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i 

20–820 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–133] 

OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN 

REASSURANCE INITIATIVE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 13, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

KATY QUINN, Professional Staff Member 

ANNA WATERFIELD, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 1 

Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Allvin, Maj Gen David, USAF, Director, Strategy and Policy, U.S. European 

Command .............................................................................................................. 4 

Ellehuus, Rachel, Principal Director, Europe and NATO Policy, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (Policy) ........................................................................ 5 

Tyra, Tom, Chief, Global Force Planning, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

G–3/5/7, Department of the Army ...................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Allvin, Maj Gen David ..................................................................................... 35 

Ellehuus, Rachel ............................................................................................... 43 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky ........................................................................................ 33 

Tyra, Tom .......................................................................................................... 49 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

EuroAtlantic Coalition statement for the record ........................................... 57 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 61 

Mr. O’Rourke .................................................................................................... 61 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 65 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN REASSURANCE 

INITIATIVE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 13, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good afternoon. 

I would like to extend a warm thank you to our witnesses testifying before us today. Thank you for being here. 

Before I begin, I would like to welcome the members of the full 

committee who are not permanent members of the subcommittee 

who are attending today. 

I ask unanimous consent that these committee members be permitted to participate in this hearing, with the understanding that 

all sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions 

prior to those not assigned to the subcommittee. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I also ask unanimous consent to include into the record all members’ statements and extraneous material for members of the committee unable to attend today’s hearing and who have asked to include a statement for the record in lieu of attendance. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. This afternoon, this subcommittee plans to discuss the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, with representatives of the U.S. European Command, the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, and the Army. All have important roles in this initiative’s development, implementation, and execution. 

The goal of this hearing is to assess how the Department [of Defense] has implemented the initiative since it was announced, authorized, and appropriated by Congress beginning in fiscal year 

2015. We also seek to understand how the Department plans to 

execute the initiative through fiscal year 2017. 

We would also like our witnesses to discuss the opportunities and 

challenges facing implementation within the current European security environment and how the initiative competes for resources 
2 

among other critical priorities within the Department, including 

readiness. 

A military that is not ready to deploy cannot credibly serve as 

a deterrent against aggressive behavior. The Department of Defense [DOD] does not have enough ships to maintain a constant 

presence in key waters. They don’t have a large enough end 

strength to support a permanent presence in Europe. And the Department’s nuclear enterprise and missile defense systems are in 

dire need of modernization. 

The recent NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Warsaw 

Summit underscored many security challenges that Europe faces 

today. Foremost of these challenges is a resurgent Russia. The 

Warsaw Summit provided the opportunity to help form a cohesive 

and comprehensive NATO plan to counter Russian actions, using 

both conventional and unconventional methods, but there is much 

more to be done. Vigilant oversight and consistent evaluation will 

help ensure that the European Reassurance Initiative invests in 

the right areas and utilizes resources effectively and efficiently. 

From recent congressionally mandated reports submitted by the 

Department, it seems the Department’s strategy, operations, and 

posture are evolving to adapt to the new security model in Europe. 

We must also address the important issue of funding the ERI. 

Currently, money for the initiative is requested annually through 

the overseas contingency operations [OCO] budget. While drawing 

from these funds provides near-term flexibility and responsiveness, 

relying on such year-to-year appropriations does not allow the Department of Defense to confidently plan or implement an evolving 

strategy in the region. 

The House-passed fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authoriza- tion Act addressed part of this issue by reallocating $2.2 billion of 

the request into the base budget. In doing so, the House has demonstrated its enduring commitment to the success of the European 

Reassurance Initiative. 

So I look forward to discussing the Department’s strategy and 

the issues I have outlined. But before I introduce the witnesses, I 

turn to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ranking 

member for any opening remarks that she would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Today’s hearing is about the ERI, a program to deter Russian aggression and reassure our European partners and allies of our commitment to their security and territorial integrity. 

We should have no doubt that Russia does indeed pose a threat, 

but this threat looks very different from the 1980s. We should be 

mindful of this difference and allocate our scarce resources accordingly. 

Recent events in Europe have underscored this threat. For example, Russia has occupied Crimea and has fomented the continuing 

separatist struggle in eastern Ukraine. Across Europe and in par-
3 

ticular along Russia’s border, the threat of Russian intervention is 

on many people’s minds. 

ERI began in fiscal year 2015 as a way to reassure our allies that 

we stand with them against these threats. If approved, ERI would 

shift focus to deterrence in fiscal year 2017. It would increase the 

U.S. presence in Europe, build partner capacity, improve infrastructure, and facilitate interoperability. Over half of ERI funding 

is for prepositioning military equipment, which would reduce the 

reaction time needed for U.S. personnel to respond to urgent crises. 

I want to make sure programs like ERI take into account the 

current environment to deter Russian aggression in a sophisticated 

and measured way. Funding is expected to quadruple to $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2017, so it is even more important that Congress 

provide effective oversight. 

We should also keep in mind threats like cyber and hybrid warfare. I want to ensure, in addition to the challenges addressed by 

ERI, we are assisting our allies to guard against less conventional 

tactics. 

In addition to our commitment, our NATO partners must do 

their part and work to increase their capabilities, presence, and defense spending. The best defense of Europe is a strong collective defense. At last week’s NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO leaders 

underscored their commitment to unity. 

Finally, I would like to know whether ERI achieves the right balance. Does it address the needs and requirements in Europe, and 

are we realistically looking at a long-term investment? 

I have concerns that the fiscal year 2017 funding for this program is requested through the OCO. The OCO funding is generally 

considered to be a temporary war fund. It looks increasingly like 

the ERI is going to be a long-term program. It also seems like Russia’s destructive influence and destabilizing efforts will continue for 

years to come. Given this, using OCO to pay for ERI is no longer 

appropriate. 

Further, what message does it convey to our allies when we put 

this, quote, ‘‘reassurance,’’ unquote, program into a temporary 

funding account? It doesn’t seem very reassuring. As we evaluate 

ERI today, I want to ensure our investment is made in the right 

way with long-term strategic planning and oversight in mind. 

And I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Ms. Speier. 

I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today. I want to thank 

them for taking the time to be with us. 

We have with us Major General David Allvin, the Director of 

Strategy and Policy at U.S. European Command; Ms. Rachel Ellehuus, Principal Director, Europe and NATO Policy, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Mr. Tom Tyra, the Chief of 

Global Force Planning in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Department of the Army. 

Thank you all for being with us. And so now we will hear your 

opening statements. 

Major General Allvin, we will begin with you. 
4 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN DAVID ALLVIN, USAF, DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGY AND POLICY, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND 

General ALLVIN. Thank you, Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and members of the committee. I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI. 

I would also like to express my sincere thanks on behalf of my 

commander and the Department of Defense for your support of this 

important initiative over the past 3 years. We believe it is making 

a real difference. 

The strategic environment in Europe has changed drastically 

over the past 30 months. One of the key reasons for the growing 

instability has been Russian malign influence, coercion, and aggression against NATO allies and other partner nations. 

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian activity 

in the Donbass region of Ukraine, the potential for Russia to further advance their military adventurism into NATO countries has 

demanded a strong response. 

We at U.S. European Command have been working to assure our 

allies that our commitment to Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty is 

ironclad. The first 2 years of the European Reassurance Initiative 

were largely focused on assurance. To an extent, assuring our allies 

has a deterrent effect in and of itself. 

However, as we continue to see a malign influence and a Russia 

acting to upset international norms, we have transitioned beyond 

purely assurance. We are planning and executing activities designed to serve as a stronger deterrent to Russian aggression. The 

fiscal year 2017 ERI submission of $3.4 billion reflects this transition, and I would again like to thank the committee for its support. 

The rapid change in the security environment requires a prompt 

answer. ERI has provided the funding mechanism to respond 

quickly and effectively, while the Department conducts the full 

analysis as to which of these requirements are enduring and which 

may be shorter-lived to provide the appropriate counter to Russian 

aggression. 

At U.S. European Command, we also understand that there are 

fiscal pressures facing all government budgets. One of our most 

foundational principles as we design, plan, and execute our ERI activities is to preserve the integrity of the program and ensure that 

we are being responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars. 

