U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis, Director February 1996

continued . . .

Implementation Challenges in

Community Policing

Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in

Eight Cities

by Susan Sadd and Randolph M. Grinc

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: An NIJsponsored evaluation of Innovative

Neighborhood-Oriented Policing

(INOP) programs, which were established with Bureau of Justice Assistance support in eight urban and

suburban sites in 1990. Distinguished

by their focus on neighborhood drug

problems, the programs used community policing techniques, particularly police-community partnerships,

to attempt to lower the demand for

illegal drugs.

Key issues: Implementation issues

received special emphasis in the

study: the extent to which police officers understood and supported the

projects and the degree to which

other public agencies and the community were involved. The study also

examined police and residents’ perceptions of INOP’s impact. Because

the evaluation was conducted relatively soon after the programs were

adopted, it could not assess longterm effects.

Key findings: Evaluation of INOP

programs revealed:

● The major implementation challenges were resistance by police officers to community policing and the

difficulty of involving other public

agencies and of organizing the

community.

● With the exception of one site, the

involvement of other public agencies

was limited.

Community policing could arguably be

called the new orthodoxy of law enforcement in the United States. It has become

an increasingly popular alternative to

what many police administrators perceive as the failure of traditional policing

to deal effectively with street crime, especially crimes of violence and drug trafficking. Although the concept is defined

in varying ways and its ability to meet its

goals remains largely untested, community policing has gained widespread acceptance. According to one source, about

40 percent of the Nation’s larger police

departments have adopted it.1

Community-centered drug

demand reduction

If community policing has been a central

aspect of emerging police agendas in

many jurisdictions throughout the country, so has drug demand reduction. Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing

(INOP) is unique in drawing on the principles of community policing and applying them to drug demand reduction. One

of these principles—a major component

of community policing—is that partnerships between the police and the community can be effective in reducing crime and

fear. In focusing on a particular issue,

INOP also draws on the principles of problem-solving policing.

Demand reduction can involve intensive

local street-level enforcement, which

makes it more difficult for buyers and sellers to link up with each other and may dissuade new users from becoming addicted.

Beyond intensive enforcement, which is

the more common focus of police initiatives directed at illegal drug use, demand

reduction can also include prevention and

treatment. What is unique about INOP is

its attempt to supplement traditional enforcement with long-term communitybased prevention, education, and

treatment referral. Combining all these

components, INOP projects approximate a

comprehensive approach to demand reduction. Ideally, all components are represented in a given project. In the INOP

projects analyzed in this Research in Brief,

each contained some but not all the

components.
2

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Issues and Findings

continued . . .

● Police officers generally did not understand community policing; saw

INOP assignments as conferring an

elite status; perceived INOP as less

productive, more time-consuming,

and more resource-intensive than traditional policing; and felt their powers, particularly to enforce the law,

were restrained.

● Average citizens had less knowledge than community leaders about

INOP and were reluctant to participate; their reasons included fear of

drug dealers’ retaliation and cynicism

about the perceived short duration of

the project.

● The perceived effects of INOP on

drug trafficking were mixed; they resulted in geographic and temporal

displacement of markets. In the sites

where people thought INOP had reduced crime, fear of crime declined.

● Most site residents believed their

relationship with the police had improved, even where the effect on

drugs, crime, and fear was believed

to be minimal.

● INOP’s limited success in reducing

drug crime and fear may be related to

the obstacles generally encountered

in transforming program ideas into

action—especially within the short

timeframe of this evaluation.

Target audience: Law enforcement

officials and administrators; city and

county officials, managers, and administrators; community organizations; and researchers.

The INOP program

INOP was designed in 1990 by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S.

Department of Justice, as a demonstration program to further the National

Drug Control Strategy by focusing on

and broadening the scope of communitybased approaches to drug demand reduction. INOP projects are based on the

notion that crime and drug problems

must be addressed by the entire community, not just by the police department.

Because of the nature and extent of the

drug problem, traditional police tactics

are limited in their ability to control it.

Proactive and interactive approaches by

communities and the police have thus

become essential to accomplish both law

enforcement and community objectives.

INOP’s goal is to develop strategies for

demand reduction that are centered in

the community and anchored in the

police-community partnership. Police

departments are to act as catalysts for

developing and sustaining a coordinated

network of neighborhood services.2

Eight jurisdictions were selected by BJA

as the sites of initial INOP demonstration projects. (See exhibit 1.) Each site

was awarded between $100,000 and

$200,000 for the first year of its program.3 The sites differed greatly in

population size and consequently in the

Exhibit 1: Size of INOP Jurisdictions and Police Departments

Jurisdiction Population Police Department

Size (Sworn Staff)

Hayward, California 120,000 156

Houston, Texas 1,700,000 3,950

Louisville, Kentucky 300,000 671

New York, New York 8,000,000 25,869

Norfolk, Virginia 261,000 684

Portland, Oregon 418,000 850

Prince George’s County, Maryland 700,000 1,230

Tempe, Arizona 145,000 234

Note: The figures reflect the information available at the time of the study.

size of the police agency that served

them. They also differed in their relationships to other neighborhood-oriented

policing initiatives within the jurisdiction. In several, for example, the INOP

project was the police department’s first

effort at implementing a neighborhoodoriented style of policing. In others, it

was a relatively small component of a

larger, citywide neighborhood-oriented

policing initiative that was either new or

well established.

In general, the projects shared a police

enforcement component (except in New

York), a focus on target neighborhoods,

community involvement, and interagency planning and partnerships. Drug

demand reduction was the goal shared

by all, but the approaches differed substantially. Some sites featured components that met particular community

needs, such as an extensive public advertising campaign or reliance on

volunteers.

Evaluation issues and methods

The INOP projects were evaluated by

the Vera Institute of Justice under National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsorship, about 1 year after each had been

launched. The process evaluation presented indepth descriptions of the sites

and cross-site comparisons of program
3

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

structure and operations and expectations of the various groups—police

personnel, municipal and community

leaders, and others—who had roles in

the projects.

Measuring effects on crime. The impact evaluation, which is discussed in

this document, examined the effects of

the INOP projects on drug demand,

public safety, and the quality of life of

the communities and identified the

characteristics of the projects that contributed to (or tended to detract from)

program effectiveness.

The effects were measured in terms of

the perceptions of the people involved

in the projects—police officers and

administrators, other police agency

personnel, residents, and business

people. Effects were measured both

within each site and across the sites.

Specifically, the individuals interviewed (a total of 552 in the eight

sites) were asked for their views of the

effects on drug use and drug trafficking, drug-related crime and other

crime, fear, quality of life in the area,

police-community relations, and level

of community organization and

involvement.

Implementation issues. Another part

of the evaluation analyzed project

implementation based on comparisons

among all sites. The research conducted for this analysis employed a variety of methods: interviews, focus

groups, field observations by the researchers, and review of evaluations

conducted locally when these were

available. The implementation issues

included police acceptance of/resistance to INOP, extent of community

organization and involvement, and extent of involvement of public agencies

other than the police.

One of the most significant findings—

but one that may come as no surprise—was that early stages of

implementing community policing are

not easy. This was the experience in

all eight jurisdictions. For one thing, it

was difficult to convince police officers to accept the new roles and behaviors required for community policing. Citizen involvement—the linchpin

of community policing—was particularly challenging. Despite acknowledgment by some residents (largely

community leaders) of community policing as valuable, activism was generally confined to a small group of

dedicated individuals. The comprehensive approach that is another hallmark of community policing was not

carried out to the extent it might have

been because the involvement of agencies other than the police was, at best,

limited at most sites.

Evaluation timing. The timing of the

evaluation goes a long way to explain

the findings regarding implementation

difficulties. The evaluation began in

mid-1991, with data collection ending

about a year later. (The timing of the

evaluation was determined by receipt

of funding from NIJ.) Most of the

projects were launched in mid-1990—

only a year before the start of the

evaluation. These dates are important

to keep in mind because they indicate

that the INOP projects were at varying

stages of implementation, most of them

empe began its INOP project in

November 1990 as a pilot program in a

single police ministation, designated as

Beat 16. Since then the police department has used its experiences in Beat 16

to expand community policing.

Expansion of community policing.

