H e r n a m e a lso a p p e a rs in the re c o rd sp e lled “V ic k y.” 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 11
, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. GA RN ER DWIGHT PA DGE TT

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for P utnam C ounty No. 01-0450 Leon Burns, Jr., Jud ge

No. M2003- 00542-CCA -R3-C D - F iled October 21, 2004

The de fenda nt, Garne r Dwig ht Padg ett, was convicted of f irst deg ree preme ditated murder . The trial court imposed a se ntence of life imprisonment. I n this appeal of right, the de fenda nt contends that the trial court err ed by failing to g rant a mistrial afte r two jurors obse rved him in custody , by failing to i ns truc t on the le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s o f a g g ra vateda ssa ult a nda ssa ult , a ndby

faili ng to suppress his confe ssion. He also challeng es t he sufficiency of t he evide nce and arg ues that there was prosec utorial misconduct during closing arg ument. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

David B rady , District Public Defe nder, a nd J ohn B. N isbet, I I I
, Assistant Public Def ender
, for the

app e lla nt, Ga

rn e r D wi g ht P a dg e tt.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Ric ha rdH. Du na va nt, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam E. Gibson, District Attorney Gene ral; and D avid A Patterson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Th e tw e nty -s ix-y e ar- oldvic tim , M a tth e w E ri c Smith, wh o li ve d w ith his pa re nts in Cumberland Co u n ty , was last see n alive at a pproxi mately

7:00 p.m. on Friday , Marc h 2, 2001. Se ve ra l day s late r, the vic tim ’s fathe r, F rank Smith, sa w the vic tim ’s ve hic le , a re d c on ve rt ibl e Mustang , being driven by

a woman later identified as Vicki Eldridg e, the wif e of the defe ndant. The 1 family rec laimed the vehic le six day s after the victim’s disappea

ranc e and on the next day , Sharon S m i t h
, t h e v i ct i m ’s m o t h er , re p o rt ed t o t h e a u t h o ri t i es t h att h e v i ct i mwa s m i s s i n g.-2-

The body was discove red in a remote wooded are a known as Glade Creek. Offic ers f ound two .22 shell casing s near

the body and a bullet e mbedded in the left side of the victim’s jacket hood. During the c o u rse of

the investig ation, TBI

Ag ent B ob Krofssik questioned the defe ndant. Afte r making sever al conf

licting c l ai ms, the defe ndant ac knowledg ed having lied to the ag ent and confe ssed to the murder . The de fenda nt admitted having stolen a .22 caliber B rowning pistol from Steve Go l d en approximately two wee ks befor e the shooting . He state d that he met the victim at Vicki Eldridg e’s tra iler on a Saturday night a nd initiallyintr o d u ce d h i m s elf as her c ousin. The de fe nd a nt r e c a lle d th a t th e vic tim , w ho ne ve r ide nti fi e d him se lf
, tol d him that “ Vi c ky ha d h is d a mn

car and wa s out running a

round” a nd complained that he had bee n abandone d in the woods by “one of the Rob bin s b oy s. ” Th e de fe nd a nt i nf orme d th e of

fi c e r that he a ndthe vic tim ha d s mok e d s ome methamphetamine f

rom a pipe and that he later drove Ms. Eldridg e’s truck as t he victim provided direc tions to “some [more methamphetamine] stashed in the woods.” The defe ndant told the a g ent that the vi ctim, who claimed to be having a sexual rela tionship wit h Ms. Eldridge , “dog g [ed] ” her

a ndde sc ri bed her a s a

“ wh or e .” Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd e d th a t w he n h e the n in fo rm e d th e vic tim that he wa s Ms. Eldridg e’s husba nd so that “he w ould shut up about Vicky ,” the victim continued to “talk[] b a d ” ab o u t h e r

. A c c o r d in g to th e d e f e n d a n t, th e tw o me n g o t o u t o f th e tr u c k and the victim “kick[ed] l eave s around” and “bent over at the waist” to look for the drug s. The def endant inf or me d th e of

fi c e r tha t he g ot “ sp oo ke d, ” pu lle d th e g un fr om h is belt , a ndthe n s ho t th e vic tim above the rig ht e ar. The defe ndant rec alled that he drove to a friend’ s residenc e wher e he a dmitted that he had “ killed a boy .” He also informed A g ent Krof ssik that severa l hours later he called the sheriff ’s department a nd asked f or an of fice r to g ive him a ride. A ccor ding to the de fenda nt, he then threw the g un awa y

in a swampy , wooded a

rea off the side of a r oadwa y . He c laimed that his actions had bee n motivated by

his love for Ms. Eldridg e and his fe ar of the victim.

Ag ent Krof

ssik collected f

our .22 caliber shell casing s at t he residence of Jack Ba ker, w here the def endant c laimed to have f ired the stolen we apon. Although the ag ent was una ble to find methamphetamine ne ar the body , he conf irmed that a gla ss pipe had been in the victim’s possession at the time of his death. At trial, the ag ent testified that off icer s found a B rowning .22 caliber automatic pistol on the side of Highwa y 70 in the are a whe re the defe ndant said he ha d disposed of the murder

wea pon.
Cumberland County

Sheriff’ s Deputy

Scott J ones, who at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of the shooting ha d been dispa tched to Hig hway 70 North in Cumberland County to assist a 911 caller

re qu e sti ng a ri de , dro ve the de fe nd a nt t o Sa nd y Cr e e k Ro a d. I t w a s h is o pin ion that th e de fe nd a nt, wh o w a s c arry ing a c e llu lar p ho ne a nda du ff e l ba g , w a s n ot u nd e r the inf lue nc e of a ny int oxic a nts

. The deputy rec alled that the defe ndant claimed to ha ve been involved in an arg ument with his wife and lef t “bef ore thing s had g ot too heated.”

