Group Violence Intervention

An Implementation Guide

Group Violence Intervention

An Implentation Guide
This project was supported by cooperative agreement number 2010-CK-WX-K006 awarded by the 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained 

herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the 

U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not 

be considered an endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references 

are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of this publication. Given that 

URLs and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch for their 

current validity.

Recommended citation:

National Network for Safe Communities. 2015. Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

ISBN: 978-1-932582-71-0

First published 2013 

Revised 2015 
— iii —

Contents

Letter from the Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Letter from the National Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

About This Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

GVI Overview............................................................... 3

Frequently Asked Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Initial Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Key Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Executive committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Technical assistance and research support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Law enforcement representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Social service representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Community moral voices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Communications Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Problem Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Overview: Assessing Your Violence Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Part 1 Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1. Group audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Space/setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Conducting the group audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Data organization and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

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2. Incident review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Space/setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Conducting the incident review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3. Executive summary and feedback to Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

4. Identifying group members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

5. Performance measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Part 2 Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

1. Criminal history review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

2. Social network analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Demonstration Enforcement Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Steps of a Demonstration Enforcement Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Ideas behind Demonstration Enforcement Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Community Moral Voices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Why Community Moral Voices Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Informal social control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Norms, narratives, and police-community reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Engaging the Community’s Moral Voice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Identify potential moral voices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Select speakers for the call-in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Why Offering Social Services Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Organizing the Social Service Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

1. Identify providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

2. Bring providers into the strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3. Identify a lead provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

4. Ensure fast response times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5. Develop tracking database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Contents

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Call-In Preparation and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

What Is a Call-In? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Law Enforcement Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

1. Identify members of violent groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

2. Determine community supervision status of group members . . . . . . 58

3. Include member(s) from each group at the call-in(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Call-In Security and Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Speaker Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Talking points for law enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Talking points for social service providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Talking points for community moral voices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Call-In Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Directing Group Members to Appear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Letter content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Best practices for letter delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Call-In Rehearsal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Checklist for a successful call-in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Call-In Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Speaking order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Visual aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Moderator’s role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Maintenance and Ensuring Program Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Recap and Planning with the Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Ongoing Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Follow-Through on Call-In Promises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Law enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Social services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Community moral voices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

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Ongoing Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Traditional call-ins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Custom notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Sustainability and Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Intelligence maintenance systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Partnership management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Governing Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

A. GVI Flow Chart and Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

B. Group Audit Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

1. Pre-session checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

2. Sample schedule for group audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

3. Sample group audit instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

4. Group audit data organization....................................94

5. Social network analysis example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

C. Sample Call-In / Rehearsal Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

D. The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence “Call-In”: 

Reflections on a Profound Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

E. Sample Press Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

1. After the first call-in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

2. After the second (or subsequent) call-in(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

F. GVI Effectiveness: What the Research Says . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

G. National Network for Safe Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

About the National Network for Safe Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

About the COPS Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
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Letter from the Director

Dear colleagues,

The COPS Office has long been a strong supporter of the National Network for Safe 

Communities and its Group Violence Intervention (GVI). When we in law enforcement talk 

about addressing urban violence, the problem is so large in scope and self-reinforcing in nature 

that finding a solution can seem overwhelming, if not nearly impossible. The root causes of 

crime and disorder in our disadvantaged communities involve so many systemic dysfunctions 

that it becomes hard to imagine how law enforcement can begin to stem the tide of group and 

gang violence. 

The beauty of GVI, therefore, is that it has never been designed to address the myriad social 

problems that both create and are created by the cycle of violence in these neighborhoods. 

Rather, it is singularly focused on an immediate and achievable goal: the cessation of gun 

violence that destabilizes communities, creates fear in our citizens, and claims the lives of many 

of our young people of color. 

In this publication, we have attempted to lay out step by step the components of the GVI 

process so that those jurisdictions that would like to implement this strategy in their 

neighborhoods can do so with clear guidance and information. To be sure, this work is not easy; 

it requires buy-in and hands-on cooperation from stakeholders across the community and the 

criminal justice system. However, when properly implemented, GVI can be transformative. I am 

not overpromising when I say it can and does help communities take control of their streets so 

that law and order is restored by the neighborhood itself—a much more effective way of creating 

public safety than through enforcement actions alone. 

The COPS Office is steadfastly committed to reducing group- and gang-related violence, which 

disproportionately affects our most vulnerable communities. Our hope is that this publication 

will help jurisdictions to learn about this strategy, which has often been misunderstood, and use 

it to guide them in implementing GVI in their own neighborhoods. 

Sincerely,

Joshua A. Ederheimer, Acting Director 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

— ix —

Letter from the National Network

Dear colleagues, 

The approach described in this guide has been in development for nearly 20 years and has 

grown to include a body of work under the National Network for Safe Communities that 

focuses on reducing violence and improving public safety, minimizing arrest and incarceration, 

strengthening communities, and improving relationships between law enforcement and the 

communities it serves. The original “Operation Ceasefire” in Boston showed that cities could, in 

fact, do something about homicide and serious violence. Moreover, national experience has now 

shown that communities can effectively address many other serious problems when they operate 

along a common set of guiding principles:

•	 First, do no harm

•	 Strengthen communities’ capacity to prevent violence

•	 Enhance legitimacy

•	 Offer help to those who want it

•	 Get deterrence right

•	 Use enforcement strategically

Following these principles, the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) has produced powerful and 

measurable results. It is, at its core, a straightforward approach: identify the groups that drive 

the violence and form a partnership among law enforcement, communities, and social service 

providers that communicates a united message to members of those targeted groups: “You 

matter. You are important. We want you to survive and flourish. Some of what you’re doing is 

wrong. We will help you if you let us, and we will stop you if you make us.”

As this guide illustrates, GVI involves various moving parts, each one of which matters and all 

of which are a challenge to get and keep right. This strategy is worth getting right—it saves lives; 

keeps people out of prison; strengthens communities; resets relationships; and makes possible 

the longer, deeper work our most vulnerable communities need and deserve. 

Since the original “Operation Ceasefire,” the GVI strategy has evolved in many ways, but two 

are most important. One way has been in coming to understand the extraordinary power of 

what we call “the moral voice of the community”—the pragmatic, concrete impact of crystalclear community norms and standards focused on the small core population that most needs to 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— x —

hear and heed them. Angry, damaged, and endangered street offenders are not much inclined 

to listen to police officers and mayors. Yet they are willing to listen to mothers; older, wiser 

offenders; community elders; and a host of others with a real standing in their world. We are 

not accustomed, in our standard approaches, to make organizing these moral voices as concrete 

a task as launching a drug raid or running a jobs program. However, we now know that it can, in 

fact, be done. 

The second way has been in coming to understand the extraordinary damage done by the toxic 

narratives that dominate the understandings between our most vulnerable communities and 

law enforcement. A community that sees the police as a race predator cannot make common 

cause with the law. Police that see the communities they serve as corrupt cannot make common 

cause with the people they serve. These conflicts are real. But the worst narratives are not true, 

and when we interrupt them, they can be acknowledged, addressed, and changed. That change 

reveals an overwhelming common interest in the fundamental safety and wellbeing of the 

community and prepares the groundwork for enormously powerful and effective partnerships.

This is work worth doing, and worth doing well. Experience shows that when the strategy is 

implemented with reasonable fidelity to its core principles—it does not have to be perfect, but 

it does have to be true to its central ideas—the strategy can produce dramatic results. 

A growing national community of practice has contributed to this guide. It welcomes you and 

is eager to help you. If you would like any such help, please get in touch.

Sincerely,

David M. Kennedy 

National Network for Safe Communities 
— xi —

Acknowledgments

The National Network for Safe Communities would like to thank the following for 

contributing their time, knowledge, and insight to this document: 

•	 Greg Baker, Executive Director, Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence

•	 Anthony Braga, PhD, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University

•	 Jeff Brown, Pastor, Union Baptist Church 

•	 Robin Engel, PhD, University of Cincinnati Policing Institute

•	 James Fealy, former Chief of Police, High Point (North Carolina) Police 

Department

•	 Daniel Gerard, Captain, Cincinnati (Ohio) Police Department

•	 Teny Gross, Executive Director, Institute for the Study and Practice of 

Nonviolence

•	 Ted Heinrich, Attorney, Harvard Law School

•	 Sherman Mason, Pastor, New Bethel Baptist Church

•	 Tracey Meares, Walton Hale Hamilton Professor, Yale Law School

•	 Andrew Papachristos, PhD, Department of Sociology, Yale University 

•	 Jim Summey, Executive Director, High Point Community Against Violence

•	 Marty Sumner, Chief of Police, High Point (North Carolina) Police 

Department

•	 Stewart Wakeling, Project Director, California Partnership for Safe 

Communities

•	 James Whalen, Assistant Chief, Cincinnati (Ohio) Police Department

•	 Brian Murphy, former Chief of Police, Bureau of Organizational Development, 

Chicago (Illinois) Police Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— xii —

Special thanks go to Katherine McQuay, assistant director, and Vonda Matthews, 

policy analyst, of the Office for Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) 

for their support of and advocacy for this project. The National Network also extends 

its deep gratitude to Zoe Mentel, former policy analyst of the COPS Office.

Thanks also to current and former staff and affiliates of the National Network for 

Safe Communities at the Center for Crime Prevention and Control, John Jay College 

of Criminal Justice: Vaughn Crandall, Amy Crawford, Sue-Lin Wong, Sibylle von 

Ulmenstein, Michael Friedrich, and Jennifer Margolis.

With permission, this guide draws substantially on writings by David M. Kennedy, 

chair of the National Network for Safe Communities. 

The National Network also thanks Peter Ohlhausen, president of Ohlhausen 

Research Inc.
— xiii —

About This Series

The National Network for Safe Communities has assembled guides to support 

communities implementing its proven strategies. The Group Violence Intervention 

reduces violent crime by joining together community members with law enforcement 

and social service providers to deliver an anti-violence message to highly active street 

groups. The Drug Market Intervention eliminates overt drug markets by bringing 

together community leaders, law enforcement, and 

service providers with street-level dealers and their 

families to make it clear that the dealing must stop.

The National Network supports these and other 

strategies that rely on partnerships between law 

enforcement and communities to reduce violence 

and improve public safety, minimize arrest and 

incarceration, strengthen communities, and 

improve relationships between law enforcement 

and communities it serves. These guides offer 

comprehensive tools to practitioners—be they community members, law enforcement, or government officials—who seek to introduce proven strategies to their 

communities, build a partnership of stakeholders, turn strategies into action plans, 

and sustain their results. 

Each guide presents the important elements of a strategy and recommends a general 

path along which communities should proceed. However, the particulars of the 

strategies are adaptable. The National Network recommends that practitioners use 

these guides to ensure that all the elements are in place, tailoring their execution to the 

local resources and personnel available.

The particulars of the strategies are 

adaptable. The National Network 

recommends that practitioners use 

these guides to ensure that all the 

elements are in place, tailoring their 

execution to the local resources and 

personnel available.

— 1 —

Introduction

The National Network for Safe Communities’ Group Violence Intervention (GVI), 

first implemented as “Operation Ceasefire” in Boston in the mid-1990s, has repeatedly 

demonstrated that violence can be dramatically reduced when a partnership of 

community members, law enforcement, and social service providers directly engages 

with the small and active number of people involved in street groups and clearly 

communicates 

•	 a moral message from community representatives that violence will not be 

tolerated; 

•	 a law enforcement message that any future violence will be met with clear, 

predictable, and certain consequences; 

•	 an offer of help from social service providers for those who want it.

GVI now represents a proved approach through which law enforcement, communities, 

and offenders can work together, reset relationships, and recognize and expand upon 

common norms, interests, and goals. Built on the schools of thought and practice 

known as “focused deterrence” and “procedural justice,” the strategy brings together 

communities and law enforcement to acknowledge that

•	 traditional methods have not produced adequate public safety, and have 

produced unintended harms;

•	 very small numbers of offenders in the most dangerous neighborhoods 

drive violence, and traditional notions of “dangerous neighborhoods” are 

fundamentally mistaken;

•	 nearly all people in such neighborhoods—offenders included—want to be safe 

and have productive relationships with law enforcement;

•	 ideas that offenders are irrational and vicious are fundamentally wrong;

•	 offenders should be offered and will often accept help;
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 2 —

•	 ideas that police and law enforcement devalue these communities and believe 

that the citizens residing in them are fundamentally wrong;

•	 profligate and disrespectful law enforcement methods should be replaced by 

precise and respectful methods.

In practice, the strategy follows a basic logic. Evidence and experience show that a small 

number of people in street groups—gangs, drug crews, and the like—drive the majority 

of violence in troubled neighborhoods. Group members typically constitute less than 

0.5 percent of a city’s population but are consistently linked to 60 to 70 percent of the 

shootings and homicides. The internal dynamics of the groups and the honor code of 

the street drive violence between those groups and individuals.

A note on why the National Network for Safe Communities 

uses the term “group” instead of “gang” 

All gangs are groups, but not all groups are gangs. An exclusive focus on gangs, which is often 

understood to include notions like organization and leadership, will exclude a significant 

number of groups that contribute heavily to serious violence, such as loose neighborhood drug 

crews. The National Network’s experience shows that worrying about whether a particular city 

has gangs, or whether a particular group is a gang, is an unnecessary distraction. The simple 

fact is that many high-rate offenders associate in groups and that these groups drive serious 

violence. Many (and often most) such groups will not fit the statutory definition of a gang. 

Nor will they meet even the common perception of what constitutes a gang. Such groups may 

or may not have a name, common symbols, signs or tags, an identifiable hierarchy, or other 

shared identifiers. For these reasons, this implementation guide uses the term group rather than 

gang throughout.
— 3 —

GVI Overview

☐ Frequently Asked Questions

☐ Glossary

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the National Network’s Group Violence Intervention? 

The National Network’s Group Violence Intervention (GVI), first demonstrated as 

Operation Ceasefire in Boston in 1996 and subsequently in many other communities, 

relies on direct communication with violent groups by a partnership of law 

enforcement, social service providers, and community figures. Together the partnership 

delivers a unified antiviolence message, explains that violence will bring law enforcement 

attention to entire groups, offers services and alternatives to group members, and 

articulates community norms against violence. When GVI is properly implemented, 

rapid reductions in serious violence are routine. The strategy is flexible and can be 

adapted to any community. Different cities use different terms for GVI and effectively 

tailor it to local conditions, as long as cities preserve GVI’s core principles.

Why does GVI focus on groups?

Readily identifiable groups of individuals commit the majority of homicides, shootings, 

and other acts of extreme violence. Street groups are also dramatically overrepresented 

as victims. For example, recent research with frontline officers in Cincinnati, Ohio, 

identified 60 criminal groups composed of 1,500 individuals (less than 0.5 percent 

of the city’s population) who were associated with 75 percent of homicides in the 

city—as victim, perpetrator, or both.1

 Research in Newark, New Jersey, shows that 88 

groups composed of 1,470 individuals were responsible for 57 percent of homicides in 

2009–2010.2

 Similar ratios have been found in scores of communities, large and small, 

across the country.

1. R.S. Engel et al., Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV): Year 2 Report 

(University of Cincinnati Policing Institute, 2009), www.nnscommunities.org/pdf/CIRV_2NDYEAR_REPORT.pdf.

2. Anthony Braga, Rutgers School of Criminal Justice, e-mail communication, 2012. These data are based on the 

problem analysis Newark, New Jersey, conducted in 2012.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 4 —

What is the difference between GVI (the Boston Ceasefire model) 

and Chicago CeaseFire (also known as Cure Violence)? 

Both approaches use street outreach workers to engage with group members in an 

attempt to prevent retaliatory violence and offer services and alternatives to street 

life. However, Chicago CeaseFire relies primarily on outreach, social services, and 

community antiviolence events and demonstrations. The National Network’s Group 

Violence Intervention involves three sets of actors: law enforcement, community 

representatives, and social service providers. The strategy requires all three to 

collaborate closely and focus their efforts on the very small group of actors most likely 

to be perpetrators or victims of violence. Chicago CeaseFire, for a range of reasons, 

includes a less direct role for law enforcement. The National Network, on the other 

hand, makes law enforcement-community partnership a central component of GVI. 

What is the difference between GVI and the Comprehensive Gang 

Model?

Both approaches use a combination of law enforcement, community engagement, 

and service provision in an effort to stem group-related violence. However, the 

Comprehensive Gang Model, developed by the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, employs an array of strategies, including broad social 

intervention, opportunities provision, suppression, community mobilization, and 

organizational change. In an effort to solve the root causes of gang violence, the 

model seeks to transform the social institutions that foster gangs, such as education 

and economic systems. GVI relies on a smaller, more easily assembled, and narrowly 

focused partnership of law enforcement, community representatives, and social service 

providers to engage in a specific way with violent groups.
— 5 —

GVI Overview

What is a call-in?

A call-in is a GVI communication tool, a meeting during which a partnership of 

law enforcement representatives, influential community members, and social service 

providers speak directly to members of street groups (usually those on probation or 

parole). The GVI partners use the meeting to deliver the strategy’s no-violence message 

to group members and, through them, back to their associates. During the call-in, the 

GVI partnership clearly communicates (1) a credible, moral message against violence; 

(2) a credible law enforcement message about the group consequences of further 

violence; and (3) a genuine offer of help for those who want it.

What is the impact of GVI?

The typical impact is a 35 to 60 percent reduction in community-wide levels of 

homicides and a significant but sometimes lesser reduction in nonfatal shootings 

citywide. Often GVI achieves larger reductions in a specific, highly victimized 

demographic. Boston, for example, showed a 63 percent reduction in the monthly 

number of youth homicides citywide. Indianapolis, Indiana; Chicago, Illinois; Lowell, 

Massachusetts; Stockton, California; and other cities have experienced similar 

reductions. The lowest rate of impact for GVI interventions appears to be around a 

one-third reduction in group member-involved homicides. Appendix H summarizes 

evaluation outcomes to date. 

Why does GVI work?

The strategy has three key elements that address what really drives violence on the 

street, including the dynamics between and within groups:

1. It communicates to street groups the community’s strong desire that the violence 

stop, and it tells group members that they are valued and the community wants them 

to succeed.

2. It creates certain, credible, group-wide consequences for homicides and shootings. 

Because groups drive violence, a group focus for legal consequences is more 

meaningful than an individual focus. 

3. It offers help to group members who want to change.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 6 —

Each element of the strategy is equally important. All the pieces work together and 

reinforce one another. 

The strategy is high activity but low enforcement. GVI works by setting and 

maintaining clear standards via the partnership and ideally not by employing large 

numbers of arrests and enforcement actions. Community representatives get a chance 

to tell group members, in safe settings, that their behavior is intolerable, and often the 

group members listen attentively. As groups come to understand that violence by one 

may lead to attention to all, the peer pressure that drives the violence is reversed. Many 

group members who also find the violence intolerable and worry about their friends and 

loved ones take the “honorable exit” that clear standards provide. Some will also take the 

social services offered.

