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i 

20–078 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–118] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

UPDATE ON THE F–35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER PROGRAM AND THE FISCAL 

YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 23, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C., USAF, Program Executive Officer, F–35 

Joint Program Office ............................................................................................ 4 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense .................................................................................. 1 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition ....................................................................................... 6 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael .................................................................................... 35 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................. 33 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with Lt Gen Christopher C. Bogdan .............. 87 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 67 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ............................................... 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Information Paper from Lt Gen Bogdan to Mr. Turner ................................ 113 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 134 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 134 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 125 

(1) 

UPDATE ON THE F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 23, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:28 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. TURNER. The subcommittee will come to order to receive testimony concerning the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, the JSF, program. I want to welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses, Dr. 

Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

[OT&E]; Dr. Michael J. Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, Government Accountability Office [GAO], and a good southwest Ohioan; the Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; and Lieutenant General Christopher C. Bogdan, F–35 Program Executive Officer. 

Because we were held up for votes, I am going to enter my statement for the record, if there is no objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. TURNER. And we will also enter Ms. Sanchez’s statement in 

for the record, and we will proceed right to the statements of our 

witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. TURNER. I believe we will start with Dr. Gilmore. 

STATEMENT OF DR. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. In my opening statement I will focus on readiness for operational test and evaluation. 

My estimate is the program won’t be ready to begin IOT&E [initial operational test and evaluation] until mid-calendar year 2018 

at the earliest. That would be about a 1-year delay relative to what 

the program is carrying currently as its objective dates and about 

6 months relative to its threshold dates. 

The reasons are the following. The most complex mission system 

testing remains, as does verification and fixes to significant problems, some of those fixes already having been identified and some 

not. Mission system stability, including the radar, still a problem. 
2 

Inadequate fusion of sensor information from sensors on the same 

aircraft, as well as among different aircraft, continues to be a problem. There are shortfalls in electronic warfare, electronic attack, 

shortfalls in the performance of the Distributed Aperture System, 

and other issues that are classified with regard to mission systems. 

Stealth aircraft are not invisible. To achieve success against the modern stressing mobile threats we are relying on our $400 billion 

investment in F–35 to provide, mission systems must work, in 

some reasonable sense of that word. And we must provide every incentive to the contractors to make the mission systems work leading up to and after IOT&E, in my view. 

The program has now changed its approach from schedule-driven 

software releases, which had overlaid old problems on top of new 

problems, to a capabilities-based approach. So now the program is 

addressing the significant deficiencies with a given version of software prior to proceeding with the next version, and I certainly commend that approach. And that should help work through and solve 

some of these problems that I have mentioned with mission systems. 

Other reasons IOT&E is likely to be delayed include the need for 

weapons testing and certification. The rate at which that has been 

done in the past must triple in order to get all the events done. 

There has been talk of cutting the number of events by two-thirds. 

If that occurs, that would simply shift the work to IOT&E and 

make essentially certain late discoveries of problems requiring fixes 

during IOT&E. 

The program is exploring ways to up the rate of testing, including using ranges at Eglin, and that would be a good decision, but 

decisions and action need to be taken soon. 

There is also the issue of certification of full weapons usage 

throughout the full flight envelope. The most recent test community estimates are that that would occur in October 2017 for F– 

35A, February 2018 for F–35C, and May 2018 for F–35B. And we 

are looking at this. Some have proposed an incremental rolling 

start to occupational tests. That may not be practical, and it was 

certainly problematic when we tried it on F–22. 

There are still problems with the Autonomics Logistics Information System [ALIS], which is critical to the combat operations of 

the aircraft. There are many resource-intensive workarounds still 

required. Under the program’s current schedule, ALIS 3.0, the full 

capability version required for IOT&E, would not be released until 

the first quarter of 2018. 

There is also the need for concurrency-driven extensive modifications required to early-lot aircraft bought for IOT&E when it was 

thought that IOT&E would begin in 2013. The current unmitigated—meaning no measures taken to correct the problem—schedule shows mods extending into third quarter calendar year 2019. 

The program is, however, working on a multipronged approach, including using later-production aircraft slated for operational use 

and taking hardware from recently delivered aircraft on the production line that could move the completion of those modifications 

into 2018, and a decision is needed now on that. 

There are also inadequacies in the U.S. Reprogramming Lab that 

is used to generate the Mission Data Files, which are essential to 
3 

the success in combat and certainly success in operational testing 

of the aircraft. 

The program’s optimistic schedule for delivery of a validated— 

but, in my view, very possibly inadequate—Mission Data File for 

operational testing is the third quarter of 2017, but that date assumes the U.S. Reprogramming Lab receives a fully capable 

version of Block 3F by April 2016, next month, which we already 

know under the program’s current plans will not happen until this 

summer at the soonest. 

So for all these reasons, I suspect that we won’t be ready for 

operational testing until mid-calendar year 2018. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here to discuss the progress 

on the F–35 program today. 

I have a written statement that I will submit for the record, and 

I just want to summarize five of the major points in that statement 

in my oral remarks. 

First, the Department [of Defense] is now planning to add new 

capability, known as Block 4, to the F–35 beyond its baseline capability and is planning to manage that effort as part of the existing 

program, rather than establishing a separate business case and 

baseline for this new work. 

This has significant implications as far as the Congress’ role in 

oversight. This modernization effort is like a new program with estimated cost of about $3 billion over the next 6 years. That price 

tag alone would qualify it as a major defense acquisition program 

in its own right, and it should be managed as such, so that it is 

subject to the same statutory and regulatory reporting as any other 

program its size. 

The F–22 provides precedent for this. It began its modernization 

effort as part of the existing baseline program and it eventually established a separate business case and developed into a major acquisition program with its own Milestone B in order to better track 

progress and cost changes. 

Second, although the program has been managing costs very well 

since 2010, the Nunn-McCurdy breach back then, and cost estimates have actually decreased since then, it still poses significant 

affordability challenges for the Department and the Congress. As 

production begins to increase and the program begins procuring 

more aircraft each year, the Department is expected to spend about 

$14 billion per year over the next decade and will average about 

$13 billion per year over the next 22 years until all planned purchases are complete in 2038. 

These annual funding challenges will compound as the program 

begins to stack its funding needs against other large acquisitions, 

such as the bomber program, the tanker program that is ongoing, 
4 

the Ohio-class submarine replacement, the new carrier, and many 

other very large programs. 

It is important to note this is just the remaining acquisition cost 

for the F–35. As we all know, the cost to operate and maintain the 

F–35 across its entire life cycle is estimated now at about $1 trillion, which has added to that overall price tag. 

My third point is software development and developmental flight 

testing of the F–35 are now nearing completion, but the program 

faces challenges in getting all of its development activity completed 

on time. I think Dr. Gilmore covered that pretty well. It is through 

with 80 percent of its developmental flight tests. It has completed 

the first three blocks of software, and it is now working to close out 

flight testing of its final block of software, Block 3F. 

That is the critical block of software as it will provide the full 

warfighting capabilities required for the F–35. Program officials 

have stated that there would be as much as a 3-month delay. We 

have done our own analysis and we think it could be more in line 

with 6 months. And I think Dr. Gilmore’s analysis indicates even 

longer than that. 

Fourth, with regard to technical risks on the program, the program has most recently found fixes for its engine seal problem that 

we were talking about last year and the design of the helmet 

mounted display. And it has begun to retrofit aircraft with those 

fixes. They are not all in, but the solutions are there. 

Two new challenges have recently been identified. One concerns 

the ejection seat and the other concerns the wing structure of the 

carrier variant. The program is working now to find solutions to 

each of those problems. I think on the ejection seat they have a 

pretty good concept figured out to solve that one. 

It should also be noted that the Autonomic Logistics Information 

System, known as ALIS, continues to be challenging and has been 

cited as one of the most significant outstanding risks to the program today, and that has a lot to do with operations and maintenance, as you know. 

Finally, manufacturing and production data continue to show a 

positive trend toward more efficient production. The amount of 

labor hours it is taking to build each aircraft continues to go down, 

quality is increasing, and engineering changes have been reduced 

significantly. 

While there are still issues with late parts, this is consistently 

improving as well. Contractors are now delivering aircraft on time 

or ahead of schedule. We continue to track the measures for the 

aircraft’s reliability and maintainability. And while they still fall 

short of expectations, they continue to improve, and there is still 

time to achieve the program’s required goals at the right time. 

I will close with that. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

Mr. TURNER. General Bogdan. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHRISTOPHER C. BOGDAN, USAF, 

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, F–35 JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE 

General BOGDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
5 

Chairman Turner, distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to address the committee regarding 

the F–35 program. My purpose here today is to provide you a balanced assessment of where the program stands. That means I will 

tell you the good, the bad, and the ugly about the program, and tell 

you what my team is doing to reduce costs on the program and improve the F–35’s performance and meet our scheduled commitment. 

Overall, the F–35 program is executing fairly well across the entire spectrum of acquisition, to include development and design, 

flight test, production, fielding, base stand-up, maintenance and 

support, and building a global sustainment enterprise. The program is at a pivot point and is now rapidly changing, growing, and 

accelerating. We will be finishing our 15-year development program 

in late 2017 and beginning to transition to a leaner, more efficient 

follow-on modernization program. 

We will see production grow from delivering 45 aircraft in 2015 

to delivering over 100 aircraft in 2018 and up to 145 aircraft by 

2020. Additionally, in the next 4 years we will continue to stand 

up 17 new operating bases all over the world. We are also accelerating the creation of our heavy maintenance and repair capabilities, and supply chain, throughout the globe, including the Pacific, 

European, and North American regions. 

However, the program is not without risks and challenges, as 

these come with any program of this size and complexity. I am confident that the current risks and issues we face can be resolved and 

we will be able to overcome future problems and deliver the full capability that we have committed to. 

I have often said that the mark of a good program is not that 

it has no problems, but rather that it discovers problems, implements solutions, improves the weapon system, and at the same 

time keeps the program on track. I believe we have been doing that 

for a number of years now. 

Let me highlight a few of our recent accomplishments since our 

last hearing. 

Last year, we began U.S. Air Force and partner pilot training at 

Luke Air Force Base, where a blend of U.S. and partner F–35 instructor pilots are helping train U.S. and other partner pilots. The 

Air Force is now receiving F–35As at Hill Air Force Base in Utah 

and training is underway to ready its first combat-coded squadron 

to be operational this year. Also, the United States Marine Corps 

successfully flying and deploying to austere sites for training, dropping and shooting live weapons with its F–35Bs. 

In addition, industry is committed to and then successfully delivered 45 airplanes last year, including the first aircraft that was 

produced in Italy and assembled in their factory in Cameri. From 

a production perspective, we have delivered a total of 172 aircraft 

to our test, operational, and training sites. 

On the cost front, the price of purchasing an F–35 continues to 

decline steadily, lot over lot. This is a trend I believe will continue 

for many years. I expect the cost of an F–35 with an engine and 

fee to decrease from about $108 million this year to about $85 million in 2019. 
6 

As I said before, the program is changing, growing, and accelerating, but it is not without issues, risks, and challenges. So let 

me highlight a few of those areas. 

On the technical front we have a number of risks. At the top of 

my list are both software and our maintenance system, known as 

ALIS. On the software front we have seen stability issues recently 

with our Block 3 software and we are currently in the process of 

fixing and flight testing those fixes. We have also experienced 

issues with the development of our next version of ALIS, known as 

ALIS 2.0.2, and I am prepared to discuss these issues with you, as 

well as other risks and issues, such as our egress system, aircraft 

modifications, and our Reprogramming Labs. 

I am also prepared to discuss Air Force IOC [initial operating capability], initial operational testing, recent U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps deployments, and the status of our partners and FMS 

[foreign military sales] customers. 

In summary, the program is moving forward, sometimes slower 

than I would like, but moving forward and making progress nonetheless. We are nearing the completion of development and flight 

test in late 2017. We are ramping up production, standing up new 

bases, growing the global sustainment enterprise, and continuing 

to drive cost out of the program. 

I intend to continue leading this program with integrity, discipline, transparency, and accountability. It is my intention to complete this program within the resources and the time I have been 

given, and I intend on holding my team and myself accountable for 

the outcomes on this program. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the program. I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Bogdan and Secretary 

Stackley can be found in the Appendix on page 87.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Stackley. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION 

Secretary STACKLEY. Chairman Turner, distinguished members 

of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program. 

I will provide brief opening remarks and submit a formal statement 

for the record. 