I n th e tw o mo nth s p ri or

to the mur de r, the de fe nd a nt h a d h e lpe d Jam e s Ra lphB ry a nt w ith
a construc tion project at the r esidence of Steve Golde n, in Nashville. During that time, the construction cr ew lived in the e mpt y Go l d en residenc e and the defe ndant had c onfided that he planned to kill his wife’s lover , explaining that “he wouldn’t g o to jail long be cause he’d g et out on his being mentally

ill or sick.” Acc ording to Bry ant, the def endant failed to r eport for work during-3-

the last ten day s to two wee ks of the job. B ry ant identified the B rowning .22 rec overe d from the side of Hig hway

70 as being simil ar to a g un that he had purcha sed and then later trade d to Steve Golden.

Bry ant’s wife , Connie Bry ant, c o n f ir me d th at a pproxi mately

three wee ks befor e the body was found, the de fenda nt told her that his wife wa s having an af fair and that he intended to kill her love r. When she counsele d the def endant a g ainst his plan, he re plied that “he w ould never g o to ja il over kil lin g so me bo dy

be c a us e he ’dbe e n in Mo c c a sin B e nd be fo re a ndthat’ s w he re the y wo uldse ndhim ag ain.”

At trial, Steve Golden te stified that the B rowning .22 rec overe d from the r oadside, whic h had a distinguishing y ellow mark, a ppear ed to be his g un. Two t o three wee ks befor e the body was found, J ack Ba

ker had seen the defe ndant with a black se mi-automatic .22 ca liber pistol with a fourto-six -inch ba

rre l. He re membere d that he and the defe ndant had fired the wea pon and that off

icer s l a t e r c o l l e c t e d t h e s p e n ts h e l l s f r o mt h e B ak e r

p r o p e r t y.

After testing the pistol and spent shells, Age nt ShellyBe tts, a fi rea rms examiner with the TB I , d e te rm ine d th a t the sh e lls fo un d at the c ri me sc e ne a nd the B ake r pr op e rt y we re c on sis te nt w ith Winchester manufa cture and had been fired by the Br owning pistol. Ag ent Be tts concluded that the bu lle t r e c ov e re d f

rom the vic tim ’s ho oda nd the tw o f

ro m th e bo dy

ha d th e sa me “ c la ss char acte ristics” as the B rowning and that they wer e also c onsistent with W inchester manufa cture

.

Dr. Char les Harlan, who performed the autop s y , t es tified at trial that the victim had thre e g unshot wounds to the head, any one of which would have been fatal. Two of the thr ee bullets we re found in the body . Dec ompositi on of the body was c onsistent wi t h i t s h av i n g been outdoor s for approximately one week during the month of March. The blood tests indicated that the victim had used methamphe tamine bef ore his death.

Th e de fe ns e didno t of

fe r a ny te sti mon y

a t th e tr ia l.

I

I nit ia lly , th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d by no t g ranti ng a

mis tr ia l on the ba sis that two jurors saw him i n custody during the cour se of the trial. After a lunch br eak, one of the fema le jurors a sked the bailiff a bout a door lea ding to the loc k-up ar ea. T he bailiff answere d that it led to “whe re [ they ] keep the people that c ome[] up from the jail” and offe red he r and a nother juror the opportu n it y to lo o k

. Wh e n h e o p e n e d th e d o o r , th e ar e a w a s e mp ty

. I n th e me a n ti me , the elevator doors opene d as a ja iler wa s escorting the defe ndant to the courtroom. The defe ndant, who was dre ssed in a sport coat and tie, was not ha ndcuff ed, shac kled or re strained in any way

. The jailer quickly closed the e levator door s.
Due pr ocess r equire s that the ac cused be aff orded the “phy sical indicia of innoc en ce .” Ken n e d y v

. Ca

r d w e ll
, 4 8 7 F

. 2 d 1 0 1
, 1 0 4 ( 6 th Ci r

. 1 9 7 3 )

. T h e u s e o f s h a c k le s d u r in g a trial, for

e xamp le , h a s b e e n s pe c if

ic a lly c on de mne d a

bs e nt c e rt a in s a fe g ua

rd s d e sig ne d to a ssu re that it wo uld-4-

no t in fl ue nc e the iss ue of inn oc e nc e or g uil t. Wi llo c ks v. Sta te , 5 46 S.W. 2d81 9, 82 2 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1976); see g ener ally State v. Smit h, 639 S.W .2d 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)

.

“ Th e e ntry of a mis tr ia l is app ro pria te wh e n th e tr ia l c a nn ot c on tin uefo r s ome re a so n, or if the trial does c ontinue, a mi scar riag e of justi ce w ill occur.” State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . The de cision to gr ant a mis trial is within t he sound discre tion of the tri al co u rt , an d this court will not dis turb the trial court’s determination unless a clea r abuse of discretion appe ars on the r ecor d. I d.

I mmediately

upon learning of the eve nt at issue, the trial court conducted a full hearing on the ma tte r. Th e tw o ju ro rs sw or e un de r o a th that th e ir jud g me nt w ou ld n ot be affe c te d. B e c a us e other juror s were aw ar e t h at t h e two jurors had seen the defe ndant in the elevator, the trial court provided a

curative instruction. All of the jurors ag ree d to disre g ard the defe ndant’s brief pr esenc e in the loc ku p a

re a a ndoth e rw ise fo llo w the in st ruct io ns of the tr ia l c ou rt . B e c a us e the re is a presumption that the jurors followe d the i nstructions of the trial c ourt and be cause the re cord doe s not establish that the defe ndant was unduly prejudice d, there was no a buse of discr etion by

the denial of a mis tr ia l.

II

Next, the defenda nt contends that the trial court e rre d by not instructing the jury

on the lesser included off

enses of ag g ravated assault and a ssault. The state asserts that the offe nses ar e not lesser inc lud e ds of

fi rs t de g re e mur de r and that a ny e rr or wo uld ha ve be e n ha rm le ss be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.

