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EXAMINING DECADES OF DATA 

MANIPULATION AT THE UNITED 

STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

OVERSIGHT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

Tuesday, December 6, 2016 

Serial No. 114–55 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

or 

Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

ROB BISHOP, UT, Chairman 

RAU ́ L M. GRIJALVA, AZ, Ranking Democratic Member 

Don Young, AK 

Louie Gohmert, TX 

Doug Lamborn, CO 

Robert J. Wittman, VA 

John Fleming, LA 

Tom McClintock, CA 

Glenn Thompson, PA 

Cynthia M. Lummis, WY 

Dan Benishek, MI 

Jeff Duncan, SC 

Paul A. Gosar, AZ 

Rau ́l R. Labrador, ID 

Doug LaMalfa, CA 

Jeff Denham, CA 

Paul Cook, CA 

Bruce Westerman, AR 

Garret Graves, LA 

Dan Newhouse, WA 

Ryan K. Zinke, MT 

Jody B. Hice, GA 

Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, AS 

Thomas MacArthur, NJ 

Alexander X. Mooney, WV 

Cresent Hardy, NV 

Darin LaHood, IL 

Grace F. Napolitano, CA 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, GU 

Jim Costa, CA 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, CNMI 

Niki Tsongas, MA 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, PR 

Jared Huffman, CA 

Raul Ruiz, CA 

Alan S. Lowenthal, CA 

Donald S. Beyer, Jr., VA 

Norma J. Torres, CA 

Debbie Dingell, MI 

Ruben Gallego, AZ 

Lois Capps, CA 

Jared Polis, CO 

Wm. Lacy Clay, MO 

Vacancy 

Jason Knox, Chief of Staff 

Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel 

David Watkins, Democratic Staff Director 

Sarah Lim, Democratic Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

LOUIE GOHMERT, TX, Chairman 

DEBBIE DINGELL, MI, Ranking Democratic Member 

Doug Lamborn, CO 

Rau ́l R. Labrador, ID 

Bruce Westerman, AR 

Jody B. Hice, GA 

Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, AS 

Alexander X. Mooney, WV 

Darin LaHood, IL 

Rob Bishop, UT, ex officio 

Jared Huffman, CA 

Ruben Gallego, AZ 

Jared Polis, CO 

Wm. Lacy Clay, MO 

Vacancy 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, AZ, ex officio 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Hearing held on Tuesday, December 6, 2016 ........................................................ 1 

Statement of Members: 

Dingell, Hon. Debbie, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Michigan ........................................................................................................ 4 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 5 

Gohmert, Hon. Louie, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas .............................................................................................................. 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Werkheiser, William, Deputy Director, United States Geological Survey ... 6 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 8 

Questions submitted for the record ......................................................... 9 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON EXAMINING 

DECADES OF DATA MANIPULATION AT THE 

UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

Tuesday, December 6, 2016 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Louie Gohmert 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gohmert, Labrador, Westerman, Hice, 

Radewagen, and Dingell. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. LOUIE GOHMERT, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. GOHMERT. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony examining 

decades of data manipulation at the United States Geological 

Survey. 

Under Committee Rule 4(f), any oral opening statements at hearings are limited to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority 

Member. Therefore, I would ask unanimous consent that all other 

Members’ opening statements be made part of the hearing record 

if they are submitted to the Subcommittee Clerk by 5:00 p.m. 

today. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening 

statement. 

Today, we will be examining decades of data manipulation that 

occurred within the United States Geological Survey, as well as the 

Agency’s failure to take timely and appropriate corrective measures. USGS has been considered by many to be the gold standard 

of scientific integrity and reliability. That image has now been indelibly stained or, at best, profoundly shaken by the revelation of 

deliberate decades-long data manipulation. 

Incredibly, this committee has learned that the USGS had shut 

down the lab from the DOI’s Office of Inspector General months 

after it happened. In 2015, the Department of the Interior 

Scientific Integrity Review Panel investigating this manner concluded that there was a ‘‘chronic pattern of scientific misconduct’’ 

at the inorganic laboratory in Colorado. The panel also concluded 

that the laboratory’s chemist ‘‘intentionally manipulated’’ data. 

2 

These shocking findings have not only impugned the integrity of 

the USGS, they also impugned the scientific underpinnings of 

policy decisions that may have been taken as a result of the USGS 

research. 

I should note that we are not talking about just a few fudged 

numbers here and there. This involves research and personnel 

going all the way back to 1996. When the data manipulation was 

discovered in 2008, new employees were shuffled in; and yet the 

fraud continued, tainting thousands of sample results. 

You might wonder how no one in USGS management noticed the 

junk science coming from the lab. Investigators offered one explanation pointing to the ‘‘conscious acquiescence and inattentiveness 

of others in the laboratory and/or the center’s management.’’ 

While the long-term costs to USGS’s reputation may be incalculable, the Inspector General reported that from Fiscal Year 2008 

through 2014, affected projects represented $108 million. This does 

not include a prior decade of data manipulation. We are still trying 

to find out the extent of the projects that were affected and any 

policy decisions that were executed with falsified data. The reliability of data we are provided as lawmakers across a spectrum of 

issues is now called into question. 

USGS is likely going to assure us that it will never happen 

again, that new procedures are in place, manuals have been rewritten, new positions have been created, and on and on, with solutions 

that make us just want to forget all this and get back to blind faith 

in Federal science. 

However, in the discussion with our witness, I want one basic 

question answered—Why? Why did this happen? With all the briefings held with staff, the reports and audits written, we still do not 

know why this occurred. USGS told us it was the lab’s lousy air 

conditioning, but then said that was not it. USGS told us the data 

was changed to account for variable calibrations, and then said 

that was not it. 

Finally, USGS offered up the excuse that it was plain incompetence. I still don’t buy it. Nearly 20 years of fraud and more than 

$100 million flushed down the toilet; this should not be pinned on 

just one incompetent employee who was, remarkably, replaced by 

another incompetent employee. Not to mention the fact that the 

most recent fall guy had sterling employee evaluations. 

The primary concern is not just the mechanics of this fraud; 

there should be a clear explanation as to why it happened. Any 

proposed solution is meaningless without it. 

It is an unfortunate coincidence that our first hearing in this 

newly created subcommittee was on the lack of accountability of 

Federal science and the consequences of politically-driven science. 

Lives have been destroyed through the actions of Federal employees, motivated by entrenched ideologies, and use of manipulated 

data, or just garbage science. Let this hearing serve as a warning 

to any Federal employee who harbors thoughts of eschewing 

scientific integrity and transparency in order to advance some 

agenda. The subcommittee will not tolerate such actions, and will 

hold accountable those who act in such a manner or turn a blind 

eye. 

3 

I would point out, as we said, the problems go back to 1996 and 

were first discovered in 2008. This goes across Republican and 

Democrat party lines. This is a matter we need to get to the bottom 

of why it happened; so I appreciate your indulgence. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gohmert follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. LOUIE GOHMERT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Today we will examine the decades of data manipulation that occurred within the 

United States Geological Survey as well as the Agency’s failure to take timely and 

appropriate corrective measures. The USGS had been considered by many to be the 

gold standard of scientific integrity and reliability. That image has now been indelibly stained and, at best, profoundly shaken by the revelation of deliberate decadeslong data manipulation. Incredibly, this committee learned that the USGS had shut 

down the lab from the DOI’s Office of Inspector General months after it happened. 

In 2015, a Department of the Interior Scientific Integrity Review Panel investigating the matter concluded that there was a ‘‘chronic pattern of scientific misconduct’’ at the inorganic laboratory in Colorado. The Panel also concluded that the 

laboratory’s chemist ‘‘intentionally manipulated’’ data. These shocking findings have 

not only impugned the credibility of the USGS, they also impugn the scientific 

underpinnings of policy decisions that may have been taken as a result of USGS 

research. 

I should note that we aren’t talking about just a few fudged numbers here and 

there. This involves research and personnel going all the way back to 1996. When 

the data manipulation was discovered in 2008, new employees were shuffled in and 

yet the fraud continued tainting thousands of sample results. You might wonder 

how no one in USGS management noticed junk science coming from the lab. Investigators offered one explanation pointing to the ‘‘conscious acquiescence and inattentiveness of others in the laboratory and/or the center’s management.’’ 