The department expanded community

policing citywide in mid-1993 and continues to be committed to the approach.

One reflection of this commitment is the

streamlining of command: The number

of ranks has been reduced from eight to

five, and the rank of detective has been

eliminated.

Continued community organizing.

The citizens’ Coordinating Committee

turned over its responsibilities to the parent organization, the Escalante Neighborhood Association (ENA). Since then

the Beat 16 officers and ENA have held

discussions concerning police activity

and problem solving. The department

T also has a citizen volunteer program

that has grown from three members in

1988 to more than 200. Its motto, created by a volunteer, is “We are not an

arm of the police; we are the heart of

the community.”

The department also continues to operate a Citizens Police Academy, begun

during the Beat 16 project, that offers

citizens an opportunity to learn about

the department and its responsibilities.

Many citizens who attend the 6-week

evening course become volunteers with

the department.

The department recently initiated a

citywide multi-unit housing program

that had been in the planning stages for

more than a year. It aims to alleviate

drugs and crime in apartments and

other multi-unit dwellings, and it includes landlord and tenant education

supported by community policing

activities.

Recent Developments in Tempe, Arizona
4

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

up and running only a short time before they were subjected to evaluation.

In other words, they did not have much

time to become fully operational.

The project in Hayward, California, is

one example. It began fairly late—in

1991—and its central component, a

mobile van, was not put into operation

until the researchers’ final site visit.

The projects continued to progress after the evaluations were completed. In

Tempe, Arizona, followup through

mid-1993 revealed the extent of

progress achieved. (See “Recent Developments in Tempe, Arizona.”)

Because the INOP projects had little

time to establish a “track record,” it is

not possible to come to any definitive

conclusions regarding long-term outcomes. Many of the difficulties the

projects encountered need to be considered in light of this timeframe. For

this reason, the evaluation is best interpreted as an assessment of the

INOP projects at a very early stage of

their development and over a brief period of time. Nevertheless, the findings

also make clear that much remains to

be learned about the optimal approach

to structuring the various components

of this type of program.

Applying the lessons. In addition, it is

important to note the small scale of

many of these INOP projects, which

often constituted only a single component of a police department’s operations. For this reason it would be

difficult to apply the lessons of their

experiences to those of police departments generally. Moreover, because

the evaluation was not national in

scope, the same reasoning would

apply.

The challenges in implementing INOP

led to the conclusion that the evaluation findings would be particularly

useful for jurisdictions that have community policing initiatives in the planning stages. The experiences of the

eight INOP demonstration sites could

help these jurisdictions avoid some of

the difficulties they might otherwise

encounter and influence them not to

abandon their plans but to improve the

likelihood of their success. In this way,

implementation of community policing

at the neighborhood level could be accomplished more smoothly and

productively.

Eight distinctive jurisdictions

and programs

Hayward, California—CommunityOriented Policing and Problem

Solving (COPPS)

Hayward is a relatively low-income

community in which a majority of the

population is white, but there is also a

great deal of ethnic diversity. The entire city was targeted for INOP, although one area with a pervasive drug

problem received more attention than

others.

Community policing was a fairly recent development, introduced in 1991.

The department reorganized to accommodate the new approach by decentralizing patrol, and all officers

became community policing officers.

The cornerstone of INOP was a large

van, the Neighborhood Access Vehicle, intended for use as a mobile office and community meeting place. It

was to serve as a source of referral information and to make the police more

accessible and more visible in neighborhoods where it was deployed. INOP

was also to include drug enforcement

in the schools that would involve cooperation between the police and school

principals. Enforcement through a

Tactical Narcotics Team took place on

a parallel track.

COPPS training was held for all police

personnel. The volunteers of Neighborhood Alert, a block watch group active in the city for 20 years, were also

trained in a range of topics, and training for rental unit managers in recognizing drug abuse was planned. Plans

were also made to increase the number

of Neighborhood Alert groups.

INOP helped solidify the interagency

cooperation that had existed for several years in the “Beat Health Team,”

which addressed issues of public

health and disorder. INOP developed

an information and referral resource

guide to facilitate citizen access to

other agencies’ services and a guide to

alcoholism, drug abuse, and family

support services.

Houston, Texas—Operation Siege

There were two INOP target areas in

Houston. In one, which experienced

the city’s most serious crime, the major problems were prostitution, crack

cocaine, and abandoned buildings

used by crack dealers. The other contained many “cantinas” (bars) that

residents associated with criminal

activity.

Houston’s experience with neighborhood-oriented, problem-solving policing dated to 1982, and 5 years later

plans were made (but then abandoned)

to adopt community policing

departmentwide. INOP emphasized

enforcement through a strategy of

high-visibility patrol aimed at open-air

drug activity, monitoring of the

cantinas, and covert operations and intelligence gathering targeted to drug

sellers and suspects.
5

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

The emphasis on enforcement did not

preclude community involvement. Operation Siege opened with a series of

meetings with community groups to

identify problems and plan strategy.

The police enhanced their relationship

with Neighborhood Watch, which

monitored the cantinas; in this target

area citizens formed a patrol and were

given CB radios to contact the police.

In the other target area the police

helped revitalize a community organization, which in turn helped supply information and aided the police in other

ways. The police also helped elderly

homeowners in “target hardening,” providing locks and doors free of charge to

a number of them. No formal partnerships were established with other city

agencies, but some informal links were

made with individuals within these

agencies.

Louisville, Kentucky—CommunityOriented Policing (COP)

INOP was adopted in one (and subsequently a second) of the six police districts in Louisville. The initial district

was selected because it had the highest

level of violent crime in the city and

had been the center of heroin trafficking. It was also plagued by high unemployment, and a substantial number of

liquor stores and bars had been identified as drug-trafficking locations. INOP

had two phases, planning and problem

identification, followed by strategy development and implementation. Phase

two focused on problem solving, primarily in a park identified as a site of drug

activity.

Since the police were involved districtwide, there was no recruitment, and all

officers were expected ultimately to

participate. The enforcement strategy

used almost exclusively was a task

force of officers who employed a variety

of techniques (surveillance, for example) for a few weeks to a few

months, depending on the problem.

Prevention/education was also part of

the strategy, with some community

members trained in drug abuse prevention, and an education campaign

to create awareness of drug issues

was planned.

A project committee and a strategy

committee, consisting of police officers and community members, were

formed and later consolidated into

one. Among other activities, the committee conducted an “advertising”

campaign and held community forums to define priority issues. Community involvement was built on the

foundation of a number of active,

organized block associations that predated INOP. Several block association leaders became active members

of the project committee.

In enforcement, the police department received cooperation and assistance from the city-county narcotics

unit whose director pledged support.

INOP created 12 partnerships with

city agencies, including those responsible for job training, housing, health,

and parks and recreation. The mayor

formally endorsed “COP” (as INOP

was called) and mandated cooperation by all supporting agencies. COP

also became a member of the citycounty drug rehabilitation, education,

and enforcement program, which

linked the project to a consortium of

treatment and prevention initiatives.

New York City—Community Patrol

Officer Program (CPOP)

By 1988 community policing in New

York had been instituted citywide, although the approach has since

evolved. The INOP project targeted

three precincts: in East Harlem, the

Bronx, and Brooklyn. Each had a substantial drug problem, a large proportion of low-income residents, and a

large proportion of minority residents.

The INOP precincts each had a van (a

converted motor home) parked outside

an elementary or junior high school in

areas of active drug markets. Services

(such as youth counseling) were provided in them and the adjacent

schools. Information on drug prevention was also available. The vans were

not used for citizen reporting of crime

or providing other information about

crime. Rather, citizens who had this

type of information were instructed to

go to the precinct or to call in reports.

The presence of the vans was expected

to encourage school attendance. Because the vans were to be seen as a

community—not a police—resource,

they were not to be staffed by police.

However, lack of volunteers led to assignment of a police coordinator.

The Tactical Narcotics Teams, a

street-level, buy-and-bust enforcement

program, conducted drug sweeps at the

time the vans were set up. Otherwise,

the enforcement component was not

large. Community Patrol Officers, who

were assigned walking beats, provided

drug prevention activities and referrals

to treatment, and they patrolled the

area around the vans to take information about drug use in the area and to

ensure the safety of people using them.

