AFGHANISTAN

State and USAID 

Should Evaluate 

Actions Taken to 

Mitigate Effects of 

Attrition among Local 

Staff

Accessible Version

Report to the Honorable 

Robert Menendez, U.S. Senate

December 2015

GAO-16-100

United States Government Accountability Office

Following the withdrawal of US and coalition 

forces from Afghanistan, in August 2021 the 

State Department requested that GAO 

temporarily remove and review reports on 

Afghanistan to protect the safety of individuals 

associated with US assistance or programs. 

As a result of that review, GAO decided to 

redact some information from this report.
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-100, a report to the 

Honorable Robert Menendez, U.S. Senate

December 2015

AFGHANISTAN

State and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken to 

Mitigate Effects of Attrition among Local Staff 

Why GAO Did This Study

Congress established an SIV 

program in 2009 for Afghan nationals 

with at least 1 year of U.S. 

government service, given the risk 

these employees face. Local staff at 

the U.S. diplomatic mission in 

Afghanistan are key to implementing 

U.S. policies and programs because 

of their institutional knowledge, 

language skills, and local 

relationships. A high rate of Afghan 

staff resigning after receiving an SIV 

could diminish the U.S. government's 

capacity to carry out its mission. 

GAO was asked to review State’s 

and USAID’s efforts to mitigate the 

loss of Afghan staff. 

GAO evaluated (1) SIV-related 

resignations, including how, if at all, 

State’s and USAID’s workforces in 

Afghanistan have been affected in 

recent years; (2) the actions, if any, 

State and USAID have taken to 

mitigate any effects related to 

attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV 

recipients; and (3) the extent to 

which State and USAID have 

evaluated mitigating actions related 

to the attrition of Afghan local staff, 

including SIV recipients. GAO 

analyzed data from 2010 to 2015, 

reviewed documents regarding the 

Afghan workforce, and interviewed 

State and USAID officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State and 

USAID evaluate actions intended to 

mitigate the effects of Afghan local 

staff resignations. State and USAID 

agreed with the recommendations.

What GAO Found

Resignations of Afghan local staff at the Department of State (State) and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) after receiving a special 

immigrant visa (SIV) reached their highest level in 2014, and have had varied 

effects on the agencies’ institutional knowledge (fig.). Resignations increased as 

more Afghan staff began the SIV application process than in the initial years of 

the program, and as State addressed delays that had previously slowed visa 

issuances. Afghan staff resignations are likely to be lower in 2015 than in 

previous years based on the number of current staff that have initiated the SIV 

process. Based on GAO’s assessment of changes to average tenure and grade 

level of Afghan staff from 2010 until June 2015, and insights from agency 

officials, the effects of SIV-related resignations on State’s and USAID’s 

institutional knowledge is varied. For example, average tenure among both 

agencies’ Afghan workforces decreased slightly. In addition, embassy officials 

said that local staff attrition may affect some program coordination with the 

Afghan government. Nonetheless, despite this attrition, agency officials reported 

that they were successful in identifying qualified replacements to fill positions. 

SIV-Related Resignations in Afghanistan, Department of State and USAID

aData are reported as of June 2015 for the Department of State and August 2015 for USAID.

Agencies have taken a number of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff 

attrition, including SIV-related resignations. For example, State and USAID 

temporarily transfer experienced local staff from other diplomatic missions to 

Afghanistan, and the agencies sometimes fill one position with two employees in 

anticipation of an SIV-related resignation. In addition, the agencies provide 

additional administrative support from Washington, D.C., beyond what is 

generally provided to other U.S. missions, and send U.S. personnel to 

Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by attrition.

State and USAID officials said that these agencies have not evaluated actions 

taken to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition. Officials said agencies have 

not conducted such assessments because of resource constraints and the 

reactive nature of operations in such an unpredictable environment. Key 

principles of human capital management that GAO identified call for agencies to 

evaluate the contribution that such activities make toward achieving 

programmatic goals, including those related to the workforce. Without these 

assessments, it will be difficult for agencies to have information to determine the 

costs and benefits of actions taken and handle workforce-related needs in 

challenging environments in the future. View GAO-16-100. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Courts, (202) 512-8980 or 

courtsm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Contents

Why GAO Did This Study 2

What GAO Recommends 2

What GAO Found 2

Acc 1

Background 2

SIV-Related Resignations in Afghanistan Are Likely to Fall from 

2014 Levels, and Have Had Varied Effects on State’s and 

USAID’s Institutional Knowledge 8

Agencies Have Taken Steps to Mitigate Attrition among Afghan 

Local Staff, Including SIV-Related Resignations 15

Officials Said Agencies Have Not Evaluated Efforts to Mitigate 

Effects of Afghan Staff Attrition 20

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 22

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 25

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 29

Text of Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 32

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 34

Text of Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development 36

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38

Table

Table 1: Total Number of Afghan Staff and Average Tenure, 

Department of State (State) and USAID 13

Figures

SIV-Related Resignations in Afghanistan, Department of State 

and USAID 2

Figure 1: Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Process for Afghan 

Nationals and Average Processing Times 5

Figure 2: An Afghan Employee at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul 7
Page ii GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Figure 3: Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)-Related Resignations in 

Afghanistan, Department of State (State) and USAID, 

2010 to 2015 9

Figure 4: Employment Certification Letters and Total Special 

Immigrant Visa (SIV)-Related Resignations, Department 

of State (State) and USAID, 2010 to 2015 11

Abbreviations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SIV special immigrant visa

State Department of State

TCN third country national

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 3, 2015

The Honorable Robert Menendez

United States Senate

Dear Senator Menendez:

Local employees working for U.S. diplomatic missions overseas have 

long been eligible to apply for a special immigrant visa (SIV) to the United 

States if they have at least 15 years of faithful service to the U.S. 

government and meet other requirements.1In 2009, Congress 

established a special immigrant visa program for Afghan nationals with at 

least 1 year of service, because of the significant risk these employees 

face working for the U.S. government. Afghan local staff at the U.S. 

diplomatic mission in Afghanistan are key to implementing U.S. policies 

and programs because of their institutional knowledge, language skills, 

local relationships, and cultural understanding. At the same time, a high 

number of Afghan staff resigning after receiving SIVs could diminish the 

U.S. government’s capacity to carry out its mission, especially because of 

short tours of duty by Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) American personnel in Afghanistan.

You asked us to assess State’s and USAID’s efforts to mitigate the loss of 

Afghan staff.2

In this report, we evaluated (1) SIV-related resignations, 

including how, if at all, State’s and USAID’s workforces in Afghanistan 

have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any, State and 

USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to the attrition of Afghan 

staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State and 

USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of Afghan 

staff, including SIV recipients.

