www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 6 1 

Background

This assessment is a synthesis of recent research projects at the National Defense University (NDU). These projects included consultations with think tanks, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Allied Command Transformation, the International Staff and U.S. Mission, 

and U.S. Military Delegation at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and U.S. 

European Command (USEUCOM). Document analysis included review of the 

2011 Capability Surveys from the NATO Defense Planning Process and Defense Intelligence Agency reports on allied capability projections. We conferred 

with U.S. Defense Attachés and Office of Defense Cooperation representatives 

in key European capitals. Finally, we have spoken with representatives of Allies 

in Washington, at NATO, and in capitals in order to understand as much as possible the factors bearing on their future capabilities decisions.

This assessment is organized into four parts. The first presents our assessment of the growing gaps in current and near- to mid-term future military capabilities across Europe. The second part describes the headline trends that will 

define the major features of European military capabilities out to 2030. The third 

part develops four initiatives, two from the NATO summit and two NDU initiatives, that could optimize both European capabilities and transatlantic military cooperation over the next one to two decades. These initiatives are Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Smart Defense, the new “NATO Forces 

2020” set of programs, a bolder capabilities concept developed by an NDU-led 

team in 2011 called Mission Focus Groups (MFGs), and proposals to revitalize 

USEUCOM as the centerpiece of transatlantic interoperability. The final part 

Widening Gaps in U.S. 

and European Defense 

Capabilities and Cooperation

by Charles Barry and Hans Binnendijk

Transatlantic Current

National Defense University

About the Authors

Dr. Charles Barry is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Transatlantic Security Studies, 

Institute for National Strategic 

Studies (INSS), at the National 

Defense University (NDU). Dr. Hans 

Binnendijk is the Vice President for 

Research and Applied Learning at 

NDU and Director of INSS.

Key Points

◆ The United States needs Allies and 

partners to implement its global 

military strategy. We need to have 

Allies with capabilities as well as 

the political will to commit them.

◆ The unprecedented economic crisis 

across NATO will continue to affect 

many Allies throughout Europe 

until 2018 and perhaps far longer. 

Capabilities are being cut in deep 

and long lasting ways. NATO took 

solid steps at Chicago to counter 

these effects in the near term with 

Smart Defense and the Connected 

Forces Initiative.

◆ NATO must organize how Allies 

specialize as they further reduce 

their defense budgets. National Defense University has proposed one 

way to organize role specialization 

called Mission Focus Groups.

◆ Sustaining transatlantic interoperability will be the biggest challenge 

after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. USEUCOM should have interoperability as its primary mission. 

Mainstays of an interoperability 

strategy should be expansive U.S. 

engagement in the NATO Response 

Force and strong U.S. support for 

NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative.

July 2012

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies
2 Transatlantic Current No. 6 www.ndu.edu/inss

describes the primary obstacles and concerns NATO will 

have to address effectively in order to close the widening 

capabilities gap.

The Widening Gap: 

10 Main Findings

◆ Most European defense cuts to date have been 

“horizontal,” divided evenly across all operations, 

maintenance, supply, and investment accounts. 

These typical responses result in a growing array 

of forces that are not ready, not trained, and not 

sufficiently equipped or supplied—a widening “invisible” gap across the Alliance.

◆ A few more visible “vertical” cuts have been 

made that forego or eliminate entire national 

capabilities—these are harbingers of the future 

as the crisis persists. The results of vertical cuts 

are growing self-selection of roles and missions, 

which is prone to create gaps in meeting core 

NATO tasks.

◆ Since 2008, NATO members have conducted 

programmed and unprogrammed defense cuts in response to economic pressures. Cuts will continue for 

several more years—until 2015 or 2018 according to 

various experts.

◆ In the future, more cuts will be vertical as nations 

realize this is the only way to achieve real savings 

and to protect their most desired capabilities.

◆ Many allied cuts are increasing NATO dependency on the United States, just as the United States 

is rebalancing toward Asia. Ultimately, European 

nations will have to spend more on defense just to 

arrest this trend.

◆ NATO nations have few if any plans to mobilize 

or reconstitute large-scale combat forces should 

the strategic environment change. This is a serious risk.

◆ Defense budgets are unlikely to return to 2 

percent of gross domestic product even after the 

NATO nations have few if any 

plans to mobilize or reconstitute 

large-scale combat forces should 

the strategic environment change

financial crisis, short of an overt military threat, 

yet the cost of military systems will continue to 

grow dramatically.

◆ NATO’s mission in Afghanistan beyond 2014 is 

assured by the Chicago Summit and will require 

substantial resources for up to 10 years. Mission 

success hangs in the balance. This continuing investment does not appear to figure in most nations’ 

future defense budgets.

◆ Interoperability has been generated by International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations since 

2003. In the future, it must be sustained by training 

and exercises, as well as by the Smart Defense and 

Connected Forces Initiatives (CFI). These will require 

significantly more emphasis and resources than today.

◆ Uncoordinated national cuts are hard to anticipate 

and measure at NATO. There is no mechanism for 

early consultation on cuts, and no method within 

the NATO Defense Planning Process to track, 

collate, and manage cutbacks.