Community volunteers were recruited

through the Parent-Teacher Associations and received training, and the

Manhattan District Attorney’s office

also trained volunteers. Outreach also

included introduction of the Neighborhood Resource Centers (the vans) to

residents, with requests for volunteers

to staff them.
6

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Several public and private agencies

were involved: the Board of Education;

Victim Services Agency; the Department of Health; the Department of

Youth Services; the nonprofit Citizens

Committee for New York City;

MOSAIC, a Bronx community center;

and the District Attorney’s Office. The

Department of Health, for example,

provided an injury-prevention component, and Youth Services provided a

counselor.

Norfolk, Virginia—Police-Assisted

Community Enforcement (PACE)

Although concentrated in and around

public housing, the INOP project in

Norfolk was part of a citywide program

called PACE, which involved all city

agencies. By the end of the evaluation

research, PACE had been established

in 10 areas, with plans for 2 more.

Crime and calls for service were to be

reduced in a 3-stage process of

sweeps, stepped-up patrols, and community partnerships. PACE included

all officers, although some were involved more than others. All officers,

including the chief, received introductory training, followed by ongoing

inservice training.

Stage 1 was an assault on street drug

activity through intelligence gathering,

undercover operations, and saturation

patrols. The major component of drug

prevention was an athletic league for

young people. Other features included

working with the D.A.R.E.® (Drug

Abuse Resistance Education) program

in the schools, demolition of abandoned buildings, attention to physical

disorder, evictions of drug dealers, and

screening of rental applicants.

Police outreach began in Stage 2, with

introduction of the program to the

community. Police met with community leaders to organize Neighborhood

Watch and Operation Identification.

PACE representatives attended community meetings and other functions.

“Community Service Days,” featuring

representatives of city agencies, were

organized. Stage 3, whose goal was full

community partnership and a reduced

burden on the police, was not fully

implemented.

Interagency coordination was extensive and mandated, and all city agencies had a role. The Support Services

Committee, which coordinated the services of police and other city agencies,

addressed specific issues like family

services and signs of physical

disorder.

Portland, Oregon—Iris Court

Community Policing Demonstration

Project

Portland INOP was a demonstration

project, one of three established in

each of the city’s three police precincts as part of community policing,

which began in 1989. The focus was a

public-housing complex where most of

the units were occupied by low-income

residents. Evidence suggested that

many of them were drug-dependent.

This site and three adjacent housing

projects were selected primarily because of high levels of open-air drug

dealing, calls for service to the police,

and gang violence. The project served

the 159 residents of the housing

complexes.

The projects had several related components: enforcement/high-visibility

patrol, a “Neighborhood Response

Team” of two uniformed patrol officers, a civilian project coordinator, a

community health nurse, a community

policing contact office, partnerships

between residents and social service

providers, use of Crime Prevention

Through Environmental Design

(CPTED) principles, and resident organizing and empowerment. The emphasis on human services partnerships

with other agencies made this project

unique among the INOP sites.

The primary method of drug demand

reduction was coordination and provision of social services. The contact office provided referral to services rather

than functioning as a police ministation. The project coordinator, a civilian employee of the police department,

worked full time in the contact office

linking residents with service providers, making referrals, and coordinating

outreach. Training landlords in how to

keep drug activity out of their properties was another INOP component

(though not in Iris Court).

Service provision aimed at improving

the quality of life of the Iris Court residents to make drug use less attractive

to at-risk youths. The enforcement/

high-visibility patrol component was

begun, however, just before INOP was

launched and was intended to convince residents the neighborhood was

safe to some degree. The rationale was

that before Iris Court residents would

take advantage of the social services

based in their neighborhood, they

needed to feel safe. The means to that

end were eviction of suspected drug

traffickers and people engaged in

other illegal activities, enforcement of

the trespass ordinance, and streetlevel drug enforcement.

Community outreach responsibility lay

primarily with the Neighborhood Response Team; its two members attended resident association meetings,

and they worked with the residents’

council and in the contact office.

Through the city housing authority and
7

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

the project coordinator’s outreach efforts, the residents’ council and a tenants’ association were organized.

Prince George’s County, Maryland—

Community-Oriented Policing Squad

(COPS)

The INOP project was located in a

single patrol sector of one police district of this bedroom suburb of Washington, D.C. The area is a “line”

district, so-called because it shares

some of the problems of crime and

poverty that characterize the adjacent

areas of its urban neighbor.

Problem-solving policing was not unknown, but the project was part of an

expansion of the police force. The aim

of the expansion was to devote staff for

the first time to continuous neighborhood-oriented problem solving in a department long known for its sometimes

strained relations with the community.

COPS officers were selected after a

call for volunteers.

Satellite offices established in problemridden apartment complexes offered information about community services.

The COPS officers’ presence several

hours a week was designed to reduce

fear and increase police visibility. The

officers patrolled (sometimes on foot),

conducted community outreach, provided service referrals, and identified

and addressed neighborhood problems.

Information about prevention was available at the offices, and COPS officers

were involved in drug prevention and

treatment activities.

Enforcement included police use of information from community sources to

identify narcotics locations. The COPS

officers also conducted traffic checks

at entrances of apartment complexes

known for drug activity and explored

avenues of civil enforcement.

Community members were represented

on the planning committee, the

project’s advisory group, which consisted also of representatives of several

county agencies. COPS officers established small planning committees on

their beats and worked with church

groups, Neighborhood Watch and

Business Watch, tenant organizations,

and municipal officials.

Tempe, Arizona—Beat 16

Beat 16, an economically disadvantaged but stable area of Tempe, had a

long-standing heroin trafficking problem and a large number of calls for

service. INOP, Tempe’s introduction to

community policing, was centered in a

police ministation created as a modular unit in a park. It was established as

a pilot project in a single beat, with assignment to a single squad of officers

on a long-term basis.

The approach differed more philosophically than operationally from traditional policing. The responsibilities

of Beat 16 were like those of routine

operations except that its officers were

not responsible for calls outside their

beat and could set priorities and delay

response to calls. The project focused

primarily on education and prevention,

and the ministation was the site of a

drug information hotline. Ties were established with several prevention programs for youths. There was also an

enforcement component that began

with a drug sweep of the area.

The officers recruited for the project

received intensive training and were

encouraged to become familiar with

problems of the beat and to interact

with residents. Several members of the

citizens’ Coordinating Committee were

also trained at the department’s Citizen Police Academy.

Each officer on the Beat 16 squad

attended meetings of a specific homeowners’ association or other neighborhood group. The Coordinating

Committee—consisting of representatives of community groups, business

leaders, service providers, and city officials—was a central feature. It created links with other agencies, and it

was to have had an active role in defining problems and identifying resources but was disbanded because of

lack of interest on the part of community residents and difficulties in defining its role and that of its members.

The activities of the committee were

then taken over by another group.

Evaluation findings

Police understanding and support.

Gaining police acceptance was one of

the major implementation challenges

of INOP. Like many other jurisdictions

that have adopted community policing,

the INOP sites experienced resistance

from many patrol officers. Some resistance may have derived from labormanagement problems and from

problems at the institutional level. In

this respect, the sites resembled other

organizations in which management

has had difficulty communicating its

goals to employees. In other words, the

resistance of patrol officers may not always have been to community policing

itself; rather, it may have resulted from

the low credibility accorded to any

management-instituted change or reform. Because most of the projects had

been in operation less than a year before the evaluation began, they had

little time to overcome this obstacle.4

Lack of knowledge. The majority of

the INOP projects consisted of pilot or

experimental community policing

units in target areas rather than
8

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

jurisdictionwide undertakings, and the

officers not involved in them had little

knowledge of them. This lack of

knowledge, which may be traced to inadequate communication of project

goals at the outset, was a major factor

in the limited support for community

policing among police officers.

Most INOP projects expended considerable effort in explaining project

goals and operations as part of their

training of INOP officers. However,

the bulk of the training focused on

these officers alone, and even the officers who were trained often displayed only a rudimentary

understanding of community policing.

(See “Preparatory Steps: Training and

Technical Assistance.”)