The que stion of whether a g iven offe nse should be submitt ed to the jury as a le sser include d offe nse is a mix ed question of law and fa ct. State v. Rush, 50 S.W .3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001) (c iting State v. Smil ey , 38 S.W .3d 521 (Tenn. 2001)). The standa rd of r eview f

or mix ed questions of law and fac t is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. I d.; see a lso St ate v. B urns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . The trial c ourt has a duty “to give a complete charg e of the law a pplicable to the fa c ts o f a c a se .” Sta te v. Ha

rb iso n, 70 4 S. W.2 d 3 14 , 3 19 (T e nn . 1 98 6) ; se e a lso Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 30.

I n Burns, our supreme court adopted a modified version of the Model Penal Code in order to determine w hat constitutes a lesser included off

ense:

An offe nse is a lesser

included off

ense if: (a) all of its st at u t ory

elements a

re inc luded within the statutory elements of the offe nse cha

rg ed; or (b ) i t f a ils to m e e t th e de fi nit ion in p art (a ) onl y in th e re sp e c t th a t it c on ta ins a statutory element or

elements e stablishing (1) a differ ent mental state indicating a lesser kind of c ulpability ; and/or-5-

(2 ) a le ss s e ri ou s h a

rm or ri sk of ha

rm to the sa me pe rs on , pro pe rt y or pu bli c int e re st,

or (c) it consists of (1) f acilitation of the off

ens e ch ar ged or of a n offe nse that otherw ise meets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or (2) a n attempt to commit the offense charg ed or an offe nse that otherw ise meets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or (3) solicitation to c ommit the offe nse char g ed or an offe nse that otherwise me ets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b)

.

6 S.W .3d at 466-67.

Th e tr ia l cou rt ha s a duty to ins truc t the jury a s to a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e if : ( 1) re a so na

ble minds could acc ept the off ense a s lesser include d; and (2) the evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to support a convic tion for the lesser included off

ense. B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 469; see also State v. L ang ford, 994 S.W .2d 126, 128 (Tenn. 1999) . Moreove r, our supre me court ha s held that trial courts “must provide an instruction on a lesse r-include d offe nse supported by the evidenc e eve n if such instruction is not

c on sis te nt w ith the the ory of the [s]ta te or

of the de fe ns e . T he e videnc e , n ot the pa rt ie s, c on tr ols wh et h eran i n s tru ct i o n i s re q u i re d

. ” S t at e v

. Al l en , 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d 1 8 1
, 1 8 8 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2 ). Ou r h i gh

c ou rt ob se rv e d that the “

jury is no t re qu ir e d to be lie ve a ny e vid e nc e of

fe re d b y the [s]ta te ,” a ndhe ld that the authority

of the jury t o co nvict on a lesser -included of fense may

not be taken a way , even wh e n p ro of

su pp ortin g the e le me nt d ist ing uis hin g the g re a te r o ff e ns e fr om the le sse r o ff

e ns e is
uncontrove rted. I d. at 189.

I n support of hi s position, the defendant cites State v. Paul Graha m Manning , No. M2002- 00547-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 14, 2003), pe rm. app. de nied (Te nn. Dec

. 15, 2003), in which a panel of this c ourt held that the trial c ourt err ed by failing to instruct the jury

on ag g ravated assault and assault as lesser included offe nses of preme ditated murder. While finding the e rr or to b e ha rm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, the c ou rt

ru le d in Ma nn ing a s f

oll ow s:

As set forth a

bove, first de g ree preme ditated murder is the “p re m editated a nd intentional killi ng of anothe r.” A n ag g ravated assault is committed, on the other ha nd
, wh e n the a c c us e d int e nti on a lly , kno wi ng ly , o r r e c kle ssl y c a us e s se ri ou s b od ily i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r

. S i m i l ar l y, a n a s s a u l t i s c o m m i t t e d w h e n o n e “ [ i ] n t e n t i o n a l l y, knowing ly

or re cklessly

cause s bodily injury to another.” The mens r ea of intentional includes the mens r eas of knowing and rec kless. A killing ce rtainly includes serious bo dil y inj ury (a s w e ll a s “ me re ” bo dil y inj ury ). Th us , a ll o f t he st atu tory e le me nts of these f orms of ag g ravated assault and a ssault are incl u d ed wi t h i n the statutory elements of f

irst deg ree preme ditated m urder
, and they are there fore lesser- included offe nses under

part (a ) of the Burns test. The trial court theref ore e rre d when it fa iled to i ns truc t th e jury

on the se fo rm s o f a g g ra vate d a ssa ult a nda ssa ult

. Manning , slip op. at 7 (citations and footnote omitted).-6-

The majority

of a se parate panel of this c ourt, howeve r, has held that ag g ravated assault and assault ar e not le sser included off enses of preme ditated murder . I n State v. J ohn C. W alker , I I I , No. M2003-01732-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug

. 11, 2004), the rationale for the holding in Manning was re jected:

An ac cused in a

criminal prose cution has the rig ht to rece ive adva nce notice of the c harg es he or

she must defe nd upon. Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 9. W h en a defe ndant is indicted for murde r, the defenda nt is place d upon notice that he or she will be required to answer to the c harg e or some le sser de g ree of homicide a s raised by the proof at trial. Criminal homicide is defined as the unlawful killing of another person, whic h may

be first de g ree murder, se cond deg ree murder, voluntary manslaug hter, c riminally

neg lige nt homicide, or vehicular homicide. Te nn. Code An n. § 39- 13 -2 01

. Ag g ra va te d ass a ult is an a ssa ult a c c omp a nie d by

se ri ou s b od ily injury or use of a dea dly wea pon. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102( a). B urns part (a) provides that ag g ravated assault is a lesser if all the “statutory elements a

re inc luded within the statutory

elements” of first deg ree murder. Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 466. The ind ic tme nt i n th is c a se a lle g e s a n int e nti on a l a nd pr e me dit a te d kil lin g of the vic tim