Through close coordination with our policy and comptroller leadership in the Department, as well as the responsive oversight provided by Congress, we will continue to provide effective deterrence 

and assurance measures to prevent a conflict in Europe, which 

could have the potential to spread to the homeland. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Allvin can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Ellehuus. 
5 

STATEMENT OF RACHEL ELLEHUUS, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, 

EUROPE AND NATO POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE (POLICY) 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Thank you. 

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you also for the opportunity to 

discuss the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative as well as some 

of the recent moves that NATO has taken under the Warsaw Summit. 

Prior to but particularly since 2014, we have really felt acutely 

the changed security environment in Europe. Where previously European Command had been focused on theater security cooperation 

and support to other combatant commands, we now face a real 

threat in the European theater, whether it is to the east or to the 

south. 

And thanks to the help and the responsiveness of ERI, we have 

been able to respond rapidly to this changing security environment. 

We are working very closely with individual allies, with NATO, as 

well as within the U.S. Government, to reinforce our collective commitment to NATO Article 5. 

Since 2014, when we began ERI, we have moved from assurance 

to deterrence, in step with the security environment. And looking 

forward to 2017, we will continue to move in that direction, as Russia’s provocation does not change. We have seen increased exercises, irresponsible behavior from the Baltics to the Black Sea, and 

we need to continue to move in step with that. 

I wanted to, rather than focus on the five lines of effort, which 

General Allvin has already highlighted, talk about how U.S. leadership in this regard is paying dividends. 

Europeans and NATO are stepping up. At the recent Warsaw 

Summit, Secretary General Stoltenberg was able to report and announce that a majority of allies had either halted or reversed downward trends in their defense spending and, for the first time since 

2009, overall NATO defense spending had increased. 

These are positive trends. We see individual allies stepping forward, as witnessed by the enhanced forward presence whereby 

alongside the U.S., the U.K. [United Kingdom], Germany, and Canada will provide framework nation status in the three Balts [Baltic 

States] and Poland. So we are seeing very positive signs that our 

leadership in this area is making a difference. 

That having been said, we need to continue to work at this. And 

the three challenges that I see post-Warsaw and as we continue to 

think about the future of ERI are: firstly, institutional adaptation. 

We need to find a way to make NATO more agile in terms of its 

decisionmaking, command structure, and defense planning. Secondly, defense investment, and that is not just monetary but also 

in terms of political will. We need to encourage folks to continue 

to increase their defense spending and to support operations both 

within the European and transatlantic theater and further afield. 

And, finally, we need to combat internal political challenges and resist those who seek to divide us or undermine the international security order. 

In these past 2 years and in the 50-plus years that NATO has 

existed, we have found one thing as the threats have evolved and 
6 

the security involvement has evolved, and that is that we are 

stronger together. So thank you for your support. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ellehuus can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Ms. Ellehuus. 

Mr. Tyra. 

STATEMENT OF TOM TYRA, CHIEF, GLOBAL FORCE PLANNING, 

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G–3/5/7, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Mr. TYRA. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members, I thank you for the opportunity to explain the 

Army’s contribution to the European Reassurance Initiative. 

I have provided a written statement. I would ask that you put 

it into the record and we proceed to your questions. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So ordered. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tyra can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right. I very much appreciate each of your 

comments. Now we will begin with some questions. 

So, in February of this year, former Commander of U.S. European Command General Breedlove noted in his posture statement 

that EUCOM has less than the minimum required personnel, 

equipment, and resources to accomplish our current theater strategy. 

Can you elaborate on these shortfalls that General Breedlove references? And will the ERI budget request mitigate some of these 

shortfalls and gaps? And are there any other additional resources 

that are needed to sufficiently support ERI? 

So, General, I want to start with you. 

General ALLVIN. Yes, ma’am. And with the reference to the personnel, equipment, and resources, we find that within the European theater we see a more aggressive Russia that is influencing 

on the periphery states of NATO. 

And so, given the current correlation of forces that might exist 

in a conflict, specifically with the United States, we do not have 

nearly the forces we had after 25 years of the degradation of the 

forces in Europe. 

This has been understandable because there have been other national security priorities that obviously have taken precedence in 

other parts of the world. However, we find ourselves now with a 

smaller number of forces from all services as well as the appropriate equipment in order to be able to field and to respond to any 

other Russian aggression. 

And I would say that what ERI has done is it has rapidly enabled us to reverse that trend. Specifically, when we look at our fiscal year 2017 submission, when we look at this heel-to-toe rotation, 

that is an additional armored brigade combat team that is able to 

make its way into theater with its equipment full-up and ready to 

train not only with our joint force in the United States forces but 

also with our partners and allies to enhance interoperability. 

I would say that also the submission for the APS, or the Army 

Prepositioned Stocks, offers the opportunity for that additional 
7 

equipment that can start to come closer to leveling the playing 

field, if you will. 

But understanding the resource-constrained environment that we 

are in, we are pleased with the submission in moving the right direction to be able to recover those resources and the manpower and 

the forces to be able to deter further Russian aggression. And if the 

deterrence succeeds, we won’t have to, God forbid, get in a conflict. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That would certainly be the goal. 

Do either one of you want to weigh in on that question? 

Ms. Ellehuus. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes, certainly. Thank you for the opportunity. 

I think the unfortunate reality is is that, given today’s security 

environment, demand continues to outpace supply. And the flexibility of funds, such as ERI and some of the training funds that you 

have provided us to build partner capacity not just of allies but also 

of partners, help us offset that fact. 

One of the other things I would like to highlight is how we offset 

our risk with our cooperation with allies and partners. So I think 

increasingly you are seeing the United States cooperating at a strategic level and at an operational level with NATO allies. 

So we have seen the French carrier Charles de Gaulle deploy in 

the Middle East to help us with some of our stress on our naval 

and maritime forces. We have seen, you know, cooperative arrangements to use one another’s bases. And we have seen host nations 

stepping up. So when we send our forces to the Baltic States, host 

nations such as Poland and the Balts are stepping forward to provide that infrastructure and support. 

So, as we realize that the demand outpaces the supply, we need 

to look and rely more heavily on our allies and partners to help us 

out. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. 

Mr. Tyra. 

Mr. TYRA. Yes, thank you. 

So the ability to deploy, first, in and of itself, will make the Army 

more capable of meeting its global requirements. The units that we 

deliver, though, will be decisive-action-trained, so we would consider they are ready to conduct operations. 

The ability to work with allies and partners and develop an 

interaction capability and a commonality of training and equipping 

and the ability to fight together is a bonus. And I think we would 

view this as actually building readiness higher than it is as we developed, and, over time, the soldiers that make those rotations will 

come back better able. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. 

Ms. Ellehuus, you discussed the recent NATO summit and some 

of the outcomes of that. And I think it is encouraging, the increased amount of resources that the countries are providing and 

their joint willingness to work with us on training and having that 

forward presence. 

But I just wonder, do you see any risk to NATO’s cohesion? And, 

if so, what are those potential risks there? And how should NATO’s 

Article 5 and 6 commitments be applied in this highly ambiguous 

domain? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Thank you. 
8 

Well, certainly there are a number of forces and actors who are 

trying to undermine alliance unity, but, fortunately, the Warsaw 

Summit was a representation of the fact that we are committed to 

collective defense and they won’t be able to do that. 

So, whether it is Russian propaganda in the Baltic States and 

Poland or in Central Europe or it is, you know, provocative actions 

towards our ally Turkey, I think we have demonstrated through 

Warsaw and our commitments there to collective defense and Article 5 that we are going to be sticking together and we are not going 

to allow them to undermine that. 

I am anticipating a question about Brexit, so I will preempt it, 

but we have—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Please tell us about Brexit and your feelings on 

its impact. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. We have a very close relationship, uniquely close 

relationship, with the United Kingdom, and, you know, in anticipation of a ‘‘yes’’ or a ‘‘no’’ vote, we continued to reinforce that relationship. 

In the days following the Warsaw Summit and the vote, the U.K. 

has reinforced its commitment to a number of important initiatives. 

So they have publicly committed at the Farnborough Airshow to 

their maritime patrol aircraft and the commitment to procure nine 

P–8s. They have announced procurement of Apaches, and they 

have announced intent to move forward as quickly as possible—I 

believe it is the 18th of July—with a debate on their continuous atsea deterrence and that principle. 