In general, when officers (both those

involved in the INOP projects and

those not involved) were asked about

the INOP project goals or for their

definition of community policing, they

would note its emphasis on community

outreach and the new relationship envisioned between police and community residents. Only occasionally did

officers mention problem-solving activities or interagency cooperation as

elements of community policing or the

INOP projects. Most police officers defined “real” police work as work involving crime-related tasks.

The lack of understanding is not

unique to the INOP sites. Because

community policing is still relatively

new, inadequate definition and understanding of its goals and means have

complicated implementation. The officers themselves did not have a single

definition, although all their definitions shared some common elements

(such as involvement of the community) that can be conveyed in training.

The ambitious nature of the community policing mission—calling for a

new role for the patrol officer—also

creates implementation difficulties.

Community policing is a fight for the

“hearts and minds” of patrol officers

and the public. It may be that the

INOP sites underestimated the difficulties of this challenge. Officers who

eventually embraced the idea of community policing enough to volunteer

for the INOP projects recognized the

scope of this challenge when they

noted that because of their nontraditional nature, the projects needed not

just to be described by management

but to be actively “sold” to patrol officers. Such an undertaking, involving

a shift in the culture of policing, would

no doubt take more time to produce results than was available to these

projects—more time than the period of

the evaluation. In New York and

Houston, even after 10 years experience with community policing, many

officers contended that there was little

support among the rank and file. This

suggests that acceptance by officers

may take a very long time.

Opposition to special-unit status. Because for most of the police departments INOP was the first experience

with community policing, the projects

were usually established as distinct

units within patrol, rather than

departmentwide. The introduction of

special units set apart from the rest of

the department seemed to exacerbate

the conflict between community

policing’s reform agenda and the more

traditional outlook and hierarchical

structure of the departments.

The perception of elitism is ironic because community policing is meant to

close the gap between patrol and special units and to empower and value

the rank-and-file patrol officer as the

most important agent for police work.

But INOP projects were themselves

special units and as such created distrust between police management and

rank-and-file patrol officers and between officers assigned to traditional

policing and those assigned to community policing.

A certain amount of this intradepartment resentment can be attributed to

the general antagonism that may exist

to one degree or another between patrol and any special unit. Therefore,

this problem in the INOP projects may

have had little to do with community

policing itself. Such rivalries are common in most police departments large

enough to have special units, and evidence suggests that police departments in the INOP sites were no

exception.

It was evident from the interviews that

senior patrol officers seemed to make

up the backbone of resistance to the

INOP projects and the reforms they

represented. This was largely because

of long-standing working styles cultivated from performing years of traditional patrol work but also because

they felt disenfranchised by a management system that takes the best and

brightest out of patrol and that has left

them behind.

The intrusion of the INOP projects and

their community policing agenda into

the long-standing promotional structure of departments that rely on the

distinctions between patrol and specialized units caused many senior patrol officers in some INOP sites to

become embittered and resistant to reforms. By contrast, it also inspired

some officers to become involved in

community policing. This was particu-
9

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

larly the case in departments that expressed intentions to expand their

community policing initiatives. An officer in Prince George’s County (Maryland), for example, indicated that the

department’s plans for expanding

INOP and adopting community policing as an important element of patrol

deployment had led some officers to

believe that the INOP projects were

the new career path to promotion.

An administrator in Louisville saw

community policing as the perfect solution to the problems he associated

with a department structured around

special units because of the value that

the approach places on the individual

o build knowledge and to develop

skills in organizing, strategy development,

leadership, and other areas, a systematic

program of training and technical assistance was carried out as an integral part

of INOP. The Police Executive Research Forum and the National Crime Prevention

Council were awarded a grant, separate

from that of the evaluation, to design and

deliver training and technical assistance.

Needs assessment. The assistance,

which was tailored to the specific needs of

each of the eight sites, was preceded by

assessments conducted to identify these

needs. Input for the assessments came

from individuals at each site—representatives of the community, the police, and

other agencies and organizations. A range

of needs was identified, but two appeared

to dominate the agenda: strengthening

collaboration among agencies and citizen

mobilization/leadership development for

both active and prospective community

leaders. In Hayward, California, for example, the police expressed the desire

that the current collaboration of the department with the building inspector’s

agency, a community preservation group,

and the city attorney be expanded to

other groups, including schools and

churches.

Leadership development might require

training in such skills as chairing a meeting

and in the roles and responsibilities of tenants’ organizations. Citizens were also interested in receiving training that was

more directly related to crime reduction

and control. They wanted to find out, for

example, the effects of various illicit substances and how to locate prevention

programs, geared to young people and

to substance abuse, that could be replicated in their jurisdiction.

The police departments also identified

training needs in the areas of crime control, management, and information systems support. For example, they wanted

training in innovative narcotics abatement strategies and in CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design),

as well as in strategic planning, problem

identification and analysis, and the development of computer-based information

systems.

Training/technical assistance received. Assistance focused on the areas

identified in the needs assessment: building and sustaining interagency collaboration and community partnerships,

mobilizing citizens/developing citizen empowerment to address crime and crimerelated problems and, for both the police

and citizens, enhancing problem-solving

capabilities. In Tempe, for example, citizens were taught how to implement

drug abuse prevention strategies and

how to build and maintain positive police-community relationships and relationships with public and private

agencies. Hayward received training in

team building and conflict resolution,

problem solving, and resource allocation.

In Louisville, training in cooperation between the police and other agencies focused on where to go for what type of

assistance outside the police department

and where to go for what type of assistance inside the police department.

Typically, participants included representatives of local governments and government agencies, business, representatives

of religious organizations, and community residents, as well as sworn and civilian police personnel. In Hayward, for

example, the mayor, the deputy police

chief, leaders of the religious community, businesspeople, and community

residents were among those taking part.

In Louisville, staff from the city’s public

housing authority, other community

agencies, and the schools were trained,

as were patrol officers, first-line supervisors, and two district commanders.

“Cluster conferences.” These meetings

of INOP project participants were held to

promote information sharing among the

sites. A series of these conferences was

held throughout the course of the

projects and functioned as “peer technical assistance.” In addition to representatives of each site, participants included

the evaluation researchers, representatives of the Bureau of Justice Assistance

and the National Institute of Justice, and

the technical assistance providers.

Spaced 6 to 9 months apart and beginning early in the life of the INOP projects

(December 1990), the conferences were

an opportunity to present project updates that covered successes achieved

thus far, challenges faced, and steps to

be taken next. Workshops were held on

such topics as landlord training, an overview of drug supply and demand, effective drug demand reduction, and

sustaining interagency collaboration.

Preparatory Steps: Training and Technical Assistance T
10

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

patrol officer and the power and

responsibility it assigns to each one.

Officers involved in the INOP projects

often expressed their belief that acceptance would take a long time. Community policing would gain widespread

acceptance in their department, they

felt, only after a generation of younger

officers, trained in community policing

from the beginning of their careers,

had filled the ranks.

Productivity issues. Some objections

stemmed from officers’ belief that

community policing is a less productive form of policing than traditional

patrol. (They perceived that fewer arrests are made, for example.) Because

police departments face resource constraints, these supposedly less productive units come in for particular

criticism.

Many non-INOP patrol officers felt

that the community policing projects

were safe havens for officers who did

not want to work hard. This perception

was particularly common in sites

where community policing officers

were not required to answer 911 calls.

Patrol officers generally believed that

community police officers should respond to calls in their beats, if only as

backup for regular patrol.

Concern for resources. Related fiscal

and human resources issues played an

important part in the way police officers viewed INOP. Most police officers

(and many community residents) felt

their police departments were understaffed and overworked. At all eight

sites, officers raised concerns about

the effect of community policing on

scarce departmental resources. In addition to believing that community policing was less productive than

traditional policing, they also saw it as

more time consuming and requiring

more police resources. Community

outreach and problem solving were the

two specific activities that officers

identified as being the most labor intensive, as well as the most difficult to

integrate with their more traditional

duties.

In general, officers recognized that

community policing activities necessarily would consume extra time, and

there was a general consensus that

they also required a different kind of

time from that spent on traditional police functions. Just as an officer in

Tempe said she needed large blocks of

uncommitted time to develop a relationship with school children in her

beat, so, too, officers in Norfolk felt

that working with community residents

demanded a new work flexibility.

Officers also indicated that the press

of 911 calls made it difficult to meet

the need for community outreach,

problem solving, and networking with

other agencies required of community

policing. That perception may be

based on the notion that the key to

easing crime conditions is additional

resources. Some officers did believe

that community policing would in the

long run reduce 911 calls and ease

staffing constraints.

Officers were also concerned about the

size of the area for which they were responsible. In contrast to conventional

police work, which rotates officers in

and out of districts according to a prearranged schedule, community policing builds the officer’s relationship

with and accountability to the community in which he or she works through

relatively permanent assignment to a

specific geographic area. These

“beats” are typically smaller than

those of radio motor patrols. Most of

the INOP projects, however, did not

subdivide their pre-existing system of

geographical deployment to accommodate the community policing agenda,

and the officers viewed their beats as

too large.

Expectations too high. Police managers in many of the INOP sites who were

trying to sell resistant officers on the

merits of the program may have described the potential benefits too

broadly and optimistically. As a result,

officers opposed to community policing

had the opportunity to criticize the

project if it failed to deliver. But in all

the sites, INOP officers saw these criticisms as premature and recognized that

community policing needed time if it

was to demonstrate the effects and efficiencies it was trying to produce. They

felt that critics of the projects were

pointing prematurely to failures that

had not had sufficient time to mature

into successes.

Reliance on individual officers. INOP

creates a new role for the police officer,

one that requires a new outlook and a

new set of skills. The scale of the

change in the police officer’s basic job

description and therefore in his/her occupational identity also generated resistance to INOP among regular patrol

officers.

Whether they were assigned to INOP

projects or not, officers believed that

certain individual “styles” of policing

were more suitable than others to community policing. The importance of the

characteristics of individual police officers in the success of the INOP

projects was a theme in all sites, and it

manifested itself in several ways. For

example, in some sites, a few dedicated

and knowledgeable police officers essentially carried the entire INOP effort.

At the supervisory level, the newness
11

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

ity, they claimed, was its ability to reduce 911 calls, reduce criminal activity, and produce arrests. At least in

part, community policing’s perceived

directives to “smile and wave” (rather

than enforce) were disdained because

they came from management.

Involvement of other agencies

If community policing is to be successful, it must include problem solving,

and this in turn requires the active involvement of other city agencies. Although most of the INOP sites made

some attempts to involve city agencies,

this is the area in which opportunities

for better implementation were greatest. Interagency involvement was limited and informal. Many of the INOP

projects were perceived to depend not

on cooperative efforts among agencies

but on the efforts of one or two individuals—a police administrator or a

beat officer.

Norfolk was the sole exception; in fact,

the active, mandated involvement of

all city agencies was the component

that made Norfolk’s program notable.

The mayor made it clear to every department head that all city departments were part of the Police-Assisted

Community Enforcement program. The

program was promoted and training

was provided to administrative staff

from every city agency. Organizational

structure was provided by the PACE

Support Services Committee on which

all city agencies were represented. The

committee focused on team-centered

assessment of family service needs

and quality-of-life issues in the

neighborhoods.

Traditional enforcement strategies—

e.g., making arrests, filing reports, and

issuing summonses—do not involve

public agencies other than the police.

and complexity of community policing

increased the latitude for individual

interpretation of its goals.

If responsibility for success resides in

a small, core group of officers, supervisors, and project administrators, this

highlights the necessity of developing

recruitment standards that will enable

police departments to select officers

who are most likely to embrace a community policing approach.

Labor-management tension. Most of the

officers interviewed felt that community

policing was happening to them rather

than with them and that there was no attempt to involve the rank and file in

decisionmaking. This perception was

due in part to their skepticism about

new programs in general and their

strained relations with management.

While officers throughout the sites expressed distaste for specific aspects of

community policing, they were almost

unanimous in criticizing what they saw

as heavy-handed implementation by

management. Community policing emphasizes community empowerment and

involving citizens in decisionmaking.

Rank-and-file patrol officers, however,

generally argued that administrators had

excluded them from decisionmaking.

Some police officers perceived that

changes in their job descriptions are

driven by political rather than law enforcement considerations. Some took

comfort from the fact that a long list of

new projects and restructurings had

come and gone without significantly

changing the way policing is performed.

This rapid succession of “repackagings”

in policing since the current round of reforms began in the 1970’s convinced

many officers that all new projects are

driven by political pressures on police

and city managers and are thus inherently of dubious value.

A “new old” idea. In virtually every

site, most of the officers who took part

in focus groups described the kind of

policing implemented by the INOP

projects as nothing new but rather as

just “good, old-fashioned policing.”

This was the view of officers who were

trying to make a case in favor of community policing, but it was expressed

more often by officers who were skeptical about reform. By arguing that

INOP essentially requires officers to

engage in the same kind of sound policing that many of them have been

practicing for years, the resistant officers made a case for continuing the

status quo. This view, which focused

largely on the community outreach

component of community policing, was

rooted mainly in the general lack of

knowledge of community policing. But

it may also have been an expression of

a generic resistance to change of any

sort rather than to INOP. Again, it reflects the distrust of management,

which officers raised without prompting, and that underlies some of their

resistance.

Perceived loss of enforcement power.

The parallel with an idyllic period in

the past when the “beat cop” and citizens enjoyed a more trusting relationship was contradicted by the officers’

perception that community policing

placed too many restraints on police

power. The officers were concerned

their enforcement powers would be

limited. In most sites, the lack of an

aggressive enforcement component

was consistently reported by officers

not assigned to INOP as the biggest

stumbling block to acceptance of it.

Some skeptical officers did express a

willingness to change their minds if

community policing could achieve traditional law enforcement goals. The

key to community policing’s credibil-
12

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

But many problems cannot be solved

through traditional means alone and

require input from other agencies and

from community residents. This is especially true of quality-of-life problems (such as abandoned cars, noise,

graffiti, and other signs of neighborhood disorder or decay).

Reliance on personal networking.

Most police officers are not experienced in dealing with other public or

private agencies, nor are there effective mechanisms to make such interactions work smoothly and predictably. If

an officer at an INOP site believed

that another public agency could be

helpful in dealing with a particular

problem, he or she most often relied on

personal contact with someone at the

agency. This was done because there

was no structured relationship between

the department and the agency and no

formalized procedures to follow. If the

contact person should leave the

agency, the officer would have no

quick, effective means of dealing with

similar, subsequent problems. This

business-as-usual approach was taken

in most of the INOP sites during the

period of the study.

In some sites there was little support

for the program from even the city (or

county) government. For such cities,

community policing is de facto an isolated police department phenomenon.

Community involvement

Definitions of community policing may

vary, but all share the idea that the police and the community must work together to identify problems affecting

the community and to develop solutions. This is a radical departure from

the era of “professionalism” in policing in which police claimed a monopoly of the responsibility for crime

control and actively discouraged citizen

involvement in police business.

Despite the central role of the policecitizen partnership, many of the police

departments paid little attention to the

education and inclusion of the community. All the INOP sites experienced

difficulty in establishing a solid community infrastructure upon which to

build their programs. Although they

did not have much time in which to organize the communities, their experience nonetheless suggests that the

question of how to unleash the potential

for effective organization may prove to

be the greatest challenge for community policing.

Familiarity with INOP and community policing. Understanding precedes

involvement. Respondents’ knowledge

of a project—its existence, goals, and

tactics—varied greatly at all the sites,

and the interview data indicate that the

level of understanding about INOP or

community policing in general was

closely linked to a person’s status in

the community and to the frequency of

his or her interaction with the police.5

Thus, in Hayward and Houston, block

watch leaders knew a great deal more

about the INOP project than did either

their members or average citizens, and

the same was true of residents’ council

members in Portland.

This phenomenon is hardly limited to

INOP, however. Almost by definition,

local leaders will make it their business

to become familiar with issues affecting

their community. This was the case in

the INOP sites, where community leaders who interacted frequently with the

police knew more about INOP than did

residents who belonged to no community group. In all the INOP sites, however, even the most knowledgeable

community leaders had only limited familiarity with project goals, tactics,

and the role of the community.

Some residents, particularly older

people, were unaware of the program.