One year ago, we discussed with the subcommittee the challenges facing the program at that time and our plans to address 

those challenges. In the course of this past year cost, schedule, and 

technical performance of the Joint Strike Fighter have steadily improved across each variant of the aircraft, in each phase of the program, development, production, and sustainment. 

Known technical issues are being driven to closure and the aircraft’s capabilities, measured in terms of flight envelope, mission 

systems, and weapons delivery, are being steadily expanded in support of each service’s requirements for initial operating capability, 

or IOC. 
7 

As noted, production of F–35 aircraft and engines has improved 

from lot to lot in terms of unit cost, schedule performance, improved quality, reduced rework, and concurrency related costs. 

These positive trends are being sustained while also methodically 

increasing our rate of production. 

The pacing activity on the program today is flight testing, which 

itself is being paced by the incremental release of warfighting capability and mission system software blocks, commonly referred to as 

Block 2B, 3i, and 3F. Block 2B testing completed in 2015 and provided the capability required to support the Marine Corps’ declaration of IOC in July 2015. 

The completion of Block 3i testing has been delayed pending correction of software stability issues. In the course of the next week, 

we commence flight testing what is planned to be the final build 

of Block 3i capability, designed to improve that stability, all in support of the Air Force IOC scheduled later this year. 

Completion of the final block, Block 3F, poses the greatest remaining challenge to completion of system development. Block 3F 

includes the more complex functionality of the three software baselines, including what is referred to as sensor fusion. 

Further coding and testing of Block 3F has been impacted by resource demands, software engineers, and lab facilities associated 

with supporting completion of earlier software builds. These factors 

add up to the program’s estimate of 4 months schedule risk to completion of Block 3F developmental testing. This projection still supports the Navy IOC with Block 3F in 2018. 

That said, we are wary that further technical issues are certain 

to emerge as we press on with testing, and it will be critical that 

the program rapidly correct these deficiencies while mitigating 

their impact on both test and production. 

The program’s commitment is to mitigate these risks going forward and to do so within the bounds of the program’s budget while 

delivering the full capability defined by the Lightning II requirements document. 

Meanwhile, the program’s focus is increasingly shifting to operations in support of in-service aircraft. The program has accumulated 50,000 flight hours, and with 152 aircraft operating at 8 

bases across the country, the warfighter’s experience and feedback 

on the aircraft and support systems is beginning to shape the program’s priorities. 

The Marines have two full squadrons in operation today and will 

stand up their third this June. They are building momentum as the 

service and the vanguard of the F–35 effort, gaining capability and 

confidence and employing it tactically every day. They have demonstrated operations from an austere forward operating base at 

Twentynine Palms in support of the Marine Corps combined arms 

exercise. They are training British pilots, as well as first tour Marine Corps pilots, in Beaufort, South Carolina. 

They will deploy the Nation’s first operational F–35 squadron 

less than a year from now to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, 

Japan, in January 2017. Marine pilots love this plane and the capability it brings to the Marine Corps air-ground task force. 

Meanwhile, delivery of Air Force F–35A aircraft at Eglin Air 

Force Base are completed, training for Air Force international part-
8 

ner pilots at Luke Air Force Base continues to ramp up, and the 

Air Force first operational squadron is filling out at Hill Air Force 

Base with seven aircraft at Hill and remaining aircraft completing 

modifications to support IOC. 

Separately, the Navy has gained extensive experience demonstrating launch, recovery, handling, and support of the F–35C during at-sea trial periods aboard the aircraft carriers Eisenhower and 

Nimitz and a third sea trial scheduled for later this year. 

Two key points regarding operations and sustainment require 

mention. First, with particular regard to aircraft reliability, maintainability, and availability, or RM&A, one year ago we reported 

that overall performance in this area was poor and trending poor. 

Concerted efforts by the government/industry team have reversed 

those trends. And while we have much work remaining, improvements to design, parts availability, maintenance training and support, and tooling are yielding improved performance in the key 

metrics. RM&A will remain a principal focus area for the program 

in the years ahead. 

Second, the program is working closely with the services, our 

international partners, and industry to formulate an operating and 

support strategy for the program including the business plan that 

will accompany this strategy and an overarching O&S [operations 

and support] war on cost. 

A critical element of the O&S plan is the Autonomic Logistic Information System, or ALIS. ALIS continues to mature, improving 

with each version fielded. In the near term, we will be testing a 

new version, ALIS 2.0.2, which we expect to support the Air Force 

IOC. Additionally, to improve turnaround time for fixing issues 

highlighted by fleet maintainers, we have commenced delivery of 

service packs aimed to be more timely and responsive to a warfighter’s immediate needs. 

In the long term, however, ALIS has yet to meet its full promise, 

and we will need to go the full distance in that regard if we are 

going to succeed in meeting our goals for reducing the ownership 

cost and increasing the operational availability for this complex aircraft, and we are committed to that end. 

In summary, the F–35 program is making solid progress across 

the full spectrum of development, production, testing, and fielding 

of capability. As known issues are retired, new issues will emerge, 

and these too will be wrestled to closure. The program’s forecast for 

delivery of initial operating capability for each of the services, including risk, is largely unchanged from one year ago. Yet, the size 

and complexity of this program and the capability it represents is 

such that a great amount of work remains ahead, leading to each 

ensuing IOC and subsequent operations and sustainment and modernization of the aircraft. 

We are careful to neither minimize our assessment of the inherent risks nor to avoid them, but rather to assess them realistically 

and manage them aggressively. The warfighter and our international partners deserve nothing less. 

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on the Joint Strike Fighter program. I look forward to answering your questions. 
9 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley and General 

Bogdan can be found in the Appendix on page 87.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I want to start with a question that goes to the public’s perception of this plane, the F–35. We all are very much aware of the difficulties that the F–35 has had both in development and in production and certainly in getting to operational capability. But I was 

surprised the other morning to wake up in my own hometown—Mr. 

Sullivan, you hail from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, so you 

may have similarly seen a huge headline across the Dayton Daily 

News that says: ‘‘Ohio Voters Favor Canceling Jet Fighter.’’ I 

thought it was kind of interesting for a couple of reasons. One, no 

one called me to ask me to quote for it, and it is my local newspaper. But it’s a Washington bureau that quotes a University of 

Maryland study, that then quotes a response from a Washington 

think tank. 

So I want to give you guys who actually know about the F–35 

an opportunity to discuss what this article raises, because there is 

a fundamental flaw in the study that gives the screaming headline 

of Ohio voters favor canceling the jet fighter. 

Apparently, they did an online poll, and we all know the liability 

of online polls of course, but there are 520 registered voters in 

Ohio. And it concludes that Ohio voters favor upgrading current 

fighters instead of going forward with the F–35 and resulting in a 

$97 billion savings to taxpayers by 2037. 

Now, obviously, we have not done a very good job of communicating the importance of the F–35 and its capability and why it 

is necessary. But the article does, I do want to give Jack Torry, the 

author of the story, credit. He does end with Loren Thompson, chief 

executive officer of the Lexington Institute in suburban Washington, with this quote: ‘‘It is impossible to upgrade any of our Cold 

War fighters that would be as survivable as a stealth plane. That 

is the biggest single appeal of the F–35, is that most enemy radars 

simply can’t see it. You can’t shoot down what you can’t see.’’ 

So the article concludes with an interesting point. But the fact 

that a poll is taken asking people would they rather upgrade something that is not upgradable rather than proceed with the F–35 

probably is something that bears our discussion. 

General Bogdan, help us here so we can give people some information so they can feel the importance of the investment in the F– 

35. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. I have to be a little bit careful because—— 

Mr. TURNER. I want to recognize—let me say it for you—I want 

to recognize that a portion obviously of the F–35 capabilities go 

into the classified realm and its adversaries’ capabilities are in the 

classified realm. So some of the capabilities of the F–35, the need 

for the F–35 cannot be discussed. But certainly the concept that 

this is fifth generation and that we cannot merely just plug and 

play with our old generation is probably worthy of a discussion. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. 

I agree with you. I have never been associated with a program 

in my 25-plus years of acquisition where the public perception and 

the reality are so different. Part of that is our problem for not tell-
10 

ing the story, but part of it is because the program is so big that 

every minor issue becomes a big issue. We have had a past that 

has not been conducive to people believing in what we say. We 

have added years and billions of dollars to the program in the past. 

Even though that hasn’t happened since 2010, people remember 

that. 

And it sometimes is difficult to explain to the public how air warfare is changing and how it is not a turn-and-burn airplane that 

looks really cool at an air show that is going to win the fight for 

the United States when we go into combat in the next 20 or 30 

years. 

So we do have a perception problem and we do have an information gap there. What do we do about that? 

First and foremost, I do want to thank the Congress for helping 

us. You do. And you do that in a number of ways. One, you help 

us by holding us accountable. And when people know that you are 

holding us accountable and we base what we do and say on our results, then people will start having a better understanding and a 

better trust in what this weapon system can do. 

On the Department side—and this is where I have to be careful, 

because I shouldn’t be necessarily a salesman for the F–35, you 

need me to be a little more balanced than that—but for our warfighters there is clearly a role for them to play in advocating for 

this airplane. And in the past we haven’t done a great job of that, 

simply because the airplane was immature, we were only operating 

at a number of locations, and we are still developing it. So let me 

just give you a few things that are going to happen this year that 

might change that a little bit. 

The Air Force has stood up an F–35 heritage flight, which means 

that the F–35 is now going to be publicly displayed in many, many 

places over the next year. In fact, they have 14 public events between now and the end of 2016, some of the places including Luke 

Air Force Base, Langley Air Force Base, Fort Lauderdale, New 

York City, Chicago, Baltimore, Reno, Las Vegas. So the Air Force 

is getting out there with the airplane to these air shows and is 

going to start talking to folks about the airplane. 

The U.S. Marine Corps and the Navy, similarly, when they go to 

sea this year for their sea trials, will bring media with them so 

that they can tell their story. The Dutch, who are a partner on this 

program, are planning on bringing their two airplanes to the Netherlands in June for 2 weeks for the very thing that you just talked 

about, Congressman Turner, to introduce the airplane to their public, to talk about it, and to talk about why the airplane is needed 

for them. The U.S. Marines, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.K. will 

bring five airplanes to Farnborough and RIAT [Royal International 

Air Tattoo] this year in July at the U.K. Air Show. 

So I think getting out there and telling the story is part of what 

we need to continue to do. I also think we need to continue to base 

things on fact. And when people out there don’t have the facts, 

then it is my job and my team’s job to correct the record for that. 

Mr. TURNER. And, General Bogdan, in getting to the issue of 

facts, this poll asked people would they rather upgrade the current 

fighters instead of proceeding with the F–35. Loren Thompson said: 

It is impossible to do what they have asked, you cannot upgrade 
11 

our Cold War fighters. Would you agree with the statement of 

Thompson and would you want to elaborate? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. You can only do so much with our 

fourth-generation fighters today. You can only add so many upgrades and structurally improve them to last a certain period of 

time. 

But what I will tell you from the knowledge I have on this program and the capabilities of the F–35, our legacy airplanes, now 

and in the future, will not survive the threat environments we 

know we are going to have to face. So no matter how much you upgrade them and how much you put into them, eventually they will 

not survive. 

This airplane differently. It will survive—— 

Mr. TURNER. In combat. 

General BOGDAN. In combat will survive for decades to come. 

Mr. TURNER. I just want to point one thing before I ask Mr. Sullivan his comments on this. This poll asks people about sticking 

with our current fighters through 2037. I wonder what the poll 

would have been if they asked people would they be willing to drive 

their current car through 2037. 

Mr. Sullivan, would you agree also that the poll is skewed in it 

gives people a false option, you can’t upgrade our current fighters, 

as Loren Thompson says, in any way that would be as survivable 

as the F–35? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think it is clear that this aircraft, fifth-gen aircraft, does things that the generations in the past can’t do, won’t 

ever be able to do. The stealthiness alone is a major part of this, 

but it is also probably more versatile. It is three different variants. 

It is replacing or complementing a number of different aircraft that 

are growing older every day as we sit here and are having service 

life extensions and things like that. 

So, yeah, I would agree that the F–35 is going to be a more 

versatile and a more powerful threat than what we have existing. 

And I think probably a lot of this has just come from—the past is 

the past, I understand that, but people still see a lot of money 

being put forth for the F–35. 