So I think that, while there are external forces that seek to divide, we have presented a united front and that, even given some 

of the trends that could undermine our ability to operate effectively 

and together, we have a strong enough base that I think we will 

manage to weather the storm. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I would cautiously say I think I am optimistic 

or encouraged by some of the recent events and some of the things 

you just shared. So that is good news. 

I now turn to the ranking member, Representative Speier, for 

her questions. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Allvin, in your statement, you said that Russia employs 

multiple types of warfare—conventional, irregular, and asymmetric—to induce regional instability. 

How is the ERI going to improve our ability to defend against 

Russia’s asymmetric tactics? 

General ALLVIN. Thank you very much for that question. 

I would say two things. With respect to sort of the hybrid warfare, which is one of the common terms, hybrid warfare is neither 

new or unique, but the way the Russians are applying it very effectively now is primarily below the conventional level. 

So I would say that the way that the European Reassurance Initiative approaches this is, with our partners and allies specifically 

in areas which are susceptible or have been susceptible to some of 

these hybrid tactics, whether they be information operations or 

propaganda or cyberattacks or these sort of things that disrupt the 

internal governmental flow or the workings of the government, the 

European Reassurance Initiative has allowed us to have engage-
9 

ments in those countries. There has been some of the funding that 

has gone towards some of the cyber engagements that we can teach 

our tactics and procedures about attribution, about hardening and 

resilience with the cyber capabilities, about attributing not only the 

cyberattacks but also some of the propaganda. So it really is an 

awareness and sharing the tactics and techniques that we use to 

be able to highlight those. 

But I would say that, on the hybrid warfare, part of the hybrid 

is the high end, and the high end is the conventional conflict. And 

I would say that, historically, has proven to be the most costly and 

the most irreversible. And so, if we can continue to reassure and 

now deter that conventional conflict, it at least sort of brackets it 

and allows us to work down in some of these lower areas of malign 

influence and coercion beyond the large conventional conflict. 

And so I think the ERI helps us both have a stronger deterrent 

effect against the conventional conflict, but there are elements that 

we are doing with engagement and resilience and hardening that 

help against some of these elements of the lower echelons of hybrid 

warfare. 

Ms. SPEIER. Major General, you had indicated to me privately 

that the troops that we will have stationed as part of ERI would 

be engaged in military exercises. And you had suggested that the 

numbers may be as high as 100 per year—some smaller, some larger. How many of these are airshows? 

General ALLVIN. Ma’am, I actually wouldn’t put an airshow in 

the—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Good. 

General ALLVIN [continuing]. Category of exercises. 

When we refer to these exercises and when I say 100, some of 

these are small, maybe company-level exercises, but these are 

building that understanding, that cohesion at the unit level. And 

I would say those are the most prolific. 

However, with the initial funding we have been able to receive 

through ERI, we are able to have exercises at the larger level, the 

battalion level and above, which really help us to understand the 

interoperability between formations. Because we understand that 

U.S. European Command will not be the sole entity that will have 

to defend against Russian aggression. We will be fighting with our 

allies and partners in the region. 

And so these broader exercises, these higher-level exercises really 

enhance that confidence to be able to fight and maneuver and do 

combined arms warfare beyond just the United States but in the 

coalition. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Tyra, what type of military equipment do you 

expect to be deployed over the next 5 years as part of the ERI? 

Mr. TYRA. So, in the next year, we intend to build an armored 

brigade combat team. If supported, we intend to build a fires brigade, which is artillery, which would be tube and rocket artillery, 

to add to it. 

We intend to build a division headquarters battalion, which is 

the equipment that the division commander and his staff use—approximately 500 soldiers. So it would be, you know, computers, radios, satellite communication, vehicles, that kind of stuff, to allow 
10 

them to conduct mission command throughout the region. And that 

will be in 2017. 

If the program continues, we would look to meet the next identified requirements for the defense of Europe. And I think you would 

expect to see engineering battalions moved over there. I think you 

would expect to see possibly the ground element of an Army aviation brigade. I think we would want to see more satellite communication, more logistics, and whatever was required to speed the 

delivery of a fighting force. 

Ms. SPEIER. So, in terms of actual weapons to be warehoused 

over there in the next year, we are not talking about a sizable 

number of weapons systems being transferred over there? I was 

under the impression that that is what we were doing. 

Mr. TYRA. So, in the first armored brigade combat team, you 

would see 80 M1 tanks and 140 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 18 artillery systems, a number of mortar systems and smaller pieces of 

equipment. So we would end up with that, plus the support vehicles that enable that to fight. 

Then there would be a rotating brigade that would bring identical sets of equipment. As you delivered the fires brigade, you 

would expect, you know, another 100 or so artillery systems, either 

tube- or rocket-launched, to be added to that fires brigade. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. Ellehuus, you know, this is an example of mission creep. I 

might actually be supportive of this, but this started out as a $1 

billion emergency fund for 1 year, and now it is morphing into a 

$3.4 billion program that, for all intents and purposes, is becoming 

permanent. 

What do you see the funding levels growing to in subsequent 

years? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Well, certainly, we are aware of this tension between things that are paid for through supplementary funding as 

opposed to things that are part of our regular base budgets. And 

when we vet the requests that come through from the services and 

the combatant commands, we take a very close look at those to 

make sure that we are not funding enduring requirements indefinitely, and over time we too would like to see more things move 

into the base, not least because, as all of you have said, it provides 

a degree of certainty to our allies and partners that our commitment is enduring rather than year to year. 

In terms of future-year budgets, I mean, we do have to plan 

against a baseline, so, you know, I would anticipate that we would 

plan against last year’s baseline as a going-in proposition and then 

adjust from there. But, you know, we don’t want to come in every 

year asking you to double this amount. We do need to continue to 

protect the integrity of the program and take a close eye at what 

is being proposed and what fits with what we need to respond to 

the strategic environment and whether we are using the right 

sources of money. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Now we will go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
11 

Ms. Ellehuus, this is somewhat of an opinion question, I recognize, but it is something that I ask myself. Russia’s economy today, 

the impact that it has on Putin’s decisionmaking process and how 

aggressive he is. The weakness in his economy could lead him to 

be more aggressive; it could lead him to be less aggressive. 

What is your opinion on that, whether or not he is less aggressive or more aggressive because of his current economic state? And 

what happens if the price of oil returns to where his economy actually recovers? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Thank you for your question. 

Yes, it is certainly a difficult balance to determine whether we 

want a strong Russia or an internally destabilized Russia. So when 

we think about things like sanctions and oil prices, certainly, instability in Russia is a concern, as well as external provocation. 

It is hard to say exactly when I look at what causes a reaction 

from Mr. Putin and what does not. It seems like, you know, we can 

try to get into his mind and guess at what is an excuse for provocation, but I don’t think that he necessarily needs one. 

I take the example of two recent exercises that we had in Europe. We had Anakonda just here in the beginning of June with 

31,000 soldiers from 24 nations. We also had BALTOPS 16, which 

has been happening for decades, and that had about 6,100 soldiers. 

And it is something that the Russians have been invited to previously, they are aware of. And, of the two exercises, he griped 

about BALTOPS rather than Anakonda. 

So it is hard to get into the mindset and sort of determine what 

would be provocative and destabilizing. But I think, in the first instance, we need to make sure that we are doing the best to make 

sure that we deter his aggression and that we are prepared if that 

deterrence fails. 

Mr. SCOTT. And correct me if I am wrong. It seems to me that 

maybe his perception of weakness on the other side may be more 

of a determining factor than how strong he is internally or his 

country is financially. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes. I think an outward show of strength is 

something that reinforces domestic support for his leadership. And 

so, if there is an opportunity or an opening to demonstrate that resolve against NATO or individual allies, I think we have seen he 

is an opportunist and will take that initiative. 

Mr. SCOTT. But if that outward show has—the more risk that 

that outward show has, the less likely he is to engage in it then. 

Would that be a fair statement? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Could you please repeat that? 

Mr. SCOTT. So the less likely he is to—the more strength that 

there is on the other side of it, the less likely he would be willing 

to engage in those provocative behaviors. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes. I think that is certainly our intent with the 

moves we are trying to take under ERI and in the NATO context. 

Earlier, resilience was mentioned. And if you build resilience in 

a country and you give them options—so, for example, you know, 

if Putin thinks one of the tools at his disposal is cutting off energy 

supplies in the Baltic States or the Black Sea, he will use that. But 

if there is kind of a safety net and an alternative, it undermines 

his ability to hold them at risk. 
12 

So demonstrating strength is certainly a way to change that calculus and make the costs outweigh the risks. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so this helps get to my point, which may be contradictory, respectfully, to another colleague’s point. 