While the long-term costs to USGS’s reputation may be incalculable, the Inspector 

General reported that from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2014 affected 

projects represented $108 million—this does not include a prior decade of data manipulation. We are still trying to find out the extent of the projects that were affected and any policy decisions that were executed with falsified data. The reliability 

of data we are provided as lawmakers across a spectrum of issues is now called into 

question. 

USGS is likely going to assure us that it will never happen again, that new procedures are in place, manuals have been rewritten, new positions have been created 

and on and on with solutions that make us just want to forget all this and get back 

to blind faith in Federal science. 

However, in the discussion with our witness, I want one basic question answered. 

Why? Why did this happen? With all the briefings held with your staff, the reports 

and audits written, we still do not know why this occurred. USGS told us it was 

the lab’s lousy air conditioning but then said that was not it. USGS told us that 

data was changed to account for variable calibrations and then said it wasn’t that 

either. Finally, USGS offered up the excuse that it was plain incompetence. I don’t 

buy it. Nearly 20 years of fraud and more than $100 million flushed down the 

toilet—you can’t pin this on one incompetent employee who was remarkably replaced by another incompetent employee. Not to mention the fact the most recent 

fall guy had sterling employee evaluations. My primary concern isn’t just the mechanics of this fraud; there should be a clear explanation of why this happened. Any 

proposed solution is meaningless without it. 

It’s an unfortunate coincidence that our first hearing in this newly created subcommittee was on the lack of accountability of Federal science and the consequences 

of politically driven science. Lives have been destroyed through the actions of 

Federal employees, motivated by entrenched ideologies, and use of manipulated data 

or just garbage science. Let this hearing serve as a warning to any Federal employee who harbors thoughts of eschewing scientific integrity and transparency in 

order to advance some agenda. This subcommittee will not tolerate such actions and 

will hold accountable those who act in such a manner or turn a blind eye. 

Mr. GOHMERT. At this time, the Chair recognizes Mrs. Dingell for 

5 minutes for an opening statement. 

4 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. DEBBIE DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mrs. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Deputy Director Werkheiser, for testifying today. 

The United States Geological Survey, or USGS, is one of the 

most esteemed scientific organizations in the world. The Agency 

earned its reputation through 137 years of unparalleled insights 

into everything from earthquakes to clean drinking water, and 

climate change to fossil fuel reserves. 

I also know how important their work is because the USGS’s 

Great Lakes Science Center, which is in my district, has played an 

important role in helping to stop the spread of Asian carp in the 

Great Lakes. The effect of Asian carp, if they become fully established in the Great Lakes, is enormous, which is why I requested 

that this subcommittee hold a hearing on just one aspect of the 

damage—the effect on Great Lakes fisheries. 

In order to effectively protect that $4.5 billion in economic activity in the Great Lakes fisheries, we must have the best possible 

science from the best possible scientific institutions. 

In fact, you would be hard pressed to find a congressional district 

that has not benefited from USGS’s work, which is why it is so disappointing that they have been dealing with a scientific integrity 

issue. 

For 18 years, chemists at a small lab in Colorado intentionally 

manipulated some of the data that they were hired to produce. 

Though none of the data was used to support any state or Federal 

regulations, seven papers were delayed and one had to be 

retracted. 

USGS had the chance to correct it when the data manipulation 

was first uncovered in 2008; but after they cleaned house and hired 

new analysts and management, the same data manipulation continued unabated until it was discovered again in 2014. 

The investigations that followed uncovered other disturbing 

things: the lab was found to be slow—they took seven times as long 

to analyze their samples as they should have, they were slow to 

identify the manipulation, they were slow to act to correct it and 

prevent the problem from happening, and they were slow to notify 

the customers. 

The investigations also found that management was asleep at 

the wheel. Not only did management fail to catch the problem, but 

one manager looked the other way for a few months. Making matters worse, they presided over, and may have facilitated, a toxic 

workplace environment. Offensive language and behavior created 

an atmosphere that was so intimidating that a scientific integrity 

investigative body concluded that it contributed to the lab’s substandard performance. Their report indicated that when a female 

employee tried to blow the whistle on it, management failed to 

support her. Any organization that devalues women in their workplace will not last. The scientific integrity report cited this failure 

as one of the main reasons it recommended that the lab close 

permanently. 

The closure of this lab is a fair outcome. The USGS got a second 

chance to correct the problem, and they didn’t. I believe the USGS 

5 

should be held to a higher standard and that the lab closure was 

the right decision. 

Fortunately, all signs point to this problem being isolated to the 

inorganic lab. The closest comparison to the inorganic lab at USGS 

is the organic lab, which is reputable and in demand. 

The report by the Scientific Integrity Review Panel concluded 

that ‘‘the organic laboratory section is an extremely productive, 

well-organized structure laboratory that is conducting important 

scientific research.’’ Of course, the remainder of the Agency continues to churn out science that is essential to the Nation. 

At this point, there have been two Inspector General reports, a 

number of external audits, a number of internal reviews, and a 

scientific integrity investigation. At this point, there have been 

more investigations than the number of analysts that were in the 

lab. 

I will be interested to know what my colleagues on the other side 

think this hearing will add to the pile, and more specifically, how 

this new information will help the USGS become a stronger agency. 

After all, that is one of the primary functions of oversight—to 

improve the effectiveness of the agencies that serve the American 

people. 

So, I hope we can focus today on making sure we can learn from 

the well-documented mistakes, ensure that they will not be repeated, and focus on building the Agency up rather than tearing 

it down. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Dingell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. DEBBIE DINGELL, RANKING MEMBER, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Deputy Director Werkheiser for testifying 

today. 

The United States Geological Survey, or USGS, is one of the most esteemed 

scientific organizations in the world. The Agency earned its reputation through 137 

years of unparalleled insights into everything from earthquakes to clean drinking 

water, and climate change to fossil fuel reserves. 

I also know how important their work is because the USGS’s Great Lakes Science 

Center, which is in my district, has played an important role in helping to stop the 

spread of Asian carp in the Great Lakes. The effect of Asian carp if they became 

fully established in the Great Lakes is enormous, which is why I requested that this 

subcommittee hold a hearing on just one aspect of the damage—the effect on our 

Great Lakes fisheries. In order to effectively protect that $4.5 billion in economic 

activity from Great Lakes fisheries, we must have the best possible science from the 

best possible scientific institutions. 

In fact, you would be hard pressed to find a congressional district that hasn’t benefited from USGS’s work, which is why it is so disappointing that they have been 

dealing with a scientific integrity issue. For 18 years, chemists at a small lab in 

Colorado intentionally manipulated some of the data they were hired to produce. 

Though none of the data was used to support any state or Federal regulations, 

seven papers were delayed and one had to be retracted. 

The USGS had the chance to correct it when the data manipulation was first uncovered in 2008. But after they cleaned house and hired new analysts and management, the same data manipulation continued unabated until it was discovered again 

in 2014. 

The investigations that followed, uncovered other disturbing things. The lab was 

found to be slow. They took seven times as long to analyze their samples as they 

should have. They were slow to identify the manipulation. They were slow to act 

to correct it and prevent the problem from happening. They were slow to notify 

customers. 

6 

The investigations also found that management was asleep at the wheel. Not only 

did management fail to catch the problem, but one manager looked the other way 

for a few months. Making matters worse, they presided over—and may have facilitated—a toxic workplace environment. Offensive language and behavior created an 

atmosphere that was so intimidating, a scientific integrity investigative body concluded that it contributed to the lab’s substandard performance. Their report indicated that when a female employee tried to blow the whistle on it, management 

failed to support her. Any organization that devalues the women in their workplace 

will not last. The scientific integrity report cited this failure as one of the main reasons it recommended that the lab be closed permanently. 

The closure of the lab is a fair outcome. The USGS got a second chance to correct 

the problem. They didn’t. I believe the USGS should be held to a higher standard 

and that the lab closure was the right decision. 

Fortunately, all signs point to this problem being isolated to the Inorganic lab. 

