This report is published by the Joint Special Operations University which led this collaborative effort for 

USSOCOM. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily 

represent the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, United States Special 

Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.

This report is UNCLASSIFIED and releasable to the public.
Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................... i

Overview...............................................................................................................1

Selection ...............................................................................................................5

Organization .......................................................................................................25

Resourcing..........................................................................................................37

Authorities...........................................................................................................45

Annexes..............................................................................................................55

The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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Executive Summary

The OSS Model and the Future of the SOF Warrior Seminar, 11-12 January 

2011, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

It has been some 70 years since the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) quietly came into 

being as a small, nearly invisible, Washington, D.C.-based organization whose unique 

capabilities and strategic reach resulted in decisive outcomes within World War II 

European, Chinese, Southeast Asian and other theaters of operations. Today the record of 

the OSS survives as far more than a topic of historical curiosity. As a result of its 

dramatic successes and failures, the OSS has developed a legacy of mission 

accomplishment that survives as a practical touchstone for the (SOF) Warriors of the 21st

century. 

In fact, the OSS Model continues to provide fresh insights and practical relevancy 

to the concept of persistent engagement as practiced by today‘s United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM). In speaking about the OSS veteran, a contemporary 

Special Forces officer observed that ―we must understand who he is, not just what he 

did.‖

As part of his Commander‘s Guidance for 2011, then USSOCOM Commander 

Admiral Eric T. Olson directed that a study be undertaken to address if and how the OSS 

Model could serve as a source of inspiration to incorporate into USSOCOM efforts to 

select, organize, resource, and develop authorities for SOF of the future. Specifically, the 

study was intended to identify ways to promote agility in the command through 

leveraging the OSS selection process, modeling its streamlined organizational structure, 

using the OSS simplified resourcing authorities, and adapting its charter and authorities 

to conduct seamless intelligence and operations. Admiral Olson highlighted the OSS 

attributes of expertise, ability to leverage networks and creativity to guide JSOU‘s efforts.

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) engaged selected members of the 

USSOCOM Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. 

Army Special Operations Command, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 

Center and School, and the OSS Society to assist in the development of recommendations 

for Admiral Olson‘s review. JSOU organized the participants into four study groups 

addressing both OSS and USSOCOM approaches to the Selection, Organization, 

Resourcing, and Authorities of SOF. The study groups began their discussions following 

the Innovation Workshop conducted at USSOCOM on 16 November 2010. Three 

principles guided the proceedings of that Innovation Workshop and subsequent 

discussions: Understand the nature of the operational environment; recognize the need for 

a small, innovative footprint for forces engaged within the operational environment; and
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

ii____________________________________________________________________________

ensure sufficient flexibility in the relevant authorities to allow for the innovation 

necessary within the operational environment.

These principles were amplified by the following thoughts: The expertise of the 

OSS allowed members of the organization to understand the operational environment; to 

understand the language and culture; and to understand the nature of the enemy‘s purpose 

or at least their objectives. The OSS recruited regional experts to apply their skills as 

operators and to be the ―reach back‖ for additional resources and knowledge as needed.

The SOF community has similar requirements today, and USSOCOM expects current 

and future SOF warriors to have the same level of expertise as the OSS warrior.

The OSS members‘ ability to leverage a multitude of personal and professional networks 

was instrumental to their operational success. The OSS leadership recruited its personnel 

by relying on contacts with business leaders, social elites, university academics, and other 

professionals. Those operators sent overseas leveraged the networks within their areas of 

operation to work against enemy networks. Today‘s SOF warrior is not as focused on or 

as skilled in leveraging or exploiting networks for a variety of reasons, including the 

relative lack of advanced language and cultural awareness skills.

Creativity enables the innovation that is required during operations for successful 

outcomes. While expertise and leveraging can be taught or developed, creativity is a trait 

not easily replicated. It is, however, a character trait expected in SOF warriors as they are 

placed in situations where creativity means the difference between success and failure. 

Each of the workgroups presented their recommendations and thoughts to those 

attending the seminar on The OSS Model and the Future of the SOF Warrior on 11-12 

January 2011. As a result of those contributions and subsequent discussion, the following 

recommendations, organized by issue, emerged for developing SOF that demonstrate 

flexibility and are able to adapt to the changing security environments SOF encounters.

Selection Process

Seek authorities for USSOCOM J-1 to monitor, influence and coordinate all personnel 

issues, including recruitment and selection, related to all of SOF and not just limited to 

USSOCOM command and staff as is the current situation.

Expand the Human Capital Plan so that it not only addresses the rapid acquisition of 

new expertise, but one that exploits existing skill sets and experience residing in persons 

now retired from the active force, but still available through the concept of ―SOF for 

Life.‖

Modify and strengthen the Human Capital Plan to manage more effectively the 

career tracks for SOF personnel and to develop further and harness the regional, cultural, 
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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and linguistic expertise of both organic SOF operators and personnel with serviceprovided capabilities.

Establish a selection process for non-operator and service-provided capabilities 

(formerly referred to as ―enablers‖).

Build and maintain a SOF personnel pool that is made up of varied cultural 

backgrounds and races, that are capable of mastering different languages, and that are 

adept of navigating cultural and ethnic boundaries.

Extend, expand and strengthen the current Military Accessions Vital to National 

Interest (MAVNI) Law—similar to the Lodge Act—to encourage the recruitment of 

foreign nationals or other recent immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship through military 

service.

Expand recruitment efforts in specific ethnic neighborhoods and enclaves in the 

United States where immigrant groups have settled.

Review existing USSOCOM programs against OSS practices to attract native 

speakers and to expedite procedures for obtaining security clearances in order to bring 

their skill more rapidly into the fight.

Make even greater use of a common SOF assessment process by having candidates 

complete a battery of psychological and aptitude assessments to determine the specific 

characteristics required for success in today‘s SOF.

Apply a 360-degree feedback mechanism as part of the assessment process to add to 

its effectiveness in measuring the ―whole man‖ (similar to the OSS process).

Continue to strengthen recruitment efforts through the use of current SOF personnel 

to ―get the word out‖ to current service members, those who are considering joining the 

services, and those who possess the attributes or specific skill sets that will contribute to 

the SOF mission.

Organization

Compare and contrast OSS Morale Operations with current Military Information Support 

Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs (CA) structures to determine ways to increase team 

integration from planning to execution and subsequent synchronization with SOF ground

units to develop a regional orientation.

Introduce on-the-job training approaches to increase CA skills for those members 

engaged in sewage treatment plant, oil field operations, and other functions, similar to the 

training concept employed by SOF medics. 

Study the OSS employment of women in operational positions with respect to the 

current gender restrictions on all SOF organizations to determine if any modifications can 

be applied to today‘s Combat Support Team (CST) approach. 
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

iv____________________________________________________________________________

Review Security Assistance Force (SAF) structures employed by forward-deployed 

SF battalions to address the concept of ―bolt-ons‖ to increase capabilities and unit 

cohesion in regional operations. 

Update Interagency Task Force (IATF) plans to determine other ways to leverage 

economic tools (―follow the money‖) in the current fight against terrorists and their 

networks by considering how the OSS employed its economic warfare capabilities. 

Resourcing

Accelerate SOF-to-Service common acquisitions to reduce duplicative acquisition costs 

and increase economies of scale. 

Establish a SOF integrated Research and Development battle laboratory to develop 

Irregular Warfare capabilities and other relevant technologies.

Develop ways to better leverage and manage existing commercial R&D capacities and 

products.

Further investigate the ability to concentrate SOF resources on select persistent 

engagement activities to respond more effectively within the international security 

environment.

Authorities 

Pursue changes in Department of Defense (DOD) oversight; manage USSOCOM more as 

a ―Special Capability‖ with appropriate funds as contrasted to a service-like entity, to 

streamline the numbers of reviews, reports, and decision layers. 

Request Congressional authority for USSOCOM to operate with appropriate 

funding similar to the OSS‘s unvouchered funds to reduce overhead and increase 

USSOCOM‘s ability and flexibility to meet urgent needs.

Educate relevant USSOCOM staff on Section 1206/1207/1208 funding and 

authorities, thus enabling a more rapid ability to support partner nations. Seek legislative 

support to expand and extend Section 1208 beyond Fiscal Year 2013.

Increase and clarify the appropriate authorities enabling USSOCOM roles in 

intelligence operations. 

The Authorities Group recommended seeking senior contract status at SES level for 

needed civilian expertise instead of a senior-level direct commission capability. For the 

ability to direct commission at any rank, USSOCOM must obtain individual service 

agreements from the appropriate service to bring individuals on active duty as 

commissioned officers. Furthermore, these commissions would most likely require staff 

or non-line officer status. USSOCOM is interested in the authority to grant a uniformed 
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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commission at senior level rank (O-6) and above for specific purposes and limited 

durations to meet specific urgent SOF needs. Refine USSOCOM roles and 

responsibilities in synchronizing plans for global operations, and develop Joint SOF 

Doctrine to support such efforts. 

Summary

It is important to remember that the OSS was, in essence, an experiment that lasted only a 

few years. The fact that the OSS did not reach full maturity and did not become 

constrained by predictable bureaucratic limitations provides an important record of both 

success and failure. This serves as a reach back as to how contemporary and future SOF 

can learn from and exploit the OSS legacy. These recommendations are intended to 

provide SOF Warriors with an agile, sustainable, and effective ―Way Ahead‖ to confront 

the inevitable uncertainties of the evolving international security environment. 

The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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Overview

Admiral Eric T. Olson, then United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

Commander, directed a study be conducted to address one of his concerns on the future 

of Special Operations. He expressed numerous times that the World War II-era Office of 

Strategic Services (OSS) may be a source of inspiration to address his questions on the 

future of Special Operations. The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) received 

the task in late 2010 to lead a study and it engaged selected members of the USSOCOM 

Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United States Army Special Operations 

Command (USASOC), The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 

and Schools (USAJFKSWCS), and the OSS Society to assist in the development of 

recommendations for the USSOCOM Commander‘s consideration. In addition three 

respected historians served as academic advisors to the project: Dr. Nancy W. Collins, 

Columbia University; Dr. Troy Sacquety, USASOC historian; and Mr. Rob Townley, 

OSS Society. 

This directed study began in earnest with a one-day OSS Innovation Workshop on 

16 November 2010. It was attended by selected USSOCOM staff members and led by 

JSOU senior fellows to answer predetermined questions on OSS practices and 

applications in four specific areas of interest for the USSOCOM Commander: Selection, 

Organization, Resourcing, and Authorities. The workshop participants, along with select 

participants from the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community participated in four 

study groups and were tasked to research each of the commander‘s areas of interest, 

answer specific questions developed for each of the four sections, and make 

recommendations. This endeavor culminated with a JSOU sponsored symposium ―The 

OSS Model and the Future of the SOF Warrior,‖ from 11 to 12 January 2011, at MacDill 

Air Force Base, Florida, where a comprehensive review of the study groups‘ findings 

were discussed and debated, and further recommendations made.

It is also noteworthy to mention that this directed study was preceded by a two-day 

symposium conducted by JSOU and the OSS Society in November 2009 titled ―Irregular 

Warfare and the OSS Model,‖ in which OSS veterans were interviewed and their 

accounts recorded. Three persistent themes from these events, previous studies, and 

research on the OSS were identified: the necessity to understand the operational 

environment; a penchant for innovative organizational design including small footprint 

for operations; and the requirement for flexible application of authorities to adapt to 

conditions in theater. These themes were embraced by the USSOCOM Commander and 

underpinned the research and seminar discussions through January 2011. It should also 

be noted that research focused on U.S. Army Special Forces since this community 

comprises the principal land component to Special Operations and historically draws 
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

2_____________________________________________________________________________ 

inspiration from the OSS experience. All research was completed using unclassified or 

declassified documents and interviews. A considerable amount of data from the National 

Archives was made available to the study and seminar participants by a member of the 

OSS Society.

The bulk of this report is made up of the four study groups‘ reports that summarize

responses to questions developed by JSOU for the four areas of interest directed by the 

USSOCOM Commander. Each study group‘s summary is presented in the context of the 

three themes identified earlier and highlighted at the November 2010 Innovation 

Workshop. Recommendations drawn from the study and the January 2011 symposium 

are presented in Annex A. A synopsis of the After Action Report from the Innovation 

Workshop is enclosed in Annex B for context. Finally an OSS reading list is included in 

Annex C.

The Selection Study Group dealt with not only the review of the current 

USAJFKSWCS process for selecting Special Forces candidates, but also the similarities 

to the CIA and that of the OSS. It also looked at the OSS‘s ability to directly commission 

experts into the OSS. This was of great interest to the USSOCOM Commander to have 

similar authorities. Another area of interest for this group was the issue of language skills.

This question dealt with both the ability to learn languages and how to recruit fully 

qualified native speakers into the services. USAJFKSWCS and members of the CIA were 

participants in the study and contributed with firsthand knowledge on their selection 

process. It should also be noted that although USSOCOM is a joint organization, the 

Selection Study Group focused on Special Forces as the cornerstone. U.S. Army Special 

Forces is the principal land component to Special Operations historically and this study 

uses it as a common reference point.

The Organization Study Group dealt with the areas of current structure, command 

and control, and comparing them to the OSS structure. This group also looked at the 

Understand and Small Footprint Themes to develop their recommendations on the future 

of Special Operations. A separate USSOCOM innovation workshop team (SOF Operator 

2020) was also was consulted for input. Additionally, the USSOCOM Interagency Task 

Force (IATF), simultaneously conducted a study on OSS Morale Operations, and was 

engaged for their input. 

The Resourcing Study Group dealt with funding, education and material support.

This group examined the historical records of the OSS and Special Forces to determine 

the cost of developing the organizations for manpower and material.

The Authorities Study Group investigated the OSS authorities, the enabling 

authorities for the CIA and USSOCOM to determine where they disconnect and what 

may be required to support USSOCOM for the future. This study, probably more so than 

the others, was limited by use of only unclassified information.
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

 3

Methodology

JSOU reached out to OSS veterans, academics, and practitioners of the special operations 

profession to conduct this short study. A data base on the OSS was made available, as 

were the records under the control of the USSOCOM Historian‘s Office. Components of 

CIA provided limited information because of the unclassified nature of this project. The 

USSOCOM U.S. State Department representative provided details on the use of selected 

hiring authorities to assist in the effort as well. The OSS Society facilitated access to 

veterans, who openly provided comments, participated in the review of the material, and

attended the January 2011 symposium.

This short study reflects a series of complex issues that have a long history in

constantly changing operational environments. The current and future realities have

transformed from wars between nation-states to violent conflict between loosely 

configured groups of terrorists, or violent extremist organizations with elements of 

criminal groups spanning the world. JSOU assembled this document as a set of findings 

supported by data to serve as the basis for further discussion and possibly a more focused 

study at the classified level for USSOCOM to consider. Each of the 4 sections of this 

report were intended as standalone documents, and the sections collectively contribute to 

the comprehensive review of potential applications of OSS-inspired models for 

consideration by U.S. Special Operations Forces.

Background

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and later the Office of Strategic 

Services (OSS) was established in 1942 during World War II (WWII) under the direction 

of Major General William J. ―Wild Bill‖ Donovan to develop strategic intelligence and 

carry out unconventional warfare. An enigmatic leader, General Donovan was revered by 

his troops; however was also known for his poor managerial skills and his disdain for the 

administrative. In contrast to the rapid growth of the OSS during the war and despite 

Donovan‘s appeal to retain a peacetime intelligence capability, the OSS was quickly 

dissolved by an executive order signed by President Harry S. Truman in 1945. Activities 

and components of the OSS were hurriedly divided between the State and War 

Departments shortly after the conclusion of the war.

1

 

1 Michael Warner, ―An End and a Beginning‖ The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence 

Agency (e-book). Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 March 2007; 

available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/oss/art10.htm; accessed December 2010.
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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In 2011, the force structure for USSOCOM was approximately 55,007 uniformed 

personnel and approximately 6,467 civilians. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 the USSOCOM 

estimated budget for operations and maintenance (O&M) was approximately $3.95 

billion.2In comparison, the OSS expended $43 million in FY 1945, and spent almost 

$135 million over its four-year existence (equivalent to $1.1 billion in 2007). The OSS at 

its zenith was made up of almost 13,000 personnel, with approximately one quarter of 

that civilian.3

In his farewell address to his subordinates, General Donovan congratulated the OSS

for being ―an experiment to determine whether a group of Americans constituting a 

cross-section of racial origins, of abilities, temperaments and talents could meet and risk 

an encounter with long-established and well-trained enemy organizations.‖4The efforts 

and exploits of the innovative and clever men and women of the OSS enabled the Allies 

to exploit economy-of-force missions throughout Europe and the Pacific theaters through 

their small footprint, intelligence-gathering, and advisory methodologies. Today‘s 

American SOF, in particular Army Special Forces, assert their heritage and lineage back 

to the OSS. USSOCOM also acknowledges the inspiration of the OSS in its logo; a gold 

lance head referred to as ―the tip of the spear.‖

 

2

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates, U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), USSOCOM 654, 

February 2010; available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/pdfs/01

_Operation_and_Maintenance /O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/SOCOM_FY11.pdf; accessed October 2011.

3 Michael Warner, ―What was OSS?‖ The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency

(e-book). Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 March 2007; available at 

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/oss/art03.htm; accessed December 2011.

4 Michael Warner, ―An End and a Beginning.‖ The Office of Strategic Services: America's First 

Intelligence Agency (e-book), 2007.
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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Selection

This section summarizes research and findings on the OSS approach toward personnel 

selection and assessment, including the establishment of the first psychological 

assessment program. It will highlight the current approach taken by U.S. Special Forces 

(SF) and the CIA toward personnel selection and offer some recommendations for 

application as it relates to the future of U.S. Special Operations Forces. Judgments 

expressed are drawn from reading OSS-related literature, discussions with military 

officers and civilian leaders from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (DASD/SO/LIC), the USAJFKSWCS, 

the USASOC, and current and former officers at the CIA. A set of Study Questions were 

developed to guide and trigger discussion intended to yield concrete recommendations.

