do not know 25 

Although all gang unit managers monitored in some way the amount of gang 

crime in their cities in order to evaluate unit effectiveness, we found that this particular 

measure was not necessarily indicative of unit performance. When the cities did 

experience increases in gang crime, the changes were not necessarily attributable to lack 

of gang unit success. Police executives recognized a multitude of reasons for gang crime 

to increase, many of which were unrelated the efforts of the gang unit. Of the remaining 

performance measures used by each department, few corresponded to the units’ assigned 

functions, and some relied upon data that the departments did not have the capacity to 

generate. 

For example, in Albuquerque, managers stated that they used the amount of 

reported graffiti, cases submitted to the county attorney, and “gang statistics” to evaluate 

the gang unit. We found the use of these measures problematic in several ways. First, the 

Albuquerque gang unit was not responsible for submitting cases to the county attorney, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 204 

only for assisting other detectives in the investigation of gang crime. Second, the 

Albuquerque gang unit was not typically responsible for issues involving gang graffiti. 

Third, neither the Albuquerque gang unit and nor the department produced data showing 

trends in gang membership or gang activity, nor did they produce reports about gangs, 

gang members, or gang activity. In fact, the agency did not regularly collect data 

pertaining to gang crime trends, making evaluation based on such statistics impossible. 

In Inglewood, managers evaluated the gang unit by measures such as citizen 

perceptions of safety and city council satisfaction. However, the primary function of the 

unit was to collect, process, and disseminate gang intelligence – a function with little 

direct impact on fear of gangs or the city council’s satisfaction with the department’s 

response to gangs. Furthermore, while managers stated that they used citizen perceptions 

of safety and council person satisfaction, such data was rarely collected; when it was, the 

results were so general in nature that even measurable changes could not in any way be 

directly attributed or related to unit activities. 

Since both were charged with collecting and disseminating gang intelligence, we 

might have expected that Albuquerque and Inglewood gang units would be evaluated by 

process measures that required tracking the numbers of individuals documented or of 

responses to requests for intelligence. The units could have used surveys to collect data 

about gang intelligence “consumer satisfaction.” In short, unit managers could have 

determined whether the intelligence collected by the unit was useful – how it was used, 

and how often. 

Both Phoenix and Las Vegas used process and outcome measures more in line 

with their respective functions, although they were both lacking the consistency and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 205 

emphasis that we would find within other units in the same police departments. For 

example, both units were responsible for directed patrols, yet the number of arrests made 

by the gang units were not tracked for their performance evaluations. Likewise, few of 

the managers mentioned clearance rates as a measure of success, even though both units 

had primary responsibility for investigating gang crimes. 

We would have expected emphasis to have been placed on measures related to 

collecting and disseminating gang intelligence, the core function of both units. Most 

managers did not indicate that their units were evaluated on measures such as the 

numbers of field interviews or stops or of gang members documented, or how often the 

unit responded to requests for intelligence. Interestingly, we did observe that some of this 

information was collected. For example, in Phoenix, the civilian staff in the intelligence 

squad tracked the annual number of requests for gang intelligence, the source of requests, 

the type of intelligence requested, and the amount of time spent responding to requests. 

These process indicators were used to illustrate the amount of intelligence that was 

disseminated and the amount of work performed by the unit. 

In Las Vegas, we found that the gang unit tracked performance indicators such as 

the numbers of field interviews conducted by officers and of gang members documented, 

along with the unit’s clearance rate. It was unclear why gang unit managers were 

unaware that these data were available for use in evaluating unit performance. 

Supervision of Gang Unit Personnel 

During our observations and interviews with gang unit officers and managers, we 

inquired about the supervision of the gang unit officers. In particular, we focused on the 

amount of supervisory attention given to gang unit officers by their immediate 

supervisors, and the extent to which managers perceived that they had control over their 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 206 

officers. We found variations from one unit to the next. 

In Inglewood, gang unit officers reported to a sergeant in the robbery and assault 

section, rather than having a supervisor within the unit. This resulted in their not being 

supervised on a regular basis. During our observations, we never saw this supervisor, nor 

was he referred to in any way. When we asked directly about the gang unit supervisor, 

the officers gave responses such as, “Well, we really don’t have one,” or “We have one, 

but it’s only a formality. He really does not have much to do with our unit.” With a little 

further probing, we learned that the officers contacted their supervisor only when 

something special was needed or an issue was viewed as particularly important. As two 

officers in the unit explained: 

They don’t supervise our daily activities. It’s not like they are over our 

shoulder or anything. When there is something really crucial or very, very 

important that is going on or some type of detailed project that we are 

doing, they are very much aware of it. But we are a well-disciplined unit. 

Not much discipline or supervision is needed.... Like I said before, most of 

the gang investigators here, we all have our own projects or assignment 

that we have to do, and the only time that we really need a supervisor 

around is when we have problems, or we need to get through some red 

tape, or if it is a big project where we are all involved. 

Units like our gang unit and our narcotic units are very loosely supervised, 

because on a day-to-day basis, we have so many different things we do 

that a supervisor really can't keep track of us. We are in here one minute, 

then we are out on the street. The next minute, we will be back in here 

again. So it’s hard for them. They just want to know what we are doing, 

and we brief them on what we are doing, why we do it, and when we have 

questions. We are pretty much a self-supervised, self-motivated unit.... It’s 

chain-of-command, we start from our sergeant and it goes up if it has to... 

The only formal means of supervision we observed in Inglewood took the form of 

a monthly report generated by the gang unit officers. The report included a review of all 

administrative and operational tasks performed by the gang unit. For example, it included 

information about major gang-related events, other units and organizations that the gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 207 

unit had assisted, and any other major activities engaged in by the gang unit officers. 

Interestingly, this monthly report was submitted directly to the commander of the Office 

of Special Investigations, and not to the unit’s formal supervisor in the Robbery Unit. 

Supervision of gang unit officers was more directed in Albuquerque than in 

Inglewood, but the supervising sergeant still provided his officers with a great deal of 

freedom. He explained: 

I tell my detectives that we give them a badge and we give them a gun, 

and they’re adults, and I want them to make their decisions on their own. 

A lot of time they do that. They are out there on their own and everything 

else, but I am here if they need supervision. If they need to ask questions 

and stuff, I am always available to them, but I try not to mother-hen them 

or micro-manage what they are doing. I like them to go out and be the 

liaison between the area commands and the area of town that they are 

working. I can’t do that for them. 

Observation of the Albuquerque gang unit, however, indicated that this sergeant 

was in fact involved in the day-to-day activities of the gang unit. He had regular contact 

throughout their shifts, ate most meals with them, worked beside the officers on 

investigations, and backed them up in the field. Interviews with the officers confirmed 

our observations. Gang unit officers in Albuquerque told us that they were often with the 

sergeant in the field, and that he was included in most field activity. Interestingly, the 

officers did not experience his participation as supervision, but rather as his working with 

them on the streets. One officer stated: 

I wouldn’t necessarily say it’s supervision, per se, as you need somebody 

watching over your shoulder for everything you do. It’s more that he’s 

involved in everything we do because he wants to be. He likes to work just 

like everybody in this unit. One reason they were chosen was because they 

worked. That was one of the big criteria. Did you work in the field? Did 

you actually go out and do stuff, or did you sit back and take calls all day 

long and not bother to be proactive whatsoever? He is a really proactive 

supervisor who likes to know what’s going on, get involved, and assist 

you and address any issues or problems that occur. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 208 

Another officer concurred: 

Pretty much, most of the time our sergeant’s with us side-by-side. If we 

request him to go with us, he’ll be right there with us. A lot of times he’ll 

ask us, “Hey, do you guys have anything going on?” If we say yes, he 

wants to come along. He acts more as a part of the team when we’re out in 

the field. If we develop the operation plan, it’s our operation plan, and he 

helps, but yet he’s always our supervisor. 

In Las Vegas, the amount of supervision officers received differed according to 

the squad to which he was assigned. Officers in enforcement squads received substantial 

supervision. In the field, the sergeant patrolled the same area as his squad, working all 

stops, interrogations, and arrests with his officers. As a consequence, enforcement squad 

officers had constant oversight. The following statement by an enforcement squad 

member represents many of the views we heard: 

[Supervision is] almost constant, because our sergeant is actually just 

another member of the team. He goes out with us, he does enforcement 

with us, he shows up on calls. He’s with us just about all the time. So 

there’s always...it’s not just as a supervisor, he’s a member of the team. 

He goes out there with us and takes care of business, and then if there is a 

need for a supervisor, he’s right there. 

When we asked the officers why the sergeant rode with their squad and constantly 

supervised their work, some explained this was a relatively new arrangement. They noted 

that the sheriff and his executive team had increased supervision of officers after a 1997 

incident in which two gang unit officers engaged in a drive-by shooting, killing a gang 

member. The police department hoped that increased supervision would reduce future 

problems that might be associated with the gang unit. 

Observations and interviews indicated that officers in the other gang unit squads 

worked under substantially less supervision. They noted that intense supervision was both 

impossible and unnecessary. First, officers assigned to the intelligence unit, graffiti detail, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 209 

and case submittal office all noted that their positions required them to work multiple 

assignments or cases, taking them in different directions than other officers in their units 

or squads or details. As a consequence, they pointed out, little supervision occurred due 

to the nature of their jobs. Second, many of the officers in these units saw themselves as 

experienced detectives who had been assigned to the unit because they were selfmotivated, needed little direction, and were responsible. As such, they and their 

supervisors felt that they did not need to be closely supervised, as they related to us: 

I can only answer that question for the two squads I’ve been on. I went to 

an investigative team for a time, and supervision was there, but it was 

loose. And because you’ve got six guys that are investigating not only six 

different cases, but they may have two or three cases apiece, so they got to 

go different directions to do different things. So in that case, the 

supervision is a little looser, yet everybody’s involved in knowing what 

each other is doing. 

Not much. I mean the whole purpose of coming up here is you are 

detectives. You are supposed to be self-starters, self-motivated. And they 

require, most of us require, little supervision or no supervision. That is the 

whole purpose of why you come up here. 

Well, speaking for myself, I’m working on a squad where the junior guy 

has eleven years on him. So to tell you the truth, we don’t need a lot of 

supervision. And basically, we know what to do, we know what our 

responsibilities are, and we really are more of a hands-off type thing, as 

far as supervision goes. 

As a result, many officers in Las Vegas only had contact with a supervisor when they 

were assigned a case and when they needed managerial assistance. 

Compared with supervisors in Las Vegas, Phoenix supervisors spent less time 

with their officers. Our observational and interview data suggested that most officers in 

the unit, regardless of assignment, had minimal supervisory contact. Most of that was in 

the form of briefings once or twice a week, or for administrative reviews (e.g., reviewing 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 210 

paperwork, case wrap-up). Officers pointed out that although they had daily contact with 

their supervisor, it was typically informal, such as general work-related conversations or 

discussions about their personal lives. When we asked officers about the amount of 

supervision they had, here’s what they had to say: 

We have a lot of contact with them, but it’s less the supervisory contacts 

as it is the relationship type of area, where we have a good personal 

relationship with our boss. Obviously, there’s a checks-and-balance 

system within this department, I think more so than a lot, and obviously 

we contact them if we’re going out of city, if we’re gonna do something, 

we always just give them a heads-up. I haven’t seen that being an issue. 

We’re not as supervised, especially not as much as in patrol. I mean, we’re 

given a lot of free rein as long as we’re doing our job and not screwing 

around. They’ll keep it check-and-balance, like I said, that we’re not doing 

nothing, but on that end, I don’t think that – I mean we’re not highly 

supervised. 

I think very minimal, everybody up here is supposed to be and is very 

minimally supervised because of the jobs that we have. Sometimes we 

won’t see our supervisor for a shift, sometimes for a couple days, 

depending on what you’re doing. However, if we do need something, we 

can basically rely on supervisors to take care of what we need or whatever, 

be it job related or personal reasons. You know, for days off or 

something’s going on, our supervisors are really good with that. 

Very little, you are self-supervised a lot. You’ll see your sergeant in the 

beginning of the shift and then as you need him throughout the night, you 

know then if there’s a shooting or something you’ll see him out there. But 

otherwise you’re pretty much on your own. 

We also asked gang unit managers whether officers in the gang unit knew their 

ideas and viewpoints regarding gang control efforts. The question was intended to focus 

on the formal and informal expectations that gang managers had for their units. In 

Albuquerque, managers were split; some believed that the officers were well aware of 

their viewpoints and ideas, and others did not. One commander, who had just recently 

returned from a lengthy leave of absence, believed that his officers were generally 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 211 

unaware of his viewpoints regarding the gang unit. The chief of police was unsure, while 

the lieutenant in charge of the unit was confident that the officers had a strong 

understanding of his perspective and viewpoints. 

The chief of police noted that he spoke with the sergeant in charge of the gang 

unit on occasion, and that he expected the sergeant to pass along the information; 

however, when asked directly, he was unclear about the extent to which that actually 

happened: 

I never say “yes” to those things. Too often I get embarrassed. I guess I 

would like to think that [the sergeant] has talked them. I think they 

generally know. It is generally understood. It is a very proactive group. 

It’s not social work. It’s knowing who the gang members are, trying to 

diffuse problems as they occur. If you get one kid shot, then you are going 

to have another kid shot by the other gang. It is just a matter of time. And 

what do we do to intervene to make sure that that doesn’t happen. 

The lieutenant in charge of the gang unit (along with other units) met frequently 

with his unit officers, both before they were assigned to the unit and afterward, to ensure 

that they understood the direction that the gang unit was heading and his expectations. 

Asked whether the officers knew what was expected of them, he responded: 

Yes, because we had a meeting with members of the unit before we 

expanded it and told them that this is the direction that we are going to 

take. And basically [we] asked them if they would like to stay and if this 

was something that they would be interested in. And if they did stay, 

everybody would be held in the same standard. As we had the interviews, 

we explained, before we ever started asking questions, the overview of 

how the gang unit was going to perform.... [Interviewer: How much 

contact do you have with the gang unit officers?] I try to go out with the 

different groups at different times, so not a lot.... [Interviewer: You just 

have more contact with the sergeants?] More with the sergeants, but I talk 

with the detectives when I run into them in different parts of the building, 

and I go out with them on different operations. It is kind of difficult for the 

one person that is mainly doing administrative stuff during the day to be 

out at night. 

In Inglewood, the chief of police, as well as the sergeant and lieutenant who 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 212 

supervised the gang unit, noted that they did not think that gang unit officers had a strong 

sense of their ideas or viewpoints on how the gang unit should operate. The following 

comments were made by two of the commanders, when we asked about their influence 

on the gang unit, and whether gang unit officers were aware of their viewpoints on how 

the gang unit should operate and what its priorities should be: 

I don’t know. Let me put it this way: If they do, it is probably through the 

chain of command, because, one of the things, I have been busy with so, 

so many things on the plate this year, that quite frankly I have not had 

occasion to go around to all the units and kind of impart my wisdom. I do 

have my first mandated supervisors’ meeting on June 2. And we will have 

first lines, who originally included the gang unit. If anybody does not 

know my philosophy about not only police work, but gang suppression 

and everything else, by that, then that won’t be my fault any more. So you 

kind of have to do it within the chain, but I will see...some of the...guys, 

and we will discuss it in the hall. Because that is the good thing about a 

small department. I know everybody. Whether they know my philosophy, 

I think they know they have my support, and they know that I think what 

they do is very important. 

No, I would say they don’t. I don’t have enough time to devote to it, to sit 

down and talk to them. 

Almost all of the managers in Las Vegas and Phoenix were confident that the 

officers in their units or squads knew their perspectives on gang control. In both units, as 

new individuals came into the unit, managers would meet with them one-on-one to 

explain their expectations and to present their visions of the unit’s history and the 

direction in which the unit was headed. The lieutenant in charge of the Las Vegas unit on 

occasion had gone as far as to document his vision and disseminate it to unit officers, 

requiring a signed statement from each one asserting that he had read it: 

I talk about it to them all the time. Whether they say they know them or 

not...we discuss it with the sergeants, we discuss it with officers, and we 

discuss it on a regular basis. This is what we’re doing, this is my vision for 

this thing, let’s do it. And sometimes you have to go, “This is my vision, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 213 

read it and sign it, so you understand it,” but I prefer not to do that. 

In Phoenix, the lieutenant talked to each of his officers and attended briefings and 

other meetings, ensuring that the officers understood their priorities and were in 

alignment with the direction of the unit: 

Yes, we have very open lines of communication for the detective level and 

the sergeant and at my level, and I attend a lot of their briefings, and I’m 

usually up to date on all the investigations they’ve logged in and their 

enforcement efforts, and if there’s any major enforcement effort that’s 

going to take place, such as serving a search warrant or this or that, I’m 

usually notified of it. Those are usually review-and-approve anyway, and 

I’ve talked to a lot of these guys on a one-on-one basis, and also in 

briefing and group basis, and they’re very aware of what our priorities are. 

I don’t call them my priorities, ‘cause its our priorities, our in the gang 

enforcement unit. 

Of special interest in both units was the fact that officers worked directly for 

sergeants, which led to additional reinforcement of the managers’ views and 

expectations. In Las Vegas, because many of the sergeants worked in the field with their 

officers, a regular dialogue occurred about what they wanted from the officers. One 

sergeant stated, “Do they know my personal feelings? They know my personal feelings as 

far as how I want my squad to work and what I expect out of them, and how to conduct 

themselves out there.” Similarly, the sergeants in Phoenix gave responses like the 

following: “Yeah, right from the bat I had a fresh squad...and you just sort of just laid it 

on the line. This is what I’m looking for, this is what I expect from you. 

Summary 

In sum, we found that the four gang units that we studied varied substantially in 

terms of organizational structure, function, and management. With respect to 

organizational structure, we found that the police departments were not uniform in the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 214 

organizational locations of their gang units. Not only had they varied in where they fit the 

gang units into the departmental organizational charts, but it appeared that those 

decisions had more to do with administrative convenience than with organizational 

planning or operational strategies. For example, the locations of the Inglewood and 

Albuquerque gang units were based on particular individuals’ willingness to assume 

additional supervisory responsibilities (an act of friendship, in the case of Albuquerque). 

In Phoenix and Las Vegas, the gang units were placed within organized crime bureaus for 

the administrative convenience of having policies and procedures already in place for 

handling intelligence. 

We found that all of the gang units except Inglewood were located off-site. The 

locations were kept secret, and as a result, were unavailable to the public, community 

leaders, and other criminal justice officials. In Las Vegas and Phoenix, even other police 

officers were not permitted in the gang unit office; special permission was needed to 

enter the office and an escort was required. Gang unit officers claimed that such secrecy 

was necessary to keep gang unit officers safe from attacks from gang members, and to 

keep their identities and vehicles from being known to gang members so that they could 

continue to conduct criminal investigations. 

Second, we found that the gang units differed in their functional, temporal, and 

spatial characteristics. We were able to place them along a continuum of complexity 

based on the characteristics of the unit. At one end of the continuum was the least 

complex or differentiated unit – the simple gang unit. This unit performed a single 

function, such as intelligence, and was responsible for a specific geographic area, with 

officers all working during a single period of time. As we mentioned previously, the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 215 

Inglewood, California, gang unit was an example of the simple gang unit. Inglewood’s 

unit consisted of four officers, all of whom were assigned to collect, process, and 

disseminate gang intelligence between the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m., five days a week. 

Next along the continuum was a slightly more complex pattern of differentiation 

and specialization, one that was characteristic of multiple-function gang units. This type 

of gang unit tended to perform two different functions, such as intelligence and 

suppression, one of the functions being primary and the other, secondary. Here, we 

defined the primary function as the focal activity of the unit and the one upon which most 

of the unit’s efforts and resources were expended. The secondary function usually 

received far less attention and fewer resources, and was considered less important by 

gang unit officers. This type of unit was more spatially and temporally differentiated than 

the simple gang unit. The Phoenix Police Department’s gang unit was a good example. It 

engaged in a combination of suppression and intelligence activities, with greater 

emphasis on suppression. Each squad was responsible for a particular area within the 

city, and officers, depending on the squad to which they were assigned, worked particular 

shifts. 

At end of the continuum, opposite the organizationally simple gang unit, was the 

complex unit. This unit was functionally comprehensive; it performed intelligence, 

suppression, and prevention activities, with each function receiving a different level of 

effort and resource investment. The complex unit was comprised of several squads and 

details that were responsible for specialized tasks. Each squad and detail was also 

responsible for particular geographic areas, and for coverage during particular time 

periods. The comprehensive unit was organizationally and operationally run almost like 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 216 

an independent police department that solely focused on gangs and gang problems. The 

Las Vegas gang unit was an example of such a comprehensive gang unit. 

This continuum of gang unit complexity based on differentiation should be 

thought of as an ideal type, with different gang units placed at different points along the 

continuum. In reality, none of the gang units that we studied fit any the three points on 

the continuum perfectly; rather, they approximated these types. For example, although 

Inglewood’s gang unit was considered a single-function unit, on occasion, the unit would 

assist other units with suppression or investigative activity. 

Although all of the gang units practiced and were responsible for an intelligence 

function, the emphasis placed on intelligence varied by unit. Inglewood officers took 

seriously their role of collecting, maintaining, and disseminating intelligence, and they 

valued this function highly. Our data analysis yielded similar results in Albuquerque. In 

Phoenix and Las Vegas, however, the intelligence function was met with less enthusiasm. 

Officers in both of these units were unable to use computers to access intelligence, and as 

a consequence, they typically left intelligence responsibilities to civilian staff. This had a 

negative impact on the quantity and quality of intelligence that was disseminated to 

others. 

With the exception of Inglewood, a single function unit with responsibility for 

intelligence, the gang units studied tended to place the greatest value on enforcement or 

suppression activities. This was the case in those departments with a serious gang 

problem to address (i.e., Albuquerque, Las Vegas), as well as those with a less serious 

gang problem (i.e., Phoenix). Communities with serious gang problems present gang 

units with the greatest opportunities to devise, experiment with, and engage in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 217 

enforcement activities, whereas communities with less serious gang problems present 

fewer such opportunities. We found that this was largely a consequence of community, 

political, and media demands placed on the police department. As such, enforcement 

strategies and tactics were often employed in an effort to maintain legitimacy from those 

in the gang units’ and police departments’ environment. It is also worth noting that 

enforcement activities were critical to the gang unit work group culture, regardless of the 

actual amount of time spent by officers on enforcement activities or the other official 

function(s) of the unit. 

Little value was placed on the function of gang crime prevention by the gang 

units. As will be discussed in chapter 7, Las Vegas’s gang unit was the only one observed 

engaging in prevention activities. Interestingly, however, all of the police departments 

participated in the GREAT program and sent officers from units other than the gang unit 

to local schools for the purpose of delivering the GREAT curriculum. Although officers 

in the gang unit believed that such prevention activities should be carried out, they felt 

strongly that it should not be their responsibility. 

Last, we found that the gang units varied with respect to the control and 

management of their officers, and that each department’s degree of control and 

management was largely related to the unit’s organizational complexity. Specifically, the 

simple gang unit had almost no written policies or procedures, no formal goals or 

objectives, and no performance measures, and was almost never supervised. On the other 

hand, the most complex gang unit had numerous written policies and procedures, 

specified objectives and goals, and clearly delineated performance measures, and it 

closely supervised its officers. Those agencies with multi-function gang units fell 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 218 

somewhere near the middle in their levels of control and management of their gang units. 

We found that the gang units that we studied were characterized by some 

noteworthy organizational features that had important implications for their functioning. 

Standing operating procedures were absent or underdeveloped, with Las Vegas being the 

only exception. The units lacked formal goals, objectives, benchmarks, and performance 

measures that could be used to gauge their effectiveness. 

Administrative oversight, formal organizational control, and managerial direction 

for the gang units was largely absent, and unit supervision was minimal. Certainly, there 

were exceptions. In Albuquerque, for example, the supervising sergeant worked with his 

unit officers in the field. However, the overall absence of stronger organizational controls 

coupled with the physical isolation of the units (except in Inglewood) created an 

environment in which the units were largely self-directed, determining their own goals 

and objectives, setting operational priorities, and crafting their own tactical practices. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 219 

Chapter 6. The Gang Unit Officer 

We were interested in how the individuals who policed gangs had influenced their 

agencies’ responses to the gang problem. We approached this by focusing first on gang 

unit officers’ ethnicity, gender, and ages, and on their prior assignments and experiences 

within their police departments. Next, we examined how they became gang unit officers 

– the selection process and how that process affected the types of officers who were 

assigned to gang units. Third, we looked at the training that officers received, both 

training that was specific to their assignments and any other gang-related training or 

education they might have attended. Finally, we focused on the officers’ perceptions of 

the job and their roles in the police department, along with their attitudes toward their 

jobs. 

Officer Characteristics 

The ethnic or racial characteristics of the officers in the police gang units that we 

studied reflected those in their parent departments. In Las Vegas and Phoenix, roughly 

the same proportion of whites, Hispanics, and African Americans served in the gang units 

as served in the police departments. Although whites were somewhat under-represented 

in Albuquerque, approximately the same proportion of Hispanics worked in the gang unit 

as served in the department. The Inglewood unit had a disproportionate number of 

Hispanics, but the unit was staffed with only three officers, making comparison with the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 220 

larger department relatively meaningless. 

Gang unit officers were mostly males. Of 90 officers assigned to the four gang 

units, only three (3.3 percent) were female: two in Las Vegas and one in Albuquerque. 

Most gang unit officers were relatively mature and experienced. They tended to be older, 

married, and parents of children. The average officer was 33 years old or more; 75 

percent or more were married; more than 50 percent had children (exhibit 6.01). 

Exhibit 6.01 Characteristics of gang unit officers by city 

Albuquerque (n=8) Inglewood (n=3) Las Vegas (n=30) Phoenix (n=22) 

Characteristics: 

Ethnicity 

African American 0.0 33.3 13.0 0.0 

Hispanic 50.0 66.6 4.3 14.3 

White 37.5 0.0 82.6 85.7 

Asian 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 

Gender 

Male 87.5 100 91.3 100 

Female 12.5 0.0 8.6 0.0 

Average Age 33.3 39.0 34.5 33.3 

Marital Status 

Single 25.0 0.0 16.7 15.0 

Married 75.0 100 76.7 80.0 

Divorced 0.0 0.0 6.6 5.0 

Parent of children 50.0 100.0 62.1 66.6 

Education 

High School 37.5 0.0 61.5 25.0 

Associates 25.0 100.0 26.9 30.0 

Bachelors 37.5 0.0 26.9 40.0 

Masters 0.0 0.0 3.8 5.0 

Military experience 

No 75.0 33.3 73.3 42.1 

Yes 25.0 66.6 16.7 57.9 

Ave. yrs. in dept. 13.4 11.2 8.2 7.8 

Gang unit officers varied from one city to the next with respect to education, 

tenure in policing, and policing and pre-policing experience. The Phoenix officers, for 

example, were more likely to have a college degree than their peers in the other police 

departments: About 45 percent of gang unit officers in Phoenix had a bachelor’s degree 

or higher, compared with approximately 38 percent of officers in Albuquerque, 30 

percent in Las Vegas, and none in Inglewood. The officers also differed in prior military 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 221 

experience; those in Inglewood and Phoenix were more likely to have had some form of 

military experience compared with officers in Albuquerque and Las Vegas. 

We found some differences among the units in average numbers of years served 

in their departments. In Phoenix and Las Vegas, gang unit officers had served for an 

average of eight years; in Inglewood and Albuquerque, gang unit officers had served an 

average of 11 and 13 years, respectively. The scope and nature of the officers’ prior 

experiences within the police department differed accordingly. In Phoenix, for example, 

almost all gang unit officers had come directly from a patrol unit, with no other 

experience, including investigative experience, within the police department. In Las 

Vegas, although all gang unit officers had worked in patrol, about one-third of them had 

also served in a problem-solving or community-oriented policing unit, and one-third had 

previously worked in a bike or foot patrol unit. As in Phoenix, almost none of the gang 

unit officers in Las Vegas had had any prior investigative experience. 

Officers in Inglewood and Albuquerque, on average, had had much more varied 

experiences within their police departments before coming to the gang unit. For instance, 

in Inglewood, all three officers had worked in patrol, as well as in some other unit, before 

coming to the gang unit. Two of them had worked in investigative units, and one had 

worked on the anti-crime team. Likewise, in Albuquerque, two of the officers had served 

only in patrol before being assigned to the gang unit, but the other six had worked in units 

such as domestic violence, organized crime, narcotics, and property and violent crime. 

Accordingly, gang unit officers in Inglewood and Albuquerque had served more time in 

the police department, including more time in units other than patrol, and had more 

investigative experience than gang unit officers in Phoenix and Las Vegas. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 222 

Becoming a Gang Unit Officer 

All four of the gang units had official policies and procedures in place for 

selecting unit officers; all were roughly equivalent. In all units, an officer had to have 

spent at least 3 years in patrol before being permitted to transfer into the gang unit. In 

fact, this was the only requirement for applying. When position opened in the units, the 

departments began accepting applications, and interested officers submitted transfer 

requests. The units then requested resumes from the applicants. 

In Albuquerque and Phoenix, gang unit managers ranked applicants based on 

reviewsof their personnel records. Managers considered prior work experience, 

disciplinary histories, foreign language aptitude, and prior evaluations. Officers who 

ranked high remained in the candidate pool. 

Oral boards were conducted by all four of the units. In Las Vegas and Phoenix, 

gang unit sergeants and a lieutenant conducted oral boards, while in Albuquerque and 

Inglewood, a gang unit sergeant conducted oral boards along with other department 

supervisors. The oral board members in all departments developed and administered the 

interview questions. In each department, the names of applicants who scored highest on 

the oral interviews were then submitted to the chief’s office to be considered for transfer. 

Although official policies guided the processes, a number of factors were taken 

into consideration during the final selection of officers for the gang units. When 

department managers were asked about selection factors, four most desirable 

characteristics emerged from their answers: self-motivation, previous experience with 

gangs or the gang unit, the ability to speak a foreign language, and ethnic diversity. 

Managers in Phoenix, Albuquerque, and Inglewood maintained that they looked 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 223 

for self-motivated officers. During the selection process, they said, they sought officers 

who would not require a great deal of oversight and who would be aggressive in the field. 

They have to be somebody who doesn’t require a lot of supervision there, 

out here beating and beating the bushes, and finding out what they need to 

do, instead of me following them around and telling them what to do. You 

got to have some initiative up here, so those are some of the qualities we 

look for. 

I know they want somebody who is willing to work hard. Past 

employment record has a lot to do with that. If you are considered a 

worker, then obviously you have got a better chance than somebody that is 

not considered a worker... [Interviewer: Define a worker.] Somebody who 

makes self-initiated arrests, handles, in a patrol sense, handles their beat, 

doesn’t expect somebody else to do their work for them. Self-reliance, 

where you don’t need to be standing over the person as a supervisor, 

constantly. Just somebody who is willing to go out and do the job. 

I know what [they] did, [they] went out and identified the best, most 

aggressive patrolmen that [they] could and talked them into applying. My 

area commanders are screaming bloody murder because they lost their 

best patrol officers. 

Managers in Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Inglewood tended to select officers who 

had worked with the gang unit before. This work could have taken different forms, such 

as special assignments with the unit or attendance at gang unit training, or sharing 

information and sending field intelligence cards to the unit. In Phoenix, for example, a 

number of gang unit officers had previously worked with the unit as Operation Safe 

Streets officers during the summer. In both Las Vegas and Inglewood, we observed patrol 

officers working with gang unit officers, performing data entry or riding with the officers 

in an effort to learn and to develop a relationship with gang unit officers. These officers 

were enhancing their chances of being selected for the unit in the future. Managers in 

these units made comments like the following: 

You know, I have three or four guys in my squad, I think, that did Safe 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 224 

Streets before they came up here, so it helps. It gives them a good 

knowledge, and they had already had an interest in coming up to Gangs, 

that’s why they do Safe Streets, and it’s one of those things, it either 

confirms their opinion where, “this is where I wanted to go,” and could 

send them the other way, and say, “this is not really want I wanted to do.” 

Officers that have shown a willingness in the past to work the gangs. This 

can be demonstrated by the number of field interview cards that they sent 

up to us, have they ever contacted us, come up here to find out what we do 

on a nightly basis by means of riding along with us, and that sort of stuff. 

So people that have shown interest and have those types of skills that we 

use on a regular basis. 

Certainly if in someone’s background it comes through that they have 

shown an interest in the gang unit by frequently contacting the gang 

officers, or the gang officers have firsthand knowledge of the quality of 

work of the officer....We don’t want somebody who has never shown an 

interest and just, “oh, something’s available, I think I’ll apply.” Hopefully 

that person will be eliminated in the process. 

We found that officers who spoke the language of local non-English speaking 

gang members or their parents were given preference in by all four of the gang units. Of 

eight gang unit officers in Albuquerque, four spoke Spanish and one spoke Vietnamese. 

As one officer explained: 

The only reason we purposely selected a Vietnamese officer...because 

we’ve seen an influx of Vietnamese gangs in Albuquerque, and we didn’t 

really have a way to address that, because we can’t talk to them. So we 

purposely chose that officer. He was an outstanding officer... 

Although fewer officers spoke Spanish or another foreign language in the other 

units, it was nevertheless a desirable qualification. 

...it is sometimes a very big problem. A majority of gang members in this 

city are Hispanic. With Hispanic gang members comes the Hispanic 

language. And if you don’t speak that, then it’s very difficult to do any – I 

think it is advantageous to have officers in that unit that reflect the gangs 

that they are working. Certainly if we are dealing with Latino gangs, being 

Latino or certainly being able to speak Spanish. There have been officers 

that can bridge that, particularly if they have the language skills, but it just 

is kind of a natural kind of thing. So I would certainly be cognizant of that. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 225 

I could tell you one of the most important things that they try to look for is 

somebody that’s bilingual, somebody that speaks Spanish. 

Not only were all gang unit managers interested in selecting officers who could 

speak the primary language of gang members and their parents, but they were also 

interested in ensuring that their units reflected the ethnicity of these individuals. Many of 

the managers pointed out that having officers of the same ethnic backgrounds as gang 

members gave the unit a competitive advantage. 

I am very pragmatic about what I need in this unit. And if I need female 

officers because female officers give me another advantage and another 

way to attack things, then I recruit female officers. And when I do 

recruitment, I recruit what I need. I mean, you can’t have an all-white 

gang unit when you have 42 percent of the gangsters in Las Vegas are 

Latino, and 33 percent are black, and 28 percent are white, and the rest are 

[Asian]. You have to have a diverse group. It is very difficult to be an allwhite police group. I actively recruit minorities, females, and foreign 

language officers. Actively recruit, and it has nothing to do with 

affirmative action. It’s just because that is what I need. I need those types 

of officers, so I go look for them. 

However, Las Vegas officers pointed out that it sometimes had been difficult to 

get minority applicants, in part because of the unit’s reputation for being white. One 

officer explained: 

Of course, there are a lot of officers that don’t want to come up here, 

because there’s not too many black police officers up here, or Hispanic 

officers or female officers or detectives up here. So they don’t feel 

comfortable coming up here. ... We’ve got a lot of individuals interested 

in coming up here, but some don’t feel comfortable because basically, 

there’s a lot of individuals that don’t listen to the same music, they don’t 

have the same type of interest, so therefore they might feel uncomfortable. 

You know, they don’t come from the same backgrounds and so forth, so 

they don’t find common ground with the individuals up here, so they feel 

uncomfortable about it and they don’t think they will get by without it. A 

lot of times in the past, it was like that. 

Certain officers bond together because of their common ground, they have 

a lot of common ground.... There’s a lot of officers that try to put people 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 226 

up here that they have common ground with them, because they want to 

feel comfortable working with them, and they haven’t been around 

anybody else that is a minority or individuals that do things different than 

they do. So they feel uncomfortable by it, and those individuals are up 

here, they don’t want to come here, because they know those individuals 

are up here. 

As a result, Las Vegas gang unit managers and officers stated that they 

occasionally used a targeted selection process aimed at bringing minority officers to the 

unit. One officer explained: 

We have had selection processes were they have specifically targeted and 

stated – unofficially, of course – that we are going to bring up a female 

this time, or we’re going to bring up a Spanish-speaking officer, or we’re 

going to bring up a black officer this time. So it has played a role, it hasn’t 

worked out real well. [Interviewer: What has the intent been?] It’s 

political, it’s public perception. Public perception is – okay, you have this 

gang unit, but you don’t have an Hispanic or a black or a female on there, 

they must all be racist. Obviously, every police department across the 

country is getting the backlash from what L.A. has done. So politically, 

the people upstairs, the administration, has looked at it and said, “Well, 

let’s try to even this out,” but it hasn’t worked. 

Another manager in Las Vegas stated: 

We’ve already had about four people come in under affirmative action, 

and have already made the gang unit. [Interviewer: Do you know why that 

is?] Well, I’m sure that there is an official reason, but there is a lot of 

competition for competent minorities. If you’re competent and a leader, 

IBM wants them, too. 

We heard a few notable additions or exceptions to the above priorities. In Phoenix 

and Las Vegas, many gang unit managers and officers agreed that an applicant’s 

complaint record was one of the most important factors in the selection decision, and that 

an officer who had received even one sustained complaint for excessive force would not 

be interviewed. In Las Vegas, gang unit managers looked for excellence in documenting 

and recording information; because a primary function of the gang unit was collecting 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 227 

intelligence, they needed officers who would be meticulous at this. 

Perhaps the most interesting finding, however, turned out to be a qualification that 

was missing from the lists of gang unit managers in Phoenix, Las Vegas, and 

Albuquerque: prior investigative experience. In Phoenix and Las Vegas, the investigation 

of street gang crime was a core function of the gang units. We were surprised to find that 

new gang unit officers were not required to have even minimal prior investigative 

experience, given the seriousness of the crimes that they would be required to investigate. 

Gang Unit Officer Status 

In all four gang units, officers had the title of detective or investigator. These titles 

were not indicative of promotion, by departmental standards; gang unit officers were the 

same rank as patrol officers. In two departments, officers assigned to the gang unit did 

receive pay increases, however. In Las Vegas, officers received an eight percent raise 

while assigned to the gang unit, because the unit was designated as hazardous duty. 

Likewise, in Inglewood, gang unit officers received an extra three percent in pay upon 

assignment to an investigative position. Phoenix and Albuquerque did not give officers 

extra pay for assignments to the gang unit. 

Officers in every unit remarked that although the designation of detective or 

investigator was technically not a promotion and did not represent an increase in rank, it 

could be viewed from some perspectives as the equivalent of a promotion, in that the 

titles sometimes conferred status within the department. 

Yeah, it is.... For one thing, right now we are assigned to the same bureau 

the detectives are assigned to. So when you come from patrol into another 

segment of the department, you are basically getting promoted. We are, I 

guess, considered detectives even though our title is investigator. So yeah, 

it is a promotion. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 228 

A lot of people look at it as a promotion, but within the department, it’s 

just a lateral move. You don’t make any more money. I guess prestige is 

what you’re looking at, and it is more prestigious, if that’s what you want 

to call a promotion. 

It’s not considered technically a promotion. You don’t get extra pay. The 

nice thing about the unit, it gives you a lot of freedom that you don’t 

usually have as a policeman or patrol officer. While again it’s not 

technically considered a promotion, in the minds of most police officers, 

myself included, it’s kind of an elite group of detectives and people who 

live here. Most officers would really like to work here. 

Officers varied in their perceptions of whether special status was attributed to 

being a member of the gang unit. A number of them argued that the gang unit was just 

like any other unit in the police department. Although being a detective offered some 

special status, particularly among younger and newer officers, most thought of 

themselves as simply participating in one of a number of specialized units in the 

department. This sentiment was echoed in all of the units, but it was particularly strong in 

Las Vegas, where few officers felt that being a member of the gang unit gave them 

special status. 

I don’t think there’s a special status. I mean, if you’re in robbery or sexual 

assault, you’re just in that unit. I don’t think anybody is special just 

because they’re in any particular position. 

I don’t think so, it’s just another unit. 

I think a lot of that is in the opinion of the individual. Some people that, a 

lot of patrol officers, or some patrol officers, don’t like gang guys because 

I have heard that some of us have been called glorified patrol officers 

because we basically do patrol stuff, but we don’t answer radio calls. Then 

there are other officers that like what we do, they think, yeah, it’s cool, it’s 

detective, and all this other stuff. 

I think each person up here, I don’t consider myself more special than a 

regular patrol officer. I like to compare to when I was in the military, my 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 229 

brother, my youngest brother, used to always ask me, “Who’s better, the 

Marines or the Army, the Navy or the Army?” And each one is good at 

what they do, you can’t generalize and say who’s better. The Army can’t 

do beach landings like the Marines can, and the Marines can’t do an 

extended land deal like the Army can. So I personally don’t think I am any 

different than a patrol officer. I just do a different job. 

A number of officers in each unit, except Las Vegas, pointed out that it was their 

knowledge of gang-related issues that gave them special status within the department. 

Their contact and work with gang members, who were more likely than most to engage in 

violent crime, gave the officers access to information, and therefore, insight, that others 

in the department did not necessarily possess. 

Probably the knowledge of knowing almost everybody on the street, 

because our job is to contact and talk and become personally involved in 

these gangsters’ lives, their family lives, their mothers, their school lives, 

so we get to know the people. We don’t know them all, I mean there is just 

too many of them to know, but we know most of them, the ones that are 

the most active, and we know a lot about them, and they talk to us, and we 

know a lot of what is going on in the street. And so we are kind of like an 

encyclopedia here of what is going on in the city, and everybody comes to 

us because of it... 

I think there’s a certain status that the gang unit has. They were known for 

being kind of some of the most physically fit people on the department, 

very knowledgeable in the different, various types of investigations. Your 

assaults, drive-bys, and homicides, and just being very knowledgeable. So 

I mean, people in a sense looked, if they needed advice, they would call 

the gang unit and they would always be there. 

Some gang unit officers commented that they enjoyed special status within the 

department because of the many benefits they received while in the unit. For example, 

some noted, no supervisors looked over their shoulders; they were self-directed in the 

field; they worked in individual cubicles; and the gang unit was physically located in a 

separate facility, apart from the rest of the department. Other officers mentioned that 

special status came with wearing a uniform that differentiated them from others in the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 230 

department. In Las Vegas, the officers wore Battle Dress Uniforms (BDUs), and in 

Phoenix, Inglewood, and Albuquerque, officers wore plain street clothing – typically 

jeans, a polo shirt, and tennis shoes. In Phoenix and Las Vegas, gang unit officers were 

permitted to take assigned undercover vehicles home. Still other officers told us that 

being in the gang unit gave them a sense of belonging to a special group, as opposed to 

being just one of many, as they had been in patrol. 

Difference just as far as filing and keeping track of items and having your 

own little space to work, so I mean, it seems like a little thing to stick us in 

a cubicle, but that cubicle is – I think it’s very beneficial, it gives you that 

sense that they’re treating you more like an adult. You got your own 

phone line, your own voice mail, you’ve got a personal vehicle that it’s 

either take home or you drop off by your house, by a city facility, so 

you’ve got that. 

They don’t really track you as much as they do in patrol, everything is seg, 

I mean you’ve got 45 minutes to eat lunch in patrol, up here you go and 

you eat lunch, if you get called out to a scene, you get called out to a 

scene, so be it. If you’re not, you eat your lunch and there’s no big brother 

watching you, saying you ate 46 minutes, next time you’re gonna get a 

written reprimand for it. 

I mean we just do that, I guess we get to pick and choose, well, I mean not 

pick and choose, but we don’t have to answer to all the burglaries, 

burglary from vehicle calls, I mean we are here to respond to the gang 

calls and we’re usually on big scenes. Yeah, it does give you that kind of 

prestige. 

The people in my class, they look at us now and see how we’ve changed. 

Kind of like not many officers can wear gold rings and dress the way they 

want when they go to work, drive undercover cars. Pretty much we answer 

to our elite chain of command, we’re almost – you can call it separate 

from the rest of the department. You can see where we’re at now, we’re in 

our own building. 

Only emotional, I think, I mean when you’re in gang squad, you know, it’s 

kind of – I don’t even know the word for it, but you know, a more 

prestigious position than patrol. Like, you know, up here we’re more 

proud to say, “hey, we work in the gang unit,” whereas opposed to, you 

know, “well, I work Cactus Park Precinct,” you know, this is when you 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 231 

say – and you’ll see it in people, and they’ll say, “Where do you work?” 

“Well, I work for the southside gang squad.” “Cool.” And big 

egomaniacs, guys like us, we like that, so ... 

We asked about the difficulty of filling open positions in the gang unit to learn 

how attractive gang unit positions were to potential applicants. The officers in all 

departments responded that gang unit assignments were sought after. In Phoenix and Las 

Vegas, officers noted that it was not unusual for 40 applicants to compete for only a few 

positions, although only three to five officers might be selected. In Albuquerque and 

Inglewood, the units were small, and finding qualified applicants to fill open positions 

was never difficult. 

Many officers said that their applicant pools were full, and that it was difficult for 

other officers to obtain positions in the gang unit. In Phoenix and Inglewood, officers 

pointed out that the gang unit was not large, so only a few positions ever opened. 

This is considered a specialty detail. That’s like a select team, so it’s a 

competitive process to get in here. And it is difficult to get in here, 

because we – it’s a small unit, there’s not a high turnover rate. Not just 

being a small unit, but because it’s such a popular place, once you get 

here, few people leave. Most people who leave here usually get promoted. 

So it’s not often you get openings here. 

...it is not a position that is open at will, if you would. What I am saying is 

there are not too many vacancies in this unit. And when there are, they are 

scarce. 

In Las Vegas, a substantial number of applicants vie for every open position in the 

gang unit, but a number of officers noted that the gang unit was not right for every 

officer. They explained that contact with gang members often was frustrating, and many 

officers were not up to the task. 

...it takes a certain person to be up here. A lot of people like to do 

investigation, but they don’t like to work around gang members. I think 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 232 

that’s the biggest drawback for a lot of officers. They don’t want to be, 

quote unquote, [with] those little gang members, and have to deal with 

them all the time. I look past the point of being around gang members all 

of the time, but it’s almost a fascinating lifestyle that they lead. And I 

think it takes somebody special to get into that. 

We asked gang unit officers how their peers outside the unit perceived it. 

Regardless of city, we heard commonalities in their responses. Namely, almost all of the 

officers focused on the perceptions of patrol officers, and they rarely mentioned other 

detectives in the department in this context. Furthermore, most of them focused on 

negative perceptions of their units. Although the officers made broad statements about 

the generally positive relationships that existed between gang and patrol units, in all 

cities, officers related specific problems. Several of them commented that most other 

officers in the police department did not know what the gang unit did. The following 

responses exemplified their claims: 

That’s pretty hard, because we are probably the best-kept secret among the 

department. They don’t know what we do. We do go out and meet with 

some people once in a while. But we are covert. We don’t let people know 

what we are doing because of the type of work we do. It’s too dangerous 

to let it out. 

They don’t know anything about the gang unit. They don’t know anything 

that goes on here. All they do is see us out there once in a while, and they 

don’t see us because we are back in here doing something. They don’t 

know what our job entails. But that’s no different than any other position. 

No one knows, because no one takes the time to find out. Not everybody, 

but most people don’t take the time to find out, what are the narcotics guys 

doing, what do gang guys do, or what somebody else is doing. They all 

have their own perception of what they should do...and what they are 

doing, and what they are not doing. So nobody really knows... 

Some gang unit officers believed that a lack of familiarity with the gang unit and its 

functions and processes led to frustration and resentment among patrol officers. For 

example, they pointed out that when patrol officers contacted the gang unit for assistance, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 233 

help was often refused because the gang unit officer would determine that the request was 

unrelated to gangs. An officer in Phoenix explained: 

There’s a lot of misconceptions about what gang squad does and what 

we’re responsible for. Patrol’s a very busy detail and they like as much 

assistance as they can, it’s just a lot of them don’t realize what our duties 

are, what we’re responsible for, and what we can and cannot do. What was 

their perceptions? Oh, the gang squad is lazy. That we are not willing to 

assist them in their investigations, which, you know, which I knew was 

not true while I was on patrol and would attempt to pass on my thoughts 

on gang squad rep. 

The most common response given by gang unit officers, particularly in Phoenix 

and Las Vegas, was that patrol officers viewed gang unit officers as arrogant and 

egotistical. Many thought that patrol officers were jealous of gang unit officers and 

resented their status because the patrol officers had not been selected for the gang unit at 

some time, or simply because the gang unit officers were different. Some suggested that 

this problem was not isolated to the gang unit, but was also an issue for other specialized 

units in the department. 

Some of them believe that we’re prima donnas, and others envy us and 

want to be in our position. I think there’s a lot of times, because of the 

situation by the gang unit being so many gang members out on the street 

and so little gang officers. You know, we don’t have that much time in the 

day to go run to every patrol officers’ meeting. And a lot of times they’ll 

stop a gang member and they want us to respond to a location and we 

can’t, because we’re busy. And because of that, they think we’re too good, 

you know, screw ‘em. 

See, I think that varies, too. I know there’s, you know, we go through 

times to where everybody hates us. What is it they dislike? Well, a lot of it 

is the freedom we have, you know, and there’s certain responsibilities that 

we have in the gang unit, you know. We respond to the agg[ravated] 

assaults and assaults and things like that. Well, we only have basically, 

except for Saturday, two squads on the street, and so there’s no way that 

we can take every one of those city-wide, and so I know a lot of times, you 

know, we’re not available to do stuff and that causes problems. I mean, 

I’ve heard it. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 234 

You know, and then we’re – we’re dressed different. We have a different 

uniform than a patrol. Any time you have the, I believe, the segregation 

like that, you’re going to have problems, you know, even though I don’t 

disagree with them. Gang members treat us different than they treat patrol 

officers, and so I believe that there is a purpose for us being, you know, 

differently identifiable, whether it’s in our cars or in our uniform or 

whatever. You know, and any time you have the specialty detail tag, 

there’s going to be problems, you know. 

Well, like I touched on it before, I mean some of them think that we’re 

cocky, we’ve been called “knuckle draggers,” you know, most of us here, 

we hit the weight room more often than maybe some of these other units 

do, so they always call us the “no neckers” or something like that. I think 

they probably perceive us as maybe egomaniacs. Some patrol officers are 

eager to talk to you and, myself personally, I can get along with anybody, 

so I don’t mind giving out info or helping people. Some of these other 

guys, you know, hold things in themselves so, you know, it’s a fine line, 

and it’s depending on who the officer is or the unit is, you know, some of 

them don’t like us, and some of them do. 

Conversely, the common thread in the answers of officers who perceived that 

their gang unit was viewed positively was their unit was responsive to patrol officers’ 

needs. 

[They think of us] as a resource. They know that we know the gangsters. 

They hear of a particular problem and they come to us with it, and if they 

know of a subject that is running from them or something like that, and 

they can identify them, nine times out of ten, a basic description from a 

gang member that we are familiar with, we can drop out of the top of our 

head, “that is so-and- so from whatever gang,” so we start writing up 

warrants. They use us a lot as a resource. 

It’s a mixed bag. And it’s dependent on – mostly upon how well we 

communicate with them, and how accessible we are to them when they 

ask for assistance. Do we blow them off, or do we go out there and talk to 

them? I suppose it would be the same as when you are a police officer, and 

you are asked for information from a citizen. It’s going to be the same 

kind of perception. If you blow them off, they are not going to have a very 

positive perception of you, and they are going to resent you. It’s the same 

thing here, and it’s the same when I was on the private sector. We had a 

difficult time sometimes alienating the store staff, you know, not 

responding to their needs. When you did that, you ended up not having 

information flung in your direction, which was sometimes pertinent, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 235 

keeping you from being able to do your job. Many of the leads that we get 

are from patrol officers, because they are out in the field all the time, on a 

day-to-day basis, and they have more access and there’s more of them. If 

you go to briefings, talk to them...you don’t even have to teach them 

anything, just be accessible to them. I found that they seem to respond real 

positively to it, and we get information flowing to us instead of around us. 

Responses from Albuquerque gang unit officers generally resembled those above; 

however, Albuquerque officers believed that the gang unit’s reputation had changed 

dramatically from that of the gang unit of years past. Almost all of them related that the 

prior gang unit had had a poor reputation among other officers, which was one of the 

reasons that the gang unit had been disbanded by the police chief. They noted that former 

gang unit officers had not worked hard, and when they did, it was not necessarily related 

to gangs. According to the officers, that gang unit had developed one of the worst 

reputations in the department. Almost all of them noted, however, that officers across the 

department were quickly gaining respect for the newly created gang unit. 

...It used to be that they had a notorious view of not really working, when 

the gang unit wasn’t full. They had 17, 18 officers. They were under 

different sergeants, and the sergeants were more of a type to say, “just 

show a force and go bug a bunch of gangbangers,” but they weren’t really 

perceived as, at least myself when I was in the field, I didn’t perceive them 

as actually working very hard. It was hard to get most of them to come out 

to your scenes to do anything. But hopefully, now we’re changing the 

perception because we’re going out. We’re going to the briefings. We’re 

talking to the field officers. We’re getting called out at least by the field 

more. 

Up to this point, I think it just depends on people inside the unit. The 

people within the unit represent, and prior, and this was before – I just 

came on – our gang unit had been disbanded for a while. Being a field 

officer, I’ll be honest with you, I had no respect for the gang unit. They 

were never out, you could never get a hold of them, you never knew what 

they did. And one of the reasons I put in for it and one of the reasons I 

asked for it was because I felt that I still had contact with the field guys. 

They could trust me to know that if they need something, they could page 

me and I’d come out, they could call me at home. Plus, I’d still be out on 

my own doing police work. The only difference is, I’d be an undercover 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 236 

car, which can make things easier sometimes. 