Cuts in resources for most European militaries have 

meant acceptable belt-tightening across agencies and 

infrastructure, but these cuts have also brought further 

trimming to already anemic investment programs. 

Traditional “salami slicing” of training and exercise 

budgets of nondeploying operational forces allowed 

resources to be concentrated on deployed or deploying 

forces. However, the impact has become substantial across 

NATO: more and more forces becoming less ready or not 

available at all—a slow hollowing out of the overall force. 

A substantial backlog of maintenance, multinational 

unit training, and personnel readiness is being added 

to deferred research and procurement. Collectively, this 
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 6 3 

situation already represents a momentous risk to future 

transatlantic military cooperation and NATO mission 

capability. The following list illustrates the defense 

budgetary decisions most used in national responses to 

the economic crises:

◆ retirement of older, costlier systems

◆ consolidation of infrastructure and commands

◆ curtailment of operations

◆ deferred maintenance

◆ lower war stock inventories

◆ delayed acquisitions and reduced quantities

◆ elimination of some units

◆ reductions in personnel strength

◆ lower unit and individual readiness

◆ training and exercise cutbacks

◆ suspension of transformation programs

◆ reduced, stretched out, or canceled modernization programs.

Highlights of the NATO Capabilities Challenge. The 

national defense budgets of many NATO nations, purposefully held down over many years before the economic 

crisis, have been forced abruptly lower still under the duress of unexpectedly severe economic conditions. Reductions are driven more than before by nonmilitary national 

priorities; maintaining capabilities promised to NATO is 

often secondary. Persistent pressure on defense budgets 

since 2008 is widening gaps in core NATO capabilities. 

Nations are making tough choices on where to cut in order to preserve the most viable national force. The likelihood of more reductions through 2015 and beyond, in 

the view of most experts, is high. Some forecasts indicate 

economic austerity could persist until 2020 or even later.

A few cuts that have already been made are highly 

visible. The United Kingdom retired its entire carrierbased Harrier GR-9 fighter wing and decommissioned 

its only carriers, HMS Ark Royal and (soon) HMS Illustrious. Yet such headline decisions are not the gaps that 

worry NATO strategic commanders. In a recent report, 

these commanders drew the greatest attention to existing 

or anticipated shortages in enabling capabilities, including theater missile defense; counter–improvised explosive device technologies; joint intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance; and cyber defense. Other high risk 

concerns include medical support; chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear defenses; and military-civilian 

capacity to bring a comprehensive approach to bear in 

conflict resolution. Gaps in these capabilities have been 

persistent for years. Shrinking budgets make addressing 

them all the more difficult and less probable, while operational concern remains high to very high regarding 

the adequacy of all these assets. The full range of missions 

envisioned in the NATO Level of Ambition (LOA) is 

already not executable as planned and will be less so in 

the near- to mid-term future due to these shortfalls.

Some cuts can be described as vertical, that is, the 

complete removal of a major capability or the foregoing 

of a major acquisition. Some vertical cuts are permanent, 

such as the Dutch elimination of heavy armor. Others 

are intended to be temporary, such as the gap in British 

naval strike aviation until 2020. There are many minor 

examples of temporary vertical cuts, including the nonavailability of three medium transport helicopters for 3 

years (Spain) or an explosive ordnance disposal platoon 

reaching full operational capability 2 years later than expected (Slovenia). The spread of similar decisions will 

delay improvements in core capabilities such as power 

projection or force protection.

More common than vertical cuts, nations are slicing 

existing capabilities, making them unready or unavailable. These are across-the-board horizontal cuts in essential functions: maintenance, spare parts inventories, 

on-hand fuel and munitions (in particular, precision munitions), training and education required to fill units with 

qualified personnel, flying-hour reductions, and exercise 

curtailment. These cause lower readiness and eventually units that are not ready at all. The result is increased 

response times for all affected land, sea, air, special 
4 Transatlantic Current No. 6 www.ndu.edu/inss

operations forces (SOF), and enabling units. One can 

find evidence of this type of cost cutting in lower operational rates for equipment, flying-hour levels below 

NATO standards, failure to replenish critical munitions, 

units being short of required personnel, and canceled 

or reduced participation in multinational commitments 

such as the NATO Response Force (NRF).

Whether cuts eliminate whole capabilities (vertical) 

or result in hollowed out forces (horizontal), the erosion 

of national capabilities is expected to continue. NATO 

policymakers should anticipate that after repeated horizontal (traditional) trimming, there will soon be no alternative to vertical cuts, which will have to be resorted 

to more often in order to achieve any real savings. This 

will be especially true of the 17 Allies whose forces are 

already quite small overall (that is, under 45,000 in total 

active strength).

Budget pressures have triggered a closer scrutiny of acceptable risk by members. They are accepting greater vulnerabilities in such high intensity military tasks as air-to-air 

combat, traditional armored warfare, and antisubmarine 

warfare. Related investment programs are seeing reductions and stretch outs, such as the Polish and Spanish naval 

upgrade programs. Others are being canceled to generate 

greater savings from mission areas where more risk is seen 

as acceptable—for example, British maritime patrol aircraft 

(MPA4) and in the Dutch armored force (Leopard 2).