Colonel Louie M. Banks, the USASOC chief of psychological evaluation, offered his 

personal insight in the selection and assessment process for OSS personnel and Army SF 

and was a key contributor to this group in answering the study questions.

What are the criteria used for selection in the CIA (Clandestine Service and 

paramilitary officers) and Special Forces today? How do they compare with and 

how are they different from selection for duty with the OSS?

Current SOF and CIA recruiting processes are derived largely from the OSS and its

processes. They include strong recruiting from a variety of sources, psychological 

assessments, and evaluations to determine mental and physical agility and toughness. The 

OSS recruited from all ranks and strata of U.S. society. They relied upon personal 

recommendations and social networks to recruit the best of the brightest, including many 

captains of industry and others steeped in knowledge of technology. They also recruited 

first- and second-generation Americans from mostly European ethnic groups to make 

maximum use of their vast native language capability and cultural awareness.

In its first year of operations OSS leadership became concerned with reports from 

the field of OSS agents‘ inability to adapt to the challenging environments they were 

operating in despite many having apparent cultural and language connections. A 

psychological-psychiatric assessment entity with a formal assessment role was 

established partially based on the model used by the British,

5

and staffed by respected 

 

5 Louie M. Banks, ―The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection,‖ (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

1995), reprinted in Psychology in the Service of National Security, edited by Dr. A. David Mangelsdorff, 

2005, http://users.idworld.net/dmangels/apampsy.htm, accessed December 2010.
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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psychologists throughout the U.S. 

6 Over 5,000 OSS candidates were screened and 

assessed in the year and half that followed, and according to Colonel Banks, this was the 

precursor to modern day assessments used in civilian assessment centers and by Army 

SOF.

7

U.S. Army Special Forces were first assigned under the Psychological Warfare 

Center at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. SF teams were originally intended to counter the 

Soviet Union and its proxies in Europe by conducting guerrilla warfare and sabotage

during the Cold War. Its team-centered organization and operating tactics techniques and 

procedures (TTP) were modeled after the 1st Special Service Force, the OSS, and other 

specialized units during World War II (WWII). SF numbers and its missions were later 

expanded by President Kennedy‘s personal support in the early 1960s to include 

counterinsurgency.

8

The yearlong SF training process had a high attrition rate, and with 

the increased through-put required during the Vietnam conflict, assessment and selection 

issues arose.

The use of psychological assessment as part of the SF selection process was 

eliminated later during the Vietnam War and was not used again until 1988. According to 

Colonel Banks it has now become engrained as part of the formal assessment program, 

and as of December 2010, approximately 59,404 soldiers have been screened for duty.

―Army SOF psychology has greatly expanded to where it currently performs a multitude 

of services within SOF, e.g., training, organizational consultation, research, and the 

prevention and treatment of stress reactions, but all of the current positions have as their 

basis the assessment and selection of soldiers for critical tasks.‖

9

Current Selection Process

Criteria for recruitment and selection into SOF and CIA today are similar to those used 

by OSS, although with a more extensive evaluation process. Today every SOF 

component has its own selection process that is rigorous and looks for very specific 

qualities. Psychological assessment, introduced by OSS as a tool to screen prospective 

recruits, continues to be a key component of today‘s selection process for entry into 

Army SF, the Ranger Regiment, SEALs, the Air Force Special Operations Combat 

 

6 Donald W. MacKinnon, How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS Assessment 

Program (Pittsburgh, PA: Development Dimensions International, 1974, 1980).

7 Louie M. Banks, ―The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.‖

8 Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years - A History of the U.S. Army 

Special Forces (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1983).

9 Louie M. Banks, ―The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.‖
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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Advisory Aviation unit, and is used by CIA to identify candidates for its clandestine 

service. In most cases candidates are assessed for mental, physical, and psychological 

qualities as well as their ability to work in a small team. The competitive selection 

process, coupled with technological training and education, produces a SOF operator who 

is adaptable, culturally aware, innovative, mature, self-assured, and self-reliant.

10

Today SF recruiters look for many of the same attributes and qualities that the OSS 

did, but the process has become much more refined over the years. A downside of the 

refined process is that it comes with specific requirements for output, so the selection 

process can be manipulated to meet number requirements which results in reduced 

quality and violates a SOF truth that quality is more important than quantity. In addition, 

another complaint includes the concept of cloning, in which the majority of SF operators 

seem to display the same physical characteristics and are homogeneous, described more 

directly, they are mostly all ―athletic-looking white guys.‖

11 ―Many parts of the SOF 

community are very white and conservative,‖ according to a recent Washington Times 

article on the repeal of Don‘t Ask Don‘t Tell.12 The article also cites a Rand study that

stated in 1999 that ―blacks are particularly underrepresented [in SOF] when compared 

with their presence in the source populations.‖

13

Selection into and participation in the Special Forces Qualification Course, also 

referred to as the ―Q Course‖ begins with an assessment: a battery of psychological and 

experiential tests and exercises, named Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS).

They address social as well as physical abilities. SFAS, a three-week precursor course 

held at a training facility near Fort Bragg, is ―designed to see if a soldier has what it takes 

to serve‖ on an Operational Detachment A–team (ODA), and is designed to assess a 

soldier‘s intellectual and physical aptitude for successful completion of Special Forces 

training and suitability to serve as positive contributing member of the Special Forces 

Regiment. The assessment of a soldier attending SFAS is based on the SF core attributes:

integrity, courage, perseverance, personal responsibility, professionalism, adaptability, 

and team player (team work) capability. The average selection rate is 40 percent.

14

 

10 Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are,

JSOU Report 11-1 (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, March 2011).

11 This quote was repeated by several current and former SOF operators during this study.

12 Rowan Scarborough, ―Special Forces Wary Of 'Don't Ask' Repeal,‖ The Washington Times (28 

December, 2010), p.1.

13 Margaret C. Harrell, et. al., Barriers to Minority Participation in Special Operations Forces (Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999).

14 ―Special Forces - Shooters and Thinkers,‖ U.S. Army, http://www.army.mil/article/29315/

Special_Forces ___Shooters_and _thinkers/, accessed December 2010. 
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

8____________________________________________________________________________

Each SF candidate is screened as soon as he arrives through a battery of 

psychological tests, and his performance is evaluated throughout the Q Course. The 

Minnesota Multi-phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI, now the MMPI-2) is used to 

identify candidates with abnormal personality symptoms and disorders. The General 

Ability Measure for Adults (GAMA) is used to measure non-verbal intelligence and 

aptitude. The Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE) is used to measure basic academic 

achievement. Intelligence and problem solving aptitude are also measured with the 

Wonderlic Personnel Test. Soldiers with abnormal psychopathology, a history of poor 

performance, or are considered a high risk are personally evaluated by a psychologist.

The candidate‘s ―trainability (intelligence) and suitability (psychopathology)‖ to 

complete training and ultimately perform the duties of an SF operator are evaluated.

Candidates who demonstrate a consistent lack of cognitive and reasoning ability 

throughout these tests and or display severe abnormal psychopathology are dropped from 

selection. Similar to the OSS evaluation program, SF candidates are also put through a 

series of grueling physical and mental tasks designed to measure their character, 

commitment, and application of acumen under pressure. Candidates are presented 

challenges and their identified task performance is carefully observed and evaluated in 

both individual and in grouped settings. Candidates must meet minimum physical 

standards measured using the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) as well as a series of 

physical endurance events.15 At any time throughout the assessment the candidate can 

voluntarily withdraw.

Upon completion of the SF assessment program, a selection board comprised of 

USAJFKSWCS senior leadership is convened to review the performance of each 

candidate presented to determine their trainability and suitability. Only candidates who 

displayed shortcomings in one or more area of assessment are considered by the board.

The board evaluates each individual presented as a ―whole man‖ to include a background 

and service history of each questionable candidate. The board votes, and the board 

president provides the tie-breaker vote if required. It is important to note that this process 

is used to identify unsuitable individuals and is not necessarily used to screen successful 

candidates. Getting ―selected‖ at SFAS is the assessment phase (Phase 1) before being 

allowed to continue onto the following phases of the Q Course. A candidate must still 

complete the next four phases of training to graduate as a Special Forces qualified Soldier 

and be assigned to an Operational Detachment A, properly known as an A-Team.

16

 

15 L. M. Banks, ―The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.‖

16 Ibid.
The OSS Model and the Future of SOF – JSOU Report of Proceedings

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The 75th Ranger Regiment is the U.S. Army‘s premier light infantry unit.

Partially based on the success of the SF assessment process, a psychological assessment 

or Ranger Assessment and Selection Program (RASP) was added to an already arduous

Army Ranger selection process. The RASP has similar technical characteristics to the 

SFAS.

17

 

The Navy has also advanced its recruiting and assessment of candidates to serve as 

SEAL operators under the Naval Special Warfare Command. Until recently, the Navy 

SEAL recruitment process focused solely on assessing the physical fitness of potential 

candidates. Candidates either passed or failed the Physical Screening Test (PST) as a 

prerequisite to formal assessment into the elite force. Quoted in a recent article in USA 

Today, ―the ideal candidate is an athlete in his early to mid-20s, plays water polo or 

competes in triathlons.‖ Once identified some SEAL candidates are personally assigned a 

mentor and prepare up to a year before beginning Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL 

(BUD/S), the Navy‘s formal SEAL qualification course. In 2010 the Navy graduated a 

record 277 from BUD/S.18

In 2008 the Navy added the Computerized Special Operations Resilience Test (CSORT) to the PST as another discriminator to determine readiness to attend BUD/S. CSORT is a psychological test that screens for characteristics such as a candidate‘s ability 

to function as a team player, to be motivated to withstand pain, and his ability to focus on 

an end goal while dealing with the immediate situations.

19

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)20 known as the ―Night 

Stalkers‖ is the Army‘s elite aviation regiment providing dedicated rotary-wing, special 

operations aviation support to the Joint SOF community. In the early years of the unit‘s 

existence it suffered from a very high accident rate during training, which also resulted in 

a high number of casualties. In addition to an assessment of technical flying capabilities 

all SOAR candidates were later evaluated with a formal psychological assessment. This 

assessment process has also recently been expanded to assess its newly assigned support 

personnel.21

 

17 Ibid.

18 Thomas Vanden Brook, ―U.S. Special Ops Forces Vital in Afghan War,‖ USA TODAY, (December 27, 

2010).

19 Discussion with Dr. Kristen E. Horgen, research scientist involved with developing the C-SORT, 

December 2010.

20 In 2011 the Army Special Operations Aviation Command (ARSOAC) was established underneath U.S. 

Army Special Operations Command. The 160th SOAR is assigned to ARSOAC. 

21 Mathew N. Butler, ―A Few Good Men: Support Soldier Selection and Training,‖ Special Warfare 

Magazine Vol. 23, Issue 6 (Nov-Dec 2010).
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Combat Aviation Advisory (CAA) operators from the 6th Special Operations 

Squadron (SOS) are U.S. Air Force SOF advisors ―specifically trained and tasked to 

assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, 

sustainment, and force integration.‖ CAA candidates are screened and selected through a 

formal process before beginning the Combat Aviation Advisor Mission Qualification 

Course (CAAMQ), a challenging program ―intended to produce foreign language 

proficient, regionally-oriented, politically astute and culturally aware aviation advisory 

experts.‖

22

CIA Selection and Recruitment: An OSS Tradition

To meet its initial demands for experts and others with advanced knowledge of world 

affairs and culture, Donovan and the OSS recruited heavily from Ivy League universities, 

industry and technology organizations, and socialites. In general, the current CIA 

recruitment and operational selection process is similar to the OSS model, but it has 

changed in parallel with the organizational growth and expansion of CIA‘s current 

mission.

23 Like its OSS predecessor, CIA also relied upon the Ivy League as a 

prospective talent pool for recruitment, and the organization still recruits significantly 

from Ivy League schools as well as other universities across the country. 

Like the OSS and unlike most government organizations, CIA still has a pick of 

employees and is still attracting the best that America has to offer because of mystique 

and patriotism. The CIA Recruitment Center coordinates recruitment initiatives and 

monitors hiring needs and metrics to meet CIA mission requirements. According to the 

CIA careers web site,24 ―the Recruitment Center aims to:

Recruit and hire the most highly qualified and diverse men and women to ensure a 

workforce with a broad range of ethnic and cultural backgrounds, language 

expertise, and educational experiences

Establish and foster productive partnerships nationwide with colleges, universities, 

professional networks, and organizations that are key sources of top talent 

Interact with minority affinity groups to establish long-term relationships and 

strategies for recruiting candidates 

Reach a nationwide audience of competitive candidates for career opportunities 

through innovative advertising and marketing‖

 

22 Combat Aviation Advisor Factsheet, US Air Force, 2011, available at http://www.af.mil/information/ 

factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=18763, accessed December 2010.

23 Rob Townley, Conversation with OSS historian and descendant of OSS veteran, November 2010.

24 Careers, CIA, available at https://www.cia.gov/careers/index.html, accessed December 2010.
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CIA recruiters canvas the country visiting college campuses, professional 

conferences, and putting on job fairs searching for suitable candidates with specialized 

knowledge and skills that can be used across the organization. Thousands of patriotic 

candidates also apply through the public web site and submit resumes by mail or through 

current employees. This is the front-door Human Resources system, and then there are all 

the other ways, including recruitment of former military personnel, many with special 

operations background. According to a recent estimate, there are some 1000 candidates 

for each available opportunity.

What were the criteria for selection of the OSS and how does it compare to the 

Question 1?

Selection for OSS was much less in-depth when compared to today. OSS recruited 

Americans from all ranks and strata, but concentrated on those already with some 

military experience to reduce the amount of basic military training required. General 

Donovan surrounded himself with top administrative men, and he believed qualified 

soldiers with language skills and cultural backgrounds to operate overseas could be found 

among ethnic groups (first- or second-generation Americans) in the U.S. He directed his 

recruiters to search for men who were ―calculatingly reckless with disciplined daring, 

who are trained for aggressive action.‖25 It has been said that Donovan would refuse no 

one who wanted to go overseas and do something worthwhile even if they did not fit the 

regulations.26

―Donovan recruited Americans who, like himself, traveled abroad or studied world 

affairs and, in that age, such people often represented  ̳the best and the brightest‘ at East 

Coast (Ivy League) universities, businesses, and law firms.‖

27 According to some 

historical accounts, General Donovan told candidates to ―write me a memorandum saying 

how you could be of service to this organization, and if I agree with you, you‘re hired.‖ 

Volunteers responded to advertisements looking for persons with foreign language 

capabilities and who would be interested in special assignments.28 Following an interview 

to determine general suitability, they reported to Washington D.C. for paramilitary 

 

25 William J. Morgan, The OSS and I (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1957).

26 Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage (New York, NY: 

Reynal and Hitchcock, 1964).

27 The Office of Strategic Services: The Forerunner of Today‘s CIA, 2008, available at 

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/office-of 

strategic-services.html, accessed December 2010.

28 Aron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986).
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training. Those selected for overseas deployment would then undergo additional, more 

intense training in England.

The world has moved on since the 1940s and 1950s, and the student bodies of 

today‘s Ivy League are nearly night and day from that of the first quarter of the 20th 

century, statistically speaking.29 Today, if one goes into the Harvard bookstore, among 

the racks and racks of clothing emblazoned with crimson and white you‘ll find that the 

rack of athletic-fit t-shirts with  ̳Harvard Business School‘ (HBS) written across the chest 

is always full—even for less than $10, the store can hardly sell one. This small indicator 

begs the same question that Donovan is reported to have asked of his recruiters, ―Where 

are the PhDs, who can win a bar-fight?‖

30

As a Master‘s program, HBS is a school now accessible to many in the corporate 

world through their offering of truncated executive MBA programs and the like, and the 

student body in general is far more of an amalgam of both American society and the 

international business community than it once was. According to one estimate, 

approximately 70 percent of the most recent executive MBA program class were not 

American citizens.31

These circumstances have not always been the case. During the first half of the 20th 

century, for example, the Ivy League was, by no small margin, a  ̳finishing school‘ for 

the children of the U.S. and international diplomatic communities. The children of 

ambassadors and consular officers who grew up in Europe, Latin America, and Eurasia in 

the 1920s, were raised speaking at least one language other than English, and attended 

European universities for their undergraduate degrees, followed their parents back to the 

U.S. for their  ̳twilight tours‘ with the foreign service where many of the children 

attended Ivy League schools for their graduate degree. This made the Ivy League the 

most accessible location with the highest concentration of educated U.S. citizens with 

practical (not school taught) foreign language proficiency who had  ̳ready made‘ social 

and political networks in Europe. By the time OSS recruiters or Donovan‘s own network 

identified them, all they needed was a short stint of paramilitary training to teach them 

how to harness their networks in Europe in support of the war effort, which an 

overwhelming number of them did as Jedburghs or Operations Group (OG) officers.32

 

29 Rob Townley, 2010.

30 Although this quote is commonly accepted and widely attributed to Donovan, its origin cannot be 

confirmed. 

31 Rob Townley, 2010.

32 Ibid.
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The makeup of student bodies in the Ivy League has changed dramatically, and 

likewise the CIA‘s focus in recruiting from such schools has changed. The latter change 

in focus is a function of two primary circumstances: the growth of the original OSS 

network within the higher end of the U.S. academic community, and the expansion of 

CIA‘s roles in intelligence collection and analysis. In the postwar years, many of OSS‘s 

recruits from the Ivy League either returned to their posts in academia or stayed on to 

become part of CIA. These officers‘ wartime experience had a cascading effect on the 

recruitment pools available to CIA in the following decades, as professors or graduate 

students with OSS backgrounds moved on to other academic institutions and gained 

access to new pools of prospective candidates. In this way, the CIA‘s recruitment efforts 

have since gained purchase across a broad spectrum of the U.S. academic community, 

riding on the coattails of the social and career progressions of Donovan‘s original 

recruits. In some fashion, this circumstance lends credence to OSS‘s  ̳Oh So Social‘ 

moniker, which, while it was often used to deride the service‘s organizational character, 

in fact hits on some of the very reasons OSS was effective; many times the deciding 

factor in the success both in the conduct of intelligence and unconventional warfare is 

 ̳who‘ you know, not  ̳what‘ you know.33

Was there a set of criteria in the selection process to determine grade level of 

appointment? Was there a set of criteria in the selection process to determine job 

specialty and assignment location? CONUS or OCONUS? Is there any evidence that 

this was an effective system?