Our review focused on State and USAID Afghan staff working in 

Afghanistan. To assess SIV-related resignations and any effects on 

agencies’ workforces, we analyzed data on the Afghan workforce for each 

 

18 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(D). 

2GAO’s work was undertaken in response to the December 2014 request from Senator 

Menendez, then Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

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Page 2 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

calendar year from 2010 through 2014, and for January to August 1, 

2015. Specifically, we analyzed information on overall attrition among 

Afghan staff, SIV-related resignations, tenure, and grade levels. We 

analyzed data and interviewed knowledgeable officials to assess data 

reliability, and determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. To assess actions agencies have taken to mitigate any effects 

related to Afghan staff attrition, and agencies’ efforts to evaluate those 

actions, we reviewed documents that included agency workforce plans, 

staffing analyses, and descriptions of proposed or implemented actions 

for addressing attrition among local staff. We also reviewed criteria for 

key principles in strategic human capital management, and compared 

agencies’ efforts against these key principles.3 For all objectives, we 

interviewed State and USAID officials working in Washington, D.C., and 

U.S. officials working in Afghanistan. See appendix I for more information 

about our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to December 

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

Special Immigrant Visa Program for Afghan Nationals

All local staff who work for U.S. diplomatic missions overseas are eligible 

to apply for an SIV that allows them to immigrate to the United States, 

provided they meet certain conditions, such as having 15 years of 

employment with the U.S. government abroad.4 Congress has enacted a 

series of laws since 2006 to enable certain Afghan nationals who have 

 

3GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning,

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003). 

4The special immigrant category includes numerous classifications, including the special 

programs for Iraqi and Afghan nationals, and for 15-year employees or former employees 

of the U.S. government abroad. 
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Page 3 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

worked as translators or interpreters for the U.S. government in 

Afghanistan to be eligible for SIVs. In 2009, Congress authorized Afghan 

employees of the U.S. government in Afghanistan who meet certain 

criteria to be eligible for SIVs.

The first of these SIV programs is permanent and provides SIVs to 

eligible Afghans who have worked directly with the U.S. armed forces or 

under chief of mission authority for at least 1 year as translators or

interpreters.5 A maximum of 50 SIVs are currently granted annually for 

principal applicants, excluding their dependents, under this program.6 The 

second program is temporary and was created through Section 602(b) of 

the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 and provides SIVs to eligible 

Afghans who worked for at least 1 year in Afghanistan for the U.S. 

government, or for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 

who provided “faithful and valuable service” to the U.S. government or 

ISAF that has been documented by a supervisor, and who have 

experienced or are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a 

consequence of employment by the U.S. government.7 As the 

Congressional Research Service has reported, the program initially 

authorized no more than 1,500 principal applicants to be granted special 

immigrant status annually for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013, 

with a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from 1 fiscal year 

to the next. Congress subsequently amended the program to authorize up 

to 3,000 principal applicants for fiscal year 2014 with an additional 1,000 

through the end of calendar year 2014, and up to 7,000 for fiscal years 

2015, 2016, and 2017.

8

If the numerical limitation is not reached in a fiscal 

year, the balance of principal applicants who may be provided special 

 

5

“Chief of mission” refers to the principal officer in charge of a U.S. diplomatic mission, 

generally the U.S. ambassador to a foreign country, who has full responsibility for the 

direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government executive branch 

employees in that country, with some exceptions. 

6

If the numerical limitation is not reached in a given fiscal year, the numerical limitation for 

the following year is increased to allow for the difference. Principal applicants may also 

include their dependents in their SIV applications. Visas issued to dependents of principal 

applicants do not count against the total number of authorized SIVs. 

7Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Div. F, Title VI, § 602(b), Mar. 

11, 2009; codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note. The recently passed National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 changed the requirement to 2 years of employment 

for applicants who submit a petition after September 30, 2015. 

88 U.S.C. § 1101 note; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1356, 

114th Cong., § 1216 (2015). 
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Page 4 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

immigrant status carries over to the following fiscal year. Principal 

applicants must apply to the chief of mission for special immigrant status 

by December 31, 2016, and the authority to issue visas under this 

program is scheduled to terminate on the date that such visas are 

exhausted. 

Numbers of Afghan SIV Recipients

Though this report focuses on Afghan SIV recipients who were employed 

by State or USAID, Afghan nationals eligible for SIVs include current or 

former employees of the Department of Defense, other U.S. government 

agencies, and U.S.-funded contractors or implementing partners. More 

than 70 percent of SIV recipients have worked as translators, mostly for 

the U.S. military in Afghanistan. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012, 73 

SIVs were issued to principal Afghan applicants.9

Issuances of SIVs 

began accelerating in 2013, with 652 visas issued to principal applicants, 

and the annual total of SIVs issued to principal Afghan applicants rose to 

3,441 in 2014. As of August 28, 2015, 2,372 principal applicants had 

applications pending in the initial stage of the SIV application process. 

Applications for 2,873 principal applicants were undergoing administrative 

processing, which is one of the final steps in the process. See figure 1 for 

more information on the various steps in the SIV issuance process.

 

9The data include individuals classified as special immigrants who adjusted to legal 

permanent resident status in the United States. Data reflect visas issued under the 

program for employees of the U.S. government, but do not include visas issued under the 

program for translators or interpreters. State reported all data on SIV issuances. 
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Page 5 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Figure 1: Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Process for Afghan Nationals and Average Processing Times

Note: Average processing times shown here are as of July 2015, and are relevant for Afghan 

nationals applying in Kabul for the SIV program. These averages assume all required SIV application 

documents are present and do not include stages of the process that are applicant controlled. 

Therefore, actual overall processing times are likely to be greater than what is shown here.
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Page 6 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

State and USAID Presence in Afghanistan

State and USAID rely on local staff to assist in accomplishing U.S. 

diplomatic objectives and in implementing and monitoring U.S. assistance 

programs in Afghanistan (see fig. 2). According to officials from State and 

USAID, staffing conditions in Afghanistan include the frequent turnover 

among American staff, who generally serve 1-year tours there and, as a 

result, may have limited institutional knowledge about their roles. 

Furthermore, the security situation in Afghanistan is dangerous and 

unpredictable, a fact that creates challenges for the international 

community and Afghan government to implement programs throughout 

the country. For example, in June 2015, we found that local staff (1) 

provide programmatic continuity, local knowledge, and language ability at 

posts where American officers may have short or interrupted tours of 

duty, and (2) often provide security and programmatic support in locations 

where American officials cannot safely or easily travel.10 As of April 2015, 

the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan had 882 positions occupied by 

Afghan staff and 502 positions occupied by direct hire American 

personnel. Of that total, State and USAID combined had 869 positions 

occupied by Afghan staff and 471 by Americans.