Many national decisions are consistent with best practices and should be acceptable improvements in defense 

spending profiles. Allies are consolidating bases and organizations, retiring older systems, and cropping personnel from 

institutional structures. The last mentioned can be a doubleedged sword: personnel cuts can also reduce hard to replace 

experience and expertise at middle and senior levels. Given 

financial pressures, there are also incentives to look more 

intently at multinational defense arrangements—so long as 

there are demonstrable savings to be achieved.

However, many of these short-term decisions may 

induce longer term worries. There is little evidence that 

nations are planning to reconstitute capabilities being cut 

or to mobilize canceled capabilities in the event of changes 

to the global security situation. The general lack of plans to 

rebuild capabilities—including industrial capacity, manpower, logistics systems, and stockage levels—is cause for 

concern. The planning, simulation, and exercise of national 

mobilization and reconstitution should be a near-term 

priority for NATO’s Defense Planning Process.

A Model for Closing NATO’s Capabilities Gap. Due 

to cuts already taken and still to come, we are headed 

toward a force that might be called the “residual force,” 

the “financial impact force,” or some similar name. De 

facto interdependency, mainly increased reliance on the 

United States and a few other nations, will continue to 

increase as the cost of full-spectrum military forces (that 

is, sustained land, sea, air, and SOF power sufficient for 

national defense) goes beyond the reach of most Allies. 

Eight European Allies at best will end up with full-spectrum military forces (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 

Poland, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) in the 

wake of the financial crisis. Several of these will struggle 

mightily to avoid future vertical cuts that would eliminate full capabilities entirely, removing them from this 

exclusive club. The United Kingdom made a bold decision in 2010 to cap its carrier (naval aviation) capability 

for at least 10 years. Troubles ahead could readily extend 

that time. The financial challenges of Greece, Italy, and 

Spain are well reported, yet the full impact on defense 

decisions is not yet clear. Eighteen other European Allies 

have much smaller active forces—including 5 with total 

active strength below 10,000. Many of these continue 

to diminish in active strength, defer modernization, and 

target resources only toward those deployed or deploying. Allies faced with the high cost of maintaining very 

small land, naval, and air forces independently should 

be more open to multinational cooperation, that is, the 

pooling and sharing of resources, support, and even command structures—provided they can overcome historic 

national biases. Such agreements will not be easy, but the 

times call for new thinking and bold, expedited actions.

NATO should pledge to hold the line at a core “musthave” force. Nations are already well short of the Minimum 

Capability Requirement (MCR) that NATO military 
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 6 5 

leaders say is needed to achieve the LOA. The MCR is no 

longer the “floor” below which national capabilities should 

not go; instead it has become a future goal. The Alliance 

has little choice but to provide an interim metric, one that 

advises Allies on what capabilities within the MCR are 

most critical—what NATO must have in order to address 

the LOA with the least possible risk to forces and mission 

success. From within the MCR, and the closely related 

priority shortfall areas that strategic commanders are now 

defining, NATO should identify a subset of most critical 

“must have” mission capabilities. Such guidance would help 

Allies make budgetary decisions that are most in concert 

with NATO needs and that have the minimum impact on 

the Alliance. This tool would protect the most critical of 

LOA forces and enablers as nations cut. NATO members 

should collectively pledge to protect these capabilities when 

faced with future cuts.

By 2020, most Allies should be able to invest beyond a 

minimal core force as the financial crisis ebbs and economies 

recover. An appropriate future force must be rebuilt, and 

that is what NATO Forces 2020 is all about. Allies will 

need to rebuild Alliance capabilities to meet the LOA again, 

taking full advantage of gains in multinational cooperation, 

prioritization mechanisms, and specialization techniques, 

including our proposed Mission Focus Groups. This force 

should include a much stronger Smart Defense initiative, 

elaboration of the Connected Forces Initiative (enhanced 

interoperability and interaction among NATO Command 

Structure [NCS], NATO Force Structure, and national 

headquarters with a regional focus—again, supports MFGs), 

the full realization of the Lisbon Capabilities Package, full 

manning of the new NCS, continued reliance on the NATO 

Defense Planning Process, a stronger defense technology 

base, and fulfillment of strategic projects in such capability 

areas as joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 

air-to-air refueling, and multinational acquisitions.

Transatlantic Defense Capabilities 

Trends Toward 2020

Looking to 2020 and beyond, it is hard to identify new 

trends that would shape European defense differently than 

what is called for by the NATO Forces 2020 initiative. Indeed, the major trends already discernible should endure with 

little variation over the next 15 to 20 years. As always, there is 

the potential for unforeseen, high impact outlier events (socalled black swans), which could disrupt one or more of these 

trends. However, trends are evident and outliers by definition 

are not. Among the best trend indicators on transatlantic defense capabilities, the following are worthy of consideration:

◆ The United States and its European NATO Allies 

will remain the largest and most capable military 

collective organization in the world.

◆ The United States will remain the dominant 

NATO partner while Europe will feature a spectrum of capable states, from modern and large to 

minimally capable and small.

◆ The utility of NATO, and the European Union’s 

Common Foreign and Security Policy for crisis response, will depend on members’ political as well as 

financial investment.

