[Cite as State v. Harrison, 2022-Ohio-741.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LOGAN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 8-21-31 

 v. 

KANDALE L. HARRISON, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. CR 20 07 0162 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: March 14, 2022 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Eric C. Stewart for Appellant 

 Kenneth J. Rexford for Appellee 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-2- 

SHAW, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, State of Ohio (“State”), brings this appeal from the 

September 21, 2021 judgment of the Logan County Common Pleas Court granting in part 

and denying in part Defendant-Appellee, Kandale L. Harrison’s motion to suppress. On 

appeal, the State argues that the trial court should not have suppressed the evidence found 

during an Adult Parole Authority Officer’s search of Harrison’s vehicle. 

Background 

{¶2} On July 14, 2020, Harrison was indicted on four criminal charges stemming 

from two separate incidents on May 27, 2020 and June 13, 2020. Based on the first 

incident, Harrison was indicted on Counts One and Two: (1) possession of fentanyl-related 

compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a third-degree felony, and (2) possession of 

cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a fifth-degree felony. Based on the second incident, 

Harrison was indicted on Counts Three and Four: (3) possession of cocaine in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11, a fifth-degree felony, and (4) illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto 

grounds of a specified governmental facility in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), a thirddegree felony. 

{¶3} After a not guilty plea, Harrison filed a motion to suppress. In his motion, 

Harrison sought to suppress evidence obtained on June 13, 2020 as well, but the sole focus 

on appeal is the warrantless search of the vehicle Harrison was observed operating on May 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-3- 

27, 2020. Harrison’s new counsel thereafter filed supplemental briefing on the motion. 

The State filed a memorandum contra to the motion to suppress. 

{¶4} A hearing was held on the suppression motion on August 25, 2021. Testimony 

at Harrison’s suppression hearing reflects that he was on post release control in May 2020. 

Condition No. 7 of the conditions of Harrison’s post release control supervision provided: 

“I agree to the warrantless search of my person, motor vehicle, place of residence, personal 

property, or property that I have been given permission to use, by my supervising officer 

or other authorized personnel of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction at 

any time.” (State’s Exhibit 1). 

{¶5} On May 27, 2020, while on patrol, Bellefontaine Police Officer Hostetler 

testified that he observed Harrison operating a vehicle. Officer Hostetler recognized him 

from a prior drug trafficking investigation. A license check revealed that Harrison was 

under an “OVI” suspension. However, due to traffic reasons, Officer Hostetler was unable 

to catch up with Harrison to initiate a traffic stop at that time. Soon afterward, while 

patrolling, Office Hostetler encountered another vehicle he was familiar with as involved 

in prior drug activity, so then he began following that vehicle into the Highland Hills Plaza 

parking lot. As Officer Hostetler entered the plaza parking lot, he observed Harrison’s 

vehicle. He further observed both Harrison get out of his vehicle and a male from the other 

vehicle, who he was familiar with for selling and receiving large amounts of marijuana, 

and they were both walking toward one another. According to Officer Hostetler, once they 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-4- 

observed the Officer’s patrol car, they both then stopped walking toward one another, 

attempted to enter the Dollar General Store (which was locked), and then entered the 

Community Market grocery store. Because Officer Hostetler had knowledge that Harrison 

was on post release control, he then called Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) Officer 

McKirahan in Bellefontaine and explained to him “that I observed [Harrison] driving under 

suspension. I also explained to Officer McKirahan the behavior that I observed in the 

parking lot between both males[.]” (Tr. at 39). 

{¶6} APA Officer McKirahan testified that he received a call from the Bellefontaine 

Police Department, on May 27, about Harrison. “It was in regards to what appeared to be 

suspicious drug activity.” Id. at 63. When asked whether he was told anything else about 

Harrison, APA Officer McKirahan replied, “That he drove there in a vehicle, and I’m pretty 

sure his license was suspended too.” Id. at 64. At that time, APA Officer McKirahan told 

the Bellefontaine Police Officer “that he was good to [arrest Harrison] on a [parole 

violation] due to him being in the city in what appeared to be a violation of rule standard 

condition number one, which is no illegal drug activity or anything of that.” Id. at 65. 

{¶7} After exiting the store, Harrison did not return to his vehicle. Instead, he 

walked around the store to the back of the plaza shopping center. Officer Hostetler made 

contact with Harrison and said Harrison became argumentative when he arrested him for 

an alleged “parole violation.” Harrison was placed in the back seat of Officer Hostetler’s 

partner’s patrol car. APA Officer McKirahan arrived. Harrison denied he owned the 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-5- 

vehicle and refused to turn over the key fob. Law enforcement attempted to obtain the key 

fob, but they were not able to recover it from Harrison at the scene. After Harrison was 

transported to the jail, law enforcement did recover the key fob. The fob was taken back to 

the plaza center parking lot where Officer McKirahan subsequently conducted a search of 

the vehicle and found a digital scale, marijuana, cocaine, and fentanyl. 