 

10GAO, Combating Terrorism: Steps Taken to Mitigate Threats to Locally Hired Staff, but 

State Department Could Improve Reporting on Terrorist Threats, GAO-15-458SU

(Washington, D.C.: June 2015).
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Figure 2: An Afghan Employee at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
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Page 8 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

SIV-Related Resignations in Afghanistan Are 

Likely to Fall from 2014 Levels, and Have Had 

Varied Effects on State’s and USAID’s 

Institutional Knowledge

From 2010 to 2015, a total of 378 Afghan local staff resigned from their 

positions at State and USAID in Afghanistan after receiving SIVs (see fig. 

3).11 State and USAID had a high of 243 SIV-related resignations in 2014, 

but the number of resignations will likely be lower in 2015 than in 2014, 

based on both the number of such resignations as of August 2015 and 

the number of Afghan staff who have currently completed an initial step in 

the SIV application process. Furthermore, resignations have had varied 

effects on institutional knowledge at State and USAID. Average tenure 

among both agencies’ Afghan workforces decreased slightly. In addition, 

embassy officials said that local staff attrition has affected some program 

coordination with the Afghan government. Nonetheless, officials reported 

that recruiting qualified applicants to replace those local staff has not 

posed a problem.

 

11SIV-related resignations are based on data State and USAID provided regarding Afghan 

staff who departed their positions after receiving an SIV. Data are reported as of June 

2015 for State and August 2015 for USAID.
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Page 9 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Figure 3: Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)-Related Resignations in Afghanistan, 

Department of State (State) and USAID, 2010 to 2015

aData are reported as of June 2015 for State and August 2015 for USAID. Dashed lines in the figure 

represent partial year data for 2015.

Few State and No USAID Afghan Staff Resigned from 

2010 through 2012 after Receiving an SIV

From 2010 through 2012, 6 State and no USAID Afghan staff resigned 

after receiving an SIV. Prior to 2012, State and USAID issued relatively 

few employment certification letters, which verify Afghan staff eligibility for 

the SIV program. The employment certification letter is the first step in the 

SIV application process; therefore the number of Afghan local staff 

receiving SIVs will likely be smaller than the number of these letters 
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Page 10 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

provided.12 State and USAID issued 6 letters in 2010 and 37 in 2011. 

Additionally, agency officials have noted that SIV processing was 

relatively slow during the early years of the program. State officials 

acknowledged that, prior to 2013, as a result of delays in administrative 

processing, relatively few SIVs were issued.

SIV-Related Resignations Reached Their Highest Level in 

2014

In 2013, the number of SIV-related resignations began to increase 

substantially and reached its highest level in 2014. A total of 81 State and 

USAID Afghan local staff resigned after receiving SIVs in 2013, and 243 

in 2014. In 2013 and 2014, State reported that SIV-related resignations 

became the single largest cause of attrition among all Afghan local staff 

employed at the Kabul embassy. From 2010 to 2012, security clearance 

revocation had been the primary cause of attrition among Afghan staff. 

The following factors may help explain the increase in SIV-related 

resignations in 2013 and 2014.

· In December 2013, changes to the law authorizing SIVs for Afghan 

nationals altered eligibility requirements for the SIV program. 

Previously, Afghan local staff who had experienced or were 

experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of their 

U.S. government employment qualified for the visa. While this 

standard still applies, the 2013 amendment to the law allowed credible 

sworn statements depicting dangerous country conditions to be a 

factor in determining the threat to local staff. According to State 

officials, this enabled all Afghans who met U.S. government 

employment requirements to be considered eligible. State officials 

noted that this change allowed the broad threat environment to be 

used to consider individual cases, alleviating the need for applicants 

to demonstrate any specific threat incident to determine eligibility. 

State officials said that these changes helped speed up SIV 

processing.

 

12The number of staff who receive SIVs will likely be smaller than the number of 

certification letters issued because not all letters may be used for SIV applications, and 

not all applicants ultimately receive or utilize their visas. Furthermore, one State official 

indicated the rejection rate for SIV applications may be over 20 percent.
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· In fiscal year 2013, State dedicated additional resources to help 

process SIVs at the Kabul embassy, including creating a position for a 

U.S. direct hire at post to help administer and address accumulated 

backlogs in the initial approval stage of the process, and four 

additional staff positions.

· The number of employment certification letters issued to Afghan staff 

increased after 2011. In 2012, State and USAID issued 303 letters 

(see fig. 4). Given, in part, visa-processing times, this increase in 

employment certification letters would lead to an increase in SIVrelated resignations beginning in 2013.

Figure 4: Employment Certification Letters and Total Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)-

Related Resignations, Department of State (State) and USAID, 2010 to 2015

Note: Data on employment certification letters and SIV-related resignations are reported as of June 

2015 for State and August 2015 for USAID. Dashed lines in the figure represent partial year data for 

2015. As of July 2015, U.S. government processing of SIVs took an average of 357 business days, 

but this estimate does not include stages of the process that are applicant controlled. Therefore, 

actual overall processing times are likely to be greater.

State and USAID Are Likely to See Fewer SIV-Related 

Resignations In 2015

State and USAID are likely to experience fewer SIV-related resignations 

in 2015 than in 2014. From January to August 2015, a total of 48 Afghan

local staff resigned from State and USAID after receiving an SIV. State 
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officials indicated that it is difficult to determine whether SIV issuances for 

the rest of the calendar year are expected to continue at the same pace 

as in prior months. However, the number of employment certification 

letters issued to State’s and USAID’s Afghan local staff have remained 

lower than the high of 303 letters in 2012. State and USAID issued 174 

letters in 2013, 178 in 2014, and 100 from January to August 2015.

State and USAID officials provided several explanations for why some 

Afghan local staff may forgo the SIV program altogether. In 2014, as part 

of a worldwide adjustment to salaries of local staff at U.S. diplomatic 

missions, State raised salaries for all Afghan local staff by 45 percent. 

State reported this salary increase has helped the embassy retain local 

staff. Additionally, State and USAID officials stated that Afghan SIV 

recipients who have relocated to the United States often face challenges 

integrating and obtaining adequate work opportunities and have 

communicated those challenges to Afghan staff employed at the embassy 

in Afghanistan.13

Afghan Staff Attrition, Including SIV-Related Resignations, 

Has Had Varied Effects on Agencies’ Institutional

Knowledge

According to our assessment of changes to average tenure and grade 

level of Afghan staff, Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related 

resignations, has had varied effects on State’s and USAID’s institutional 

knowledge. The average tenure of each agency’s Afghan staff, one 

measure of institutional knowledge, has decreased slightly since the SIV 

program began, while average grade level, another measure, has 

remained relatively stable.14 From 2010 to June 2015, average tenure 

among both agencies’ Afghan workforces decreased slightly (see table 

1). During this period, average tenure among State’s Afghan local staff 

 

13GAO has previously reported on challenges Iraqi SIV recipients faced in obtaining 

working opportunities in the United States, including limited opportunities for federal 

employment. See GAO, Iraq: Iraqi Refugees and Special Immigrant Visa Holders Face 

Challenges Resettling in the United States and Obtaining U.S. Government Employment, 

GAO-10-274 (Washington, D.C.: March 2010).

14Agencies categorize grade levels for local staff on a scale from 1 through 12, with grade 

level 1 positions being entrance level for routine, unskilled types of work and grade level 

12 being the highest level of professional or specialist positions.
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has decreased by less than 3 months, while average tenure among 

USAID’S Afghan local staff has decreased by approximately 5 months.15

Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations, has also had no 

substantial effect on average grade levels among USAID’S Afghan local 

staff.16 From 2010 to June 2015, the average grade level among USAID’s 

local staff in Afghanistan has remained consistent over time at the level 

that includes management and technical positions. Additionally, the grade 

levels from which State and USAID had the most SIV-related resignations 

differed from the grade levels that agency human resources officers 

reported difficulty filling in 2013.

Table 1: Total Number of Afghan Staff and Average Tenure, Department of State 

(State) and USAID 

State USAID

Year

Total local 

staff

Average tenure 

(in years)

Total local 

staff

Average tenure 

(in years) 

2010 553 3.8 162 3.1

2011 664 3.9 162 3.2

2012 685 3.9 217 3.1

2013 624 4.1 176 3.9

2014 615 3.5 182 2.8

2015a 613 3.6 200 2.7

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State and USAID data. | GAO-16-100

aState reported data as of May 31, 2015 and USAID reported data as of May 19, 2015.

State and USAID officials also identified a number of other effects that 

Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related attrition, may have on 

operations in Afghanistan.17 USAID officials noted that it can take several 

years for local staff to build effective relationships with Afghan 

government officials. When Afghan local staff resign, these contacts are 

 

15While average tenure provides an overall summary of yearly trends, a relatively small 

drop in average tenure can be associated with a relatively larger increase in the number of 

newly hired Afghan staff. 

16State did not provide similar data on the grade levels of its Afghan workforce.

17Outside of SIV-related attrition, there are a number of other reasons for attrition in 

Afghanistan, such as dismissals because of security clearance revocations and 

performance issues. Agency officials generally shared insights on the effects of Afghan 

staff attrition as a whole, and not specifically on SIV-related attrition.
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Page 14 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

often lost, a result that may affect operations by slowing down program 

coordination with the Afghan government.

Attrition can also affect program management. For example, State has 

reported that experienced staffing in grants management is needed to 

ensure accountability and proper oversight. Likewise, USAID officials said 

that the ability of American staff to perform some aspects of the agency’s 

work, such as program monitoring and evaluation, can be affected by 

increased demands on their time caused by local staff attrition. Attrition 

can lead to American supervisors’ taking on additional responsibilities that 

they would not be expected to perform at other posts. For example, State 

and USAID officials said that American personnel spend significant 

amounts of time training and bringing replacement staff up to speed on 

embassy processes and operations as a result of attrition. These officials 

stated that these additional responsibilities can present challenges for 

maintaining adequate management controls and program oversight in 

some areas.

Attrition, including SIV-related attrition, may also affect the training and 

productivity of Afghan local staff. State officials said that Afghan staff may 

need up to 2 years to receive the necessary training and skills to perform 

their jobs at a high level. However, the period of highest productivity can 

be short because these staff are eligible to apply for an SIV after 1 year of 

employment with the U.S. government. For example, according to USAID 

officials, the agency invests in the training and certification process for 

contracting officer representatives. When these Afghan staff resign, 

USAID fills the vacancies and goes through the process of recertifying 

replacement staff. Embassy managers have reported hesitation about 

investing in training because they may not see an adequate return on 

their investment. In July 2014, State’s Office of Inspector General 

reported that, at that time, only one Afghan staff member in the 

embassy’s Consular Affairs office had received supervisory or advanced 

consular training, and none of the Afghan staff in the information 

management section had received supervisory training.

Agencies Reported That They Have Successfully 

Identified Qualified Afghan Staff to Fill Vacancies

State and USAID reported they were successful in identifying qualified 

replacements to fill vacancies for local staff positions. State officials 

reported receiving applications from qualified candidates to staff all but 

three vacancies from 2010 through 2014. State and USAID officials 
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Page 15 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

provided several insights that may help explain the availability of qualified 

Afghan workers. These officials stated that the U.S. government 

drawdown and the reduction in civilian organizations’ staffing levels have 

increased the availability of qualified applicants because fewer potential 

applicants are now employed by the U.S. government and international 

organizations. In addition, officials from both agencies report that the SIV 

program is often perceived as a recruitment incentive for qualified 

applicants. State officials said that some Afghans may be willing to take 

comparable or even lower salaries to have the potential benefit of the SIV 

program.

Agencies Have Taken Steps to Mitigate Attrition 

among Afghan Local Staff, Including SIVRelated Resignations

State and USAID have taken a number of actions to help mitigate the 

effects of attrition among Afghan local staff, including local staff who 

resigned their positions after receiving an SIV. State and USAID officials 

said they conduct recruitment to fill positions that have been vacated as a 

result of SIV-related resignations and for other reasons, such as dismissal 

due to losing a security clearance. State and USAID officials said they 

temporarily assign American personnel and local staff from other 

diplomatic missions overseas to Afghanistan in order to fill staffing gaps 

and provide experienced staff who can train and supervise Afghan staff. 

USAID also assigns local staff from other diplomatic missions for longerterm assignments that can last up to several years. Both agencies’

headquarters have provided additional administrative support to their 

missions in Afghanistan beyond what is generally provided to other 

overseas missions. Both State and USAID are considering moving 

additional functions from the U.S. embassy in Kabul to other diplomatic 

missions in the region. State and USAID officials said they sometimes fill 

one position with two employees in anticipation of an SIV-related 

resignation. In 2014, as part of State’s worldwide effort to normalize 

salaries for local staff, the embassy in Kabul raised salaries for all Afghan 

local staff by 45 percent, and State and USAID officials said this has 

helped to retain local staff.

Recruitment

Despite 243 resignations in 2014 as a result of receiving an SIV, State 

and USAID officials said they were able to recruit and hire personnel to 
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Page 16 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

replace those lost because of attrition. These officials stated they have to 

constantly advertise and fill vacant positions within the local workforce as 

a result of relatively high local staff attrition in Afghanistan, including SIVrelated resignations. In 2014, State posted 219 job vacancy 

announcements and received an average of 555 applications for each 

vacancy announcement that was posted. From June 2014 through May 

2015, State reported it had hired about 120 Afghan staff. USAID officials 

reported they posted 130 vacancy announcements from April 2014 to 

April 2015, and USAID officials said they have not had difficulty recruiting 

qualified replacements.

State and USAID officials said that one of the biggest challenges to the 

recruitment process is the amount of time needed to conduct security 

screenings for new employees, and typically it may take 6 to 8 months to 

fill a position. USAID officials said efforts have been made to shorten the 

security screening process, and State human resources officials said the 

embassy maintains a queue of qualified applicants in an effort to speed 

up the hiring process. Similarly, USAID officials said they prescreen 

applications in Washington, D.C., in order to alleviate some aspects of the 

recruitment process for USAID in Afghanistan. In addition, USAID officials 

said the agency streamlined its hiring strategies in 2014, and reduced the 

amount of time to hire a new employee by 60 days, from 10 months to 8 

months.

Temporary Assignments of Other Personnel to Kabul

State and USAID officials said they send U.S. direct hire employees to 

Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by Afghan 

staff attrition or to provide additional support to American personnel. 

Temporarily assigned personnel may work for a few days or several 

months. According to State and USAID officials, these employees can 

help to supervise and train Afghan staff recently placed in new positions. 

The number of these temporarily assigned personnel in Afghanistan 

anytime varies by the needs of individual offices, as well as security 

concerns and available housing and office space. The embassy at times 

restricts these personnel from entering Afghanistan because of security 

concerns, according to State officials. In fiscal year 2014, the embassy’s 

Consular Affairs office received approximately 600 staff days’ worth of 

temporary assignments from U.S. consular officers and local staff from 

other diplomatic missions.
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Page 17 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

State and USAID officials also reported they recruit local staff from U.S. 

missions in other countries, referred to as third country nationals (TCN), 

to fill key positions at the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. TCNs are 

experienced State and USAID employees who have expertise in key 

areas and are able to build capacity among Afghan staff and provide 

training. According to State and USAID officials, TCNs tend to have a 

high level of experience and are familiar with State and USAID policies 

and procedures, and therefore can work more independently than newer 

Afghan staff. According to USAID officials, USAID employs TCNs on a 

short-term basis, typically 6 months, and also utilizes a TCN program 

where local staff from other diplomatic missions work in Afghanistan for at 

least 1 year with the option to renew. USAID had 34 TCNs supporting the 

USAID mission as of September 2015. State also uses TCNs on a shortterm basis, and has proposed a TCN program similar to the USAID 

program, where local staff from other diplomatic missions work for 1 year 

or longer in Afghanistan. State has identified 20 key positions for TCNs 

that would provide the continuity, expertise, and training lacking in several 

offices within the embassy.

State and USAID officials noted TCNs are more expensive for the mission 

than Afghan staff because they receive higher salaries, incur travel 

expenses associated with deployment to Afghanistan, and have other 

benefits and costs not associated with Afghan staff. In addition, the 

diplomatic missions from which TCNs are transferred have expressed 

concerns regarding their own workforce needs. Short-term TCNs create 

temporary vacancies at the diplomatic missions that send them, and 

TCNs who accept long-term positions must resign their positions at their 

current diplomatic missions, creating vacancies that must be filled.

Offshoring Support

State currently performs some administrative functions outside of 

Afghanistan on behalf of the embassy in Kabul. For example, State 

headquarters in Washington, D.C., performs financial and security inprocessing functions for American personnel who are going to 

Afghanistan. Officials said that these are functions usually performed at 

an overseas mission. In addition, the embassy has started to conduct 
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Page 18 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

procurements from the U.S. embassy in Amman, Jordan, and State’s 

Regional Procurement Support Office in Frankfurt, Germany.18

USAID’s Afghan Hands program supports the mission in Afghanistan with 

20 available U.S. direct hire positions at USAID headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. The Afghan Hands personnel work directly on USAID 

programs and projects in Afghanistan, and provide management and 

oversight to USAID implementing partners. According to USAID officials, 

Afghan Hands personnel are expected to travel frequently to Afghanistan 

for short-term assignments. As of May 2015, 17 of the positions were 

filled, according to USAID officials. Many of the Afghan Hands personnel 

have previously served at the USAID mission in Afghanistan and have 

institutional knowledge of USAID programs and procedures in 

Afghanistan. Afghan Hands personnel perform functions that are often 

performed by American personnel or Afghan staff in Afghanistan.

State and USAID have proposed to offshore additional administrative 

functions to other U.S. missions in the region. In August 2014, USAID 

proposed to offshore 9 positions in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in order to 

provide dedicated support for USAID’s financial management, 

acquisitions, and the economic growth and infrastructure team. The 

USAID proposal notes that Afghan staff attrition has created a continuous 

need for training of newly hired Afghan employees, which could be 

provided by offshore staff on temporary assignment in Afghanistan. 

Furthermore, in this proposal, USAID estimated the total annual costs for 

a fully staffed Afghanistan Support Team in Kazakhstan.19 According to 

State officials, State is considering offshoring some procurement 

functions to provide continuous support, similar to what is provided in 

Amman, Jordan. However, State officials said that other diplomatic 

missions may find it difficult to reassign their local staff to provide 

functions for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or may be limited in the 

amount of available office space.

 

18State officials noted that offshoring certain functions is a common agency practice used 

to consolidate processes and create efficiencies.

19USAID officials told us that as of October 2015, USAID has chosen not to follow this 

course of action.
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Page 19 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Double-Encumbering Afghan Staff Positions

According to State and USAID officials, these agencies sometimes 

double-encumber positions when a local employee reports that he or she 

is in the process of applying for an SIV. Double-encumbering occurs 

when agencies fill one position with two employees in anticipation of an 

SIV-related resignation. As of September 2015, State had 36 positions 

that were double-encumbered, and USAID had 11 as of May 2015, 

according to State and USAID officials. State and USAID officials 

reported that the embassy allows for agencies to start recruiting for a 

currently filled Afghan position when the Afghan staff person occupying 

that position informs his or her supervisor that an application for an SIV 

has been initiated.20 State and USAID officials said the employee 

expecting to depart an embassy can train his or her replacement. State 

officials said that sometimes this practice results in two employees filling 

the same position if the original employee’s application is delayed or 

rejected.

Salaries and Benefits

As previously mentioned, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan provided a 45 

percent salary increase to all agencies’ Afghan staff in July 2014, as part 

of State’s effort to raise the salaries of local staff worldwide to better 

reflect the median wage rate of similar and comparable organizations. 

State officials said the salary increase was part of a State effort to update 

salaries at diplomatic missions worldwide, and was not in response to the 

SIV program. However, State and USAID officials said higher salaries 

help to recruit and retain well-qualified employees. Human resources 

officials at the embassy in Kabul reported that the pay increase was a 

strong incentive for Afghan staff to postpone SIV applications and remain 

employed by the U.S. government.

The U.S. mission provides 25 percent additional compensation for local 

staff in Afghanistan given the extra measures they may take to avoid or 

 

20Federal law requires that State records pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas 

shall be considered confidential and generally shall be used only for the formulation, 

amendment, administration, or enforcement of immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f). 

Agency officials said that under the confidentiality requirements, officials may not ask 

Afghan staff whether they have applied for an SIV. However, officials may take action if 

Afghan staff volunteer this information. 
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Page 20 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

endure terrorist threats or harassment. State provides local staff at 

selected diplomatic missions additional compensation as a percentage of 

their salary because of potential harassment or threats of violence related 

to their U.S. government employment. In 2015, State designated 21

posts, including Afghanistan, as offering such allowances.

Officials Said Agencies Have Not Evaluated 

Efforts to Mitigate Effects of Afghan Staff 

Attrition

While State and USAID have made a number of efforts to mitigate the 

effects of Afghan staff attrition, according to officials, agencies have not 

formally evaluated the extent to which these actions have addressed 

effects on the workforce or programs. Key principles of human capital 

management call for agencies to evaluate the success of human capital 

strategies, such as actions taken to mitigate attrition among staff, by 

using performance measures to assess the extent to which these 

activities contribute to achieving programmatic goals.21 An evaluation of 

actions taken to mitigate effects related to local staff attrition can help 

determine if an agency has effectively filled gaps in institutional 

knowledge from attrition among Afghan staff, and identify reasons for any 

performance shortfalls resulting from those gaps. Without such 

evaluations, agencies will be limited in having information to determine 

the costs, benefits, and relative effectiveness of actions taken. Further, in 

August 2014, State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) noted that mission 

operations may be negatively affected without a programmatic approach 

to addressing attrition among Afghan staff. State and USAID officials 

have also noted that American personnel’s 1-year tours in Afghanistan 

create challenges with institutional knowledge. Evaluations can provide 

critical information to enable knowledge transfer among American staff in 

Afghanistan and minimize duplication of efforts that have already proven 

to be ineffective or resource intensive.

 

21GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003). To develop this information, we 

reviewed documents from organizations with government-wide responsibilities for or 

expertise in workforce planning models and tools, and selected federal agencies. In 

addition, we met with officials from these organizations concerning existing workforce 

planning models and lessons learned from their workforce planning experiences.
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Page 21 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

For example, agencies can measure whether actions such as hiring, 

training, and retention have changed the skill level of the workforce or 

affected the U.S. mission’s capabilities related to maintaining its overseas 

presence in Afghanistan. In its draft proposal to employ TCNs in 

Afghanistan, State noted that if the program were to proceed, the agency 

would need to demonstrate the benefits associated with the employment 

of TCNs and justify increased costs.22 However, in its proposal, State did 

not identify any potential measurements to evaluate the benefits of using 

TCNs or the additional costs that would be incurred to attract these 

individuals to long-term positions in Afghanistan. USAID identified cost 

information that could be utilized to evaluate human capital efforts in its 

strategic staffing document for Afghanistan, which outlines a number of 

proposals to potentially address staffing challenges there. The document 

includes examples of resources required and cost analyses of some of 

the proposals to mitigate the effects of attrition, such as the option to 

offshore positions that may be vacated by Afghan staff to another 

embassy in the region. However, USAID officials also said they were not 

aware of any completed evaluations of actions taken related to mitigating 

the effects of attrition.

State and USAID officials noted that agencies operate in a reactive state 

and face resource constraints managing a large diplomatic mission in a 

dangerous and unpredictable environment such as Afghanistan. 

Accordingly, agencies may not fully document or evaluate certain efforts. 

Key principles for human capital management note that evaluations of 

human capital strategies may help agencies determine if they met human 

capital goals and whether those strategies helped or hindered the 

agencies from reaching their programmatic goals. While the State OIG 

has reported that increased security risks in Afghanistan hinder 

employees’ ability to assess programs, inadequacies with such 

assessments can impair program performance. Nonetheless, State’s 

evaluation policy calls for evaluations to improve programs, projects, and 

management processes. USAID’s evaluation policy also notes that 

though security concerns can pose challenges to conducting evaluations, 

creative approaches can be utilized to measure achievements in such 

environments.

 

22According to officials, this proposal is in development as of November 2015, and the 

program has not been fully implemented.
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Page 22 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Conclusions

Local staff are a vital component of the success of U.S. diplomatic 

missions overseas. The U.S. mission in Afghanistan faces a number of 

uncertainties and challenges that make the presence of its Afghan staff all 

the more important, including an unpredictable security situation, 

relatively short tours among U.S. personnel, and an evolving diplomatic 

presence that relies on the U.S. military for security support. State and 

USAID have taken a number of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan 

staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations, such as increasing 

recruiting efforts and augmenting staff with experienced local staff from 

other U.S. missions overseas. However, State and USAID have not 

evaluated their actions to address the effects of Afghan staff attrition to 

assess the costs or effectiveness of these actions. Information gained 

from such evaluations could inform agencies’ workforce planning efforts, 

including strategies related to hiring, training, and staff development and 

could improve how agencies manage attrition of Afghan staff in the future, 

whether because of SIVs or other reasons. Agencies could also share 

information learned from these evaluations with one another, particularly 

if an agency conducted evaluations on resource-intensive efforts to 

mitigate the effects of attrition. For example, USAID has a program in 

which third country nationals from U.S. missions in other countries are 

employed for periods of 1 year or longer to help mitigate the effects of 

attrition among local staff in Afghanistan—a practice that is more costly 

than employing Afghan staff and one that can pose challenges for the 

U.S. missions that send them. If USAID had evaluated its program, 

USAID could have informed State’s assessment of a similar proposal. 

Furthermore, without evaluation of mitigating actions that agencies have 

previously undertaken, agencies may be unable to weigh the costs and 

benefits of actions being implemented, and may be unable to identify the 

strategies that are most effective for handling future workforce-related 

needs in challenging environments.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To better understand the costs and effectiveness of actions to mitigate 

the effects of Afghan staff attrition, and to inform future workforce 

planning efforts, we recommend that

· the Secretary of State evaluate these actions, and

· the Administrator of USAID evaluate these actions.
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Page 23 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State and 

USAID. In written comments, summarized below and reproduced in 

appendix II and III, respectively, State and USAID agreed with the 

recommendation to evaluate actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff 

attrition. 

In its written comments, State agreed with the recommendation. State 

noted that the Afghanistan SIV program has had considerable impact on 

mission staffing levels and SIV-related resignations are currently the 

largest contributing factor for increased attrition among local staff. 

However, State wrote that many elements should be taken into 

consideration when looking at sustaining a workforce capable of meeting 

U.S. goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Further, State noted that 

strategically approaching workforce planning is complicated by, among 

other things, the unpredictable nature of events in a dangerous 

environment. State said that it evaluates staffing levels as part of its 

regular agency-wide review processes, and that a specific analysis of 

actions taken to mitigate attrition among Afghan staff would be reactive in 

nature and have minimal value added in a more complex staffing picture. 

Nevertheless, as we note in this report, an evaluation of the relative costs 

and effectiveness of specific actions taken to mitigate effects related to 

local staff attrition could help determine if State has effectively filled gaps 

in institutional knowledge from attrition among Afghan staff, and enable 

knowledge transfer among American staff in Afghanistan. 

In its written comments, USAID agreed with the recommendation. USAID 

noted that it proactively tracks staffing levels in Afghanistan, and has 

taken steps to develop and implement creative approaches to staffing. 

For example, USAID said that, in addition to weekly and monthly staffing 

reports, from January to October 2015 it conducted seven ad hoc 

analyses regarding locally employed staff for internal and external 

audiences. In addition, USAID said it regularly discusses staff retention 

and recruitment and staffing mechanisms at strategic management 

meetings. According to USAID, these meetings serve as a venue to 

discuss, evaluate, and iterate strategies and other efforts to mitigate the 

effects of local staff resignations. We will continue to work with USAID in 

monitoring the implementation of the recommendation. 

State and USAID also provided technical comments that we incorporated, 

as appropriate.
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Page 24 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on 

GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

Michael J. Courts at (202) 512-8980 or at courtsm@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Office of Public 

Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Michael J. Courts

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 25 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, 

and Methodology

In this report, we evaluated (1) special immigrant visa (SIV)-related 

resignations, including how, if at all, the Department of State’s (State) and 

U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) workforces in 

Afghanistan have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any, 

State and USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to the attrition 

of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State 

and USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of 

Afghan staff, including SIV recipients.

We interviewed agency officials at State and USAID in headquarters and 

at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan, including consular officers, 

human resource officers, USAID mission executive officers, and State 

management officials to address all three objectives. We reviewed 

background on the SIV program for Afghan nationals, including relevant 

legislation and a report from the Congressional Research Service. In 

order to provide background information on the SIV program for Afghan 

nationals, we also utilized reports published by State and the Department 

of Homeland Security on the SIV program for Afghan nationals, primarily 

data on visa issuances and general processing times.1

To assess SIV-related resignations, and how, if at all, State’s and 

USAID’s workforces in Afghanistan have been affected by the 

resignations of SIV recipients in recent years, we obtained and analyzed 

data for each calendar year, 2010 through 2014, and for January to June 

or August 1, 2015.2 We performed longitudinal analysis of the data in 

order to identify the initial extent of SIV effects, significant trends or 

changes over time, and any correlation between variables. We assessed 

data on Afghan staff for the following categories: the number of SIVrelated resignations at State and USAID, the number of employment 

certification letters State and USAID issued to Afghan staff, average 

 

1To access these reports, see 

http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/afghans-work-for-us.html.

2State reported 2015 data from January to June, and USAID reported 2015 data from 

January to August. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

tenure of State’s and USAID’s current staff, and average grade levels of 

USAID’s current staff.3

· We analyzed data on SIV-related resignations related to the 

special category of SIVs created by the Afghan Allies Protection 

Act of 2009. State and USAID provided these data, which included 

only Afghan staff who departed their positions after receiving an 

SIV and did not include those who departed employment for other 

reasons. These data were relevant to Afghan local staff but did not 

include third country nationals or other staff working in 

Afghanistan on a temporary duty basis. Agencies provided data 

on start and end dates of employment for those Afghan staff who 

resigned after receiving SIVs.

· We utilized data on average tenure and grade level of Afghan 

local staff as rough indicators of institutional knowledge. Both 

agencies provided start and end dates of employment, from which 

we calculated average tenure. While average tenure provides an 

overall summary of yearly trends, a relatively small drop in 

average tenure can be associated with a relatively larger increase 

in the number of newly hired Afghan staff. Agency data 

demonstrated this increase in the number of newly hired Afghan 

staff. For example, in June 2015, USAID had 92 Afghan staff with 

less than a year’s tenure, representing about 46 percent of the 

agency’s local staff, compared with 65 in December 2012, 

representing about 30 percent of the agency’s local staff. In 

addition to calculating averages, we also calculated and examined 

yearly median tenure levels and considered the distribution of 

length of tenure. USAID provided staff grade levels but State 

could not provide similar data for its Afghan staff. We analyzed 

average tenure and grade level for a single-month slice of each 

year within the scope of our analysis (i.e., May 2015 and 

December for all other years). Accordingly, the data do not 

represent all Afghan local staff who worked for State or USAID 

over the course of any particular year. Average tenure rates were 

also affected by local staff separating from mission employment 

for reasons other than SIVs, such as retirements or terminations. 

The data the agencies provided did not report whether newly hired 

 

3Agencies categorize grade levels for local staff on a scale from 1 through 12, with grade 

level 1 positions being entrance level for routine, unskilled types of work and grade level 

12 being the highest level of professional or specialist positions.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

local staff had previously been agency employees and may 

therefore understate the actual experience these staff brought to 

their agencies.

We also utilized data related to recruitment of local staff from the 2010 

through 2014 local compensation questionnaires for Afghanistan. This 

annual questionnaire gathers input from all U.S. agencies at an overseas 

mission across a range of topics related to the local workforce.

To assess the reliability of State’s and USAID’s data and responses to the 

local compensation questionnaires, we interviewed knowledgeable 

human resources officials from State in Kabul and solicited input from 

both agencies on their internal controls, potential data vulnerabilities, and 

any incidence of missing data. We determined the data to be sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes.

To assess the actions, if any, State and USAID have taken to mitigate 

any effects related to the attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients, 

we reviewed agency documents that described these efforts, including 

any analyses agencies had undertaken.

To assess the extent to which State and USAID have evaluated mitigating 

actions related to the attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients, we 

reviewed criteria for key principles in strategic human capital 

management, State’s and USAID’s evaluation policies, and agency 

documents that included workforce-related planning and analyses.4 We 

also reviewed State’s August 2014 Office of Inspector General Inspection 

of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, for the recommendations it made to 

address challenges associated with attrition in the Afghan workforce. We 

compared State’s and USAID’s efforts against key principles in strategic 

human capital management.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to December 

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

 

4GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 28 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 29 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Appendix II: Comments from the 

Department of State
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 30 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 31 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 32 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Text of Appendix II: Comments from the Department of 

State

Dr. Loren Yager 

Managing Director

International Affairs and Trade Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Dear Dr. Yager:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "AFGHANISTAN: State 

and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken to Mitigate Effects of Attrition among 

Local Staff." GAO Job Code 321059.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation with this 

letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Karen Keshap, 

Post Management Officer, Office of the Executive, Bureau of South and Central 

Asian Affairs at (202) 647-3641.

Sincerely,

Christopher H. Flaggs

Enclosure:

As stated

cc: GAO - Michael Courts SRAP - Laurel Miller, Acting State/OIG - Norman Brown
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 33 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report, 

AFGHANISTAN: State and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken 

to Mitigate Effects of Attrition Among Local Staff, (GAO-16-100, 

GAO Code 321059)

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report 

Afghanistan: State and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken to Mitigate Effects of 

Attrition Among Local Staff. 

The Department agrees with the GAO's recommendation to evaluate the costs and 

effectiveness of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition. The 

Department regularly evaluates the staffing levels in Afghanistan, both via formal 

reports and in on the spot analyses. The Department utilizes the Congressionally 

mandated rightsizing review process which was most recently completed for Mission 

Afghanistan in 2015. Mission Afghanistan also participates in the Department-wide 

annual Mission Resource Request process. Both of these vehicles are important to 

the planning process, and are regularly used to plan for and respond to staffingrelated impacts. Staff retention is a focus of the Department, and is discussed 

regularly both in Washington and in Kabul. 

The Department agrees with the GAO’s report that the Afghanistan SIV program has 

had considerable impact on mission staffing levels. Since the inception of the 

program in 2010, the attrition rate has spiked to a more than 50% turnover rate in the 

Locally Employed (LE) staff workforce. Critical Mission operations are unsustainable 

under this workforce paradigm. In an effort to mitigate the adverse impact of SIVrelated resignations, Embassy Kabul has taken many actions as described in the 

GAO’s report. The Department believes that additional offshoring of support 

services could further mitigate the impact of SIV-related resignations.

Resignations related to SIV approvals are currently the largest contributing factor for 

inflated attrition rates. Many elements should be taken into consideration when 

looking at sustaining a workforce capable of meeting future U.S. goals and objectives 

in Afghanistan. The non-permissive security environment, unpredictable nature of 

events, decreasing direct hire staffing levels, changing program focus and the sheer 

magnitude of the workload at Embassy Kabul complicates the ability to strategically 

approach workforce planning. Specific analysis of Post’s current stop-gap measures 

would be reactive in nature and have minimal value added in a much more complex 

staffing picture. 

The Department of State thanks GAO for the opportunity to respond to the report 

draft and for the courtesies extended by GAO staff in the conduct of this review.
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 34 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. 

Agency for International Development

GAO received USAID's 

letter on 11/10/2015
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 35 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 36 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Text of Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Michael J. Courts Director

International Affairs and Trade

U.S. Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Courts:

I am pleased to provide USAID's formal response to the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) draft report entitled "Afghanistan: State and USAID Should Evaluate 

Actions Taken to Mitigate Effects of Attrition among Local Staff' (GAO-16-100).

This letter, together with the enclosed USAID comments, is provided for 

incorporation as an appendix to the final report.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and for the 

courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit review.

Angelique Crumbly 

Assistant Administrator Bureau for Management

U.S. Agency for International Development

Enclosure: a/s

USAID COMMENTS ON GAO DRAFT REPORT, No. GAO-16-100

Recommendation 1: To better understand the costs and effectiveness of 

actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition, and to inform future 

workforce planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State and 

USAID Administrator evaluate these actions.

Response:

USAID agrees with the recommendation and, as acknowledged in the GAO draft 

report, has in place a number of actions designed to track, consider, and iteratively 

mitigate staffing level changes in Afghanistan.
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 37 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

USAID proactively tracks Mission staffing levels via regular and ad hoc analyses. 

From January to October 2015, in addition to our weekly and monthly staffing 

reports, USAID conducted seven additional ad hoc analyses around foreign service 

national (FSN) staffing for USAID leadership, Congress, and GAO. Combined, these 

actions allow USAID/ Afghanistan to plan for and respond to staffing-related impacts.

USAID/Afghanistan also takes active measures to evaluate staffing levels' effects on 

operational capacity. For instance, staff retention is discussed in regular strategic 

management meetings such as bi-annual portfolio reviews and annual leadership 

reviews. These meetings also serve as a venue to discuss, evaluate, and iterate 

knowledge management retention strategies, strategic recruitment, creative staffing 

mechanisms (such as the Afghan Hands program), and other efforts to mitigate the 

effects of Afghan local staff resignations. USAID/Afghanistan benefits from what we 

learn in our evaluations and employs this knowledge to continue to develop and 

implement creative approaches to maintain a robust and qualified staff that are able 

to maintain the Mission's operational capacity and pass on its institutional 

knowledge.

Based on our ability to conduct comprehensive staffing analyses, regular and 

continued high- level management discussions, and our continuing efforts to develop 

and implement approaches to maintain USAID/Afghanistan's operational capacity 

and knowledge management, the Mission requests GAO's concurrence to close the 

recommendation.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 38 GAO-16-100 Afghanistan

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Michael J. Courts, 202-512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant 

Director), Jon Fremont, Farhanaz Kermalli, and Owen Starlin made key 

contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Tina Cheng, Martin De Alteriis, 

Katie Bernet, Karen Deans, Thomas Gilbert, and Michael Silver provided 

additional support.

(321059)
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