Well, we kind of have – it’s a mixed emotion, I think, because the last 

gang unit that we had, a lot of people didn’t take very well. They weren’t 

very – all I can say is, in the short time that I was in the department and 

there was a gang unit, they weren’t very respected in a lot of ways, 

because they weren’t very proactive. They just kind of – they didn’t do a 

whole lot of work. So right now it’s been very, very good. A lot of officers 

that I know, especially that have come out near my academy, are very 

anxious to get over there with me. I mean 10, 15 guys really came to me 

and said, “How do I get to your unit.” 

Gang Unit Officer Training 

The training that gang unit officers received varied by unit in quantity, quality, 

and substance. This section summarizes training practices and experiences in each of the 

four units studied. 

Inglewood 

Inglewood gang unit officers were the best trained of the four units. All 

Inglewood officers had received training on gangs as part of their academy training. They 

were exposed to gang trends and taught how to identify gang members and submit gang 

intelligence. Next, all officers appointed to the gang unit were required to attend a 40­

hour training session conducted by the California Gang Investigators Association. This 

training formally educated officers about profiling gang members, filing considerations, 

writing reports, and preparing for court and case presentation. It focused on issues related 

to gang organization, recognizing gang activity, investigating gang activity, and 

procedures for documenting gang members. 

Once assigned to the gang unit, new officers were paired with the most senior 

officers in the unit for on-the-job training. This was informal, with the new officer 

shadowing the experienced officer for several days. During this period, the senior officer 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 237 

would explain the role of the unit, the technical aspects of collecting, processing, and 

disseminating gang intelligence, and other issues pertaining to gangs and the gang unit. 

Inglewood officers continued to receive formal training as long as they were with 

the unit. Their training took place in a number of venues. First, they were required to 

receive 24 hours of continuing POST training each year, and some gang unit officers 

reported that they used this opportunity to take courses relating to gangs. Second, the 

California Gang Investigators Association conducted a monthly meeting at which 

members took turns training other members; all gang unit officers were expected to 

participate. Third, a number of area criminal justice agencies provided training that on 

occasion focused on gangs and the gang problem, and gang unit officers were invited to 

those sessions. Although most advanced training was optional for gang unit officers, 

many noted that they did regularly attend gang training, largely because it was available 

through a number of sources. 

Albuquerque 

In Albuquerque, few gang unit officers had had any gang-related training before 

being appointed to the gang unit. In addition, no courses or methods had been established 

for training officers once they were assigned to the unit. When we asked about the 

training that officers had received after coming into the unit, none reported having 

received any department-sponsored training, formal or otherwise. 

Instead, officers explained, they attended national, state, and local conferences 

focusing on gang-related issues. Each year, the Albuquerque Police Department allocated 

a predetermined amount per officer for training. Some gang unit officers said they used 

their share to attend one out-of-state conference and a few state training sessions. Others 

did not travel out-of-state for training because of the high costs; instead, they used their 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 238 

trainings funds for state and local training so that they could attend more courses. This 

training, however, could be of any type; gang unit officers were not required to attend 

training related to gangs, gang investigations, or to their responsibilities in the gang unit. 

Phoenix 

In Phoenix, several gang unit officers reported receiving training on gangs before 

being assigned to the unit. Many of the officers stated that they had been interested in 

gangs and, as a consequence, had trained on issues related to gangs. A number stated that 

although they had been assigned to patrol at the time, they had requested assignment to 

areas with high levels of gang crime. This assignment, they argued, had given them onthe-job training in the form of exposure to gang members, as well as to gang unit officers. 

Additionally, almost 40 percent of the gang unit officers stated that they had 

attended at least some gang training seminars prior to being assigned to the unit. Most of 

this training was conducted by other officers from the gang unit or other units in the 

police department. Just over 10 percent of the officers assigned to the gang unit had 

earlier served as liaison officers between the gang unit and the patrol division; they had 

received 16 hours of training from the gang unit while in that role. About a quarter of that 

training time was spent learning to use the department’s gang database system (SIDS); 

the remainder focused on issues related to local gangs and gang unit policies and 

procedures. 

Once officers had been selected for the Phoenix gang unit, they were required to 

attend the same training that the gang liaisons had attended. Afterward, they were 

permitted access to the unit’s gang intelligence system. In addition, several reports and 

manuals about gangs, gang members, and gang activity were available for new gang unit 

officers. The handbooks also addressed officer safety, communication, and interviewing 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 239 

and interrogating gang members, and they provided instruction on “how to research gang 

members.” 

Almost all of the Phoenix gang unit officers stated that they had received 

additional training after joining the gang unit. Officers attended local gang training 

seminars conducted by other metropolitan area criminal justice agencies, and 

occasionally attended national conferences related to gangs. Interestingly, however, the 

Phoenix police department did not pay for gang unit officers to receive additional gangrelated training. Officers paid their expenses out-of-pocket, even seminar fees and travel 

costs. The unit commander attempted to assist by leaving officers on salary while 

attending training, so they did not lose vacation time. 

Given those obstacles, we were surprised that so many officers had attended gang 

training conferences. Officers commented that the training was often useful, and that they 

minimized costs by carpooling and sharing hotel rooms. Remarkably, only four Phoenix 

officers indicated that they had received no training after being assigned to the gang unit; 

those remarked that they had received on-the-job training, just being on the streets. 

Las Vegas 

In Las Vegas, many gang unit officers had received gang training as part of their 

academy coursework. In particular, the academy featured a section titled Gangs in Clark 

County. During this session, new officers were exposed to gang trends and gang 

identification, and they were trained to communicate more effectively with young people 

in general, and with gang members specifically. Most Las Vegas officers indicated that 

they had also attended several departmental training courses on gangs, such as Black 

Gangs, Asian Gangs, Hispanic Gangs, and Gang Trends. Several had attended national 

or regional gang conferences before being selected for the gang unit. Gang unit officers 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 240 

who had prior gang training indicated that they had taken the courses because of a 

general interest in gangs – and as part of their strategy for getting into the gang unit. 

According to the Las Vegas gang unit’s Standard Operating Procedures, one unit 

supervisor was to act as the designated training coordinator for sworn and civilian 

personnel. This supervisor assumed responsibility for assuring that gang unit personnel 

knew the training requirements, and assisted with course selection. The coordinator 

maintained training records and forwarded them to the departmental planning unit each 

month. All gang unit officers worked with the training coordinator to establish training 

plans. Gang unit officers, like all others in the department, were required to receive 24 

hours of training annually, but gang unit personnel had added requirements. During their 

first 6 months, they received training in: 

� Cultural awareness 

� Crime scene preservation and investigation 

� Informant management 

� Interview and interrogation techniques 

� Search and seizure forfeitures 

� Search warrant preparation and execution 

� Investigator development 

� Computer skills 

By their third year in the gang unit, officers were also to have attended the following 

courses: 

� Verbal judo 

� Gangs in Clark County 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 241 

� Advanced firearms training and tactics 

� Drug recognition, detection, and training 

� Basic video photography 

� Time management 

Training Quality 

We asked gang unit officers to rate the quality of their training on a scale of zero 

to 10, with 0 = poor and 10 = excellent. Although we had found that training 

requirements varied significantly between units, there was little variation among the units 

in how officers perceived the quality of their training. For instance, on average, officers 

in Inglewood rated their training at 8.5, Albuquerque officers at 7.5, Las Vegas at 7.45, 

and Phoenix at 7.85. In general, officers expressed satisfaction with the training received, 

but added that the material covered in most courses had not changed much since the first 

time that they had encountered it. Some noted that national conferences were more 

interesting, in part because the material was less repetitive than at the department and 

local levels. The following responses were typical: 

Some are better than others, I think the ones in state, they’re not the best, 

but it’s better than nothing. When you send yourself out of state, like now 

we have a unit in Anaheim, for the national gang conferences, those are 

generally better. They pull people from all the major cities, Chicago, 

Detroit, New York, all over the country, and they talk about their gang 

problems. ‘Cause then you’re learning things, whereas these gangs here, 

when they teach local classes, it’s kind of the same thing over and over. 

You can go to one and you’ve been to ten of them. 

It depends on where the seminar is. If it’s a national seminar, I would say 

10. If it’s an interstate (sic), basically, I feel that interstate (sic) 

conferences are basically spearheaded by our department. I would, that’s 

about seven or eight, because most of the time we are teaching it. And 

basically what that is going to do is reinforce some things for me. 

Knowing about what gangs are doing in other cities, that helps because 

there will be times when gang members will be going to other states, and I 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 242 

know where they are going and what they are doing there. And if they still 

have some facilitators still left in here, like a lot of times they have 

facilitators, people come in and make the driver’s license and the fake 

i.d.’s. Giving them jobs and giving them a place to stay. These facilitators 

are known to me when we have some of these big conferences. We learn 

about those things and that helps a lot. But I would say about a seven if 

it’s an interstate (sic) conference, and if it’s a national conference, it’s a 

10. 

Other gang unit officers in all departments thought that training was generally of 

good quality, but that the best training was gotten on-the-job, working in the field. 

I would say, you know, I’d say most of the stuff that I have learned from 

gangs has been just from working with them and being out in the field. So 

I would say, the gang-related classes...probably a six. 

Well, when you’re brand new up here, it’s really good because you’re 

learning, but once you’ve been up here in our unit for, I’d say maybe, it 

depends on how much you get into, after 2 years, you pretty much know 

just being in the unit how to do these investigations, so as like this year, 

when we went to the Anaheim seminar, a lot of the stuff wasn’t new to 

me. It’s stuff that I had already either heard or I had already learned from 

being working here. But it – in the initial stage when I first came up, the 

training was very good and it helped me, it provided a lot of information 

for me. And now as I’m in my, I don’t know, my last – not last, but in the 

last two or three years, it’s not – it’s just kind of going over the same stuff, 

over and over again. 

Officer Perceptions of the Job 

Examining the gang unit officers’ perceptions of their jobs, we first focused on 

problems encountered when officers first arrived in the gang units, and how they solved 

those problems. Next, we asked for the officers’ perceptions of the role of the gang unit. 

Finally, we asked how they believed their superiors evaluated individual performance. 

Problems Associated with Joining the Gang Unit 

We asked all gang unit officers to tell us about any problems they encountered 

when they first became gang unit officers. A small number of them, primarily in Phoenix 

and Las Vegas, stated that they had had no problems when they assumed their new 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 243 

positions. This was the exception rather than the rule, however. Most remarked that they 

had either had problems related to changing work environments or with learning to 

perform in the new position. 

Adapting to a new work environment. For some officers, the primary problems 

encountered after transferring to the gang unit were associated with the new working 

environment. As a group, these officers tended to identify three challenges. First, a 

number of them had difficulty adjusting to working as part of a team. Before transferring, 

many had worked alone as patrol officers or detectives. Once assigned to the gang unit, 

they acquired a partner or began to work closely with a group of other officers. The 

following comments are representative of those made by officers in all of the units: 

I think the toughest thing coming to the gang unit from patrol, you’re 

paired up with another officer, and you may have different work ethics or 

different work things that you do. I think that that would be the toughest 

thing to overcome, but after you kind of get a thing going on that you get 

along well, work well together, that’s good. But sometimes you don’t 

work well together, and you’re kind of stuck together. 

I think – I don’t know how every department in the nation works, but this 

unit is a very close-working, close-knit type of a unit. I think that one of 

the problems I had is, I had to learn to fit into what my role on this team 

was. And I was no longer an individual police officer pushing a black-andwhite every day, that I had to learn my role, so this team would succeed 

and not just Officer ___ succeeding. 

So I had to learn to get into the real team work environment. Plus the 

dangers and the problems we incur at being in the type of unit, doing this 

type of work, day in and day out. It is very difficult if you don’t get that 

good team work environment. You just got to have it, team work. That 

was a hard thing to learn. [Interviewer: How long did it take you to learn 

that?] I’d say it’s taken a good year. I’ve been up here about a year-and-ahalf now, and I’d say my first year. It took me a year to be comfortable, to 

understand where I fit in and what I needed to do to make the team 

successful. 

Some officers had difficulty adapting to working in a different geographic area. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 244 

As patrol officers, many had worked specific beats and precincts, and had become 

intimately familiar with the community and streets. Once in the gang unit, they had to 

know the entire city, or at least those areas where the gang unit frequently worked. We 

heard statements such as the following: 

The hardest, for me what was hard, was coming from Maryvale, I got 

assigned to the 25 squad which handles Central City, and I knew nothing 

about Central City. I’m real familiar with Maryvale. Central City is 

different streets, different people, different types of people, where 

Maryvale didn’t. I think when I found out I was coming to gangs, I 

assumed that I would go to the 21 squad, who handles Maryvale. But once 

I got here, I went to the 25 squad because the man... So now I have to 

learn a new area so, and it makes it hard when you’re doing, like a traffic 

stop. It’s hard to concentrate on what you need to do with a traffic stop 

when you also have to look at street signs. I think that was the hardest 

thing as far as the actual dealing with people. 

It just took time to learn gangs from other areas. ‘Cause when you’re in 

patrol, you work one specific geographic area. And when you come into 

the gang unit, you work the whole city of Las Vegas. It just takes time to 

learn the other areas of town that you are not familiar with, and the other 

types of gang members or gangs that you are not familiar with. So it’s just 

a learning process of learning the other areas and everything. 

Some officers found working with gang members, their families, and friends to be 

more challenging than expected. It took time to come to an understanding of the unique 

populations. A few found they needed to adjust their dispositions and develop new 

communication skills in order to succeed. 

I think, see, I came from Illinois, so there wasn’t that many Hispanics, 

learning the Hispanic culture and then how tight the family is, the family 

structure, the language barrier, I think that was probably the hardest thing. 

Well, number one was approaching these gang members who are known 

to be violent and carry guns and everything, and approaching them with an 

outwardly lackadaisical appearance, because the thing that I saw is the 

more authoritative you are in your approach, the less cooperation you’re 

going to get. But the way the guys I trained with up here, their approach is 

very subtle, in an effect, and almost a mutual respect. And I saw that when 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 245 

you approach them like that, instead of, hey, put your hands up, here, do 

this, do that, you’d get a lot more information. In fact, most of the times, 

they start volunteering information about rival gang members and 

everything else. So I think it was just dropping guard a little bit. You 

know, dropping that authoritative figure and trying to relate on a more 

one-to-one basis. 

Learning a new job. Some officers responded to our question about problems 

encountered when first becoming a gang unit officer by describing their difficulties with 

finding and absorbing new information related to the job itself. For some, the information 

they needed centered on working with the gang population; others had needed more or 

clearer information about procedures, practices, and even technical skills. Many officers 

stated that before coming to the unit, they had had little working knowledge about gangs, 

so the sheer quantity of new information presented a challenge. 

I wouldn’t call them problems, I would just say, having to adjust to a new 

assignment. One of the things that I experienced was that I was 

overwhelmed with all the gang slang, language, with monikers, having to 

remember so many different faces, names, monikers, where the gangs 

hang out, and all that kind of stuff. 

I would say...knowing the members; getting to know the gangs. Getting to 

know where they, particularly, where they hang out. Once you know that, 

getting to know the specific members. Like being able to go up to you and 

say, “Hey, John,” instead of “What’s your name?” Or another hard part is 

getting to know the signs, getting to know somebody is a gang member 

who doesn’t necessarily want to admit that they are a gang member... 

The most frequent responses to our questions about adjusting to the assignments 

had to do with new gang unit officers’ problems with learning how they were to perform 

their duties. Some officers explained that for some time, they had lacked confidence that 

they understood their unit’s policies and procedures, how to conduct criminal 

investigations, and how to use the gang database. Very few officers associated this kind 

of problem with lack of training, however. Instead, they regarded it as a normal hurdle 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 246 

that they initially faced – a problem that was resolved with time, patience, and on-the-job 

experience and training. 

I’m still learning, basically at this point, how to sub out cases, how to 

work the computer, for example The computer in a patrol car is different 

than the computer in the office. Obviously, those are some of the steps that 

I need to take to learn. So it just takes time and experience. 

For me, probably crime scenes. Up here, and this is something that I 

would change if I could, there is no field training program. I mean, it’s 

pretty much baptism by fire. I came up here with a new partner and we 

didn’t have anybody to really show us what to do. So when we went out 

there on a scene, we had to pay attention to the older guys, but there was 

nobody that pulled you aside and said, “Listen, this is what we need to do, 

and this is how you need to do this.” You just kind of watch those guys 

and eventually, through repetition, you learn what to do, and I don’t think 

that that was the best way to do things. But that’s the way it’s been done 

for a long time, so it’s hard to change. 

When we became detectives and started submitting our own cases, I had 

no knowledge of that. I have never done anything like that, like a search 

warrant or an arrest warrant, and I had to learn all that. I was computer 

illiterate and had to learn computer processing and stuff. [Interviewer: 

Was it all sort of on the job learning?] Yes. At home I spent a lot of my 

personal time trying to update my knowledge on computers and stuff like 

that. 

Officer Perceptions of Role 

Gang unit officers appeared united in the perception of themselves as crime 

fighters, regardless of their units’ formal mandates. Our observations suggested that the 

gang unit officers perceived their units not as responding to crime, so much as responding 

to groups of individuals whom they believed to be deeply involved in criminal activities. 

Although this may be a fine distinction, it is meaningful. Gangs and gang members, not 

just their criminal acts, were viewed by the officers as the threat, and gang unit officers 

believed that their mission was to protect the community by combating those gangs. 

Unlike patrol officers and investigators, gang unit officers tended to see themselves as 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 247 

engaged in a fight not merely against crime, but against evil and its perpetrators. 

This unity of perception across study sites was reflected again in how remarkably 

similar all gang unit officers were in how they rated the importance of various unit 

activities. Exhibit 6.02 shows the average ratings of gang unit officers of various unit 

activities. The officers used a five-point scale, with “1” representing activities that the 

officers believed were unimportant, and “5” representing activities that the officers 

believed were most important. Officers ranked collecting and processing gang-related 

intelligence and investigating gang-related activities as the most important activities, in 

all four of the gang units. 

The units’ official mandates supported the selection of intelligence as a topranking activity. Asked to elaborate, officers from all units routinely stated something to 

the effect of “that’s what we are here for,” “that’s what we do,” or “it’s critical,” 

although several officers in Inglewood and Albuquerque ranked gang investigation as a 

highly important activity, somewhat at odds with their official mandates. In Inglewood, 

gang unit officers were formally responsible for gang intelligence and nothing else, and 

in Albuquerque, gang unit officers were not assigned the primary responsibility for 

investigating gang crime, but were to assist other officers with investigations. 

Next, all gang unit officers agreed that working on gang-related issues with other 

units within their departments and in other agencies was their next most important 

activity. The officers indicated that their intelligence was often valuable to other units and 

agencies, and indicated that their experience with gangs and gang culture often assisted 

others in solving crimes. Officers mentioned that gang members were involved in a 

variety of activities, sometimes crossing jurisdictions, which made interagency 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 248 

cooperation especially important. 

That’s very important, I’d like to shove that one up there towards a five, 

because, too, especially because the way gangs – gangs cover the gamut of 

crime. We’ve had gangs doing money laundering, producing counterfeit 

money, all gangs are into drugs or drug sales, so we need to be working 

with our DEB, our fraud groups, so yeah, it’s important. 

Very important, a five. Here is a case in point. We’re working a – 

homicide calls me and they go – well, here’s what happens. A kid, an 18th 

Street gang member, is over at this apartment complex. And supposedly a 

car comes by, shots are fired into this apartment. And these two guys that 

are upstairs in the apartment come, and here is this guy lying on the 

ground with a bullet hole in his head. And they run down there and tell the 

security guard, “Jose’s been shot. Call 911.” And they’re over there 

cradling him while he dies and all of that. 

And so what happens is a car speeds off, and so homicide gets there and 

the security guard says, “They said it was Jose, call 911.” So the homicide 

guy goes up with his traditional investigative techniques and goes, “Well, 

who is this guy?” “We don’t know who he is.” “Well, you called him Jose. 

Don’t fuck with me, don’t lie to me. I’ll put your fucking ass in jail for 

homicide.” They go, “Dude, we don’t know this motherfucker. He’s just 

another dead Mexican.” So homicide gets a little statement from him. 

Well, we hear about this and we’re like, fuck this, those two guys offed 

him. And so things just weren’t adding up. So we’re not working the 

homicide, but homicide calls us and let’s us know what they know. I do 

some research and find out that those two guys have been identified three 

times in one year with the dead guy. Now you know what that homicide 

investigator’s solution to that was? “They fucking lied to me, I’m going to 

go out there and jam their ass.” When in reality, if he knew the gang 

culture, if he had walked that night and said, “Man, what’s up with this, I 

want to get the fuckers as much as you do.” They’d said, “Yeah, he’s Jose, 

we know them from here.” 

Well, as it turns out, those two fuckers shot him and now they’re in 

Mexico. But the whole case in point is when you use traditional 

investigative techniques, shit that has worked in the past and always 

worked, sometimes you don’t realize that it’s not still working. And a lot 

of these detectives take that approach, and these fuckers will clam up and 

they won’t say a fricking word. So they need to be educated, but they 

don’t think they need to be educated. So, I think that it is very critical that 

that process is ongoing throughout the department, especially since I 

would venture to say that well over half of the crimes committed in this 

community are committed by gangs. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 249 

Despite the importance they attached to interagency cooperation, however, gang unit 

officers, other than in Inglewood, rarely had contact with others outside their own units. 

Exhibit 6.02 Ratings of enforcement, intelligence, and prevention activities by city 

Albuquerque Inglewood Las Vegas Phoeni 

x 

Investigate gang-related activity 5.00 4.66 4.97 5.00 

Directed patrol at known gang hot-spots 4.75 5.00 4.74 4.43 

Deal with gang graffiti 3.31 3.33 3.21 3.14 

Perform gang sweeps of known gang 

members 

4.29 4.00 4.37 4.50 

Deliver prevention talks with respect to gangs 3.63 3.00 3.94 2.62 

Provide information to citizen groups about 3.92 2.67 3.92 2.98 

gangs 

Work with other agencies on gang-related 

issues 

4.75 4.67 4.77 4.26 

Work with other units on gang-related issues 4.88 4.67 4.67 4.74 

Collect and process gang-related intelligence 5.00 5.00 4.81 4.95 

Ratings: 1=unimportant; 5=most important 

Directed patrols and gang sweeps were viewed, in general, as the next most 

important gang unit activities. Inglewood gang unit officers ranked directed patrol as one 

of its most important activities, giving it an average score of 5.0, while Las Vegas 

officers generally rated directed patrol as of average importance (exhibit 6.02). These 

findings are interesting, given that the Inglewood gang unit was not mandated to perform 

direct patrols or sweeps, while in Las Vegas, the majority of gang unit officers were 

specifically assigned to do them. The officers’ perceptions of the importance of these 

activities in these two units did not appear to match their formal responsibilities. 

Regardless, many gang unit officers noted that directed patrols or sweeps were 

regular and important activities for the unit. Although the majority of officers in each unit 

ranked these two activities relatively high in importance (four out of a possible five), 

most did not necessarily believe that the activities were effective. Instead, the officers 

appeared to rank these activities high in importance simply because they performed them 

regularly; they were part of the job. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 250 

[I’d rank them as] three or four, maybe. Because we’ll never leave them 

[alone]. They know we’re there. We’re just in their back pocket, agitating 

them. I’d say probably a four, because they need to know we’re still alive. 

Three. [Interviewer: Why is that a three?] ...We’ve got tunnel vision. 

What I mean by that is, we hit the same exact spots everyday, that we 

know to be hot spots. Well, that’s ineffective, very ineffective. What about 

everywhere else? What about these apartments over here that we never go 

to? How do you know that people aren’t hanging out over there? You just 

don’t know unless you go. So I think it’s important and you should hit 

them a large majority of the time, but you also need to hit everywhere else 

that you don’t hit. [Interviewer: Do you hit the hot-spots on a predictable 

basis?] No, but it is pretty much in the routine. I mean, like you know 

where you are going to go next. You don’t even have to ask. [Interviewer: 

So they know when you’re going to show up, sort of?] We don’t hit it the 

same time or even the same day. 

I’m just saying, like if on Monday we’re going to go to this side of town, 

and we’re going to start at this location, we know where we’re going to go 

after that. And we might do the same thing over here and over here, but 

we would hit it on a Monday one week and a Friday another. The times of 

the day are completely unpredictable, but the locations are sometimes – I 

think it’s definitely important, but I also think everywhere else is 

important, too. Making car stops. That’s where everyone keeps their guns 

and drugs. 

Dealing with gang graffiti was ranked as the least important activity in 

Albuquerque and Las Vegas, as the second to least important activity in Phoenix, and 

within the bottom half in importance in Inglewood. Likewise, officers in each of the gang 

units gave some of the lowest ratings to educational activities. Many officers noted that 

the gang unit did not have time to perform these kinds of duties, or that other units were 

responsible for them. With graffiti, many simply noted that such crimes were fairly 

minor, and that individuals engaged in these crimes were young, inexperienced, and not 

very dangerous. Many officers made statements such as the following: 

Well, because dealing with it, well, because I don’t see a lot of gang 

graffiti. I see a lot of tagger graffiti, but not so much gang graffiti. And 

gang graffiti is mostly done by young punks that are not heavy into the 

gang yet, and it’s hard to catch them at it, and it’s difficult to find out who 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 251 

is doing it. It takes too much time, and it’s a misdemeanor offense. 

Some officers added that Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) 

officers were assigned to either the department’s community affairs or crime prevention 

unit, and they dealt with education and prevention issues. One Phoenix officer explained 

his low ranking of these activities this way: 

We leave that for community relations. That’s not important to me. 

Somebody needs to do it, but as a gang enforcement unit, what are you 

going to do, other than walk in there with your black clothing that we wear 

everyday, and try to scare the shit out of them. There’s people that are 

more suited to do that on our department than I am. 

Evaluating Gang Unit Officers 

We were interested in the indicators, measures, and standards managers used to 

evaluate their gang unit officers, since performance measures often serve as indicators to 

employees of organizational priorities and activities that are deemed most important. 

Gang unit managers, both within and between police organizations, were inconsistent in 

the indicators that they reported using to evaluate gang unit officers, regardless of the 

formal mandates of the units or documented responsibilities of the unit officers. 

In both Inglewood and Las Vegas, most of the managers’ responses were 

nonspecific. In Albuquerque, two of the three gang unit managers stated that they 

evaluated their officers by checking the number of investigations they had performed. 

Albuquerque managers also considered whether officers arrived at work on time, the 

number of arrests they made, and the amount of intelligence they gathered. In Inglewood, 

managers considered the number of investigations conducted and the amount of 

intelligence that an officer gathered, but they also reviewed the number of cases 

submitted to the county attorney’s office and the amount of gang crime in the city. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 252

In Las Vegas, managers relied on a number of process indicators, such as 

numbers of arrests, citations issued, field interviews conducted, cases submitted to the 

district attorney’s office, and conviction rates. Phoenix managers, while focusing on the 

number of arrests made, also considered more general skills such as investigative ability 

(not including clearance rates) and view skills, as well as appearance and maturity. 

Exhibit 6.03 Performance measures used to evaluate gang unit officers 

Albuquerq Inglewood Las Vegas Phoenix 

ue n=3) (n=4) (n=6) (n=5) 

Number of investigations X X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Work attendance

Number of arrests X X 

Number of cases submitted to DA X 

Number of citations Issued

Number of field interviews

Conviction rate

Amount of intelligence gathered X 

Amount of gang crime

Investigative ability

View skills

Appearance

Does not use excessive force

Maturity

Nothing specific/overly vague X X 

We found that many measures used by managers to evaluate gang unit officers 

were not directly related to their formal responsibilities, and conversely, that many of 

their assigned responsibilities were not evaluated by the managers. For example, in 

Albuquerque and Inglewood, gang unit officers did not have the primary responsibility 

for investigating crimes and rarely submitted cases to the county attorney’s office, but 

they were apparently evaluated on these measures. In Phoenix and Las Vegas, where 

officers were expected to perform gang investigations, managers were not using 

clearance rates as a performance measure. Although in Las Vegas, managers used various 

measures to evaluate intelligence and enforcement activities engaged in by officers, 

Phoenix managers did not mention the use of such performance measures, even though 

their officers were also responsible for those functions. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 253 

We were especially interested in two issues. First, it was unclear why so many 

supervisors gave vague answers when asked how they evaluated their officers, and why 

there were such wide variations in those measures that they did provide. Possibly, 

evaluations were conducted so rarely that managers did not remember the measures, or 

perhaps formal evaluations were not taken seriously and they received limited attention 

as a management tool. 

Second, we were interested to find that almost all of the measures used to evaluate 

gang unit officers, regardless of the department, were process measures. None were 

related to outcomes. In other words, gang unit managers stated that they evaluated gang 

unit officers by tracking such factors as the number of investigations they conducted, the 

amount of intelligence they gathered, the number of arrests they made, and work 

attendance. None of the managers stated that they measured and evaluated work 

outcomes, for example, clearance rates or stakeholder satisfaction with gang unit 

services, such as investigative assistance or intelligence dissemination. 

Summary 

Assignment to the gang unit was a highly sought prize in the departments that we 

studied. In overall prestige, the gang units rated above property crime, public relations, 

and prevention-oriented units. The gang units were considered on par with vice and 

narcotics units, although below homicide and SWAT units. 

The gang units promised officers unusual action and excitement stemming from 

the perceived opportunity to take off the gloves and fight crime – an image embraced and 

perpetuated by gang unit officers. Gang sweeps and specialized enforcement tactics 

promised relief from the tedium of patrol, even when the centerpiece of a gang unit’s 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 254 

formal mandate was intelligence gathering and dissemination. The job also offered, in 

some of the departments, involvement in the investigation of crimes against persons, 

which some viewed as a potential stepping stone to homicide units. Gang unit officers 

noted that the status of the gang unit was enhanced by many day-to-day benefits. The 

units were often located off-site, and officers were self-directed, free from supervision. 

They wore plain clothes or special uniforms. All of these things, the officers believed, 

gave them a sense of working with and belonging to a special group. 

Typically, the gang units were all-male, ethnically diverse enterprises of veteran 

officers, who viewed their role as fighting crime. Although most of the officers did 

acknowledge the importance of their gang intelligence functions, clearly crime fighting 

was the function that gave them identity and purpose. Functions unrelated to enforcement 

and intelligence were viewed as relatively unimportant. If the department wanted those 

things done, in the view of the gang unit officers, they should be done by others. 

We found that most of the gang unit officers entered their assignments with 

limited preparation for policing gangs. They received much of their gang-related training 

after they began working in their units, and much of it was best described as on-the-job 

training. Although officers stated that they were generally satisfied with their training, 

lack of training proved a significant problem when they first began their jobs. Formal inservice training for officers in the gang units was hit-or-miss (Inglewood being the 

notable exception), even though most officers expressed a keen interest in learning more 

about gangs and gang-related policing procedures. The lack of training was even more 

pronounced for investigators in the two gang units that had primary responsibility for the 

investigative function. These officers typically had no prior investigative experience and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 255 

were not trained in the investigation of crimes. This omission was significant, given the 

major crimes investigated by gang unit officers. 

The dearth of specialized training for gang unit officers had ramifications for their 

departments, other criminal justice agencies, and their communities. Regardless of 

training, officers assigned to gang units were automatically labeled as experts on gangs 

and gang issues. Stakeholders in and out of the police departments assumed that 

membership in the gang unit conferred expertise, and that the officers were repositories 

of information on gangs. This gave gang unit officers special status within the police 

departments, as well the communities, and also gave them considerable influence on 

gang-related policies and procedures, as well as on matters related to strategic planning. 

Furthermore, gang unit officers were called upon to train and educate others on 

gang matters. Often they conducted trainings or educational sessions for police, probation 

and parole officers, prosecutors, school officials, community leaders, citizens, and the 

media. Although we did not set out specifically to evaluate the quality of the training 

received or delivered by gang unit officers, or their knowledge about gangs, we were 

nonetheless struck by the lack of depth in their education and training in this area. 

Gang unit officers felt that they were the objects of some resentment from officers 

outside the unit. Some stated that other officers did not understand what the gang unit did 

or its official functions, and when gang unit officers failed to meet their expectations, 

patrol officers and detectives became frustrated. For example, officers in all of the units 

mentioned that patrol officers would frequently contact them for assistance on non-gangrelated incidents; when gang unit officers were unable to help them, the patrol officers 

reacted with anger and resentment. Gang unit officers also mentioned that those outside 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 256 

the unit viewed them as arrogant and egotistical. Gang unit officers believed that some 

other officers’ perceptions were the consequence of jealousy, in some cases, perhaps 

because they had been refused a position in the gang unit. 

We found that the measures that gang unit managers used to evaluate their 

officers were not necessarily directly related to the officers’ responsibilities, and that 

many core responsibilities assigned to gang unit officers were not evaluated. Gang unit 

supervisors were often vague and varied greatly in the factors that they considered when 

evaluating officers. Furthermore, when gang unit managers were able to explain how they 

evaluated their gang unit officers, they invariably described process measures, and not 

measures of outcomes or effectiveness. The data suggested that the lack of training, along 

with vague and wide variation in factors considered for performance evaluation, could 

leave officers with little official direction or guidance from the department. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 257 

Chapter 7. On the Job 

As a rule policemen assume that the gang must be suppressed—must be 

broken up. They fail to understand that boyish energies, like tics, 

suppressed at one place are sure to break out at some other. And when the 

breaking up of the gang has been accomplished, there is usually no 

attempt to provide substitute activities for the boys. Under ordinary 

circumstances, then, the “cop” becomes the natural enemy of the gang. 

–Fredric M. Thrasher, 1927 

This chapter focuses on the actual work of gang unit officers, as we describe what 

the gang unit officers were doing in the four cities that we studied, how they were doing 

it, and why, from the officers’ perspectives, they were performing their jobs as they were. 

We also examined the roles and functions of the gang units within their communities, in 

part by examining how gang unit officers spent their time over the normal course of a 

work day. We described the numbers and types of individuals that the gang unit officers 

came into contact with, how those contacts were initiated, and the various strategies and 

tactics that we observed being used by the gang unit officers in the field. 

How the Gang Unit Officers Spent Their Time 

We directly observed officers at work in the four cities that we studied. For 

collecting and analyzing the data that would help us determine how the officers were 

spending their work time, we chose the time diary strategy. This approach provided the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 258 

latitude to record activities in the open-ended fashion used by many ethnographers and 

time use researchers, and allowed us to code our observations for analysis afterward. This 

methodological strategy offered the flexibility that we needed to arrive at a clear and 

precise understanding of the actual nature of the gang unit officers’ work. 

While still contemplating alternative methods of data collection for this study, we 

became interested in creating a unique categorization system for recording officer activity 

in the field. In particular, we thought to develop a unique set of codes that would both 

indicate what the officer was doing in the field and describe the purpose of the activity. 

However, after attempting to create an activities and goals log worksheet, we discovered 

some inherent problems. First, prior research in general, and policing research in 

particular, thus far had not produced standards for coding police activities and goals. We 

found only one study addressing time use among police officers, and that one was limited 

to patrol officers (Parks et al. 1999). In addition, little research had been conducted 

examining the police response to gangs, and what did exist had shed almost no light on 

the functions and roles of gang units and gang unit officers. 

Given the circumstances, we could not be certain what types of activities should 

be included in such a log. If we were to construct the log with an excessively long 

activity code list, it might result in the field researcher over-relying on a few favorite 

codes; if we created a list that was too short, it could result in broad, general activity 

categories that would limit our ability to accurately portray activities engaged in by the 

officers (Fein and Staff 1991). For all of these reasons, we decided upon using the time 

diary strategy instead. 

Once our activity data were collected, and after an initial qualitative analysis of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 259 

the types of activities that the gang unit officers engaged in and the roles they played in 

the field, we identified and described seven general categories to further examine how the 

officers allocated their time: suppression, investigations, intelligence, 

education/prevention, administrative, en route, and non-police related. 

� Enforcement. Directed patrol, field and traffic stops, hot spot operations, and 

back-up for other officers and units. 

� Investigative. Surveillance, locating suspects, interviewing (witnesses, 

victims, and suspects), processing crime scenes, and similar activities related 

to conducting criminal investigations. 

� Intelligence. Collecting information from gang members, community 

members, business owners, and the public; documenting gang members; 

exchanging information with officers and other criminal and non-criminal 

justice personnel. 

� Education and prevention. Counseling at-risk youth, attempting to find 

employment for gang youth, educating the public about gangs and gang 

activity, and other similar activities. 

� Administrative. Field preparation, report production, evidence processing, 

meeting with court officials, testifying in court, and job training. (This 

category was constructed similarly to Parks et al., 1999.) 

� En route. Travel to and from official destinations (constructed similarly to 

Parks et al., 1999.) 

� Non-police related. Activities unrelated to official police business, e.g., meals 

and snacks, personal errands, restroom and other breaks (constructed similarly 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 260 

to Parks et al., 1999.) 

The four gang units that we studied differed substantially in how officers spent 

time (exhibit 7.01). For the most part, the differences reflected variations in the principal 

function(s) assigned to each unit. In spite of the differences, however, we found that the 

kinds of activities performed by each unit, with the exception of Inglewood, were fairly 

similar. In this section, we compare the amount of time spent by each unit on various 

functions, and we discuss how the units performed each function. 

Exhibit 7.01 Average minutes per 8-hour shift allocated to activities 

Activity (primary) Inglewood Las Vegas Albuquerque Phoenix 

Enforcement (total) 57.68 155.20 127.64 144.72 

Directed patrol 35.04 98.43 57.53 90.51 

Investigation 22.64 56.77 70.11 54.21 

Intelligence 207.81 12.51 81.63 69.17 

Education/prevention 0.00 3.96 0.00 0.00 

Administrative 65.26 106.08 90.95 98.17 

En route 28.84 45.25 99.40 52.43 

Non-police related 102.96 135.63 64.15 81.37 

Orientation of observer 17.45 21.37 16.23 34.14 

Enforcement 

As exhibit 7.01 shows, three of the four gang units dedicated a disproportionate 

amount of time to enforcement. The Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix gang units 

each spent an average of about 2 to 3 hours a day on enforcement, compared with 

Inglewood, which spent only about 1 hour a day on enforcement activities. To understand 

the enforcement role of the gang units, it is important to note that none of the gang units 

were responsible for responding to calls for service; it was each officer’s prerogative to 

respond or not. As a result, gang unit officers only responded when there appeared to be 

an opportunity to assist with a gang-related investigation or to collect gang intelligence. 

With few exceptions, in fact, officers were generally free to perform only the 

gang control activities that interested them. They received little direction about what to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 261 

do, or about when or how their activities were to be performed. They were left to conduct 

their activities as they saw fit, with little or no oversight. With this said, gang unit officers 

generally engaged in two types of enforcement activity: directed patrol and investigation. 

Directed patrol. All of the gang units allocated some portion of time for directed 

patrols. Las Vegas and Phoenix gang units each spent an average of about 1.5 hours a day 

on directed patrols, whereas Albuquerque averaged just under 1 hour a day, and 

Inglewood averaged just over 30 minutes a day (exhibit 7.01). Directed patrol was almost 

exclusively carried out in known gang hot spots. As a result, gang unit suppression efforts 

were typically directed toward minority neighborhoods, public housing complexes, and 

parks frequented by gang members. 

In Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, directed patrols in such areas served 

two general purposes. The primary goal was to suppress gang crime. Officers in all three 

units believed that gang members were aware of their presence in the targeted areas, and 

that this deterred gang violence. The officers stated that directed patrols often yielded 

arrests of gang members, which in turn caused those arrested, as well as their gang 

member friends, to think about negative consequences associated with gang life. 

The second purpose of directed patrols in known gang areas was to gather 

intelligence from gang members. In particular, gang unit officers were expected to stop 

gang members on the street, document those who were not already documented, and 

gather intelligence on their gangs. From these stops, they collected information about 

active disputes and other happenings occurring among neighborhood gangs. Much of the 

time that officers spent on the street patrolling known gang areas was in pursuit of the socalled good stop. The good stop was one that yielded an arrest of a gang member, usually 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 262 

for drug or weapons possession, or on an outstanding warrant. If a stop did not result in 

an arrest, officers hoped at least to have gathered some new gang-related intelligence. 

Although all of the gang units except Inglewood used directed patrol as a general 

strategy to suppress gang activity, each relied on different tactics. In Albuquerque, 

officers conducted directed patrols in areas where gang violence had occurred in the past. 

Patrolling these areas, according to the officers, allowed them to increase police presence 

in high gang crime neighborhoods and to survey them for potential problems. Directed 

patrols also increased the probability that officers would come into contact with gang 

members and make a good stop resulting in an arrest or a newly documented gang 

member. Directed patrols were officer-initiated; they were performed at times when the 

officers did not have other priorities. 

In Las Vegas, gang unit officers used a much more aggressive strategy that many 

of them referred to as a sweep. The members of each gang enforcement squad worked as 

a team. The team would split into four pairs, each assigned to its own squad car. At the 

beginning of the shift, the team would agree on the areas they were going to sweep and 

the order in which sweeps would be conducted. To begin, generally all four vehicles 

would rally at a single point outside the specified neighborhood. From there, one pair of 

officers would patrol down the “hot street” – a street or area where gang members were 

known to loiter or conduct street-level drug sales. Two other pairs in squad cars would 

patrol the two streets immediately parallel to the hot street, keeping pace with the lead 

car. The forth squad car would remain out of sight at the end of the street, slowly 

patrolling toward the other three. This tactic involved squeezing gang members toward 

the center of the targeted area. Then if a suspect fled on foot or in a vehicle, one of the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 263 

squad cars would be in position to pursue and stop that person. 

Las Vegas officers explained that sweeps accomplished several purposes. They 

were thought to be effective for apprehending individuals engaging in illegal activity, 

such as drug dealing. Officers also believed that working in teams made their jobs safer. 

They explained that they often had to deal with groups, and having more officers present 

helped them to maintain control in difficult situations. The tactic also served as an 

intentional show of force, sending the message to gang members that the police gang unit 

controlled the streets, and that if gang members stepped out of line or engaged in illegal 

behavior, they would be caught. One officer described how he believed the gang 

managers expected the unit to perform: 

Our [managers] want the gang unit to be very proactive. Pick them up for 

everything, like jaywalking. We want these gangsters to know that we 

own the streets. [Managers] want us to be aggressive, just short of beating 

the shit out of them. If they talk back to us, we cuff them, and sit them 

down and lecture them. 

Another officer explained: 

We are out here letting gang members know that we are in control of the 

city. We are proactive, fill out FIs, and use this to prosecute them on gangrelated crimes. Mix it up with the gangs. If they run, we chase them.... We 

all work a neighborhood, and we take the neighborhood over. Let them 

know that we are in charge. 

Phoenix took a slightly different approach to patrolling known gang areas. Each 

enforcement squad was assigned to a specific precinct for the purpose of patrolling and 

investigating gang crimes. However, even though more than one squad member might be 

patrolling within a precinct at any given time, the Phoenix officers did not work together 

as a team to focus on specific locations, as officers in Las Vegas did. 

For the past 10 years, however, the Phoenix gang unit had been substantially 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 264 

increasing its patrol presence through another kind of strategy – the Operation Safe 

Streets (OSS) program. During the summer months, officers normally assigned to schools 

were being reassigned to patrol commanders in order to increase the number of patrol 

officers on the street. Precinct commanders, in turn, would assign one or two of their 

patrol officers to the gang unit, where they served as OSS officers. Additionally, every 

summer, a motor squad comprised of one sergeant and six officers, otherwise responsible 

for traffic enforcement, would be assigned to the gang unit to participate in the OSS 

project. These reallocations of personnel resulted in a total of 13 additional officers 

assigned during the summer months to work with the gang unit. OSS officers rode with 

gang unit officers in the areas that the officer normally covered, and they performed all of 

the typical gang unit officer activities. 

As noted above, the Inglewood gang unit also patrolled known gang areas, but 

here they used tactics and strategies that were different from those of the other units 

because their goals were substantially different. According to Inglewood officers, their 

directed patrols were performed exclusively for the purpose of gathering intelligence. 

They argued that if they were to conduct arrests of gang members and carry out other 

traditional enforcement activities, gang members would stop providing them with 

intelligence. Additionally, they explained, the three gang unit officers did not have the 

resources to arrest gang members; making arrests would take up substantial time that 

could otherwise be allocated for intelligence-gathering. Inglewood gang unit officers 

believed that except when the evidence in front of them was overwhelming, they had no 

other choice – they did not make arrests. 

When Inglewood officers learned of gang violence that was about to occur, or 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 265 

when they witnessed an on-going criminal act such as street-level drug trafficking, they 

told us that they contacted the department’s Anti-Crime Team (ACT), which then 

performed any necessary enforcement. The officers were firm in their conviction that the 

gang unit should remain in the good graces of gang members, allowing it to continue to 

collect gang intelligence, letting ACT officers be the so-called bad guys if an arrest or 

other enforcement effort was warranted. 

Investigation 

All of the gang units performed investigative activities (exhibit 7.01). 

Albuquerque gang unit officers spent about 70 minutes a day on investigations, Las 

Vegas and Phoenix units each spent about 55 minutes a day, and Inglewood averaged just 

over 20 minutes a day. These variations in the amount of time spent, as well as 

differences in the nature of the units’ investigative activities, were consistent with the 

differences in the gang units’ assigned functions. As noted in chapter 5, three of the gang 

units (Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix) were mandated to conduct activities related 

to investigations of gang crimes, albeit in different ways. Albuquerque’s gang unit was 

charged with assisting other units and officers with gang-related investigations, but they 

were not assigned the primary responsibility for investigating gang crimes. On the other 

hand, Las Vegas and Phoenix’s gang units did have primary responsibility for 

investigating all gang-motivated crimes, with the exception of homicides in Phoenix, and 

homicides, sexual assaults, and casino robberies in Las Vegas. 

Our field observations indicated that Albuquerque’s auxiliary investigative role 

resulted in that gang unit participating in a greater number of investigations than units in 

the other three cities. Officers and detectives contacted gang unit officers when the 

investigation of a gang-involved crime required follow-up. Typically, gang unit officers 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 266 

were also called upon for initial consultations, generally to provide detectives with real 

names to match with street names, recent known addresses, and known associates. As a 

consequence, Albuquerque gang unit officers spent substantial time discussing cases with 

officers from other units. Additionally, if the investigation required the questioning of 

known gang members, gang unit officers assisted in questioning such suspects, victims, 

and witnesses. They believed that previous contacts with gang members gave them an 

advantage during such interviews, and found that being present during questioning 

allowed them to collect additional gang intelligence. 

In both Las Vegas and Phoenix, although standard operating procedures made the 

gang units responsible for investigating all gang-motivated crimes (with a few 

exceptions), typically, their officers investigated only violent crimes. Cases were 

obtained by gang unit officers in each department in one of two ways. First, during patrol, 

the officers monitored the radio, and although they were not responsible for responding to 

calls for service, they did respond when it sounded as if there might be gang involvement. 

This commonly occurred when a shooting was announced over the radio. In this case, 

after arriving on location, if gang unit officers determined that the shooting was gang 

motivated, they took investigative responsibility at the scene and then conducted all 

follow-up work. 

In addition, gang unit sergeants could assign cases to their officers for 

investigation. If an investigating officer elsewhere in the department discovered a gang 

connection in his case, he could forward it to the gang unit sergeant responsible for the 

geographic area where the crime occurred. If the sergeant concurred that the crime was 

gang motivated and that the gang unit should investigate it, he would assign it to a gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 267 

unit officer. If the sergeant believed that the crime was not gang motivated, or that it was 

gang motivated but should not be investigated by his unit for any reason, the sergeant 

could refuse the case. Our observations and interviews in Las Vegas and Phoenix 

indicated that the units accepted only cases that were serious in nature or that officers 

believed would result in good intelligence. As a result, gang unit officers generally had 

light case loads. Gang unit officers in both Las Vegas and Phoenix noted that they rarely, 

if ever, had active case loads of more than two cases. 

The graffiti detail in Las Vegas was an exception. This detail was responsible for 

investigating all of the city’s gang and tagger group graffiti, a problem that many officers 

in the department and the gang unit considered to be of minor importance. To report 

graffiti, citizens were required to call a city office, and then to photograph the damage 

and submit the photo to the office. (In certain cases, the city might take the photograph.) 

The crime report and photo were next forwarded to the general investigations or juvenile 

unit. If the original complainant did not follow up on the investigation by contacting that 

unit within 4 days, the unit would usually close the case. 

If there were leads or if the offender had signed the graffiti with a moniker (street 

name), the case was forwarded to the graffiti detail, where all available data, including a 

scanned copy of the photograph, were entered into the computer system. At this point, 

investigators in the graffiti detail would attempt to link the evidence to prior offenders or 

to identify a suspect through leads. According to the officers, cases were typically solved 

because the unit had intelligence on monikers that could be tied to the graffiti artist’s 

signature. In most cases, the officers explained, apprehended offenders were charged with 

a felony because of the high cost associated with cleaning up graffiti. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 268 

Officers in the graffiti detail expressed a great deal of frustration with their jobs. 

Citizens were expressing concern about graffiti in their neighborhoods because of the 

public perception that graffiti was associated with gang violence. On the other hand, the 

graffiti detail’s status was low within the department, and within the gang unit, because 

of the nature of the crime. Graffiti officers frequently noted that they were responsible for 

all of the city’s graffiti, gang-related or not, largely because no one else in the department 

viewed it as an issue worth addressing. 

Inglewood’s gang unit was the only one not mandated to perform investigative 

activities. Our observations of the work of the Inglewood officers indicated, however, 

that they occasionally did participate in both gang and non-gang investigations. Their 

involvement most often started with individual curiosity rather than with a formal 

assignment. When a homicide occurred while officers were on duty, they often would 

arrive at the scene just to find out what had happened. Under those circumstances, their 

role might simply be that of an observer, or they might assist with keeping the public 

away from the crime scene. Once in a while, when gang unit officers were on the scene 

when detectives needed assistance tracking down individuals who might have 

information about the crime, gang unit officers would be used as auxiliary personnel. 

Intelligence 

As we discussed in the preceding chapters, having primary responsibility for 

collecting, processing, and disseminating gang intelligence for the police department was 

a defining characteristic of the gang units that we studied. Accordingly, each of the units 

served, at least in part, as the central information broker of gang intelligence for its 

department. 

We observed that gang intelligence originated from a number of sources, and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 269 

presented itself through a variety of formal and informal media. Regardless of its source 

or the medium through which it was received, each gang unit was responsible for 

processing intelligence and disseminating it to others both inside and outside the agency. 

Because our study focused on gang unit officers and the strategies that they used to 

collect, process, and disseminate gang intelligence, we discuss these issues as they related 

to our observations of the gang unit. 

Exhibit 7.01 shows that although all four of the gang units were responsible for 

intelligence functions, the time that they devoted to intelligence activities varied 

significantly. In Inglewood, gang unit personnel averaged about 3.5 hours a day on 

intelligence activities, compared with 1.35 hours in Albuquerque, 1.15 hours in Phoenix, 

and 0.2 hours in Las Vegas. In the sections that follow, we discuss how the gang units 

performed this function, focusing on three primary tasks: collecting, processing, and 

distributing gang intelligence. 

Collecting intelligence during field interviews. The medium for collecting most 

gang intelligence in all four departments was the Field Interview (FI) card. FI cards were 

used by patrol officers, detectives, and gang unit officers to record basic information 

about suspected gang members who had been interviewed either during a field stop or in 

the course of another police-related encounter. Although all of the units used the 

suspicion stop to gather intelligence, each unit was stylistically and strategically unique 

in its tactics, varying from overtly friendly to blatantly aggressive. 

Inglewood gang unit officers were polite and friendly. They all commented that 

they did not stop suspected gang members in order to make an arrest or to hassle them, 

but rather the stops were intended to be friendly, fostering relationships and resulting in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 270 

quality intelligence. This was referred to by the officers as the friendly stop. The 

following excerpts from our field notes represent typical contacts that we observed 

Inglewood gang unit officers making with gang members: 

We stopped and talked to a 17-year-old Hispanic male who was a member 

of Inglewood 13. The officer said Hi and asked him, in a good natured 

way, to stay out of trouble. The kid smiled back and said that he would try 

to. It was a genuinely friendly contact. The officer explained that there 

was little animosity between the gang unit and gang members. 

The officer stopped a black male in his mid-20s wearing all black. He was 

a member of the Bounty Hunters. The officer asked where he worked, 

lived, and asked the name of the guy who he had just walked by. After the 

discussion the officer informed me that he knew that he had lied to him 

about where he lived and worked because he did not want the officer to 

know where he was at. However, I noticed that the interaction was 

positive; both were smiling at one another. 

We stopped and talked to three Hispanic males who were all in Inglewood 

13. One pretended to run away, clowning around as he did it. The officer 

knew the three of them by their street names. He asked the kid if he 

expected him to be “Packman” and run after him. Another positive 

encounter. All four of them were laughing. 

None of the stops that we observed in Inglewood resulted in an arrest, as we will 

discuss later in this chapter. The gang unit officers were interested in maintaining positive 

relationships with gang members. In fact, it became apparent to us that Inglewood 

officers in the field were choosing not to speak to individuals dealing drugs on the street. 

They frequently pointed out such individuals, but they never made contact. When asked 

about this, the officers emphasized that they did not have the resources to engage in 

enforcement activities, and that their primary responsibility was to gather intelligence. 

They were concerned that if they did make arrests, gang members would no longer 

provide them with timely and accurate information, and that they would lose time to 

processing the arrest. As a consequence, they explained, they called upon other units in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 271 

the department for follow-up enforcement. 

During Inglewood field contacts, however, if an officer determined that an 

individual met any of the criteria required to be documented as a gang member, and if 

that person was cooperative and willing, the officer would fill out an FI (field interview) 

card. The FI card allowed the officer to collect information such as the individual’s name, 

date of birth, social security number, race, sex, height, weight, hair and eye color, driver’s 

license number, street name, name of business or school, identifying marks, and vehicle 

information. The cards had predetermined categories for the officer to use in recording 

criteria for gang membership that the individual had met, and the name of his or her gang. 