{¶8} Following this incident, on June 8, APA Officer Burns issued Harrison a 

sanction receipt. The receipt stated, in part, “[y]ou also failed to comply with [a] direct 

order from your Supervising officer [i.e., APA Officer Burns], to STAY OUT of City of 

Bellefontaine while on supervision.” (State’s Exhibit 2). The sanction receipt also stated: 

“You are ordered to STAY OUT of the [City] of Bellefontaine while on supervision, only 

allowed to be in the City of Belle[]fontaine to attend Court Hearings as scheduled.” Id.

{¶9} Based on the suppression-hearing testimony, the trial court granted in part and 

denied in part Harrison’s motion to suppress. His motion was granted as to Counts One 

and Two but denied as to Counts Three and Four. The trial court granted Harrison’s motion 

as to Counts One and Two for the reasons that APA Officer McKirahan did not have 

reasonable grounds to conduct the search of Harrison’s vehicle pursuant to the warrantless 

search Condition No. 7 of his post release control supervision and that the search was not 

based on probable cause. As a consequence, the trial court suppressed all evidence 

resulting from the search on May 27, 2020. 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-6- 

{¶10} The State now appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for our 

review. 

The trial court erred in suppressing the State’s evidence found during 

an APA Officer’s search of the Defendant’s vehicle. 

{¶11} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting 

Harrison’s motion to suppress the State’s evidence found during APA Officer McKirahan’s 

search of Harrison’s vehicle. 

Standard of Review 

{¶12} A suppression motion is a device used to eliminate evidence from a criminal 

trial that has been secured illegally in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment. 

State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449, 1995-Ohio-32. Appellate review of a decision on 

a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 

Ohio St.3d 152, 2003–Ohio–5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes 

the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the 

credibility of witnesses. Id. citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). When 

reviewing a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings 

of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 

1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our 

standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts 

satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 

(4th Dist.1997). 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-7- 

Argument and Analysis 

{¶13} In support of its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court failed 

to consider the adult parole authority’s statutory authority to analyze the validity of the 

APA Officer’s verbal arrest order of a person suspected of violating post release control 

conditions and his subsequent warrantless post release control search. 

{¶14} The State first argues APA Officer McKirahan’s verbal arrest order was 

justified pursuant to R.C. 2967.15 because he had reasonable cause to believe there were 

violations of the Conditions of Supervision based on facts relayed that Harrison was 

observed operating a vehicle with a suspended license in Bellefontaine and that he was 

possibly involved in suspected drug activity. 

{¶15} The APA has statutory authority to arrest or have a police officer arrest a 

person alleged to be in violation of his post release control, R.C. 2967.15. Specifically, 

Section (A) states that: 

If an adult parole authority field officer has reasonable cause to believe 

that a person * * * who is under the supervision of the adult parole 

authority has violated or is violating the condition of a conditional 

pardon, parole, other form of authorized release, transitional control, or 

post-release control * * * or any other term or condition of the person's 

conditional pardon, parole, other form of authorized release, 

transitional control, or post-release control, the field officer may arrest 

the person without a warrant or order a peace officer to arrest the 

person without a warrant. 

R.C. 2967.15(A). 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-8- 

{¶16} Under the circumstances of the instant case, there was sufficient evidence that 

Officer Hostetler lawfully arrested Harrison pursuant to APA Officer McKirahan’s order. 

According to Officer Hostetler, he had informed APA Officer McKirahan of the fact that 

he observed Harrison driving under suspension in Bellefontaine and that he had also 

observed Harrison appear to rendezvous and begin to engage with a person known by 

Officer Hostetler to have been involved in prior drug activity. The driving under 

suspension alone was a clear violation of Harrison’s first condition of supervision which 

required him to “obey federal, state and local laws and ordinances, including those related 

to illegal drug use.” (State’s Exhibit 1). APA Officer McKirahan then ordered the arrest, 

which was supported by all of the foregoing information known to him at the time. 

{¶17} While we do not rely specifically upon the fact of Harrison being in “the city,” 

i.e. Bellefontaine as a conclusive violation of conditions, because, as noted by the trial 

court, that condition had not yet been reduced to a written condition, we do find that this 

circumstance was at least some additional evidence to establish reasonable cause to suspect 

that Harrison was not complying with the conditions of his post release control. As 

presented by his supervising APA officer’s testimony, Harrison was given a prior verbal 

order by APA Officer Burns to stay out of the city of Bellefontaine while on supervision 

because Harrison had previously claimed that he was “getting stopped or harassed” every 

time he goes there. (Tr. at 17). The second condition of supervision required Harrison to 

“follow all orders given to [him] by [his] supervising officer.” (State’s Exhibit 1). As such 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-9- 

the order to arrest by Officer McKirahan was consistent with good faith reliance on APA 

Officer Burns’ instructions to Harrison. 

{¶18} In any event, based upon the statutory authority of R.C. 2967.15 and the 

totality of the circumstances in this case, there was reasonable cause for APA Officer 

McKirahan to believe Harrison was violating his “Conditions of Supervision” while under 

post release control and thereby order the detention and arrest. 

{¶19} The second suppression issue is whether APA Officer McKirahan properly 

initiated the subsequent search of Harrison’s vehicle. The State argues that the search of 

his vehicle was supported by reasonable grounds pursuant to R.C. 2967.131(C) and the 

consent to search provisions of Condition No. 7 of the terms and conditions of post release 

control set forth earlier. 

{¶20} The statutory authority afforded to APA officers to conduct warrantless 

searches of offenders released on post release control supervision is found in R.C. 

2967.131(C), which states that “authorized field officers of the authority * * * may search, 

* * * without a warrant,” a felon’s person, residence, vehicle, or other property if they 

“have reasonable grounds to believe” that he “is not complying with the terms and 

conditions” of his post release control. R.C. 2967.131(C). This standard is further 

supported in Condition 7 of the terms and conditions of Harrison’s post release control as 

set forth earlier, providing for a blanket consent to conduct a warrantless search of any 

motor vehicle he operated at any time. 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-10- 

{¶21} Officer Hostetler testified that he detained Harrison until APA Officer 

McKirahan arrived, which was about eleven minutes later according to his police cruiser 

video. Upon his arrival, APA Officer McKirahan and Harrison had an argumentative 

conversation about the arrest and when asked about the vehicle, Harrison claimed that he 

did not drive there, but he had the key fob on him. Officer McKirahan asked him for the 

key fob to the vehicle and as the officers attempted to retrieve the key fob, the car alarm 

for the vehicle that was under suspicion started going off, which vehicle was registered to 

Harrison’s mother. In his testimony, Officer McKirahan described Harrison’s behavior, 

stating that “his behavior was conducive to what I believed of trying to suppress us from 

finding something. So, with his behavior and how he was acting and just his body language 

and pushing and trying to get us to get away from the vehicle gave me reasonable grounds 

to believe that he was hiding something in that car.” (Tr. at 67). 

{¶22} We reiterate, the standard for evaluating the search in this instance is 

established in R.C. 2967.131(C), to wit: “reasonable grounds to believe [Harrison] is not 

complying with the terms and conditions of his post release control” as opposed to the more 

traditional standard of probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained drugs, 

exclusively relied upon by the trial court in its decision to suppress. As such, it is our 

conclusion that the personal interaction and conversation with Harrison at the scene, 

coupled with the totality of circumstances known to Officer McKirahan up to this point, 

including the driving under suspension, apparent effort to rendezvous with and approach a 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-11- 

known drug dealer, and the evasive behavior in the parking lot prior to his detention by 

Officer Hostetler, constituted sufficient grounds to support the search of the car pursuant 

to the governing standards of R.C. 2967.131(C) and Condition 7 of the terms and 

conditions of post release control. 

{¶23} In our judgment, and given the constant communication between Officer 

Hostetler and Officer McKirahan leading up to the arrest and search, the time delay of 

approximately eleven minutes in Officer McKirahan arriving is not significant in this case. 

Further, it is evident from APA Officer McKirahan’s testimony that he did not rely solely 

on Officer Hostetler’s observations but also relied on his own observations and interaction 

with Harrison prior to searching the vehicle. Officer McKirahan’s conversation with 

Harrison as described above, is alone objectively consistent with reasonable grounds to 

believe that there was something in the vehicle which would place Harrison in violation of 

his post release control, and that Harrison knew it. 

{¶24} For all of the foregoing reasons, it is our conclusion that the trial court 

improperly granted the motion to suppress as to Counts One and Two and the State’s 

assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶25} We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to 

suppress in part as to Counts One and Two and remand the matter to the trial court for 
Case No. 8-21-31 

-12- 

further proceedings according to law. 

 Judgment Reversed and 

 Cause Remanded 

MILLER, and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur. 

/jlr