If we have a short-term commitment, he can simply wait us out, 

where if we show a long-term commitment, then maybe he doesn’t 

feel like he is—maybe he is not as froggy, as we would say in south 

Georgia—— 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Right. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. If you will. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. It is difficult to know, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. What other plans, other than the European Reassurance Initiative, does the DOD have to deter Russia over the long 

term? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Well, I know that we have a number of classified 

programs, which we would be happy to come back and discuss in 

another forum, that try to look at some of Russia’s capabilities and 

the military buildup that they have undertaken in recent years and 

how we might get at that. 

For example, I think you are all very familiar with the third offset strategy and some of the efforts we are trying to take to think 

about how we change the way we approach conventional capabilities and make sure we retain the military edge. So that is definitely one thing. 

Also, I would say that, you know, in addition to European Command, we have to remember that other combatant commands have 

a role in deterring Russia. So I know that Northern Command is 

looking very closely at the Arctic and what Russia is doing in the 

Arctic and trying to make sure that, while we keep that stable and 

safe and demilitarized, we are not being naive about what Russia’s 

intentions there. Similarly, PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] has a 

role to play. If you are on the west coast, that is how you are looking at the Russia threat. So there are a number of initiatives underway across the Department. 

Mr. SCOTT. My time has expired, but, Madam Chair, I hope we 

have a time for a second round of questions. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. I do too. Thank you. 

Now we turn to the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it. 

And thank you all very much for being here today. 

Please pardon my lack of knowledge in this area, but what is 

Russia doing in the Arctic? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Well, certainly, they have a presence there, and 

a great part of their territory is in the Arctic, so a lot of that presence is legitimate. It is economic interests, and as we see new seaways opening up, I think they are thinking ahead to the economic 

opportunities but also to being able to control those lanes and passageways. 

So, in addition to military buildup in the Baltic Sea region, we 

are seeing some changes in military buildup in the Arctic, as well— 

increased exercises and presence that we hadn’t seen to date. 

So, while some of the presence is certainly legitimate and in defense of their economic and legitimate interests, some of it is a lit-
13 

tle bit worrying, given that in the Arctic Council and other fora we 

really try to focus on keeping that a conflict-free zone and keeping 

it stable. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Uh-huh. Anything else to add by the other two 

panelists? 

General ALLVIN. Ma’am, I would just add the one. Sort of an exclamation point on that is, you know, beyond their legitimate interests, I forget how many years ago, but they did take sort of the rhetorical point of placing a platinum Russia flag on the northern pole, 

sort of staking their claim to the very north part of the Arctic. 

So there is some rhetoric that is sort of this bullying type of behavior that has been consistently how they approach things. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Uh-huh. Thank you. 

And I think that segues nicely into my next question: Putin as 

a bully and how we deal with that type of a personality, the uncertainty that he presents. Because we never know what he is going 

to do. He is capable of anything. 

So I would like you all to address that. How do we deal with 

someone of the personality type of a Putin? 

General ALLVIN. Ma’am, I will take the first shot at that, and 

then the smarter people to my right and left will probably be able 

to improve on that. 

But that is a question that we ask ourselves continuously. And 

I think, absent being able to get into the mind of Mr. Putin, which 

none of us have been able to, I think that we go back to the principles, I guess, of deterrence, when, in fact, we look at the principles of what we need to do to prevent certain behavior or unacceptable behavior from occurring from a certain actor. 

And the deterrence theory really says, if you want to prevent 

that behavior, you need to do a couple of things. You either need 

to convince that potential doer of adversarial actions that the outcome that they seek will not be attainable, they will not achieve 

the benefit that they perceive they are going to achieve by that, or, 

in the pursuit of that, the cost will be so high that it will not be 

worth that benefit they anticipate they are going to gain. 

And so that really is the traditional deterrence paradigm. So if 

you perceive him as a bully or if you perceive him as a confident, 

aspirant, great-power leader, however you do that, we judge his actions and we look at what the potential actions would be that 

would be adversarial to our national security interests, and then 

what are the things we can do to either make that perception that 

it is unattainable or that the cost of attaining it would be too high. 

And so that is really at the heart of really what the ERI really 

is. It starts with assurance, where we are showing that we have 

a stake in the game, perhaps greater than Putin’s Russia believed 

that we did. And so, for the first couple of years, we are assuring 

our European allies we are going to be there, our commitment to 

Article 5 is ironclad. 

Now, as we are showing we have a better interoperability with 

them, we are putting more credible combat formations in there, we 

are showing that cohesion, now we are looking at trying to convince 

Putin’s Russia that this is going to cost more than you think, and 

your ambitious behavior here may be met with the cost that you 

may not want to incur for your particular adventurism. 
14 

And so we really just fall back on the principles of deterrence as 

really the foundation for some of the activities we are doing with 

ERI, whether it is a bully or whatever you see him as. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I often think of, sort of, you know, childrearing 

metaphors in context to international relations, so I very much appreciate the question. 

I think, first and foremost, we need to demonstrate unity. So, 

whether it is on sanctions or, you know, just trying to pick off individual allies, I think that is the worst thing we can do, is allow him 

to separate us from one another. We just have to demonstrate that 

resolve and unity. 

I actually think the administration’s policy of a strong and balanced approach to Russia is very wise, because one of the things 

that Putin seeks is influence. He wants to matter. He wants a seat 

at the table. But in order to coerce that behavior in the right direction, where it is supporting rather than undermining the international system, we cooperate with them in areas where they are 

being a constructive actor. So you reward the good behavior while 

punishing the bad—again, going back to the childcare metaphor. 

Ms. GRAHAM. My kids would be appalled to hear me say this in 

an open hearing, but that approach does work. 

And thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

We will move on to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for 

allowing me to join your committee today. 

And thank you, panel, for being here. It is good to see Mr. Tyra. 

It has been many, many years. And, General Allvin, it is good to 

see you again. 

We have had suggestions here today of mission creep, but I recall, when I joined the military in the mid-1980s, in Europe we had 

two full corps of soldiers. That would have been a minimum of four 

total divisions and two armored cavalry regiments, not to mention 

air forces and allies. So this is not a mission creep. This is 

staunching the bleed-out of a presence to virtually nothing now in 

Europe. 

It calls to mind that deterrence without a deterrent is a bluff 

that gambles the future security of Europe. So I guess my question 

to the three of you is, how reassuring would it be to Europe if we 

don’t have a deterrent, if we don’t build this contingency force? 

What would the reaction be in that scenario? 

General ALLVIN. Well, thanks for the question. 

I think it, again, is trying to predict an unknown, but I would 

say that history has shown that if one seeks to split the alliance 

or a set of individual nations, then one can show how perhaps the 

team is not all playing together. 

And so, to your point, the lack of showing our commitment—and 

our commitment in presence, our commitment in interoperability, 

our commitment in training and exercises to show that we are a 

cohesive, credible combat force—I think logic would dictate that 

that would have a negative effect on the alliance’s confidence in its 

ability to fight as an alliance and repel a Russian aggression. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Can I preempt you? 
15 

So I, again, am reassured by some of the language in the communique from the Warsaw Summit. NATO focused very much on deterrence and defense and how to reinforce that even if we don’t 

have the volume of forces and capabilities in theater that we had 

previously. 

And the way that they put it is they underscored that that collective defense is a fundamental responsibility of NATO, and it relies 

on a whole suite of capabilities. So it is a mix of the nuclear, the 

conventional, missile defense, and, increasingly, even cyber and 

space and other elements. 

So, even if we don’t have the heft of conventional forces that we 

had, I am hopeful that the way we think creatively about the mix 

of capabilities enables us to get at the problem and to deter. 

Mr. TYRA. So I would add to that, the U.S. has a long history of 

displaying the ability to deploy enormous resources against a problem, and that raising the determination in the U.S. and its allies 

is not profitable, right? And, therefore, you can, in fact, deploy that 

entire force and keep deploying it without having to build more of 

it. The economies in Europe, the U.S. economy, they are all capable 

of conducting these operations. 

And I think that is how we would sell them. What they need is 

assurance that the U.S. is with them, and then that would be 

enough. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, thank you for that. 

And I guess my last question would be, what impact would it 

have on other nations? 

We have made much of the initiative to encourage our European 

allies to provide 2 percent towards their national defense, and we 

see some movement on that. Some is mixed. A lot of it is tied to 

a lot of factors. 

If we lead and show, from no presence to now a brigade combat 

team, with a promise of, as you suggest, Mr. Tyra, that, as we 

show up, there is more to follow—you may pick on little brother 

today, but big brother is coming. If we don’t do that, what impact 

would that have on the 2 percent initiatives that we have worked 

so carefully to try to craft with our European allies to make their 

own commitments? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I can begin, since you took the last one. 

Certainly, it is a fine balance between being there and being a 

good NATO ally and doing our part while not allowing inequitable 

burden-sharing. 

So I think a good example of this is the enhanced forward presence [EFP]. The U.S. actually did not commit to be a framework 

nation until we were pretty certain that other allies were going to 

step up. And it goes with this thinking that, you know, Europeans 

should also be taking responsibility for their security and caring 

about it as much as we care about the transatlantic space. So enhanced forward presence is an example of how the U.S. was careful 

not to underwrite everything, because we had already done quite 

a bit through ERI. 

On 2 percent, I think we do need to keep the pressure on. Again, 

five allies have stepped up and are now at or above 2 percent, and 

others are on their way. But we regularly, in our office, have people 

coming through and telling us that we need to keep the pressure 
16 

on, because they need to be able to go back to their parliaments 

and argue for greater defense spending and why it is central to stability, economic stability, in their countries. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you for that. 

And I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentleman. 

Now we will turn to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me to join 

the hearing today. 

I would love to follow up on Mr. Russell’s point. We have talked 

a lot today about deterrence and about the money that we are committing towards that end. But I think it would also send a very 

powerful message for our NATO allies to meet their commitments 

in terms of proximity to Russia itself, to the threat that that potentially presents. They have the most to lose in a confrontation. 

And it blows me away that, of the 28 NATO member countries, 

only 5 have met a minimal threshold of 2 percent while we are 

spending near 4 percent, double all other NATO countries combined. And of the Baltic States, only Estonia has reached that—the 

Baltic States, who we seem to be preoccupied with in terms of potential Russian provocation. 

And so my concern—I don’t know if you have an answer to it. 

You said that we are pretty certain that some of these member 

countries are going to meet their commitments; we need to do 

more. 

If you have something specific to share, I would love to hear it. 

If not, I would just love to make the point that we are creating a 

moral hazard by upping an investment from $789 million to $3.4 

billion without a concurrent commitment in real dollars or euros 

from our allies on the continent. And I think that sets its own set 

of problems in motion. 

The other thing that I would like to ask of General Allvin is, last 

week, we had a great panel, including Dov Zakheim, who talked 

about the tyranny of consensus. And you have been talking about 

all the reasons that ERI makes sense, everything that it might be 

able to do. I would love to get a sense of the intellectual rigor that 

went into making these decisions and coming up with this strategy. 

In much the same way that we may or may not have been able 

to forecast that Russia might feel encircled as we brought more 

countries formerly in the eastern bloc into NATO, is there some unintended consequence that we might want to think about now or 

that you could share with us, in terms of upping our commitment, 

our force structure, the amount of money that we are spending, 

ratcheting up the escalation in that area? Again, maybe for the 

right reasons; maybe we have thought all of this through. But assure me that you have thought through some of the other consequences that may not have been obvious from your testimony. 

General ALLVIN. Well, sir, I would say, specifically, with respect 

to the approach that we have taken, as I mentioned, there has been 

a transition. For the first couple years, it was really about assurance. And so if one wanted to say that was a more passive approach, because when you looked at the way that we were executing and had been executing, it was very disaggregated with our 

formations. And it was sort of a statement that we are here, we 
17 

are here, but the way that we were here in many of the—the presence in the Baltics, for example, was not necessarily a credible 

combat formation, but it sent that message that we are standing 

next to our allies. 

And as we saw the continued malign influence and the activities, 

that is what has had us step up—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I am sorry to interrupt you. I have limited time. 

So I am not so interested in the thinking that went into coming 

up with this as the strategy, but the thinking that challenged this 

strategy. What are the potential risks of this strategy? What could 

go wrong? 

General ALLVIN. So you actually touched on it very well, Congressman, is that there is an escalation risk here. And so, as we 

try and understand those things which are true red lines, those 

things which are rhetorical red lines, the consistency is with our 

commitments of resources and equipment and exercises and increased focus in Europe. It is also with the consistent messaging, 

the messaging of what we are here to do and the objectionable behavior by the Russians that has caused this response. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. From my perspective as a Member of Congress, 

Crimea caught me by surprise. And, again, from a little bit of a distance, although I sit on the committee and I have been able to be 

in some classified discussions on this, I think all of us would have 

liked to have known more about what was about to come before it 

hit us. 

Tell me what, since Crimea, you have done in terms—that you 

could talk about here—in terms of maybe Russian language specialists who are on your staff, your ability to collect information, 

the ability not just through deterrence and force presence but perhaps the nonforce aspects of what we do in Europe to prevent 

something from happening in the first place or to anticipate it before it hits us. 

General ALLVIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And I didn’t leave you much time, so I may have 

to take this for the record, Madam Chair. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

General ALLVIN. I would just—I will introduce, and perhaps I 

will get a chance to expound on it later, but the Russian Strategic 

Initiative is something I would like to share and talk about. 

Of course, with respect to the intel [intelligence] capabilities, I 

am not of that particular ilk, and I know that there are more intel 

professionals who can speak more deeply on this. But they are committed to regaining that expertise in the quantities that have sort 

of eroded over the past 15, 20 years, for the right reasons, because 

there are more global requirements for that. But that is a commitment that the intel community is making. 

The Russia Strategic Initiative is—much of it is about learning, 

it is about understanding. So, to your point, sir, that the surprise 

of Crimea, that caught a lot of us sort of unawares, and understanding that we need to be able to have a better understanding 

of the thinking, of the strategy, of the doctrine of Russia to be able 

to anticipate better, in conjunction with the increasing resources 
18 

from the Intelligence Community, we have an understanding to 

how to respond to those and perhaps get ahead of that. 

So and I would be happy to talk further at length about the Russia Strategic Initiative, which is something that, incidentally, was 

initially funded through ERI. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. You bet. And we are getting ready to start here 

in a minute a second round of questioning. So if you can stick 

around, we would love to have you have the opportunity to share 

any more questions you might have, because those are really excellent questions. 

Representative Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is great 

to be here. 

First of all, I just want to associate myself with Representative 

Russell and Representative O’Rourke and their remarks about the 

importance of contributions to the NATO alliance. You emphasized 

how important it is that we have a united alliance. 

General, you used the terms ‘‘commitment in presence,’’ ‘‘confidence in the alliance,’’ ‘‘effectiveness of interoperability.’’ Do you 

think it would be a wise decision to dismantle NATO? 

General ALLVIN. No. Absolutely not. I could go on for minutes or 

hours, but, absolutely, if NATO—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Well, you are preaching to the choir here. We 

just, unfortunately, have a major-party candidate who thinks that 

is a good idea. 

You also talked about the importance of deterring Putin. And I 

couldn’t agree more that he is a real threat. Is it helpful to have 

people talking about his leadership, praising his military accomplishments? Is that a good way to deter Putin, General? 

General ALLVIN. I can really only speak to the way that we can 

try and avert behavior through our strength and, sort of, the primary deterrence theory model. With respect to other influences 

outside of the principles of deterrence, which are deny the benefit 

or increase the cost, I am not really a deterrence specialist beyond 

the principles of deterrence theory, so I really can’t speak to those 

elements. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you. 

Would anyone else like to comment on that? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. We work with alliances and partnerships every 

day, so we see the value of those. 

And the transatlantic community, you know, Putin aside, when 

we have other nations who are undermining the rules-based international order which we have tried so hard to create, I think the 

transatlantic community has greater influence together. 

And so, outside of a NATO perspective, I think in terms of relative influence, there is a rationale for keeping NATO and increasing our relationship with individual allies in the EU. 

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Thank you very much. 

I would like to talk about something that some other people have 

brought up, which is the Russian hybrid warfare threat and how 

we are meeting that threat. 
19 

When I was in Eastern Europe looking at the threat of Russia 

last year, it was very clear that we have gotten—you know, we 

were doing some good tank drills and things like that, but Russia 

has an incredibly well-developed propaganda effort—for example, 

extensive propaganda, both clandestine but also, frankly, very public, with their public TV stations. 

One of the lessons that we have learned in fighting ISIS [Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria] over the past several years is that we can 

drop a lot of bombs and kill a lot of ISIS fighters, but if we don’t 

address the recruiting effort, either right there on the ground 

amongst the family and friends of those we kill or through the 

Internet with folks even back home, then we are really not going 

to win this fight against ISIS. 

And it strikes me that there is a bit of an analogy with the fight 

against Russia, that we can add a few more battalions of tanks and 

do some larger tank drills and shows of force with our Air Force, 

but if we are not addressing the way that they are really undermining confidence in the NATO alliance right there in Eastern Europe, then we are probably not going to win this fight in the long 

run. 

So, General, can you talk about the balance that you see in the 

ERI and whether we are putting enough effort into those types of 

battles as well? 

General ALLVIN. I would say that balance of effort does not necessarily equate to balance of dollars. 

Mr. MOULTON. Sure. 

General ALLVIN. So I think that there are some areas that are 

smaller dollar amounts within ERI, and some of the things that we 

are doing just within the normal conduct of business with our Special Operations Command in Europe that really get at this using 

the host nation to strengthen their ability to attribute, to be able 

to sort of call out, to be able to identify that which is true with that 

which is being, you know, formulated, the facts on the ground. 

I think, inherently, you step back and it is easy to understand 

how a country that acts fully out of interests versus a country 

which is value-based has an advantage tactically in being able to 

not be encumbered by the truth. So it makes it a bit of a challenge, 

but one that I think we embrace happily as a values-based nation. 

So I think those sort of things that we are doing to be able to 

help them attribute it, confront it, call them out, and be able to 

identify the differences between the truth and what is being portrayed, that is being funded partially through ERI and some of the 

engagements that we do in the day-to-day business within European—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Do you think it is being funded sufficiently? 

General ALLVIN. Honestly, I am not enough of an expert to say 

what—— 

Mr. MOULTON. I mean, my impression a year ago was that we 

were doing very little, compared to what they are doing, to counter 

their effort. So, I mean, if there has been a dramatic change in the 

last 12 months, then I would be willing to revise my assessment, 

but—— 

General ALLVIN. I would offer that, as we look at this, it is not 

necessarily the Russian military alone that is doing this. They are 
20 

approaching it with a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach, and—— 

Mr. MOULTON. And do we have enough of a whole-of-nation, 

whole-of-government approach in response? 

General ALLVIN. I would say that is beyond my particular area 

of expertise to—— 

Mr. MOULTON. From your perspective, do you think you are 

being supported enough? I mean, you have a job that is very dependent on these other arms of government. Do you think we are 

doing enough? 

General ALLVIN. I honestly—understanding the tensions that 

exist within this government for all the things that have to be 

done, I cannot speak credibly as to what the other elements of the 

government are doing, whether it is sufficient. 

Mr. MOULTON. So, General, if you cannot even speak to what the 

other elements of government are doing, it certainly doesn’t give 

me enough confidence that we have enough of a whole-of-government approach to this threat. 

Thank you very much. 

Madam Chair, thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much. 

Now, as has been alluded to, in this initiative for fiscal year 2017, we are funding the operation at $3.4 billion, which is up from 

$789 million authorized and appropriated last year. So that is a 

huge increase in investment. 

And the request addressed most of those funds towards a conventional buildup, including consecutive, rotational, or heel-to-toe deployments of U.S. troops and the prepositioning of an armored brigade combat team’s equipment in Europe. And the funds also are 

providing for additional military exercises with one or more foreign 

partners, building foreign military capacity, countering unconventional threats, and military construction, or MILCON, projects. 

So, just for the record, could you expound on specific examples 

of the way this money is being used, specific MILCON projects that 

are going to be using this money, specific training exercises that 

you have been doing, and examples of building that foreign military capacity? 

General. 

General ALLVIN. Yes, ma’am. Well, I would say specifically—well, 

starting with the exercises. That is one we alluded to earlier, 

whether it be Anakonda 16 or the BALTOPS or Cold Response, Trident Juncture. These are elements of exercising that we are enabling to grow and be more multinational and more opportunities to 

test interoperability amongst nations. So, on the exercise, it has 

been very robust. 

The infrastructure, when we talk about MILCON, it is not necessarily what we would consider big construction. It is a very small 

percentage. But the military construction is really to allow the infrastructure of the host nation to better support their training and 

our training needs alongside them. 

So, when you have slight improvements, for example, in training 

ranges, in Bulgaria, for example, that allows us to have better bilateral or multilateral exercising and training interoperability exercises, given the improvements in the ranges, for example. 
21 

With respect to the presence—I would say that each of these five 

lines of effort, the key is that this is one area where the sum is 

much greater than the parts. If you have the, sort of, slight increase in the infrastructure, it enables you to do more robust exercising. If you have a greater presence of this armored brigade combat team, which is their heel-to-toe, fully with their equipment, it 

allows you to do more broader engagements and interoperabilities 

and leverage the small infrastructure improvements that we are 

doing. As you increase the engagements with your partners at the 

smaller level with building partnership capacity, that is done 

through the presence and the engagements of those forces that are 

able to come over. 

And in a purely deterrence aspect, which is really what this—the 

prepositioned stocks are largely a deterrent aspect, but they also 

enable the Army to in future times come over and fall in on that 

and be able to exercise that as a deterrent. So each of those really 

feed into each other for an overall increased deterrent effect. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. And, as we discussed privately, you 

will be modernizing some of the bunkers and some of the old facilities that are there in order to house the equipment and to be able 

to have those prepositioned stocks. 

What can we expect our allies to contribute to the ERI from both 

a capability and capacity perspective? 

And, separately, would the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program 

be a useful mechanism through which the U.S. could aid our ERI 

partners? And, if so, are there any FMS cases that are currently 

working their way through the FMS process relating to this initiative and our partner nations? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I can begin on that. 

Certainly, you know, as we have moved from assurance to deterrence, and we have learned more each year as we have proceeded 

with the training and exercises and other efforts under ERI. So, for 

example, as we do the training and exercises, we find other 

vulnerabilities, in terms of maneuverability or movements or gaps 

in infrastructure or communications, and so we are able to build 

on that. 

And those aren’t just vulnerabilities that we, the United States, 

needs to come in and fix; those are lessons learned that we pass 

on to individual allies about their vulnerabilities and what they 

need to do to reinforce their own defense, and there are things that 

we pass on to NATO as well. 

So, to give you one example, you are probably familiar with 

NATO’s RAP, or Reassurance Action Plan, which was a holdover 

from the Wales Summit in 2014. And the NAC [North Atlantic 

Council] recently agreed the Readiness Action Plan reception, staging, and onward movement and preposition capability packages, 

whereby NSIP [NATO Security Investment Programme] funding, 

about 300 million euros, will be used to support ERI projects, so 

design and construction, including storage of U.S. equipment in Poland. 

So, you know, that is a lot of words, but, in short, we have said 

we want to preposition stocks in Poland and we want to train 

there, and NATO is recognizing that they will take advantage of 

those sites as well. And so they recognize that NATO will also pro-
22 

vide funding for that. So that heavily reduces the bill for the U.S. 

and allows us to either give back that ERI funding or use it elsewhere. 

And so I give you that example just to show the kind of expectations we are conveying not only to individual allies, in terms of 

host-nation support, but to NATO, saying, you are benefiting from 

this as well, you are going to use those training ranges, you are 

going to use those bases. 

In terms of your second question about building partner capacity 

and FMF [Foreign Military Financing], I would have to get back 

to you because I would need to confer with State Department about 

what the security assistance plan is for this year. 

But I do know that in the discussions that DOD has been involved in with State Department about building that program, we 

have argued for pooled funding for the Baltic nations to increase 

their capabilities under the Baltic Defense Capabilities Initiative, 

particularly in areas such as air defense. And so we have tried to 

look at them, you know, as three rather than individual nations 

and look at what they already have and what they might need in 

future to reinforce their own defenses, using mechanisms like FMF. 

But we can certainly take that for the record and get you exact 

numbers for FMF. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I appreciate that. Yeah, this subcommittee has 

been looking at the foreign military sales process and ways that it 

is impacting our global defense, as well as any problems, so that 

is why I ask that question. 

My last question before I turn to the other members is, giving 

the information coming out of Eastern Europe, I understand that 

there are very lethal threats to our primary ground combat platforms and their crews. And many in the Army, including General 

McMaster, the Director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center and Deputy Commanding General of Futures at the U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, has stated that our ground combat vehicles are losing their qualitative edge over our adversaries. 

‘‘With Russia demonstrating the capability to field advanced antitank weapons and thermobaric warheads, our armored vehicles 

and servicemembers will be vulnerable in a fight.’’ 

So I understand that new technologies like the Active Protection 

System, the APS, can defeat these threats, and they have already 

been successfully fielded and combat-tested by our allies with great 

results. And I have been a very strong advocate of APS technologies to protect our men and women and believe we need the 

technology fielded now. 

So, General Allvin, can you tell us how EUCOM, in particular, 

views the threat situation to our ground combat vehicles? And how 

is EUCOM working with the Army to address the threat sooner 

rather than later, especially if the APS solution already exists? 

General ALLVIN. Well, I will tell you that what we are learning 

in—as we mentioned, this last 30 months has been—it is relatively 

rapid, I guess, in bureaucratic timeframe, but we have been getting 

smarter about what it takes to operate in the vicinity of and what 
23 

combat might look like if, God forbid, it were to actually happen 

through some of our contingency planning and wargaming. 

And that actually has yielded deficiencies in several domains, so 

it is not only just the land domain but the air domain. Their ability 

to inhibit freedom of movement and the qualitative edge is, sort of, 

waning in several areas. 

So, while I can’t speak to this specifically, what we do as a result 

of that, those are the capability gaps and shortfalls that we do submit in each of those domains, those shortfalls, as they are identified and clarified to the Department. And that goes back to the 

services and into the building to come up with the solutions to 

those. 

So we do identify the gaps and the shortfalls, and then the solutions come out through OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] 

and the services. And I would say that this one, this particular one, 

has not elevated above others to us. There is a general category of 

inhibitors to freedom of movement and things where the qualitative 

edge has waned with respect to a potential confrontation with the 

Russians. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I am having a classified briefing tomorrow on 

some of these issues, so perhaps we can delve further into those 

vulnerabilities at that time. But thank you for your answer. 

Ranking Member Speier, do you have any additional questions? 

Ms. SPEIER. No. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. 

Mr. Scott, do you have any additional questions? 

Mr. SCOTT. General Allvin, I wanted to follow up, and this may 

give you a chance to speak about the initiative you were talking 

about earlier. 

What requirements remain unfunded under the current budget, 

and how would you assess the risk that that causes the forces 

under European Command? And then just any general comments 

that you have. I know you had some comments about the Russian 

initiative. 

General ALLVIN. Well, thank you. 

I would say that, in general, we do need those forces that are 

coming in through ERI, those increased rotational forces. And I 

think one of the other areas that has been identified is also, as we 

mentioned, the ability to counter this anti-access/area denial capability that the Russians have been able to put up that could inhibit 

the freedom of movement. That is about as much depth at this classification. 

But I would say thank you for the opportunity to reengage on the 

Russia Strategic Initiative. Because one thing we certainly understand is that we do have some learning to do, and we have to do 

it fairly rapidly. And so, while the Intelligence Community is really 

working hard on being able to increase the robustness and the capacity of their resources and their analysts and the understanding, 

we also in the Department understand that this is an issue that 

crosses combatant commands and it is something that we need to 

understand as a department. 

And so, thanks to initially the funding of the European Reassurance Initiative, we have developed this Russia Strategic Initiative. 

And I can tell you at this classification level, its primary role is to 
24 

enhance our understanding and to help support some of the planning that we would do and some of the deterrent activities. 

A lot of these questions that have been asked today we are still 

trying to get to the correct answers on. The Russia Strategic Initiative is moving us closer to a better understanding that will help us 

be able to have more satisfying answers to questions like this in 

the future. 

And I would say that this is an example, as we look at the question of what is in the OCO which should be into base, this is one 

of those that the Department realizes this is a long-term initiative. 

And so it has been transitioned into a program of record. So the 

funding that started off in ERI is going to transition into the 

Army’s base budget as a program of record. So this is one of the 

examples where we keep analyzing those things that we think are 

going to be long-term requirements and how we might be able to 

move them into the base budgets. 

So thank you for the opportunity to respond. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you think that Mr. Putin underestimated the 

global response with his actions in the Ukraine? 

General ALLVIN. That is a very difficult question. It is a great 

question, and I think that there are many competing scholars who 

have differing opinions as to whether he achieved some level of success and is satisfied with that at this point. There are others who 

will say that he was surprised, that he did not anticipate the level 

of national unity post-Crimea that actually came against him when 

he went into the Donbass. 

I will say that is still an open question at this point, but, as we 

look at the future, we do understand something about Russia, that 

they are a learning and adaptive country. This is not the Soviet 

Union of old. And so, as you look at the tactics and the techniques 

and what they have been doing, starting with Georgia in 2008 up 

to now, they are learning and adapting. 

The question of what they are learning from Ukraine I believe 

is still an open one, and I can’t give you a good, solid answer on 

that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do either of you have an opinion on that that you 

would like to share? 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. I think he certainly underestimated the resolve 

coming out of NATO. I mean, the increase in defense spending and 

the refocus on deterrence and defense, that has really energized 

the alliance at a time when I think some countries were certainly 

sitting back and looking for a further peace dividend. It has woken 

up a lot of people. 

I think of the example of Germany, in particular, which has always played a pretty calm role in arbitrating between, kind of, Europe and Russia. And, you know, Chancellor Merkel speaks Russian and has a long history there and so thought she had an understanding of where he was coming from. But, clearly, a lot of countries woke up and realized that you can’t handle—— 

Mr. SCOTT. They also have very strong trade relationships with 

Germany, as I understand it. And I would think that that would 

lead to maybe part of the surprise that he had from—— 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Certainly. But Germany, in particular, has been 

very strong on sanctions, with Chancellor Merkel leading the 
25 

charge in their rollover each and every time and focusing on the 

importance of Minsk implementation. Other nations haven’t been 

as strong, but she has been a real champion of that, despite the 

damage it has done to Germany’s economy. 

Mr. TYRA. So I would observe that every action that has been 

taken has resulted in an action that is unhelpful to them. And so 

the more times they push, the harder it gets. And I think the reaction is they are only making the coalition stronger, they are only 

making NATO stronger. And I think they will eventually get to 

that point. 

I would observe that Germany, among others, is one of the 

framework nations for the EFP. And so I think it is clear where 

they believe their future lies. 

Mr. SCOTT [presiding]. Well, certainly, every member of this committee is aware of the challenges of what is in OCO that we would 

prefer to be in base and something that we look forward to resolving as time goes forward. 

I would make one final point, which is, certainly, he saw where 

our NATO allies increased their defense spending, and he can also 

see when we reduce our defense spending. And I think that maybe 

leads to a false perception of weakness of the United States and 

our resolve. 

With that, Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. 

General Allvin, going back to the line of questions about unintended consequences or thinking through next-order effects of some 

of the decisions we are making today, we increase our force size in 

Europe and the amount that we are spending there; ideally, Russia 

gets the message and it deters them from provocation or doing 

things that we don’t or the Europeans don’t want them to do. What 

if Russia increases its force size with its border with NATO? 

To Ranking Member Speier’s question in terms of anticipating 

the budgetary consequences of this, do we see you back here, or 

someone from the Pentagon, 2 years from now saying, ‘‘Look, we 

thought $3.4 billion was going to do the trick. It turns out the Russians have put two more divisions here. We need to step up’’? 

You can understand my concern along this trajectory. Tell me 

how you have addressed that concern for yourself or for others in 

the Pentagon. 

General ALLVIN. Well, certainly, our role in U.S. European Command is to be able to identify, sort of, the demand as we see it to 

be able to counter security threats in Europe. So to the extent 

that—and I certainly wouldn’t be able to predict what might happen in the coming years. 

I think our role here is to ensure that the money that we are 

being given now, we are spending it in the most efficient and effective manner, to where we are actually increasing the power of the 

alliance, increasing the power of not just the United States forces 

over there but the interoperability and that what we are learning 

from our training and exercises is making the entire alliance 

stronger. 