. It c o n t a i n s n o r e f

e r e n c e t o s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o r u s e o f a d e a d l y w e ap o n

. C l e ar l y,

no ne of the e le me nts of

a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult are a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt no r are the se elements include d within the statutory elements of f

irst deg ree murder. L ikewise, the elements of the various forms of assault, i.e., (1) bodily injury , (2) f

ear of imminent bodily injury and (3) phy sical c o n tac t re g arde d as extremely offe nsive or provoc ative,

are not alleg ed in the indictment and are clea rly not e lements of first deg ree murder. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101 ( a)( 1)-( 3). F or this rea son, we c onclude that neither a g g ravated assault no r assault are lesser included off

enses of first deg ree murder under Burns. Thus, the trial court did not err in f ailing to c harg e these crimes
t o t h e j u r y.
Slip op. at 11-12.

Whether the rule in Manning or Walker is applica ble, the def

endant he re w ould not be entitled to a new trial for f ailure to char g e agg ravated and simple assault. I f er ror at all, the err or wa s harmless be y o n d

a r e a s o n able doubt. See State v. D avid Way ne Smart, No. M2001-02881- CCA-R3- C D ( T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. , a t N a s h v i l l e, M ay1 3
, 2 0 0 3 ) ( h o l d i n g t h at an y erro r b y fa i l i n g t o ch ar ge

a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult a nda ssa ult a s le sse r i ncl ud e d o ff

e ns e s o f p re me dit a te d mu rd e r w a s h arm le ss be y on d a re a so na

ble do ub t)

. I n this c a se , the tr ia l cou rt ins truc te d the jury on the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e of pre meditated murde r as we ll as the lesser included offe nses of second deg ree murder, voluntary

ma ns laug hte r, re c kle ss h omi c ide , a ndc ri min a lly ne g lig e nt h omi c i d e

. B y

f i n d i n g th ed e f

e n d a nt g uil ty of pre me d it a te d mu r d e r , th e ju ry imp li c it ly r e je c te d f o u r le s s e r in c lu d e d o f

f e n s e s

. Se e A ll e n , 69 S.W .3d at 1 8 9 ; M an ning, slip op. at 8. The evidenc e of murde r wa s simplyoverw helming. T he proof e stablished that the def endant d ro v e t h e v ictim to a remote a rea , shot him i n the hea d three times, and then aba ndoned the body

. Under these c ircumstance s, it is our conclusion that any err or by virtue of the failure t o char g e either ag g ravated assault or simple assault was ha rmless bey ond a-7-

re a so na ble do ub t.

III

The de fenda nt next arg ues that t he evidence was i nsufficie nt to establish preme ditation. On

app e a l, o f c ou rs e , th e state is e nti tle d to th e st rong e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll

rea sonable infe renc es which mig ht be dra wn there from. State v. Cabba g e, 5 7 1 S

. W

. 2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8 ). The c redibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht to be g iven their testimony , and the

rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the j ury as t he trier of fa ct. B yrg e v. Sta te , 5 75 S.W. 2d

29 2, 29 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 78 ). Whe n th e su ffi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is

c ha lle ng e d, the re le va nt q ue sti on is w he the r, a ft e r r e vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the state, any rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e ); State v. Wil liams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983)

. Qu e sti on s con c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the we ig ht andva lue of the e vid e nc e , a s w e ll as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e are resolved by the trier of fac t. Liakas v. State, 199 Te nn. 298, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (1956). Be cause a ver dict of g uilt removes the pre sumption of innocence and ra ises a presumption of g uilt, the convicted criminal defe ndant bea rs the burde n of showing that the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to sustain a g uilty verdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)

.

F ir st d e g re e mur de r i s d e fi ne d a s:
(1) A pr emeditated and intentional killi ng of anothe r; (2 ) Akil lin g of

a no the r c omm itt ed in th e per pe tr a tio n o f o r atte mpt

to p er p et ra t e a n y

fi rs td egr ee m u rd er , ar s o n , ra p e, ro b b er y , b u rgl ar y , t h ef t , k i d n ap p i n g, ag g ravated child abuse , ag g ravated child neg lect or a ircra ft pirac y ; or (3 ) A k i l l i n g o f a n o t h erco m m i t t ed as a r es u l to f t h e u n l aw fu l t h ro wi n g, placing or dischar g ing of

a destruc tive device or bomb.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a) (Supp. 2000). Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-202( d) pr ov ide s th a t:

[P]re me dit a tio n is a n a c t do ne a ft e r the e xer c ise of re fl e c tio n a nd ju dgment

. “Preme ditation” means that the intent to kill must have be en formed prior to the a ct itself. I t is not necessary

that the purpose to kill pre- exis t in the mind of the ac cused for a ny definite pe riod of time. The me ntal state of th e ac cu s ed at t he time the

acc used alleg edly

decide d to kill m ust be ca ref ully considere d in order to de termine whether the ac cused w as suffic ient l y fre e fr om excitement and passion as to be capa ble of pre meditation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(d) (1997). Whether the evidenc e wa s sufficient de pends entire ly on whether the s tate was able to esta

blish bey ond a re asonable doubt the element of preme ditation. See State v. Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 7 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Hall, 8 S.W .3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999)

.-8-

Our supre me court has held that the presence of premeditation is a question for the jury and may be inferr ed from the manne r and c ircumstance s of the killing. See State v. Suttl es, 30 S.W.3d 25 2, 26 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Pik e , 9 78 S.W. 2d90 4, 91 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) . M or e ov e r, it i s w e llestablished that premeditation may be proved by circ umstantial evidenc e. See, e.g ., State v. Br own, 836 S.W .2d 530, 541 (Tenn. 1992)

