THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Military Airpower

A Revised Digest of 

Airpower Opinions 

and Thoughts

Compiled by

Charles M. Westenhoff

Colonel, USAF, Retired

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 2007
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent 

the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for 

public release: distribution unlimited.

All photographs are courtesy of the US Government.

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center

Cataloging Data

Military airpower : a revised digest of airpower opinions 

and thoughts / compiled by Charles M. Westenhoff.

 p. ; cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-163-5

1. Air power—Quotations, maxims, etc. 2. Air warfare—

Quotations, maxims, etc. 3. Military art and science—

Quotations, maxims, etc. I. Westenhoff, Charles M.

358.4—dc22

Air University Press

131 West Shumacher Avenue

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5962

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil
iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

OUTCOMES AND ARGUMENTS . . . . . . 97

TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

PRINCIPLES OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

TWENTY GOOD BOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

SOURCE INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

TOPICAL INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
v

Foreword

When Air University Press first published 

Military Air Power early in 1990, the Cold War 

was ending and US forces were poised to 

launch Operation Desert Storm. Today’s captains and staff sergeants were in grade school. 

Since then, our Air Force has achieved unprecedented combat successes; enabled great humanitarian efforts; and crossed new thresholds in air, space, and cyberspace. We’ve added 

great new chapters to our service’s heritage—

and our nation’s history—and the horizon just 

keeps unfolding.

The year 2007 marks the 60th anniversary 

of the US Air Force as an independent service. 

It’s also the centennial of military aviation. In 

1907, the Signal Corps established its Aeronautical Division and later released its specification for a “heavier-than-air flying machine.” 

Since then, Airmen have consistently proved 

themselves as well as the utility of airpower 

in combat, leaving no doubt that the US Air 

Force is America’s asymmetric advantage. 

Yet, 2007 also marks the dawn of a new era 

for the Air Force. Today, America’s Airmen 

are engaged in a dizzying array of worldwide 

missions that were unthinkable a century 

ago. Every day Airmen conduct space operations, deliver precision weapons, develop and 

fly the latest generation of stealth aircraft, 

move our nation’s war fighters and equipment 

around the globe, fuse advanced sensors 

with trained analysts to develop exquisite intelligence, conduct aeromedical evacuation 
vi

of wounded personnel, open and sustain expeditionary bases, operate unmanned aerial 

vehicles from halfway around the world, and 

devise and test new war-fighting technologies. 

And Airmen combine these disparate missions 

so seamlessly and effectively that it may seem 

easy. Of course, it is not.

This book is about what Airmen have in 

common—our heritage, capacity, and future 

potential. It also illustrates that while we’re 

on the leading edge, we’re also part of the 

sweep of military history. Understanding the 

way that our predecessors handled their 

challenges can equip us to better serve our 

nation. We can learn from both the failures 

and the successes of soldiers, sailors, marines, and Airmen; the ancient past; and yesterday’s headlines. 

As military professionals, our interest in 

learning from others is to gather clues that 

we can put to work in the future. I encourage 

you to target your search toward determining how timeless wisdom can be best applied 

to the optimal use of our armed forces’ air, 

space, and cyberspace power, and to add 

your own pages to our great story. 

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY

General, USAF

Chief of Staff
vii

Col Charles M. Westenhoff, US Air Force, 

retired, is a 1974 graduate of the US Military 

Academy at West Point. He served two tours 

as a flight inspection pilot in the T-39 and 

three tours as a forward air controller (FAC) 

in the O-2 and A-37. As the chief of FAC Tactics at Nellis AFB, Nevada, he taught at the 

USAF Weapons School, wrote and edited tactics manuals, and developed precision weapons tactics and procedures. Returning from 

service as the air attaché in Baghdad, Iraq, 

during the closing months of the Iran–Iraq 

War, he served at Air University’s Airpower 

Research Institute. There he led parallel planning for Instant Thunder (the concept plan 

for the Desert Storm air campaign), compiled 

the 1990 Military Air Power book, and contributed to the 1992 Air Force Manual 1-1, 

Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States

Air Force. Colonel Westenhoff served as the 

Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review deputy 

director in 1996–97 and as commander, Joint 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Joint 

Test Force, from 1998 to 2001. Returning to 

About 

the Author
viii

the Air Staff in 2001, he led Red Team planning in support of Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and served as 

Checkmate deputy division chief. Colonel 

Westenhoff served as chief of strategy for 

Coalition Joint Task Force Seven in Iraq 

until retiring in 2004. He has served as 

the senior mentor to Checkmate since retiring. Colonel Westenhoff lives in Reston, 

Virginia, with his family.
ix

Preface

The number one aim of this book is to supply Airmen with useful thoughts that might 

help them meet their known responsibilities 

and the unknown challenges their service will 

bring. The most capable Airmen are judicious 

in finding the best material to put into their 

“clue bags.” They continue a long tradition. 

Nearly three hundred years ago, Frederick 

the Great searched the best of military thought 

trying to “acquire perfect knowledge and experience.” 

The materials in this book are offered as 

candidates for your clue bag. Some of the 

quotations were selected for their irony, humor, or incendiary effect. I’m confident that 

readers will know good sense from nonsense. 

This book contains many “old, dead guy” 

quotations for several reasons. First, they’re 

good. No one has improved on Sun Tzu in 

2,500 years. Second, time has graded their 

work and put them at the head of the class. 

Third, they wrote clearly.

To identify the sources of quotes, I’ve used 

two military principles—brevity and simplicity. 

Rank abbreviations reflect the official usage 

of parent services (i.e., Lt Gen for the Air Force, 

LtGen for the Marine Corps, and LTG for the 

Army). Those who should be household names 

are treated as such (e.g., Commanding General of the US Army Air Forces and, later, the 

first and only General of the Air Force, Henry 

H. Arnold, is simply Hap Arnold). Also, I have 

periodically interjected my own thoughts, de-
x

noted by italics. Another note, unless otherwise indicated, emphasis in quotes is in the 

original.

Just as in the 1990 edition, (1) the quotations are arranged by subject matter to present multiple views of each topic; (2) I couldn’t 

include one-tenth of the good material I would 

have liked to; and (3) any errors are mine. 

What’s different is the world we live in—

and the way it’s been shaped by airpower. 

CHARLES M. WESTENHOFF

Colonel, USAF, retired

March 2007
xi

Acknowledgments

Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff of the 

Air Force, had the idea of revising this book. 

I’m grateful to him for the opportunity to update this work to improve its utility to today’s 

Airmen. The commander of Air University, Lt 

Gen Stephen “Steve” Lorenz, made this book 

happen through the able office of the Airpower 

Research Institute (ARI)—especially Dr. Dan 

Mortensen and John Conway, as well as the 

production support of Emily Adams and the 

Air University Press staff. 

On inputs, I had help from the most perceptive of Airmen, including Phil Meilinger, 

Rob Owen, Lt Gen Dave Deptula, Mace Carpenter, and Bill Andrews. I’m also grateful for 

the help supplied by the Air Force Doctrine 

Center (AFDC), spearheaded by Maj James J. 

Marsh, Maj Ray Fernandez, and Bob Poynor. 

Both the ARI and AFDC provided sanity 

checks; Dr. David Mets and Capt Jamie 

Swisher were very helpful in this regard.

The greatest pleasure of service in the Air 

Force is the people. We improve from every 

briefing and debriefing. I’ve had the honor of 

flying on the wing of many outstanding flight 

leads, too many to mention, but will single 

out two—Gen Chuck Boyd and Maj Gen 

Chuck Link. 

I’m most grateful for the support of a family 

of avid airpower advocates, and, in particular, I thank my wife, Kelley. Any person who 

sends you off to a combat zone with cheerful 

support is worth their weight in gold.
xii

The 1990 book contained 30 pages of material at the end. This included a brief bibliography and biographical snapshots of the 

sources of the quotations, which did not do 

them justice. Those wishing to know more 

about a source can learn as much or little as 

they wish on the Internet. I do append a list 

of 20 books that I found most valuable for 

both editions of this book.


Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Page

The Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

About Brevity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Introduction
Introduction

The Challenge

Know and use all the capabilities in your airplane. If you don’t, sooner or later, some guy 

who does use them all will kick your ass.

Dave “Preacher” Pace

Quoted in Robert L. Shaw, Fighter Combat

Every art has its rules and maxims. One 

must study them: theory facilitates practice.

The lifetime of one man is not long enough to 

enable him to acquire perfect knowledge and 

experience. Theory helps to supplement it; it 

provides a youth with premature experience 

and makes him skillful also through the mistakes of others. In the profession of war the 

rules of the art are never violated without 

drawing punishment from the enemy, who is 

delighted to find us at fault.

Frederick the Great
Introduction

About Brevity

It would further human knowledge if, instead 

of writing new books, we would apply ourselves to making decent extracts from those 

that are already in existence. Then one would 

hope to avoid wasting his time by reading.

Frederick the Great

Frederick the Great’s writings fill 30 

books.

As one veteran Israeli pilot said after the June 

1982 air campaign over Lebanon in response 

to American questions about how much doctrine the Israeli Air Force had written down, 

“Yes, we have books. But they are very thin.”

Barry D. Watts and James 0. Hale

Air University Review, 1984 

It is a good thing for an uneducated 

man to read books of quotations.

Sir Winston Churchill 

The checklist is not a substitute for 

the full text of the flight manual.

Stan Eval “famous aviator”


Introduction

Regardless of Air Force Specialty Code, we 

must understand the overall purposes of military air power and then see how our individual 

duties support those purposes.

Col Keith W. Geiger

Airpower Journal, Fall 1987

You should understand airpower, and you 

must preach the doctrine. You will be on 

staffs where you are going to meet people 

who do not understand airpower, and you 

are going to have to educate them.... You 

have got to go out and preach the doctrine of 

airpower and never give an inch on it.

Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg

More than most professions the military is 

forced to depend upon intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting 

the future.

Douglas MacArthur

The present state of things is the consequence 

of the past; and it is natural to enquire into 

the sources of the good we enjoy and the evils 

we suffer.

Ben Jonson ca. 1600

Nothing is comprehensible, except through 

its history.

Teilhard de Chardin
Introduction

Assumptions

A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly 

trained Air Force in being at all times will not 

alone be sufficient, but without it there can 

be no national security.

Gen H. H. “Hap” Arnold

War is a matter of vital importance to the 

State, the province of life or death, the road 

to survival or ruin. It is therefore mandatory 

that it be thoroughly studied.

Sun Tzu

When blows are planned, whoever contrives 

them with the greatest appreciation of their 

conse­quences will have a great advantage.

Frederick the Great

War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of 

knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well.

Frederick the Great

No study is possible on the battlefield.

Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch

A wise man learns from his experience; a wiser 

man learns from the experience of others.

Confucius
Introduction

There is only one method of fitting our intellects to be ready for war, and that is by studying the history of air warfare, and by no means 

should we neglect naval and land warfare.

“Squadron Leader”

(Note: Squadron Leader was the pen name of the author of Basic Principles of Air Warfare, a 1927 classic with the subtitle, The Influence of 

Air Power on Sea and Land Strategy.) 

As a nation we were not prepared for World 

War II. Yes, we won the war, but at a terrific 

cost in lives, human suffering, and [matériel], 

and at times the margin was narrow. History 

alone can reveal how many turning points 

there were, how many times we were near 

losing, and how our enemies’ mistakes often 

pulled us through. In the flush of victory, 

some like to forget these unpalatable truths.

Hap Arnold

Adherence to dogmas has destroyed more 

armies and cost more battles than anything 

in war.

Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller

Many commanding generals spend their time 

on the day of battle in making their troops 

march in a straight line, in seeing that they 

keep their proper distances, in answering 

questions which their aides de camp come to 

ask, in sending them hither and thither, and 

in running about themselves. In short, they 

try to do everything and, as a result, do nothing. How does this happen? It is because very 
Introduction

few men occupy themselves with the higher 

problems of war. They pass their lives drilling 

troops and [come to] believe that this is the 

only branch of the military art. When they 

arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and, in default of knowing 

what should be done, they do only what they 

know.

Maurice de Saxe


Airpower

Airpower

Page

Airpower Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The Nature of Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Air Force Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

United States Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

The Global Airpower Perspective . . . . . 24

Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Elements of Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Expeditionary Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

“Complete” Uses of Airpower . . . . . . . . 35

Objectives of Airpower 

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Economic and Political 

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Psychological Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Control of the Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Airpower and Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Interdiction, Attrition, and 

Counterland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Airpower Prophecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Airpower
11

Airpower

AIRPOWER

We have the enemy surrounded. We are dug 

in and have overwhelming numbers. But 

enemy airpower is mauling us badly. We will 

have to withdraw.

Japanese infantry commander

Situation report to headquarters, Burma, 

World War II

The gratitude of every home in our island, in 

our Empire, and indeed throughout the free 

world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes 

out to the British airmen who, undaunted by 

odds, unwearied in their constant challenge 

and mortal danger, are turning the tide of 

world war by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict 

was so much owed by so many to so few.

Winston Churchill 

People have preferred to feel rather than know 

about airpower.

Common paraphrase of Noble Frankland: 

“People have preferred to feel rather than 

know about strategic bombing,” 1963

There are still those who fail to stand back 

and reflect on the fact that air assets operate 

in the one medium that surrounds the earth 

and that touches 100 percent of the earth’s 

population, political capitals, and centers of 
12

Airpower

commerce. Because of the long history of 

surface warfare and, perhaps, of our very 

existence on land, air power is not an easy 

concept to grasp.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, retired, 1997

The United States relies on the Air Force and 

the Air Force has never decided a war in the 

history of wars.

Saddam Hussein, 29 August 1990

While Saddam Hussein could rely on likethinking unsophisticates from his home town 

of Tikrit to run his army, finding equally doctrinaire individuals who could also fly an airplane was a far more difficult task. (Hitler and 

Goering had the same problem with the Luftwaffe in the Second World War.) 

Richard P. Hallion, 1992
13

Airpower

Airpower Theories

There has been a tendency to overemphasize 

long-range bombardment, and to ignore the 

versatile application of air power. Our Air 

Forces were used for any mission considered 

important, at any given moment. Especially 

misleading is the distinction made between 

strategic and tactical air forces. That distinction is not valid in describing the use of air 

power as a whole, day after day.

Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz

If we should have to fight, we should be prepared to do so from the neck up instead of 

from the neck down.

Lt Gen Jimmy Doolittle

Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into 

compartments, you merely pull it to pieces 

and destroy its greatest asset—its flexibility.

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

Air power is like poker. A second-best hand 

is like none at all—it will cost you dough and 

win you nothing.

Gen George Kenney
14

Airpower

By material, we mean the stuff or goods out 

of which something is made. Materiel means 

the finished product, whether it be machineguns, rivets, photographic film, engines, or 

bombers. So superior materiel is the key to 

airpower.

Maj Gen Oliver P. Echols
15

Airpower

Air power alone does not guarantee America’s 

security, but I believe it best exploits the nation’s greatest asset—our technical skill.

Hoyt S. Vandenberg
16

Airpower

The Nature of Airpower

Once the command of the air is obtained by 

one of the contending armies, the war must 

become a conflict between a seeing host and 

one that is blind.

H. G. Wells

In the air are no streets, no channels, no point 

where one can say of an antagonist, “If he 

wants to reach my capital he must come by 

here.” In the air all directions lead everywhere.

H. G. Wells

Neither the Army nor the Navy is of any protection, or of very little protection, against 

aerial raids.

Alexander Graham Bell

The first important difference between air 

forces and armies is that, within his tactical 

range, the airman is independent of lines of 

communication and has no flanks. The only 

other important difference between armies 

and air forces is that an air force is not committed to any one course of action.

Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor
17

Airpower

Because of its independence of surface limitations and its superior speed the airplane is 

the offensive weapon par excellence.

Giulio Douhet

The measure of airpower is the ability of a nation to exploit airspace for its own purposes—

and in wartime to deny it to an enemy.

Adm Arthur Radford

Air power can either paralyze the enemy’s 

military action or compel him to devote to the 

defense of his bases and communications a 

share of his straitened resources far greater 

than what we need in the attack.

Winston Churchill

Aerial forces menace all the territory comprised in their radius of action. They can set 

off from different points and arrive “en masse” 

on a chosen point. They lend themselves to 

the offensive because they leave the adversary, until the last moment, in uncertainty 

as to their objective.

Arsene Vauthier

Paraphrase of Douhet

The air ocean and its endless outer space extension are one and indivisible, and should be 

controlled by a single homogeneous force.

Alexander P. de Seversky
18

Airpower

The very flexibility of air forces makes true 

cooperation essential. Air forces, at short notice, can be switched from one sort of target 

to another and, within limits, from one type 

of operation to a quite different type. There 

is, therefore, a constant temptation to use 

them piecemeal to meet an immediate requirement, rather than to use them on a 

long-term joint plan.

J. C. Slessor

Every soldier generally thinks only as far as 

the radius of action of his branch of the service and only as quickly as he can move with 

his weapons.

Luftwaffe general Karl Koller

If we lose the war in the air we lose the war 

and lose it quickly.

Field Marshal Montgomery
19

Airpower

Air Force Airpower

America has only one Air Force.... The 

other Services have aviation arms essential 

to their specific roles and functions but 

which also work jointly to project America’s 

air power.... It is a potent combination, 

proven over and over in combat.

GEN Colin Powell, 1993

The soul of an Air Force is range and payload 

and access.

Gen T. Michael Moseley, 2006

American planners should look at what happened and ask whether these improvisations 

do not point the way to greater effectiveness.

After several decades of insisting that the 

word service means “parochial,” military reformers might ponder the individual merits 

of the services, each of which can pool a great 

deal of operational expertise along with a 

common world view and an esprit de corps 

difficult to find among a melange of officers.

Eliot A. Cohen, 1994

The other services have air arms—magnificent air arms—but their air arms must fit 

within their services, each with a fundamentally different focus. So those air arms, when 

in competition with the primary focus of their 

services, will often end up on the short end, 
20

Airpower

where the priorities for resources may lead to 

shortfalls or decisions that are suboptimum.

It is therefore important to understand that 

the core competencies of air and space power 

are optional for the other services. They can 

elect to play or not play in that arena. But if 

the nation is to remain capable and competent in air and space, someone must pay attention across the whole spectrum; that is 

why there is a U.S. Air Force.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, retired, 1997

While on one hand, soldiers and sailors alike 

tend to downplay the influence of air power 

on the modern battlefield, on the other, these 

very individuals are seen campaigning for 

further strengthening their service-specific air 

arms. The problem, it seems, is not with air 

power, which is acceptable, but with the air 

force emerging as a rival military service.

Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

Pakistan air force, 2002
21

Airpower

An Airman’s Perspective

• Land and naval warfare expertise were 

sufficient, until the invention of the 

airplane. Operations in the aerospace 

medium are sufficiently complex and 

unique to require a new and separate 

competence.... This is the only reasonable and defendable justification 

for the expense of organizing, training, 

and equipping an Air Force separate 

from the Army and the Navy.

• Airpower characteristically moves rapidly and responsively, neither inhibited 

nor encumbered by mountains, gorges, 

rivers, or beaches: this isn’t doctrine, 

this is physics!

• Modern airpower’s characteristics: 

Speed, Range, Freedom of Maneuver, 

and Perspective, give the Joint Force 

Commander [JFC] freedom of action 

and a great range of choices.

• It is an airman’s job and duty to articulate the ways in which the unique characteristics of airpower can be brought 

to bear on the JFC’s objectives.

Maj Gen Chuck Link
22

Airpower

United States Airpower

Air and space power IS America’s asymmetric 

advantage.

Brig Gen David A. Deptula, 2000 

The United States is neither a land nor a sea 

power, as those terms are usually understood. Other nations have maintained strong 

air forces, but the United States is the world’s 

first and only aerospace power. We do it 

uniquely well. But we’re also uniquely dependent upon it. Lose command of the skies 

and space, and the whole thing falls apart.

Philip Gold, 1997

You could give the same airplanes to two different air forces—one of them totalitarian 

and the other one under a democracy, and 

the democracy’s going to win every time because the air war is about freedom of choice, 

it’s about maneuver, and it’s about a regime 

that’s able to entrust a handful of men with a 

great deal of power.

Maj Gen Chuck Link, 1996

The United States of America is an aerospace 

nation. Throughout history, great nations have 

been defined by the nature of their military 

forces. Certainly, the strength of Rome lay in 

its legions.... England became a world power 

as a result of the Royal Navy and its ability to 
23

Airpower

control the seas and project power around 

the globe for that island nation. I think as we 

move into the twenty-first century, the United 

States of America will be defined by the fact 

that it is an aerospace nation.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, 1995

It is now an entrenched fact of life that as 

American air power has become ever more 

accurate, lethal, and effective, it also has 

come under ever more intense public attention, scrutiny, and questioning, even as it 

has, at the same time, heightened not only 

the nation’s political imperatives but also a 

legal need to be more discriminate in the use 

of force.

Ben Lambeth
24

Airpower

The Global 

Airpower Perspective 

World War II demonstrated for American 

statesmen and military planners that the 

world was one seamless strategic problem 

for the United States.

Eugene M. Emme 

Air power is not limited by oceans, by shorelines, by shallow water. It’s not limited by 

mountains or mountain passes or rivers, shallow or deep. It’s not limited even by distance.

Gen T. Michael Moseley

The Air Force can deter, deliver a tailored response, or punch hard when required—over 

great distances—with quick response. We 

can provide a presence, or put ordnance on a 

target worldwide in a matter of hours.

Global Reach–Global Power

USAF White Paper, June 1990

In-flight refueling converts the tactical fighter 

into a strategic, long-range participant. It sustains combat air patrols, enables indirect 

routing, extends interdiction and strategic 

penetration depth and increasingly is an integral component of front-line strength.

Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason

Royal Air Force (RAF)
25

Airpower

Link air and space force together. Under the 

strategic principle that the one who controls 

outer space can control the Earth, superpowers and military giants are expanding 

their strength in outer space and the function of [their] air force.

Maj Gen Zheng Shenxia and 

Senior Col Zhang Changzi

People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)

Both Afghanistan and Iraq were air mobility 

wars. Every single flight into these areas of 

operation needed some kind of air refueling—fighters, bombers, lifters and even other 

tankers needed air refueling. Navy carrierbased fighters needed dramatic air refueling 

to get them the “legs” they needed.

Gen John W. Handy

The successful execution of the lift portion of 

Enduring Freedom spotlighted the value of 

logistics as a weapon system, as well as the 

fact that effects-based operations entail materiel delivery as well as bombing.

Ben Lambeth
26

Airpower

Space Power

There is something more important than any 

ultimate weapon. That is the ultimate position—the position of total control over Earth 

that lies somewhere out in space. That is ...

the distant future, though not so distant as 

we may have thought. Whoever gains that ultimate position gains control, total control, 

over the Earth, for the purposes of tyranny or 

for the service of freedom.

Lyndon B. Johnson, 1958

[As] we showed and proved during DESERT 

STORM, and proved again during the air 

campaign over the Balkans, space is an integral part of everything we do to accomplish 

our mission. Today, the ultimate high ground 

is space.

Gen Lester P. Lyles

The US must, over the next few years, develop a cadre of experienced, intensely knowledgeable people skilled in applying space to 

combat. We are talking about an entirely new 

breed of war fighters, who will ultimately 

transform the power and scope of warfighting in the same way airpower professionals 

have done in the last century.

Acting Secretary of the Air Force Peter B. Teets
27

Airpower

Space Superiority has to roll off the tongue 

as easily as Air Superiority.

Gen John P. Jumper

Whereas those who have the capability to 

control the air, control the land and sea beneath it, so in the future it is likely that those 

who have the capability to control space will 

likewise control the earth’s surface.

Gen Thomas D. White

Space superiority is our imperative—it requires the same sense of urgency that we 

place on gaining and maintaining air superiority over enemy airspace in times of conflict.