Glossary

The following is a list of key terms used in the strategy:

call-in. A key GVI communication tool, a meeting during which a partnership of law 

enforcement, community members, and social service providers delivers the no-violence 

message to group members and, through them, back to their associates. The strategy 

can entail other methods of notification, but the call-in is its traditional communication 

mechanism. The partnership usually holds a call-in in a place of civic importance, and it 

ideally lasts about one hour. The term “notification” is also often used to describe direct 

communications between the partnership and group members.

community moral voice. (1) The collective standards of a community affected by 

violence that are articulated through individuals with moral standing and credibility 

in the eyes of group members. (2) The selected individuals who, by the virtue of their 

moral standing, articulate the community’s standards, aspirations, frustrations, and 

expectations and who, by the virtue of their life experiences, have the respect of group 

members. During call-ins, community moral voices speak directly to group members to 

clarify and reinforce community standards. This includes openly addressing street and 

community norms that can drive violence. 
— 7 —

GVI Overview

enforcement action. Coordinated law enforcement action against members of a 

violent group, performed by the law enforcement operational team (i.e., local, state, and 

federal agencies) of the GVI partnership. Sanctions include performing full conspiracy 

investigations, vigorously enforcing the conditions of group members’ probation or 

parole, serving outstanding arrest warrants, performing drug buys and arrests, serving 

warrants for outstanding child support, checking group members for unregistered cars, 

and performing housing code enforcements. When law enforcement performs this 

action for the first time in a jurisdiction prior to a call-in, it is called a demonstration 

enforcement action. Performed upon a jurisdiction’s most violent group, it 

demonstrates to other groups that the partnership is serious about ending violence. 

group audit/group mapping. The process of identifying all violent groups in a 

jurisdiction, their areas of operation, and their alliances and conflicts, and estimating 

the number of their members. This is most often done by convening and debriefing 

experienced frontline officers and other street-knowledgeable practitioners, such as 

field parole/probation personnel. In some leading National Network cities, the process 

involves social network analysis. See also social network analysis.

incident review. The process of reviewing a jurisdiction’s violent crime incidents for 

group member involvement, motive, connection to prior and subsequent violence, and 

similar key aspects. This is most often done by convening and debriefing experienced 

frontline officers and other street-knowledgeable practitioners, such as field parole/

probation personnel.

influential. A person known to have a positive influence in a group member’s life. 

project manager. The person who facilitates GVI implementation at the local level, 

taking the lead for the professional and administrative work; coordinating and assisting 

law enforcement, community, and social service partners; and acting as liaison to 

governmental agencies and funders. 

social network analysis. A mathematical method that identifies the structures of 

street groups through connections contained within the records of police department 

arrest, field stop, and other similar data.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 8 —

street outreach workers. Men and women, often with their own history of group 

and street involvement, who can easily connect to and establish relationships with group 

members to prevent violence, broker social services, quell “beefs,” etc. 

target offense. The violent offense selected by the GVI Working Group that will 

trigger an enforcement action against group members. Based on the results of its 

incident review, a jurisdiction will determine whether the target offense includes 

homicides only or also other kinds of violence, such as nonfatal gun assaults. See also 

Working Group.

Working Group. A small, stable membership of core representatives from law 

enforcement, the community, and social services, chaired by the project manager, who 

meet regularly and coordinate the actions of their respective operational teams. In many 

cases, the core law enforcement representatives form the initial Working Group, and as 

implementation develops, community and social service representatives join the group.
— 9 —

Initial Planning

☐ Key Commitments

◾ Executive committee

◾ Project manager

◾ Technical assistance and research support

Working Group

◾ Law enforcement representatives

◾ Social service representatives

◾ Community moral voices

Communications Strategy

Sustainability

☐

☐

☐

Launching the GVI effort can unfold differently in different places. Law enforcement 

buy-in is instrumental to the initial planning, and in many cities, city officials or law 

enforcement initiate the effort by reaching out to community members and social 

services. In other cities, GVI grows out of community efforts that bring the other 

partner agencies into the fold.

Key Commitments

Communities new to GVI must make a clear, public commitment that the city will 

implement the approach as a primary operational response to group violence. City 

leadership should commit to the basic operational elements of the strategy; to a 

governing structure to ensure accountability; and to the law enforcement, community, 

and social services responses the strategy requires to be effective and sustainable.

Executive committee

The National Network strongly recommends establishing an executive committee 

comprised of local leaders with high-level management experience. In conjunction with 

a project manager and a core Working Group (see page 26), this committee can help 

establish measures for the collective accountability and progress of the GVI effort.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 10 —

Oversight option

Consider forming an executive committee of agency heads who meet every few months to discuss 

how the effort is going, to help obtain resources, and to open doors. The committee can make 

sure that if the project manager moves on, a suitable successor replaces him or her. Being on the 

committee also keeps the agency heads informed on the nature and operations of GVI.

– Anthony Braga, Ph.D., School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University

Project manager

New GVI communities should designate a senior-level project manager who will 

oversee and coordinate the overall effort. This person should have the following 

competencies: 

•	 Project management experience

•	 Ability to work effectively with law enforcement, community, and social service 

constituencies

•	 Sufficient reputation and clout to manage agency and personality disagreements

•	 Ability to work effectively with local media

If the project manager is a career law enforcement officer with little experience working 

collaboratively with social service and community constituencies, designating a separate 

resource or community outreach coordinator may be helpful.

Technical assistance and research support

GVI benefits immensely from the support of an experienced technical assistance 

team. During the initial planning period, the National Network recommends that the 

community interested in launching GVI work with a technical assistance team that 

can explain, guide, and ensure fidelity in basic implementation. Technical advisers can 

also provide guidance on a governing structure for the GVI effort and analytical and 

research capacity.
— 11 —

Initial Planning

Typically, advisers require some funding, which the following sources can often secure:

•	 Police or prosecutors’ asset forfeiture funds

•	 Local foundations

•	 State agencies: e.g., a criminal justice coordinating board

•	 Federal sources: e.g., U.S. Department of Justice grant programs3

For more information on how to retain technical advisers, contact the National 

Network for Safe Communities at infonnsc@jjay.cuny.edu.

Local research support (e.g., universities) adds great value to the Working Group and 

the overall violence reduction effort. Ongoing research support that builds on the 

problem analysis is not essential to GVI, but it is strongly encouraged, especially during 

the initial implementation phase. The incident review and group audit, two key GVI 

research components, require law enforcement to analyze the data in a nontraditional 

manner. Local researchers can provide context for the overall violence problem and help 

embed the data analysis process within the law enforcement operational team.

The role of local research partners includes the following:

•	 Unpacking the core violence issues through the group audit and incident review, 

enabling a much more focused collective effort

•	 Collecting and analyzing performance data on law enforcement, social service, 

and community moral voice components of the strategy, enhancing performance 

management for the strategy

•	 Helping local law enforcement to update group member lists and analyze the 

connections between violent incidents and local groups regularly

•	 Performing applied social network analysis to support targeted group 

enforcement, selection of group members for notifications, moral engagement, 

and other applications

•	 Creating or supporting data collection to enable formal evaluation of the 

violence reduction effort

3. See “Grants,” U.S. Department of Justice, www.justice.gov/business.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 12 —

Working Group

The Working Group, chaired by the project 

manager, has a small and stable membership of core 

representatives from law enforcement, the community, 

and social services who can meet regularly and 

coordinate the actions of their respective operational 

teams. For best results, the Working Group should meet 

monthly with clear ground rules that require principalsonly attendance and a closed-door, no-distractions 

working environment.

Law enforcement representatives

The law enforcement representatives of the Working 

Group typically include one or two senior officials 

from the police, the county sheriff, the local prosecutor, 

probation and parole, and the U.S. attorney’s office. 

Federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

may have their own representatives on the Working 

Group or may be represented by the U.S. attorney’s office.

Local law enforcement agencies sometimes have histories that create challenges for 

the type of collaboration the strategy requires. Someone knowledgeable about the 

GVI process may need to meet individually with the senior officials of each agency 

(1) to understand and address any concerns they may have about the substance of the 

strategy and about working with other local partners and (2) to present the basics of 

the strategy. 

Picking the right 

structure

From the beginning of the strategy 

implementation, we wanted to make 

sure we had the right people in the 

Working Group. If we had too many, 

the group would be unmanageable. If 

we had too few, the people we added 

later would feel they had been left out. 

We wanted to have the necessary and 

sufficient number and type of members.

Locally headquartered multinational 

manufacturer Procter & Gamble 

lent its expertise and advised us on 

management, helping us establish the 

right teams within the Working Group 

and select key players.

– Robin Engel, Ph.D., University of Cincinnati
— 13 —

Initial Planning

If the jurisdiction has access to a technical adviser, the presence of the adviser during 

these meetings will be helpful. Agency principals are typically interested in the following 

key issues:

•	 Background of GVI and evidence of its efficacy

•	 Steps to implementation

•	 Expectations of Working Group partners 

•	 Mechanism for agency participation in the Working Group: e.g., point of contact, 

methods of communication, and operational commitments

•	 Timeline for local design and implementation

Social service representatives

Social service agencies play an essential role in GVI. Typically one or a few senior 

figures representing social services (and sometimes other related capacities, such 

as street outreach) join the Working Group. In some communities one agency can 

provide “one stop shopping” for the necessary services. In others, the Working Group 

representatives will need to assemble a coalition of providers. 

In either case, the social service representatives of the Working Group will need 

to create a single access point to services and a plan for social service providers to 

offer outreach and support. For more information about working with social service 

providers, see “Social Services” on page 67. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 14 —

Community moral voices

As with social services, the Working Group 

typically includes a small number of key 

community representatives. 

This element of the strategy has unfolded 

differently in various places. Many cities 

that have implemented GVI have engaged 

community representatives after the initial 

data gathering and problem analysis. By 

waiting until then, the Working Group can 

present the community with a clearer picture 

of the problem. In other places, community 

stakeholders have played the lead role in 

convening law enforcement and other partners 

and driving the process. 

Once that process is underway, community 

representatives of the Working Group take 

the lead in identifying and working with 

community participants who will speak at 

the call-ins as “community moral voices” and 

provide guidance on any broader community 

outreach and organizing. This can include 

attention to explicit work on reconciliation 

between law enforcement and communities 

(see “Norms, narratives, and policecommunity reconciliation” on page 56).

For information about how to work with community members, see “Community Moral 

Voices” on page 53.

❯ Tip from the field

Finding and channeling 

community moral voices

A community moral voice 

❯ must be a natural voice, not invented or 

developed, only informed and given a 

platform;

❯ may be someone who has never spoken up 

before;

❯ can be anyone who believes it’s wrong to 

have to live in chaos and fear;

❯ may embrace the strategy better if told that 

it focuses on groups that are statistically 

shown to be the most at risk of killing or 

getting killed;

❯ is best contacted by police or other partnership 

members discreetly (not at home); 

❯ can remind call-in group members that most 

murders in their city are of people like them.

GVI is a potent delivery system for the community’s 

moral voice.

– Jim Summey, Executive Director, High Point Community 

Against Violence 
— 15 —

Initial Planning

Accurate press in Salinas, California

Group enforcement actions should be shown as resulting directly from violent acts committed 

by street group members. Accurate press coverage can communicate that link clearly to group 

members, community members, and the public.

The article “Police Arrest Salinas Gang Members in Sweep after Boy’s Death”* provides an example 

of good press coverage, as it describes a group enforcement action by the Working Group of Salinas,

California, as part of a GVI implementation.

* S ee “Police Arrest Salinas Gang Members in Sweep after Boy’s Death,” The Herald, March 26, 2010, 

www.montereyherald.com/ci_14762339?source=most_viewed&nclick_check=1.

Communications Strategy

GVI takes an unusual approach to reducing group violence, and as a result, media 

accounts sometimes misrepresent it. In particular, the media can portray GVI as 

excessively “hard” (e.g., “U.S. attorney threatens gang members with federal prison”) or 

excessively “soft” (e.g., “police chief offers gang members jobs”). Before holding the first 

call-in, the Working Group will want to engage with existing media contacts or develop 

a working relationship with a reporter or media outlet. This will facilitate the most 

accurate press coverage during the GVI implementation process. 

Based on the experiences of different cities, the elements of an effective public 

communications strategy include the following:

•	 The Working Group reaches out to a trusted local reporter during the early 

stages and provides detailed information about the strategy and implementation 

process. The Working Group asks the reporter to delay coverage until an 

agreed-upon time, which is usually after the first call-in. 

•	 Together with the executive committee, the Working Group prepares a press 

release to be issued after the first call-in. The press release ensures that one 

accurate account of the project and call-in is in circulation. Writing an op-ed 

piece on the strategy for a local newspaper may also be helpful.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 16 —

•	 The Working Group notifies community members and the press about group 

enforcement actions, linking them explicitly to the GVI approach (for a sample 

press release, see Appendix E.2.).

Sustainability

Cities new to GVI should build sustainability measures into their effort from the 

beginning. After holding several call-ins and witnessing initial reductions in violence, 

the Working Group can focus specifically on sustaining the work long-term. For more 

information, see “Sustainability and Accountability” on page 97.

As long as collaborators from key organizations are willing to commit to GVI, the 

strategy generally does not benefit from a formal memorandum of understanding. 

GVI implementation is a fluid process, and the resources and actions that each group 

might be called on to supply are unpredictable. A commitment that specifies which 

resources must be contributed, which enforcement activities must be undertaken, or 

which services must be provided could feel like an intrusion on each agency’s discretion 

and may become rapidly outdated. If a city seeks a written agreement, the best type is a 

general agreement to participate in the process.
— 17 —

Problem Analysis

☐ Overview: Assessing Your Violence Problem

Part 1 Steps

◾ Group audit

◾ Incident review

◾ Executive summary and feedback to Working Group

◾ Identifying group members

◾ Performance measures

Part 2 Steps

◾ Criminal history review

◾ Social network analysis

☐

☐

Technical assistance and research partnership

GVI requires specialized research skills for the group audit, incident review, social network analysis, 

and other related research. The law enforcement team uses two major steps to look at violent crime 

data in a fresh way:

◾ Group audit. A current, accurate snapshot of active street groups, relationships, 

and members may not exist in any organized form. Local law enforcement may have a 

gang database, but GVI focuses on groups that may or may not be gangs. Thus, the gang 

database may be framed by state or national definitions and not focus on which groups are 

currently active.

◾ Incident review. The context behind violent incidents—details that are known 

though not germane to a prosecution—is often not in investigative or prosecutorial files. 

For example, the files might not capture the fact that numerous shootings have occurred 

between two groups and that this dynamic is responsible for a string of homicides that may 

seem, from the case files, to be unrelated.

In its initial stages, a GVI effort often includes a relationship between the Working Group and an 

outside advisor and/or a local university for research assistance. Over time, the sustained success 

of GVI requires that group data analysis and the incident review become internal to, and a standard 

operating procedure for, law enforcement.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 18 —

Overview: Assessing Your Violence Problem

Design work for GVI begins by assessing the facts on the ground (i.e., who and what 

are driving serious violence) to design an operation that addresses the actual situation. 

An experienced technical assistance team can help immeasurably by working with the 

project manager and the law enforcement representatives of the Working Group to 

organize their initial research efforts. 

While law enforcement has access to a wealth of information on current and historic 

crimes, the information is often captured in a way that is more useful for prosecution 

than for violence prevention. Information and current intelligence on the street scene 

are usually scattered among frontline personnel and not systematically collected. 

Therefore, getting a current snapshot of local group and violence dynamics is important. 

The research uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative information. Quantitative 

information can be used to assess the location of target crimes and their concentration; 

demographic characteristics of victims, offenders, and communities; criminal histories 

of victims and offenders; weapon types, origins, and pathways to the street (through 

crime gun trace analysis); and similar matters. Qualitative information usually needs to 

be gathered through structured methods with frontline practitioners—such as police 

officers, probation and parole officers, and street outreach workers—to answer basic 

questions such as these:

•	 What is the context in which violent incidents occur?

•	 Are victims and offenders known to practitioners before violent events?

•	 Do victims and offenders participate in street groups, drug crews, or other kinds 

of highly active groups?

•	 How many such groups exist, where are they active, and what are their 

relationships with each other?

•	 Who are the individuals in these groups, and which of them are most violent or 

otherwise influential?

Once gathered, such information can guide policy formulation as well as GVI 

operations.
— 19 —

Problem Analysis

Tailoring for local conditions

In most cities, a disproportionate amount of violent crime is committed in a few places by a few 

people who are known to law enforcement. However, the particulars vary. The data gathering 

and problem analysis stage is where you diagnose the local problem (individuals, groups, and 

circumstances) and local resources and then customize the strategy. With a tailored approach, you 

can get the city to embrace GVI as a local strategy. You are not imposing the Boston approach in 

Baltimore, for example; you are just using the sample principles.

– Anthony Braga, Ph.D., School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University

The problem analysis consists of two parts. The steps in part one are essential research 

exercises that are necessary to begin the design of the strategy. 

These steps are

•	 Group audit

•	 Incident review

•	 Executive summary and 

feedback to Working Group

•	 Identifying group members

•	 Performance measures

The steps in part two are valuable 

research exercises that can be added 

to the Working Group process when 

the group can perform them. These 

steps are

•	 Criminal history review

•	 Social network analysis

❯ Tip from the field

Value of researchers

It’s important to partner with an outside research 

group. I wouldn’t do this work without academic 

support. Researchers bring unique skills to the 

effort.

Our partnership with the University of Cincinnati 

was the most productive partnership I’ve had in 25 

years of policing.

– Dan Gerard, Captain, Cincinnati (Ohio) Police Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 20 —

Researcher-police department collaboration technique

A research team working with a law enforcement agency on a GVI implementation typically cannot 

obtain the necessary criminal history data on its own—it needs the police to get the data. To solve 

that problem, we created a custom database template for the police to fill in. Once the police add 

the appropriate, allowed data, they give us the database and full access to it. The database also 

contains information on every call-in, every house visit, social service activity, etc. 

If a police department plans to partner with a research team, the police need to find out and comply 

with the complex rules regarding information sharing.

– Robin Engel, Ph.D., University of Cincinnati

To prepare for the group audit and incident review, the project manager works with the 

law enforcement representatives of the Working Group to discuss the data needed and 

the personnel commitment required. This generally involves the following: 

•	 Personnel. Data gathering requires that every district, unit, or area with high 

numbers of homicides, shootings, or violent incidents identify a selection of 

knowledgeable beat officers so that researchers can systematically, collectively 

interview them. This process typically takes one to two days, depending on the 

size of the jurisdiction. Generally, this process involves neighborhood patrol; 

the most knowledgeable detectives from homicide; and line officers from vice, 

gang, and other specialized units with connections to violent crime. Probation 

and parole officers who are similarly street-knowledgeable can also provide 

valuable information. 

•	 Data. The incident review requires data collection on recent homicides and 

nonfatal shootings. The amount of data collected depends on the intensity of 

violence in the community. The incident review ideally examines three years of 

homicides. Homicides tend to provide richer intelligence and information. If a 

community has not experienced between 50 and 100 homicides in the last three 

years, the research team can include nonfatal shootings from the last 18 months 

in the data set. 
— 21 —

Problem Analysis

Law enforcement’s chain of command should tell attending officers that the research 

exercise is not an evaluation or a test but a vital opportunity to draw on their unique 

frontline knowledge and experience.

PART 1 STEPS

1 . Group audit

Preparation

Having senior police officials present helps the research process, as they can make some 

of the following points to the line personnel:

•	 GVI is a priority of these agencies (police chief, sheriff, mayor, local prosecutor, 

federal prosecutor, probation, parole, as appropriate). I fully support this 

initiative. 

•	 GVI has proven effective in other communities with serious violence problems.

•	 We must share everything we know about what is happening on the street so 

GVI can be effective.

•	 GVI represents a new way of doing things that could be really good for 

us. It can help us make our community safer and improve our community 

relationships.

Space/setup

Tables and chairs at this meeting are best arranged in a U-shape around a table or 

surface holding a city or neighborhood map, allowing participants to refer to the map 

and collaborate easily throughout the meeting.

If the project has retained an experienced technical adviser, he or she is best suited to 

facilitate the group audit. If not, the project manager or local research director can lead 

the meeting. The National Network recommends the group audit leader first observe 

a similar exercise in a peer community. The group audit usually requires at least two 

people dedicated to capturing the information elicited during the exercise. Saving any 

maps used is also important so that geographic locations can be recorded electronically.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 22 —

Conducting the group audit

The facilitator reviews the day’s agenda and does the following: 

•	 Explain the purpose of the group audit, emphasizing that “group” can refer to 

any set, clique, or crew of individuals who run together: i.e., a group need not 

be an official gang by statutory code or current department definition. In this 

context, a group means two or more high-rate offenders who commit crimes 

together.

