U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

Review of the Critical Incident 

Response Plans of the United 

States Attorneys’ Offices 

Report Number 

 I-2004-001

December 2003
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Department of Justice (Department) has long recognized the need to 

respond quickly and appropriately to critical incidents, from natural disasters 

to terrorist attacks. Since 1988, the Department has implemented at least 11 

initiatives aimed specifically at improving its capability in this important area. 

After-action reports on critical incidents in the 1990s (for example, Ruby Ridge 

and the Branch Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas) documented problems with 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), other federal investigative agencies in 

the Department’s responses, and United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs) 

responses to critical incidents. 

In 1996, the Attorney General addressed the USAOs’ preparedness to 

respond to critical incidents by directing that the Department implement the 

Crisis Management Coordinator Program (CMC Program). To implement the 

CMC Program, each USAO was directed to designate a Crisis Management 

Coordinator (CMC), who was to develop a critical incident response plan (Plan) 

and make other preparations to ensure that the USAO was ready to respond to 

a critical incident. The Criminal Division’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS)1

and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) were assigned to 

administer and support the CMC Program, and to train the coordinators 

designated by the United States Attorneys. 

After September 11, 2001, the Attorney General undertook an extensive 

reorganization of the Department to address the continuing threat of attacks by 

terrorist organizations, and created the USAOs’ Anti-Terrorism Task Forces 

(ATTFs).2 The Department’s Anti-Terrorism Plan clearly gave priority to the 

prevention of future terrorist attacks through expanded intelligence gathering 

and information sharing. However, the need to respond quickly and effectively 

to critical incidents continued to be highlighted by both the National Strategy 

for Homeland Security and the Department’s Anti-Terrorism Plan.3 For 

USAOs, that response continues to depend, in large part, on the preparations 

and Plans developed under the CMC Program. 

We conducted this review to determine whether the USAOs have acted to 

improve their ability to respond quickly and appropriately to critical incidents 

 1 Prior to December 1, 2002, CTS was part of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section. 

2 The ATTFs are now called Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs). 

3 Memorandum from the Attorney General to the U.S. Attorneys, “Anti-Terrorism Plan,” 

September 17, 2001; National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, 

July 16, 2002. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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by developing comprehensive critical incident response plans, training staff to 

carry out the Plans, and exercising the Plans.4 

Results in Brief 

The primary finding of this review is that most USAOs have not 

effectively implemented the required CMC Program. In particular, the Plans 

developed by the USAOs are inadequate in scope and content to ensure a quick 

and appropriate response to a terrorist attack or other critical incident. In 

1999, CTS identified for the USAOs 48 fundamental actions that should be 

taken when responding to a critical incident. The actions are organized into 10 

separate categories that cover areas such as coordinating and conducting 

interviews, managing the overall crime scene, and deploying USAO resources to 

FBI’s command post. For example, among the 48 actions are steps to ensure 

that responders: 

• coordinate interviews to avoid multiple agency interviews of the same 

person, 

• establish a unified evidence room and communicate chain of custody 

procedures, 

• establish a crime scene protocol, 

• preserve the crime scene, and 

• set up overlapping relief shifts to avoid fatigue. 

Some of the 48 actions were included to avoid missteps identified in 

after-action reports on earlier critical incidents. For example, the need to 

establish a crime scene protocol and better preserve the crime scene were 

identified in the after-action report on the Oklahoma City bombing. The need 

to plan for overlapping relief shifts to avoid fatigue and the potential for poor 

decision-making that may result from fatigue was recommended in the Ruby 

Ridge after-action report. With the advent of the ATTF initiative in October 

2001, the Department increased the level of communication and interaction 

between USAOs, FBI, and state and local officials, thus enhancing overall 

response capabilities. Nonetheless, developing Plans that address all 48 

actions remained essential to ensure a comprehensive response to a critical 

incident. 

 4 The performance of the USAOs’ ATTF/ATACs is the subject of a separate Office of 

Inspector General review. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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However, the Plans developed by the USAOs failed overwhelmingly to 

include guidance to ensure that all 48 specific actions are accomplished. Only 

12 of the 76 Plans we found on file at CTS and EOUSA addressed at least half 

of the 48 actions. Just 4 of the 76 Plans addressed them all. Eleven USAOs 

simply inserted their name into a five-page “model” plan issued by EOUSA as a 

format guide. Three of the Plans addressed none of the 48 actions because the 

USAOs had submitted documents other than critical incident response plans to 

meet their CMC Program requirements (for example, one USAO submitted the 

emergency evacuation plan for its building). 

Moreover, we found that USAOs generally do not follow the standard 

crisis preparedness practice of conducting regular critical incident response 

exercises. While 20 of the 94 USAOs participated in at least one of 23 exercises 

sponsored by the FBI’s Crisis Management Unit that were appropriate for 

USAO participation, and other USAOs participated in exercises sponsored by 

other federal, state, and local preparedness agencies, exercise participation was 

the exception rather than the rule. Conducting regular exercises, both within a 

USAO and with other agencies, to practice crisis response procedures is 

important to ensure a coordinated and competent response to an actual critical 

incident. However, in responding to a survey that we conducted during this 

review, over 60 percent of the 81 CMCs who replied indicated that their USAOs 

had conducted no exercises since 1996, and an additional 20 percent 

responded that they had conducted just one exercise during that time. Only 

17 percent indicated that their offices had conducted more than one exercise 

since 1996. 

The USAOs’ failure to effectively implement the CMC Program was not 

corrected because CTS and EOUSA did not administer and support the 

Program. The CMCs received only limited training, consisting primarily of two 

national conferences held in 1997 and 1999. CTS provided no further training 

from 1999 until March 2003, when it sponsored a 2-hour videoconference. 

CTS and EOUSA also provided only minimal guidance to the CMCs, and did 

not keep the guidance up to date as changes in departmental and national 

policy occurred. CTS and EOUSA further failed to track the receipt of the Plans 

and to properly maintain them on file. 

CTS has maintained a significant training effort in support of the ATTFs, 

but we found that training provided for ATTFs generally focused on preventing 

terrorist attacks, rather than on how to respond to attacks that occur. Our 

interviews with CMCs, including 10 who were also ATTF Coordinators, 

confirmed that the training provided to date, including the ATTF training, did 

not meet most of the specific needs of the CMCs. 

When we questioned the lack of CMC-specific training over the previous 

four years, CTS told us that national CMC training had been planned for Fall 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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2001 or Spring 2002. This training was initially deferred after the events of 

September 11, 2001, to accommodate other training requirements mandated 

by the Attorney General. The training was then deferred further because many 

of those who would have been the trainers or trainees were involved in the 

nationwide investigation of the terrorist attacks. CTS told us that additional 

preparedness and response training for CMCs is now scheduled for March 

2004. 

Although most USAOs submitted their Plans to CTS and EOUSA as 

required, CTS’s review was not thorough.5 Beginning in early to mid-2000, 

four CTS attorneys reviewed the Plans on file in order to draft a model plan. 

Each of the attorneys reviewed approximately 10 plans in conjunction with 

their work on drafting the model plan. Approximately 5 to 10 plans were 

identified as having “best practices” or provisions worthy of inclusion in a 

revised model plan that would address content, not just format. However, CTS 

never provided feedback to each USAO on its individual plan and, as a result, 

USAOs continued to rely on Plans that substantially failed to address the 

fundamental actions for responding effectively to a critical incident. A revised 

model plan was issued in May 2003 and in August 2003 USAOs reported that 

they were in the process of revising their Plans. 

We also found that the description of CMC Program implementation 

included in the Department’s Annual Performance Reports was overstated. In 

its FY 2000 Performance Plan, as a part of the strategic objective to “Improve 

Response Capabilities to Terrorists’ Acts,” the Department set a goal of having 

Plans in place at 90 of the 94 USAOs by the end of FY 2002.6 In FY 2001, 

based on an e-mail survey conducted by EOUSA, the Department reported that 

88 USAOs had completed their Plans. In addition, several Performance Reports 

also contained a narrative detailing the performance of the program.7 The 

narrative provided specific information indicating that: 1) all 88 Plans had been 

submitted by the USAOs and evaluated by CTS; 2) the Plans met the criteria 

for a complete Plan and provided a framework for responding to terrorist 

attacks and other critical incidents, including a crosswalk to FBI and other 

 5 After the completion of our fieldwork, CTS provided the inspection team with the 

name of a former staff attorney who said he reviewed all of the Plans that were submitted as of 

the end of September 1999. When interviewed, he told us that he did not recall the exact 

number of Plans reviewed nor did he write up individual Plan reviews, but his overall 

assessment was that the Plans were not detailed and were generally of poor quality. He also 

told us that he informed the Deputy Chief, CTS, of his findings, but CTS took no action. 

6 Department of Justice, FY 2000 Performance Report & FY 2001 Performance Plan, 

April 2001, page 29. 

7 Department of Justice, FY 2001 Summary Performance Report, February 2000; 

Department of Justice, Department of Justice, FY 2000 Performance Report & FY 2001 

Performance Plan, April 2001; Department of Justice, FY 2002 Performance Report/FY 2003 

Revised Final, /FY 2004 Performance Plan, February 2003. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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response plans; and 3) the Department was providing continuing support to 

the CMC Program. 

Our review found that information to be inaccurate. Not all of the Plans 

were actually submitted; the vast majority of Plans were not comprehensive in 

their guidance, did not provide a framework for the USAOs’ response and did 

not contain a crosswalk to the FBI’s or other response plans; and CTS and 

EOUSA had not adequately supported the CMC Program. Moreover, our 

discussions with CTS officials found that their own reviews had identified the 

shortcoming of the Plans. Nonetheless, in FY 2001 the Department declared 

the performance measure “met,” and eliminated the performance measure from 

future Annual Performance Reports.8

While the first priority of the Department is the prevention of terrorism, a 

commensurate need exists to respond effectively to critical incidents that are 

not prevented. As stated in the Department’s FY 2003 and FY 2004 

Performance Plans, “to effectively address international and domestic terrorism, 

[the Department] must concentrate on both prevention and response.”9 

Despite the enormous efforts undertaken by federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies – including the work of the ATTFs to disrupt terrorist 

organizations and prevent terrorist attacks - Attorney General John Ashcroft 

recently reiterated that the United States continues to face a “very real 

potential” of another terrorist attack.10 The failure of the USAOs, CTS, and 

EOUSA to fully implement the CMC Program leaves the Department less 

prepared than it could be – and should be – to respond to critical incidents. 