. Our high court has identified a number of circ umstances f rom which the jury

may infer pr emeditation: (1) the use of a de adly wea pon upon an unarme d victim; (2) the particular c ruelty

of the killing; (3) the def

endant' s threats or de clar ations of intent to kill; (4) the defe ndant' s procur ement of a wea pon; ( 5) any prepa

rations to c oncea l the crime unde rtake n befor e t h e c ri m e i s co m m i t t ed ; (6 ) d es tru ct i o n o r s ec re t i o n o f e v i d en ce o f t h e k i l l i n g; an d (7 ) ad ef en d an t 's calmness immediately

afte r the killing. See State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997) ; Pike, 978 S.W .2d at 914-15. This list, however , is not ex haustive and se rves only t o demonstrate that preme ditation may be established by any evidenc e fr om which the jury may infer that the killing was done “a fter the exercise o f re flec tion and judgme nt.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-202( d); see Pike, 978 S.W .2d at 914-15; B land, 958 S.W.2d at 660.

One treatise sugg ests that preme ditation may be inferre d from events that occur befor e and
at t h e t i m e o f t h e k i l l i n g:

Three cate g ories of evidence are important for [the] purpose [of inferring preme ditation] : (1 ) fa ct s about how and w hat the def endant did prior to the a ctual kil lin g wh ic h s ho w h e wa s e ng a g e d in a c tiv ity dir e c te d to war d th e kil lin g , th a t is
, pla nn ing a c tiv ity ; ( 2) fa c ts abo ut the de fe nd a nt' s prior re la tio ns hip a ndc on du c t w ith the victim from which motive may be inferr ed; and (3) fac ts a bout the nature of the killing from whic h it may be inferr ed that the manne r of killing w as so particular a nd exacting that the defe ndant must have intention al l y k i l led ac cording to a prec onceive d desig n.
2 Way ne R. L aF ave, Substantive Criminal L aw § 14.7( a) ( 2d ed. 2003) ( emphasis in orig inal).

I n this case, ther e wa s evidenc e that the de fenda nt, awar e that his wife w as having an af fair, ha d v oic e d to bo th Ra lp h a ndCon nie B ry a nt that he int e nd e d to kil l he r l ov e r. Th e B ry a nts attempted to dissuade him from his plans . The wa s proof that two or thr ee w eeks be fore the shooting, the de fenda nt stole the .22 caliber Br owning pistol from the Golden re sidence just before quitting a c onstruction job in Nashville and re turning to Putnam County

. The de fenda nt admitted shooting the vic tim and later disposing of the murder weapon alongside a rura l highway . That the defe ndant had the prese nce of mind to call 911 for a ride from a sheriff ’s deputy

without arousing suspicion sug g ests a calm demea nor afte r the crime. I n our view, the re is suff icient evidenc e in the

rec ord to support a finding of pre meditation.-9- IV

Nex t, th e def

e nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld h a ve su pp re sse d h is s ta te me nts to police bec ause the circ umstances e stablish that they wer e coe rce d. The state a rg ues that the de fe nd a nt w a ive d th e iss ue by fa ili ng to t ime ly

raise it i n a

mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l.

Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b), whic h g overns the time f or filing a motion for

ne w t ri a l, p ro vid e s a s f

oll ow s:

A motion for a ne w t rial shall be made in writing, or if made or ally

in open court shall be reduc ed to writing
, within thirty day s of t he date the order of sentence is entere d. The [c]ourt shall upon motion allow amendme nts liberally until the day of the he ari ng of

the mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l.

The re cord r efle cts that t h e judg ment of convic tion was filed on Oc tober 8, 2002. The defe ndant’s motion for new trial, filed two day s later, doe s not include as a g round for relief that the trial court f

ailed to suppress the sta tements. At the hea ring on the motion for new trial some four months late r, howeve r, defe nse counsel raised the issue and the tria l court instructed him to amend the mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l. A n a me nd e d mo tio n w a s f ile d o n th a t date . T hestate didno t ob je c t.

T h er e was a

full hearing on the motion to s uppress. De tective Jerry Dale A bston of the Putnam Count y

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment testified that

h ew itne ssed statements take n from the de fenda nt by Ag ent Krof

ssik on Marc h 24 and Marc h 27, both of which wer e made in the confe renc e room of the justice ce nter. He rec alled that the de fenda nt, who rec ei v ed no promises of lenienc y , was cooper ative, re sponding c ohere ntly and without difficulty . The de tective c onfirmed th at Ag ent Krofssik had provided t he defenda nt with Miranda w arning s and that the de fenda nt never indicated that he wi s h ed t o stop the interviews or ha ve an attorney prese nt. The dete ctive re called that the defe ndant ac knowledg ed that he had been drinking prior to the M arc h 24 interview but de nied the th use of a ny

drug s. I t was the de tective’ s opinion that the defe ndant was not intoxicated at that time. Detec tive Abston te s ti f

ie d th at A g ent Krof

ssik wrote out the def

endant’ s statement long hand and that the statement was then rea d back to the defe ndant, who was g iven the opportunity to m ake

corr ections. He h ad no recollec tion of any reque st by

the def endant to tape the interview s and ins ist e d that th e defe nd a nt h a d, in f a c t, d e c lin e d to be tape d b e c a us e the re c or de r m a de him uncomforta

ble. The de tective a cknowledg ed that a t t h e time of the f irst interview, the de fenda nt mentioned that he had bipolar disorder. He reme mbere d that the defe ndant repe atedl yd en i ed t he need f or any medication or tre atment. Dete ctive Abston denie d that either he or Ag ent Krof ssik had threatened to throw the defe ndant down the s tairwe ll at the justice ce nter or ha d otherwise c oerc ed the conf ession.