◆ Cooperation on collective defense is not in doubt 

but transatlantic cooperation can also be expected in crisis response, in the immediate regions 

around Europe, in northern/central Africa, in 

Europe’s immediate Middle East neighborhood, 

and in the new Arctic mission area called the 

High North.

◆ The potential to overcome inefficiencies through 

European industrial cooperation is not promising, and the low level of defense investment 

across Europe is driving defense industries toward more contracts outside the region, where 

they may be junior rather than leading partners 

in many enterprises.

◆ The entrenched issues of protectionism and sovereignty are the primary impediments to closer 

multinational cooperation.

◆ European defense spending will have to 

increase toward 2020 simply because much of 
6 Transatlantic Current No. 6 www.ndu.edu/inss

the equipment found in national inventories is 

aged, overused in recent operations, and simply 

wearing out.

◆ Europe will continue to favor nonmilitary solutions to crises and therefore low defense budgets. 

Both are sources of enduring tension with the 

United States.

◆ Europe, despite present constraints, will continue to be the most capable cluster of Allies for the 

United States—militarily, financially, and politically. However, the United States will struggle to 

find European Allies effective as modern military partners.

◆ As the price of fielding full-spectrum militaries 

rises, fewer Allies will have such forces in the future. Interdependency, often undeclared but real, 

will become the NATO norm.

Succinctly put, today’s widening gap will continue 

to grow so long as current spending trends continue. After 2020, the transatlantic capabilities gap should stabilize but should not be expected to close much, except for 

one or two major Allies. Important niche Allies may also 

emerge. Divergent military capabilities will erode the 

capacity for transatlantic top-tier military cooperation 

by all but a few Allies. The resultant reduced capacity 

to cooperate across the Atlantic will tend to cause military cultures and security perspectives to diverge. If not 

arrested through concerted action by all Allies, behind 

strong and persistent U.S. leadership and actions, the effect will become permanent in most military matters. 

Four Initiatives for Improving 

Trend Outcomes

NATO forcefully addressed the widening capabilities gap at its May 2012 Chicago Summit when NATO 

leaders underscored key defense priorities and emphasized 

the need for economies in defense through multinational 

solutions. They endorsed new initiatives to preserve the capabilities most needed to meet the three core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. 

Over the next several months, NATO staffs and military 

leaders must elaborate how summit goals will be achieved. 

In the context of postsummit implementation, four initiatives—two emanating from decisions in Chicago and 

two developed by NDU—are worthy of further examination. Smart Defense and NATO Forces 2020 are two key 

summit initiatives. Mission Focus Groups and the role of 

USEUCOM in long-term transatlantic interoperability are 

proposals that have emerged at NDU over the past year.

Smart Defense. As already stated, Smart Defense is 

the Secretary General’s premier initiative deployed at the 

Chicago Summit. It is intended to commence a new era of 

closer multinational cooperation in response to the widespread and enduring crisis of defense resource austerity. 

Smart Defense is described as having three components. 

The first goal is to improve NATO and national efforts at 

prioritizing defense investments. The focus is to encourage Allies to remain committed to the critical capabilities 

agreed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, as well as a wider set 

of priority shortfalls military commanders identified as 

high risk with respect to achieving the LOA.

The second goal is the promotion and facilitation of 

multinational cooperation to realize capabilities that extend increasingly beyond the resources of any one nation. 

The 2009 Strategic Airlift Capability initiative among 

13 members is a prominent example. The initiative has 

purchased one C-17 aircraft to date and is eventually to 

acquire three C-17s operating out of Pápa Airbase, Hungary. Participating nations contribute aircrews and support 

resources and purchase flying hours as needed. There are 

many less visible cooperation agreements already in place. 

The goal is to broaden and deepen cooperation wherever 

practicable, while preserving the essential principle of assured access to collective assets by participating nations.

The third goal is to create a foundation for specialization by design rather than realizing it by default as 

members are forced to divest capabilities, or to allow 

them to fade into unusable obsolescence for lack of investment. The decision by the Netherlands in 2011 to 

eliminate the last of its armored forces is a good example. 
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 6 7 

Without consultation at NATO—none was required 

and no Alliance mechanism is provided to do so in the 

course of national budgetary reviews—The Hague determined the only way to achieve sufficient cost reductions 

was the vertical elimination of entire capabilities rather 

than to continue the horizontal haircut approach across 

all capabilities. For the Alliance, however, there are now 

five members without armored forces, which illustrates 

the creeping process of specialization by default.

The Smart Defense challenge is daunting. This is 

evident in the nature of the projects being proposed after 

more than a year of emphasis by the Secretary General and 

a significant summer 2011 study of opportunities by Allied Command Transformation called the Multinational 

Approach (MNA) Study. From an initial list of only eight 

projects viewed as feasible last summer, concerted effort 

by NATO’s leadership has expanded the MNA list to just 

18. Most projects are modest and limited to support areas 

such as multinational maintenance, shared use of training 

areas, and greater participation in multinational exercises.