In March 2003, CTS recommended that the CMC Program be 

incorporated into the ATTF/ATAC initiative. The recommendation was 

approved October 17, 2003. Although placed under the ATACs, the CMCs “will 

remain responsible for the creation, implementation, maintenance and exercise 

of their district’s crisis response plan....”11 However, the ATACs are only 

responsible for responding in the event of terrorist attacks, not other critical 

incidents. It is not clear whether the ATACs’ responsibilities will be expanded 

to include non-terrorist critical incidents, or whether the CMCs are still 

 8 Department of Justice, FY 2001 Summary Performance Report, page 223, Appendix A 

– Discontinued Measures Performance Report. 

9 Department of Justice, FY 2002 Performance Report/FY 2003 Revised Final 

Performance Plan/FY 2004 Performance Plan, page 1. 

10 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Fox News Sunday, August 3, 2003. 

11 Memorandum from Guy Lewis, Director, EOUSA, to All United States Attorneys, 

“Merger and Realignment of Crisis Management Coordinators Program Under Anti-Terrorism 

Advisory Council,” October17, 2003. 
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responsible for responding to non-terrorist critical incidents separately. 

Therefore, it is unclear how the realignment of the CMCs may affect the USAOs’ 

ability to respond to critical incidents, especially those that are not terroristrelated. As this review showed, the need to prepare for all critical incidents has 

not been met. Therefore, we provide ten recommendations to improve the 

preparedness of the USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

We recommend that the Deputy Attorney General: 

1. Ensure that performance measures are developed to assess the 

readiness of USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

We recommend that all United States Attorneys: 

2. Revise the critical incident response plans to address the action items 

identified by CTS, and regularly update the plans to reflect changes in 

law, departmental policy, or local procedures. 

3. Conduct and participate in periodic exercises to test the critical 

incident response plans and practice responding to critical incidents. 

4. Establish workload-reporting procedures that capture the time 

dedicated to critical incident response planning duties. 

We recommend that the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division: 

5. Provide updated training and guidance to USAOs on how to prepare 

effective and comprehensive critical incident response plans. The 

guidance should reflect changes in legislation, policy, and critical 

incident response practice that have taken place since September 11, 

2001. 

6. Review all USAOs’ Plans, including revisions, to ensure that the Plans 

cover all critical areas; provide individualized feedback to USAOs; and 

periodically report to the Deputy Attorney General on the status of the 

USAOs’ Plans. 

 

7. Provide USAOs with training and guidance on how to develop and 

conduct appropriate critical incident response exercises, either 

independently or in conjunction with the FBI or other offices. 

8. In conjunction with EOUSA, complete the development of a website 

containing information on critical incident response, including lessons 

learned, exercise scenarios, and best practices. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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We recommend that the Director, EOUSA: 

9. Establish a system for accurately tracking and reporting the status of 

USAO submissions and updates to critical incident response plans. 

10. With advice from CTS, revise the operations review process to include 

a full evaluation of the preparedness of USAOs to respond to critical 

incidents. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY.......................................................... 8 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW ............................................................ 13 

Most USAOs Have Not Prepared and Exercised Comprehensive 

Plans to Guide Their Response to Critical Incidents .................... 13 

Most USAOs failed to prepare comprehensive critical incident 

response plans ....................................................................... 13 

Most USAOs have never conducted critical incident 

response exercises................................................................... 15 

CTS and EOUSA Failed to Fulfill Their Administrative and 

Support Responsibilities for the CMC Program ............................. 18 

CTS and EOUSA did not provide effective training .................. 18 

CTS and EOUSA provided minimal guidance to the CMC 

Program ................................................................................. 22 

CTS and EOUSA failed to accurately track and maintain 

the Plans submitted by USAOs, resulting in lost Plans ............ 25 

CTS did not timely review submitted Plans or provide 

feedback to USAOs ................................................................. 26

EOUSA neglected to examine CMC Program 

implementation during evaluations of USAO operations ......... 27 

The Department Overstated CMC Program Implementation in 

Its Annual Performance Reports .................................................... 29 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................... 32 

APPENDIX A - CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN CONTENT 

 ANALYSIS................................................................. 35 

APPENDIX B - CONTENT OF CMC TRAINING CONFERENCES ...... 38 

APPENDIX C - CMC SURVEY INSTRUMENT ................................... 41 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

APPENDIX D – CRITICAL INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY: 1988-2003 .. 42

APPENDIX E – CRIMINAL DIVISION AND EXECUTIVE 

OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ RESPONSE .............. 45 

APPENDIX F – OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S 

ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL DIVISION AND EXECUTIVE 

OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ RESPONSE .............. 52 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

1

INTRODUCTION

After several highly publicized failures to respond effectively to critical 

incidents, in 1996 the Attorney General directed the Department of Justice 

(Department) to implement a Crisis Management Coordinator Program (CMC 

Program). The CMC Program required United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs) 

to improve their preparedness to respond “quickly and appropriately” to critical 

incidents by developing critical incident response plans. The Attorney General 

directed the USAOs to implement the CMC Program, and the Criminal 

Division’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS) and the Executive Office for United 

States Attorneys (EOUSA) to administer and support the Program. We 

conducted this review to determine whether the USAOs have acted to improve 

their ability to respond quickly and appropriately to critical incidents by 

developing comprehensive critical incident response plans, training staff to 

carry out the Plans, and exercising the Plans. 

Background 

Responding quickly and 

appropriately when critical incidents 

occur is an essential part of the 

Department’s mission, as well as an 

integral part of the Department’s 

strategy for protecting the nation 

from terrorism. Problems 

encountered during prior critical 

incidents – such as the Branch 

Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas, 

the Oklahoma City bombing, and 

natural disasters like Hurricane 

Andrew – resulted in significant 

congressional and public scrutiny of 

the Department’s actions. Afteraction reports on these and other 

critical incidents identified serious 

mistakes by the Department in areas 

such as communication and 

coordination between negotiating 

and tactical elements, personnel 

availability, crime scene 

management and evidence collection, 

and use of deadly force. 

Critical Incidents 

Critical incidents include acts of terrorism, 

group defiance of governmental authority, 

hostage situations, and natural disasters. 

Typically, these events involve one or more of 

the following factors (although the presence of 

one factor by itself does not automatically 

mean that incident is critical): 

• Involves threats or acts of violence against 

government or social institutions. 

• Involves significant loss of life, significant 

injuries, or significant damage to property. 

• Demands use of substantial resources. 

• Attracts close public scrutiny through the 

media. 

• Requires coordination among federal law 

enforcement agencies (more so than usual),

state or local law enforcement agencies, 

local or state prosecutors, emergency relief 

services, and/or emergency response 

services. 

• Requires ongoing communication with 

upper level personnel at the Department of 

Justice. 

Source: OIG review of USAOs’ critical incident response 

plans. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

2

Selected Critical Incidents and Federal Actions, 1988 – 2003 

INCIDENTS DATE FEDERAL ACTIONS

 Dec 1988 - DOJ Crisis Management Plan 

 Oct 1989 - DOJ National Security Emergency Preparedness Program 

Ruby Ridge - Aug 1992 

Hurricane Andrew - Aug 1992 

World Trade Center Bombing - Feb 1993 

Branch Davidian Stand-Off - Feb–Apr 1993 

 Apr 1994 - FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) 

Oklahoma City Bombing - April 1995 

 Jun 1995 - PDD 39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism” 

 Jan 1996 - Attorney Critical Incident Response Group 

Freemen Standoff - Mar–Jun 1996 

 May 1996 - USAO Crisis Management Coordinator Program 

 May 1998 - PDD-62, “Protection Against - Unconventional Threats to the 

Homeland and Americans Overseas” 

Terrorists attack World Trade 

Center and Pentagon - 

Sep 2001 

 Sep 2001 - DOJ Anti-Terrorism Plan 

 Oct 2001 - Deputy AG issues “Guidance for Anti-Terrorism Task Forces” 

 Oct 2001 - USA PATRIOT ACT passed by Congress 

Anthrax attacks: New York, 

Washington DC, and Florida - 

Oct 2001 

 Oct 2001 - Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan 

 Nov 2001 - Anti-Terrorism Task Forces established in USAOs 

 Nov 2001 - Blueprint for Change, A Plan to Reshape the Department and Its 

Components to Focus on Anti-Terrorism 

 Jul 2002 - National Strategy for Homeland Security 

 Nov 2002 - Reorganization of the Criminal Division 

 Feb 2003 - Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

Since 1988, at least 16 initiatives – 11 departmental and 5 other federal 

or legislative – have focused on correcting past deficiencies and improving the 

ability of the Department (and other federal agencies) to respond to critical 

incidents (the Table above). Between 1988 and 1996, these initiatives 

established requirements for periodic exercises of emergency operating plans, 

and assigned EOUSA responsibility for overseeing the emergency preparedness 

of the USAOs, including developing critical incident response training.12 In 

May 1996, the Attorney General directed that each United States Attorney 

establish a CMC Program, and prepare Plans as an integral part of the overall 

preparedness effort of each office.13 

 12 DOJ Order 1900.6A, Department of Justice Crisis Management Plan, 1988; DOJ 

Order 1900.5A, National Security Emergency Preparedness Program, 1989; Memorandum from 

Merrick Garland, Principal Associate Attorney General, et al., to the Attorney General, 

“Attorney Critical Incident Response Group,” January 11, 1996. 

13 Critical Incident Response Plan, Decision Memorandum from Merrick Garland, 

Principal Associate Attorney General to the Attorney General, May 23, 1996, and approved on 

May 24, 1996. 

Source: OIG review of departmental and other documents. 

See Appendix D for a more detailed chronology of critical incident events. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

3

Recent initiatives reinforce that being prepared to respond to critical 

incidents is still one of the primary objectives of the Department. For example, 

the Department’s Anti-Terrorism Plan (2001) and the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security (2002) were implemented to update the strategic objectives 

for the Department in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. 

Each of those initiatives identifies three major strategic objectives for the 

Department, one of which is to respond effectively to critical incidents. 

Specifically, the initiatives direct the Department to ensure national security 

by: 

• serving as an organizational structure for a coordinated response to 

acts of terrorism (Department’s Anti-Terrorism Plan), and 

• minimizing the damage and leading the recovery from attacks that do 

occur (National Strategy for Homeland Security). 