There was no formal assessment process to enter the OSS in its first year. According to 

Dr. Donald MacKinnon, a psychologist who pioneered assessment and selection 

programs for both the OSS and CIA, personnel entered the OSS through the following: 

recruitment of military personnel by the Personnel Procurement Branch (PPB) 

recruitment of civilians by the Civilian Personnel Branch (CPB) 

recruitment of both military and civilian personnel through the initiative of 

individual OSS members34

As stated earlier, by the middle of 1943 reports from the field indicated that there 

were issues with some deployed personnel.35 According to MacKinnon, ―nobody knew 

 

33 Ibid.

34 Donald W. MacKinnon, ―How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS 

Assessment Program,‖ Studies In Intelligence, 23, No. 3 (Fall 1979), available at 

http://www.ddiworld.com/DDIWorld/media/whitepapers/HowAssessmentCentersWereStarted_mg_ddi.pdf

?ext=.pdf, accessed December 2010.

35 L. M. Banks, ―The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.‖
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who would make a good spy or an effective guerrilla fighter. Consequently, large 

numbers of misfits were recruited from the very beginning, and this might have continued 

had it not been for several disastrous operations such as one in Italy for which, on the 

assumption that it takes dirty men to do dirty works, some OSS men were recruited 

directly from the ranks of Murder, Inc. and the Philadelphia Purple Gang.‖

36

OSS Psychological Assessment Program

The OSS Assessment Program encountered other shortcomings due to the haste in which 

it was established.

37 According to MacKinnon ―psychological assessment staff lacked 

knowledge about the assignments, most of them novel, to which new recruits would be 

sent. Without job analyses, the psychologists did not know specifically for what they 

were assessing. Operations experts were needed to write job descriptions, but initially 

there were none in the field. At best, job assignments were described by single terms: 

language expert, cartographer, news analyst... Only those destined for overseas 

assignment were assessed; those who remained in the United States were exempt.‖

38

Special Forces “Whole Man” Assessment

The ―whole man‖ assessment approach used by Special Forces psychologists to evaluate 

a soldier‘s suitability to become an SF operator is based loosely on the practice used by 

OSS and is used also by CIA to select candidates to undergo training as operations 

officers.39 The ―whole man‖ assessment model initiated by the OSS was applied in part 

because the civilian psychologists assigned to the OSS assessment program did not know 

what specific tasks and skills where required in the field. MacKinnon wrote:

In the beginning, the lack of specific knowledge led us to conclude that 

assessments could not be made of the specific skills of a given candidate for a 

specific job but rather in each case, an assessment of the  ̳man as a whole,‘

should be made, including the general structure of his being, and his strengths 

and weaknesses for rather generally described environments and situations.40

 

36 Donald W. MacKinnon, ―How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS 

Assessment Program,‖ Studies In Intelligence, 23, No. 3 (Fall 1979).

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Louie M. Banks, The Office of Strategic Services Psychological Selection Program (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: 1995)

40 Donald W. MacKinnon, ―How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS 

Assessment Program, 1979.
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This led to a discovery that very few recruits were actually assigned to the billet they 

were recruited for. People would be hired and show up in Washington only to be asked 

―Do you have any idea what OSS might have hired you for?‖41 In other cases they hired 

two people for the same job, such as the case where two people were hired to head the 

Research Section of the Division of Special Information, so one was given the title 

―Director‖ and the other ―Chief.‖ The lack of a specific system meant that there were 

men who did daring missions with strategic implications and those who spent their 

service doing nothing but travelling the world on a high priority at government expense.

The only thing that appeared to impact assignment location was language capability and 

cultural familiarity. It was not relevant that the OSS tried to fit the right person to a 

position. Training including paramilitary operations lasted up to eight months after 

selection and in some instances the initial assignment would change as the needs of the 

war advanced.42

In addition to establishing the psychological assessment program discussed above, 

the OSS defined its human resource pool and selected personnel on the basis of three 

primary sets of holistic attributes as they pertained to each service member or employee: 

specific discipline or skill, ethnic or geographic background (access, experience), and 

general temperament (personality). The apparent overlap, or lack thereof, with regard to 

discipline and background was often a deciding factor in the selection of an individual for 

service with the OSS, and furthermore informed the type and character of the assignment 

for which the individual evaluated would be chosen. Though this system manifested in a 

number of different forms (PPB activities, spot assessment, referral, etc), it is important 

to note that the selection process was not predicated primarily upon the evaluation of 

basic human predispositions or physical abilities, but on the identification and evaluation 

of practical knowledge, experience, and access that the individual might provide in 

support of OSS‘s requirements. To this end, the OSS made a point of seeking out 

individuals with existing skill sets that the military did not or could not develop 

organically that might be of use in military or intelligence applications.

The above assertion is borne out in a number of larger OSS or COI recruitment 

efforts, but is most readily apparent in two cases: the selection of  ̳Donovan‘s 300,‘ and 

 

41 Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; First Lyons Press, paperback edition, 1972).

42 Donald W. MacKinnon, ―How assessment centers were started in the United States: The OSS 

Assessment Program, 1979.
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the immediate consequences of Donovan‘s relationship with the British as illustrated in 

correspondence in 1941 between him and Commander Ian Fleming.43

First, consider the relationship General Donovan as Coordinator of Information 

(COI) had with  ̳the 300.‘ During the years between WWI and WWII, Donovan, a 

prominent Wall Street lawyer, travelled extensively throughout Europe as either a private 

citizen or at the behest of President Roosevelt. During this period he observed the rise of 

the Nazi Party in Germany, and particularly the Reichstag‘s renewal of the  ̳Enabling 

Act‘ in 1937, which set in motion a number of social and political changes in Europe that 

led Donovan to conclude that war was inevitable. In the interest of maintaining as much 

knowledge as possible regarding the irredentist rhetoric of Nazi party leadership, 

Donovan developed a network of largely academic contacts in both Europe and the U.S.

who were either expatriates or citizens of nations that bordered Germany.

After he was appointed to the post of COI in summer 1941, Donovan reactivated 

many of these contacts and gathered a number of additional ones to aid him in producing 

a complete picture of both the German population and leadership as well as that of those 

countries immediately surrounding Germany in an effort to understand Nazi intentions 

and put the Nazi leadership's activities in context. Donovan placed a number of these 

contacts, estimated at approximately 300, on retainer for the COI as the organization 

developed a foundation of knowledge to advise the Roosevelt administration. Many of 

these individuals were selected not because of their technical knowledge of the German 

military, but because of their proven practical experience or knowledge of the political, 

cultural, economic, environmental, linguistic or other concerns of anthropological or 

behavioral nature in Europe. As such, their contributions to the COI‘s planning efforts 

produced what could be characterized as a predecessor to a current day  ̳national 

intelligence estimate‘ that was almost wholly focused on the populations of Europe rather 

than the governments, and on the societal, rather than technological, aspects of European 

nations and international discourse. 

Something to be considered when examining the COI‘s recruitment and use of such 

individuals is the  ̳lead time‘ involved given the timeline and nature of what was to 

become the multi-theater conflict of WWII. Donovan began developing a knowledge 

base (and in some respects what could be considered a capability development roadmap) 

on conditions in Europe years prior to America‘s entry into the war. This knowledge base 

offered the OSS a significant depth of operational context and currency in many critical 

aspects of its development. By the time the U.S. began moving toward the commitment 

 

43 Rob Townley, 2010.
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of more than materiel support to the British war effort, Donovan already had an 

informational advantage over his more conventional counterparts in the armed services 

given their comparative poverty of knowledge on many subjects germane to the analysis 

of the German military industrial base that was, at the time, supporting the blitzkrieg, and 

which would later become the large focus of the Allied bombing campaign in Europe.

By the time the OSS was activated, Donovan already knew the general mix of 

manpower and skills that would be required to carry out his mission, and was able to 

deploy trained, informed, and effective teams into combat alongside the British Special 

Operations Executive (SOE) well in advance of any other American military ground 

force. Without first developing the capability to maintain a measure of historical 

perspective and mid-term currency in operational context regarding the European theater 

of operations, the OSS may not have recruited the right sort of personnel to meet the 

intellectual, as well as the physical, demands of an incredibly dynamic operational 

environment.

The original recruitment and use of  ̳the 300‘ also helped to create another, equally 

important part of the OSS‘s foundation: the process helped to found the service with a 

reverence and reliance on the history of the populations in which it was to operate. This 

reliance, in operational terms, translated culturally into one of the more deceptive traits of 

the OSS. Though each OSS team (Jedburghs, OGs, Secret Intelligence detachments, etc.) 

made what would be considered  ̳small moves‘ on the battlefield when considered 

independently, each small move was purposely designed to take advantage of existing 

circumstance in order to produce disproportionate result, or to compliment other  ̳small 

moves‘ in order to build the critical mass necessary to achieve a large goal. At its core, 

this characteristic may be superficially compared to the adage  ̳think globally, act 

locally.‘

OSS leadership did not need to micromanage operations in the field to coordinate 

these kinds of activities; rather, they occurred naturally. To consider in linear fashion 

how this was possible given the relatively limited communications infrastructure of the 

period, OSS personnel assigned to combat or intelligence collection duties overseas were 

selected by men whose knowledge of their enemy was steeped in a holistic understanding 

of their proposed operating environment. 

As such, the selection teams were predisposed to choose men with a similar rich 

understanding, paired with specific skill sets as necessary. Once in the field, OSS officers 

did not need to communicate with each other or their headquarters constantly or over 

long distances to achieve operational unity – their common perspective and near native 

familiarity with their operating environment produced this unity of action naturally, such 

that each  ̳small move‘ intrinsically complemented another. When considered in the 

aggregate, OSS operations in Europe during WWII resembled less something regulated 
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by command and signal, and more something governed by common strategic purpose and 

well-heeled instinct. 

Donovan‘s close collaboration with the British leading up to the beginning of 

WWII provided a second and readily apparent influence on the OSS‘s recruitment 

activities. During Donovan‘s assignments on behalf of President Roosevelt as a special 

liaison to Whitehall, Donovan gained much insight (whether arranged or objective) into 

the logic behind the SOE and Special Intelligence Service (SIS) operations in Europe. In 

later correspondence with his colleague Fleming during the summer of 1941, Donovan 

asked him how he should initially devise the makeup of his headquarters staff. Fleming‘s 

response was somewhat flippant, but confirmed many of Donovan‘s earlier assertions on 

the nature and requirements for the prosecution of successful guerrilla warfare. Fleming 

recommended that Donovan locate and enlist the services of a number of reputable 

professionals from American industry or society to serve as senior officers or department 

heads.

The logic behind Fleming‘s recommendation for recruitment was twofold: first, the 

proven track record of these individuals obviously indicated that each would be an asset 

to the OSS from a simple managerial standpoint. However, the more important aspect of 

these recommendations was that the recruitment of these individuals represented a 

harnessing of the  ̳best of breed‘ from the U.S. as a nation, and with that came expertise, 

access and resources associated with the industrial or societal sector in which each 

individual had distinguished himself. By adding these individuals to the ranks, the OSS 

gained the ability to leverage large parts of American society in support of the war effort.

Again, these recruitments were small moves, but they had disproportionate effects when 

considered in context of America‘s trajectory into the war. Several of these recruitments, 

such as the relationship that the OSS developed with Henry Luce (influential publisher 

and creator of the Time/Life magazine empire), long outlasted the OSS‘s existence, and 

became valuable assets to our nation‘s national security apparatus both during and after 

WWII. However, it can be conjectured that it was not the distinguished individual, but 

the network in which he existed, that represented value to the OSS as an organization.

What are your recommendations for the selection process for special operations 

warriors in the 21st century?

The most important thing in selection is to remember that quality (suitability) is more 

important than quantity (numbers) and that SOF cannot be mass produced. Our selection 

processes are sound as long as they are followed. 

S1: There needs to be a selection process for non-operator service-provided 

capability personnel (enablers). We spend an enormous amount of effort and money to 

select the right operator but other than a few exceptions do nothing to screen the 
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individuals who will be supporting the operator. These support personnel are absolutely 

critical to mission success, and yet SOF generally accepts whoever the service provides. 

The challenge to selecting support personnel is that the services may not provide enough 

candidates to allow a rigorous selection, but there should be some system to evaluate a 

support person‘s potential for serving in a SOF unit.

S2: Target recruitment efforts in ethnic neighborhoods and enclaves in the United 

States where immigrants from around the world settled. Middle Eastern and South Asian 

immigrant communities can be found in the following areas:

Arabian Village, Detroit and Dearborn, Michigan

Assyrian District, northern Chicago, Illinois

Chaldean Town, Detroit, Michigan

East Dearborn, Michigan (Iraqi) 

Little Arabia, Albany Park, Chicago, Illinois

Little Arabia Anaheim (Orange County), Anaheim, California

Little Kabul, Fremont, California (the largest Afghan population in the United 

States in 2001) 

Little Persia, Los Angeles, California (Iranian) 

South Paterson/Little Ramallah, Paterson, New Jersey and Clifton, New Jersey

Little Tel Aviv, Miami, Florida44

Similar ethnic enclaves with immigrants who speak various African dialects, Asian 

languages, or Spanish exist in many other areas of the U.S., such as numerous cities with 

a China Town, a Little Havana, or a Little Somalia. Many immigrants are eager to prove 

their patriotism and loyalty to their new nation and simply need to be asked to join the 

military. 

S3: Cultural awareness: To promote development of cultural awareness and 

advanced language skills, a quote was extracted from a November 2010 statement made 

by John R. Clapper, the Director Of National Intelligence: ―we need to build and 

maintain a workforce that represents the rich diversity of the world we live in: a work 

force that reflects different cultural backgrounds, ethnicities and heritage, languages, 

races, gender, orientation, abilities, and ideas.‖

45 Despite previous efforts that have not 

 

44 List of Ethnic Enclaves in North America, Wikipedia, (n.d.), available at 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_named_ethnic_enclaves_in_North_American_cities, accessed 

December 2010.

45 John R. Clapper, ―Statement on Intelligence Community Equal Opportunity and Diversity,‖ Director of 

National Intelligence, signed 10 November 2010.
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been as successful or effective as we would like, we should continue to look for methods 

to deliberately recruit people with the desired language and cultural background.

S4: Finally, in terms of selection process, focus on recruiting or getting the word 

out to current service members or those who are considering joining the services that may 

potentially qualify as a special operations warrior. Extend the search across service 

organizations to identify current service members, irrespective of service, who may 

possess special skills of interest to SOF. Expand the recruiting effort by using current and 

former SOF operators to recruit in high schools, junior and four-year colleges and 

universities to better inform potential candidates about the positive and negative aspects 

of SOF. In a manner similar to OSS, selecting candidates based on already acquired skill 

sets (e.g., free fall sky diving, SCUBA, use of compass and orienteering, language, 

cultural, computers, etc.) may be of value. Focus recruitment efforts on those who have 

been successful in the scouting movement because many of them, particularly if they 

have achieved the Eagle or Explorer rank, will have mastered some of the above skills 

being sought. Even with such a good head start, of course the difficulty lies in the actual 

training required to make a candidate SOF-qualified. Targeted recruiting efforts, 

however, for potential candidates, who already possess a specific required skill set rather 

than the current recruiting for generalist candidates, should result in identifying motivated 

candidates ready to undergo the rigor of SOF training.

S5: One recent hurdle to recruiting has been the inability to obtain clearances for 

new immigrants to the U.S., and is a significant issue in the current environment where 

SOF operators routinely work with classified information. The Lodge-Philbin Act better 

known as the Lodge Act was passed in 1950 and was in effect through 1959. It allowed 

foreign nationals to serve in the U.S. Armed forces with the ultimate reward of US 

residency and citizenship. Former OSS members and new Army SF soldiers were 

common beneficiaries of the policy.46 Recommend taking another look at introducing a 

new law similar to the Lodge Act to encourage the recruitment of foreign nationals or 

other recent immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship through military service.

S6: ―USSOCOM does not normally have operational authority over deployed 

forces, the plans and operations themselves are executed by the Geographic Combatant 

Commanders.‖

47 Similarly, USSOCOM will require the support from the other military 

services to implement major improvements to its recruitment and selection process.

Recommend that the USSOCOM J-1 (Personnel) be granted authority to manage all 

 

46 L. Morgan Banks, ―The History of Special Operations Psychological Selection.‖

47 Extracted from Admiral Eric Olson‘s testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee as USSOCOM 

commander, June 2009.
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personnel issues, including recruitment and selection, related to the entire force and not 

just limited to the command level as is the current situation. This will allow the J-1 to 

have visibility throughout SOF and to be able to monitor and respond to recruitment 

needs across the force as well as better coordinate force-wide requests for support from 

the other military services. 

S7: Special Operations warriors, like OSS agents of the past, need to be of a certain 

mind, body, and motivation type. In terms of ―mind,‖ recommend SOF evaluators make 

even greater use of the assessment process by having candidates complete a battery of 

psychological and aptitude assessments to determine a host of specific characteristics 

required for success in today‘s SOF. Assuming the selection committee knows what 

characteristics are determined desirable they can add this to their consideration. Both 

body and motivation type are covered in the selection and training process current 

candidates undergo. 

S8: Build a 360-degree feedback mechanism into the assessment process to add to 

its effectiveness of measuring the whole man. In this 360-degree feedback assessment the 

candidate‘s immediate supervisor(s), colleagues, and subordinates would receive an online feedback assessment for each of the identified raters. The 360-degree feedback 

assessment gives a more complete view of the candidate in terms of multiple 

perspectives.

Are there new authorities required to achieve the recommendations?

New authorities, such as a new Lodge Act, would be required to recruit non-citizens into

the military. The U.S. military services already have the authority to recruit and offer 

direct commissions to medical and legal specialists. Another program, The MAVNI is an 

extended pilot program, under the authorization of the Department of Defense. It allows 

the services ―to recruit certain legal aliens whose skills are considered to be vital to the 

national interest‖

48 such as medical professionals (nurses, doctors) and enlisted 

individuals with ―special language and cultural backgrounds... those in certain 

nonimmigrant visa categories can obtain citizenship without first becoming a permanent 

resident.‖ Background security investigations, required for security clearances are 

currently an issue being addressed by USSOCOM; foreign nationals from certain focus 

countries are having trouble obtaining the appropriate level of clearance to be of use to 

SOF.49

 

48 Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Factsheet, available at 

http://www.defense.gov/news/mavni-fact-sheet.pdf, accessed December 2010. 

49 Input provided by the USSOCOM J1 (personnel) representatives contributing to the OSS study.
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Similar to the Lodge Act, Section 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA), also known as ―wartime naturalization‖ allows service members ―who serve 

during specifically designated periods of hostilities‖ to achieve citizenship without 

having to first apply for permanent residency.

50 The MAVNI program derives its 

authority from this section of the INA. Extension of the MAVNI program was a priority 

for Admiral Olson and USSOCOM as he also included an endorsement of the program in 

his September 2009 Posture Statement.51

Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a 

description of resources-education, equipment...)?

An expanded recruitment and selection effort probably would require additional

resources, recruiters and screeners, and training staff for processing them into their 

respective SOF organizations. Moreover, the influx of additional personnel, especially if 

they require the granting of a security clearance, would also require additional security 

and other investigative personnel to process the requests for clearances. In the case of 

immigrants wanting to join the military, part of the problem with clearances is that 

investigators cannot look into a person‘s background overseas prior to their arrival in the 

U.S. To successfully recruit immigrant personnel, USSOCOM might require its own 

investigative branch to research an applicant‘s background overseas. It would also require 

additional training courses to prepare the applicant for existing training courses, much 

like was run in the 18X program, an enlistment option which provides soldiers an 

opportunity to ―try out‖ for Special Forces. 

Selecting support personnel would also require additional recruiters and an 

organizational structure to conduct the selection. It could be minimal, as a useful 

selection for support personnel could be as simple as an application, a review of the 

applicant‘s records, and an interview. The question would be whether SOF can select 

enough support personnel to fill the required billets.

 

50 Naturalization Process for the Military (n.d.), U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services website, available at 

http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=858921

e54dc3f110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=8a2f6d26d17df110VgnVCM100000471819

0aRCRD, accessed December 2010. 

51 Admiral Olson reiterated his continued support for the MAVNI program in his March 2011 Posture 

Statement. 
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Organization

This section summarizes the approach the OSS took toward the organization, the current 

organizations of U.S. Army Special Forces and CIA, and offers some recommendations 

for application as it relates to U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF). Judgments 

expressed are drawn from reading OSS-related literature, discussions with military 

officers and civilian leaders from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Counterterrorism (DASD/SO/CT), USAJFKSWCS, 

USASOC, and current and former officers at CIA. Research was organized according to a 

set of Study Questions which were developed to guide and trigger discussion during the 

seminar and yield concrete recommendations.

Study Questions on Organization

How was the OSS structured during the war (Jedburghs and Operational Groups)?

Was this an effective structure?

The OSS was, according to legendary CIA historian and analyst Thomas F. Troy, ―a 

novel attempt in American history to organize research, intelligence, propaganda, 

subversion, and commando operations as a unified and essential feature of modern 

warfare; a  ̳Fourth Arm‘ of the military services.‖52

The organization of the OSS can be described as ―purpose-built.‖

53 The structure 

was flexible enough to adjust itself to meet its objectives in support of the war effort. The 

organizational chart that follows for the OSS Organization can be a little deceptive to the 

casual reader. This chart was to satisfy the Washington, D.C. establishment sense of 

organization rather than the real functionality of it. The OSS was in reality a collection of 

small units supporting other small units within this organization. Each of these small 

units was mission-driven in defeating the enemy. 

The reality of this chart was that almost everything was organized as small teams 

(small footprint). This was true from the Jedburghs (Jeds) to the Operational Groups54 to 

the Board of Economic Warfare. The structure, with some exceptions, was functional in 

design and the exceptions, the Jeds and OGs, were more traditional military in their 

 

52 Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence 

Agency (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981).

53 Rob Townley, discussions with JSOU Senior Fellows on the OSS, December 2010.

54 Office of Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, ―Operational Group Field Manual - Strategic Services 

(Provisional),‖ 25 April 1944, declassified on March 12, 2009, National Archives Record Service (NARS).
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respective design structure. These tactical units also had ―bolt on‖ (additional function 

people or teams) personnel or teams that made them non-standard from their design.

Under the Deputy Director of Strategic Services Operations were both Morale Operations 

(MO, propaganda) and the OGs. These units operated in the same areas, but with 

completely different missions. In spite of those operational differences they both had 

similar and therefore mutual objectives. They did mutually support each other within the 

AO, and at times it was synchronized to meet specific missions. OGs were regimental in 

design to fit their mission of recruiting, training, and commanding local guerrilla groups.

MOs were organized by function and then by region.

By contrast, the Board of Economic Warfare and the Office of Economic Warfare 

Analysis (OEWA) were more complex. However, they still were ―purpose-built‖ and 

maintained the small team approach. As an example, the Research and Analysis (R&A) 

section had only eight personnel to cover the entire effort in Europe.

The OSS began as a small organization by design. The OSS Organization Chart55 is

depicted below.

 

55 Michael Warner, ―What was OSS?‖ The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency

(e-book) 2007.
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This organization was Major General Donovan‘s design based on his knowledge of 

business, Europe, and understanding of guerrilla warfare. He knew that his headquarters 

must remain small to be agile to apply its strategy from OSS Headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. to the units in the field. There was limited ―two way‖ communications 

from his headquarters to the field units partly by design and partly because of the 

limitation of communication equipment. This did not mean that Donovan did not

communicate or protect his commanders. Rather, he believed they were in the best 

position to make decisions, even ones that were not well received in their Theater of 

Operations. Donovan stood by his leaders‘ decisions, in many cases even if they were 

wrong.

Current Organization Construct

The answer to this question of structure has some obvious links from the OSS to 

USSOCOM/USASOC today and may lead to a path to the future of the SOF warrior. The 

most direct comparisons with the OSS are with Special Forces and to Military 

Information Support Operations (MISO) which were found under the Deputy Director for 

Strategic Services Operations. Special Operations (SO), Morale Operations (MO) and 

Operational Group Command are the links between the OSS and USASOC with SF and 

MISO. 

Special Forces organizations take their heritage from the OSS in two areas. The 

Operational Groups, the first of these two areas, are roots for the SF Operational 

Detachment A. The two officers and 10 enlisted configuration is a spin-off from the OSS 

Operational Group structure of 34 men, including four officers and 30 enlisted. The basic 

structure of communications, demolitions, medics, and weapons specialties comes 

directly from the OSS. This OSS structure could be subdivided into two elements, with 

two officers and up to15 enlisted in each team. Some of the officers and 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who set up the early Special Forces organizational 

framework came from either the OGs or the Jedburghs and sometimes both. Major 

General (retired) Jack Singlaub, Colonel (retired) Aaron Bank, and Major (retired) Caesar 

Civitella are three examples of that linkage. 

The second area of the Special Forces mission concept of ―by, through, and with‖ is 

derived from the OSS operational mission: ―to organize, train and equip‖ local resistance 

groups to conduct guerrilla operations against their occupiers, as stated in the Operational 
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Groups Field Manual56 for the OSS Special Operations units (Jedburghs and OGs). SF 

operates ―by, through, and with‖ using Foreign Internal Defense (FID) or Unconventional

Warfare (UW) techniques, and it still organizes, equips, and trains the locals. Direct 

Action certainly plays a role today as it did during WWII, but it was not the primary role 

then. The above mission tasks are part of USSOCOM‘s core activities and they have their 

roots in the OSS.

The use of Direct Action capability is also a direct link back to the OSS. This is one 

of the current SOF Core Activities, and it has become the signature of how the world sees 

Special Operations today. It may be causing the concern that the SF community is losing 

focus on the other Core Activities.

57 Consequently, many of the other SOF Core 

Activities are being challenged by the Conventional military by default and by over 

commitment to this single activity. Our assets are being stressed with repeat rotations to 

Iraq and Afghanistan at a very high percentage of our force structure.

Military Information Support Operations, formerly known as Psychological 

Operations (PSYOP), also has strong roots in the OSS under Morale Operations. As the 

COI, Donovan had control over all of the intelligence and information for the war effort 

to include propaganda. However, after Pearl Harbor, the President made a critical 

decision to separate ―White‖ (overt, truthful, identifiable origins) and ―Black‖ (covert, 

feel of truth, not clearly identifiable origins) propaganda, giving half (Black) to Donovan 

and half (White) to the Foreign Information Service (FIS) under Nelson Rockefeller. The 

FIS conducted radio broadcasts outside of military control with the expected clashes 

between conventional Services and Donovan‘s OSS. This remains true today; there is still 

separation between the types of psychological operations being conducted. Today, even 

on the military side of these types of operations are clashes over ―turf‖ between Public 

Affairs (PAO), Information Operations (IO) and now MISO on issues of who does what 

and when at which target audience. 

Morale Operations, established in January 1943, had two components: radio and 

printed materials. The components were intended to create havoc by the use of lies and 

deception to undermine enemy morale (military or population). The OSS did have trouble 

demonstrating the success of their operations, although there are cases where their 

deceptions were effective enough that they were picked up and reported by the allies as 

 

56 Office of Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, Operational Group Field Manual - Strategic Services 

(Provisional).1944.

57 Until 4 August 2011 the following were listed as SOF core activities: Foreign Internal Defense, Security 

Force Assistance, and Military Information Operations, See USSOCOM Factbook, 2010, p. 7. 
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true. Printed material included leaflets, false documents, false newspaper stories and 

death notices (rumors) to erode the enemy‘s will. By the end of World War II, there was 

sufficient enough belief in psychological warfare that the US military would include it in 

future warfare. This remains true today. 

One common denominator between MISO and the OSS Morale Operations is 

language skills. Morale Operations required a high level, native-born, first hand 

knowledge of the particular language. This meant getting beyond the classroom and into 

the business/street-smart level of knowledge and cultural awareness. This was a reason 

the OSS got the ―Oh, So Social‖58 negative reputation. Early recruits and leadership came 

from the part of American society that was educated overseas or was first generation US 

born. There were large numbers of Ivy League educated OSS warriors which contributed 

to this misunderstanding. Since the beginnings of SF, language skills and cross-cultural 

awareness have remained a constant challenge to the community. MISO has a greater 

challenge, because added to the language are some local cultural challenges.

MISO and Civil Affairs (CA) are being modified structurally and expanded in 

manpower. However, as two of the five SOF Truths state; ―SOF cannot be mass 

produced‖; Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur‖. 59 Like SF 

soldiers, MISO and CA practitioners take time to develop and gain experience. Some of 

this experience is difficult to acquire by the military. For example, where do you find a 

CA guy on active duty who knows how to run a sewage plant? 

The short answer for the OSS effectiveness depends on what theater and when the 

question was asked and by whom. Today, there is little doubt that both the CIA and 

Special Forces owe some varying degree of their existence and organization to the OSS.

The most identifiable example is the SF A-team. The Afghan UW campaign in 2001 had 

its foundations built by the OSS in the 1940s.

What lessons were used from the OSS to create the CIA and SOF? Do those lessons 

still apply or has the structure of those organizations changed?

The short answer is that the selection process has had some minor changes, but the basic 

notions remain the same. Recruiters search for individuals with certain attributes that 

appear to be constant: physical fitness, intellect, self-control, outdoor skills, interpersonal skills, confident decision-making, and flexibility to adapt or adjust to most 

 

58 A.B. Kongrard, executive director of the CIA in his remarks to the Conference on the 60th Anniversary of 

the OSS in June 2002 put this well known accusation of the OSS into context that due to the war-driven 

haste in establishing the OSS Donovan relied on his network of elites to build the organization. 

59 USSOCOM Command Brief, November 2010.
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situations. In short, Donavan tasked his recruiters with finding the PhD capable of 

winning the bar fight,

60 better still, capable of winning the fight the indirect way using 

―by, through and with‖ the occupants of the bar. 

Time and technology have, of course, caused some changes to occur already in the 

selection and recruitment of potential SOF warriors. The need for more technical skills 

and capability in cyber warfare are constantly being raised by the field, the theaters and 

by the public. Another technology that is also in high demand is the Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles (UAV). This was not available during the OSS era, but Special Forces did have 

their own aviation assets. The following organizational chart illustrates the assignment of 

SOF dedicated aviation assets assigned to Special Forces Groups which had an aviation 

section61 of fixed wing aircraft and included U-6 Beaver, U-10 Courier, and C-7A

Caribou.

62

One of the innovations that came out of early OSS requirements was parachute 

infiltration. During Vietnam, U.S. Army Special Forces developed the then new

 

60 Walter Mess, quoted during the JSOU OSS-Society Seminar (video and transcript), 9 November 2009. 

61 Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 31-21, ―US Army Special Forces Operations,‖1969.

62 Unit history of 134th Aviation Company Website. ―Unfortunately the Air Force never flew the Caribou 

like the Army. They were primarily interested in long-range ―throughput‖ missions while the Army used 

the Caribou for local support to remote Special Forces camps and similar missions. After the Air Force 

takeover, this incredible short field aircraft was phased out in favor of larger, high-speed conventional air 

transports. Consequently, the Special Forces and others were left without support. This was a role 

subsequently assumed by helicopter units.‖ Available at http://unitpages.military.com/unitpages/unit.do? 

id=892938, accessed December 2010.
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technique of High Attitude Low Opening (HALO) insertion. This was developed by 

several Special Forces soldiers to include Master Sergeant (retired) Billy Waugh in 

October 1970.63

The two recent major engagements, Iraq and Afghanistan, should cause a need to 

revisit the role of women in SOF organizations to include Special Forces. If our 

grandmothers and mothers could be in the OSS to jump in and operate behind the lines 

(e.g. Virginia Hall64 air-landed because she was missing a leg), why can‘t women be in 

operational units today? The Marines have women units attempting to interface directly 

with the women networks in Afghanistan. To be sure MISO and CA have long had 

women in their Table of Organizations and Equipment (TO&E). The question is whether 

there is a need for women on an SF A-team. One possible answer to this could be an old 

SF experimentation, called the Special Action Force (SAF).

The SAF65 was a company of mixed specialists not found on an A-Team.

Configurations of this company included detachments like PSYOP Teams, Veterinary 

teams, Military Police, Preventive Medicine, and Communication specialists for fixed 

installations. This company was regionally aligned and language-qualified. The 8th

Special Forces Group was home to the SAF organization. The Group‘s mission was 

counterinsurgency in Latin America. The deploying SF team could add ―bolt-ons‖ from 

that company much like the OSS concept. In essence, this was like a company team, 

purposely built for the mission. This would be a way of approaching the issue of women 

on the detachment. 

Would a revisiting of the OSS structures be useful for the CIA and SOF for 21st

century operations?

The short answer for the SOF community is yes. The OSS again was ―purpose-built,‖ 

flexible in design, and more autonomous than today. Part of this was due to the nature of 

the conflict and part was due to the technology of the times. Donovan‘s selection process 

 

63 From an interview with Billy Waugh in Las Vegas, 2004 printed in The Interview, December 2005.

Master Sergeant (ret) Waugh is a veteran of both US Army Special Forces and the CIA.

64 Troy, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency.

65 The 8th Special Forces Group, D Company, from 1963 to1972 contained a Special Action Force (SAF), 

Military Police (MP), Military Intelligence (MI), Medical, Engineers, PSYOP and Security Agency 

detachments. Its primary mission was counterinsurgency in Latin America. SAF was also defined in Army 

Field Manual 31-21, ―Special Action Force (SAF),‖ February 1969. ―The SAF is a specially trained, area 

oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force, available to the commander of a unified command for 

the support of cold, limited, and general war operations. SAF organizations may vary in size and 

capabilities according to theater requirements.‖
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stressed the idea that the field personnel were expected to make decisions or actions 

without lots of guidance as long as it advanced the End State of winning the war. 

The accountability of funding had limited visibility and oversight. This is enjoyed 

by the CIA more so than USSOCOM. The resourcing and authorities reports address this 

in more detail. The bottom line is there is a need for more flexibility in the resourcing 

authorities.

As discussed earlier, aviation is an area that should be explored with the new SOF 

Aviation Command. How much UAV and other air assets can the SF Groups count on to 

be at least placed under their tactical control (TACON)?

Integration of SOF organization in support of specific missions should be reexamined. To be sure there is a long history of Command and Control configurations 

(Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Joint Special Operations Task Force, 

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, and Special Operations Command and 

Control Element, as examples). One idea developed as part of the investigation of SOF 

integration into the Future Force dealt with Special Operations Command and Control 

Element (SOCCE). The idea66 was to establish a cadre of SF Officers and NCOs in 

regionally focused, rapidly deployable teams (SOCCE) from LNO duty with 

conventional Units of Action (UA), today called Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). These 

teams would be made up of SF soldiers who have returned from an overseas deployment 

waiting schooling (Staff College) or a new assignment. They would be controlled by 

USASOC to manage them.

Another intriguing idea relates to the OSS economic war. This was an attack or at 

least leveraging of networks to influence outcomes. Clearly, we have some efforts along 

this same line, for example, ―following the money‖67 as a key component of threat 

financial analysis. However, this has been a reactive approach to a specific problem. The 

OSS started from a system approach: how does it work, and can it be influenced for a 

specific outcome? This approach is more indirect as opposed to direct action on a specific 

source of funding (drug lords) or source of revenue (drug supplies).

Currently, our use of money as bullets has not been effective in the current fight.

Title 22 funding has been more about spending than producing a desired or effective 

result. This lack of effectiveness is a symptom of poor integrated planning between the 

 

66 JSOU Senior Fellow comments from personal experience as USAJFKSWCS liaison to the U.S. Army‘s 

Unit of Action (UA) Battle Lab from 2003 to 2005.

67 Wesley J.L. Andersen, Disrupting Threat Finances, JSOU Report 08-3 (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press,

April 2008).
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host nation and supporting countries. The lack of understanding of the Internal Defense 

and Development (IDAD)68 model is one reason for this lack of coordination. Insurgent 

warfare is about legitimacy or governance. This means more focus on indirect action and 

less on direct action. The U.S. Air Force recently circulated a draft of IDAD, which once 

was a major part of SF education. This suggests that a review of operational needs should 

be linked to curriculum review to determine if SOF education needs an update.

Does either the CIA or SOF need new authorities to bring experts (regional, 

cultural, linguistic) into the service for short periods of time at a senior grade to 

support missions?

The OSS had many advantages that are not present today. The pool of candidates 

available to them was large. A national draft for the military was underway and continued 

throughout the war. The national will was focused on the outcome of the war, and the 

country was totally committed and engaged. The OSS looked good as a patriotic means 

to support the war effort for those who either had been educated overseas, or traveled 

extensively abroad and had linguistic skills that went beyond the high school and college 

levels of language training. This meant that much of the initial crop of OSS members 

were from well-to-do families. As the war went on, first generation Americans were 

recruited to further capitalize on their culture, language and regional knowledge. More 

importantly, was their willingness to think beyond the same target audience as the 

conventional military. They looked to people older than 39 and were gender-blind. This 

allowed them a resource pool that was broader than the military needed. They sought 

experienced and knowledgeable personnel rather than just physically fit personnel. 

The Research and Analysis Branch was filled with many of the best minds in the 

country coming from academia, business and industry. Donovan believed that OSS 

volunteers needed to come to the fight ready, not prepared to be trained to fight. The 

R&A experts brought with them knowledge and networks from their civilian work ready 

to fight. This afforded the operators in the field insights that they would have had to learn 

on their own (reach back). The OSS was about influence and leveraging networks, which 

came from the highest levels of the society. The R&A team had both influence from their 

 

68 Joint Publication JP-3-24, ―Counter Insurgency Operations,‖ October 2009. Internal Defense and 

Development (IDAD) is defined as follows: ―The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its 

growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable 

institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society, also called 

IDAD.‖ Also see Joint Publication JP 3-22, ―Foreign Internal Defense,‖ July 2010. It contains a chart 

depicting IDAD Strategy, page IV-5, figure IV-2.
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former jobs and networks that were developed over a longer life than the 18-year-old 

draftee. 

The wartime legislation and demand for skill supported Donovan‘s needs. The 

general assumption of authority and absence of oversight allowed for less scrutiny in 

some areas. The initial phase of working out of the White House and using the 

President‘s funds kept the bureaucrats at bay. By the same token, it created enemies in 

areas that needed or would need support to achieve the OSS goals.

Current Organization

USASOC/JFKSWCS does not have all the advantages of the OSS. It does have some, 

and the current levels of authority seem sufficient to meet the current needs. The 

Authorities Report will explore this in more detail. However, it is clear there are some 

disadvantages.

The MAVNI recruitment program was created after 9/11 to address a critical need 

for people knowledgeable in certain languages. The program is healthcare-focused

(doctors and nurses), but USSOCOM has some 92 personnel in the command that are a 

product of this program. The primary shortcoming is obtaining security clearances on a 

timely basis. USSOCOM needs these people in sensitive areas, and the delay in obtaining 

their required clearance has reduced the effectiveness of the program. The delays are 

caused by the lack of proper vetting from the country of origin.

What USSOCOM needs is something like the Lodge Act of 1950 (1950-1959), to 

be able to recruit persons that meet our needs for cultural awareness, advanced language 

proficiency, and political and geographic knowledge of key regions. There appears to be 

a need that goes beyond ―gray beard‖ contractors and a cultural need for uniformed 

personnel. ―Took a lot of time to distinguish between training and education in preparing 

SOF. — Afghan veteran‖

69

As suggested within this section, there may be other authorities to permit NCOs to 

fly (UAV or aircraft), add additional manpower (cyber warriors) and structure (SAF) that 

will require examination. The resourcing and authority section will touch on some of 

these points.

Are there new authorities required to achieve your recommendations?

 

69 JSOU Report, OSS Report, Irregular Warfare and the OSS Model, 2-4 Nov 2009, ISBN 1-93374-45-8

(Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2010).
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See above and sections on resourcing and authorities for more information.

Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a 

description of resources-education, enablers, equipment...)?

This answer, of course, will depend on what is changed. For example, if a SAF unit is 

created for forward deployed SF Battalions, it will have an impact on the TO&E of the 

SF organization, on facilities, education/training and other expenditures. 

Cyber Warfare positions would require more specialized equipment, increased 

training and a probably more computer and other electronics savvy SF type soldiers.

Economic Warfare would require course development to produce more experienced 

and highly educated economists or finance persons. The duty position probably would be 

at Group or Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) level to be the most 

effective—regional impact, not local level.

Recommendations:

O-1: Review OSS MO with the current MISO and CA structures to determine ways to 

increase team integration from the planning to execution and synchronization with SF 

units on a regional orientation.

O-2: Consider on-the-job training approach to increase CA skills for selected areas 

(sewage treatment plant operations) similar to the concept employed by SF medics.

O-3: Review the OSS employment of women in operations to the current gender 

restrictions on all SOF organizations to determine if any modifications are required.

O-4: Conduct a review of a SF concept of SAF (bolt-ons) structure to enhance the 

forward-deployed SF battalions in order to increase capabilities and unit cohesion in 

regional operations.

O-5: Review IATF plans to determine other ways to leverage economic tools (follow the 

money) in the current fight against terrorism by considering how the OSS employed their 

economic warfare organizations. 

O-6: Conduct curriculum review of SOF education to determine relevance to the Core 

Activities and current operations.
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O-7: Examine existing programs with OSS practices to bring native speakers into the 

program with the need for security clearances in order to employ their skills more quickly 

into the fight.
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Resourcing

This section summarizes research and findings on the OSS approach toward allocating 

resources and the current approach employed by U.S. Special Forces and the CIA. It will 

offer some recommendations for application as it relates to the future of U.S. Special 

Operations Forces. Judgments expressed are drawn from reading OSS-related literature, 

discussions with military officers, civilian leaders, and a historian at the CIA. A set of 

Study Questions were developed to guide and trigger discussion intended to yield 

concrete recommendations.

Before addressing the study questions directly, it is useful to review some 

observations with regard to the OSS approach to allocating resources based on input from 

Mr. Rob Townley,

70 an OSS historian and ―The War Report of the OSS‖ by Peter 

Karlow.

71

The OSS‘s Special Funds branch was responsible for financing the secret activities 

of OSS through ―unvouchered funds.‖ Such funds were necessary to the maintenance of 

cover, whether of a corporation, a training installation, a recruiting office, or an agent or 

group of agents in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. The use of unvouchered funds 

supported the most secret operations in which OSS engaged, and the Special Funds 

branch spent a great deal of time acquiring stockpiles of foreign currency for use in those 

operations. Unvouchered funds are moneys made available to the President by Congress 

to support activities of a confidential nature, are exempt from the provisions of public law 

regulating the outlay of government funds, and not comprehensively audited.

72

When the Coordinator of Information was established under the direction of Major 

General Donavan, its original unvouchered funds were allotted from the President's 

Emergency Fund in September 1941, the first allocation being $100,000. After the 

creation of OSS in June 1942, an additional appropriation of $3,000,000 was granted for 

the fiscal year (1942-1943). A second allotment in the amount of approximately 

$10,000,000 was further supplied for the same period. In the spring of 1943 the OSS was 

ultimately able to go before Congress and obtain directly its own appropriation for the 

fiscal year 1943-1944. This appropriation was granted in the amount of $21,000,000, of 

 

70 Rob Townley, December 2010.

71 Peter Karlow, The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) Volume II

(Washington, D.C.: the Walker Publishing Company, 1976).

72 Michael Warner, ―COI Came First‖ The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency

(e-book). Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 March 2007; available at 

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/oss/art02.htm; accessed December 2011.
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which approximately $15,000,000 was classified as unvouchered funds. In fiscal year 

1944-1945, Congress appropriated $57,000,00073 ($57 million in 1945 dollars is roughly 

equivalent to $691 million in today‘s dollars).

According to the National War Agencies Appropriation Bill of 194574, expenditures 

had only to be endorsed by Donovan and submitted to the Treasury Department to secure 

reimbursement for amounts disbursed from Special Funds. This departure from the 

normal Congressional requirement of detailed accounting for government expenditures 

was necessary for OSS security. Later the process included routing through the Joint 

Staff, but only as a courtesy.75

There were a few driving forces behind the way the OSS resourced its operations.

Resources were dedicated to an activity based largely on its return on investment ratio—

the activities with the most disproportionate effect in comparison to the amount of funds 

expended on the activity won out, hands down, nearly every time. The J8 equivalents of 

the WWII era did not judge the merit of a sustained operation based on its parts and 

objective, rather operations were judged based on what they delivered. Just because

something is inexpensive does not mean it is ineffective. Work backward from effect in 

the analysis of resource allocation, and you have a far better means of judging what to 

keep and what to toss.

The entire operating mantra of the OSS was different than ours is today, and it 

shows through in the amount of resources we dedicate to certain things without thinking 

about our actions in the aggregate and how inane they can be sometimes. It can be boiled 

down to the supposition that the OSS, as a culture, knew how to  ̳manage‘ the chessboard 

upon which it operated rather than chasing its adversaries this way and that as we are 

prone to do today. The ability to manage the operational environment, rather than just 

existing as a player within it, allows for far more efficient options to expend resources 

than does the latter option. 

The OSS expended its resources with great care that they be spent on leveraging 

other existing networks or resource pools. The OSS never operated in a vacuum because 

it did not have the budget. Whereas, currently, we spend most of our time acting like 

we‘re alone with an opponent in a boxing ring, generating whatever punching power we 

 

73 David H. Berger, ―The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations 

Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951,‖ (May 1995, Quantico VA) 

available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/berger.htm, accessed December 2010.

74 Federal Records of World War II, Volume II, Military Records, Part One, Interallied and Interservice 

Military Agencies, section on The Office of Strategic Services.

75 David H. Berger, 1995.
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can just from our shoulder, what the OSS did took advantage of all other sources of force 

or momentum available inside that ring or out. Even if it meant paying the brute in the 

audience $20 to step in the ring and knock an opponent senseless, they would do it.

The OSS was created as a response to a national or even a global threat. Its creation 

was akin to someone  ̳breaking the emergency glass‘ that you only do as a last resort, so 

as a service the OSS had a lot of ground to cover and little time to cover it. Thankfully,

General Donovan had done much of the necessary work in the late 1930s to take some of 

the pressure off. Had this not been done, the resources that the OSS expended would not 

have been anywhere near as effective. So you have to view the lifespan of OSS as part of 

a continuum. This circumstance supports the position that it is more cost effective to 

maintain a low level presence in many areas of the world in order to help manage conflict 

rather than having to react to it. The activities that happened before the OSS was created 

are good examples of how this philosophy is effective and saves money.

Summary of Group Study:

1. What are critical resourcing issues for CIA and SOF today (manpower, 

education, training, equipment)?

The critical resourcing issues will revolve around overcoming parochial interservice/interagency rivalries, not doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 

education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) or appropriation funding. USSOCOM 

was neither intended, nor funded, to function independently and was designed to rely on 

service support. It is the statutory responsibility of the services to provide departmentcommon capabilities to SOF. Currently, Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) resources are 

intended to fund SOF-peculiar requirements. Obtaining broad agreement and support on 

SOF-peculiar and service-common is often a challenge. Tackling drastic USSOCOM 

reorganization that potentially requires additional inter-service/interagency support, 

funding, and authorities will be monumental when leveraging status quo is already 

difficult.

Manpower is a problem because there is not enough SOF to go around. The biggest 

problem in manpower is non-SOF enabler support. SOF goes through significant efforts 

to recruit and train the best SOF operators but fills non-SOF-billets generally with what 

the services provide (with exception for some specific units that do selection support 

MOSs). SOF is not able to select the right enabler and support personnel, but these 

positions are critical to SOF success.

As we attempt to grow SOF to meet demand, there is a danger of diluting the force 

with ―acceptable‖ operators to meet the numbers demand instead of the ―best‖ operators 

we need to accomplish strategically important missions. We need to break the service 

norms of a ―career path‖ to provide our senior operators experiences needed to further 
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develop SOF. Currently, we need to follow service-acceptable career paths to ensure 

advancement. These career paths do not equate to the desired SOF experience.

In education, language training needs to be more developed so it is enduring 

throughout a SOF operator‘s career and follows him wherever he goes. Some forces have 

very effective initial language training, but sustainment and improvement away from 

tactical units is difficult. SOF operators should have language training requirements to 

meet even when they leave a tactical unit to maintain or improve their proficiency 

because it is too late to do when they return to a tactical unit.

The disconnect between the TSOC that commands and controls SOF and the 

components that provide the trained and equipped SOF is the biggest issue in resourcing 

equipment. Since the components are not in the fight, they are naturally behind when it 

comes to developing the next equipment capability. There needs to be a tighter, more 

agile loop from identifying a requirement forward and resourcing a solution for the force.

The constant challenge is keeping pace with technology while preserving MFP-11 buying 

power.

How was the OSS resourced as a percent of war budget? What problems did they 

face in resourcing during the war?

The OSS was a very small percent of the war budget. It is difficult to aggregate, but as 

noted earlier, for fiscal year 1944-1945, $57 million was appropriated by Congress for 

the OSS while in 1944, the U.S. defense budget topped out at $85 billion.

Overall, the OSS was well resourced during the war. There was some fraud, waste 

and abuse. It is almost unavoidable that the more flexibility and speed an organization 

has to use funds the more chance there is for abuse. The OSS was far to one end of this 

scale where they had maximum speed and flexibility with funds, but they were at high 

risk for waste.

If the CIA and SOF were reorganized, what types of resourcing issues would be 

envisioned?

This is a complex question and would involve a study by itself. It is not an organization 

issue as much as a utilization/employment issue. SOF is a strategic asset and should be 

used accordingly. The SOF focus should be on the prevent and deter phases of conflict, 

not getting bogged down in the current fight. The challenge is defining success to the 

policy makers. Essentially, success of SOF would mean not having to escalate to the use 

of kinetic force. In other words, if ―nothing happens‖ in the region in which we are 

employed we are a success. It is difficult to convince the policy makers to spend money 
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for ―nothing.‖ Regardless, our current employment in Afghanistan is not optimized. We 

are not getting the return on investment that we could if we were utilized properly.

A significant resourcing issue would be the difference between USSOCOM funding 

and service funding. USSOCOM could do reorganization that required USSOCOM funds 

only, but would have to get support from the services to make changes that required any 

service funds or resources. If the changes required more or different personnel, then it 

would be critical to ensure the changes are feasible for the services to support.

The current force provider/force employer model should be studied to consider 

alternatives. There are certain SOF units that operate on a different model where the same 

headquarters is responsible for garrison command and control (C2) and training but also 

commands and controls the force in combat. This model provides much greater agility in 

resourcing combat needs with units or equipment, but also makes the combat 

headquarters consider the long-term health of the force when making requests. The 

current system where the TSOC employs SOF and the component provides them was not 

developed for today‘s environment of continuous combat. SOF should consider other 

models to see if there are more efficient methods, but a change to this system would have 

significant resourcing impacts, and a full study of the DOTMLPF impacts would need to 

be considered.

USSOCOM has little to no relief from Department of Defense-imposed statutes, 

regulations, and oversight that limit its agility. The regulatory requirements drive 

USSOCOM to invest in large bureaucratic ―Service-like‖ organizational structures with 

all the associated inefficiencies, particularly in the execution of the Title X roles and 

responsibilities. Statutes, policies, and regulations, which if removed, would allow 

greater efficiencies.

If either CIA or SOF obtained new authorities for bringing experts (regional, 

cultural, linguistic) into the service for short periods of time at a senior grade to 

support missions, what resources would be required?

Special authorities from the Department of Defense (DOD) may be required to hire an 

assortment of experts for short periods of time, with the flexibility to let them go without 

incurring a career or long-term employee status (similar to contractors, but with rank and 

authority to represent USSOCOM).

The OSS had to hire experts because they did not have time to develop their own 

expertise in many cases. Similarly, USSOCOM will face challenges that it could address 

quicker by hiring some experts either until USSOCOM can develop its own experts 

(which would involve education) for enduring issues or until the expert is no longer 

required for specific topics. This practice should not be overused to prevent causing the 

same level of mistrust that existed between the OSS ground operatives and the largely 
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civilian-oriented headquarters back in the U.S. Additionally, any experts hired should be 

used only in their field of expertise and not used for leadership positions.

Special allowances would have to be made to match or compensate said personnel 

for the loss in terms of personal remuneration they may endure by signing on with the 

service (salary matching, compensation schemes, etc.). Real talent is not cheap.

Issues of association, such experts may lose legitimacy in their respective 

professional communities if it is publicly known that they are taking on a position with 

the government. There may need to be a mechanism in place to engage such talent in an 

indirect fashion (CIA already does this).

An alternative to bringing experts into the service would be to capitalize on our 

organic SOF operators by sending them to advanced regional, cultural, and linguistic 

schools. We need to invest in talent management and develop a human capital plan. We 

must source our ―Lawrence of Arabia‖ strategy, not outsource it. It is more efficient and 

arguably more effective to provide SOF operators with advanced education and return 

them to the force instead of hiring non-military personnel for potential tactical 

employment with regional impact.

Are there new authorities required to achieve your recommendations?

Maybe, but most of the necessary changes are not in authorities, they are in procedure.

Legislative armed services committees would be required to write such procedural 

changes into law at some point, but they may not need to initially to get things started.

If new authorities are required, a more detailed analysis would need to be done to 

determine what advantage bringing a person on to active service has over contracting 

them or employing them as a government civilian. The discriminators are likely to be 

speed of hiring and the ability to hire someone into a senior position/rank.

Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a 

description of resources-education, enablers, equipment...)?

No, additional resources should not be required except perhaps in the requirement for 

non-organic General Purpose Forces enablers, but they should be a service bill. There 

will need to be reallocation of resources within the existing budget, not new levels.

USSOCOM‘s budget is more than adequate to accomplish the mission. There is a great 

deal of redundancy to be found within the current structure that could be turned into 

operational or training capacity necessary to bring on new talent. The new talent would 

be brought into the service for the expertise they already possess; therefore, they should

require only some basic military training like those individuals brought into the OSS.
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We need less Congressional oversight and more flexibility with existing resources.

We need a ―cash-like‖ account that can be used for operations and maintenance (O&M),

procurement, or research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) to resource in 

support of the fight, similar to a combat mission needs statement (CMNS) pot of money 

for the USSOCOM Commander to use in a rapid fashion. Right now, we have the purple

(MFP-11) pot, but it is not considered rapidly available funds; it is normal program 

objective memorandum process funds.

Recommendations:

R1. Concentrate resources on persistent engagement activities in order to ―manage‖ the 

global environment.

R2. Enable SOF to operate with colorless (e.g., DERF) funding to reduce overhead and 

increase USSOCOM‘s ability to meet urgent needs similar to OSS‘s unvouchered funds.

R3. Tailor DOD oversight; manage as a Special Activity with ―Special Funds‖ vice a 

service-like entity by reducing numbers of reviews, reports, and decision layers.

R4. Create a human capital plan (talent management plan) to develop the regional, 

cultural, and linguistic expertise of our organic SOF operators and enablers.

R5. Transition SOF acquisitions to become service-common programs to reduce overall 

equipping, training, and support costs.

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Authorities

This section summarizes research and findings on the OSS authorities and their approach 

to resource authorities and allocation. It will highlight the current authorities granted to 

SOF, the CIA, and their authorities, which are also many times tied to resourcing. The 

summary will offer some recommendations for application as it relates to the future of 

U.S. Special Operations Forces. Judgments expressed are drawn from reading OSSrelated literature, discussions with military officers and civilian leaders from the office of 

the DASD/SO/CT, USASOC and OSS historians, and former officers at the CIA. A set of 

study questions were developed to guide and trigger discussion intended to yield concrete 

recommendations.

―A good idea without funding is a hallucination.‖ -Anonymous Staff Officer

What is legal authority, and why is it important? Funding and resourcing are tied to legal 

authority. According to the Judge Advocate General‘s Operational Law Handbook, the 

expenditure of appropriated funds is governed by the established rule that ―the 

expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that proper 

funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.‖ Congress defines legal 

authorities via several means to include: U.S. Code Title 10, U.S. Code Title 22, DOD

Authorizations Acts, and DOD appropriations. Federal agencies also provide guidance 

through regulations and Comptroller General Decision.

76

Without a clear legal authority, one must be prepared to articulate a rationale for an 

expenditure which is ―necessary and incident‖ to an existing authority. Executing 

appropriated funds without proper legal authority can lead to what is known as a Purpose 

violation. Failure to correct a purpose violation obligation (of funds) can lead to a 

violation of the amount which will in turn cause an Anti-Deficiency Act Violation. In 

addition to all this legal jargon, more legal jargon translated below explains that Congress 

imposes fiscal controls through three basic mechanisms, (each implemented by one or 

more statutes):

Proper Purpose. Expenditures must be authorized by law for the intended purpose.

Time Limits. Appropriations have a life span, and must be used during their period 

of availability.

 

76 Definition of Legal Authority, posted by USSOCOM Special Operations Financial Management SOFMM policy, and derived from Chapter 16 of the Judge Advocate General‘s Legal Center and School, 

Operational Law Handbook, (2010, MacDill Air Force base, FL).
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Obligations must be within the amounts authorized by Congress.77

Without delving deeper into law, it is clear to see how today‘s SOF operator must 

also be well versed in what is and is not authorized. USSOCOM has a ―one-stop 

shopping‖ portal for its staff to research authorities and what type of funding is required 

for tasks. In that portal there is an ―authorities matrix‖ containing detailed information on 

more than 40 authorities that relate to Special Forces Activities, training, contingency 

operations, and humanitarian operations. A few examples of the authorities listed are 

Section 1206/1207/1208 Authorities, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and 

Contingency Construction Authority.

78 A vast difference from what the OSS was saddled 

with during WWII. For example, the Operational Groups Field Manual, a 31-page 

manual used by the OSS references JCS Directive 155/11/D for its authority to ―execute 

independent operations against enemy targets.‖

79 The JCS directive that delineated the 

functions and authorities of the OSS was a document of only six pages.80

What are the authorities for the establishment of the CIA and Special Operations 

Forces today? How do they link to each other? Are the authorities sufficient to 

achieve their mutual tasks?

Bottom line: Overarching authorities come from civilian and political leadership—

primarily the Executive Branch and more importantly Congress, since it controls the 

purse strings. Authorities can be granted and expanded OR retracted and taken away 

altogether by statutes, regulations, policies, and executive orders.

President Harry Truman, by executive order deactivated the OSS in 1945 and split 

its activities up between the Department of State and Department of War. The 1947 

National Securities Act created a new clandestine agency to replace the OSS: the CIA.

81

By contrast, due to perceived military parochialism, Congress forced the Department of 

Defense into action with the 1986 Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols 

 

77 USSOCOM Special Operations Financial Management SOFM-M policy, and derived from Chapter 16 of 

the Judge Advocate General‘s Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook, (2010, MacDill Air 

Force Base, FL).

78 ―New Matrix Puts Funding Authorities at Your Finger Tips,‖ policy article from the USSOCOM Spear 

Policy Newsletter, November 2010, (2010, MacDill Air Force Base, FL), p. 3. 

79 Office of Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, ―Operational Group Field Manual - Strategic Services 

(Provisional),‖ 25 April 1944, declassified on March 12, 2009, National Archives Record Service (NARS).

80 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 155/11/D, ―Functions of the Office of Strategic Services,‖ 27 

October 1943, declassified on September 20, 1995, National Archives Record Service (NARS).

81 Michael Warner, ―An End and a Beginning.‖ The Office of Strategic Services: America's First 

Intelligence Agency (e-book), 2007.
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Act. President Reagan signed it into law in 1987 to establish USSOCOM. USSOCOM 

acts as a unified combatant command with service-like authorities with MFP-11 funding 

authority. Since 9/11 it has also evolved into the lead command in synchronizing plans 

for global operations against terrorist networks.82 One critical shortfall is that USSOCOM 

was not originally intended, nor funded to function independently, and was designed to 

rely on other military services support. MFP-11 funds are intended to fund SOF-peculiar 

requirements. Obtaining broad agreement and support on SOF-peculiar and servicecommon requirements is often a challenge. 

USSOCOM, in contrast to the OSS and the CIA, was not envisioned to conduct 

clandestine, strategic, or operational intelligence operations. USSOCOM missions

referred to as ―SOF Core Activities‖83 include direct action (DA), special reconnaissance, 

UW, FID, CA, counterterrorism (CT), MISO, information operation (IO), 

counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), security force assistance 

(SFA), counterinsurgency operations (COIN), and any activities specified by the 

President or Secretary of Defense. Note that special reconnaissance is not considered 

intelligence collection. Most SOF units have a competence and charter to carry out

several to all of the core SOF activities while some specialize. 

The  ̳National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States‘ also 

known as the 9/11 Commission report recommended expanding the role of USSOCOM.

Recommendation 31 stated that ―the CIA should retain responsibility and execution of 

clandestine and covert operations...‖ That recommendation led into the next with 

―however, that one important area of responsibility should change...[recommendation 

32] The lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether 

clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be 

consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations 

already being developed in the Special Operations Command.‖84 Currently there is no 

SOF Doctrine85 to address these specific concerns, and Recommendation 32 has not been 

 

82 U.S Special Operations Hand Book (2011), produced by USSOCOM Public Affairs, Mac Dill Air Force 

Base, FL: pg. 7-9.

83 The 11 SOF core activities (―any activities specified by the President and SECDEF is not counted‖) were 

accepted nomenclature until August 2011 when they were changed to Core Missions and Activities. 

84 Wording of Recommendation 32 from the report, available at http://9-11commission.gov/. 

85 In joint doctrine, Joint Publication 3-05 for Special Operations (April 2011) does not address it directly 

but states that the Department of Defense may be placed in a ―supporting role to inter-organizational 

partners.‖ USSOCOM SOF Publication 1, ―SOF Doctrine‖ (August 2011) also does not directly address 

this issue. Both documents were in draft form during the study.
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approved despite a presidential directed review of policy.

86 Expanding USSOCOM role 

in covert or clandestine mission areas will also raise additional legal concerns beyond the 

scope of this study.

Today, USSOCOM, as a service-like command, is authorized its own major force 

program (MFP-11), with all of the oversight any service budget would receive from 

Congress. In reference whether authorities are sufficient for either the CIA or SOF in 

comparison to the OSS, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Gregg in his research placed this into 

context:

Since the disestablishment of the OSS, America‘s social and political 

environment changed in ways that leaders of the OSS would probably find 

both counterproductive and ironically appealing. Some of the most significant 

changes [reference to oversight of CIA clandestine and covert operations] 

were the findings of the 1976 Church Committee regarding paramilitary 

operations. These findings resulted in increased oversight of covert operations 

by Congress and more scrutiny over funds for clandestine organizations. In 

contrast, the leaders of the OSS might find the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment 

to the Goldwater-Nichols Act a realization of their goals of a separate, 

national-level special operations capability. However, they would probably 

find the subordination of control and employment of special operations to 

geographical commanders troublesome at best.

87

What were the authorities for the OSS and were they sufficient for their tasks? How 

did they support the military and other security organizations during the war?

Current laws and statutes regarding authorities, funding, and oversight of special 

operations, covert operations, and clandestine intelligence operations, are vastly different 

and more restrictive than the funding of the OSS. Congress exercised little or no 

oversight in the use of unvouchered funds, and Donovan personally had ―unprecedented 

access‖ to and support from the President.‖88

The OSS operated under broad and powerful authorities to ―collect and analyze 

strategic information‖ and to ―plan and operate...special services.‖ The OSS also had 

 

86 ―Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations issues for Congress,‖ Congressional 

Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Order Code RS22017, Library of Congress, January 2005, 

updated December 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf. 

87 Steven C. Gregg, Major, USAF, ―Lessons of the OSS: Warnings and Guideposts for Modern SOF.‖ (Air 

University, 2007), p. 15.

88 Ibid, p. 2.
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authorized responsibility for being in charge of resistance.89 With such a broad mandate, 

the OSS was mostly free to operate as it saw fit to accomplish its mission.

Many of the OSS‘s greatest successes were in how it supported the military during 

the war. The OSS provided intelligence and assisted conventional forces by conducting 

sabotage to degrade and disrupt enemy units‘ morale and will to fight prior to engaging 

allied military units or during their efforts to withdraw. Intelligence included providing 

enemy order of battle information, such as the case where the OSS provided the location 

of the German 7th Corps Headquarters so it could be strafed.

90 The OSS also employed 

the resistance to attack a Panzer Division en-route to Normandy so it arrived with only 

3,500 of 10,000 men and all on foot with no tanks or artillery because of attacks from 

guerrillas.

91 General Eisenhower said ―I consider that the disruption of enemy rail 

communication, the harassing of German road moves, and the continual and increasing 

strain placed on the German war economy and internal services throughout occupied 

Europe by the organized forces of the resistance played a very considerable part in our 

victory.‖92 Lieutenant General A.M. Patch said, ―During the planning phase for our 

landing in southern France we were constantly kept informed of the enemy‘s strength and 

activities by American agents behind the lines.‖93

What is the process to make changes in the structure today for USSOCOM and 

CIA?

To make a change at USSOCOM or down to the division level, a request has to be 

submitted to the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board 

(SOCREB) for Deputy Combatant Commander approval. Three documents are included 

in the package: a doctrine, organizational, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, facilities change recommendation, a capability decision memorandum signed 

by the director or deputy director supporting the change, and a SOCREB briefing. To 

make a change to an organization below division level the same packet must be submitted 

to the SOCREB but then must also go through the applicable service organizational 

change process.

 

89 Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage (New York: Reynal & 

Hitchcock, 1946), p. 13.

90 Ibid., p. 5.

91 Ibid., p. 4.

92 Ibid., p. 5.

93 Ibid., p. 5.
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Structural changes will require Congressional approval or oversight. For example 

the Post 9/11, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) - Public Law 

108-458 delineates that procedures for operational coordination between DOD and CIA

at minimum will provide: ―methods of communication‖ between the SECDEF and 

Director, CIA; and when ―conducting separate missions in the same geographic area, a 

mutual agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the region and a clear 

delineation of operational responsibilities.‖

94

Are there existing authorities to bring line officers (not medical or legal) directly 

into the services at the rank of LTC or above? How was this done by the OSS? Is it 

a tool that would be useful to USSOCOM? 

Many in USSOCOM agree that it can become a more agile force if it could bring experts 

into service to address specific problem sets. It takes time to grow experts, and if it is a 

discrete problem that does not require an enduring capability, then creating USSOCOMinternal experts is not efficient. The OSS had the ability to ―hire‖ experts, the Group of 

300, for example, because they did not have time to develop their own expertise in many 

cases. The OSS also operated during the ―draft era‖ and the whole nation was mobilized 

and motivated to support the war effort. Direct commissions given in the OSS were a 

point of contention with many career military officers in and outside the OSS.

USSOCOM will face challenges that it could address quickly by hiring experts 

either until USSOCOM can develop its own experts for enduring issues or until those 

experts are no longer required for specific topics. The majority of officers contributing to 

this study warned that this practice should not be overused to prevent causing the same 

level of mistrust that existed between the OSS ground operatives and the largely civilianoriented headquarters back in the U.S. Additionally, any experts hired should be used 

only in their field of expertise and not used for leadership positions. The MAVNI pilot 

program that permits non-citizens legally residing in the U.S. to join the military and 

quickly obtain citizenship has met with mixed reviews primarily due to the applicants not 

being able to pass the required security background checks.95

Some study participants questioned outright the validity of bringing outside experts 

and ―putting rank on them.‖ One recommendation is to in-source vice out-source our 

 

94 Delineated in Section 1013 ― Joint Procedures for Operational Coordination between Department of 

Defense and Central Intelligence Agency,‖ available at www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf , accessed 

December 2010.

95 According to input from the USSOCOM J1 OSS study participants.
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―Lawrence of Arabia strategy‖ by sending some of our SOF operators out to develop and 

hone required cultural and language skill sets. Also, in this day and age of heightened 

transparency it may be wiser to bring renowned experts discretely into the fold without 

enlisting them or providing direct commissions into uniformed service. The 

commissioned expert may lose legitimacy in his/her respective professional communities 

if it is made known publicly that they are now in uniform. The CIA uses this discrete and 

indirect method of hiring experts. One modern day example where the U.S. Army 

brought in experts without extending field grade rank is in the area of human terrain 

mapping. One assumption for direct commissioning at any level of rank would be that the 

new authority would have to be faster and easier to accomplish than contracting or hiring 

civil service civilians, or the authority would not be worthwhile. Regardless, the 

discriminator may likely be speed of hiring a subject matter expert due to a crisis or 

pressing issue, for which a line commission may be inappropriate. Study group members 

indicated that the authority for bringing someone onto active service via direct 

commission as field grade or above officers does not exist other than in the medical and 

legal career fields.

During WWII, the OSS commissioned personnel from early 1942 to 1945, and 

commissions were implied to be for the duration of the war and not to last more than 6 

months following its conclusion. The JCS also gave the OSS the authority to commission 

without any basic training. However, even with a global war and more than 12 million 

serving in uniform, direct commissioning of civilians was a rare exception. The majority 

of those commissioned entered the Army Specialist Corps, and not the Regular Army.

The other source was from commissioning enlisted to officer. The OSS was given an 

officer allotment from each of the military services. If requested the OSS could direct 

commission against these quotas as per Army Regulation 605-10, 10 December 1941.

OSS commissions also did not count against TO&E stateside or in theater. 96

The OSS used direct commissions primarily for three reasons. The first was to 

protect civilian personnel of draft age who were already with the COI or OSS from being 

drafted into the other services. The second was to allow enlisted soldiers to achieve parity 

with British counterparts in enemy occupied territory, since the British policy was to 

commission their enlisted in order to put the lower ranking U.S. personnel at higher risk. 

Lastly, OSS civilian subject matter experts (SMEs) who were later inserted behind enemy 

lines to deal with military occupation issues were commissioned through Military 

Government (today‘s Civil Affairs). One example of this was the Monument and Fine 

 

96 Troy Sacquety, discussion and email input from the USASOC Historian, January 2011.
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Arts Commission whose task was to preserve European history and artifacts. U.S.

citizens and later citizens of partner nations were commissioned, and the Commanding 

Officer in Theater had commissioning authority. Despite the expedient manner in which 

direct commissions were accomplished during the war, there were troublesome issues 

that developed since no long-term plan was developed by the OSS. Difficulties with 

promotions did arise due to the TO&E exceptions and recognition during separations 

were also upsetting to many OSS veterans.

97 According to the USASOC historian it is an 

unknown whether OSS personnel could have performed many of their duties out of

uniform.

Other examples brought to the study group came from the Department of State 

(DOS) representative to the USSOCOM IATF. The DOS uses Title 5 authorities, and 

Personal Service Contracts (PSC) to bring SMEs and former DOS officials into the 

Foreign Service. Of interest is the PSC program where the individual SME is contracted 

directly by the DOS for up to 5 years to serve in overseas posts providing skills that may 

not exist there. The individual is treated similar to a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) and 

afforded all benefits except for participation in the Thrift Savings Plan. The Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and embassy-based 

Narcotics Affairs Sections (NAS) have successfully used this program in employing 

former law enforcement and military (many are former SOF) experts to equip, train, and 

advise partner nations‘ law enforcement, paramilitary and military organizations engaged 

in counternarcotics activities. For USSOCOM the closest methods that can be used today 

are to hire civilians through contracting companies or by creating a civil service position.

The DOS PSC concept removes the long and arduous process in hiring of civil service 

employees, and reduces the sometimes exorbitant costs that companies charge for an 

individual contractor‘s work. A more detailed analysis would need to be done to 

determine what benefit bringing a person into active duty service has over contracting 

them or employing them as a government civilian.

Are there new authorities required to achieve the recommendations?

Yes, but USSOCOM cannot do this right now on its own. Congressionally- and DoDimposed statutes, regulations, and oversight mechanisms are not easily overturned, and 

many lawmakers would argue that they should not be. One commonly heard complaint of 

SOF operators at the tactical unit level starts with ―if we only had the authority to...‖ On 

 

97 Troy Sacquety, 2011.
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the USSOCOM staff, ―the angry Turks‖ (experienced SOF operators) have spearheaded 

other innovation groups and call for combining, streamlining, or doing away with 

oversight committees in order to become a more effective and efficient organization of 

SOF warriors. One suggestion from SF officers at Fort Bragg involved assigning more 

SOF operators to CIA where they would then be covered by less restrictive CIA 

authorities to carry out special operations and irregular activities. This blending of 

warrior capabilities under authorities more linked to the President of the United States 

would be reminiscent of the former OSS.

Will there be new levels of resourcing required (not numbers of dollars rather a 

description of resources-education, colors of money, equipment...)

If Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission Report is to be enacted, new authorities 

and funding will have to be legislated. In reference to bringing in outside experts, the 

levels of resourcing should be fairly limited since they would be brought into service for 

expertise or a capability they already have, so they should need fairly little training other 

than some basic military training. There would be individual equipment requirements, but 

those are minimal in consideration of the amount of individual equipment already 

purchased annually. It would also require some type of training center to give the new 

people some minimal level of military training, much like doctors going through an 

Officer‘s Basic Course. There would have to be systems in place to incorporate them into 

the military personnel and health care systems. If the skill they were hired for required 

specific equipment that is not organic to SOF or the military already, then there would 

have to be funds to purchase the necessary equipment.

Recommendations to address authorities primarily rely on lobbying efforts to 

convince civilian leadership in OSD and Congress that USSOCOM is trustworthy enough 

to have less oversight. We should also be aware that the political will to make these 

changes must exist. Many could argue that in order to maintain American values, such as 

those that agree with the Church Committee findings, the ―speed bumps‖ need to remain 

in place to prevent unauthorized military operations in variance of stated U.S. policy.

Some of the recommendations for this group overlap with recommendations from the 

other study groups, primarily the Resourcing Group.

Recommendations

A1. Tailor DOD oversight; manage as a Special Activity with ―Special Funds‖ vice a 

service-like entity by reducing numbers of reviews, reports, and decision layers.

A2. Develop Joint SOF Doctrine.
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A3. Refocus and enhance 1206/1207/1208 Authorities. This will enable a more rapid 

ability to support partner nations.

A4. Enable SOF to operate with colorless funding (e.g. DERF) to reduce overhead and 

increase SOF‘s ability to meet urgent needs similar to the OSS unvouchered funds.

A5. Refine roles and responsibilities in synchronizing global operations.

A6. Increase authorities and roles in intelligence operations.
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Annex A: Recommendations Chart

Recommendations made by each of the four (4) OSS Study Group reports (listed in each 

section) were discussed, debated, voted on, and synthesized at the January 2011 OSS 

Symposium where a final list was compiled. The explicit task presented by Admiral 

Olson was to document what could be accomplished within the Command (internal 

actions) and what recommendations required coordination or approval outside of 

USSOCOM (external actions). The chart below was developed to quickly depict those 

items and where the solutions lay (internal, external, or both). Several of these actions 

have occurred or are underway. This chart is an abstract of the final recommendations

complied at the January 2011 symposium. 

Recommendations Internal Actions External Actions

Selection

Establish a 

selection process 

for non-operator 

(enablers) 

personnel.

WHAT: Critical to the support of SOF are 

those non-SOF assets that contribute to 

success (logistics, Admin), there is a need 

to identify and retain that group of 

personnel with in SOCOM.

HOW: SOF leaders need to identify

personnel that SOCOM should retain in the 

community.

WHAT: There is a need with in 

the personnel systems to enable 

SOCOM to identify and retain 

non-SOF personnel without 

causing harm to their careers if 

they stay too long in SOCOM.

HOW: Provide the Services with a 

listing of critical non-SOF MOSs 

to determine a methodology how 

to share their services.

Target 

Recruitment efforts 

in ethnic 

neighborhoods 

and enclaves in 

the United States.

WHAT: SOCOM needs to anticipate future 

diversity needs from communities within 

the US as priority recruitment areas, as an 

example the 18L program.

HOW: Identify those countries where 

SOCOM sees the greatest future needs for 

engagement; determine the language 

requirements and where they can be found 

in the U.S.

WHAT: DOD recruiting needs to 

review incentives for diversity 

groups to encourage their 

enlistment into SOF MOSs. There 

is a need to look more like the 

foreign nations that we operate in.

HOW: Focus on incentives that 

appeal to people who are 

motivated to serve in areas where 

their language skills and cultural 

knowledge will benefit the nation

Build and maintain 

a SOF workforce 

that represents the 

rich diversity of the 

world

WHAT: In order to understand the 

complexity of the world, SOCOM needs a 

more diverse force that better appreciates 

the cultural environments it will operate in. 

Much like the OSS selecting 1st or 2nd

WHAT: DOD should continue to 

provide incentives for non-citizens 

and 1st or 2d generation to 

citizens to membership in the 

military and also in SOF 
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generation citizen, SOCOM needs to 

embrace these groups.

HOW: SOCOM identifies those areas in 

the world with a potential for crisis and 

identify those language and cultural skill 

necessary to engage in the solution.

organizations.

HOW: Coordinate with SOCOM 

on the language and cultural skills 

required to support SOF needs 

for Persistent Engagement 

activities.

Introducing a new 

law similar to the 

Lodge (Bill) Act to 

encourage recent 

immigrants 

seeking U.S. 

citizenship through 

military service.

WHAT: SOCOM continues to support 

MAVNI Program as a short-term method of 

increasing diversity. There should also be 

an examination of how rapidly gain 

clearance for these individuals.

HOW: Coordinate with the investigative 

services on ways to speed up the security 

clearance process.

WHAT: SOCOM, through DoD 

and SOLA, should suggest the 

enactment of a DREAM-like Act; it 

also suggests the need to 

enhance (funding) programs to 

have key personnel (18L/FAO) to 

study overseas to learn language 

and culture.

HOW: Increase the resourcing to 

the existing program and expand 

the numbers of personnel 

selected for those programs. It 

may require a review of personnel 

promotion systems to prevent 

these specialists from being 

harmed for being in the program.

USSOCOM J-1 

(Personnel) be 

granted authority 

to manage all 

personnel issues, 

including 

recruitment and 

selection for the 

entire force.

WHAT: SOCOM manage all SOCOM 

personnel activities (Service like 

responsibility); promotions, schooling, in

order to retain personnel; protect them in 

the promotion system and identify 

personnel for schooling (JSOFSEA); 

investigate whether there is a need for a 

SOF Command & Staff Course like CGSC.

HOW: Conduct a study how to best 

approach this issue and identify those 

areas that can quickly be implemented or 

reinforced (JSOFSEA) with a strategy of 

expanding gradually.

WHAT: DoD needs to formerly 

endorse the SOCOM personnel 

needs as different than the 

Services; JSOFSEA should be 

ratified by all the Services as the 

test case of this difference; 

support the investigation of post 

qualification education for SOF 

Warriors up to the 04/-5 level 

rather than meeting the 

requirements of the Services.

HOW: Coordinate with SOCOM 

personnel and educators to 

determine what and how shifting 

of some Service responsibilities 

can be moved to SOCOM and 

present to the Service Chiefs.

Use a complete 

battery of 

psychological and 

aptitude 

assessments to 

WHAT: The selection process has served 

the community well since the 1940’s; 

however, warfare continues to change. 

The selection criteria should continue to be 

evaluated to ensure the process meets the 

WHAT: Although, the SOF 

Service Components have some 

unique differences, there are 

some attributes that are common. 

SOF Components should seek 
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determine specific 

characteristics 

required for SOF.

SOF community’s needs.

HOW: Direct coordination between the 

SOF components to determine what needs 

to amended, added, or deleted to ensure 

the quality of SOF warriors remains high. 

(Some thought about adding a lie detector 

test.)

ways to synchronize the selection 

tests to determine what those 

characteristics are in order to 

have a clear picture of the SOF 

Warrior.

HOW: Request Service 

assistance in the screening of 

SOF candidates by conducting 

the testing with SOF test 

standards.

Organization

Conduct 

curriculum review 

of SOF education 

to determine 

relevance to the 

Core Activities and 

current operations.

WHAT: There is a need for a study of SOF 

Service Component Curriculum Review to 

determine if it is meeting the needs of the 

components and if there are common 

knowledge areas that can be standardized 

for all SOF Warriors (COIN is now a Core 

Activity again).

HOW: Direct the SOF Service 

Components to Conduct a Curriculum 

Review, coordinate the results to identify 

areas that common.

Consider On-thejob training 

approach to 

increase CA skills 

for selected areas 

(sewage treatment 

plant operations) 

similar to the 

concept employed 

by SF medics.

WHAT: The highly successful On-the-Job 

Training program for Special Forces 

Medics could serve as a model in the build 

up of Civil Affairs soldiers in those 

technical skills areas such as public works 

facilities (sewer and water) to provide them 

with increased technical knowledge.

HOW: Establish local intern-type 

agreements with municipal governments in 

proximity with Special Operations units 

(example-Fayetteville, NC). This will permit 

the deploying soldiers a first hand 

knowledge of systems that aren’t easily 

learned from books or on the site.

WHAT: Coordinate with DoD 

legal that SOCOM has the 

necessary authority to enter into 

agreements with local 

government to conduct intern 

training (OJT) for Special 

Operations Personnel.

HOW: Conduct a legal review.

Review OSS 

Morale Operations 

(MO) with the 

current MISO and 

CA structures to 

determine ways to 

increase team 

WHAT: The OSS used a variety of 

psychological warfare techniques in 

support of tactical OSS operations. SOF 

should review those OSS techniques to 

determine how they were used and 

determine if they are consistent with 

today’s authorities for MISO. 

What: Coordinate with 

ASD/SOLIC to determine if new 

authorities are required to 

conduct a wider variety of 

psychological operations to 

support current SOF operations. If 

necessary, then assist in the 
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integration from 

the planning to 

execution and 

synchronization 

with SF units on a 

regional 

orientation.

HOW: Review OSS files (after action 

reports) and compare them with current 

doctrine and policies to determine if the 

necessary authorities exist to conduct 

similar operations. May require some 

classified study.

development of those required 

authorities.

HOW: Review current authorities 

and modify them as required to 

ensure the maximum capability of 

the SOF forces.

Examine existing 

programs with 

OSS practices to 

bring native 

speakers into the 

program in order 

to employ their 

skills more quickly.

WHAT: Review the language skills for 

recruiting of the OSS to determine how 

they can be incorporated into existing 

selection programs. OSS practices also 

need to be reviewed in reference to the 

security classification levels that were 

necessary to perform their duties.

HOW: Compare the MAVNI and other 

culture/language based selection programs 

to how the OSS recruited for language and 

cultural skills. There should also be 

consideration given to what level of 

security classification levels are required to 

support SOF needs. There are different 

levels of security needs ranging from basic 

translation of unclassified documents to 

integration of High Value Targets (HVT).

WHAT: Seek ASD SOLIC, SOLA 

support in obtaining new 

authorities or new policies on 

recruiting uniquely language 

qualified personnel under MAVNI 

or other similar programs.

HOW: SOCOM provides 

information, studies or reports on 

language qualified personnel from 

priority regions or to support the 

SOCOM Persistent Engagement 

Program to support new 

authorities, policies or programs.

Review the OSS 

structure with 

current SOF 

organizations to 

determine what 

capabilities require 

updating.

WHAT: The OSS was a “purpose built” 

organization that focused on a small foot 

print. A comparison of the OSS and SOF 

structures would determine if SOF has the 

necessary capabilities to meet the current 

challenges. As an example, the OSS work 

on economic warfare is worthy of 

examination for SOCOM.

HOW: Conducted detailed examination of 

the branches of the OSS and compare 

them with today’s SOCOM organizations to 

determine what capabilities are missing 

and how to adapt them in the force.

Conduct a review 

of a SF concept of 

SAF (bolt-ons) 

structure to 

enhance the 

forward deployed 

SF battalions in 

order to increase 

WHAT: OSS was an organization of small 

elements and could be tailored for an 

operation. It assembled the necessary 

elements within the theater, because they 

were language and culturally capable to 

support each other quickly. They referred 

to this as “bolt-on.” SOCOM units have 

organizations that are regionally focused 
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capabilities and 

unit cohesion in 

regional 

operations.

and they can be tailored for missions. In 

the 1960-1970s, SF were organized in 

their forward deployed units as a structure 

called Special Action Force (SAF). 

HOW: Review the history and AAR from 

the 8th and 10th Special Forces Groups 

with their experiences with SAF elements. 

Review IATF plans 

to determine other 

ways to leverage 

economic tools 

(follow the money) 

by considering 

how the OSS 

employed their 

economic warfare 

organizations.

WHAT: OSS had a basic Interagency 

design with connections to STATE 

Department, JUSTICE (FBI) and 

TREASURY in the D.C. area and more 

limited connection at the operational level 

normally at the Theater level. The 

economic warfare approach of the OSS is 

an area to be further investigated by 

SOCOM beyond the current “follow the

money”.

HOW: Engage the SOCOM IATF to 

investigate what is currently being done 

and compare it with how the OSS 

conducted economic warfare. 

Resourcing

Accelerate SOF to 

Service common 

acquisitions to 

reduce duplicative 

acquisition costs 

and increase 

programmatic 

economies of 

scale.

WHAT: Investigate how to reduce the 

amount of duplication in the acquisition 

process in place today in SOF programs. 

The purpose of this study is to determine if 

SOCOM needs a more Service-like status 

for acquisition.

HOW: Investigate the current authorities, 

regulations and policy that govern SOCOM 

acquisition to determine where 

improvements can be made.

Concentrate SOF 

resources on 

select persistent 

engagement 

activities with the 

intent to better 

“Manage” the 

global 

environment.

WHAT: Persistent Engagement is a key 

program in managing the global 

environment and SOCOM needs to ensure 

that it’s resources to be flexibility in the use 

of those funds.

HOW: Review current funding authorities, 

policies, and directives that affect 

Persistent Engagement Activities to ensure 

efficiencies exist.
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Tailor DOD 

oversight; manage 

USSOCOM more 

as a Special 

Activity with 

appropriate funds 

vice a Service-like 

entity by reducing 

numbers of 

reviews, reports, 

and decision 

layers.

WHAT: Review all funding sources to 

determine the oversight requirements and 

the impact on the availability of funds and 

evaluate whether SOCOM needs more 

Service-like responsibilities.

HOW: Direct review of SOCOM funding to 

determine ways to reduce oversight or 

layers of decision making in order to seek 

relief from unnecessary bureaucracy.

Empower

USSOCOM to 

operate with 

funding similar to 

OSS’s unvouchered to 

reduce overhead 

and increase 

USSOCOM’s 

ability to meet 

urgent needs.

WHAT: Review funding reporting 

requirements to determine ways to reduce 

bureaucracy and improve ways to employ 

the funding operationally rather than 

reporting or accounting procedures.

HOW: Direct review of how the OSS was 

funded and how it accounted for the 

expenditures, then compare it to the 

requirements placed on SOCOM today for 

similar activities in order to seek ways to 

reduce the overhead.

WHAT: OSD, congressional and 

NCA approval required funding 

authorities and the oversight to 

determine how to streamline the 

number of oversights actions on 

that funding.

HOW: Review all oversights 

actions and compare them to 

determine how they can be 

streamlined to reduce amount 

time necessary for approvals and 

reporting.

Create a human 

capital plan to 

further develop 

and harness the 

regional, cultural, 

and linguistic 

expertise of our 

organic SOF 

operators and 

enablers.

WHAT: SOCOM needs to review its’ 

Human Capital Plan to determine how to 

maximize the resources available, SOF 

and non-SOF, DDD, and retired (SOF of 

Life).

HOW: Direct a review of the SOCOM 

Human Capital Plan to determine what 

deficiencies exist and where the plan can 

be improved. Examine how a concept of 

“SOF for Life” to determine how use retired 

SOF personnel on an as needed bases for 

regional crisis responses.

Authorities

Tailor DOD 

oversight; manage 

USSOCOM more 

WHAT: As a baseline, documentation in a 

consolidated format is required to illustrate 

the layers of bureaucracy in reporting 

WHAT: Majority of work will be to 

convince DOD and OSD chain of 

command to support.
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as a Special 

Activity with 

appropriate funds 

by reducing 

numbers of 

reviews, reports, 

and decision 

layers.

mechanisms and requirements for each 

SOF funding/authorities program.

USSOCOM policy branch has an excellent 

start with their authorities’ portal.

HOW: Each of the Funding Authorities 

should be reviewed and determine the 

overlap in reporting and make 

recommendations on where they can be 

streamlined.

Congressional approval will be 

required to reduce the amount of 

bureaucracy involved in the 

Special Activities funding.

HOW: Present findings from 

SOCOM studies on oversights 

burdens and layers of 

bureaucracy that don’t contribute 

to regional solutions to seek 

relieve from those requirements.

Refocus and 

enhance 

1206/1207/1208 

Authorities to 

support partner 

nations.

WHAT: Currently the funding authorities 

are a compromise between DoS and DoD, 

but there needs to be better 

synchronization of the funding.

HOW: The funding lines need to be 

analyzed to simplify their use and reporting 

procedures.

WHAT: Congressional and 

interagency coordination and 

approval required to simplify the 

use and reporting of these funds 

by SOF personnel.

HOW: Conduct review of the 

funding lines and determine 

where they can be simplified and 

be more flexible in their use by 

SOF personnel.