This imperative requires a full understanding of the medium of space, and we will pursue robust space situation awareness leading 

to space superiority.

Gen Lance Lord

The proverbial first shot of space warfare has 

already been fired with the advent of jammers designed to defeat the capabilities our 

airmen derive from space.

Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche

If you’re not in space, you’re not in the race.

Gen Lance Lord
28

Airpower

Space is a realm in which many military operations are conducted more efficiently than 

by terrestrial systems. Military satellites have 

been operating in space for more than twenty 

years, and our accomplishments in DESERT 

STORM emphasize that space has unquestionably evolved as a military theater of operations.

Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner

In the long haul our safety as a nation may 

depend upon our achieving space superiority. Several decades from now the important battles may not be sea battles or air 

battles, but space battles, and we should be 

spending a certain fraction of our national 

resources to insure that we do not lag in obtaining space supremacy.

Gen Bernard “Bernie” Schriever

Our space force may need to become a military entity in its own right, equal and apart 

from our air, land, and maritime forces.

Gen Chuck Horner, 1999
29

Airpower

Elements of Airpower

Air power is the total aviation activity—civilian and military, commercial and private, potential as well as existing.

Hap Arnold

The air power of a nation is what it actually 

has today. That which it has on the drafting 

board cannot become its air power until five 

years from now.

Lt Gen Frank M. Andrews, 1937

I have flown in just about everything, with all 

kinds of pilots in all parts of the world—British, French, Pakistani, Iranian, Japanese, 

Chinese—and there wasn’t a dime’s worth of 

difference between any of them except for 

one unchanging, certain fact: the best, most 

skillful pilot had the most experience.

Brig Gen Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager

Why can’t they buy just one airplane and 

take turns flying it?

Calvin Coolidge

A nation may have every other element of air 

power but still lag behind if its government 

has no real urge to insure its future development. The attitude and actions of government will fully determine the size of our mili-
30

Airpower

tary air establishment, and greatly affect the 

efficiency of our civil air establishment, our 

aeronautical industry and facilities—hence 

our air power in being.

John C. Cooper

Service aviation must be the spearhead, civil 

aviation the shaft, of our air effort.

Maj Gen F. H. Sykes, 1922

A large system of commercial aviation will remain an abiding support for the national aircraft industry and will at the same time provide those reserves of personnel which are 

essential for the expansion of aerial strength 

in case of need.

P. R. C. Groves

There aren’t a lot of movies made about airlifters. There’s no “12 O’Clock High” or “Top 

Gun” about those heavy aircraft, but, despite 

their lack of glamour, they are arguably the 

most potent tool this nation has for shaping 

the international arena.

Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall

It is this beat, this precise rhythmical cadence, which determines the success of an 

airlift. This steady rhythm, constant as the 

jungle drums, became the trademark of the 

Berlin Airlift, or any airlift I have operated.

Lt Gen William H. Tunner
31

Airpower

We have learned and must not forget that, 

from now on, air transport is an essential of 

airpower, in fact, of all national power.

Hap Arnold

The interesting thing is that now you will 

never hear about airpower separately from 

space power. When the Air Force talks about 

what it brings to the [joint] fight, the first 

thing is air and space power. The bottom line 

is, everything on the battlefield is at risk 

without air and space superiority.

Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr.
32

Airpower

Expeditionary Airpower

When the United States forces first landed in 

North Africa, there were nine airdromes that 

our planes could use. Within a few months 

there were a hundred. Mud, and later dust, 

were the worst problems. With the Axis on 

the run, airfields were built even faster. One 

request was received to build several airfields 

in the Sbeitla sector; seventy-two hours later, 

all were in use.

Hap Arnold

We move on time lines that simply will not 

work if we have to wait for support for our 

expeditionary forces.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

Allied Force remains the most accurate air 

campaign in history, but it was a logistics 

masterpiece that orchestrated the opening 

and operation of 20 bare bases and the beddown and maintenance of more than 1,000 

US and allied fighters, bombers, support and 

reconnaissance aircraft, and helicopters.

Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters

The aim of a military organization is not to 

make do with the smallest number of supporting troops but to produce the greatest 

possible fighting power. If, for any given campaign, this aim can only be achieved by hav-
33

Airpower

ing a hundred men pump fuel, drive trucks, 

and construct railways behind each combatant, then 100:1 is the optimum ratio.

Martin van Creveld

Agile combat support reaches outside of pure 

logistics. It includes functions like force protection, Red Horse engineers, services, contingency medical care and other combat support functions.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

A recipient of a PGM [precision-guided munition] does not know or care if the weapon 

came from near or far, or from what kind of 

platform, or from what kind of base.

Brig Gen David A. Deptula, 2001

No soldier can fight unless he is properly fed 

on beef and beer.

John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough

Teamwork allows us to be an effective fighting force—a rapid expeditionary force capable 

of deploying anywhere in the world in a minimum of time and in austere conditions—not 

operating from where we are stationed, but 

from where we are needed, not when we can, 

but when we must.

Gen Michael Ryan
34

Airpower

Diplomacy will not be strengthened by a military force and a deployment structure that 

give an opponent time to raise questions 

about the true extent of U.S. power and influence, especially when those questions 

start to resonate in the United States.

Dr. David A. Kay

United Nations chief nuclear 

weapons inspector, 1998 
35

Airpower

“Complete” Uses 

of Airpower

What gave American air power such predominance in the Gulf, and what makes the United 

States incomparable as a military power, is 

its systemic quality.

Eliot A. Cohen, 1995

There was no line of cleavage between strategic and tactical air forces. It was over-all effort, uniting all types of aircraft, coordinated 

for maximum impact.

Tooey Spaatz

The four principles of air power that I set out 

were:

1. To obtain mastery of the air, and to keep 

it, which means continually fighting for it.

2. To destroy the enemy’s means of production and his communications by strategic 

bombing.

3. To maintain the battle without any interference by the enemy.

4. To prevent the enemy [from] being able 

to maintain the battle.

Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard
36

Airpower

Once real mastery of the air was obtained, all 

sorts of enterprises would become easy. All 

kinds of aeroplanes could come into play.

Winston Churchill

The single clear lesson of World War II was 

that the visionaries were correct that all future warfare would be dominated from the 

air. They agreed on that. What they argued 

about was just how airpower would dominate 

surface warfare.

David MacIsaac
37

Airpower

Objectives of 

Airpower Employment

To avoid the fate of the vanquished is an obligation of statecraft second only to the solemn duty of controlling war itself. Whatever 

the future may hold, victory in war now rides 

on the wings of the fighter and the bomber, 

and air power is essential to national survival. But the only ultimate security lies in 

the conquest of war itself.

Edward Meade Earle

Objectives vary considerably in war, and the 

choice of them depends chiefly upon the aim 

sought, whether the command of the air, 

paralyzing the enemy’s army and navy, or 

shattering the morale of civilians behind the 

lines. This choice may therefore be guided by 

a great many considerations—military, political, social, and psychological.

Giulio Douhet

Air power will play the leading role in our response to the security challenges of the uncharted future. It will in some circumstances 

be the only engaging form of military power 

and in others the form upon which successful surface operations depend.

Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd, 1991
38

Airpower

The air campaign may be the primary or supporting effort in a theater.

Col John A. Warden III

The Air Campaign
39

Airpower

Economic and 

Political Objectives

The real importance of Munich ... is that it 

was the first victory for air power—no less 

significant for being temporarily bloodless.

J. C. Slessor

The Berlin Airlift was the first real event of the 

Cold War. Many people in high places thought 

it was the first event in World War III.

Gen T. Ross Milton

The Strategic Theory postulates that air attack on internal enemy vitals can so deplete 

specific industrial and economic resources, 

and on occasion the will to resist, as to make 

a continued resistance by the enemy impossible.... It is conceivable that there will always be one industry, such as the oil industry in Germany, so necessary to all phases of 

the national war-making ability that its destruction would be fatal to the nation.

Hap Arnold

The flexibility which the range of aircraft 

gives to air forces permits concentrated effort 

against a particular target system or complex 

without need for concentration against a particular target of the system; hence the enemy 
40

Airpower

is unable to keep his defenses in one geographical area.

Air University (AU) Manual 1, United States Air 

Force Basic Doctrine, 1951

Strategic air assault is wasted if it is dissipated piecemeal in sporadic attacks between 

which the enemy has an opportunity to readjust defenses or recuperate.

Hap Arnold

The advocates of all-out air-power maintain 

that area destruction and mass annihilation 

can effectively destroy the war potential of the 

adversary and lower his strength and will to 

continue the struggle. It should be remembered, however, that the objective of war is the 

exercise of effective control over the political 

elite of the state to enforce a political decision.

S. T. Das

It is easy to say, as many people do, that 

England should isolate herself from Europe, 

but we have to remember that the history of 

our insularity has ended, because with the 

advent of the aeroplane, we are no more an 

island. It does not matter whether we like [it] 

or not, we are indissolubly tied to Europe.

Stanley Baldwin
41

Airpower

Psychological Effects

The constant arrival of wounded, without any 

battle taking place, makes us all think. The 

conduct of operations is such that the Panzer 

Divisions are being decimated by naval gunfire and low flying aircraft without being able 

to fight. It can’t go on like this anymore! In 

such a situation, one can calculate the day on 

which the division will finally be annihilated.

SS Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer 

Air power is, above all, a psychological 

weapon—and only short-sighted soldiers, too 

battle-minded, underrate the importance of 

psychological factors in war.

B. H. Liddell Hart

Not only our military reverses but also the 

severe drop in the German people’s morale, 

neither of which can now be overlooked, are 

primarily due to the unrestricted enemy air 

superiority.

Joseph Goebbels, diary, 15 March 1945

The internal situation in the Reich is governed almost exclusively by the air war. Here 

is our real weakness in the overall conduct of 

the war.

Goebbels, diary, 17 March 1945
42

Airpower

It is not so much the existence of a military 

establishment that determines a people’s will 

to resist as it is their confidence in it, as witness the collapse of Japan while still armed 

with effective ground forces numbering over 

three million. In other words, the will of a nation to resist is not always dependent on 

armed strength, but rather upon its belief in 

its chances for political success.

Maj Gen Dale O. Smith

It is improbable that any terrorization of the 

civil population which could be achieved by 

air attack would compel the Government of a 

great nation to surrender. In our own case, 

we have seen the combative spirit of the 

people roused, and not quelled, by the German air raids. Therefore, our air offensive 

should consistently be directed at striking 

the bases and communications upon whose 

structure the fighting power of his armies 

and fleets of the sea and air depends.

Winston Churchill, 1917
43

Airpower

Control of the Air

Without a reasonable degree of air superiority, 

no air force can effectively assist land or sea 

forces or strike at the enemy’s war potential.

Arthur William, Lord Tedder

There are no silver medals in the air superiority event. You either win it or you get your 

ass kicked. When you get your ass kicked in 

the air, your people are getting their ass 

kicked on the ground.

Maj Gen Chuck Link, 1996

The only real security upon which our military principles can rely is that you must be 

master of your own air.

Winston Churchill
44

Airpower

Air superiority is not the God-given right of 

Americans. It doesn’t just happen. It takes a 

lot of people working hard to produce the capabilities that provide it for U.S. forces.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

The minimal requirement for a successful 

[maritime] operation is a favourable air situation. Air superiority will be a requirement for 

sea control where a robust challenge from 

the air is possible. Air supremacy is a necessary precondition of command of the sea.

Royal Navy, The Fundamentals of British 

Maritime Doctrine, BR 1806, 1995
45

Airpower

Air control can be established by superiority 

in numbers, by better employment, by better 

equipment, or by a combination of these 

factors.

Tooey Spaatz

After all, the great defence against aerial 

menace is to attack the enemy’s aircraft as 

near as possible to their point of departure.

Winston Churchill

Memorandum, 5 September 1914

The first and absolute requirement of strategic air power in this war was control of the 

air in order to carry out sustained operations 

without prohibitive losses.

Tooey Spaatz

One general inference to be drawn has been 

that in twentieth-century war, defeat will 

almost always be avoided (and outright victory likely gained) by the side that has secured air superiority. Indeed, a more comprehensive perusal would probably show 

that virtually the only exceptions concern 

counterinsurgency warfare.

Neville Brown

The future battle on the ground will be preceded by battle in the air. This will determine 

which of the contestants has to suffer operational and tactical disadvantages and be 
46

Airpower

forced throughout the battle into adopting 

compromise solutions.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

To use a fighter as a fighter-bomber when 

the strength of the fighter arm is inadequate 

to achieve air superiority is putting the cart 

before the horse.

Adolf Galland

The Ardennes battle drives home the lesson 

that a large-scale offensive by massed armor 

has no hope of success against an enemy 

who enjoys supreme command of the air.

Maj Gen F. W. von Mellenthin

On 15 December [1911] an aircraft was hit 

by anti-aircraft artillery shrapnel. The pilot 

then swooped low over the gun battery, as if 

to congratulate the gun crew, and dropped 

some of his visiting cards as he flew by. This 

precedent was unlikely to be followed in subsequent conflicts.

Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason

The Gulf War was the first rather large-scale 

regional war in which the number of aircraft 

destroyed in beyond-the-horizon air combat 

exceeded those destroyed in visual air combat. It indicates that beyond-the-horizon air 

combat technology is maturing.

Col Ming Zengfu, PLAAF, 1995
47

Airpower

Airpower and Maneuver

What I hope we’re beginning to understand is 

airpower’s ability to destroy enemy forces without giving the enemy as much to shoot at.

Maj Gen Chuck Link, 1997

We are seeing right now an historic evolution 

in maneuver warfare: to the interdependent 

fight, where long-duration mass on the ground 

can be exchanged for rapid massing of resources of awareness, of detection, and of 

instant communications to deliver concentrated and precision strike.

Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne

The attention of commentators usually focused on the violent application of air power, 

but in fact, its nonlethal characteristics were 

no less important. For example, airlift delivered over half a million tons of dry cargo to 

the Gulf region. It also made possible such 

movements as the repositioning of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps for the left hook into 

southern Iraq and Kuwait. That repositioning took C-130 aircraft landing every seven 

minutes for thirteen days, moving fourteen 

thousand personnel and over nine thousand 

tons of equipment over four hundred miles.

Eliot A. Cohen, 1995
48

Airpower

The primary objective of Allied forces in the 

Southwest Pacific is to advance our own 

network of air bases deep into the Japanese 

perimeter.

Hap Arnold

Movement is the essence of strategy. This is 

true even though strategy is not confined to 

the military art: the implementation of every 

political decision requires movement. It may 

be messages that move, or men, or money, or 

munitions.

Stephen B. Jones

Air strategy begins with airplane ranges. Airplane ranges determine the location of bases.

The proximity to the target of the bases under one’s control fixes the weight and rhythm 

of the attack.

Tooey Spaatz

The Americans, with minimum losses, attacked and seized a relatively weak area, 

constructed airfields, and then proceeded to 

cut the supply lines to troops in that area.

The Japanese Army preferred direct assault, 

after German fashion, but the Americans 

flowed into our weaker points and submerged 

us, just as water seeks the weakest entry to 

sink a ship. We respected this type of strategy 
49

Airpower

for its brilliance because it gained the most 

while losing the least.

Lt Col Matsuichi Iino

Japanese Eighth Area Army

Strange as it may seem, the Air Force, except 

in the air, is the least mobile of all the Services. A squadron can reach its destination 

in a few hours, but its establishment, depots, 

fuel, spare parts, and workshops take many 

weeks, and even months, to develop.

Winston Churchill

We do not have to be out and out disciples of 

Douhet to be persuaded of the great significance of air forces for a future war, and to go 

on from there to explore how success in the air 

could be exploited for ground warfare, which 

would in turn consolidate the aerial victory.

Maj Gen Heinz Guderian, 1937 

The fact of British air superiority threw to the 

winds all the tactical rules which we had hitherto applied with such success. In every battle 

to come the strength of the Anglo-American 

air force was to be the deciding factor.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, 1942
50

Airpower

Utilization of the Anglo-American air forces is 

the modern type of warfare, turning the flank 

not from the side but from above.

Vice Adm Friedrich Ruge

Rommel’s naval aide at Normandy

Somebody has to be on the ground. I don’t 

want them to have to fight their way in. I 

want the American soldier to only have to 

worry about mud on his boots, not blood. At 

the end of the day, the American soldier’s 

best friend is the American airman. But only 

if we get our story told.

Maj Gen Chuck Link, 1995

Only through speedy delivery of combat forces 

to favorable positions can decisive impact be 

exerted. Among various delivery measures, 

air transport is the most effective action because of its strong mobility, fast speed, and 

less restrictive geographic conditions.

Maj Gen Zheng Shenxia and 

Senior Col Zhang Changzi, PLAAF, 1996
51

Airpower

Interdiction, Attrition, 

and Counterland

It is infrequently claimed that the maintenance of a favorable situation in the air is the 

principal task of both bombers and fighters 

in the field. This is definitely not so. Air superiority is only a means to an end. The object 

of air superiority is the control of air communications, firstly for our own use and secondly 

to deny it to the enemy. And the use we require 

is to “conduct operations against an enemy”; 

and this, in a land campaign, means to break 

down the resistance of the enemy army.

J. C. Slessor

The greatest secret of war and the masterpiece 

of a skillful general is to starve his enemy.

Frederick the Great

When one army is full and another starving, 

lead and steel are hardly needed to decide 

the victory.

Sir John Fortescue

The idea that superior air power can in some 

way be a substitute for hard slogging and 

professional skill on the ground is beguiling 

but illusory. Air support can be of immense 

value to an army; it may sometimes be its 

salvation. But armies can fight—and not only 
52

Airpower

defensively—in the face of almost total air 

superiority.

J. C. Slessor

For our air offensive to attain its full effect, it is 

necessary that our ground offensive should be 

of a character to throw the greatest possible 

strain upon the enemy’s communications.

Winston Churchill, 1917

There is a great difference in the mental attitude of aerial crews when “close-in” Army 

targets are attacked as opposed to the normal strategical target. Crews will fly through 

intense flak to a “close-in” target and do an 

excellent piece of work. Ten days later the 

same crews will fly into just as intense flak to 

attack a bridge or supply dump and do only 

a fair job. In spite of the losses and injuries 

sustained to date in Air-Ground cooperation 

work, morale always reaches a new high during such periods of operation.

United States Army Air Forces

42d Bomb Wing report, World War II

Air interdiction and ground maneuver must 

be synchronized so that each complements 

and reinforces the other. Synchronization is 

important because it can create a dilemma 

for the enemy that has no satisfactory answer. His dilemma is this: if he attempts to 

counter ground maneuver by moving rapidly, 

he exposes himself to unacceptable losses 
53

Airpower

from air interdiction; yet if he employs measures that are effective at reducing losses 

caused by air interdiction, he then cannot 

maneuver fast enough to counter the ground 

component of the campaign.

Price T. Bingham

If the enemy has air supremacy and makes 

full use of it, then one’s own command is 

forced to suffer the following limitations and 

disadvantages:

• By using his strategic air force, the enemy 

can strangle one’s supplies, especially if 

they have to be carried across the sea.

• The enemy can wage the battle of attrition from the air.

• Intensive exploitation by the enemy of his 

air superiority gives rise to far-reaching 

tactical limitations for one’s own command.

Erwin Rommel

The argument has been advanced that the 

Air Force should be concerned with land objectives, and the Navy with objectives on and 

over the water. That distinction is to deny the 

peculiar quality of the air medium, the third 

dimension. The air is indivisible; it covers 

land and sea.

Tooey Spaatz
54

Airpower

Airpower has become predominant, both as 

a deterrent to war, and—in the eventuality of 

war—as the devastating force to destroy an 

enemy’s potential and fatally undermine his 

will to wage war.

GEN Omar Bradley

As the aeroplane is the most mobile weapon 

we possess, it is destined to become the dominant offensive arm of the future.

J. F. C. Fuller

70 percent of casualties and injuries to enemy 

troops in the Vietnam War were caused by 

U.S. air firepower. Half the Arab tanks damaged during the fourth Middle East War were 

destroyed by the Israeli Air Force. During the 

Falkland Islands war between Britain and Argentina, 90 percent of the 29 vessels that were 

lost were due to air strikes. All the above indicates that with the rapid development of air 

weapons, the focus of modern war is gradually shifting to the air. Air firepower is becoming the backbone of joint military forces.

Maj Gen Zheng Shenxia and 

Senior Col Zhang Changzi, PLAAF, 1996
55

Airpower

Airpower Prophecy

I dipt into the future far as human eye could 

see,

Saw the vision of the world, and all the 

wonders that would be;

Saw the heavens fill with commerce, 

argosies of magic sails,

Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down 

with costly bales;

Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and 

there rain’d a ghastly dew

From the nations’ airy navies grappling in 

the central blue.

Alfred, Lord Tennyson

“Locksley Hall,” 1842

Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible.

William Thomson, Lord Kelvin

President, Royal Society, 1895 

An uninterrupted navigable ocean that comes 

to the threshold of every man’s door ought 

not to be neglected as a source of human 

gratification and advantage.

Sir George Cayley (1773–1857)

The example of the bird does not prove that 

men can fly. Imagine the proud possessor of 

the aeroplane darting through the air at a 

speed of several hundred feet per second. It 
56

Airpower

is the speed alone that sustains him. How is 

he ever going to stop?

Simon Newcomb

Independent, 22 October 1903

In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary—and sufficient—to be 

in a position in case of war to conquer the 

command of the air.

Giulio Douhet

The bomber will always get through.

Stanley Baldwin

Engines of war have long since reached their 

limits, and I see no further hope of any improvement in the art.

Sextus Julius Frontinus

Strategemata, Introduction to Book III, AD 84

Few people who know the work of Langley, 

Lilienthal, Pilcher, Maxim and Chanute but 

will be inclined to believe that long before the 

year 2000 A.D. [sic], and very probably before 

1950, a successful aeroplane will have soared 

and come home safe and sound.

H. G. Wells, 1901 
57

War

War

Page

The Nature of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Clausewitz on Policy and War . . . . . . . . 63

War as Art and Science . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Time and Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Irregular Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Friction, War’s Resistant 

Medium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Oils for the Friction of War . . . . . . . . . . 90

The Art of Studying 

Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
War
59

War

The Nature of War

Five great enemies to peace inhabit with us—

avarice, ambition, envy, anger, and pride. If 

those enemies were to be banished, we should 

infallibly enjoy perpetual peace.

Petrarch

It is apparently not possible for another real war among the nations of 

Europe to take place.

David Starr Jordan, 1914

We live in a world where emergencies are always possible, and our survival may depend 

on our capacity to meet emergencies. Having 

said that, it is necessary also to say that 

emergency measures—however good for the 

emergency—do not make good permanent 

policies. Emergency measures are costly, 

they are superficial, and they imply that the 

enemy has the initiative.

John Foster Dulles

Soldiers usually are close students of tactics, 

but rarely are they students of strategy and 

practically never of war.

Bernard Brodie
60

War

War is part of the intercourse of the human 

race.

War is the province of danger, and therefore 

courage above all things is the first quality 

of the warrior.

War is the province of physical exertion and 

suffering.

War is the province of uncertainty.

War is the province of friction.

War demands resolution, firmness, and 

staunchness.

Ernest Hemingway

Men at War (chapter titles), quoting Carl von 

Clausewitz

Air power is particularly vulnerable to the 

perils of strategy made by rule of thumb. Its 

potential cannot be judged nearly as well by 

historical precedent as both critics and advocates would like: its utility depends much 

more on the particulars of the case than they 

might think.

Eliot A. Cohen, 1995 

It just worries the hell out of me. It’s damned 

easy to get in war, but it’s going to be awfully 

hard to ever extricate yourself if you do get in.

Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 May 1964, 

telephone conversation with National 

Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy

The purpose of all war is peace.