As useful as these projects are in terms of costcutting, they will have limited impact unless Smart Defense can truly become a new mindset toward greater 

multinational cooperation. This means deeper cooperative enterprises on infrastructure, logistics functions, and 

education and training facilities—as well as operational 

functions such as shared command and control, intelligence resources (unmanned aerial vehicle access), and 

multinational mission expertise in terms of doctrine, 

concepts, planning, tactics, and procedures. In short, 

Smart Defense is a gamble that Allies are ready for a 

new metamorphosis in creating defense capabilities, one 

that relies much more on multinational solutions. The 

key will be to design in genuine reversibility that satisfies national sensitivities for sovereign control over the 

means of national security.

NATO Forces 2020. The Alliance deployed the concept 

of NATO Forces 2020 in Chicago. The building blocks of 

NATO Forces 2020, in addition to Smart Defense, include:

Connected Forces Initiative. Secretary General 

Rasmussen proposed the CFI at this year’s Munich Security 

Conference as a complement to Smart Defense. The 

initiative emphasizes the importance of interoperability 

as NATO operations draw down and nations are facing 

the twin realities of fewer forces and scarcer resources for 

training. CFI’s main components include:

◆ maximizing value of NATO training and education facilities, as well as centers of excellence, 

including with partners as appropriate

◆ increasing NATO-led multinational exercises, including with partners as appropriate

◆ agreeing on better use of technology, including 

increased use of adapters, which will facilitate 

interoperability and plug-and-play capabilities 

among allied systems

◆ strengthening the NRF by building on the U.S. 

commitment to rotate elements of a U.S.-based 

Brigade Combat Team to Europe.

Follow-through on the Lisbon Critical Capabilities Commitment (LCCC). A great deal of progress has 

been made already on the 10 capability commitment 

goals since 2010. LCCC was reinforced at Chicago by 

a special Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: 

“Toward NATO Forces 2020.” The plan laid out in this 

new agreement is intended to emphasize LCCC until all 

agreed critical capabilities are in place.1

Key Long-term Projects. Three enduring projects were 

given special emphasis in Chicago. One was to extend 

Baltic air policing, a model of solidarity that may inform 

other regional initiatives. The two others, already on the 

Lisbon list, are missile defense and air-ground surveillance. These projects will become essentially permanent 

commitments but will also take a number of years to put 

in place at full capacity; thus, they are highlighted under 

Smart Defense.

Strategic Projects. Looking toward 2020, NATO 

intends to initiate stronger transatlantic and intraEuropean cooperation to fill three critical shortfalls in 

an affordable manner. These are joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; air-to-air refueling; and 
8 Transatlantic Current No. 6 www.ndu.edu/inss

multinational acquisition opportunities that can produce economies of scale in major programs.

When these initiatives are brought to fruition, 

NATO will realize the minimum force the Alliance 

needs to meet its LOA with no more than acceptable 

risk. There can be no mistaking the daunting challenge 

these goals represent in the current fiscal climate. NATO 

members will have to commit to making hard choices, 

and as an alliance, NATO will have to sustain its collective resolve to see them through. In this way, NATO 

Forces 2020 is achievable.

Mission Focus Groups—A Future Opportunity. The 

MFG concept is a planning tool to optimize the planning, training, resources, and capabilities of a core group 

of likeminded members and partners around particular 

NATO missions. The aim is to provide NATO with reliable mission capabilities as well as expertise that can be 

promulgated across the Alliance as required. Eventually, 

working within the NATO Defense Planning Process, 

all essential missions would benefit from a focus group 

in this way. Mission Focus Groups would adhere to the 

logic of the Smart Defense tenets of cooperation, prioritization, and specialization and be guided by NATO 

political and military authorities. MFGs would lower the 

risk of gaps in capabilities by highlighting Allies who 

have prioritized specific capabilities.

Prototypes of MFGs already exist in NATO. Allies 

with combat aviation and blue-water maritime patrol 

capabilities have provided core groups focused on airpolicing and antipiracy missions. A geographical focus 

group of Allies and partners has begun work on Baltic 

Sea littoral defense employing land-based, air, and 

maritime forces. The initiative to extend this successful 

model to other mission areas was conceived at NDU in 

summer 2011. The rationale is that Allies thus committed 

will be most resolute in maintaining the related mission 

capabilities as a priority when faced with budgetary 

decisions. This would help NATO manage the risk of 

gaps in capabilities by establishing that Allies would 

not only retain given capabilities but also hone mission 

expertise and be inclined to commit to the mission if 

required. The NRF could also be the basis for creating 

strong, capable MFGs.

The MFG concept would “build out” over time, and 

not all mission areas need to have a corresponding focus 

group. Group members would not be free of NATO’s wider 

mission requirements; conversely, other Allies would not be 

absolved completely from assisting such groups in persistent 

operations. The connective tissue of the Alliance as a whole 

would not only remain in place but also be strengthened by 

the underlying sinew of such clusters, analogous to muscle 

groups within a body or specialized groups of players on 

a sports team. It would take time to build out the MFG 

concept in a deliberate and constructive way, consistent with 

the principle of assured access as well as with NATO’s enduring, essential Defense Planning Process. In spite of significant reservations, the MFG concept continues to gain 

interest throughout the Alliance.