Ag ent Krof

ssik corrobor ated the te stimonyof De tective Abston. He re ca l led that on the second inter view day , the def endant mentioned that he was not taking his medication but “indicated that it didn’t affe ct his understanding of wha t our conve rsation was a bout.”-10-

Eric Eng um, a P h .D. psy cholog ist, performe d psy cholog ical and ne uropsy cholog ical evaluations of the defe ndant. He determined that the def endant wa s first treated for a lcohol and drug ab u s e i n 1994 and wa s hospitaliz ed on an e merg ency basis in Febr

uary of 2000 whe n he beg an experiencing , among other thing s, sever e mood swing s, temper outbursts, and disorg anized thought proce sses. The medic al history of the de fenda nt indicated bipolar a ffe ctive d i s o rd er and poly substance abuse. Eng um testified t hat s hortly afte r t he arrest of the defe ndant, he wa s diag nosed with sc hizo-affe ctive disorder, bipolar type, and put on a medication reg iment consisting of Ef fexor, Se ro qu e l, a ndEs ka lith, wh ich les se ne d h is s y mpt oms . H e fo un d th e de fe nd a nt h a d d if fi c ult y sustaini n g conce ntration, org anizing his thoug hts, and eng ag ing in a bstract r easoning . Acc ording to Eng um, he diag nosed the de fend an t as h aving bipolar disorder in partial re mission, alcohol depende nce in e arly

full remission, and a mix ed per sonality disorder w ith avoidant, depre ssive, and para noid fea tures. With reg ard to the de fenda nt’s ability to voluntarily waive his rights, he te stified that “knowing what we know about [bi polar disorder] sy mptoms, i t would seriously raise a question in my mind as to whether

he wa s able to make a voluntary waiver . And that’s as f

ar a s I can g o.” Durin g c r o s s

- e xa mi n a ti o n , E n g u m a c k n o w le d g e d th a t h e h a d f o u n d e v id e n c e o f

s y mptom mag nification, or “ reporting symptoms . . . in strong er te rms than might be uncover ed upon objec tive revie w.”

Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d a t th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng that he “ re a lly sta rt e d d ri nking ha

rd ” in 1988 and that he first rec eived trea tment f or alcoholism in 1994 at Plateau when he was c onvicted of third offense driving under the i nfluenc e. He stated that althoug h he had a lso rece ived treatment at McF arla nd and Ne w L ife L odg e, his problems continued a nd, in Febr uary of 20 0 0
, he wa s committed to L akeshor e Menta l Heath Center in Knoxvil le, wher e he sta y ed for five da y s. The defe ndant contende d that on the day of his arr est, he drank a g allon of whiskey and smoked methamphetamine. A ccor ding to the de fenda nt, when Detective Abston telephoned him that there

wa s a wa rr a nt f or his arr e st, he re sp on de d th a t he ha d b e e n d ri nking a ndwou ld turn h ims e lf in t o Offic er Bi l l P ar ro t t

. He c laimed that the last thing he re called w as g etting into the ba ck seat of Offic er Par

rott’s cruiser , unable to wa lk, and that the police “ didn’t even book [him] .” The defe ndant t estified that he remembere d the s econd se t of interviews w ith police “somewhat,” but that he wa s not feeling well bec ause he had bee n hallucinating
, “see ing snakes in [ his] walls and spider s

c omi ng ou t of

[his ] dr a in. ” He ins ist e d that he wa s a fr a id that D e te c tiv e Ab sto n, a ndAg e nt K ro fs sik

wer e g oing to throw him down the stairwell bec ause one of them had me ntioned that “[i] t was a long way s d o w n

. ” T h e d e f

e n d a n t a c k n o w le d g e d
, h o w e v e r , th a t e ar ly in th e in te r v ie w p r o c e s s , h e took brea ks in the conferenc e room rather than the stairwell. He claimed that he had aske d for the interviews to be ta

pe re corde d. Whil e ac knowledg ing that he had sig n ed and ini tialed the written
sta te me n ts , h e c o n te n d e d th a t A g e n t Kr o f s s ik h a d n o t r e a d th e s tate me n ts to h im a n d th a t the documents we re only

draf ts.

The trial c ourt denied the motion to suppress, finding that the defe ndant’s stateme nts were

vo lun tary a ndru lin g a s f

oll ow s:

[W]e are de a lin g wi th a

qu e sti on of

the vo lun tari ne ss o f a

c on fe ssi on a ndthe tot a lit y of the c ircumstance s is the s tandar d. Under the circumstances of how the stateme nt-11-

was a lleg edly

made on the 27 , there would be nothing to indicate fr om the testimony th of [the defe ndant] or from the testimony of the off icer s that something transpired that

w o u l d o v e r

b e ar t h e w i l l o f

t h e a c c u s e d i n th i s c a s e i n s o m e s o r to f a t h r e a t e n i n g w a y. * * * I don’t think any

body can dispute the diag nosis. . . . But that in itself does not

re n d eran y

s t at em en tgi v en t o b e v o l u n t ar y o r a n y wa i v ert o b e u n k n o wi n g. And all of the proof here that I ’ve hear d this morning would indicate that the defe ndant under stood his rights. He waived his rights. And he g ave a statement that he sig ned off

on those rig hts. . . . And . . . the totality

[of the] the circ umstances would indicate . . . that there

was a voluntary

and knowing waiver of t he rights and a voluntary

statement g iven.

. . .

The trial c ourt also questioned the c redibility of the defe ndant, observing that he appe are d to “have some selec tive memory

loss.”