•	 Ask participants to gather around a large map of the jurisdiction or the entire 

city, depending on the focus, and physically identify territories associated with 

street groups.

•	 Ask officers to provide the following information for each known street group: 

—Group name

—Group territories (mark on the map)

—Estimated number of members

—Known standout members within each group: e.g., those who are 

particularly influential, violent, or both 

—Illegal activities of the group

—“Beefs” with other groups

—Alliances with other groups

—Any other information the officers can provide

•	 When the officers complete this process, the facilitator asks the participants to 

review each of the groups identified and provide the following information for 

each group: 

—Level of violence (scale: very, somewhat, not very)

—Level of organization (scale: very, somewhat, not very)

—Any larger affiliation or connection: e.g., Bloods, Crips, Norteño, and 

Sureño (Note: many groups do not have a larger affiliation or connection.)
— 23 —

Problem Analysis

Cincinnati CIRV initial group audit

In Cincinnati, the initial group audit exercise took less than a day and identified approximately 

60 groups with an estimated total membership of around 1,500. Subsequent work using both 

qualitative research and formal criminal justice records identified those group members by name. 

They averaged 35 prior criminal charges each, and a third had 10 or more prior felony charges.

Appendix B.4. contains a sample data collection instrument that can be used to record 

this information during the exercise.

A key next step is for line officers to populate membership lists for each of the groups 

they have identified. That process is described in “Law Enforcement Preparation” on 

page 72.

Data organization and analysis

Law enforcement and researchers can use a variety of software to organize and analyze 

the resulting data. This software includes Microsoft Excel, Statistical Product and 

Social Services (SPSS), Statistical Analysis System (SAS), UCI Net, and ArcGIS. 

These tools help place the products of a group audit into useful analytic units, such as 

group databases, individual databases, group network diagrams, and geographic maps:

•	 Group database. This list includes basic information on all groups in a 

community, such as group name, unique group identifier, geographic location 

(e.g., street segments and intersections), and group violence level.

•	 Individual database. Using statistical analysis software, the analyst enters each 

individual as a case, including variables such as last name, first name, individual 

unique identifier, juvenile record, and criminal record, creating a list of all 

group members in the community. Often the Working Group will need to task 

individuals in each agency with gathering intelligence to flesh out the list. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 24 —

•	 Group network diagram. This is a graphic representation of groups’ alliances 

and conflicts: i.e., a geographical area’s “street dynamics.” Figure 1 on page 39 

shows violent groups in Cincinnati and the nature of their relationships in 

2008. The groups represented about 1,500 individuals (0.3 percent of the city’s 

population) and were directly linked to nearly 70 percent of the city’s homicides.

•	 Geographic information system (GIS) mapping. GIS mapping displays the 

geographic distribution of groups. Using ArcGIS or similar software, the analyst 

creates a shape file of street groups to overlay on a city map and then enters all 

group-level variables available in the group database so the information can be 

displayed geographically.

For several group audit tools, see Appendix B.

2 . Incident review

Purpose

The incident review assesses the nature of group involvement in recent homicides 

and shootings. The exercise helps determine the need for group-targeted enforcement 

and identifies which groups are the most violent and dangerous. It can also lead to an 

understanding of the relationships between groups and violence, as well as the specific 

types of violence and the context of incidents. 

Preparation 

Having already assembled the personnel who will contribute to the process (the group 

audit participants), the project manager may again want to ask high-ranking officials to 

speak at the incident review meeting to emphasize the project’s importance. 
— 25 —

Problem Analysis

Figure 1. Example of Cincinnati’s group network diagram, 2008

Source: Policing Institute at the University of Cincinnati

Ahead of the incident review, the project manager or facilitator creates a slide presentation 

that shows the following information for each violent incident to be reviewed:

•	 Victim name and photo (if available), with a street name (if available)

•	 Location of the incident

•	 Date and time of the incident

•	 Known offenders or suspects, including gender, race or ethnicity, age, and photo 

(if available), with a street name (if available)

•	 Type of incident

•	 Type of weapon used (e.g., gun, knife, and object) and vehicle
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

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Space/setup

The meeting requires a projector and a laptop computer for the slide presentation. The 

room needs to be large enough to accommodate all participants comfortably. Tables and 

chairs in the room are best arranged in a U-shape or theater-style. 

If the project has retained an experienced technical adviser, he or she is best suited to 

facilitate the incident review. If not, the project manager or local research director can 

lead it. In either case, the National Network recommends the facilitator first observe a 

similar exercise in a peer community. The incident review typically also requires at least 

two people dedicated to capturing the information elicited during the exercise. 

Conducting the incident review

The facilitator reviews the day’s agenda and then does the following: 

•	 Explain that the purpose of the meeting is to understand each incident in 

question. Frontline law enforcement officers often know what happened in 

homicides and shootings even if they cannot prove those claims in court. The 

incident review aims to collect what officers know about each incident, not 

what they can prove legally. The information collected will be much more 

extensive than what might normally be brought to a prosecution. 

•	 Review the types of questions that will be asked about each incident:

—Was the incident known to the review group?

—Was the offender known to the review group?

—Was the victim known to the review group?

—What happened? What was this about? What is the “story” of this 

incident?

—Was the offender involved in a street group?

—Was the victim involved in a street group?

—Did the victim and offender know each other? 

—Was the incident preceded by a violent incident?

—Was the incident followed by a violent incident? 
— 27 —

Problem Analysis

•	 Guide the participants systematically through each of the above questions for 

each incident. This typically results in a rich, free-ranging discussion in which 

volumes of information not formally recorded in investigations or other agency 

records can be brought to the surface, shared, and recorded.

3 . Executive summary and feedback to Working Group

The research analysts, the project manager, and, if applicable, the technical adviser 

should work together to write a summary for the Working Group that presents 

findings from the group audit and incident review. The report typically begins with a 

brief description of the data gathering process, a brief summary of the problem analysis, 

and recommendations. It is then divided into four sections: 

1. Analysis of violence in the city. This section lays out the larger patterns of street 

violence and key elements such as a percentage of incidents known to the review 

group, percentage of incidents where the victim and/or offender were reported to be 

involved in a street group, percentage of incidents that were preceded by or followed 

by violence, the total number of street groups identified during the group audit and 

incident review, a brief description of the characteristics of the street groups, and 

other key patterns of violence observed. 

2. Summary of identified street groups, characteristics, and relationships. This 

section includes a sociogram of group dynamics in the city, a list of all groups, and all 

relevant information about each specific group: i.e., approximate size of the group, 

criminal activities, groups in conflict, allied groups, territories, level of violence, level 

of organization, and larger affiliations.

3. Descriptive statistics from the incident review. This section includes clear and 

simple descriptive statistics from the incident review, such as the number of incidents 

that show group member involvement. 

4. Items for clarification. The research process typically raises issues that require 

follow-up, such as groups that were identified in the incident review but not in the 

group audit. (This can result, for example, from groups that were active in the past 

but are no longer active). 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 28 —

In most cities, the key new understandings this process provides relate to the following: 

•	 The extent of group involvement in homicides

•	 The identification of violent groups and the relatively small number of 

individuals involved

•	 The even smaller number of identified “impact players”

•	 Patterns of homicides by major category, such as running “beefs” between groups 

and drug businesses

•	 Particularly hot running conflicts

•	 Interesting or unexpected local dynamics

4 . Identifying group members

The problem analysis will have identified an initial snapshot of active, violent groups 

currently operating in a jurisdiction as well as their pattern of conflicts and alliances. 

Law enforcement is now in a position to identify the members of these groups. This 

next step serves three purposes: 

1. It identifies the potential pool of individuals who can be directed to attend the 

call-in.

2. It enables law enforcement to respond to violence swiftly and effectively following 

the call-in. 

3. It enables the partnership to assemble a social service structure that has sufficient 

capacity to serve the likely proportion of group members who will seek such help.

For all three purposes, the partnership must have a current and accurate list of 

active group members, including individuals currently serving jail or prison sentences. 

Identifying group members cycling in and out of jail or about to be released from prison 

may also be useful. 
— 29 —

Problem Analysis

While this list can be assembled in a number of different ways, police executives 

usually charge their frontline gang, patrol, and vice officers, etc., with identifying group 

members. This often includes the following:

•	 Reviewing any existing informal information they may have: e.g., “beat” books 

and lists

•	 Reviewing existing formal information: e.g., case files, field stops, and gang 

databases

•	 If necessary, conducting surveillance, deploying informants, etc.

•	 Reviewing this information at the executive level for reliability

For group members to be included in the list, law enforcement officers must know that 

the members are actively involved in a street group at that time. 

Adding qualitative measures

In addition to watching crime statistics, we measure our success by doing the following:

◾ Talking to school resource officers (whose direct observations mean a lot)

◾ Talking to community groups

◾ Monitoring social networks

◾ Talking to the police department’s gang liaison officers

These measures together can paint a picture of the effectiveness of GVI.

 – Marty Sumner, Chief of Police, High Point (North Carolina) Police Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

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Linking measures to objectives

In advance, we list our goals and objectives so we know what to measure later. We track not just 

crime decreases but also participation in social services, membership in groups, etc. We do a social 

network analysis quarterly, because as you pressure the groups, you also change them, and it is 

useful to measure the changes. We also track who comes to call-ins. If a group member is chosen 

to attend four call-ins, he may not benefit from hearing it again; maybe his seat should go to 

someone else. We also track whether we have a representative of every group to maximize getting 

the word out. We track who was invited but did not show up, and then we tell probation or parole 

as appropriate.

– Robin Engel, Ph.D., University of Cincinnati

5 . Performance measures

These five research exercises also set the stage for basic but powerful local performance 

measures. In most cities, law enforcement does not routinely track group memberinvolved (GMI) homicides; however, the incident review will provide a baseline rate 

for GMI killings. As the partnership implements GVI, the research team and law 

enforcement can compare GMI killings against this baseline: if the strategy is working, 

both the absolute number and the percentage of GMI incidents should go down. 

The four preceding steps—group audit, incident review, executive summary, 

and identifying group members—will ensure the GVI partnership has a shared 

understanding of what is driving violence locally and who is at greatest risk of 

committing, or being a victim of, violence. These understandings are essential to 

effective implementation.
— 31 —

Problem Analysis

Criminal history review

Challenges:

◾ Every state’s criminal records system is different; you need to know what you are getting 

and what you are missing.

◾ Complying with state law on the collection and sharing of criminal history records may be 

complicated; allow time for this. It may make sense for the police department to code the 

records and then give researchers the coded information instead of the protected records.

Benefits:

◾ Data may suggest the importance of partnering with particular agencies. For example, 

if two-thirds of offenders were on probation at the time of their crime, a stronger 

relationship between police and probation may be needed.

◾ Recent contacts with the criminal justice system tell the most about an offender’s activities 

and how to address them.

– Anthony Braga, Ph.D., School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University

PART 2 STEPS

The National Network recommends the following valuable research steps, but they 

do not necessarily have to be completed before the Working Group proceeds to later 

stages of the strategy, such as community engagement and collaborating, and call-in 

preparation and execution. 

1 . Criminal history review

Reviewing group members’ criminal histories provides a clearer picture of their street 

activity; typically provides a graphic picture of how exceptional they are, even by 

street offending standards; can show who is under community supervision and can be 

directed to attend call-ins; and can help assess group members’ legal vulnerabilities.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 32 —

It can also help show communities just how concentrated the problem is; convey that 

law enforcement understands that the community is not responsible for the violence; 

and demonstrate that the strategy is narrowly focused, data-driven, and not profiling.

2 . Social network analysis

Law enforcement has been performing social network analysis (SNA) informally 

for some time, but SNA has now reached a level where it can significantly assist in 

addressing group violence. Groups rarely have a formal hierarchy; a highly active 

offending group may still be very fluid and informal. For example, even though the 

group audit can identify such groups, identifying “cliques” within the overall group, or 

the individual with the most active relationships inside the group, can be difficult.

SNA uses information that law enforcement already possesses to address and “unpack” 

these and similar issues. As GVI cities have used it to date, SNA often begins with the 

names of key group players identified during the group audit. SNA links those names 

to co-arrests and co-field interrogations: i.e., other people with whom key players were 

arrested or observed in the field. This produces network structures that illustrate how 

group members are connected to one another through arrests and field contacts. 

The Chicago Violence Reduction Strategy project has 

used SNA to learn about group dynamics and personal 

connections. The information derived from SNA helps 

in determining inter- and intra-group dynamics; which 

groups should be represented at the call-in to maximize 

message transmission; and which individuals are at 

greatest risk of committing, or becoming the victim of, 

violence, even within their own group networks. 

“Social network analysis helps you 

determine the existence of a group, 

even if that group is amorphous and 

has no name.”

– Andrew Papachristos, Ph.D., Department of 

Sociology, Yale University
— 33 —

Problem Analysis

Figure 2 shows the social network of group members who attended two call-ins 

in Chicago. The dark circles represent the individuals who attended, and the light 

circles represent individuals with whom they had been arrested. In the call-ins, the 

group members were explicitly told to carry the law enforcement, social service, and 

community messages back to their networks. The image shows how a call-in serves as 

a messaging device that uses representatives of groups to communicate with the entire 

universe of this population in a given community.

Figure 2. Chicago’s social network of call-in attendees, August 17, 2010

Source: Andrew Papachristos
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 34 —

If traditional crime mapping is about places, and especially “hot spots,” SNA is about 

people, and especially “hot people.”

A variety of software tools and approaches can produce useful SNA; the National 

Network and many other researchers can provide guidance and support to cities 

interested in these possibilities.

For another example of SNA as used in Chicago, see Appendix B.5.
— 35 —

Demonstration Enforcement Action

☐ Steps of a Demonstration Enforcement Action

☐ Ideas behind Demonstration Enforcement Action

This element of the GVI strategy is essential. The demonstration group enforcement 

action shows violent groups that future violence will be met with swift and certain 

consequences and that from now on, a partnership of local, state, and federal authorities 

will pay special attention to an entire group when a member commits a violent act. 

The demonstration enforcement action illustrates, in advance, the key enforcement 

message that the law enforcement speakers will deliver during the call-in.

The demonstration enforcement action should rise to a crucial threshold, reaching 

groups in a way that other groups will want to avoid. It uses traditional legal and 

enforcement tools in unusual ways, generally through a coordinated interagency 

operation, employing existing resources.

Steps of a Demonstration Enforcement Action

The following list outlines the essential elements of conducting a demonstration 

enforcement action:

•	 Select a “standout” violent group. This may be a new group or a group already 

under investigation. 

•	 Identify all group members, if not already done, especially impact players, who 

are usually known as such by frontline personnel. 

•	 Design an interagency enforcement plan (whether short-, medium-, or longterm), focusing directly on group members. In practice, the plan can involve 

assessing the legal vulnerabilities of group members: e.g., current cases, old 

cases, warrants, probation/parole status, drug activity, child support, and IRS 

prosecution. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 36 —

•	 Conclude the investigation and 

enforcement action one to two weeks 

prior to the first call-in. This should result 

in a high-profile sweep in which arrests, 

warrant service, and violations occur at 

once. The goal is for law enforcement to 

deliver meaningful sanctions to the majority 

of the groups’ members. 

Future call-ins are usually best organized 

around the completion of subsequent 

enforcement actions, as the call-in will 

use information about those actions to 

demonstrate the consequences of further 

violence.

Ideas behind Demonstration 

Enforcement Actions

The Working Group should understand the 

several key ideas that underlie demonstration 

enforcement actions: 

•	 These actions focus on groups. Enforcement actions often pursue serious 

consequences for the shooter (the individual who committed the specifically 

prohibited violent act) and seek to apply legal sanctions, informal sanctions, or 

uncomfortable attention to as many of that person’s group associates as possible. 

This shows group members that they will be held collectively accountable for 

violence committed by a fellow member, countering the group dynamic that 

drives violence. 

❯ Tip from the field

Demonstration enforcement 

in Chicago

For Chicago’s first call-in, police pointed to a recent 

federal enforcement action against group members 

as the demonstration enforcement action. Because 

the group members at the call-in knew many of 

the names of those arrested and were reminded 

of the severe penalties associated with federal 

prosecutions, the federal enforcement action served 

as a substitute for a special, GVI-led demonstration 

enforcement action.

Ten days after Chicago’s second call-in, a grouprelated shooting took place, leading to the city’s first 

major group-focused enforcement action as part of 

GVI. Within two months, approximately 60 members 

of the Black Souls were charged with crimes.

– Brian Murphy, former Chief of Police, Bureau of Organizational 

Development, Chicago (Illinois) Police Department
— 37 —

Demonstration Enforcement Action

•	 These actions use available legal and informal sanctions creatively. Although 

law enforcement may not have sufficient evidence to prosecute the shooter 

immediately, it can focus on sanctioning other group members. Law enforcement 

can violate group members under community supervision, vigorously enforce 

the conditions of their probation or parole, serve outstanding arrest warrants, 

or perform drug buys and execute drug arrests. In addition, GVI partners can 

employ more creative sanctions, such as serving warrants for outstanding child 

support, checking group members for unregistered cars, or enforcing the housing 

code where they live. 

•	 The law enforcement operational team conducts the demonstration 

enforcement action in response to specifically prohibited violent acts. If 

the call-in will later identify homicide or nonfatal shooting as the threshold 

crime that will trigger a law enforcement action on an entire group, then the 

demonstration enforcement action ought to focus on that same crime. 

•	 The local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies participating in 

GVI perform these actions in a coordinated effort. This approach allows 

law enforcement to review and adopt federally eligible cases quickly when 

appropriate. It allows local law enforcement to work more effectively to ensure 

speedy disposition of group member cases through understandings with local 

prosecutors. It also enables the agencies to exploit legal vulnerabilities more 

efficiently and effectively than if each agency operated on its own. 

To be effective, demonstration enforcement actions must make group members 

understand that the rules have changed and that law enforcement can carry out its 

promises after a group member engages in the prohibited behaviors. 

— 39 —

Community Moral Voices 

☐ Why Community Moral Voices Matter

☐ Engaging the Community’s Moral Voice

Why Community Moral Voices Matter

In GVI, the role of moral voices in a community is closely linked to three key ideas: 

informal social control, legitimacy, and police-community reconciliation.

Informal social control

One of the central goals of GVI is to promote informal social control within a 

community. The most important factors that influence whether someone chooses to 

commit a crime are whether the person thinks doing so is wrong, whether the people 

he or she cares about and respects think it is wrong, and whether the community the 

person belongs to thinks it is wrong. Even in communities with the highest levels of 

crime, most people obey the law most of the time. 

The ability of the criminal justice system to impose punishment—what scholars call 

formal social control—is generally the least important influence on a person’s decision 

to commit or not commit a crime. The police are not present at every potential crime 

scene. Most of the crimes committed are never reported. Most that are reported are 

never cleared by an arrest, and most arrests do not result in meaningful sanctions. What 

matters the most are the norms and values held and promoted by individuals, peer 

groups, families, and communities that regard crime in general, or specific crimes, as 

wrong. Informal social control—both internal (e.g., conscience and shame) and external 

(e.g., beliefs of peers, loved ones, families, and the community)—is far more potent than 

formal social control.4

4. Robert J. Sampson, “Crime in Cities: The Effects of Formal and Informal Social Control,” in Crime and Justice, 

vol. 8 of Communities and Crime (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 271–311; Robert J. Sampson and 

John J. Laub, “Crime and Deviance over the Life Course: The Salience of Adult Social Bonds,” American Sociological 

Review 55, no. 5 (1990): 609–627.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 40 —

Legitimacy

Why do people obey the law? Because they fear the consequences of breaking the law? Deterrence 

theory would say people obey the law because they fear formal sanctions and being shamed by friends.

By contrast, legitimacy theory suggests that people comply with the law because they think it’s the 

right thing to do or because they think that government in general, and specifically police, have the 

right to dictate to them proper behavior.