The closest comparison to the Inorganic lab at USGS is the Organic lab, which is 

reputable and in demand. The report by the Scientific Integrity Review panel concluded that ‘‘the Organic Laboratory section is an extremely productive, well organized, structure laboratory that is conducting important scientific research.’’ Of 

course, the remainder of the Agency continues to churn out science that is essential 

to the Nation. 

At this point, there have been two Inspector General reports, a number of external audits, a number of internal reviews, and a Scientific Integrity Investigation. 

At this point, there have been more investigations than the number of analysts that 

were in the lab. I will be interested to know what my colleagues on the other side 

think this hearing will add to the pile and more specifically, how that new information will help USGS become a stronger agency. 

After all, that is one of the primary functions of oversight—to improve the effectiveness of the agencies that serve the American people. So I hope we can focus 

today on making sure we learn from the well-documented mistakes, ensure that 

they won’t be repeated, and let’s focus on building the Agency up rather than tearing it down. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

At this time, I will remind the witness that, under our 

Committee Rules, oral statements are limited to 5 minutes. Your 

entire written statement will appear in the hearing record. When 

you begin, the light on the witness table will turn green, as it is 

now. When you have 1 minute remaining, the yellow light comes 

on. When time has expired, the red light comes on, and I will ask 

you to conclude your statement. 

At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Werkheiser for his 

testimony. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM WERKHEISER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Chairman Gohmert, Ranking Member Dingell, 

and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. I am Bill Werkheiser, Deputy Director of the United 

States Geological Survey. 

The United States Geological Survey has served the Nation for 

137 years, providing unbiased science for use by decisionmakers 

covering a wide range of policy issues. Our reputation for scientific 

integrity is essential to everything we do. 

That is why I am here today, to address a serious breach of 

scientific integrity at USGS. This is not a proud day for our agency’s 8,670 employees. In my 30 years of Federal service at USGS, 

this is my lowest moment. 

In 2014, USGS identified a potential incident of scientific misconduct at the Inorganic Geochemistry Lab in Lakewood, Colorado. 

7 

A scientist had been making improper adjustments to data from a 

machine used to measure heavy metals in coal and water samples. 

All work in the affected section of the laboratory was stopped and 

an internal investigation was initiated. USGS also promptly reported the possibility of scientific misconduct to the Office of the 

Inspector General. 

Our investigations into the incident confirm that this data 

manipulation constituted scientific misconduct. This closely resembled a similar incident at the Inorganic Section that had occurred 

from 1996 to 2008. The investigation also identified additional 

management and personnel problems, including indications of a 

hostile work environment. 

I suspect your questions are the same as mine—Why didn’t we 

know this sooner? How could it have happened in the first place? 

How did it go on for so long without being detected? 

Following the recommendations of the investigation, the USGS 

closed the Inorganic Section of the Energy Geochemistry Laboratory effective March 1, 2016. All the employees implicated in the 

scientific integrity incidents are no longer employed by the USGS. 

We posted public notice of this incident, contacted customers of the 

inorganic lab, and carefully reviewed work products that could 

have made use of manipulated data from the lab. 

All failure of scientific integrity is a serious matter. Misconduct 

and mismanagement will not be tolerated at USGS. My job is to 

ensure a situation like this is never able to occur again. We are 

undertaking significant steps to enhance data quality assurance 

and quality control procedures. 

First, I have asked the National Academy of Sciences to assess 

all the bureau’s laboratory programs, data quality assurance, and 

quality control procedures. Second, I established a strategic lab 

committee to ensure that all of our laboratory assets are managed 

to best support the science mission of the USGS. Third, the energy 

program is developing a comprehensive and rigorous quality management system to replace current procedures. This will include 

periodic external review and international benchmarking. Fourth, 

we have hired a permanent quality management system manager 

who reports directly to headquarters to avoid any potential conflict 

of interest, as well as two laboratory quality assurance specialists 

that will oversee data quality in USGS energy science centers. 

Taken together, these steps will ensure that any future data quality problems are identified quickly and dealt with immediately. 

In our 137-year history, the USGS has built a strong reputation 

on providing quality scientific information critical to the Nation. 

For example, our science has helped protect communities in the 

path of lava flows and prevented a catastrophic rupture along the 

Alaska pipeline. Most recently, we released an assessment that 

identified 20 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil resources 

in west Texas. 

We do, and have done, important work in service of this Nation, 

but none of that excuses or explains this incident. I am committed 

to upholding the long-standing USGS reputation for scientific quality and integrity. We will continue to address the issues which led 

to misconduct at this USGS lab and will make all changes 

necessary to prevent it from happening again. 

8 

1http://energy.usgs.gov/GeochemistryGeophysics/GeochemistryLaboratories/Geochemistry 

LaboratoriesNotice.aspx. 2https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/2016EAU010Public.pdf. 

3https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/CREVGSV00032014PUBLIC.pdf. 

Throughout these incidents, we have tried to be accountable and 

transparent to the committee and the public. We have worked with 

your staff to provide briefings, documents, and other relevant 

information as quickly as possible, and to prioritize the delivery of 

the most critical documents to assist in your oversight. 

To date, we have provided 270 documents, consisting of more 

than 4,000 pages responsive to 27 of your 30 specific requests. We 

anticipate supplying the remaining outstanding documents as soon 

as possible. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am here 

to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Werkheiser follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. WERKHEISER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

Chairman Gohmert, Ranking Member Dingell and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is the Nation’s largest water, Earth, and 

biological science and civilian mapping agency, and the science agency for the 

Department of the Interior. For over 100 years, USGS has published unbiased 

science for use by decisionmakers, the Department of the Interior and other Federal 

agencies, consumers and industry, and the general public. Our reputation for 

scientific integrity is central to everything we do. 

In October 2014 the USGS identified a potential incident of scientific misconduct 

at the Inorganic Section of the Energy Geochemistry Laboratory in Lakewood, 

Colorado. This laboratory provided chemical analysis of samples submitted by both 

USGS researchers and scientists outside of USGS. The misconduct centered on improper adjustments made to calibration and standardization curves of an inductively 

coupled plasma mass spectrometer, which typically was used to determine the concentrations of a wide range of heavy metals in coal and water samples. 

Local managers immediately stopped all work in the Inorganic Section and initiated an internal investigation. We also promptly reported the possibility of scientific 

misconduct to the Department of the Interior’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

in November 2014. The USGS Office of Science Quality and Integrity (OSQI) 

performed a preliminary review in March 2015 to investigate the incident. At the 

conclusion of that review, in accordance with USGS and Department of the Interior 

policy, the USGS convened a Scientific Integrity Review Panel (SIRP) in June 2015 

to investigate the incident. Following its investigation, the SIRP concluded that a 

chemist repeatedly falsified data by making improper adjustments to calibration 

and standardization curves and that this manipulation qualified as scientific misconduct. This closely resembled a similar incident at the Inorganic Section that had 

occurred from 1996–2008. 

Following the recommendations of the SIRP, the USGS closed down the Inorganic 

Section of the Energy Geochemistry Laboratory, effective March 1, 2016. All of the 

employees implicated in either of the scientific integrity incidents are no longer employed by the USGS. 

The USGS posted public notice 1 of this incident, and has since acted on the sole 

recommendation from the June 2016 OIG Report,2 which was to notify stakeholders 

about the scientific integrity incident. The USGS contacted customers of the 

Inorganic Lab and carefully reviewed work products that could have made use of 

manipulated data from the lab. The USGS continues to evaluate the potential impacts stemming from this latest incident, but to date we have not identified any 

policy or management decisions affected by the manipulated data. 

Any failure of scientific integrity is a serious matter. The USGS has taken and 

is continuing to take significant steps to enhance data quality assurance and quality 

control procedures. The Energy Resources Program (ERP) is developing a comprehensive, rigorous and externally vetted Quality Management System (QMS) to 

replace current procedures, pursuant to a May 2015 OIG Report.3 The QMS will ensure data quality through transparency of operation, periodic external review, and 

9 

4 International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical 

Commission (IEC) 17025, ‘‘General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration 

laboratories’’ and, The NELAC Institute (TNI), the national standard for laboratory 

accreditation. 

the addition of extensive quality assurance and quality control practices that are the 

foundation of international and national laboratory standards for competence and 

quality.4 Additionally, the ERP is hiring a permanent QMS Manager, who will report directly to headquarters under the ERP Coordinator to avoid any potential conflict of interest, as well as two Laboratory Quality Assurance Specialists who will 

oversee data quality in USGS Energy Science Centers in Reston, Virginia, and 

Lakewood, Colorado. The QMS Manager has been hired, and will start work this 

month. This more robust QMS will place ERP management in direct coordination 

with data quality managers, thus ensuring that any future data quality problems 

are identified quickly and dealt with immediately. 