CMC Program. The CMC Program is designed to improve the ability of 

the USAOs to accomplish their statutory responsibilities while responding 

quickly and appropriately to critical incidents.14 Specifically, implementing 

better planning and preparation for responding to critical incidents was 

intended to improve USAOs’ performance in legal and procedural crisis 

response; enhance USAOs’ coordination with law enforcement and emergency 

response agencies; ensure the identification and organization of resources 

needed to respond to a critical incident (e.g., personnel, equipment, 

information); and improve the USAOs’ anticipation of likely crisis situations.15 

Each USAO was to improve its performance in a critical incident by 

developing plans to clarify department-wide notification procedures, district 

office resources, headquarters’ response, and the command and control 

process during a critical incident. In addition, the Attorney General directed 

that CTS and EOUSA administer and provide support to the CMC Program.16 

The specific duties assigned to the USAOs, CTS, and EOUSA are described in 

the following sections. Figure 1 shows the components involved in the CMC 

Program. 

 14 Each of the 93 United States Attorneys is the chief federal law enforcement officer 

within his or her jurisdiction, and serves as the principal litigator under the direction of the 

Attorney General. 

15 Attorney General’s speech to CMCs at the first national training conference, June 17, 

1997, page 7. 

16 Effective December 1, 2002, the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section was 

reorganized into the Counterterrorism Section (CTS) and the Domestic Security Section (DSS). 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

4

Figure 1 - Components Involved in the CMC Program

Office of Legal Education

Evaluation and Review Staff

Security Program Staff

Executive Office for

United States Attorneys

United States Attorneys

Crisis Management Coodinators

Counterterrorism

 Section

Criminal Division

Deputy Attorney General

Attorney General

Source: Organization Charts for the Department of Justice, EOUSA, and Criminal Division, July 2003.

United States Attorney and Crisis Management Coordinator 

responsibilities. In the event of a critical incident, the United States Attorney is 

the on-scene legal decision maker responsible for managing the Department’s 

response by, among other things: 

• facilitating coordination and communication with federal, state, and 

local officials and prosecutors, 

• preparing and securing search warrants, 

• assisting law enforcement personnel in interviewing witnesses, 

• making legal decisions, such as granting immunity, 

• appearing before grand juries, and, when necessary, 

• advising law enforcement personnel on collecting and preserving 

evidence. 

To coordinate and plan each USAO’s response to a critical incident, the 

Attorney General directed each United States Attorney to select a senior 

Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) to be the Crisis Management 

Coordinator (CMC) and directed that at least one AUSA at each USAO receive 

crisis response training. The CMCs for each USAO were directed to submit to 

EOUSA a Plan describing how the USAO would manage responsibilities during 

a critical incident. The CMCs were directed to coordinate the development and 

implementation of their Plans with appropriate federal, state, and local law 

enforcement and emergency response agencies, and participate in crisis 

response exercises with law enforcement and emergency response agencies. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

5

These Plans serve as the foundation upon which USAOs will base their 

response to a critical incident. It was the CMCs’ responsibility to identify the 

resources required for their USAOs to respond quickly and appropriately to a 

critical incident. 

While developing a Plan does not guarantee a flawless response to a 

critical incident, being prepared makes it more likely that a successful 

response will be achieved. As former Attorney General Janet Reno stated in a 

June 17, 1997, speech delivered to CMCs at the first CMC Training Conference 

held in Arlington, Virginia: 

By being thoroughly prepared to deal with all aspects of a crisis, 

which can reasonably be anticipated, investigators and 

prosecutors free themselves to concentrate on those unique 

aspects of the crisis, which could not have been anticipated.... 

Advance preparation needs to be focused through the 

development of a written crisis response plan in each U.S. 

Attorney’s Office. 

CTS and EOUSA’s responsibilities. To implement the CMC Program, 

Attorney General Reno assigned CTS to review the Plans submitted by the 

USAOs for content and quality and provide feedback to each district; EOUSA 

was assigned to monitor timely Plan submission and Plan updates. To support 

the CMC Program, the Attorney General directed CTS, in conjunction with 

EOUSA, to develop and ensure training for the CMCs. The Attorney General 

stressed “training and advanced planning are imperative” given the intense 

time constraints and public attention during a critical incident. Specifically, 

CTS was to provide CMCs training in: 

• coordination with law enforcement and emergency response agencies, 

• legal and procedural crisis response, and 

• specific planning to identify and organize resources, as well as 

anticipate likely crisis situations. 

The direction for CTS and EOUSA to develop training was reiterated on 

October 21, 1999,17 and in the Department’s FY 2002 Performance Report:

In the area of preparation for and response to acts of terrorism, 

the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section [now CTS] is 

responsible for administering the Department’s Attorney Critical 

 17 Memorandum for the Attorney General from the Deputy Attorney General, “U.S. 

Attorney’s Offices’ Preparedness to Address Critical Incidents,” October 21, 1999, page 4. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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Incident Response Group and its Crisis Management 

Coordinators program, which involves the development of a 

crisis response plan for each federal judicial district and the 

training of specially selected federal prosecutors from the U.S. 

Attorneys’ offices and the DOJ litigating divisions in crisis 

preparation and response techniques.18

CMC Training Conferences. Since the inception of this CMC Program in 

1996, CTS and EOUSA, through the Office of Legal Education, have held two 

CMC Training Conferences. The first conference took place in Arlington, 

Virginia, from June 17 through 20, 1997. At the Conference, the CMCs 

received information on the availability of cross-training crisis response 

exercises with the FBI and how to develop a Plan. The second conference took 

place in Columbia, South Carolina, from October 19 through 22, 1999. CMCs 

received contact information and general information on exercising Plans and 

preparing a portable “office in a box” (containing, for example, frequently used 

legal forms on a CD-ROM, cell phones for communications capabilities).19 

Subsequent to the initiation of the OIG review, CTS held a two-hour Crisis 

Management Coordinators Videoconference through the Justice Television 

Network on March 26, 2003. The videoconference consisted of a briefing by a 

CTS Deputy Director and a senior litigation specialist. They discussed with the 

CMCs the existing documentation and information available on USABook 

Online, an internal Department of Justice website for USAOs. They also 

suggested that CMCs review their Plans and integrate them with the District 

Office Security Plan and the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) Plan. 

During this review, CTS told us that national CMC training had been 

planned for Fall 2001 or Spring 2002. This training was initially deferred after 

the events of September 11, 2001 to accommodate other training requirements 

mandated by the Attorney General and then deferred further because many of 

those who would have been the trainers or trainees were involved in the 

nationwide investigation of the terrorist attacks. CTS told us that additional 

preparedness and response training for CMCs is scheduled for March 2004. 

 

CMC Manual. At the 1999 training conference, CTS gave the CMCs a 

“Crisis Management Coordinator’s Manual” in both hardcopy and on CD-ROM. 

The CMC Manual provides legal and practical guidance on how to respond to 

critical incidents. Developed by CTS, the CMC Manual provides over 100 pages 

 18 Department of Justice, FY 2002 Performance Report/FY 2003 Revised Final 

Performance Plan/FY 2004 Performance Plan, Strategic Objective & Annual Goal 1.2 –1.3: 

Investigate and Prosecute Terrorist Acts, page 3. 

19 See Appendix B for a more detailed description of training content. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

7

of detailed critical incident response information specific to the CMC Program. 

The second chapter of the CMC Manual contains a list of CTS-recommended 

action items that USAOs should take within the first 48 hours of a critical 

incident. The CMCs also received an electronic copy of the Attorney Critical 

Incident Response Group Form Book, which contains typical forms that may be 

needed when responding to a critical incident.
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

8

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

Review of Critical Incident Response Plans 

We began this review in December 2002 and completed our work in 

October 2003. We reviewed the 76 Plans available at EOUSA’s and CTS’s 

offices to determine whether USAOs submitted Plans as required, the 

timeliness of the Plan submissions, and the overall quality and content of the 

Plans. We assessed the quality and content of the Plans using the “Crisis 

Incident Checklist For Initial 48 Hours” (48-Hour Checklist) contained in 

Chapter Two of the CMC Manual. The 48-Hour Checklist contained 10 

categories of specific action items compiled by CTS to guide USAOs in 

developing their Plans for responding to a critical incident. The action items 

cover every aspect of USAO critical incident response, from notifying the 

Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General that an incident has occurred to 

coordinating with state and local emergency response agencies. We identified 

48 specific actions contained in the checklist.20 

Before we used the 48 specific actions as the basis for evaluating the 

Plans on file, we examined whether those recommended actions remained valid 

responses and whether the list as a whole represented a reasonably complete 

approach to responding to a critical incident. Based on our examination, 

which consisted of the three steps described below, we verified that the 

approach to incident response delineated by the 48-Hour Checklist was 

reasonably complete and valid criteria for evaluating the USAOs’ critical 

incident response plans. 

We began our examination of the 48-Hour Checklist by confirming that it 

was the guidance given to the CMCs on what to include in a critical incident 

response plan. We confirmed that: 

 

• CTS identified the 48 action items as important tasks to be 

accomplished in a crisis situation, 

• the CMCs were informed of the 48 action items at the 1999 CMC 

training conference, as part of the CMC Manual they were given to 

guide the implementation of the Program within their district, and 

• the 1999 CMC Manual, particularly Chapter 2, was the latest, most 

detailed, and most comprehensive information provided to CMCs on 

how to develop Plans. 

 20 See Appendix A for a list of the 48 action items. 
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Subsequent to our fieldwork for this review, in May 2003, CTS issued a 

revised “Guide to Developing a Crisis Response Plan” that included the same 

48-Hour Checklist, further confirming that the 48 actions remain the current 

guidance on the fundamental steps to take in responding to a critical incident. 

To assess the completeness of the range of actions included on the 48-

Hour Checklist, we compared the 48 action items to deficiencies noted in past 

FBI after-action reports from critical incidents, including: 

• Ruby Ridge (1992), 

• Branch Davidian Stand-off (1993), 

• World Trade Center Bombing (1993), 

• Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City (1995), and 

• Freemen Stand-off (1996). 

Our assessment showed that the 48-Hour Checklist includes steps to 

address the recommendations in the above reports. For example, one of the 

major findings in the after-action report on Ruby Ridge was that on-scene 

personnel made mistakes in judgment as a direct result of fatigue because 

there was no plan to provide relief personnel and adequate rest periods for 

those conducting the operation. The 48-Hour Checklist clearly states that 

USAOs should “Plan relief shift[s] of AUSAs with preset period[s] of overlap to 

facilitate continuity.” 