– Tracey Meares, Ph.D., Yale Law School

Therefore, GVI works to bring respected elements of the community into direct 

contact with group members to set clear norms and expectations against violence 

and to help bring to the surface group members’ own internal standards that weigh 

against violence.

Legitimacy

Even if people do not feel a particular crime is wrong, they are more likely to obey the 

law if they feel that those making the law are legitimate and that the laws will be applied 

fairly. If people are not sure that refraining from violence is the right thing to do, if they 

do not understand that their own community disapproves of violence, and if they see 

law enforcement as illegitimate, then they are more likely to commit violent acts. If a 

group member’s own views about violence can be shifted, if community norms against 

violence can be clarified, and if law enforcement comes to be seen as legitimate and fair, 

then informal social control and the impact of any action by law enforcement will be 

more effective.5

Raising the cost of law-breaking by increasing the likelihood of being caught and 

punished may reduce violence in the short term; however, for a long-term effect, 

potential offenders must also be helped to see the law as legitimate. 

5. Tracey Meares, “The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men,” Marquette Law Review 92, no. 

4 (2009): 651–666, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1527&context=fss_papers.
— 41 —

Community Moral Voices

Normative beliefs

The key to changing patterns of gun crime lies in altering the normative beliefs of gun users 

themselves. Prior research, including research in Chicago, suggested that individuals are most likely 

to comply with the law (a) when they believe in the substance of the law, (b) when they have 

positive interactions with law enforcement agents, and (c) when they perceive the procedures used 

in enforcing the law to be fair and just.

Source: Meares and Papachristos 2009

GVI aims to enhance legitimacy as a collateral impact of its approach. It sends the 

following messages, from law enforcement in particular, to group members:

•	 We are working in partnership with your own community to stop the violence. 

•	 People you respect and care about in your community need the violence to stop.

•	 Here is specific information, relevant to you as an individual, about your risk of 

experiencing law enforcement sanctions; we respect you and want you to know 

how vulnerable you are.

•	 We believe you are rational and can make the right decision.

•	 Our job is to keep this community safe. For that reason, preventing and 

responding to violence is our top priority.

•	 You and your group are at extremely high risk for violent victimization. We are 

committed to keeping you and them alive and safe.

•	 Here is exactly what will happen if group members commit violence.

•	 We would prefer that you not behave violently and that you live and succeed. 

We would prefer not to put you in prison, but we will if that’s the only way to 

keep everyone safe.

•	 We would like to help you.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 42 —

If there is no call-in (i.e., group members do not receive prior warning of consequences), 

and a group member commits homicide, and the police crack down on the whole group, 

the group members may perceive that the police conducted the enforcement action 

because the police hate them, hate black people, are getting rich from enforcement, etc. 

By contrast, if a similar enforcement action takes place after a call-in, the group 

members may see that the police are responding to violence, at the request of the 

affected community, in the way they said they would during the call-in. Thus, police 

action will seem more transparent and predictable, and the community and group 

members will perceive the police as more trustworthy.

Norms, narratives, and police-community reconciliation

Police and community reconciliation is increasingly emerging as a key process in 

creating the partnership necessary to implement and sustain GVI successfully. 

Experience and research have shown that the dynamics that drive violence in affected 

communities are about not only group members and their relationships but also their 

view of police, the police’s view of them, and other community residents’ thoughts 

about both police and group members. Fundamentally, these three stakeholders 

misunderstand each other in ways that have a profound impact on violence 

prevention efforts.

One way of thinking about these issues is in terms of norms and narratives. Norms are 

standards for behavior; they establish rules to which people conform to fit into society. 

For example, within street group culture, a common norm is that one must respond 

to perceived disrespect with violence. For various reasons, the communities in which 

those group members operate do not always clearly convey a norm of nonviolence. 

GVI aims to change undesirable group norms and encourage desirable but suppressed 

community norms.

As noted earlier, in communities affected by high levels of violence, which are 

predominantly poor communities of color, there is a persistent gulf between law 

enforcement and the community. This gulf is embedded in history and often 

furthered by current practice. When the community and law enforcement address 

the gulf openly, a profound transformation in police-community relations is 
— 43 —

Community Moral Voices

possible. The new relationship directly supports the efficacy of GVI and is in fact 

one of the independent goals of the National Network: community norms against 

violence and crime (informal social control), freed to emerge as tensions with 

law enforcement ease, can carry much of the burden of crime prevention. Law 

enforcement actions, conducted in an atmosphere of community legitimacy, will be 

more effective and cause less unintended harm.

“Police-community reconciliation and truth-telling” is shorthand for a process of 

airing grievances and misunderstandings between a law enforcement agency and the 

community it serves. These misunderstandings and grievances tend to be explicitly 

racial and prevent the real working partnerships necessary for sustained public safety 

and healthy communities. To repair the police-community relationship, both sides must 

openly acknowledge grievances and debunk misunderstandings. Through this process, 

communities and law enforcement can come to see the following:

•	 They have misunderstood each other in important ways.

•	 Both have been contributing to harm that neither desire.

•	 In crucial matters, both want fundamentally the same things.

•	 An immediate opportunity exists for a partnership that can concretely benefit 

both the community and its guardians.

The gulf between distressed, high-crime communities of color and law enforcement 

is embedded in hundreds of years of legal oppression by various levels of government, 

including law enforcement. In day-to-day interactions between law enforcement 

and community members—from traffic stops to searches—that history may not be 

discussed, but it powerfully influences how affected communities of color understand 

law enforcement actions.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 44 —

Affected communities view law enforcement actions through the lens of history, 

creating a narrative such as this:

The U.S. government, from the beginning of its history, has used law and 

state power as tools to oppress, exploit, and damage black people and black 

communities (and, in different ways, brown communities). When the civil 

rights movement achieved full legal citizenship, outside conspirators had to 

find new tools to continue oppressing black communities. To this end, the 

government invented crack, passed draconian drug laws, and privatized the 

prison industry so that it could continue to exploit black people for monetary 

gain. The state of affairs in American ghettos today is just an unbroken 

continuation of history.6

A body of formal scholarly work documents those perceptions.7

Law enforcement agencies have their own understandings of the relationship. In 

policing, for example, an arrest is a good thing. Police norms are pro-arrest, even when 

an arrest does not solve the underlying problem. This norm often leads to high-arrest 

strategies in troubled communities. 

In turn, the community reads those strategies as further evidence that the point of 

policing is arresting and incarcerating young black and brown men rather than solving 

community problems. This view fuels the “stop snitching” norm, prevents partnership 

with police, and makes community members disinclined to speak against crime and 

violence and more inclined to criticize law enforcement. 

Law enforcement’s narrative, its understanding of why the community is silent, often 

holds that the community lives off drug money and tolerates crime and violence. This 

narrative reduces law enforcement’s desire to engage in community partnerships and 

further fuels the pro-arrest norm.

6. R.K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black People: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences,” 

Criminology & Public Policy 6 (2007): 71–101, doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2007.00423.x.

7. See David Kirk and Andrew V. Papachristos, “Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistence of Neighborhood 

Violence,” American Journal of Sociology 116, no. 4 (2009): 1190–1233.
— 45 —

Community Moral Voices

“Racism says, ‘You don’t matter.’ 

The call-in says, ‘You matter.’”

– P astor Sherman Mason, High Point 

Community Against Violence

Community and law enforcement understandings are 

mirror images of each other. Each side blames the other for 

producing the high crime and high incarceration rates. Yet 

both sides want the following:

•	 Safety and security

•	 An end to intrusive and damaging law enforcement

•	 Control of truly dangerous and disruptive group members

To begin a process of addressing these dynamics, a police executive could communicate 

points such as the following in a small meeting with community representatives:

•	 We are frustrated too. We are trying to do a good job. We want the community 

to be safe, but what we are doing is not working well enough. We recognize 

that arresting ever-increasing numbers of people of color has not reduced the 

violence. We would really like to do better. We have not known how to do so—

but we may have a way now.

•	 We understand that most people in the community are not acting dangerously, 

and we understand that some of those who are doing so are under terrible 

pressure or feel they have no other option. We want them to be safe and to be 

able to ask us for help. We understand that outsiders, mostly white, who come 

into your community to buy drugs are doing terrible damage, and we want to 

stop that.

•	 We understand that we have given you a difficult choice because as we try to 

protect you, we have asked you to tell us about people in the community so 

we can put them in prison. We understand that while you want the crime and 

violence to go away, you do not want an ever-growing number of community 

members locked up.

•	 We would like to do things differently—in a way that respects the 

neighborhood, respects everyone’s rationality, and focuses our serious attention 

on the few individuals who are really hurting the community (and in a way that 

puts them in prison only if they keep hurting the community).
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 46 —

•	 We understand that you want less crime, 

violence, arrests, and incarceration. We want the 

same. We do not get up in the morning to put 

black men in prison. There is a way to increase 

your safety and put fewer people in prison. 

•	 We believe those involved in violence in your 

community will listen to you. We understand that 

we have no moral standing with them, but you 

do. We believe we can work with you to create 

safe ways for you to engage with them and set 

community standards, and that will be powerful.

•	 Would you be willing to work with us to try something new that would let us 

back off and let you step forward?

In this conversation, law enforcement and community representatives can also talk 

about the communities’ role in some of the following ways: 

•	 Nobody can set standards about right and wrong for your community except 

you. Nobody from the outside can do this. If the only voice telling young men 

not to shoot people or sell drugs in public is law enforcement, or any other 

outsiders, nothing will change.

•	 A strong public stance that the police are oppressive, without a message 

that violence is wrong, allows the small number of individuals who are truly 

dangerous to justify their actions and lead the police to incorrectly believe that 

the community sanctions their behavior.

•	 The most important thing you can do is to state clearly to the few who are 

driving the violence that the community wants them to stop.

•	 We cannot do this alone from the outside. We have often acted as if we could; 

we have often actually thought we could. We have learned that is wrong. We 

need you to do this as a partnership.

“Seeing a white chief speak this 

message of reconciliation helped 

wash away years of bad feelings. His 

statement disarmed the community’s 

objections. It deflated a mother’s 

claim that law enforcement was 

picking on her child.”

– P astor Sherman Mason, High Point 

Community Against Violence
— 47 —

Community Moral Voices

The power of reconciliation

First, I had to come to the realization that what we, the police, were doing was not working. 

We had a long history of baggage between the police and the minority community. How did they 

come to believe that the police don’t care? Well, the crack house goes on and on despite their calls 

to police. Or they see us just driving by after they call to report a guy selling drugs on the corner.

But we do care. People don’t know the many reasons we might seem to be just driving by—we 

could be checking the computer, responding to another call, etc. Let’s acknowledge that the police 

do care; let’s set this straight.

Let’s also talk about what the community does that makes police think the community doesn’t care. 

I’ll say, “I realize we have let you down, and I apologize for that.” I’ll start to see some heads nodding 

in agreement. I’ll say, “Give us one more chance. Let’s work together.” This difficult speech has gone 

well every time. 

I have even told the community that if they didn’t want to do this, we wouldn’t. But I knew the talks 

were working when, as soon as I finished speaking, a hand shot up in the back and a woman asked, 

“When do we start?”

This is important groundwork outside the call-ins. In a given community, we’ll have one meeting 

with about 10 people, then ask them to invite their neighbors to another meeting, growing these 

meetings to 30 to 40 people, sometimes as many as 100. It takes about three visits to a community 

to pass the word and explain the strategy effectively.

For chiefs who don’t want to admit mistakes, they should realize that what they were doing simply 

wasn’t effective despite their hard work. They don’t have to admit any bad motives, but they can’t 

continue to claim credit just for effort.

What we were doing was ineffective and unpleasant for neighborhood residents. People might be 

able to tolerate aggressive and effective policing, but not policing that is ineffective and aggressive.

For us, the payoff is that the city is far safer than it used to be. Everybody wants that.

– James Fealy, former Chief of Police, High Point (North Carolina) Police Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 48 —

Engaging the Community’s Moral Voice

Community moral voices are local figures who have 

the respect of the group members attending the 

call-in and who can influence how they think and 

act. The moral voice of the community is extremely 

important for articulating clear standards against 

violence and for community success.

“The community moral voice is 

essential. Without it, the Group 

Violence Intervention is just another 

law enforcement effort.”

– Rev erend Jeff Brown, Co-Founder, Ten Point 

Coalition of Clergy, Boston, Massachusetts

Identify potential moral voices

Representatives of the Working Group 

typically meet with a small number of 

community figures to brief them on the 

GVI model, explain its goals and record 

of accomplishment, answer any questions, 

and ask if they are willing to play a role in 

the project and who else might serve as a 

community moral voice. Working Group 

representatives should plan to hold several 

rounds of such meetings to build a cadre 

of local community members willing to be 

involved in this way. 

Social service providers cannot deliver the 

message of the community moral voice. 

GVI draws a clear distinction between the 

message delivered by social service providers 

and the community moral voice. 

❯ Tip from the field

Community moral voices: 

The best choices

❯ Choose a person who knows and interacts 

with the group members who will be at the 

call-in: e.g., a teacher, community center 

worker, or coach. 

❯ Choose a person whom group members will 

view as a natural authority in their world.

❯ Choose a person who will strengthen the idea 

that GVI is not a law enforcement tool but a 

partnership between the community and law 

enforcement to stop violence. 

– Reverend Jeff Brown, Co-Founder, Ten Point Coalition of 

Clergy, Boston, Massachusetts
— 49 —

Community Moral Voices

Select speakers for the call-in

Selecting the right people to 

communicate the community moral 

message is crucial. In most cities, GVI 

proceeds by identifying and working 

with community members already 

committed to and engaged in violence 

prevention work and often closely 

engaged with group members. They 

may be any of the following:

•	 Street outreach workers

•	 Workers in the prisoner reentry field

•	 Grassroots leaders in affected neighborhoods

•	 Faith leaders

•	 Community members engaged in existing local organizations such as groups for 

parents of murdered children

•	 Prominent local public figures such as neighborhood activists, coaches, and local 

business people

The Working Group should first identify a small set of such figures and arrange private 

meetings with them to work through their questions and concerns about the strategy in 

private. Once they are convinced of the strategy’s utility, they are usually willing to speak 

at the call-in or support the work in other ways. To broaden the roster of community 

moral voices, the Working Group can ask members of this first group for access to their 

social networks to find others like them—others whom they trust, who would be able 

to play this role, and with whom they would want to work. 

The community moral voices brought into the partnership should be those to whom 

group members will listen. People whom active group members respect and perceive as 

authentic influence group members the most strongly. 

A note on community organizing

Having a partner in the community who can effectively 

educate and organize community members to support 

the GVI effort can be extremely valuable. In some cities, 

organizations like the Ten Point Coalition in Boston, 

the High Point Community Against Violence in North 

Carolina, and affiliates of the PICO (People Improving 

Communities through Organizing) National Network 

have played this role effectively.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 50 —

Street outreach: Building bridges

The target audience for the GVI message—members of violent groups—cannot typically be 

reached in schools, recreation centers, or other traditional meeting places. Some GVI communities 

have used street outreach workers or street advocates to connect with group members, meeting 

them where they can be found. Street outreach of this kind can add enormous value to GVI.

In Rhode Island, the street outreach arm of the Institute for the Study & Practice of Nonviolence and 

the Providence Police Department entered into one of the most advanced partnerships in support 

of violence reduction. Street outreach workers meet weekly with the police, and the police call the 

institute to intervene in potential acts of retaliation or ongoing disputes and to try to convince group 

members wanted on warrants to turn themselves in rather than be arrested at their workplace or home. 

Most of the institute’s street outreach workers are ex-offenders who have been involved in street 

groups. Applicants undergo three rounds of interviews and are told to expect close scrutiny of their 

conduct, both from the institute and from law enforcement. They are chosen for their dedication 

to transforming their communities. At the same time, the institute informs the police department 

about the institute’s hiring and firing decisions as a way to build trust between the partners.

The following three community groups generally have been shown to produce the most 

effective speakers: 

1. Parents who have lost children to violence. Communities that suffer from violence 

are usually home to a number of parents who have lost children to violence. These 

parents have particular moral authority with group members and can speak to 

the pain the violence has caused in their lives and the damage it is doing to the 

community.

2. Formerly incarcerated people. Individuals who have lived through crime and 

violence and no longer wish to act in this way are typically well suited for speaking 

at a call-in. They frequently feel a powerful desire to give back to the community 

and have tremendous standing in the eyes of younger offenders. The formerly 

incarcerated can most powerfully challenge the street code and speak to the 

possibility of redemption. 
— 51 —

Community Moral Voices

3. Grassroots leaders. Communities often have local leaders whom street group 

members recognize as authentic and whom they respect. Often these leaders are 

neither traditional community leaders nor elected or appointed officials. They are 

usually grandmothers, neighborhood elders, barbers, coaches, or clergy members or 

have some other kind of standing in the community. These authentic community 

leaders can speak to community aspirations for growth and change.

Influentials

Borrowing a technique from its Drug Market Intervention, the National Network is evolving a way 

to involve “influentials” in GVI call-ins and other communications with group members. 

Almost all those involved in violent crime have people who are close to them, whom they care 

about, and who care about them. These influentials may be parents, grandparents, other family 

members, friends, or mentors. They have a great ability to affect an individual’s behavior. 

One can find influentials by doing the following:

◾ Reading probation and parole records, which often record the influentials’ roles in an 

individual’s life

◾ Checking jail and prison logs as a way of seeing who cared enough to visit group 

members

◾ Examining pre-sentencing reports

◾ Asking group members whom they trust and who cares about them

Not everyone identified through this process is a good influence. It pays to talk to probation and 

parole officers and others to find out who might be a positive influential on the group member. 

To invite influentials to participate, Working Group representatives explain that the strategy is 

not about arrests but about keeping their loved ones alive and out of prison, and ask for their 

help in doing so.

— 53 —

Social Services

☐ Why Offering Social Services Matters

☐ Organizing the Social Service Structure

Why Offering Social Services Matters

Providing help to street group members is 

a critical part of GVI. Social services play 

several roles in the strategy. First, experience 

shows that after a call-in some of the seasoned 

group members will accept the offer of help 

and change their lives. They may be tired of 

the violence, tired of going to jail and prison, 

and tired of being afraid for themselves and 

their loved ones. Getting them to accept 

help is enormously important for them, 

their families, and the community. Some 

have a powerful desire to give back to their 

community and can become valuable assets 

in ongoing antiviolence and community 

development work.

In most National Network cities, about 10 to 

20 percent of group members come forward 

to accept help. This “service uptake” can be 

influenced by the following: 

•	 The skill and credibility of the social 

service representative who makes the appeal at the call-in

•	 The quality of the services provided

•	 The reputation of the lead service agency

•	 The presence of street outreach workers as part of the partnership

•	 The previous experiences of group members who came forward

❯ Tip from the fiel

Choosing the right social 

service provider

To ensure good follow-through on the strategy’s 

promise of social services, enlist an especially able 

social service provider.

Look for one that can identify the group members’ 

needs, provide certain services, refer other services,

and track each group member’s progress.

The organization needs sufficient capacity, 

resources, and diligence to treat all call-in group 

members as well as any group members they may 

encourage to call.

The provider ideally has a physical presence in or 

near the neighborhood that is the subject of GVI.

– Chris Mallette, Executive Director, Chicago Violence Reduction 

Strategy

d
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 54 —

Service provision also helps in mobilizing community figures who can influence the 

behavior of group members. Community members are more willing to deliver the 

needed moral messages against violence when they know that group members have a 

standing, genuine offer of help. 

The services should be organized so that group members need call only one phone 

number. Any group member calling that number is then prioritized for immediate help. 