The other thing, I think, that you have to consider is that some 

of these aircraft, their production lines are shut down or they are 

not as hot as they used to be. And you can’t, I think, as General 

Bogdan said, you can’t plug and play these new technologies into 

those old aircraft anyway. So, yeah. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Sullivan, I appreciate your comments on that 

because you being the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing for this 

program with the U.S. Government Accountability Office, you are 

responsible for giving us some of the most critical oversight information that we have on the program. I know you know its difficulties and the areas in which we struggle to try to make certain that 

the program is effective. So I appreciate your overarching statement. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our beef has always just been with the acquisition strategy of this and many other programs. It takes way longer 

and costs more than they thought. But we have never really challenged the need for this or what its capabilities are eventually 

going to bring us. 
12 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. 

Mr. Stackley, Dr. Gilmore, do you wish to comment on this? Excellent. 

Dr. GILMORE. The fourth-generation aircraft that we have and 

the systems that they have, and even with upgrades, wouldn’t be 

able to handle the threats that we have already seen being deployed by our potential enemies for over half a decade. Those are 

very challenging air defense threats that are mobile, so you can’t 

count on knowing where they are. The F–35, with mission systems 

that work as I alluded to in my opening statement, will provide capability that we don’t have in any other platform to dynamically 

sense that very stressing mobile threat environment you can’t 

know ahead of time with certainty and deal with it. 

So that is why it is so important that we get the F–35, including 

its mission systems, to work. It will provide us capability that we 

otherwise won’t have and can’t get in upgraded systems. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Stackley. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, let me just add, our operational planning for major combat operations, first and foremost, relies upon 

air superiority, air dominance. The F–35 is not being designed and 

built for the fight today, it is being designed and built for the fight 

in the future against the high-end threat. So we are not willing to 

take risk in terms of maintaining air superiority that we will need 

in the 2020s, 2030s, and beyond. And the capabilities that are 

being brought to this aircraft are what we envision today as that 

necessary to overcome the threat in the future. 

I agree with Loren Thompson here that somebody is offering a 

false choice when they say we can just upgrade the existing fighters to get that level of capability. You cannot. The Navy/Marine 

Corps does have a mixed fleet in the future of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft. We will continue to have a mixed fleet at least 

through the mid-2030s. But we cannot enter high-end fight without 

the fifth-generation capability that the JSF brings. That is why we 

are so committed to this capability. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Very important discussion. 

Now turning, however, to some of the issues and difficulties that 

we have in making certain that this plane reaches its full potential. 

General Bogdan, Dr. Gilmore, and Mr. Sullivan’s testimony indicate that significant challenges still do remain in completing the 

final software block, Block 3F. As you know, this is the version of 

software that gives the F–35 a full wartime capability, so it is very 

important. You also indicated in your testimony that Block 3F software is likely to be delivered 4 months late. 

What is the operational significance if this software is delivered 

4 months late? Could it impact the current scheduled initial operational test and evaluation, IOT&E test? And what risk-mitigation 

actions are you taking to be able to fix this? 

General BOGDAN. Thank you, sir. 

The issue today with the Block 3 software—and we see the problem in both our 3i, or 3 initial, software and in our 3F software— 

has to do with stability. 

And just very quickly, what the pilots are seeing is, when they 

take off and they need to use the sensors, particularly the radar, 
13 

there are some instances where the communication between the 

radar and the main computers in the airplane are mistimed. 

And that mistiming builds up little delays. And eventually those 

delays get to be big enough where the radar shuts off. Okay? And 

the radar will recover, but it will recover and take a few minutes 

to regain the picture that it had. Some of the other sensors experience the same thing. That is not good. 

We are experiencing that kind of problem about once every 4 

hours of flight time. We need the system to be much more stable 

in that, something on the order of once every 8 to 10 hours. 

So what we did when we found this problem out in the last few 

months is we went back and did a root cause analysis. As I just 

talked about, we know it is a timing issue. Lockheed Martin has 

a number of fixes in the software that we are about to flight test, 

starting next week in our next version of 3i software. In the next 

month or so we will know if those fixes work. 

If those fixes work, the stability fixes and some of the other software fixes, then the impact of this problem to Air Force IOC will 

be minimal. The impact to the remaining testing of 3F, as I said, 

will probably just delay the end of flight test about 4 months. That 

does not impact Navy IOC because we had some margin there, but 

it clearly would impact how ready the airplanes are for IOT&E. 

So we are looking forward to the flight tests that we are going 

to do in the next month or so to see if we have this solved. If we 

do have it solved, again, no impact to Air Force IOC, no impact to 

Navy IOC, but probably an impact overall to the end of testing, 

and that would eventually impact the start of IOT&E. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Bogdan, I must have misunderstood. You were 

describing a problem with the software that you said would occur 

one time every 4 hours, but it would be okay if it occurred every 

8 to 10 hours. Isn’t that still a problem with the software? 

General BOGDAN. With 8 million lines of code in the airplane, it 

is not unusual for both legacy airplanes and modern fifth-generation airplanes every now and then to have to reset one of the sensors in flight or have an automatic reset. That is not an uncommon 

situation. 

What we find is, if that happens more frequently and it happens 

at critical times, then that impacts the pilot’s ability to get the mission done. But over time and historically we have seen that somewhere between 8 and 10 hours is probably about what we can expect and that, according to the warfighters, is good enough. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for clarifying that. 

Mr. Sullivan, Dr. Gilmore, would you like to clarify on the 3F 

software. 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, the rate at which these instability incidents 

were occurring with Block 2B was one every 30-plus hours, and 

now it is one every 4 hours. And the initial versions of Block 3i 

don’t provide any more combat capability than Block 2B, it was 

supposed to be rehosting of Block 2B with the new processor. 

So with regard to whether 8 to 10 hours is sufficient, what you 

want is a low probability that during a combat mission, which comprise several hours, you want a low probability that one of these 

upsets that takes time to reset—and several minutes in the middle 

of a fight is not acceptable—you want the time between these in-
14 

stability incidents to be long enough that you have a very low probability it would occur in a multi-hour combat mission. 

Whether 8 hours would be sufficient is something that we will 

certainly be looking at in IOT&E. It was much better than once 

every 8 hours with the Block 2B software. And again, 3i initially 

provided no more capability than Block 2B. 

Now, as we add capability and more complexity in Block 3F, you 

might see the numbers come down again. Ultimately, operational 

testing will tell us what is sufficient. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yeah, I think, depending on the mission scenarios 

and things like that, it is certainly a critical thing. I don’t know 

if I would want to be a pilot and watch the screen go blank. But 

it is a spec, I assume, it is a spec that the contractor has, they are 

in development. We have talked to the contractor and the program 

office about this and it is a very serious problem. But 2B had 

issues and they worked through those and I would hope they can 

do the same with 3i. And I think probably they will be the same 

thing with 3F. 

So eventually I would hope that they will work that out and get 

it to whatever the spec is, which I would hope would support the 

warfighter. And if they do that—that is why the timing is so critical, because you would want that done by IOCs obviously, you 

would want to be able to go to IOT&E with problems like that 

under your belt as opposed to adding that to the burden of the 

operational testers. 

Mr. TURNER. I am going to ask Mr. Stackley to follow up, but I 

have a few other questions that I am going to have to get through, 

but considering this is our last day for votes, I want to be sensitive 

to members who might need to leave. Since I am the only one on 

this side, I am going to ask unanimous consent if I let Mr. Stackley 

respond. And then the order is Mr. Johnson, Gallego, and Ms. 

Graham. 

What I will do is I will let each of you ask your questions, and 

then I will go back to my next question, and then we will finish 

up, and that way you can exit, if that is okay. 

Mr. Stackley. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir, very briefly. The 2B software is 

performing very stably and I think everybody is satisfactory with 

its performance. The rehosting of that software into the new what 

is referred to as tech refresh on the JSF, the complexity of that 

rehosting should not be understated. We went through that on this 

tech refresh. We don’t anticipate as large a leap in future tech refresh. But that complexity should not be understated. 

That did create a reset in terms of stability and now with each 

such successful build of software going back at building back up 

the degree of stability that we require. General Bogdan’s reference 

to an 8 to 10 hours at this stage of the program, that probably is 

satisfactory. In the longer haul, Dr. Gilmore is correct, we want to 

get this up to a low probability of occurrence such that the pilot 

does not have to worry about resetting his mission systems midflight. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
15 

To follow up on your questions about the need for our country to 

invest in a fifth generation of aircraft to take over from the legacy 

aircraft that have been flying for decades now, the F/A–18, the A– 

10, and the AV–8B, would all be replaced by our investment in the 

F–35 fifth generation. 

And it is important to note that other nations are investing in 

fifth-generation aircraft—the Russians, the Chinese—and that is 

what we mean by a changing threat environment, which America 

must step up to the plate. And if it intends to remain superior in 

the air, we must step up to the plate and invest and prepare for 

the long term. And that is what the F–35 enables us to do. 

With respect to those who may have participated in the poll that 

Chairman Turner referred to and were of the opinion that we 

should extend the legacy fleet and rely on it for our future protection, isn’t it—and I assume they want to do that because it saves 

money. So penny-wise, pound-foolish, that would apply in this kind 

of a situation here. 

Isn’t it a fact that if America were to do what some prefer, which 

is to extend the life of the legacy fleet, isn’t it a fact that operations 

and supply costs to extend the legacy fleet would cost approximately four times what operations and support costs would be for 

the F–35 over the next 50 years? Isn’t it a fact? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, let me start with responding to that. 

I don’t know about the four times number, but what we do know 

is that—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Approximately. 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. As our aircraft age, for example the early versions of the F–18 that the F–35 Bs and Cs are 

going to be replacing, the A through D version, as they age, the 

cost of sustaining them, the cost of keeping them flying, the availability rates for those aircraft, they are, frankly, hurting us in 

terms of our strike fighter inventory for today. 

So we have got to get this next version, generation of aircraft, 

not just the capability, but also to retire the legacy aircraft that are 

costing us today. So as that timeline extrapolates out, all the legacy 

aircraft could be running into similar costs associated with sustaining a fleet that is not just old, but a lot of the sustainment is 

dealing with obsolete parts and capabilities that fall short of what 

we require for the warfighter. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Anyone else want to add to that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would just say that I wouldn’t focus as much on 

the cost for O&S. The Joint Strike Fighter is going to be very costly 

with sustainment too. It is more about the capability. They need 

that greater capability. The fifth-generation aircraft is really just 

far superior. 

I think O&S costs, it would cost a lot to keep these legacy aircraft in the air—I know the Harriers are really old—and eventually 

they just won’t be able to fly them, I would think, after a while. 

So there is just nothing out there. The F–16 is another aircraft 

that the F–35 is going to replace. So there is an awful lot of aircraft 

it replaces. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Lieutenant General Bogdan and Secretary Stackley, the Marine 

Corps declared initial operational capability last year for the F–35B 
16 

and the Air Force is planning to do the same this year. This, to me, 

demonstrates a program that is maturing and reaching a point 

where it would benefit from increased production. Do you agree? 

And if so, what are some of the benefits and increased production 

rates for the F–35 program? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me start. First, it clearly reflects a program that is maturing. It was mentioned earlier that back in 2010 

we restructured the program and within months we are holding to 

that restructured program’s schedule here in 2016 and our costs at 

the same time are coming down in terms of production while we 

hold the line on development. 

The program is methodically increasing its production rates to 

today in terms of both the U.S. and our international partners and 

foreign military sales customers joining in that production. So the 

production rate is methodically increasing. And what we are seeing 

in terms of benefit is we are accelerating the learning curve on the 

production floor, it is driving down our costs. And as described earlier, we are seeing positive trends by every measure as it relates 

to both airframe and engine manufacturing. 

The longer term, when we complete IOT&E and getting to the 

full-rate production decision, I think we are on track for that, 

again, within months, within a budget cycle. And as we march in 

that direction, we are looking forward to such vehicles as block 

buying contract and ultimately multiyear contracting to, again, further leverage the benefits of a stable design, mature production 

lines, and then let’s buy it as efficiently as possible. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Turning back to the initial operating capability concerns and the 

requirements for later this year, General Bogdan, in attention to 

software development I understand that General Welsh is closely 

watching the progress of the Autonomic Logistics Information System, known as ALIS, as well as challenges facing aircraft software 

stability which is affecting the radar. As you know, ALIS was a significant area of concern raised by maintainers during our visit to 

the Eglin Air Force Base last year. 