The Long-term Challenge to Transatlantic Interoperability—USEUCOM’s Top Priority. Taking steps to change 

the course of transatlantic defense capabilities requires a 

new cooperative mindset on the west side of the Atlantic as 

much as or more so than within Europe. The main instrument for this connection should be a revitalized and more 

adaptive USEUCOM. It is the most critical agent for ensuring U.S. forces can operate in concert with any NATO 

Ally or formal partner, a staggering 69 nations in all that 

already adhere to some or all NATO practices as a result of 

operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans over the past 17 

years. As already stressed, the primary thrust of current U.S. 

military policy is to operate within multinational coalitions 

when possible.

The most immediate USEUCOM challenge will be 

to counterbalance the impending drawdown of the last 

U.S. heavy combat brigades from Europe and the end 

of ISAF operations. The withdrawal of heavy brigades 

removes U.S. main battle tanks in Europe for the first 

time since 1944. The symbolism of this passage for our 

Allies is far more significant than it is for Washington. 

Reassurance of the U.S. commitment to collective defense is at a premium not only because of U.S. troop draw 

downs; fears of gradual decoupling have been growing 
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 6 9 

in recent years due to the U.S. focus first on the Middle 

East/South Asia regions and now on the Pacific.

The incremental contractions of the NATO Command 

Structure have continued through the steady winnowing of 

the U.S. military presence in NATO headquarters. 

Finally, there has been a long hiatus in visible emphasis on NATO’s core Article 5 territorial defense mission, 

including exercise of nuclear decisionmaking, that worries 

Allies on NATO frontiers especially. The huge U.S. presence and the many large exercises of the Cold War, and 

almost 20 years of persistent multinational expeditionary 

operations since, will soon be history. The primary tools for 

maintaining future ties will be education, training, exercises, 

collaborative capabilities initiatives, and everyday staff coordination in the planning and conduct of operations.

The main U.S. interface with Allies for the above 

activities is USEUCOM, which should be revitalized 

as the U.S. flagship command responsible for sustaining 

transatlantic cohesion, maintaining and nurturing transatlantic interoperability, making MFGs viable and useable, and committing the United States to the NRF as a 

visible signal of its Article 5 commitment as well as its 

commitment to NATO crisis response missions.

The first and most immediate tool in USEUCOM’s 

interoperability toolbox is the commitment of a Brigade 

Combat Team to the NRF. This promise should be met consistently and in full. USEUCOM and the Department of 

Defense (DOD) should guard against truncated participation or stretch outs between deployments. Both will be particularly tempting solutions to U.S. Army budget shortfalls, 

and DOD has already signaled a shift in priorities toward air 

and maritime programs that better support Pacific requirements. USEUCOM should put the U.S. commitment to the 

NRF to maximum advantage in terms of mission planning, 

multinational training, and participation in NRF exercises.

The U.S. commitment of a battalion to each annual 

NRF rotation beginning in 2014 should translate into 

a deployment of no less than a battalion for 3 months 

annually to Europe for multinational training. This need 

not be limited to elements of the NRF; U.S. training 

should be open to other forces on a limited basis. The 

U.S. battalion should mainly be included in the Response 

Force Pool rather than the Immediate Response Force, 

where it will compete with the infantry battalions of 

other members, which are often their only viable contributions.

USEUCOM should press for a prepositioned set 

of at least a heavy battalion equipment set that is maintained and used at least annually as a visible testament 

of U.S. presence. The U.S. commitment to the NRF 

should be incorporated into the Response Force Pool, 

annually certified by USEUCOM and authenticated as 

other forces are by the designated NRF Command and 

SHAPE. Beyond the commitment of a Brigade Combat 

Team, USEUCOM should study other U.S. commitments that would strengthen transatlantic interoperability as the main focus becomes training and exercises 

rather than operations.

First, USEUCOM should investigate including a U.S. 

corps headquarters among the NATO Force Structure 

commands rotating as NRF land component commands. 

A U.S. corps need not deploy to Europe to assume NRF 

duties. Given the NRF’s annual rotation and the number of 

participating allied headquarters, a U.S.-based corps need 

only deploy to conduct NRF certification exercises once every 10 years or so. Second, USEUCOM should propose to 

NATO that long-term habitual affiliations be established 

between each designated NRF command and at least its 

core subordinate commands for NRF rotation. Such relationships would foster cohesion and routines of information-sharing similar to NATO’s very successful standing 

maritime forces.

Finally, the United States should locate a forward 

corps command element in Europe similar to the forward 

command of I Corps in Japan. A forward corps would be 

an economy of force presence that pays huge dividends 

in terms of signaling the U.S. commitment to NATO. It 

could readily be dual-hatted and collocated with an existing command, perhaps at Grafenwöhr or Wiesbaden. This 

headquarters would not be a figurehead but could engage 

in planning for both USEUCOM and U.S. Africa Command. However, its most important mission should be 
10 Transatlantic Current No. 6 www.ndu.edu/inss

interoperability, including to assist Allies in transitioning 

their corps commands to deployable joint commands.