Organizing the Social Service Structure

To organize an effective social service structure, the Working Group typically completes 

the following five steps:

1 . Identify providers

For GVI purposes, the ideal social service provider offers as many of the needed 

reentry-style services as possible in-house, including mental health treatment, case 

management, education, employment training and placement, crisis intervention, drug 

treatment, housing, mentoring, and emergency services. The provider selected should 

have a reputation for effectively delivering services to people with extensive criminal 

justice histories, especially those whose histories include violence and street group 

involvement. Where no one provider can deliver all of these services, the Working 

Group should assemble multiple providers.

2 . Bring providers into the strategy

After identifying a social service provider or providers that meet the preceding criteria, 

the Working Group should get dedicated providers to deliver rapid, priority attention 

to group members. 
— 55 —

Social Services

3 . Identify a lead provider

If several social service agencies are involved, one agency should provide intake and case 

management for all group members who come forward. A senior representative of this 

lead agency should then join the Working Group going forward. 

Any other agencies can provide support services via referrals from the central agency. 

Providers should have a reliable service-delivery record and the capacity to track and 

report on both service enrollment and outcomes. 

The intake agency must be able to access information from any other agencies to 

which it refers group members. (Interagency memoranda of understanding may be 

needed.) Social service agencies selected for this project must be able to work with law 

enforcement and have good standing in the community. 

4 . Ensure fast response times

Upon contacting the social service providers, group members should receive a prompt 

response. Social services should provide an individualized assessment, backed with case 

management and follow-up, as soon as possible. 

5 . Develop tracking database

The lead social service agency, in partnership with any other social service agencies 

to which it will refer group members, should collect and analyze data on all group 

members who make contact for services. The lead agency then reports information 

on clients’ progress, process adherence, and program outcomes to the Working Group 

that defines successful outcomes: e.g., completion of life plan goals, employment, or no 

further involvement in violence. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 56 —

A note on funding

Many GVI cities have found that the best social service 

providers understand the merit of the work and are 

already working with this population in some capacity. 

By contrast, other providers may be drawn to the project 

only if they expect new funding. Therefore, the National 

Network recommends that the Working Group begin 

with pre-existing providers and work with them to 

obtain funding if and when enough group members 

come forward, requiring additional resources.

In sum, the following social service elements should be in place before holding a call-in: 

•	 One or more social service providers have agreed to provide the needed services 

in a streamlined and coordinated manner.

•	 They have agreed to prioritize group members.

•	 They have identified a single intake point.

•	 They can provide case management.

•	 They have agreed to track service uptake and outcomes. 
— 57 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

☐ What Is a Call-In?

☐ Law Enforcement Preparation

☐ Call-In Security and Logistics

☐ Speaker Preparation

☐ Call-In Audience

☐ Directing Group Members to Appear

☐ Call-In Rehearsal

☐ Call-In Execution

The next major stage of GVI is preparing and executing a call-in, a key event in the strategy. 

What Is a Call-In?

A call-in is a face-to-face meeting of law enforcement 

representatives, community figures, social service 

providers, and group-involved individuals usually on 

probation or parole. The call-in is a communication 

device; its primary purpose is to deliver the strategy’s 

key messages clearly to the group members and, 

through them, back to the entire groups with 

which they are associated. During the call-in, the 

law enforcement-community partnership clearly 

communicates three points:

1. A community moral message against violence

2. A credible law enforcement message about the consequences of further violence

3. A genuine offer of help for those who want it

“The philosophy of this program is 

right on target. It tries to get people to 

choose not to do violence. We create an 

internal disincentive for group members 

to react with violence; we undercut the 

peer pressure they feel to defend their 

honor in a conflict.”

– Br ian Murphy, former Chief of Police, Bureau of 

Organizational Development, Chicago (Illinois) 

Police Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 58 —

Law Enforcement Preparation

The law enforcement representatives of the Working Group will need to perform the 

following three steps before a call-in takes place:

1 . Identify members of violent groups 

The problem analysis (see page 31) identified violent groups currently operating in the 

community, as well as their patterns of conflicts and alliances. With that information, 

law enforcement identifies the active members of those groups, including individuals 

who are currently serving jail or prison sentences (especially those about to be released).

2 . Determine community supervision status of group members 

Once law enforcement completes the initial list of group members (see “Group audit” 

and “Incident review” on pages 35 and 38), probation and parole personnel examine 

it and identify which members are currently under supervision. Institutionalizing 

this process enables the Working Group to update information regularly on group 

membership and supervision status (in advance of any subsequent call-ins).

3 . Include member(s) from each group at the call-in(s)

The Working Group should keep the number of group members attending a call-in 

to approximately 40 or less. Because GVI relies on group accountability, members 

from each group in a jurisdiction must be present at the call-in. If there are too 

many probationers and parolees to fit in one call-in, the jurisdiction can hold 

multiple sessions.
— 59 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

Site selection theory

To enhance the call-in’s effect on group members, holding the call-in at a nonthreatening place 

of civic importance may be better. While many call-ins have been held in courtrooms, that setting 

might send an overly harsh message to group members.

Instead, holding the call-in at, for example, a park building, library, or community center instead 

of a criminal justice site changes the tone of the meeting and may help group members think of 

themselves as citizens, not outcasts. The idea is to encourage them to become upstanding citizens. 

These people are so alienated from law enforcement and the state that respectful treatment has a 

bigger impact on them than on other citizens.

Holding the call-in at a welcoming place of civic importance in effect changes the background 

music. It’s like turning off the Jaws soundtrack. Even the smallest pro-legitimacy dose can affect a 

group member at a call-in.

– Tracey Meares, Ph.D., Yale Law School

Call-In Security and Logistics

Ideally, the call-in location should be physically secured and have a separate entrance 

for group members and other call-in participants so that individuals can be admitted 

in an orderly manner, any disruptive individuals can be kept out, and the safety of all 

attendees can be ensured. 

The Working Group should have group members invited to the call-in arrive early 

and have a place at the site for checking group members in before they enter the 

presentation area. Law enforcement typically searches group members for weapons; this 

is best done away from speakers and other participants arriving. Furthermore, the police 

department should develop an area security plan so that group members can arrive and 

depart safely. Problems such as rival group members causing trouble are almost unheard 

of but should be prepared for.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 60 —

The site should have a staging area, such 

as a side room or a lobby. This will allow 

the Working Group to assemble group 

members prior to the call-in so they can 

enter all at once. A staging room will 

also provide a reception area for group 

members to meet with speakers after the 

call-in has finished.

Speakers and observers should assemble 

early, wait in the call-in area quietly, and 

be prepared and ready to proceed when the group members enter. Any prep work, 

meetings, or socializing should be done in a separate area and out of view of the invited 

group members. 

❯ Tip from the field

Community setting

Another advantage of holding a call-in at a community 

venue—instead of a distant courtroom, for example—

is that more community and family members can attend 

the event to hear and reinforce the message.

– Greg Baker, Executive Director, Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence

Speaker Preparation

The call-in is a thoroughly structured event designed to convey specific messages. The 

National Network recommends that the Working Group provide all of the speakers’ 

talking points to everyone involved so everyone can see the entire message and the 

required coordination in advance. The Working Group should also provide information 

to nonspeaking participants, such as community members, ahead of the event, so they 

too can see the big picture.

The Working Group typically selects a maximum of three individuals from each group 

(i.e., law enforcement, social service providers, and the community) to deliver their 

respective messages. 

Talking points for law enforcement

For the GVI law enforcement speakers, the key objective of the call-in is to 

communicate to group members that new law enforcement rules are now in place. 

The speakers explain that these rules target specific acts of violence and that law 

enforcement will collectively focus its attention on an entire group if one member 

commits such an act. The enforcement attention must be sufficient to convince group 

members that things have actually changed.
— 61 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

Law enforcement must communicate a promise it can keep. Usually, law enforcement 

promises to pay special attention to all crimes of all members of the most violent group 

and/or the next group that shoots or kills somebody after the call-in. The worst/next 

group promise helps ensure the enforcement partnership can fulfill the promise 

it makes during the call-in. Even if a community experiences multiple homicides 

immediately after the call-in, this enforcement promise commits the partnership to 

special enforcement action against only two groups.8

The following recommendations illustrate how the law enforcement speakers can 

discuss the demonstration enforcement action when they talk about the new ways of 

responding to violence: 

•	 Articulate the purpose of the meeting: What we are about to say is not aimed 

at you personally but at your group. You are here to listen to the message and 

then take it back to your associates. Today is a new day and we are here to tell 

you the rules. From now on, whoever commits [the prohibited acts of violence] 

will bring special attention to their entire group for all crimes its members are 

committing. 

•	 Articulate the strengthened law enforcement agency partnership: All of our 

local, state, and federal partners are on board with this. We are working together 

to ensure that violence is going to be met with swift and certain consequences 

from now on. (If possible, law enforcement speakers can state that they have 

special understandings with local and federal prosecutors that will limit plea 

bargaining and enable enhanced federal review and adoption of cases, etc.). 

•	 Clearly articulate the new enforcement rules: We know that groups drive 

the violence. From now on, we are going to follow through accordingly with 

delivering the consequences of breaking the law. We cannot pay special attention 

to all crimes at all times, but the next group to commit [the prohibited acts 

of violence] after this meeting will get our full attention. We will go after the 

shooter and the entire group for any and all other illegal activities. 

8. For demonstration purposes, discussion throughout the remainder of this guide will assume an enforcement 

focus on the next violent group.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 62 —

•	 Present details of the demonstration enforcement action to illustrate that 

law enforcement is making a credible promise: Up on the wall are pictures and 

charts of the group that committed the first killing. You will see some familiar 

faces. This was [group name]. The shooter is now in [location/sentence/

pending charges]. His associates face [likely sanctions to be imposed on the 

group members]. If their associate had not shot someone, they would not have 

gotten this attention. This is what we mean. This is how things will be from 

now on.

•	 Articulate your partnership with the community and social services: We 

hope you listen to the members of your community present here today and 

stop the violence. We would also like you to take the help offered by the social 

service providers. However, if nothing else, put your guns down. We want you 

to be safe.

•	 Stress that the new rules are in effect now: Starting after this meeting, all law 

enforcement agencies are coming after the next person that shoots someone and 

everyone in his group for all crimes they have committed. Now you know how 

things are going to work. If you see or know members of your group are about 

to become violent, tell them to stop. If they do not stop, your group will become 

the focus of special local, state, and federal law enforcement attention.

Law enforcement must not make promises or say anything that is not true. As 

tempting as they may be, statements such as “we know everything you do” or “we’ll send 

everybody in your group to federal prison” are simply not correct.

In addition to explaining the new rules, National Network cities are also paying 

increasing attention to community and group member perceptions of law enforcement 

legitimacy and the stories that both law enforcement and communities tell about each 

other (see “Community Moral Voices” on page 53). These stories often explain much 

about why working together has been so hard for the community and police and why 

group members think violence is necessary. 
— 63 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

During their call-in presentations, many law enforcement speakers have been willing 

to focus on challenging group narratives that say police do not care about group 

members or the safety of their community. This focus can include statements such as 

the following:

•	 None of us have been entirely in the right; all of us would like to change. 

•	 Law enforcement respects you and believes you can make the right decision.

•	 Law enforcement has been part of the problem; what we have been doing has 

not worked well enough; we have not kept you safe, and we want to change that.

•	 We know you are the ones being hurt and killed, and that is not ok. We are 

going to make sure from now on that you do not get hurt.

•	 Law enforcement does not want to put you in prison or see you dead; law 

enforcement would prefer that you succeed and the community thrive.

•	 Law enforcement will tell you exactly how to stay out of prison.

•	 Law enforcement wants you with your family and children—alive and out of 

prison.

Talking points for social service providers

In essence, the key messages of the social service providers are that (1) they are ready, 

willing, and able to work with group members and their associates; (2) they have 

various services available to help group members and their associates; (3) they will 

give group members immediate priority attention; and (4) group members and their 

associates can get help by calling a single phone number, and whenever group members 

are ready, the social service providers will be there to help. 

Social service speakers should avoid technical jargon, such as “case management plans” 

or “needs assessment,” and speak plainly about how they can help: e.g., finding group 

members a place to live and getting drug treatment, job training, and education. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 64 —

Here are some recommendations on how to deliver the social service message:

•	 Articulate the overarching message of the call-in: There is no justification 

for the violence. We agree with law enforcement and the community that the 

violence has to stop.

•	 Stress that help is available for those who want it: We want to help you and 

will do the best we can to help you change your life.

•	 Explain the social service structure: A new service structure has been created 

for you and members of your groups who want help. Our agency is prepared 

and qualified to help you. You can access these services by calling [provide one 

phone number for one point of contact]. The services available to you include 

[describe what is available]. We cannot promise you employment, but we 

promise to do the best we can to help you get a job if you want one. 

Note: A social service provider must NOT promise jobs. This is ordinarily 

not a promise that can be delivered with certainty. Providers can promise job 

training and working with group members to find jobs but cannot and should 

not guarantee employment.

•	 State that help is unconditional: This offer is not conditional; if you want help, 

we will help you.

Talking points for community moral voices

Different types of community members are best suited to deliver different aspects of 

the moral voice messages. Some areas may overlap, but the following groupings and 

messages typically prove to be most powerful:

•	 Parents of murdered children or other victims speak to the community pain: 

The violence destroys families and the community; this is what it did to me. 

This is what it will do to your family.

•	 Ex-offenders challenge the street code and speak to the possibility of 

redemption: This was what I did. There was no justification for what I did. It 

was wrong. The ideas of the street code are wrong and destructive. Redemption 

is possible; learn from my example. I have lived the life you are living now, and I 

am here to tell you change is possible and life can be different.
— 65 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

•	 Faith or grassroots community leaders speak to community aspirations: Your 

acts of violence are inflicting immeasurable harm on the community. You are 

currently poor role models for your children and others. The community needs 

to grow and thrive, but it needs you alive and out of prison to do so. 

Call-In Audience

In addition to the speakers, a jurisdiction 

may decide to invite other law enforcement, 

community, and social service representatives 

to attend the call-in as audience members. 

Community members in the audience can 

effectively demonstrate a neighborhood’s 

support for GVI just as law enforcement 

representatives can demonstrate their 

departments’ support. However, the law 

enforcement representatives may want to 

attend in plain clothes to keep the call-in 

setting as nonthreatening as possible. 

Keeping a list of all invited audience members 

at the door and signing them in as they arrive 

has also proven useful, helping to ensure the 

call-in is not disrupted by anyone not involved 

with GVI. Some GVI cities, on the other 

hand, have decided not to have an audience 

present, particularly for their first call-ins. 

Directing Group Members to Appear

Normally, the Working Group selects from each group one or more members who are 

currently under probation or parole supervision and directs them to attend the call-in 

as part of their regular reporting. Providing invitations to parolees and probationers 

at least one week before the call-in is important. Delivering one invitation two weeks 

before the call-in and a reminder several days before the event is often effective.

❯ Tip from the field

Hand delivery

In High Point, North Carolina, community moral 

voices help invite group members to the call-in. 

We take letters from the chief of police and deliver 

them, in-person, to the invitees. For safety, we 

are accompanied by police officers, but we do the 

talking. 

We try to deliver the letters in the presence of the 

invitees’ family members or other influentials, and 

we tell the invitees they can bring those influentials 

to the call-in. 

At the house, we tell invitees that they won’t 

be arrested at the meeting but that we, the 

community, have something important to tell 

them, so they should come. 

– Pastor Sherman Mason, High Point Community Against 

Violence
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 66 —

Letter content

The invitation letter typically does the following:

•	 Addresses the recipient by name 

•	 States that the person has been identified as being at risk for committing, or 

being the victim of, an act of violence

•	 Invites the person to attend the meeting; clearly states the meeting’s date, 

location, starting time, and expected length

•	 Provides a general overview of the meeting and who will be speaking (e.g., 

law enforcement, social service providers, and community members) without 

mentioning names

•	 Highlights that the invitee will not be arrested or detained if he or she attends 

the meeting

Best practices for letter 

delivery

Many cities opt to hand deliver 

invitations, as mailing them has 

often proved ineffective. Teams 

of police officers can deliver the 

letters, with some combination of 

probation or parole staff, community 

representatives, social service 

representatives, or others associated 

with the GVI effort. Many cities 

have also used follow-up phone call 

reminders.

❯ Tip from the field

Picking the right group members

We check whether a person is an associate of a violent 

group, even if he is not known to be an actual member, 

and whether he has committed violence recently. That’s 

who we pick for the call-in—people who have been hot 

recently. We try to bring in one or two members of each 

active group, capping the call-in at 20 group members.

– Marty Sumner, Chief of Police, High Point (North Carolina) Police 

Department
— 67 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

The teams usually deliver the letters along with a respectful, simple, and short 

conversation (perhaps 30 seconds), which typically touches on the following points:

•	 We want to invite you to hear some 

important information about law 

enforcement activities and violence in 

the neighborhood.

•	 Community members and law 

enforcement will present some 

information that will be important for 

you and your associates to know.

•	 This information discusses how to 

stay out of prison.

•	 You will not be arrested or detained 

if you attend. We want you to hear 

the message and take it back to your 

associates.

Letters are best delivered to the location 

where the person is known to reside (and in 

the presence of family members, if possible). 

If the person is not available, the letter can be 

left with someone known to be influential in 

the person’s life. That person may be a spouse, 

mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, or 

anyone known to have a positive impact on 

the decision making of the individual.

❯ Tip from the field

Strengthening the message

In Cincinnati, the GVI team wrote a personalized 

letter for each group member invited to the callin. Machine-signed by the chief, the letters told 

group members that they were at risk of enhanced 

sentencing and should avoid further arrests. The 

letters were handed to group members at the 

call-in, in sealed envelopes, and the group members 

were asked not to open the envelope until after the 

call-in. 

Aside from emphasizing that the group members 

must avoid future violence or risk enhanced 

sentencing, the letters were intended to make the 

group members feel they were already under the 

close attention of the police, even before a post-callin enforcement action could be carried out.

– James Whalen, Assistant Chief, Cincinnati (Ohio) Police 

Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 68 —

Call-In Rehearsal 

Once the Working Group has identified the speakers and moderator for the callin, the group should schedule a rehearsal and go over the previously developed 

talking points for each speaker. GVI is an intervention based on information 

and messaging; if the messaging goes off script, the strategy may be not only 

ineffective but also damaging. Disrespectful and challenging messages can provoke 

group members to act out after the meeting. For this reason, the National Network 

recommends preparation and a rehearsal before the call-in. The National Network 

strongly recommends that the moderator not permit anyone to speak at a call-in 

if they did not attend the rehearsal.

The project manager or an appointed moderator typically runs the rehearsal and 

provides constructive feedback to each speaker. Sharing feedback with one another is 

also useful for speakers. 

The agenda for the rehearsal outlines the order and the time limit for each speaker; the 

same agenda can be used for the call-in. For a sample rehearsal agenda, see Appendix C.

The rehearsal should take place within one week of the call-in (often the day before), 

ideally in the same location and with all speakers present. At this time, the speakers 

should recite their talking points as if they were actually speaking before a live audience 

of group members and practice keeping to their assigned time limits. The rehearsal 

allows participants to offer constructive criticism and feedback to each other to ensure 

all messages are clear, concise, respectful, and effective. It also allows speakers to learn the 

messages of others, avoid repetition, and enhance community building for the partnership. 

Each speaker can receive or prepare a set of talking points in advance of the rehearsal. 

These can be customized and adapted to local conditions, but maintaining the core 

themes is important. 

For sample talking points for each set of speakers, see “Speaker Preparation” on page 74.
— 69 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

Checklist for a successful call-in

The National Network provides technical assistance to facilitate successful call-ins 

containing elements of the following list (which cities implementing a first call-in may 

find useful):

•	 The call-in setting is a place of civic and symbolic importance. Absent the 

negative connotations of a law enforcement setting, it still allows for physical 

security. The room is large enough and comfortable and has the right feel for the 

call-in’s purpose.

•	 All street groups are represented. If those called in are more than 40 individuals, 

the jurisdiction holds multiple call-ins.