Please provide us with a short update on these two issues and 

what your concerns are concerning the IOC later this year. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. As I said before, within the next 30 

days we ought to know if the fixes we have put into the software 

on stability will take hold. And if that is the case, then we will incrementally upgrade the Air Force’s airplanes at Hill Air Force 

Base with that version of software and the software stability issue 

will not impact their ability to declare IOC. 

That is not the case with ALIS. ALIS, the next increment of capability we are delivering, as you know, is 2.0.2, and we were supposed to have that fielded by August of this year. I am estimating 

that that delivery of that system is probably about 60 days late 

now. I am not sure if we will be able to pull that schedule back 

any. If that is the case, then it will be up to the U.S. Air Force to 

decide what to do in August when it comes to ALIS 2.0.2 if it is 

going to be about 60 days late. 

Mr. TURNER. Does anyone else wish to comment? 
17 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would only say that we have another team within GAO that is looking and specifically kind of looking at ALIS. 

And I believe they have a draft report over on the Hill right now. 

That might be helpful, to look for that. In fact, I can probably make 

sure that the committee gets a draft copy of that. 

[The report referred to, GAO–16–439, is retained in the subcommittee files; it can be found online at http://gao.gov/products/ 

GAO-16-439.] 

Mr. TURNER. That would be great. We should, because we had 

significant concerns for the maintenance group. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yeah. So this team is focused really on O&S and 

ALIS and things like that. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General BOGDAN. Can I make one other comment, sir, about 

ALIS, very quickly? If you went to Eglin Air Force Base today or 

if you went to Luke Air Force Base, what you would find over the 

past year is not all, but many of the maintenance workarounds and 

burdens that we placed on the maintainers over the last few years 

are systematically getting improved. 

We are not anywhere near where we need to be with ALIS, but 

I think what you would get from the maintainers if you talked to 

them today is the fact that they do indeed see an improvement 

each and every time we put out a new version of software, which 

means the trending is going in the right direction, we just have a 

long way to go. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

One thing we know is that consumers weren’t given iPhones 

until they were done. You have to, however, put planes in pilots’ 

hands while you are still developing them. And so we all get to look 

over your shoulder as you are doing it, and we appreciate both the 

work of the GAO and others to ensure that we have the right todo list, but your diligence to try to make certain we complete it. 

Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

General Bogdan, the original concept of the F–35 platform was 

to retain about 70 percent similarity between the three variants in 

order to keep costs down on the budget. But as we know, this has 

not been achieved, which calls the original concept into question. 

Knowing this, would you support programs in the future that 

aim for commonality between platforms for the services or do you 

think these efforts would also have too many cost and schedule 

overruns? 

General BOGDAN. Congressman, what I have said before about 

joint programs is that they are hard, they are neither good nor bad, 

and it really depends on how you manage them. But they are indeed hard, and they are hard because when you bring together a 

number of different customers that may have varying requirements, it is sometimes hard to meet all those requirements without 

going to the least common denominator. 

And so what I would tell you is a decision to move forward on 

any platform in the joint arena would depend on how much overlap 

the services see in the requirements that they have. There are opportunities outside of a joint program to benefit from commonality, 

using similar engines, using similar flight control systems. But to 
18 

embody that in the same airplane that would try and meet the requirements of varied customers is a really hard thing to do. 

Mr. GALLEGO. I hope we will remember that in the future. 

Moving on to pilots, though. An October subcommittee hearing 

discussed the problems with the ejection process for pilots. Two solutions you talked about were developing lighter helmets and managing parachute timing after ejection. However, today we find out 

the GAO report notes that the helmet weight was not the root 

cause of neck injuries during ejection. 

What is the status of the efforts to protect our pilots, one? And 

with certainty, can you say that we’ve identified all the problems 

related to this issue? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, Congressman. One point of clarification. 

There are two technical issues as to why a pilot less than 136 

pounds has an added risk of injury during ejection. One of them 

is indeed because the helmet is too heavy, but the other is a technical issue having to do with the way the seat fires up and the center of gravity of a light pilot. But both of those problems contribute. 

We have three fixes in place to remedy this. The first is an ejection seat switch. That will be set by the pilot based on his or her 

weight. We have tested that. We are in the design phase of it. And 

that fix will be cut into production on our lot 10, and we will start 

retrofitting airplanes with that fix in November of this year. 

We also have a head support panel, which is a pad that will be 

sewn into the risers of the parachute. That fix has been tested. It 

too will be incorporated into lot 10 and it will start being retrofitted in November. 

Relative to the helmet weight, we needed to get the helmet down 

to about 4.6 pounds. We are in process of doing that as we speak. 

Originally the estimate was that that helmet wouldn’t be ready for 

fielding until November of 2017. I can report now that that helmet 

will be available in November of 2016. 

So when we have the switch, the helmet support pad, and the 

lighter helmet out there in November, I believe by the end of this 

year we can remove the requirement of a pilot not being able to fly 

the airplane less than 136 pounds. 

Mr. GALLEGO. And then just the second portion of my question 

was, can you say with certainty that we have identified all the 

problems related to this issue in terms of our pilot safety ejection. 

General BOGDAN. Sir, we have 14 more sled tests and ejection 

tests to go between now and September. So I cannot tell you right 

now definitively that we won’t find other things. 

What I will tell you is we will completely test it. If there are 

problems, we have a good track record of fixing them. Because we 

will not put pilots’ lives in danger by putting them in an airplane 

and an ejection system that is not safe. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Bogdan, as you are aware, a lot of our discussions between you and the committee are based upon our visit to Eglin Air 

Force Base, and the questions that we pose are a result of that 

fact-finding trip. There were 14 of them. And you have continued 

to both answer those questions and update them. I have your 

March 17, 2016, letter in response continuing to update us on those 
19 

issues. If there is no objection, I am going to enter this into the 

record of your discussion on these items and the issues that we 

have been looking for, for oversight. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

General BOGDAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen. 

I remain a strong supporter of a fifth-generation fighter, having 

been an airman myself. Knowing the threats that we have that are 

emanating, we need that capability. However, I remain concerned 

about the close air support of FAC(A) [forward air controller-airborne] and combat search and rescue missions that are currently 

being done by the A–10 Warthog and the F–35’s capabilities to replace that without increasing risk to American lives. 

General Bogdan, can you confirm that the F–35 requirements 

document is still that the F–35 would replace the A–10 and the F– 

16? 

General BOGDAN. Ma’am, what I will tell you is the requirements 

document that I have on the program does not specifically say that 

it will replace the A–10 and the F–16. My requirements document 

has to do with what the capabilities of the F–35 is. The decision 

to replace airplanes with the F–35 is a service decision. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. I think, though, on the program page, I 

mean, the intent of the Department, the intent of certainly the Air 

Force is that the F–35 will replace the A–10 and the F–16. Is that 

fair to say? 

General BOGDAN. I would believe, from the public statements I 

have heard from the Chief and the Secretary and the combatant 

commanders, that is a true statement. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. And I think that is also on the JSF Web 

site, as well, for the program. 

On March 3rd, the Air Force Chief of Staff said in a hearing that 

the mission capability of the A–10 will not be replaced by the F– 

35. He also talked to me about this after our hearing last week. He 

went on to say the A–10’s current workload would be handled by 

the F–16 and the F–15E. This was a total surprise to me to hear 

him say this, to be frank with you. So I am concerned. 

And I look at their 5-year plan, that they are going to start mothballing more A–10s, next year, 49; 49 the year after that; 64 the 

year after that; 98 the year after that, finishing in fiscal year 2022. 

When do you think, again, we are going to be at FOC [full operational capability] for the F–35? 

General BOGDAN. Ma’am, the full capability of the F–35 relative 

to close air support will be delivered in the late 2017 timeframe. 

We will have additional capabilities in our block for modernization 

that would make that mission more viable for the F–35. And I am 

not sure if the Air Force has declared an FOC date yet. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. But from the testimony, I think, for Dr. Gilmore, I mean, we have seen the F–35A, and we have talked about 

this in previous hearings, capabilities are limited, 20, 30 minutes 

time on station; two bombs; you know, excuse my language, but we 

call one pass haul ass; no time to loiter; having to go to tankers; 
20 

† ‘‘Sandy’’ refers to a mission in which an aircraft (most often an A–10) is tasked to support 

and provide protective coverage for a combat search and rescue mission to recover an ejected 

pilot behind enemy lines. 

being Winchester; 182 bullets; limited night capability; inability to 

get data; targeting information; inability to survive a direct hit in 

close combat. These are all limitations we know about, we have 

talked about in previous hearings. 

So, Dr. Gilmore, I appreciate that your office has decided to do 

a comparison test between the F–35 and the A–10 on close air support. And I am concerned also about the combat search and rescue 

and the forward air control mission. Can you give us an update on 

that comparison test and when that is going to happen and whether there are any concerns about funding or its continuation in another administration? 

Dr. GILMORE. First, with regard to requirements, I reviewed the 

requirements document before I came here. And there is a clear 

statement at the beginning of the requirements document, which 

has been in force for a number of years now, that the F–35 would 

replace the A–10. 

Ms. MCSALLY. That is what I thought. Thanks, Dr. Gilmore. 

Dr. GILMORE. I am happy to send you a copy of that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Please do. 

Dr. GILMORE. In any event, with regard to—— 

General BOGDAN. Can I correct the record? When I talk about requirements on the program, I talk about a specification that I put 

contractors on to deliver a capability. The document you are talking about is a service document known as an operational requirements document,—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

General BOGDAN [continuing]. An ORD, which I do not control. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. GILMORE. And that’s the one the Chief of the Air Force, the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force signed—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. 

Dr. GILMORE [continuing]. Namely, the operational requirements 

document. So that is what I was talking about. 

With regard to the close air support tests, comparison tests, yes, 

we are planning that. We are planning all the open air tests as we 

speak, working with the joint operational test team and the services. We expect to have that effort completed in June or July of this 

year. And we are happy to share those results with the committee 

and with you. 

With regard to funding, the costs of the close air support tests, 

including combat search and rescue [CSAR] and Sandy †—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE [continuing]. Compared to not doing them—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE [continuing]. You know, compared to not having the 

A–10s fly, you know, conducting the same missions that the F–35s 

would conduct in those two areas or those three areas, varies between $3.5 million and $5.2 million. The difference is the amount 

of refly that you have to do. When you are doing—just like when 

you are doing a test, you can’t count on every scenario that you are 

trying to run actually working. 
21 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE. So you have to plan in the test for refly, the same 

way General Bogdan is planning for refly in developmental testing. 

So that is the reason for the range of $3.5 million to $5.2 million. 

We are working to, with the joint operational test team, to fit all 

of these comparison tests within the budget for operational testing, 

which was established, I think, about 5 years ago in the TEMP 

[Test and Evaluation Master Plan] that is now rather out of date. 

But, nonetheless, we take that budget seriously. And we are working to fit all the comparison testing within that budget. 

If there is—if we do go over, which, again, we are trying very 

hard not to do because we do take that budget limit seriously, it 

wouldn’t be by more than 10 or 15 percent. And I would remind 

the committee that the Block 2B operational utility evaluation, 

which was supposed to have been done in 2015, was canceled at 

my recommendation 2 years ago because it was clear to me that 

the aircraft wouldn’t be ready for that kind of rigorous operational 

test. And the service acquisition executives agreed. And that was 

a savings of about $100 million. 

So we are working to keep within the existing budget and the 

CAS comparison testing, CSAR, and so forth is, again, a small 

amount of the overall cost, $3.5 million to $5.2 million. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks, Dr. Gilmore. I am over my time. But 

could you—when would we be able to have those results delivered 

to Congress of the tests, do you think? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, if we begin the operational testing, according 

to my estimate, which would be mid-calendar year 2018, the operational test will compose, will comprise, rather, about a year. It 

will take about a year. And then it would be a few months after 

that, no more than 6, hopefully fewer, to actually finish the report. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So late 2019, early 2020 would be fair? 

Dr. GILMORE. Yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Walz. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you all for being 

here again. We really appreciate it. The strategic need for the F– 

35, I think everyone knows that. We hear it. It is now crunch time, 

though, on the delivery piece of it. 

And, General Bogdan, you are right, there is a perception issue 

both in what they are going to get and what they expect to get. But 

there is also this perception that I have held and I have used this 

as an example. 

I have been to no less than 14 hearings dealing with changes to 

retirement plans, taking away of the housing allowance, transferability of the GI Bill benefit, commissary changes, and TRICARE. 

And where that relates to this is the perception out there is, is 

when the Pentagon needs to save money, they go to those programs. And I always use the example that we haven’t had as many 

of these. 

