In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-19-00207-CR 

SAMUEL CAMPOS, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 

Travis County, Texas 

Trial Court No. C-1-CR-17-209306, Honorable Jon N. Wisser, Presiding 

 

December 2, 2019 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

This appeal simply involves a “bear hug” and what one is. Through its charging 

instrument, the State accused Sam Campos of unlawfully restraining his victim by 

grabbing her “from behind placing her in ‘bear hug’ restraint.” The trial court omitted the 

quoted passage from its jury charge, though. Instead, it described the restraint allegedly 

exercised by appellant as “seizing [the victim] on and about the torso with the Defendant’s 

arms.” No one objected to the variation. Eventually, the jury returned a verdict of guilty,

and judgment was entered upon that verdict. Appellant now argues that the variation 
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“improperly expanded allegations contained in the charge,” constituted charge error, and 

caused him egregious harm. We modify the judgment and affirm it as modified.1

The complaint raised is nothing more than one involving a variance between the 

accusation in the charging instrument and the description of the accusation in the jury 

charge. We assume it to be jury charge error, for purposes of this appeal. Furthermore,

because appellant did not object to it at trial, the error is reversible only if egregiously 

harmful. 

Next, error is egregiously harmful “only if [it] was fundamental in the sense that it 

was so egregious and created such harm that the defendant was deprived of a fair and 

impartial trial.” Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Not only 

is that a very difficult test to meet but also one requiring case-by-case analysis. See

Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). In determining whether 

the quantum of harm from the error rose to the requisite level, we consider: 1) the jury 

charge as a whole; 2) the evidence, including the contested issues and the weight of the 

probative evidence; 3) closing arguments; and 4) other relevant information from the 

entire record. Id. The purported harm at bar falls short of rising to the requisite level.

First, the jury charge included the following definition and instruction:

A person commits the offense of Unlawful Restraint if he intentionally or 

knowingly restrains another person.

 

“Restrain” means to restrict a person’s movements without consent, so as 

to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty by confining the person. 

Restraint is without consent if it is accomplished by force or intimidation.

Its application paragraph stated:

1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals, we are obligated to apply 

its precedent when available in the event of a conflict between the precedents of that court and this Court. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant . . . did then and there intentionally or knowingly by force or 

intimidation, restrain [the victim], without the consent of [the victim], by 

restricting the movements of [the victim], to wit: by seizing [the victim] on or 

about the torso with the Defendant’s arms, you will find the Defendant 

guilty of the offense of Unlawful Restraint, however, if you do not so find, or 

you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will find the defendant not guilty.

(Emphasis supplied).

Second, a bear hug in common parlance is merely a “tight embrace” involving 

someone wrapping his arms around another. See Bear Hug, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1976) (defining “bear hug” as a “rough tight embrace”

or “a wrestling hold” where one contestant “locks his arms around the opponent’s back 

and forces him backwards to the mat.”) 

Third, the prosecutor, during voir dire, told panel members that the State’s burden 

consisted of proving that a defendant intentionally or knowingly restrained another 

person’s liberty. Later, during opening argument, she told the jury appellant grabbed the 

victim with his arms and held her down on a bed. 

During trial, an officer testified that the victim told him appellant “grabbed her in a 

bear hug.” The victim testified that appellant grabbed her from behind and around her 

arms and body, pulled her down onto the bed, and there held her down. 

During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the application paragraph 

presented “basically what we’ve proved through the testimony in the trial.” In turn,

defense counsel’s closing argument included 1) a reminder of the victim’s testimony about 

being “bear hugged” on the bed and 2) a description of the State’s burden of proof that 

consisted of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not [appellant] intentionally,

knowing, [sic] restrained her liberty by holding her torso[.]” (Emphasis supplied). At no 
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time did said defense counsel draw a distinction between a “bear hug” and seizing 

someone about the torso. 

Simply put, a “bear hug” is an embrace with one’s arms about the torso of another,

just as described in the jury charge. Maybe that is why no one objected to the jury charge. 

Indeed, appellant made no effort to explain any difference between the two descriptions 

in his brief, other than concluding that they were different. Furthermore, the testimony 

illustrated that appellant placed his victim in a “bear hug,” i.e., embraced her around her 

torso with his arms. Given these circumstances, we find that appellant was not deprived 

of a fair trial by the variance in question. So, the purported error was not egregious on

the record here, and we overrule appellant’s contention otherwise. 

Nevertheless, there is a mistake in the trial court’s judgment involving appellant’s 

name. While called “Sam Salazar Camos” in the judgment, his name appears as “Sam 

Campos” in the complaint, information, and jury charge. 

This Court has the power to modify the judgment of the court below to make the 

record speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P.

43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). So too 

may we correct, sua sponte, whatever the trial court could have corrected by a judgment 

nunc pro tunc. Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. 

ref’d). This is one of those occasions. 
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Therefore, on our own motion, we modify the judgment to reflect appellant’s name 

as “Sam Campos.” And, in so modifying the decree, we affirm it. 

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.