 

The after-action reports on the bombings of the World Trade Center in 

1993, and the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building in 1995, found 

problems with evidence collection and preservation. The Checklist addresses 

those areas by stating that Plans should include how USAOs will: 

• preserve the crime scene consistent with life-saving requirements, 

• ensure that there is a single, coordinated crime scene protocol and 

that no crime scene search is undertaken independent of that 

protocol, 

• implement a crime scene protocol, which includes guidance to ensure 

the orderly presentation of evidence at trial through a limited number 

of witnesses (e.g., search team leaders), and 
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• establish a single, unified evidence room with clear understanding of 

management and chain of custody procedures.21 

Finally, during our interviews with 26 CMCs and the Deputy Chief, CTS, 

we asked their opinions as to whether the 48 actions remained the appropriate 

actions to take in response to a critical incident and whether the range of 

actions was reasonably complete. The CMCs we interviewed confirmed that the 

48 actions remained valid and reasonably complete, although they indicated 

that the list could be expanded to reflect changes that have occurred since 

September 11, 2001. 

USAO Critical Incident Response Survey 

Because the scope of our review encompassed the implementation of the 

CMC Program at all 94 USAOs, we conducted a survey of all offices to 

determine the following: 

• which USAOs filed their Plan with EOUSA or CTS, 

• how many times the offices exercised their Plans in a simulated 

critical incident since 1996, the year the CMC Program began, 

• the number of actual critical incidents at the office since 1996, 

• the location of any post-exercise or post-incident reports, and 

• additional critical incident commentary. 

We received completed surveys from 81 of the 94 USAOs, an 86 percent 

response rate. The data we collected allowed us to determine how many survey 

respondents exercised or activated their Plans, how many found their Plans 

effective, and how many updated their Plans. The comments CMCs provided 

supplemented the survey responses. A copy of the survey is included in 

Appendix C. 

 21 The critical nature of evidence management related to the Oklahoma City bombing 

came to the forefront again, long after the actual incident, when on May 11, 2001, the 

Department announced that it would postpone the execution of Timothy McVeigh, after 

confirming the existence of approximately 3,100 pages of previously undisclosed evidence. 
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Interviews with Crisis Management Coordinators 

We conducted in-person and telephone interviews with a structured 

sample of CMCs at 26 USAOs across the United States. Our interview sample 

included five CMCs each from among USAOs that: 

• did not respond to our survey, 

• did not exercise, but responded to an actual incident, 

• did exercise, but did not respond to an actual incident, 

• neither responded to an actual incident nor exercised their Plans, and 

• both responded to an actual incident and activated their Plans. 

In addition, we interviewed the CMC for the USAO for the District of 

Columbia because it is frequently involved in responding to critical incidents 

and handles both federal and local prosecutions. 

Interviews with EOUSA, Criminal Division, CTS, and FBI 

As part of our review, we interviewed EOUSA, Criminal Division, CTS, 

and FBI officials who have critical incident response oversight responsibilities. 

Our interviews with EOUSA included the Assistant Director for Operations; the 

Assistant Director for Security Programs Staff; the Assistant Director for 

Evaluation and Review Staff; and the Attorney Advisor for the Office of the 

Director. At the Criminal Division, we interviewed the Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General responsible for CTS. At CTS, we interviewed the Chief, 

Principal Deputy Chief, Deputy Chief, and six of the eight Anti-Terrorism Task 

Force Regional Coordinators. At the FBI, we interviewed the SAC, the Assistant 

SAC, the Unit Chief, and the Supervisory Special Agent of the CIRG Crisis 

Management Unit. 

Review of Background Information 

We reviewed the Department’s Crisis Management Plan (DOJ Order 

1900.6A), December 12, 1988; Attorney Critical Incident Response Group 

(ACIRG) Decision Memorandum, January 11, 1996; Critical Incident Response 

Plan Decision Memorandum, May 23, 1996; and the Attorney General’s speech 

to CMCs on June 17, 1997. We reviewed training materials for the 1997 CMC 

National Training Conference held in Arlington, Virginia, and the 1999 

conference held at the National Advocacy Center in Columbia, South Carolina. 

We reviewed the Status of USAOs’ Preparedness to Address Critical Incidents 

memorandum, October 21, 1999; EOUSA’s request to review Crisis Response 
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and Disaster Recovery Response Plans memorandum, October 15, 2001, and 

the corresponding USAO responses; DOJ Fiscal Year (FY) 2001-2006 Strategic 

Plan, November 2001; DOJ FY 2001 Performance Plan, February 2000; DOJ 

FY 2002 Performance Report, FY 2003 Revised Final Performance Plan, 

FY 2004 Performance Plan, February 28, 2003; and other appropriate 

documents. Additionally, we consulted books and articles on critical incident 

response practice and theory. 

Critical Incident Exercise Observation

We also observed a weapons of mass destruction exercise, “Operation 

Furies,” in Alexandria, Virginia, conducted on February 8, 2003. Operation 

Furies was a full-scale critical incident response exercise involving more than 

400 rescue workers, law enforcement officers, and military personnel, along 

with volunteer role players from the surrounding residential area and the 

USAO for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
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RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

Most USAOs have not prepared comprehensive Plans to guide 

their response to critical incidents. The Plans prepared by 

USAOs overwhelmingly failed to address the 48 actions 

identified by CTS as fundamental to respond effectively to 

critical incidents and avoid past mistakes. Further, most 

USAOs have never conducted critical incident response 

exercises. CTS and EOUSA failed to carry out their 

administrative and support responsibilities to conduct 

training, provide guidance, track and maintain the USAOs’ 

Plans, and review and provide feedback on the Plans to the 

USAOs. The failure by the USAOs to implement the CMC 

Program was neither corrected nor reported to the Attorney 

General. Moreover, the Department reported in its annual 

Performance Report that the CMC Program had met its 

objectives to improve the Department’s preparedness, when it 

had not. 

Most USAOs Have Not Prepared and Exercised Comprehensive 

Plans to Guide Their Response to Critical Incidents 

Most USAOs failed to prepare comprehensive critical incident 

response Plans. Our analysis showed that the Plans submitted by the USAOs 

provide inadequate guidance to respond to a critical incident. The 48 actions 

that should be taken when responding to a critical incident were contained in 

the 1999 CMC Manual. The actions address essential elements of critical 

incident response, including coordinating interviews to avoid multiple agency 

interviews of the same person, providing for a unified evidence room and 

communicating chain of custody procedures, establishing a crime scene 

protocol, preserving the crime scene, and setting up overlapping relief shifts to 

avoid fatigue. 

We analyzed the 76 Plans available at CTS and EOUSA and found that 

most Plans substantially failed to include instruction to ensure that USAO staff 

responding to a critical incident accomplishes the 48 fundamental actions. 

Only 12 of the 76 Plans on file addressed at least half of the 48 actions, and 

just 4 Plans addressed all 48 actions (Figure 2, next page). Many of the 

omitted actions represent vital elements of an effective critical incident 

response. For example, of the 76 Plans: 
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• 67 failed to address coordination of interviews to avoid multiple 

agency interviews of the same person, 

• 61 did not provide for a unified evidence room and communicating 

chain of custody procedures, 

• 60 did not address establishment 

of a crime scene protocol, 

• 54 did not address preservation 

of the crime scene, and 

• 32 failed to address setting up 

overlapping relief shifts to avoid 

fatigue among AUSAs working a 

critical incident. 

In some cases, the Plans did not 

represent even a minimal attempt to 

develop critical incident guidance. Eleven 

USAOs did nothing more than insert their District’s name into a “Sample Plan” 

distributed by EOUSA and attach contact lists from their office and several 

other agencies.22 In three other cases, the USAOs submitted documents other

than a critical incident response plan. These documents included an Occupant 

Emergency Plan, an Emergency Relocation Plan, and a “Plan” comprised of 

handouts from a January 1999 FBI-sponsored workshop on Weapons of Mass 

Destruction.23

Developing Plans that address all 48 actions is essential to ensure a 

comprehensive response to a critical incident and to avoid repeating missteps 

that were identified in after-action reports on earlier critical incidents. For 

example, the need for action to establish a crime scene protocol and better 

preserve the crime scene were identified in the Oklahoma City after-action 

report. The need to plan for overlapping relief shifts to avoid fatigue and the 

potential for poor decision-making that may result from fatigue was 

 22 The Sample Plan did not contain specific guidance on how to respond to critical 

incidents, but was a format guide intended to help the USAOs in developing their own Plans. 

The Sample Plan is discussed further on page 21. 

23 Occupant Emergency Plans provide for either the rapid evacuation of a building or 

sheltering in place within the building, depending on the nature of the incident that triggered 

the plan. Emergency Relocation Plans provide for the continuation of all essential 

organizational activities in secondary locations because the primary location has become 

unusable. These plans are required for USAOs, but they address activities in a context other 

than crisis response, as defined in the CMC Program. 

Figure 2

48 Actions in USAO Plans

N = 76

32

32

5

7

0 10 20 30 40

0-12

13-24

25-36

37-48

Action Items

Addressed

Number of Plans

Source: OIG review of Plans on file with CTS & EOUSA.
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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49

16

8

3

3

2

Never - 49

Once - 16

Tw ice - 8

Three times - 3

Four or more times - 3

Unknow n - 2

Figure 3

 USAOs Conducting Critical Response 

Exercises in Last 7 Years

N=81

recommended in the Ruby Ridge after-action report. Failing to develop Plans 

that ensure these and other actions are accomplished increases the risk that 

USAOs will respond incompletely or ineffectively to critical incidents. While the 

absence of a Plan does not preclude a USAO from responding to a critical 

incident, having a Plan that guides responders through all 48 fundamental 

actions ensures that the USAO is better prepared to respond quickly and 

appropriately to a critical incident. 

Planning to respond to critical 

incidents was not a priority for USAOs. 

Based on the quality of the Plans, as 

well as our discussions with CMCs, we 

concluded that the CMC Program was 

not a priority for the USAOs. In our 

interviews with 26 CMCs at the USAOs, 

we were consistently told that more 

attention was given to competing 

priorities and that the CMCs’ workload 

was not adjusted to allow time for Plan 

development and CMC Program 

implementation. Several CMCs noted 

that there is no applicable category on 

their work tracking system to account 

for the time they spend on CMC duties. 

Therefore time spent on CMC Program 

related activities does not get reported as time spent directly on work that 

contributes to overall office performance. 

Most USAOs have never conducted critical incident response 

exercises. Over 60 percent (49 of 81) of the USAOs responding to our survey 

reported that they conducted no 

critical incident response 

exercises since 1996. Another 

20 percent (16 USAOs) conducted 

one exercise during that time. 

Only 17 percent (14 USAOs) 

conducted more than one exercise 

in the last 7 years (Figure 3). 

The expectation that USAOs 

would exercise their Plans was 

clearly enunciated in 1997 by the 

former Attorney General. In 

speaking to all CMCs, she stated 

Source: OIG administered survey of CMCs that USAOs should participate in 

During our review, the Deputy Director, Security 

Program Staff, acknowledged some confusion 

concerning the overall security planning effort 

within USAOs. The confusion was the result of 

different directives that require USAOs to draft and

maintain six plans for separate but related 

purposes, many of which overlap in key areas. To 

bolster preparedness and eliminate confusion, in 

July 2003 EOUSA recommended that USAOs draft 

a core plan with individualized annexes targeting 

specific purposes, such as crisis response, 

continuity of operations, occupancy emergencies, 

and emergency relocation. A Security Working 

Group (SWG) comprised of U.S. Attorneys and 

EOUSA senior staff is responsible for promulgating

the appropriate guidelines. These actions are an 

indicator of EOUSA’s effort to be more responsive 

to the confusion created by overlapping plans. 
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regional critical incident response exercises with their local FBI field offices 

because: “The first tense hours after a bomb has exploded should not be spent 

on trying for the first time to build a working relationship with your key law 

enforcement agency. It is too little, too late.”24 

However, in promulgating the CMC Program, CTS and EOUSA did not 

establish any specific requirements for 

USAOs to conduct exercises to test their 

Plans and practice responding to 

critical incidents. Consequently, as 

detailed above, only a few USAOs have 

regularly conducted critical incident 

response exercises.25 

We found that exercising plans is 

standard practice for emergency 

response programs. For example, 

Federal Preparedness Circulars (FPC) 

65 and 66, which direct all Federal 

agencies to develop continuity of 

operations plans to maintain agency 

operations in the event of catastrophes, 

require that the plans be exercised at 

least annually.26 

Similarly, within the Department, the FBI (which also prepares critical 

incident response plans) requires its field offices to conduct annual crisis 

response exercises. We contacted the Department’s Office of Domestic 

Preparedness (ODP), which helps state and local agencies prepare to respond to 

critical incidents, and found that between May 2000 and March 2003, that 

office sponsored over 150 crisis response exercises.27 The Acting Director of 

 24 The Attorney General’s speech at first CMC National Training Conference, June 17, 

1997. 

25 CTS did encourage USAOs to participate in preparedness exercises conducted by the 

FBI and by other federal and state and local agencies in their region. At both national 

conferences, CTS distributed a list of exercises organized geographically to facilitate USAO 

involvement in crisis response and preparedness training. This list contained numerous 

exercises sponsored by ODP. 

26 FPCs 65 and 66 were issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on 

July 26, 1999, and April 30, 2001, respectively. 

27 The Office of Domestic Preparedness, which assists state and local public safety 

personnel in acquiring training and equipment to manage the response to weapons of mass 

destruction attacks, moved from the Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, to the 

Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. 

ODP: Exercises Are An Essential Part 

of Critical Incident Response 

Experience and data show that exercises

are a practical and efficient way to

prepare for crises. They test critical

resistance, identify procedural difficulties,

and provide a plan for corrective actions

to improve crisis and consequence

management response capabilities

without the penalties that might be

incurred in a real crisis. Exercises also

provide a unique learning opportunity to

synchronize and integrate crossfunctional and intergovernmental crisis

and consequence management response. 

ODP Website, (visited on April 29, 2003) 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/exercises/state.htm
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ODP, and the Director, Exercise and Evaluation Division, ODP, told us that 

preparedness depends on exercising critical incident response plans, as well as 

updating and revising the Plans to reflect lessons learned. An ODP official told 

us that, “Having a Plan and not exercising or revising it is the same as not 

having a Plan.” 

Importantly, although few USAOs conducted exercises, most CMCs that 

did conduct exercises reported that they were helpful in establishing sound 

operational procedures to respond 

to a critical incident. We 

interviewed five of the six CMCs 

from USAOs most directly 

impacted by the events of 

September 11, 2001, who 

confirmed the need for conducting 

regular Plan exercises and 

updating Plans. The CMCs all told 

us that, based on their experience, 

well-exercised Plans save lives, 

property, and other assets. 

While we found that most 

USAOs do not regularly conduct 

critical incident exercises, some 

USAOs did participate in exercises 

led by the FBI’s Crisis Management 

Unit (CMU). The Supervisory 

Special Agent (SSA) for the FBI 

CMU informed us that, in the 33 

months from January 1999 to 

September 2001, USAOs 

participated in 20 of 23 FBIsponsored exercises where USAO 

participation would have been 

appropriate.28 The exercises took 

place throughout the country and 

involved USAOs of all sizes. Scenarios ranged from a full-scale mock airliner 

hijacking in Anchorage, Alaska, to a weapons of mass destruction tabletop 

exercise in Pomona, New York. While the USAOs participated in the FBI CMU 

exercises when they had the opportunity, we noted that, in the 33 months 

 28 The CMU conducts a wide range of exercises, some of which involve supporting local 

law enforcement agencies. Because some of these exercises do not involve violation of federal 

law, USAO involvement is not always appropriate. 

CMC Training Recommendations

In a survey of the CMCs responsible for implementing the

CMC Program (81 of 94 responding), and interviews of 26

CMCs, we received numerous comments recommending

improvements to CMC Program training. The most

frequent CMC training recommendations were: 

> Organize districts by size and situation for 

discussion. Most CMCs recommended against a “one 

size fits all” training model. Where appropriate, lectures 

and discussion materials should consider the inherent 

differences in personnel and other resources available to 

small, medium, large, and extra-large USAOs. 

> Address the relationship of the CMC Program to 

the ATTFs. Several CMCs stated that ATTF 

coordinators and CMCs duties overlap, particularly in 

coordinating with state and local agencies. One 

interviewee suggested that CMC and ATTF coordinator 

training be designed so the groups can discuss areas of 

joint or overlapping responsibilities. 

> Maximize small group discussion. CMCs frequently 

stated that training should utilize a more interactive 

format featuring pragmatic advice and information 

sharing among USAOs, rather than being “a gathering of

talking heads” as one CMC described the prior CMC 

Training Conferences.

> Conduct training on a regular basis. CMCs stated 

that training in critical incident response should be 

conducted on a regular schedule (annual or bi-annual) 

and the training should be mandatory. 
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covered by the SSA’s records, the FBI CMU conducted exercises in less than 

25 percent of the USAO districts. Therefore, most USAOs had no opportunity 

to participate in an FBI-sponsored exercise. 

CTS also reported that USAOs participated in many exercises since 1997, 

including cyberterrorism exercises, a “full-field” weapons of mass destruction 

exercise, exercises in preparation for the 2002 Winter Olympics, and 

TOPOFF 2000 and TOPOFF 2002, which were large-scale exercises simulating 

coordinated terrorist attacks in multiple jurisdictions. Our survey regarding 

participation in exercises (see Appendix C) was specifically designed to capture 

data on USAO participation in all of the above exercises. 

 

USAOs report they lack training and resources to conduct exercises. 

During our interviews of 26 CMCs, we asked why USAOs did not conduct more 

critical incident response exercises. They responded that the primary reasons 

for not conducting exercises were that they lacked information on how to 

conduct exercises (14 of 26) and that small districts lacked the resources to 

conduct an exercise. However, we found that some CMCs took creative steps 

to identify and use local resources to conduct exercises. For example, one 

CMC in a medium size USAO in the Midwestern United States told us that she 

is developing a tabletop exercise, complete with video, with the assistance of a 

professor at a top research university. The CMC told us that she serves on a 

curriculum advisory committee for a graduate program in homeland security 

that the same professor is developing. Such efforts enhanced the USAO’s 

response capabilities by enabling it to draw on previously untapped resources. 

CTS and EOUSA Failed to Fulfill Their Administrative and 

Support Responsibilities for the CMC Program. 

We found that CTS and EOUSA did not effectively support the CMC 

Program because they did not provide effective training, did not provide 

adequate guidance, did not accurately track and maintain the submitted Plans, 

did not review the submitted Plans, and did not evaluate the USAOs’ 

implementation of the CMC Program. 

CTS and EOUSA did not provide effective training. Since the 

inception of the CMC Program in May 1996, CTS sponsored only two CMC 

Training Conferences and one two-hour videoconference. The first training 

conference took place in Arlington, Virginia, from June 17 through 20, 1997. 

The second conference took place in Columbia, South Carolina, from 

October 19 through 22, 1999. No additional CMC-specific training was 

provided until March 2003, when CTS sponsored a two-hour videoconference 

for CMCs. The Deputy Chief, CTS, confirmed that CTS neither developed nor 

sponsored any other training for CMCs. 
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Limited CMC Training. When we questioned the lack of CMC-specific 

training over the previous four years, CTS told us that national CMC training 

had been planned for Fall 2001 or Spring 2002. According to CTS, this 

training was initially deferred after the events of September 11, 2001, to 

accommodate other required training, and then deferred further because many 

of those who would have been the trainers or trainees were involved in the 

nationwide investigation of the terrorist attacks. In August 2003, in response 

to a draft of this report, CTS told us that additional preparedness and response 

training was scheduled for March 2004. 

We assessed the training agendas of the 1997 and 1999 CMC training 

conferences and viewed a videotape of the 2003 videoconference. We found 

that CMCs received little specific instruction on how to develop Plans and 

conduct critical incident exercises. According to the 1997 CMC Training 

Conference agenda, during the three-day conference the CMCs received three 

hours of instruction on developing crisis response plans and spent three hours 

in a group assignment on planning exercises. Similarly, during the 1999 CMC 

Training Conference CMCs participated in a two and one-half hour session 

covering “Development and Testing of a District Plan and Intra-district 

Coordination of Planning Efforts.” The most attention given to either topic 

related to conducting exercises occurred at the 1999 conference. Participants 

spent four hours in a general session discussing two possible terrorist attack 

scenarios, after which they met in small groups to discuss one of the scenarios 

for 90 minutes. The session concluded with a 45-minute review for all 

participants. 

In addition to reviewing the 1997 and 1999 Conference agendas, we 

discussed training during our interviews with CMCs across the country. All 

but one of the 26 CMCs we interviewed indicated that the prior training was 

inadequate and that they needed additional training. Further, the CMCs stated 

that the training should be revised to include changes that have occurred since 

the last CMC Training Conference in 1999. The changes include the post 

September 11, 2001, reorganization of the Department to focus on 

counterterrorism; the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and other terrorismrelated legislation; the reorganization of the Criminal Division; the issuance of 

the National Strategy for Homeland Security; the formation of the Department 

of Homeland Security; and the creation of the ATTFs within USAOs. While 

these topics were addressed in the ATTF training conducted since September 

2001, we found that few CMCs have attended that training. 

 Regarding the lack of CMC Program training, CTS confirmed that it did 

not conduct more CMC-specific training after 1999. CTS also stated that it has 

no line authority over the USAOs and, thus, can provide guidance but not 

dictate what the USAOs do. CTS told us that with the Department’s increased 

focus on prevention, it is working to see that fewer incidents occur and that 
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there is less need for response activity. CTS stated that it is addressing 

preparedness through such activities such as increased planning and 

cooperative action between FBI Strategic Information Operations Center and 

CTS, the establishment of a national process tracking system, and a CTS 

website being piloted to 18 USAOs. 

Other Training Fails to Fully Address Critical Incident Response 

Planning. During our review, the CTS Chief told us that ATTF training focused 

on both prevention and crisis response. He further stated that the training 

conducted for ATTF Coordinators covered much of the information needed by 

CMCs. CTS cited several examples of training that they believed met the needs 

of the CMCs, including: 

• Between April 2002 and November 2002, approximately 1,600 

prosecutors and law enforcement officers were trained at seven 

regional and national anti-terrorism conferences. One of the sessions 

at the November 2001 ATTF conference in Washington, D.C. 

addressed crisis management and was led by an experienced CMC. 

• In January 2002, in order to comply with a directive issued by the 

Attorney General at the November 2001 conference, EOUSA broadcast 

a live, four-day teleconference to an estimated 25,000 viewers. 

• In January 2003, 72 U.S. Attorneys were trained at an anti-terrorism 

conference. 

• Between May and September 2003 (after fieldwork on our review was 

complete), approximately 330 prosecutors and 500 FBI supervisors 

received updated training at six national security conferences, each of 

which included a tabletop crisis response exercise. 

Because the CTS Chief stated that ATTF training addressed CMC needs, 

we reviewed the training materials from the two national ATTF training 

conferences and the six regional training conferences. We found that the ATTF 

training focused on intelligence gathering and information sharing to prevent 

terrorist attacks. The training neither addressed preparing to respond to an 

attack or other critical incidents, nor developing and exercising a critical 

incident response plan.29 While we found the first ATTF conference included a 

session on crisis response, we also found that crisis response information was 

not covered at the following six regional training conferences, nor the second 

 29 The single reference to the CMC Program that we found was a list of CMC telephone 

numbers dated January 22, 2002. The only region to address the need for preparing for 

critical incidents was the Northeastern Region. 
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National Conference. Further, 10 of the 26 CMCs we interviewed also hold the 

ATTF Coordinator position for their USAO. In the last 2 years, these 10 CMCs 

attended the 2 ATTF national conferences and a regional training conference. 

Without exception, the CMCs told us they believe that the ATTF training was 

not a substitute for additional CMC-specific training. 

Although CTS provided information that showed USAO staff members 

have attended numerous training events related to the ATTF initiative, our 

review found that this training did not replace or diminish the need for CMC 

training. Our review of the training agendas and curricula found that most of 

the training focused on the primary ATTF goals of identifying and preventing 

terrorist attacks, not on responding when attacks occur. In addition, while 

some of the training did address preparing to respond to attacks, our review of 

the attendee lists found that few CMCs attended that training. For example, no 

CMCs attended the January 2003 U.S. Attorney Anti-Terrorism Conference, 

and only 52 of the CMCs attended one of the six national security conferences 

conducted between May and September 2003. Further, ATTF training that did 

address response capabilities focused on responding to the threat of terrorism, 

not on responding to other critical incidents. The inadequacy of the ATTF 

training as a substitute for CMC training was confirmed in our interviews with 

26 CMCs, as most (24 of the 26) identified the lack of training as the major 

hurdle they faced in improving the readiness of their offices to respond to a 

critical incident. 

In addition to the ATTF training, CTS stated that many USAOs had been 

involved in “real-life” events such as responding to the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks, and subsequent terrorism investigations, and suggested that 

those responses served as training. The actions of USAOs in responding to 

critical incidents could result in improvements to preparedness for later events 

if they were followed by after-action reviews, identification of weaknesses, and 

improvements to the process. However, we found that was not occurring. In 

May 2003, we contacted the 81 USAOs that responded to our initial survey to 

determine if they had made any substantive changes to their Plans.30 The 

responses we received from 53 USAOs indicated that only 8 had ever updated 

their Plans. While responding to “real-life” events does provide experience, the 

failure to fully exploit that experience by identifying shortcomings and 

improving response Plans leaves the USAOs at risk of repeating mistakes 

during future incidents. 

Based on our review of the CMC training materials, our evaluation of the 

Plans submitted, our interviews with CMCs, and our determination that the 

 30 We defined “substantive” as changes in policy, scope, or procedures, as opposed to 

“administrative only” changes, such as updating telephone contact lists. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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ATTF training did not provide a substitute for the CMC training, we concluded 

that the training provided to CMCs has not sufficiently prepared them to 

develop and exercise critical incident response plans. The inadequate CMC 

training contributed to the poor quality of the Plans submitted by the USAOs.31 

The uniform poor quality of the Plans and CMC feedback strongly suggest that 

the CMCs need additional training to provide them with the guidance that will 

enable them to prepare complete crisis response Plans, as well as to implement 

effective exercises to test the Plans. 

CTS and EOUSA provided minimal guidance to the CMC Program. 

From 1996 until May 2003, CTS and EOUSA guidance to CMCs consisted of 

providing CMCs with the CMC Manual at the 1997 and 1999 conferences, and 

a “Sample Plan” sent to them in October 1999. This paucity of guidance was 

confirmed by the responses of all CMCs we interviewed. Significantly, most 

CMCs appointed since 1999 said that they were either unaware of the CMC 

Manual or unaware that it was available through USABook Online, the internal 

Department of Justice website for USAOs. Also, as with training, we found 

that the CMC Manual has not been updated since October 1999, and therefore 

does not reflect the critical changes in departmental and national policy since 

September 2001. 

Further, we found that CTS and EOUSA did not work together to develop 

appropriate guidance for the CMC Program. For example, without notifying 

CTS, in October 1999 EOUSA distributed a five-page Sample Crisis Response 

Plan (Sample Plan) to CMCs. The Assistant Director for the EOUSA Security 

Programs Staff (SPS) told us that EOUSA distributed the Sample Plan after 

noting a serious inconsistency in format of the initial plans submitted by 

USAOs. According to EOUSA, the Sample Plan was never intended to be a 

comprehensive template, but was intended as a resource for CMCs to use in 

preparing district-specific Plans. 

We reviewed the Sample Plan and confirmed that it is primarily a format 

guide. It does not provide complete guidance for USAOs. As a format guide, 

the Sample Plan was not designed to be scalable to meet the varying size, 

location, and vulnerabilities of all USAOs. Further, the Sample Plan gives 

examples, but does not mention many of the 48 actions recommended in the 

CMC Manual, such as coordinating with the FBI, ensuring the availability of 

specialized resources, and cooperating with state and local agencies. 

 31 As discussed earlier in this report, our review of the 76 Plans available at CTS and 

EOUSA found 62 do not address most of the 48 actions deemed essential to a critical incident 

response by CTS, and our survey of CMCs found that since the Program’s inception in 1996, 

60 percent of USAOs have never conducted an exercise. 
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 The Deputy Chief, CTS, told us that, after CTS learned of the EOUSA 

Sample Plan, it did not support its distribution. According to the Deputy Chief, 

each USAO has unique requirements and CTS was concerned that some 

USAOs would merely adopt the Sample Plan without modification.32 However, 

she stated, at that time CTS did not have the resources to develop a sample 

plan that would address all the varying needs of the USAOs. When we asked 

her if CTS had contacted either EOUSA or any USAO to communicate this 

concern, she told us that it had not. 

In May 2003, near the end of our review, CTS issued a “Guide to 

Developing a Crisis Response Plan.” CTS requested that the CMCs review and 

revise their Plans using the Guide as a baseline.33 The USAOs were instructed 

to submit their revised Plans to their Regional ATTF Coordinators and the ATTF 

Coordinator at EOUSA. As of August 2003, USAOs reported that they were in 

the process of revising their Plans. 

CMCs cite need for additional guidance. The CMCs we interviewed 

identified several areas of needed guidance. For example, half of the CMCs 

(including CMCs that were also ATTF Coordinators) cited the lack of a forum to 

improve communication of CMC Program information. CMCs told us that they 

would benefit from a web-based system that would allow them to share 

information such as: 

• key resource documents for the CMC Program, 

• preliminary guidance for newly appointed CMCs, 

• critical incident response planning procedures from USAOs organized 

by size and region, 

• expert guidance on conducting tabletop exercises based on realistic 

scenarios of all magnitudes, not just international terrorist incidents, 

• best practices and innovative approaches, and 

 32 Our review of the 76 Plans on file with CTS and EOUSA, as well as our interviews 

with CMCs substantiated CTS’s concern. Our review of the Plans showed that at least 11 

USAOs simply put their district’s name on the plan, added a phone list, and submitted it back 

to EOUSA. 

33 Attachments to this Guide included a re-release of several outdated documents, 

some from as far back as 1994. Included was an unrevised copy of Chapter 2 of the CMC 

Manual, “Practical Tips.” CTS did not revise the “Critical Incident Checklist for the Initial 48-

Hours” to reflect legislative and policy changes that have taken place since September 11, 

2001. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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• bulletins notifying CMCs of developments affecting the CMC Program, 

such as the Department of Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive.34

The CMCs also requested guidance on the relationship between the CMC 

Program and the Department’s counterterrorism mission, additional training 

reflecting the changes in law and policy regarding critical incident response 

since 1999, individualized feedback on submitted Plans, and information on 

conducting exercises tailored to the size of the district (Figure 4). 

During our exit conference with CTS in which we discussed the findings 

of this review, CTS told us that it is developing a website intended to address 

these issues, among others. As of September 12, 2003, the website was being 

pilot- tested at 18 USAOs. According to CTS, full access is planned for all 

USAOs by the end of October 2003. 

 34 While we acknowledge the CMC’s comments that the lack of a forum makes it more 

difficult for them to share information, we noted that it has not prevented all CMCs from 

sharing information. In fact, more than 25 percent of the CMCs we interviewed told us that 

they used personal contacts to obtain information from other USAOs to assist in writing their 

Plans. 

Model Plan - scalable 

and size relevant - 31%

How to conduct

 exercises - 54%

National Training 

Conference -92%

Feedback on Plans - 

62%

Training based on size 

and needs - 23%

Improved 

communication among 

CMCs - 50%

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Area of Support Requested by CMCS

Number of requests

Figure 4 - CMC Requested Support and Guidance 

Source: OIG CMC Interviews.
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Evaluation and Inspections Division

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CTS and EOUSA failed to accurately track and maintain the Plans 

submitted by USAOs, resulting in lost Plans. We found that both CTS’s and 

EOUSA’s tracking and maintenance of submitted Plans were disorganized and 

inadequate. Neither organization was able to accurately identify which USAOs 

had submitted a Plan, nor were they able to ensure that the Plans on file were 

current. 

We found that the problems with CTS and EOUSA’s management of 

submitted Plans began at receipt. Neither CTS nor EOUSA date stamped the 

Plans upon receipt. Our review of the 76 Plans submitted found almost 

40 percent had no publication or submission date. As a result, it was not 

possible to determine from CTS’s and EOUSA’s records if those Plans were the 

current versions in use at the USAOs. When we asked the Security Programs 

Staff (SPS) Assistant Director about the lack of date stamping, he confirmed 

that they had no mechanism for tracking Plans, other than a checklist 

containing a listing of the USAOs and corresponding boxes that were checked 

to indicate an office had submitted a Plan. 

We found that CTS and EOUSA have no system for ensuring that they 

both have the same Plans in their inventory. The Deputy Chief, CTS, 

confirmed continuing disparity in the inventories. According to the Deputy 

Chief, after the second CMC conference, CTS started to inventory and review 

the Plans and found that it did not have the number of Plans that EOUSA said 

that it had. She indicated that CTS has since tried to obtain the missing Plans, 

but has been unsuccessful. We asked EOUSA why it did not provide the Plans 

to CTS, and EOUSA indicated that it was not aware of any outstanding CTS 

requests. 

As a result, different offices reported different counts of submitted plans. 

According to EOUSA, 88 Plans have been submitted since 1996. However, a 

list provided by CTS indicated that 81 USAOs submitted Plans. Moreover, in 

the FY 2001 Performance Report, the Department reported that 88 of the 94 

USAO Districts had submitted Plans by the end of FY 2001.35 To establish an 

accurate count, we conducted a physical inventory of all of the Plans available 

at CTS and EOUSA and determined that only 76 Plans were on file.36 

 35 Department of Justice, FY 2001 Performance Report & DOJ FY 2002 Revised Final, 

FY 2003 Performance Plan, page 223. The Justice Management Division collected the data 

used in the report. 

36 In August 2003, in response to a draft of this report, CTS reiterated that it had 81 

Plans on file and provided a list of the Plans. We reviewed the list and found it omitted the 

Northern Mariana Islands federal judicial district, but did list four Plans that were not among 

the Plans initially made available to us. When we asked to review the four plans, CTS could 

not find two and had the USAOs provide copies by facsimile. The Principle Deputy Chief, CTS, 

speculated that the four Plans may have been out of the files during our review because CTS 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

26

The discrepancy between the reported number of submitted Plans and 

the number we found on file apparently occurred because six USAOs attempted 

to submit their Plans but the Plans were lost, and six other USAOs were 

counted as having submitted Plans in error. Specifically, in response to our 

request for further information on the Plans that had been submitted, the SPS 

Assistant Director provided 88 USAO responses to an October 2001 e-mail in 

which the USAOs were requested to review their Plans, ensure that the Plans 

were current and complete, and confirm completion of the review by e-mail.37 

Among the 88 responses were 12 e-mails from USAOs that our review found 

had no Plans on file. Six of the e-mails indicated that an electronic copy of the 

USAOs’ Plans had been included as an attachment, and the other six e-mails 

indicated that the USAO had reviewed the Plans as requested, but did not 

indicate that a copy was attached. When we asked the SPS Assistant Director 

if he or his staff had printed the six attached Plans, he told us that the 

electronic copies, including all attachments, had been deleted. Nonetheless, 

based on the receipt of 88 e-mail responses, the SPS Assistant Director 

reported that 88 USAOs had submitted their Plans. 

CTS did not review timely submitted Plans or provide feedback to 

USAOs. Although most USAOs submitted their Plans to CTS and EOUSA as 

required, CTS did not review timely or adequately submitted Plans and failed to 

act when its review showed that the Plans were severely deficient in content 

and quality.38 CTS did not review the Plans as it received them, and some 

Plans remained on file for as long as five years before CTS began its review. 

CTS never provided feedback to each USAO on its individual plan and, as a 

result, USAOs continued to rely on Plans that substantially failed to address 

the fundamental actions necessary to respond effectively to a critical incident. 

Our interviews showed that the CMCs wanted feedback on the Plans. All but 

one of the 26 CMCs we interviewed indicated that they were unsure of the 

quality of their Plans and strongly desired feedback regarding Plan quality and 

content. After additional training, feedback on the Plans was the most 

frequently requested support identified by CMCs. 

 

staff may have been working with them, but she could not be sure because the individual 

responsible for maintaining the files was on detail in another city. 

37 EOUSA Memorandum to All USAOs, “Review of Crisis Response and Disaster 

Recovery Plans,” October 15, 2001. 

38 After the completion of our fieldwork, CTS provided the inspection team with the 

name of a former staff attorney who said he reviewed all of the Plans that were submitted as of 

the end of September 1999. When interviewed, he told us that he did not recall the exact 

number of Plans reviewed nor did he write up individual Plan reviews, but his overall 

assessment was that the Plans were not detailed and were generally of poor quality. He also 

told us that he informed the CTS Deputy Chief of his findings. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

27

The CTS Deputy Chief told us that the reason CTS did not complete the 

reviews or provide feedback to the USAOs was that CTS did not have the 

resources to conduct individualized Plan reviews. Therefore, CTS opted instead 

to develop its own model plan.39 Beginning in early to mid-2001, nearly five 

years after CTS began receiving Plans, four CTS attorneys began reviewing the 

Plans on file in order to draft a model plan to guide USAOs in revising their 

Plans. Each attorney reviewed approximately 

10 plans in conjunction with their work on 

drafting the model plan. Approximately 5 to 10 

plans were identified as having “best practices” 

or provisions worthy of inclusion in a revised 

model plan that would address content, not just 

format. However, CTS’s initial review also 

revealed serious shortcomings in the submitted 

Plans. Nonetheless, there was an additional 

two-year delay before CTS issued its Guide to 

Developing a Crisis Response Plan in May 

2003.40 In August 2003, USAOs reported that 

they were in the process of revising their Plans. 

EOUSA neglected to examine CMC 

Program implementation during evaluations of USAO operations. We 

found that EOUSA only recently included a minimal examination of the USAOs’ 

implementation of the CMC Program in the triennial operations reviews 

conducted on each USAO. During the triennial operations reviews, EOUSA’s 

Evaluation and Review Staff (EARS) evaluates “the performance of the Offices of 

the United States Attorneys, making appropriate reports and taking corrective 

action where necessary.”41 When we initially interviewed the EARS Assistant 

Director, he told us that the CMC Program was not part of EOUSA’s triennial 

operations reviews of USAOs. In a subsequent interview, he informed us that, 

in October 2002, two questions regarding the CMC Program were added to a 

Security Evaluator’s Checklist completed by evaluators during the reviews. 

The questions added to the checklist were: 

 39 As discussed on page 23 of this report, in May 2003, CTS sent all CMCs a “Guide to 

Developing a Crisis Response Plan.” 

40 As noted earlier in this report, after the completion of our fieldwork, CTS provided 

the inspection team with the name of a former staff attorney who reviewed all of the Plans that 

were submitted as of the end of September 1999. When interviewed, he told us that he did not 

recall the exact number of Plans reviewed nor did he write up individual Plan reviews, but his 

overall assessment was that the Plans were not detailed and were generally of poor quality. He 

also told us that he informed the CTS Deputy Chief of his findings. 

41 EOUSA website, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/mission.html#backtotop, 

April 9, 2003. 

CMC Feedback - 

Need for CTS review of Plans 

“Feedback would be helpful, 

any kind of feedback... 

observations, insights... I 

would love to see some 

feedback – model plans, best 

practices, any type of 

information to make the plans 

more effective... We are not 

doing this for bureaucratic 

reasons.” 

- CMC from a large-size USAO in the 

southern United States 
U.S. Department of Justice 

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Evaluation and Inspections Division

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• Has the Crisis Response Coordinator developed the Crisis Response 

Plan and provided a copy to the Security Program Staff? 

• Has the Crisis Response Plan been reviewed by the District Office 

Security Manager and signed by the U.S. Attorney? 

We asked the EARS Assistant Director why the CMC Program was not 

reviewed in more depth during the triennial operations reviews. He stated that 

EARS currently lacks the resources to evaluate the CMC Program in greater 

detail. When we posed the same question to the SPS Assistant Director, he 

asserted that the Plans are prosecutorial plans, not security plans. He stated 

that the Plans are not within the purview of the SPS to review, but are more 

appropriate to be reviewed by CTS. Further, he pointed out that the 

individuals reviewing the security operations are generally security personnel, 

who may not have extensive legal training, and therefore would not be 

appropriate to evaluate a prosecutorial plan. We asked the SPS Assistant 

Director if he had requested CTS’s assistance in formulating appropriate 

evaluation questions for the CMC Program. He stated that he had not, and 

assumed that if CTS wanted the CMC Program evaluated, it would contact 

EARS directly. 

We reviewed the reports from 18 EARS reviews conducted since those 

questions were added. We found the questions were checked off without any 

additional information provided. Moreover, the limited information contained 

in the reports was inconsistent with what we found when we reviewed the 

Plans available at CTS and EOUSA. Four of the 18 triennial operations reviews 

were conducted at USAOs that we found had no Plans on file with CTS or 

EOUSA, but the reports indicated that the USAOs had submitted Plans. In 

contrast, one report on a USAO that we confirmed had submitted a Plan 

indicated the opposite. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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0 0

60

90

10

20

80

88

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01

Goal

Actual

Figure 5

Goal v. Actual Plans Submitted, FY 1998 - FY 2001

Source: OIG administered survey of CMCs

The Department Overstated the CMC Program Implementation 

in Its Annual Performance Reports. 