Following the interview, gang unit officers, with permission, would photograph the gang 

member and any physical evidence of gang membership – a tattoo, a belt buckle, or the 

individual displaying a gang sign. When an officer gathered intelligence on a person 

already known to be a gang member, he would record the information on an FI card out 

of sight of the gang member. This information would then be used to update the gang 

member’s computer record. 

In Albuquerque, gang unit officers used two tactics in the field to gather gang 

intelligence. The first, as in Inglewood, was the friendly stop. Officers would identify an 

individual or group, and make the stop in the field. This type of stop was consensual, and 

the officer conducted himself in a good-natured way. For example, the officer would ask 

how they were doing, what they were up to, and other general questions. In doing so, the 

officer would ask about gang affiliation and about other people in the neighborhood. If 

the officer identified an individual as a gang member through self-admission or other 

visual cues, he would ask further questions about where that person lived and worked, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 272 

who he dated, and the names of friends. Field notes from our observations provided 

examples of how such stops were conducted: 

We stopped three Hispanic male juveniles.... All had shaved heads, baggy 

pants, and no visible tattoos. He asked them where they lived...who they 

knew in the neighborhood. They said they were not in a gang. The officer 

was very nice to the boys. [He] talked about their dogs. [It was evident 

that the officer] knew a number of the guys in the neighborhood. 

We stopped three Hispanic male adults who were walking by...[a] 

consensual stop. The officer just...[talked] about neighborhood stuff, who 

is warring with who, who has been sent to prison, etc. All three were selfadmitted gang members...shaved heads, baggy shirts and pants. [The 

officer] asked where [they] worked, lived, [and who they] dated. He said 

he would update the card so [the police] knew where [they] worked. One 

was a victim of a drive-by. 

Not all stops made by gang unit officers in Albuquerque were consensual. Gang 

unit officers also used occasional legal justifications such as traffic violations to make 

stops. However, officers pointed out, they did not invoke minor legal infractions such as 

jaywalking or walking on the wrong side of the street as justification for stops. They 

argued that such tactics would result in gang members losing respect for the unit, which 

in the long run, they believed, would result in gathering less intelligence. 

Officers in Albuquerque used suspicion stops as a tactic only when they observed 

illegal activity or when they had a strong suspicion that illegal activity was taking place, 

and they conducted these professionally and without creating conflict. Regardless of the 

situation, officers typically remained focused on the goal of gathering gang-related 

intelligence. Officers would work the stop as if it were for a traffic violation, asking for 

the driver’s license, registration, and insurance information. If passengers were in the car, 

officers would request identification from them, as well. The officer would then check for 

criminal histories and outstanding warrants. As the information was being run by the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 273 

central office, the officer would interview the driver and passengers about their 

involvement in gangs. If someone was a self-identified gang member, the officer would 

question that person about gang conflict in the neighborhood. 

All gang-related information was recorded on a special gang card used by the 

Albuquerque police department. The card included spaces for information such as the 

person’s street name, address, alias, gang name, clique, date of birth, social security 

number, sex, race, height, weight, eye and hair color, work or school, and identifiable 

tattoos. The gang card also had space for information about the vehicle, and the names 

and dates of birth of anyone else present and the time of the contact. Albuquerque 

officers, however, were particular about not recording information on a gang card in the 

presence of the gang member. They explained that if gang members saw the card being 

used, they would not provide the information and would deny gang membership. As a 

result, officers adopted the use of a regular notebook, and then transferred the 

information onto a gang card after concluding the stop. 

In Phoenix, gang unit officers were also professional, respectful, and direct during 

their contacts, but they were more interpersonally remote than officers in Inglewood, for 

example. In Phoenix, the primary goal of such stops was an arrest or to gather 

intelligence from a gang member. Phoenix officers used municipal ordinances and county 

laws as pretexts for making stops. Typically, with a little patience, actual traffic 

violations were commonly observed when following a suspected gang member, but 

occasionally officers became more inventive. As one officer explained, “You have to be 

creative with the law, then you can work them over to learn stuff and get intelligence.” 

He further explained that officers “liked to use the little piddly stuff to talk to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 274 

them...because [if] he breaks the law, then they are required to have I.D. [and if they 

don’t], then you can arrest them for that.” 

Other officers decided on a reason for the stop after it had already taken place. For 

instance, on one occasion, an officer being observed for this study stopped a Bronco with 

two Hispanic juvenile males inside. After the officer pulled the vehicle over, but before 

he got out of the squad car, he had the following conversation with his partner and the 

field observer: 

Partner: Is this a shit stop? 

Driver: ...loud music? 

Partner: I didn’t hear anything. 

Driver: ______, did you hear any music? 

Observer: I didn’t hear anything, but I wasn’t paying attention. 

The officers then simultaneously exited the squad car and approached the suspect without 

discussing the matter further. 

Gang unit officers in Phoenix primarily worked in the dark at night, making visual 

identification of likely gang members more difficult. After seeing a suspect up close, 

officers would have to decide quickly whether he was, in fact, a likely gang member. On 

a number of occasions, we observed as officers pulled over individuals who from a 

distance looked like gang members (i.e., they were young, male, and minority) and who 

were driving substantially over the speed limit. Then on closer inspection, the officer 

would see that the driver had children in the back seat, or the driver or passenger was an 

elderly man or woman; the officer would give the driver a quick warning and let him go. 

Often with such stops, it would have been within the officer’s purview to issue a citation 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 275 

or make an arrest for the traffic violation, but if the individual was not a gang member 

and a violation was not gang related, officers did not believe that they should take time to 

process the incident. 

When an individual who had been stopped did fit the profile for gang 

membership, the officer would assess whether he or she was actually involved in gangs. 

First, officers would order the suspect out of the car and ask for a driver’s license, vehicle 

registration, and insurance documents. Meanwhile, the officers were scanning the 

suspect’s arms, hands, and ankles for gang tattoos, and examining their clothing, belt 

buckle, shoes, and hair style for indications of involvement in the gang lifestyle. Officers 

also examined personal property such as school books or bags for gang graffiti, and 

interviewed the suspect about gang affiliation. The officer would ask the suspect 

questions: Where are you going? Who are you down with? Who do you hang out with? 

Were you ever down with a gang? All of this would take place while the officer’s partner 

was running the individual’s name for possible warrants. If the officer determined that the 

individual was a gang member or met the criteria for gang membership, he completed an 

FI card and took a Polaroid picture of the person. He would also ask permission to search 

the vehicle. Even though typically no reason was given for searches, all suspects whom 

we observed permitted the officers to search their vehicles. If the individual had no 

warrants for arrest and if there was no incriminating evidence, he or she would be 

released. 

Las Vegas also used FI cards to document gang members. Officers in Las Vegas 

were the most aggressive in tactics and demeanor of the units we studied. As noted 

above, Las Vegas gang enforcement squads moved through neighborhoods in an 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 276 

orchestrated fashion, and officers rarely used any pretext for making suspicion stops. If 

an individual was thought to be a gang member, or if there was a small crowd of young 

minority males in a known gang neighborhood, the squad targeted them. Our field data 

showed that almost all individuals stopped by the gang unit during our observations were 

minority residents. When we asked one sergeant how the unit dealt with the profiling 

issue, he explained: 

You have to walk a fine line, because we do target particular kids. While 

there are white, Asian, etcetera, gang members, we just do not run into 

them. We primarily deal with blacks and Hispanics. You have to have an 

administration that backs you up and our department does. It is a very 

tough issue.... If you have 15 black kids hanging out on a corner and 15 

white kids also hanging out on a corner, the blacks are more likely to be 

questioned. 

In Las Vegas, once a vehicle, individual, or group had been targeted by the squad, 

three or four squad cars moved in harmony toward the target. This strategy startled or 

frightened most of the individuals contacted by the gang unit. Once the squad car 

stopped, officers would quickly leave their cars, hands on their guns, requesting the 

targeted individual to get out of the vehicle (if they were in one). They would place the 

person(s) in a prone position, either on the ground or against the hood of the squad car, 

and hand pat him for weapons or other contraband. They would request identification, 

check for a criminal history, and conduct an interview about the person’s activities and 

gang involvement. This strategy had been used so often by the gang unit that they had 

developed boiler-plate language for documenting stops and searches – namely, all stops 

and searches, for report purposes, were consensual. During our observations, one new 

gang unit officer was unsure how the process worked, and asked his partner how he 

should write up the stop-and-search. Our field notes recorded this interchange: 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 277 

[Officer A] asked [Officer B] why they originally stopped [the suspects], 

so he could write up the report. [Officer B] said, “You know how it goes 

(smiling). If you see a group, you search them in this area.” [Officer A] 

said, “Well I know that, but how should I write it up?” He told [Officer A] 

to write it up as consensual for the report. I asked [Officer B] further about 

it and he said you [write them up] as consensual until [you find 

something] and then it becomes probable cause. 

The Las Vegas officers explained that at every opportunity, they would ticket 

gang members for any infraction or offense, serious or non-serious. If a gang member 

was driving without insurance, they would write a ticket. If a gang member was seen 

jaywalking, they would write a ticket. If a gang member was riding a bicycle on the 

sidewalk, they would write a ticket. They argued that most gang members would not take 

the time or have the money to pay the fine. Then the next time an officer stopped that 

gang member, if he or she was disrespectful or did not give the officer information as 

requested, the officer could arrest the gang member for failure to pay the fine. 

Las Vegas officers also used tickets to punish and reward gang members for their 

attitudes and behavior during suspicion stops. Those who were disrespectful would 

receive tickets, while those who were cooperative and provided the information requested 

would not. One observer’s field notes described the following two incidents: 

We stopped a Hispanic male, 28 years old. He was walking down the 

street and the officers pulled over and asked him to step over to the car. He 

ignored them and started to walk away. They said they were the police and 

he said, “no kidding.”...The officers then laid him up on the car because 

he was being a smart-ass. They said because he lied, they were going to 

give him a ticket for not using the sidewalk. They asked if he was a gang 

member. He said he was not and had no tattoos. Just one tattoo that 

indicated that he was “100% Mexican.” They gave him a ticket and told 

him not to lie again. They said if he would have been cool, they would not 

have done anything. They seemed to have used more force than was 

necessary, but he was very non-responsive. Perhaps he was drunk or 

mentally ill.... 

The officer stopped a white male, 27 years old with a white T-shirt, baggy 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 278 

pants, and a shaved head, for a jaywalking violation. He admitted to being 

in a gang in LA. He said he moved to get away from all of that shit. The 

officers filled out an FI card [asking] questions about his criminal history 

and gang membership. The gang member commented how everyone else 

is jaywalking. [The] officer said “We are in the gang unit and primarily 

interested in gang members.” [The suspect said that] he was 16 when he 

was jumped in. The gang member was shot by a .38 between the eyes and 

through the neck from a drive by. They took his picture. The officer told 

him he was not going to give him a ticket because he was being 

cooperative. 

Las Vegas gang unit officers used aggressive tactics to obtain intelligence from 

suspected gang members, as well. For example, officers frequently would demand that 

suspects pull up their shirts, lift up pant legs, and turn around while an officer physically 

inspected their bodies for gang tattoos. During our observations, suspects rarely refused 

the officers’ demands, but many appeared embarrassed, and some were visibly offended. 

On occasion, officers in Las Vegas were observed to use other high pressure tactics to 

elicit intelligence from those they stopped. In particular, they would threaten their targets 

with arrest or citations if they were not provided with intelligence or when they thought 

that an individual was not being honest about gang membership. The following excerpt 

from our field notes describes one such occasion: 

Went on a fishing trip – pulling over everyone (with cause) who was 

leaving a fashion show [with] all black attendees. Many were wearing red. 

We pulled over 2 black male...[adults]. Their car was speeding.... One 

had been arrested for drugs in the past.... [One] claimed that he used to be 

a Piru Blood. But he is 30 now, and said he has not been in a gang for 13­

14 years. The [other] was getting an attitude. He was upset that he was 

pulled over for nothing. The officer continually asked him who he was 

down with and he said no one. When the officer asked to take the older 

brother’s picture, he asked if that was legal. The cop said absolutely. 

(They then took the picture.) When they tried to get the younger brother’s 

picture, he (the younger brother) said no, you already have one. The 

officers became very upset and said they were going to arrest him if he did 

not cooperate. [An officer] then went over to the (older) brother and asked 

him who the younger brother was down with. He said no one. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 279 

Collecting intelligence intra-departmentally. Many of the gang units used intradepartmental intelligence-gathering tactics. All units permitted other officers to document 

gang members by filling out an field interview card. In Inglewood, Albuquerque, and Las 

Vegas, FI cards had a box for officers to check when the interviewee was a suspected 

gang member, and a place to indicate the criteria that were met that suggested gang 

membership. When an FI card showed that the subject was a likely gang member, a copy 

of the card would be forwarded to the local gang unit. 

However, it was unclear how often outside officers furnished this kind of 

intelligence to the gang units. Many officers in the units we studied believed that the 

majority of gang intelligence came from interviews that they conducted themselves, 

although no one was able to substantiate this assertion. When we inquired why other 

officers in the departments did not document gang members or provide gang intelligence 

more often, many stated that patrol officers were too busy and did not want to take the 

time to process the paperwork. Others believed that patrol officers simply felt that 

gathering gang intelligence was the gang units’ responsibility, not theirs. 

Some police departments tried to build and facilitate relationships among those in 

the field to encourage their assistance with collecting gang intelligence. In Albuquerque, 

for example, patrol officers and detectives were asked to radio the gang unit whenever 

they had contact with a gang member. Once notified, the gang unit would arrive at the 

scene to determine whether in fact the person was a gang member; if so, they would 

document and interview him for gang intelligence. The gang unit felt that this simple 

procedure was a relatively easy thing to ask of other officers; it cost them little effort 

since most of the work was done by the gang unit. The strategy appeared to be somewhat 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 280 

successful. On several occasions, we observed patrol officers and investigators requesting 

the service. Gang unit officers did note that often when other officers contacted them, the 

individual who had been stopped turned out not to be a gang member. However, they 

believed that in order to continue to receive the calls from other officers, they needed to 

be appreciative and to respond to as many requests as possible. 

The Phoenix gang unit formalized this approach by creating a gang liaison 

program designed to increase communication among patrol and investigative officers and 

the gang unit. The goal was to increase the amount of intelligence forwarded from other 

officers to the gang unit. All gang liaison officers received 16 hours of training, with 

about 4 hours spent learning about the department’s gang data base system (SIDS) and 12 

hours spent discussing issues related to local gangs and gang unit policies and 

procedures. A civilian in the gang unit was responsible for processing and disseminating 

the unit’s intelligence; that person was also responsible for coordinating the gang liaison 

program. Although many officers volunteered to become gang liaisons, their interest did 

not usually last long. Only a modest number remained full participants in the program 

after training. From the inception of the program in March 1998, through January 4, 

2000, according to an informal list given to us by the gang unit (Jan. 4, 2000), 228 

officers received gang liaison training, 20 detectives and 208 patrol officers. Only about 

60 percent (n=14) of the detectives and 32 percent of the patrol officers (n=67) continued 

with the program after they were trained. 

Another internal intelligence-gathering technique used both in Phoenix and in 

Inglewood was the review of arrest reports. In Phoenix, the civilian in charge of 

processing and disseminating gang intelligence reviewed the previous day’s arrest reports 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 281 

and documented the number of gang-motivated incidents, to monitor the level of local 

gang crime. Due to the substantial number of arrest reports generated each day, only 

reports of homicides, drive-by shootings, aggravated assaults, threats, and endangerments 

were reviewed. Those determined to be gang motivated – that is, criminal acts committed 

for the purpose of promoting gang status or personal status in the gang – were recorded as 

gang crimes. 

In Inglewood, gang unit officers also reviewed arrest reports, but here, they 

tracked a wider array of crimes: homicides, felony assaults, rapes, robberies, burglaries, 

street terrorism act violations, and shootings into dwellings (drive-by shootings). If an 

offense was determined to be gang related, the information from the report was placed in 

the gang member’s record. 

While reviewing the report, if an officer determined that an offense was gang 

motivated (not merely gang related), he would search the report for additional gang 

intelligence. Officers stated that on occasion, they would first learn about violent acts 

having occurred through the daily reports; in this way, they were able to identify trends in 

disputes between gangs. The information was used either to suppress future gang 

violence by notifying gang members that the gang unit was aware of their activity, or to 

give detectives intelligence on crimes already under investigation. If an offender was still 

in custody, a gang unit officer would attempt to gain an interview. He would focus the 

interview on the nature of the gang-motivated event, and would try to gather additional 

intelligence that would assist detectives with their investigations and might help prevent 

further gang-related activity. 

In Albuquerque, this approach was not used because the gang unit supervisor 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 282 

believed that his officers did not have enough time to review crime reports. More 

important, he and the police chief disagreed on the criteria for gang crime. The chief 

believed a gang motive was needed for a crime to be counted as a gang crime, while the 

sergeant believed that if either the offender or victim was a documented gang member, 

the offense should be recorded as a gang crime. Both the chief and the sergeant informed 

us that they had discussed this issue on numerous occasions, without resolving their 

differences. 

Las Vegas’s gang unit used several practical, undemanding strategies for 

collecting gang crime data. First, all crime reports included a check-off box that officers 

were to mark for gang motivated offenses. The report would then be forwarded to the 

gang unit for inclusion in the gang crime count. Second, a civilian staff member, a retired 

police officer, read the newspaper every day searching for homicides that might be gang 

related. He checked all victims’ names against the unit’s gang list. If a homicide victim 

was a gang member, that victim was included in the unit’s count of killed gang members. 

Last, at the end of each year, officers from the gang intelligence squad worked with the 

department’s crime analyst to obtain a count of shootings at occupied structures, or driveby shootings. From these reports, gang unit officers determined whether the shootings 

had claimed victims; if so, these were included in the count. The supervisor of the gang 

intelligence squad mentioned that these strategies for collecting gang crime data was 

perhaps not as thorough as that of many other agencies, but it was efficient and protected 

his officers’ time for working on other more important issues. 

Of special significance is our finding that none of the gang units collected 

intelligence on gangs, per se. Identification of a particular gang’s members always 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 283 

preceded documentation of the gang. Only after an individual had claimed membership 

or had met the criteria for being documented as a gang member could his or her gang be 

documented. Even then, gang unit officers who were careful about the criteria used for 

documenting individual gang members did not have to verify that each gang documented 

matched the official definition. In Phoenix and Inglewood, gang units required that for a 

gang to be counted, it needed at least three documented members. We found it 

interesting, however, that a gang member could be documented, whether or not his gang 

had enough documented members to be formally acknowledged by the unit. The bottom 

line is that, with the exception of Phoenix, none of the gang units that we studied 

gathered intelligence directly and proactively on gangs as groups. 

In Phoenix, the gang unit would occasionally perform a syndicate investigation on 

a targeted gang. In these instances, gang unit officers would gather previously collected 

intelligence on members of the targeted gang, attempting to link their activities and 

associations with one another. This strategy allowed the prosecutor to enact statutes 

designed to enhance the sentences of convicted individuals belonging to a criminal 

syndicate. The gang unit officers believed this strategy to be effective, although they 

pointed out that it was only possible with the more organized gangs. 

Collecting intelligence extra-departmentally. Three of the four police 

departments used extra-departmental intelligence-gathering tactics. Albuquerque gang 

unit officers collected intelligence from the New Mexico State Correctional Facility’s 

officials and prison gang unit files. During intake procedures, when a prisoner selfadmitted membership in an Albuquerque street gang, that information could be used to 

document him. Gang unit officers also interviewed prison officials about gang activity 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 284 

within the prison and how that activity might influence street gang activity. 

Inglewood’s gang unit also received intelligence from their state prison system. 

The unit received faxed bulletins when local gang members were released from the 

state’s correctional facilities. The Inglewood officers, however, did not believe that they 

needed to collect other intelligence from other agencies on a regular basis. Their gang 

intelligence computer program, CALGANG, was internet-based, and participating 

agencies could enter new data directly and view the records of any gang members who 

had been documented by any participating agency. 

Interestingly, Las Vegas’s gang unit intelligence squad was monitoring a few 

popular internet chat rooms frequented by gang members. Officers explained that 

although they rarely found intelligence online to be directly applicable to their issues, the 

sites occasionally would inform police of an upcoming party or social event. This 

intelligence, the police believed, led them to people of interest from whom they could 

then obtain more useful intelligence. During our observations, enforcement squad officers 

did follow up some leads from the internet, but none proved to be of use. 

Processing gang intelligence. In all of the departments, once an officer completed 

an FI card nominating an individual to be documented as a gang member, that card would 

be forwarded to the gang unit. That unit’s procedures would be followed to review, 

process, and entered data into the gang information database. Each of the gang units we 

studied used a particular application to store gang intelligence: Inglewood used 

CALGANG; Albuquerque used the Gang Reporting, Evaluation and Tracking (GREAT) 

system; Phoenix used the Suspect Image Database (SID); and Las Vegas used the 

Gang/Narcotics Relational Intelligence Program (GRIP). Although all of the units used 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 285 

computerized systems to store intelligence, their oversight of data processing, input, and 

maintenance varied. 

In Albuquerque and Phoenix, all information nominating individuals to become 

documented gang members (e.g., FI cards, gang cards, photographs) was administratively 

reviewed, regardless of which officer or unit had provided it. In Albuquerque, before any 

individual could be placed in the system and before other paperwork was processed, the 

sergeant in charge of the gang unit had to approve the action. Likewise, in Phoenix, all 

nominating materials were forwarded to the daytime investigation squad, whose officers 

reviewed the materials to assure that the nominee met their formal criteria for becoming a 

documented gang member. If so, the officer completed and stamped a Gang Member 

Identification Card (GMIC). The sergeant in Albuquerque and the Phoenix investigative 

squad officers explained that individuals nominated as gang members by officers were 

virtually always documented, but the review process provided them with the opportunity 

to oversee nominations in order to clarify missing, unclear, or contradictory intelligence. 

This, they argued, would be helpful if the information was ever to be used in court. 

In Inglewood, all FI cards and associated intelligence produced by officers outside 

the gang unit were forwarded to the unit. The gang unit officers then reviewed the 

materials to assure that the individual met the criteria for documentation, and that all 

required information had been collected. FI cards and other intelligence produced by 

gang unit officers, however, were not reviewed by anyone else in the department. 

In Las Vegas, all FI cards completed by officers, regardless of their units, were 

forwarded to the gang unit secretarial staff, where they were prepared for processing. No 

one else reviewed or approved paperwork associated with documenting an individual as a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 286 

gang member in Las Vegas. 

In Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, civilian staff in the gang units were 

responsible for intelligence data entry and processing; in Inglewood, gang unit officers 

assumed this responsibility. In all locations, once an individual had been accepted for 

documentation, his or her file was forwarded to the appropriate data processing person in 

the gang unit. That person would take the necessary steps to compile all available 

information, and would then create the documented gang member’s record in the gang 

intelligence database. The gang member’s criminal, vehicle, and field interview records, 

along with photos, if any, were pulled, and all of the information available was entered 

into gang intelligence system. A typical record, in all of the units, would include the gang 

member’s name, moniker(s), date of birth, gender, age, ethnicity, criteria for 

documentation, known address, place of work or school, name of gang, known associates 

(per FI card data), physical characteristics including scars and tattoos, a reference to the 

number of photos on file, arrest record, field interview record, probation, parole and 

correctional records, and vehicle information. In Inglewood, Phoenix, and Las Vegas, 

photographs could be scanned into the system, for ready access. 

In Phoenix and Las Vegas, after information was entered into the gang database, 

the unit would update its departmental criminal history system, as well. This would alert 

officers in other units if an individual they were checking on was a safety risk as a gang 

member. It also signaled officers to collect gang intelligence, whenever appropriate and 

possible, and to forward an FI card to the gang unit for processing. 

In most of the units, the period between completion of a new FI card and 

documentation and entry of the data into the gang intelligence system was relatively 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 287 

short, typically around 1 week. In Las Vegas, however, civilian staff stated that they were 

about 4 months behind in processing gang intelligence and entering data into the system. 

They cited the large number of FI cards generated by the gang unit and the amount of 

time that it took to process individual files as reasons for the delay. 

Once an individual was documented as a gang member, that person’s record 

would remain in the gang intelligence database for a specified time. In Albuquerque and 

Inglewood, gang member records were purged from the system after 5 years. In Las 

Vegas, gang members were considered in active status for 2 years, dating from the most 

recent police contact connecting them with a gang; their records were scheduled for 

purging after 2 years of inactivity. In Phoenix, records of associate gang members were 

purged after 1 year, and records of gang members were purged after 5 years. 

Three units (Inglewood, Phoenix, and Las Vegas) used automated systems to 

generate periodic lists of documented gang members who had been in the system for the 

specified period. They checked the listed names against police records, searching for any 

further police contacts that included evidence of continuing gang membership, 

involvement with a gang or gang members, or gang activity. If such evidence was found, 

that individual’s record would be updated and replaced in the gang information system 

for another 1 to 5 years, depending upon the unit. 

Each department handled this process differently. In Phoenix, the civilian in 

charge of the gang information system printed all prior gang intelligence on the 

individual and forwarded it to the gang officer assigned to the area where the gang 

member lived. The officer was then responsible for reviewing the record and determining 

whether the person had been involved in further gang activity since last having been 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 288 

documented. This was typically accomplished by reviewing FI cards and criminal history 

records. If the officer determined that the individual had been neither involved in further 

gang activity nor identified in the presence of other documented gang members, the 

record was approved to be purged from the system. 

In Las Vegas, the gang information system automatically generated this list on the 

first day of each month. Las Vegas and Inglewood then followed the same procedures as 

Phoenix, except that in Las Vegas, the work was performed exclusively by secretarial 

staff, and in Inglewood, it was performed by gang unit officers. In Las Vegas and 

Inglewood, record purging was not supervised or coordinated by a specific person in the 

unit. 

Only Albuquerque’s gang intelligence system could not automatically generate 

these reports. Instead, the gang unit supervisor was responsible for coordinating system 

purges. He explained that although his gang unit had only recently been created, it had 

inherited all the information collected by the prior gang unit. He had assigned a civilian 

volunteer to handle the purging of all gang member records that had been in the system 

for more than 5 years, as long as the gang member had had no further contact with police. 

This action reduced the number of documented gang members from roughly 8,000 to 

about 7,000. He further explained that in the future, the gang unit would purge the system 

every 5 years. In other words, records would not be reviewed individually; instead, 

periodically all records in the information system would be reviewed simultaneously for 

possible purging. 

In Albuquerque and Las Vegas, all purged records were archived on the chance 

that police would have a future need for the information. Officers from both units 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 289 

explained that federal guidelines required them to purge the system every 5 years if they 

were interested in sharing the information with other agencies or using it in court. As a 

consequence, the units had two filing systems. One contained the records of current 

documented gang members, about whom intelligence could be shared with other 

agencies; the other contained archived, purged records of gang members, about whom 

information could be shared only for internal police purposes. 

Disseminating gang intelligence. We observed gang unit officers using four 

distinct tactics for disseminating gang intelligence: processing requests, participating in 

gang intelligence forums, distributing aggregate data on gang trends, and distributing 

intelligence on specific gang activity. 

The most basic method of disseminating gang intelligence, used by all four gang 

units, was processing informal requests for information. Officers within the department 

or personnel from other agencies would contact the gang unit to request information on a 

particular individual whom they believed to be a gang member. Because they maintained 

the gang databases, each unit had a relatively large body of intelligence on individuals 

believed to be involved in criminal activity. Furthermore, the gang unit’s intelligence was 

usually more up-to-date than that of other police units. As a result, when detectives or 

others needed to contact a gang member or wanted to link street names of suspects with 

given names, they often turned to the gang units for help. 

Each gang unit processed information requests differently. In Inglewood and 

Albuquerque, gang unit officers processed all requests themselves. Typically, an officer 

or member of another agency would telephone the gang unit to request information, and 

an officer would return the call when he could. In Phoenix and Las Vegas, requests for 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 290 

gang intelligence were usually processed, one way or another, by the units’ civilian staff. 

In Las Vegas, for example, most callers knew to call unit secretarial staff directly for 

information; if someone called a gang intelligence officer, the officer would simply 

request the information from the secretarial staff. Although gang intelligence squad 

officers were responsible for disseminating intelligence, most appeared to be incapable of 

accessing the computerized gang information systems. Officers explained that many of 

them had never learned to use a computer; they were concentrating their efforts 

elsewhere, on what they viewed as real police work. When we asked a supervisor about 

the officers’ reluctance to use the gang information data system, he explained: 

They [secretarial staff] enter all gang FIs in GRIPS. If people need things 

from GRIPS, you get one of the girls to get it, because we don’t know 

computers. I want to use my officers to put bad guys away. 

When we asked one of the officers about the use of computers in his unit, he explained 

that officers used them for public presentations, and that “right now, [we] are working 

hard on learning...how to use the computers.” Our field notes further illustrate this skill 

deficit: 

It [is] apparent that none of the officers are computer literate. They spent 

an hour the other day trying to save a file from the C to the A drive, and 

then from the A to the C drive. They have no understanding of paths.... [A 

supervisor] said they are crime fighters not computer geeks...that’s why 

[they] have the girls. 

In Phoenix, gang intelligence was disseminated by the civilian in charge of data 

processing. According to our observations, again, most gang unit officers were unable to 

use the gang information system because they lacked experience with the program. On 

several occasions, some civilian staff complained about always having to retrieve this 

information for the officers, explaining that they had repeatedly shown the officers how 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 291 

to use the system, but the officers were either disinterested or incapable of learning to use 

a computer. As a consequence, most requests for gang intelligence ended up going 

directly to civilian staff, without going through gang unit officers. 

In an effort to decentralize gang intelligence dissemination and to increase the 

availability of data to officers throughout the department, the Phoenix gang unit located 

computers equipped with the gang information system at each substation. The strategy 

did not work as well as had been hoped. Officers frequently failed to learn to use the 

program or forgot their passwords. For example, we observed as one gang unit officer 

entered a substation to access the database and asked the patrol officer inside how to use 

the system. The patrol officer replied, “You can’t, because no one knows the password.” 

“What good is the stuff if we can’t get the info?” the gang unit officer responded. 

Some units formed or participated in gang intelligence-sharing forums or groups 

in an attempt to formalize a process for collecting and disseminating gang intelligence. 

Officers in all four departments recognized that the gangs in their areas did not operate in 

a vacuum, and that interaction with other gang units in surrounding jurisdictions would 

enhance their chances of receiving up-to-date intelligence on gangs, gang members, and 

gang activity. 

Officers in both Las Vegas and Phoenix had facilitated or attended multijurisdictional gang intelligence meetings. In Las Vegas, every Wednesday at 3 p.m., 

while all shifts and teams were on duty, the gang unit facilitated what it called the Rock 

Pile. The Rock Pile was conceived by a former gang unit lieutenant who was interested in 

criminal justice agencies coming together to “beat big rocks – the gang problem in the 

county – into little rocks.” The informal meetings, lasting only about 20 minutes, were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 292 

attended by all gang unit officers, as well as by local probation, parole, and other law 

enforcement officers, and some federal agents. We observed that about half a dozen 

criminal justice officials other than gang unit officers attended Rock Pile meetings, 

including two probation and two parole officers who consistently attended. During the 

meetings, each attending officer would share intelligence with the group, requesting 

assistance when appropriate. An officer might, for example, present information about a 

dispute between two gangs, a wanted person, or a recently identified trend in criminal 

activity. Although the meetings appeared to be useful and interesting to those outside the 

gang unit, they seemed to be of even greater value to the gang unit officers themselves, as 

a means of sharing information among shifts and teams. 

Phoenix’s gang unit participated in two gang intelligence forums. The East Valley 

gang meeting, facilitated by the Mesa, Arizona, Police Department gang unit, was held 

every month, and attended by about 30 officers and gang crime analysts from criminal 

justice agencies on the east side of the metropolitan area. The meetings served three 

general functions: training, intelligence sharing, and networking. Generally, they began 

with a brief training session. For example, we observed attendees watching a video on a 

“white power” group that had ties to prison and street gangs. After the training activity, 

each agency would have an opportunity to share and disseminate intelligence. 

Similarly, in the summer during the Operation Safe Streets (OSS) program, the 

gang unit would facilitate a gang intelligence meeting for gang intelligence specialists 

from 23 agencies that frequently worked with the Phoenix Police Department. Officials 

from the county jail, juvenile and adult probation and correction departments, and 

representatives from various task forces attended. The meetings typically lasted about an 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 293 

hour, during which individual agencies would each share information about recent 

events, requesting assistance in locating wanted individuals. 

Distributing aggregate gang trend data. All of the gang units except Albuquerque 

produced gang activity reports for their respective stakeholders. Each report examined 

different data, and covered different time periods. In Inglewood, the monthly gang 

activity report described trends in the numbers of gang crimes committed, of gang 

member arrests by age, and of offenses involving guns or narcotics. They distributed the 

report to department administrators and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Safe 

Streets Bureau, which was responsible for tracking county-wide gang crime. 

Phoenix’s criminal intelligence analyst produced a similar report monthly, 

including a current count of documented gang members by ethnicity, age, and gender. 

The unit also distributed a annual report of the numbers of gang homicides, drive-by 

shootings, and aggravated assaults for the year. The reports were distributed to gang unit 

officers and police managers, and the data were presented annually to the city council. 

The Las Vegas gang unit produced perhaps the most sophisticated and thorough 

report, an annual accounting highlighting trends in gang membership and gang activity. 

Gang crime data were analyzed by month, year, and time of day, and gang membership 

trends were reported by age and ethnicity. The report discussed the gang unit’s strategies 

for responding to gangs, and any special trends that the unit wanted to emphasize. This 

report was distributed annually to administrators and newspapers; the public also had 

access at the department internet site. Many Las Vegas gang unit managers and officers 

noted that the data were used internally, as well, for making shift scheduling decisions 

and to assess the scope and nature of the gang problem in Las Vegas. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 294 

Disseminating intelligence on selected gang activity. The Inglewood and Phoenix 

gang units used internal unit and departmental bulletins to disseminate selected gang 

intelligence for strategic purposes. A typical bulletin might include a brief description of 

recent gang activity for the purpose of locating a particular person or for directing patrol 

officers to particular areas. For example, the Inglewood gang unit placed the following 

statement in the April 30, 1999, Inglewood Crime Analysis Bulletin (10 (17): 1): 

Gang Activity on W. Olive. Unidentified gangsters are disrupting the 

neighborhood around 514, 520, and 524 W. Olive. They are harassing the 

neighbors with reckless driving, underage drinking, and other gang 

activity. They threaten anyone daring to confront them. Please provide 

extra patrol. 

Education and Prevention 

While observing gang unit officers at work, we saw relatively little activity in any 

of the four units that could be classified as gang education or prevention. As shown in 

exhibit 7.01, the only unit that we observed engaging in prevention was Las Vegas, 

where the unit averaged about 4 minutes a day on activities related to this function. 

In fact, the majority of that time was attributable to a single case, in which Las 

Vegas gang unit officers (from the intelligence squad) had responded to a request for 

family counseling from a parent concerned that her son had joined a gang. In this case, 

with the parent’s permission, officers had searched the youth’s room for evidence of gang 

membership. When they had talked with the young man about gang involvement, they 

learned that he had not been able to find a job, and therefore had too much time on his 

hands. The officers had contacted a prominent casino on the Las Vegas strip on his 

behalf, and the casino subsequently hired him. 

The officers explained to us that the casino had approached the unit years before 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 295 

with a hiring program for under-privileged youth. They offered to hire gang members, 

under certain circumstances. In order to qualify, applicants could not have been arrested 

for serious violent offenses, although less serious charges, including drug trafficking, 

would not necessarily be held against them. Over time, the gang unit had developed a 

relationship with casino personnel that had allowed them to direct gang members toward 

the legitimate employment opportunities. 

In Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, our interviews with gang unit officers 

suggested that they occasionally presented gang training sessions to other law 

enforcement agencies and educational talks to public groups. We did not directly observe 

these kinds of activities, but we reviewed the units’ training and education materials. 

Officers told us that they had offered training primarily to other officers from smaller 

agencies just outside their jurisdictions and to other criminal justice officials such as 

probation, parole, and social workers. Training styles varied among the individual 

trainers, but officers in all of the units used approximately the same instructional outline. 

First, they would cover basic background information on gangs operating within the 

community, including the history of the local gang problem and trends in gang 

membership, gangs, and gang activity. This information was generally followed by 

definitions of gangs, gang members, and gang crime, and tips for how to distinguish gang 

members and gangs from other youth and youth groups. Then they would discuss the 

structure and culture of gangs, including why youth joined gangs, how they gained status, 

and how members were permitted to quit. Next, officers discussed gang involvement in 

drug sales, violence, and other crime. The trainings often concluded with instructions on 

how to respond to gangs and gang members. This segment might include how to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 296 

communicate with gang members, how to document gang members, and how the gang 

unit responded to gangs. 

Training presented by gang unit officers was usually basic, supplemented with 

stories from the field. Instructional materials tended to convey simple information such as 

gang colors; how, as part of gang culture, gang members must be “jumped” into the gang; 

and reasons that children might join gangs, such as not getting attention at home, being 

from single-parent families, and needing protection from other gangs. Training materials 

also reviewed basic policies adopted by the gang units as part of their gang control 

efforts, but rarely explored alternative gang control strategies in any depth. 

Gang unit officers did note that they sometimes gave presentations to public 

groups. They described these as similar to their presentations for criminal justice 

professionals, but without the discussion of departmental policies or confidential 

information. The officers would present lectures on actions that citizens could take to 

prevent gang crime in their neighborhoods or that parents could take to dissuade their 

children from joining gangs. These were filled with conventional advice, e.g., develop 

good communication with your children; occupy your children’s free time; set limits; 

start a neighborhood block watch program. Records indicated that from July 1, 1998, 

through June 30, 1999, the Las Vegas gang unit had conducted 24 public presentations. 

Interviews with Phoenix gang unit officers suggested that they had done the same. 

Also, in an effort to educate the public and criminal justice officials about street gangs, 

the Phoenix gang unit had developed several handbooks. Some outlined how various 

organizations could respond to gangs, offering tips on recognizing gang members and 

early warning indicators, and giving gang prevention suggestions specific to various 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 297 

kinds of organizations. Others informed residents about city and police resources that 

could help community members combat gang problems. Another handbook addressed 

issues of interest to criminal justice officials and officers in other units of the Phoenix 

Police Department; this one provided background information on gangs, gang culture, 

and the gang environment in Phoenix, and included chapters on identifying gang 

members, officer safety, and how to interview and interrogate gang members. 

According to our observations, except for Inglewood, officers from all of the gang 

units we studied did engage in some prevention and education activities; however, such 

activities actually occurred rarely. 

Administrative, En Route, and Non-police Related Time 

We found significant differences among the four gang units in the time officers 

spent for administrative tasks, driving from one location to another, and non-policerelated activities (exhibit 7.01). The data showed that those units that spent more of their 

time on enforcement activities also spent more time on administrative tasks. This, we 

found, was largely due to the amount of paperwork required for processing arrests and 

evidence, and for testifying in court as a consequence of enforcement activity. Gang unit 

officers in Inglewood spent little time on enforcement, and consequently, they spent only 

a small proportion of their time on administrative tasks. 

We also found differences in the amount of time that officers spent en route from 

one location to the next, not including patrol time. Again, this was dependent upon the 

types of activities conducted by the gang units. Compared with the other units, 

Albuquerque averaged almost two to three times as much time spent traveling from one 

location to the next, largely because of their auxiliary investigative function. It was not 

unusual for Albuquerque gang unit officers to spend a substantial part of their shifts 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 298 

trying to locate a suspect, traveling to several possible locations. Conversely, because 

Inglewood’s primary function was carried out in the office, they had few work-related 

reasons to be driving from one location to another. 

As with any job, gang unit officers spent a portion of their time engaging in nonpolice related activities, such as eating meals and snacks, running personal errands, and 

relaxing. During our observations, Albuquerque officers averaged about 60 minutes per 

8-hour shift spent on non-police related activity, compared with 81 minutes in Phoenix, 

103 minutes in Inglewood, and 136 minutes in Las Vegas. The Las Vegas unit attributed 

the relatively high amount of non-police related activity to the hours that they were 

assigned to work and the temperature during summer months, when it was not 

uncommon for the temperature to be well over 100 degrees until sunset. As a result, 

officers explained, there was little street activity during the day. This led the officers to 

take the time between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m., at the beginning of their shifts, to catch up on 

office gossip, get dressed for the shift, and relax. From 5 p.m. to 6 p.m., officers ate 

dinner, after which they started working. 

When compared with Albuquerque and Phoenix, Inglewood also spent more time 

on non-police related activity, probably due to the substantial amount of time officers 

spent collecting and processing intelligence. Inglewood officers spent long periods sifting 

through volumes of paper reports and entering data into the gang information system. 

Although they occasionally took breaks from this activity to patrol neighborhoods and to 

attempt to gather intelligence on the street, they also took breaks to talk with other 

officers throughout the department as a way to relax. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 299 

Gang Unit Officer Contacts 

As we observed gang unit officers at work, we documented their contacts with 

others outside the gang unit. For purposes of this study, our definition of a contact was 

similar to the definition of a Full Encounter (Parks et al.1999, 505). Specifically, any 

verbal or physical contact involving police business that lasted longer than approximately 

1 minute and/or that included a meaningful verbal or physical exchange was designated 

as a contact. The term meaningful here is intended to reflect the significance of the 

exchange from the point of view either of the officer or the person having contact with 

the officer. For example, if a person were to call a gang unit officer and the telephone 

conversation lasted less than 1 minute, but significant information was shared by either 

party, we would count it as a meaningful contact. If an officer stopped a suspected gang 

member, then upon closer inspection decided that the person was not a gang member and 

released him, the exchange would be considered meaningful because the officer exercised 

his authority to detain or release that person – no doubt a meaningful exchange from the 

perspective of the other person. 

In the sections below, we discuss the frequency of officer contacts with others, 

typical ways in which contacts were initiated, and the identities of the persons contacted. 

In addition, because it was the method used for a significant number of the units’ contacts 

with gang members, we discuss the use of suspicion stops. 

Mobilization of Gang Unit Officers 

Inglewood gang unit officers were mobilized significantly more often than 

officers in any other unit (exhibit 7.02). During an average 8-hour shift, Inglewood 

officers altogether were mobilized about 13 times, compared with about four or five 

times per shift for gang unit officers in Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix. We found 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 300 

few differences among the four units in whether mobilizations were initiated by officers, 

radio calls, or other sources. However, the units did differ in the frequency with which 

officers were mobilized by telephone calls or walk-ins. In Inglewood, where the gang 

unit office was co-located with other units in the department, officers often received 

telephone requests for gang intelligence from other criminal justice agencies, and other 

officers routinely visited the gang unit office to request intelligence. 

Exhibit 7.02 Average number of mobilizations per 8-hour shift, by medium 

Source of mobilization Inglewood Las Vegas Albuquerque Phoenix 

Telephone 6.08 0.78 1.05 1.28 

Walk-in 3.16 0.10 0.38 0.06 

Gang unit officer-initiated 3.29 3.12 2.11 2.82 

Radio 0.00 0.10 0.57 0.25 

Other 0.12 0.26 0.00 0.43 

Total 12.65 4.37 4.13 4.85 

Individuals Contacted by Gang Unit Officers 

We examined the types of persons with whom gang unit officers had contact and 

how much time officers spent on these contacts. The number of contacts that gang unit 

officers had with gang members and the average length of these encounters were perhaps 

our most interesting findings. 

Las Vegas gang unit officers had the most frequent contact with gang members, 

with about three contacts per 8 hours. Similarly, the contacts that Las Vegas gang unit 

officers had with gang members lasted longest, averaging about 41 minutes per contact. 

Our observations of the gang units suggested that this finding reflected Las Vegas’s 

aggressive gang enforcement strategy. 

Inglewood had the next highest number of contacts with gang members, but the 

duration of their contacts was the shortest of the four gang units – most likely a reflection 

of the type of contacts that the Inglewood gang unit officers had with gang members. The 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 301 

officers made only friendly stops to collect intelligence, and did not contact gang 

members for enforcement purposes. 

Phoenix and Albuquerque each averaged about one contact with gang members 

per 8 hours, encounters averaging 20 and 32 minutes in length, respectively. 

With regard to investigative contacts (i.e., with victims, witnesses, other 

suspects), Las Vegas and Phoenix had the highest numbers; each had roughly three 

investigative contacts per 8 working hours. During our observations in Phoenix, 

investigative encounters consumed roughly 1 out of 8 working hours, while in Las Vegas, 

the time spent on investigative contacts averaged just over 30 minutes per 8 working 

hours. This was largely a result of these units being responsible for investigating gang 

crime. Albuquerque’s gang unit, where officers were responsible only for assisting other 

units with gang-related investigations, had slightly fewer investigative-related contacts 

(n=2.29) and spent slightly less time on these contacts than officers in Las Vegas and 

Phoenix. Inglewood’s gang unit had the fewest investigative contacts (n=1.89) and spent 

less time with them (10.11 minutes) over an 8-hour period, largely because the unit did 

not have investigative responsibilities. 

Exhibit 7.03 Gang unit contacts: Averages per 8-hour shift 

Inglewood Las Vegas Albuquerque Phoenix 

Number Length Number Length Number Length Number Length 

Internal stakeholder 4.68 46.17 0.57 8.18 2.20 26.99 1.22 24.83 

External stakeholder 4.55 42.37 0.52 2.03 0.96 14.21 0.67 6.50 

Gang member 2.15 12.02 3.07 41.34 1.24 32.56 1.22 20.30 

Victim 0.25 3.79 0.52 7.09 0.09 1.73 0.18 4.35 

Witness/ 3rd party 0.25 3.16 0.78 11.68 0.76 7.59 0.49 10.06 

Other suspect 1.39 3.16 1.72 12.93 1.44 13.45 2.57 42.19 

Citizen 0.25 5.06 0.26 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.36 3.80 

Total 15.06 115.73 6.93 84.50 6.14 96.53 6.99 112.03 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 302 

With the exception of Inglewood, gang unit officers in all of the departments 

rarely had contact with internal stakeholders (other police officers inside their 

department) or external stakeholders (criminal justice officials outside the department). 

Gang unit officers in Las Vegas had contact with an internal stakeholder or with an 

external stakeholder only once every other 8-hour shift, on average. Likewise, the length 

of their encounters with stakeholders was extremely short – 8 minutes with internal 

stakeholders and 2 minutes with external stakeholders. Similarly, Phoenix gang unit 

officers had contact with internal stakeholders only once per 8 hours and had contact with 

external stakeholders only once every other shift. These findings reflected the lack of 

officer-disseminated intelligence in Las Vegas and Phoenix; when these units 

disseminated intelligence, civilians handled the task. A civilian employee in Phoenix’s 

gang unit had tracked the number of requests per month that he processed and the amount 

of time required to process the requests. Although not all records were available, those 

we examined indicated that he had been processing 61 to 113 requests per month (exhibit 

7.04), and he was spending 6.5 to 13.66 hours every month on this activity – or about 41 

minutes per 8 hours in his busiest month. 

Exhibit 7.04 Phoenix intelligence requests 

Requests Time spent 

(#) (hrs: mins) 

April 1999 113 13: 40 

May 1999 80 07: 35 

August 1999 94 06: 30 

December 1999 61 10: 00 

January 2000 70 10: 40 

March 2000 105 07: 25 

May 2000 71 07: 10 

Albuquerque’s gang unit officers had substantially more contact with internal and 

external stakeholders, spending more time with these stakeholders than officers in Las 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 303 

Vegas and Phoenix. This was largely a consequence of the added time that Albuquerque 

officers spent on intelligence, compared with Las Vegas and Phoenix officers. 

On the other hand, when compared with the other units, Inglewood gang unit 

officers had substantially more contact with internal and external stakeholders. In an 

average 8-hour shift, gang unit officers averaged contact with just over four internal 

stakeholders and more than four external stakeholders, totaling about nine stakeholder 

contacts per 8-hour shift. These contacts were lengthy, as well, averaging 42 to 46 

minutes each. Inglewood gang unit officers explained that this many internal stakeholders 

were contacting them because of the unit’s reputation for giving quality gang 

intelligence. Asked why others turned to the gang unit for information, one of the gang 

unit officers explained: 

Probably the knowledge of knowing almost everybody on the street, 

because our job is to contact and talk and become personally involved in 

these gangsters’ lives, their family lives, their mothers, their school lives, 

so we get to know the people. We don’t know them all, I mean, there is 

just too many of them to know, but we know most of them, the ones that 

are the most active, and we know a lot about them, and they talk to us, and 

we know a lot of what is going on in the street. And so we are kind of like 

an encyclopedia here of what is going on in the city, and everybody comes 

to us because of it... 

Another officer felt that the unit was counted on to have answers: 

As a resource. They know that we know the gangsters. They hear of a 

particular problem and they come to us with it, and if they know of a 

subject that is running from them or something like that and they can 

identify them, nine times out of ten, a basic description from a gang 

member that we are familiar with, we can drop out of the top of our head, 

“that is so-and-so from whatever gang,” so we start writing up warrants. 

They use us a lot as a resource. 

Our observations suggested that criminal justice officials outside the police 

department did, in fact, rely heavily on the unit for gang intelligence. Some surrounding 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 304 

police departments, including the Los Angeles Police Department, contacted Inglewood’s 

gang unit for intelligence almost daily. When we asked the officers about this, they gave 

a few different reasons why other agencies contacted them so frequently. One officer’s 

explanation focused on the inability of the Los Angles Police Department to collect its 

own gang intelligence: 

LAPD CRASH can not get fuck for intelligence. All they do is 

enforcement. They bust heads, so nobody will talk to them.... We go out 

there and make friendly contacts. We get to know the guys. 

Another officer stated that other agencies contacted Inglewood’s gang unit because of the 

mobility of gang members from Inglewood: 

These people call because the Inglewood gang members do shit in other 

cities, so the police departments come to us for information because they 

do not know who they [gang members] are. 

Lastly, the data showed that none of the gang units had much contact with citizens 

who were not suspects, victims, witnesses, gang members, or criminal justice officials. 

These findings were consistent with our finding that gang unit officers did not participate 

in community policing activities, as we will discuss in chapter 10. 

Suspicion Stops 

As we discussed above, gang unit officers spent substantial time conducting 

suspicion stops for the purpose of arresting or gathering intelligence from gang members. 

About 88 to 92 percent of those stopped by gang unit officers from all four units were 

male, 92 to 98 percent were minorities, and 79 to 96 percent were under 30 years old 

(exhibit 7.05). Although the profiles of individuals contacted and interviewed in the field 

were fairly similar among the units, the number, duration, and nature of the contacts 

varied substantially. For example, in Albuquerque, gang unit officers averaged 1.05 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 305 

suspicion stops per 8 hours, compared with Inglewood officers, who made about 1.8 

stops per 8 hours, and Phoenix and Las Vegas officers who made just over 2 stops per 8 

hours. Likewise, in Inglewood, suspicion stops tended to last 10 to 15 minutes, whereas 

in Albuquerque they lasted about 25 minutes, in Phoenix they lasted about 30 minutes, 

and in Las Vegas they lasted about 40 minutes. 

Exhibit 7.05 Suspicion (field) stops by city 

Inglewood Las Vegas Albuquerque Phoenix 

Field stops (#) 1.77 2.29 1.05 2.14 

Average length of field stop (min.) 12.90 40.92 24.97 31.27 

Males (%) 89 88 92 87 

Minorities (%) 92 98 92 95 

Under 30 years old (%) 96 88 92 79 

We examined the results of suspicion stops made by gang unit officers. Analysis 

showed that some units were more effective at making stops that actually resulted in 

contact with or an arrest of a gang member (exhibit 7.06). In Las Vegas, Albuquerque, 

and Inglewood, 60 to 67 percent of all suspicion stops resulted in contact with a gang 

member, whether self-admitted or documented by the officer. Gang unit officers in these 

cities were modestly accurate when identifying gang members to stop in the field, which 

presumably increased their probability of gathering current gang intelligence. (It was 

beyond the purview of this study to examine the accuracy of the intelligence collected, or 

the probability that the intelligence gathered related to those most likely to offend; still, 

our findings do suggest that the gang units we studied were contacting the individuals and 

collecting the kind of intelligence that they were designed to do.) 

In Phoenix, only 29 percent of suspicion stops resulted in contact with a gang 

member. When we asked the Phoenix officers why relatively little contact with gang 

members resulted from their suspicion stops, almost all explained that gang activity had 

declined substantially, and they were simply seeing fewer gang members on the streets as 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 306 

of late. This explanation was confirmed by an examination of gang crime trends in the 

city (chapter 4). 

Exhibit 7.06 Results of gang unit suspicion stops by city 

Inglewood Las Vegas Albuquerque Phoenix 

Gang member contacted (%) 60 67 64 29 

Gang member arrested (%) NA 30 55 11 

Albuquerque had the highest proportion of stops resulting in arrests, at 55 percent. 

Next was Las Vegas with 30 percent, Phoenix with 11 percent, and Inglewood with none. 

These patterns reflected not only the cities’ respective levels of gang unit activity, but 

also the gang units’ enforcement patterns. In Albuquerque, gang unit officers were 

selective in their stops, making a point of stopping only those whom they believed to be 

acting suspiciously or engaging in criminal activity. Las Vegas had higher arrest rates per 

stop because they arrested and booked gang members for the most minor offenses (e.g., 

jaywalking, driving without a license). In Inglewood, gang unit officers stated that they 

would not make an arrest unless they had no choice. In Phoenix, officers had fewer 

contacts with gang members, and thus presumably fewer opportunities for making an 

arrest. 

In two of the communities, we had an opportunity to talk with gang members who 

had been stopped by gang unit officers. On a few occasions, when we had the opportunity 

to talk with a gang member out of the presence of the officers, we asked about the gang 

unit and gang unit officer behavior. This anecdotal data suggested that gang members 

perceived a difference in the tactics and strategies employed by the gang unit and those 

employed by other units in the department. In particular, gang members stated that gang 

unit officers talked to them or asked questions more often than other officers. The 

following is one such conversation between an observer and a Las Vegas gang member: 
Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Observer: 

Gang Member: 

Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 307 

What do you think about the gang unit?

I don’t think about them, man.

What about the guys you hang out with?

No, man, no one gives a shit. They don’t mean nothing, man.

No one thinks about them.

Do they influence how you act?

No, man, I told you. I don’t even think about them.

What do you think about the police here in Las Vegas?

They’re assholes, man. They jack you up.

Has it happened to you?

Yeah, they beat the hell out of me a couple of times.

Why?

I was talking shit to them. They have taken a couple of friends

of mine out to the desert and done things to them there.

Has the gang unit done this to you or anyone you know?

No, man, they just talk, talk, talk, talk. They just talk your ear

off.

What do you think about the gang unit documenting [you]?

I don’t give a shit. It don’t mean nothing.

What do you mean? You just don’t care?

No, man, I don’t care. All they’ll do is fine with me. Who

cares?
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 308 

Interviews with two gang members in Albuquerque yielded similar results. Our field 

notes indicated: 

I talked to the female [gang member] and the male [gang member] about 

how the officers treated them. They said it depended on the cop, but if 

they (the police) think you are a gang member you get treated worse. They 

said there was not much difference in how gang unit officers and patrol 

officers treated them [except that] gang unit officers asked a lot more 

questions. Both of them [said that they] had been pulled over by gang unit 

officers twice before. 

At one suspicion stop in Albuquerque, we had the opportunity to interview a 

police-described gang leader while the officers were gathering intelligence from other 

gang members. This excerpt is from the observer’s field notes on that interview: 

...talked to ______, a major gang [leader] in the city. He said he is 

harassed by officers all of the time. I asked him how, and he said he gets 

harassed. He said that they stop him and all of the gang members all the 

time. I asked him how people get into [his] gang and he said they get beat 

in or ranked in. I asked how the gang unit treated him, [whether it was] 

different than patrol officers. He said he knew most of the gang unit 

officers and they were cool because they knew how to talk to gang 

members and understand [them]. I asked if that makes a difference in how 

he communicates with gang unit officers and he said no. He said that some 

cops are cool and some are pussies. “The pussies, even if you are straight 

with them, they give you shit.” He said that other than gang officers being 

able to communicate more effectively and understanding the gang culture 

better, he did not think that there was any difference between gang unit 

officers and patrol officers. 

Summary 

One way of examining the functions of an organization is to examine the 

activities its people perform and the relative emphasis placed on each activity. With this 

in mind, we analyzed how gang unit officers in four police departments spent their work 

time, the different strategies and tactics they employed, the types of individuals that gang 

unit officers came into contact with during their work, and how those contacts were 

initiated. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 309 

A principal finding was that although considerable organizational and cultural 

emphasis was placed on the enforcement function, in reality, the gang units all engaged in 

a wide variety of other activities, relegating enforcement to a relatively modest role. 

Except in Inglewood, the officers in each gang unit collectively dedicated less than 2 

hours per 8-hour shift to enforcement activities. 

This was surprising, given that our interviews with gang unit officers suggested 

that they prized enforcement over any other function, and little in their standard operating 

procedures would have prevented them from spending more time on enforcement 

activities. We had also found that the gang units generally had little supervision, and they 

were more or less free to set their own priorities. Although we did not query internal or 

external stakeholders (chapters 8 and 9) about their perceptions of the use of time by their 

gang units, we suspect that they would be surprised to learn that their gang units averaged 

fewer than 2 hours per shift on enforcement actions. 

Although intelligence was an official function of all of the gang units, the 

emphasis placed on it varied widely among them. The Inglewood unit spent a substantial 

amount of time on intelligence; Albuquerque and Phoenix spent a more modest amount; 

and Las Vegas spent minimal time on intelligence. The gang unit placing the most 

emphasis on intelligence gathered information using the friendly stop, in which officers 

went out of their way to build rapport with gang members. Gang units placing less 

emphasis on intelligence tended to be more aggressive during their contacts with gang 

members. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the more enforcement-oriented the unit, the 

less intelligence they were able to gather. 

A number of internal and external strategies were used by the gang units to collect 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 310 

intelligence on gangs, gang members, and gang crime. All of the gang units permitted 

other officers in their police departments to nominate individuals to document as gang 

members. Some cultivated intelligence by creating formal and informal partnerships 

within their police departments and with persons working for other criminal justice 

agencies. Others examined departmental arrest and calls for service data, newspaper 

clippings, and information obtained by interviewing arrestees who were gang members. 

All of the units used special computer database applications to process and store gang 

intelligence, but the amount of oversight for the collection, processing, and 

documentation of this data varied substantially among the units. 

All of the gang units that we studied disseminated gang intelligence. Most of it 

was distributed as requests for information coming from outside the units were processed. 

In Inglewood and Albuquerque, requests were processed by officers; in Phoenix and Las 

Vegas, they were typically processed by civilian unit staff. In Phoenix and Las Vegas, the 

two units most heavily invested in gang enforcement, we found that many officers had 

not learned to operate their computerized gang intelligence systems, and even those that 

did know how to use the system believed that officer time should be spent on “more 

important” activities such as enforcement. 

Some units initiated and participated in gang intelligence exchange forums, where 

they met with other police officers and criminal justice officials to exchange tactical 

intelligence. A few units used bulletins to alert their agencies’ officers to timely 

intelligence about specific gang members, gangs, or patterns of gang crime. Three units 

distributed aggregate data on trends and gang intelligence about the number of gangs, 

gang members, and gang crime in the city; most of this information was extremely 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 311 

cursory and broad in nature. One gang unit (Las Vegas) published a more thorough 

document analyzing the state of the gang problem in the city and describing the strategies 

and tactics that the unit was using to respond to the city’s problem. 

We found the gang units to be engaging in few activities that could be construed 

as gang education or prevention. With regard to prevention, some of the officers in one 

department were observed to be counseling gang members and their parents about issues 

related to gangs. In one unit, officers were helping gang-involved youth find jobs. None 

of the gang units engaged in educational activities during our observations; however, they 

provided us with materials that supported the contention that their officers did train other 

officers from smaller agencies and outside criminal justice officials on gang-related 

issues, make educational presentations to community groups, and produce handbooks and 

pamphlets on the prevention of gang membership for other agencies and members of the 

community. 

Additionally, data in this chapter showed the number and types of contacts that 

gang unit officers had with individuals outside the gang unit. In particular, we found that 

gang unit officers had less contact with gang members than many might expect. The Las 

Vegas gang unit had the most, averaging about three contacts per 8-hour shift, followed 

by the Inglewood gang unit with about two gang member contacts per 8-hour shift, and 

the Phoenix and Albuquerque gang units with only about one contact per shift. Most gang 

member contacts resulted from suspicion stops made for the purpose of trying to make an 

arrest or gather intelligence. Analysis showed that some units were more effective than 

others in their use of suspicion stops. For example, roughly 60 to 67 percent of suspicion 

stops in Inglewood, Albuquerque, and Las Vegas resulted in contact with a gang member 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 312 

and 30 to 55 percent of the stops resulted in an arrest. Phoenix officers accurately 

identified gang members in only about 30 percent of their suspicion stops and made 

arrests during only 11 percent of them. 

We found wide variations in the amount of contact that gang unit officers had 

with stakeholders and community members. Our data showed that the more decoupled 

from its parent department the gang unit was, physically and strategically, the fewer 

contacts they had with stakeholders. For example, Inglewood, whose unit was located in 

central headquarters and whose sole mandate was intelligence, had the greatest amount of 

contact with stakeholders. The Albuquerque gang unit, also with an emphasis on 

intelligence, but located off-site at a substation, had the next greatest amount contact with 

stakeholders. The Phoenix and Las Vegas gang units, located in secret off-site locations 

and valuing enforcement the most, had almost no contact with stakeholders. Of particular 

interest was our finding that that gang unit officers in all of the sites had little, if any, 

contact with citizens. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 313 

Chapter 8. Organizational Environment: Internal Stakeholder 

Perceptions 

Someone named Penguin at a bar committed a robbery. He went to the 

gang unit with the questions, “Who hangs out at a bar on East 13th? Who 

has the name of Penguin or the moniker Penguin?” The gang unit was able 

to go through its intelligence file and pull out a photo that was shown to 

the victim to see if it’s the same guy. This is the way the gang unit should 

function. 

–Inglewood gang unit detective 

Organizational legitimacy is the perception that organizations behave 

appropriately “according to some culturally shared definitions of what is appropriate.” 

(Scott and Lane 2000, 49). Acquiring and maintaining organizational legitimacy is a 

problem faced by all police organizational sub-units. Although legitimacy resides in part 

in the organization’s objective reality, equally important are the attributions of 

individuals whom it affects, both within the organization and outside of it. 

Attribution of legitimacy results when organizational behavior is perceived as 

being consistent with the beliefs held by the perceiver (Suchman 1995). Thus, police 

gang units will be perceived as legitimate police sub-units to the extent that the perceivers 

believe that a gang problem exists, and that the tactics and strategies used by the unit to 

address the problem are appropriate and effective. To be perceived as legitimate, an 

organization or an organizational sub-unit has to be seen first and foremost as having a 

job to do, and second, as doing that job well. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 314 

The stakeholders of an organization are its principal source for the attribution of 

legitimacy, both for itself and for its sub-units. Stakeholders are those who stand to gain 

something of value if the organization is successful (Donaldson and Preston 1995). 

Stakeholders can be individuals, groups of individuals, or subsets within groups of 

individuals (T. Jones 1995). In the case of police gang units, a stakeholder can be an 

individual officer or police manager, a group of officers, such as those working in an 

intelligence bureau, or an entire category of police personnel, such as detectives. These 

are examples of what we refer to as internal stakeholders: They are part of the larger 

police organization, and they and the larger organization stand to gain if the police gang 

unit is “successful.” 

Not all stakeholders are located within the organization. External stakeholders are 

those individuals, groups, and subsets of groups located outside the police organization 

who stand to benefit if the gang unit is successful. Police gang units have a variety of 

external stakeholders, as we shall discuss in the following chapter. 

As we have said, the legitimacy of the police gang unit, as well as the validity of 

the police response to gangs, is determined to a large extent by stakeholders. For that 

reason, our study of police gang units focused on perceptions of both internal and 

external stakeholders, whom we asked key individuals in the gang units to nominate. The 

nominees were then invited to participate in structured interviews to discuss specific 

aspects of the gang problem and the police response: 1) the nature and scope of their local 

gang problems; 2) the nature of the stakeholder’s contact with gangs; 3) the nature of the 

stakeholder’s relationship and contact with the local gang unit; 4) the stakeholder’s 

perception of gang unit activities and effectiveness; 5) the stakeholder’s perception of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 315 

community policing practices; and 6) the stakeholder’s perception of external factors that 

influenced the police department’s response to gangs. 

In this chapter, we report findings from our interviews with those internal 

stakeholders. (Findings from external stakeholders are presented in chapter 9.) For this 

study, we interviewed internal stakeholders who were employed in some capacity within 

the police department housing the gang unit that made the nomination. The array of 

stakeholders from each study site was diverse. In Albuquerque, internal stakeholders 

included area commanders, police school resource officers, sergeants in charge of violent 

crime units, and detectives formerly assigned to the gang unit. In Inglewood, we 

interviewed graffiti abatement officers, detectives in the criminal investigation bureau, 

the crime analyst, and police officers on the Anti-Crime Team (ACT). Las Vegas internal 

stakeholders included area commanders, lieutenants, sergeants, and detectives from other 

specialized units. Phoenix internal stakeholders included area commanders, officers and 

supervisors working on Neighborhood Enforcement Teams (NET), lieutenants serving as 

area managers, and detectives from the homicide squad and the anti-graffiti unit. 

Clearly, the internal stakeholders whom we interviewed were but a small fraction 

of each organization’s population of potential stakeholders, and they were unlikely to 

have constituted a representative sample. Nevertheless, these particular stakeholders were 

viewed by gang unit officers and leaders as holding some significance for the unit, and as 

those within the agency who might have special insight into the local gang unit. 

We were interested in gauging the extent to which internal stakeholders shared a 

common perspective on the nature and scope of the local gang problems. It seems 

reasonable to expect that the stakeholders’ attribution of legitimacy to the gang units 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 316 

would depend in part upon whether the units’ functions and activities seemed 

appropriate, given the stakeholders’ perceptions of those problems. 

Nature and Scope of Local Gang Problems 

Most internal stakeholders used dynamic terms to describe their community’s 

gang problems. In Albuquerque, a 15-year police veteran working as a School Resource 

Officer described the changing nature of the local gang problem: 

Well, I think back in 1996 – 1996 we did have a gang problem. We had 

reciprocal problems with the Crips and Bloods and whatever, and the 

subcultures of them. But in the last 2 or 3 years, I’d say 2 years, the gang 

influence isn’t that much. The only kind of gangs we have are just like 

other students that...want to force their way of thinking on other 

students...they’re wannabes. 

A commander in a police district that is generally thought to have one of the area’s worst 

gang problems gave this moderate assessment of the local gang problem: 

The extent of it – I would classify it as fairly extensive for a community of 

our size. I think we probably have, per capita, more gang members than 

most cities our size. The nature of it is that it’s not as bad as it could be, 

given how many people we do have as gang members. There is obviously 

some violence associated with gangs...but for the number we have, things 

could be a lot worse in terms of violence. 

This same commander noted a shift over time, with gangs becoming less territorially 

based: 

We have had your neighborhood gangs that have been in existence for 

generations, going probably back to the early part of the last century, 

definitely the ‘30s, ‘40s, and ‘50s; Duranas, Barellas, some of these old 

neighborhoods that have been around for quite a while. They were 

basically more of your territorial gangs. In the ‘80s, we started to see some 

of these drug gangs that weren’t necessarily territorial, just existed for the 

purpose of dealing dope, most of them coming from California – Bloods, 

Crips, 18th Street, Seveno Thirteen, those groups. 

Different views of the nature of the local gang problem in Albuquerque were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 317 

offered by a School Resource Officer, who maintained that “there is an extensive gang 

problem in the community...,” and a sergeant with the violent crimes unit, who said: 

I think it’s increasing. We do have a major gang problem. The gangs are 

filtering in from California, moving eastward. We also have a lot of 

Hispanic gangs coming from south, from over the border. We deal right 

now with an ever-growing population of a gang called the Barritos. 

They’re growing. They’re predominantly Spanish speakers only, and 

they’re a force to be reckoned with. 

This same sergeant went on to describe prison gangs as a growing force in controlling the 

activities of local street gangs. 

A strong consensus about the gang problem and its changing nature existed 

among Inglewood’s internal stakeholders. In the view of nearly every one of them, gang 

violence had decreased. Some attributed the decline to the gangs’ increasing involvement 

in drug trafficking and sales. One detective pointed out that Inglewood formerly was one 

of the more prominent gang cities, but that this had become much less of a problem than 

it used to be. Another detective pointed out that gangs had been more active when he first 

joined the department. He attributed the decline to changes in the demographics of 

gangsters. He thought that gang members were increasingly coming from the Hispanic 

population, and that the Mexican Mafia had brought stability, strategically maintaining a 

low profile in order not to disrupt drug markets. Another detective provided a similar 

assessment of the current situation: 

Gangs are on the decline; the numbers are not as great as before due to the 

death of gang members and incarceration. A lot of the problems were due 

to the introduction of crack. They found it was more profitable to sell dope 

than to shoot each other, and once they got into the drug selling business, 

the level of violence declined. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 318 

An officer with the Anti-Crime Team concurred: 

The dynamics are changing. It’s changing from black to Hispanic-based 

gangs. The level of violence has decreased in the last 10 years, and no one 

really knows why. They’ve gone to dope trafficking. Old gangsters realize 

that shooting each other up is bad for business. Violence screwed up dope 

trafficking, and it was the young ones who were engaging in violence and 

making mistakes. 

Internal stakeholder perceptions of the gang problem in Las Vegas stood in 

marked contrast to the perceptions of stakeholders in Inglewood. Internal stakeholders in 

Las Vegas were more likely to describe their gang problem as growing, in the numbers of 

both gangs and gang members. In addition, a strong consensus existed among the 

stakeholders that the changes could be attributed to geographical decentralization. 

A veteran sergeant described the growth in gangs during his tenure in the 

department: 

In 1987, I was working on a street narcotics unit...it’s when, you know, 

crack cocaine was first starting to become prominent. I’m trying to 

remember the documented gangs we had at the time. There might have 

been three or four different gangs, maybe 40 to 50 gang members, that I 

think we had documented back in 1987. Now – thousands of members 

and, you know, ten to a hundred actual gangs in different areas. Hispanic, 

Asian, black, white gangs...and the diverse multi-cultural gangs, as well. 

A lieutenant who had been on the force for 16 years believed that the nature of the 

gang problem had changed, as gangs had expanded and become decentralized in recent 

years: 

The gang problem...as I saw it was pretty centralized. We had 

neighborhoods that were government-housing neighborhoods. We had 

gangs that were basically turf bound. In West Last Vegas where I grew up, 

I was familiar with the Gerson Park Kingsmen...an example of one of our 

most notorious turf gangs. It started out with things such as fights, turf 

battles...and evolved into more violent crimes. You know...drive-by 

shootings, walk-up shootings. It’s interesting...about the Gerson Park 

Kingsmen – that entire government housing development was torn down. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 319 

Through the evolution of time, we start to see the whole problem become 

more and more decentralized, and you start to see different gangs then 

develop as offshoots. 

At least one internal stakeholder had a contrary view of the gang problem in Las 

Vegas. A lieutenant assigned to a command in a predominantly black area of the city had 

lived in Las Vegas for 34 years and had been on the force for 10 years; he shared this 

perspective: 

Well, up in the Rodney King era there were gangs. And the gangs... 

basically a terror thing. You know, the Gerson Park, wherever public 

housing projects were. But I have never seen an organized effort at 

anything to where I would classify it as a gang. In some areas, there are 8, 

9, 10 tough people in the area. And people tag on wearing colors, etcetera, 

for protection more than they are an active, organized gang. And then as 

far as activities, the only efforts you can really see are drug sales. 

Internal stakeholder perceptions of the gang problem in Phoenix tended to reflect 

the generally held belief that the problem had moderated, and that the fundamental nature 

of gangs had changed. A sergeant working in a high-crime precinct described the 

changing nature of the gang problem: 

I think things have calmed down a bit. I’m with Central City only. That’s 

all I’ve worked, all I know. I think things have calmed down a lot as far as 

the street warfare that I’ve seen over the years. I don’t really know a 

reason for that. I don’t know if they’re going out of the precinct or things 

like that, but I haven’t seen near the gang violence that I saw when I first 

came on 6 years ago. I have seen a steady kind of decrease here in the 

precinct. 

The commander of that same precinct and a former head of the gang unit provided 

a similar assessment of the changes over time: 

Then, in 1993, I was the south precinct shift lieutenant where I was in 

charge of the shift three staff. Gang-related violence was pretty much at an 

all time high – shootings very frequently, rival gangs, open notorious 

shootings, cruising on South Central, and the biggest problem was rival 

gangs crossing paths and having shootouts in the middle of the night. I left 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 320 

in 1994. I came back in 1997...I noticed immediately a distinct difference 

between then and now. The violence had gone down. We could see it. We 

could feel it. The violence is still there and unacceptable, the gangs are 

still there, but the rivalry and everything else isn’t as high. 

A lieutenant working as an area manager in the same precinct had a more mixed 

assessment of the problem. He had worked in the gang unit in its early days, and had 

been shot and wounded in the line of duty by a gang member. 

I think the gang problem has gotten a lot worse that it has been, but in a lot 

of neighborhoods where we got special grants and special programs, and 

especially with the growth of the gang unit over the years, we move better 

on gang problems, and in some areas it has gone down and some areas it 

has gone up. In some areas, Hispanics gangs, all gang activity, has 

probably gone up in general, but in some neighborhoods it has decreased. 

Black gangs have definitely gone up... 

Across the four study sites, we found varying degrees of consensus about the gang 

problem and the ways in which it had changed. In all sites, some internal stakeholders 

thought the problem had improved and noted that gang-related violence seemed to have 

declined. Yet in nearly every site except Inglewood, we also found some who thought the 

problem had worsened. 

Either way, the overwhelming majority of internal stakeholders in each site 

reported that gangs had changed. Common change themes included a decline in gang 

territoriality; a decline in street violence concurrent with the growth of gang-sponsored 

drug dealing; the maturation and changing demographics of gangsters; and the influence 

of prison gangs, especially the Mexican Mafia, in controlling street-level gang activity. 

The main point is that, with the exception of Inglewood, internal stakeholders did 

not share a common view of the fundamental problem that gang units were created to 

solve. Their lack of agreement about the extent and nature of the problem could have 

adversely affected their attributions of legitimacy, if the stakeholders had believed that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 321 

the unit’s efforts were addressing a greatly diminished problem or even a “non-problem.” 

However, this turned out not to be the case, as we will see later in the chapter. 

Why Gang Units Exist 

We were interested in learning the extent to which internal stakeholders shared a 

common framework for explaining the existence of gangs. Understanding the 

stakeholders’ beliefs about conditions in their communities that contributed to the gang 

problem was central to understanding their assessments of the legitimacy of their gang 

units. One might reasonably expect that the police response to gangs would be viewed as 

most legitimate when stakeholders believed that that response corresponded to their 

perceptions of causal factors underlying the problem. 

We found that all of the internal stakeholders all tended to share common causal 

explanations for their local gang problems. Cultural traditions, poverty and related 

conditions, and drug abuse were the most common explanations offered. This response 

from the commander of an Albuquerque police district summarized the cultural 

explanations offered by several other stakeholders: 

Well, I think there are two things that have given rise to [gangs]. I think 

the Hispanic culture as it has existed throughout the last few generations 

has kind of prompted a lot of this sense of...there’s a sense among 

Hispanics that we kind of all need to draw together. The neighborhoods 

kind of need to protect themselves. I think that has given rise to some of 

the gang activity. And I think part of that also is due to the fact that 

families haven’t really stayed together and haven’t been as strong as they 

needed to be. Part of that, I’m sure, is socio-economic. 

A Phoenix detective working with graffiti abatement also viewed the problem as 

rooted in Hispanic culture: “There is a large Hispanic population – I don’t want to 

stereotype people, but there are very large traditional Hispanic gangs that are within the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 322 

Phoenix Metropolitan Area. A variant of that explanation was offered by a Neighborhood 

Enforcement Team supervisor in a high-crime Phoenix police precinct: 

The thing I see most is that we are a predominantly Hispanic 

neighborhood. I see there’s a gang called Wetback Power. Talking to a lot 

of these kids coming in, they’re in the country new, and they’re looking 

for protection and things like that. So now a lot of the kids come in here, 

and they move into their neighborhood, and they almost feel obligated to 

join the gang, or pressure to join the gang. 

A number of internal stakeholders offered what might be referred to as a cultural 

diffusion or transmission explanation for the rise of gangs in Phoenix. A Phoenix 

detective involved in graffiti abatement gave the following explanation: “We are 

positioned relatively close to California, and in a variety of ways – commercially, 

culturally. Currently it seems like what happens in California eventually makes its way 

east to Phoenix...” “Because of proximity to Mexico” was the explanation offered by a 

lieutenant in charge of an undercover team working a high-crime district. 

Several stakeholders in Las Vegas echoed the belief that the community’s gang 

problem was rooted in conditions existing in public housing, and that drugs played a role 

in the development of gangs. For one Las Vegas lieutenant, the spread of gangs could be 

attributed to changes in public housing: 

One of their first, I guess, reactions was to determine that a lot of the gang 

problems emanated out of our public housing projects, and they took 

people and moved them from this project to another project, to another 

project, to another project. So the gangs, actually the proliferation of them 

throughout the city, was actually facilitated by the city and county itself. 

Because they moved the hard-core, they thought they were going to break 

up the problem or stop the problem by breaking it up again, and all they 

did was like, they cut the worm into several different sections and moved 

it to different parts of the garden, and now you have worms all over the 

garden. 

A lieutenant working as a shift supervisor attributed the problem to “criminal 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 323 

enterprise – robbery, drugs, weapons.” He also listed “economically depressed people, 

housing projects, in-migration from Southern California” as contributing factors. With 

regard to Southern California, this lieutenant claimed that gangs now were more 

sophisticated and organized, and “would train guys here.” 

A strong consensus existed among internal stakeholders in Inglewood, a severely 

economically depressed community, about the conditions responsible for their gang 

problem. Two Inglewood detectives described those conditions as follows: 

The conditions that give rise to participation in gang membership include 

poverty issues, broken homes, lack of parental supervision. A lot of the 

local junior highs used to have a lot of programs, but cutbacks in budgets 

and general problems with the local economy have eliminated these 

programs, and are making it easier for kids to become gang involved. 

The causes of the gang problem are the endless supply of young men 

without direction. Gangs give these young men a sense of belonging. They 

see what a gang can offer them – endless support. A lot of the problem is 

single-parent homes. It’s easy for kids to fall into gangs as a result. It’s 

easy for kids to fall into the gang way of life. Drug involvement is also a 

large part of the picture, especially selling rock or crack cocaine. 

Overall, the internal stakeholders that we interviewed gave a common set of 

causal explanations for the gang problems in their communities. In Albuquerque and 

Phoenix, they emphasized cultural explanations, seeing gangs as intergenerational and 

rooted in Hispanic culture. At least some stakeholders saw drug abuse at the root of the 

gang problem, and most saw poverty and related social conditions as contributing to the 

problem. 

We asked internal stakeholders about the impact of local gangs on the police 

agency units in which they worked. The greater that impact, the greater benefit the gang 

unit might confer on the stakeholder. We assumed that the greater that benefit, the more 

likely the stakeholder would attribute legitimacy to the gang unit. The internal 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 324 

stakeholders’ assessments of that impact varied considerably among the study sites. 

In Albuquerque, one School Resource Officer indicated that gangs were not a 

problem in his school, while his counterpart in another school indicated that “it is a 

problem, but it is not a big problem, because we basically control it from the beginning. 

We do not allow gang attire, gang activity, and fighting involving gangs.” The 

commander of a large Albuquerque precinct responded: 

They’re a big problem, primarily in the southern part of my command. 

The old Hispanic gangs have existed there for years. They’re fighting with 

each other. They’re throwing signs or whatever, and the next thing you 

know, you’ve got a fight. There’ll be a drive-by. They’ll run into each 

other on Central, which is a big cruise. I can’t give you percentages. I 

don’t know exactly which, but I would say that it’s a significant amount of 

violence associated just simply with gangs. 

A lieutenant in the homicide division in Las Vegas gave the following assessment 

of the impact of gangs on that unit:11

From a homicide perspective, we probably don’t have as large a 

percentage of homicide or gang-related homicides as most people 

probably think we do. And I guess the perception that gang violence is 

rampant and most of the homicides are gang related is just not accurate. 

Probably only about 8 to 12 percent are gang related, and then I 

guess...the problem with that is, you know, how do you define a gangrelated homicide? I think the guys in our section came to call a homicide 

“gang-related” if anyone involved in the homicide – suspects or victims or 

the witnesses involved – if they have any gang ties whatsoever, they tend 

to call it a gang-related homicide. I think we have a little problem with 

definition with what is a gang-related homicide. 

The view of a sergeant assigned to the same homicide investigation unit differed; 

he claimed that as many as one-third of the homicides that occurred annually in Las 

Vegas – a third of the work load in his unit – were gang related. He gave the following 

example, one that posed the definitional problems suggested by the lieutenant: 

Another thing, as far as our gang-related homicides are concerned, we had 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 325 

one homicide here about two weeks ago – in fact, not far from here. Even 

though the people involved were gang members, the actual motivation 

behind the homicide was they were fighting over pit bull dogs. One of the 

suspects and the victim had ...one had a male and one had a female. They 

bred the dogs. Apparently there were 12 puppies involved. They were 

going to divide them equally. Three of the puppies died. Apparently they 

couldn’t figure out how to divide the nine dogs, so one shot the other and 

killed him. So we’ve really had, even though they’re associated, two 

gangs...it’s not classified as a gang homicide, because it didn’t relate to 

the purpose of the gang. It was just a private dispute. 

Internal stakeholders in Inglewood tended to see gangs and gang members as 

responsible for much of the crime that they investigated. An Inglewood homicide 

detective indicated that much of his case load was comprised of gang-related homicides, 

and that gangs were also a big problem when working with thefts, since “a lot of older 

and younger gangsters are into theft of some sort.” 

In Phoenix, the assessments given by internal stakeholders varied. A detective 

working with graffiti abatement gauged the amount of graffiti attributable to gangsters as 

“tagger, tagger, tagger, tagger, oh, that a gangster, tagger, tagger, tagger, you know. The 

gangster-related graffiti tends to be the very small percentage of what we see.” A beat 

sergeant gave an assessment that reflected a down-turn in gang activity and a lessening of 

gang impact on his unit: 

I just took over a beat right here by the precinct....We have a gang called 

El Cien Los Lobos. They’ve calmed down, so I haven’t dealt with any 

active gang violence in probably 2 or 3 months. It hasn’t been that bad for 

me lately. Things have really calmed down. 

However, a sergeant working in the Phoenix homicide unit indicated that for his 

unit, gangs were “a very big problem, because again, they are the number one motivation 

in our homicides.”12 

Three principal findings emerged regarding the gang problem, as perceived by 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 326 

internal stakeholders. First, we found pockets of both consensus and dissent about the 

nature of the problem and about changes in the problem over time; however, consensus 

or the lack thereof was almost always a matter of degree. The stakeholders’ perceptions 

of the impact of the gang problem on their own day-to-day work varied, with some seeing 

gangs as a “non-problem” for their organizational units, and others seeing them as a 

significant problem. 

Second, a surprisingly strong consensus existed across the sites regarding the 

nature of the changes in the gang problem; at least, there was consensus that the gang 

problem had, in fact, changed. Change was frequently described in terms of declining 

levels of violence, changing demographics of gang members, declining territoriality, 

growing influences from prison-based gangs, and gradually stabilizing gang-controlled 

drug markets. Third, internal stakeholders articulated explanations of the causes and 

conditions that fostered local gang problems that were grounded in their ideas and 

attitudes about culture, poverty, and related social issues. 

Internal Stakeholder Contacts with Gangs 

One could expect that internal stakeholders’ assessments of the police response to 

gangs would be in part a function of their own contacts with gangs and the gang problem. 

Stakeholders with considerable contact might be more likely than those with little contact 

to value a specialized unit tasked with gang control. This assumes, of course, that the 

gang unit’s activities seemed appropriate, in light of the stakeholder’s experiences with 

and perceptions of the gang problem. 

We asked internal stakeholders to talk about the nature of their own units’ 

contacts with gangs. We were interested in the frequency of their contacts and the types 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 327 

of activities that brought them into contact. In general, stakeholders reported frequent 

contact with gangs, but this varied, both within and among sites, depending on the 

particular work responsibilities of the stakeholder. 

In Albuquerque, an area commander described the nature and frequency of the 

contacts of his 83 patrol officers with gangs: 

They deal with gang members on a day-to-day basis, just in the type of 

calls they respond to, the type of people they access for information, and if 

they’re being proactive, the type of people they’re going to run into in 

some of their problem areas. 

A commander in a different area noted that his officers probably had daily contact 

with gang members, and it was not always confrontational in nature. He described the 

contacts of his officers as ranging “from a spectacular chase that we had a few days ago, 

that stemmed from an armed robbery in another command, perpetuated by gang 

members, to just casual contact with gang members.” A sergeant from the violent crimes 

unit indicated that he had daily contact, due to investigating Part I violent crimes (Federal 

Bureau of Investigation 2002). 

The responses of School Resource Officers (SRO) provided insight into the 

situational nature of gang contacts from one school to the next. One SRO simply said, “I 

don’t know, I wouldn’t even hazard a guess, because like I said, a large percentage of 

kids will admit to being in a gang...I really feel that they don’t [belong to one]. So I don’t 

know.” Another SRO at a different school reported his contact with gangs as follows: 

Well, basically what my job is, what I perceive it to be, is that I try to 

identify kids that belong to gangs, and once I identify this person as, let’s 

say, for example, that he had a fight here or whatever, then I would put on 

my report that it’s gang related. Once it gets down to the juvenile 

detention center, then their people start getting involved regarding whether 

this kid might belong to a gang. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 328 

That same SRO qualified his frequency of contact, noting that he had very little 

contact with “official” gang members, but saw “unofficial” members all the time, thus 

making a distinction between documented gang members and kids whom he thought 

belonged to gangs, but who were undocumented. 

In Albuquerque, the type of activity that brought internal stakeholders into contact 

with gangs was probably best described as “routine.” In other words, most contacts 

resulted from ordinary patrol operations, criminal investigations carried out as part of the 

normal investigative process, and the daily activities of School Resource Officers 

maintaining order in schools. As one SRO noted: 

We don’t deal in the school with gangs, per se...our primary purpose is to 

provide a safe environment for – whether it be staff or students – anybody 

that is attending the school, we provide a safe environment for them. And 

we, for the most part, don’t try to classify the problems as gang or nongang problems. There are problems, and we deal with them as problems, 

and as we do that, we deal with the gang problem as we would any other 

crime. 

Internal stakeholders in Inglewood reported that most of their contacts with gang 

members occurred in the course of performing regular duties. A homicide detective 

reported that his contacts with gang members stemmed from the fact that 70 to 80 percent 

of homicides over the past few years had been gang-related. As a result, he indicated, his 

detectives had day-to-day contact with gang members. Another detective working with 

aggravated assaults also pointed out that contacts with gang members were the result of 

investigative routines: 

In terms of aggravated assaults...it’s reactive crime that gets them 

involved with gangs through reactive investigation. Lots of cases get 

suspended before we see them. There’s oftentimes, with a gang involved, 

no cooperation by the victims. There is not cooperation by the victim 99 

percent of the time, unless you get an independent witness. Gang members 

will stop the investigation if they are one of the victims. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 329 

An officer assigned to the transit safety team reported that his team dealt with 

gangs frequently since they specialized in high crime areas, and a seasoned robbery 

detective, a former member of the gang unit, described using gang members to generate 

investigative leads. 

The pattern of contact with gang members in the course of routine patrol or 

investigative activity, as reported in Albuquerque and Inglewood, was also present in Las 

Vegas. The lieutenant in charge of patrol in one command area reported that his officers 

had daily contact with gang members. In his view, his officers were intimately involved 

in addressing the gang problem, serving as important information sources on gangs and 

gang members: 

Our officers, they deal with black gangs, Hispanic gangs. We have [Asian] 

gangs, Vietnamese gangs, Filipino gangs that they’re coming in contact 

with. And whenever possible, we try to, when we recognize that we have a 

gang-related situation where we have gang-related groups of individuals 

that we’re dealing with, we try to liaison with our gang detail and our 

intelligence detail as much as possible...so they know what’s happening in 

our area. 

This lieutenant described routine patrol activity as the mechanism that brought his 

officers into contact with gang members, along with routine field stops and completion of 

FI cards. 

A lieutenant in another Las Vegas command area said that his officers were 

acquainted with gang members and their monikers in the area, as well as with their 

families and friends. Their day-to-day contacts were in response to calls for service, for 

example, “...residents calling and says kids are drinking and causing hell,” or a call 

where the caller “noticed gangs hanging out at a casino and [patrol] got them out with the 

curfew law.” A sergeant in the Las Vegas homicide unit indicated that his unit didn’t 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 330 

“have any proactive involvement...ours is only reactive.” Their gang contacts were 

normally related to investigative processes, and the frequency depended on the number of 

homicides that were, in some respect, gang-related. 

In Phoenix, area managers (lieutenants), as well as a lieutenant who supervised 

the Neighborhood Enforcement Team (NET) in a high-crime precinct, all reported 

frequent contact with gangs. One area manager described the contact as “everyday” due 

to calls from neighborhood association leaders complaining about gang members, and to 

the fact that: 

...I encourage my street cops to cultivate informants.... I want my officers 

to know who the gang members are and stuff like that. You know, in my 

position, I know a lot from what they tell me, but they are the ones who 

should know, when we go to a community meeting, my beat officers 

should know what gang members are on the beat, not me. 

The lieutenant in charge of the Phoenix precinct’s NET team pointed out that 

most of their contacts with gang members had to do with drug operations; they 

functioned largely as an undercover operations team, and contact was usually the result of 

a search warrant. He estimated that about a third of their time was spent on cases 

involving gang members. 

A beat officer in the same precinct, who aspired to join the gang unit, described 

his contacts with gang members as flowing from routine patrol activity: 

Usually radio calls, or just driving by and seeing kids, and we stop and 

have like a consensual contact, talk to them. And again, with the kids I’ve 

found – I can’t say being their buddy, but treating them with respect, they 

try to treat you with respect. So a lot of these kids, they know you. They 

wave to you. They know you’re an all right guy, but they’ll allow you to 

stop and talk to them, kind of tell them what’s new, what’s happening. 

You just kind of develop a little rapport with them even though they’re on 

the other side. It still makes the job easier if you kind of build a little bit of 

rapport with them, so if you do have a contact with them in the future, 

they know that you’re not going to do anything to violate them. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 331 

The graffiti abatement detective in Phoenix indicated that most of their contacts 

resulted from calls to the graffiti hotline, although they could not determine whether such 

calls involved a gang member or a tagger. A homicide sergeant reported that there was 

seldom a week when a gang-related homicide failed to come to his unit. 

Most of the internal stakeholders we interviewed reported frequent contacts with 

gang members, usually while carrying out their normal duties during patrol or 

investigations. Often, the contacts were informal; these were sometimes described as 

unofficial or non-confrontational. If the attribution of legitimacy to the gang units in their 

respective organizations was, in part, dependent upon the stakeholders having direct 

experience or contacts with gang members, then this group of stakeholders certainly had 

substantial contact and a firm foundation for attributing legitimacy. 

Stakeholders’ Relationships with Gang Units 

Internal stakeholders were asked a series of questions designed to help us grasp 

their perceptions of and the nature of their relationships with of their local gang units. We 

were interested in the stakeholders’ perceptions of the police role in responding to the 

gang problem, of their communication and relationships with their gang units, and of the 

benefits they received from their gang units. Our working assumption was that positive 

perceptions of all of these things would contribute to attributions of legitimacy. 

Perceptions of Police Roles 

The role of police departments in responding to local gang problems may vary. 

Some departments emphasize a single function, such as intelligence gathering; others 

may emphasize a cluster of functions, for example, intelligence gathering along with 

suppression and prevention. One could expect internal stakeholders to give more positive 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 332 

assessments and attribute greater legitimacy to their local gang unit if that unit engages in 

activities consistent with the stakeholders’ beliefs about how police departments ought to 

be addressing the gang problem. We asked internal stakeholders about the role they 

thought the police department should assume in responding to gangs. As a group, the 

stakeholders articulated clear roles in this domain; however, in several instances, 

stakeholders did not distinguish between the broader role of the police department and 

the more specialized role of the gang unit. 

Gang suppression and intelligence were the functions most frequently mentioned. 

An area commander in Albuquerque, however, had a broader role definition to offer: 

The role of the police department in general is to monitor and to gather 

intelligence. It’s diverse in nature. The ultimate responsibility for the 

police is to do everything in our power constitutionally to restrict the 

gang’s illicit activities. 

An Albuquerque School Resource Officer described the police role as “to solicit 

good intelligence,” as did a sergeant with the violent crimes unit, who then went on to 

describe the primary function of the gang unit as maintaining intelligence as a tool for the 

rest of the department. The sergeant further noted that gang units should also be involved 

in investigating gang-related crime; he offered the view that “the Albuquerque Police 

Department’s role is to deal with neighborhoods, to clean up neighborhoods.” 

The commander of a different area was clear that the appropriate role for the 

department was suppression: 

I wish I could tell you that our primary responsibility is to stamp it out and 

get rid of it, but being a realist, I know that’s not going to happen. Our 

primary function is within all constitutional guidelines and conduct of 

human decency, our job is to make sure that the gang activity is controlled 

so that it doesn’t negatively impact the quality of the life of the average 

citizen of Albuquerque. That’s basically what our job is. However we go 

about doing that, primarily it’s in response to criminal activity. But 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 333 

however we go about doing that, we go about doing that. 

Still, a few other officers in the Albuquerque department articulated a prevention 

role. For example, a sergeant in a violent crime unit stated, “We do quite a bit of 

prevention as police officers. We jump into that intervention stage when kids are actually 

in that lifestyle and they want to get out...” 

Inglewood stakeholders pointed to their gang unit as the appropriate police 

response, and they described the unit’s role as “keeping on top of it,” and gathering and 

maintaining intelligence on gang members that “saves hundreds of hours of investigation 

time...” For example, a robbery detective emphasized the importance of the Inglewood 

gang unit’s intelligence function in a recent case that he had solved: 

A robbery was committed by someone named Penguin at a bar. He went to 

the gang unit with the questions, “Who hangs out at a bar on East 13th? 

Who has the name of Penguin or the moniker Penguin?” The gang unit 

was able to go through its intelligence file and pull out a photo that was 

shown to the victim to see if it’s the same guy. This is the way the gang 

unit should function. 

Las Vegas stakeholders listed intelligence and enforcement or suppression as the 

principal roles of the department in addressing the gang problem. According to one 

lieutenant, the role is to “ID the problem to stop the problem.” However, the lieutenant 

also acknowledged that police needed to work with the community to solve the problem; 

he thought that they needed to develop employment opportunities since “arrest is a band 

aid approach.” 

Another Las Vegas lieutenant described two roles for the department that were 

similar to those of other internal stakeholders: 

One collects intelligence information, trying to identify who, you know, 

who the gang members are, who their associates are, and what they’re 

doing is gaining intelligence information on their activities. Also the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 334 

enforcement aspect to keep as much pressure on gang members and 

arrests, interviews, what have you, as many gang members as we can take 

off the street through arrest for whatever lessens violence on the streets. 

Phoenix internal stakeholders also listed suppression and, to a lesser extent, 

intelligence as the principal roles for the police department in responding to the gang 

problem. A lieutenant in charge of a Neighborhood Enforcement Team described the 

suppression role: 

Obviously, we have to protect the community. Our role is to enforce, to 

[disperse] the gangs. We have a lot of low-income areas, like I said, for 

instance, the Garfield neighborhood. We have a gang in there that’s the 

Garfield Gang, and we also have a younger gang that’s affiliated with it 

called the 9th Street Gang. What they do is, they’re intimidating the elder 

people. They’re robbing them on the streets. They’re doing home 

invasions. They’re stealing their property and coercing them not to call the 

police. Otherwise they return and hurt them, physically, bodily harms. 

Obviously, we can’t have that. Our role is basically, squash these gang 

problems like that. 

A beat sergeant in a high-crime precinct in Phoenix cited intelligence as an 

important role: “I think it’s real important to track them and document them as gang 

members...” An area manager and lieutenant maintained that the department needed 

units “out there” suppressing gang activity. He described the role of prevention: 

I’m a firm believer in preventive programs on the other end, GREAT, 

DARE, police athletic leagues, just building a lot of social programs on 

the other end. If you don’t there, then I’ve got to deal with it on the other 

side. 

As a group, internal stakeholders identified intelligence, enforcement, and 

prevention as roles for their departments in addressing the gang problem. Most 

stakeholders emphasized roles that corresponded to the principal functions of their own 

local gang units, for example, intelligence in Inglewood, or suppression with enforcement 

in Las Vegas and Phoenix. Several stakeholders quickly pointed to their local gang unit 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 335 

when describing the police role, seeming to imply that in their view, the unit itself 

embodied the role of the police in responding to the local gang problem. 

Contact and Information Sharing 

We were interested in the frequency of contact between the stakeholders’ 

organizational units and the gang units, and the basis for these contacts. We found that 

the frequency of contact varied widely, both within and across the study sites, depending 

on the assignment of the stakeholder. For example, in Albuquerque, one commander 

indicated that he rarely had contact with gang unit officers except at meetings, while 

another commander said that he had frequent contact with two gang detectives assigned 

to his command area. One School Resource Officer reported four contacts over the past 6 

months, whereas the sergeant in charge of that unit reported two contacts during the same 

time period, and a sergeant in the violent crimes unit reported three to four contacts a 

week. This pattern of contact frequency variability based on departmental assignment in 

Albuquerque was typical for the other study sites, as well. 

Information sharing was most frequently cited as the basis for stakeholder contact 

with their local gang units. For example, an Albuquerque sergeant working with violent 

crime reported that his unit often shared information with the gang unit: “It’s intelligence 

information. I mean it’s primarily intelligence information. That’s their function, and our 

function is to take intelligence and use it in an investigation.” An area commander gave 

the following as an example of sharing and using gang unit intelligence: 

A great example is an apartment complex up in Westgate. We had a driveby. We got people in custody. We call the gang unit out. They want to 

know what’s going on with our people, and they’ll be able to give us some 

information regarding who we are dealing with. So they bring their little 

computer and tell us, “Yeah, we have these people in the system.” 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 336 

Inglewood stakeholders also reported that they shared information with the gang 

unit, and in this case, information flowed both ways. They also described that information 

as intelligence. One detective explained: 

The intelligence that the gang unit generates that’s valuable is being able 

to identify members. Information on where they’re located, who their 

associates are. Being able to use identifying characteristics to identify 

suspects and link suspects with other individuals is sort of the basis of 

using the intelligence generated by the gang unit. 

Las Vegas patrol lieutenants also claimed that they and the gang unit shared information, 

especially intelligence information: 

Yeah, they have the, you know, gang intelligence, who is out there, what 

are the relationships between the different gangs, you know; what gangs 

are or may be experiencing friction between the different gangs...so their 

information is often beneficial to our cases. 

The picture in Phoenix was less clear. Most internal stakeholders indicated that 

they and the gang unit shared information. However, a sizable number stated that the 

exchange of intelligence did not occur as frequently as it should. For example, a NET 

sergeant responded, “Sad to say, but no.” A lieutenant working as an area manager gave a 

similar, albeit a slightly more positive, assessment: 

I’d say on a one-to-ten scale, we’re at about a seven. It could be a lot 

better. What I would prefer is that in every briefing, a gang officer would 

stop in and share information. That is not occurring. They are stopping in 

about twice a month...but right now we are at a seven. Is seven 

acceptable? Yeah. Could it be better? Yes, it’s above the mean, but it 

could be a lot better. 

Another Neighborhood Enforcement Team sergeant told interviewers, “No, I 

haven’t had any circumstances or incidents where they related information to us.” But a 

Phoenix patrol officer gave a contrasting response: 

Oh, yeah, they’ve helped me out tremendously on cases where I say, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 337 

“Hey, I’ve got this guy. He’s in this gang. His nickname is whatever.” 

Within a half hour, they’ll call me back and say, “Okay, I’ve i.d.’d him. 

This is who he is.” They’ve been a tremendous help. 

All Phoenix stakeholders indicated that the information shared most commonly 

between their units and the gang unit could be classified as intelligence. 

Overall, most stakeholders reported that contact between the gang units and their 

own was initiated in both directions – the stakeholders initiating contact in some cases, 

and the gang unit initiating contact in others. Most indicated that they had shared 

information with the gang unit and the gang unit with them, although the amount of 

sharing varied among the study sites. 

Communication and Relationships 

All internal stakeholders were asked several questions pertaining to their 

relationships with the gang unit. We were interested in learning about their 

communication and general relationships, and their levels of satisfaction with that 

relationship. In Albuquerque, internal stakeholders referred to a newsletter produced by 

the gang unit as an illustration. Liaisons, formal and informal, were also given as 

examples. A School Resource Officer gave the following account: 

I know one of the [gang unit] members.... I had about three or four 

gangsters from California come and walk around. And I think they were 

trying to find out or recruit people to sell drugs for them and stuff like that. 

So what I did was called him, and he said, “Yeah, we already know who 

they are and why they’re here,” and she gave me all this information that 

without, you’re going blind with some the kids you’re going to interact 

with. So as soon as we knew exactly what they were about, and I told 

them exactly what I found out, I haven’t seen them [the gang unit] since, 

and that was a year and a half ago. 

When asked about communication with the gang unit, an Albuquerque area 

commander responded, “To a degree, especially when there’s a homicide or something 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 338 

related to gang activity, we work in a collaborative fashion with them. We have an officer 

assigned as a liaison to this command from the gang unit, but we don’t see him a whole 

lot.” A sergeant from the violent crimes unit also mentioned formal liaisons as the basis 

for their communication with the gang unit: 

The gang unit has assigned detectives to speak to us, specific area 

commands. This area command has two detectives. They’re primarily 

responsible for everything that happens in this area command with gangs. 

Those two gang officers, at least two or three times a week, come into our 

office. We tell them what we’ve got going on; they tell us what they’ve 

got going on. We have any questions for them.... 

They help us with surveillance. They are in a position where their unit has 

different funding, so they have access to undercover cars, undercover 

equipment, and surveillance equipment. We work hand-in-hand with 

them, and we are constantly communicating with each other to update 

each other as to what the trends are. If they get a rumor of a shoot-out, or 

this gang’s fighting this gang and it’s happening in this area command, 

they let us know. Not just us, but the whole area command. 

Albuquerque internal stakeholders were nearly uniform in describing their units’ 

relationships with the gang unit. They used language such as “it’s a great relationship,” ”I 

think it’s an excellent relationship,” “probably pretty good,” or just “good.” One 

commander, who responded that “it’s good,” went on to say that “anyone just needs to 

pick up the phone and get a hold of those people, and they’ll be available.” 

A sergeant with the violent crimes detail who described the relationship as 

“excellent” told us, “I went through academy with the [gang] sergeant, and the detectives 

are constantly calling me, ‘Hey, are you doing this case?’ They’re always willing to assist 

or to take over a case if it’s gang related.” Albuquerque stakeholders were satisfied with 

their relationships with the unit, and consistently talked about the unit in positive terms. 

Inglewood’s internal stakeholders also reported frequent communication with 

their local gang unit, and assessed the relationship favorably. The gang unit was in close 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 339 

physical proximity to most internal stakeholders, a difference from other study sites 

where gang units were located in separate facilities. Detective stakeholders gave 

examples of their ability to obtain intelligence from the unit, illustrating the positive 

relationship. One Inglewood robbery detective said that he used gang unit intelligence 

“...especially about younger guys [he] didn’t know”; he talked about taking monikers he 

had picked up in the course of investigations to the gang unit for suspect identification. A 

homicide detective also commented that the good relationship existed “...primarily 

because the majority of the homicides [that the homicide unit] investigate[s] involve gang 

members.” He also reported using gang unit intelligence to develop suspects. Inglewood 

internal stakeholders were generally satisfied with their relationship with the gang unit. 

A more complicated picture of emerged from our interviews in Las Vegas. Some 

stakeholders characterized communication as most frequently occurring officer-toofficer, following informal rather than formal channels. For example, a sergeant working 

on the bike squad mentioned that some individuals with whom he had previously worked 

had moved to the gang squad, so it was easy for him to call for information. A lieutenant 

told us that “sometimes it’s done on a more one-to-one basis between detectives, and 

sometimes it’ll be a little broader scale between squads.” Another Las Vegas lieutenant 

saw communication as individualized, based on personal contacts and friendships: “You 

work with specific people you know...professional friendships.” Still another lieutenant 

reflected on the historical basis for communication with the unit, noting: 

So the first couple years while [the gang unit was] developing, I think we 

went through some stages of “Well, we’re gang detectives. We’re 

special.” And that’s just every specialized unit I’ve ever been in, you have 

that mentality. You know, “those damn patrol guys. You know, they don’t 

know what they’re doing. They can’t help us. We don’t need to tell them 

this.” And not realizing that 3 months ago, they were those “damn patrol 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 340 

guys.” 

The lieutenant noted that communication had improved immensely since gang 

unit officers had started coming to his unit’s briefings. This improved information 

sharing and resulted in more frequent requests going to the gang unit for information and 

assistance. 

Not only was unit-to-unit communication described as more complicated in Las 

Vegas than in the other cities, but internal stakeholders’ descriptions of their relationships 

with the gang unit were, as well. One lieutenant described the relationship as 

“improving”: 

Gotten better. In the past, the gang unit did not share info. Weren’t around 

when you needed them. Over last year, the unit has been more service 

oriented. They have assigned liaison officers so patrol knows who to 

contact for gang issues. We also have their pager number. It has been 

helpful. They have expertise and suggestions. The gang unit comes out 

and investigates and frees up resources in patrol. We cannot afford the 

time they can. 

This lieutenant’s counterpart in charge of a patrol shift gave the following response: 

We have a very good relationship between the units. They’ve always been 

very helpful. It’s one of those situations where they could probably help us 

more than we could help them in their mission...our mission is a little 

more focused. You know, we try to identify, locate, put, take into custody, 

those people who’re responsible for specific crimes. They are usually in a 

much better position to assist us in our cases. 

However, a lieutenant in a command area with a substantial black population had had this 

experience that colored his relationship with the unit: 

A couple years ago, at about 6:30ish, there were two people shot, and they 

didn’t kill ’em, but you know, they shot at the transport. And at about 9:30 

or so, in the same area, just maybe a half a block from there, five people 

get sprayed with shotguns. So, I mean, I got deep moles in the 

neighborhood. I dance to a different drummer as opposed to a gang unit. 

And so that’s trying to say drive-bys, gang-related, some gang is after 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 341 

these folks that just drive by doing drive-bys from one set on another set, 

‘cause it’s all happening the same. 

And so, you know, I made some phone calls. Okay. It’s not somebody 

from another set coming back. And what happens is one of those guys, if a 

group burst through, gets ripped off in the dope house. Man in a dope 

house didn’t put out a contract. But he had some people that are in on the 

set that he wants to do some enforcement action. And so those two or 

three of those five people that got shot later on, the first guy gave him 

some of the dope he took from the dope house. And you know, when out 

among thieves. So he shoots them, too. 

So, I go to this gang sergeant to tell him what my sources say. He tells me, 

“Oh, no. This is over a girl. One of the guys that got shot was going with 

this girl that was going with some guy from another gang.” I said okay. 

And I just reached the point where I’m, you know, for some reason, these 

guys create this spectacle in the head. You know, you got a perception of 

what’s going on and you’re blind to anything else. And that’s just, you 

know, it wasn’t the case, but now you’ve created... you’re a gang 

authority. You said, “This is the way it is,” so, so be it. And everybody 

dances to that particular tune. 

But I still say that today the gang problem is, so-called gang problem, is 

drug-related. And if you find a way to stop people from coming into west 

Las Vegas, the bad drugs and whatever problem, is that, you know, it 

would dissipate. 

This stakeholder indicated that his unit had contact with the gang unit only when drive-by 

shootings occurred; then the gang unit would pass along information on the shooting. 

With the exception of the lieutenant above, however, Las Vegas internal 

stakeholders generally indicated satisfaction with their relationship with the gang unit. 

Overall, they perceived that the relationship was improving, and that the department was 

working to make the gang unit more responsive to area commands, to share information 

with patrol more freely, and to become more active with patrol through organizational 

briefings. In part, this shift toward better relations appeared linked to the implementation 

of a “COMPSTAT-like” accountability in the department, a process by which 

commanders are held accountable for crime levels in their area. Some Las Vegas 

command staff had insisted that the gang unit participate in the process and improve the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 342 

support they gave to the patrol unit. 

Phoenix internal stakeholders told us that they had limited communication with 

their gang unit. A Neighborhood Enforcement Team supervisor said that his unit 

communicated with the gang unit “very rarely because his own unit had a “drugs and 

prostitution” agenda with a focus separate from that of the gang unit. 

Asked whether communication occurred between his unit and the gang unit, a 

Phoenix detective working on graffiti detail at first responded, “Not really,” and then 

went on to say, “The only thing we communicate on is intelligence on who is and who 

isn’t, and who’s associated with whom, and who may have this friend, and that sort of 

thing.” A patrol officer who aspired to join the gang unit described his communication 

with the gang unit as contact with a network of personal acquaintances: 

I personally do [communicate] because I know a lot of the guys. I’m pretty 

active in it, but I don’t think the average patrol officer does. I do only 

because I have an interest in it and I know a lot of the guys. I’ve done 

temporary assignments with them, like ride-alongs and stuff. So me, 

personally, yes. But I don’t think the average patrol officer has much 

contact with them other than the Gimmick, which is a non-verbal form. 

Just fill it out and throw it in the mail. 

He went on to point out that, overall, “there is not much communication between patrol 

and the gang unit.” 

Despite their perceptions that communication was sparse, Phoenix internal 

stakeholders had generally positive things to say about their relationships with the gang 

unit. According to a lieutenant in charge of one of the Neighborhood Enforcement 

Teams: 

We have a very good gang squad. When I was patrol sergeant, any time I 

had any kind of crime affiliated with gangs, they came out there, readily 

available. They were there for me to take over the investigation or to assist 

us, whatever I deemed necessary. Sometimes our patrol officers were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 343 

pretty well into it and knew all the players involved. In that case, they 

would just assist us. But otherwise, if we felt that it needed to be further 

investigated and time-consuming, I would just turn the investigation over 

to them. They’re there for us. 

A Phoenix graffiti detective also described the relationship in positive terms: 

“Very good, it’s a matter of a phone call, and I can have anything that they have and have 

it on a ‘right now’ basis.” This characterization given by a former homicide detective was 

similar: 

I would characterize the relationship as very open, and one in which 

communication was easy, and that’s what’s so important to me as an 

investigator, because there’s no way that I can keep up on every street 

gang... 

There were some exceptions, although few in number, from the pattern of overall 

satisfaction with the Phoenix gang unit. For example, a patrol officer in a high-crime 

district was more negative in his assessment of the relationship of patrol with the gang 

unit: 

At times, it can be distant, and we could forget they’re out there, and they 

could forget we’re out there. We hear them on the radio now and again 

during traffic stops and things like that. I have probably weekly contact 

with them, again, like I said, because I know a lot of the guys. The average 

patrol guy, I don’t think we have many contacts at all with them. There’s 

not much communication between us. 

Phoenix internal stakeholders gave varied answers when asked whether they were 

satisfied with their relationship with the gang unit. Some responded, “Oh, yes, very 

much,” “yes, very much so,” or just plain “yes.” As one detective put it, “Oh, yeah...I 

pick up the phone and can have access to anything they have and vice versa.” A 

lieutenant working as an area manager reported: 

Yes, right now. I have no complaints. I’ll tell you, when I first got here 4 

years ago, I had a number of complaints. Since I was out of shift three, I 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 344 

never saw them, and I’ll call them and they were working different hours, 

so my service level was not nearly what I expected, but when [the precinct 

commander] got here, he changed that, he changed the service level, he 

changed their hours so that they cover until three in the morning, so when 

I needed them, they came. 

A patrol officer, on the other hand, attributed his dissatisfaction with the 

relationship between patrol and the gang unit as stemming from lack of communication, 

suggesting that he would prefer contact “like maybe once a month, have them come to a 

briefing and just give us a 5-minute spiel on things that we’re working on in the 

community, give us a pager number.” An officer working on one of the Neighborhood 

Enforcement Teams expressed the most negative feelings, and recommended 

reorganizing the gang unit: 

No, I’m not. I’m not satisfied, I’m not content with it, and one of the 

things is that because I’m looking to be squad detective, so obviously I’m 

trying to do face time and understand what they’re doing. If I had my way, 

I would rather see the gang squad melted back in patrol just because 

Phoenix needs the manpower so badly...there’s no reason why I should as 

an officer, or any other officer, shouldn’t be able to do gang investigation 

simply because we don’t have a black uniform or are not assigned to that 

unit. 

We found that the level of communication between internal stakeholders and their 

gang units varied across sites. For example, in Inglewood, communication was described 

as frequent, whereas in Phoenix, internal stakeholders described communication as 

limited. Regardless of the level of communication, however, nearly all of the 

stakeholders with whom we spoke described positive relationships with their gang units. 

Perceived Benefits 

We were interested in whether internal stakeholders thought they had derived 

advantages or benefits from their relationships with their local gang units. Nearly all 

internal stakeholders maintained that having access to the gang units’ information was 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 345 

their most important benefit. Generally, the stakeholders were referring to gang 

intelligence, but they also appreciated having learned from the special expertise and 

knowledge possessed by gang unit personnel. In Albuquerque, for example, a sergeant in 

charge of school resource officers called information sharing the greatest benefit: “...we 

have gang experts within the unit that are able to disseminate the information among 

other officers...and keep liaison with the unit.” A sergeant in a violent crimes unit echoed 

that view: 

I think awareness. I think intelligence. They’re hooked into Gang Net, and 

they have a lot of resources and confidential informants that are in gangs 

that they can solicit. If we have a violent crime and we know that it’s gang 

related, they will go out and solicit the information from the informants. A 

lot of time, crimes are solved that way. 

Inglewood detectives frequently mentioned that intelligence provided by the gang 

unit was useful in their solving cases, much like in Las Vegas, where both intelligence 

and gang unit expertise were valued. As a Las Vegas lieutenant in homicide 

investigations put it: 

They have the intelligence information. They have the working knowledge 

out on the street, you know, of different gang members that we’re just not 

able to have up here, because our focus changes from case to case. You 

know, their focus is specifically gang violence and our focus is specific 

murder cases. So their knowledge and experience and their gang 

intelligence is very beneficial for us. 

Phoenix stakeholders also appreciated the information and expertise that resulted 

from the relationship with their gang unit. A sergeant who had formerly worked in 

homicide praised the efforts made by the gang unit to get gang intelligence to them, and 

for having provided the detectives with a laptop computer with the gang database. A NET 

team officer pointed out: 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 346 

The gang squad has a lot of information when it comes to gang members 

that patrol doesn’t necessarily have access to, so when you do go to gang 

squad, they are usually pretty good about finding who you are looking for, 

or a least giving information on them. They have a database with 

information, which is a nice resource to have. 

A lieutenant working as an area manager in a high-crime precinct gave the 

following example of one of the benefits of gang unit information and intelligence: 

Instant identification of bad guys through their computer system is 

wonderful. I just had a nickname of a shooter 6 months ago and his name 

is Smokey.... We had no clue who it was we had...he had a joker tattoo 

on his neck, the gang guys show up, but this here, we can’t say it was 

gang-related because it was boyfriend-girlfriend...the girl had a new 

boyfriend and Smokey came and shot the new boyfriend, so really, 

technically, you can’t make a gang connection, but since this guy was a 

gang member, I had a nickname and a tattoo, and they show me in the 

computer, and say “Well, Lieutenant...is it this guy?” Instantly we have a 

suspect, we have a location to check...he was arrested the next day, so the 

information they have, the availability of the information is just 

incredible... 

Another benefit of gang units to internal stakeholders is their expertise. Gang 

units are generally perceived to be staffed by experts, and internal stakeholders could 

potentially learn from them through formal and informal education and training. We 

asked the stakeholders to discuss what, if anything, they had learned from their respective 

gang units. Albuquerque stakeholders told us that they had learned about the prevalence, 

organization, signs, and methods of operation of gangs in their community. Most of what 

they had learned was closely tied to the intelligence function of the gang unit. One 

commander described it as follows: 

What I’ve learned is basically what [gangs] are doing, who they may be 

affiliated with, who they’re pissed at, and who they may be warring 

with.... For example, the 18th Street, which is a drug gang with its origins 

in California, for a long time we thought that they just operated out of the 

Valley and Southeast Heights. We’ve seen more and more of them over 

here, and it really took the gang unit to bring that to our attention up here. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 347 

On the other hand, Inglewood stakeholders attributed less of what they knew 

about gangs to having learned from the gang unit. Detectives, for example, felt that they 

had learned about gangs from their own experiences rather than from the gang unit. Las 

Vegas stakeholders said that they had learned about specific gangs and gang members 

from the gang unit, a form of knowledge that could be considered gang intelligence. 

Phoenix stakeholders responded similarly; as one patrol officer stated, “They do a 

lot of intel gathering, and most of the things I’ve learned about each gang and their 

characteristics are things I’ve learned through the gang squad.” A sergeant assigned to a 

Phoenix Neighborhood Enforcement Team elaborated upon this point of view: 

I’m pretty proud of our gang unit. I think they’ve come a long way as far 

as identifying [gang members], and educating patrol people as far as their 

activities and their location. They’re kind of their own separate 

intelligence unit. They’re readily available to us when we call for them, 

but other than that, there’s little interaction between us. 

We found that as a group, most internal stakeholders believed that they and their 

units had benefited from their respective gang units. Stakeholders typically identified 

access to gang-related information and expertise as the major advantage the gang units 

provided to them; they made it clear that as internal stakeholders, intelligence was the 

kind of information they perceived to be of the greatest value. 

Perceptions of Gang Unit Activities and Effectiveness 

The internal stakeholders’ perceptions of what their gang units actually do, and of 

their effectiveness, are at the heart of whether or not the stakeholders attribute legitimacy 

to the units. Attribution of legitimacy requires that stakeholders believe, first, that the 

gang unit engages in appropriate activities and, second, that they are effective in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 348 

contributing to the amelioration of the gang problem. 

Gang Unit Activities 

We asked internal stakeholders to identify the specific activities that their gang 

units engaged in, particularly any that they had actually witnessed firsthand. Nearly every 

Albuquerque stakeholder mentioned intelligence gathering in one form or another; 

enforcement and suppression were close second choices. One commander told us that the 

gang unit’s principal activities were “to surveil gang activity and to engage in 

enforcement activities when it’s appropriate.” When asked about activities that he had 

personally observed, he gave the following response: 

Well, they used to give me a report every month. They don’t do that any 

more. Actually it was a weekly report on exactly what they were doing, so 

I knew pretty accurately exactly what they were doing. They don’t do that 

any more. What we’re getting now is just the newsletter, and it’s just kind 

of a bigger, global view of the gang issues. I’d like to feel that they’re 

doing activities in my area, but I just don’t know, and especially with the 

special investigation division. They don’t communicate very well with 

what they’re doing on a day-to-day basis. I’m not upset, because we’re 

really not having a major gang issue problem right now. 

Another Albuquerque commander also described the unit’s activities as consisting 

of intelligence gathering and suppression: 

My observations, and frankly I’ve never actually sat down and even read 

their mission statement, is essentially, they gather intelligence. That’s a 

big component of it. I think they do a lot of suppression types of activities, 

in terms of they’ll identify a gang that’s really starting to get out of 

control, or they identify things that are starting to happen. I think their 

intervention [suppression] tactics, first in gathering intelligence and in 

applying strong intervention techniques, I think is probably a critical 

function. 

Several other stakeholders also mentioned intelligence gathering as the principal 

activity of the gang unit. A sergeant from a violent crimes unit described one of the gang 

unit’s activities as shakedowns, performed by the gang unit in conjunction with the local 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 349 

sheriff’s department at the county jail: 

What they’ll do is they’ll pretty much go through each cell and look for 

any kind of contraband, weapons, anything of that nature, and then they 

will interview that person. They might gather intelligence: “Hey, you 

know, okay, we can work these charges off, but you’ve got to give me 

something that I can...work with.” A lot of time they get some good 

information. They’ll say, ”Hey, well, I know the San Jose gang is moving 

a lot of dope and it’s coming up this way, and this is the key person that’s 

running the show,” and stuff. 

Inglewood stakeholders across the board described their gang unit’s activities as 

intelligence related: the gathering and disseminating of information on gangs and 

gangsters. However, in Las Vegas, stakeholders tended to see the gang unit as 

emphasizing suppression or enforcement activities more than intelligence gathering. One 

patrol commander described their activities as “enforcement activities – stopping 

individuals, interviews, foot pursuits, and investigations.” His counterpart in another 

command described the gang unit’s activities as falling within both areas: 

...basically what I see them doing up there is kind of developed into two 

main areas. One is intelligence gathering and handling most of the gang 

report type of things. I believe they are processing that stuff. And I think 

the reason for that is simply because they’ve got the information. And I 

noticed the latest increase [in personnel] that they just had was, I believe, 

specifically for the purpose of putting in another enforcement unit. And so 

basically, I kind of see them as two-fold...doing almost the same thing as 

my patrol officers are doing, but within a little narrower range. 

Internal stakeholders in Phoenix also placed more emphasis on the enforcement or 

suppression activities of their gang units, but recognized that they engaged in 

intelligence-related activities and investigations, as well. A detective on the graffiti detail 

noted that “...suppression is number one...intelligence fits right up there.” According to a 

former homicide detective: 

Well, out on the streets, most of the people are assigned to gang squad 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 350 

work at night, when the majority of gang violence occurs. They are on the 

street every night. Their job is to be a high-profile presence in ganginfested neighborhoods with a lot of street crime, and try to develop 

intelligence, gathering data, collecting photographs...documenting 

affiliations so that come sentencing time or come investigation time, we 

are able to show who belongs to what gang. 

A Neighborhood Enforcement Team sergeant describes the gang unit as having 

two investigative groups: “I know we have one squad that basically investigates the 

street-level gang members, and the other part is more like a conspiracy type that is more 

intense.” A patrol officer stated, “They do routine patrol. They do patrol areas that are 

hot. They also respond.” 

At all sites, internal stakeholders described their gang unit’s activities as 

consisting of intelligence gathering, as well as suppression and enforcement. We rarely 

heard mention of prevention activities. Stakeholder descriptions of gang unit activities 

such as intelligence or suppression corresponded to what we observed. For example, 

stakeholders described intelligence gathering and dissemination as the principal activity 

of the Inglewood gang unit, and that was what we observed them doing. Phoenix 

stakeholders described suppression as the principal activity carried out by their unit; that 

also was consistent with our observations of gang unit activity in that department. 

Gang Unit Effectiveness 

We asked internal stakeholders to share their impressions of the effectiveness of 

their gang units. Albuquerque stakeholders generally gave positive, albeit qualified, 

assessments, such as the following: 

I think they’re marginally effective, based on their resources. I think they 

do very good. 

Given the resources I told you they have, I think they’ve been very

successful.
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 351 

I think they’re effective. They probably need more officers. 

Given the resources we have, I think it’s about as effective as it could be. 

Although nearly all Inglewood stakeholders gave generally positive evaluations of 

that gang unit’s effectiveness, they became more guarded when discussing its 

effectiveness at developing intelligence. For example, a homicide detective felt that the 

gang squad, which from his view spent too much time in the office processing 

paperwork, ought to get out on the street to develop contacts with new gang members, 

and thereby develop new intelligence: 

They should be able to answer questions like, “Who is Woody?” They 

should be able to tell you Woody’s address and date of birth. The gang 

unit is falling down on the job. They’re doing other things. They’re 

inundated. There’s too much paperwork. It should be expanded to an extra 

guy or two. 

Las Vegas stakeholders gave mixed assessments of the effectiveness of their gang 

unit. Some suggested that the general decline in drive-by shootings and shootings was 

evidence of effective activity. However, one lieutenant in charge of a command area 

patrol shift had a different assessment; he thought that the effectiveness of the gang unit, 

and of the police response to gangs in general, had been limited by societal constraints: 

Not, [the gang unit is] not too successful. And I don’t mean to sound like a 

cliché or archaic. I think one of the reasons is we operate within the 

boundaries of what our society feels that police officers should be. And we 

are a society right now that they don’t want to be victimized by criminals, 

but we’re kind of touchy feely. We don’t want to see our cops out there 

kicking butt, taking names, and slamming people into jail. And in all 

honesty, from a policing standpoint, that’s all the gangsters understand. 

They don’t – they don’t understand love. They don’t respect courtesy. 

Every, every gang member that I’ve ever talked to, and in 27 years I’ve 

talked to hundreds of them...they see, you know, Officer Friendly as 

being weak. They see your courtesy as being a signal that maybe they can 

take advantage of you. And I think that society in general isn’t ready to 

deal with these people in a fashion that in law enforcement, that needs to 

be dealt with. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 352 

In Phoenix, nearly all internal stakeholders gave good marks to their gang unit. As 

a graffiti detective put it, “I think they are pretty effective. They’ve been very proactive 

as far as trying to enact new laws, as far as them hanging out with other documented gang 

members, making it a violation.” As a graffiti detective responded: 

I don’t know. But I know that you don’t hear about gang-related stuff as 

much as you did 10 years ago in the early ‘90s, late ‘80s, that sort of thing. 

So only judging by that, I’d have to say they are doing a pretty reasonable 

job. 

A former homicide detective attributed the decline in the gang problem to 

investigative techniques of the gang unit: “...if there is anything that I can credit with the 

decline of gang violence in the last several years, it would be with those kinds of 

nontraditional street crime investigation tactics.” 

Overall, most stakeholders gave positive assessments to the effectiveness of their 

gang units. Nevertheless, we heard some reservations. For example, the guarded and 

qualified assessments given by Inglewood stakeholders seem to reflect a perception that 

that gang unit might now be less effective than it had been. Several Albuquerque 

stakeholders qualified their assessments, indicating that the unit’s ability to be effective 

had been hampered by having too few officers. In other words, although internal 

stakeholders were generally positive, several qualified their assessments in ways that 

indicated that gang unit effectiveness could be improved. 

Perceived Problems in Gang Units 

Internal stakeholders in all of the study sites identified several problems with their 

gang units. They cited shortcomings related to such issues as unit size (number of officers 

assigned to the unit), insufficient communication, lack of proactivity, deficiencies in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 353 

intelligence gathering, the need to decentralize the unit to area command, and 

organizational isolation. In Albuquerque, a sergeant in a violent crimes unit described 

these problems with the gang unit: “The problem with the unit is, number one, it’s small 

and, number two, it’s accessible to all five area commands, but I think the logistics and 

the communication problem is the worst.” An area commander in Albuquerque 

commented on the number of officers: “I think the primary problem is a lack of 

them...there are not enough of them...but if we were to grow, it would hurt other 

elements in the department.” Another commander remarked on problems created by the 

unit’s centralization and organizational placement: 

Well, one problem is they are on special investigations, and I don’t think 

there’s an easy answer. Special investigations have city-wide 

responsibility, and I think the only way around that would be to have a 

gang unit based out of every substation. The gang unit used to be under 

field services’ control, and that was based out of this substation, as a 

matter of fact. And we had 20 officers back then. But because it was based 

out of this substation, we probably got the lion’s share of the gang 

enforcement, just because they were under our chain of command. The 

reason they’re on special investigations is because if they’re not tied to 

one specific command, they theoretically would be more responsive to the 

city in general. I just don’t think there’s an easy answer other than having 

the resources to decentralize another gang unit based out of every 

substation. That’s certainly not in the foreseeable future. 

Inglewood internal stakeholders, primarily detectives, implied that a major 

problem with the gang unit was its lack of proactivity. In their opinions, rather than being 

in the field interacting with gang members, their gang officers spent too much time in the 

office doing paperwork. A robbery detective implied that the gang unit was staffed with 

the wrong kind of personnel: 

It takes a certain type of officer to work the gang unit. What you want is a 

person who can establish rapport, and that’s a special skill. Even though 

they are gang members, you still have to be able to communicate with 

them, and talk and treat them as non-gang members. You need to set aside 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 354 

your personal beliefs about them once in a while in order to establish 

rapport. 

An officer working in the Anti-Crime Team unit found the gang unit understaffed 

and hard to access. He noted that they previously had worked until 11 p.m., often in the 

field collecting information, but now they were “doing data entry and things, and they 

can’t be out in the field as much.” Still another detective stated, “They need more contact. 

The limitation on manpower limits their ability to work out in the field...” 

Las Vegas internal stakeholders implied that the working relationship between 

patrol and the gang unit itself was a problem created by a lack of communication and 

isolation. A lieutenant in charge of patrol gave this account: 

Well, like I say, sometimes getting information from them is difficult... 

unless you know somebody up there, sometimes getting information can 

be really difficult. We went through one phase when I first came out here 

that I didn’t like seeing in my area.... You know, they would come in and 

they would serve a warrant, or give a sweep, like I said, or something like 

that. And we’d be totally clueless that they were even here. You know, 

we’d start getting phone calls about guys in military uniforms. This I’d 

think was a hoax...I’ve always told them you can come and play in my 

backyard, but at least you can give me the courtesy to let me know you’re 

here. 

Another patrol lieutenant noted that “[the gang unit is] isolated from the rest of 

the police department...they work downtown...not much interface. A new officer 

wouldn’t know where to call for help.” 

Phoenix internal stakeholders perceived manpower shortages as among the unit’s 

problems; in addition, several talked about isolation, communication, and turf problems. 

A patrol officer underscored the problems of isolation and communication: 

I think the main thing, which we’ve addressed a couple of times, is their 

distance. That’s something, I just don’t understand why we have that. It 

just creates that gap. In fact, it’s hard to get hold of them. It’s just a phone 

call, but to sit down and talk to them and say, “Hey, we’ve got this 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 355 

problem, you know.” If they were out at the station, I could grab them in 

the hallway and just give them a quick 1-minute spiel on my problem. 

That’s the main thing I see, the distance. If I were to prioritize, it would be 

number one, the distance. 

A Phoenix detective indicated that there were few problems now, but recalled: 

A few years ago, like I said, there was this non-determinable north-south 

line, and if you were north of that line, well, you probably weren’t going 

to ever see or get any help from the gang squad, because gangs were all 

down here. 

When the internal stakeholders were asked how the gang units could improve 

their performance, the stakeholders suggested, among other things, that the gang units 

could improve communication and increase their contact with patrol, increase manpower, 

ensure that they were assigned the right kind of officers, change their images, and 

increase their officers’ rapport with gangsters. 

In Albuquerque, one commander made the following suggestion for improving 

communication: 

I think that if they would go back to their weekly briefings, and it doesn’t 

have to be in person, but on paper...describing the kind of operations 

they’re conducting...would be helpful. And if they could come on 

occasion, that would be helpful to enhance communication. 

His counterpart in a different command area suggested that the unit needed a public 

relations effort to increase gang awareness and discourage gang activity. Another 

commander made the following suggestion: 

I think that, number one, we need to increase the size of the gang unit, 

which means we need to increase the size of the entire department. But if 

we accomplish that, the second thing we need to do is, we need to train 

every one of these patrol officers on how to be better resources for valid 

information for the gang unit for the purposes of trying to control gang 

activity. 

An Inglewood detective made a suggestion related to the rapport of the gang unit 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 356 

officers with gang members, one that was echoed by other stakeholders: 

They need to spend more time on the street...gang unit officers need to be 

able to establish rapport with gang members to sort out the bad ones from 

the good ones, to give up a case when it leads to successfully investigating 

a more important case, and that is the basis for being on the street and 

establishing rapport with the gang members.

 One Las Vegas patrol lieutenant held the gang unit, as well as other specialized 

units, partially responsible for officer turnover in his command area; the gang unit would 

recognize the capabilities of the best patrol officers, and then recruit them. He suggested 

the possibility of decentralizing the gang unit across the command areas as a way of 

addressing the problem. Still another lieutenant suggested that the unit could market itself 

better, informing the rest of the department about what it does; he claimed most people 

did not know what the gang unit did. He said that gang unit officers needed more contact 

with patrol, and that “combat dress is too much...panics tourists on the strip. A lot of 

people wonder why they dress that way. Too militant.” 

Las Vegas stakeholders’ theme – increase contact and improve communication 

with patrol – was echoed by a Phoenix stakeholder, an officer in another unit: 

The main thing is just have that communication between us, and right 

now. Obviously they’re not going to be able to just transfer these guys out 

to the precinct, but if they’re going to keep the distance, at least do a oncea-month briefing. A lot of the bureaus do that, like we just had one from 

burglary and the motorcycle cops, so I think we ought to have a mandatory 

one each month, just real quick, 5 minutes. You can be real informal. Just 

come in and say, “This is what we’re working on.” We want to help them 

out, but I can’t remember the last time they came in and did a briefing. It’s 

pretty unfortunate. We have all these officers. We have 260 officers at this 

precinct who’d love to help them, but we just don’t have the 

communication, and without that, you’re not going to get much done. 

The view within the Phoenix patrol unit – that patrol officers were a valuable but 

under-used resource for the gang unit – was common, and we also heard it from several 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 357 

internal stakeholders in Las Vegas. Commanders there described patrol as the “eyes and 

ears of the department,” experts on what went on in the neighborhoods. They suggested 

that the gang unit ought to become more involved with patrol, taking advantage of their 

street wisdom. 

Perceived Factors Affecting Approaches to Gang Control 

We asked internal stakeholder to discuss their perceptions of the factors that had 

shaped their departments’ responses to local gang problems. Scholars have attributed the 

creation of police gang units to a variety of factors from competing theoretical 

perspectives (C. Katz 2001). Although the issues surrounding these perspectives are 

complex, at the heart of the debate is the question of whether police responded with a 

rational approach to solving an objective gang problem, or they were more influenced by 

other factors, including media and other public and political pressures. In each study site, 

we asked about the evolution and development of the approach used by their police 

departments’ gang units, which factors they thought had most influenced or shaped their 

departments’ choices, and how much influence, if any, politics, media, and/or the public 

had exerted. 

Albuquerque’s internal stakeholders were particularly aware of the importance of 

politics, media and, to a certain extent, the public, in the development of that 

department’s response to gangs. In their view, the gang unit’s origination and recent 

rebirth were primarily political reactions to publicity surrounding outbreaks of violence. 

For example, one area commander explained: 

Primarily the publicity.... One of the reasons why the gang unit grew to 

the extent that it did was a series of gang-related homicides that occurred 

down in [another command] area. So our response to the gangs basically 

was how much bad publicity we are going to get in terms of the number of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 358 

homicides and...the number of gang-related crimes that are being 

committed out there. 

A sergeant from a violent crimes unit described the development of the gang unit 

as a result of “the squeaky wheel [getting] the oil.” He went on to identify the squeaky 

wheel as “media, politics, the mayor’s office, and neighborhoods,” and he explained: 

But you get a high-profile gang case...and it’s been that way with 

administrations since I’ve been a cop. When the caca hits the fan, every 

resource this place has goes to it. Could those resources have been used to 

prevent it? Maybe, maybe not, but they’re never put there. It’s always a 

reactive situation. That is my problem, my complaint. And it’s not this 

department, it’s all departments. Nothing gets done unless something bad 

happens, and that’s just the way this thing goes. 

On the other hand, another Albuquerque commander indicated that the rationale 

for the development of the gang unit was to respond to an increase in violent crime. He 

saw the development of the unit as a natural response to the crime problem; he made no 

mention of media, political, or public influence. 

Inglewood internal stakeholders saw media as important in the development of 

their gang unit. As one detective put it, “The media had a lot to do with starting the gang 

unit. We were always in the media with gang problems, and that led to politicians having 

to do something about it.” Interestingly, the Inglewood gang unit was configured as an 

intelligence unit, according to one detective; he saw that as a rational decision, based on a 

natural incompatibility between the intelligence and enforcement functions. He explained 

that gang members saw enforcers as “blue suiters” (cops), and were unwilling to give up 

information to them. He described his own experience working in the gang unit: 

If we found someone doing serious crime, we would make an arrest. 

Oftentimes we passed over the less serious crime. So we’d sit and talk and 

listen; gangsters will tell you something. And then we’d drive away, and 

we’d get a black and white to do the enforcement. We were cool, so we 

didn’t arrest. We shot the shit with them instead. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 359 

Las Vegas internal stakeholders, like their counterparts in the other police 

departments we studied, saw their department’s response stemming from media and 

public pressure. One lieutenant said, “...media, public pressure – drive-bys are not good 

for tourism.” Another Las Vegas lieutenant also attributed the development of the gang 

unit to public pressure, and the political response that it produced: 

Public pressure. They closed down housing projects, and gang members 

have moved all over. Now they are all spread out. We had a big drive-by 

problem in one area...so political figures in the area criticized the police 

department for allowing it to happen. People got upset. The public wanted 

something to happen, so the police department got a lot of resources as a 

result. 

Phoenix internal stakeholders tended to attribute the creation of their gang unit to 

objective conditions – an indigenous gang problem and associated crime. A 

Neighborhood Enforcement Team supervisor described the situation: 

Like I said, our location right here, right behind our precinct, we have 

what’s called the Meepas. That’s very original gangsters, family that’s 

been there for over 50, 60 years, and a lot of them, a good 90 percent of 

them, have been involved in some kind of gang activity. So with that and 

their low-income areas, I think that’s why the city developed a gang 

squad. It’s a necessary squad that we need just for intelligence and the 

crime that comes from the gangs. 

A detective indicated that he thought that it was “the result of violence issues, 

those sort of things, as well as the sheer numbers of people involved.” Another homicide 

detective, talking about the suppression or enforcement approach that dominated Phoenix 

gang unit activity, described the development of that approach: 

There was an increase in violence that...peaked in the mid-‘90s...the 

amount of shootings and drive-bys, homicides, and it was the influx of the 

black street gangs that really changed and dictated how we were going to 

have to deal with the problem, and from that point forward, it was 

different than how we’d dealt when it was only the Spanish-speaking 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 360 

gang, and fights in the park with knifes and chains. With the Crips and the 

Bloods came semi-automatic handguns, fully automatic weapons, a 

proliferation of fire-power that we had never seen before, as a city or a 

police department. All that came over with the Crips and the Bloods in the 

late ‘80s and early ‘90s and dictated our response, and we had no choice to 

respond to it but by beefing up the gang unit squad, and taking them and 

training them in unique ways that our previous gang detectives and 

officers had not received. 

A former commander of the gang unit talked about how he had changed its focus 

shortly after taking it over, during the era of growing gang-related violence: 

I found their major focus was really street enforcement, putting out fires, 

and after being there for 6 months, I saw an opportunity to deal with this 

as a focus in individual gangs, and try to actually impact the hard-core 

gang members. So in my tenure there, our focus was to change the overall 

approach to just strictly street enforcement, going out there where the 

gangs were hanging out to do some more comprehensive investigations, 

treat them as criminal syndicates. We started doing criminal syndicate 

investigation or RICO investigations. 

Some Phoenix internal stakeholders downplayed the influence of media and 

politics, and as noted above, attributed the creation of the gang unit to the department 

being proactive, responding to a growing gang problem. In their view, the gang unit was 

a rational response to the gang problem. However, other Phoenix stakeholders thought 

the media played an influential role in the creation of the unit. An area manager in a highcrime precinct described this role and the related politics: 

They controlled our response; we used the media and they used us. They 

would ask...if the shooting was gang-related, if the shooters came by 

yelling “WBP” out of the window, what do you think, and we turned it 

back around on them. At the same time, the politicians were saying that 

we have no gang problem...we’re saying, “Yes, we do,” and once the 

innocents started getting hurt, that’s when the media brought it to the 

forefront, and then the politicians had to react to the issues. 

Other stakeholders also noted that the media had helped bring attention to the 

gang problem. This forced politicians to give cities more resources for police 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 361 

departments, which used them to expand their gang units. According to a homicide 

sergeant, once it became impossible to deny the existence of the gang problem, the 

political machine helped secure funding for additional gang unit positions and equipment, 

which in his view was something “the police would not have been able to do on its own.” 

Phoenix internal stakeholders generally saw the public as an important influence 

on the department’s response to gangs. At least one stakeholder saw this as a recent 

development, resulting from greater activism on the part of neighborhood associations: 

Right now we have a lot of neighborhood associations that are taking over 

their neighborhoods, which is a very good thing. They want to clean up 

their neighborhoods of crime and gangs and so forth. We’re not enacting 

new laws where the neighborhoods can be victims. We have a 

spokesperson, a leader of a neighborhood. They go to court and attend the 

initial appearance and the sentencing, and request higher sentences. That’s 

all new. 

A sergeant working in the public information bureau described the citizen role: 

They work through their elected officials, and those were some of the 

most adamant supporters for the police department when we went to the 

city council and asked for additional positions and asked for additional 

funding to increase the size of the war we wanted to wage against gangs... 

Altogether, internal stakeholders described a complex set of forces that had given 

rise to their local gang units. Stakeholders acknowledged that the media, the public, and 

politicians all had been influential in the establishment of the units, but from their 

perspectives, the police response – to establish gang units – had not resulted from the 

external pressure, even though that pressure may have been influential. All stakeholders 

believed that the existence of a real gang problem and increasing gang-related violence 

had been at the heart of the police response. 

These stakeholders described a spiraling process that had started with an 

emerging gang problem and associated violence, that then had gotten the attention of the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 362 

media and the general public. The public, armed with media accounts of growing gang 

violence, had then demanded action from elected officials who, in turn, had placed 

responsibility for responding to the problem on the shoulders of the police. Some internal 

stakeholders found this process beneficial, because media and public pressure had 

motivated city councils and other government units to allocate greater resources to the 

police for use in addressing the gang problem. 

Summary 

Our interviews with the gang units’ internal stakeholders presented a complex set 

of perceptions of the local gang problems and gang units. Despite that complexity, 

several commonalities emerged from the discussions. First, we found a strong consensus 

that the gang problem was not nearly as severe as it had been in the early 1990s, and that 

the magnitude and nature of the gang problem had changed and was continuing to 

change. Several stakeholders believed that gangs had become less turf based and more 

decentralized, although this view was not unanimous. Some stakeholders believed that 

gangs had become more commercial – that is, they were selling drugs – and older 

gangsters were discouraging high-profile violence that could draw unwanted law 

enforcement attention, disrupting their business. 

With the exception of Las Vegas stakeholders, nearly all of them believed that 

gang-related violence such as shootings and drive-bys had declined considerably in 

recent years. Nevertheless, all of the stakeholders maintained that a significant gang 

problem still existed within their communities, and that the gang problem was sufficient 

rationale for continuing support for their gang units. 

Internal stakeholders perceived that media, politics, and the public had influenced, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 363 

if not caused, the creation of their gang units. According to some, the media had been the 

source of political pressures that led to increased resource allocation, making the creation 

or expansion of gang units possible. These external influences were not always viewed as 

negative; in the view of many stakeholders, gangs presented a real, objective problem, 

one to which the police had reacted only after media attention pressured politicians and 

the police department to respond. 

Generally, internal stakeholders were supportive of their gang units, giving 

positive assessments of their performance. Some valued the units’ suppression or 

enforcement efforts, while numerous stakeholders pointed to intelligence information that 

the gang unit produced as being of the greatest value. Although generally positive about 

their gang units, stakeholders were able to identify problems and to make 

recommendations for improving the gang units’ performance. Typically, these problems 

and related recommendations had to do with communications, the sharing of intelligence 

and information, and organizational arrangements that isolated the gang units. These 

problems tended to be seen as intertwined – for example, gang unit isolation was 

frequently thought to contribute to communication and information-sharing problems. 

Nevertheless, even though they were able to articulate problems, it seems safe to 

say that for most internal stakeholders, the perceived value of the gang unit to the 

department outweighed their concerns. Most did view their gang units as carrying out 

unique and valuable functions. Thus, as a group, the internal stakeholders believed in the 

existence of local gang problems, and they believed that the gang units were appropriate 

and legitimate organizational units – ones that effectively addressed the problems 

assigned to their oversight. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 364 

Chapter 9. Organizational Environment: External Stakeholder 

Perceptions 

If you are a gang member, APD will be in your face. If you spit, you will be 

prosecuted. If you have a broken tail light, you will be prosecuted. It is going to 

be a very rough time to be a gangbanger in Albuquerque. 

–Mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico 1996 

The external stakeholders for a police gang unit are comprised of individuals who 

are affiliated with outside organizations, but who have some special significance for the 

department. To develop our list, we asked the gang units in all four study sites to 

nominate external stakeholders to be interviewed (chapter 2). As a group, the their 

nominees were a diverse lot, including representatives from other criminal justice and 

local government agencies, and even from private enterprise. Representatives of 

nonprofit youth service organizations were also nominated, but their numbers were 

unexpectedly small, considering the 1990s expansion of community-based programs for 

the “youth at risk” clientele. 

We used structured interviews with the external stakeholders to get their 

perceptions of several aspects of the police response to gangs. The external stakeholder 

interviews were similar to those conducted with the internal stakeholders, and they 

focused on many of the same topics (chapter 8). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 365 

Nature and Scope of Local Gang Problems 

We were interested in whether or not external stakeholders held one common 

view of the gang problem, and if so, whether that view was similar to or significantly 

different than that of internal stakeholders. It seemed reasonable to expect external 

stakeholders to be most concerned about the police response to gangs and its validity if 

that response was seen as addressing a community problem that they had deemed 

important in the first place. 

We found that external stakeholders, as a group, viewed their local gang problems 

as more serious than internal stakeholders did, although there were exceptions. Generally, 

external stakeholders tended not to be aware of historical changes in the fundamental 

nature of gangs or in the gang problems in their respective communities. When they did 

recognize such changes, they usually had to do with the gang problem getting worse. For 

example, an intensive probation supervisor in Albuquerque described how the problem 

had worsened there: 

I’ve been here since 1984, and I see it getting progressively worse. It 

seems to be more organized now with some the gangs. There seems to be 

a lot movement now between the gangs and the institution [prison]. It’s 

very well organized back and forth between the streets and the institutions 

for a couple of gangs. The violence has gotten higher. It seems to be more 

indiscriminate and it seems to be younger and younger, as far as I see. 

An Albuquerque juvenile prosecutor made a similar claim: “From my perspective, 

I think we have a tremendous gang problem in Albuquerque. The way I see it is the 

amount of violence that is going on.” A juvenile probation supervisor described it as a 

“fairly large problem,” and the director of a local intervention program believed the area 

had “a big gang problem.” The director of a similar program also commented on the large 

amount of gang violence, then added, “...there’s a lot of violence, period, not just gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 366 

violence.” An external stakeholder from a state-level commission on crime and 

delinquency agreed that violence was on the increase, and attributed that to the move of 

gangs toward profitable enterprises: 

The commercialization of gangs has probably been the most profound 

impact. By commercialization, I mean the profitability of drugs, the 

selling of things. Turf issues have always remained pretty much the same. 

The way they protect turf has changed because of the commercialization 

of gangs. With that, and I don’t know if that is a term that you use, but the 

profit motive has brought about more violence. 

A representative of the American Civil Liberties Union represented an alternative point 

of view: 

I have never really come across it [the gang problem].Well, I shouldn’t say 

“never.” I have three kids, and the middle kid was out skateboarding when 

he was in middle school on Thanksgiving night, and a group of five kids 

jumped him and knocked him down, and knocked him in the head. But we 

didn’t even report that. He said they looked “gang-ish.” 

In Inglewood, a prosecutor in the District Attorney’s office maintained that “it is 

very extensive. From my experience, there are times when there is a crime almost every 

night of a violent nature.” A gang intelligence officer in a California state correctional 

institution believed that the area had “a large gang problem.” A gang coordinator with the 

Inglewood parole office described how he viewed the nature of the problem: 

The gang problem is heavily drug based, in terms of drug dealing. At the 

current time, Hispanic gangs are fighting each other. Old gangsters are 

coming out of prison, they come back to claim their own territory from 

young gang members. They want to reclaim the territory for purposes of 

drug dealing. 

Not every external stakeholder saw gangs as engaging in violence and drug 

dealing. A city graffiti officer in Inglewood gave this account: “...kids from high 

school...form little gangs, little cliques.... There are not really a lot of real tough gangs.” 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 367 

For Las Vegas external stakeholders, a clear sense of the level and nature of the 

gang problem seemed elusive. They tended not to describe the problem as necessarily 

increasing or decreasing; some just seemed out of touch with the issue. A representative 

of the gang task force indicated that the gang problem had shifted from its historical turfbased orientation to today’s economically oriented gangs. Staff from the Las Vegas 

probation and parole unit tasked with supervising gang members also noted a shift to 

commercial enterprises: 

Really, as the city got bigger, more commercialized with gaming, the gang 

members wanted to get more into that instead of staying on the street. 

They got smarter and more commercial. The majority of the gang activity 

we have out here are young individuals, and they’re just mostly killing 

each other. The older gangbangers are more into the commercial stuff, 

getting into stuff like gaming or more professional, trying to make like 

they’re legit. 

A Las Vegas-based HUD agent expressed puzzlement about the gang problem. To 

him, it seemed to have abated for a period, but then to have revived over the past year. He 

attributed this shift to rapid population growth. A county ordinance enforcement official 

told us that gangs were everywhere in the community – that they were more mobile and 

“their turf is pretty big right now.” 

In Phoenix, external stakeholders tended to see the gang problem as extensive and 

in some cases as growing. An assistant county prosecutor assigned to the gang 

prosecution unit described the problem as follows: 

I think it’s very extensive. We have a number of gangs within Maricopa 

County, but predominantly the Phoenix metropolitan area. The nature of it 

is probably, there are a couple of different realms, a lot of the gang activity 

is focused around the drug dealing aspect of it, and the gangs have their 

focus in dealing drugs. And the gang activity is done to protect that aspect 

of it. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 368 

Of course, there were exceptions. For example, the director of a program that 

works with gang members felt that the gang problem had been “curtailed somewhat,” and 

attributed this to proactive prevention and intervention programming. However, a liaison 

from a gang unit in another area police department thought the problem “was growing,” 

and that he was finding gang members younger, more fatalistic, and more violent. Unlike 

stakeholders in Las Vegas, who thought the involvement of gangs in drug dealing had 

resulted in less violence, a Phoenix stakeholder believed that involvement in drug sales 

had escalated gang violence. 

Overall, the external stakeholders differed from internal stakeholders, in that they 

perceived a substantial gang problem in their communities. As discussed in chapter 8, 

internal stakeholders varied in their perceptions of the magnitude of their local gang 

problems, but in general, they thought the problem was in decline. In contrast, external 

stakeholders in the same communities reported that the gang problems were continuing 

and, in fact, were getting worse. 

In part, the variation between internal and external stakeholder perceptions could 

be a function of differences in the nature of their direct contacts with gang members. 

Some external stakeholders worked in agencies and jobs – for example, nonprofit 

organizations with gang clientele – that brought them into regular contact with gang 

members; they probably had more contact than many internal stakeholders did. Their 

views of the overall gang problem in their communities would most likely mirror their 

experiences through their own agencies. 

Perceived Causes of Gang Problems 

We were interested in determining whether the external stakeholders as a group 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 369 

held a common understanding of the causes of the gang problem. From all of the study 

sites, external stakeholders suggested a variety of reasons for the existence of gangs, as 

well as for the conditions that produced them. Their causal explanations were quite 

similar to those of internal stakeholders. 

Several stakeholders described Hispanic gangs as intergenerational, rooted in 

Hispanic culture and tradition. Poverty and family conditions were frequently offered as 

factors leading to the development of gangs. As one probation supervisor put it, “It’s 

handed to sons – dad’s in a gang, son’s in a gang. It’s a poverty problem, money.” 

Many of the stakeholders saw a close connection between gangs and drugs, and 

attributed the rise of gangs to drugs. For example, a gang prosecutor in Phoenix described 

the problem this way: 

Well, I think that one thing that makes up the gang problem, is there is a 

large population of drug users, and anywhere that you have that, where 

you have the demand, obviously you will have the supply. We have a lot 

here that adds to the gang culture. There is a large Hispanic population. I 

don’t want to stereotype people, but there are some very large traditional 

Hispanic gangs that are within the Phoenix metropolitan area. That’s 

probably the predominant type of gangs that we have. And there are a fair 

number of black gangs, as well. They focus on dealing drugs. And so 

when you have that ability, you’ve got the demand there for a lot of drugs, 

and you will have the supply and gangs... 

A sergeant from the Arizona State Department of Public Safety had a slightly 

different take on the conditions giving rise to the local gang problem, but he also saw a 

drug connection: 

Then you have an influx of folks from California. We see a lot of mainly 

Hispanics and black gangs coming from California to Arizona and 

establishing business, because of the increased penalties of the three strike 

rule. We see a lot of what we call two-strikers, because they have been 

convicted of two crimes in California, and a third one and they’re 

gone...they are coming here and we find that they are involved in the drug 

trade, but they are not turf oriented...they are very transitional, they move 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 370 

around a lot, they’re very mobile. Money, that’s where their motivation is. 

It’s not heritage or tradition, it’s more profit motive. 

We found that as a group, external stakeholders believed that the causes of the 

gang problem resided in intergenerational cultural traditions and in social structural 

conditions, including poverty and family problems. They also pointed to drugs and gang 

migration as important factors underlying their local gang problems. 

Impact of Gangs on External Stakeholders 

We asked external stakeholders to gauge the magnitude of the problem that gangs 

presented for their organizations. Their estimates varied from one study site to the next. A 

prosecutor in Albuquerque noted that a gang specialist who left his organization recently 

would not be replaced because “...the caseload never had that many cases.” In 

Inglewood, a city-level graffiti abatement officer described the size of the problem for his 

agency as follows: 

In an all-around package...they don’t give us a lot of problems because we 

are trying to help the community, and they do kind of see that in a way. 

They are not out of control, beating up people. When they see us coming, 

they kind of respect the fact that we are trying to keep the community 

clean. 

The perceptions of these two external stakeholders were the exception. Several 

other stakeholders indicated that the impact of gangs on their organizations was 

substantial. A Las Vegas prosecutor attributed about half of his homicide caseload to 

gang-involved shootings, and as a member of the gang task force, he saw gangs playing a 

major role in a local auto theft problem. His perspective was shared by most other 

external stakeholders in Las Vegas, including a patrol supervisor who reported: 

Big problem. Generally a huge amount of calls for service. We have a 

high burglary rate. I can’t say how much is gang related, but I suspect 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 371 

gang members are involved. We are now fighting with kids in gangs – 

emulating other gangs. 

In Phoenix, most external stakeholders reported that the gang problem was having 

a significant impact on their own organizations. A liaison from a gang unit in another 

police department saw the problem for his department as substantial: “Locally, we have 

26 homegrown gangs here in Mesa. Probably members and associates total around 1,500 

to 1,700. But that’s just what’s documented in our department.” A prosecutor in Phoenix 

used terms such as “large scale” and “bigger priority” to describe the impact: 

I would say within the last few years that the prosecution of gangs has 

become larger scale and a bigger priority for the county attorney’s office. 

We’ve had a number of large-scale investigations involving gangs. I’m 

sure you are familiar with the Mexican Mafia, which was a very large 

investigation of a very violent gang. I think we are trying to focus more on 

the large-scale investigations, which obviously take more time; they take 

more coordination between agencies in trying to hurt the gang basically 

where they live. If you can take out the core of the gang, then you can take 

out the core of the gang problem. 

The perceived impact of the local gang problem on external stakeholders’ 

organizations varied from one site to the next, and among the stakeholders at each site. 

Although some reported relatively little impact, most had experienced a substantial 

impact, and indicated that the local gang problem was an especially important problem 

for their organization. 

Stakeholder Contacts with Gangs 

We were interested in understanding how the external stakeholders at our four 

study sites perceived the gangs in their communities. We started with the assumption that 

their perceptions had developed partly from exposure to outside information – for 

example, from the gang unit – and partly from direct contacts with gang members in the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 372 

normal course of work. We found variations among them, but overall, the external 

stakeholders had had substantial personal contact with gang members. The organizations 

with which they were affiliated differed in their agency goals and their activities and 

services (if any) relative to gangs, and this in turn determined the amount and kinds of 

contact the stakeholders had with gang members. 

For example, one nonprofit agency in Albuquerque engaged in street work aimed 

at prevention and intervention; another in Phoenix taught parental responsibilities to 

young fathers. In these cases, the stakeholders’ clients included members or associates of 

gangs, and so contact was frequent. Other stakeholders had more limited, circumstantial 

exposure; for instance, prosecutors’ contacts were only with gang members involved in 

specific cases. Not all external stakeholders worked in settings that brought them into 

direct contact with gangs – for example, those who worked in state policy organizations. 

In general, Albuquerque external stakeholders reported having considerable 

individual contact with gangs. The staff of a youth development program that emphasized 

gang prevention and intervention numbered more than 20 individuals dedicated to 

addressing gang issues, through mentoring and counseling. Prosecutors in Albuquerque 

and Las Vegas estimated that about half of their caseloads involved gang members. 

Inglewood external stakeholder reported regular contact with gangs, as well. For 

example, a gang coordinator with the state parole authority in Inglewood described his 

job as “trying to identify whether or not [his] parolees are gangsters.” The operations 

director of a major California cemetery told us that he came into contact with gangs when 

arranging funerals for gang members. 

Basically, what we try to do in scheduling funeral services...is to make 

sure we didn’t have two different gangs scheduled at the same time, so 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 373 

that two different gangs won’t be brought to the cemetery and have a 

chance to engage in conflict. 

A Phoenix prosecutor explained that the principal way he comes into contact with 

gangs “...is by getting involved with the police agencies, with the gang detectives, who 

are pinpointing where the problems are.” The director of a nonprofit organization 

described the nature of his organization’s direct contacts with gang members as follows: 

Primarily, when we’re looking at young fathers, we’re talking about 

increasing their ability to maintain a responsibility or meet their 

responsibility to their children. There may be some gang involvement, so 

we try to address that in a non-intimidating way. 

Prosecutors at all four sites worked with local gang units to develop criminal 

cases. In Phoenix, in order to get maximum sentences, some cases were based on 

multiple undercover drug purchases from gang members. In Phoenix and Las Vegas, 

prosecutors and gang units collaborated to take advantage of provisions for enhanced 

sentences for gang-related offenses. In these cases, the contact between stakeholders and 

gang members was mostly vicarious, but case preparation and legal proceedings also 

brought prosecutors into direct contact with gang members, either as charged offenders or 

as witnesses. 

The director of a probation and parole district in Las Vegas described that 

agency’s contacts with gang members: 

It has clearly to do with the level of supervision. When we get a gang 

member in...they come into our section. We have to do more contacts 

with them because most of the gangbangers, you can’t find them at home 

for home contacts. They’re mostly in their territory on the street, so we 

have to do more contacts with them, try to find them. Their criteria are a 

little higher than anybody else’s. 

An intelligence officer with a Las Vegas area correctional facility described that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 374 

organization’s intelligence gathering and violence prevention activities, in relation to 

gangs: 

The gang office receives information that a family member, for example, 

of a ward, has been killed in gang-related activity, so we go on the lookout 

to try to figure out who knows who, in terms of gang members inside the 

institution. We try to identify gang members in terms of specific gang 

memberships, their affiliation with others. We look at identifying 

characteristics such as tattoos. We start and maintain these files. We 

monitor the mail coming into gangsters at the request of outside agencies, 

and notify agencies if the mail is negative. We review fights to determine 

the motivation behind the fights and whether or not they’re related to gang 

activity. 

That officer described interviewing offenders in the segregation unit for gang 

members as an occasion for direct contact with gang members. 

Overall, we found that the level and nature of contact with gang members varied 

from one external stakeholder to the next, depending on the stakeholder’s organizational 

affiliation and responsibilities. In general, those working in criminal justice agencies 

reported the most frequent contacts; however, stakeholders in nonprofit organizations 

serving a clientele that included gang members also reported substantial contact with 

gang members. 

Relationships with Gang Units 

We were interested in the external stakeholders’ perceptions of the role of their 

police departments in addressing the gang problem. We also wanted to understand the 

communication, contact patterns, and relationships that stakeholders had with their 

respective gang units. Finally, we asked the external stakeholders to assess the quality of 

and the benefits derived from those relationships. Our objective was to learn whether 

external stakeholders perceived gains for their agencies and valued the existence of the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 375 

gang units. As we mentioned before, we would expect that if the majority of their 

interactions with and impressions of the gang units were positive, then they would be 

more likely to assess the units as a valid expression of the role of the police in addressing 

the gang problem. 

Perceptions of Police Role 

At all study sites, external stakeholders perspectives varied on the appropriate role 

for police with respect to gangs and gang members, but intelligence and information 

gathering were frequently mentioned as principal activities. Stakeholders usually 

enumerated the activities of their local gang units when describing the police role. For 

example, in Albuquerque, an intensive probation supervisor observed that “they [gang 

unit officers] do a lot of gathering of intelligence and data. It really helps us.” A juvenile 

court prosecutor described the police role as “not only trying to keep the incidence of 

gang-related crime down, but also to gather information regarding the gang to have this 

base of information available.” Another Albuquerque prosecutor stated: 

I see their role as getting out, intermingling with these guys. Kids will do 

stupid things, you know, and it’s not too harmful giving them a break, 

getting the trust going, obtaining information about more serious types of 

cases, trying to prevent a lot of stuff, as opposed to just reacting to it once 

they commit the crimes. 

Most external stakeholders in Inglewood agreed with their colleagues in the other 

cities that the intelligence function was an important role for police. For example, a gang 

specialist in another criminal justice agency stated: “The principle function of the 

Inglewood gang unit is the intelligence function, and that’s a lot of the value to my 

agency, in that we interface based on sharing of intelligence information. “ 

However, an Inglewood graffiti officer saw enforcement or suppression, rather 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 376 

than intelligence, as the principal role of police: 

So they got to keep on top of the neighborhoods, just keep patrolling 

certain neighborhoods, and getting a lot of graffiti, a lot of drug problems, 

just keep a check on those areas, because eventually you will get them out 

and maybe even arrested. 

In Las Vegas, one prosecutor credited the gang unit for their proactive approach 

to intelligence gathering: 

I give them a lot of praise for the proactive attention that they give. I 

mean, they go out there every day. They see gang members. They develop 

relationships. They’re talking to these kids. They’re learning a lot of 

valuable information: gang alliances, youth gang rivalries, which gang is 

not getting along with what gang, who’s joining a gang, who just got 

jumped in. I mean they’re learning a lot of stuff. And you’re documenting 

really the basic characteristics and traits of many gangs on the nightly 

basis that they’re out there. 

The director of a nonprofit youth service organization in Phoenix also thought that 

the local gang unit’s proactive role better enabled the unit to gather information and put it 

to good use: 

I believe the gang squad is actually taking a more proactive approach, a 

more one-on-one, if you will. Because they’re actually dividing 

themselves up, going into the community, and allowing themselves to be 

approached by some of these individuals, thereby instilling trust in the 

community, whereas if someone gets wind of an activity that maybe 

someone’s planning, they’d be more comfortable in coming to them 

somewhat anonymously, saying, “I hear this is in the wind right now. This 

is what someone is telling me about.” So that way, they’re a little more 

informed. 

Communication and Relationships with Gang Units 

At all study sites, external stakeholders described their communication and 

relationships with area gang units, and assessed their level of satisfaction with those 

relationships. In Albuquerque, a prosecutor from the adult courts reported that 

communication with the police department on gang issues “occurred daily,” whereas a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 377 

juvenile prosecutor indicated that communication occurred “to some extent.” The director 

of a nonprofit youth service organization reported that the police department had initiated 

meetings in order to open a dialogue with local merchants and residents about the gang 

problem, but that the meetings hadn’t gone over well. 

Albuquerque’s external stakeholders were generally positive in their assessments 

of their working relationships with the gang unit. An intensive probation supervisor 

described it as “very good: just an open line of communication back and forth, the 

sharing of information,” and went on to describe this aspect of their relationship: 

They’re very familiar with the people that we’re supervising, so it’s only 

natural that we talk back and forth. They’ll come across our folks...I had 

one of my guys...we have a big low-rider car show in northern New 

Mexico. And our folks in intensive supervision are not allowed to travel 

any place outside a 70-mile radius...so [they] went up to the car show, and 

the gang unit was familiar with one of my guys and had him arrested... 

An Albuquerque prosecutor described a relationship with the gang unit in which 

information is constantly shared; another prosecutor described the relationship as 

“cooperative, but not real close as far as a working relationship.” According to a member 

of the gang task force, that group had “a great relationship” with the gang unit. However, 

the director of a local nonprofit youth service agency had a different point of view: 

There’s not one. There used to be. When we first started this program, it 

was first funded by the city in 1993. The unit had just been funded itself. 

When ______ was the sergeant in charge, he was pretty good. He still had 

a hard-core attitude and they still photographed kids, and they’d go and 

put them up against the building and harass them, but some of the 

members of the unit themselves were more cooperative. You could talk to 

them. Sometimes they’d make a referral; sometimes they would 

participate in some of our activities.... 

A sheriff’s representative to the Albuquerque gang task force characterized their 

relationship with the police department this way: “We work together hand-in-hand.” The 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 378 

remainder of the Albuquerque external stakeholders also generally expressed satisfaction 

with their relationships with the gang unit. 

Inglewood external stakeholders gave their gang unit mixed reviews in the areas 

of communication and working relationships. A city graffiti officer indicated that 

communication with the gang unit seemed to depend on whether or not the unit needed 

his agency’s information. An Inglewood prosecutor related that their office 

communicated with the gang unit “...more than [the gang unit] want[s].” The graffiti 

officer described the relationship of his organization with the gang unit as “not that 

tight...,” whereas the description provided by a prosecutor was quite different: 

Oh, Inglewood is great. I mean, I am very demanding and I am constantly 

bothering them for things, but they are very receptive and work very hard 

for me. I will have a filing of a case. For example, Monday I had a case 

that was a sheriff’s homicide, but the shooter is an 18th Street. The expert 

that is the best on that is an Inglewood police officer, so I basically have to 

subpoena him, and get him to do a bunch of work. 

Overall, external stakeholders in Inglewood reported that they were satisfied with 

their relationships with the gang unit. 

A Las Vegas prosecutor noted occasional communication problems with the gang 

unit in his police department, although he went on to say that he was generally satisfied 

with the relationship and described it as “professional.” 

Yeah...we’ve gotten at odds a couple of times...a case gets submitted to 

our office. It’s not trial-ready. Our screening department rejects it or sends 

it back for further investigation. The police department gets upset and they 

go to the media. “We have this great case, and I can’t believe the D.A.’s 

not prosecuting it.” 

A Las Vegas county code enforcement officer described the police department as 

the best he had ever worked with; the gang unit took advantage of the information that he 

provided and wrote tickets on his behalf for ordinance violations, which he saw as “a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 379 

major coup...to have police officers writing tickets for us.” The director of a Las Vegas 

probation and parole district indicated that their contacts with the police department and 

gang unit were principally for sharing information about which of their probationers were 

gang members. The probation supervisor also commented on the relationship between the 

probation agency and the gang unit, admitting that “it could be improved.” The 

supervisor described “butting heads a little bit” with the gang unit over the unit’s attempts 

to take advantage of a probation and parole search clause that exempts the probation 

agency from the requirement of a search warrant. 

They would like us to provide them with much more information and 

much more access than we can. But, you know, that’s what I’m saying. 

We have our days and we don’t have our days. We have days when it 

comes like that and we butt up, and then we have days when we’re able to 

give them what they want.

 As with Albuquerque and Inglewood, Las Vegas external stakeholders generally 

reported that they were satisfied with their relationships with the gang unit. External 

stakeholders of the Phoenix gang unit gave mixed reports on the extent and quality of 

communication with their gang unit about gang control. A liaison from a different 

department explained that participating in monthly “crackdown meetings” was his 

primary opportunity for communicating with the gang unit. The director of a nonprofit 

stated, “I believe we’re supposed to be meeting on a quarterly basis, although my 

schedule here has not allowed me recently to attend the last two quarters of meetings.” 

A Phoenix prosecutor explained that communication was appropriately limited 

between the two agencies: 

To a certain extent. I don’t think that we get involved in what they are 

going to focus on, what gangs they are going to focus on, or how they are 

going to do it. That’s a decision that’s made by each department, given 

what resources they have to work with and what they deem is a threat at 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 380 

the time. I don’t think that we get involved in what their policies should be 

to get a better gang unit...I don’t see that as our role. 

Similar to their internal stakeholder counterparts, most external stakeholders 

identified information sharing as the principal reason they would be in contact with their 

gang units. For some external stakeholders, the information sharing worked in both 

directions. A few stakeholders, for example an Albuquerque juvenile court prosecutor, 

indicated that they did not participate in information sharing, meaning that his agency did 

not provide the gang unit with information. The external stakeholders characterized most 

of the information exchanged as “intelligence.” For example, a member of the Las Vegas 

gang task force noted, “...I go there and get information about people that we’re 

working.” An Inglewood prosecutor told us that most of the case-related information that 

he receives originates with the gang unit. 

Perceived Gang Unit Activities and Performance 

We asked all external stakeholders to assess the performance of their local gang 

units’. We asked them to describe their understanding of gang unit activities and to 

evaluate the effectiveness of those activities in addressing the gang problem. We also 

asked them to identify any problems and to make recommendations for improving the 

gang units’ performance. 

Although a few external stakeholders in Albuquerque labeled their gang unit’s 

activities as enforcement or suppression, most stakeholders emphasized the intelligence 

function. A representative of a probation agency mentioned intelligence, but also said that 

their gang unit had become involved in investigation: “The intelligence is a big part when 

there are crimes that are committed that are done by gang members. Typically, they will 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 381 

take over the investigation.” A county sheriff’s deputy described the Albuquerque gang 

unit’s activities this way: “I think they basically focus on the same that we do. It is 

intelligence, it’s enforcement, and it’s suppression. They all go hand in hand.” 

Inglewood external stakeholders saw intelligence gathering as the emphasis of 

their gang unit. For example, a city graffiti officer described it as “keeping up with some 

of the troubled people that have been in and out of jail.” An intelligence officer with a 

correctional facility and a crime analyst each identified intelligence as the principal 

activity of the gang unit. The analyst explained, “The gang unit is really an intelligence 

unit; the ACT [Anti-Crime Team] or patrol are the folks responsible for suppression and 

for making arrests.” Not all stakeholders saw intelligence as a positive role for their gang 

units. For example, the director of a nonprofit youth service organization said: 

It’s not too good. Can we be honest? Personally and from what I’ve seen 

from my kids, it’s not too good. Their role is to go out and take pictures of 

our kids’ tattoos and put them in their gang book and say, “I’ve got this 

gang file on these kids.” That’s my personal – and I guess from what the 

kids have told me, that’s my perception of what their role is. It’s definitely 

intelligence driven. It’s oppression. Big time. That’s definitely their role. 

In Las Vegas, external stakeholders identified enforcement, intelligence, and 

investigations as gang unit activities. A county prosecutor described the importance of 

the unit’s intelligence information to his prosecutions: 

And this gang enhancement, like I said, is very hard to prove, but, boy, 

when you have the facts and you can prove it up, it’s a powerful thing. 

...let’s say this individual in the past has admitted to this officer...being a 

member of a gang. That he’s admitted to being a 28th Street member for 

the last five years...that he goes by the street name of “Pee Wee” or “Dirt 

Dog” or something. Mundane little things like that are so valuable when it 

comes down to sitting in court. Having your gang detective sit there in 

front of the judge or jury and start spouting out information about this 

particular gang. 

An intensive probation supervisor also described Las Vegas gang unit activities: 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 382 

...they’ve seen the need for an active presence. I think they’ve responded 

quite well. I know that they’re very attuned to it. They look at trends...I 

was at a meeting where the sheriff was recently, and they were responding 

to a rash of drive-bys.... They were gathering intelligence and making 

their presence known, trying to figure out what the issue was and figuring 

out those issues. I think that they monitor it, they look at it, they make 

their presence known. 

Phoenix external stakeholders also described and characterized the activities 

undertaken by their gang unit. A liaison from another police department thought the gang 

unit’s activities were limited to suppression and intelligence gathering. The director of an 

area nonprofit agency noted that the gang unit patrolled problem areas, an activity that is 

classified as enforcement or suppression; however, he also saw the unit “holding monthly 

meetings where the community would come to the table.” A prosecutor specializing in 

gang-related cases described the unit’s activities as follows: 

I think their principal activities are to be out on the street and be in contact 

with the gang members. Sometimes it’s just driving down the street, 

standing outside a house, they are just standing there talking to them on a 

very informal level. I think that’s why the gang unit activity has been so 

successful, is because they build that rapport with the gang members so 

that it’s not a constant beating down as “you’re bad, you’re bad,” because 

you are a gang member...I can’t tell you the number of times that I’ve 

seen gang members meeting cops or the gang detectives like they are their 

friends. 

We found that external stakeholders, like their internal stakeholder counterparts, 

were able to describe actual activities carried out by their gang units. Although several of 

them mentioned investigation and suppression-like activities, they also emphasized 

intelligence as a gang unit activity that they valued. External stakeholders in cities where 

suppression and enforcement were emphasized tended to recognize that these kinds of 

functions were being assumed by the local gang units. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 383 

Perceived Effectiveness 

Albuquerque external stakeholders diverged widely in their assessments of gang 

unit performance. An intensive probation supervisor described the Albuquerque unit as 

“very effective,” while a juvenile prosecutor described it as “fairly effective.” An adult 

court prosecutor stated, “It depends on the individual officer. Some officers do better than 

others.” A representative of a state criminal justice policy agency commented, “I don’t 

think it’s made a bit of a difference, having the gang unit or not. We still have gangs, and 

gangs still engage in the same type of behavior.” An individual from a nonprofit youth 

service organization believed that the gang unit had actually contributed to the gang 

problem: 

They’ve probably escalated the problem and created a lot more problems 

because of their attitudes. How so? I don’t think the community views 

them as effective, as helpful, as trying to engage, because a lot of them 

[gang members] are just kids. They just need a little support, a little 

guidance, but they treat them all as criminals. I think the kids sometimes 

get an attitude, “Well, I’ll show those guys,” and then they’ll pull some 

kind of nonsense. I think they’ve escalated the problem instead of reduced 

it.... My questions, at least as it relates to Albuquerque: Who are they? 

We don’t see them. We don’t work with them. We don’t talk to them. Do 

they even exist? 

External stakeholders in Inglewood described the gang unit in that city as 

effective, given limited resources. An Inglewood prosecutor described the unit’s 

effectiveness as follows: 

I think they are very good in the sense of developing the evidence for 

proof in court, and also knowing what is going on. In the office, it really 

helps to solve crimes... [Interviewer: In what way?] Well, you will have a 

murder. And of course, typical gang style, you have a dead body and 

nobody saw anything. Ultimately, the word on the street will get out, and 

it will get back to the gang officer who has a rapport with some of the 

people on the street. Otherwise, we would never solve a lot of these gang 

crimes. That is predominantly how this happens. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 384 

Las Vegas external stakeholders gave their gang unit’s effectiveness mixed 

reviews. A prosecutor said that “...when it comes to investigations I think they’re 

effective...but they’re not effective when it comes to stopping the gang problem.” A 

graffiti enforcement officer implied that the unit’s effectiveness was hampered by “lack 

of action.” This former Los Angeles police officer seemed to be saying that, unlike 

LAPD officers, the Las Vegas police were afraid to make arrests. He attributed that to 

differences between the two departments’ policing philosophies, although he was 

referring to the culture of the Las Vegas department in general, and not just to the gang 

unit. 

Some Phoenix external stakeholders rated their gang unit as effective, although 

sometimes with qualifications. A prosecutor found the unit “highly effective,” and a 

member of a state gang task force described it as “very effective, very effective.” Yet the 

director of a nonprofit organization disagreed, describing the unit’s effectiveness as 

follows: 

I’d like to say that they’re 100 percent effective; however, I am drawn to 

the thought that there are more gangs in the community that are popping 

up left and right...you’ll look at one specific gang that no longer is being 

called by its name anymore, and you wonder where they went. Well, what 

they’ve done is they’ve broken up into little sub-gangs in the communities. 

It continues to perpetuate. What I see the gang unit doing is, in fact, 

keeping on top of that information. 

A liaison to the gang unit gave this qualified positive assessment of their effectiveness: 

I think they’ve probably been as effective as they can be.... That’s my 

perception of them, that they are strictly enforcement and intelligence 

gathering, which I think is wonderful. It’s a big part of it. But I think they 

have to have some interventions. They need some education. I think that 

they’re missing several levels, maybe because they got into the gang 

business a little late. But they could certainly use a gang intervention 

project in their city. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 385 

Overall, the external stakeholders’ assessments of gang unit performance were 

mixed. Even when giving positive assessments, nearly all external stakeholders thought 

their gang units could do more to be effective. Interestingly, some stakeholders, albeit a 

small number, pointed to criteria such as the number of gangs and gang members and 

their continued presence in the community as indicators of gang unit ineffectiveness. 

Perceived Problems 

External stakeholders in all four sites identified problems with their gang units. 

Albuquerque stakeholders sought improvements in the areas of communication, case 

follow-up, and basic resources, and they questioned the motivation of the unit’s officers. 

An Albuquerque juvenile prosecutor identified lack of follow-through and not completing 

cases as problems, and his counterpart in adult court added, “They need more resources 

and more individuals that are motivated to do gang work.” The juvenile prosecutor noted 

that the problems they were citing were specific to the gang unit itself, and did not apply 

to the larger police organization: 

I mean, my sense is that there may be kind of a mentality there...“our job 

is to gather intelligence, and go out and ride around and kind of gather 

intelligence by harassing these gang members on a weekend night, or 

whatever it might be, you know. Complete a case? That’s boring. I don’t 

feel like doing that right now.” 

An intensive probation supervisor speculated about the communication problem: 

I don’t know how much they communicate between shifts, between day 

shift and swing shift. That’s probably the biggest problem. You may find 

that somebody on day shift is looking into something and so is somebody 

on swing shift. There may be a little bit of lack of communication from 

within the unit itself that is problematic. 

The director of an Albuquerque nonprofit agency added “lack of visibility” and 

not having “a good reputation with kids” to the list of problems attributed to this unit. A 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 386 

representative of a criminal justice policy agency saw the entire concept of a separate 

gang unit as a problem: 

I don’t know that there is a need for a gang unit. I would rather that all of 

the officers be trained in recognizing gangs, recognizing gang symbols, 

and treat individuals within gangs in much the same manner as they would 

anybody else. I think that by developing a select unit that they tend to 

become more over-aggressive than they need to be, because they see that 

as their issue, their turf, and if there is gang activity, it may reflect 

negatively on them. So I would rather police officers be generalists, and 

then you progress up to detectives and that sort of thing. I don’t know that 

there is a need for the specialization. 

When Inglewood external stakeholders were asked about problems with the gang 

unit, they listed communication and a lack of resources. Nearly all indicated that the 

unit’s small size was a problem that hampered its effectiveness and, subsequently, the 

police department’s ability to respond to the gang problem. This perspective was 

summarized by a local prosecutor: 

I think just in general they are probably overworked and understaffed. I 

know one of them is out on injured reserve. That just cuts down on the 

number of people that are able to do the work. Funding – Inglewood 

doesn’t have a lot of money. It’s also an intensive job, they have to work 

unusual hours. They don’t tend to be 9-to-5. It is a hard job to want to do 

with a family. 

In Las Vegas, a prosecutor who had handled many homicides saw the gang unit’s 

quality of investigations as problematic, although his view was not representative of 

stakeholders in general. He took note of the tenure and expertise of homicide detectives, 

comparing them with gang unit officers: 

The gang detectives, sometimes it appears that they...may have been 

patrol officers for two or three years out in the street, and they move into a 

detective role. And...I don’t think that somebody is qualified, or is ready 

to be a detective and start doing investigations, until he’s truly a seasoned 

police officer on the street. And I don’t think that happens until you’ve 

been in the police department for about 10 years. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 387 

Phoenix external stakeholders identified their unit’s most pressing problems as 

lack of time and lack of resources, along with noting a few functional shortcomings. A 

nonprofit agency director indicated that funding was a problem, and that the gang unit 

was “existing with some sort of skeletal crew.” Another stakeholder believed that the unit 

didn’t have enough time to carry out enforcement, intelligence, and prevention. He also 

suggested that enforcement and intelligence functions are incompatible, claiming that the 

two needed to be separated because “...you can’t be the nice guy one day [gathering 

intelligence] and be the bad guy [enforcing] the next day.” A state gang task force 

member saw the unit as limited by the “rigid” policies of the Phoenix police department, 

noting that such policies “kind of limit what you can do.” Finally, a Phoenix prosecutor 

gave the following assessment of problems within the unit, a nearly classic description of 

police-prosecutor relationships: 

...the detectives are very passionate about what they do. And that’s very 

good, but sometimes they get a little too passionate about what they do, 

and they lose sight of what we have to work with. Meaning, they will 

make an arrest and we won’t be able to prosecute those, and we just don’t 

have it, and they get frustrated with us because we won’t file it, because 

they see it from their perspective – this is really a bad person and we really 

need to get him off the streets, and so I need you to do this...and 

sometimes we will go out on a limb and say, “Okay, if you feel this 

strongly about it, we don’t know whether we are going to be able to 

prosecute it, but we will try.” But sometimes we just have to say, “Hey, 

it’s not there and we can’t do it.” And they get upset about that, and we 

will jump on that. I think that if there’s any problem, they go for it. 

We asked all of the external stakeholders to make recommendations for 

improving gang unit performance. The Albuquerque external stakeholders suggested that 

their gang unit could improve performance with such things as “breaking down barriers,” 

“becom[ing] involved with the larger community,” and “[placing] the emphasis on 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 388 

community policing.” One external stakeholder, representing a state criminal justice 

planning organization, offered this advice: 

I think, the philosophy of community policing. There are a lot of 

similarities between the expressed role of community policing and the 

expressed roles of the gang unit – to be out among the community, to 

recognize who’s in gangs, to try to develop relationship with gang 

members or community members – so I think the goals and principles 

there are much the same. And that’s why I’d like to see, rather than the 

emphasis on a gang unit, the emphasis on the movement toward 

community policing. I think its had a bigger impact than the gang unit. 

Oddly, Inglewood stakeholders offered no suggestions for improving gang unit 

performance. The stakeholders had identified a shortage of officers and resources were 

identified as problems, and these would seem to have obvious solutions. However, 

Inglewood’s municipal finances were in such dire straits that any recommendation for 

additional resources might have seemed too unrealistic to pursue. 

In Las Vegas, a district attorney suggested that for the gang unit to improve, first 

the relationship between gang detectives and homicide detectives would have to improve, 

implying that some longstanding problem between the units may have had a negative 

impact on the quality of homicide investigations: 

I think what needs to be done is, I know the relationship between a gang 

unit and a homicide detective bureau is...not all that great. I like to see 

some better cohesion or – or relationship would develop between these 

gang detectives and the homicide detectives. Because when it comes to 

investigating a homicide gang case, the best qualified person to talk to 

these little gangbangers would be a – a gang detective as opposed to a 

homicide detective. And in that sense, I think it’s helpful, but there’s some 

sort of problem that exists and has existed... 

His observations about conflict between the gang unit and the homicide 

investigations unit was a theme repeated several times. Apparently the gang unit was 

attempting to gain authority to conduct gang-related homicide investigations. The 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 389 

homicide investigation unit was resisting the move, arguing that they, not the gang unit, 

had the requisite investigative experience and expertise. From the gang unit’s 

perspective, the homicide unit lacked the necessary expertise on gangs to successfully 

investigate gang-related homicides. 

Some Phoenix external stakeholders saw no need to improve the gang unit’s 

performance; others saw opportunities for positive change. The director of a nonprofit 

organization indicated that the unit needed to become more involved with the 

community. Another police department’s liaison to the unit recommended that the unit 

shift focus from suppression to prevention: 

I think just looking at what the roles are when we’re trying to do the job of 

working gangs. I think suppression is not the only song in town. Most 

police officers would maybe just agree a little bit. But you know what? 

They would up front, but when they sat down and got in a discussion with 

them, they wouldn’t. And they know that it’s more, that it’s prevention, 

intervention, and suppression. And I believe suppression is necessary. I 

think they’ve been forced to do that. I think, you know, let’s face it. Police 

departments are into numbers. We love statistics. That’s the name of the 

game. It’s easy to justify our existence with that. But I think if we’re going 

to be honest and we’re going to make a difference, we have to look past 

the statistics and do some work with lives. 

Generally, we found that external stakeholders could identify a number of 

problems with their gang units, and they were able to make concrete recommendations 

for change. A lack of resources and too few officers were internal problems that limited 

gang unit effectiveness, according to many stakeholders. Several others pointed out 

communication issues, such as frequent lack of communication and interaction with 

external stakeholder agencies and the community. Many of these thought that, in some 

cases, problematic communication and interactions stemmed from gang units being 

isolated from the rest of the police department. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 390 

Summary 

Overall, external stakeholders at all study sites, like their internal counterparts, 

tended to perceive their local gang units as legitimate police sub-units that were 

addressing an objective gang problem. However, we found differences in their 

perceptions, as well. Internal stakeholders reported that the gang problem was declining 

and gangs were exhibiting less violence, while the majority of external stakeholders 

experienced the problem as escalating. External stakeholders as a group tended to view 

the gang problem as more serious than did the internal stakeholders. 

One possible explanation for the differences in perception could be the 

differential contact and involvement with gangs and gang members of the two kinds of 

stakeholders. Although their respective gang units had nominated all of the individuals 

included in both our internal and external stakeholder groups, those who were external 

stakeholders probably had more direct contact with gangs. Several external stakeholders 

were in positions dedicated almost exclusively to dealing with gang members. For 

example, the group included prosecutors who had been assigned gang-related cases; 

correctional officers who had worked solely on gang intelligence; probation and parole 

officers who had supervised caseloads of gang members; and representatives of nonprofit 

gang intervention organizations. 

Internal stakeholders had varying but generally limited contacts with gangs. 

Typically, such contacts only occurred incidentally as the stakeholders carried out other 

police functions, perhaps patrols or investigations. With the exception of those in 

criminal justice policy agencies, the external stakeholders’ work worlds were "gang 

filled," while gangs were only one segment of the work environment for internal 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 391 

stakeholders. Quite possibly, external stakeholders perceived the gang problem and 

related violence as more extensive because they had more extensive contacts with gangs. 

It is also possible that external stakeholders, who by definition are outsiders, 

were more susceptible to influence from the media on high-profile gang incidents, as well 

as to gang unit lore from gang unit officers and others inside the police department. Such 

sources of information, in addition to their own work-related contacts with gang 

members, may have caused external stakeholders to perceive the gang problem as more 

serious. 

For external stakeholders, intelligence or information emerged as the gang unit’s 

most valued product. Although they recognized other gang unit functions, the utility of 

their intelligence gathering and sharing of information seemed to be the principal basis 

upon which external stakeholders attributed legitimacy to the gang units. At the same 

time, several also valued another gang unit function – education. For these stakeholders, 

the gang unit was a welcome source of general knowledge about gangs. 

External stakeholders as a group gave reasonably good marks to their respective 

gang units in the categories of communication and satisfaction with interagency 

relationships. In fact, stakeholders tended to report satisfaction with the relationship even 

when communications were described as problematic. 

Overall, external stakeholders assessed their gang units as effective, although a 

minority did not think the gang units made a significant difference, and some even 

thought that their gang units contributed to the gang problem. From the perspectives of 

most external stakeholders, police gang units are a legitimate and valued police sub-unit.

 As a group, the stakeholders perceived their local gang problems as serious, and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 392 

they believed that gang units were still needed as a police response. 

For external stakeholders, as well as for internal stakeholders, the most important 

gang unit function appeared to be intelligence gathering. From the stakeholders’ points of 

view, such intelligence enabled investigations and suppression activities, and when that 

intelligence was shared, it facilitated their own agencies’ responses to the gang problem. 

The external stakeholders whom we interviewed offered several recommendations 

for improving gang unit performance, consistent with gang unit problems they had 

identified. This included recommendations aimed at improving communication, building 

better partnerships with their communities, allocating additional resources to gang units 

and to gang suppression efforts, and placing increased emphasis on prevention and 

intervention. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 393 

Chapter 10. Police Gang Units in a Time of Community 

Policing 

You know, I think community-based policing is the citizens being our 

eyes and ears, you know, calling in when you see something. They’re 

definitely calling in and making almost every call somehow gang 

involved, so I think we get more people calling in, but not actually 

reporting any type of crime, you know just some kids hanging out on the 

corner that are out past curfew, and they look like gang members, and it 

appears that they’re going to do something. So I think that communitybased policing has made some people call the police more. 

–Gang unit officer 

The development and expansion of police gang units coincided with a paradigm 

shift in American policing: the movement from the professional policing era to the 

community policing era. The literature developed on policing over the past 15 years is 

replete with polemics on the nature and desirability of community policing. Research into 

its pervasiveness and impact continues to receive considerable attention (Schafer 2003; 

Zhao, Scheider and Thurman 2002; Webb 2000). In this study, we are interested in 

community policing not necessarily to contribute to that discussion, but rather to assess 

the compatibility of community policing practices with the police response to gangs. 

In this chapter, we report on our inquiry into the relationship between police gang 

units and community policing. We begin with our effort to understand the nature and 

extent of community policing as practiced in each of our four study cities; then we assess 

the extent to which each department’s response to the gang problem is consistent with its 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 394 

own community policing principles. 

When we began this research, we were interested in exploring three possibilities. 

First, we wanted to gauge whether and to what extent the police response to gangs had 

facilitated or hindered the practice of community policing. Next, we considered the 

possibility that the police response in the form of gang units and the practice of 

community policing might simply be coexisting, with no significant effect on one 

another. Finally, we recognized that community policing might not be well-developed in 

one or more of our study communities, in which case the nature of interactions between 

community policing and the response to gangs would be a moot point. If this proved to be 

the case, however, we were still interested in examining each department’s response to 

gangs against the backdrop of generally accepted principles and features of community 

policing. 

We used a threefold approach. First, we interviewed police managers in each 

study site, seeking their perspectives on community policing and on the compatibility of 

community policing principles with gang unit activities. The managers interviewed were 

either gang unit supervisors or in the chain of command above the gang units. Second, we 

analyzed interview data obtained from internal and external stakeholders in each city to 

understand the stakeholders’ perceptions of local community policing and the response to 

gangs. Third, we talked with gang unit officers about the nature and extent of community 

policing in their departments, and about their own roles in the practice of community 

policing. We also examined the configurations and activities of the police gang units, in 

light of some common features of community policing. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 395 

Community Policing and the Response to Gangs 

We interviewed police managers who were at some level responsible for the 

activities of the gang unit. We solicited their views on community policing in their 

departments, and their perceptions of the compatibility of their respective gang units with 

local community policing practices. We asked them to tell us about: 

� Their respective departments’ approaches to community policing; 

� Their perceptions of how well the activities of their respective gang units fit 

with the department’s community policing approach; 

� Whether or not community policing was having an impact on the gang 

problem; and 

� Whether or not their respective communities were playing a role in addressing 

their gang problems. 

Albuquerque 

Police managers in Albuquerque identified several different characteristics of 

community policing, when asked about their department’s approach. For example, one 

manager emphasized problem solving: “...basically, what they are trying to do is a 

problem-solving approach at the area command level, through tact plans, problemoriented policing, and models to deal with those issues.” Another manager emphasized 

decentralization: 

Community policing talks about principles and the organizational structure 

being decentralized, with flat organizational command. For example, the 

area commanders and the captain report to the chief directly; they don’t go 

through a deputy chief. With a flat organizational structure, you can give 

more power to the officers in the field; the area commanders run their own 

areas. They are really the police chiefs out there, and they’ve got basic 

patrol officers, they’ve got traffic capability and investigative 

responsibility. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 396 

Still another manager emphasized interaction with the community: 

It’s working hand-in-hand with the citizen groups. Many times when there 

is a gang problem in the neighborhood, the citizen group is contacted by 

the gang unit, and it’s a two-way street. If they’re informed of what is 

going on, they can take measures as far as going to the court process, 

going after people where their property has been foreclosed on, and such 

as that. 

When asked about the compatibility of the gang unit as a police response to gangs 

with Albuquerque’s community policing approach, one manager commented on the 

inconsistency he saw in using a centralized unit (the gang unit) when community policing 

emphasizes decentralization; however, he did not find that inconsistency problematic. 

Most managers dismissed the idea that community policing might be having an 

impact on the gang problem in Albuquerque, responding, “Not really,” or “To some 

degree, but not a great degree.” However, at least one manager offered a different 

perspective: 

Community policing is basically officers talking with the community and 

working together and being honest and each doing their part. Yeah, I think 

that helps in the gang problem, but it also helps whether it is burglaries or 

the prostitution problem. It is something that we have spent a long time on 

in this department, and the process came out and we became more 

formalized on how we account for the community policing efforts. I think 

this department has done it for a long time, but did not call it community 

policing. 

Albuquerque police managers believed that the community was playing some role 

in addressing the gang problem; however, the managers did not attach much importance 

to the public’s contribution. They tended to characterize the community as most 

concerned with graffiti, and as often misperceiving crime. One manager described 

community input as follows: 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 397 

Yeah, I think they, you know – we get a significant amount of input just 

based on the amount of community meetings that we have had. You know, 

we have some groups that are more active than others and give us more 

input than others. But yeah, I think they have had a voice in it. I wouldn’t 

say that it has been significant. Most of the public outcry is for the graffiti, 

than for the gang violence. Graffiti is more of an immediate recognition of 

a problem. 

A second manager also implied that community input was suspect, often arising from 

misperceptions: 

We just did a survey city-wide and asked them what their major concerns 

were. Crime was one of the main concerns in Albuquerque. Later on, we 

asked them what was the crime problem in their neighborhood, and that 

was one of their least concerns. So, the perception of the crime city-wide 

is bad, but when it comes to their neighborhoods, no, they don’t have a 

crime problem. Not a serious crime problem. Which tells you that the 

perceptions are different than what the reality is. And I think that is similar 

to involvement in the gang activity. They know we have gang activity, and 

so often in the news, “...well, sources in the police department believe that 

it is gang related,” or “sources in the police department think that this is 

narcotics related.” And all of that is, in some degree, true. But I think 

people in the community get that, in some areas, that it is all gang infested. 

Well, maybe it is or maybe it isn’t. 

Overall, police managers in Albuquerque articulated community policing as part 

of their policing philosophy, but they each emphasized different features when describing 

its local practice. They recognized inconsistencies between their community policing 

approaches as managers and the approach of the gang unit, but they did not see that as a 

problem. Albuquerque police managers in general did not credit community policing with 

having had an impact on the gang problem. In the spirit of community policing, the 

managers indicated that the public had opportunities to be heard on the subject of the 

department’s response to gangs, but they put little stock in the public’s contributions – 

largely because they believed that the public perception of the gang problem was 

misguided. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 398 

Inglewood 

Police managers in Inglewood described their department as being in a period of 

transition with respect to community policing, and that the number of specialized 

community policing units was declining. As one manager told us: 

Yeah, we are in a transition. When I got here, community policing was 

basically a program called the ICOP centers, and we had at some point 

eight officers that we assigned to those centers, and they basically took 

care of all the problems that came from the community. That lieutenant 

assigned to it is very, very visible. He had little or nothing...but they acted 

almost autonomously. They were invested with the community policing. 

Everybody else could kind of go out, as you know, and do real police 

work. 

And when I got here, first of all, we could not support ICOPs any more as 

a separate unit, and then again coming from LA, I kind of had a different 

philosophy, and that is saying that community policing has to be 

incorporated into the entire organization. So I moved those lead officers 

into patrol. I brought the lieutenant at that time into a watch commander’s 

role, and I said, “It is your job to teach the rest of the officers what you 

have been doing and how to go about it.” 

Another manager, explaining the department’s reorganization of community 

policing, said: “Ultimately, we want to end up with the department where everybody is 

involved in the community policing effort, where we have some kind of ownership.” 

The responses of most Inglewood police managers to questions about the fit 

between the department’s approach to community policing and gang unit activities were 

ambiguous, but no one identified incompatibilities between the two. For instance, one 

manager described the gang unit as “on the periphery” of their community policing 

approach, but also recognized that information provided by the gang unit to other police 

units was instrumental in addressing gang problems in the neighborhoods. Another 

manager described the gang unit as a resource for community groups such as block 

watch, exemplifying the compatibility of community policing and gang unit activities. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 399 

Inglewood police managers gave differing assessments of the impact of 

community policing practices on the gang problem. Some managers gave responses such 

as “I haven’t seen it,” or “I would like to hope so, but I don’t have any information on 

that.” Other managers were more positive, some pointing out that since community 

policing had had a favorable impact on the crime problem in general, it followed that it 

had similarly affected the gang problem, in particular. Only one manager felt that 

community policing was helping to deter gang activity: 

I think that putting the community policing presence in the community, 

that the gang members know also...we would not have any impact on it if 

the gangs or the people involved in that activity didn’t have a perception 

that the citizens were also involved. So I think there is an integral tie to 

community policing, citizen involvement as partners, and the impact on 

the crime problem. 

Inglewood police managers also gave mixed responses when asked about the 

community’s role in addressing the gang problem. Some pointed to block watch and 

volunteer groups as examples of community involvement. However, others believed that 

the community was less of a factor: “Not really; they have trusted us to come up with a 

strategy.” 

Inglewood police managers explained that community policing was in transition, 

having moved away from the former Inglewood Community Oriented Policing (ICOP) 

standalone units to a more philosophical, if less well-defined, department-wide effort. 

Inglewood managers identified no areas of incompatibility or conflict between 

community policing and gang unit activities; rather, they indicated that the gang unit was 

a valued resource for other units and for the community. 

The managers’ assessments were mixed concerning the impact of community 

policing on Inglewood’s gang problem, as were their assessments of the community’s 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 400 

role in addressing the gang problem. Some managers thought that community 

organizations were involved in addressing the gang problem, and others thought that the 

community depended entirely on the department for this purpose. A few saw community 

policing being a deterrent to gangs, while others saw no impact at all. 

Las Vegas 

When asked about their approach to community policing, Las Vegas police 

managers pointed toward specialized police officers, interactions with the community, 

and the use of problem-solving techniques. One group of managers all made comments 

similar to the following, describing their version of community policing in terms of their 

Community Policing Officers: 

Well, as far as department wide, they have just come up with new 

positions, Community Policing Officers, and they are stationed at every 

substation. I think that they have three or four officers that are assigned to 

this position, and their main role is to go out and deal with the community 

and the problems the community has, such as bad tenants in apartment 

complexes. They help get them evicted, or if the apartment buildings 

aren’t up to code, and it’s been a problem for the residents in the 

neighborhood, they go through and make sure that the apartment complex 

has come up to code, and things of that nature. 

Another group of managers emphasized the department’s partnerships with the 

community: 

Our motto, that is on every piece of stationery, is “Partners With the 

Community,” and so the community policing initiative and philosophy is 

transmitted in most areas. So from the top level, the executive office, the 

sheriff, it is communicated and re-emphasized down through the executive 

and middle management, first line supervisors. So a simple example 

would be, somebody calls for a gang problem in the neighborhood. We 

would immediately dispatch, depending on the type of complaint and the 

notoriety of the concern, we would send either a detective or a supervisor 

to meet with the people, gather the information, and come back and start 

developing a strategy. But years ago, those initial meetings wouldn’t 

occur. But under the community policing philosophy and practice, the 

input and dialogue with the community members is critical. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 401 

Most managers, however, alluded to problem-solving methodologies. Some were 

specific, referring to Community Oriented Policing (COP) and Problem Oriented 

Policing (POP): 

It’s a combination of COP and POP; everybody knows what that means. 

We’re constantly reminding our guys to get the community involved in it. 

So much nowadays that we are getting a lot of our stuff accomplished by 

community involvement.... I mean, people make a big deal out of COP 

and POP, but it’s not that hard. You got a problem...most area commands 

have a line solution policing team, or a problem-oriented policing team, if 

they have a problem in a certain neighborhood. That neighborhood lets 

them know or they figure it out for themselves, then they send that team in 

to address that certain problem. But the rest of the patrol officers follow up 

and use the COP thing. I mean, we got our bike units walking the 

neighborhoods finding out what the problem is. It’s community contact, 

and that is supported by the community. 

Las Vegas police managers saw no problems with the fit between their 

department’s approach to community policing and their gang unit. They described the 

gang unit as a problem-solving group; therefore, almost by definition they found the 

unit’s approach consistent with COP. The following responses of two managers 

exemplify this point of view: 

Well, I think that community policing is also problem-oriented policing. If 

you don’t deal with every avenue of crime, then there’s a branch that you 

are leaving out. The gang crime in Las Vegas is definitely a large part of 

the statistics; it’s a large part of the crime in Las Vegas. And I believe that 

us, as a gang unit, going out and putting a dampener on the gang crime, I 

think that’s our avenue from the problem-oriented policing. 

Community policing is where you find out what are the community’s 

concerns. Because as you know, what we feel is a real concern isn’t the 

community’s concern. And the community has consistently over the years 

said that gangs are a concern. So the gang unit really is – its whole 

existence is in response to the community. So the whole unit is a giant 

community-policing thing. Because it’s a high concern for the community, 

so this is how we are responding to it. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 402 

Although certain that the gang unit was practicing community policing, some 

police managers were less convinced that the practice was having an impact on the gang 

problem. One manager’s uncertainty focused on problems with measuring potential 

impacts: 

That’s hard to measure – very, very hard to measure. I know, because of 

our relationship with most of the gang members of this community, we 

can get information, and they know who we are and what we do. We know 

who they are and what they do, and we communicate with them. But 

we’re not going to change them...they basically say that they are a bad 

guy and you have got to catch me. 

Other managers had a more positive impression of the impact of community 

policing. One individual related the following success story: 

You know, it probably has [had an impact], because in some areas we 

worked closely with patrol stations. We identified gang problems, we 

worked with the management of several apartments and, if nothing else, at 

least displaced that, at least out of a couple of the apartment tracts for a 

while. So I think it has had an effect; it made it harder for them to operate 

in that area for a while. 

One manager described a positive impact, not in terms of gang abatement, but of 

improved relations with the community: 

When we go into a community, especially into a minority community or 

public housing, the interaction, aside from what we are doing at the 

activity, the interaction before, during, and after with other people, 

because we are trying to do the positive dialogue, I think that does have an 

impact. So we drive into a small community, we are not normally greeted 

with rocks and bottles and things like that. I think that is indicative of the 

relationship developed as a result of trying to apply community policing 

philosophies. 

Some Las Vegas managers were unclear whether the local community was 

playing a significant role in addressing the gang problem. At least one manager 

responded, “I really don’t have a handle on that, I’m not sure.” Another indicated that the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 403 

community was involved, but only to the extent that they were informing the department 

of their problems: “To a degree, when they communicate problems in their 

neighborhoods, we listen carefully, and based on their concerns and their statements, we 

try to respond with police resources to address those concerns and handle those problems 

that they are telling us.” 

Not all Las Vegas managers were this noncommittal about community 

contributions. One individual gave a local neighborhood positive recognition for its 

efforts: 

There’s our predominantly black culture that lives in what we call the 

West Las Vegas area. Some people refer to it as the Westside. They are 

very active in getting involved in the gangs. All the...pastors of all of the 

churches over there are proactively going out in the neighborhoods, and 

talking to these kids about the violence and how stupid it is. It all helps. 

Las Vegas police managers generally defined local community policing as 

instituting specialized policing units, building partnerships with the community, and 

using problem-solving methods. They saw no incompatibilities or conflicts between 

community policing and gang unit activities. Instead, they frequently defined gangs in the 

terms of formal Problem Oriented Policing, and saw the gang unit as engaged in problem 

solving. 

They differed among themselves in assessing whether or not community policing 

and community involvement was having an impact on the gang problem. Some expressed 

doubts, but others responded with confidence that community policing was having a 

positive impact, and that at least some parts of the community were actively and 

effectively involved. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 404 

Phoenix 

Police managers in Phoenix tended to emphasize partnerships and working with 

the community in defining their approach to community policing. Most mentioned 

specific community policing strategies, such as the department’s Area Manager Program: 

My idea of the community approach...I think they want to form a 

partnership with the community, and one of the programs they put in place 

is the area manager program, where they have a lieutenant assigned to a 

specific area and he is the main person. It’s like his own little precinct for 

that community, and they go to that lieutenant with their problems, and 

that lieutenant fans it out on how to deal with the problem. To me, that’s 

the biggest thing we’ve done...move the police department as far as 

precinct substations back into the community where they don’t see us as a 

taboo or something mysterious...we’re regular people, this is who we are, 

and we’re not going to fix your problem alone – we need to fix the 

problem together. 

Similarly, other managers commented on the department’s increasing emphasis 

on engagement with the community, and pointed to community action officers, the 

citizens’ police academy, and block watch as examples. Many managers gave responses 

similar to the following: 

It would be working hand-in-hand with the community on certain issues 

and problems they have, getting their respect as well as them giving us 

respect...we open up the doors to the community through the different 

functions...we have to let them know what we are doing to get out more 

of the community. I mean we want...instead of riding around in the car 

with the windows rolled up, you want to get officers out in the street, 

working hand-in-hand with the community...you have the community 

action officers and you have the bike officers making us more accessible 

to them and their needs...of course, having block watchers on patrol and 

citizens’ police academy...like I said before, just opening the doors for 

them and working hand-in-hand, instead of us against them...getting more 

and more involved policing their community. 

Nearly all Phoenix police managers thought that the fit was good between their 

approach to community policing and the gang unit. Some managers saw the gang unit as 

a problem-solving tool; others thought that the gang unit fit with community policing just 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 405 

as other specialized policing units did. One gang unit manager responded: 

I don’t see a big problem with how we fit in...we fit in just like another 

unit would...as long as we market ourselves to the community, how we’re 

doing things and why we’re doing things that we do...I don’t see a 

problem. 

Another manager told of the gang unit’s involvement with a neighborhood activist group 

as an example of the compatibility between community policing and the gang unit: 

...we do neighborhood marches with NAIL’EM, which is...she’s a 

neighborhood activist, and I don’t know what exactly the acronym stands 

for, but they go out and they get the neighborhood association groups from 

around the city when neighborhoods are having gang problems or drug 

problems, they’ll go out, you know, 50 or 100 strong, and they’ll march 

the neighborhood with megaphones and yelling, or not yelling but just 

saying, “Hey, listen, gangster,” and “It’s time to leave...the neighborhood 

is fed up with it,” or drug dealers. “Get out here,” and “We know who you 

are...” 

We go out and march with them, basically to show our support for them, 

but also to provide security for them...they get rocked and bottled in some 

of the neighborhoods that they’re going to that are scary. I wouldn’t want 

to go in without a gun, you know.... We do a lot of gang protection and 

gang presentations making the citizens and whoever asks – just giving the 

awareness of what gangs do and how they operate. 

When asked to assess the impact of community policing on the area’s gang 

problem, however, the Phoenix police managers’ responses became rather vague. As an 

example of a positive impact, some emphasized that closer contact with the community 

increased their acquisition of information. The following two responses reflect the 

managers’ perceptions of the community as an information source: 

They’re an excellent source of information for us, because they lived in 

the neighborhood, they have been around these kids for years and years, 

and they know them, they know where they live and what’s going on, so if 

we can get the community to give us information...I mean we can work 

with it and do a lot more. The problem is, you have kids in the 

neighborhoods and the people who live there are intimidated by them, so 

they don’t want to give the information freely as they normally would. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 406 

I think it has, I think what it does is give ownership back to the citizens... 

we can’t be the eyes and ears always, you know, we need their help ‘cause 

we’re getting a lot of calls...we got a gang hotline, people call up and say, 

“Hey, I got this gangster lives at this house and his name is this...I have 

information he may be involved in a homicide or drive-by,” or “You know 

he pulled into his yard yesterday and his back window was all shot out, 

he’s out there fixing it right now, you may want to check it out,” you 

know, something like that...it’s giving them the opportunity to help 

us...they feel more comfortable with us and they feel more comfortable 

with the knowledge they get, and they feel comfortable with the way they 

are relating to us, and they feel stupid...making a big something out of 

nothing. 

Assessing the impact of community policing on the gang problem, these managers 

pointed out that the community was playing a legitimate role in addressing gangs, but 

they had some qualifications: 

Yes, I think so, and in areas where they have neighborhood associations, 

you’re going to get more contact with them, and you’re going to get phone 

calls, and you’re going to get more information than the normal 

neighborhood where one neighbor might call sometime this year, and 

another neighbor might call sometime the next year, but nobody really 

pulls together, and they don’t voice all their opinions about it, they just 

kind of keep to themselves and kind of just live with that. 

Other police managers saw the role of the community in addressing gangs as 

embedded in public support for the Phoenix Police Department as a whole: 

They always have a big role, because we – our job is to listen to what the 

citizens say...a citizen advisory group to the city council, I think, has 

made a major impact on how we do business...these different functions 

we attend...I think people like us here, I think the good people like us, and 

that has made it a lot easier to deal with here, compared to Los 

Angeles...they have such a lousy reputation with the public, they’ll never 

get new equipment...where we feel confident, you know, coming about an 

election...you know people will vote for us and get new equipment...we 

have the citizens’ police academy where 30 to 40 citizens go through a 

little academy...we give a dog and pony show, and that opens some eyes 

on how we do things. I think its positive for the department. 

Phoenix police managers in general emphasized working with the community and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 407 

mentioned specific public partnerships when describing their department’s approach to 

community policing. They tended to see the gang unit fitting with community policing in 

the same ways that other specialized units did, although few elaborated on that point. 

Assessing the impact of community policing on the gang problem, the Phoenix managers 

viewed the community as an additional source of information. Some believed that the 

community’s role in addressing the gang problem was best expressed through public 

support for the department as a whole. 

Stakeholder Perceptions of Community Policing 

In addition to interviewing managers in the chain of command for gang units, we 

asked similar questions of the gang units’ internal and external stakeholders in each of the 

cities that we studied. We asked for their perceptions of the nature and extent of 

community policing practices in their local police departments. More specifically, we 

asked: 

� How they defined community policing, 

� Whether or not their police departments were practicing community policing, 

� Whether they could identify police and gang unit activities that were examples 

of community policing, and 

� Whether, in their opinions, the local police department’s response to gangs 

reflected community policing. 

Albuquerque 

Internal and external stakeholders in Albuquerque were consistent in how they 

defined community policing. Nearly all of their responses were articulated in terms of 

police reaching out to, being in, and working with the community. As one School 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 408 

Resource Officer put it, “[Community policing] is when you get out into the community.” 

Another School Resource Officer described it as “going to the community” with 

problems in the school. A sergeant expanded upon that definition, saying that 

“community policing is going into the community, soliciting information, and also 

making officers more accessible to the public.” One commander gave “talking to the 

neighborhoods” as an example. A parole and probation supervisor defined it as 

“...responding to the makeup of your community.... You have to...fit the needs of your 

community.” A sergeant from a violent crimes unit saw community policing as “having 

resources available to address community problems.”

 An external stakeholder, a probation and parole supervisor, offered the following 

definition by example: 

Officers are assigned to different neighborhood associations so that if 

there’s crime going on, on the rise, or a particular activity that’s going on, 

you have somebody that you can contact other than just calling dispatch 

and maybe being put way down on the priority thing. 

Some considered community policing a tangible partnership with members of the 

community. An area commander explained: “Community policing to me is a kind of 

collaborative undertaking between the police and active members of the community to 

address common problems.” A deputy sheriff also defined community policing as 

collaboration: “It’s basically the public and the police coming together, and working 

together to try to reduce the criminal problems.” One sergeant looked to the past for this 

all-encompassing definition: “To me, community policing, sir, is the good, old-fashioned 

beat cop.” 

Albuquerque stakeholders were mixed in their views of the extent to which the 

police department was actually engaging in community policing. The perceptions of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 409 

internal and external stakeholders diverged on this point. Most internal stakeholders 

reported that the department was engaged in community policing, although each offered 

different examples in support of that view. An Albuquerque sergeant attached to a violent 

crimes unit described the nature of the department’s community policing this way: 

The way they’re engaged in it right now is that in each area command, 

they are required to stay in contact with the neighborhoods in their 

command and, on a regular basis, be informed by those residents, whether 

it be business or residential, what their problems are, and call upon us and 

other resources to help solve those problems. What the police department 

is trying to do is organize their efforts to rid neighborhoods of 

undesirables, and rid business of the problem that they’re dealing with. 

Another sergeant agreed that the department was engaged in community policing, but in 

another way: 

I believe it is [engaged in community policing]. I think that it’s good that 

they’re putting investigators in the substations. It’s increased the 

intelligence between the field officers and the detectives.... A lot of the 

times, a field officer would get that information, but didn’t know what to 

do with it. I think now with the investigation at each substation...we have 

field officers coming in all the time with this information. I think this 

makes us more accessible to the public. The public will come in and say, 

“Well, you know, I understand that you’re the Violent Crimes Unit for the 

Valley, and I have this problem.” I think the public knows more that we 

are more accessible... 

Not all internal stakeholders believed that community policing was thriving in 

Albuquerque, however. For instance, one area commander commented: 

Quite honestly, I think community policing is wheezing on oxygen and is 

about to die in this community, primarily because I don’t believe that the 

political structure of this community has a true commitment to public 

safety, much less community policing. Politically, oh, it’s alive and well. 

It’s the reason crime has dropped 17 percent in the last 3 years. 

Community policing is the greatest thing since sliced bread, and every 

area command is practicing community policing, and they’ll give you the 

biggest bunch of bullshit you ever wanted to hear. In reality, community 

policing is barely hanging on. 

But you go out to these neighborhoods...all these other places, you ask 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 410 

them, “What do you want?” They want to see more cops. They want 

quicker response times. They want to work with us. They want their 

neighborhoods to be safer. It’s all about public safety in their minds, but 

these morons downtown, they have no clue. All they’re worried about is 

building baseball stadiums and stuff that doesn’t matter. And that’s the 

reason why community policing is so unhealthy in this city. 

The external stakeholders in Albuquerque seemed to be only minimally aware of 

community policing. For example, a prosecutor responded, “I think they are [practicing 

community policing]. I know that that was a push and the intent a few years ago.” A 

parole and probation supervisor simply responded, “Yes,” and other external stakeholders 

responded, “I don’t know,” or “I think there’s a beginning.” 

A few external stakeholders seemed aware of the concept and the department’s 

intent to practice community policing, but they represented community policing as an 

idea that had never been allowed to reach maturity in their city. The director of a 

nonprofit agency operating the area’s largest youth mentoring program reported that, due 

to a change in the department’s leadership, “community policing is no longer on the front 

burner like it was in the past.” A representative of the American Civil Liberties Union 

took a similar position, reporting that the new police administration claimed to favor 

community policing, but that little evidence was visible: 

They have said that they’re really for community policing and I really 

haven’t seen any...I don’t guess I could really say I’ve seen any progress 

in better community relations.... This community where we are right here 

is like the young people’s hanging out place. And there are bike cops that 

come around here and stuff, but it’s on the edge of a lot of prostitution and 

the edge of a lot of homelessness. What I see is several officers picking on 

one little person.... I just see a lot of bullying.... If they stop someone on 

the street, they’re not going to have a friendly encounter and let it go... 

The director of a nonprofit youth service agency described the department’s 

engagement in community policing as “half-hearted”: 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 411 

...I think [the chief] came in here with that notion, but I don’t think he’s 

really implemented anything. I don’t know if it’s money, resistance from 

the police force here, from the rank and file. I’m not sure. But it really 

hasn’t happened. You know, there are a couple of cops on horseback at 

events and they let the kids pet the horse. That’s about it. That’s what I’ve 

seen. 

Albuquerque stakeholders were asked whether the gang unit practiced community 

policing and to give specific examples. For the most part, they had few to offer. Several 

responded with short statements such as “I would think so,” “I think it does,” “I’m not 

sure,” or more directly, “ I don’t know,” sometimes adding that they had little knowledge 

of the inner workings of the gang unit. Other stakeholders gave ambiguous answers, such 

as the one provided by a sheriff’s deputy: “I know the patrol officers do work beats. I 

don’t know if they have a COPS unit like our department does. I’m not too sure.” 

An internal stakeholder, a commander, observed that from his point of view, the 

gang unit did not practice community policing: 

Well, I think that because the unit itself is insulated from community 

policing in the Special Investigations Division, I don’t believe it 

participates in community policing to a very large degree. I think that’s 

problematic. I just think they’re insulated from it. They have in the past 

gone to meetings, but they’re not involved with that process. And to be 

real involved with community-based policing, you need to interact with 

community, and they’re not doing that. 

However, a School Resource Officer had a different perspective: 

The gang unit works through different units in the police department, and 

that’s the way that they interact with different facets of the community. 

And that’s really basically what the gang unit is comprised of. It’s trying 

to gather all this information about individuals who are involved in gang 

activity. And because your average gangster, the ones called veteranos, as 

I would call them, all started in elementary and up to middle school. And 

sometimes their whole families were gangsters. The gang unit interacts 

with different facets of school detectives and SROs, and that to me would 

be involved in community policing. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 412 

Overall, as a group, Albuquerque internal and external stakeholders shared a 

common definition of community policing. To them, it meant that police were involved 

in some direct way with the community. Yet they had trouble expanding upon that 

generality when asked for specific instances. Some saw no engagement in community 

policing on the part of the police department; others saw the department as deeply 

engaged. We concluded that the stakeholders were unsure whether the gang unit used 

community policing techniques, and whether the department’s response to gangs 

reflected a community-oriented approach. A few remarked that the particular placement 

of the gang unit in the organizational structure of the department insulated it from the 

community, cutting against the grain of community policing. 

Inglewood 

Like Albuquerque stakeholders, those in Inglewood offered variations on the 

theme of “interacting with the community” when asked to define community policing. 

One detective working robbery detail explained that community policing meant being in 

the community, getting to know people, and activity in the “’hood,” while another 

defined it as an attitude, reflecting mutual respect and restraint between the police 

department and the community. 

The perceptions of Inglewood internal and external stakeholders varied 

considerably with respect to whether or not the police department was engaged in 

community policing. Most internal stakeholders thought little community policing was 

occurring any longer, while external stakeholders seemed to believe that the department 

was actively involved in the practice. 

One internal stakeholder, a detective working aggravated assaults, told us that the 

department had lost ICOP (Inglewood Community Oriented Policing) during budget 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 413 

reductions, and that former ICOP officers had been reassigned to patrol. A detective 

working in a robbery unit confirmed that ICOP had been relegated to the past, adding that 

in his day (the era of ICOP), “we did community policing and patrol, being in the ‘hood, 

getting to know people in the ‘hood, kids in the ‘hood, what was going on in the ‘hood”; 

however, he viewed the department as still engaged in informal problem solving. In his 

view, the difficulties with sustaining community policing had extended far beyond 

financial resources; he blamed a lack of a clearly defined power structure and an absence 

of community-based groups for the unit’s apparent demise. 

A detective working with the anti-crime team added that ICOP had had a 

“frictional relationship” with the community, and, in his view, ICOP would not “smooth 

it out.” From his perspective, Inglewood’s lack of financial resources many have caused 

the actual closure of the community policing unit, but like others, he also attributed its 

loss to underlying organizational problems, including an unclear power structure, and the 

lack of organized community groups. Not an advocate of community policing, this 

stakeholder articulated his disdain for ICOP and community policing, which he saw as 

being “soft” on crime, this way: “When you have an asshole [a criminal] making a 

person’s life miserable, he has to go. Why should one hundred suffer for the sake of 

one?” Still, one internal stakeholder, a detective, stated, “The philosophy of COP is still 

practiced, even though we don’t have specific COP resources.” 

External stakeholders may have been unaware of changes in the department, or 

perhaps they simply had a more diffuse definition of community policing. Whatever the 

reason, they believed that community policing was practiced by the department. An 

official with the state parole authority reported that the department was active in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 414 

community policing, emphasizing prevention, although he could not produce specific 

examples. A gang intelligence officer working in the State Department of Corrections 

also reported that the department was actively engaged in community policing: “They’re 

out there dealing with the community and dealing with negatives and positives, giving 

back, not just arresting.” 

When asked about specific police or gang unit activities that exemplified 

community policing in Inglewood, the internal stakeholders’ responses ranged from not 

being aware of such activities, to referencing the intelligence function of the gang unit. 

One detective thought that since “gang intelligence could be used to address problems of 

physical and social disorder, it could be viewed as a community policing activity.” A 

detective in the anti-crime unit pointed to the gang unit spending time talking to gang 

members and “being out there” as examples of community policing. The internal 

stakeholders generally agreed that their police department was taking a communityoriented approach to responding to gangs. Some detectives indicated that the intelligence 

and information provided by the gang unit was invaluable in support of other police 

operations that included community policing: 

The gang unit as a service provider is where we have shined over the 

years. We have cracked a lot of cases using information from the gang 

unit. They provide good intel. They’re a great source of information. They 

know about crime. 

Activities such as “midnight basketball” or programs that “emphasize early 

childhood development” were given as examples by another detective, who saw such 

community involvement as compatible with enforcement efforts. 

Most external stakeholders also thought that Inglewood’s response to gangs 

reflected a community-oriented approach; as one stakeholder commented, the police 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 415 

department had a vested interested in working with the community to solve the gang 

problem. One stakeholder involved in graffiti abatement complained, however, that a 

communication problem between the police department and his department had hindered 

his ability to do his own job. 

In general, from the perspective of internal stakeholders, most of whom were 

Inglewood Police Department detectives, formal community policing in Inglewood was 

nearly extinct. According to them, severe budget reductions and organizational problems 

had eliminated ICOP; all that remained of community policing were the interactions with 

community members that occurred as officers of the gang unit and other police units 

carried out their normal assigned duties. Unlike internal stakeholders, however, external 

stakeholders believed that the department was actively engaged in community policing. 

Inglewood’s internal and external stakeholders both tended to see the 

department’s approach to gang enforcement as community-oriented. Whatever their 

perceptions, however, few internal or external stakeholders were able to point to 

particular community policing activities or programs. It appeared that the Inglewood 

Police Department, and consequently the gang unit, operated in an organizational 

environment that supported the philosophy, but currently attached little importance to the 

practice of community policing. 

Las Vegas 

Las Vegas stakeholders presented a less clear picture of community policing in 

that city. As in Albuquerque and Inglewood, the stakeholders in Las Vegas defined 

community policing in terms of general community involvement and collaboration. As 

one sergeant put it, “Basically, it’s a partnership between, you know, the police 

department and the community. Getting involvement by the community in an effort to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 416 

correct some of the problems.” A patrol lieutenant gave a similar response: “Policing that 

addresses problems in the community...here the community feels they can communicate 

with the P.D. ...listen to what they say so we can I.D. problems.” Another patrol 

lieutenant offered a slightly different definition: 

Well, I think that community policing is nothing other than what good 

policing has always been. The thought that the police department and the 

community are separate...I’m not sure how that evolved. But community 

policing to me is what policing is always meant to be...that community 

policing is simply that – just policing. 

Internal stakeholders gave mixed and often ambiguous responses to our questions. 

Many high-ranking officers indicated that community policing was not well-established 

throughout the department. 

Well, you know, it depends on whether you – if you really know that 

working definition of community policing. Because, you know, the 

officers I have working for me, I let them have flexible hours. So whatever 

the situation calls for, whether it calls for community policing, then you’ll 

be a community policing officer. If it calls for problem solving, do that. If 

it calls for community relations, do that. Don’t just get focused in any one 

mode, and so community policing – it’s problem solving. Here’s a 

problem that you, along with the people in the neighborhood determine, 

and the solutions. 

Another area commander gave the following response: 

I think we’re probably like the rest of the law enforcement community. 

We’re still trying to figure out what community-oriented policing is all 

about, you know, and I think unfortunately most of us get into this 

program or project mindset, you know. We’re going to do this, and this is 

going to bring us community policing. But it’s nothing different that 

anything we’ve done before. We take a look at a bad neighborhood; we 

throw a bunch of cops in there. We solve the problem. And then our cops 

get bored because there’s nothing going on there anymore. 

Other internal stakeholders affirmed the department’s engagement in community 

policing. A sergeant on bike patrol reported that the department was “very active” in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 417 

community policing, and a patrol lieutenant simply responded, “Yes,” that the department 

did engage in community policing. One patrol lieutenant outlined a series of actions that 

would need to be taken to move from philosophy to practice: 

Well, right now that’s the sheriff’s and our department’s philosophy, is 

that we want to move consistently towards community policing. We 

understand that law enforcement exists in a political climate in every 

single agency in this country. It’s going to be somewhat calls-for-service 

driven. You know if you have a group of people in a particular area that 

are calling you for something, you’re going to have to respond to that. But 

one of the things that we’re trying to look at is training our officers, 

training our supervisors and managers, as to what community policing 

really is. How do we get at root problems? How do we identify what we 

can do in community policing to reduce those calls for service on that 

backside, and that’s a long, dynamic process. 

External stakeholders did not exactly deny the existence of community policing, 

but at the same time, they appeared reluctant to confirm its practice in the police 

department. For example, a district manager for parole and probation gave the following 

response: “Well, I think you’d have to talk to Metro. I think that all the police 

departments in the area move more toward community policing, where they’re in the 

neighborhood patrolling instead of just responding.” When an investigator affiliated with 

the state of Nevada was asked if the Las Vegas police department engaged in community 

policing, he responded, “I don’t know. They could be.” The manager went on to point out 

that Las Vegas was not conducive to community policing (compared with Boston and 

New York) since “they’ve got to walk a beat. Las Vegas is not conducive to that.” 

Interestingly, although many stakeholders were vague about whether community 

policing was practiced in the police department, others were able to give specific 

examples of community policing practices. They pointed to the Weed and Seed project, 

community centers, and graffiti abatement as just a few examples. Several mentioned 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 418 

First Tuesday; a lieutenant explained that on the first Tuesday of each month, the captain 

made time to talk with community members. Other stakeholders described this as an 

event that occurred in each command area. 

Las Vegas internal stakeholders tended to distinguish between the way things had 

been done in the past and how they were currently being done, when assessing whether or 

not their department’s approach to gang enforcement had become more communityoriented. One patrol lieutenant stated: 

Yes, for the better. The old approach was to take everyone to jail using 

gang sweeps. Now they recognize that problems are not just gang related, 

so they take a broader approach and work with the community to address 

the problems. In the past, the Westside hated the gang unit because of their 

operational activities, but that gang unit has changed activities, and 

tensions have been reduced. 

The description provided by a patrol lieutenant of his involvement in gang sweeps 

provided additional insight into this source of tension between the police department and 

the community: 

We did Operation Colors when I was leaving the gang unit, which is our 

first-ever major operation where we went after gang members from a 

racketeering point of view.... Some community people questioned why 

there’s a big proportion of African American people affected by the search 

warrants. But, you know, fortunately no one was hurt in an execution of 

multiple warrants. And you know, they were big operations! 

The same lieutenant described other gang unit and police joint activities that 

proved problematic in terms of community relations: 

We used to do reverse sting operations in the neighborhoods where street 

narcotics were sold openly. And the interesting thing about that is that we 

would take over and have officers posing as gang members and selling the 

drugs. What I did not like about it was that we would have officers, white 

officers, put black paint on their faces to be – to pretend they were black. 

That was justified in their minds due to the fact that we didn’t have any 

[African American] officers at the time in the gang unit, which led me to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 419 

say, “Well, we need more [African American] officers in the gang unit.” 

So I was able to recruit more on my team. And then we would work those 

operations with them. Because to me, in the early ‘90s, to think that we 

would have white officers be black-faced...and I was quite offended by 

that. We’ve come a long ways. 

A lieutenant working on the west side of the city offered some strong opinions 

about the nature of the gang unit’s orientation to the community, as well as about their 

performance in his command area: 

You know, I’m in the neighborhood. I know people in the neighborhood, 

you know, and it pisses me off when I hear a white officer, a lieutenant 

say, telling me what’s best for those good people in West Last Vegas. 

Well, you don’t know about anything. Who have you talked to in West 

Las Vegas? Who have you talked to? Who? 

This lieutenant went on to describe in detail how he had helped organize the 

community in an effort to prevent disruption when the second Rodney King verdict came 

down. He made the point that he was able to rely on his knowledge and relationships 

within the community, which he believed that the gang unit was unable to do. 

An area commander described a gang unit operation that increased tensions 

among the residents in his command area. He had been in the midst of working with a 

particular segment of the community on problem-solving activities, when without his 

knowledge, the gang unit conducted a sweep in that neighborhood. He first learned of the 

operation when he began receiving citizen calls complaining about the operation. He 

attributed the incident to a lack of communication between the gang unit and patrol, but 

he also said that communication between the two units had been improving. 

Overall, we found that the stakeholders’ definitions of community policing in Las 

Vegas were often ambiguous, although several were able to point to specific communityoriented police activities. Although the stakeholders thought that the department 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 420 

practiced community policing, they did not think the department placed it at center stage. 

Several suggested that it was something the department was working toward. Some 

stakeholders found the department’s approach to gang enforcement community-oriented, 

but when asked for specific details, nearly all of them referenced examples from the past, 

when gang enforcement activities had apparently exacerbated tensions between the police 

department and the community. 

Phoenix 

Phoenix stakeholders as a group were fairly consistent in their definitions of 

community policing. One dominant theme among internal stakeholders was “getting out 

in the community.” Others were similar: “partnerships,” “problem solving,” and 

“listening” to the public. One internal stakeholder, a lieutenant working as an area 

manager, defined community policing as the “co-production of public safety”: 

Basically, community-based policing, in my opinion, is where the police 

department is helping the public solve crimes. Rather than us answering 

calls for service, we want them to be the eyes and ears and help us solve 

their crimes – having a beat officer know these people in the area, that 

way they’d be more likely to call us and have confidence and faith and 

trust in us...you know, the broken window where we want to solve the 

crime before it happens. 

Another lieutenant defined community policing as “...absolute long-term problem 

solving, and it’s ‘partnershipping’.” One detective emphasized that a sense of community 

could provide a “natural barrier” to crime: 

It’s getting the community to have a sense of itself, to where natural 

barriers are put up by the community in conjunction with the police. 

Because when there was a sense of community, when you knew all of 

your neighbors, knew them by name, knew their kids, you would never go 

and damage so-and-so’s house. They’d been living there for years. 

With the anonymity of our society, you can go attack anybody, because 

you don’t know them and they’re not real to you. And the same thing goes 

with police work. I know when I get to these kids, then they tell me things. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 421 

When I was at the high school campus, I had all the gangsters there. At 

first I arrested a lot of people, but then we moved past that, and I got 

information on several big-time crimes because I was their officer. They 

know me. I wasn’t like those officers on the street. 

Well, yes, I am! But the fact that they know me – and community policing 

is the same thing, getting everybody to know everybody. Then you have 

some natural barriers to a lot of the crimes that we see. 

Phoenix external stakeholders also emphasized active involvement in the 

community. When asked for a definition of community policing, one probation 

supervisor responded, “Getting out and being in the neighborhood.” The director of a 

nonprofit agency had a similar view: “Community policing, I think, is being seen in the 

community, being heard in the community...” An assistant county prosecutor echoed 

those thoughts: “What I think is that community policing is working with the 

neighborhood. Working with the individuals that they are trying to help, and kind of 

getting that working relationship between the community and the police department.” 

Asked whether the Phoenix Police Department was actively engaged in 

community policing, most stakeholders believed that it was. The internal stakeholders’ 

responses were generally positive, with a few qualifications. Community policing as a 

“rediscovery” was mentioned by several of them. The response of one beat officer 

reflected the rediscovery theme: 

Community policing to me is just another name, and used to be team 

enforcement, and before that it was beat enforcement, and right now we’re 

coming back and know it as community policing, and it’s all the same 

thing in my opinion—accountability for your beat. 

Or as a detective involved in graffiti abatement put it: 

Getting the community involved has been big, and we’ve got a huge 

community involvement here from the graffiti, to the block watch, to all 

the stuff. That’s an old way of doing things that’s new again, and needs to 

be, because it used to be, a few generations ago...you knew everybody’s 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 422 

house by name. That was the Smith house. That was the Jones house. You 

know all your neighbors, you know. Now they’re trying to do that, 

reinvent that thing again. 

External stakeholders’ responses were also positive. Some external stakeholders, 

similar to their internal counterparts, told us that the department was in the process of 

moving to community policing; some saw these efforts as a rerun of previous policing 

strategies. The director of a city-sponsored youth service organization, with many gang 

members among its clients, offered this perspective: 

I strongly feel they are [engaging in community policing]. They’re parking 

their cars. They’re getting on bikes. They’re walking down the 

communities and actually getting to know some of the names of the 

children that are in the community, establishing some rapport there. I think 

it takes you back to the ‘30s and the ‘40s where officers were known by 

their names. I think now that they saw some benefit to that, which we’ve 

gotten away from obviously. I think they’re seeing some benefit to that 

and reintroducing it. 

Even though most external stakeholders were enthusiastic in their assessment of 

community policing in Phoenix, a few remained skeptical. For example, an external 

stakeholder associated with the gang unit in the police department of a neighboring 

community questioned just how deeply ingrained community policing was in the Phoenix 

department: 

I’ve been here for over 30 years and I really believe that they are hoping 

that they’re doing that. Realistically, I think we give a lot of lip service to 

community policing.... I think that probably their department is real 

similar to ours, that they’d love to say, yes, that’s what we’re doing. But I 

think until you start doing some positions and become open to a project 

like the Gang Intervention Project, I don’t think you really are. 

Stakeholders in Phoenix pointed to a variety of activities, some fairly concrete 

and others more abstract, when asked for examples of specific community policing 

actions or activities. An external stakeholder, the director of a nonprofit youth service 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 423 

agency, responded, “I’d have to say the biggest one is accessibility...” Another external 

stakeholder, an assistant prosecutor, pointed directly to the gang unit and its 

neighborhood activities as the best example of community policing: 

I guess just the gang detective. Because the neighborhood, they have to 

rely on them a lot. That’s how they get information about what gangs are 

doing in the neighborhood. I know recently they have just concluded an 

investigation down on the South Side where they had complaints from 

neighbors on drug activity going on...they had a case that I’m doing in 

Windom—same thing, the gang detectives knew that this stuff was going 

on, and when you start getting the neighborhood involved and getting the 

community involved, and saying we don’t want this type of activity in our 

neighborhood anymore, and you get them working together—that’s when 

you can resolve the situation. 

A lieutenant in a high-crime precinct mentioned community-oriented personnel 

assignments and activities as examples: 

Our precinct alone, we have what’s called CAOs, Community Action 

Officers, where we have designated officers just to go out to the public 

and reach them, to hear their concerns, to hear what they want done that 

the police officer and the city can do to improve the quality of life. We’ve 

gone to community meetings where we’ve established neighborhood 

associations. We weekly, daily, go to their meetings and hear their 

concerns to help solve their problems and crimes. It’s not necessarily 

drugs and prostitution and robbery. They can be anything from street 

lighting, to trash in the alley, to potholes, and whatever their concerns are. 

They tell us and we’re the mediators for the rest of the city departments. 

In general, internal stakeholders believed that the police response to gangs in 

Phoenix did reflect a community orientation. In the view of a Neighborhood Enforcement 

Team (NET) officer, even the enforcement actions of the gang unit were communityoriented, in that the unit was addressing a problem that the community wanted solved. 

...the majority of the community wants the gang problem quashed, and a 

lot of the stuff we deal with are community complaints. Again, I don’t 

really know their bureau. I don’t know their manuals and their policing 

plan, but the way I see things being done, I think [their response reflects 

community policing].... We let [gang members] know we’re watching 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 424 

them, and when they commit a crime, they usually get the most sentencing 

we can give them as far as their prosecution goes, because they’re 

documented and things like that. I think that we’re on the right page. 

A detective working the graffiti detail saw the gang unit assisting precinct 

operations to achieve community policing goals and objectives: 

I think it does [reflect community policing goals and objectives] now more 

so than it used to at its inception, in that they actively work with precincts 

on a precinct-by-precinct basis, and then the precinct in turn is working 

with given neighborhoods in a mile-by-mile square. So the gang unit tends 

to be more of an assistance that the precinct can call on, to use as the 

precinct is doing the hands-on, neighborhood community policing thing, 

and then they’re able to bring in this outside force to help deal with that 

community policing issue. 

In the view of this detective, gangs were a community policing problem, and the 

gang unit’s enforcement approach was representative of problem-solving. Interestingly, 

this same detective pointed out that until 3 or 4 years ago, others in the department used 

to refer to the gang unit as the “goon squad” instead of the “gang squad.” He said that 

“given the tactics used by the squad, no one thought their cases would hold up in court, 

but they did, since the gangster didn’t know anything about the law.” 

A lieutenant serving as an area manager in the same precinct had a different 

perspective on the link between the unit’s enforcement response and community policing: 

Yes and no – yes, from a standpoint that there is liaison and they are 

dealing with the internal customers, mainly patrol officers, yes. No, from 

the standpoint that they are not solving problems long term, they are 

solving them short term...the short-term reactionary issues...now, I don’t 

totally put this black cloud over them, because when they do RICO cases, 

they are good at it, and those RICO cases may go 3 or 4 months with a lot 

of arrests being made, that part I still say is a success. Long term, though, 

changing the complexion of a neighborhood so they don’t have to come 

back next year and do it again, that’s the mark they’re missing. 

External stakeholders had more varied views on whether the Phoenix response to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 425 

gangs was community-oriented. For example, an assistant prosecutor offered this 

opinion, similar to that of several other stakeholders: 

I think it does [reflect community policing], because the gang problems 

really affect not the community at large, but primarily the neighborhood 

where that activity is going on, when you get the citizenry saying, “I can’t 

walk outside my front door, I can’t stand in my front yard and talk to my 

neighbors, because I’m afraid of X.” And I think that’s where the police 

department has done a good job of getting out there, making the public 

and getting the citizens to assist them to at least start an investigation, and 

follow up on them. 

A contrary perspective was offered by a stakeholder from a neighboring police 

department who deplored what he called the “enforcement only” approach used by the 

gang unit. He offered the following, representing the views of several other stakeholders: 

If we are talking about the gang unit, I would say no.... When you call the 

Phoenix P.D. right now and you’re going to call their gang unit, you’ll get 

a secretary or somebody, but you may not find any of the guys. You say, 

“Well, if I wanted someone to come and give me a prevention talk on 

gangs, who would I contact?” And they give you another number. I don’t 

think that’s being very open to community policing. 

As a group, Phoenix internal and external stakeholders agreed that community 

policing meant that police engaged with the community to help solve neighborhood 

problems. Some saw community policing as a goal the department was working toward, 

but the majority were able to point to specific examples already in practice. Internal 

stakeholders generally saw the gang unit as practicing community policing, although that 

perspective was not universal. External stakeholders were more mixed in their 

perspectives, with some finding the unit difficult to access. 

Gang Unit Officers’ Perceptions of Community Policing 

In our interviews with gang unit officers, we explored both their perceptions and 

their practices with respect to community policing. We were interested in their awareness 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 426 

of community policing efforts in other parts of their departments, and connections they 

saw, if any, between community policing and gang unit activities. We asked for their 

thoughts on five issues related to community policing: 

1. Department-wide, to what extent community policing was being practiced, 

2. In the department, whether or not formalized problem solving methods 

were in use (e.g., the SARA model), 

3. The impact of community policing on the police response to gangs, 

4. To what extent gang unit officers used problem solving for addressing 

gang-related problems, and 

5. The kind of relationship the gang unit should have with its community. 

Albuquerque 

Gang unit officers varied considerably in how they assessed the extent of 

community policing practices throughout the Albuquerque police department. One officer 

indicated that the gang unit practiced community policing at “every opportunity,” while a 

colleague said that “no,” it was not being practiced. Another officer was uncertain 

whether community policing was being practiced, since he “was not out in the field,” but 

he believed the department “had been doing it all along.” Another used these words to 

express his doubts about the issue: 

I don’t know if it is practiced that much. I mean, we say that we are doing 

it, but I don’t even know to what extent, or what we are doing. I have no 

idea. Because when you work SID [Special Investigations Division] like I 

worked, there is not much community-oriented policing done here. It is 

usually done out there with the patrol officers out on the street. But here, 

we are talking hard-core. 

Another individual indicated that community policing had been cut back, having failed 

when implemented several years ago. One of the gang unit officers indicated that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 427 

community policing was not practiced in the gang unit, but that it was practiced in the 

rest of the department. He gave the following account: 

Outside of the gang unit, quite a bit. Within the gang unit, because we’re 

so specialized and because we have higher priorities right now, I don’t 

think we’re able to. I would like to go out to our community center and 

talk to people about the gang problem, but a lot of times you see that – and 

I’ll give you a quick instance – last night we were walking around – one of 

the few times you’ll see us walking around wearing our gang unit jackets 

– and a lot of people actually stopped us at the mall and asked us, “I didn’t 

realize we had a gang unit. Do we have a gang problem?” I’m not sure 

who’s problem that is. But for people not to realize that we do have a gang 

problem kind of blows my mind. 

A supervisor in the gang unit summed up his assessment as follows: “It’s talked 

about a lot. It’s a theory that everybody talks about, but it’s never been implemented. I 

don’t think that it ever has been implemented to the degree.... Everybody talks about it to 

get the federal money and that’s it.” 

All gang unit officers interviewed except one indicated that problem solving was 

formalized in the Albuquerque department, although none could detail the process used 

or provide examples. One officer thought that they would be using the SARA model in 

the future: “...since we’ve been assigned to our individual area commands, we’re all 

going to be writing up our own different types of tact plans and [we’ll] use the SARA 

model to address that.” Another officer indicated that the unit had to use problem solving 

because they were “so specialized.” His colleague had the opposite view: “I don’t think 

we ever used the SARA model, just because when we got down-sized, there were just 

four of us. Then one left and so we went for 7 or 8 months with just the three of us. We 

didn’t have enough manpower to do anything.” 

These same officers often gave ambiguous evaluations of the impact of 

community policing on the police response to gangs. Some had seen no impact, while 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 428 

most saw a positive impact from improvements in communication and interactions with 

the community: 

I think we deal with the public a lot more, a lot better than we used to. I 

think a lot of them feel free to call up and get information. Just help on 

problems that they’re having and letting us know directly, when before, 

they were kind of going through the field officers that they saw in the field 

and they would say, “Hey, we’re having problems.” They wouldn’t even 

deal with us. Or they’d say, “Can you contact somebody who can help us 

out?” And they left it up to the field officer who’s busy doing something 

else. And he wouldn’t call us. 

You can tell. I think the bottom line in my opinion of community policing 

is communication. Between the citizens, which have the problem – the 

gangs – and address that with us so that we can address them...oftentimes 

before, they would talk to the cops. It’s just that communication is the 

biggest thing. 

Another gang unit officer expressed a contrary point of view, that departmental 

community policing was responsible for the demise of the gang unit: “Well, this chief’s 

community policing wiped out a 20-man gang unit. It devastated it, actually. It really did, 

and now we are playing catch-up.” 

All gang unit officers in Albuquerque recognized the importance of having a good 

relationship with the community; in fact, they used words such as “good,” “open,” 

“close,” and “working” to describe the ideal relationship. One officer summed up their 

perspectives this way: 

I think it needs to be a good relationship. We need to go to the 

neighborhood meetings and things like that. The problem comes in with 

some of the neighborhoods where it is multi-jurisdictional, and they feel 

that we are just picking on the young kids. They feel that it is their right to 

be a gang member. You know, it’s just a way of life for them. So it 

depends. The people that are trying to clean up the neighborhoods and be a 

part of the solution, yeah. But the people that are part of the problem, we 

have to build relationships with them. When you’re in the business of law 

enforcement, that’s what we need to do. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 429 

In general, Albuquerque gang unit officers expressed divergent views of the 

extent to which community policing was practiced department-wide and in the unit. As a 

group, they agreed that the department had formalized the process of problem solving, 

but their examples tended to point toward future problem solving activities, when they 

anticipated using the SARA model. They gave mixed reviews to the impact of 

community policing on the department’s response to gangs, with some officers reporting 

improved communications with the community, and one blaming community policing, as 

practiced at that time, for the near-extinction of the original gang unit. Gang unit officers 

shared a common vision of good working relationships with their community as a 

positive goal. 

Inglewood 

When we inquired about the extent of community policing practiced by the 

Inglewood police department, the diversity of responses from gang unit officers took us 

by surprise, especially given the small size of the unit and the relatively small size of the 

department. Responses from three individual gang unit officers illustrated this: 

Again, we are going back to funds. We had that program here for several 

years. I think it worked really well. We had it for 4 or 5 years, and because 

of cut-backs in the police department, they had to do away with that 

program and reduce the number of officers. And now I believe we only 

have about four, where before we had about eight. 

It’s pretty new, they started – it’s a pretty new innovation. I can't really 

rate it yet, because I don’t think it has really gotten off the ground here 

yet. 

A lot [of officers practice community policing]. They are like the pipelines 

from the community to the police department. They are the contacts, a lot 

of citizens want something done, but don’t want to actively get involved. 

So it is hard for the police department to wait for the person to call and 

report things, so our community policing officers that are involved in that, 

they go out and they see those people that are like anonymous informants, 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 430 

and they bring information back to the police department so we can go 

check it. 

When we asked gang unit officers whether problem solving was formalized in the 

Inglewood department, we again encountered wide variability in their responses. Of the 

three officers interviewed, one thought that it was generally being practiced, one thought 

that community policing was practiced only by ICOP, and one didn’t know whether it 

was practiced at all. 

Two gang unit officers believed that community policing had had a beneficial 

impact on the police response to gangs in that community; the third was uncertain. The 

benefits described by the first two were long-term solutions to the gang problem and a 

greater amount of information originating from the community, helping to make the gang 

unit more effective. 

Better understanding and faster response.... Because we are realizing our 

community policing style, we have a better understanding of what the 

citizens are actually talking about.... You know we always get five or six 

gang members...utilizing the community style policing, that certain 

address where our community affairs officers go out there to get that 

information. Say 524 is where they hang out, but when the police get 

there, they run to the back yard, they go in the garage, they do this, they do 

that. Now we have a better understanding when we get that call at 524 

West Queen, they say Bloods are hanging out, and we get there and they 

are not there, it is not a bogus call...they have seen us, so the next time we 

come, we are not going to come this way, or we may just go back. It gives 

us more of an impact on how we handle calls. 

When asked whether they engaged in formal problem solving, Inglewood gang 

unit officers responded only in general terms. They viewed their routine daily activities as 

problem solving, but did not seem to be using formalized problem solving strategies or 

techniques. 

Every day [we engage in problem solving]. We are an intelligence unit. 

Our job is to go out there and be amongst the gang members, and so we 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 431 

are part of the community. Like I said, they know us, they don’t even see 

us and they know our cars, just by seeing the car. They see us coming a 

mile away, “here comes ____.” So we are an intelligence unit, gang 

intelligence unit, we are a big part of it. 

A fellow gang unit officer shared this view: 

[We are] just more into intelligence information and, you know, getting 

more people involved, getting more resources, gang members are hanging 

out at a certain apartment complex, we get the owner involved. Even if it 

is so small as getting a key to the gate, you know to the secure doors, we 

get the owners involved, we get the managers involved, we get some of 

the residents involved. 

When asked about the kind of relationship that should exist between the gang unit 

and the community, one officer responded, “I think it should be an open line of 

communication where the community can express their concerns, their ongoing 

problems, with different gang members.” A fellow officer emphasized this 

communication model, and described the existing relationship: 

I like the relationship that we have now. It’s pretty close. We do have 

citizens that call on a regular basis. Sometimes it can be a nuisance, but we 

can't shut them off because a lot of times, they are a resource. So I like the 

way it is now. They feel comfortable calling us on a day-to-day basis. We 

just have to utilize our patience, and something might not even deal with 

gangs. Sometimes they call us and we try to help them out, so it is a real 

close-knit relationship. 

Still another officer mentioned communication, with even greater emphasis on the role of 

the community in communicating with the gang unit: 

I would say that the community has to share the problems. They have to 

let us know, because they are our ears, our eyes; they know what is going 

on in the community. They know a lot better than we do. They have to tell 

us what is going on, we can't always guess and know just by talking to the 

gang members. They have to tell us what is going on over here. And they 

do. 

Although communication was a strong theme in the officers’ responses, we did 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 432 

note that no one referred to a two-way exchange; rather, they each described 

communication flowing from the community to the gang unit. 

We found that as a group, Inglewood gang unit officers presented widely 

divergent views of community policing as practiced in their agency. One officer reported 

that community policing was practiced routinely; one thought the practice was new; and 

one reported that it had been around for several years, but had been down-sized due to 

budget cuts. 

The gang unit officers’ views were equally diverse on the practice of formal 

problem solving in the department, with one officer perceiving that the practice was 

limited to ICOP officers. (Inglewood police managers told us that ICOP as a unit was 

defunct.) The gang unit officers did report that community policing had a beneficial 

impact on the department’s response to gangs. They viewed intelligence-gathering 

activities as exemplary of the unit’s practice of problem solving, and most often pointed 

out the example of community members contacting the unit with problems to describe the 

nature of the gang unit’s relationship with the community. 

Las Vegas 

Gang unit officers in Las Vegas were more consistent than those in Inglewood in 

assessing the extent of community policing in their department. They tended to report it 

as a practice that was gaining momentum, a visible characteristic associated with the 

department. The following responses of three individual gang unit officers exemplify 

these assessments: 

I think that [community policing] is one of the most up and coming things. 

It is on an uphill climb. When I started on the department, we didn’t have 

community policing officers for every station. Now we do; we have three, 

as a matter of fact. I think there are three in every police station. I think 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 433 

it’s how you get along with the public a whole lot better. I think when you 

start opening the access to the police department to the public, other than a 

911 call or a traffic ticket, they get...then they start to see, hey, this is 

what they’re doing for a job, when they say they need help, they need 

funds, they need equipment. They understand why we need this stuff. So I 

think our department is on the big climb with community policing. 

Well, it’s kind of big now. Each substation has four community 

officers...COP police officers at each substation now. That is something 

they just started in the last year. You know, you’re going to get certain 

officers that don’t believe in COP. Most of them, the old-timers...when I 

worked the bike, we had to do a little bit of COP just because of the areas 

we were working. Which, I think you’re always going to need that, 

community-oriented policing. But recently, this department has really 

gone full force forward to try to get that going. They have put, like I said 

four...I think it’s three officers and one civilian in each substation and that 

is their job, they are COP officers, that’s all they do. So I think they’re 

really taking a step forward in that direction. 

It has expanded a lot now. There was only one COP position allocated to 

each of the five main substations in town. It has tripled; now there’s three 

in each one, and I think it reflects a bigger commitment by the department. 

Other than paying lip service to, you know, what has been written in 

various textbooks that have come out in the last 10 to 15 years regarding 

community-oriented policing, they are actually budgeting for it and 

putting people in it that are suited for it. And it is getting to the point now 

where people are getting very proficient at it, at least in our department. 

Most Las Vegas gang unit officers indicated that problem-solving processes were 

formalized in the department. Area commands and patrol were most frequently identified 

as the organizational locations of the problem-solving efforts, and several mentioned that 

substations had problem-solving teams or units referred to as PSU or PS teams. One 

officer referred to problem solving as “line solution policing.” He explained, “Line 

solution policing is strictly that – it’s usually six, seven officers, and a supervisor, and 

when a problem comes up in your area, then they go to the lady that does charts, graphs, 

and reports, and they see where it happens and then they attack that area.” 

A few officers, however, were uncertain whether or not problem solving had been 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 434 

formalized in the department, offering responses such as “I think so,” or “it appears to 

be.” Some gang unit officers were less optimistic about the institutionalization of 

problem solving in the department, and many gave responses similar to the following: 

They actually have it written down, particularly the SARA model, for 

example, of how to go about doing POP. In reality, it has taken a back seat 

to call for service and response times and things like that...until they are 

actually putting the bodies in and specifically saying that [problem 

solving] is what you are going to do, this is what you are responsible for, 

this is what your sole reason for being is right now, and this is what your 

performance is rated on. 

Although generally in agreement that community policing was practiced 

department-wide, gang unit officers were mixed in their impressions of the impact that it 

was having on the department’s response to gangs. Some indicated that there had been 

little or no impact, such as an officer who stated simply, “I am not aware of any.” 

Another officer responded, “I’d say very little [impact], and the only reason is apathy 

amongst the citizens.” Apparently, from this officer’s point of view, the failure of 

community policing to impact gang problems rested with shortcomings in the community 

rather than with police. 

However, other gang unit officers perceived a more positive effect: 

I think it actually has had a very good effect...for instance, in our briefing 

right now, we were told that there are certain members of the community 

that have come forward and said that we don’t want this element living in 

our housing projects. And for that, we have gotten consent from a couple 

of these neighborhoods to be able to transport off the property people that 

are committing crimes. Selling dope, possession of guns, things like that. 

And we also have a close relationship with HUD. We have that 

relationship with a lot of the agencies in this town and that helps us quite a 

bit. 

Most of the gang unit officers indicated that they personally used problem 

solving, some indicating that they used it “quite a bit,” “a fair amount of time,” or even 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 435 

“daily.” However, when we pursued the question, we found that most appeared to be 

using the term generically to refer to enforcement activities in response to incidents, or 

even to patterns of incidents, but without the benefit of formal scanning or analysis. In 

other words, they tended to see traditional law enforcement itself as a problem solving 

activity, and police officers as inherently being problem solvers. 

Yeah, I think we do problem solving all the time, if we know a particular 

gang is engaging in criminal activity in a certain area, or if they are on the 

uprise because of a friend that has been killed, or so on and so forth. We 

saturate that area; we hit that area hard. So I think we are problem solving 

all the time. We get information on areas that need to be hit, then we work 

that area. That way they know that we’re out there in force, and we know 

they’re up to something. 

I think we use it quite a bit. I mean, we wouldn’t know...until somebody 

comes to us and says hey...like Saturday, we’re on a car stop, and an 

officer says we’re taking rocks and bottles every time we come into this 

complex. People are throwing them at us. There’s a problem and we try to 

solve it. We come in from different angles in the middle of the night trying 

to find gang members out there and take them to jail, and find their dope 

and find their guns. In our job we try to be proactive, but a lot of it is 

reactive. 

One officer contended that the investigative process was equivalent to the SARA 

problem-solving model: 

I don’t think they know the full SARA-type model and stuff like that, 

because they are probably using it already like an investigative tool. So 

when you do your investigation, you already have...you’ve scanned it, 

you already know what the problem was, you don’t really do the analysis 

much. Your response is going to be the investigation, evidence. And your 

assessment is going to be basically how well you did the report. Guys 

don’t understand that SARA is just a simple model tool that people have 

put an acronym on, that is done on a daily basis. 

So I think they do it, but I don’t know if they do it...like Eric and I are 

starting a program right now with our Students Academy Alumni. And 

we’re going to have them do retail store checks throughout Clark County 

for locking up paint. And if they are locking up paint, then they get an 

“atta boy” slip and a nice certificate. If they are not locking it up, we’re 

giving them the code violation and telling them we are going to be back in 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 436 

6 weeks to check. But we go back the next week, and if they don’t have it 

locked up, they get cited. Again, that’s a POP project. 

We’re working it from our end, and we’re using Citizens’ Academy 

people to do something for us. I guess we’re using it, but it just depends 

how well you know how to use it. 

In Las Vegas, we found that a problematic relationship had developed between 

the gang unit and the community. Some Las Vegas gang unit officers described it as a 

conflict between gang unit enforcement practices and the community’s expectations. The 

officers knew that community policing promoted cultivating openness with the public, 

but at the same time, they felt compelled to maintain secrecy about intelligence functions 

and certain enforcement activities. One officer gave this rather negative assessment of the 

unit’s current relationship with the community it served: 

I wish it were better. But a lot of times we need to be secretive, and we 

can’t disseminate all of our information. There are some things we need to 

share. But I don’t think the community is receptive as a whole...the 

community itself. I’m not talking about our leaders; I’m talking about the 

public. Not very receptive; they don’t feel we have a problem. They don’t 

want to acknowledge it. 

Another officer described the current situation, one in which business as usual 

meant keeping enforcement tactics out of the public eye, but he also pointed out the need 

for increased public support and participation: 

I have some mixed thoughts in that, only because the community itself 

wants to stop the gang activity, suppress it, don’t let it happen to my kid. 

And there are certain things we need to do, to do that. You don’t violate 

their civil rights or anything like that. We go out there with a heavy hand 

and zero tolerance on these things. The community wants to know, why 

are you picking on my kid. So I think if they realized what we are doing, 

they might not like it, and maybe they’ll take a softer approach. “Well, we 

don’t want you to do it that way.” 

But at the same time, that’s the way it has been for so many years, and the 

police department has to say, “I know what’s best for this community, so 

we are going to do it that way.” It can’t be that way anymore. We have to 

have the support and the participation from the community, because if we 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 437 

don’t, we’re going to fall apart. So that’s where I think the department 

needs to improve it better. 

Another officer painted a pessimistic picture of gang unit-community relations. 

He expressed frustration with public criticism of gang unit tactics emanating, in his 

opinion, from the community’s lack of understanding of their activities. When asked how 

they might address such problems, however, this officer did not suggest better 

communication as a potential solution. 

My biggest pet peeve with people who criticize the police department is 

they don’t know what we do, and how we do it, and why we do it. There 

are so many times that we stop people on the streets and we get, “You’re 

harassing them.” And it bugs the heck out of me, because they don’t know 

why we do what we do. Then they go tell somebody else, so they make it 

known that we’re harassing them. Then somebody else says, “Oh, yeah, 

they’re harassing them.” They don’t even know why. 

Most of the time we’re out there, we do consensual stops and say, “Hey, 

what’s going on?” We get their information and take their pictures. If we 

have a normal citizen that sees us do that, they have a real problem with 

that. The unfortunate thing is they don’t why we do it. On the flip side of 

the coin is, there are things that they don’t need to know, that they 

shouldn’t know how we do our intelligence, why we do the things that we 

do. We’re not out violating people’s civil rights, we’re not out slamming 

people on the hood, ‘cause I could tell you at least five times in a shift, 

somebody will come up and say, “Do you see me slamming into the hood, 

do you see him in handcuffs, do you see him this or that?” And they still 

have a problem with that. If somebody needs to be in handcuffs or needs 

to be under arrest, then we have to do what we have to do. But we don’t 

go out there looking for people to hurt, we don’t go out there looking for 

people to put in handcuffs, or make an example of. 

But, my point is, people don’t understand why we do what we do, and 

until you walk a mile in my shoes, don’t criticize me or what I do. And I 

think the public is not educated enough on why we do what we do, and I 

don’t think they ever will be. And I think we’re going to have to battle 

with a lot of people in the public on what is happening. I mean it is getting 

worse. 

Several gang unit officers expressed the view that the relationship between the 

unit and the community should be more open. They believed that they derived benefits 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 438 

from an open relationship, and one officer said that working toward this end was 

resulting in increased information and resources. 

I think it should be an open, good relationship. I mean, there again, if 

those doors are opened up to people, other than receiving a traffic ticket 

from a policeman and having to call 911. Then they will be more apt to 

give us information when there’s a crime. They will be more apt to donate 

equipment when a fund thing erupts through the voters, they will be more 

apt to give us these fund increases. 

Overall, Las Vegas gang unit officers were consistent in their assessment of the 

extent of their department’s community policing practices, and they pointed to the 

development of teams assigned to area commands as tangible evidence. Several also 

pointed to problem-solving teams in the area commands as evidence of departmental 

problem solving. They generally described problem solving within the gang unit in more 

traditional terms, however, defining enforcement activities as the equivalent of problem 

solving. Some Las Vegas officers reported that community policing had little or no 

impact on the police response to gangs. Although some unit officers reported that 

community policing techniques were producing more community support and 

cooperation for enforcement activities in general, most gang unit officers still believed 

that the unit’s relationship with the Las Vegas community was problematic. 

Phoenix 

Nearly all Phoenix gang unit officers interviewed indicated that community 

policing was an important initiative in Phoenix. In their descriptions of the practice, 

however, several unit officers were careful to point out that the gang unit was the least 

involved in community policing. 

One gang unit officer described community policing in the department as follows: 

I think that the big rave is community-based policing. You know, you hear 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 439 

about it all the time. Where community police officers – I think that’s 

allowed the community more involvement with the police department. I 

feel like we deal with that a little bit less here than the patrol officer would 

deal with it, because we are not responding to calls for service or doing 

proactive enforcement. We are not really the main communicators with 

the public. 

Another officer also described community policing as a departmental priority, but made it 

clear that his own top priority was traditional enforcement: 

Oh, it’s top priority, you know, and it’s absolutely top priority...we in the 

gang unit, we follow the community policing practice, but like I said 

earlier, when I’m dealing with a gang member and he’s a criminal, he’s 

going to jail, period, end of story. He can get his community-based 

policing procedures in prison if he wants. 

But as far as patrol units, there are all kinds of activities they conduct. 

They do all kinds of meetings with the citizens, get citizens involved, man, 

you know the Crime Stop program...they have the citizens on patrol, or 

they get the cell phones and they give them out to their neighborhoods, 

and they call the police when they need them...when I’m dealing with a 

citizen, one-on-one contact, if they ask me any questions about our city’s 

policies or what the Phoenix Police Department is doing, I can give them 

all the answers they want. 

However, like I said, when I’m dealing with a gang member and he’s in 

custody, he’s going to jail, its very professional. I don’t degrade them in 

any way, but at that particular point in time, I’m not, you know, a 

community-based police officer. I’m an enforcement police officer at that 

time. 

Another officer responded that, although community policing was practiced, it 

was nothing new: 

It’s huge right now, and the big push for that came back when I was in 

patrol and I’d been on a few years. Those became the buzzwords around 

here, and they kind of stuck. They’re still the buzzwords: “communitybased policing.” Personally, I think community-based policing has always 

been here, it’s a matter of how they defined it or how they’ve wanted you 

to go about it. Even with the gang unit where we’re not really community 

relations oriented, obviously we can’t do what we do without the 

community calling us, giving us tips, telling us where the problems are. 

That’s still a form of community-based policing, it’s just how they’re 

going to define it, and how they’re going to push it towards dealing with 

it. It’s always been there. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 440 

Other officers echoed this sentiment, emphasizing the role of patrol in community 

policing. One officer indicated that it was practiced by patrol, but not by the gang unit 

because the latter engaged primarily in “night enforcement.” Another officer elaborated 

on the reasons that it was difficult for the gang unit to engage in community policing: 

Yeah, we work in the community, we work with the community, you 

know. We’ll go out and we’ll do meetings, you know. We’ll put together 

gang awareness meetings, those types of things, but I don’t think that 

should be our focus here. If you want to have an officer go in and instruct 

somebody on what to look for in their neighborhoods when it comes to 

gangs, what to be aware of when in their neighborhood when it comes to 

gangs, you know, alternatives on how to get their kids out of gangs, that’s 

fine. I don’t think a parent is going to want to see me, or I don’t really 

want a parent seeing me, telling them, you know, I can get your kid, send 

your kid to this program, get them out of this gang, and then this week I 

put cuffs on them. You know, how’s that going to look to them? It’s like, 

wow, you know, you were a nice guy last week, now you’re the bad guy, 

you know. 

It’s not that I want to be the bad guy, either, I just want people to know 

that is my job to enforce, do street enforcement, you know, I don’t want 

them to think that – how do I put it – it’s not that I want to be soft, but I 

don’t want the community to think that that’s all we’re going to do, is that 

we’re going to go out there and just try to reform gang members. 

Phoenix gang unit officers as a group were barely familiar with formalized 

problem solving in the department, or with the SARA problem-solving model. Some 

asked interviewers to describe the model to them; others simply admitted that they knew 

nothing about formal problem solving or SARA. A few indicated that formal problem 

solving occurred at higher levels, such as the “chief’s level,” while others knew of 

problem-solving efforts carried out at the precinct level: 

In the gang unit, [problem solving] really isn’t up here, because it’s more 

an investigative detail, there’s a certain way things have to be done. But 

when you go to the precincts, their net squads, their bike squads, they use 

it a lot, all the time. In fact, I don’t think you’re going to find a guy on one 

of the bike squads that’s been there any amount of time that hasn’t had a 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 441 

lieutenant or sergeant come to them and say, “Hey, you need to come up 

with some kind of model, some kind of action plan to take care of this 

problem.” 

That’s a big thing...SARA model...Weed and Seed programs are 

designed to target specific troubled neighborhoods. And doing that, you 

clean out a neighborhood, now obviously you’re going to push people to a 

different neighborhood, and you’ve got to continuously attack it that way. 

And I think the only way to attack it in a progressive and a proactive 

manner is through these problem-solving techniques. 

Phoenix gang unit officers were mixed in their assessments of community 

policing on the police response to gangs, and they tended make that judgment in accord 

with how they perceived it to have affected gang unit operations. Some officers indicated 

that community policing had not had an impact on the gang unit. Others were uncertain, 

or believed that its impact had been minimal, such as one who said: “I don’t think it has 

[had an impact], I think it’s a whole different concept.” Some officers thought that it 

would be difficult for the gang unit to be involved in community policing activities. The 

comments of this officer were representative of those made by others: 

...from my squad and the area I’m working, I’d say it’s pretty minimal. 

The guys who work North Side, you know, they’re the ones going on 

those marches and stuff, and stuff that those marches are getting, or 

they’re going on spurts where they’ll send a whole bunch of them all at 

once, and they’ll kind of die out for a while, so they go to those, and that 

affects them more as far as that’s concerned. You know, we work such – 

you know, the whole city really, I mean we’re assigned a precinct, but we 

really work the whole city, so it’s kind of hard for us to get into a 

community, if you will. 

Still, most officers saw community policing as beneficial to the gang unit in 

various ways, resulting in more intelligence and public pressure on the department to 

address the gang problem. As one of these officers related: 

I’d say it’s had an impact. These neighborhoods, we feel more responsible 

for the gangs that are in these neighborhoods. When these community 

groups or neighborhood block groups put the pressure on the police 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 442 

department because of gang problems in their neighborhood, then the 

police department will put the pressure on the gang unit to go solve those. 

So in kind of an indirect way, we’re solving the problem that the 

community is bringing to us. 

I think it has had a major impact, because we’re getting into the 

community and we’re finding out what the problems are. By doing that, 

we’re breaking down some of those barriers and improving some of those 

trust levels, and people can come and contact us and talk to us. And now 

we can find out who is doing what as opposed to we know it’s happening, 

but we don’t know who’s involved and nobody will tell us, we’re breaking 

those barriers down a little bit, and people are starting to trust us a little bit 

more. With that trust, we get information and intelligence, and that goes 

right back to when we have something happen, we need to be able to draw 

from that intelligence pool. 

Although Phoenix gang unit officers indicated that they used problem solving to 

address the gang problem, generally their descriptions described something other than 

formal problem-solving strategies: 

I think we use that on a regular basis. If we hear or see a gang problem, 

like at a house, we’ll do our standard workup on the house. Who lives 

there, what have they been arrested for, if anything, who lives down the 

street from them, are there friendlies to that gang house. If we’re going to 

go sit up on that house, we know who’s behind us, that kind of thing. I 

would say we use that type of approach on almost everything. 

We actually use it a lot, you know, if we have two rival gangs shooting it 

up between each other, or there’s been a homicide or what not, you know, 

we spend more time in that neighborhood, just by going down there and 

making an arrest, gathering, using informants, just a show of force could 

bring our presence down in a community more often...could dismantle the 

gang for a little bit and move them to a different location. 

Most of the gang unit officers in Phoenix indicated a need for good working 

relationships and communication between the unit and the community, especially when 

communication facilitated investigations: 

[We need] [a] good one! The same as them reporting regular criminal 

activity, they can report any gang activity or gang graffiti to us because, 

obviously, activity and graffiti are intelligence for us that lets us know 

again what’s going on in the neighborhood. If we know what’s going on in 

a neighborhood between graffiti itself, if there’s fresh graffiti and its been 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 443 

crossed out, and another gang has put their name on top of it, we know 

that in the near future that there might not only be a fight, but a shooting 

between these two groups, because they are trying to control one area and 

sooner or later, somebody is going to control it, which means either the 

other gang is going to step aside, which doesn’t happen, or they’re going 

to take over the other gang, and obviously that’s something we need to 

know about. 

I think we need to have a good relationship with the community when 

we’re investigating crimes, so we can have contacts with them. But I think 

the contacts need to be done with the community-related officers, because 

I think they’re the ones that are breaking those barriers more than 

anybody, because they’re getting out there in a friendlier, happier 

environment in the daytime. We come out at night, we’re dressed in black, 

and there’s a reason for it, and I think it’s a good reason – we want to 

emphasize that we’re hitting the gangs. We want that to be emphasized to 

the gang members themselves. At the same time, night time, these guys 

dressed in black usually don’t make people feel at ease. So I think the 

community relations officers need to break those barriers down during the 

day, so when we have those contacts at night, there’s not an automatic 

wall stuck up. At least they’ve got a badge, so we can maybe relate to 

them that way, and I think it needs to be done more in the day, and we can 

utilize those at night. 

Additionally, several officers described the relationship with the community as 

important in order for the community to better understand and support the gang unit: 

I mean, I think there’s got to be a relationship, you know, maybe a better 

understanding of how we work or what we do, but I mean I know I don’t 

want to ride around with somebody and, you know, I mean there’s 

definitely times when it’s to our benefit to do that, or it’s necessary for us 

to do that, but I don’t want a ride-along every night. I mean it would be 

stupid for me now, but when I worked nights, you know, we’d just go out 

and do it, you know, and a lot of times that that happened, whoever called 

– whoever wanted to ride, rode, and it’s like, okay. 

I would like to see a relationship where we can go into a neighborhood, 

and they are aware that we are actually there to help them. We’re not there 

to harass a particular minority group, we’re not there to arrest their babies, 

and thump on them and do what they think we do, which that’s what the 

majority of the people think. I would like to be called by the community 

and given information so that I can make their community better. I mean it 

may sound kind of hokey, but I do this job because I want to make it 

better. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 444 

Well again, I think the community needs to know who we are, what we do 

and what we’re all about. You know, so when they see us, they understand 

who we are. We get people looking at us, they’re like, you know, “geez, 

who are these guys?” You know, dressed in black and this and that. And I 

know it’s getting, a lot of them, you know the neighborhoods that don’t 

normally see us, especially when we go eat or something, they look at us 

that way. Others just flat out don’t like us because we’re the ones always 

in their neighborhoods arresting their kids and everything else, you know, 

and that’s just the way it’s going to be. If you don’t like it because of who 

we are and what we do, then they’re not going to like it. But I think they 

just need to be educated on who we are, what we’re doing, I don’t mean 

who we are as far as specifically, but, you know, what we’re doing. 

Basically what we’re all about and, you know, don’t be afraid of us just 

because we look different, our uniforms are different—doesn’t mean 

we’re anything different. We’re just set up on a different mission, if you 

will, than a normal patrol officer, and therefore we dress differently than 

the patrol. 

We found that gang unit officers in Phoenix generally considered community 

policing a department priority. However, they tended to locate the practice of community 

policing in units other than their own. They appeared less aware of formalized problem 

solving in the department, and were especially unfamiliar with the use of specific 

strategies such as the SARA model. The gang unit officers gave mixed assessments of the 

impact of community policing on the department’s response to gangs. Some officers saw 

no impact, while others saw benefits such as improved communication with the 

community that, in turn, led to more information and intelligence. 

Gang unit officers reported engaging in problem solving, but the examples they 

gave were of traditional enforcement problems and responses, and not of contemporary 

formal problem-solving strategies. Phoenix gang unit officers tended to describe the most 

desirable relationship with the community as one that generated more communication 

and useful information coming from community members into the unit, and as one that 

allowed the community to better understand and support the gang unit. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 445 

Summary 

One of the purposes of this study was to assess the fit of community policing with 

the police response to gangs, or gang units. We started by examining how police 

managers, gang unit officers, and internal and external stakeholders perceived the nature 

and extent of community policing practices in their respective departments. If community 

policing was not being pursued and practiced, our question might be moot. 

In all of our study sites, we found that community-oriented policing for the most 

part was underdeveloped. But the status of community policing in their respective 

departments was not always clear to our interviewees. For example, in Inglewood, three 

individual gang unit officers gave three conflicting assessments of the status of 

community policing in Inglewood: One thought it was well-established, one thought it 

was just getting off the ground, and the third thought that community policing was a 

concept whose time had come and gone. We found similar variability in Albuquerque, 

where some respondents reported that community policing was well-integrated into their 

policing practices, while others reported that it was on its last legs. 

Respondents as a whole gave ambiguous or overly general definitions and 

descriptions of community policing in their locales, although again, we encountered wide 

variability within and across departments. Community policing was typically defined or 

described in terms of police relationships with the community and neighborhoods. 

Several respondents described community policing as "the way policing used to be 

done," or simply as "good policing." Others thought that specialized policing units and 

problem solving exemplified community policing practice. Stakeholders, especially 

external stakeholders, tended to give positive marks to the implementation and practice of 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 446 

community policing, but as with police managers and gang unit officers, their comments 

were often vague and they frequently were unable to produce specific examples. 

Interestingly, although most gang unit officers reported that problem solving was 

practiced in their departments, these respondents most often described it in conventional 

terms, such as solving a particular enforcement problem in traditional ways, rather than in 

contemporary professional terms. Few officers appeared familiar with formal police 

problem-solving methodologies, such as the SARA model. 

Respondents appeared almost guarded in their assessments of the impact of 

community policing on local gang problems; few thought that it had had any major 

impact. Some indicated that they would view increased engagement with and input from 

the community as beneficial in addressing the gang problem, and they associated this 

kind of community interaction with community policing practice. Specifically, they noted 

as a primary benefit the potential increase in community-generated information on gangs 

and gang activity, information that could be put to use for enforcement. 

Some respondents reported or hoped for an indirect benefit from community 

policing: An engaged and informed community could become a source of political 

support, passing local bond issues for the acquisition of equipment and other resources. 

These same respondents tended to see their department's response to gangs as consistent 

with and reflecting a community-oriented approach to policing. However, some 

stakeholders, both internal and external, did report that certain gang unit enforcement 

activities had actually put a strain on police-community relations. 

We concluded that the four gang units that we studied did not engage in 

community policing or formal problem solving; in fact, many gang unit officers were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 447 

unclear about exactly what those terms meant. Gang unit officers tended not to enter into 

partnerships within their communities, and they were not proactive in seeking citizen 

input. None had used formal problem-solving strategies to plan their approaches to gangrelated problems. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 448 

Chapter 11. Conclusion and Implications 

The purpose of this report has been to provide better descriptions of gang units, 

including their origins, structure and functions, and their fit with their parent police 

organizations and contemporary policing practices. The findings generated by our 

research into four Southwestern police department gang units suggest a number of 

conclusions. Our principal findings are as follows: 

� First, two forces accounted for the creation and initial development of the 

gang units that we studied: objective gang problems within the communities, 

and external pressures applied to the police departments to respond to those 

gang problems. 

� Second, organizational mechanisms for controlling and holding the gang units 

and their personnel accountable were lacking in the gang units. They were 

operating, for the most part, without the guidance of mission statements, 

policies, or hard or soft performance measures of effectiveness, and their 

officers had received little training for their specialized responsibilities. 

� Third, the intelligence function, the gathering and sharing of gang 

information, was identified repeatedly as the principal value of these gang 

units to their stakeholders – that is, their benefit for others in their parent 

organizations and in the criminal justice system, and for members of their 

communities. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 449 

� Fourth, essentially, the gang units were strategically and structurally 

decoupled from their parent organizations. This organizational feature brought 

about several undesirable consequences. 

� Fifth, we found that the gang units that we studied were at best marginal 

participants in the community policing practices of their parent organizations, 

and in fact, they were poorly configured to support community policing 

initiatives. 

Police Gang Units as an Indirect Response to an Objective Problem 

All four cities had documentable gang problems at the time that their police 

departments decided to establish gang units. However, that decision in each police 

department occurred in response to political, public, and media pressure, and not to the 

objective reality of the gang problem. In other words, the creation of the gang units was 

an indirect rather than a direct response to local gang problems. In our assessment, a strict 

constructionist interpretation of the formation of gang units misses the mark, at least for 

our study sites. 

Most earlier researchers examining the creation of police gang units have argued 

that gang units have not been established in response to an objective threat, but rather to 

moral panics and social threats. Researchers have also argued that police officials, along 

with the media, have socially constructed local gang problems, demonizing minority and 

other marginalized youth, in order to support campaigns for additional resources. We 

have no doubt that each of the cities that we studied had very real gang problems with 

their attendant crime and violence, and none of those gang problems were constructions 

of the police department for any purpose. We also found no evidence that any of the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 450 

police departments had created gang units in order to control marginalized populations 

perceived as threatening; rather, we found evidence to the contrary. 

Much of our data suggested that minority communities were playing a major role 

in shaping the nature of the police organizations’ response to the gang problem. In almost 

all of the communities studied, we found evidence that as gang violence became a local 

reality, community members began publicly criticizing police for lack of action. In a 

number of cases, widespread rallies, meetings, and protests took place, as the public 

demanded that police “do something” about the gang problem. Their demands typically 

motivated local policymakers to inquire into the problem, and the media began reporting 

gang incidents, the public outcry, and policymakers’ actions. 

Although in each community a local gang problem had preceded the creation of 

its police gang unit, in no case was the gang unit a direct response to the problem. In fact, 

the police departments’ responses, at least initially, had little to do with enhancing 

operational efficiency and effectiveness. Instead, the specialized units were created in 

response to the institutional environment, in which public pressure to act was being 

applied. The fact that the specialized gang units were created in response to politicalinstitutional considerations, rather than to purely rational needs, eventually resulted in 

problems for some of the departments. 

In all of the cities, we encountered what appeared to be a growing lack of 

consensus about the magnitude and nature of the local gang problem, largely with respect 

to their nature and declining scope. Interestingly, internal stakeholders tended to see the 

problem as diminishing, whereas external stakeholders and at least some gang unit 

officers claimed that the problem continued to be serious. This split was complicated by 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 451 

the fact that little thoughtful analysis had been conducted to clarify the issue. 

The statistical assessment of local gang problems typically consisted of little more 

than counting the numbers of gangs and gang members. The absence of detailed analysis 

was surprising, given recent advances in information technology, crime analysis, GIS 

mapping, and the current emphasis on formal problem solving in policing with models 

such as SARA that emphasize analysis. As a result, the study participants whom we 

interviewed could provide only subjective evaluations of the local gang problem, which 

in turn made it difficult for us to objectively assess the goodness of fit of local responses 

to local problems. More often than not, study participants seemed to have based their 

appraisals of the situation on dated media accounts of the local gang problem, official 

reports from years past, and their own gang unit’s cultural lore. 

We concluded that the police agencies were often not well-positioned to respond 

efficiently or effectively to their gang problems with their gang units. Once the gang units 

had been created, abundantly staffed, and given ample resources, their autonomous 

organizational structures and operational strategies rapidly became entrenched within the 

agencies. None of the structures or strategies allowed for rational organizational 

adaptation, should the community’s gang problem, albeit still in existence, become less 

serious. 

Absence of Direction, Controls, and Accountability 

Our examination of the gang units, and of their parent police departments, found 

few formal mechanisms in place for directing and controlling gang units or for holding 

the units and their officers accountable. Many units lacked governing policies, 

procedures, and rules. Most of the departments did not adequately train officers to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 452 

perform the specialized tasks and activities necessary to fulfill the functions of their gang 

units. None of them used formal performance measures to examine the effectiveness of 

their gang units or to hold them accountable for carrying out designated responsibilities. 

First, with the exception of Las Vegas, the gang units either did not have special 

policies, procedures, and rules guiding officer behavior, or those they did have were 

overly modest in nature and scope. The fact that some units had not so much as a mission 

statement spoke to the minimal direction that the parent organizations were providing. As 

a result, unit functions and activities were largely driven by either the unit supervisor or 

an officer who had been with the unit for a long period of time. The chief of one police 

department admitted that he did not know exactly what the gang unit did or how they did 

it. The unit had been around for a long time, he explained, and he was confident that his 

officers were doing whatever they were supposed to be doing. 

Although we had no reason to think that any individual officer was acting 

inappropriately in any way, we did believe in general that the lack of formal direction 

given to the units (and to their supervisors) hampered the departments’ effectiveness in 

developing coherent and well-articulated plans for controlling community gang problems. 

Since the 1960s, police agencies across the country have sought to control the 

discretionary behavior of officers. 

The gang units that we studied were decoupled, both organizationally and 

strategically, from the rest of their departments. Given the autonomous nature of their 

work, decoupling made control and accountability even more elusive, and more critical. 

Departmental policies, procedures, and rules not only would have helped to guide the 

activities conducted by gang unit officers, but also would have established behavioral 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 453 

boundaries, so that officers could be held accountable by a clear standard. Instead, the 

gang unit officers were a force unto themselves, free to engage in whatever activities they 

wished, with little input from supervisors or administrators. 

To be sure, in accord with recently established principles of community and 

problem-oriented policing, agencies have been encouraged to limit the number of policies 

and procedures that interfere with the good judgment and discretion of officers. But this 

recent paradigm shift calls for more educated and better trained officers, with the capacity 

to move beyond responding to calls for service to solving longstanding problems within 

the community. The gang unit officers whom we studied were, for the most part, poorly 

trained by their departments on gang-related matters. Although all of the officers received 

the generally mandated trainings, most were not required to be trained for their specific 

positions within the gang unit – at least not beyond such basic elements as an 

introduction to gang culture, how to document gang members, and how to use the gang 

information system. As a consequence, officers learned primarily by on-the-job training, 

a method which was found to have its own problems. 

Accountability was further complicated by the fact that officers in three of the 

gang units were expected to engage in investigative functions; yet most had never 

performed any police function other than patrol before they were assigned to the unit. 

Although expected to investigate serious crimes, these officers had received no formal 

training in how to properly conduct such investigations. Gang unit officers were also 

responsible for disseminating gang intelligence. Officers in the two largest gang units, 

however, did not know how to operate their computerized intelligence applications. The 

officers acknowledged that they had received some training on the system, but with little 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 454 

prior computer experience, they still were not comfortable or proficient with the 

technology. This left the majority of gang unit officers unable to engage in this part of the 

very activity for which they were responsible. 

Compounding the problem, the gang unit officers were widely recognized by 

policymakers, the public, and even other police and criminal justice officials as experts 

on gangs, gang members, and gang activity. Accordingly, they often were called upon to 

serve as advisors and educators by other community agencies and law enforcement 

officers, elected officials, and the public. They served as experts and consultants on the 

gang problem – a problem about which they themselves had not been adequately trained 

or educated. Serving in these capacities, the officers shared information based on their 

own deeply held cultural beliefs, not on objective data that had been subjected to rigorous 

analysis. Important decisions were being based on such information, both within and 

outside the department. 

Finally, the gang units that we studied lacked adequate performance measures. 

Measuring police gang unit performance is important for several reasons. First, and 

perhaps most obvious, evaluation is vital for assessing the fundamental success of the 

unit. Performance evaluations provide critical feedback to police managers about their 

organizations’ gang control efforts, informing managers about strengths and weaknesses 

in their organizational structures and operational activities. The information from 

performance evaluations is used to guide decisions about disbursements of limited 

resources, and to support individual and organizational accountability for specific 

problems (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1997). 

Gang units should be evaluated for other important reasons, as well. Without 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 455 

performance measures, managers are unable to make effective administrative decisions 

relating to training, officer evaluations, and promotions. Performance measures allow 

managers to provide feedback and guidance to unit personnel, so they can continue to 

grow in productivity and effectiveness. Systematic evaluation of the unit and its 

personnel provides information to managers concerning the means that the unit uses to 

address gang-related problems. It keeps management up-to-date on the support (i.e., 

personnel and other resources) needed to address the gang problem (Mastrofski and 

Wadman 1991; Oettmeier and Wycoff 1998). 

Performance evaluations provide a means of formally socializing gang unit 

officers and holding them accountable. The measures convey agency expectations and 

inform unit officers, in an official and formal way, about the mission, goals, and priorities 

of the unit. Performance measures are essentially a detailed list of expectations regarding 

the types and numbers of activities that are to be performed and their quality. 

Performance evaluations also socialize officers informally, communicating acceptable 

styles of policing, and they help to create a shared vision of what constitutes successful 

gang control. Finally, performance measures facilitate professional development among 

officers in the unit (Oettmeier and Wycoff 1998). 

Not only did we find that these four police departments rarely conducted 

evaluations of or within their gang units, but even when evaluations did take place, 

performance and effectiveness were typically judged using global, subjective measures. 

Many participants in this study were hard-pressed to offer specific evidence of gang unit 

effectiveness, even though they assessed the local gang problem as substantial, and had 

given us generally positive assessments of their gang units. Interestingly, when we asked 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 456 

stakeholders and police managers about the units’ utility, they frequently mentioned the 

value of gang intelligence, but they seldom addressed the units’ impact on the 

amelioration of the local gang problem. Without objective performance measurements, 

management decisions about the configuration of the gang unit, or even about whether or 

not to continue having one, were necessarily premised on something other than hard 

evidence. 

Gang unit managers and their officers were generally unable to produce 

performance measures used to evaluate gang unit officers. When they did provide them, 

the measures did not reflect the specialized responsibilities and activities of the officers. 

At best, they referenced basic employee requirements (e.g., attendance, timeliness in 

turning in reports). Regardless of the mandated functions of the units and the roles of the 

gang unit officers, police managers did not appear to use even traditional police 

performance measures for evaluation, such as officer clearance rates, number of arrests 

made, and amount of intelligence collected and distributed. This oversight, we found, 

added significantly to the lack of accountability and sense of autonomy prevalent in the 

gang units that we studied, and in their officers. 

Information As The Principal Gang Unit Commodity 

Although the gang units placed organizational and cultural emphasis on 

enforcement activities, one of our principal findings was that they were engaging in a 

wide variety of activities, with enforcement playing a relatively modest role. Clearly, 

gang unit officers and some internal stakeholders valued suppression-oriented 

enforcement activity. Internal stakeholders of the gang units that did not spend much time 

on enforcement were quick to point that out as a failing. Many gang unit officers 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 457 

themselves argued that enforcement activities gave the gang unit legitimacy; they also 

argued that prevention activities had no place in a gang unit and should be the 

responsibility of community relations or another unit. At the same time, however, few 

internal or external stakeholders commented upon the value or effectiveness of their gang 

units’ enforcement efforts (e.g., directed patrols, crackdowns, investigations) in reducing 

the community gang problem or in supporting outside units’ or agencies’ efforts. 

Stakeholders seemed to view enforcement as something that gang units ought to do, but 

almost no one suggested that the gang units’ enforcement or suppression strategies were 

proving effective. 

In part, this might have been a consequence of the limited contact that occurred 

between gang unit officers and gang members. Specifically, we found that gang unit 

officers averaged only one to three gang member contacts per 8-hour shift, depending on 

the unit. Of those contacts, most resulted in intelligence gathering, not an arrest. 

Stakeholders may have not considered gang unit enforcement activities effective because 

gang unit officers were not arresting and confining large numbers of gang members, at 

least not enough of them to have a substantial effect on gang crime. 

Actors in the gang units’ environments received the most benefit when the units 

produced and disseminated of gang intelligence. Internal stakeholders frequently 

commented on the usefulness of such information in solving crimes. External 

stakeholders often made reference to the importance of intelligence to their agencies’ 

gang suppression, intervention, and prevention efforts. In reality, few department 

resources were dedicated to producing and disseminating intelligence, but from the 

perspectives of the stakeholders, this was clearly the gang units’ most important 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 458 

contribution. Perhaps this explains why their most common activities were the collection, 

processing, and dissemination of gang intelligence. 

Incorporating the intelligence function helped the gang units establish and 

maintain partnerships with other organizations that had a high degree of legitimacy. 

Intelligence-related activities were largely conducted in coordination and cooperation 

with established institutions such as criminal justice agencies, schools, and formal 

community groups that could lend organizational support to the gang unit. Association 

and alignment with organizations that had achieved high levels of legitimacy, making 

themselves useful to these organizations, the gang units also gained and sustained 

legitimacy from the organizations, as well as from those organizations’ constituents and 

other supporters. As a consequence, although some of the gang units emphasized the 

enforcement function internally, the intelligence function permitted them to survive 

because of the technical efficacy that it brought to the unit. 

We noted that gang units that prioritized gang intelligence conducted street 

activities differently than those that did not. In Inglewood, for example, gang unit officers 

acknowledged that in order to maintain productive relationships with gang members, they 

could not make arrests unless they had no other choice. Instead, when they observed 

crimes, they referred them to the department’s crime suppression unit. The officers 

believed that arresting gang members would create mistrust between the gang unit and 

gang members, hampering intelligence-gathering. Similarly, in Albuquerque, gang unit 

officers placed great importance on treating gang members respectfully, making contacts 

only when they were certain that an offense had occurred or when they had a strong 

possibility of gathering useful intelligence. Albuquerque gang unit officers explained that 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 459 

“bogus” stops and disrespectful treatment of gang members could cost the unit the trust 

of gang members and future opportunities to gather intelligence. 

The Las Vegas and Phoenix gang units, which placed more emphasis on 

enforcement, were less concerned about gang members’ perceptions of the unit. For 

instance, the gang unit officers in Las Vegas often cited the youths for walking the wrong 

direction down the street, jaywalking, and driving infractions. We observed them 

frequently stop, frisk, and question youths for no legal reason. In Phoenix, although not 

as aggressive as in Las Vegas, gang unit officers did frequently stop individuals for minor 

traffic offenses, hoping to gather intelligence. In both communities, such actions not only 

caused gang members to share far less intelligence with gang unit officers, but it also 

resulted in community dissatisfaction with police conduct, because ordinary citizens in 

their own neighborhoods frequently were stopped when gang unit officers mistook them 

for gang members. 

Strategic And Structural Decoupling Of Gang Units 

All of the police departments studied had decoupled their gang control units in 

one or more ways from the parent police organization. Decoupling stands in contrast to 

the normative theoretical position that structural patterns within an organization should 

be tightly coupled with activities, so that the structures conform to a consistent and 

clearly articulated set of expectations (Donaldson and Preston 1995). In contrast, 

institutional theorists maintain that some organizations function better if structure and 

activities are decoupled, enabling the organization to carry out core activities while at the 

same time engaging in activities substantially different from those core activities (Meyer 

and Rowen 1977). 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 460 

The gang units’ activities occurred well apart from the parent organizations’ 

operational practices and activities; they were not well-integrated or connected with 

departmental structural patterns or activities. As prescribed by the loose-coupling 

perspective, we found the gang units we studied to be strategically and structurally 

decoupled from the larger police organization. In accord with the decoupling, gang unit 

officers were not held responsible for performing core policing activities. Instead, the 

gang units that we observed allowed their officers to engage in buffet-style policing, 

picking and choosing what to do and when to do it. 

Gang unit officers were generally not responsible, for example, for responding to 

calls for service or performing other tasks associated with routine patrol activity. The 

gang unit officers only responded to calls that interested them. For example, if an officer 

believed that a call for service broadcast over the radio might be gang-related, he might 

back up the dispatched patrol officer. Efforts like this typically were made when an 

officer suspected that valuable intelligence might come from the contact. Supervisors and 

officers strongly emphasized that the unit was not required to handle calls for service, 

however, and that they considered responding to them a distraction from the units’ core 

missions. 

Similarly, in most of the gang units that we studied, officers were highly selective 

when accepting cases for investigation. Gang unit officers were typically only interested 

in investigating (whether in a primary or auxiliary capacity) gang-involved cases with a 

high probability of giving up valuable intelligence and in high-profile cases. As a result, 

gang unit officers most often investigated crimes such as homicide, drive-by shootings, 

and aggravated assaults. Even when they were clearly gang-related, the gang unit officers 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 461 

did not normally handle less serious crimes. 

In most of the gang units, such strategic decisions were not dictated by a superior 

nor did they emerge from a well-articulated vision of what the gang unit ought to be 

doing toward achieving its goals. Rather, operational activities in most units tended to 

arise from the unique workgroup subculture that existed within the gang units, reflecting 

the officers’ shared beliefs about the nature of the gang problem and the appropriate 

response to that problem. 

The gang units in Las Vegas, Albuquerque, and Phoenix demonstrated the use of 

structural decoupling by police organizations in their response to gangs. All of the gang 

units that we observed exhibited high degrees of autonomy, with several factors 

contributing to this. Physical location was among the most important, and these three 

units were all operating from off-site, “secret” facilities. Nearly all other police officers 

and criminal justice stakeholders were kept in the dark about their locations. Even those 

select few who may have been told where to find them could not enter unescorted; the 

facilities were secured, and only gang unit officers had keys and access codes. 

Various rationales were offered to justify the secret locations. The principal one 

was to offer protection from gang retaliation for officers who felt safer working in the 

secure, off-site facilities. Protection was an issue for the officers; some took further 

precautions, traveling varied routes from work to avoid being followed home. In a few 

instances, we thought that the espoused need for secrecy had become cloaked with a cold 

war, spy-like quality, some gang officers asserting that their regular precinct stations or 

police headquarters had become subject to penetration by gangsters, rendering 

intelligence files vulnerable to destruction or manipulation. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 462 

When the police departments that we studied decided to centralize the 

responsibility for responding to local gang problems, that decision meant that the gang 

units would almost certainly become decoupled from their parent organizations. Police 

departments have two alternatives for disbursing resources allocated to responding to 

community problems. Traditionally, police departments have centralized these resources. 

More recently, however, with the advent of community-oriented policing, departments 

have begun to decentralize, realigning resources more closely with the communities they 

serve and the problems they address. As they configured their responses to gangs, the 

four departments we studied had to decide whether to disburse their resources and 

conduct activities at the precinct or neighborhood level (decentralizing), or to consolidate 

resources and activities at one location (centralizing). Nationwide, gang units had come 

to represent a form of organizational centralization; true to form, none of the units that we 

studied were decentralized. 

Centralization and autonomy are not necessarily identical, but in these units, it 

appeared that they went hand-in-hand. The gang unit supervisors and officers we 

interviewed believed that consolidation and centralization would permit their officers, 

through training and experience, to develop more highly developed technical skills than 

otherwise would be possible. Additionally, they pointed out, centralizing allowed more 

orderly distribution of gang-related work and enabled police departments to coordinate 

their responses to community gang problems. 

Whatever its potential advantages, centralization and the structural decoupling of 

the gang units had created several problems for their parent departments. First, we found 

that decoupling had isolated the gang unit officers from the rest of their police 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 463 

organizations. Because the gang units were strategically and structurally removed, gang 

unit officers interacted infrequently with patrol officers and investigators. They also 

tended to isolate themselves from the community. Gang units and gang unit officers were 

found to pick those with whom they would interact; that is, most interactions with 

outsiders were initiated by the officers for their own purposes, instead of in response to 

requests for assistance from patrol officers, detectives, or even citizens. 

We also found that centralization and its associated characteristics seemed to have 

reduced the gang units’ capacity to receive and provide information. This was especially 

true within the departments, particularly with police units engaged in core policing 

activities such as patrol and investigations. We noted earlier that gang unit stakeholders 

within police departments considered the information contained in gang intelligence 

databases to be the most valuable commodity controlled by the gang unit. These 

stakeholders’ overall assessments of their gang units often were directly related to their 

perceptions of the local unit’s performance in developing and providing intelligence. 

Stakeholders tended to view the gang units most positively when they perceived the units 

as proactive in developing and freely disseminating intelligence, and as appreciating the 

gang-related intelligence contributed by others in the police organization. 

Internal stakeholders in the Inglewood police department (the most tightly 

coupled unit of those we observed) tended to give positive evaluations to their gang unit, 

largely because they could easily access gang intelligence to use in criminal 

investigations. Similarly, in Phoenix, Community Action Officers (CAOs), police 

officers tasked with community-oriented policing practices, were quick to acknowledge 

the value of gang unit intelligence in helping them respond appropriately in the 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 464 

community. For example, one CAO described an experience responding to a complaint 

about gang members hanging out on a certain corner. He initially found the youths, 

wearing baggy pants and sports team-affiliated clothing, hanging out as reported, but an 

inquiry to the gang unit failed to link them with membership in any gang. With that 

information, the CAO was able to avoid inappropriately treating the youths as gang 

members, and could reassure the complainants that these were just “kids hanging out” – 

not part of a larger gang problem. 

On the other hand, in Albuquerque and Las Vegas – departments with more 

loosely coupled gang units – department stakeholders complained that their gang units 

failed to provide intelligence and that the officers seemed disinterested in cooperating to 

generate new intelligence. Stakeholders’ overall assessments of the gang units’ 

performance reflected their dissatisfaction in this area. The potential for gang units to fail 

to produce products valued by other police units is a problem often associated with loose 

coupling, one that affects the support received by gang units from other parts of the 

organization. When internal stakeholders perceived their gang units not to be taking care 

of business, they were less likely to view those units as legitimate, and that, in turn, 

threatened the units’ institutional viability. 

Second, centralization that included off-site and secretive locations (and other 

organizational characteristics that promoted autonomy) had consequences for both the 

gang unit and the parent police department. Not only are centralized units more likely to 

become autonomous, but so are their officers. Both formal, direct line supervision and 

informal supervision (e.g., officers being observed by supervisors in other units) was 

often minimal in the gang units that we studied. Autonomy makes it difficult for 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 465 

departments to maintain oversight and hold gang units and their officers accountable for 

their actions and results. In fact, we found that the police departments that we studied had 

left the organizational character of the gang unit by default largely to the subculture of 

the gang units. 

Third, related to the above, a still greater problem with loosely coupled gang units 

is the potential for them to develop unique internal subcultures that can become at odds 

with the mission of the parent department, or even with the law itself. This problem is 

exemplified by findings from the recent investigation of corruption in the Los Angeles 

Police Department’s Rampart Command Area. The investigation included LAPD’s own 

investigation of the Rampart Areas CRASH unit (Community Resources Against Street 

Hoodlums), the department’s version of a gang unit. Investigators concluded that the 

decoupled gang unit had developed a culture that contributed to the corruption incident 

which, among other things, involved gang unit officers framing gang members. 

The “Rampart Way” mentality was particularly strong with Rampart 

CRASH. The inquiry uncovered ample evidence that Rampart CRASH 

had developed its own culture and operated as an entity unto itself. It 

routinely made up its own rules and, and for all intents and purposes, was 

left to function with little or no oversight. This certainly perpetuated a 

feeling of cultural elitism and was a significant factor in this corruption 

incident (LAPD 2000, 61). 

Interestingly, the LAPD Rampart CRASH unit demonstrated that complete 

physical isolation is not necessary for decoupling to occur, since the CRASH unit shared 

facilities with patrol prior to moving into separate quarters. The separation conducive to 

decoupling was found to be in part social-psychological, and not entirely physical. The 

following excerpts from the LAPD report illustrate this point: 

The CRASH unit developed into an entity unto itself. It maintained its 

own booking bench and only CRASH supervisors provided booking 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 466 

approval and signed arrest reports. At one point CRASH had it own kit 

room, separate from the patrol kit room. This became problematic when a 

watch commander attempted to identify officers involved in a complaint, 

but could not find a worksheet for the CRASH vehicles. 

Separate roll calls from the from the patrol division, a unique patch and 

jackets, an emphasis on narcotics enforcement, and an outward appearance of elitism 

were common CRASH traits that Rampart shared with other CRASH and specialized 

units. The supervisor who took over Rampart CRASH in 1992 had prioritized making 

every CRASH officer into a narcotics expert. Although CRASH’s primary function was 

gang intelligence, the supervisor justified the narcotics enforcement emphasis by pointing 

out the correlation between gangs and narcotics. 

A wide chasm developed between patrol supervisors and Rampart CRASH 

officers. Several supervisors recalled the CRASH practice of specifically requesting a 

CRASH supervisor at the scene of a crime. If a patrol supervisor showed up instead, 

CRASH officers would tell him that he was no longer needed, or that a CRASH 

supervisor was on the way. Similarly, CRASH would often specifically request a CRASH 

unit when back up was needed. These practices fostered a sense of exclusion that resulted 

in other officers and supervisors avoiding CRASH incidents (LAPD 2000, 69). 

The Los Angeles Police Department’s own findings in this case illustrated some 

of the consequences of decoupling gang units that we have mentioned above. For 

example, LAPD identified weak supervision as part of the problem: “The apparent lack 

of supervisory and management control over the CRASH unit was a significant factor 

identified during this inquiry” (LAPD 2000, 61). The chasm between Rampart CRASH 

and patrol reflected the decoupling consequence of autonomous units not being 

responsive to others. The emphasis on narcotics in CRASH, while the principal and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 467 

formally assigned function of the unit was gang intelligence, reflected the loosely 

coupled unit’s characteristic lack of goal consensus. In addition, throughout the report, 

evidence demonstrated the lack of information sharing between CRASH and other units 

involved in the technical core of policing, such as patrol. 

Gang Units and Community Policing 

In recent decades, police departments across the country have responded to local 

gang problems by establishing specialized police gang units, coinciding with the 

nationwide emergence of community-oriented policing. Community-oriented policing 

emphasizes decentralization and de-specialization, but the inherent nature of gang units 

seems to promote the opposite. The conflict raises several questions that we sought to 

answer in this report: Do police gang units support and facilitate community-oriented 

policing? Is the character of police gang units compatible with community-oriented 

policing philosophy and practice, or conversely, do the units constrain or even undermine 

development of community-oriented policing within the department? Are the 

organizational and structural characteristics and practices of gang units consistent with 

community-oriented policing principles and practice? 

In both scholarly and practitioner literature, a good deal of attention has recently 

been paid to the key features and principles of community-oriented policing (Cordner 

1999; Dunworth and Abt Assoc. Inc. et al. 2000; Greene 2000). Police scholars and 

practitioners have not reached complete consensus on all of the defining characteristics of 

community policing, but they are in general agreement about the core features that 

distinguish it from traditional “reactive” policing: citizen input, geographic focus, 

emphasis on prevention, partnerships, formal problem solving, and management 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 468 

(Dunworth and Abt Assoc. Inc. 2000). 

Citizen Input 

Community policing seeks direct input from citizens. It then uses that input to 

identify and prioritize community problems, and to formulate responses. The gang units 

that we observed had generally made little or no systematic effort to obtain or use direct 

citizen input, even though the initial formation of the gang units was in response to 

community pressure to do something about a local gang problem (Huff 1993; C. Katz 

2001). 

Although the gang units rarely sought citizen input, we did observe some 

exceptions. For example, in Albuquerque, the gang unit was working closely with a 

neighborhood organization to reduce local gang-related crime. Likewise, in Phoenix, at 

the request of several neighborhood associations, the police department had allocated 

additional personnel to the gang unit to devote more attention to the north side of the city. 

Overall, however, we found little evidence of regular dialogue between citizens and gang 

units, and even less evidence of gang units systematically pursuing citizen input to 

identify and solve neighborhood problems. The lack of communication between citizens 

and the gang unit became particularly problematic when the unit attempted to carry out 

enforcement operations. We found that enforcement operations conducted without prior 

citizen input or awareness – not to mention without the input and awareness of other 

police units – were creating serious community relations problems. For example, during 

one unannounced gang unit action in a Las Vegas neighborhood, a district commander 

recalled getting calls from the neighborhood’s residents describing an invasion of officers 

in ninja-like uniforms. Not only were the residents upset, but the area commander was 

unhappy, as well, that an action had been carried out in his community policing area 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 469 

without prior consultation or warning. Such occurrences distanced the gang unit from the 

community, and especially from minority communities since most gang unit operations 

were conducted in non-white neighborhoods. 

Geographic Focus 

Unlike traditional reactive policing, community policing designates geographic 

areas such as neighborhoods and police beats as the basis for assigning accountability, as 

well as for assessing performance in managing crime levels and community problems. 

Police gang units have often had a geographical focus, since in the past gangs were turfbased. The common measure of success, at least from the public’s perspective, has 

usually been area-wide reduction in gang-related crime and activity. 

Sustaining that geographical focus had become challenging for nearly all the gang 

units that we observed, however. In their view, local gangs were becoming less territorial. 

In Las Vegas, gang unit officers maintained that destruction of public housing had 

displaced and dispersed gang members formerly based in those complexes. As a result, 

they argued, gangs were no longer associated with specific neighborhoods; members of a 

given gang were likely to be scattered, living in several different neighborhoods. 

The Phoenix gang unit was the exception. Here, gang unit squads were assigned 

to precincts, and individual officers were responsible for particular gangs in their 

precincts. The Phoenix officers argued that this configuration increased their familiarity 

with assigned neighborhoods and their knowledge about particular gangs, which in turn 

had been helpful in investigations of gang-related crimes. Still, we found no evidence that 

officers or squads were being held accountable for gang control efforts in particular 

geographic areas.13 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 470 

Prevention 

Community policing emphasizes prevention as a key tactic for managing crime 

and disorder. Officers are to be proactive, addressing potential problems before they 

materialize. As Klein (1995a) pointed out, however, only about eight percent of gang 

units carry out prevention-related activities. Klein’s finding proved to be the case for the 

four gang units that we observed. Officers in all of these units believed their 

responsibilities did not include addressing underlying problems related to gang crime. 

They argued that the nature of the job was essentially reactive; they were to respond to 

real problems, after they occurred. Some officers counted directed patrols in gang areas 

and investigation of gang crimes as prevention, because the activities deterred future 

crimes. 

Generally, the few activities with prevention potential that were carried out by the 

gang units took the form of educational presentations at schools, community groups, and 

other law enforcement agencies. These typically covered topics such as the gang unit’s 

mission, the history of the local gang problem, and typical gang member beliefs and 

behaviors. We found these were not given for the purpose of addressing or reducing 

underlying gang-related problems, however. Instead, as the officers explained, the 

presentations were part of a public service campaign to educate audiences about the role 

of the gang unit and the nature of the local gang problem meant to increase public 

support. In sum, we found few gang unit activities undertaken with prevention in mind. 

Partnerships 

An important theme in community policing has been that police can form 

productive problem-solving partnerships when they coordinate and collaborate with 

community groups, other government agencies, the private sector, and nonprofit agencies 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 471 

that share their objectives. This could apply to gang control activities, but the number of 

such partnerships varied in our study sample, with some units having formalized 

partnerships and others lacking partnerships entirely. 

Surprisingly, the Inglewood gang unit was among those functioning completely 

without partnerships. The Inglewood unit’s claim that information and intelligence was 

its primary commodity would lead one to think that formal networks would be developed 

to distribute that intelligence; this was not the case. Similarly, Albuquerque’s gang unit 

was in the midst of an organizational transformation, and it was not formally partnering 

with others in the community or with other criminal justice agencies. 

Las Vegas and Phoenix gang units had established informal partnerships with 

several criminal justice agencies. For example, Las Vegas engaged in weekly “Rock Pile” 

intelligence exchange sessions with department officers and probation, parole, and 

corrections criminal justice officials. The Phoenix gang unit had a similar arrangement, 

albeit slightly more organized, with criminal justice agencies in its metropolitan area. 

Phoenix’s gang unit had initiated a gang liaison program, formalizing its 

partnership with patrol officers with an interest in gangs, to train them to identify and 

document gang members. The program was intended to strengthen the relationship 

between the units. Many participants believed that the program’s significance was that it 

put gang unit officers in closer contact with patrol officers, who had more contact with 

gang members. Gang unit officers believed that the liaison program increased their 

intelligence capabilities. 

A similar program had been established in Albuquerque. However in that 

community, specific gang unit officers were assigned as liaisons to each of the area 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 472 

commands. Area command personnel indicated that these officers were spending time at 

the commands on a regular basis. 

The gang units that we studied rarely formed intentional partnerships with 

community groups, local businesses, or state and other local agencies. When they did, the 

partnerships typically were with criminal justice personnel, for the purpose of exchanging 

gang-related intelligence. Nowhere did gang unit officers appear to value information 

from non-criminal justice agencies, and none of them seemed to recognize potential value 

in sharing their own information and knowledge with non-criminal justice personnel. 

Those attitudes clearly made it more difficult for the gang unit to collaborate with the 

community in their gang control efforts. 

Formal Problem Solving 

Formal problem solving using a standardized methodology, such as the SARA 

(Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) model, is a defining element of community 

policing. Typically, formal problem solving begins with a process to identify crime and 

community problems, working at the level of a specific police beat, neighborhood, or 

address. To be successful, problem-solving relies upon having certain community 

policing prerequisites already in place. For instance, close connections with the 

community are needed to assure that the problems addressed are, in fact, relevant and 

important in the minds of the community members. Both problem analysis and responses 

developed as part of the problem-solving process require participants with an interest in 

the problem or in contributing to its solution, from the community, other police units, and 

other organizational stakeholder groups. 

We observed little evidence of police gang units initiating or participating in this 

kind of formal problem solving. There appeared to be two dominant reasons. First, gang 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 473 

units were decoupled from their parent organizations, and connections with community 

and other key stakeholders that could have facilitated formal problem-solving were 

generally missing. Second, most gang unit officers were untrained or were only vaguely 

familiar with SARA or other formal problem-solving models. We found that the gang 

units simply did not routinely consider formal problem solving as a strategy for 

addressing local gang problems. 

Interestingly, we found none of the police departments engaging in any form of 

analysis to better understand their cities’ gang problems. Community gang control 

activities most often were planned and implemented in accord with popular beliefs about 

problems, rather than being grounded in thoughtful analysis. It appears, then, that if gang 

units are to engage in any formal problem-solving efforts, they should begin at this point 

– collecting and carefully analyzing available data about their particular gang problems. 

Management Tactics 

Community policing calls upon managers to rely less upon formal rules and 

policies to guide organizational decision-making and employee behavior, and more on 

intentionally developing an organizational culture and values. This is typically done by 

creating and communicating mission statements, participatory strategic planning, and 

coaching and mentoring. The objective is to empower officers to take reasoned risks as 

they respond to problems, but at the same time, to provide enough organizational 

direction to ensure that officers work toward common goals (Cordner 1999). 

Two of the four gang units studied (Phoenix and Las Vegas) had mission 

statements, broadly articulating that the units were to engage in gang control and setting 

out the primary functions of the units (enforcement and intelligence). Two units did not 

have written mission statements, and were given no other verbal guidance pertaining to 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 474 

their goals and functions. In both Inglewood and Albuquerque, senior gang officers, one a 

sergeant and the other an officer with 25 years of experience, had essentially determined 

an implied mission and set of functions, simply in the way that they conducted business. 

In those units, police executives relied heavily upon these officers’ expertise and 

knowledge to focus their units’ efforts on “what really mattered.” 

Only the Phoenix unit had engaged in a formal strategic planning process. Gang 

unit supervisors there had worked with the city council to develop a long-term strategic 

plan to address the community’s gang problems. Afterward, they met with city council 

members each quarter to discuss trends in gang-related activity and gang unit 

performance (e.g., number of arrests, amount of drugs confiscated, number of guns taken 

off the street, number of gang members documented). Based on this information, the city 

council would redistribute resources. 

For the most part, gang unit officers appeared to work without supervision. When 

officers worked the streets, they might go weeks or longer without a sergeant observing 

them. When asked, officers and supervisors in all gang units agreed that the autonomous 

nature of gang work was not conducive to field supervision. Only the best officers were 

selected for the gang unit, they argued, so the independence afforded by the job would be 

unlikely to lead to problems. In addition, written guidance (e.g., a mission statement, 

policies and procedures) was unavailable in two of the sites studied, and oral guidance 

(e.g., supervision, coaching) was lacking or rarely occurred for gang units at all four sites. 

This accounted for the fact that the practical mission and functions of each gang unit had 

evolved by the time of this study to reflect the units’ subcultures and strong individual 

interests. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 475 

In sum, the police gang units that we studied were generally poorly designed to 

engage in or support community policing efforts. The units tended to be centralized, 

while community policing emphasizes decentralization. Frequently they were 

geographically isolated from the communities and neighborhoods they served. 

Community partnerships were largely absent, and when they existed, they tended to be 

entered into solely for the purpose of increasing the unit’s access to information, and not 

for the co-production of public safety. Although gang unit members and gang unit 

stakeholders saw gangs and gang crime as a problem, there was little evidence of the 

“problem orientation” that characterizes community policing and its variants. The gang 

units that we studied were barely familiar with community policing problem-solving 

strategies, much less engaging in them. 

We concluded that the gang unit officers in these units were free to undertake any 

activity that interested them, they had few expectations to meet, and they had virtually no 

policies or training to guide their decision-making. Gang unit officers were also rarely 

under the control or supervision of police management. They were physically and 

operationally isolated from the rest of the police department, and typically had little 

contact with “regular” police officers, criminal justice officials, the public, or community 

groups. In short, these gang unit officers were on their own. 

Final Thoughts 

Our observations of the workings of police gang units led us to several 

conclusions and recommendations. The gang units that we observed could be placed in 

two different categories that have some features in common, but that are really very 

different. Inglewood’s gang unit was in a category of its own, as a single-function 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 476 

intelligence unit tasked with developing information on gangs and gang members and 

disseminating that information to other units in the police department. The other three 

gang units (Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Phoenix) were multifunctional gang units or 

comprehensive units tasked with various functions – intelligence, enforcement, and 

prevention. 

Our general conclusion is that for Inglewood, in the context of that community 

and police department, a relatively small gang unit (three sworn officers) focusing 

entirely on intelligence made sense. The Inglewood Police Department and the city itself 

had faced one financial crisis after another, and it was extremely important for the police 

response to gangs to be as cost-effective as possible. Although we had no hard measure 

of this, we suspected that the level of Inglewood’s financial investment in the small 

single-function gang unit was appropriate, especially in comparison with the cost of 

multi-function or comprehensive gang units. As we noted earlier, stakeholders in the 

Inglewood police department greatly valued the intelligence function of their gang unit, 

and were able to provide fairly dramatic examples of its utility in solving crimes. 

Interestingly, external stakeholders also valued the Inglewood unit’s intelligence 

function. For example, the director of a large Inglewood cemetery, the largest single 

industry in Inglewood, pointed to occasions when gang unit intelligence had enabled him 

to take special precautions in conducting funerals involving the victims of inter-gang 

shootings so that conflicts would not flare up at the funeral ceremony. 

Inglewood’s gang unit was not located off-site, but was in the central police 

facility in close proximity to the criminal investigation bureau. Co-location facilitated the 

sharing of information, the gang unit’s principal commodity, and generally kept the unit’s 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 477 

“customers” satisfied. However, this is not to imply that the gang unit’s customers were 

completely satisfied, or that the unit was completely integrated into the larger police 

organization. In the view of some internal stakeholders, over time the gang unit had 

become less proactive in developing new intelligence. They were seen as spending too 

much time in the office and not enough in the field, where they needed to be if they were 

to identify new gangs and gang members and track changes in patterns of gang activity. 

In contrast to Inglewood, the other gang units that we observed seemed to share 

common patterns of development that reflected increasing decoupling. They also 

exhibited similar consequences; as a rule, they were isolated from core policing 

technology units, lacked supervision and accountability, were inaccessible to the 

community, lacked strategic vision, and had developed a separate gang unit subculture. 

The gang units’ inability or reluctance to share information with others in their police 

organizations caused their internal stakeholders to devalue the units. Furthermore, if these 

units seemed isolated from mainstream policing in their respective departments, they 

were even more isolated from community policing activities. Occasional exceptions were 

found, illustrating the potential for gang units to play a stronger role in both traditional 

and community policing activities. As mentioned earlier, in Phoenix, Community Action 

Officers had access to the gang unit for assistance with sorting out gang members from 

non-gang youth in response to a citizen’s concern about a potential neighborhood 

problem. Additionally, officers in Phoenix who participated in the gang liaison program 

were able to access the gang intelligence system directly from precinct computers, and to 

serve as expert resources for other precinct personnel. 

We also noted that at least two departments (Albuquerque and Las Vegas) were 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 478 

searching for ways to reduce the effects of decoupling and to reconnect their gang units 

with core policing units. We have concluded that the recoupling of gang units should be a 

high priority for police departments throughout the country, as they continue to seek 

more effective responses to local gang problems, and at the same time, to more fully 

implement community policing. High-profile incidents, such as the Los Angeles CRASH 

unit’s framing of gang members, or more recently in Chicago where gang unit personnel 

are alleged to have participated in drug trafficking, are dramatic reflections of the 

consequences of decoupling gang units from mainstream policing. These two examples 

are the exception, not the rule, but the need to recouple gang units with their parent 

organizations also stems from needing to find more cost-effective responses to the gang 

problem, while concurrently implementing community-oriented policing more fully. 

Our observations convinced us that police organizations need to reassess the 

organizational configurations of their responses to gangs, and the investment of resources 

in those responses. The starting point is a careful and thoughtful assessment of the local 

gang problem to learn whether or not it is presently of sufficient magnitude to warrant a 

specialized unit. To be sure, the gang units that we observed had been established in 

communities with substantial gang problems, and the specialized gang units were a 

reasonable response. However, we suspect that a substantial number of gang units 

developed in the last decade were not in response to local gang problems, but were the 

result of mimetic processes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 

Mimetic processes are a consequence of organizations modeling themselves after 

other organizations. DiMaggio and Powell (1991, 67-8) explain that mimetic processes 

may occur when 1) little consensus exists as to which organizational structures and 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 479 

operational activities are most efficient and effective, 2) organizational goals are unclear, 

or 3) the “environment creates symbolic uncertainty”(e.g., is there or is there not a gang 

problem in our community). 

The authors argue that organizations mimic others in response to uncertainty. By 

adopting the same organizational structures and operational activities that are used by 

organizations considered successful, an agency can itself gain legitimacy. If anything, the 

authors argue, such a move illustrates to the institutional environment that the 

organization is acting to improve the (albeit ambiguous) situation. 

We suspect that many police departments created gang units for reasons related to 

institutional legitimacy rather than to actual environmental contingencies. Klein (1995a) 

alludes to this point in his discussion of Sergeant Wes McBride of the Los Angeles 

Sheriff’s Department (LASD). Many departments across the nation have adopted the 

structures and strategies recommended by McBride and the LASD because of its national 

reputation, rather than because the model is necessarily appropriate for their own 

jurisdiction’s gang problem. 

There is evidence that some police departments are disbanding gang units (C. 

Katz, Maguire and Roncek 2000), but it unclear whether this is in response to a 

diminished local gang problem, a growing awareness of problems stemming from 

decoupled gang units, or other issues. One would hope that these decisions are being 

made following careful assessment of local gang problems. However, gangs do remain a 

problem in jurisdictions throughout the country, and therefore they warrant a continued 

response on the part of police. The challenge becomes one of reassessing present patterns 

of response and adjusting them to attain the highest possible level of effectiveness. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 480 

1

 For example, persons on skid-row (Bittner 1967), domestic violence (Sherman 1992), and minorities 

(Bayley and Mendleson 1969; Westley 1970; Skolnick 1994). 

2

 In addition, there were practical reasons for selecting these cities. They were geographically proximate to 

the researchers’ home institution, simplifying the logistics and minimizing the costs of the field work. 

3

 Curry et al. (1992) reported that the median size gang unit in the United States was 10 personnel. They 

further reported that only approximately 20 percent of established gang units have 20 or more personnel. 

4

 As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, Albuquerque was later staffed with an additional six officers, 

bringing the total number of officers assigned to the unit to nine. As a consequence, field observation in 

Albuquerque involved three officers, while we interviewed nine officers. 

5

 Dr. Robin Haarr was instrumental in conducting many of the gang unit officer interviews in Las Vegas, 

Inglewood, and Albuquerque. We thank her for her assistance. 

6

 A small number of internal and external stakeholders who were law enforcement personnel did not want 

their interviews recorded. 

7

 The contention that Bloods and Crips moved into the city because there was less drug sale competition 

and greater profitability is one that we heard repeatedly in a number of departments. We know of no hard 

evidence to support or dispute this claim. 

8

 The other 20 percent indicated that they did not know whether migration had had an impact on the gang 

problem. However, no officers believed that gang migration had no impact on the city’s gang problem. 

9

 Although all four gang units were responsible for documenting gang members, other criminal justice 

agencies participated, as well. For example, in Las Vegas, parole and probation officers specializing in 

gang member’s cases were occasionally involved in documentation. They did so by completing Field 

Interrogation (FI) cards, checking appropriate fields and providing other required information. The 

completed cards were then turned in to the police gang unit. We were unable to determine the extent of 

documentation by parole and probation officers. 

10 This qualitative data was then coded and categorized. Because many of the respondents stated that they 

used multiple outcomes to assess the effectivness of the gang unit, each response category represented the 

number of times that an outcome or measure was discussed or mentioned by all of those interviewed. As 

such, columns do not total 100 percent. 

11 Jurisdiction over homicide investigations in the Las Vegas Police Department was in dispute as we were 

conducting our study. The homicide unit had jurisdiction over all homicide investigations, gang-related and 

otherwise. The gang unit was arguing that it should be responsible for gang-related homicide 

investigations. 

12 This claim was not substantiated by official department data. 

13 With the exception of Phoenix, the gang units that we observed were not held accountable for long-term 

reductions in gang-related problems. Only process indicators were measured, such as the number of arrests 

or the number of individuals documented, to assess gang control efforts – not outcome measures. 
Police Response to Gangs: A Multi-Site Study 481 

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