So I hear statements like this from one of our partners from the 

Australian Defence Force, I think it was Keith Joiner said it. He’s 

responsible for evaluating this, and he said some systems like the 
22 

radar are fundamentally worse than earlier, which is not a good 

sign. The next software version Block 4 won’t be available. So here 

we are with bug fixes for the next 7 years. And they are looking, 

am I correct in this, they are reevaluating their purchases on this. 

So I go back home. I talk to soldiers and sailors, say, ‘‘So I just 

lost a GI Bill benefit. What is happening with this?’’ How do I talk 

to them about it? Is it a matter of until you deliver it, this is just 

going to go on? Because I do kind of feel like I am asked to come 

into the play and do my part and say this, and then it is going to 

be delivered. How do I go back? How would you answer on this? 

General BOGDAN. It is a tough question, Congressman. And I 

clearly understand the point of view here. I guess the best I would 

offer, if I were asked that question, is that bringing a new weapon 

system online to defend our country is never easy. And it always 

is fraught with mistakes, bad choices, technical challenges. And the 

history of especially developing airplanes has been murky. We have 

had lots of problems over the years bringing new airplanes online. 

Mr. WALZ. And that is a helpful piece. You have more experience 

in this. How similar is this to when the F–16 came on? How similar is what we are seeing here today? 

General BOGDAN. The F–16 was a very simple airplane when it 

first came out and over the years got more complicated. And it had 

setbacks. I am not sure if you are aware, the very first flight of the 

F–16, sir, was an accident. They were not supposed to take off. Because of the flight control system not being properly rigged, the 

pilot, in order to save the airplane, had to take off. So airplanes 

experience this. 

Mr. WALZ. No, I think that is true. And I want to be clear on 

this so that I am not, and I am not teeing this up, because I am 

one who believes we need these systems. Is it apples to oranges because of the exponential technical differences between that launch 

and this launch? And I know that is kind of a hard question because we were at our technological limit then and now maybe we 

are there, so it may be similar to that. But is it the case that there 

is more things that can go wrong so they probably will? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, let me jump in and say that is absolutely the case. And it is not unique to the F–35 program. We are 

going after a high-end capability on this and other warfare systems 

that are significantly more complex than the systems that they are 

replacing. So there is no such thing as replacing legacy, whether 

it is aircraft, missile systems, ships, tactical vehicles, on a one-forone basis anywhere near the same cost of those legacy systems because these are so much more capable. 

You know, the comments and perceptions from folks that are not 

well informed on the program, those are tough to defeat because 

now you are talking about an education process. 

The reality is that the F–35 program, albeit it has gone through 

restructuring, is on a path to deliver all the capability that was 

promised from day one. It is going to cost more than what was estimated back in the 2002 timeframe. Those costs were rebaselined in 

2010. And we have kept those under control to the extent that now 

we are actually reducing costs with time as the program gets more 

and more mature. 
23 

What you are not hearing, and I think General Bogdan touched 

on this earlier, is the warfighters that are flying this plane, what 

their perception is. My comment in the opening statement was the 

Marines love this aircraft, absolutely love this aircraft. This is 

what they plan to go to war with, if called upon. I think that you 

are going to hear that overtake the other rhetoric over time as 

more and more of our Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy pilots, 

and our international partners climb into this cockpit, see what its 

capability is, train with it, and then deploy with it over time. 

Mr. WALZ. Yes, Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Your question is an excellent question. And it is 

not just the F–35 program. It is about the acquisition process. We 

do acquisition reform all the time. And actually, it has been improving the last few years. But the bottom-line answer to this is 

there has got to be a little truth in advertising when these weapon 

systems start up because they are always started up with optimistic cost estimates and schedules. 

This program was originally planned to be completed, everything 

purchased, by 2026. Now that is 2038. And so that additional 12 

years of funding—— 

Mr. WALZ. And that has as much to do with this side of the table 

as that side. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yeah. So, I mean, and that is what you are talking about, is that the Congress is faced with unplanned, you know, 

funding for 12 years that they weren’t planning on when they 

started. Like I said, it is not the F–35, it is most of the major weapon systems. They just don’t have a good business case at the outset. 

The F–16 was a really good aircraft when it was delivered, and 

it was simple. And it is not that simple anymore. It is a very complex aircraft because they planned it properly. They had incremental planning on that and they did block upgrades. That is really what, I think what this is all about. And so other priorities go 

by the wayside. 

Mr. WALZ. I know. Well, thank you. I yield back. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do just want to follow 

up on our discussion on requirements, just to make sure. Luckily, 

I flew airplanes, I never had to procure them. So this process 

seems a little cumbersome to me. 

But just, Dr. Gilmore, an Air Force Chief of Staff has said that 

the A–10 will not be replaced by the F–35, on the record, within 

the last few weeks. And then said that to me in a conversation last 

week, surprising me. Is the Air Force going to be updating their 

ORD, or whatever you just called it—— 

Dr. GILMORE. The operational requirements document? I haven’t 

heard that they are. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. To reflect that? 

Dr. GILMORE. I haven’t heard that they are. And then the F–35s 

are going to be replacing the F–16s. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE. So I am a bit puzzled. But all I know is what the 

existing operational requirements document said. 
24 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. So you know of no efforts to update that. 

And if it is currently—— 

Dr. GILMORE. I am not aware of any. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. Going to be replacing the A–10 and 

the F–16, but he is saying the F–16 is going to replace the A–10, 

but then the F–35 is going to replace the F–16, then we are still 

in the same situation where we are. In specific circumstances for 

close air support, we potentially have additional risk or a gap or 

capabilities that are going to be degraded, which is why it is so important that we have this flyoff. Do you agree, Dr. Gilmore? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, you know, I don’t know whether the capabilities will be degraded. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE. That is what the comparison testing is supposed to 

find out. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely. 

Dr. GILMORE. And that is why we are planning it to be, you 

know, absolutely fair. We are going to consider all the conditions 

under which close air support are done, all the different kinds of 

threats. And it certainly will be a challenge. 

In fact, the A–10 couldn’t survive in the highest threat environments. But we are also looking at, you know, less stressing threats 

like the ones that the A–10 is being used in, the environments it 

is being used in today: urban, rural situations, buildings, vehicle 

personnel, different kinds of control for the close air support, different kinds of control interaction, all of the things that you know 

are done in close air support missions. 

We are going to set up the missions. And then the A–10 pilots 

and the F–35 pilots will use those two aircraft to their best capabilities, using whatever TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] 

they have. We are certainly not going to specify how the missions 

are done. We are going to specify what the mission is. And then 

we will do matched pairs comparisons of how well each set of pilots 

and aircraft can perform those missions the way they choose to. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. And it seems like there is just 

some different messages coming out of the Pentagon. I mean, the 

Secretary of Defense, when he announced his budget, said A–10s 

will be replaced squadron by squadron, with the F–35 predetermining the outcome of this test. So we are trying to get some consistency out of the Pentagon by just asking these questions. I highlighted this to the Secretary yesterday. We are going to follow up 

with him and the Chairman. Because it just seems like even between the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense, they have got 

two different messages going on here. 

We believe that any movement forward should be conditional. 

Let’s have the test. Let’s get the results of the test. And then let’s 

make a decision afterwards as to whether we are going to be increasing risks to our troops on the ground. 

So I appreciate the additional time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

gentlemen. And I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, this is one of our most important and certainly largest programs. And I want to thank each of you for your diligence 

in trying to ensure that this program reaches all of the capabilities 
25 

that are obviously going to be necessary. Because of that, before we 

conclude, knowing your diligence, I want to give each of you an opportunity if you have anything else that you want to put on the 

record or that you want to raise before the committee as we consider this, knowing that your input is incredibly important. 

If not, I know we have your opening statements. And we continue to have your advice and counsel. We appreciate the information you have provided to the committee. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 23, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. What do you think are the biggest hurdles for the program to overcome to be ready for IOT&E? 

Dr. GILMORE. The current plan to complete development and enter IOT&E by August 2017 is unrealistic. Several obstacles must be overcome before IOT&E can 

begin. These include: • Completion of Block 3F development. The completion of Block 3F development 

will provide full combat capability to the F–35, including the ability to employ 

the full suite of weapons planned for the F–35. However, the program has completed less than 20 percent of the baseline Block 3F test points as of the end 

of April 2016. Completing the remaining nearly 4,200 baseline points will likely 

not occur until the end of January 2018, based on historical test point burn 

rates. 

• Weapons integration. Much of the weapons testing remains, particularly to support the additional weapons being brought on with Block 3F (SDB, JSOW, 

AIM–9X, and the gun) 

• Mission data. The programming lab that provides mission data needs to be upgraded to provide adequate, optimized, and tested mission data files for IOT&E. 

Despite being provided a $45 Million budget in FY13, the program has still not 

designed, contracted for, and ordered the required equipment—a process that 

will take at least two years, not counting installation and check-out. As a result, 

the signal generators needed to adequately test the mission data loads against 

advanced threat waveforms will probably not arrive until 2019 at the soonest, 

causing risk to F–35 avionics performance during IOT&E and in combat. 

• Sustainment. The program set a target of 60 percent aircraft availability for the 

fleet as an objective at the end of CY14, but has yet to reach that goal. To efficiently complete the mission trials during IOT&E, most of which will require 

4-ship formations of a single variant (out of 6-aircraft fleets of each US variant), 

the program will need to have an availability of approximately 80 percent, 

which is also the availability that will be required to succeed in actual combat. 

Improvements in reliability and maintainability, along with significant improvements to ALIS, are all needed. 

• Modifications to operational test aircraft. The operational test aircraft must be 

production-representative and have the required instrumentation called for in 

the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). Modifying the currently designated fleet of operational test aircraft to the Block 3F configuration would extend beyond August 2017. Although the requirement to modify these aircraft 

has been known for years by the program and Lockheed-Martin, adequate plans 

were not made to accommodate these modifications. For example, all of the 

operational test aircraft need the Tech Refresh 2 (TR2) processors, which have 

been included in the production aircraft since Lot 6 aircraft were delivered in 

late 2014, but TR2 processors for retrofitting the OT aircraft were not ordered 

in time to support completing modifications prior to August 2017. 

There is very little which can be done to mitigate these timelines to meet an August 2017 IOT&E start date. Although the program office is considering options 

with the Services provide operational test aircraft earlier, either by getting parts 

from the production line or from later-lot aircraft, or by substituting in newer aircraft, decisions must be made soon to have the TEMP-required number of production-representative aircraft in time for IOT&E. 

Mr. TURNER. Do the F–35 development and production schedules have more or 

less risk than last year and what is that level of risk? 

Dr. GILMORE. My assessment is that the progress in development over the past 

year has been less than planned, and hence—given the shorter timeline remaining 

to the completion of System Development and Demonstration (SDD)—the risk to the 

development schedule is greater than it was last year. The program’s decision to 

pause the Block 3F mission systems development in order to address the Block 3i 

stability and other deficiencies was a good decision, but the needed fixes came at 

a cost to schedule. For several reasons, SDD will likely not be complete before 

March 2018, at the earliest. This assessment is based on the following assumptions: 
126 

• Block 3i mission systems testing is complete and will not need to restart 

• Block 3i stability fixes have been successfully transferred to the Block 3F software 

• Block 3F mission systems has restarted in earnest with all SDD aircraft 

• The balance of approximately 4,200 Block 3F mission systems baseline test 

points (the number as of the beginning of May) will be completed by the test 

teams, without significant deletions by the program 

• No additional discoveries which cause significant delays or unplanned software 

releases (beyond those currently planned) occur in Block 3F flight testing 

• All planned weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) events—which include 25 events 

with air-to-air missiles or bombs and two sets 19 WDA events supporting of gun 

tests, one with the embedded gun in the F–35A and one with the podded gun 

for the F–35B and F–35C—are completed before the end of SDD. As of the end 

of April, none of these WDA events had been completed and will likely not 

begin before August 2016, after a version of software is released to flight test 

that will support the start the of the WDA events. The latest Program Office 

schedule shows that the missile and bomb events are planned to start in June 

and be complete by the end of November 2016, a schedule that I consider to 

be unrealistic. The program has prioritized 16 of the 25 bomb and missile 

events to be completed to support flight certification of weapons releases for 

Block 3F; however, all events, including the WDAs with the gun, must be completed to support end-to-end fire control characterization for all required weapons prior to the start of IOT&E. Although possible, the program’s ability to complete these events before March 2018 will depend on efficiencies in completing 

WDA events and data analyses that have not been seen in the past (i.e., during 

the Block 2B and Block 3i WDA events) and the maturity of mission systems 

software to support the find-fix-track-target-engage-assess kill chain for each of 

these events. 

Concerning production risk, the program continues to have discoveries from testing that require modifications to be cut into production and retrofits to fielded aircraft. These discoveries are reflective of a design that is still not mature. Recent examples include cracking in the titanium bulkhead of the F–35C durability test article (CJ–1) where significant limitations to the life of the fielded F–35C aircraft can 

only be addressed with intrusive structural modifications prior to the expected full 

service life, and show again the high cost of concurrent production and development. 

Another example is the observed structural exceedances in both the F–35A and F– 

35C at the external carriage points for the AIM–9X missile—a weapon being integrated in Block 3F. Both aircraft have shown structural exceedances during in-flight 

maneuvering, and the F–35C during simulated carrier landings. The program is currently investigating a way forward to address these structural exceedances. 

Mr. TURNER. Your report mentioned some concerns in your annual report about 

the U.S. Reprograming Lab not having the equipment necessary to produce the software necessary for F–35 combat operations. What are the implications of the USRL 

not having the required equipment? 

Dr. GILMORE. Significant, correctable deficiencies exist in the U.S. Reprogramming Laboratory (USRL) that will preclude development and adequate testing of effective mission data loads for Block 3F. Despite a $45 Million budget provided to 

the Program Office in FY13, the required equipment was not ordered in time and 

the USRL is still not configured properly to build and optimize Block 3F Mission 

Data Files (MDFs). The program still has not designed, contracted for, and ordered 

all of the required equipment—a process that will take at least two years for some 

of the complex equipment—after which significant time for installation and checkout will be required. The estimate of earliest completion, with the required signal 

generators and other upgrades to properly test Block 3F mission data loads, is late 

2019, which is after the planned IOT&E of Block 3F. As I explain in my annual 

report, the corrections to the USRL are needed to provide the F–35 with the ability 

to succeed against the modern threats that are the key rationale for pursuing this 

$400-Billion program. If the situation with the USRL is not rectified, U.S. F–35 

forces will be at substantial risk of failure if used in combat against these threats. 

Further, I note that the laboratory being built to provide MDFs to the partner nations will be more capable than the USRL is when we are preparing for IOT&E. 

The program must take immediate action to complete required modifications and 

upgrades to the lab before the USRL is required to provide the Block 3F mission 

data load for tactics development and preparations for IOT&E. 

Mr. TURNER. Are you concerned that the program paused its software development schedule to try and fix the avionics stability problems and other critical deficiencies in Block 3i and 3F? 
127 

Dr. GILMORE. No, I am not concerned. In fact, I applaud the program’s effort to 

change from the schedule-driven, concurrent development process that the program 

was previously using to develop, test, and field versions of missions systems software to pursue a serial approach of addressing deficiencies before moving on to the 

next iteration of software. The decision by the program in February to return to the 

Block 3i configuration and address the poor mission systems performance has 

caused some near-term delays, but it is a necessary step to ensure the Air Force 

has adequate Block 3i software for IOC and that the additional full set of combat 

capabilities planned in Block 3F can be effectively tested with a stable baseline of 

software and eventually fielded to operational units. The success of Block 3F mission systems depends on the program resolving the problems with Block 3i. The stability and functionality problems in the initial versions of Block 3F, including those 

inherited from Block 3i and problems caused by new Block 3F capabilities, were so 

significant that the program could not continue flight test. I agree with the program’s decision to shift to a serial process of testing and fixing software in the lab 

before releasing the next software version, and the recent improvements observed 

in Block 3i stability validate this serial approach. The program recently released an 

updated version of Block 3FR5 software to flight test in April and then plans to release Block 3FR6 later this summer. If the fixes to stability programmed into the 

latest Block 3i software continue to suppress the need for avionics resets in flight, 

mission systems testing and weapons releases can potentially resume in earnest and 

the test point completion rate will increase, which is essential given the significant 

amount of testing that remains. 

Mr. TURNER. What more can be done or focused on to improve operational suitability? 

Dr. GILMORE. The operational suitability of all variants continues to be less than 

desired by the Services and relies heavily on contractor support and workarounds 

that would be difficult to employ in a combat environment. Almost all measures of 

performance have improved over the past year, but most continue to be below their 

interim goals to achieve acceptable suitability by the time the fleet accrues 200,000 

flight hours, the benchmark set by the program and defined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the aircraft to meet reliability and maintainability 

requirements. To improve operational suitability, the program should: 

1. Improve the reliability of components with higher-than-planned failure rates. 

While the program focuses on contract specification requirements, particularly Mean 

Flight Hours Between Failure for Design-Controllable components, I noted in my 

annual report that, among the measures of reliability that have ORD requirement 

thresholds, eight of nine measures are still below program target values for the current stage of development, although two are within 5 percent of their interim goal. 

2. Improve aircraft availability. Aircraft availability improved slightly in CY15, 

reaching a fleet-wide average of 51 percent by the end of the year, but the trend 

was flat in the last few months and was well short of the program’s goal of 60 percent availability that it had established for the end of CY14. It is also important 

to understand that the program’s metric goals are modest, particularly in aircraft 

availability, and do not represent the demands on the weapons system that will 

occur in combat. With respect to IOT&E readiness, if the program is only able to 

achieve and sustain its goal of 60 percent aircraft availability, the length of IOT&E 

will increase significantly because a combat-ready availability of 80 percent is 

planned and needed to efficiently accomplish the open-air mission trials with the 

number of aircraft planned for IOT&E. 

3. Improve maintainability by improving the quality and number of validated and 

verified Joint Technical Data, which are the reference documents used by uniformed 

personnel to conduct maintenance. Doing so would reduce the dependence on Action 

Requests currently experienced by fielded units to complete actions not clearly addressed in JTD, or to fix faults which are not yet addressed or covered by JTD. 

4. Deliver the planned capabilities of ALIS through ALIS 3.0 by the end of SDD. 

Functions such as propulsion data and life-limited parts management are expected 

to improve the overall utility of ALIS and streamline post-mission maintenance 

processes. 

5. Improve the accuracy of the Prognostic Health Management (PHM) system by 

reducing the number of false alarms reported after each flight. PHM is designed to 

automatically detect faults in the aircraft and alert maintenance personnel to take 

corrective actions. Unit maintenance personnel spend a sizable amount of maintenance time confirming there is no fault when one is reported, including time clearing known ‘‘nuisance’’ faults in the maintenance logs within ALIS. 

Mr. TURNER. Your latest report indicates that it is premature to commit to a block 

buy for the F–35 program. However, the Department does have the potential to benefit in cost savings from such an approach. a. Please discuss the risks that you see 
128 

1GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A–22 Quantities 

and Increased Capabilities, GAO–05–304 (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005). 

in such a commitment. b. Given that a block buy was not requested in fiscal year 

2017, do you believe the Department would be in a better position to commit to a 

block buy in fiscal year 2018? Please discuss why or why not and at what point you 

feel a commitment would be warranted. 

Dr. GILMORE. a. As stated in my annual report, committing to a block buy prior 

to completing the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) may cause the 

Department and the partners participating in the block buy to: 

1. Commit to aircraft that may require corrections to significant deficiencies discovered during IOT&E before they can be used in combat, particularly with the expected capabilities from Block 3F. 

2. Commit to large numbers of aircraft in a configuration that may need modifications to reach full combat capability and full service life. 

3. Lose the needed incentives to the contractor and the Program Office to correct 

an already substantial list of deficiencies in performance, a list that will only lengthen as Block 3F testing continues and IOT&E is conducted. 

4. Commit to an acquisition strategy that is not consistent with the ‘‘fly before 

you buy’’ approach to defense acquisition that many in the Administration have supported and is not consistent with the intent of Title 10 U.S. Code, which stipulates 

that IOT&E must be completed and a report on its results provided to Congress before committing to Full-Rate Production—a commitment that some could argue 

would be made by executing the ‘‘block buy. 

b. My understanding is that the program and the Services have decided to delay 

the consideration of the block buy for at least another year, possibly starting in 

FY18. Nonetheless, even if the proposed block buy is delayed to FY18, all of the 

risks I identified previously remain valid, since IOT&E will not start until FY18, 

at the earliest, and will likely not be complete until FY19. The Department should 

not commit to a block buy until after IOT&E is complete and the decision to do so 

can be informed by the results of the planned, dedicated, operational testing. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement, you highlight similarities of the F–22 modernization program and the current F–35 modernization program. Can you discuss some 

of these similarities and the risks involved with the Department’s current approach 

to managing the F–35 modernization program? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our experience with the F–22 highlighted that managing modernization programs of this magnitude under an existing baseline hinders transparency. In March 2005, we found that the Air Force was managing its multi-billion 

dollar F–22 modernization efforts as part of the program’s baseline and had not established a separate knowledge-based business case.1 As a result, the F–22 baseline 

and schedule were adjusted to reflect the new timeframes and additional costs, comingling the funding and some content for the baseline development and modernization efforts—some content that had not been achieved under the baseline program were deferred into the modernization program. When the content, scope, and 

phasing of modernization capabilities changed over time, it appeared that the F– 

22 program was fraught with new schedule delays and further cost overruns. The 

comingling of modernization efforts with the existing baseline reduced transparency 

and Congress could not readily distinguish the new costs associated with modernization funding from cost growth in the original baseline. We recommended that the 

Air Force structure and manage F–22 modernization as a separate acquisition program with its own business case—matching requirements with resources—and acquisition program baseline. Eventually, the department separated the F–22 modernization program from the baseline program with a Milestone B review, in line 

with our recommendation, which increased transparency and better facilitated oversight. 

The F–35 Block 4 modernization effort is much larger than the F–22 modernization effort. DOD expects Block 4 modernization to develop and deliver 80 new capabilities and 17 weapons that were not part of the program’s original acquisition 

baseline, compared to 8 new capabilities and 3 weapons for the F–22 modernization 

effort. In its fiscal year 2017 budget request, DOD has identified the need for nearly 

$3 billion over the next 6 years for development of the new capabilities. If Block 

4 is managed as a distinct program with a separate baseline, it would be easier for 

Congress and DOD decision makers to track program-specific cost and schedule 

progress. A hypothetical $1 billion cost increase in Block 4 illustrates the difference 

in cost reporting and oversight. While a $1 billion cost increase is significant, it 

would represent growth of less than 1 percent if tracked against the current F–35 

program baseline—currently about $400 billion. That same cost increase, if tracked 

against the $3 billion funding estimate reflected in DOD’s budget request for Block 
129 

4, would be more visible, representing a 33 percent cost increase. The department 

has the opportunity to apply lessons learned from the F–22 modernization effort to 

the F–35 Block 4 program. 

Mr. TURNER. In this testimony as well as in the past, you have consistently raised 

long-term affordability as a key area of risk. Please explain why you continue to believe that affordability is a risk. In your opinion, has the program addressed this 

risk? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Affordability continues to be a concern because of the sheer magnitude of the funding needs for this one program. For example, the F–35 program 

will require more than $14 billion a year on average for a decade. Affordability challenges will compound as the F–35 program competes with other large acquisition 

programs including the long range strike bomber and KC–46A Tanker. At the same 

time, the number of operational F–35 aircraft that DOD will have to support will 

be increasing. The total cost to operate and support the F–35 fleet is still estimated 

to be more than $1 trillion. In recent years, affordability challenges, in part, have 

forced the Air Force to defer F–35 aircraft procurements to later years. Since 2014, 

the Air Force deferred 45 aircraft between 2017 and 2021 to later years. This will 

likely require the military service to make unplanned investments in extending the 

service life of their current fighter aircraft. The cost of extending the lives of current 

fighter aircraft and acquiring other major weapon systems, while continuing to 

produce and field new F–35 aircraft, poses significant affordability risks in a period 

of austere defense budgets. 