In addition, the USGS has created a Strategic Lab Committee to ensure that its 

laboratory assets are managed to best support the science mission of the USGS. 

This committee will assess laboratory assets that represent significant investments 

in personnel, facilities, equipment and operations across USGS mission areas and 

regions, and will also provide advice regularly on the strategic and tactical development of those assets. The USGS is also consulting with independent entities regarding assessments of the Bureau’s laboratory programs, data quality assurance and 

quality control procedures. 

In our 137-year history, the USGS has built a strong reputation on providing consistent, quality scientific information critical to the Nation. Our science has helped 

protect communities in the path of lava flows and prevented a catastrophic rupture 

along the Alaska pipeline. Our scientists have elucidated the geochemical processes 

behind mercury contamination, uncovered the mysteries of white-nose syndrome in 

North American bats, and investigated avian influenza in American poultry farms. 

Just a few weeks ago, we released an assessment that identified 20 billion barrels 

of technically recoverable oil resources remaining in the Wolfcamp Shale formation 

in the Permian Basin of west Texas. The societal value of these studies is why we 

are committed to upholding the long-standing USGS reputation for scientific quality 

and integrity. We will continue to address the issues which led to misconduct at this 

USGS lab, and will make all changes necessary to prevent such a thing from happening again. 

Throughout these incidents, we have been open and transparent about our activities. We have also worked with congressional staff to provide briefings, documents 

and other relevant information as quickly as possible. We appreciate the opportunity to provide this information, and look forward to continuing to do so. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to answer 

any questions you might have. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD TO WILLIAM WERKHEISER, DEPUTY

DIRECTOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

Mr. Werkheiser did not submit responses to the Committee by the 

appropriate deadline for inclusion in the printed record. 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Gohmert 

Question 1. In your testimony you maintained that, at the time, USGS had 

provided the subcommittee with 270 documents that were responsive to ‘‘27 of your 

30 specific requests,’’ that were made in a September 23, 2016 letter from the 

subcommittee to USGS. In addition, you also testified that USGS anticipated 

‘‘supplying the remaining outstanding documents as soon as possible.’’ Could you 

provide the subcommittee with a list of the 27 requests that you testified USGS 

satisfied by the December 6, 2016 hearing as well as the requests that were satisfied by USGS’s December 20 document production, making specific note whether the 

requests were fully or partially satisfied? 

a. By approximately what date does USGS anticipate that it will be able to fully 

satisfy the subcommittee’s requests, made in its September 23, 2016 letter? 

Question 2. When does USGS anticipate the National Academy of Sciences’ 

bureau-wide review of USGS laboratory data assurance and quality control 

procedures to be completed? 

10 

Question 3. In its September 23, 2016 letter, the subcommittee requested USGS 

to provide information that would illustrate all the disciplinary actions the Agency 

took after the discovery of years-long data manipulation, first in 2008 and then 

again in 2014. In its December 20, 2016 document production USGS provided the 

subcommittee with a number of documents that described various disciplinary actions taken against a number of USGS employees. Do the documents provided to 

the subcommittee by USGS in its December 20 production represent the full extent 

of the disciplinary actions taken by the Agency in response to nearly two decades 

of data manipulation occurring at the Lakewood, Colorado Energy Resources 

Program Geochemistry Laboratory as well as the issues identified in the September 

21, 2015 Scientific Integrity Review Panel Report? If not, when does USGS 

anticipate it will be able to satisfy the subcommittee’s request in full? 

Question 4. Your oral testimony noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission determined that the safeguards USGS has in place to protect employees seeking to blow the whistle on potential workplace misconduct as well as policies 

that will ensure these matters are investigated fully are ‘‘not totally adequate’’ and 

are currently being revised. When does USGS anticipate that its revisions will be 

completed? 

Question 5. What changes were made in the lab’s standard operating procedures 

for the mass spectrometer after the first period of scientific misconduct was 

discovered? How did they prove ineffective at discovering the second course of data 

manipulation? 

Question 6. In regards to allegations that laboratory personnel created a hostile 

work environment and that both management as well as the human resources 

offices failed to act on employee complaints, you testified that USGS is continuing 

to actively investigate this matter. When does USGS estimate this investigation will 

be completed and provide the subcommittee with a copy of the investigative report? 

Question 7. A document provided to the committee noted that after the first 

iteration of data manipulation was discovered, the lab’s manager and QA/QC officer 

reviewed 7 months’ worth of the work produced by the analyst over a 12-year 

period. According to the document, the reviewers ‘‘did not find a single job without 

data manipulation,’’ estimating that over 2,500 samples had analysis data manipulated. Could you provide the committee with the total number of sample analyses 

that have had data manipulated during the entire 18-year course of scientific 

misconduct? 

Question 8. Currently, how many USGS labs are operating with fully implemented Quality Management Systems (QMSs)? How many are not? Will the QMS 

currently being developed by USGS encompass laboratories agency-wide or will individual laboratories retain their own QMSs? In the event that individual labs are 

permitted to retain their own QMSs, are these systems review and approved by 

USGS headquarters? 

Question 9. USGS has established that data manipulation incidents occurred 

between both 1996 and 2008, as well as 2008 and 2014. How were these particular 

beginning and end dates established? 

a. With what frequency did the data manipulation occur? 

b. Are you able to isolate any particular time periods, such as weeks or months, 

during which the data manipulation did not occur? 

Questions Submitted by Ranking Member Dingell 

Question 1. I’m concerned about the blank pages from the document production 

the Chairman held up at the end of the hearing. Why were they blank? 

Question 2. What is the evidence the analysts did not manipulate the data in 

order to achieve a desired outcome? How do we know the data was not manipulated 

to suit an agenda? 

Question 3. I want to follow up on a question about the financial impact of the 

second incident that was raised in the hearing. Mr. Werkheiser indicated that the 

$108 million assessed by the Inspector General (IG) was not fully explained. Please 

explain it. 

11 

Question 4. The IG report detailed the studies impacted by the second incident. 

Is that the entirety of the impacts from the second incident? Can we say with confidence that the impacts from the second incident are fully known or are known to 

the extent possible? What uncertainties about the extent of the impacts of the data 

manipulation remain for both of the incidents? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Werkheiser. We do appreciate 

your testimony. We appreciate you being here. I know that is not 

the most fun thing to do. But we will begin the questioning, and 

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

You have talked about the troubling aspect of this issue, but like 

I mentioned in the opening statement, going back to 1996, that is 

during the Clinton administration; through 2008, that is the Bush 

administration; to 2014, that is the Obama administration. I have 

to tell you, Mr. Werkheiser, when I first got elected, I can remember walking around Stephen F. Austin University, and they have 

done some great work in conjunction with the United States 

Geological Survey. I looked at this stuff from the USGS, and my 

thought, going back to high school, wow, the USGS, this is really 

quality stuff. And I got the high grade in science in my high school, 

and I remember seeing USGS, wow, this is really impressive. This 

is really quality stuff, as we talked about the gold standard. 

So, it is really heartbreaking to think about all of the great work 

that has been done to build this phenomenal reputation of the 

United States Geological Survey, to come around to the point 

where we are now, where we have had years of just falsity and 

fraud, manipulating data. You got rid of one employee—and really, 

it doesn’t sound like there were a lot of consequences there. That 

is deeply troubling. If somebody’s falsifying data, it ought to be a 

blight on their total reputation and their professionalism. 

But I come back to the question I mentioned in my opening 

statement—To what end? Why the continued falsification and 

manipulation of data? Do you have an answer to the why? As a 

lawyer, I was taught never ask the question ‘‘why,’’ but I really, 

truly want to know. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I share your concern. I was appalled and devastated when I learned of this incident. Like you, when I was in 

school, I learned of the USGS through an article that said the 

USGS was the best at what it does in the world. That made me 

want to become part of USGS, so I was deeply, deeply appalled 

when I learned about this incident. 

While I cannot look into the mind of the analysts involved, what 

I can say is that with this instrument, when the raw information 

comes off of it, it often needs to be adjusted to comply with standards that are run. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, Mr. Werkheiser, we had heard that originally that you have to change it some because of the calibration. 

But then it turned out, we heard from USGS, that really does not 

explain all of the falsification that we have here. So, I appreciate 

that position, but we heard that before and then it turned out that 

really was not the proper explanation. 

Let’s try again. Do you have some other explanation for why? 

12 

Mr. WERKHEISER. The issue is that those adjustments were well 

outside of established standards. And while I cannot look into the 

mind of the person or the analyst—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. You said that twice now, but the fact is you can 

ask the scientist why. Did you ever ask these people, ‘‘Why did you 

do this? ’’ 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes, they were asked why. Their explanation 

was that they felt those manipulations were justified when, in fact, 

they were not. We looked at it to see if there is a pattern of that 

manipulation. Was it consistently high, higher than the value 

should have been? Was it consistently lower than the value could 

have been? Were they trying to drive some agenda to falsify that 

data? 

There was no consistent bias in that information. Sometimes it 

was high, sometimes it was low. In fact, the way the samples are 

submitted, there is no way for them to know what those samples 

are going to be used for. The project is not identified. 

So, I cannot explain exactly why, except from what they tell us. 

It was in an effort, in their minds, to provide more accurate information, which is absolutely not the case. 

Mr. GOHMERT. That is total irony. You manipulate data in order 

to make it more accurate. That is totally incongruent. 

What do you believe is the long-term effect of USGS’s reputation 

in the science field? I mean, you have university students that are 

now saying, ‘‘What are we supposed to do? This is totally bogus 

science here.’’ 

Mr. WERKHEISER. This is damaging to our reputation. There is 

absolutely no doubt about that. All I can do is to ensure that we 

rebuild and regain that reputation. The four steps I outlined before: bringing in the National Academy of Sciences, a very prestigious organization, to evaluate our protocols to help us into the 

future; the establishment of our strategic laboratory committee to 

look at all our assets, every lab we have; and the implementation 

of a QMS, quality management system, that will eventually encompass all of our laboratories across the USGS will help to rebuild 

that reputation. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Has that been done? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. The quality management system is underway. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. Well, my time has expired. 

I recognize Mrs. Dingell for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Deputy Director Werkheiser, because I so value USGS’s work 

that it does and the people that work there, I want to ask you 

about the workplace environment at the lab. As you know, the 

Scientific Integrity Review Panel was appalled to learn that there 

was a toxic work environment characterized by ‘‘use of offensive 

language and behavior’’ that appears to be created, at least in part, 

by a lab analyst that was flippant and difficult to work with. 

When a female staff member brought the issue to the attention 

of two levels of management, management and human relations 

appeared to have failed to adequately address the harassment. She 

was reportedly one of the several recipients of bullying behavior in 

the lab. 

13 

While this sounds like it is not a case of sexual harassment, because it happened to men and women, it is a case of harassment 

that apparently also went for a very long time without being addressed. In fact, it might not have been discovered at all or paid 

attention to, even though it was being reported, if not for this particular scientific integrity investigation. 

I want to know how, in the absence of this kind of investigative 

report in other parts of USGS, can we know that such a hostile 

work environment has not taken root elsewhere in the Agency? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Thank you for the question. I also was deeply 

disturbed to learn of the hostile work environment at play here. I 

am appalled at that environment. So, the main question of ‘‘How 

can we be assured that this does not happen elsewhere in the 

Agency? ’’ is one of great importance to me. 

I will point to two things where I say I am confident that is not 

a culture within USGS. The two things I will point to are: if we 

look at our sexual harassment claims, they are the lowest in the 

Department of the Interior; and when you look at our Federal 

Employee Viewpoint Survey results, we consistently score higher— 

and these results are used to evaluate work employee engagement, 

employee satisfaction—those results are consistently higher than 

the Department and consistently higher than the government 

overall. 

However, those are just statistics. Even one instance of hostile 

environment or sexual harassment is one too many. Our job is: 

‘‘How do we ensure that we have a workplace where people feel 

safe and are comfortable bringing issues of this nature forward and 

not be afraid of any type of retaliation or retribution? ’’ 

In doing that, we take it very seriously, and we are undertaking 

a number of things that are happening. First, is that all the executives within USGS have attended training on workplace environment, workplace culture. That training will be cascaded through 

the organization until every employee has received that training 

and is made aware. 

The other thing we have done is, in looking at this case in 

particular, it is clear that the employee did not feel comfortable 

coming forward. So, we need to have advocates for employees who 

represent their interest, and that they can go to confidentially and 

not be concerned about any retribution or any type of stigma 

attached to coming forward. We are working with the Department 

of the Interior to make our employees have access to an 

ombudsperson, at least one, maybe several, to ensure that confidentiality and that advocacy. 

The other thing I will say is that our Director takes this issue 

very seriously. She has issued several memos and communications 

with employees on the issue. She has developed a work group to 

look at, in particular, workplace issues and reaching out to organizations such as the American Geosciences Institute and the 

American Geophysical Institute—or Union—to look at the processes and the lessons learned, the best practices from those very 

large institutions and bringing those into USGS. 

Mrs. DINGELL. Let me quickly ask you two questions. I work 

there, and I want to report a harassment. How can I do that, be 

assured that my whistleblowing will remain confidential to all, 

14 

including my supervisor? And how do I know it will be investigated 

fairly, thoroughly, and promptly? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. We have worked with our Office of Diversity 

and Equal Opportunity. That is where those claims are looked at 

and investigated. And we have had that looked at by the EEOC; 

and, I guess several years ago now, they determined that our systems were not totally adequate to ensure just what you had asked, 

that confidentiality and that ability to look and investigate an issue 

fully without any type of stigma attached to it. We are revising our 

policies in our office. We are working with the Department to do 

that. 

Mrs. DINGELL. Thank you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mrs. Dingell. I really do appreciate 

your getting into that issue like that. I was reminded, in very recent years, we actually impeached a couple of judges, and one of 

them was about the workplace environment and harassment of the 

women on his staff. He should have been thrown out of office for 

the things he was doing. 

I am wondering out loud here, maybe we need to encourage people that work in the Federal Government, if you have a hostile 

workplace environment, maybe we need to know and drag those 

people up here and over the coals, so that if they are tempted to 

abuse people working for them, particularly women working for 

them, maybe you will get a chance to come up here and be totally 

humiliated in front of the whole world. We will have to keep that 

in mind. 

At this time, I would recognize Mr. Labrador for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Werkheiser, for being here today. 

In reviewing some of the facts of this case, do you believe that 

the chemist most directly involved with the data manipulation was 

qualified for the job? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Using the instrument that he first started on 

in 2010, or I believe it was 2009, yes. New instrumentation was 

procured in 2012, and evidence indicates that he was not qualified 

to operate that instrument. 

Mr. LABRADOR. It appeared that other employees of the inorganic 

chemistry lab were aware that the chemist in question did not even 

have sufficient database experience to do his job. They described 

his Microsoft Excel knowledge as rudimentary, i.e., freshman college level. The SIRP report team called this incomprehensible that 

this chemist in question was hired to work within this facility without possessing adequate data processing skills. 

This man was a 30-year employee of the USGS working with expensive equipment, handling projects with a value in excess of 

$100 million. How did he maintain his employment? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Most of his career, he was working in a different lab doing different things. And he was transferred to the 

Inorganic Geochemistry Lab, I believe, in 2009 or 2010, where he 

took over those new duties. So, it was clearly a management failure 

at several levels. 

And, again, through these procedures and through this quality 

management system implementation, we intend to make sure that 

15 

does not happen again; or, if it does happen, that we catch it 

quickly and take appropriate action. 

Mr. LABRADOR. I am trying to understand, because you, Mr. 

Werkheiser, you are one of the best witnesses that I have ever seen 

in Congress. I really want to praise you for taking responsibility. 

You seem to really care about your job, so I am trying to understand how this happened. With somebody that really cares about 

what they are doing, you have so much pride in the work that you 

do, how did this happen? Have you thought about that? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I have thought about it often, long and hard. 

The responsibility for ensuring that our employees are doing their 

jobs and are accountable to their jobs resides in all levels of management, from first-line supervisor up to the Director of the United 

States Geological Survey. Failures along the way are inexcusable, 

and I need to do a better job of holding my supervisors accountable, 

and that will trickle down through the organization. 

Mr. LABRADOR. I am concerned by this and think everyone 

should be concerned, as you are. Here we have employees of what 

has already been described as the gold standard of scientific institutions, and they do not have the basic knowledge necessary to 

enter data into a computer. How do we know this is not happening 

in other labs in Denver or in every other Federal lab in the 

country? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes, we have a number of labs throughout the 

country. And, in fact, one of the labs in Denver that you just mentioned is our National Water Quality Lab. Whereas the lab in question, the Inorganic Geochemistry Lab, processed about 575 samples 

a year, the National Water Quality Lab processes about 35,000 to 

40,000 samples a year. So, the throughput is much larger and 

employs a much larger staff. 

The quality controls at that Denver lab, the National Water 

Quality Lab, are stringent. It is a best practice. It is recognized. It 

is reviewed often by external agencies. And there are other labs. 

Most of the labs across USGS that have that type of volume and 

that type of stature have similar quality management systems in 

place. 

We have other labs that are research labs. Those are staffed by 

one or two people. They do work for their project. They may be developing methods that do not exist at this time, looking at very 

unique types of constituents. Those quality management systems 

are not as robust because they do not exist, but our new effort to 

implement here in this quality management system will eventually 

encompass all those labs. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Can you give us some reason to continue to have 

faith in the research produced by the USGS? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. As I said, I am confident that this was an 

isolated example. We have other quality assurance measures in 

place. For example, many of the projects that use this lab have 

their own quality assurance procedures in place, and they actually 

caught a number of the issues and did not use that information because they have those quality assurance procedures. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Does the energy resources program at Lakewood 

facility have a fully functional quality management system in 

place? 

16 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Not at this time. That is what is being 

implemented now. 

Mr. LABRADOR. How is it possible that it has taken this long to 

still not have a quality management system? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. We have had quality management systems. 

They were not effective, as we mentioned in the opening statement. 

There have been a number of reviews, in particular, in this lab. 

After the 2008 incident, there was an internal review by a team 

from outside the lab. There was an external review in 2012 that 

had 29 recommendations that were implemented. But it was the 

responsibility of the local management to implement those recommendations, and they were slow to do that. 

Those previous efforts were not successful, so we need to ensure 

that this future effort is successful. We believe that the robust system that we are putting in place, even though it will take some 

time to put in place, is the way to go. It is the right way to do it, 

and we have tried other ways that have not been effective. 

Mr. LABRADOR. OK. Like I said, I have really enjoyed you as a 

witness, and I want to believe you. But the fact that we do not 

have the system in place is very concerning to all of us. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Labrador. 

At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Westerman for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Werkheiser, thank you for your, pretty much, raw testimony today. I know this is not the first time this issue has been 

discussed in this committee. The last time there was only a little 

bit of smoke and we thought there was probably some fire, and I 

think you have verified that there was wrongdoing and definitely 

fire associated with this, figuratively speaking, obviously. 

I would like to commend the Chairman and the Ranking 

Member. And I think this is a sign of the seriousness of this issue 

that scientific intellectual integrity is an important thing to everyone across these party lines, and it is something that we simply 

just cannot tolerate. 

If you look at the founding of our greatest educational institutions in this country that even predate the Constitution, the motto 

of Harvard is veritas, which means truth; if you look at Yale, it is 

Lux et veritas, light and truth, so transparency and truth. This 

Nation has held that to be paramount for a long time, and when 

issues like this happen, it troubles us. 

Personally, I worked as an engineer for over 20 years, and I used 

USGS data. And it makes me think, did I make professional decisions that I am accountable for based on flawed data? Even though 

it was not this data, but it was USGS data, and there are 

thousands and thousands of people across the country that have 

experienced that. 

When we think about what has happened and how to move forward and why we, as Members of Congress and keepers of the taxpayers’ dollar, should continue to invest in USGS, I think we need 

a better answer. I know that this data may not have been used directly in policy, but how much of this data was used by people in 

industry, or people in research. 

How much of it—I mean, testing coal and heavy metals. Were 

there bad decisions made that resulted in somebody doing someVerDate Mar 15 2010 13:27 Jan 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 J:\114TH CONGRESS\OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS\12-06-16\22862.TXT DARLEN
17 

thing in a process that harmed the environment? Were there decisions made that prevented someone from using something in a 

process that caused economic damage? 

I think we need a better explanation, that you go back and find 

out exactly why this data was manipulated, what the far-reaching 

effects are. There is a proverb that says that if a thief is caught, 

he should repay it seven times over. I think USGS needs to do a 

more in-depth investigation so that we feel comfortable that the 

problem has been rectified and it will not happen again. 

Are there any efforts underway to go back and trace the knowledge trail to see where this data might have been used and—even 

public opinion may have been influenced by articles that were 

written based on this research which actually could affect policy decisions. Where are you in the process of actually going back and 

uncovering the real damage that was done? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. We are continuing to investigate the original information. Part of the issue and part of the reason that 

makes this so bad is that standard procedures for keeping records 

were not kept. So, the raw data that came off was not necessarily 

archived. 

However, we have gone back and we have retrieved a significant 

amount of that information from other sources, and we are evaluating what that manipulation exactly looked like, how severe was 

it, can we re-create what the values should have been. We did not 

have that information when we first started the investigation. We 

have some of that now. So, we are hoping to go back and learn 

from that. 

We were also making an effort to go back and, as you say, take 

a look at the stakeholders that may have used products from this 

lab. Most of those were internal, and we feel confident that none 

of the data used from this, at least this latest incident, made it into 

the public domain, that the projects that had those analyses run 

were able to capture it. It was definitely inefficient and cost money, 

but they were able to use other means to reach their conclusions, 

multiple lines of evidence. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. So, 20 years of research and none of this ever 

got outside of the USGS? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I should have been clear. It was this latest incident from 2010, 2009 to 2014. We cannot evaluate the previous 

1996 to 2008. That information does not exist. However, we have 

talked to scientists who used that information, who had projects 

back in that time frame and we are evaluating the potential impacts from that. 

The other thing we are doing is we are looking at those 33 

projects that used the information from the latest incident and are 

trying to backtrack that to look at all stakeholders, so that even 

if the data did not make it into the public domain, there may have 

been informal communications with others, and we are trying to 

backtrack that also. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. So, you could maybe do research on where the 

lab was cited back as far as 20 years ago in other research papers. 

And also—I know I am out of time, but when do you expect to have 

that report to us on the effects of the manipulated data? 

18 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. It will take several months to do that investigation, but certainly as soon as we have it, we would be happy 

to come and talk to you about it. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Hice for 5 minutes. 

Dr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Werkheiser, thank you for being here to try to answer 

some pressing questions. 

Obviously, it is disturbing to all of us, disturbing to you as well, 

I am sure, and you have communicated to that. But when you have 

decades of falsified, manipulated data, we all recognize it is inexcusable. And it is phenomenal to me that something like that can 

even take place for so long and either not be checked or be overlooked. Whichever the case was, it is inexcusable. 

Then we find that, as you mentioned, I believe it was 2008 when 

a new scientist was brought in, he immediately begins doing the 

same thing, and earlier this year receives a 30-year service award. 

It sounds like it is like a resume enhancer to come in and be involved in data manipulation. But the fact that it was intentional 

and continuous is very difficult to wrap my mind around, and I am 

sure others feel the same way. 

Let’s go to this second chemist, the new chemist that came in. 

We already had, from 1996 to 2008, a long period of manipulated 

data. We finally have a new chemist come in, and in 2014, discovered that that chemist, as I mentioned earlier and the Chairman 

did as well, had also been manipulating data. 

How long did that chemist stay on the payroll after his 

fraudulent activity was discovered? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. In October of 2014, a stop work order was 

issued, and that chemist was involved in trying to re-create the 

work he had done. Personnel actions were initiated, and I believe 

it was June 2016 when the separation took place. 

Dr. HICE. All right. June 2016, after he had received a 30-year 

length-of-service award. Did he retire? Did he get full benefits? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I would be happy—— 

Dr. HICE. Please provide that information. I would be curious to 

know. 

So, for 2 years he still remained on the payroll. What was he 

doing? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Trying to re-create the information that was in 

question. 

Dr. HICE. Trying to re-create the falsified information? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Trying to justify his actions to the investigative bodies, the various bodies that went through that lab. 

Dr. HICE. So, we, the taxpayers, were paying for a guy who 

manipulated data to justify why he manipulated it. Is that what 

you are telling us? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Well, to look at exactly the questions you had 

asked: Why did this happen, how did it happen. 

Dr. HICE. That sounds to me like it could be done through 

interrogation rather than giving him 2 years on the payroll. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Our personnel processes are complex. 

Dr. HICE. Did no one interrogate him? 

19 

Mr. WERKHEISER. They certainly questioned him. 

Dr. HICE. I am not going to use that word ‘‘interrogate.’’ Did no 

one try to just sit down and get the facts on the table? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. Several times. 

Dr. HICE. Did it take 2 years of him doing it on his own, and 

being paid? I mean, I don’t understand this. It sounds to me like 

there is a brief slap on the wrist and he continues on the payroll 

until he is ready to retire, after he receives an award. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. The length of service is exactly what it says. 

You work for 30 years and you get recognized for that. I don’t think 

it was a slap on the wrist. 

Dr. HICE. Let’s not go on—my time is short—what disciplinary 

actions do you have against employees who commit data manipulation and fraud or commit something against supervisors? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. There are various penalties, including 

suspension without pay up to separation from the Agency. 

Dr. HICE. But that obviously did not occur in this case? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. The action was initiated, yes. 

Dr. HICE. After 2 years? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. No. I mean, it was initiated, not right away 

but—— 

Dr. HICE. What discipline did he incur? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. The investigation, as I said, is complex, takes 

time. 

Dr. HICE. My question has to do with what discipline action was 

taken. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Again, I would be happy to provide that 

information. 

Dr. HICE. Provide the information, Mr. Werkheiser. It seems like 

that would be something you would come to this committee hearing 

prepared to answer. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I cannot answer. 

Dr. HICE. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, I have one further question. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Without objection. 

Dr. HICE. Thank you. 

This subcommittee has repeatedly asked, since the September 23 

letter, for the performance evaluation of these two chemists who 

committed the manipulation. To this point, we have still not received those evaluations. When can we expect to receive that? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. That information has left the USGS, is at the 

Department being reviewed at this time. Part of the reason it took 

so long to produce is that we had to retrieve that information from 

OPM. When the information came, much of that information was 

non-responsive to the specific request. So, we went through it and 

brought out the specific information requested. That is now at the 

Department being reviewed and will be here as soon as it is—— 

Dr. HICE. With all due respect, sir, we are the ones that want 

to review that information. We are the ones who requested it, and 

we expect it. When will we receive that? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. It is at the Department, and we have, as I am 

sure you are aware, we have—— 

Dr. HICE. Can you give me a general time line? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Approximately 2 weeks. 

20 

Dr. HICE. Thank you, sir. 

I now yield back. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

At this time, Mrs. Radewagen is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your appearance today, Mr. Werkheiser. 

I assume the lab lost a significant amount of credibility when the 

disclosure was made. What is really amazing and troubling among 

many details of this case is that the lab went ahead as if nothing 

occurred, and you doubled down on a $174,000 piece of equipment 

that no one either knew how to operate, cared enough to operate 

correctly, or was even interested enough to oversee. 

How do you justify buying a new piece of equipment like a mass 

spectrometer when no one was willing to verify that it was 

operated correctly? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. In any laboratory situation, upgrades of equipment are a common business practice, and we need to stay on the 

forefront of technology. When new equipment comes out, oftentimes, I know in my experience in the Water Quality Laboratory, 

when the new generation of equipment comes out, they process 

more samples in a shorter amount of time and are more efficient 

in the processing of that information. Plus, they provide information that is more accurate and more reliable. 

So, the purchase of equipment is a standard business practice 

that occurs throughout our labs. In this case, the critical failure 

was in not training this individual, not ensuring that this individual had the appropriate training and background to operate the 

equipment appropriately. That is a management failure. And that, 

again, is something that we recognize and that we will move forward to correct as part of some of the tasks we are undertaking 

to improve the quality of our laboratories. 

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. We have one report stating the lab had an 

average turnaround time of 224 days to process samples. Did the 

lab have a reputation for long turnaround times to process 

samples? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. It did, much longer than could be achieved in 

private laboratories. So, in addition to the scientific misconduct and 

integrity issues, the decision to close the lab also included those 

operational issues, such as turnaround time, and efficiency and 

value to the taxpayer. 

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. So, coupled with knowledge that the lab had 

a history of inaccuracies and slow turnaround, why was management so complacent, or as the Scientific Integrity Review Panel 

described, characterized by conscious acquiescence and inattentiveness? Didn’t that ultimately let the fraud continue until 2014? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes, it clearly was a management failure. As 

managers and as supervisors, we owe it to the taxpayer and to this 

country to hold ourselves and our employees accountable. That did 

not happen in this case. 

Mrs. RADEWAGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. Thank you. 

We do have a few more questions. For one thing, you heard from 

the Ranking Member that the SIRP reported that a culture of harassment existed at the lab. That is so incredibly serious. 

21 

And, by the way, we have been going through this hearing all 

this time and I don’t believe a single name has been mentioned. We 

are covered by Speech and Debate Clause privilege regarding 

things that are said on the record. But for the record, who was the 

person who was manipulating the data beginning back in 1996? We 

haven’t even heard a name. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Again, I would be happy to provide that in 

private. Our advice is that because this is being broadcast, that we 

should not, because of privacy concerns—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, that is the whole reason I ask. If somebody 

is making an abusive workplace, I want their name out there. They 

should not be provided protection from having their name mentioned. And with regard to privacy concerns, that is what I am 

saying. This is protected. You don’t have to worry about lawsuits. 

But if somebody is abusing female employees, I think it is good 

to talk about, like we did in Judiciary when we had a judge doing 

that. I would like for any man that is tempted to do that to realize 

that some day his name is going to be brought up in a broadcast. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. What I can say is those employees are no 

longer with the United States Geological Survey. I would be happy 

to provide that information to you privately. My advice has been 

not to provide that publicly because of the public nature of this 

hearing. 

Mrs. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I do think that we need to make 

the point this is still under active investigation and that the 

committee probably has the right at the end of the investigation to 

ask for the findings. Is that correct, that this is still under active 

investigation? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. That is the case, OK. It is still under active 

investigation. So, the investigation is not concluded. Is that right? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Well, the overall investigation is not. Those 

employees are no longer with the United States Geological Survey, 

but there is still an active component going on. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Active component to what? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. To learn exactly what happened, what the 

nature of the issues were, how severe it was. It is not a formal investigation, but we are still investigating the issue. 

Mrs. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, again, so I had had questions 

about how are they allowed to retire, what were the circumstances, 

were people held accountable. Are we going to ultimately get that 

report? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I—— 

Mrs. DINGELL. I shared your concerns. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. We—— 

Mrs. DINGELL. So, I was told it was still under active investigation. They did not have that yet, but I think this committee would 

like to see it when you do. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Right. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. We can certainly provide that to the 

committee, yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. Thank you. Well, I would very much 

like to have that information. 

22 

And if the investigation has formally concluded—you say there 

may be some informality in the continuation. Well, if it is formally 

concluded, I would like this committee to have access to that information to know who was creating the problem. And I don’t care if 

they retired or not. There need to be consequences. Even if at a 

minimum, it is having your name discussed on the record as someone who is abusing the employees under your supervision. 