Augustine
61

War

In order for a war to be just, three things are 

necessary. Firstly, the authority of the sovereign.... Secondly, a just cause.... Thirdly, 

... a rightful intention.

Thomas Aquinas

The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories. The supreme excellence is to 

subdue the armies of your enemies without 

having to fight them.

Sun Tzu

In war, Resolution; in defeat, Defiance; in 

victory, Magnanimity.

Winston Churchill

One thing stands out clearly against the 

background of my experience: the winning of 

peace is much more difficult than the winning of even a global war..... The principles 

of yesterday no longer apply. Air travel, airpower, air transportation of troops and supplies have changed the whole picture. We 

must think in terms of tomorrow.... Let us 

give the people of the United States the best, 

the most efficient, the most modernly 

equipped armed forces possible, using as determining factors, our foreign policy and the 

capabilities and limitations of our enemies.

Hap Arnold
62

War

Nobody dislikes war more than warriors, but 

we value the causes of peace so highly that 

we will not duck a war in an effort to get a 

lasting peace.

Gen Daniel “Chappie” James Jr.

That slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must 

make us take war more seriously, but that 

doesn’t excuse blunting our swords in the 

name of humanity. Sooner or later someone 

with a sharp sword will come along and cut 

off our arms.

Carl von Clausewitz
63

War

Clausewitz on 

Policy and War

Now the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman 

and General exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for something, or wish to 

make of it something, which by the nature of 

its relations it is impossible for it to be.

The ultimate object of our wars, the political 

one, is not always quite a simple one.

The great point is to keep the overruling relations of both parties in view. Out of them a 

certain center of gravity, a center of power 

and movement, will form itself, on which all 

depends.

Truth alone is but a weak motive of action 

with men, and hence there is always a great 

difference between knowing and action, between science and art.

Where no powerful motives press and drive, 

cabinets will not risk much in the game. The 

more war becomes in this manner devitalized 

so much the more its theory becomes desti-
64

War

tute of the necessary firm pivots and buttresses for reasoning.

Where judgment begins, there art begins.

Clausewitz
65

War

War as Art and Science

The terrain of war is generally mapped using one of two “projections”: those of art and 

science. As with other maps, detailed study of 

both projections leads to more complete understanding of the terrain.

The science of war (knowledge).

The art of war (application of knowledge).

Wallace P. Franz and Harry G. Summers

Art of War Colloquium, textbook

Army War College

It is absolutely true in war, were other things 

equal, that numbers—whether men, shells, 

bombs, etc.—would be supreme. Yet it is also 

absolutely true that other things are never 

equal and can never be equal. There is always a difference, and it is the differences 

which by begging to differ so frequently throw 

all calculations to the winds.

J. F. C. Fuller

War belongs not to the province of Arts and 

Sciences, but to the province of social life. It 

is a conflict of great interests, which is settled 

by bloodshed, and only in that is it different 

from others. It would be better, instead of 

comparing it with any Art, to liken it to business competition, which is also a conflict of 

human interests and activities; and it is still 
66

War

more like State policy, which, again, can be 

looked upon as a kind of business competition on a great scale.

Clausewitz

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the 

likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on 

our own readiness to receive him.

Sun Tzu

War involves in its progress such a train of 

unforeseen and unsupposed circumstances 

that no human wisdom can calculate the 

end. It has but one thing certain, and that is 

to increase taxes.

Thomas Paine

War and truth have a fundamental incompatibility. The devotion to secrecy in the interests of the military machine largely explains 
67

War

why, throughout history, its operations commonly appear in retrospect the most uncertain and least efficient of human activities.

B. H. Liddell Hart

If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may 

occur. It is not genius which reveals to me 

suddenly and secretly what I should do in 

circumstances unexpected by others; it is 

thought and preparation.

Napoléon
68

War

Time and Space

Time is necessary to both belligerents, ...

the only question is: which of the two, judging by his position, has most reason to expect special advantages from time?

Clausewitz

When you engage in actual fighting, if victory 

is long in coming, the men’s weapons will 

grow dull and their ardour dampened. Again, 

if the campaign is protracted the resources of 

the State will not be equal to the strain. Thus, 

though we have heard of stupid haste in war, 

cleverness has never been associated with 

long delays. There is no instance of a country 

having benefitted from prolonged warfare.

Sun Tzu

Time is the condition to be won to defeat the 

enemy. Time ranks first among the three factors necessary for victory, coming before terrain and support of the people. Only with 

time can we defeat the enemy.

Ho Chi Minh

Space in which to maneuver in the air, unlike fighting on land or sea, is practically 

unlimited.

Group Captain J. E. “Johnnie” Johnson
69

War

You can’t expect the Rapid Reaction Force to 

be ready immediately.

Military spokesman on preparations for 

Implementation Force

You win battles by knowing the enemy’s timing, and using a timing which the enemy 

does not expect.

Miyamoto Musashi

At the outset of a war, time is the supreme 

factor. Do not let us forget that the aggressor 

is also concerned with the time factor; he is 

ready, otherwise he would not have provoked 

armed conflict; he inevitably hopes and plans 

for a quick decision, since no one would wish 

for a long war if it could be avoided; moreover 

he wants a decision before his opponent has 

had time to “turn his capacity into the new 

activities which war calls for.”

Lord Tedder

Go sir, gallop, and don’t forget that the world 

was made in six days. You can ask me for 

anything you like, except time.

Napoléon 

A good plan executed now is better than a 

perfect plan next week.

GEN George S. Patton
70

War

Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.

Napoléon

Rapidity is the essence of war; take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your 

way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

Sun Tzu

The last war is not modern, it is out of date.

At the same time there are factors that do not 

change, or only change very slowly. Geography does not change—though its effect on 

military operations may be modified by technical changes. Human nature does not 
71

War

change, and national characteristics and 

temperaments change but slowly. Economic 

factors, generally speaking, change slowly.

Lord Tedder

If there is one attitude more dangerous than 

to assume that a future war will be just like 

the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so 

utterly different that we can afford to ignore 

all the lessons of the last one.

J. C. Slessor, 1936

But there is one element in relation to the flying machine that we are not producing, that 

we cannot produce in an emergency, and 

that is the men. We can produce machines 

but not the aviators. That takes time.

Alexander Graham Bell

Strategy is the art of making use of time and 

space. Space we can recover; lost time, never.

Napoléon

He who can move twice as fast as his opponent doubles his operative time and thereby 

halves that of his opponent.

J. F. C. Fuller
72

War

Effects

But there is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy’s forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, 

that are designed in the first place to disrupt 

the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that 

gain us new allies, favorably affect the political 

scene, etc. If such operations are possible it 

is obvious that they can greatly improve our 

prospects and that they can form a much 

shorter route to the goal than the destruction 

of the opposing armies.

Clausewitz

On War, book 1, chapter 2

Objectives are essential to achieve unity of 

effort. In the abstract sense, the objective is 

the effect desired.

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed 

Forces, 1995

The significance of the capacity to affect a large 

number of objectives simultaneously in the 

Gulf War was not simply that a lot of targets 

could be attacked, but that vital enemy systems could be brought under effective control.

Brig Gen David A. Deptula, 2001

The cause is hidden but the effect is known.

Ovid

Metamorphoses IV, ca. AD 5
73

War

The most important events are often determined by very trivial causes.

Cicero

Orationes Philippicae V, 60 BC

In past air campaigns, the random effects of 

ballistic weapons often created ambiguity and 

uncertainty as to intent. We can now expect 

enemies to rapidly assess the pattern of targets attacked by PGMs in an effort to predict 

future attacks. This suggests that we need to 

contemplate the second-order effects of force 

application—human responses and target 

system responses—rather than just the immediate effects we intend to achieve. Understanding what up to now have been “unintended effects” is just a first step; airmen 

need to plan and perhaps even devise strategy 

around them. All the processes of adjusting 

to air attack (e.g., dispersing, digging in, moving, reorganizing) cost the enemy something 

and may deserve consideration as campaign 

objectives in themselves.

Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd, 1991

The effects of an attack against the industrial 

facilities on the social life of a nation cannot be 

overestimated. Modern warfare places an enormous load upon the economic system of a nation which increases its sensitivity to attack.

“Air Force Objectives”

Air Corps Tactical School lecture, 1935
74

War

Only by a careful analysis—by painstaking investigation—will it be possible to select the 

line of action that will make it possible to efficiently employ the air force during war. It is 

a study for the statistician, the technical expert, not the soldier.

“National Economic Structures”

Air Corps Tactical School lecture, 1936 

Well before it makes any sense to talk about 

mechanics, it is imperative to decide what effect you want to produce on the enemy. Making this decision is the toughest intellectual 

challenge; once the desired effect is decided, 

figuring out how to attain it is much easier if 

for no other reason than we practice the necessary tactical events every day, whereas we 

rarely (far too rarely) think about strategic 

and operational problems. Let us propose a 

very simple rule for how to go about producing the effect: do it very fast.

Col John A. Warden III, 1996 

The “Revolution in Military Affairs” is now 

the mantra of those who seek remote, clinical, 

and surgical solutions to what has traditionally been a close-in, chaotic, and bloody 

brawl. This has weakened the concept of the 

warrior, as the androgynous technician has 

gained ascendancy in some quarters.

LtGen Bernard E. “Mick” Trainor, USMC, retired, 

2000
75

War

I believe that effects-based operations will be 

the doctrinal concept—the future joint warfighting concept—that our nation will employ. But it ain’t ready yet.

GEN William F. Kernan, 2002
76

War

Strategy

Strategy is the employment of battle to gain 

the end in war; it must therefore give an aim 

to the whole military action, which must be in 

accordance with the object of the war; in other 

words, strategy forms the plan of the war.

Clausewitz

Tactics are concerned with doing the job 

“right,” higher levels of strategy are concerned with doing the “right” job.

Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow

Throughout his life Alexander consistently 

subordinated strategy to policy, which is the 

essence of grand strategy.

J. F. C. Fuller

The strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the war in sight and the objective of the 

war is never military and is always political.

Alfred Thayer Mahan

The twin problems of modern warfare: How 

to persuade the adversary to come to terms 

without inflicting on him such severe damage as to prejudice all chances of subsequent 

stability and peace? Under what circumstances can armed force be used, in the only 
77

War

way in which it can be legitimate to use it, to 

ensure a lasting and stable peace?

Sir Michael Howard

The soundest strategy is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the 

enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow 

both possible and easy.

Vladimir I. Lenin

Fight the enemy with the weapons he lacks.

Aleksandr V. Suvorov

True economy of force is using the indirect 

approach to effect a psychological defeat without engaging in actual combat.

B. H. Liddell Hart

In Japan there was nothing that could be 

called grand or military strategy until a short 

time before the outbreak of World War II.

There was little correlation between her national defense theory and the strategic plans 

of the army and the navy. In [my opinion this] 

eventually resulted in the calamity of Japan 

entering into her disastrous war.

Japanese historian Toshiyuki Yokoi

Generally in war the best policy is to take a 

state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To 

capture the enemy’s army is better than to 
78

War

destroy it. To subdue the enemy without 

fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of 

extreme importance in war is to attack the 

enemy’s strategy; next best is to disrupt his 

alliances; [and] next best is to attack his 

forces. The worst policy is to attack his cities; 

do so only when there is no alternative.

Sun Tzu

Where the strategist is empowered to seek a 

military decision, his responsibility is to seek 

it under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much 

to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation 

so advantageous that if it does not of itself 

produce the decision, its continuation by battle 

is sure to achieve this.

B. H. Liddell Hart
79

War

1.  He will win who knows when to fight and 

when not to fight.

2.  He will win who knows how to handle both 

superior and inferior forces.

3.  He will win whose army is animated by 

the same spirit throughout all the ranks.

4.  He will win who, prepared himself, waits 

to take the enemy unprepared.

5.  He will win who has military capacity and 

is not interfered with by the sovereign.

Victory lies in the knowledge of these five 

points.

Sun Tzu 

It is the mark of good action that it appears 

inevitable in retrospect.

Robert Louis Stevenson 

There are some roads not to follow; some 

troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be 

contested.

Sun Tzu

We must perceive the necessity of every war 

being looked upon as a whole from the very 

outset, and that at the very first step forward 

the commander should have the end in view 

to which every line must converge.

Clausewitz
80

War

In war the victorious strategist seeks battle 

after the victory has been won, whereas he 

who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks to victory.

Sun Tzu 
81

War

Deterrence

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.

George Washington

The expenses required to prevent a war are 

much lighter than those that will, if not prevented, be absolutely necessary to maintain it.

Benjamin Franklin

It is customary in democratic countries to 

deplore expenditure on armament as conflicting with the requirements of the social 

services. There is a tendency to forget that 

the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them 

alive and free.

J. C. Slessor

The great lesson to be learned in the battered 

towns of England and the ruined cities of 

Germany is that the best way to win a war is 

to prevent it from occurring. That must be 

the ultimate end to which our best efforts are 

devoted. It has been suggested—and wisely 

so—that this objective is well served by insuring the strength and security of the United 

States. The United States was founded and 

has since lived upon principles of tolerance, 

freedom, and goodwill at home and abroad.

Strength based on these principles is no 
82

War

threat to world peace. Prevention of war will 

not come from neglect of strength or lack of 

foresight or alertness on our part. Those who 

contemplate evil and aggression find encouragement in such neglect. Hitler relied heavily 

upon it.

US Strategic Bombing Survey 

Summary Report (Europe)

If we are living in a world where either side 

can make a surprise attack upon the other 

which destroys the latter’s capability to make 

a meaningful retaliation, then it makes sense 

to be trigger-happy with one’s strategic air 

power. But if, on the other hand, the situation is such that neither side can hope to 

eliminate the retaliatory power of the other, 

that restraint which was suicidal in one 

situation now becomes prudence, and it is 

trigger-happiness that becomes suicidal.

Bernard Brodie

It is a doctrine of war not to assume the 

enemy will not come, but rather to rely on 

one’s readiness to meet him; not to presume 

that he will not attack, but rather to make 

one’s self invincible.

Sun Tzu

America must maintain a state of readiness 

for defense and counterattack. This is not 

just for the sake of being prepared. Of equal 

or greater importance is the fact that the visi-
83

War

bility of our preparedness will deter attacks 

against us.

Gen Curtis E. LeMay

Forces that cannot win will not deter.

Gen Nathan F. Twining

Deterrence is not just aircraft on alert and 

missiles in the silos. It is not defined by the 

size of the defense budget. It is a product of 

both capability and credibility.

Gen Jerome F. O’Malley

A nation, regardless of its protestations, if it feels that its national existence is threatened and that it is 

losing a war, will turn to any weapon 

that it can use.

GEN Walter Bedell Smith

There will always be time enough to die; like 

a drowning man who will clutch instinctively 

at a straw, it is the natural law of the moral 

world that a nation that finds itself on the 

brink of an abyss will try to save itself by any 

means.

Clausewitz

When you surround an army, leave an outlet 

free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

Sun Tzu
84

War

Irregular Warfare

By exacting a great price on the Taliban for 

any massing of forces to defend or counterattack, the asymmetrical advantage of the 

US ground-based targeting and air attack 

made the ground forces of the Northern Alliance unstoppable.

GEN Montgomery C. Meigs, USA, retired, 2003 

We are no more prepared for the suicidal “human bomb” terrorist in the Middle East than 

we were for the saffron-robed monk in Saigon who put the torch to himself.... We 

persist in refusing to acknowledge what we 

don’t know or understand about them—or 

heaven forbid—to concede that many of them 

are not likely to respond to either our threats 

or our blandishments.

Meg Greenfield, 1983

In point of fact you do not control a country 

from the air, any more than from the business end of a gun. It is the civil administrator, the District Commissioner or Political Officer, and the policeman who control the 

country.

J. C. Slessor, 1957
85

War

It is fighting at a great disadvantage to fight 

those who have nothing to lose.

Francesco Guicciardini

Storia d’Italia, 1564

The conventional army loses if it does not 

win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.

Henry Kissinger

Perhaps the only subject regarding the American intervention [in Nicaragua] upon which 

all authorities are able to agree is the efficacy 

with which the Marines employed the air 

power at their disposal.

Lejeune Cummins

Quijote on a Burro, 1958

Our evidence goes to show that it is not the 

way force is applied but its effectiveness that 

is feared and to that extent resented. Once 

force is actually applied, the tribesm[a]n probably dislike[s] land and air operations equally, 

except that in the latter his prized inaccessibility is taken from him and his opportunities 

for hitting back are far more limited.

Rufus Isaacs, Lord Reading, 1925 
86

War

Lessons from RAF Operations 

in Iraq, 1914–32

• Perhaps the most serious long term 

consequence of the ready availability 

of air control was that it developed into 

a substitute for administration.

• The speed and simplicity of air attack 

was preferred to the more time consuming and painstaking investigation 

of grievances and disputes.

• With such powers at its disposal the 

Iraq Government was not encouraged 

to develop less violent methods of extending its control over the country.

Peter Sluglett, 1976

Those governments that were able to create 

effective intelligence organizations and use 

them efficiently were normally successful in 

their counterinsurgency efforts. This was 

particularly true of the British campaign in 

Malaya from 1948 to 1960 and the Philippine 

operations against the Huks from 1946 to 

1954. In both instances, accurate and timely 

intelligence was a crucial factor in defeating 

the insurgents. On the other hand, inadequate intelligence was a significant weakness 

in the French campaign against the Viet Minh 

in Indochina.

Dr. Charles A. Russell and 

Maj Robert E. Hildner, 1973
87

War

So far from the use of the aeroplane having 

tended to replace the intimate knowledge of 

the local Political Officer regarding his tribes, 

it has done an enormous amount towards increasing that knowledge and towards removing the risk of inflicting indiscriminate punishment on the innocent and guilty alike.

Sir Steuart Pears

Resident in Waziristan, 1924

The tenets of AirLand Battle apply equally to 

the military operations characteristic of low 

intensity war.

Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1986

One of the most significant after effects of the 

September 11, 2001 attacks on the World 

Trade Center in New York has been the realization that anti-terrorism operations will now 

be occupying the center stage of military operations for at least the next few years, if not 

decades.

Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

Pakistan air force
88

War

Friction, War’s 

Resistant Medium

Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man 

can imagine exactly who has not seen war.

Clausewitz

If one has never personally experienced war, 

one cannot understand in what the difficulties constantly mentioned really consist, nor 

why a commander should need any brilliance 

and exceptional ability.

Clausewitz

Only the study of military history is capable 

of giving those who have no experience of 

their own a clear picture of what I have just 

called the friction of the whole machine.

Clausewitz

War is composed of nothing but accidents, 

and though holding to general principles, a 

general should never lose sight of everything 

to enable him to profit from these accidents; 

that is the mark of genius.

Napoléon

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is 
89

War

based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 

uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating 

judgment is called for: a skilled intelligence 

to scent out the truth.

Clausewitz

Clausewitz framed the notion of friction in 

On War, book 1, chapter 7. 
90

War

Oils for the 

Friction of War

Now is there, then, no kind of oil which is 

capable of diminishing this friction? Only 

one, and that one is not always available at 

the will of the Commander or his Army. It is 

the habituation of an Army to War.

Clausewitz 

Clausewitz corrected the notion that habituation was the sole remedy for the friction of war 

by prescribing leadership as a second remedy. 

Other remedies include: understanding war’s 

uncertainty; professional training; exercises that 

include friction; war games and thought exercises; maintaining alternatives; maintaining reserves; plans that provide room for frictional results; mental agility; organizational agility; 

clarity of purpose; judicious use of the initiative; 

and the compound lubricants of mental clarity, 

originality, discipline, and doctrine. 

The more one can increase the fog and friction encountered by the enemy, the more 

likely it is that the enemy will be defeated.

Flexible plans with alternative objectives, 

counterintelligence, disinformation deception, concealment, and campaigns to disrupt 

[the] enemy ... not only lead to serious errors by the enemy on the battlefield but can 

also cause confusion and uncertainty that 
91

War

lower morale, sap aggressiveness, cause tentativeness, and undermine initiative.

Dennis Drew and Donald Snow

The friction of war stems from the magnified results of fundamental uncertainties.

You will usually find that the enemy has 

three courses open to him, and of these he 

will adopt the fourth.

Moltke, the Elder

A battle sometimes decides everything; and 

sometimes the most trifling thing decides the 

fate of a battle.

Napoléon

In wars throughout history, events have generally proved the pre-hostilities calculations 

of both sides, victor as well as loser, to have 

been seriously wrong.

Bernard Brodie

All action in war is directed on probable, not 

certain, results. Whatever is wanting in certainty must always be left to fate, or chance, 

call it which you will. We may demand that 

what is so left should be as little as possible, 

but only in relation to the particular case—

that is, as little as possible in this one case, 

but not that the case in which the least is left 

to chance is always to be preferred. That 
92

War

would be an enormous error. There are cases 

in which the greatest daring is the greatest 

wisdom.

Clausewitz
93

War

The Art of Studying 

Circumstances

To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose 

banners are in perfect order, to refrain from 

attacking an army drawn up in calm and 

confident array—this is the art of studying 

circumstances.

Sun Tzu

The most important thing is to have a flexible 

approach.... The truth is no one knows exactly what air fighting will be like in the future. We can’t say anything will stay as it is, 

but we also can’t be sure the future will conform to particular theories, which so often, 

between the wars, have proved wrong.

Brig Gen Robin Olds

In his many battles his tactical genius is 

apparent in the lightning-like speed with 

which he adapted his actions to novel circumstances.

J. F. C. Fuller on Alexander the Great

The problem for the military planner is that 

intentions can change far more rapidly than 

can capability. A military capability can take 

a decade to develop while an election, or a 

coup-d’etat, can change political intentions 

overnight. Of all the factors which allow an 

airman to rapidly redirect his efforts in such 
94

War

circumstances the greatest is range, or more, 

descriptively, reach.

Air Vice-Marshal J. R. “Johnnie” Walker, RAF

The more I see of war, the more I realize how 

it all depends on administration and transportation.

Field Marshal Earl A. P. Wavell

The carrying out of a plan, from its very beginning to the conclusion of an operation, is 

another process of knowing the situation; i.e., 

the process of putting it into practice. In this 

process, there is need to examine anew 

whether the plan corresponds with the actualities. If the plan does not correspond or 
95

War

does not fully correspond with them, then we 

must, according to fresh knowledge, form 

new judgments and make new decisions to 

modify the original plan in order to meet the 

new situation.

Mao Tse-tung

It is above all necessary that a general should 

adopt a role proportionate to his capacity, a 

plan that he feels himself able to follow out 

methodically amidst dangers, surprise, friction, accidents of all sorts.

Jean Colin

The truths of war are absolute, but the principles governing their application have to be 

deduced on each occasion from the circumstances, which are always different.

Winston Churchill

One falls into a feeling of security by mental 

laziness and through lack of calculation concerning the intentions of the enemy. To proceed properly it is necessary to put oneself in 

his place and say: What would I do if I were 

the enemy? What project would I form? Make 

as many as possible of these projects, examine them all, and above all reflect on the 

means to avert them. But do not let these 

calculations make you timid. Circumspection is good only up to a certain point.

Frederick the Great
War
97

Outcomes

and

Arguments

Outcomes 

and 

Arguments

Page

Operation Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Operation Deliberate Force 

(Bosnia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Operation Allied Force 

(Kosovo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Operation Enduring 

Freedom (2001–) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(2003­­­–) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Outcomes 

and

Arguments
99

Outcomes

and

Arguments

Operation Desert Storm

You have restored my confidence in the United 

States Air Force. CENTAF [Central Command 

Air Forces] can’t do [the] planning. Do it the 

way you want. It is up to the Air Force.... I 

love it. You are the first guys who are leaning 

forward. This is exactly what I want.