Mr. TURNER. Your statement mentioned that the program is making progress in 

testing, but that the most complex testing still remains. What do you see as the 

major risks in completing the remaining developmental test program? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Although early software blocks (Block 2A through 3i) have completed testing, risks remain with the completion of Block 3F mission systems software testing. These risks center on the complexity of Block 3F, software issues, and 

the completion of a number of weapons accuracy events that have proven to be difficult in the past. Block 3F is the F–35’s full warfighting capability and consists of 

challenging testing given the complexity of the missions and the stressing environments that are required. The program continues to experience problems with some 

mission system software functions shutting down and restarting during flight testing. Officials believed they had identified a fix at the end of 2015 and program officials plan to continue addressing the issue during 2016 in order to meet the Air 

Force initial operational capability in August 2016. There are also concerns about 

the tight timeframes to conduct the 55 weapons accuracy events that remain—30 

of which are related to a gun. As of December 2015, the program had completed 

17 weapons events many of which were delayed by months due to software deficiencies and fleet groundings. Program officials are analyzing the remaining test 

schedule to identify potential efficiencies in their weapons test plan. Any delays in 

developmental testing could pose risk to the timely start of initial operational test 

and evaluation, currently planned for December 2017. 

Mr. TURNER. The committee is concerned about meeting the U.S. Air Force’s IOC 

requirements later this year. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General Mark Welsh, recently summarized two risks related to reaching Air Force F– 

35A IOC later this year (Aug-Dec time frame), the Autonomic Logistics Information 

System (ALIS), and aircraft software stability. a. Do you agree with General Welsh’s 

assessment? b. Please tell us where you are with the ALIS development, its challenges, and what lies ahead to meet the Air Force initial operational capability? c. 

Characterize for us the software challenges, the approach you are taking to address 

them, as well as the timing to get this resolved for the warfighters? d. Finally, 

please share with us the progress you are making to get the Air Force combat ready 

with its F–35s later this year. 

General BOGDAN. a) At the time United States Air Force Chief of Staff General 

Welsh made this remark, his assessment was spot on. These were the two biggest 

risks my team was working. Fortunately since that time, the software issue has 

been resolved. 

b) The ALIS software development to support AF IOC is complete and this version 

of the ALIS system is currently in the Integration and Test Phase. We are finding 

defects that are taking longer than planned to fix which is delaying our test events. 

In this version, we are integrating the F–135 Pratt & Whitney (P&W) engine management capabilities into ALIS for the first time. The ALIS system will be connected 

to the P&W enterprise supply and maintenance systems. This is a complex effort 

and we will take the time necessary to ensure we get it right. We are working 

through these issues and expect its resolution before the AF IOC threshold date of 

31 December 2016. 
130 

c) The F–35 had been experiencing some timing communications issues between 

the sensors and the aircraft main operating computer causing the system to reset. 

However, after much lab and flight testing to get to root causes, the F–35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has completed development of the Block 3i software the AF will 

use to declare IOC this year. The Block 3i software provides F–35s with initial 

warfighting capability on upgraded computer hardware. As of 1 May, the F–35 program has flown more than 100 flight hours with the 3i software and it has shown 

approximately twice the level of stability as the previously fielded Block 2B software 

and three times better stability than the original 3i software. The JPO began upgrading the F–35 fleet (Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lots 6–8 aircraft) with 

3i software the week of 9 May. The same stability and mission effectiveness enhancements have also been incorporated into a new version of Block 2B software, 

for the benefit of earlier fleet aircraft. The new version of 2B software will be used 

to start upgrading LRIP Lots 2–5 aircraft by the end of May. The entire fleet of 

fielded F–35 aircraft will eventually be upgraded to these two new software versions 

by the end of calendar year 2016. 

d) In addition to resolving the software stability, the newest software also includes fixes to deficiencies that the USAF deemed ‘‘must-fix’’ prior to IOC and also 

includes the Generation III helmet which has improved night sensor video processing and optics above the Generation II helmet. Other IOC needs are Mission 

Data Files (MDFs), training simulators, spares and support equipment, aircraft and 

training. Three developmental versions of MDFs to support USAF IOC have been 

delivered to Hill Air Force Base (AFB) in Utah to aid in its IOC preparations. Currently, we project two of the operational MDFs to deliver in early August 2016 and 

the remaining two to deliver in September 2016. We are working to pull all four 

MDFs further left in the schedule. All required training simulators have been delivered to Hill AFB. Sufficient support equipment and spares are forecasted to be in 

place to support IOC declaration. Twelve jets have already been delivered to Hill 

AFB and by July have 12 jets completed with all required modifications. For ALIS, 

we’ve already delivered (March 2016) the necessary hardware to Hill AFB that will 

support USAF IOC. Additionally, we’ve developed a training plan with USAF that 

provides multiple opportunities to review the new capabilities, train on those capabilities and ultimately receive ‘‘hands-on’’ experience with the new software prior to 

delivery at Hill AFB to support the AF IOC decision. 

Mr. TURNER. The President’s Budget request includes provisions to leverage 

economies of scale for a block buy contract. a. Please share with the committee what 

the benefits are of a block procurement strategy. b. Do these benefits also include 

the engine? c. Could you implement this sooner if we advance the President’s proposal to FY17? And in your response, please let us know where the F–35 International Partners are with this and their view of the timing. d. If the International 

Partners elect to proceed with Block Buy economies of scale investments in FY17, 

and the United States waits until FY18, could this result in the U.S. Services paying a higher procurement price for the same F–35? e. If granted block buy authority, 

what would be your strategy to mitigate risks to the United States if the U.S. Services reduced or deferred their procurement quantities, similar to the five-aircraft reduction included in the current budget request for the U.S. Air Force? 

General BOGDAN. a) The F–35 Joint Program Office (JPO) believes a Block Buy 

Contract (BBC) approach has the potential to save real money on this program. A 

BBC would achieve significant program cost savings by allowing the contractors to 

utilize Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchases, enabling suppliers to maximize 

production economies of scale through batch orders. To substantiate the potential 

savings of a BBC concept, the F–35 Joint Program Office contracted with RAND 

Project Air Force, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), 

to conduct an independent assessment. RAND’s assessment, delivered in March 

2016, indicated that savings on the order of $2.5 to $3.0 billion can be achieved by 

providing a total of 4 percent EOQ funding to selected suppliers. b) Yes, overall BBC 

savings includes the propulsion system. EOQ will be provided to engine suppliers 

that offer the best return on EOQ funding. c) The JPO is ready to implement a BBC 

sooner if Congress includes the language and EOQ funding in FY17. Almost all F– 

35 International Partners expressed they would follow the U.S. in such a BBC, 

while most may elect to begin in FY17 even if the U.S. starts in FY18. d) At this 

time, RAND is evaluating this hybrid option for the JPO; however if the F–35 International Partners follow this strategy and begin a year earlier than the U.S., the 

cost of an International Partner F–35 could be lower than one sold to the US Services. e) It is important to guard against year-to-year adjustments to the budget; 

therefore, the F–35 JPO will structure the contract using a variable-quantity matrix 

as a tool to accommodate year-to-year adjustments should they occur, regardless if 

they are due to a downward budget adjustment or to address an increase to the 
131 

quantities coming from the International Partners, Congressional adds, or through 

Foreign Military Sales. 

Mr. TURNER. The President’s Budget request includes $290 million in FY17 for 

F–35 Follow-on Modernization Block 4. What is your strategy to structure the F– 

35 Follow-on Modernization so it provides the most efficient use of tax payers’ dollars while at the same time providing the maximum amount of transparency to the 

Congress to support our oversight responsibilities? 

General BOGDAN. The F–35 Lightning II Joint Program is committed 100% to ensuring the Follow-on Modernization (FoM) effort is as lean as possible so that the 

output—capability to our warfighters—is maximized. This will not be System Development and Demonstration (SDD) all over again but a smaller effort with a smaller 

footprint. We believe the F–35 FoM program should not be designated a separate 

Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) but should be sub-program to the existing F–35 program. The JPO estimates the documentation and approvals necessary 

to establish and start a new program will cost between $10 million and $13 million 

and delay execution of FoM six to twelve months. 

The JPO will place FoM on a separate contract, establish a separate program 

baseline and require cost, schedule, and performance metrics—to include Earned 

Value Management metrics and Nunn-McCurdy criteria—on this separate FoM 

baseline. This contract structure will allow the JPO, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

and you the Congress and your staffs to have full insight into its costs, performance, 

and earned value—all the tools necessary for you to perform your oversight function. 

We are completely receptive to adding your specific reporting requirements that you 

believe are necessary. The JPO has no intent to ‘‘bury’’ the FoM program within the 

larger F–35 program to avoid performance monitoring and oversight—we just want 

to avoid unnecessary and costly effort. We can assure this openness and believe it 

is achievable without characterizing it as a new program, as some have recommended. 

Mr. TURNER. When you appeared before this committee last fall we heard a lot 

about the pilot escape system. You testified that there are three things you are pursuing to address the light-weight pilot restriction. Briefly summarize the problem 

and the fixes that you’re developing. More importantly, let us know the status of 

the fixes and when can we expect to see them so the pilot restriction can be lifted? 

General BOGDAN. The F–35 pilot escape system is designed to be superior to legacy systems. The system provides reduced ejection stresses on the pilot and accommodates the widest range pilot sizes and weights (103 to 245 lbs). 

Lightweight Pilot Restriction: In August 2015, the U.S. Services and International 

Partners restricted F–35 lightweight pilots (weighing less than 136 lbs) from operating the F–35 after tests to qualify safe escape with an F–35 Generation (Gen) III 

helmet at low speed ejections indicated the potential for increased risk of neck injury for lightweight pilots due to forces experienced on the pilot’s head. 

Solutions: There are three technical solutions that when in place will reduce the 

risk of neck injury to all pilots and will eliminate the restriction. All three are 

planned to be ready by the end of 2016, clearing the way for the U.S. Services and 

International Partners to lift the F–35 lightweight pilot restriction. These solutions 

include: 1. A head support panel between the parachute risers. This eliminates the 

possibility of the head/helmet going between the parachute risers in low speed ejections. 2. A pilot-selectable switch to delay parachute deployment for lighter weight 

pilots. This ∼0.5 second delay will reduce parachute opening shock and neck loads 

during the parachute deployment phase of the ejection. 3. A lighter Gen III pilot 

helmet. This will reduce neck loads during all phases of ejection (catapult, 

windblast, drogue, and parachute deployment). 

Mr. TURNER. As the F–35 program continues to field aircraft and the number of 

F–35 sites increase, there is a concern that the ALIS global network will become 

more vulnerable. What efforts are you pursuing to protect the ALIS global network 

from nefarious activities and other network disruptions such as those caused by natural disasters? 

General BOGDAN. We are continuing to implement the necessary Information Assurance controls and testing required by the Department and the individual Services to allow Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) to be connected to the 

US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and US Navy networks. Second, the Joint Operational Test Team (JOTT) is now performing Cyber Testing on the ALIS system and 

will continue this over the next year and a half. This testing will inform us of any 

deficiencies that may require mitigation. And finally, we have contracted for backup 

hardware for key elements of the ALIS system that we will be installing later this 

year in different geographic areas. This effort will eliminate single points of failure 

and mitigate risks from natural disasters. 
132 

Mr. TURNER. Last year, the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA included a provision that 

asked for assurances that Block 3F software is on the right course and will be in 

F–35A aircraft delivered during fiscal year 2018. 

a. Can you elaborate on this and share with us what capabilities are in the Block 

3F software? b. What is the status of Block 3F development and what risks and 

mitigations are you managing to deliver this capability? 

General BOGDAN. a) The Senate included this provision to prevent the significant 

ramp up in annual F–35A procurement rate unless the F–35A aircraft hardware 

and software were mature enough to minimize costs for retrofits should aircraft continue to be delivered without the full capability. In this regard, the Low Rate Initial 

Production (LRIP) Lots 9 and 10 aircraft delivered after 1 October 2017 (start of 

FY18) have an extremely low risk of retrofit costs because the full Block 3F mission 

software will be inherent with all LRIP 9 aircraft by May 2017. Block 3F includes 

the Tech Refresh 2 suite of hardware, coupled with software functionality that enables or enhances several F 35A mission areas. Block 3F incorporates advanced tactical avionics and opens the full flight envelope for the F–35. Block 3F weapons for 

the F 35A will include the GAU–22 internal 25-millimeter gun system, internallycarried AIM–120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles, GBU 31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions, GBU–39/B Small Diameter Bombs, GBU–12 Paveway II 

laser guided bombs, and externally-carried AIM–9X Sidewinder missiles. 

b) The program plans to deliver the first F–35A (LRIP 9 procured with FY15 

funds) with Block 3F hardware and software in August 2017 with the full Block 3F 

capability minus the ability to use the AIM–9X weapon until the airworthiness and 

engineering communities clear the capability for use. We expect this AIM–9X capability to be released in September 2017. It will provide the full Block 3F combat capability of the F–35A, in advance of the first F–35A delivery in FY18. However, 

there is some schedule risk to meeting this full Block 3F capability as a result of 

delays in improving Block 3i and Block 3F software stability, which delayed the 

start of Block 3F flight testing. The program is taking concrete steps to mitigate 

this schedule risk including: committing all software development activities to Block 

3F, condensing software release cycles, increasing software maturity prior to release 

from the lab, surging manpower and material resources, and deploying to high-capacity flight test ranges. We are confident we will be able to mitigate this schedule 

risk. 