Another important tool for USEUCOM is to draw 

closer to the NCS. The two structures are very distant 

today. Traditionally, USEUCOM and NATO have been 

kept separate to avoid the appearance of U.S. dominance 

of the Alliance military structure. The USEUCOM commander as well as his air and maritime component commanders are dual-hatted in the NCS. However, USEUCOM’s land component and Marine Corps component 

do not have dual-hatted commanders and share no formal 

staff ties with the NCS. USEUCOM SOFs maintain perhaps the strongest overall ties to NATO through the nonNCS NATO SOF headquarters adjacent to SHAPE.2

Still, none of the USEUCOM commands coordinate and 

share information on the level needed to strengthen transatlantic bonds. There are fewer formal links today between 

the NCS and USEUCOM than ever before, yet the task 

has expanded with NATO enlargement, the growth of 

partnership, and the modern demands of interoperability.

Transatlantic ties cannot be sustained solely by common 

commanders. Staffs must be drawn closer together, a 

daunting challenge given reductions in the NCS and across 

USEUCOM. The NCS is shrinking below levels many now 

consider wise. Far fewer and much smaller headquarters will 

be operating with considerably smaller budgets to oversee a 

growing number of member and partner militaries preparing 

for an expanded mission set. USEUCOM is also much 

smaller and less resourced than in the past; however, it now 

has primary responsibility for maintaining ties to Allies as 

well as for transatlantic interoperability.

A third tool at USEUCOM’s disposal is its premier 

set of land force training areas that are increasingly 

underutilized by the shrinking size of the U.S. Army 

stationed in Europe. These have been used by Allies at 

times, funded by the United States, but much more could 

be done if funding could be shared both by users and by 

NATO (common funding for infrastructure). USEUCOM 

could propose creation of a special DOD-level funding 

program for all interoperability, including both the U.S. 

battalion contribution to the NRF and for maintaining the 

world-class multiple facilities of the Joint Multinational 

Training Center located in Hohenfels and Grafenwöhr, 

Germany. In addition to greater use by Allies, U.S.-based 

units could rotate to these facilities in a similar manner to 

their use of the National Training Center in California (Fort 

Irwin). This concept fits well with the proposal to invest in 

maintaining a heavy unit set of equipment on site.

Finally, USEUCOM should consider calling for a 

comprehensive interoperability DOD budget package. 

Such a package would provide line item protection of funded initiatives for all Service component training areas and 

exercises in the USEUCOM area of operations, as well as 

other combatant commands worldwide. It should include 

funds for bringing USEUCOM and its component commands appropriately closer to the NCS in the interest of 

transatlantic military cooperation. Protecting interoperability in the DOD budget would serve as a strong testament 

to the U.S. commitment to transatlantic interoperability, 

NATO, and multinational operations worldwide. Most 

critically, it would remove temptations to cut funds from 

these vital programs when budgets get even tighter.

Obstacles and Concerns NATO 

Must Address in Closing the Gap

Obstacles to Be Overcome. The two biggest obstacles 

to increased multinational cooperation across the Alliance 

over the mid- to long term are the deep roots of traditional 

national defense and the cultural dominance of national 

sovereignty. Nations turn to national sources of supply 

whenever such means are manufactured within their territory, regardless of cost. They subsidize domestic defense 

industries in order to preserve sovereignty over the means 

of national defense, nurture national pride, and protect jobs. 

Finally, nations prefer national versus collective capabilities 

to assure access to them should they be needed for national 

purposes. Assured access has been a point of contention 

in crisis response with respect to past collective capability 

investments. These motives account for a lot of protectiondriven inefficiencies that may well thwart Smart Defense.

However, the depth of the financial crisis provides 

an opportunity to break down these obstacles. Auster-
www.ndu.edu/inss Transatlantic current No. 6 11 

ity measures have already triggered public outcry and 

contributed several changes in political leadership in a 

number of European powers including France, Greece, 

Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 

Dramatic changes in attitudes about protectionism or 

sovereignty should not be expected. Nonetheless, the 

severity of the defense resource situation cannot be dismissed. Allies entered the crisis from the position of already historic low spending over an unprecedented period, beginning in the early 1990s as the Cold War ended.

Most European powers have seen steady declines 

in defense spending since then, even as their operating 

tempo reached unprecedented highs. The financial crisis 

is widening the gap inside Europe between increasingly 

worn out and obsolete inventories and budgets that are 

dropping dramatically from their low starting points. 

There is no guarantee these factors will cause nations to 

draw closer together in desperation to realize better results 

from defense spending; however, the possibility should not 

be discounted, and in fact, should be encouraged.

A penultimate word on protectionism is that the 

European aerospace industry model, well advanced yet 

still incomplete, points the way for other defense industry consolidation. Since the Cold War, this industry has 

built on earlier multinational projects and joint ventures. 

In response to shrinking markets it has achieved more 

successful mergers and acquisitions, resulting in a few 

major truly multinational corporations with less government ownership. Today, 3 of the top 10 arms producers 

in the world are European aerospace firms: BAE Systems, EADS, and Finmeccanica (the other 7 are U.S. 

firms). Twenty years ago, none of these giants existed, but 

today, their markets are not only Europe but also global, 

and their impact across Europe extends deep into subcontractor industries. Other sectors are far behind the 

aerospace sector. Europe has too many subsidized national industries producing products independently for 

very small militaries.