I t is th e d u ty o f th e tria l ju d g e to d e te r mi n e th e v o lu n ta r in e s s a n d th e a d mi s s ib il it y o f a defe ndant’s pre trial statement. State v. Pursley
, 550 S.W .2d 949, 952 (Tenn. 1977) . The trial c ourt’s de te rm inatio n th a t a

c on fe ssi on wa s g ive n kno wi ng ly a ndvo lun tari ly

is b ind ing on the app e llate courts unless the e vidence preponde rate s o t h er wi se. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Questions about witness cre dibilit y and “re solution of c onflicts in the evidenc e ar e matter s

e ntr us te d to th e tr ial ju dg e .” I d. Te sti mon y pr e se nte d a t tria l may

be c on sid e re d b y

a n a pp e llate

co u rt i n d ec i d i n g t h e pr o p ri et y o f t h e tr i al co u rt ’s ru l i n g o n a m o t i o n t o s u p p re s s

. S t at e v

. He n n i n g, 975 S.W .2d 290, 299 (T en n. 1998). I f the “ g reater we ight” of the e vidence supports the court’ s ruling , it will be upheld. I d. Yet, this court must conduct a de no v o review of the tria l court’s application of la w to fac t. State v. Bridg es, 963 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1997); S t at e v

. Ye arga n, 958 S.W .2d 626 (Tenn. 1997)

.

I n Miranda v. A rizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966 ), t h e Un i t ed S tates Supreme Court r uled that befor e a c ustodial interrog ation, police off icer s must advise a def

endant of the rig ht to remain silent

a ndthe ri g ht t o c ou ns e l. I f the se wa rn ing s a re no t g ive n, a ny state me nt e lic ite d f ro m a de fe nd a nt i s not admissible in trial. Dicker son v. United S tates, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). A de fenda nt’s rig hts to counsel and ag ainst self-incr i m i n at i o n m aybe

wa ive d a s lo ng a s th e wa ive r i s ma de “ vo lun tari ly , kno wi ng ly , a ndint e lli g e ntl y .” Mir a nd a , 3 84 U. S. at 479; State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W .2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992). I n order for a n acc used to eff ect

a wa iver, he must be adequately appra ised of his rig ht to remain si l en t and the conse quence of deciding to abandon it. State v. S t ep h enson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994). I n determining whether a conf ession was voluntary

and knowing , the to t al i t y of the c ircumstance s must be examined. State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997).

Al tho ug h th re e ha nd writt e n sta te me nts sig ne d by the de fe nd a nt ar e in the re c or d, on ly the la st statement wa s introduced at trial. The st atement, which has been summarized in this opi nion, was taken on Ma

rch 27 at 11:38 p.m., shortly afte r the de fendant asked to spea k with the office rs for a-12-

second time that e vening

. By ref using to suppre ss, the trial court implicitly acc redited the testimony of De te c tiv e Ab sto n a nd Ag e nt Kr of ssi k that the de fe nd a nt w a s c oh e re nt andre sp on siv e a t th e tim e of the int e rv ie w, that he un de rs too d h is M ir a nd a ri g hts , a ndthat hekn ow ing ly a ndvo lun tari ly waived those rig hts. A completed TB I Miranda w arning s form bea ring t h e defe ndant’s sig nature appea rs in the re cord. The trial court s p ec i fi ca l l y found that the de fenda nt’s testimonylacke d

c re dib ili ty , the de fe nd a nt ha vin g “ se le c tiv e me mory los s” a s to the c ir c ums ta nc e s sur ro un din g his

arr e st a ndhis sw or n s ta te me nts to the of fi c e rs . In o ur

vie w, th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate

a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n that th e state me nt w a s k no wi ng ly a ndvo lun tari ly

pr ov ide d to the int e rr og a tin g of

fi c e rs

.

V

Finally , the defendant c ontends that the prose cutor wa s g uiltyof misconduct during the

c los ing arg ume nt. He sp e c if ic a lly c omp la ins abo ut the fo llo wi ng c omm e nts :

You know . . . I ’m looking at that scene . . . and I can’ t think of a better pla ce to kill so me bo dy . I t’ s te n mi le s f ro m no wh e re , o ut i n th e bo on ie s, a ndthe n a lmo st 100 y ards, almost 300 fee t dow n a dirt road whe re the re’ s no chanc e of be ing se en. Th e re ’s no c ha nc e of

ha vin g wi tne sse s. I

c a n’ t th ink

of a be tte r p la c e in the wh ole wi de wo rl d to take so me bo dy to kill the m if

that’ s w hat y ou r p ur

po se is. No t a g oo d p la c e to h ide y ou r d op e . Pe op le hid e do pe off of the ir pr op e rt y but close to their home. The y don’t have to drive. And isn’t it interesting too who was doing the driving ? The de fenda nt was dr ivi ng the truc k th a t nig ht a ndhis vic tim wa s in the pa sse ng e r s e a t. A ndI su g g e st to y ou that y ou can a ssume that the def endant wa s in there at gunpoint being driven to – (I nterrupte d)

(Emphasis adde d.)

Trial courts have substantial discre tionary authority in determining the prop ri et yof final arg ument. Although counsel is g ener ally g iven wide latitude, courts must re strict any i mproper arg ument. Sparks v. State, 563 S.W .2d 564 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Gene rally speaking , closing arg ument “must be temperate, must be predic ated on evidenc e introduced during the trial of the c ase, and must be pertinent to the issues be ing tried.” State v. Sutton, 562 S.W .2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978)

. F or e xamp le , o ur

su pr e me c ou rt has rul ed tha t arg ume nt that “ that de fe ns e c ou ns e l w a s ‘ tr y ing to throw sand in the e y es of the ju ry ’ an d ‘bl owing smoke in the fac e of the jury ’” w as improper arg ument. State v. West, 767 S .W

. 2d 387, 395 (Tenn. 1989) . To merit a ne w trial, howe ver, the arg ument mu s t b e s o in f

la mm a to r y o r imp r o p e r a s to a f f e c t th e v e r d ic t. H arr in g to n v

. St a te , 215 Tenn. 338, 385 S.W.2d 758 (1965). I n J udg e v. S t at e, 5 3 9 S.W .2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976), this court articulated the f actor s to be consider ed in making that determination:

(1) the c onduct complained of viewed in the c ontext and the lig ht o f t h e facts and circ umstances of

the ca se;-13-

(2) the c urative me asure s undertake n by the court and the prose cution; (3 ) the int e nt o f the pr os e c uto r i n ma kin g the imp ro pe r s ta te me nts ; (4) the c umulative eff

ect of the improper conduct and any other err ors in the re cord; and (5) the r elative stre ng th or wea kness of the c ase.