Mr. TURNER. As more and more F–35 aircraft are produced and enter operational 

use, there is a concern if we have everything in place to provide for their continued 

support. Are we providing adequate levels of spare parts across all the F–35 

variants, or is there an imbalance between aircraft quantities and spare parts procurement along with other aspects of support. What are the impacts? 

General BOGDAN. Sustaining the fleet especially our operational units is a top priority for the F–35 team and we will continue to ensure it remains as such. Spares 

are essential to keeping sortie rates up and we will do everything we can to keep 

our operational units flush with spares. There are three things that have impacted 

spares: 1) a prior year underfunding, 2) a downward congressional mark (e.g., 

$380M reduction to aircraft support per 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act) and, 

3) upward congressional aircraft procurement quantities (e.g., +11 aircraft per 2016 

Consolidated Appropriations Act). The combination of these requires us to rebalance 

our spares pools to support scheduled 2017 deployments but adds risks to home 

base F–35 operations resulting in higher supply downtime, decreased aircraft readiness levels and poor contingency availability. 

Mr. TURNER. GAO and others continue to raise concerns about the long term affordability of the F–35 acquisition program, noting that as procurement ramps up 

over the next 5 years, annual funding requests are projected to increase significantly. By 2022 it is projected to reach between $14 and $15 billion and stay at that 

level for a decade. At the same time other high profile DOD programs will be competing for funds, including the KC–46A Tanker, new bomber, and the Ohio class 

submarine replacement. a. What are the key factors driving the current F–35 procurement plans–production rate levels and funding levels? b. Given Federal budget 

constraints and the competition for funding within DOD, do you believe that sustained annual funding of that magnitude is going to be achievable? Has the Department considered different procurement options, and if so, what has been considered? 

Are there any viable alternatives if the current plan is not affordable? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The key factors driving the Department’s procurement plansproduction rate levels and fiscal decisions include the F–35 Program’s progress and 

fiscal constraints as the Navy considers competing priorities for annual resources. 

Since the program was re-baselined in 2012, following the Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 

critical breach in 2010, the development costs have remained stable. The costs required to complete the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase are 
133 

tracking to what was budgeted for in 2011. Production costs continue to decrease 

with each production lot. Unit cost reductions are in line with projections and allowing for procurement quantity changes. The F–35 Program is tracking to meet the 

unit costs targets that were established when Milestone B was re-certified in 2012. 

The sustained funding requirements are certainly a priority for the Department. 

The F–35B and F–35C are much needed replacements for legacy platforms that 

have well outlived their expected service life. The AV–8B and F/A–18A–D fleet of 

aircraft were originally designed as 6,000-hour airframes. The Department has successfully enabled flight beyond the designed services lives, but continued modernization and sustainment is a fiscal challenge. Moreover, warfighting requirements demand a fifth generation aircraft to counter the expanding threat environment. Consequently, the Department considers the F–35 Program a critical node in Naval 

Aviation warfighting requirements and prioritizes funding accordingly. 

The Department is also considering a number of options in resourcing competing 

priorities. Given the fiscal and strategic implications for the Department of Defense 

as a whole, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 

is examining the long-term health and viability of the TACAIR industrial base in 

depth. This study includes affordability as a primary objective in evaluating the 

TACAIR procurement plans. 

Mr. TURNER. A year ago, the Navy deferred nearly 20 aircraft to the out-years. 

The latest Presidential Budget request shows that the Navy appears to be moving 

some of those same aircraft into the near-term and at the same time buying more 

F–18s. a. What is the rationale for these constant changes? b. How will this address 

the current fighter shortfall? 

Secretary STACKLEY The 2017 President’s Budget submission represents a comprehensive approach to close growing gaps in Naval Aviation warfighting capacity 

and capability. The Department has committed to a balanced objective of 

sustainment, modernization and procurement across the strike fighter force. If 

resourced as requested, the plan will integrate fifth generation capabilities to meet 

the expanding adversary threat, continue modernization of the current fleet to 

maintain warfighting relevance and sustain strike fighter capacity to meet anticipated operational commitments into the future. 

The 2017 President’s Budget request addresses all facets of Strike Fighter Inventory Management. In the near-term, sustainment investments are targeted at maximizing F/A–18A–D availability. The Navy has harmonized critical readiness accounts to target repair requirements which will ultimately continue to increase 

depot throughput to meet operational demand. In the mid-term, investments are 

targeted at decreasing F/A–18E/F service life extension risk to sustain inventory capacity into the 2030’s. Targeted investments accelerate the F/A–18E/F Service Life 

Assessment Program and procure additional aircraft to ensure inventory capacity 

and pipeline aircraft availability during the process. In the far-term, the Department has focused on overmatching the expanding adversary threat with the integration of fifth generation capabilities. An additional ten F–35C aircraft over the Future Years Defense Program, relative to the 2016 President’s Budget request, will 

assure capacity to meet warfighting requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. Regarding the prospect of a block buy, do you believe the program 

is in a position to capitalize on economies of scale beginning in FY17 if the Congress 

provided the authority? 

Secretary STACKLEY The Department supports a future Block Buy Contract (BBC) 

to capitalize on economies of scale. A BBC would achieve significant savings by allowing the contractors to utilize Economic Order Quantities (EOQ) purchases, enabling suppliers to maximize production economies of scale through batch orders. An 

independent assessment by RAND Project Air Force, a Federally Funded Research 

and Development Center (FFRDC), indicates potential BBC savings between $2.5B 

and $3.0B over three Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots starting in Lot 12. The 

cost savings from a BBC have been factored into the procurement cost savings in 

the F–35 Fiscal Year 2015 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR 2015). 

As the Department is exploring the possibility of a block buy, the F–35 International Partners and FMS customers are already considering a three-year BBC beginning with production Lot 12 (FY18), which requires EOQ funding in FY17. The 

risk of entering into a BBC in Lot 12 is low. By the time it is necessary to commit 

to a BBC in Lot 12, many aspects of the Program will be stable, including completion of durability testing, 98 percent completion of all hardware qualification, completion of majority of 3F software and weapons delivery testing, stable production 

processes and ramp-up. 
134 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Why is the program office including follow-on modernization efforts (Block 4 upgrades) within the base F–35 acquisition program? Is there a quantifiable benefit to not treat the Block 4 upgrades as a separate major development 

and acquisition program? 

General BOGDAN. We estimate the documentation and approvals necessary to establish and start a new program Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) will 

cost between $10 million and $13 million and delay execution of Follow-on Modernization (FoM) six to twelve months. The F–35 Lightning II Joint Program is committed 100% to ensuring the FoM effort is as lean as possible so that the output— 

capability to our warfighters—is maximized. 

The JPO will place FoM on a separate contract, establish a separate program 

baseline and require cost, schedule, and performance metrics—to include Earned 

Value Management metrics and Nunn-McCurdy criteria—on this separate FoM 

baseline. This contract structure will allow the JPO, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

and you the Congress and your staffs to have full insight into its costs, performance, 

and earned value—all the tools necessary for you to perform your oversight function. 

We are completely receptive to adding your specific reporting requirements that you 

believe are necessary. The JPO has no intent to ‘‘bury’’ the FoM program within the 

larger F–35 program to avoid performance monitoring and oversight—we just want 

to avoid unnecessary and costly effort. We can assure this openness and believe it 

is achievable without characterizing it as a new program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

Mr. JONES. What is the total cost of the F–35 program from its inception through 

FY 2016? 

Dr. GILMORE. Program costs are officially reported in the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), formally submitted by the Department. According to the December 

2015 SAR for the F–35 (as of the FY 2017 President’s Budget), released in March, 

2016, the ‘‘Appropriation Summary’’ table on page 28 shows that the total cost of 

the F–35 program from inception through FY 2016 is $111,219.4M or $111.2B. 

Mr. JONES. What is the total cost of the F–35 program from its inception through 

the President’s Budget request for FY2017? 

Dr. GILMORE. Program costs are officially reported in the Selected Acquisition Reports, formally submitted by the Department. The following answer is from the December 2015 SAR for the F–35 (as of the FY 2017 President’s Budget), released in 

March, 2016. Per the ‘‘Appropriation Summary’’ table on page 28, the total cost of 

the F–35 program from inception through FY 2017 is $121,931M or $121.9B. 

Mr. JONES. What is the total cost of the F–35 program from its inception through 

FY 2016? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. By the end of fiscal year 2016, DOD will have invested a total of $59.02 billion in F–35 development and procurement. When the F–35 development 

program began in 2001 DOD estimated the total acquisition cost to be $233 billion 

(then-year). As of December 2015, the total program acquisition cost estimate had 

increased to $379 billion (then-year), an increase of 62 percent. 

Mr. JONES. What is the total cost of the F–35 program from its inception through 

the President’s budget request for FY2017? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The total investment in F–35 development and procurement from program inception through the end of fiscal year 2017 will be $69.14 billion, based 

on DOD’s fiscal year 2017 budget request. 

Mr. JONES. What is the total cost of the F–35 program from its inception through 

FY 2016? 

General BOGDAN and Secretary STACKLEY. $127.5B 

Appropriated through Fiscal Year (FY) 2016: Below reflects the total cost of the 

F–35 program from inception through FY16 to include United States Air Force 

(USAF), United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Navy (USN) and the 

International Partners. System Development and Demonstration (SDD) includes 

Pre-SDD and International Partner contributions. Military Construction funds are 

not executed out of the Joint Program Office but are shown for completeness. 

The USMC declared Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with its F–35Bs in July 

2015 and USAF IOC is scheduled between 1 August and 31 December 2016. The 

F–35 program completed Block 2B and Block 3i software. Block 3F software is now 

in Developmental Flight Test. The program completed Italian, Australian, and 

Dutch tanker aerial refueling flight test. Overall, the F–35 Fleet has over 51,000 

flight hours and we recently completed the second trans-Atlantic flight in an F–35. 

The Fleet consist of 184 operational and test aircraft, and the program has procured 
135 

a total of 203 US and International aircraft through Low Rate Initial Production 

(LRIP) Lot 8 and will contract for an additional 52 and 91 in LRIP Lots 9 and 10, 

respectively, by end of 3rd quarter FY16. 

Program / Appropriation FY94–FY16 

US $M 

FY94–FY16 

International $M Total $M 

System Development and Demonstration 48,182 5,205 53,387

Defense Wide (1994–1998) 118 0 118

Deployability and Suitability 287 57 344

Follow-on Modernization 167 51 218

Procurement 55,879 14,303 70,182

Other Procurement Navy 33 0 33

Operations and Maintenance 1,482 0 1,482

Military Construction 1,782 0 1,782

Total 107,930 19,616 127,546

Mr. JONES. What is the total cost of the F–35 program from its inception through 

the President’s budget request for FY2017? 

General BOGDAN and Secretary STACKLEY. $144.7B 

Appropriated through Fiscal Year (FY) 2017: Below reflects the total cost of the 

F–35 program from inception through FY17 to include United States Air Force 

(USAF), United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Navy (USN) and the 

International Partners. System Development and Demonstration (SDD) includes 

Pre-SDD and International Partner contributions. Military Construction funds are 

not executed out of the Joint Program Office but are shown for completeness. 

During FY17, the program will complete Block 3F Verification and Mission Effectiveness Testing and begin Block 3F introduction to F–35A. Also, the program will 

transition to leaner Follow-on Modernization for developing and delivering enhanced 

capability. The program will procure 63 aircraft for the US Services as part of Low 

Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 11 and we will continue to build the Global 

Sustainment Posture in order to best deliver the required cost and performance outcomes. 

Program / Appropriation FY94–FY17 

US $M 

FY94–FY17 

International $M Total $M 

System Development and Demonstration 49,596 5,227 54,823

Defense Wide (1994–1998) 118 0 118

Deployability and Suitability 383 67 450

Follow-on Modernization 458 178 636

Procurement 64,582 19,712 84,294

Other Procurement Navy 36 0 36

Operations and Maintenance 2,155 0 2,155

Military Construction 2,354 0 2,354

Total 119,682 25,184 144,866

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