GEN Norman Schwarzkopf to Col John Warden 

regarding initial Instant Thunder air campaign 

plan for Iraq, 10 August 1990

In the end, of course, the Gulf War did in fact 

include a strategic air campaign, and the 

very least that one could say about it was 

that by so thoroughly destroying the Iraqis’ 

capability to wage warfare, it permitted a relatively bloodless war-concluding ground operation by coalition army forces. The most 

one could say about the air campaign was 

that it—in and of itself—won the war.

Gen Charles G. Boyd

It is undeniable that for six weeks—during 

the period now known as the air campaign—

coalition aircraft dropped tons of bombs and 

missiles on Iraqi targets. It is also undeniable 

that Iraq’s ground forces were totally ineffective against the coalition’s ground forces. But 

those facts do not prove that the bombing 

caused Iraqi ineffectiveness.

Daryl Press, Dartmouth College
100

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

I don’t always find that Desert Storm receives 

the historical, honest perspective that it should.

In fact, it tends to be a gold mine that people 

go to to extract particular points they want to 

make and then justify, based on that war. In 

fact, I go to briefing after briefing from my 

own space people who tell me how they won 

the Gulf War.... I sit there and smile and 

say, “Thank you very much. I appreciate that.” 

Gen Charles A. Horner, 1993

Desert Storm Air Campaign objectives

• Gain and maintain air supremacy to permit unhindered air and ground operations.

• Isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime.

• Destroy Iraq’s known NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] warfare capability.

• Eliminate Iraq’s offensive military capability by destroying key military production, 

infrastructure, and power capabilities.

• Render the Iraqi army and its mechanized 

equipment in Kuwait ineffective, causing 

its collapse.

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian 

Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, 1992

The recent air campaign against Iraqi forces 

gained not a single one of the US or UN 

[United Nations] objectives in the Persian 

Gulf War. Four days of land combat—aided 
101

Outcomes

and

Arguments

immeasurably by the air campaign—achieved 

every goal and victory.

GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, USA, retired, 1994

The desert—a tactician’s paradise, a quartermaster’s nightmare.

Attributed to a German general

Out of 2,400 main battle tanks, 1,865 were 

destroyed by Coalition airpower. This does 

not include Iraqi tanks destroyed by US Army 

Aviation.

Col Viktor Patzalyuk

Former Soviet military attaché to Baghdad

The Multinational Forces [MNF] won the war 

back before the beginning of the ground offensive as a result of an almost 40-day offen-
102

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

sive air operation.... The concentration of an 

MNF ground army of a half million indicates 

the US command did not believe it would be 

able to win the war without its use.

Russian colonel (Reserve) Yu. G. Sizov and 

Col A. L. Skokov, 1993

The Gulf War brought to the fore the technology, tactics, techniques, and operational 

methods on which the Air Force had been 

working since the Vietnam War. Precision 

guided munitions, precision navigation systems like the global positioning system (GPS), 

and day-night all-weather operations allowed 

the Air Force to fly, fight, and win in the face 

of the worst weather in the Middle East in 

more than a decade. That technology helped 

to win the fastest, lowest casualty, most devastatingly destructive one-sided war in recorded history. Air Force capabilities had 

come of age.

James A. Mowbray, 1995

The air war against Iraq turned out to be an 

enormous success. One of the reasons for 

this triumph was the integration of the various air forces into a solid fighting force.

Miron Rezun, 1992

Allied air supremacy in Desert Storm created 

conditions that could with equal facility have 

been exploited by a frontal assault, a flanking attack of almost any magnitude, an air-
103

Outcomes

and

Arguments

borne insertion almost anywhere, or an amphibious assault—or some combination of 

the four. Aerospace supremacy thus preserved 

ambiguity of intent, and with it, strategic maneuverability and surprise for all force types.

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace 

Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, 

1992

The sheer abundance of assets such as 

aircraft, airfields, and tankers allowed the 

air campaign generally to accommodate all 

service points of view on the priorities of 

the air war.

Congressmen Les Aspin and 

William L. Dickinson, 1992

This way I didn’t have to play around with 

the [joint air planning] process while I was 

waiting to hit a target. I kind of gamed the 

[air tasking order] process. The Navy’s trouble was that they tried to do it honestly and 

write just what they were going to fly.

MajGen Royal N. Moore Jr., USMC, 1991

The Coalition was fortunate to have an overwhelming number of air forces in the Gulf 

War. When elements of one force component 

chose to bypass the joint air planning process, the JFACC [joint force air component 

commander], in the interest of avoiding doctrinal strife, could afford to rely upon forces 
104

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

directly under his command to accomplish 

theater objectives.

Brig Gen David A. Deptula, 2001

If an Iraqi pilot had managed to penetrate the 

airspace above the border area during the 

great shift west, he would have been stunned 

by the panorama below. It was mile after mile 

of tank transporters, gasoline tankers, troop 

and ammunition carriers.... I shudder to 

think what a couple of Iraqi planes could 

have done to that column on a strafing and 

bombing run.

COL David Hackworth, 1991

Iraq’s operational center of gravity, the Republican Guard, and to a lesser extent, the 

heavy divisions of the regular army, remained 

a viable fighting force in spite of significant 

physical damage caused by air attack because their will to fight was not broken. Only 

by vanquishing an enemy and displacing him 

on the ground can a military force break the 

enemy’s will and ensure ultimate victory.

Robert H. Scales, Terry L. Johnson, and 

Thomas P. Odom, 1993

There had never been a war like that before 

and the wonder is that, in what was in effect 

a military laboratory, the workers and their 

apparatus so often achieved the correct results. It is odd that Americans now seem as 
105

Outcomes

and

Arguments

eager to decry their victory in the Gulf as they 

were their defeat in Vietnam.

John Keegan

For the Army, the JFACC system was a beast 

to be tamed.... An Army corps commander 

was not concerned with the entire theater.

He looked at the battlefield like a giant bowling alley. To move down the lane, the corps 

needed to sweep the obstacles from its path, 

starting with those directly in front of it and 

then those a day or two away. For the corps 

commanders, air power was a form of flying 

artillery and should be on call immediately to 

support their attack.

Michael Gordon and 

LtGen Mick Trainor, USMC, retired, 1995

The parallel attack against Iraq was against 

what may well have been the country best 

prepared in all the world for attack. The Iraqi 

army was the largest fielded since the Chinese in the Korean War.

Col John A. Warden III, 1996

It is a given that air power theory is enjoying 

a renaissance that is completely unrealistic 

in light of the reality of the Gulf War or of 

capabilities achievable in any reasonable 

timeframe.

GEN Gordon Sullivan

Chief of Staff, US Army, 1994
106

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

Evidence from the Gulf War suggests that 

even if there had been no significant air campaign, the ground war would not have been 

substantially different.

Daryl Press, Dartmouth College

We may require a sterner test against a more 

capable adversary to come to a conclusive 

judgment. But if air power again exerts similar dominance over opposing ground forces, 

the conclusion will be inescapable that some 

threshold in the relationship between air and 

ground forces was first crossed in Desert 

Storm.

Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot Cohen, 1995

To a great extent, information combat has 

been enlightened by the Gulf War, in which 

multinational troops captured all the highfrequency and ultrahigh frequency radio signals of the Iraqi army and stored the numerous amounts of information gathered by the 

34 reconnaissance satellites, 260 electronic 

reconnaissance planes, and 40 prewarning 

aircraft. Then, the multinational troops used 

various information systems and high-tech 

weapons to destroy the Iraqi communication 

system and take control of the war. The Iraqi 

command system, radar, and command systems of missiles, aircraft, and artillery were 

at a standstill. This demonstrates that information is the key to victory. The side that 

controls information can give full play to the 
107

Outcomes

and

Arguments

materials and energy possessed, and thereby 

increase combat power.

Maj Gen Zheng Shenxia and 

Senior Col Zhang Changzi, PLAAF, 1996
108

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

Operation Deliberate 

Force (Bosnia)

U.S. air strikes delivered 1,026 bombs against 

56 military targets in western Bosnia and 

near Sarajevo—less than half the munitions 

used per day against Saddam’s army in the 

Persian Gulf War, but enough to debilitate 

the far smaller and less heavily armed Bosnian Serb Army.

Robert A. Pape, 2004

One of the great things that people should 

have learned from this is that there are times 

when air power—not backed up by ground 

troops—can make a difference.

Amb. Richard Holbrooke, 1996

So much damage from such a little thing.

Slobodan Milosevic, overheard looking 

at an Air Force cruise missile at the 

Air Force Museum, 1995 

In the past we thought about precision in 

terms of meters CEP, Circular Error Probable.

Now we should think in terms of the precise 

application of military effect to policy objectives. That’s what that Bosnia campaign sort 

of unveiled.

Maj Gen Chuck Link, 1996
109

Outcomes

and

Arguments

Air power not only was the lead arm of American involvement in the region but also was 

almost certainly the only politically viable offensive arm available for use by the United 

States and any of its partners.

Col Robert C. Owen, 2000

We don’t need to occupy an enemy’s country 

to defeat his strategy. We can reduce his 

combat capabilities and in many instances 

defeat his armed forces from the air.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

In 1994 and 1995 President Clinton ... had 

many options to deal with these crises—

capabilities beyond silver bullets that would 

not work then and will not work tomorrow. It 

was forces on the ground with balanced full 

spectrum dominance that successfully secured U.S. interests.

GEN Dennis J. Reimer, 1996

Inserting ground forces in a region today may 

create more problems than it resolves.

Richard Hallion

“Airpower and the Changing Nature of Warfare” 

If those calls for air strikes against the Serbs 

had been heeded in 1992, Holbrooke suggests, some two million refugees would probably today be in their homes and at least 

100,000 lives might have been saved. An 
110

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

early and large intervention by NATO warplanes, something that did not occur until the 

fall of 1995, might even have accomplished 

what will probably never be accomplished 

now, the rebuilding of a viable, multiethnic 

Bosnian state.

Chris Hedges

New York Times, 1998

While normal procedure called for attacking 

aircraft to minimize their exposure to enemy 

defensive systems by dropping all of their 

weapons in single passes, General Ryan required many aircraft over Bosnia to make 

multiple passes, dropping only one weapon 

at a time, and only after the dust from previous weapons had cleared. These tactics exposed crews to the potential of ground defenders improving their aim with practice, 

but they also assured that all bombs were 

released as accurately as possible and in no 

greater number than was required to destroy 

a target. In other instances, targets were hit 

late at night to minimize the likelihood that 

civilians and even military personnel would 

be in or on them.

Col Robert C. Owen, 2001
111

Outcomes

and

Arguments

Operation Allied Force 

(Kosovo)

There are certain dates in the history of warfare that mark real turning points. Now 

there is a new turning point to fix on the 

calendar: June 3, 1999, when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved that a war 

can be won by air power alone ... the air 

forces have won a triumph, are entitled to 

every plaudit they will receive and can look 

forward to enjoying a transformed status in 

the strategic community, one they have 

earned by their single-handed efforts. All 

this can be said without reservation, and 

should be conceded by the doubters, of 

whom I was one, with generosity.... This 

was a victory through air power.

John Keegan, 1999

They knew everything about us. There wasn’t 

anything they didn’t know. If we lit a cigarette they could see it. God knows what they 

were dropping on us, all sorts of bombs. We 

didn’t expect that intensity.

“Milos,” a Yugoslavian soldier

Quoted by Rory Carroll, 1999 

While NATO leaders and planners may have 

believed that they were communicating some 

sort of message to Milosevic through bomb-
112

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

ing, on the ground the message could hardly 

be extracted from the background noise.

William M. Arkin, 2000

Attacking fielded enemy forces without the 

shaping presence of a NATO ground threat 

had produced “major challenges,” including 

creating a faster flexible targeting cycle; putting a laser designator on Predator; creating 

new target development processes within the 

[combined air operations center]; creating 

real-time communications links between finders, assessors, and shooters; and developing 

more real-time retargeting procedures.

Gen John Jumper

Airpower alone has never been decisive. In 

Vietnam, for example, the Air Force dropped 

some 6 million tons of bombs, almost triple 

the tonnage dropped in World War II, without 

breaking the North Vietnamese will to resist.

COL Harry Summers, USA, retired, 1999

The battle damage assessment of strikes against 

individual ground weapons remains as much 

an uncertain art form as during the Gulf War 

in spite of advances in [unmanned aerial vehicles], reconnaissance and intelligence systems, and analysis. NATO and the US lack 

the capability to “close the loop” in terms of 

reliable, real-time battle damage assessment 
113

Outcomes

and

Arguments

that can be used for effective tactical decision making.

Anthony H. Cordesman, 1999

I found myself reiterating our priorities again 

and again. “You must impact the Serb Forces 

on the ground. Do you understand that attacking the Serb forces on the ground is my 

top priority? We’re going to win or lose this 

campaign based on how well we go after the 

ground targets.”

GEN Wesley K. Clark, USA, retired, 2001

The tank, which was an irrelevant item in the 

context of ethnic cleansing, became the symbol of Serbian ground forces. How many 

tanks did you kill today: All of a sudden, this 

became the measure of merit although it had 

nothing to do with reality.

Gen Joe Ralston

[Precision-guided munitions] can offset the 

need for mass attacks to achieve a high probability of success—a reality evidenced with the 

dramatic increase of their use in the air war 

over Serbia.

Brig Gen David A. Deptula, 2001

For the first time in some 5,000 years of military history—5,000 years of history of man 

taking organized forces into combat—we saw 

an independent air operation produce a po-
114

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

litical result. What that means for the future 

we will still have to divine.... This kind of 

utility can do nothing but place greater demands on air and space forces for the future.

Gen Mike Dugan, USAF, retired, 1999

Both of these attributes of air power—relatively low force vulnerability and high precision—can also fortify coalition unity, which 

is itself susceptible to disruptions as friendly 

casualties and collateral damage mount.

Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, 2000

Planning and preparations for ground intervention were well under way by the end of 

the campaign, and I am convinced that this, 

in particular, pushed Milosevic to concede.

GEN Wesley K. Clark, USA, retired, 2001

To move Task Force Hawk to its location at 

an airfield in Rinas, Albania, required 550 

C-17 sorties.... Task Force Hawk was built 

around 24 AH-64 attack helicopters.... To 

command the unit, a corps headquarters deployed from Germany.

Michael G. Vickers, 2001

The reason Slobodan Milosevic finally caved 

in—a primary reason—was the presence of 

US Army ground forces in Albania.

LTG John W. Hendrix, 1999
115

Outcomes

and

Arguments

Already some of the critics of the war are indulging in ungracious revisionism, suggesting that we have not witnessed a strategic 

revolution and that Milosevic was humbled 

by the threat to deploy ground troops or by 

the processes of traditional diplomacy....

All to be said to that is that diplomacy had 

not worked before March 24, when the bombing started, while the deployment of a large 

ground force, though clearly a growing threat, 

would still have taken weeks to accomplish 

at the moment Milosevic caved in. The revisionists are wrong. This was a victory through 

air power.

John Keegan, 1999

I would have argued for a campaign that, if it 

couldn’t include ground troops, then don’t 

take away also the threat of ground troops.

GEN Colin Powell, USA, retired, 1999

Only institutional pride would maintain that 

there is only one formula for subduing an 

enemy.

William M. Arkin, 2000
116

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

Operation Enduring 

Freedom (2001–) 

Four simple words describe our mission: 

global strike, precision engagement. It’s exactly on the other side of the globe from Missouri. It’s a long way.

Brig Gen Anthony F. Przybyslawski, 2001

Nobody’s calling us unilateral anymore....

We’re so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours 

a day checking on everybody.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, 2001

The best recent example of operational asymmetry involves the US campaign in Afghanistan. US forces entered the fray with technological superiority in sensors and space-based 

communications and the ability to deliver 

precision weapons from aircraft. Based on 

training, initiative, and fieldcraft, they possessed the ability to knit together new tactical techniques integrating an air operation 

and special forces with an indigenous formation, the Northern Alliance.

GEN Montgomery C. Meigs, USA, retired, 2003

It is not a quagmire at all. It’s been three 

weeks that we’ve been engaged in this.

SecDef Donald Rumsfeld, 2001
117

Outcomes

and

Arguments

This is not a rout, it is a withdrawal in reasonably good order. They don’t want to hang 

on to any territory because if they do they 

will be destroyed from the air.

Charles Heyman, editor

Jane’s World Armies, 2001

You must stand strong, my brothers. Don’t 

vacate any areas. Stick to your positions and 

fight to the death.

Taliban leader Mullah Omar, November 2001

The success of the bombers is nevertheless a 

surprise, even if not a wholly unpredictable 

one. What had been unpredictable is the resurgence of the Northern Alliance. Their ability 

to achieve practical superiority, against an 

enemy superior in numbers who had held 

them at bay for five years, could not have 

been foreseen and defies explanation. It is 

not due to superior weapons—there must 

have been a collapse of Taliban morale.

John Keegan, 2001

What was demonstrated in Afghanistan on 

repeated occasion, especially early on, was 

not classic close air support or air interdiction but rather SOF [special operations 

forces]-enabled precision air attacks against 

enemy ground forces with no friendly ground 

forces in direct contact.

Ben Lambeth
118

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

This is modern war. It’s not like Desert Storm.

You go into it with your nose first, slowly. You 

get your grip. You get others to fight for you.

And you use airpower as much as you can 

and stay as high as you can.

GEN Wesley K. Clark, USA, retired, 2001

In any scenario, the Army soldier brings closure, not precision guided munitions, not 

surgical strikes, and not minimalist combat 

events.

GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, retired, 2002

Every unit that is not supported is a defeated 

unit.

Maurice de Saxe

Although the JFACC’s staff had begun assessing the overall air effort at the beginning 
119

Outcomes

and

Arguments

of the operation, CENTCOM directed that all 

such activities be stopped in November 2001.

CENTCOM did not want independent assessments of the campaign’s progress to come 

out of the components.

Maj Thomas J. Timmerman

Another problem in the use of U.S. air power 

in Afghanistan was a clear overemphasis on 

avoiding collateral damages. Reportedly, virtually every strike or attack was approved by 

CINCCENT [commander in chief, Central 

Command] in Tampa. Lawyers were heavily 

involved in approving the list of targets to be 

attacked, at all command echelons. The lawyers participated in determining whether a 

specific target was used for military purposes, evaluating the propriety of using certain type of munitions, and deciding whether 

a successful attack on such a target was outweighed by civilian losses. Although the commander made a final decision, this process 

was unnecessarily complicated, cumbersome, 

and time consuming.

Dr. Milan Vego, 2002

The most effective close air support asset we 

had was the Apache, hands down.... The 

Apaches were extraordinary—they were lethal and survivable. We had six in the fight 

with two left flying at the end of the first day.

MG Franklin L. Hagenbeck, 2002
120

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

Since they were unable to define what it was 

that they wanted from us, we just elected to 

... push on our own.... My answer was, I 

will give them more capacity than they could 

potentially use. I’m trying to do back-of-theenvelope planning so that even if they can’t 

define a requirement, they will have the resources necessary to successfully execute 

this.

Gen John Corley, 2004

The air war in Afghanistan against a fleeting 

enemy operating in penny packets in extremely inhospitable terrain which made 

their detection very difficult demonstrated 

once again the tremendous flexibility and 

adaptability of air power to new and emerging situations. More significantly, this conflict showed that air power has a major role 

to play in low intensity conflicts, especially 

those being waged against an enemy fielding 

irregular forces.

Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

Pakistan air force

You do what you have to do, so you play the 

cards you’re dealt. There is not one component that is dominant over the others. There 

are a set of components that have different 

tools that a combatant commander uses, 

and out of all of this we should have the 

closest of relationships because we’ve all 

walked through fire together.

Gen T. Michael Moseley, 2004
121

Outcomes

and

Arguments

Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (2003–)

I do not want General McKiernan to have to 

stop anywhere between Kuwait and Baghdad 

unless it is at a local 7-11 for a chili-cheese 

dog and a cherry limeade.

Lt Gen T. Michael Moseley to Combined Air 

Operations Center staff three days prior to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom 

In my judgment, there should have been a 

minimum of two heavy divisions and an armored cavalry regiment on the ground—

that’s how our doctrine reads.

GEN Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, retired, 2003

This is “Desert Lite.” As they said in briefings 

before the war, this force is probably adequate for the job, but it doesn’t leave much 

room for setbacks or sandstorms.

Anthony H. Cordesman, 2003

The main thing we’ve learned from this is 

that “shock and awe” hasn’t panned out.

The targeting hasn’t broken the back of the 

leadership.

Robert A. Pape, 2003

We might be able to do the job if airpower is 

effective, if we don’t have close contact with 
122

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

enemy forces, and if the Iraqi will is broken.

But those are a lot of big ifs.

GEN Wesley K. Clark, USA, retired, 2003

The Republican Guard is in full control. We 

have defeated them; in fact, we have crushed 

them. We have pushed them outside the whole 

area of the airport.

Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf

“Baghdad Bob,” 6 April 2003

I believe the Americans have so far been unable to capture a single large locality because 

the Iraqis organized their defense using the 

combat experience of the Soviet Army, obtained during World War II.

Col Gen Vladislav Achalov, Soviet army, retired, 

7 April 2003

Don’t believe these invaders and these liars.

There are none of their troops in Baghdad.

Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf

“Baghdad Bob,” 8 April 2003

Had it been possible to know on March 20 that 

in just 17 days, US forces would have captured 

Baghdad’s international airport, destroyed most 

of the Republican Guard, and secured Iraq’s 

vital oil infrastructure, all at a cost of fewer than 

75 American lives, most people in this country 

would have been elated at the prospect of seemingly overwhelming military success.

Washington Post, 6 April 2003
123

Outcomes

and

Arguments

The divisions [Republican Guard] were essentially destroyed by airstrikes when they 

were still about 30 miles from their destination.... The Iraqi will to fight was broken 

outside Baghdad.

Colonel Ghassan, Republican Guard

Iraqi General Staff 

It is difficult to overstate the importance of air 

operations in the context of [Operation Iraqi 

Freedom]. By dominating the air over Iraq, 

coalition air forces shaped the fight to allow 

for rapid dominance on the ground.... Integration of precision munitions with ground 

operations, supported by a largely space-based 

command and control network, enabled combat operations to occur in ways only imagined a decade ago.

Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn

On Point, 2005

We primarily used schools and hidden command centers in orchards for our headquarters—which were not hit. But the accuracy and lethality of those attacks left an 

indelible impression on those Iraqi soldiers 

who either observed them directly or saw 

the damage afterwards.

Commanding general

Al Nida Republican Guard Division
124

Outcomes 

and

Arguments

We never really found any cohesive unit, of any 

brigade, of any Republican Guard Division.

COL William Grimsley

1st Brigade commander, 3d Infantry Division

The most striking feature of the air campaign 

was the very high degree of precision attained. The results, compared with those 

achieved in previous air campaigns, appeared 

sensational.

John Keegan, 2004

I am a determined nonpartisan former public 

official who loyally served the past two Administrations. My criticism of the brilliantly executed air-land-sea campaign to disarm Iraq 

was limited to the “rolling start.” My anxieties 

are, of course, being rapidly washed away by 

the superb success of our fighting forces—and 

by the rapid reinforcement of the courageous 

initial assault elements in accordance with 

this very daring and successful plan.

GEN Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, retired, 2003

They knew that the only chance they had was 

to wage a struggle against us that marginalized our air power.

John Pike, 2006
125

Technology

Technology

Page

Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	127

Effects of Introducing

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	131

Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	133

Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	135

Stealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	141

The Emergence of Stealth . . . . . . . . . . 	142

Precision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	146

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . 	149

Synergies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	151

Technology and Numbers . . . . . . . . . . 	154

Reactions to Technology . . . . . . . . . . . 	156
Technology
127

Technology

Impact

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the

changes in the character of war, not upon

those who wait to adapt themselves after the

changes occur.

Giulio Douhet

Airpower has been transformed (rather than

revolutionized) since Vietnam; and even if it

cannot carry the day alone, we would be derelict in our duty as citizens not to consider the

possibility of increasing [the] use of airpower

as the supported force and ground and sea

power as the supporting forces. 

Dr. David R. Mets

It may be said that warfare has acquired a

new phase—technological war. In the past,

research and development were only preparation for the final and decisive testing of new

systems in battle. Today the kind and quality

of systems which a nation develops can decide the battle in advance and make the final

conflict a mere formality—or can bypass conflict altogether.

Gen Bernard Schriever

We should base our security upon military

formations which make maximum use of sci-
128

Technology

ence and technology in order to minimize

numbers of men.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Performance means initiative—the most

valuable moral and practical asset in any

form of war.

William Sholto Douglas

Marshal of the RAF

New conditions require, for solution—and

new weapons require, for maximum application—new and imaginative methods. Wars

are never won in the past.

Douglas MacArthur

An air force is always verging on obsolescence

and, in time of peace, its size and replacement rate will always be inadequate to meet

the full demands of war. Military air power

should, therefore, be measured to a large extent by the ability of the existing air force to

absorb in time of emergency the increase required by war together with new ideas and

techniques.

Hap Arnold
129

Technology

Obsolete weapons do not deter.

Margaret Thatcher

In many instances the information displayed

for the commander, when traced back to its

origins, rests upon an assumption, an estimate, or an extrapolation of data derived

from a field trial of some weapon or item of

equipment. Commanders, who have seldom
130

Technology

participated in deriving the algorithms by

which the information on display before them

was drawn, tend to accept the given data as

reliable fact, especially when the data are

presented in numerical form. These soft links

in the chain of remote inputs are fatally easy

to overlook.

I. B. Holley Jr. 

Some airpower missions demand the best

technology the nation can produce. The construct that produced airpower . . . for the

Vietnam War came from a conscious decision, in pursuit of cost-effectiveness, to build

a force with capabilities only incrementally

better than the [adversary’s]. Consequently,

the US Air Force alone lost 16 wings of aircraft in those eight years.

Gen Larry D. Welch, USAF, retired, 1997
131

Technology

Effects of 

Introducing Technology

Out of the 16,000 V-1s launched against

England and the Low Countries in 1944–5,

nearly 7,000 were to be destroyed by fighters, anti-aircraft guns, or barrage balloons. 

Yet the first waves suffered only 2 per cent

attrition. Within a week, however, near to 50

per cent was being registered. Towards the

end of the attacks on England, anti-aircraft

batteries were shooting down up to 80 per

cent of those V-1s that crossed their sights.

Neville Brown

We must be prepared to change requirements

and operating procedures to agree with commercial practice if we are to make efficient

use of commercial technology. In the fields of

space, communications, and information, the

time from concept to deployment must be no

longer than two years.

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996

The way US military leaders regard technology

has changed profoundly over the last 20 years. 

During the Cold War the United States developed the concept of the reconnaissance strike

force, key to its “offset strategy”: a combination of stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and advanced surveillance technology

to offset superior numbers of Soviet forces. 

Some military leaders and outside experts
132

Technology

believed that such advanced technology was

too delicate or would not work in the fog of

war. But the concept proved itself in Desert

Storm, crushing the Iraqi military force with

very low US losses. 

SecDef William J. Perry, 1996

In military systems, the second step in the

development of a radically new concept must

be determined after operational deployment. 

The warfighters will use the system in innovative ways not described in the manuals,

and it is this experience that will define the

path to revolution. 

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996

We must be prepared for a failure rate greater

than 50 percent. Most revolutionary ideas will

be opposed by a majority of decision makers.

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996
133

Technology

Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance

There will be sensors functioning cooperatively aboard small, distributed satellite constellations, sensors aboard uninhabited reconnaissance aerial vehicles (URAVs), sensors

aboard weapons, and sensors on the ground

delivered by URAVs.

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996

The whole art of war consists in getting at

what is on the other side of the hill, or, in

other words, in learning what we do not know

from what we do.

Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington

It’s important to reflect that over half of our

sensors that provide us information about

the battlefield are sensors that ride on airbreathers, not satellites. And so air dominance for us is absolutely key if we’re going

to maintain dominance on the battlefield. 

GEN John Shalikashvili, 1997

Think about where you live at home and then

think of a place 125 miles from that location. 

If you were to move out of your driveway and

we were orbiting 125 miles away, we would

see you move.

Maj Thomas Grabowski, crewmember, 2006

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
134

Technology

In the realm of [intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance], Allied Force witnessed the

first large-scale use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with near realtime sensors,

which provided persistent surveillance in defended areas without putting air crews at risk. 

Anthony H. Cordesman, 1999

In an era where, increasingly, military planners speak of conducting “information warfare” against an opponent, the connection

between intelligence, sensor suitability, targeting, and combat operations is obvious. No

less significant is the importance of bomb

damage assessment. Precision weapons, in

short, are only as good as the intelligence

that governs and guides their use.

Richard Hallion, 1999

The power of the new information systems

will lie in their ability to correlate data automatically and rapidly from many sources . . . 

the accuracy of a single sensor and processor in identifying targets or threats is severely

limited. Detection and identification probabilities increase rapidly with sensor diversity

and the false alarm probability and error

rates decrease correspondingly. 

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996
135

Technology

Information

Information warfare will be the most complex

type of warfare in the 21st century, and it will

decide who will win and who will lose the war.

Chang Mengxiong

To achieve victory in information warfare,

the central issue is control of information.

Maj Gen Wang Pufeng

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 1995

You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the

war.

William Randolph Hearst

Letter to Frederic Remington, 1898

Initial insights gained from over a year of research indicate that network-centric forces

are more effective. They can do traditional

missions more effectively (faster, better, more

efficiently) and importantly, they can do different missions. They can accomplish missions thought impossible until very recently. 

John Garstka and David Alberts, 2004

Hackers routinely attempt to get into US military systems. During the Gulf War, hackers

from Denmark, Moscow, and Iraq tried to

penetrate these systems. Our awareness of
136

Technology

these attempts does not necessarily prove there

were no successes of which we are unaware.

Col James W. McLendon, 1995

Operational-level cyberwar may, then, be

that very “acme of skill” which reduces the

enemy will without killing. On the other hand,

it may also be the abolition of strategy as it

attacks the very rationality the enemy requires to decide for war termination. 

George J. Stein, 1995

The essence of information is the negation of

uncertainties, or negative entropy. Entropy

is disorder, thus negative entropy means order. This means that areas with the greatest

uncertainties will have the greatest demands

for information. Whoever can turn uncertainties into certainties will gain the upper

hand under such conditions.

Timothy L. Thomas, paraphrasing Shu Enze

Those who take part in information war are

not all soldiers. Anybody who understands computers may become a “fighter” on the network. 

Think tanks composed of nongovernmental experts may take part in decision-making; rapid

mobilization will not just be directed to young

people; information-related industries and

domains will be the first to be mobilized and

enter the war.

Wei Jincheng, summarizing Dr. Shen Weiguang’s

concept of “take-home war”
137

Technology

Military force has always been based on the

main industry of its day.

Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller, 1932

It seems to me we’ve got to leap into the

thought process . . . of trying to use information warfare itself to be able to make an attack

or even a serious illegal probe very unattractive to the potential perpetrator.

Senator Sam Nunn, 1996

The electron, in my judgment, is the ultimate

precision guided munition.

John M. Deutch, 1996

The B-2, which is one of the newest aircraft

we have, has an avionics suite that is written

in Jovial. I programmed in Jovial when I was

in the Navy in 1969, and it was kind of a dead

language then. It’s almost the equivalent of

speaking ancient Greek today. It’s going to be

an industrial base issue, a personnel issue. . . . 

Even the commercial stuff that’s on our aircraft was commercial 15, 20 years ago, and

it’s no longer actually being maintained.

F. Whitten Peters

Former Secretary of the Air Force, 2001

Technologically, we should try harder to go

where others have not trodden and develop

uncommon technology. We can also consider

organizing some “network special warfare
138

Technology

detachments” and finding some computer

experts to form a shock brigade of “network

warriors” who specialize in looking for critical

nodes and control centers on the enemy network and sabotaging them.

Li Yinnian

Thus, as important to modern warfare as information capability has become, it now

takes severalordersofmagnitude [of]improvement to make a significant difference in capability. For example, a system capable of

generating imagery accurate to the inch is

not necessarily 144 times better than one

capable of generating accuracy to the foot,

even though the former reveals 144 times as

much information, in the technical sense. 

This is not true for some other aspects of

warfare. For example, tank guns that can be

aimed accurately from 4,500 meters give

overwhelming advantage to an armored force

engaging an opponent with tanks armed with

guns accurate to only 1,500 meters. In this

case, the 3-to-1 superiority alone provides a

decisive difference. The performance of Soviet tanks with their Iraqi crews in combat

with their American counterparts in the Gulf

War made that clear.

Martin C. Libicki, 1996

There may have been a spark of netwar genius in treating the Iraqi soldiers as “brave

men put into an impossible situation by a

stupid leader.” Under such conditions, there
139

Technology

is no dishonor in surrendering. And there

may have been a glimpse of future netwar—it

is rumored that Baghdad Radio signed on one

morning with “The Star-Spangled Banner.”

George J. Stein, 1995

The Air Force’s real strength no longer is the

airplanes. The good old days of two incredibly

maneuverable planes dogfighting are over

and have been overtaken by data links, computers, and satellites.

Richard L. Aboulafia

Aviation analyst, 2005

At present, it appears as though Information

Warfare is more of a “bag of tricks” than a

system of warfare. As the technologies are

better defined, this will change. 

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996

Even if two adversaries are generally equal in

hard weapons, unless the party with a weaker

information capability is able effectively to

weaken the information capability of the adversary, it has very little possibility of winning the war. Conversely, if one side can effectively weaken the information capability of

the other side, even if its capability in other

ways is less, the other side will dare not take

any ill-considered action. These two situations constitute “information deterrence.” It

can prevent war from breaking out. Adroit

strategic employment of one’s own informa-
140

Technology

tion deterrence capabilities constitutes an

information deterrence strategy. 

Chang Mengxiong

Air electronic confrontation equipment, compared to that on the ground, can cover a

wider space and have a higher fighting efficiency. The U.S. [armed forces have] developed

more than 600 electronic combat devices, of

which 70 percent are installed in aircraft.

Maj Gen Zheng Shenxia and

Senior Col Zhang Changzi, PLAAF, 1996

The thrust of China’s military construction

and development of weapons and equipment

will no longer be toward strengthening the

“firepower antipersonnel system” of the industrial age, but toward the strengthening of

information technology, information weapons systems, and information networking. 

Our sights must not be fixed on the firepower

warfare of the industrial age, rather they

must be trained on the information warfare

of the information age. 

Maj Gen Wang Pufeng, PLA, 1995
141

Technology

Stealth

Surprise was always difficult to achieve because it conflicted with the concepts of mass

and concentration. In order to have enough

forces available to hurl enough projectiles to

win the probability contest, a commander

had to assemble and move large numbers. Of

course, assembling and moving large forces

in secret was quite difficult, even in the days

before aerial reconnaissance, so the odds on

surprising the enemy were small indeed. 

Stealth and precision have solved both sides

of the problem; by definition, stealth achieves

surprise, and precision means that a single

weapon accomplishes what thousands were

unlikely to accomplish in the past.

Col John A. Warden III, 1996
142

Technology

The Emergence of Stealth

I am announcing today a major technological

advance of great military significance. This

so-called “stealth” technology enables the

United States to build manned and unmanned aircraft that cannot be successfully

intercepted with existing air defense systems. 

This achievement will be a formidable instrument of peace. It promises to add a unique dimension to our tactical forces and the deterrent

strength of our strategic forces.

If you believe that a Soviet capability to

shoot down all aerodynamic aircraft of the

US is a good thing, then you should be very

much against this development. If you believe that a US capability to penetrate Soviet

air defenses contributes to deterrence as I

do, then you will regard this as an advance in

stabilizing the arms competition. There is no

doubt that bombers which have a longer reaction time are not the destabilizing component. That’s land-based fixed ICBM. . . . The

ability to penetrate air defenses is not a first

strike capability. The ability to penetrate air

defenses is a good retaliatory capability.

SecDef Harold Brown, 22 August 1980

World War II demonstrated the decisive role

that airpower can play in military operations. 

It also demonstrated the potential of radar as

a primary means of detecting aircraft and directing fire against them.
143

Technology

Because of these developments and because

of the importance we attach to maintaining our

air superiority, we have for years been developing what we call “penetration” technology: the

technology that degrades the effectiveness of

radars and other sensors that are used by air

defense systems. A particular emphasis has

been placed on developing that technology

which makes an aircraft “invisible” to radar.

Recognizing the great significance of such a

development, we took three related actions:

first of all, we made a ten-fold increase in the

investment which we are making in this penetration technology, the underlying technology

which allows us to defeat the radar systems. 

Secondly, we initiated a number of very high

priority development programs with a purpose

of applying this technology; and finally we gave

the entire program extraordinary security protection, even to the point of classifying the

very existence of the program.

Stealth technology does not involve a single

technical approach, a single gimmick so to

speak, but is rather a complex synthesis of

many. Even if I were willing to describe to

you how we do this, I could not do it in a sentence or even in a paragraph.

I do want to emphasize the point, though,

that the term invisible is strictly a figure of

speech. It is not an invisible airplane. In the

strict sense of the word it is not invisible. You

can see it. And it is also not invisible to radar. 

It can be seen by radars if you get the airplane close enough to radars.

Undersecretary of Defense William J. Perry

22 August 1980
144

Technology

Because of his work during the Carter Administration, Dr. Perry is known as the “Father of Stealth.” If that’s true, it’s my job to

make sure he keeps up his child-support

payments.

Gen Merrill A. McPeak, 1994

The following are some of the critical technical

problems that will have to be resolved in China’s research on stealth weaponry:

•	 	Expand the stealth waveband. Stealth technology is an important component of

electronic warfare, and development of

stealth technology must be conducted

with full consideration for the peculiarities

of modern warfare. The main emphasis

on research of stealth weaponry in the

various countries is currently placed on

centrimetric wave, submillimeter wave,

infrared, laser, and metric waveband expansion. The stealth waveband will therefore have to be expanded. 

•	 	Meticulous design of the external contours of stealth weaponry. It necessitates

streamlining of the exterior of stealth

weaponry, eliminating angular reflections

and mirror reflections, and the rational

design of the exhaust and air intake system of the power unit, to provide minimal

surface area for radar reflection. 

•	 	Use of the most modern types of radar

wave absorption and permeable materials. 

Exterior coating of the stealth weaponry

with wave absorptive material and the
145

Technology

use in structural components of wave

absorptive and permeable materials can

effectively reduce the surface area for radar reflection. 

•	 	Selection of power units with limited heat

radiation, combined with the cooling of

the exhaust fumes will reduce infrared

and heat radiation of stealth weaponry

and will make it infrared indiscernible. 

•	 	Use of electronic countermeasures and

increasing the outer impedance load of

the stealth weaponry. Installing on stealth

weaponry electronic interference mechanisms and various kinds of equipment

that would signal out false targets. 

•	 	Developing and installing accurate measuring devices. We should place main

emphasis on setting up radar testing

plants that are consonant with the environment of modern warfare, develop

newly structured radar, taking as our

principal research objective measurement

of the reflecting surface area of the radar

targets under wideband conditions, and

should thoroughly research the reaction

in the targets of the radar waves.

Cao Benyi, 1992
146

Technology

Precision

The precision weapon exemplifies the principle of the low-cost threat that forces a

high-cost and complicated defense.

Richard Hallion, 1999

Above all, PGMs connect political objectives

to military execution with much greater reliability than ever before. The political leader

can have far greater confidence that discrete

objectives can be met and can thus gain

broader latitude in formulating the overall

objective. This is not just a change in air

power or even in military power; it is a fundamental change in warfare. 

Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd, 1991

Any air force can launch occasional raids or

surges of force against a few targets. With

adequate preparation, as in the case of the

Iraqi raids on Larak Island in 1986 and 1987

during the Iran-Iraq war, such raids can be

quite spectacular, and may exercise a temporarily dazzling psychological effect, or even a

momentary operational effect (for example,

by closing straits to maritime traffic).

Eliot A. Cohen, 1995

The Iraqi Air Force employed PGMs as preferred weapons on targets such as bridges, 

air defense sites, oil tankers, nuclear plants, 
147

Technology

oil storage facilities, and satellite downlinks. 

The Iraqi Air Force raid on Larak Island on 25 

May 1988 was particularly spectacular; it sank 

the world’s largest ship, the Seawise Giant, 

and three other oil tankers.

The era of smart weapons is here. Yet we do

not seem to be as smart as our weapons. 

William M. Arkin, 2000

The tremendous military value of weapons

that can be employed with very high confidence in their outcome creates a demand for

corresponding insight in the fields of intelligence preparation and operational planning. 

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

Given the nature of precision weapon warfare, education of decision-makers as to

their capabilities and limitations is critically

important.

Richard Hallion, 1999

A President who understands that capability

has a very powerful tool, because he has reduced the extent to which his policy is now hostage to the errant bomb or the errant missile. 

Maj Gen Chuck Link
148

Technology

As weapons increase in lethality, precision

and standoff, intercepting any hostile platform

early in its flight is increasingly important. 

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

But the accuracy standard applied by the

military is so extraordinarily strict that civilians are seldom put at risk, assuming that

the target was properly selected in the first

place. An aimpoint might be, for instance,

the center of Hall Three of the Lola Utva factory. If the weapon lands 500 feet away on

Hall One, it is said to be a miss.

In most cases, the level of accuracy is so

much greater today than ever before that a

“miss” hardly ever means that civilians will

be harmed. But that is not the way the public, the press, or even military spokespersons

seem to understand it. To the public and the

press, a “miss” strongly suggests an unfortunate and brutally bad outcome. To the military, a miss simply means failure. Neither

assumption is necessarily true.

William M. Arkin, 2000

Surgical air strikes are a growing aspect of

air power employment in high-tech local

wars. [Their] strategic objective is obtained

by precisely attacking the enemy’s sensitive

strategic targets. 

Col Ming Zengfu, PLAAF, 1995
149

Technology

Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles

The secret of future air power lies in wireless

control, that is, in electrical science. The air

must wed the ether if air power is to dominate in war; and when this union is consummated, as I will show, the offensive may become so powerful and so difficult to counter,

that ultimately nations may decide that the

game of war is not worth the candle.

Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller, 1932

UAVs enjoy the enormous advantage over

space-based optical sensors of being able to

operate under cloud cover. Given their special capabilities, UAV sensors can identify an

object, when sensors on a satellite can only

spot it. However, UAVs have great disadvantages. Because they violate airspace, they

can create political problems when flown in

other than wartime circumstances. UAVs are

manpower intensive to operate. . . . Unlike

stealth aircraft, UAVs are useless if not communicating.

Martin C. Libicki, 1996

The Army and Marines have an insatiable

appetite for full-motion video the Predator

supplies. Currently, there is a daily request
150

Technology

for more than 300 hours of video a day, and

we can only provide about 110 hours.

Lt Col M. E. Bannon, 2005

While the UCAV [unmanned combat air vehicle] has been proposed as a defacto replacement for manned aircraft, we have yet to see

the development of artificial intelligence techniques capable of providing UCAVs with more

intelligence than that of an insect. Until this

software problem is solved, compute cycles will

not confer the sought capabilities, especially

flexibility, which we find in crewed platforms. 

Carlo Kopp, 2002

By far the most significant aspect of the Air

war in Afghanistan relates to large-scale employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) by the

coalition forces, specifically the Americans. 

The Americans, having deployed their Predator UAVs at a secure location in Central Pakistan, were able to undertake a virtual roundthe-clock surveillance of the entire area of

interest in Afghanistan. The information being acquired by the Predator UAVs was transmitted in real-time through a data down-link

which allowed almost simultaneous vectoring of USAF offensive assets which were already airborne, onto the selected target.

Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

Pakistan air force
151

Technology

Synergies

Progress in a particular direction, aircraft

speed or whatever, is usually registered via a

diversity of increments (more exotic fuel, innovations in engine design, improved wings

and so on). Nonetheless, the cumulative result is likely to approximate a sigmoid curve

[of sudden acceleration and deceleration].

Neville Brown

The addition of new armament, command

and control, and intelligence technologies to

matured aviation technology resulted in a

combination that yielded a great improvement in the cost-effectiveness of the aerial

offensive—notwithstanding the maturation

of air defense systems during the same period. The combination produced a synergy

that changed the calculus of conventional

war; and it was demonstrated in the Israeli

operations in the Bekáa Valley, the Persian

Gulf War, and the air war over Serbia. Enthusiasts called it an RMA [revolution in military

affairs], others called it a transformation,

and still others called it a pipe dream.

Dr. David R. Mets

From the time of the Crimean War a century

and a half ago until recently, platforms were

militarily crucial: the newest ship, plane, or

tank. Now what the platform carries—sen-
152

Technology

sors, munitions, and electronics—matters

more than the platform itself.

Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 1997

We have a lot of capabilities that can be glued

together quickly to create a new military capability.

Stephen Younger, director

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2004

The future force will become efficient and effective through the use of information systems

to enhance US operations and to confound

the enemy. The infancy of this capability is

represented today in the F-22. Information

and Space will become inextricably entwined. 

The Information/Space milieu will interact

strongly with the air and ground components, and it is here that commercial technologies and systems will have the largest

presence. Defense will not be a driver of important technologies in this area. 

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996

The linkage of advanced sensors, advanced

precision weapons (particularly smaller ones),

long-range combat aircraft, stealth, information technologies, and the ability to strike

multiple aimpoints virtually simultaneously,

offers the best hope for militarily confronting

the variety of challenges we will face, particu-
153

Technology

larly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogue nations.

Dr. Richard P. Hallion, 1999
154

Technology

Technology and Numbers

We have never been likely to get into trouble

by having an extra thousand or two of up-todate airplanes at our disposal. As the man

whose mother-in-law had died in Brazil replied, when asked how the remains should

be disposed of, “Embalm, cremate, and bury. 

Take no risks.”

Winston Churchill, April 1938

One can never have too many guns; one never

has enough.

Napoléon

The burning wreck of one aircraft or one

white parachute spilling out against the sky

[was] often glimpsed by many pilots when

they twisted and turned five miles high. There

can be no doubt that in the confused and

intricate air fighting, many of our claims were

duplicated, but, wisely, those in authority

were not concerned with mere numbers, but

with the greater issues of whether or not the

Luftwaffe was being held at bay.

Johnnie Johnson

The hope of the wisdom essential to the general direction of men’s affairs lies not so

much in wealth of specialized knowledge as

in the habits and skills required to handle

problems involving very diverse viewpoints
155

Technology

which must be related to new concrete situations. Wisdom is based on broad understanding in perspective. It is never the product of

scientific, technological, or other specializations, though men so trained may, of course,

acquire it.

Wallace B. Donham

It is true that [in Germany in World War II]

unheard-of inventions and progress were

made in individual fields, far ahead of the

rest of the world, but they all came too late

and . . . they came in such small numbers

that they could no longer be decisive.

Karl Koller
156

Technology

Reactions to Technology

No form of transportation ever really dies out. 

Every new form is an addition to, and not a

substitution for, an old form of transportation.

Air Marshal Trenchard

When offensive weapons make a sudden advance in efficiency, the reaction of the side

which has none is to disperse, to thin out, to

fall back on medieval guerrilla tactics which

would appear childish if they did not rapidly

prove to have excellent results.

Gen G. J. M. Chassin

The highly sophisticated industrial economy of

the advanced nations of the world, the degree

of urbanization of their demographic distribution, and the high standard of living, make

them very sensitive to weapons of mass annihilation and area destruction. On the other

hand, the underdeveloped areas of the world

display a hardening of conflict when faced with

such weapons and resort to guerrilla warfare,

where man is superior to machine. . . . People

used to high material standards of living are

most unlikely to harden their will in the face of

mass annihilation and area destruction and

resort to guerrilla warfare.

S. T. Das
157

Technology

The scientific and technical talents of the

contemporary world are spread rather evenly

among all potential contenders. This means

that whoever invents whatever new device to

supplement his power, the other will not be

long in shaping it himself for his own uses. 

While he is doing it, his primary interest will be

not in bringing the device to maximum effectiveness, but in the study of it for deficiencies.

J. M. Cameron

It requires more aircraft to transport a light infantry division than to move the total number

of PGMs delivered during the Gulf War. . . . 

What moves into a theater—and when—should

be determined by its ability to effectively influence an adversary.

Brig Gen David A. Deptula, 2001

Our damage assessment once again contradicted the conventional wisdom that bombing is, by its nature, indiscriminate and immoral. But the design of the air campaign

also offered little comfort to air power zealots, who often argue that air warriors, especially in the United States, have it all figured

out—that they know just what to do with

their smart weapons.

William M. Arkin, 2000

Best of all, no nation on Earth can assemble a

system to match us. And therein lies the problem. Since they can’t, they probably won’t
158

Technology

bother to try. What they will do is use bits and

snippets of new technology—begged, borrowed, purchased or stolen—to bypass, degrade, and perhaps destroy an RMA force . . . 

or perhaps blackmail or intimidate us into not

acting at all.

Philip Gold, 1997
159

Principles

of War

Principles of War

Page

Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Unity of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Offensive, Initiative, and Surprise . . . . . 170

The Offensive Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

The Defender’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . 173

Limits of the Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

Using the Initiative: Agitation . . . . . . 174

Using the Initiative: Alternatives . . . . 175

The Offensive Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Mass, Concentration, and

Economy of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Economy of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Maneuver and Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Constants—If Not Principles—

of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Three British Principles . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Principles

of War
161

Principles

of War

Foundation

The principles of war provide a common understanding across the armed forces. Airmen 

may find them invaluable in understanding 

how soldiers think. 

Principles of War are only the principles of

common sense applied to war.

J. C. Slessor

Lecture to Air War College, 1957

The ideas about strategy which have evolved

from time to time no sooner gained acceptance

than they were stripped to their barest essentials and converted into maxims or, as they

have latterly come to be called, “principles.”

The baggage that was stripped normally contained the justifications, the qualifications,

and the instances of historical application or

misapplication.

Bernard Brodie

Principles of war, though they can be simply

stated, are not easy to learn, and can never

be learned from books alone. They are the

principles of human nature; and whoever

learned from books how to deal successfully

with his fellows? War which drives human

nature to its last resources is a great engine

of education, teaching no lessons which it
162

Principles

of War

does not illustrate, and enforcing all its lessons by bitter penalties.

Walter Raleigh

War in the Air

The primary elements of tactics are to be

seen in their simplest form in a fight between

two unarmed men. They are: to think, to guard,

to move, and to hit.

J. F. C. Fuller

For they had found that true safety was to be

found in long previous training, not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were

going into action.

Thucydides
163

Principles

of War

Those who expect to reap the blessings of

freedom must like men, undergo the fatigue

of supporting it.

Thomas Paine

In war, the moral is to the physical as three

is to one.

Napoléon
164

Principles

of War

It should be remembered that the statements

of the Principles of War were derived from

study of surface operations and written by

soldiers with ground warfare in mind. They

stem from periods of history when the airplane existed only in the minds of men.

Nathan F. Twining

Quoting a 1947 Air War College seminar
165

Principles

of War

Objective

Compare to the topic of “Effects” under the 

“War” section (pp. 72–75). 

The single path to success in aerial warfare is

unwavering adherence to the Principle of the

Objective. The adaptability of air forces to many

missions and the ease with which they may be

diverted encourage vacillation and defeat.

“General Air Force Principles”

Lecture, Air Corps Tactical School, 1934–35

The ordinary man is much more likely to do

the right thing if he really understands why he

is doing it, and what will probably happen if he

does something else; and the best basis for

sound judgment is a knowledge of what has

been done in the past, and with what results.

J. C. Slessor

General MacArthur approved [my] program

and said to go ahead, that I had carte blanche

to do anything that I wanted to do. He said

he didn’t care how my gang was handled,

how they looked, how they dressed, how they

behaved, or what they did, so long as they

would fight, shoot down [Japanese airplanes],

and put bombs on the target.

Gen George Kenney
166

Principles

of War

The mission of tactical fighter and fighterbomber units is to engage in operational missions, as directed by higher echelons within

the theater air structure. These operations

may be independent of or in conjunction with

surface action, but in any event are all directed toward the effective, efficient, and economical accomplishment of the theater commander’s assigned mission.

AFM 51-44, Fighter and Fighter-Bomber 

Employment in Tactical Air Operations, 1953

There were two extremely important points

about him [Yamamoto] as a commander. 

First, he made the objectives of the operation

extremely clear, and he expressed them with

indomitable will. Second, although he did not

permit any criticism of the objectives of the

operation, he entrusted the details of its execution to the discretion of his subordinates.

Lt Gen Minoru Genda

Successful operations depend on the entire

wing organization working as a team with

but one purpose in mind. The purpose, of

course, is to make certain of the destruction

of the selected target at exactly the right time

and place. All of the years of planning and

training, and the great financial and personal

costs and sacrifice, will be vindicated by the

successful execution of the mission; likewise,
167

Principles

of War

all will be wasted by failure, regardless of its

cause.

AFM 51-44, Fighter and Fighter-Bomber 

Employment in Tactical Air Operations, 1953

An irresolute general who acts without principles and without plan, even though he lead

an army numerically superior to that of the

enemy, almost always finds himself inferior

to the latter on the field of battle. Fumblings,

the middle course, lose all in war.

Napoléon

At the same time, the nature of the

enemy and the immediate threat he

poses to national and friendly forces,

demand action that may distract full

commitment to one’s own objectives.

S. T. Das
168

Principles

of War

Unity of Command

One of the outstanding characteristics of

air-power proved to be its flexibility and

the terrific concentration made possible

by a unified air command—a unity only

achieved by a faith born of mutual understanding between all branches and ranks

of the air forces.

Lord Tedder

There is a weakness in a council running a

war. That is true of any council. I don’t care

if it is composed of the best men in the

world. . . . In war, you must have decision. 

A bum decision is better than none. And

the trouble is that when you get three, you

finally get none.

Dwight Eisenhower

The compromise which forms the mean between several plans usually combines their

faults rather than their merits.

Sir Charles Oman

Nothing is more important in war than unity

in command.

Napoléon

My observation is [that] where one person is

found adequate to the discharge of a duty by
169

Principles

of War

close application, it is worse executed by two

and scarcely done at all by three.

Friedrich von Steuben

The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions and councils of war will follow at all times. They will

end in adoption of the worst course, which in

war is always the most timid, or, if you will,

the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a

general is determined courage.

Napoléon

An educated guess is just as accurate and

far faster than compiled errors.

George Patton

Unity of command is not alone sufficient. 

Unity of planning, unity of common item procurement, and unity of doctrine are equally

necessary.

Hap Arnold

We are seemingly still in the period of transition Douhet described in 1928. . . . He said

then that there were men competent to wage

war on land, others to wage war at sea, and

still others to wage war in the air, but that there

were not yet men competent to wage war in

general.

Louis A. Sigaud, 1941
170

Principles

of War

Offensive, Initiative, 

and Surprise

The power of the initiative might be related to

the principle of surprise. Without initiative,

the best one can do is to hold one’s own. With

the power of the initiative, the opposition can

be destroyed. It would therefore seem axiomatic

that the first principle of our national security policy would be to seize and maintain the

initiative in all dimensions of modern war; to

include the economic, psychological, political,

military, and the technological.

Nathan Twining

Offense is the essence of air power.

Hap Arnold

Your first priority is to take the offensive.

Lt Gen Jimmy Doolittle, 1944

Don’t hit at all if it is honorably possible to

avoid hitting; but never hit soft [sic].

Theodore Roosevelt

True offensive doctrine consists of creating

favorable situations when they do not otherwise exist, striking at the enemy with the

maximum power at the decisive time and

place, and driving home the effort deter-
171

Principles

of War

minedly until the desired results have been

accomplished.

AFM 51-44, Fighter and Fighter-Bomber 

Employment in Tactical Air Operations, 1953

The offensive knows what it wants, whereas

the defensive is in a state of uncertainty.

S. T. Das, paraphrasing Moltke, the Elder

In order to have rest oneself it is necessary to

keep the enemy occupied.

Frederick the Great

It is much better to go over difficult ground

where you are not expected than it is over

good ground where you are expected.

George Patton

Air forces characteristically take the offensive. Even in defense, they defeat an invading

enemy by attack.

AU Manual 1, United States Air Force Basic 

Doctrine, 1951

Success is to be obtained only by simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with constancy, and executed with

decision.

Archduke Charles of Austria
172

Principles

of War

An air force commander must exploit the extreme flexibility, the high tactical mobility,

and the supreme offensive quality inherent

in air forces, to mystify and mislead his

enemy, and so to threaten his various vital

centers as to compel him to be dangerously

weak at the point which is really decisive at

the time.

J. C. Slessor

The Offensive Aim

To strike with strong effect, one must strike

at weakness.

B. H. Liddell Hart

In place of hitting at a vital spot, however

tough, they committed the deadly tactical sin

of looking for a soft spot.

J. F. C. Fuller, describing a World War I battle

Hold out baits to entice the enemy. . . . Amid

the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may

be seeming disorder and yet no disorder at

all; amid confusion and chaos, your array

may be without head or tail, yet it will be

proof against defeat.

Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage;

simulated weakness postulates strength.

Sun Tzu
173

Principles

of War

The Defender’s Dilemma

The spot where we intend to fight must not

be made known; for then the enemy will have

to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being

thus distributed in many different directions,

the numbers we shall have to face at any

given point will be proportionately few.

Sun Tzu

Petty geniuses attempt to hold everything;

wise men hold fast to the key points. They

parry great blows and scorn little accidents. 

There is an ancient apothegm: he who would

preserve everything, preserves nothing. Therefore, always sacrifice the bagatelle and pursue the essential.

Frederick the Great

[The French army in Vietnam] suffers from

the considerable disadvantage attaching to

those who seek to protect and preserve rather

than simply destroy. It is much easier to cut

a railway line or blow up a bridge than to

protect them from destruction.

Gen G. J. M. Chassin, 1952

The general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is

skillful in defense whose opponent does not

know what to attack.

Sun Tzu
174

Principles

of War

Limits of the Offensive

It is dangerous to make a fetish of any principle or to become the slave of any tactical

doctrine as the French did in 1914. Just as it

may sometimes be necessary to divert temporarily even the whole of our air forces to

the strategically defensive role for reasons of

security, so on occasions we may be compelled for the same reason to divert part of

our fighter strength to the tactical defensive.

J. C. Slessor, 1936

Military organizations generally prefer offensive doctrines because they reduce uncertainty and enhance military autonomy and

resources. But . . . because military organizations seek autonomy, their offensive doctrines are usually poorly integrated with the

political aspects of grand strategy.

Daniel J. Hughes

The sands of history are littered with the

wrecks of States which set their compass on

an offensive course only.

S. T. Das

Using the Initiative: Agitation

Offensive action has often been used to provoke reactions, to force an opponent to make 

mistakes. Just as certainly, one’s enemies are 

likely to try probing and stirring in return. 
175

Principles

of War

Agitate the enemy and ascertain the pattern

of his movement. Determine his dispositions

and so ascertain the field of battle. Probe him

and learn where his strength is abundant

and where deficient.

Sun Tzu

Attacks on the decision element of command

are limited only by the imagination. They can

range from direct strikes at enemy command

posts to complex operations to mislead the

enemy and induce him to do something inappropriate.

Col John A. Warden III

The Air Campaign

I started shooting when I was much too far

away. That was merely a trick of mine. I did

not mean so much to hit him as to frighten

him, and I succeeded in catching him. He began flying in curves and this enabled me to

draw near.

Baron Manfred von Richthofen

Using the Initiative: Alternatives

Maintaining sensible alternatives is like 

taking a good stance in sports; the purpose is 

to preserve the benefits of the initiative. 

If the enemy is certain as to your point of aim

he has the best possible chance of guarding

himself—and blunting your weapon. If, on
176

Principles

of War

the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his

mind and forces.

B. H. Liddell Hart

The question “Where should the decisive

point be sought?” does not arise; the question is, “How can a preponderance of force be

brought against the enemy’s will?”

There are two answers to this question: to

do something which the enemy cannot prevent, and to do something which he does not

suspect.

J. F. C. Fuller

The Offensive Spirit

No guts, no glory. If you are going to shoot

him down, you have to get in there and mix it

up with him.

Col Frederick C. “Boots” Blesse

I always thought to go around in circles,

slower and slower, was a ridiculous thing. . . . 

It’s not the way to fight. The best tactic is to

make a pass, then break off and come back. 

If you don’t do this you’ll lose people. One

can’t be greedy.

Brig Gen Robin Olds
177

Principles

Find the enemy and shoot him down; anyof War

thing else is nonsense.

Baron Manfred von Richthofen

When we study the lives of the great captains,

and not merely their victories and defeats,

what do we discover? That the mainspring

within them was originality, outwardly expressing itself in unexpected actions.

J. F. C. Fuller

Originality is the most vital of all military virtues as two thousand years of history attest. 
178

Principles

of War

In peace it is at a discount, for it causes the

disturbance of comfortable ways without producing dividends, as in civil life. But in war,

originality bears a higher premium than it

can ever do in a civil profession.

B. H. Liddell Hart

Never forget that no military leader has ever

become great without audacity.

Clausewitz

An aggressive act in the initial phases of the

attack will very often give you a breather and

a head start home. . . . Showing a willingness

to fight often discourages the enemy even

when he outnumbers us, while on the other

hand I have, by immediately breaking for the

deck on other occasions, given the enemy a

“shot in the arm,” turning his half-hearted

attack into an aggressive one.

Gen John C. Meyer
179

Principles

of War

Mass, Concentration, 

and Economy of Force

The alternative to massing forces is piecemeal employment—a practice summarized by 

the phrase “defeat in detail.” 

We had been taught a lesson, brutally and

unmistakably. The first round in modern war

takes place in the air—the fight for air superiority; and to be successful one must have

reasonable strength in quantity as well as

quality, and one’s air bases must have security—the security given by warning systems,

by dispersal, by protection and by guns. In

Greece and Crete we had none of these things. 

The lesson is clear. It was no use having a

victorious and predominant surface fleet if it

was not free to operate because we had lost

control of the air; it was no use having a

strong army if, for the same reason, it could

not be supplied and maintained.

Lord Tedder

The principles of Mass were better stated:

“Mass is the concentration of optimum combat

power selected from the available maximum,

to be used at a critical time and place.”

J. M. Cameron
180

Principles

of War

The principles of war could, for brevity, be

condensed into a single word: concentration.

B. H. Liddell Hart

Whereas to shift the weight of effort on the

ground from one point to another takes time,

the flexibility inherent in Air Forces permits

them without change of base to be switched

from one objective to another in the theatre

of operations. So long as this is realised then

the whole weight of the available air power

can be used in selected areas in turn. This
181

Principles

of War

concentrated use of the air striking force is a

battle winning factor of the first importance. 

It follows that control of the available air

power must be centralised and command

must be exercised through Air Force channels. Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources

into small packets placed under command of

land formation commanders, with each

packet working on its own plan. The soldier

must not expect or wish to exercise direct

command over air striking forces.

Field Marshal Montgomery

Numerical weakness comes from having to

prepare against possible attacks; numerical

strength, from compelling our adversary to

make these preparations against us.

Sun Tzu
182

Principles

of War

Economy of Force

In the last war, air-power forfeited much of

its effect from being kept in separate packets

like the parts of an army, with a consequent

dispersion of effort and frittering of effect.

B. H. Liddell Hart

The principle of Economy of Force is sometimes misunderstood as holding back a large

body of troops and committing the minimum

force to battle. This is not the true interpretation or application of the law. To hold back

troops when they can be gainfully employed

is false economy. The use of reserves on the

other hand is a tactical application of the

same principle. When information is lacking

or the situation is such that only after the

initial engagement can the enemy’s weak

spot be discovered, in such cases reserves

are not really held back from the battle but

are actually kept ready for battle when the

decisive time and place has been reached.

S. T. Das

Economy of Force rightly means, not a mere

husbanding of one’s resources of manpower,

but the employment of one’s force, both men

and weapons, in accordance with the economic

laws, so as to yield the highest possible dividends of success in proportion to strength.

B. H. Liddell Hart
183

Principles

of War

Economy of Force is the supreme law of successful war because in a trial of strength a

nation’s capacity to stand the strain depends

not merely on the extent of its resources, but

on their economic distribution.

B. H. Liddell Hart

It was the strategy employed by raiders since

naval war began, to strike in one area until

the strength of the enemy was directed

thither, and then to slip away and start again

in a fresh unguarded area.

C. S. Forester

The Age of Fighting Sail

The principles of mobility and concentration

of force were considered to be contradictory

elements of principles of war till the arrival of

airpower. Today the exponents of airpower

maintain that the principles of offensive and

economy of force can be achieved effectively

only by the exploitation of airspace, whereas

prior to the emergence of airpower the principle

of offensive could only be applied by maintaining a 4-to-1 ratio over the enemy forces.

S. T. Das

There are generally insufficient forces to conduct extensive operations in all air tasks at

one time; thus the selection of targets and

the allocation of effort must be in terms of
184

Principles

of War

the needs of the theater. Enemy action may

necessitate a major revision in task priorities.

AFM 1-3, Theater Air Operations, 1953

To me an unnecessary action, or shot, or casualty, was not only waste but sin.

T. E. Lawrence
185

Principles

of War

Maneuver and Mobility

The enemy must not know where I intend to

give battle. For if he does not know where I

intend to give battle, he must prepare in a

great many places. . . . For if he prepares to

the front his rear will be weak, and if to the

rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to

the left his right will be vulnerable and if to

the right, there will be few on the left. And

when he prepares everywhere he will be weak

everywhere.

Sun Tzu

I believe that, more or less, all of the Allied

operations [in the Southwest Pacific] depended on deception by landing in places

where we thought a landing and the building

of airfields impossible.

Lt Col Masaru Shinohara

Japanese Eighth Area Army

Modern war is a war for airbases; the bulldozer must accompany the plane. . . . One of

the elements of victory in North Africa was

the speed with which our aviation engineers

constructed airfields behind the front lines

and pressed the attack.

Hap Arnold

Maximum time over target or extreme depth

of penetration may be necessary. This nor-
186

Principles

of War

mally requires that aircraft be based as close

to the target areas as possible. Since ground

action is often fluid in nature, tactical air

units must possess a considerable degree of

mobility. It is essential that all components

of the tactical air organization, including

supporting or service units, be able to move

from site to site without disrupting the combat mission. Equipment should be designed

with this in mind and, whenever possible, be

air transportable.

AFM 51-44, Fighter and Fighter-Bomber 

Employment in Tactical Air Operations, 1953

The giant airbases of today will become the

bomber cemeteries of a future war.

Gen P. F. Zhigarev

Soviet air forces, 1958

The strength of air forces lies in mobility and

flexibility. These characteristics permit concentration of massed firepower at the place

and time dictated by the situation with maximum surprise. Mobility and flexibility are reduced when:

a.  Air forces are compartmented in separate units under separate commands, and

b.  Are allotted to lower echelons.

AU Manual 1, United States Air Force Basic 

Doctrine, 1951
187

Principles

of War

Simplicity

Remember, gentlemen, an order that can be

misunderstood will be misunderstood.

Moltke, the Elder

The ability to distinguish essentials from

non-essentials, to grasp quickly the elements

of the changing situation, and the intestinal

fortitude to keep cool and to continue fighting when the going gets tough are required in

the successful war commander.

Adm Raymond A. Spruance

Difficulties always arise from attempts to improve to the point of achieving what is not

possible, thereby failing to gain what is well

within reach.

J. M. Cameron

The principal message of fog, friction and

chance is that strategy must be flexible. Plans

that rely on flawless execution are overly

susceptible to failure. Plans that rely on rigid

timetables and rigidly sequenced actions are

overly susceptible to failure. In general, the

more complex the plan, the more likely that

something will go awry.

Dennis Drew and Donald Snow
188

Principles

of War

Few orders are best, but they should be followed up with care.

Maurice de Saxe
189

Principles

of War

Security

The whole art of war consists of a well-reasoned

and extremely circumspect defensive followed

by rapid and audacious attack.

Napoléon

Skepticism is the mother of security. Even

though only fools trust their enemies, prudent persons never do. One falls into a feeling of security after battles, when one is

drunk with success, and when one believes

the enemy completely disheartened. One falls

into a feeling of security when a skillful enemy

amuses you with pretended peace proposals. 

One falls into a feeling of security by mental

laziness.

Frederick the Great

Always presume that the enemy has dangerous designs and always be forehanded with

the remedy. But do not let these calculations

make you timid.

Frederick the Great

Three can keep a secret if two of them are

dead.

Benjamin Franklin

Our continuous air offensive had evidently

annoyed them, as the raid was made by
190

Principles

of War

twenty-four bombers escorted by about the

same number of fighters. We lost eleven aircraft on the ground at Seven Mile Airdrome. 

In addition, the operations building was

burned down, several trucks destroyed, two

hundred drums of gasoline went up in smoke,

and the runway was hit in several places. 

The Japanese left eight calling-cards in the

shape of long-delay time-fuzed bombs which

exploded at intervals all the way up to fortyfour hours. Several men were wounded by

bomb fragments. Once again our warning

service was inadequate.

Gen George Kenney
191

Principles

of War

Constants—If Not 

Principles—of War

Communications

If intercommunications between events in

front and ideas behind are not maintained,

then two battles will be fought—a mythical

headquarters battle and an actual front-line

one, in which case the real enemy is to be

found in our own headquarters.

J. F. C. Fuller

Congress can make a general but only communications can make him a commanding

general.

GEN Omar Bradley

Public Support

Except for valid security reasons, any action

that cannot be satisfactorily explained to the

troops, the Congress, and the general public,

should be regarded as suspect and thoroughly

examined.

GEN Matthew B. Ridgway

Integrity is the fundamental premise for military service in a free society. Without integrity, the moral pillars of our military strength,

public trust, and self-respect are lost.

Gen Charles A. Gabriel
192

Principles

of War

By rapidity many measures of the enemy are

nipped in the bud, and public opinion is

gained in our favor.

Clausewitz

It is strange that except by Clausewitz and to

some extent by Macklin, the Principle of “Public Opinion” has not been considered very vital

even by the modern military theoreticians.

S. T. Das

Logistics

When the enemy assesses our forces, he values only those forces which the logistics community has ready for combat, or can get

ready in time, and then sustain for a requisite period of time.

F. M. Rogers

My logisticians are a humorless lot . . . they

know if my campaign fails, they are the first

ones I will slay.

Alexander the Great

My Dear General, this expanding and piling

up of impedimentia [sic] has been so far almost our ruin, and will be our final ruin if it

is not abandoned.

Abraham Lincoln to Gen Nathaniel P. Banks

on the inability of the Union Army to move

due to logistic excesses
193

Principles

of War

Logistics controls all campaigns and limits

many. 

Dwight Eisenhower

The crews of a heavy bombardment group in

China must ferry over their own gasoline,

bombs, replacement parts and everything

else in their own B-24s. Before this bombardment group can go on one combat flight, it

must make four trips over the Hump. To perform one extremely dangerous mission, those

crews must make four separate flights over

the most hazardous terrain in the world. 

Hap Arnold

What I want to avoid is that my supplies

should command me.

Comte de Guibert

Logistics is the bridge between the economy

of the nation and the tactical operations of

its combat forces. Obviously, then, the logistics system must be in harmony, both with

the economic system of the nation and with

the tactical concepts and environment of the

combat forces.

Adm Henry E. Eccles

The ideal for all military forces is to reduce their

logistical requirements to necessities only.

AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United 

States Air Force, 1992
194

Principles

of War

I don’t know what the hell this logistics is

that Marshall is always talking about, but I

want some of it.

Adm E. J. King

Air logistics is defined as that section of military science that embraces the details of

planning for, and preparation of, all of the

means and facilities required to make a combat force operational and capable of sustaining its action.

Maj Gen Elmer D. Adler

The essence of flexibility is in the mind of the

commander, the substance of flexibility is in

logistics.

Adm Henry E. Eccles

It is very necessary to attend to all this detail

and to trace a biscuit from Lisbon into a man’s

mouth on the frontier and to provide for its

removal from place to place by land or by water,

or no military operations can be carried out.

Wellington

We have a claim on the output of the arsenals

of London as well of Hanyang, and whatis more,

it is to be delivered to us by the enemy’s own

transport corps. This is the sober truth, not

a joke.

Mao Tse-tung
195

Principles

of War

The sinews of war are five—men, money, materials, maintenance and morale.

Bernard M. Baruch

When the Duke of Cumberland has weakened his army sufficiently, I shall teach him

that a general’s first duty is to provide for its

welfare.

Maurice de Saxe

I believe that the task of bringing the force to

the fighting point, properly equipped and

well-formed in all that it needs is at least as

important as the capable leading of the force

in the fight itself. . . . In fact, it is indispensable, and the combat between hostile forces

is more in the preparation than the fight.

Gen Sir John Monash

Mobility is the true test of a supply system.

B. H. Liddell Hart

In my opinion, there is no one single piece of

foresightedness that helped our war effort

more than the policy that kept our depots intact and operating on an efficient basis.

Maj Gen Oliver P. Echols
196

Principles

of War

Be nice to your mother but love your logisticians and communicators.

Gen Charles A. Horner

Time

During the last great aerial raid on England,

the German Air Force flew about 1,200 bombers over industrial targets which were critical

to the survival of the British Empire. At the
197

Principles

of War

same time the Royal Air Force Fighter Command consisted of little more than a handful

of trained pilots and fighter planes. The incredible German decision to stagger the attack, and to use twelve hours for its completion, actually multiplied the strength of the

Royal Air Force Fighter Command by a factor

of five. This was possible because on that day

each Spitfire pilot had the time to fly five missions.

Nathan Twining

When you seem to be most prodigal of the

soldier’s blood, you spare it, by supporting

your attacks well and by pushing them with

the greatest vigor to prevent time from augmenting your losses.

Frederick the Great

Quick decisions are unsafe decisions. 

Sophocles

The god of war hates those who hesitate. 

Euripides

Take time to deliberate, but when the time

for action arrives, stop thinking and go on.

Andrew Jackson
198

Principles

of War

Three British Principles

Morale: Success in war depends more on morale than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament, resources or skill can not compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination

and the bold offensive spirit which springs

from a national determination to conquer.

Flexibility: Modern war demands a high degree

of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be

altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. By strategical and tactical

flexibility, force can be concentrated rapidly

and economically at decisive places and times. 

This entails good training, organization, discipline, and staff work, and above all, that rapidity of decision on the part of the commander

which ensures that time is never lost.

Administration: The administrative arrangements must be designed to give the commanders the maximum freedom of action in

carrying out the plan. Every administrative

organization must be simple. Every operational commander must have a degree of

control over the administrative plan within

his sphere of command, corresponding to the

scope of his responsibilities for the operational plan.

Quoted by Nathan Twining in

Neither Liberty nor Safety 

Another Principle: Poise

Air Forces more than surface forces must 

consciously anticipate, posture, and ready 
199

Principles

of War

their fighting forces to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. They must be spring-loaded 

without being overcommitted to one anticipated course of events. In the fighter pilot vernacular, command elements must “lead-turn,” 

or constantly stay ahead of, events; they must 

develop cues to guide increased surveillance 

and alert status; they must be mentally prepared to herd the enemy rather than simply 

react. The experience of war indicates that 

commanders must also economize alertness 

by aggressively relaxing their forces when opportunities for recovery and rest are achieved. 

Only ruthless reduction of sensor and information data, to distinguish essentials from all 

the available information, can permit the mental clarity necessary for optimum poise and 

perception.

Suggested by the ideas of Clausewitz, On War 
Principles

of War
201

Command

Command

Page

Human Factors in War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Professional Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

The Commander and the Staff . . . . . . . 216

Administration and Combat 

Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . 220

Command Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Field Manual 100-20.............. 225
Command
203

Command

Human Factors in War

If one could only come to mastery of things 

inside him, nothing outside could get the better of him.

Col Raynal C. Bolling
204

Command

With equal or inferior power of destruction 

he will win who has the resolution to advance, who by his formations and maneuvers 

can continually threaten his adversary with 

a new phase of material action, who, in a 

word, has the moral ascendancy.

Ardant du Picq 
205

Command

Professional Growth

In sum the leader has to achieve a balance 

between the essential need for professional 

competence in his own technical field and 

that broader understanding of human problems which can only be achieved from a wide 

and largely self-acquired education.

S. W. Roskill

If we wish to think clearly, we must cease imitating; if we wish to cease imitating, we must 

make use of our imagination. We must train 

ourselves for the unexpected in place of training others for the cut and dried. Audacity, and 

not caution, must be our watchword.

J. F. C. Fuller

The essential basis of the military life is the 

ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which 

sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always 

a citizen. So long as he serves he will never 

be a civilian.

Gen Sir John W. Hackett

A great captain can be formed only by long 

experience and intense study; neither is his 

own experience enough—for whose life is 
206

Command

there sufficiently fruitful of events to render 

his knowledge universal?

Archduke Charles of Austria

It is common to see men who have used all 

their limbs without once in their lives having 

utilized their minds. Thought, the faculty of 

combining ideas, is what distinguishes man 

from a beast of burden. A mule who has carried a pack for ten campaigns under Prince 

Eugene will be no better a tactician for it, and 

it must be confessed, to the disgrace of humanity, that many men grow old in an otherwise respectable profession without making 

any greater progress than this mule.

Frederick the Great

In the profession of war the rules of the art 

are never violated without drawing punishment from the enemy who is delighted to find 

us at fault. An officer can spare himself many 

mistakes by improving himself.

Frederick the Great

Education is a two-edged sword. If it indoctrinates with rigid principles, constantly hammering home the fixed and immutable nature 

of those principles, and if it offers neat solutions to every human problem in terms of 

these fixed principles, then change and development can not take place.

Maj Gen Dale 0. Smith
207

Command

The man who can’t make a mistake can’t 

make anything.

Abraham Lincoln

Perhaps the most valuable result of all education is the ability to make yourself do the 

thing you have to do, when it ought to be 

done, whether you like it or not.

T. H. Huxley 

Few men during their lifetime come anywhere 

near exhausting the resources dwelling within 

them. There are deep wells of strength that 

are never used.

Adm Richard E. Byrd
208

Command

In battle nothing is ever as good or as bad as 

the first reports of excited men would have it.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

One machine can do the work of 50 ordinary 

men. No machine can do the work of one 

extraordinary man.

Elbert Hubbard

Of every one hundred men, ten shouldn’t 

even be there. Eighty are nothing but targets, 

nine are real fighters.... We are lucky to 

have them [for] they make the battle.... Ah, 

but ONE, one of them is a Warrior ... and he 

will bring the others back!

Heraclitus ca. 500 BC
209

Command

Command

The first quality for a commander-in-chief is 

a cool head, which receives a correct impression of things. He should not allow himself to 

be confused by either good or bad news. The 

impressions which he receives successively 

or simultaneously in the course of a day 

should classify themselves in his mind in 

such a way as to occupy the places which 

they merit, for reason and judgment are the 

result of comparison of various impressions 

taken into just consideration.

Napoléon

The qualifications of the combat commander 

determine to a larger extent than any other 

single element the effectiveness of a unit in 

combat.

Hap Arnold

The first requirement to be a military leader 

is to know thoroughly one’s specialty, and 

the second to be loyal to one’s subordinates.

Both conditions will save one from mutual 

disloyalty.

Simón Bolivar

Remember this: the truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and 

battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to be overcome. The lack of equip-
210

Command

ment, the lack of food, the lack of this or that 

are only excuses; the real leader displays his 

quality in his triumphs over adversity, however great it may be.

GEN George C. Marshall

I don’t mind being called tough, because in 

this racket it’s the tough guys who lead the 

survivors.

Gen Curtis LeMay

No normal young man is likely to recognize 

in himself the qualities that will persuade 

others to follow him. On the other hand, any 

man who can carry out orders in a cheerful 

spirit, complete his work step by step, use 

imagination in improving it, and then when 

the job is done, can face toward his next duty 

with anticipation, need have no reason to 

doubt his own capacity for leadership.

S. L. A. Marshall

I’m firmly convinced that leaders are not 

born; they’re educated, trained, and made, 

as in every other profession. To ensure a 

strong, ready Air Force, we must always remain dedicated to this process.

Gen Curtis LeMay
211

Command

Once you pick up the burden of leadership, 

you can never put it down again as long as 

you live. Sergeant or general, we all carry the 

same load.

GEN Williston B. Palmer
212

Command

The commander should practice kindness 

and severity, should appear friendly to the 

soldiers, speak to them on the march, visit 

them while they are cooking, ask them if they 

are well cared for, and alleviate their needs if 

they have any. Officers without experience in 

war should be treated kindly. Their good actions should be praised. Small requests should 

be granted and they should not be treated in 

an overbearing manner, but severity is maintained about everything regarding duty.

Frederick the Great

I will tell you that a commander without the 

proper C2 assets commands nothing except 

a desk.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

All a soldier desires to drive him forward is 

recognition and appreciation of his work.

George Patton

Duty is the sublimest word in our language.

Do your duty in all things. You cannot do 

more. You should never do less.

 Robert E. Lee

A hero is no braver than an ordinary man, 

but he is brave five minutes longer.

Ralph Waldo Emerson
213

Command

The definition of military training is success 

in battle. In my opinion that is the only objective of military training.

LtGen Lewis “Chesty” Puller
214

Command

Advice

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them 

what to do and they will surprise you with 

their ingenuity.

George Patton

Every general-in-chief who undertakes to execute a plan that he knows to be bad is culpable. He should communicate his reasons, 

insist on a change of plan, and finally resign 

his commission rather than become the instrument of his army’s ruin.

Napoléon

When things go wrong in your command, start 

searching for the reason in increasingly larger 

concentric circles around your own desk.

GEN Bruce C. Clarke

The principal task of the general is mental, 

involving large projects and major arrangements. But since the best dispositions become useless if they are not executed, it is 

essential that the general should be industrious in seeing whether his orders are executed 

or not.

Frederick the Great
215

Command

Do what is right, not what you think the 

higher headquarters wants or what you think 

will make you look good.

GEN Norman Schwarzkopf
216

Command

The Commander 

and the Staff

I had [the general] assemble his whole staff 

and tried to give them a picture of what we 

were up against in New Guinea. That was 

where the war was and it was not moving to 

Australia. Those youngsters up there were 

our customers and customers are always 

right. Our only excuse for living was to help 

them. We might work ourselves into having 

stomach ulcers or nervous breakdowns, but 

those things were not fatal. The work those 

kids in New Guinea and at Darwin were doing, however, had a high fatality rate. They 

deserved all they could get. Most of the crowd 

appreciated what I was talking about. The 

others would go home.

Gen George Kenney

The staff is simply the servant of the general 

force; it exists but to further the welfare of 

the fighting establishment. Those within it are 

remiss if they fail to keep this rule uppermost.

S. L. A. Marshall

My Lord,

If I attempted to answer the mass of futile 

correspondence that surrounds me I should 

be debarred from all serious business of campaigning.

I must remind your Lordship—for the last 

time—that so long as I retain an independent 
217

Command

position, I shall see to it that no officer under 

my command is debarred, by mere quill driving in your Lordship’s office, from attending 

to his first duty, which is, and always has 

been, so to train the private men under his 

command that they may, without question, 

best any force opposed to them in the field.

I am, my Lord

Your obedient servant,

Wellington

Possibly apocryphal correspondence, 

supposedly written in 1810 

A bulky staff implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action and indecision, 

whereas a small staff implies activity and 

concentration of purpose.

GEN William Tecumseh Sherman
218

Command

Administration and 

Combat Support

I must have assistants who will solve their 

own problems and tell me later what they 

have done.

GEN George C. Marshall

Nobody in the British Army ever reads a regulation or an order as if it were to be a guide 

for his conduct, or in any other manner than 

as an amusing novel; and the consequence 

is, that when complicated arrangements are 

to be carried into execution ... every gentleman proceeds according to his fancy, and 

then when it is found that the [mission] fails 

(as it must fail if the order is not strictly 

obeyed) they come upon me to set matters 

right and thus my labor is increased tenfold.

Wellington

It is not recognized that the object of regulations and rules is to produce order in the 

fighting machine, and not to strangle the 

mind of the man who controls it.

J. F. C. Fuller

There has been a constant struggle on the 

part of the military element to keep the end—

fighting, or readiness to fight—superior to mere 

administrative considerations. The military 

man, having to do the fighting, considers that 
219

Command

the chief necessity; the administrator equally 

naturally tends to think the smooth running 

of the machine the most admirable quality.

Alfred Thayer Mahan

Any commander who fails to exceed his 

authority is not of much use to his subordinates.

Adm Arleigh Burke
220

Command

Information Management

The central problem is not collecting and 

transmitting information, but synthesizing for the decision maker.

Richard Burt

There are no “battle management” magic bullets that will substitute for the ability of onscene commanders, soldiers, and airmen to 

make appropriate decisions based on the ebb 

and flow of events.

Richard P. Hallion

To do our work we all have to read a mass of 

papers. Nearly all of them are far too long.

This wastes time, while energy has to be 

spent in looking for vital points.

I ask my colleagues and their staffs to see 

to it that their reports are shorter.

The aim should be short reports which set 

out the main points in a series of short crisp 

paragraphs....

Let us have an end of such phrases as these: 

“It is also of importance to bear in mind the 

following considerations” or “Consideration 

should be given to the possibility of carrying 

into effect.” Most of these woolly phrases are 
221

Command

mere padding which can be left out altogether, 

or replaced by a single word.

Let us not shrink from using the short expressive phrase, even if it is conversational.

Reports drawn up on the lines I propose 

may at first seem rough as compared with 

the flat officialese jargon. But the saving in 

time will be great, while the discipline of setting out the real points concisely will prove 

an aid to clearer thinking.

Winston Churchill, 1940

The main thing is to have a plan; if it is not 

the best plan, it is at least better than no plan 

at all.

Gen Sir John Monash
222

Command

Command Arrangements

It is astonishing how obstinate allies are, how 

parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing 

how they fail to see how broad-minded you 

are, how clear your picture is, how up to date 

you are and how co-operative and big-hearted 

you are. It is extraordinary.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

The proverbial weakness of alliances is due 

to inferior power of concentration.

Alfred Thayer Mahan

This is notably less of a limitation for combined air forces, which can be concentrated in 

space and time, can provide simultaneous 

supporting efforts if differently equipped, can 

mutually support one another in many ways, 

and can concentrate over time on particular 

target systems, objectives, and campaigns.

Of all the lessons we learned about tactical 

air operations, perhaps the most important 

is that the air commander, his group and 

squadron commanders must have a sincere 

desire to become part of the ground team.

The Army must, of course, have the same 

dedication to reciprocate. This close liaison 

can come only from close day-to-day contact—especially at command levels; there 
223

Command

must be almost instantaneous communication between ground and air and through all 

the chain of command.

Lt Gen Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada

The greatest lesson of this war has been the 

extent to which air, land, and sea operations 

can and must be coordinated by joint planning and unified command. The attainment 

of better coordination and balance than now 

exists between services is an essential of national security.

Hap Arnold

It turned out to be another scrambled outfit ... with so many lines of responsibility, 

control, and coordination on the chart that it 

resembled a can of worms as you looked at 

it. I made a note to tell Walker to take charge, 

tear up the chart, and have no one issue orders around there except himself. After he 

got things operating simply, quickly, and efficiently he could draw up a new chart if he 

wanted to.

Gen George Kenney

Mutual support is the fundamental basis 

upon which the air-surface relationship is 

founded.

AFM 1-3, Theater Air Operations, 1953
224

Command

We must not allow Centralized Control–

Decentralized Execution to devolve to Centralized Control–Centralized Execution. That 

construct breeds excessive cautiousness at 

all levels, stifles initiative, and it is instructive to remember that it was the Soviet command model.

Maj Gen David A. Deptula, 2001
225

Command

FM 100-20

FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS

COMMAND AND EMPLOYMENT

OF AIR POWER

SECTION I

DOCTRINE OF COMMAND

AND EMPLOYMENT

1. RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.–LAND 

POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL 

AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER 

IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER.

2. DOCTRINE OF EMPLOYMENT.–THE 

GAINING OF AIR SUPERIORITY IS THE 

FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUCCESS 

OF ANY MAJOR LAND OPERATION. AIR 

FORCES MAY BE PROPERLY AND PROFITABLY EMPLOYED AGAINST ENEMY SEA 

POWER, LAND POWER, AND AIR POWER.

HOWEVER, LAND FORCES OPERATING 

WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY MUST TAKE 

SUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES 

AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT 

THEIR MOBILITY AND ABILITY TO DEFEAT 

THE ENEMY LAND FORCES ARE GREATLY 

REDUCED. THEREFORE, AIR FORCES MUST 

BE EMPLOYED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE 

ENEMY’S AIR FORCES UNTIL AIR SUPERIORITY IS OBTAINED. IN THIS WAY ONLY 

CAN DESTRUCTIVE AND DEMORALIZING 

AIR ATTACKS AGAINST LAND FORCES BE 

MINIMIZED AND THE INHERENT MOBILITY 

OF MODERN LAND AND AIR FORCES BE 

EXPLOITED TO THE FULLEST.
226

Command

3. COMMAND OF AIR POWER.–THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER, IS 

ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY 

MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE 

WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR 

POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN 

TURN; SUCH CONCENTRATED USE OF THE 

AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE.

CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER 

MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND 

MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR 

FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT 

FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A 

DECISIVE BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY EXPLOITED. THEREFORE, THE COMMAND OF 

AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER 

OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED IN THE 

SUPERIOR COMMANDER CHARGED WITH 

THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 

IN THE THEATER, WHO WILL EXERCISE 

COMMAND OF AIR FORCES THROUGH 

THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER AND COMMAND OF GROUND FORCES THROUGH 

THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDER. THE 

SUPERIOR COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR FORCES TO UNITS OF 

THE GROUND FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH GROUND 

FORCE UNITS ARE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY DISTANCE 

OR LACK OF COMMUNICATION.

JULY 1943
227

Doctrine

Doctrine

Page

Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Change and Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Joint and Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Doctrine
229

Doctrine

Basics

Those who are possessed of a definitive body

of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions

upon it will be in a much better position to

deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short

views, and indulging their natural impulses

as they are evoked by what they read from

day to day.

Winston Churchill

If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.

Derek Bok

The organization of men and machines into

military forces does not necessarily mean that

they are equipped and trained for the accomplishment, if necessary, of decisive action in

war. For this, the discipline of a coherent body

of thought appears to be indispensable.

Eugene Emme

In short, doctrine is what is officially approved to be taught. But it is far more than

just that. Doctrine is the departure for virtually every activity in the air arm.

I. B. Holley Jr.
230

Doctrine

The way we teach around here nowadays is

that doctrine is always wrong. The side that

wins is the side whose doctrine is the least

wrong and who has a system that is flexible

enough to adopt its doctrine once combat reveals the flaws in the doctrine.

Dr. David R. Mets

The standardization of technique of operations is not possible in this global war, for 90

times out of 100 an idea that succeeds in Italy will not work in New Guinea. Hence we

must be versatile—our tactics must be susceptible to change—our commanding officers

must have ingenuity and imagination.

Hap Arnold

Doctrine is like a compass bearing; it gives

us the general direction of our course. We

may deviate from that course on occasion,

but the heading provides a common purpose

to all who travel along the way. This puts a

grave burden on those who formulate doctrine, for a small error, even a minute deviation, in our compass bearing upon setting

out, may place us many miles away from the

target at the end of the flight. If those who

distill doctrine from experience or devise it

from logical inference in the abstract fail to

exercise the utmost rigor in their thinking,

the whole service suffers.

I. B. Holley Jr.
231

Doctrine

There are tens of thousands of individuals in

the Air Force whose training and traditions

lead them to identify with one or another of

the major commands, with SAC [Strategic Air

Command] or TAC [Tactical Air Command],

or MAC [Military Airlift Command]. And each

of these bespeaks a vested interest. Each

such interest must be placated, reconciled,

accommodated. These necessities, along with

the never-ending confrontations with other

services fighting for roles and missions, keep

the present-day guardians of Air Force doctrine eternally on the run. They are so busy

putting out fires, few of them find time in

which to think at leisure.

I. B. Holley Jr.

Understanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstraction requires

the simplification and ordering of reality. . . . 

Obviously, the real world is one of blends, irrationalities, and incongruities: actual personalities, institutions, and beliefs do not fit

into neat logical categories. Yet neat logical

categories are necessary if man is to think

profitably about the real world in which he

lives and to derive from it lessons for broader

application and use.

Samuel P. Huntington
232

Doctrine

Example is not the main thing in influencing

others. It is the only thing.

Albert Schweitzer

The JFC and JFACC staff should not have to

sift through dozens of Joint and service publications to discover how to accomplish assessment. Ultimately, the doctrinal confusion is the fault of Joint doctrine. 

Maj Thomas J. Timmerman

Failures in the transmission of information

from the desert back to Britain and on to the

United States are typical of an ancient theme

in military history: the reluctance of tribes,
233

Doctrine

nations, and armed forces to learn except

from their own experience. 

Vincent Orange

Everyone is equal before truth; earnestly advocate creative and pioneering efforts; let a

hundred flowers blossom and a hundred

schools ofthought contend; and weed through

the old to bring forth the new. . . . Draw upon

all advanced and beneficial military thinking;

make foreign experiences serve China’s purposes; and enrich and develop China’s military theories.

Gen Fu Quanyou, chief, PLA general staff, 1998
234

Doctrine

Change and Resistance

Attempting to employ long term fixed doctrine, regulations or legislation to confront

changes resulting from evolution is utterly

futile. The only thing which will remain fixed

is ever increasing change.

Carlo Kopp

The traditions among all the armed services

are much older than any government, more

conservative than any department of government, and more sure to build on a foundation that they are certain of, rather than to

take any chance of making a mistake.

Billy Mitchell

I was to learn later in life that we tend to

meet any new situation by re-organizing; and

a wonderful method it can be for creating the

illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization.

Petronius Arbiter ca. 210 BC

The professional soldier is a purely military

alchemist; he dabbles in tactical and strategic magic, fashions charms and pentacles,

burns incense before training manuals, and

when on the battlefield, if he has ever studied

military history, conjures forth the ghostly

theories of past masters of war in order to

solve the problems which there confront him. 
235

Doctrine

The politician is no better, for he knows nothing of war, and yet feels eminently capable to

control a War Office or an Admiralty, or even

to conduct a campaign. If surgery and medicine were still treated as war is now treated,

we should to-day be using grated unicorn’s

horn and butcher’s knives in our hospitals.

J. F. C. Fuller, 1932

Air power speaks a strategic language so new

that translation into the hackneyed idiom of

the past is impossible.

Alexander de Seversky

The only thing harder than getting a new idea

into a military mind is getting an old one out.