So, you are agreeing to get us that information, with regard to 

the investigation? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. OK. And I do want to follow up with a couple 

more questions. Did the lab management take the discovery of the 

second instance of continuous data manipulation seriously? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. When the second incident was discovered, 

the lab management acted immediately to notify the energy resources program at headquarters, and initiated an internal investigation from our Office of Science, Quality, and Integrity. That 

investigation eventually led to notification to the Office of Inspector 

General. It was self-reported. And the science center management 

generated all those requests. 

Mr. GOHMERT. The reason I ask is that the SIRP noted that the 

lab’s lead physical scientist, quality assurance officer, asserted 

‘‘that all activities related to the SIRP are not necessary, and that 

the situation has been blown completely out of proportion.’’ 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, that sounded like it was not being taken 

seriously. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Right. The QA/QC person was not in the management chain. They are not a supervisor. The management chain 

took it very seriously and reported it. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, did the laboratory’s culture fostered by the 

United States Geological Survey promote an environment where a 

person would feel comfortable coming forward to expose the wrongdoing? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. That is our job. Our job is to create that 

environment. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I know it is your job. The question is about 

whether it was done. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. In this case, I don’t believe enough was 

done to create that environment. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. The SIRP found that whistleblowing, related to the second incidence of data manipulation, created ‘‘a 

feeling of mistrust and resentment present at all levels.’’ So, it 

sounds like there is a lot more work that needs to be done there. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I would certainly agree. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Werkheiser, one thing that still troubles me is something in 

the response in the letter that you sent to Chairman Gohmert. It 

says here that we have been unable to determine either the rationale for the data manipulation or any consistent calculations that 

the analyst used in performing those data manipulations. 

Is that still being investigated, or is that your final say on it? 

23 

Mr. WERKHEISER. The analyst in question has been consistent in 

his responses that he viewed that he was doing an appropriate adjustment to the data, even though it is clear that it was not. So, 

I don’t think any further questioning of that person is going to 

yield anything different than that. 

The investigation of, ‘‘Was there a pattern, is there a consistency 

as to how that manipulation happened, the extent of what it 

was’’—many of the reasons for it are still under investigation. Since 

we have been able to identify some of that through notebooks and 

those type of things, with that information we are trying to recreate what exactly happened. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. So, there is still investigation going on to try 

to determine the rationale? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Yes. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. OK. The June 2016 Department of the Interior 

Inspector General report noted that the second case of continuous 

data manipulation at the Lakewood facility affected, at a minimum, projects that received $108 million in funding. However, 

what remains unclear is the dollar value of the projects that were 

impacted by the data manipulation that occurred at the lab between 1996 and 2008, and we talked about that a little bit earlier 

about the records. 

Could you tell the committee what was the aggregate dollar 

value of the projects that were affected during this earlier 12-year 

course of data manipulation? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. We have been trying to assemble that information. Actually, I do not have that information, but I would like to 

follow up on the $108 million figure. 

That represents the total funding for those projects that used the 

lab. The actual value of those samples that were analyzed is much 

less than that. The projects and the results they make, they use 

many lines of evidence, they use outside labs, they use a number 

of—it represents the entire effort to produce a report or an assessment. The value of the impacted from the laboratory is probably a 

tenth of that. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Do you know how many projects were in that 

time period? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. In the—— 

Mr. WESTERMAN. We have the dollar amount, but what was the 

number of projects affected? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. In the second incident, it is 22 projects. We 

actually do not have the information for the first incident. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Do you happen to know how many projects 

there were? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Not for the first one. Those records just do not 

exist back that far. We have partial records, but dating back to 

1996, that was prior to an automated laboratory information management system that was put in place in 2010. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Hopefully, you can understand the heartburn 

that creates, that there is a federally funded research lab with no 

data or no backup. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I do understand that on the financial side. We 

will try to re-create as much of that as we can. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Even on the research side. 

24 

Mr. WERKHEISER. Well, certainly on the research side, I think we 

know that the——Do we know how many projects? We do not 

know. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. And no way to find out? 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I will go back and try to. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. I had a follow-up question—Did any of the data 

derived from the lab during this period affect any Federal legislation or regulation, Federal or state? If you don’t even know what 

projects were done, obviously there is no way to determine if the 

research affected any state or Federal regulations. 

Mr. WERKHEISER. I cannot address that with any certainty, that 

is true. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. I guess with that, Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss 

for words. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Hice, do you have any further questions? 

All right. I would like to thank the witness, Mr. Werkheiser, for 

being here. And I appreciate the participation of the Members, the 

Ranking Member. Obviously, this is a reminder why we must be 

vigilant and make every effort to hold the executive branch accountable to the taxpayers. 

While I hope this revelation of mass data manipulation is limited 

in scope, it is only through careful examination we can learn and 

move through and move forward with confidence. And it is normally an assurance to the public that we have this republican, 

small ‘‘r,’’ form of government, where we have representatives, and 

if one party or one administration is manipulating or providing an 

abusive work environment, then it has always been a bit of a comfort—well, the next one coming in will surely correct that. 

We have just seen an outrageous example of how none of those 

safeguards worked, none of the checks and balance work. And then 

we have someone, whose name I want to say on the record when 

we get the information, but you have people creating a hostile work 

environment, you have people totally manipulating data, fraudulent activity, a person involved in it is replaced to bring an end, 

only to see that continue on. It just is staggering. 

And, as we said at the beginning, I think the Ranking Member 

and I both have always thought of the United States Geological 

Survey as the gold standard; and now I am not even sure it merits 

a mercury standard. I mean, it is changing and moving and doesn’t 

seem to have much of a form. It is like that terrible joke about 

what would you like the answer to be. 

Anyway, as much as I would like to dismiss this issue, we just 

cannot. As the facts come out, it seems to just open more and more 

questions. How did this go on over the span of three decades with 

the procedures, policy, and management over the course of 18 

years? How does this happen? I know the United States Geological 

Survey wants to put this behind them, but as a committee, we cannot close the books on this when the Administration witness shows 

up with a two-sentence explanation. 

This was a chance to get the record straight. We have been assured that you will get us additional information when the investigation is concluded, but I would suggest to you that we are still 

waiting for documents that we requested 3 months ago. Some of 

25 

the documents we did receive were redacted, they were duplicates, 

or even blank pages. 

This document I am holding up here is a record of Dionex-IC2000, 2011—Page 1 is a cover sheet; page 2, it is blank; page 3, 

it is blank; page 4, it is a comfort because this says this page is 

only for our committee use, and it is a blank piece of paper; page 

5, this is only for committee use, and it is a blank piece of paper. 

I don’t know what you were expecting this committee, whether 

it is this side of the aisle or that side of the aisle, what is a 

committee supposed to do? We are supposed to play tic-tac-toe on 

this? For committee use only, pages 6 and 7, blank pieces of paper. 

Oh, we have a little bit on page 8. Again, a blank piece of paper 

on page 9. Page 10, we at least have a few things on that. Page 

11, another blank piece of paper. 

This is extraordinary. I mean, it is unbelievable. The Federal 

Government, regardless of administration, the Federal Government 

is being reduced to a joke, except it is so deadly serious. 

So, the gold standard, it is not even a good toilet paper standard. 

When you submit the additional information, please give us something besides blank pieces of paper, because otherwise, at the hearing where we get into the names of people who have dishonored the 

government, dishonored themselves, dishonored those who worked 

under them, we don’t want to have to bring up your name as one 

of those that has dishonored the committee. 

You have been very gracious to come up here and to try to deal 

with this issue. But we hope as this administration comes to a 

close, the integrity and transparency will be restored, the Department of the Interior will abandon entrenched ideologies that have 

been going on over three decades, and finally hold wrongdoers accountable. Because one way or another, this committee is going to 

hold wrongdoers accountable, and we want to make sure that your 

name is not one of those who is helping cover for people who have 

done wrong over the years. If you will bear with me just one 

moment—— 

With that, let me also mention, Ranking Member Dingell, or 

other members of the committee, may have some additional questions for the witness. Under our rules, if any Member has additional questions, you will be required to respond to those, and we 

are not talking about blank pieces of paper with a stamp on it that 

says, ‘‘For Committee’s Use Only.’’ 

Under Committee Rule 4(h), the hearing record will be held open 

for 10 business days to provide those responses after such 

questions, if any, are asked. 

If there is no further business, then at this time the committee 

stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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