And if we succeed at that, then, in fact, the likelihood of coming 

back—and whether that comes back or makes it through the Department—because that is actually what we do. We compete with 
26 

all the other combatant commands to say, this is what we see in 

our AOR [area of responsibility]. I think the more successful we are 

in utilizing the resources we have now to help build the alliance 

and build that unity, the less likely it is that you will see us here, 

you know, in a couple years. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So a success would be we have calibrated this 

correctly, we have spent the right amount, we have put the precise 

number of forces there to get the desired outcome. Failure would 

be the Pentagon coming back or a future administration coming 

back and saying, actually, we didn’t quite get this right; it looks 

like the Russians have escalated; we now need to, in turn, escalate. 

Let me ask you, just because of limited time, as we bring more 

U.S. forces into this region and as the Russians respond in kind, 

I think we increase the opportunities for miscalculation. You mentioned your efforts towards ensuring that we do a better job of 

gathering intelligence and are just smarter and more effective with 

the resources that we have there. 

Talk about military-to-military cooperation with Russia, your relationships with your counterpart or your counterparts in Russia 

and your ability to talk to each other to ensure that we don’t have 

a miscalculation that leads to an unintended conflict or war. 

General ALLVIN. I am going to actually probably yield that second to my policy counterpart. 

But I will just say quickly on the first, I don’t know that I would 

calculate that failure would be necessarily that we come back here. 

It might be a failure to predict. There are certain things that they 

say the enemy gets a vote. So the failure to predict exactly what 

an unpredictable Russia would do could actually result in us coming back. 

So there are many things that we don’t fully have control over. 

We are going to focus on the things we do have control over to 

make sure that, again, we are making the best use of the resources 

that you are providing for us. 

I am going to actually turn it over with respect to the mil-to-mil 

policy to Rachel. 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes, certainly. Thank you. 

Yes, I mean, I think when we look at these programs each year, 

success would actually be Russia behaving responsibly and becoming a cooperative partner, as it has been in the past, on Afghanistan, in the Balkans. We have very positive examples of a time 

when they did work with the international community. 

If things have gotten worse, I think we need to actually have a 

more fundamental relook at our prioritization of the Russia threat 

vis-a-vis other threats that the Department and the U.S. Government have identified. 

In terms of how—you know, your question about deconflicting 

and dialogue with Russia, again, the strategy is strong and balanced, so the ‘‘balanced’’ side of that is having a dialogue with Russia. Today, in fact, there is a NATO-Russia Council meeting. It is 

the second since 2014, when we said no business as usual and actually stopped the military-to-military cooperation under the business-as-usual rubric. 

So we do continue that dialogue, not least in Syria, where it is 

very important that we talk with them to avoid miscalculation. 
27 

And every time they have a violation of airspace or fly too close to 

our ships, we also call out that bad behavior, because the last thing 

we need is miscalculation or an accident. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that. 

And, as I yield back, I would just like to make the point that I 

would view continued escalation to be a failure. And I would hope 

that, in maybe working through the committee staff, the ranking 

member, and the chair, there would be some way to hold a joint 

hearing with our colleagues on Foreign Affairs, because I would 

really like to understand everything that we are doing to address 

these issues militarily but also non-militarily. 

And nothing that I can think of condones Russia’s behavior in 

the areas that we have talked about, but there is a logic to it. And 

I can understand them responding to the growth of NATO, to 

things that happened in Ukraine, a part of the world that is central to the Russian psyche. And the responses, while not justified, 

are understandable to me. 

And, in that same way, I want to make sure we are thinking through adding $3.4 billion to the fire, bringing more forces in, and 

potentially setting us on a trajectory where we will be obligated, as 

things continue to escalate, to bring more forces and more dollars 

into play, thereby provoking additional responses that may not be 

wise, they may not follow the international norms, but may follow 

a logic that we have seen play out from Georgia to Ukraine to Crimea. 

And so, anyhow, I would just like to set that out there. I really 

appreciate your all’s work and response to our questions. 

With that, I yield back to the chair. 

Mr. SCOTT. Ma’am, do you have any? 

Ms. SPEIER. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. I want to thank all of you for being here. It is very 

clear to me that we need your expertise. 

And the other thing that is clear to me from this hearing is that 

Putin—he may be predictable sometimes and at other times unpredictable, but he clearly would not have stopped in the Ukraine, in 

my opinion, had the United States not shown the resolve and had 

our NATO allies not shown the resolve that they did to stop him. 

And so we will have honest and respectful discussions about the 

funding of the operations in that part of the world. And I look forward to your input on that, and I look forward to making the world 

a better place. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 13, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 13, 2016 

(33) 
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47 
48 
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 13, 2016 

(57) 
58 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 13, 2016 

(61) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Ms. ELLEHUUS. Yes. For Ukraine, there is one FMS case for 2,250 AN/PVS–14 

Night-Vision Devices that is still being processed using the European Reassurance 

Initiative (ERI) funds, and the devices are tentatively scheduled to be delivered by 

the end of September 2016. Other than Ukraine, there are no other FMS cases to 

our Partner nations that are funded with ERI appropriations. [See page 22.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O’ROURKE 

General ALLVIN. While more work needs to be done, EUCOM has enhanced our 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance interoperability and sharing with 

partner nations in order to maximize limited resources. This includes multiple lines 

of effort: coordinating processes, sharing key intelligence questions, deconflicting capabilities, and developing shared architecture and tools. [See page 17.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 13, 2016 

(65) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Please expand on your comments about the value of restricting 

Russia’s options by ‘‘bracketing’’ the scope of its hybrid warfare. Even if Russia 

takes actions at the lower-intensity end of the hybrid warfare spectrum, what value 

do you foresee in continuing to invest the full amount of requested ERI funds to 

increase the costs to Vladimir Putin—and therefore decrease the likelihood—of higher-end military engagements? Do you believe the U.S. should continue to fund ERI 

based on an analysis of the region’s strategic goals and the changing operational 

landscape in Europe? 

General ALLVIN. (U) In order to effectively counter the lower end of hybrid warfare and strive to prevent high end conflict, USEUCOM must understand what messages our adversary is pushing, which messages have traction with key audiences 

and how our adversary reacts to US counter-messaging and reassurance/deterrence 

activities. This understanding will both help USEUCOM message more effectively, 

and avoid unintentionally provoking our adversary. 

(U) A lack of a presence in the information environment during steady state operations would leave DoD at a distinct disadvantage when dealing with audiences that 

have been inundated with adversary propaganda and malign influence efforts. 

USEUCOM is reliant on ERI funding to augment the ASSURED VOICE base funding it currently receives in order to effectively counter propaganda and deter aggression. Until this funding issue is addressed, USEUCOM’s ability to compete in the 

information space will be limited and therefore the risk of higher end military engagement is increased. 

(U) With regard to the last question on if ERI should continue to be funded, as 

a Combatant Command it is our responsibility not to advocate for funding sources 

but to clearly communicate requirements given our strategic environment and assigned missions. Given this, we clearly see an enduring demand signal to successfully deter Russia, and sincerely appreciate the support to date Congress has provided through ERI. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Please provide an update on the timeline for deploying the 80 M– 

1 tanks and 140 Bradley vehicles to EUCOM, and please elaborate on the the types 

of modernization and capability improvements that will be integrated into each set 

of vehicles. 

Mr. TYRA. Starting in 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2017, the Army will initiate heelto-toe rotations of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to Europe. The current plan is to rotate units with 87 M1A2SEPv2 Abrams tanks and 138 Bradley 

Fighting Vehicles (BFVs). With respect to the Bradley Fighting vehicles, 125 are 

M2A3 BFVs and 13 are M7A3 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles. These 

vehicles have digital architecture and 2nd Generation forward-looking infrared 

which provides visible imaging for day or night operations. If the European Reassurance Initiative program continues, the Army would recommend fielding an additional Armored Brigade as prepositioned stock. This would provide U.S. Army Europe two complete Armored Brigade prepositioned stock sets while continuing to 

rotationally deploy one ABCT. 

Accordingly, the Army has requested funding to modernize 14 Abrams and 14 

BFVs available due to unit conversions in the European Reassurance Initiative portion of the 2017 President’s Budget. This will begin building a second ABCT set in 

Europe. 

Æ