B. H. Liddell Hart

There is nothing permanent except change.

Heraclitus, 513 BC

He that will not apply new remedies must

expect new evils; for time is the greatest

innovator.

Francis Bacon

The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the

rational mind is a faithful servant. We have

created a society that honors the servant and

has forgotten the gift.

Albert Einstein
236

Doctrine

A new idea must have three qualities: First, it

must have dynamic novelty to spark the

imagination; something never tried before. It

must overcome the entrenched opposition. 

Second, it must be feasible of fulfillment, by

new means either available or potential. Third,

it must promise overwhelming capacity to alter the course of history.

Tooey Spaatz

An army is an institution not merely conservative but retrogressive by nature. It has

such natural resistance to progress that it is
237

Doctrine

always insured against the danger of being

pushed ahead too fast.

B. H. Liddell Hart

Contrasting Views

Against a lot of solid armies, it’s necessary to go forth into death ground at

bayonet point and kill the other guy, face

to face. . . . The United States continues

to trust in airpower and magical technology, then hopes for the best. It may

work. But history offers no particular

cause for optimism.

COL Daniel P. Bolger, 2003

Cavalry as an assaulting arm proved

useless against cavalry, and the bayonet, the weapon of . . . shock, was

abruptly dethroned by the bullet [by

1865. The] chief of staff to General J. E. 

B. Stuart writes “recalling all the battles

in which I have borne a part, bayonetfights rarely if ever occur, and exist only

in the imagination.”

J. F. C. Fuller, 1932

When, in 1898, I joined the Army, though a

normally indifferently educated young Englishman, I was appalled by the ignorance
238

Doctrine

which surrounded me and the immense military value attached to it.

J. F. C. Fuller

A Human Being should be able to change a

diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn

a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a

new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently and

die gallantly. Specialization is for insects.

Robert Heinlein
239

Doctrine

Terminology

The clarity and therefore the utility of doctrine is a direct product of how well language 

is used in its writing.

How many a dispute could have been deflated

into a single paragraph if the disputants had

just dared to define their terms.

Aristotle

The beginning of wisdom is calling things by

their right names.

Confucius

On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Declaration

urged Japan to surrender. Thereupon the

Japanese Cabinet agreed that it was time to

make peace, and on July 28 Premier Suzuki

announced a policy of “mokosatsu.” This unfortunate word has no exact counterpart in

English. Its approximate meaning is “to withhold comment,” but it also means “to ignore.”

The Domei News Agency at once broadcast in

English that the Cabinet had decided to ignore the Potsdam ultimatum. After the atomic

bombs had been dropped, President Truman

cited the Japanese rejection of the ultimatum

as a reason. Convincing evidence available

since then shows that the Premier had indeed meant to convey “no comment,” with

the implication that a significant announcement would come later. Connoisseurs of the
240

Doctrine

ifs of history say that the right translation

could have brought quick peace without

atomic explosions.

Peter T. White
241

Doctrine

Joint and Service

A professional is one who does his best work

when he feels the least like working.

Frank Lloyd Wright
242

Doctrine

It was not appreciated, and has scarcely been

appreciated today, that the fighting power of

an army is the product and not the sum of the

arms composing it.

J. F. C. Fuller

The lesson from the last war that stands out

clearly above all others is that if you want to

go anywhere in modern war, in the air, on the

sea, on the land, you must have command of

the air.

Adm William F “Bull” Halsey

House Armed Services Committee report,

October 1949

We are about to invade the continent and have

staked our success on our air superiority, on

Soviet numerical preponderance, and on the

high quality of our ground combat units.

GEN George C. Marshall

Memo to the Secretary of War, 1944

The use of military, naval and aerial forces in

war should be directed toward a single end,

to win. To attain maximum effectiveness

these forces must be coordinated and in harmony with one another. The three forces

should function as ingredients—or factors—

of a single product in which the best results

can be obtained only by a proper apportioning of the ingredients used.

Giulio Douhet
243

Doctrine

War is waged in three elements but there is

no separate land, air, or naval war. Unless all

assets in all elements are efficiently combined and coordinated against a . . . common

objective, their maximum potential power

cannot be realized. 

Dwight Eisenhower

The point to understand is what the ultimate

objective is, and instead of applying that objective to a land war and then organizing joint

forces around the land war, let’s look at it as

we can apply military power directly to the

objective.

Maj Gen Chuck Link, 1996

Now, I will be the first to admit that aerospace

power let others down from the Peloponnesian through Spanish-American wars. 

Gen Michael J. Dugan, USAF, retired, 1998

But I learned as a lieutenant that they were

part-time soldiers, great when they were

available, but not to be relied on routinely. 

They were never there at night, or in bad

weather, or when “priorities” sent them elsewhere. . . . To my knowledge, it has not

changed today, despite the additions of night

vision, infrared sensors, and “smart” bombs. 

The Army has paid a high price for the unfulfilled promises of airpower since World War

II—between wars in budget battles and during wars in facing enemy capabilities with
244

Doctrine

which we were unprepared to cope. . . . Even

with the wondrous capabilities of today’s

technology, airpower is still a part-time participant.

GEN Frederick J. Kroesen

So long as large armies go to battle, so long

will the air arm remain their spearhead.

Cyril Falls

The wider role of mobility and offensive power

lies in the air. And the air force appears to be

cast for the decisive role . . . in the future we

need to think of the army and the air force as

the two main components of military power.

B. H. Liddell Hart

You cannot beat an Air Force with an Army. 

You can’t beat an Air Force with a Navy. But

you can beat either of those with an Air Force. 

It has to do with physics.

Maj Gen Chuck Link

The US Army is incapable of surviving, much

less prevailing, without overhead cover provided by the Air Force. It is myopic to think

that money spent to control airspace somehow detracts from Army effectiveness. It

makes Army effectiveness possible.

Lor­en B. Thompson
245

Doctrine

Joint warfare weaknesses of the U.S. Army,

Navy, and Air Force:

Interservice rivalries limit coordination. 

Intelligence does not reach operators rapidly. 

Space satellites are vulnerable to direct attack. 

Command control nodes are exposed to attack. 

Ports and airfields are vulnerable in initial deployment. 

Each high-tech weapon has its own weakness. 

Aircraft carriers depend on E6 Prowlers. 

U.S. forces are optimized for deserts, not mountains. 

Li Zhiiyun, summarizing views of

75 PLA authors, 1995

We have good corporals and good sergeants

and some good lieutenants and captains, and

those are far more important than good generals.

GEN William Tecumseh Sherman

When I have young airmen who believe that

an air power solution is the right thing to do

but hesitate to say it for fear of appearing un-
246

Doctrine

joint, it’s going too far. If we create an environment in which we raise young military

people to believe that it’s okay to think one

thing and say something else, than we’ll be

rotten at the core, and we can’t afford that.

Maj Gen Chuck Link
247

Twenty 

Good Books

Twenty Good Books

Arnold, Henry H. “Hap.” Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces 

to the Secretary of War. Washington, DC: 

War Department Bureau of Public Relations, 1944. 

Borowski, Harry R., ed. Harmon Memorial 

Lectures in Military History 1959–1987. 

Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988. 

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated 

by Anatol Rapoport. New York: Penguin 

Books, 1968. 

Das, S. T. An Introduction to the Art of War.

New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1970. 

de Seversky, Alexander P. Victory through Air 

Power. New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1942. 

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air.

Translated by Dino Ferrari. Washington, 

DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983. 

Emme, Eugene M. The Impact of Air Power: 

National Security and World Politics.

Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 

1959. 

Fuller, J. F. C. Generalship: Its Diseases and 

Their Cure. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1936. 
248

Twenty 

Good Books

Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: 

A History of Basic Thinking in the United 

States Air Force, 1907–1964. Maxwell 

AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1971. 

Heinl, Robert D., Jr. Dictionary of Military 

and Naval Quotations. Annapolis, MD: 

Naval Institute Press, 1966. 

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports. 

Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987. 

Liddell Hart, Basil H. Strategy. New York: 

New American Library, Inc., 1954. 

Marshall, S. L. A. The Officer as a Leader.

Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966. 

Mitchell, William. Skyways. Philadelphia: 

J. B. Lippincott Co., 1930. 

———. Winged Defense. Port Washington, NY: 

G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925. 

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: 

From Machcavelli to the Nuclear Age.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1986. 

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by 

Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1971.

Tedder, Arthur. Air Power in War. London: 

Hodder and Stoughton, 1948. 
249

Twenty 

Good Books

Warden, John A., III. The Air Campaign. 

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988. 

Watts, Barry D. The Foundations of U.S. Air 

Force Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in 

War. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 

Press, 1984.
Twenty 

Good Books
251

Source Index

42d Bomb Wing report, 52

Aboulafia, Richard L., 139

Achalov, Vladislav, 122

Adler, Elmer D., 194

Air Force Manual: 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, 103, 193; 

1-3, Theater Air Operations, 184, 223; 51-44, Fighter and 

Fighter-Bomber Employment, 166–67, 171, 186

“Air Force Objectives,” 73

Air University Manual 1, 40, 171, 186

Al Nida Republican Guard Division, 123

Alberts, David, 135

Alexander the Great, 192

al-Sahhaf, Muhammad Said, 122

Andrews, Frank M., 29

Aquinas, Thomas, 61

Arbiter, Petronius, 234

Aristotle, 239

Arkin, William M., 112, 115, 147–48, 157

Army Field Manual: 100-5, Operations, 87; 100-20, Field 

Service Regulations, 225

Arnold, H. H. “Hap,” 6, 7, 29, 31–32, 39–40, 48, 128, 

169–70, 185, 193, 209, 223, 230

Ashraf, Tariq Mahmud, 20, 87, 120, 150

Aspin, Les, 103

Augustine, 60

Bacon, Francis, 235

Baldwin, Stanley, 40, 56

Bannon, M. E., 150

Baruch, Bernard M., 195

Bell, Alexander Graham, 16, 71

Benyi, Cao, 145

Bingham, Price T., 53

Blesse, Frederick C. “Boots,” 176

Bok, Derek, 229

Bolger, Daniel P., 237

Bolivar, Simón, 209

Bolling, Raynal C., 203

Boyd, Charles G., 37, 73, 99, 146

Bradley, Omar, 54, 191

Brodie, Bernard, 59, 82, 91, 161

Brown, Harold, 142

Brown, Neville, 45, 131, 151
252

Burke, Arleigh, 219

Burt, Richard, 220

Byman, Daniel L., 114

Byrd, Richard E., 207

Cameron, J. M., 157, 179, 187

Carroll, Rory, 111

Cayley, George, 55

Changzi, Zhang, 25, 50, 54, 107, 140

Charles, Archduke of Austria, 171, 206

Chassin, G. J. M., 156, 173

Churchill, Winston, 4, 11, 17, 36, 42–43, 45, 49, 52, 61, 95, 

154, 221, 229

Cicero, 73

Clark, Wesley K., 113–14, 118, 122

Clarke, Bruce C., 214

Clausewitz, Carl von, 60, 62–64, 66, 68, 72, 76, 79, 83, 

88–90, 92, 178, 192, 199

Cohen, Eliot A., 19, 35, 47, 60, 106, 146

Colin, Jean, 95

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 100

Confucius, 6, 239

Coolidge, Calvin, 29

Cooper, John C., 30

Cordesman, Anthony H., 113, 121, 134

Corley, John, 120

Cummins, Lejeune, 85

Daryl Press, 99, 106

Das, S. T., 40, 156, 167, 171, 174, 182–83, 192

de Chardin, Teilhard, 5

de Guibert, Comte, 193

de Saxe, Maurice, 7, 118, 188, 195

de Seversky, Alexander P., 17, 235

Degen, E. J., 123

Deptula, David A., 22, 33, 72, 104, 113, 157, 224

Deutch, John M., 137

Dickinson, William L., 103

Donham, Wallace B., 155

Doolittle, Jimmy, 13, 170

Douglas, William Sholto, 128

Douhet, Giulio, 17, 37, 56, 127, 242

Drew, Dennis M., 76, 91, 187

du Picq, Ardant, 204

Dugan, Michael J., 114, 243

Dulles, John Foster, 59

Earle, Edward Meade, 37
253

Eccles, Henry E., 193–94

Echols, Oliver P., 14, 195

Einstein, Albert, 235

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 128, 168, 193, 243

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 212

Emme, Eugene M., 24, 229

Enze, Shu, 136

Euripides, 197

Falls, Cyril, 244

Foch, Ferdinand, 6

Fogleman, Ronald R., 12, 20, 23, 32–33, 44, 109, 147–48, 

212

Fontenot, Gregory, 123

Forester, C. S., 183

Fortescue, John, 51

Frankland, Noble, 11

Franklin, Benjamin, 81, 189

Franz, Wallace P., 65

Frederick the Great, 3–4, 6, 51, 95, 171, 173, 189, 197, 206, 

212, 214

Frontinus, Sextus Julius, 56

Fuller, J. F. C., 7, 54, 65, 71, 76, 93, 137, 149, 162, 172, 

176–77, 191, 205, 218, 235, 237–38, 242

Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, The, 44

Gabriel, Charles A., 191

Galland, Adolf, 46

Garstka, John, 135

Geiger, Keith W., 5

Genda, Minoru, 166

“General Air Force Principles,” 165

Ghassan, 123

Global Reach–Global Power, 24

Goebbels, Joseph, 41

Gold, Philip, 22, 158

Gordon, Michael, 105

Grabowski, Thomas, 133

Greenfield, Meg, 84

Grimsley, William, 124

Groves, P. R. C., 30

Guderian, Heinz, 49

Guicciardini, Francesco, 85

Hackett, John W., 205

Hackworth, David, 104

Hagenbeck, Franklin L., 119

Hale, James O., 4
254

Hallion, Richard P., 12, 109, 134, 146–47, 153, 220

Halsey, William F. “Bull,” 242

Handy, John W., 25

Hart, B. H. Liddell, 41, 67, 77–78, 172, 176, 178, 180, 

182–83, 195, 235, 237, 244

Hearst, William Randolph, 135

Hedges, Chris, 110

Heinlein, Robert, 238

Hemingway, Ernest, 60

Hendrix, John W., 114

Heraclitus, 208, 235

Heyman, Charles, 117

Hildner, Robert E., 86

Ho Chi Minh, 68

Holbrooke, Richard, 108

Holley, I. B., Jr., 130, 229–31

Horner, Charles A. “Chuck,” 28, 100, 196

Howard, Michael, 77

Hubbard, Elbert, 208

Hughes, Daniel J., 174

Huntington, Samuel P., 231

Hussein, Saddam, 12

Huxley, T. H., 207

Iino, Matsuichi, 49

Implementation Force, 69

Jackson, Andrew, 197

James, Daniel “Chappie,” Jr., 62

Jincheng, Wei, 136

Johnson, J. E. “Johnnie,” 68, 154

Johnson, Lyndon B., 26, 60

Johnson, Terry L., 104

Joint Publication 0-2, 72

Jones, Stephen B., 48

Jonson, Ben, 5

Jordan, David Starr, 59

Jumper, John P., 27, 112

Kay, David A., 34

Keaney, Thomas A., 106

Keegan, John, 105, 111, 115, 117, 124

Kelvin, William Thomson, 55

Kenney, George, 13, 165, 190, 216, 223

Kernan, William F., 75

King, E. J., 194

Kissinger, Henry, 85

Koller, Karl, 18, 155
255

Kopp, Carlo, 150, 234

Kroesen, Frederick J., 101, 244

Lambeth, Ben, 23, 25, 117

Lawrence, T. E., 184

Lee, Robert E., 212

LeMay, Curtis E., 83, 210

Lenin, Vladimir I., 77

Libicki, Martin C., 138, 149

Lincoln, Abraham, 192, 207

Link, Chuck, 21–22, 43, 47, 50, 108, 147, 243–44, 246

Lord, Lance, 27

Lyles, Lester P., 26

MacArthur, Douglas, 5, 128

MacIsaac, David, 36

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 76, 219, 222

Mao Tse-tung, 95, 194

Marlborough, First Duke of (John Churchill), 33

Marshall, George C., 210, 218, 242

Marshall, S. L. A., 210, 216

Mason, Tony, 24, 46

McCaffrey, Barry R., 121, 124

McLendon, James W., 136

McPeak, Merrill A., 144

Meigs, Montgomery C., 84, 116

Mengxiong, Chang, 135, 140

Mets, David R., 127, 151, 230

Meyer, John C., 178

Meyer, Kurt, 41

“Milos,” 111

Milosevic, Slobodan, 108

Milton, T. Ross, 39

Mitchell, Billy, 234

Moltke, the Elder, 91, 187

Monash, Sir John, 195, 221

Montgomery, Bernard Law, 13, 18, 181

Moore, Royal N., Jr., 103

Moorman, Thomas S., Jr., 31

Moseley, T. Michael, 19, 24, 120–21

Mowbray, James A., 102

Musashi, Miyamoto, 69

Napoléon, 67, 69–71, 88, 91, 154, 163, 167–69, 189, 209, 

214

“National Economic Structures,” 74

Newcomb, Simon, 56

Nunn, Sam, 137
256

Odom, Thomas P., 104

Olds, Robin, 93, 176

O’Malley, Jerome F., 83

Oman, Sir Charles, 168

Omar, Mullah, 117

Orange, Vincent, 233

Ovid, 72

Owen, Robert C., 109, 110

Pace, Dave “Preacher,” 3

Paine, Thomas, 66, 163

Palmer, Williston B., 211

Pape, Robert A., 108, 121

Patton, George S., 69, 169, 171, 212, 214

Patzalyuk, Viktor, 101

Pears, Sir Steuart, 87

Perry, William J., 132, 143

Peters, F. Whitten, 32, 137

Petrarch, 59

Pike, John, 124

Powell, Colin, 19, 115–16

Przybyslawski, Anthony F., 116

Pufeng, Wang, 135, 140

Puller, Lewis “Chesty,” 213

Quanyou, Fu, 233

Quesada, Elwood R. “Pete,” 223

Radford, Arthur, 17

Raleigh, Walter, 162

Ralston, Joe, 113

Reading, Rufus Isaacs, 85

Reimer, Dennis J., 109

Rezun, Miron, 102

Ridgway, Matthew B., 191

Roche, James G., 27

Rogers, F. M., 192

Rommel, Erwin, 46, 49, 53

Roosevelt, Theodore, 170

Roskill, S. W., 205

Ruge, Friedrich, 50

Rumsfeld, Donald, 116

Russell, Charles A., 86

Ryan, Michael, 33

Scales, Robert H., 104

Schriever, Bernard “Bernie,” 28, 127

Schwarzkopf, Norman, 99, 215
257

Schweitzer, Albert, 232

Shalikashvili, John, 133

Shenxia, Zheng, 25, 50, 54, 107, 140

Sherman, William Tecumseh, 217, 245

Shinohara, Masaru, 185

Sigaud, Louis A., 169

Situation report to headquarters, Burma, 11

Sizov, Yu. G., 102

Skokov, A. L., 102

Slessor, Sir John C., 16, 18, 39, 51–52, 71, 81, 84, 161, 165, 

172, 174

Slim, Sir William, 208, 222

Sluglett, Peter, 86

Smith, Dale O., 42, 206

Smith, Walter Bedell, 83

Snow, Donald M., 76, 91, 187

Sophocles, 197

Spaatz, Carl A. “Tooey,” 13, 35, 45, 48, 53, 236

Spruance, Raymond A., 187

“Squadron Leader,” 7

Stan Eval “famous aviator,” 4

Stein, George J., 136, 138

Stevenson, Robert Louis, 79

Sullivan, Gordon R., 105, 118

Summers, Harry G., 65, 112

Suvorov, Aleksandr V., 77

Sykes, F. H., 30

Tedder, Arthur William, 43, 69, 71, 168, 179

Teets, Peter B., 26

Tennyson, Alfred, 55

Thatcher, Margaret, 129

Thomas, Timothy L., 136

Thompson, Lor­en B., 244

Thucydides, 162

Timmerman, Thomas J., 119, 232

Tohn, David, 123

Trainor, Bernard E. “Mick,” 74, 105

Trenchard, Hugh, 35, 156

Tunner, William H., 30

Twining, Nathan F., 83, 164, 170, 197–98

Tzu, Sun, 6, 61, 66, 68, 70, 78–80, 82–83, 93, 172–73, 175, 

181, 185

US Strategic Bombing Survey, 82

USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996, 131–34, 139, 152

van Creveld, Martin, 33
258

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., 5, 15

Vauthier, Arsene, 17

Vego, Milan, 119

Vickers, Michael G., 114

von Mellenthin, F. W., 46

von Richthofen, Manfred, 175, 177

von Steuben, Friedrich, 169

Walker, J. R. “Johnnie,” 94

Warden, John A., III, 38, 74, 105, 141, 175

Washington Post, 122

Washington, George, 81

Watts, Barry D., 4

Wavell, Earl A. P., 94

Waxman, Matthew C., 114

Weiguang, Shen, 136

Welch, Larry D., 130

Wellington, First Duke of (Arthur Wellesley), 133, 194, 

217–18

Wells, H. G., 16, 56

White, Peter T., 240

White, Thomas D., 27

Widnall, Sheila E., 30

Wright, Frank Lloyd, 241

Wynne, Michael, 47

Yeager, Charles E. “Chuck,” 29

Yinnian, Li, 138

Yokoi, Toshiyuki, 77

Younger, Stephen, 152

Zengfu, Ming, 46, 148

Zhigarev, P. F., 186

Zhiiyun, Li, 245

Zuckerman, Mortimer B., 152
259

Topical Index

about brevity, 4

administration and combat support, 218

advice, 214

Air Force airpower, 19

airpower, 9

airpower and maneuver, 47

airpower prophecy, 55

airpower theories, 13

another principle: poise, 198

art of studying circumstances, 93

assumptions, 6

basics, 229

challenge, 3

change and resistance, 234

Clausewitz on policy and war, 63

command, 201, 209

command arrangements, 222

commander and the staff, 216

communications, 191

“complete” uses of airpower, 35

constants—if not principles—of war, 191

control of the air, 43

defender’s dilemma, 173

deterrence, 81

doctrine, 227

economic and political objectives, 39

economy of force, 182

effects, 72

effects of introducing technology, 131

elements of airpower, 29

emergence of stealth, 142

expeditionary airpower, 32

FM 100-20, 225

foundation, 161

friction, war’s resistant medium, 88

global airpower perspective, 24

human factors in war, 203

impact, 127

information, 135
260

information management, 220

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 133

interdiction, attrition, and counterland, 51

irregular warfare, 84

joint and service, 241

limits of the offensive, 174

logistics, 192

maneuver and mobility, 185

mass, concentration, and economy of force, 179

nature of airpower, 16

nature of war, 59

objective, 165

objectives of airpower employment, 37

offensive aim, 172

offensive spirit, 176

offensive, initiative, and surprise, 170

oils for the friction of war, 90

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo), 111

Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia), 108

Operation Desert Storm, 99

Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–), 116

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–), 121

outcomes and arguments, 97

precision, 146

principles of war, 159

professional growth, 205

psychological effects, 41

public support, 191

reactions to technology, 156

security, 189

simplicity, 187

space power, 26

stealth, 141

strategy, 76

synergies, 151

technology, 125

technology and numbers, 154

terminology, 239

three British principles, 198

time, 196

time and space, 68
261

United States airpower, 22

unity of command, 168

unmanned aerial vehicles, 149

using the initiative: agitation, 174

using the initiative: alternatives, 175

war, 57

war as art and science, 65
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Military Airpower

A Revised Digest of Airpower 

Opinions and Thoughts

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Jeanne Shamburger

Copy Editor

Sherry Terrell

Cover Art and Book Design 

Steven C. Garst

Illustrations 

Daniel Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Ann Bailey

Quality Review

Mary J. Moore

Print Preparation

Joan Hickey

Distribution

Diane Clark