•	 A full-time project manager helps to ensure the call-in is well-organized 

logistically and operationally.

•	 Community attendance is robust, and the room is organized to facilitate faceto-face messaging. Speakers greet attendees as they enter and mingle with them 

before the meeting starts.

•	 A PowerPoint presentation visually conveys a number of key themes, such as the 

GVI no-violence message; official knowledge about groups and group members; 

how to access services; and clear explanations of group-focused enforcement 

actions.

•	 Speakers stay focused on the key messages of their talking points and keep to 

their allotted time. 

•	 Law enforcement speakers use a matter-of-fact tone and include reconciliation 

content.

•	 Community speakers convey the pain of violence and incarceration. A mother 

of a murdered child, the brother of a group member in prison for life, or other 

community speakers debunk the street code and group culture. 

•	 A social service speaker clearly states that help is available and explains how 

group members can access that help.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 70 —

•	 All speakers consistently treat the group members as respected partners in the 

project, telling them they have influence and can help make the situation right 

by talking to their people and helping to stop the violence.

•	 The moderator keeps the meeting on track and within a one-hour timeframe.

•	 The Working Group cultivates a trusted reporter, and media coverage is wellmanaged, favorable, and accurate.

Call-In Execution 

The Working Group should schedule the call-in within a week or so of the 

demonstration enforcement action. The call-in itself carries great meaning. Having law 

enforcement, community figures, and social service providers appear together before 

group members and speak to them directly with one voice is extremely unusual. As 

such, the call-in conveys the strength of the partnership. 

The tone of the call-in should clearly convey that the partnership (1) regards the group 

members to be rational and responsible, (2) expects them to make good use of the 

information provided, and (3) views any law enforcement consequences that might 

fall on them for noncompliance as strictly business, nothing personal—the behavior is 

rejected, while the people are embraced. Speakers should avoid the use of derogatory 

terms. In unison, all must convey there is no justification for the violence. 

The call-in should last no longer than 90 minutes; keeping it to one hour is ideal. 

Speaking order 

Different cities arrange their call-ins differently. Many open the call-in with the 

moderator, move to law enforcement speakers, then social services, and then 

community members. Other partnerships prefer to have community members speak 

first to emphasize the intervention is community-led, with law enforcement there 

to support the communities’ demand that the violence stop. Other cities have social 

service providers speak last and provide them with time to engage directly with call-in 

participants before the meeting adjourns. The most important point is that all three 

components of the partnership are represented and their key messages delivered.
— 71 —

Call-In Preparation and Execution

Visual aids 

Especially at initial call-ins, the explicit purpose of talking about group enforcement 

actions is to establish the credibility of group-focused sanctions. The National Network 

recommends the partnership create a visual display of the group most recently targeted 

for an enforcement action. This can include mug shots or other pictures of each group 

member. If there was a meaningful hierarchy to the targeted group, pictures can be 

arranged accordingly. 

Under each picture, include the actual or potential sentences or sanctions the 

offenders face. A key point to communicate is that these individuals would still be in 

the community if their group had not self-selected for law enforcement attention by 

committing acts of violence.

Moderator’s role 

The moderator’s role is to open the call-in, set the appropriate tone, frame the meeting, 

manage the transition between speakers, and close the meeting. The Working Group 

should select a moderator who represents the effort of the call-in as a community and 

law enforcement partnership. Often the project manager is a good choice. Some cities 

have used co-moderators to model this partnership.

The moderator is also responsible for ensuring the meeting stays on track. In the 

adrenaline of the moment, speakers can sometimes go off message or run long. If this 

happens, the moderator can refocus the call-in by reiterating the core themes. If group 

members become unruly, the moderator can address this and, if necessary, ask probation 

or parole officers to settle them down or remove them. 
Finally, the moderator must ensure no speakers engage in conversation with the group 

members—this includes not allowing or answering their questions. If group members 

who are under supervision engage in two-way conversation with law enforcement 

representatives in this setting, it can be considered a custodial interrogation. Even 

more important, the partnership can quickly lose control of the room and the essential 

messaging. For this reason, group members must be asked to hold any questions 

until after the meeting, when they can seek out and speak with individual GVI 

representatives.

For a sample call-in agenda, see Appendix C. 

For an eyewitness account of the effect a call-in can have on group members and 

participants, see Appendix D.
— 73 —

Maintenance and Ensuring Program Integrity

☐ Recap and Planning with the Working Group

☐ Ongoing Data Analysis

☐ Follow-Through on Call-In Promises

☐ Ongoing Communication

Recap and Planning with the Working Group 

After the first call-in, usually within one to two weeks, the Working Group and project 

managers typically meet to do the following:

•	 Discuss the call-in

•	 Assess recent violence and ensure follow-through on enforcement promises

•	 Assess social service uptake and ensure effective service delivery

•	 Continue to identify and involve community moral voices to broaden and 

deepen community support for the work

•	 Establish a schedule of regular future meetings

Law enforcement-sensitive information cannot be shared with the social service and 

community members of the Working Group, so the law enforcement team within the 

Working Group may have to discuss certain issues in separate meetings.

Staying in touch

To maintain good communication between our Working Group’s teams (i.e., law enforcement, social 

services, and moral voice representatives), we hold strategy implementation meetings monthly 

with the head of each team. At those meetings, we can’t share all of our information, but we can 

share enough to keep each other informed.

– Dan Gerard, Captain, Cincinnati (Ohio) Police Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 74 —

Regular meetings of the Working Group can provide an opportunity to assess the 

integrity of strategy implementation: i.e., to ensure GVI is being carried out as it 

should. These meetings also provide a venue for all the partners to share information 

and think together. Regular meetings help keep the strategy alive over time.

Ongoing Data Analysis

The Working Group can increase the effectiveness of GVI by continuing some of the 

analytical steps it took during the initial problem analysis. These include structured 

problem analysis, social network analysis (where possible), and tracking performance 

metrics. For details on each of these steps, see “Problem Analysis” on page 31. 

Follow-Through on Call-In Promises

Once the GVI partnership has successfully executed the call-in, it must keep the 

promises it made there. The next group that shoots or kills someone must become the 

focus of the inter-agency law enforcement team. 

Similarly, the social service provider must keep its promises. Those who call the number 

provided at the call-in should get special, intensive help to the greatest extent possible. 

Law enforcement

The key tasks for law enforcement following each call-in are to monitor violence, 

detect group-involved violence, and respond with special, coordinated law enforcement 

attention to all crimes of the next group to cause violence.

Law enforcement, usually the police, must monitor homicides and shootings carefully 

to track those that involve groups as either suspects or victims. Again, motive does not 

matter for this purpose; only group involvement matters. Police should regularly review 

and assess shootings (fatal and nonfatal) by group member involvement to determine 

which group(s) will get special enforcement attention. Tracking these incidents can 

generate a group violence scorecard by which law enforcement can tell, at any given 

time, which groups in the city are the most violent and which group is the next to shoot 

or kill someone after each call-in. 
— 75 —

Maintenance and Ensuring Program Integrity

Once law enforcement has identified a group for GVI enforcement action, law 

enforcement must align the full resources of the criminal justice system—local, state, 

and federal—to act on its promise. Agency leadership must assign responsibility for 

carrying out the GVI action to an operational team that usually consists of police, an 

assistant district attorney, an assistant U.S. attorney, probation, parole, and any other 

participating enforcement agencies. Furthermore, that agency leadership must protect 

this team in being able to conduct the GVI action and hold the team accountable 

for doing so. The purpose of this operational team is to focus enforcement on all 

members of the street group that the Working Group has identified to receive 

special attention.

All such investigations are different, although there are patterns. Group enforcement 

actions generally fall into the following categories: 

•	 Quick enforcement action (30 to 60 days). The law enforcement team 

assesses the current legal exposure of group members to pull any available 

legal levers. Actions include violating group members under community 

supervision, vigorously enforcing the conditions of their probation or parole, 

enhancing those conditions, serving outstanding arrest warrants against group 

members, performing street drug enforcement, reviewing current cases for 

state enhancements or federal adoption, withdrawing plea deals from group 

members, reviewing the sources of bail and bond funds, serving warrants for 

outstanding child support, checking for unregistered cars, performing housing 

code enforcement where they live, checking child support conditions, checking 

for outstanding fines, and conducting bail reviews. These actions often result in 

arrest, detention, and short jail sentences as well as some shorter state sentences 

for group members. 

•	 Medium-term enforcement action (60 to 90 days). The Working Group 

engages in a focused state-level drug or other undercover investigation. These 

actions often result in meaningful state sentences, but the most important factor 

is including as many group members as possible. These actions can include 

federal review and adoption of some cases. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 76 —

•	 Major/long-term enforcement action (six months to two years). Federal 

investigations can involve substantial federal charges, career criminal 

enhancements, and organized crime statutes. State gang, wire, or conspiracy 

charges are sometimes possible as well. This type of action could be a federal or 

state-federal, long-term drug or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization 

Act (RICO) investigation that results in the adoption and prosecution of all or 

most cases in federal court. This type of action generally results in the heaviest 

sentences and will lead to significant attention from the media, the public, and 

group members. However, such actions are rare, resource-intensive, and take 

time, often as much as one to two years.

Group enforcement actions can be effective even if there is no formal case against the 

perpetrator for the homicide or for any crime. 

Very violent groups are often already the subject of pending state and/or federal 

investigations. If these investigations are completed within reasonable proximity to 

the call-in, they can be used for demonstration purposes, and no special GVI-initiated 

enforcement action will be necessary. For this to work effectively, (1) the investigation 

must be group-focused in some way (this does not mean the prosecution has to use 

group-related statutes such as RICO or gang enhancements, but the enforcement 

action must be directed at a criminal group), and (2) the group must be known as 

violent.

The group-targeted enforcement ends when as many members of the group as possible 

have experienced a meaningful sanction (e.g., arrest, incarceration, enhanced community 

supervision, and asset forfeiture) because of the operational team’s actions. The timing 

is ultimately the decision of the operational team, which will need to make a judgment 

call as to when it has had an impact on the group.

The GVI partnership can then present the enforcement action as a warning and as 

evidence of follow-through to other groups in the next call-in. 
— 77 —

Maintenance and Ensuring Program Integrity

Social services

In the call-in, social service providers offer 

attendees special help to change their lives. 

For many reasons, tracking service uptake 

and outcomes is important. The lead social 

service provider agency should report service 

uptake (i.e., individuals who come forward), 

service engagement (i.e., services received), and 

outcomes (e.g., employment and continued 

engagement in programming) to the Working 

Group on a monthly or quarterly basis.

Tracking the provision of services after a callin typically involves the following:

•	 Collecting information on the number of group members who have sought help

•	 Tracking referrals from the lead agency and follow-through by social service 

partner agencies

•	 Ensuring that all social service providers are prioritizing group members

•	 Tracking retention rates for services obtained by group members

•	 Taking affirmative steps to reach out to group members who have “fallen off ” the 

service track

•	 Preparing a brief update of success stories and service uptake for use in the next 

call-in

•	 Assessing participants’ subsequent involvement in violence

As with the follow-through enforcement actions, reporting social service successes to 

group members at subsequent call-ins is important because it is evidence of the GVI 

partnership’s integrity.

❯ Tip from the field

Uptake and progress

One advantage of continuing to hold regular 

meetings with the GVI Working Group is the chance 

to touch base with social service providers. At the 

meetings, we ask whether group members from 

the call-in have been calling for assistance and, if 

so, whether they are making progress.

– Marty Sumner, Chief of Police, High Point (North Carolina) 

Police Department
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 78 —

Community moral voices

Sustaining engagement between the right kind of community figures and group 

members between call-ins is a critically important but still evolving component of 

GVI. However, this is a research and development priority for the National Network, 

and establishing a strong community moral voice can look different from community 

to community. 

In some cities, community moral voices take the initiative to maintain the strategy. In 

High Point, North Carolina, for example, some community moral voices who have 

participated in call-ins coordinate their efforts through the High Point Community 

Against Violence to ensure that any group members who request help are receiving 

social services. They have also taken direct action to promulgate the GVI message of 

nonviolence, going to group members’ homes regularly to talk to them and their families 

and urging them to stop their conflicts with other groups. 

In Boston, the Ten Point Coalition pre-dated the original “Operation Ceasefire” 

implementation but became part of the partnership to deliver the community moral 

voice message to group members between call-ins. 

A number of cities are currently testing and refining models to enhance this component 

of the strategy. Such models include community members working directly with 

influentials or with impact players (i.e., individuals with strong connections and 

standing in their group) and delivering specially tailored community moral voice 

messages directly to them wherever they can be found. 

While community moral voices should always be represented in the Working Group, 

the community at large can be kept informed about GVI progress through meetings, 

fliers, and on-the-street interactions. The GVI effort is strengthened when all partners 

develop relationships, build trust, and maintain lines of communications with 

community residents.
— 79 —

Maintenance and Ensuring Program Integrity

Ongoing Communication

Traditional call-ins

After the first call-in and the resulting group enforcement action, the GVI partnership 

should hold another call-in. The invitation list can include some or all of the same 

group members who attended the first call-in as well as new ones. Over time, as group 

members both exit and enter into court supervision, that population will change. 

In addition to the central messages conveyed at all call-ins, speakers at each 

subsequent call-in must point out the connection between the first call-in and the 

group enforcement action. They can explain that law enforcement did what it said 

it would, naming the group member who killed someone and detailing the special 

actions the law enforcement team took against his entire group and the sanctions his 

associates are facing. 

The speakers should emphasize that they will continue the strategy, including group 

enforcement actions, as long as group members commit acts of violence. Speakers can 

also point out that some group members asked for help at the prior call-in and detail 

the help they received.

The GVI partners can hold repeat call-ins as 

needed to reach violent groups and to send the 

message about group enforcement, community 

concern, and available services. Within the 

first one to two years of implementation, a 

good rule of thumb is to hold a traditional 

call-in every three to four months. After a 

couple of years, the jurisdiction can reassess 

the level of street violence and adjust the 

call-in schedule, if necessary. It can then be 

supplemented with other methods of group – Dan Gerard, Captain, Cincinnati (Ohio) Police Department

communication and violence prevention (see 

“Custom notifications” on page 94).

❯ Tip from the field

Data updates

It’s vital to stay current on the dynamics of the local 

group violence problem, keeping up to date on 

groups and individuals. In Cincinnati, we update 

our intelligence gathering and analysis three times 

a year.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 80 —

Custom notifications

The call-in is the traditional method of the GVI partnership to communicate with 

group members. However, a number of National Network cities have developed 

supplementary methods to keep channels of communication open between call-ins, 

reach key players who are not under community supervision, and respond to “beefs” and 

retaliatory violence on short notice.

For example, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) conducts regular 

visits with key group members at their homes or on the streets to keep its antiviolence 

message alive between call-ins. If the visit takes place on the street, officers usually call 

the individual to the side; however, if other group members are present and want to 

listen, the officers do not exclude them. 

The officers tell the group members what they know about current violent activity in 

the neighborhood as a way to demonstrate their up-to-date intelligence. Officers point 

out the legal vulnerabilities of the individuals based on criminal records, handing them 

a letter on police letterhead that details their personal exposure. The officers reiterate 

the initiative’s antiviolence message and tell group members they are expected to control 

group-related violence in their neighborhood or face the consequence of an enforcement 

action on their groups.

CIRV also holds voluntary call-ins at prisons and jails to talk directly to those with 

a violent crime conviction and no more than six months left in their sentence. The 

partnership feels strongly that these individuals need to hear its antiviolence message, 

be informed about the new rules of law enforcement before they return to the city, and 

learn that social services are available to them upon re-entry. 
— 81 —

Maintenance and Ensuring Program Integrity

In High Point, North Carolina, law enforcement and community partners have used 

custom notifications as a method to quell retaliatory violence between groups. When a 

violent incident flares up or intelligence alerts police that groups or individuals are “hot,” 

law enforcement goes directly to the individuals involved. The officers deliver a message 

and letter custom-tailored to the individuals’ legal exposure to provide information 

about consequences of further violence and reinforce the community’s antiviolence 

demand. When possible, a member of the city’s High Point Community Against 

Violence accompanies law enforcement to demonstrate support for the message. 

The National Network recommends using both traditional call-ins and supplementary 

communication methods such as custom notifications to increase the impact of the 

GVI message.

— 83 —

Sustainability and Accountability 

☐ Performance Management

☐ Governing Structures

GVI requires nontraditional partners to work together in unusual ways and focus 

ruthlessly on violence prevention. The central challenge of the work after its initial 

launch is ensuring the sustainability of the strategy in the long term. Each jurisdiction 

and community will have to develop a sustainability and accountability structure 

that works for its particular environment. The following sections detail sustainability 

methods that have worked in some National Network cities or are based on lessons 

learned in cities where sustainability proved a challenge.

Performance Management

Creating a performance management system is highly useful for sustaining a GVI 

effort. It typically includes an intelligence gathering mechanism and an organizational 

structure to manage the GVI partnership. 

Intelligence maintenance systems

The formal and informal intelligence that crime analysis units and academic partners 

gather, record, and analyze guides GVI in important ways. Keeping such data timely 

is crucial.

Cities vary in how often they update their group violence intelligence. For the purpose 

of GVI, the Working Group should update such intelligence (e.g., group alliances, 

conflicts, and membership) at least twice a year if not quarterly. 

Both fatal and nonfatal shootings are best tallied according to street group (victim or 

suspect) to track which groups are most violent. Once the Working Group completes 

the initial incident review, it should track incidents more or less in real time.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 84 —

In some cities, this takes the form of a weekly call among 

knowledgeable personnel to debrief fatal and nonfatal 

shootings from the prior week and make preliminary 

group assignments. The Working Group then revisits 

this information quarterly to reassess original findings 

and incorporate investigative developments.

The analysis determines which street groups are the 

most violent and victimized at the current time. This can 

help the GVI partnership prioritize enforcement actions, street outreach, social services, 

and other activities to focus on the hottest groups.

Repeating the group audit process annually or semi-annually can be helpful to assess 

whether the network of street groups has changed because of GVI implementation. 

“The police department needs to 

commit to the Group Violence 

Intervention. GVI should not be an 

exception to the rule—it should be 

the rule.”

– Anthon y Braga, Ph.D., School of Criminal Justice, 

Rutgers University

Keeping focus, losing focus

GVI was originally implemented in Boston under the name Operation Ceasefire. After several years, 

despite much success, the effort faded away, and Boston lost its strategic focus on group violence 

reduction. The program’s demise may be attributed to several factors:

◾ A police department shift led to the removal of the Ceasefire project manager. No one 

else took responsibility for the strategy.

◾ The level of violence had declined so much (due to Ceasefire) that the interagency 

Working Group lost focus. 

Other cities, too, have seen their GVI efforts fade for reasons such as these:

◾ The city had formal commitments from political leaders who did not follow through.

◾ The police department handed the effort off to a junior officer who did not have 

enough authority to compel others to participate.
— 85 —

Sustainability and Accountability

Partnership management

GVI requires many energetic partners, 

unflagging focus, coordinated actions, and 

substantial organization and planning. Even 

when actions are not required, the partnership 

itself needs care and maintenance.

The independent partners have different 

constituencies, purposes, and resources. As 

such, producing a coordinated response 

from politically independent agencies and 

diverse individuals can be a challenge. Many 

GVI cities rely on a project manager to serve 

as a shepherd to the Working Group, and 

some cities have established larger project 

management teams. 

Governing Structures

Experience has shown that often the project 

manager and Working Group alone cannot 

ensure that GVI is successfully sustained. 

There is not yet one single approach that can 

be said to work in any given jurisdiction. 

However, the Cincinnati Initiative to 

Reduce Violence (CIRV) developed one of 

the most advanced governing structures yet 

seen. It may, in full or in parts, serve as a model for other cities. CIRV developed 

its governance structure after carefully studying similar violence interventions 

that experienced dramatic initial violence reductions followed by partnership 

disintegration due to internal conflict, leadership transition, or the loss of political 

will to focus on the strategy.

❯ Tip from the field

Lessons learned from Boston

Operation Ceasefire in Boston was founded as an 

informal Working Group of people from different 

agencies. The people, individually, were interested 

in pursuing a Group Violence Intervention, but doing 

so was a special, additional task, not their main 

duty. As team members were transferred to new 

posts, it proved difficult to keep the effort going.

The effort’s informal status also meant that 

participation by social services and community 

representatives was episodic. A more formal model 

of organization might have provided a mechanism 

for those groups to meet regularly with law 

enforcement to assess progress toward goals and 

refine operations as needed.

A board of directors that oversees the Working 

Group would be good for two reasons:

❯ The Working Group would have to report 

its results to a group in authority, providing 

accountability.

❯ The board can help the Working Group obtain 

needed resources.

– Ted Heinrich, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Boston
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 86 —

Figure 3. CIRV’s organizational structure

Source: Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence

In addition to law enforcement, social service, and community partners, CIRV includes 

various other teams as shown in Figure 3. For example, the systems team, which ensures 

permanence and quality assurance, includes intelligence analysts, business consultants, 

and academic advisers. It produces best practice documents, tracks goals and measures, 

prepares annual reports and partner briefings, evaluates performance, and suggests 

process improvements.

The governing board provides Cincinnati’s GVI initiative with resources and helps it 

overcome barriers to success. The strategy/implementation team is tasked with CIRV’s 

daily operations, including making key decisions, developing program strategies, securing 

resources, and continuously monitoring results. The team reports to the governing board 

regularly to provide progress updates and request resources. Finally, each of the four 

strategy teams is responsible for executing a particular element of the initiative.

CIRV’s governing structure ensures all partners are involved in goal setting and decision 

making and consequently share credit and blame. A project manager relieves the 

individual agencies and partners of substantial organizational burdens. Furthermore, 

the meeting and report schedule serves to structure, coordinate, and focus the strategic 

activity. The meetings and reports can also function as an ongoing seminar in which all 

partners can learn from the experience of various interventions. 
— 87 —

Conclusion

The National Network for Safe Communities continues its work to strengthen and 

build the components of the Group Violence Intervention. For over 15 years, the 

approach has reduced violence in a range of cities across the nation, and it continues 

to evolve. 

Experience has shown that when community members, law enforcement, and social 

service providers make an organized effort to engage with the members of violent 

groups according to the guiding principles of GVI, cities can achieve striking results—

results that everyone can agree on: e.g., reducing violence, improving law enforcementcommunity relationships, and bettering the quality of life in the nation’s most vulnerable 

neighborhoods. 

The National Network hopes this guide helps communities implementing GVI and 

asks them to share what they are doing; how the National Network can help; and 

what they are learning, inventing, and adding to the common goal of reducing violence 

throughout the United States.

— 89 —

Appendices

A. GVI Flow Chart and Timeline

Source: National Network for Safe Communities
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 90 —

B. Group Audit Tools

1 . Pre-session checklist

•	 Select a location for the session. The room must be large enough to 

accommodate the participants comfortably.

•	 Obtain a flip chart, markers, an easel, and a large map of the city.

•	 Identify individuals to attend the session.

— From the police department:

▪ Knowledgeable beat officers from every district, unit, or area with high 

numbers of homicides, shootings, or violent incidents (must know 

about group dynamics)

▪ The most knowledgeable detectives from homicide, vice, gang, and 

other specialized units involved with violent crime

— From probation, parole, and other law enforcement agencies:

▪ Officers knowledgeable about homicides, shootings, or violent incidents

•	 Notify individuals regarding the session.

— Follow up with supervisors to ensure the individuals are committed to 

attend and participate for the full session.

— Tell the individuals they are not to bring any official records to the 

meeting.

•	 Identify speakers who can begin the session (typically high-ranking officials 

who will describe the importance of the group audit and encourage full 

participation).

•	 If working with an experienced adviser, let him or her facilitate the group audit. 

If not, the GVI project manager can facilitate. 

•	 Identify at least two members of the experienced adviser’s team to assist with 

data collection.

•	 Arrange for breakfast and lunch to be delivered to the group audit session. 
— 91 —

Appendices

2 . Sample schedule for group audit

8:30 AM: Coffee and breakfast set up and served

•	 Place the easel with a large pad by the front of the room.

•	 Place the map where it is easily accessible by participants in the room.

9:00 AM: Welcome (law enforcement speaker)

9:15 AM: Welcome (moderator) 

•	 Thank everyone for participating.

•	 Read the oral consent form (if needed, depending on the requirements of any 

researchers’ universities).

•	 Go over the schedule for the day.

•	 Go over the process of the group audit, describe the questions participants will 

be asked, and address any questions any participants may have.

10:00 AM: Group audit

12:00 PM: Lunch break

12:30 PM: Group audit

2:30 PM: Break*

2:45 PM: Continue until completion 

* Breaks should be provided whenever necessary. If participants’ attention is flagging, 

the moderator should call a 15-minute break. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 92 —

3 . Sample group audit instrument

Jurisdiction: __________________________________

Name of group: _______________________________

GVI reference number for group: _____________________

Estimated size of group: _________________________

In what core criminal activities is the group involved? 

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Is this group involved in a persistent conflict with other group(s)? 

Yes No

If yes, what group(s)? 

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Do you know what started the conflict(s)? 

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Does the group have alliances with other group(s)? 

Yes No
— 93 —

Appendices

If yes, with which other group(s)?

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Are there any influential members who are particularly violent or who seem to lead the 

group? 

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Does this group “claim” or belong to a larger network (e.g., Bloods, Crips, and Gangster 

Disciples)? If so, do you think that larger network has a lot of influence on the group’s 

behavior?

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

How organized is this group? 

Highly organized Somewhat organized Not very organized

Is this group violent? 

Extremely violent Somewhat violent Not very violent
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 94 —

4 . Group audit data organization

The group audit data is best organized in the following ways:

Group network diagram to show group alliances and conflicts (see Figure 1 on page 39) 

•	 Group database to store group-level information 

— Use statistical analytic software, such as SPSS or SAS, to enter each group 

as a case.

— At a minimum, include the following fields (i.e., variables) when 

appropriate: 

▪ Group name

▪ Group unique identifier

▪ Geographic location (street segments, intersections, etc.)

▪ Group violence level 

▪ Estimated number of participants

▪ Number of known participants

▪ Police jurisdiction (e.g., precinct or district)

▪ Number of members on probation or parole supervision

▪ Number of members who have attended a call-in session

▪ Number of members currently receiving services
— 95 —

Appendices

This process provides a list of groups operating in the community, along with their 

key characteristics, as identified by front-line law enforcement. 

•	 Individual database to store individual-level information

— Using statistical analytic software, enter each individual as a case.

— At a minimum, include the following variables when appropriate: 

▪ Last name

▪ First name

▪ Individual unique identifier

▪ Community identification

▪ Sex

▪ Race

▪ Date entered into database

▪ Group name

▪ Group unique identifier

▪ Juvenile record

▪ Criminal record

▪ Probationary status

▪ Parole status

▪ Notified to attend call-in

▪ Attend call-in

•	 GIS mapping to capture geographical distribution of groups

— Using ArcGIS or similar mapping software, create a shapefile of street 

groups to overlay on a city map.

— Enter all group-level variables available in the group database so the 

information can be displayed geographically.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 96 —

5 . Social network analysis example 

After Chicago’s first call-in in August 2010, a member of the Black Souls was charged 

with the murder of a rival group member. In line with the GVI promise, swift and 

meaningful law enforcement actions were taken not only against the shooter but also 

against the Black Souls as a group.

As a first step, front-line officers and staff from the Chicago Police Department’s 

(CPD) gang enforcement unit, gang intelligence unit, patrol, and tactical divisions held 

a roundtable meeting. Drawing on existing intelligence, they jointly identified known 

members of the Black Souls. Those individuals are represented by dark circles in Figure 4. 

Using social network analysis (SNA), CPD then mapped other individuals who had 

been arrested with known members of the Black Souls in the last five years to identify 

any previously unknown group members. 

Figure 4. Black Souls’ social network

Source: Andrew Papachristos
— 97 —

Appendices

Based on the list of names produced by the roundtable group, Andrew Papachristos of 

the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, one of CPD’s key research partners, created 

a two-degree network of associates. The first-degree network mapped the known group 

members with everyone CPD officers had arrested or contact-carded over the past five 

years. CPD then repeated this step of the process to identify additional associates (coarrestees) of those in the first-degree network, thereby creating the two-degree network.

In Figure 5, the dark circles represent individuals not previously known to CPD as 

Black Souls and whom SNA identified as having the strongest network connections 

to known Black Souls. Papachristos sent their names back to the roundtable group for 

confirmation, and nine of the ten individuals were indeed associated with the group, 

adding to CPD’s intelligence.

Figure 5. New Breeds’ social network

Source: Andrew Papachristos
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 98 —

CPD has also applied SNA to assess the impact of its enforcement actions against 

groups in response to violence. By examining an illustration of a group’s network before 

and after an enforcement action, CPD can assess whether it did in fact remove key 

members. Figure 5 represents a before-and-after example that clearly shows that the 

enforcement action against the New Breeds successfully broke off central network 

connections, making reorganization more difficult for the group. 
— 99 —

Appendices

C. Sample Call-In / Rehearsal Agenda 

[Location]

February 24, 2013

6:30 PM – 8:00 PM

15 minutes – Opening and set up

5 minutes – Moderator: Welcome and introductions

20 minutes – Law enforcement message

5 minutes – Police executive

5 minutes – District/state’s attorney

10 minutes – Assistant U.S. attorney

3 minutes – Moderator: Transition 

30 minutes – Community moral voices message

7 minutes – Violence victim: Discuss community pain 

7 minutes – Grassroots leader: Discuss community aspiration

7 minutes (each) – Ex-offenders: Discuss redemption

3 minutes – Moderator: Transition

10 minutes – Social service provider message

3 minutes – Moderator: Closing message and adjourn

“Stop the violence. Put your guns down—you and your associates.”

Food and conversation 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 100 —

D. The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence “Call-In”: 

Reflections on a Profound Experience

Michael Blass, a career law enforcement officer working for the Ohio Attorney General, wrote 

the following essay after observing the first call-in in Cincinnati, Ohio, on July 31, 2007.

I saw something profound today. 

I saw the same players and actors, those nameless, faceless people who make up the 

good guys and the bad guys and the ordinary guys in any community. They are all 

different from one another, but they are mirror images of the players and actors in 

communities all across this nation. They have roles to play, these good guys, bad guys, 

and ordinary guys...and the roles are uniform and consistent throughout America’s 

communities. But today those roles were played in a different script. 

I saw something profound today. 

I watched the confused faces of those we commonly call the bad guys—angry young 

men, almost exclusively African American, as they filed into a room full of criminal 

justice professionals, social service providers, and community members. I saw, with 

exceptional clarity, the fear in their eyes, the apprehension on their faces, soon replaced 

with seemingly awkward attempts to project confidence, indifference, in some cases, 

perhaps, hostility. But I saw angry, street-savvy young men who were caught off-guard 

and struggling to find a comfort zone in what must surely have felt to them like an 

artificial environment. As they settled into their seats, they attempted to coax from 

within themselves a more comfortable demeanor while their genuine discomfort 

collectively and silently resounded across the room. These angry young men, used 

to being in control in the incredibly brutal environment of the mean streets, were 

noticeably off-balance and unsure of themselves. 

That was profound. 

I watched as the first speaker, Dr. Victor Garcia, stood and addressed the group. 

He was the first to deliver this simple message: “The violence—the killing and the 

shooting—must stop.” He provided startling statistics that supported his claim that 

black men killing black men has the potential to destroy the black race. He spoke of his 

personal experiences as a trauma surgeon saving, and losing, the lives of young men and 
— 101 —

Appendices

women who are victims of violence. He told the angry young men that he loved them, 

that they have value to their community, and that they are better than their violent 

actions imply. It was clear that he wanted more for these familiar strangers than they 

seemed to want for themselves. I saw a few angry faces soften, almost imperceptibly. 

That was profoundly interesting. 

I watched as law enforcement, prosecutors, social service providers, and community 

members addressed the angry young men, most of whom were attentive if for no 

other reason than to satisfy their curiosity. The speakers talked about consequences 

resulting from remaining in a violent lifestyle, but they spoke just as eloquently and 

passionately—perhaps more so—about how to exit the cycle of violence. They offered 

assistance and expressed feelings of personal faith, community hope, and love for the 

angry young men. 

I saw the faces of a few young men appear slightly less angry. I saw a few young men 

choke back tears. I saw in the eyes of a couple of young men the tears of a painful 

existence—the tears that come from the realization that reality and truth have just 

intersected within one’s consciousness; perhaps tears reflecting a recognition that they 

could dare to be hopeful about their future. I saw one young man raise his shackled 

hands above his head and exclaim “I never knew there was this much love out there...

seriously, I never knew it.” I saw several young men openly express a desire for respite 

from the pressures of their violent lifestyle. With a shrug of his shoulder, feigning 

nonchalance, one of the most angry young men said, “I’d like to change because I’m 

getting older and I’d like to get away from the violence.” Nobody argued for the status 

quo. Not one young man tried to justify violence, or argue that change was impossible, 

futile, or that their situation was hopeless. 

That is profoundly surprising. 

I watched mothers bravely balance their own personal anger and grief on the scales 

of hope as they tearfully and painfully explained how their sons were murdered and 

how these murders have affected them, their families, and their communities. I heard 

mothers describe their experience of emotional survival in the company of the misery 

that comes with a parent outliving a child. I saw a few young men swallow hard and 

look away—but they couldn’t stop listening and couldn’t find a suitable distraction 

to escape the brutality of the truth these women spoke. I saw mothers speak through 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 102 —

tears, and I saw young men hang their heads, stare at the ceiling, or simply sit with 

eyes transfixed on these fearless and charitable women as their words cut mercilessly 

through the room. 

That is profoundly different. 

I watched the faces of the law enforcement officers assigned to accompany the young 

men. I saw a subtle yet measurable change on their faces as well. Over the course of 

a couple of hours, their facial expressions changed from those of cynicism or polite 

boredom to attention and curiosity. In a couple of instances, I saw those public servants 

struggle to control their emotions, just as I was. I suspect that those law enforcement 

officers, like me, have had their moments of living the lives of angry young men, too, 

albeit from a different vantage point than those they were there to protect or guard. Too 

much anger leads to many harmful emotions, the most common among the protectors 

probably being best described as hopeless exhaustion. 

Regardless of our politics or our propensity for honest introspection, somewhere 

within us we all seek unity and healing. Long ago, we grew weary of living through the 

experiences of angry young men dying at our feet. I believe I saw recognition in the 

expressions of those law enforcement officers that maybe there are solutions to what we 

may have considered insolvable problems. Perhaps the seeds of change were planted in 

the fertile soil of public service today. 

That is profoundly refreshing. 

I saw former gang members, convicted murderers, drug dealers—those reformed men 

and women who now reach out to others as their penance for what they’ve taken in 

a previous, unrepentant life—speak passionately and eloquently, pleading with the 

young men to take the help being offered. I saw some of these former criminals weep 

for the soon-to-be lost young men and maybe in some way for themselves and then be 

embraced by society’s elite, both literally and figuratively. The young men saw that, too, 

and I suspect the significance of that solitary, sincere, and meaningful demonstration of 

community was not lost on them. And I saw the change that is coming. 

It is profound change.
— 103 —

Appendices

I walked away from this experience transformed from an observer to a participant, 

born of a renewed sense of hope and the warmth of a newly sparked inner fire. I believe 

again—I believe that there is hope for the hopeless, healing for the angry, and justice 

for the community. I believe that lives are being changed and will be changed. I believe 

that we—the community in its purest form and finest sense—will prevail, through the 

certain challenges and general messiness that human interactions create, through the 

inevitable setbacks, and the new obstacles that success itself will bring. We will prevail; 

we will be stronger, wiser, and more united as a community and, perhaps, eventually, as 

a people. 

This experience was profoundly meaningful. 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 104 —

E. Sample Press Releases

1 . After the first call-in

This information could also be shared in the form of an op-ed piece or on fliers to be 

distributed in the community in question.

On [insert date], members from several groups operating in the City Park area were 

called to a meeting to hear about a new violence reduction strategy in Chicago.

While new to Chicago, this strategy has been deployed in communities across the 

nation for 15 years. Other communities have seen a 40 to 60 percent reduction in 

group-related homicides after implementing the strategy.

Similar meetings have become business as usual in many cities, including Boston, 

Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Oakland, Nashville, Memphis, Seattle, and more than 40 others 

across the country. California, North Carolina, and New York have launched state 

efforts to move the technique to multiple cities. Los Angeles is following in Chicago’s 

footsteps with its own street group meetings. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. 

Department of Justice actively promoted the meetings for the simple reason that they 

have proven to have a profound impact on serious crime. The strategy’s meetings for 

group members have been shown, in a very careful, peer-reviewed, published evaluation, 

to lead to a 37 percent reduction in homicide in Chicago neighborhoods. Boston, where 

the approach originated 15 years ago, cut homicide by half citywide and decreased 

youth violence by two-thirds. 

The idea behind the strategy is surprisingly simple—groups drive the overwhelming 

majority of homicides and shootings. Groups are easily identified, and invariably they 

have members on probation and parole. Those supervisees can be ordered to attend 

a meeting like the one in Garfield Park. There they are told three things: First, their 

own community hates the violence and wants it to stop. At the Garfield Park meeting, 

a family that had lost a son to homicide could not have been clearer or more moving. 

Second, they are offered help, if they will take it, and given a phone number that will 

activate a wide range of social services. Third, they are told that this is not a negotiation, 

and that the next group that kills someone will get comprehensive enforcement 
— 105 —

Appendices

attention to all crimes any of its members may be committing. Those who want that 

kind of attention should let their peers continue with their gunplay. Parolees at the 

meeting can be expected to carry that group-accountability message back to their 

groups. Their subsequent heated complaining shows that they understand the message 

clearly. However, group members cannot have life as group member both ways—they 

cannot be in the group when they feel like it and shed all responsibility for their groups’ 

actions when they do not.

There are many reasons why people may think this strategy will not work, but the 

record now shows clearly that it does work. More than a decade of experience has 

shown that many group members listen to their own community; that many ask 

for help; and that, once groups believe violence will bring attention to the whole 

group, they police themselves. The approach has worked with more or less organized 

groups, like the traditional groups seen in Chicago; with disorganized crews, as many 

Chicago groups are becoming; with Asian groups; with Hispanic groups; with white 

groups in Glasgow, Scotland; and within the worst neighborhoods in Brazil. The 

approach has also routinely produced rapid reductions in homicide at rates of a third 

to a half.

This strategy must not be mistaken as law enforcement offering groups a deal. Nobody 

in law enforcement would do that. Rather, this strategy is a promise that violence will 

result in a stronger enforcement response than groups have been used to. If a groupinvolved homicide occurs and other members of that group are not committing crimes, 

they will be fine. If group members want out and choose to take the help they have been 

offered, or even just put their guns down, that is progress. If they listen to their own 

community, that is progress, too. 

However, the meeting at Garfield Park clearly stated that the next shooting after the 

meeting will get a whole-group response (i.e., a group enforcement action). After the 

next killing and the subsequent group enforcement action, there will be another meeting, 

and group members will be asked, “Who wants to be next?” Those who want to be next 

can continue shooting and bring swift and certain sanctions down on their group. Those 

who heed their own community, want a way out, or simply have the common sense to 

put their guns down will not be the object of a group enforcement action.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 106 —

2 . After the second (or subsequent) call-in(s)

This information could also be printed on fliers and distributed in the community in 

question.

On [insert date], members from several gangs operating in the Garfield Park Area were 

called to a meeting to hear about a new violence reduction strategy in Chicago.

While new to Chicago, this strategy has been deployed in communities across the 

nation for 15 years. Other communities have seen a 40 to 60 percent reduction in gangrelated homicides after implementing the strategy.

There were three core elements to the call-in:

1. Members of the community shared the pain that the violence causes. They let the 

gang members know their behavior was unacceptable and would not be tolerated 

anymore. They shared their aspirations for the community and concerns that too 

many of their own were dying. They cannot live with the violence anymore.

1. Attendees were offered help and were encouraged to get their peers to take advantage 

of help as well. They were given a special phone number that will get them expedited 

social services, including [insert details of what is available].

2. Attendees were told that, from the time of the meeting on, law enforcement will 

respond in a new way to homicides and gun violence in Garfield Park. Federal, state, 

and local law enforcement representatives told the gang members in no uncertain 

terms that the next gang-related homicide that occurred in District 11 would draw 

the full attention of law enforcement, including the Chicago Police Department; the 

U.S. Attorney; the State’s Attorney; the Illinois Department of Corrections; parole 

and probation; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); 

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); 

and the U.S. Postal Service. The attendees were warned that the shooting would 

bring attention not only to the perpetrator but also to all members of his or her gang 

faction for any crimes they may be committing.

3. The first Garfield Park meeting was the beginning of a longer strategy. Other 

communities have found that large reductions in violence usually come only after 

gangs test the warning and the partnership demonstrates that it is serious—i.e., 
— 107 —

Appendices

that it will deliver on its promise; that this is in fact the new way of doing business; 

and that it intends to fulfill the community’s aspirations, the offer of help, and 

the commitment to a new way of deploying law enforcement with respect to gang 

homicide.

Since [insert date of second call-in], there have been seven homicides in the area. The 

first homicide positively tied to a gang faction operating in District 11 was the killing 

of John Doe on [insert date] at [insert time] in the 4000 block of W. Jackson. This 

homicide was the first to draw our attention.

Since that time, [insert number] members of the [insert name of gang] faction have 

been identified [recap all the enforcement actions taken]:

•	 [Insert number of gang members] were arrested on drug charges.

•	 [Insert number of gang members] were arrested on other charges.

•	 [Insert number of gang members] were found in violation of parole.

The focus was solely on the active members of this particular gang faction. Those who 

were not involved in illegal activity were not arrested or violated. No one’s civil rights were 

violated. We, the Chicago Violence Reduction Strategy partnership, simply took a close 

look at the current activity of all members of the faction and acted on what we found.

Tonight, we are talking to other gang members in Garfield Park to share this 

information and to show them we are serious. They are also going to hear from 

members of their own community that the violence needs to stop, and they will be 

offered the opportunity to receive help in changing their lives from a local social service 

organization. They will be warned again that the next gang-related homicide following 

the conclusion of the meeting will receive the full attention of the law enforcement 

team, which includes federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.

Results from others communities show that this continued engagement with gang 

members is key to achieving violence reduction. Gangs will realize we are serious and 

begin to police themselves. There is every reason to hope that this is the beginning of a 

significant, new effort to prevent serious violence in Chicago and give the community 

what it is asking for.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 108 —

F. GVI Effectiveness: What the Research Says 

The Group Violence Intervention has accumulated a compelling record of 

accomplishment. The logic behind the approach does not permit the random 

assignment of experimental designs that would allow a decisive verdict; the approach is 

designed to operate wherever there is violence citywide, to influence the entire network 

of violent groups simultaneously and to amplify the effect of the intervention beyond 

those individuals and groups touched by it directly. Individual offenders, groups of 

offenders, and neighborhoods cannot usually be set aside and used as experimental 

controls. Nevertheless, the evidence of effectiveness is compelling.

A careful pre/post-evaluation of the pilot approach, Operation Ceasefire, in Boston 

found that youth homicide fell by two-thirds in the two years after Ceasefire was 

implemented and homicide among all ages citywide fell by about half at a time with 

no equivalent declines in 39 similar U.S. communities.9

 Before Ceasefire started in 

1996, Boston was averaging 100 homicides a year. By 1999, it was down to 31. Another 

evaluation looked for the statistical breakpoint in Boston’s homicides and located it in 

June 1996, when Ceasefire was implemented.10

Minneapolis removed a street group called the Bogus Boyz in the first week of June 

1997 and began face-to-face meetings with group members. In the summer of 1996, 

Minneapolis experienced 42 homicides; in the summer of 1997, it had only eight.11

The U.S. Department of Justice program modeled on the Boston project—the Strategic 

Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI)—produced significant impacts 

in High Point and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and Portland, Oregon, in the late1990s. In High Point, street violence was virtually eliminated, and homicides dropped 

from 15 to 2 from one year to the next. Winston-Salem’s statistics indicated a steep 

decline in the use of firearms in violent crimes in targeted areas. 

9. Anthony Braga et al., “Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s 

Operation Ceasefire,” Journal of Research In Crime and Delinquency 38 (2001): 195–226.

10. Anne Morrison Piehl et al., “Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs,” Review of Economics 

and Statistics 85 (2003): 195–226.

11. David Kennedy and Anthony Braga, “Homicide in Minneapolis: Research for Problem Solving,” Homicide 

Studies 2, no. 3 (1998): 263–290.

In Portland, where the 
— 109 —

Appendices

focus was on youth gun and group violence, the data indicated a 74 percent reduction in 

drive-by shootings from 1995 to 2000. Homicide victims age 24 or under dropped by 

82 percent during the same period.12

A growing body of quasi-experimental evaluations of the approach, as applied in 

other cities, found results remarkably similar to those of the original Boston Ceasefire 

intervention. Indianapolis, Indiana, used the strategy and found a citywide homicide 

reduction of slightly more than a third, with larger impacts in the neighborhoods 

and groups most affected by violence. Comparison cities in the region saw no such 

reductions.13 As in Boston, the impact was nearly immediate upon the commencement 

of face-to-face meetings. Braga et al. applied the strategy in Lowell, Massachusetts, and 

found a statistically significant reduction of 43.1 percent in combined gun homicide 

and assault and no equivalent reductions in seven comparison cities in Massachusetts or 

for the state as a whole.14 An application and formal evaluation in Stockton, California, 

with Hispanic groups showed a 42 percent reduction in homicide.15

An evaluation of even a poorly implemented intervention based on the Ceasefire model 

found a reduction in violent crime of about a third in the project neighborhoods in 

East Los Angeles.16 In Chicago, beginning in 2002 under the auspices of the federal 

Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative, criminologist Tracey Meares and her colleagues 

implemented a reentry variation of the strategy, focusing on individual parolees in a 

set of extremely violent neighborhoods, allowing them to use a more sophisticated 

evaluation design with other neighborhoods as controls. 

12. Erin Dalton, “Lessons in Preventing Homicide,” (Project Safe Neighborhoods Report, Michigan State University, 

December 2003), 52.

13. Edmund McGarrell et al., “Reducing Homicide through a Lever-Pulling Strategy,” Justice Quarterly 23, no. 1 

(2006): 226.

14. A. A. Braga, J. McDevitt, and G.L. Pierce, “Understanding and Preventing Gang Violence: Problem Analysis and 

Response Development in Lowell, Massachusetts,” Police Quarterly 9, no. 1 (2006): 20–46.

15. A.A. Braga and D.L. Weisburd, Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime, no. 6 of Crime 

Prevention Research Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, 2012).

16. George Tita et al., Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an Intervention in East Los Angeles (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2003).

As the best evaluation of these 

interventions available to date, it found a 37 percent reduction in homicide, again with 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 110 —

very rapid impact when the strategy was implemented.17 Subsequent work by Meares 

and her research team found dramatically lower recidivism for the offenders with whom 

her project intervened, along with improvements in perceptions of the legitimacy of law 

enforcement and of offenders’ willingness to obey the law.18

Furthermore, in April 2012, a Campbell Collaboration Systematic Review, the gold 

standard in evaluating social science interventions, found “strong empirical evidence” for 

the effectiveness of the Group Violence Intervention.19

17. Andrew Papachristos, Tracey Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan, “Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe 

Neighborhoods in Chicago,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4, no. 2 (2007): 223–272.

18. For a summary of that research, see Tracey Meares and Andrew Papachristos, “Policing Gun Crime without 

Guns” (Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc., 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326932.

19. Anthony Braga and David Weisburd, The Effects of “Pulling Levers” Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime, 

Campbell Systematic Reviews (The Campbell Collaboration, March 2012), www.nnscommunities.org/Braga_

Pulling_Levers_Review_CAMPBELL_RECORD.pdf.
— 111 —

Appendices

G. National Network for Safe Communities 

The following list identifies member jurisdictions of the National Network as of 

September 30, 2013:

Arizona

Mesa

California

East Palo Alto 

Fresno 

Los Angeles 

Long Beach 

Oakland 

Oxnard 

Sacramento 

Salinas 

Stockton 

Connecticut

Bridgeport 

Hartford 

New Haven 

Florida

Ocala 

Sarasota 

Illinois

Chicago 

Peoria 

Rockford 

Louisiana

New Orleans 

Maryland

Baltimore 

Snow Hill 

Massachusetts

Boston 

Michigan

Detroit 

Flint

Kalamazoo 

Missouri 

Kansas City 

Native American 

Communities

Bureau of Indian 

Affairs, Office of 

Justice Services 

San Carlos Apache 

Tribe 

Nebraska

Omaha 

New Jersey

Newark 

New York

Hempstead 

Mineola P

Mount Vernon L

White Plains 

Yonkers 

North Carolina P

Concord 

Durham S

Graham 

Greensboro T

Greenville 

High Point 

Hillsborough 

Salisbury 

Shelby 

Winston-Salem S

Ohio

Canton 

Cincinnati 

Cleveland 

Dayton 

Middletown 

Toledo 

Oklahoma

Oklahoma City 

Oregon

Portland 

ennsylvania

ancaster 

Pittsburgh 

Rhode Island

rovidence 

outh Carolina

Aiken 

exas

Dallas 

Virginia

Richmond 

Washington

eattle 

West Virginia

Huntington 

Wisconsin

Madison 

Milwaukee 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 112 —

Bibliography

Alexander, Michelle. 2010. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color 

Blindness. New York: The New Press. 

Braga, Anthony, and David L. Weisburd. 2012. The Effects of “Pulling Levers” Focused 

Deterrence Strategies on Crime. Campbell Systematic Reviews. doi:10.4073/csr.2012.6. 

———. 2011. “The Effects of Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime: A Systematic 

Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Research in Crime 

and Delinquency. doi:10.1177/0022427811419368.

Braga, Anthony, David Hureau, and Christopher Winship. 2008. “Losing Faith? Police, 

Black Churches, and the Resurgence of Youth Violence in Boston.” Ohio State Journal 

of Criminal Law 6 (1): 141–172.

Braga, Anthony, David Kennedy, Anne Morrison Piehl, and Elin Waring. 

2001. Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project’s Operation 

Ceasefire. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

Braga, Anthony, David Kennedy, Elin Waring, and Anne Morrison Piehl. 2001. 

“Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of 

Boston’s Operation Ceasefire.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 38:195–

226.

Braga, Anthony, Jack McDevitt, and Glenn Pierce. 2006. “Understanding and 

Preventing Gang Violence: Problem Analysis and Response Development in Lowell, 

Massachusetts.” Police Quarterly 9 (1): 20–46.

Braga, Anthony, Glenn Pierce, Jack McDevitt, Brenda Bond, and Shea Cronin. 2008. 

“The Strategic Prevention of Violence among Gang-Involved Offenders.” Justice 

Quarterly 25 (1): 132–162.

Brunson, R.K. 2007. “Police Don’t Like Black People: African-American Young Men’s 

Accumulated Police Experiences.” Criminology & Public Policy 6:71–101. 
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Bibliography

Dalton, Erin. 2003. “Lessons in Preventing Homicide.” Project Safe Neighborhoods 

Report. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice. 

Engel, R.S., M. Skubak Tillyer, J.R. Dunham, D. Hall, M. Ozer, B. Henson, and 

T. Godsey. 2009. Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence 

(CIRV): Year 2 Report. University of Cincinnati Policing Institute. http://www.

nnscommunities.org/pdf/CIRV_2NDYEAR_REPORT.pdf.

Heinrich, Theodore, and Anthony Braga. 2010. “Focused Deterrence and Norm 

Changing Strategies: The Problem of Sustainability.” Unpublished paper.

Kennedy, David. 2008. Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of 

Sanction. New York: Routledge.

Kennedy, David, and Anthony Braga. 1998. “Homicide in Minneapolis: Research for 

Problem Solving.” Homicide Studies 2 (3): 263–290.

Kirk, David, and Andrew V. Papachristos. 2009. “Cultural Mechanisms and the 

Persistence of Neighborhood Violence.” American Journal of Sociology 116 (4): 

1190–1233. 

McGarrell, Edmund, and Steven Chermak. 2003. Strategic Approaches to Reducing 

Firearms Violence: Final Report on the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership. 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

McGarrell, Edmund, Steven Chermak, Jeremy Wilson, and Nicholas Corsaro. 2006. 

“Reducing Homicide through a Lever-Pulling Strategy.” Justice Quarterly 23 (1): 226.

Meares, Tracey. 2009. “The Legitimacy of Police among Young African-American Men.” 

Marquette Law Review 92 (4): 651–666. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/

viewcontent.cgi?article=1527&context=fss_papers.

Meares, Tracey, and Andrew Papachristos. 2009. “Policing Gun Crime without Guns.” 

Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326932.
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———. 2009. “The Re-Entry of Violent Offenders in Chicago: Summary of the 

Project Safe Neighborhoods’ Offender Notification Forums.” Review of Research. 

Project Safe Neighborhoods Chicago. http://www.psnchicago.org/PDFs/RIBForum-Final.pdf.

Papachristos, Andrew, Tracey Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan. 2007. “Attention Felons: 

Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago.” Journal of Empirical Legal 

Studies 4 (2): 223–272.

Piehl, Anne Morrison, Suzanne Cooper, Anthony Braga, and David Kennedy. 2003. 

“Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs.” Review of Economics 

and Statistics 85 (3): 195–226.

Sampson, Robert J. 1986. “Crime in Cities: The Effects of Formal and Informal Social 

Control.” Communities and Crime. Vol. 8 of Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 

271–311. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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The Salience of Adult Social Bonds.” American Sociological Review 55 (5): 609–627.

Tita, George, K. Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, Clifford Grammich, Allan Abrahamse, and 

Peter Greenwood. 2003. Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an Intervention in East 

Los Angeles. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
— 115 —

About the National 

Network for Safe 

Communities

The National Network for Safe Communities, a project of John Jay College of Criminal 

Justice, was launched in 2009 under the direction of John Jay College President Jeremy 

Travis and Professor David M. Kennedy, who serves as its director. The National 

Network supports cities implementing strategic interventions to reduce violence and 

improve public safety, minimize arrest and incarceration, strengthen communities, and 

improve relationships between law enforcement and the communities it serves. 

Scores of American cities have implemented the National Network’s strategies 

with powerful impact, particularly the Group Violence Intervention (GVI), first 

implemented as “Operation Ceasefire” in Boston in the mid-1990s, and the Drug 

Market Intervention (DMI), first implemented in High Point, North Carolina, in 

2004.

Substantial research and field experience has proven that these interventions are 

associated with large reductions in violence and other serious crime. The National 

Network has also begun to adapt its approach to other contexts, such as strategic 

prosecution, reconciliation between law enforcement and distressed communities, and 

problems such as domestic violence and prison violence.

The National Network is committed to building a community of practice that operates 

along a set of guiding principles:

•	 First, do no harm. Too much incarceration, aggressive and disrespectful 

policing, and other missteps can damage individuals, families, and communities 

and undermine relationships between neighborhoods and law enforcement. Law 

enforcement should do its work in ways that do not cause that harm. 

•	 Strengthen communities’ capacity to prevent violence. Community norms 

and actions do most of the work of crime control. Community members can 

establish expectations for nonviolence and intervene directly with the few 
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 116 —

people at the highest risk for violent victimization or offending through direct 

communication. Using this approach strengthens neighborhoods and keeps 

people out of jail.

•	 Enhance legitimacy. Most people obey the law because it is the right thing to 

do, not because they’re afraid of being arrested. Communities need to see law 

enforcement, especially the police, as fair, respectful, and on their side. Police 

should conduct themselves in ways that model their caring and respect for the 

communities they serve. Where legitimacy goes up, crime goes down.

•	 Offer help to those who want it. Many of the people at highest risk for violent 

victimization or offending do not like how they are living and want a way out. 

Communities should meet them where they are and do everything possible to 

support them.

•	 Get deterrence right. When law enforcement needs to act, it’s usually best to 

let offenders know that enforcement is coming so they can stop their offending, 

rather than to arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate them. The creative use of 

existing law, combined with direct communication with high-risk people, can 

make deterrence work and head off both violence and actual enforcement.

•	 Use enforcement strategically. When arrest, prosecution, and incarceration 

are necessary, law enforcement should use them as sparingly and tactically as 

possible. Law enforcement should apply the minimum that is compatible with 

ensuring public safety.

National Network membership includes community leaders, city officials, law 

enforcement, social service providers, street outreach workers, and many other 

representatives from cities dedicated to using these principles. 

Please visit www.nnscommunities.org for detailed information on the National 

Network’s mission, strategies, research findings, media coverage, events, and 

membership.
— 117 —

About the COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department 

of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s 

state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and 

grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual 

respect between police and communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all 

stakeholders to work together to address our nation’s crime challenges. When police 

and communities collaborate, they more effectively address underlying issues, change 

negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources. 

Rather than simply responding to crime, community policing focuses on preventing 

it through strategic problem solving approaches based on collaboration. The COPS 

Office awards grants to hire community police and support the development and 

testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training 

and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders, as well 

as all levels of law enforcement. 

Another source of COPS Office assistance is the Collaborative Reform Initiative for 

Technical Assistance (CRI-TA). Developed to advance community policing and ensure 

constitutional practices, CRI-TA is an independent, objective process for organizational 

transformation. It provides recommendations based on expert analysis of policies, 

practices, training, tactics, and accountability methods related to issues of concern.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $14 billion to add community 

policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime 

prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance 

community policing.

•	 To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of approximately 125,000 

additional officers by more than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement 

agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide

— 118 —

•	 Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and 

government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training 

organizations.

•	 To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than eight million topic-specific 

publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs.

•	 The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, roundtables, and other forums 

focused on issues critical to law enforcement.

The COPS Office information resources, covering a wide range of community 

policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—can be downloaded 

at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is also the grant application portal, providing access 

to online application forms.

The National Network for Safe Communities’ Group Violence Intervention (GVI) has repeatedly 

demonstrated that serious violence can be reduced when law enforcement, community members, 

and social service providers join together to engage directly with violent street groups and clearly 

communicate (1) a credible, moral message against violence; (2) a credible law enforcement message 

about the group consequences of further violence; and (3) a genuine offer of help for those who want it. 

This publication provides comprehensive guidance on how to implement GVI step by step, discussing 

the role and responsibilities of the core representatives in law enforcement, the community, and social 

services. It explains the logic and basics of the strategy before taking the reader through the initial 

planning stages, design, and execution of all key strategy elements, such as problem analysis and the 

call-in. This guide also includes methods to maintain program integrity and ensure sustainability in the 

long-term. 

This publication is part of a series by the National Network for Safe Communities about its two crime 

reduction strategies: Group Violence Intervention and Drug Market Intervention.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street NE

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details about COPS Office programs, call 

the COPS Office Response Center at 800-421-6770.

Visit COPS Office online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

The City University of New York

524 West 59th Street 

New York, NY 10019

www.jjay.cuny.edu

ISBN: 978-1-932582-71-0

First published 2013

Revised 2015

e12123529