Community leaders and other residents tended to lay blame for lack of

knowledge on the police, who they

claimed did not adequately inform or

educate the general population. Even

assuming the best education campaign, however, it would have been

difficult for the INOP projects to become a familiar community fixture in

the short timespan they were in

operation.

Type of knowledge. Residents of public housing or other disadvantaged

neighborhoods that were INOP sites

often defined community policing or a

specific INOP project solely in terms

of the picnics, block parties, and

events for children that were so often

used as methods of community outreach. They were familiar with little of

the substance of community policing

or the INOP projects. While social

events like block parties do little to inform or educate community residents

about community policing and their

role in it, it is possible that they may

create solidarity in the community and

thus could be considered the beginnings of attempts to organize. In addition, these events allow residents to

meet police officers in a nonthreatening situation.

Perception of community organization. Many residents at all eight sites

believed the projects had positive effects on the level of community organization and involvement. In many

instances, however, their responses indicated they equated community organization with large turnouts for social

events, such as barbecues and picnics.

Again, although larger turnouts for
13

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

community meetings or significant increases in the number of people volunteering to help with problem solving

would be better indicators of community involvement, the rudiments of

community organization might be detected in people’s equating it with

these social events.

Issues in stimulating

community involvement

Both practitioners and theorists of

community policing often assume that

because the approach offers such evident benefits to the community, once

educated about these benefits, residents will actively aid in the effort.

The evidence from these eight sites

strongly suggests, however, that community residents generally may not

want to become involved, and from

their perspective, the reasons are

sound.

Fear of retaliation. The reason most

frequently cited in all eight communities for lack of involvement was residents’ fear of retaliation from drug

dealers. In several communities residents also specifically expressed fear

of reprisals when they were identified

as “snitches” as a result of their calls

to the police. Responding police officers would come to their homes and

thus they would be observed by the

drug dealers.

In all theories of community policing,

the perception of fear is a central concern. Implicitly or explicitly, most

adherents of community policing incorporate the theory of “broken windows”6

 into their programs. This

theory holds that the police need to

emphasize their order-maintenance

function; for example, attending to

disorderly behaviors such as loitering

or public drunkenness. Such behavior, if neglected by the police, leads to

increased incivilities, lower levels of

informal social control, and greater

fear among community residents. The

resulting condition, left unattended,

increases the level of community decay, both social and physical, and

makes the area ripe for intrusion by

outside criminal elements. This in turn

generates even more fear.

The role of the community policing officer is to make residents feel safer because he or she will concentrate on the

incivilities and order-maintenance

problems that inspire fear in residents.

It may be, however, that fear is too

deeply ingrained among residents of

some low-income urban areas. If so,

community policing may be unable to

reduce fear to the degree necessary to

allow residents to feel safe enough to

police themselves and take back the

streets.

Community policing may find itself

confronted by a major contradiction as

a result. If community policing is to attain its goal of reducing fear, the

streets must first be made safe from

the perspective of community residents. According to the residents of

these eight communities, for this to

happen, the level of crime, not merely

the perception of it, must fall. However, most theories of community policing seem to assert that without the

active participation of the community,

the police cannot reduce the incidence

of crime and disorder and thus reduce

fear.

The transitory nature of projects to

assist disadvantaged neighborhoods.

The designers of many of the INOP

projects realized this and began or

preceded their projects with intensive,

traditional law enforcement efforts.7

Such actions may produce unintended

effects, however. Residents almost

unanimously applaud police attempts

to increase enforcement in their neighborhoods, and during such crackdowns

they report feeling safer. But many of

these intensive enforcement initiatives

are (intentionally) short-lived and

therefore do not produce the desired

effect of reducing fear in the long run.

When this happens, residents begin to

define community policing as “just another program” in which services are

here today but gone tomorrow. Residents attributed lack of community involvement to the fleeting nature of the

INOP projects. The perceived view of

projects as transitory was most apparent where a strong enforcement effort—one of short duration—preceded

an INOP project.

Historically poor police-community

relations. One of the untested assumptions of community policing is that

residents really want closer contact

with the police and want to work with

them to reduce crime. The assumption

is itself based on the notion that

people who do not routinely violate the

law and who will eventually come to

work cooperatively with the police are

the logical audience for the community

policing approach. Again, data collected in the interviews for this study

cast doubt on these assumptions.

A large number of the community residents indicated that a major reason for

lack of involvement or even outright

hostility was the historically negative

relationship between the police and

residents of economically disadvantaged communities. Such relationships, most common in areas of the

city usually chosen as the target sites

for community policing demonstration

projects, will not be easily changed.

Police officers in many of the sites interpreted the refusal of residents to be-
14

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

come involved as apathy or lack of interest in bettering their own lives. The

lack of involvement may, however, be

due less to apathy than to this longstanding antagonism.

Lack of outreach by the police.

Nearly all the INOP sites were hampered in their attempts to generate

community organization and involvement by lack of resources and experience. The exceptions were Hayward

and Houston, which had strong block

watch groups in the target areas.

While the police departments recognized the need to train officers in the

strategy and tactics of community policing, they did not provide the same

level of training to members of the

community.

One evident need is for training in the

fundamental principles of community

policing and the role of the community. Confusion about the role of the

community in “community policing”

was common. As noted earlier, although community leaders had some

notion of community policing, ordinary

residents had very limited knowledge.

Most of the INOP projects did, however, attempt to involve residents in

some manner. In Tempe and New

York, police recruited citizens as volunteers; in Portland, they helped residents form councils; and in Norfolk,

they involved citizens in interagency

problem solving.

The nature of the target neighborhoods. The economically disadvantaged urban areas that generally serve

as testing grounds for community policing tend to be highly disorganized,

characterized by poverty, unemployment, inadequate educational services,

and high crime rates. In areas encumbered by such an array of problems it

is often difficult to find well-organized

community groups that are attempting

to address quality-of-life issues.

Most residents in the eight INOP sites

reported that the level of community

organization was only average or low

and that this had been the case for

some time. Most attributed this lack of

community activism to fear. In several

sites (particularly Tempe, Houston,

and Hayward), the police were particularly feared by the illegal immigrants

who lived there in large numbers.

The initial responsibility for generating community organization in

troubled areas must fall to the police

because it is they who are asking the

public to assist them. This police effort

is best undertaken in association with

other city agencies. Thus, in Portland,

where the Iris Court project serves

people living in public housing, the

police asked the city’s Housing Authority to assist the residents in forming a residents’ council; and in

Hayward, the police built on the solid

foundation provided by the citywide

“Neighborhood Alert” groups.

Intragroup conflict. A common barrier

to organizing, according to both residents and police officers, was conflict

among community leaders and residents. In some sites this took the form

of disagreement about what issues

were to be addressed, how tasks were

to be delegated, and similar strategic

and tactical questions. In several sites,

personality conflicts with community

leaders were cited as a major reason

residents refused to become involved

with a block watch, residents’ council,

or other civic association linked to

INOP.

The intragroup conflicts suggest that

references to an ideal “community” often fail to consider that in reality the

community is often an aggregate of

competing groups. Simply because

people live in the same geographic

area and share the same racial and

class backgrounds does not guarantee

that they share all the same values or

define problems the same way.

The Portland site took a step toward

solving this problem by offering training for the Iris Court residents. The

aim of the training, offered to residents’ council members, was broader

participation in the project, and it also

focused on resolving intragroup

conflict.

Finding out what the community

wants. One of the principles guiding

community policing is recognition that

the police must be guided by the values of the community. Identifying

those values may not be easy, especially when neighborhoods are

heterogeneous.

Residents of the INOP sites were

asked how they would improve the

project and how they would improve

community policing or policing in general. A number of patterned responses

emerged across the sites, among them

the desire for continuity in assignment

of beat officers. Residents wanted a

beat officer assigned for an extended

period of time. In Portland, for example, a Neighborhood Response

Team, consisting of two officers, spent

a great deal of time at the start of the

INOP project in the public housing

complex to which they were assigned

and established rapport with a large

number of residents. Residents reported that after a time, however, the

presence of these officers declined

dramatically.

It is clear from the INOP sites that

residents took the problem of “revolv-
15

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

ing beat officers” very seriously. The

beat officer is the most visible manifestation of the community policing

approach, and, in fact, it was common

for residents to define community policing in terms of the beat officer.

Another community expectation, as

expressed by residents, was for police

to be crime fighters above all else, and

they defined the success of community

policing in terms of reducing crime

and fear. However, a great many residents also noted other, equally important criteria, one of which was better

relationships among residents and the

police, which often seemed to hinge

on the idea of having long-term beat

officers.

The perceived impact of INOP

on crime and quality of life

Drug trafficking. All the projects had

one goal in common: reducing drug

demand. The purpose of INOP was to

develop innovative approaches to that

end. The general perception of residents and others who were interviewed

was that drug trafficking had been displaced, either from one area to another, from street level to indoors, or to

a different time of day.

Some differences in this overall impression were found in specific sites.

In Hayward, Houston, and New York

City, for example, some people interviewed believed the INOP project had

no effect on drug trafficking. In Portland and Tempe, by contrast (see “Attitudes Towards INOP”), the project

was seen as extremely effective. In the

other sites, the predominant view was

that drug dealing had been displaced

to an area receiving less attention from

the project, to a few blocks away but

within the same area, to locations indoors rather than on the street, or to

another time during the day.

Drug-related crime. The people interviewed found it more difficult to assess the effects of the INOP projects

on drug-related crime. Often they

noted they were not really able to distinguish crimes that were drug related

itizens. As part of the Beat 16

project in Tempe, citizens were

asked how they felt about the

project and its effects. This was

done through surveys—conducted

just after the project began and

again a little over a year later—after

INOP was in full operation. The initial survey was conducted to provide

baseline data, the second to register

any change over time.

The results were encouraging. For

example, when residents were initially asked about the number of

times they saw police officers patrolling their neighborhood, 38 percent answered more than 10 times

per month, but in the survey conducted after the INOP project was

in operation, the percentage rose to

65. In the baseline survey, 24 perAttitudes Towards INOP C cent of the respondents said they personally had seen drug activity in the

neighborhood, but this number

dropped by almost half (to 13 percent) in the second survey. Only 9

percent initially said they were active

in the neighborhood association, and

this number doubled when the second survey was taken.

Officers. The nine beat officers involved in the INOP project were also

asked, about 2 years after Beat 16’s

inception, how they felt about the

project. All nine said it was working

well. They especially liked the idea

of staying in one beat and having

time to get to know the area and the

residents. One officer noted, “I now

take ownership of problems instead

of slapping a band aid on them.”

All nine officers thought the attitudes of residents toward the police

had become more favorable, and

they felt more empowered and free

to pursue more independent avenues of policing and dealing with

citizens. Several said they felt more

effective now than before when

they were limited to random patrol.

The officers also believed they enjoyed a greater sense of responsibility for their work. Among the

weaknesses they identified were

reluctance of officers from other

beats to help out, the feeling that

not all officers were “pulling their

own weight,” the need for more

training, and the feeling that at

times things were moving too fast.
16

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

from those that were not, but despite

this difficulty they were able to make

an assessment. Responses ranged

from “no effect” to “very strong” impact, with a full range of responses inbetween. New York City was the only

site reporting “no effect” on drug-related crime, while Portland, Tempe,

and Norfolk said the INOP project

had a “very strong” impact. In fact,

almost all respondents in Portland believed the INOP project had a very

large impact on crime in Iris Court,

with dramatic changes in gang activity, violent crime, robberies, and burglaries. In Prince George’s County,

people believed that crime rates had

declined, and the County Executive

proclaimed the program a “true success.” In Hayward, Houston, and Louisville, respondents were divided in

their assessments.

Fear and drug-related crime. Theories holding that social disorder and

crime generate fear suggest that it will

decline where drug trafficking and

crime are perceived to have declined.

Accordingly, respondents in

Hayward, Houston, and New York

City believed the INOP projects had

little or no effect on drugs and crime

(or only a temporary effect), and the

levels of citizens’ fear in those cities

changed little. By contrast, in Portland, where the project was viewed as

effective in reducing drug trafficking,

respondents were overwhelmingly

positive about the project’s effect on

fear, as were respondents from Tempe

and Prince George’s County. Responses from Norfolk and Louisville

were mixed.

Police-community relations. There

appeared to be little relationship between perceptions of effects on drugs,

crime, and fear and perceptions of

how the projects affected police-community relations; it did not necessarily

follow that respondents who saw INOP

as having little effect on crime also

saw it as having little effect on the relationship of the community to the police. Most respondents reported better

relationships between the police and

community residents. Even in sites

where INOP’s effect on drugs, crime,

and fear was perceived as minimal

(Hayward, Houston, and New York

City), respondents generally believed

the relationship between the police

and the community had improved.

Community organization and involvement. Respondents found it more

difficult to assess INOP’s effect on

community organization and involvement, but in most sites they indicated

that levels of community organization

and involvement had increased since

the start of the INOP project. It was

not clear, however, whether the increases were attributable to INOP or

to other factors. Even in Hayward,

where citizens’ groups were the most

organized among the eight sites, it

appeared that the increased organization was more likely the result of a

grassroots effort by the community that

predated the INOP program. Nevertheless, the police and residents all indicated that more Neighborhood Alert

groups had been formed and attendance in existing groups had improved

since community policing began.

The response of a police administrator

from Louisville may help explain the

general view of respondents that community organization had increased.

The administrator indicated that the

many interventions taking place, some

not related to INOP, made residents

feel “there is some interest in them.”

Residents of many of the INOP neighborhoods to whom the police were paying attention for the first time may

have felt that any intervention was better than no attention at all.

Easing the transition to

community policing

Community policing holds great promise for citizen participation, increased

responsiveness on the part of the police to the concerns of residents, and

greater police accountability. But if

community policing is to be granted

legitimacy by the public, its proponents need to demonstrate that it

works. The INOP projects provided an

opportunity to meet the need for information about the effectiveness of the

approach and about the implementation challenges community policing

faces.

In achieving the crime-reduction goals

of community policing, the INOP

projects had mixed success, but this

conclusion needs to be seen in light of

the limited amount of time the projects

had been in operation before their results were assessed. Community policing represents major shifts, both for

the police and community residents,

and—particularly because of its emphasis on prevention—is likely to take

a long time before it approaches institutionalization.

Aside from the effects of the projects

in reducing crime and fear, the assessment brought to light a number of areas in which implementation could be

improved. The experiences of the eight

INOP sites clearly revealed that in the

transition to community policing, jurisdictions need to pay particular attention to three issues: overcoming

patrol officer resistance, generating interagency support, and building community involvement. The assessment

findings suggest that helping to ensure
17

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

a better product—crime reduction—

may require greater attention to

process.

Overcoming patrol officer resistance.

Resistance by police officers to community policing is due in part to inadequate understanding of the principles

on which the approach is based, which

in turn stems from insufficient training. Police officials who envision the

transition of their own departments to

community policing can learn from the

experience of the INOP sites about the

need for a commitment to training all

officers.

Jurisdictions contemplating adopting

community policing may also want to

rethink the special-unit status accorded many of the INOP project officers because of its potential for generating intradepartmental rivalry and

consequent resentment and resistance.

Moreover, the view of community policing as a drain on resources, one in

which not all officers are seen as pulling their own weight or performing traditional duties (such as responding to

911 calls), was also revealed in the

INOP sites as a problem that needs to

be overcome. For community policing

to be successful in attracting the most

talented personnel, police departments

might want to make it a career path—

an exception to the current rule that

advancement does not run through

patrol.

New recruitment strategies may also be

needed. In some INOP sites, it appeared that the continued existence of

the program rested on a single officer

or administrator. The nature of community policing also makes it susceptible to variations in supervisory style,

and because of the emphasis on interaction with the community, a single officer or supervisor can strongly

influence the public’s perceptions of

the program. Officers who are favorably

disposed toward community policing

may positively influence community

residents, while officers who have not

bought into the concept may cause residents to develop a negative impression.

New recruitment strategies could help

police departments select candidates

committed to the ideals of working with

and for the community.

Becoming a city agencywide phenomenon. At the INOP sites, the police tended to rely on personal

contacts with other agencies to secure

their involvement, and community policing was almost always an isolated

police department phenomenon. This

approach highlights the need for an

organized, systematic involvement of

agencies citywide. This need is particularly acute because community

policing involves crime prevention

and quality-of-life issues, not all of

which fall within the purview of the

police.

The experience of the INOP sites suggests that at the very least, employees

of other agencies should understand

how they can contribute to problem

solving; in short, they need to be instructed in their role in community

policing, which is no less important

than that of beat officers or concerned

community residents.

Involving the community. That the

INOP sites in general had limited

success in stimulating community organization is not surprising, given the

brief time in which to involve the

community and the limited experience of the police in this area. The

evaluation findings indicate that

neighborhood organizing is a skill the

police will want to develop if they

hope to involve the community. Other

city agencies can play a role in this

process. If police departments involve

them from the beginning of the implementation process, they could be

useful in stimulating community involvement by educating the public.

By the same token, the experience of

the INOP projects can be useful for

police administrators in recognizing

community education and training as

equal in importance with police training and education (though far more

difficult to accomplish). Existing community organizations and leaders are

the logical first audience, but it should

be kept in mind that neighborhoods

that commonly serve as community policing pilot sites generally have few viable community groups. The police, in

concert with other public and private

agencies, should create organization

where it does not exist, although it may

be argued that a high level of community organization is not necessary for

community policing to function

effectively.

To address residents’ concerns about

the transitory nature of policing

projects, departments considering

adopting community policing will want

to gauge as accurately as possible, before it is instituted, the resources required to practice it. Almost all the

INOP sites promised communities

regular beat officers who would be permanent fixtures of the neighborhood,

but these officers were in fact rotated,

preventing residents from getting to

know them. If the police do not accurately estimate resources, the result

may be broken promises to the community and a loss of police credibility.

Conclusion

At least initially, community policing

will require more resources. That
18

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

agencies, and community leaders and

other residents.

6. Wilson, James Q., and George L.

Kelling, “Broken Windows,” Atlantic

Monthly, March 1982:29–38.

7. These law enforcement efforts were

not specifically mandated by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, but they

were part of the overall demand reduction strategy.

means jurisdictions will find themselves faced with committing to larger

budgets in an increasingly harsh fiscal

climate. This need highlights the importance of involving other agencies.

Not only are they essential to the problem-solving approach to policing, but

resource constraints on police departments make them even more valuable

because their involvement provides

the opportunity to leverage additional

expertise and resources.

Given the monumental nature of the

tasks, the transition to community policing will take a considerable amount

of time—much more time than these

eight sites had to “prove themselves.”

It remains to be seen whether an already impatient public will accept this

fact. In large cities with extremely diverse populations and large police bureaucracies, the process is likely to

take far longer.

The transition may be faster and ultimately more productive if the jurisdiction itself makes a commitment to a

transition that assigns equal value to

training the police, the public, and the

staffs of all public agencies. The training provided to the INOP sites introduced the key players to the concepts

and principles of community policing

and to related procedures and practices. It was intended only to set community policing in motion. However,

the need for training persists throughout the life of a project, particularly

because the new philosophy entails so

many and such profound changes. The

resistance of many officers at these

sites to community policing is a strong

argument for offering training on an

ongoing basis. Ultimately, training

may prove to be a key to long-term

success.

Notes

1. Wycoff, Mary Ann, “Community

Policing Strategies,” draft final report,

U.S. Department of Justice, National

Institute of Justice, November 1994

(grant 91–IJ–CX–K0008):45. The data

for this Police Foundation study are

from a survey conducted in 1993. The

figure is for municipal police departments with staffs of 100 or more. Figures for county police and sheriffs’

departments with staffs of this size are

23 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The community policing provisions of the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act of 1994 will undoubtedly cause these figures to rise.

A two-page summary of the report is

available from the National Criminal

Justice Reference Service. Call

800–851–3420. Ask for FS 000126.

2. This description of the INOP program was drawn from the Bureau of

Justice Assistance’s initial solicitation

for proposals to establish INOP programs.

3. The total amount awarded to the

eight INOP sites was $2.4 million. All

but one received funding for 2 years.

4. The police reaction to INOP documented in this section was obtained

from individual interviews and focus

group sessions (comprising up to eight

people) conducted at all the sites,

which included the officers involved

in INOP and those not involved. Supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants)

were interviewed both individually

and in groups.

5. The information regarding familiarity with INOP and community policing

was obtained from focus groups and

interviews with individuals—police

officers and police management, representatives of other local government

The evaluation was conducted under

NIJ grant 91–DD–CX–0012. The full

reports of the impact evaluation, Issues

in Community Policing: Lessons Learned

in the Implementation of Eight Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing

Programs, NCJ 157933, and of the process evaluation, Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing: Descriptions of

Programs in Eight Cities, NCJ 157934,

are available for a fee through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), by calling

800–851–3420; or by writing to NCJRS,

Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland 20849–

6000. They are also available over the

Internet by telnetting to

ncjrsbbs.aspensys.com or connecting to

the NCJRS Justice Information Center

World Wide Web site:

http://ncjrs.aspensys.com:81/ncjrshome.html

or gophering to ncjrs.aspensys.com 71.

Those without Internet access can dial

the NCJRS Bulletin Board System via

modem: dial 301–738–8895, set modem

at 9600 baud, 8–N–1.
19

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Susan Sadd, Ph.D., was project director for the NIJ-sponsored evaluation conducted by the Vera Institute

of Justice. She is currently director

of planning and analysis for the

Bronx District Attorney. Randolph

M. Grinc, Ph.D., now an assistant

professor at Caldwell College, was a

research associate at the Vera Institute and deputy director of the evaluation project. The update on Tempe

was written by Thomas J. McEwen,

Ph.D., managing principal with the

Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ),

and Edward F. Connors, president of

ILJ, on the basis of their evaluation

report.

The National Institute of Justice is a

component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau

of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for

Victims of Crime.

NCJ 157932

Selected NIJ Publications About Community Policing

Listed below are some NIJ publications related to the issues of community policing. These publications can be

obtained free, except where indicated, from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS): telephone

800–851–3420, e-mail askncjrs@ncjrs.aspensys.com, or write to NCJRS PO Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000.

Please note that when free publications are out of stock, they are available as photocopies for a minimal fee or through

interlibrary loan. They are also usually available on the NCJRS Bulletin Board System, the NCJRS Justice Information

Center World Wide Web site, or the Department of Justice World Wide Web site. Call NCJRS for more information.

Community Policing Strategies, Research Preview,

1995, 2 pages, FS 000126.

Goldstein, Herman, Research in Brief, The New Policing: Confronting Complexity, 1993, 6 pages, NCJ

145157.

Kelling, George L., and William J. Bratton, Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative

Problem, 1993, 12 pages, NCJ 141236.

Kennedy, David M., The Strategic Management

of␣Police Resources, Perspectives on Policing, 1993,

12 pages, NCJ 139565.

Managing Innovation in Policing, Research Preview,

1995, 2 pages, FS 000130.

Wycoff, Mary Ann and Skogan, Wesley K., Research

Report, Community Policing in Madison: Quality

from the Inside Out, 1993, 96 pages, NCJ 144390.

Wycoff, Mary Ann and Timothy N. Oettmeier,

Research Report, Evaluating Patrol Officer Performance

Under Community Policing: The Houston Experience,

1994, 30 pages, NCJ 142462, $8 (U.S.), $14.30 (Canada),

$13.75 (other countries).

Sherman, Lawrence W., Chief Criminologist, Indianapolis

Police Department; Professor of Criminology, University of

Maryland: Reducing Gun Violence: Community Policing

Against Gun Crime, Research in Progress, VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ 153730, $19 (U.S.), $24 (Canada and

other countries).

Skogan, Wesley, Professor, Political Science and Urban

Affairs, Northwestern University: Community Policing in

Chicago: Fact or Fiction? Research in Progress, VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ 153273, $19 (U.S.), $24 (Canada and

other countries). A summary of the videotape is also available free: Community Policing in Chicago: Year Two, FS

000105.
20

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20531

____________________________

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

BULK RATE

POSTAGE & FEES PAID

DOJ/NIJ

Permit No. G–91