Empower 

USSOCOM to 

operate with 

funding similar to 

OSS’s 

unvouchered 

funds in order to 

reduce overhead 

and increase 

ability to meet 

urgent needs.

Refine roles and 

responsibilities in 

synchronizing 

global operations 

and develop Joint 

SOF Doctrine to 

support.

WHAT: Provide SOCOM with the 

necessary authority to control the 

operational funding in a more flexible 

manner and reduce the amount of 

oversight on those funds without the loss 

of accountability of those funds. 

HOW: Review the OSS funding and 

accountability systems to determine how to 

utilize that flexibility for SOCOM. The 

amount of oversight and accountability for 

SOCOM consumes large amount of time 

and duplication of effort which should be 

reduced while preserving fidelity of the 

funding accountability.

WHAT: OSD, congressional and 

NCA approval required funding 

authorities and the oversight to 

determine how to streamline the 

number of oversights actions on 

that funding.

HOW: Review all oversights 

actions and compare them to 

determine how they can be 

streamlined to reduce amount 

time necessary for approvals and 

reporting.

Increase 

authorities and 

roles in 

intelligence 

operations

WHAT: Review current intelligence 

authorities and determine what new 

authorities are needed.

HOW: Requires classified discussion.

WHAT: OSD, congressional and 

interagency coordination and 

approval required for new 

Intelligence Authorities.

HOW: Review findings from both 

unclassified and classified studies 
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to determine deficiencies and 

propose

Refine roles and 

responsibilities in 

synchronizing 

global operations 

and develop Joint 

SOF Doctrine to 

support.

Current Joint SOF Doctrine JP 3-05 (dated 

1998, and revised in 2003) is outdated and 

requires a rewrite

Coordination with services and 

DOD required.
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Annex B: Innovation Workshop

This annex is a synopsis of the JSOU After-Action-Report for the 16 November 2010 

OSS Innovation Workshop directed by Admiral Olson. This annex places into context the 

scope of work the USSOCOM study members were tasked to complete. It also highlights 

the compressed timeline that followed this workshop which culminated with the

symposium held in early January 2011.

DISCUSSION:

a. USSOCOM Commander, Admiral Eric T. Olson, commissioned a series of four 

Innovation Workshops to encourage creative and imaginative thinking on the part of the 

USSOCOM J-code staff. This Workshop, third in the series, focused on the Office of 

Strategic Services (OSS) and was intended to spark the participants‘ imagination and 

interest in determining which OSS practices and procedures might serve as a model to 

apply in the future of SOF. Workshop participants will contribute to a follow-up study to 

examine the OSS experience and potential applications. The study will concentrate on 

four topics: Selection Process, Organization, Resourcing, and Authorities. Outcomes 

from this total effort will influence the commander‘s testimony, as well as USSOCOM 

doctrine, and policy recommendations. The study will conclude with a seminar on 11-12 

January 2011, MacDill AFB, to validate and prioritize recommendations to be presented 

to Admiral Olson. 

b. The Workshop included presentations by Admiral Olson and Dr. Nancy Collins, 

Columbia University, and a series of discussion topics. The blending of the presentations 

and discussions resulted in the desired outcome for the study.

c. Observations:

1) Admiral Olson addressed three key points in his welcome: 

a) He used the ―warrior-diplomats‖ concept (3D warrior) to move into his 

main point: a discussion of the SOF worldwide footprint. He showed a series of nightly 

world maps that demonstrated through the use of lights to indicate where SOF is and 

needs to be. However, he stated we are not prepared to be in those countries that are in 

the dark. The Admiral said SOF will be successful by engaging with small teams who can 

operate with the wits and have the authority to do so.

b) He charged the group to ―be imaginative and get outside your 

organizational cocoons and be creative...‖ He strongly suggested that this effort at 

―initiative of thought‖ could influence the future of USSOCOM.

c) His last point referred to how USSOCOM should be viewed. The Admiral 

reminded the assembly that Dr. Dave Kilcullen, an Australian SOF expert, believes 

USSOCOM should have been named ―Strategic‖ and not ―Special‖. This simple name 

change reflects a difference between levels of employment of the forces. He referenced a 

War College paper written by LTG (ret) Jerry Boykin that also called for the name to be 

Strategic Services Command. Admiral Olson believes SOF are and should be strategic 

assets.

2) Dr. Maher introduced the Workshop and described the project scope which 

includes this workshop, an attendant study, a concluding seminar, and a report with 

recommendations to the Commander. The Workshop marked the beginning of the study 
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effort that will conclude with a seminar 11-12 January 2011. The study will focus on four 

topics: Selection Process, Organization, Resourcing, and Enabling Authorities. The 

seminar will feature the final validation and priority ranking of the study 

recommendations which have the potential to influence the future of SOF.

3) JSOU Senior Fellow, Mr. Jeff Nelson, set the conditions for approaching the 

study with a review of some elements of critical thinking, a discussion of hindrances to 

critical thinking, and examples were given to illustrate how they can affect operational 

decisions. To further emphasize these points, Mr. Nelson offered a set of operational 

terms to show linkage and to stimulate thinking about what the USSOCOM J-code staff 

knows and doesn‘t know about operational terms and terminology.

4) Dr. Nancy Walbridge Collins, professor of contemporary history at Columbia 

University, was the keynote speaker for the Workshop. She analyzed the OSS model and 

its potential applicability for USSOCOM.

a) Dr. Collins outlined some of the historical links between OSS and 

USSOCOM, tracing the ways in which OSS may be considered a precursor organization 

to USSOCOM, and how this earlier model could be utilized as a historical force to propel 

future changes. 

b) She delineated some of the challenges/obstacles that could arise from 

these efforts, especially noting well-established and direct linkages between the OSS 

model and CIA history, which have created parallel narratives and ripple effects on the 

SOF story. 

c) Dr. Collins provided a brief outline of OSS 

origins/development/dissolution and emphasized characteristics of OSS that could serve 

as sparks for workshop dialogue:

i. OSS was established as a strategic operation, fusing operations and 

intelligence at all levels, in a highly adaptive and creative environment

ii. Afforded exceptional authorities, which ensured wide latitude and 

maximum flexibility

iii. Operated with both centralized and decentralized activities, led by a 

charismatic leader who established high standards and then expected deputies/ operatives/ 

analysts to take on great individual responsibility for decision-making

iv. Emphasized a culture of experts, with focus on specific/detailed 

context knowledge 

v. Recruited individuals for what they already knew; there was little time 

for training; focused on industry civilians who brought in elite networks and refugees, 

émigrés, and immigrants who offered in-depth cultural awareness and native language 

capabilities

vi. Operated with small footprints, without bells and whistles, and called on 

individuals who had considerable appetite for calculated risks and sophisticated cognitive 

skill

vii. Focused on integrating capabilities, in response to emergency 

conditions rather than creating new functions

d) Dr. Collins then addressed the potential problem of OSS nostalgia, to avoid 

any suggestion that there was a SOF utopia in the past. She highlighted a few OSS 

challenges during WWII, notably:
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i. Intense rivalry between OSS and other defense/intelligence agencies 

over resources, authorities, and manpower

ii. Lack of inherited/existing infrastructure for their work, which resulted 

in some spectacular operational failures

iii. Inability to institutionalize authorities and structures before the death 

of President Roosevelt in 1945

e) And to underscore some of the challenges in the applicability of the model today, 

Dr. Collins noted a few of the key environmental differences:

i. The total war environment of WWII, with national mobilization, drafts, and 

domestic near-unanimity and contributions

ii. Nearly everything was innovative/new: no barnacles to scrape/ship had not 

yet been built; bureaucracy was not yet formed, much less entrenched

iii. Exceptionally close civil-military relations, including deep and 

knowledgeable support of OSS by key Washington policymakers 

f) In conclusion, Dr. Collins posed two questions about the potential applicability of 

the OSS Model:

i. Could it serve as a potential heritage touchstone; inspiration for today‘s 

SOF warrior, by promoting focus on understanding and the values of finesse, focus, 

persistence, flexibility, creativity, leadership and wisdom?

ii. Could it serve as a means to enhance USSOCOM‘s mission as a strategic 

services command?

5) The Workshop discussion focused on three discussion topics on the areas of 

Understanding, Small Footprint, and Authorities.

a) Understanding: This topic provided for an initial free flow of ideas 

between the participants and featured a Question and Answer exchange with Dr. Collins. 

Some key discussion ideas were:

i. Influence and action are part of the strategic end states. These are 

shaping ideas that are better ways to do things.

ii. OSS may be a good business practice to be examined, but the military 

is good at creating legends and we need to be careful of not falling into the trap of blindly 

following the ―mythology of the OSS.‖

iii. Question of how to leverage patriotic civilians to engage in military 

operations and understand what authorities are available to engage them.

iv. The battlefield landscape is changing from rural to urban to electronic. 

We need to understand how to prepare our ―snake-eaters‖ for this new environment.

v. There is a need to understand space and cyber space environments.

vi. Understanding current authorities and forecast new authority 

requirements. One comment from the participants was ―keep me at the LOR level‖ as far 

as advice from legal counselors.

b) Small Footprint: 

i. USSOCOM headquarters is not prepared to be flexible in organization 

or equipment. 

ii. OSS Command and Control was one of maximum flexibility. The 

farther from the HQ, the more flexibility the mission had. Innovation and creativity were 

the hallmarks for success.

iii. The status of SOF for Life was discussed and questioned.
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iv. OSS learned that they needed to be there (in the area of operations) 

earlier in their operations. It takes time to build relationships and to execute operations.

v. SF is learning that 12 may not be the correct number (for a team) and 

augmentation may be required.

vi. Individual career-track requirements hurt SOF continuity.

c) Authorities: 

i. ADM Olson did not want to use Afghanistan as a model for review.

ii. A new mindset must be ―how to do this‖ not one of ―it can‘t be done.‖

iii. There is a need for layered authorities to support the mission.

iv. There is need for authority for teams to manage operational funds, like 

the OSS was able to do.

v. Department of State has some authority to hire under Title 5 US Code, 

Section 3161 to hire select experts for one year terms of service; the Admiral was 

interested to learn more about this authority.

vi. More needs to be done with authorities to understand what needs to be 

changed.

CONCLUSION:

a. ADM Olson closed the workshop and provided some final thoughts:

1) The 9-11 Commission had only one recommendation that was not 

implemented. The recommendation had to do with USSOCOM becoming the lead 

organization for paramilitary operations for the U.S. government. (CIA currently is the 

lead organization.) 

2) Since 9-11, we still need to practice ―Shoot, move and communicate.‖ We are 

better at shooting, mobility is improved, and our communication capability is 

tremendous. However, we need to add, ―Understand‖ to this fundamental expression of 

skills. We need to be prepared for the ―lights out‖ portions of the map.

3) In his last comment he noted that we spent huge energy on the bad guys but 

we need to spend more energy on knowing who the good guys are.

b. JSOU will collect detailed notes and circulate to USSOCOM Components and 

other stakeholders to prepare a study and recommendations for the 11-12 January 2011 

seminar at MacDill AFB.
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Annex C: OSS Innovation Workshop and OSS Study 

Participants

CDR Janet Lomax USSOCOM J1

Jennifer Nevius USSOCOM J1

Nick Pultorak USSOCOM J2 CIO

Wade Clare USSOCOM J3X

Brian Sweeney USSOCOM J39

Leonardo Yuque USSOCOM J51

Bob Berry USSOCOM J51

John Bone USSOCOM J53

Steven Kline USSOCOM J55

Chris McNulty USSOCOM J7/9

Robert Hyde USSOCOM J7/9

LTC Eric Shwedo USSOCOM J7/9

Mark Truluck USSOCOM J7/9

Rick Lamb USSOCOM IATF

Chris O‘Connor USSOCOM IATF/DOS

Aaron Thompson USSOCOM IATF/FBI

Jim Ladd USSOCOM IATF

Camilo Guerro JMISC-RF

Jamie Charlton USSOCOM JMISC

CAPT Charles Lockett USSOCOM

MAJ Lewis Powers CENTCOM J33

COL Louie M. Banks, III USASOC

Lt Col Steven Gregg ACC

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Annex D: Recommended OSS Reading List

This list serves as basic guide for literature and recommending readings that are relevant to the 

historical study of the OSS and its impact on the intelligence community, the Central Intelligence 

Agency, and Special Operations Forces. 

Robert Hayden Alcorn, No Bugles for Spies: Tales of the OSS (New York: D. McKay Co., 

1962).

Richard Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of 

Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage (New York: 

Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946).

Christopher M. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American 

Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995).

Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio, 

1986).

Colin Beavan, Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War (New York: 

Viking, 2006).

Howard Blue, Words at War: World War II Era Radio Drama and the Postwar Broadcasting 

Industry Blacklist (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2002).

Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982).

Anthony Cave Brown, The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkeley Pub. Corp, 

1976).

David K. E. Bruce, edited by Nelson D. Lankford, OSS Against the Reich (Kent, OH: Kent 

State University Press, 1991).

John W. Brunner, OSS Weapons (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 1994).

Roger Burlingame, Don't Let Them Scare You: The Life and Times of Elmer Davis (Philadelphia: 

Lippincott, 1961).

William J. Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway: 1988).

George C. Chalou, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II 

(Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992).

Ray S. Cline, The CIA: Reality vs. Myth (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1982).

William Egan Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon 

and Schuster, 1978).

Max Corvo, The O.S.S. In Italy, 1942-1945: A Personal Memoir (New York: Praeger, 1990).
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Richard W. Cutler, I Came, I Saw, I Wrote: A Risk-Takers Life in Law, Espionage, Community 

Service, Start-Ups and Writing (Milwaukee, WI: Richard W. Cutler, 2010).

Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 

(United States: Historical Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, 1989).

Helias Doundoulakis, I Was Trained to Be a Spy: A True Life Story (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2008).

Allen Welsh Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

Allen Welsh Dulles, The Secret Surrender (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

Allen Welsh Dulles, with Neal H. Petersen, From Hitler's Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence 

Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 

Press, 1996).

Richard Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines, with the OSS in Burma (Chicago: Rand McNally, 

1979).

Richard Dunlop, Donovan, America's Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982).

Captain Charles Fenn, At the Dragon's Gate: With the OSS in the Far East (Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 2004).

David J. Ferrier, ONI and OSS in World War II (Washington, DC: Navy & Marine Corps WWII 

Commemorative Committee, Navy Office of Information, 1995).

Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

Kirk Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943-1945 (College Station: Texas A & M 

University Press, 1992).

James L. Gilbert and John Patrick Finnegan, U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A 

Documentary History (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 

1993).

Roger Hall, You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957).

Jürgen Heideking, Christof Mauch, and Marc Frey, American Intelligence and the German 

Resistance to Hitler: A Documentary History (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996).

F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, R. C. Knight, C.A.G. Simkins, and Michael 

Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1979).

Maurice Isserman, Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party During the 

Second World War (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982).

Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human 

Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-45 (St. Martin's Press, 1999).

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence (New 
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Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

Gary Kamiya, Shadow Knights: The Secret War Against Hitler (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2010).

I. L. Kandel, The Impact of the War Upon American Education (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North 

Carolina Press, 1949).

Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 

1942-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

Louis E. Keefer, Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in 

World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1988).

Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. 

Press, 1949).

Marcia Christoff Kurapovna, Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the 

Rivalries That Doomed WWII Yugoslavia (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010).

William L. Langer, In and Out of the Ivory Tower (New York: N. Watson Academic 

Publications, 1977).

Nelson D. Lankford, The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of David K.E. Bruce, 1898-

1977 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996).

Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany 

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996).

William M. Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency, History and Documents (University, AL: 

University of Alabama Press, 1984).

Wilmarth S. Lewis, One Man's Education (New York: Knopf, 1967).

Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime 

Yugoslavia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

Eugene Liptak, Office of Strategic Services, 1942-45: The World War II Origins of the CIA 

(Oxford: New York, 2009).

Elizabeth P. McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS (Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 1998).

H. Keith Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment: Spy Devices of W.W. II (New York: 

Sterling, 1991).

Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, 

October 1950-February 1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 

1992).

J. Robert Moskin, Mr. Truman's War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the 
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Postwar World (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002).

Wayne Nelson, A Spy's Diary of World War II: Inside the OSS with an American Agent in 

Europe (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009).

Patrick K. O'Donnell, Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and 

Women of World War II’s OSS Free Press, 2004).

Patrick K. O'Donnell, The Brenner Assignment: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Spy 

Mission of World War II (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2008).

G. J. A. O'Toole, Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert 

Action from the American Revolution to the CIA (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 

1991).

Wyman H. Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of Naval 

Intelligence: Naval Historical Center, 1996).

Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret 

Agents During World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979).

Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York, N.Y: Viking, 1990).

Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: 

Random House, 2001).

Daniel C. Pinck, Geoffrey M.T. Jones, and Charles T. Pinck, Stalking the History of the Office of 

Strategic Services: An OSS Bibliography (Boston, MA: OSS, Donovan Press, 2000).

John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1986).

Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security, The Intelligence Establishment 

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive 

Co-Operation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the 

Second World War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001).

Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA (New York: A.A. Knopf, 

1994).

Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) (New York: Walker, 

1976).

Barry M. Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign 

Policy (New York: Oxford, 1985).

David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
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1943-1947 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Life in the Twentieth Century: Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950 

(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2000).

David F. Schmitz, Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly 

Resources, 2000).

Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic 

Books, 1983).

Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi, Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender (New York, NY: 

Basic Books, 1979).

R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency 

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

Phyllis L. Soybel, A Necessary Relationship: The Development of Anglo-American Cooperation 

in Naval Intelligence (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2005).

Donald Paul Steury, The Intelligence War (New York: Metro Books, 2000).

Phil Swearngin, Secret Heroes (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace, 2009).

Marianna Torgovnick, The War Complex: World War II in Our Time (Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 2005).

Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central 

Intelligence Agency (Frederick, Md.: Aletheia Books, 1981).

Thomas F. Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA (New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the 

Intelligence Establishment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996).

Douglas C. Waller, Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Free Press, 2010).

Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency 

(Washington, DC: Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, 2002).

Robin W. Winks, Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961 (New York: Morrow, 

1987).

Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).