Most restrictions durin g final ar g ument are place d upon the state. That is based in g reat

me a su re up on the ro le of

the pr os e c uto r i n th e c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m:
[The prosecutor ] i s the repr esentative not of an ordina ry party to a controve rsy , but of a so ve rei gn ty

wh os e ob lig a tio n to g ov e rn imp art ia lly is a s c omp e lli ng a s it s obl i gat i on to gove rn at a ll; and whose intere st, theref ore, in a criminal prose cution is not that it shall win a ca se, but t h at j u s t i ce s h all be done. A s such, he is in a pe c uli ar andve ry

de fi nit e se ns e the se rv a nt o f the la w, the tw o fo ld a im o f w hic h is that g uil t sh a ll n ot e sc ape or inn oc e nc e su ff

e r. He ma y

pr os e c ute wi th e arn e stn e ss and vig or, indee d he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. I t is as much his dutyto refr ain from imprope r methods

c a lc ulate d to pr od uc e a wr on g fu l c on vic tio n a s it is to us e e ve ry le g iti ma te me a ns to bring about a just one. I t i s fa i r t o say that the ave rag e jury , in a g reater or le sser deg ree , has conf

idence that these oblig ations, which so plainly re s t upon the prosec uting attorney , will be faithfully observe d. Consequently , improper

su g g e sti on s, ins inu a tio ns , a nd e sp e c ia lly a sse rt ion s o f p e rs on a l kn ow le dg e are apt t o

car ry much weig ht ag ainst the ac cused w hen they should properly

car ry none.

Be rg er v. U nited States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also J udg e, 539 S.W.2d at 344-45. Thus, the
state mus t re fr a in fr om ar g ume nt de sig ne d to inf la me the jury a nd sh ou ld re stric t its com me nta ry to matters in evidenc e or issues at trial. The prose cutor must not e x press a persona l belief or opinion, but whether

that q u al i fi es as misconduct ofte n depends upon the specific terminolog y used. F or example, arg ument predic ated by the words “I think” or “I submit” does not nece ssarily indicate a n expression of persona l op i n i o n

. United States v. Stulga, 584 F .2d 142 (6th Cir. 1978). The prosec ution is not permitted to ref lect unfa vorably

upon defe nse counse l or the trial tac tics employ ed during the cour se of the trial. See Dupr ee v. State, 219 T enn. 492, 410 S.W.2d 890 (1967); Moore v. State, 159 Tenn. 112, 17 S.W. 30 (1929); Watkins v. State, 140 Tenn. 1, 203 S.W. 344 (1918); McCrac ken v. State, 489 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). Altho u gh t here may be no
commentary

on the conse quence s of an a cquit t al , the prosec ution may point out the gr avity

of a particula r crime and empha siz e the importanc e of la w enf orce ment. See State v. Dakin, 614 S.W .2d 812 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) ; Bowling v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 176, 458 S.W .2d 639 (1970).

This court has obse rved that there a re fi v e gene rally

rec og nized area s of prosec utorial mis c on du c t r e la te d to c los ing arg ume nt:

1. I t is unprofessional conduc t for the pr osecutor int en t i o n al ly to misst ate the evidenc e or mislead the jury as to the infer ence s it may draw

.-14-

2. I t is unprofessional conduc t for t he prose cutor to express his persona l belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony

o r evidence or

the g uilt of the de fe nd a nt. 3. The prose cutor should not use ar g uments calc ul at ed to inflame the passions or p r e j u d i c e s o f t h e j u r y. 4. Th e pr os e c uto r s ho uldre fr a in f ro m arg ume nt w hic h w ou ld div e rt the jury fr om i ts duty to decide the case on the evidenc e, by injecting issues broade r than the g uilt or innocenc e of the acc used under the controlling law, or by making predic tions of the

c on se qu e nc e s o f the jury ’s ve rd ic t. 5. I t is un pr of

e ssi on a l c on du c t fo r a pr os e c uto r t o in te nti on a lly re fe r t o o r a

rg ue fa c ts outside the rec ord unless the fa cts are matters of c ommon public knowledg e.

State v. Goltz, 111 S .W.3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

Be cause there was no evidenc e that the defe ndant held the victim at g unpoint at any time, the prosec utor’s sug g estion that the jury assume that fa ct was imprope r. Ne verthe le ss, it does not require
t h e g r a n to f

a n e w tr i a l

. W h i l e o v e r s t a t i n g t h e s u p p o r t i n g f a c t s , t h e ar g u m e n td i d not qua lif y a s a g ross exagg eration. Def

ense counsel objected immediately
, interrupting the state’s attorney , and the trial court sustained the objection, instructing the j ury to disreg ard the remar k. There is no indication that the prosec utors’s er ror wa s intentional or meant to unfai rl y p rejudice the def endant. An

overzea lous or overly

partisan interpre tation of the evide nce of ten discre dits the validityof the arg ument. Evidence of g uilt included confe ssions to t he police and o t h er s

. Application of the Judg e fa c tor s f

a vo r the state . A ne w t

ri a l is no t w arr a nte d u nd e r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE