www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 5 1 

During the Cold War, space was the private reserve of the two superpowers. But American allies drew great benefits from U.S. investment in space. For the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), it was the “high frontier” from which we could support 

collective defense and project power with near impunity.

Today, space is a shared domain in which we operate together with more 

and more countries—friends and allies as well as potential adversaries. It is a 

domain that is increasingly challenged, and the nature of these challenges can be 

characterized by “three Cs”: congested, contested, and competitive:

◆ Congested: There are over 1,100 active systems in orbit, and an additional 

21,000 pieces of trackable debris. Radio frequency interference is also a concern, with more than 9,000 satellite transporters expected in orbit by 2015.

◆ Contested: China demonstrated a direct ascent antisatellite capability in 2007 

and is developing other capabilities to disrupt and disable satellites. Iran and 

others have demonstrated the ability to jam satellite signals. Our reliance on 

space tempts potential adversaries to see it as an exploitable vulnerability.

◆ Competitive: A total of 11 countries operate 22 launch sites. More than 60 

nations and government consortia operate satellites. This not only creates 

new challenges but also opens opportunities for international cooperation—including within NATO.

A New Strategy for Space

To address these challenges, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Director of 

National Intelligence approved the inaugural National Security Space Strategy 

in 2011.1 The first objective of the strategy is to strengthen safety, stability, and 

Protecting NATO’s 

Advantage in Space

by Gregory L. Schulte

Transatlantic Current

National Defense University

About the Author

Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte 

is Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Space Policy. His 

previous assignments include 

Permanent Representative to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

and Director of Crisis Management 

and Operations at North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization Headquarters 

during the Alliance’s first out-of-area 

deployments to the Balkans.

Key Points

◆ The North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) is an 

alliance enabled by space. NATO 

operations increasingly take 

advantage of space, but potential 

adversaries are seeking to negate 

that advantage.

◆ In Libya, during Operation Unified 

Protector in 2011, satellites 

helped to acquire targets and 

attack them with precision. In 

Afghanistan, satellites help 

International Security Assistance 

Force troops map their routes 

and look over the next ridgeline. 

Off the Horn of Africa, satellites 

help NATO maritime forces track 

shipping and conduct antipiracy 

operations.

◆ While NATO is critically 

dependent on space, its doctrine 

and planning have not kept up. 

NATO doctrine and planning need 

to evolve in order to preserve the 

operational benefits afforded by 

space-based capabilities and to 

minimize vulnerabilities.

May 2012

Center for Transatlantic Sec

urity S

t

udies
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 5 2 

security in space. The second is to maintain and enhance 

national security advantages that space affords the United States and its Allies.

Three key aspects of the strategy are promoting responsible use of space, operating with Allies and partners, and deterring and protecting against attacks on 

space capabilities.

Promoting Responsible Use of Space. Under the new 

strategy, the United States continues to lead in promoting 

responsible use of space. Every day, U.S. Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) tracks the growing number of objects in 

space and, when necessary, provides warning to owner-operators in order to help avoid collisions. Over the past year, 

USSTRATCOM’s Joint Space Operations Center provided 

over 1,300 warnings to satellite operators across the world. 

USSTRATCOM has been providing these warnings on an 

emergency basis, but was recently authorized to negotiate 

agreements for sharing space data on a more regular basis.

The United States is also leading efforts in several 

fora to strengthen international norms of responsible behavior.2

 Earlier this year, the United States decided to 

join with the European Union and other space-faring 

countries to develop an international code of conduct 

for outer space activities. A transparent and widely subscribed code could encourage responsible space behavior 

and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing 

the risk of misunderstanding and misconduct.

Operating with Allies and Partners. In the past, 

space was a domain in which the United States operated 

largely alone or with only a few Allies. Under the new 

strategy, we plan to operate increasingly in coalitions, as 

we do routinely in other domains.

More and more Allies and partners are developing 

space capabilities, and all our armed forces are increasingly reliant on space. We need to ensure that operations 

in other domains—land, sea, air—can be effectively enabled by the space assets of individual Allies. Moreover, 

we need to ensure that we can effectively coordinate the 

use of these assets in support of combined operations.

Cooperative programs can play an important role. The 

U.S. Air Force’s Wideband Global SATCOM system is a 

good example. Six partners—four of them NATO Allies—

have invested in the system. This increases the size and capacity of the constellation while sharing the expense.

Partnership must also extend to planning and operations. USSTRATCOM is transitioning the Joint Space 

Operations Center to a Combined Space Operations 

Center, incorporating those Allies ready to commit space 

capabilities. Air Force Space Command invited NATO 

to participate in its recent Schriever Wargame.3

 The objectives of the wargame centered on:

◆ examining options of how to optimize space efforts 

from participating Allies and Australia in support 

of a notional NATO expeditionary operation

◆ identifying ways to increase the resilience of space 

capabilities in a contested environment through 

expanded international and private-sector cooperation and coordination

◆ determining operational challenges associated 

with defense of space capabilities employed in support of the operation

◆ examining the operational integration of cyber 

into defense of the space domain

◆ expanding understanding of the operational benefits of broader international participation in 

combined space operations.

Approximately 270 military and civilian experts 

from more than 30 agencies around the country as well 

“The now-ubiquitous and interconnected 

nature of space capabilities and the 

world’s growing dependence on them 

mean that irresponsible acts in space 

can have damaging consequences for all 

of us.” 

—2010 National Space Policy
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 5 3 

as from Australia and NATO nations participated in 

the event.

Deterring and Protecting against Attacks on Space 

Capabilities. NATO’s Strategic Concept warns about the 

deployment of technologies that threaten allied capabilities in space.4

 A number of countries outside the Alliance are developing and fielding capabilities that range 

from jammers and lasers to direct ascent antisatellite 

missiles. Some capabilities, such as jammers, are readily 

available on the commercial market and have been used 

by countries such as Iran to disrupt commercial satellite 

broadcasts. The same countries developing counterspace 

capabilities are also actively developing cyber attack capabilities that could be turned toward space.

Under the new National Security Space Strategy, 

the United States is pursuing a four-layered approach 

to deterring attack on space assets critical to national 

security. The first layer of deterrence is the establishment of norms of responsible behavior. This helps separate responsible space-faring countries from those that 

act otherwise. The second layer of deterrence is the establishment of international partnerships. This forces a 

potential adversary to contemplate attacking the capabilities of many countries, not just one. The third layer 

of deterrence is increasing the resilience of our spacebased capabilities and our ability to operate in a degraded environment. Demonstrated to potential adversaries, this reduces the assessed benefit of attacking our 

space capabilities and thus the incentive to do so. The 

fourth layer of deterrence is a readiness and capability 

to respond in self-defense, and not necessarily in space. 

This further complicates the calculus of a potential adversary contemplating an attack on our space assets.

Resilience is critical to both enhance deterrence 

and to protect our ability to operate in a degraded 

environment should deterrence fail. Under the new 

strategy, resilience is to be incorporated into all U.S. 

architectures for the full range of space missions, from 

missile warning to communications.

Resilience can be achieved in many ways: dispersing capabilities across larger number of satellites, augmenting national capabilities with the capabilities of 

Allies, hosting military payloads on commercial satellites, backing up key capabilities with cross-domain 

solutions, and heightening the information assurance 

for our space systems.

Protecting Our Advantage Under 

Budget Constraints

The January 2012 Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense (DOD) includes operating effectively in space as a key military mission.5

 The guidance 

builds on and reinforces the 2011 National Security 

Space Strategy with an emphasis on:

◆ promoting a rules-based international order

◆ operating when possible with allied and coalition 

forces

◆ improving resilience and supporting access in an 

antiaccess/area-denial environment

◆ supporting combined-armed campaigns across all 

domains.

The new Strategic Guidance also foreshadows an 

era of budget constraints, which are projected to include cuts of almost $500 billion by 2020. The guidance clearly reflects the need for DOD and the military 

to adapt in order to proactively address the changing 

Strategic Approaches:

◆ Promote responsible use of space

◆ Provide improved space capabilities

◆ Partner internationally and 

commercially

◆ Prevent and deter aggression against 

space assets

◆ Prepare to defeat attacks and operate in a degraded environment.
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 5 4 

nature of the security environment and to reflect new 

fiscal realities.

As DOD develops architectures for future spacebased capabilities, affordability will be important. Future 

architectures will need to leverage commercial and international capabilities and incorporate such concepts as 

distributed sensors and hosted payloads in order to provide responsive and resilient space capabilities while also 

reflecting new budget realities.

Cooperative approaches such as the Wideband 

Global SATCOM system and coalition space operations 

can help maintain our collective advantage while making 

the most of individual country investments.