A final observation on sovereignty is its slow, unique 

evolution across the membership of the European Union, 

most of which are also NATO members. Since Europeans 

jealously guard sovereignty, they choose carefully to commit 

to collective efforts in ways they regard as reversible. The price 

of reversibility can be very high, as members of the Eurozone are finding at present. However, it is no less a cherished 

national prerogative exercised regularly and visibly in council 

decisionmaking. The creative concept of “reversible pooling of sovereignty” suggests optimism for Smart Defense in 

terms of cooperation that can be guided toward priorities and 

commonly agreed specialization. The requirement will be for 

reversibility to be genuine without creating undue risk to Alliance action. This was never possible to achieve by Chicago. 

Rather, the summit launched Smart Defense in a way designed to sustain momentum long after Chicago, creating a 

new mindset of confidence and assurance in the merging of 

national and multinational defense. Eventually, that will lead 

to increased cooperation, and that is the goal.

Future Concerns to Be Avoided. Experts on NATO’s 

capacity to implement multinational solutions such as 

Smart Defense are already concerned that the Chicago 

initiative could be delayed, diluted, dismissed, or generally 

prove too difficult for the Alliance to implement. That 

would lead to a weakened transatlantic relationship that 

leaves Europe and the United States less interoperable 

and more on their own in the future. For the United 

States that would mean less reliance on Allies and 

partners, and greater investment in a more unilaterally 

capable military. Three concerns are paramount.

One concern is that in a period of sustained economic 

turmoil marked by well-known perils—rampant inflation, 

stagflation, recession, and joblessness—nations will be 

driven away from cooperation by competing demands. Allies would be reluctant to pool capabilities and industries. 

They would be inclined to maintain wasteful duplication 

and less modern, poorly trained, and less interoperable 

forces. Behind this façade, they could argue that they are 

participating in the Alliance—so long as they do not have 

to demonstrate real capabilities. Yet they would be moving 

away from cooperation precisely when they need it most.

Another concern is that transatlantic relationship apathy 

will grow on both sides of the Atlantic in the absence of an 

overt threat to territory or Allies’ stability. Investing adequate 
12 Transatlantic Current No. 6 www.ndu.edu/inss

political, military, and financial resources in transatlantic interoperability could be deemed unnecessary by a new generation of leaders as well as publics born after the Cold War. This 

is a special risk in the United States where taxpayers as well as 

politicians and policymakers are sensitized to providing the 

vast majority of NATO operational capabilities. Pressed hard 

toward other priorities, U.S. and other leaders may not appreciate the tremendous value of maintaining interoperable 

allied militaries until times of tension inevitably arise. The 

value is diplomatic and political as well as military. Maintaining common standards, shared doctrine, well-known tactics, 

techniques, and procedures, routine political consultations, 

training and education (civilian as well as military), exercises, 

and investment in adaptive technologies—all these are openended programs and cost money. Yet they are the grist of 

multinational cohesion and successful coalition operations. 

They are also mundane stuff that attracts no political champions in capitals without steady exposure to their worth and 

strong advocacy from military leaders.

A third concern is that NATO will become a 

shell while the United States deepens bilateral ties with 

the handful of European Allies willing and capable of 

cooperation on missions around NATO’s neighborhood. 

Counting the United States, only eight members have substantial forces and only one of these, France, has the size and 

financial potential to provide sizable forces on a sustained 

basis. The United Kingdom can provide only a brigade and 

equivalent air and naval resources, though it has many highend capabilities, including nuclear submarines and aircraft. 

Germany has evolved into a specialized military, fully capable 

when faced with the unlikely situation of self-defense but 

otherwise intent on low-end, mainly nonlethal operations. 

The majority of NATO members can contribute little, and 

then only if they remain dedicated to programs like the NRF.

NATO members, the United States in particular, 

cannot afford to let these scenarios erode transatlantic 

interoperability in the future. It is the lifeblood of our respective nations’ defense and security—none more than 

the United States of America.

This paper was originally presented to a Department of State Outreach Seminar at the University 

Club in Washington, DC, on March 26, 2012, and has 

been edited. The seminar was sponsored by the State 

Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 

the National Intelligence Council, and the Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institute.

Notes 1 The LCCC capabilities are full capability of the Afghan 

Mission Network; implementation of an ambitious counter–improvised explosive device action plan; improvement of airlift and 

sealift capabilities; implementation of collective logistics contracts; 

missile defense; full capability of the NATO Cyber Defense Package; 

development of NATO support for stabilization and reconstruction 

operations; full implementation of an interoperable Air Command 

and Control System; development of a coordinated joint intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance capability; and deployment of an 

Alliance Ground Surveillance system.

2 The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters is located 

at SHAPE but is not a NATO-approved organization or part of the 

Command Structure requirement. The United States is the framework 

nation and provides the largest staff contingent and funding support.

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies within the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies provides research 

and policy advice to senior Department of Defense and 

other U.S. Government leaders through studies, research 

projects, and outreach and education programs. CTSS 

draws on its unique interface with U.S. and international 

governments and research institutions to provide timely 

and relevant policy recommendations.

The Transatlantic Current series presents original research by members of the CTSS resident scholars as 

well as nonresident subject matter experts. The opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Department or 

any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU 

Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Ambassador Robert Hunter

Director

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS