[Cite as State v. Hashman, 2023-Ohio-3853.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, : 

 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186,

22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,

v. : 22AP-190, & 22AP-191

 (C.P.C. Nos. 19CR-6512, 21CR-873, 

Irvin H. Hashman, : 21CR-1587, 21CR-1790, 21CR-3100,

 21CR-3137, & 21CR-4429)

Defendant-Appellant. :

 (REGULAR CALENDAR)

:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on October 24, 2023

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. 

Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

On brief: Siewert & Gjostein Co. LPA, and Thomas A. 

Gjostein, for appellant. Argued: Thomas A. Gjostein.

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BOGGS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Irvin H. Hashman, appeals from the judgments of 

conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, after 

Hashman entered guilty pleas to charges of possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree felony;

receiving stolen property, a fourth-degree felony; receiving stolen property, a fourth-degree 

felony; receiving stolen property, a fifth-degree felony; theft of a motor vehicle, a fourthdegree felony; vandalism, a fourth-degree felony; theft of a motor vehicle, a fourth-degree 

felony; and possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-degree felony. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189, 2

22AP-190, & 22AP-191

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Hashman was indicted in seven cases between December 17, 2019 and 

October 22, 2021: (1) Franklin C.P. No. 19CR-6512 for possession of cocaine a fifth-degree 

felony and for possession of drugs a fifth-degree felony, (2) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-873 for 

receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, (3) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-1587 for 

receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, (4) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-1790 for 

receiving stolen property a fifth-degree felony, (5) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-3100 for

breaking and entering a fifth-degree felony, for theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree 

felony, for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, and for vandalism a fourthdegree felony, (6) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-3137 for theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree 

felony and for breaking and entering a fifth-degree felony, and (7) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR4429 for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, and for possession of a fentanylrelated compound a fifth-degree felony.

{¶ 3} On January 10, 2022, Hashman entered guilty pleas in each of the seven 

cases. Hashman pled guilty as follows: in case No. 19CR-6512 for possession of cocaine a 

fifth-degree felony, in case No. 21CR-873 for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree 

felony, in case No. 21CR-1587 for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, in case

No. 21CR-1790 for receiving stolen property a fifth-degree felony, in case No. 21CR-3100 

theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree felony, and vandalism a fourth-degree felony, in 

case No. 21CR-3137 for theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree felony, and in case No. 

21CR-4429 for possession of a fentanyl-related compound a fifth-degree felony.

{¶ 4} Prior to Hashman entering his guilty pleas, the trial court engaged in a 

Crim.R. 11 colloquy wherein the trial court informed Hashman of the various rights he was 

waiving by pleading guilty and of the maximum penalty for each count. With respect to 

case No. 21CR-3100, the only case in which Hashman was pleading guilty to more than one 

count, the court also informed Hashman that his sentences for the two fourth-degree felony 

counts could be ordered to be served consecutively, for a maximum penalty “on that case” 

of 36 months. (Jan. 10, 2022 Tr. at 7.) Hashman confirmed that he understood the 

maximum possible penalty for each count and that he understood he was waiving certain 

rights in pleading guilty.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189, 3

22AP-190, & 22AP-191

{¶ 5} On February 23, 2022, the trial court sentenced Hashman to the following 

prison terms in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction: in 

case No. 19CR-6512, 12 months; in case No. 21CR-873, 12 months; in case No. 21CR-1587,

18 months, plus payment of restitution in the amount of $5,684; in case No. 21CR-1790, 6

months; in case No. 21CR-3100, 18 months for both counts to run concurrently; in case No. 

21CR-3137, 12 months; and in case No. 21CR-4429, 9 months. The trial court ordered that 

the sentences in case Nos. 21CR-873, 21CR-1587, 21CR-3100, and 21CR-3137 run 

consecutively to each other, for an aggregate prison sentence of 60 months. The trial court

found that “consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crimes 

or punish the offender” and that consecutive sentences were “not disproportionate to the 

seriousness of the Defendant’s conduct and the danger imposed to the public.” (Feb. 23, 

2022 Tr. at 12.) Hashman now submits this appeal.1

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 6} In his appeal, Hashman asserts the following sole assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS PLEA COLLOQUY WITH 

THE APPELLANT PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE NOS. 

11(C)(2)(b) & 11(C)(3)2 OF THE OHIO RULES FOR FAILING 

TO STATE THAT POTENTIAL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 

COULD BE IMPOSED OVER ANY OF THE SEVEN 

SEPARATE CASES.

(Appellant’s Brief at 6.)

III. ANALYSIS

{¶ 7} Hashman argues that the trial court did not fully inform him of the potential 

sentences under Crim.R. 11 (C)(2) prior to entering his guilty pleas because the trial court 

did not adequately inform him that his sentences could be imposed consecutively.

{¶ 8} A felony defendant is entitled, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), to be informed 

of various constitutional and non-constitutional rights prior to entering a plea of guilty or 

1 On April 6, 2023, this court sua sponte issued a stay pending the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State 

v. Tancak, case No. 2022-0515. On August 1, 2023, however, the Supreme Court dismissed Tancak for being 

improvidently accepted. On September 1, 2023, this court reactivated these appeals.

2 We note that Hashman’s assignment of error references Crim.R. 11(C)(3), which applies to a defendant

charged with aggravated murder. Because Hashman was not charged with aggravated murder and because 

he does not make an argument with respect to Crim.R. 11(C)(3), we decline to address it.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189, 4

22AP-190, & 22AP-191

no contest. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 6. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)

provides:

In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or

a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no

contest without first addressing the defendant personally

either in-person or by remote contemporaneous video in

conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea

voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges

and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that

the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition

of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the

defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may

proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the

defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is

waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against

him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses

in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which

the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or

herself.

{¶ 9} To be valid, a defendant’s plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. “ ‘ “[F]or a guilty 

plea to be voluntarily and intelligently entered, the defendant must be informed that he is 

waiving” ’ the constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).” State v. Miller, 159 Ohio 

St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio5200, ¶ 25-26, quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 477-78 (1981). When a trial 

judge fails to explain to a defendant the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), 

the defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea is invalid “ ‘under a presumption that it was 

entered involuntarily and unknowingly.’ ” Clark at ¶ 31, quoting Griggs at ¶ 12. “[A] trial 

court’s failure to notify a defendant of his constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 

amounts to plain error. Miller at ¶ 13, citing Veney at ¶ 24, citing Ballard at 476-77.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189, 5

22AP-190, & 22AP-191

{¶ 10} For the non-constitutional rights set out in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), the 

trial court need only substantially comply with the mandates of Crim.R. 11. State v. Nero, 

56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). “Substantial compliance” means that, under the totality of 

the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and 

the rights he is waiving. Veney at ¶ 15, citing Nero at 108. A defendant who challenges his 

guilty plea on the basis that the advisement for the non-constitutional rights did not 

substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) must also show a prejudicial effect, meaning 

the plea would not have been otherwise entered. Id.

{¶ 11} While Hashman does not allege constitutional violations during his plea 

colloquy, we now turn to Hashman’s argument that the trial court committed prejudicial 

error under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by not informing Hashman that his individual sentences 

could be ordered to run consecutively. The mandate that the defendant must understand 

the maximum penalty is a non-constitutional right. State v. Draughn, 10th Dist. No. 15AP632, 2016-Ohio-1240, ¶ 7. In State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 133 (1988), the Supreme 

Court concluded, “neither the United States Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution 

requires that in order for a guilty plea to be voluntary a defendant must be told the 

maximum total of the sentences he faces, or that the sentence could be imposed 

consecutively.” While Crim.R. 11 has been amended since the court’s holding in Johnson,

the analysis of the Supreme Court in State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132,

suggests that the court did not view the amendments as abrogating the basic holding from 

Johnson. In Bishop, the court distinguished Johnson and held that, unlike the failure to 

tell Johnson that his sentences could run consecutively, which did not violate Crim.R. 

11(C)(2), the failure to inform Bishop that he was subject to a separate and additional 

consecutive 12-month sentence for violation of his post-release control was a violation of 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Bishop at ¶ 16.

{¶ 12} Unless consecutive sentences are statutorily required, the imposition of 

consecutive or concurrent sentences is a matter of judicial discretion. “Only after the judge 

has imposed a separate prison term for each offense may the judge then consider in his 

discretion whether the offender should serve those terms concurrently or consecutively.” 

State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 9, citing State v. Foster, 109 Ohio 
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189, 6

22AP-190, & 22AP-191

St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph seven of the syllabus, ¶ 100, 102, 105; R.C. 2929.12(A); 

State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 13} Here, the trial court informed Hashman of the maximum sentence for each 

count and therefore substantially complied with the requirements under Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a). Hashman directs this court to Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, which instructs trial 

judges to only accept a plea of guilty after they have addressed the defendant personally 

and “[d]etermine[ed]that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding 

of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved.” Id. at ¶ 27. However, 

the maximum penalty involved as interpreted in Johnson is the maximum penalty for each 

count, rather than the maximum penalty over all sentences.

{¶ 14} We note that Ohio trial judges must consider each count separately when 

imposing sentences rather than packaging all sentences together. “Instead of considering 

multiple offenses as a whole and imposing one, overarching sentence to encompass the 

entirety of the offenses as in the federal sentencing regime, a judge sentencing a defendant 

pursuant to Ohio law must consider each offense individually and impose a separate 

sentence for each offense.” Saxon at ¶ 9. When a defendant is engaging with a trial court 

in a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy,the judge would be considering each offense separately, rather 

than as a package. Here, the trial court properly informed Hashman of the maximum 

sentence for each count, and following its acceptance of Hashman’s guilty pleas, the court 

then properly exercised its discretion in ordering some of Hashman’s sentences to run 

consecutively. Accordingly, we overrule Hashman’s sole assignment of error.

{¶ 15} We are not unsympathetic to Hashman’s argument that defendants should

have a full picture of the charges and potential sentences they face when deciding to enter 

a guilty plea. However, we recognize the law here is clear against levying additional plea 

colloquy duties upon trial court judges beyond substantial compliance with the nonconstitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Nevertheless, we urge trial judges, as a 

best practice, to inform defendants during a plea colloquy of the maximum, cumulative

total of the various individual sentences the defendant would face should the court 

subsequently order sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189, 7

22AP-190, & 22AP-191

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶ 16} Having overruled Hashman’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the 

judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgments affirmed.

EDELSTEIN and LELAND, JJ., concur.