Implications for NATO

Over half of the NATO Allies have space 

capabilities. While the United States possesses 

the bulk of these, other Allies have a wide range of 

capabilities, including space-based Earth observation 

and radar mapping, space-based communications, and 

ground-based surveillance of space. These capabilities 

are increasingly important to NATO operations in 

other domains.

NATO doctrine and planning have not kept up. 

A key lesson from space support for Operation Unified 

Protector was the need for improved understanding, integration, and planning at all levels. To make this more 

of a challenge, Alliance planners must recognize that 

operations to date have taken place within a space environment that has been relatively benign. NATO must 

also prepare for future operations when its use of space 

is actively challenged, whether by direct attacks on satellites, jamming of their signals, or cyber attacks on their 

command and control.

To benefit fully from space, while protecting the advantage it derives, NATO should:

◆ continue to build the expertise and capacity to 

conduct operations enabled by space

◆ ensure that doctrine, requirements, and planning account for the operational advantages 

provided by space as well as the risk of a degraded 

space environment

◆ adapt exercises and training to ensure forces can effectively exploit space-based capabilities but still operate 

successfully in the face of adversary interference.

At a strategic level, NATO is uniquely positioned 

to bolster deterrence in space. With the Alliance increasingly reliant on space for its collective defense 

and economic prosperity, an attack on the space assets of any one Ally impacts the security of all Allies. 

A unified approach to protecting NATO interests in 

space, to include enhancing the resilience of allied capabilities there, can send an important deterrent signal 

and complicate the decisions of any country contemplating interference with our space-based capabilities.

At an operational level, space needs to be reflected 

in NATO planning and command structures. Space 

capabilities should be incorporated into Alliance 

processes for requirements development, force generation, and command and control. A dozen countries 

contribute space capabilities to International Security 

Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan; building 

on this experience, NATO needs an agreed and tested 

concept to harmonize the use of allied space capabilities in future operations.

At a tactical level, NATO personnel need to be 

trained and exercised to exploit space capabilities while 

also operating in a degraded environment. While a “day 

“A number of significant technologyrelated trends—including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access 

to space—appear poised to have major 

global effects that will impact on NATO 

military planning and operations.”

—Active Engagement, Modern Defence
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 5 5 

without space” might be considered unlikely, NATO exercises should still include such worst-case scenarios. The 

goal is to “stress” not only allied space operators, but also 

the aviators, sailors, and soldiers who depend on space, 

sometimes more than they realize.

Conclusion

NATO is an alliance enabled by space. Alliance doctrine and planning must reflect this reality, and the new 

challenges of a space environment that is increasingly 

congested, contested, and competitive.

In updating its doctrine and plans, NATO must 

take full advantage of the Allies’ individual space capabilities. And it must retain the ability to operate 

successfully even if these capabilities are contested by 

future adversaries.

Notes 1 An Executive Summary of the National Security Space Strategy is available at <www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/>.

2 Gregory L. Schulte and Audrey M. Schaffer, “Enhancing Security by Promoting Responsible Behavior in Space,” Strategic Studies 

Quarterly 6, no. 1 (Spring 2012), 9–17.

3 The Schriever Wargame, set in the year 2023, explores critical 

space issues and investigates the integration activities of multiple agencies associated with space systems and services. Schriever Wargame 

2012 International Game included international partners from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and, for the first time in its history, 

country representatives within the NATO Alliance from Denmark, 

France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

4 Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for 

the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (Brussels: NATO, 2010), 14, available at <www.nato.int/

strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf>.

5 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), available at <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>.

“NATO is increasingly reliant on space to 

support operations. NATO’s doctrine and 

plans need to be updated to deal with the 

vulnerabilities of Allied space capabilities 

to disruptions.”

—Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, 

April 18, 2012

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies within the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies provides research 

and policy advice to senior Department of Defense and 

other U.S. Government leaders through studies, research 

projects, and outreach and education programs. CTSS 

draws on its unique interface with U.S. and international 

governments and research institutions to provide timely 

and relevant policy recommendations.

The Transatlantic Current series presents original research by members of the CTSS resident scholars as 

well as nonresident subject matter experts. The opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Department or 

any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU 

Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Ambassador Robert Hunter

Director

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 5 6 

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Cross-currents in French Defense 

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Grand Strategy and 

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NATO Partnerships and the 

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