We found significant discrepancies between the reported performance of 

the CMC Program in the Department’s Annual Performance Reports and the 

actual performance of the USAOs, CTS, and EOUSA in implementing the CMC 

Program.42 While the performance measure was the number of USAOs with 

Plans, the supporting narrative indicated that all of the Plans (88) had been 

submitted and reviewed by CTS. The narrative also stated that the Plans met 

certain minimum content standards and provided a crosswalk with FBI and 

local and regional crisis response plans. However, we found that the number, 

the process, and the content of the Plans were all reported incorrectly. As a 

result, the intent of the performance measure – to ensure that the Department 

was fully prepared to respond to critical incidents – was not clearly met. 

 

In its FY 2000 Performance Plan, as a part of its strategic objective to 

“Improve Response Capabilities to Terrorists’ Acts,” the Department established 

a goal of having Plans in 

place at 90 of the 94 

USAOs by the end of FY 

2002.43 In FY 2001, JMD 

reported that 88 USAOs 

had completed their Plans 

based on the USAOs’ 

responses to an e-mail 

survey conducted by 

EOUSA (Figure 5). The 

Department declared the 

performance measure 

“met,” and eliminated the 

performance measure from 

future Annual Performance 

Reports.44

 42 Each fiscal year, the Department develops a Performance Plan that describes how it 

will achieve the objectives of its overall Strategic Plan. The following fiscal year, the 

Department issues a Performance Report that details its progress at achieving those objectives. 

43 Department of Justice, FY 2000 Performance Report & FY 2001 Performance Plan, 

April 2001, page 29. 

44 Department of Justice, FY 2001 Summary Performance Report, page 223, 

Appendix A – Discontinued Measures Performance Report. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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In addition to reporting the number of Plans submitted, several 

Performance Reports also contained a narrative that described the content of 

the Plans, and the support that CTS and EOUSA had provided to the CMC 

Program.45 That narrative stated that: 1) CTS had reviewed the Plans 

submitted by the USAOs, 2) the Plans provided specific information to guide 

the response to a terrorist attack, and 3) the Department was providing 

continuing support to the CMC Program. 

Our review did not corroborate the reported level of performance and the 

claims of continued CMC Program guidance and administration. For example, 

the FY 2000 Performance Plan stated: 

These plans articulate the steps each office would take in 

the event of a terrorist act or other critical incident in their 

jurisdiction. Critical aspects of each plan include a listing 

of essential points of contact with state and local 

authorities, including first responders and other emergency 

personnel; identification of potential infrastructure targets, 

in both the public and private sector; and coordination 

with the local the FBI field office and other law enforcement 

entities.46

• Our review found that the vast majority of the Plans submitted did not 

“articulate the steps each office would take in the event of a terrorist act or 

other critical incident in their jurisdiction.” Neither did they “establish a 

framework to enable each U.S. Attorney’s Office to address and plan for the 

steps to be taken in the event of a terrorist or other critical threat or act in 

their jurisdiction.” Moreover, not one plan identified potential infrastructure 

targets. 

Data Validation and Verification: The plans are evaluated 

to determine if they meet the criteria of a complete plan.

This criteria [sic] the Attorney General includes, but is not 

limited to whether resource support elements such as other 

 45 Department of Justice, FY 2001 Summary Performance Report, February 2000; 

Department of Justice, Department of Justice, FY 2000 Performance Report & FY 2001 

Performance Plan, April 2001; Department of Justice, FY 2002 Performance Report/FY 2003 

Revised Final/FY 2004 Performance Plan, February 2003. 

46 Strategic Objective 1.4 Terrorism, Deter and detect terrorist incidents by developing 

maximum intelligence and investigative capability. FY 2000 Performance Report and FY 2002 

Performance Plan – April 2001 (pages 34 and 35). 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

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government agencies (FEMA, National Guard, etc.) are 

identified.47 

• Our review found that CTS did not review the Plans as they were submitted, 

and did not begin a systematic review until 2001. Although that review 

disclosed the poor quality of the Plans, CTS never provided feedback to the 

USAOs to inform them that the Plans substantially failed to address the 48 

actions that should be taken when responding to a critical incident. 

Strategies and Initiatives to Achieve the FY 2002 Goal: Our 

strategy is to build maximum feasible capability in the 

counterterrorism program, allowing the Department to 

identify and address terrorist threats...It means that all 

elements of crisis and consequence management at the 

federal, state, and local levels throughout the country will 

have developed and implemented integrated terrorism 

response plans [emphasis added]. 

• Despite the declaration of the Criminal Division in the FY 2000 Performance 

Report and FY 2002 Performance Plan that the performance measure for the 

number of submitted USAO Plans had been achieved, and the removal of plan 

submission from future performance plans, our review found that integrated 

terrorism incident response plans have not been developed and implemented. 

 47 Department of Justice, FY 2001 Performance Report/FY 2002 Revised Final, 

FY 2003 Performance Plan, Section 1.4B, Improve Response Capabilities to Terrorists’ Acts, 

April 2001. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

32

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

We concluded that the Department has not effectively implemented the 

CMC Program to ensure that the USAOs are ready to quickly and appropriately 

respond to critical incidents. Both the National Strategy for Homeland Security 

and the Department’s Anti-Terrorism Plan establish responding effectively to 

such incidents as one of three main strategic objectives for the Department. 

The CMC Program, which began in 1996, remains the core activity of the 

USAOs response planning effort. 

Although CTS provided the USAOs with guidance that identified 48 

fundamental actions needed to plan their response to a critical incident in 

1999, most critical incident response plans prepared by the USAOs failed to 

reflect that guidance. Of the 76 Plans that we reviewed, only 12 Plans 

addressed half or more of the 48 fundamental actions. Further, the USAOs 

rarely conducted exercises to test their Plans and practice critical incident 

response procedures. These deficiencies occurred because the USAOs did not 

place a high priority on response planning. 

We also found that CTS and EOUSA did not fulfill their responsibilities to 

administer and support the Program. After holding two national training 

conferences in 1997 and 1999, CTS and EOUSA provided no further CMCspecific training in critical incident response until March 2003. CTS reviewed 

only a few of the Plans prepared by USAOs, and did not act when that limited 

review found the Plans to be largely incomplete and inadequate. Further, 

EOUSA does not evaluate CMC Program implementation during its periodic 

operational reviews of each USAO. Finally, the Department’s Annual 

Performance Reports substantially overstated the achievements of the CMC 

Program at improving the USAOs’ and the Department’s preparedness to 

respond to critical incidents. 

In summary, since 1996, the USAOs, CTS, and EOUSA have failed to 

implement Plans to improve the preparedness of the USAOs to respond to 

critical incidents. The first priority of the Department and the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security is to prevent terrorism, but those initiatives 

also recognize that there is a commensurate need to be prepared to respond to 

incidents that cannot be prevented. As stated in the Department’s FY 2003 

and 2004 Performance Plan, “to effectively address international and domestic 

terrorism, DOJ must concentrate on both prevention and response.”48 The 

 48 Department of Justice, FY 2002 Performance Report/FY 2003 Revised Final 

Performance Plan/FY 2004 Performance Plan, page 1. 
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Office of the Inspector General 

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failure of the USAOs, CTS, and EOUSA to fully implement the CMC Program 

leaves the Department less prepared to respond effectively when critical 

incidents occur. 

In March 2003, CTS recommended that the CMC Program be 

incorporated into the ATTF/ATAC initiative. The recommendation was 

approved October 17, 2003. Although placed under the ATACs, the CMCs “will 

remain responsible for the creation, implementation, maintenance and exercise 

of their district’s crisis response plan....”49 However, the ATACs are only 

responsible for responding in the event of terrorist attacks, not other critical 

incidents. It is not clear whether the ATACs’ responsibilities will be expanded 

to include non-terrorist critical incidents, or whether the CMCs are still 

responsible for responding to non-terrorist critical incidents separately. 

Therefore, it is unclear how the realignment of the CMCs may affect the USAOs’ 

ability to respond to critical incidents, especially those that are not terroristrelated. 

As this review showed, the need to prepare for all critical incidents has 

not been met. Therefore, we provide ten recommendations to improve the 

preparedness of the USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

We recommend that the Deputy Attorney General: 

1. Ensure that performance measures are developed to assess the 

readiness of USAOs to respond to critical incidents. 

We recommend that all United States Attorneys: 

2. Revise the critical incident response plans to address the action items 

identified by CTS, and regularly update the plans to reflect changes in 

law, departmental policy, or local procedures. 

3. Conduct and participate in periodic exercises to test the critical 

incident response plans and practice responding to critical incidents. 

4. Establish workload reporting procedures that capture the time 

dedicated to critical incident response planning duties. 

 49 Memorandum from Guy Lewis, Director, EOUSA, to All United States Attorneys, 

“Merger and Realignment of Crisis Management Coordinators Program Under Anti-Terrorism 

Advisory Council,” October17, 2003. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division

34

We recommend that the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division: 

5. Provide updated training and guidance to USAOs on how to prepare 

effective and comprehensive critical incident response plans. The 

guidance should reflect changes in legislation, policy, and critical 

incident response practice that have taken place since September 11, 

2001. 

6. Review all USAOs’ Plans, including revisions, to ensure that the Plans 

cover all critical areas; provide individualized feedback to USAOs; and 

periodically report to the Deputy Attorney General on the status of the 

USAOs’ Plans. 

7. Provide USAOs with training and guidance on how to develop and 

conduct appropriate critical incident response exercises, either 

independently or in conjunction with the FBI or other offices. 

8. In conjunction with EOUSA, complete the development of a critical 

incident response website with information on critical incident 

response, including lessons learned, exercise scenarios, and best 

practices. 

We recommend that the Director, EOUSA: 

9. Establish a system for accurately tracking and reporting the status of 

USAO submissions and updates to critical incident response plans. 

10. With advice from CTS, revise the operations review process to include 

a full evaluation of the preparedness of USAOs to respond to critical 

incidents. 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division

35

 APPENDIX A - Critical Incident Response Plan Content Analysis 

Action 

Item CTS-Recommended Action Items (from 48-Hour Checklist) 

1 Obtain the best information available on the incident 2 Determine FBI plans for establishing a command post 3 Advise EOUSA and CTS per the DOJ Crisis Response Plan 4 Establish clear communication channels with Headquarters 5 Establish initial support needs and liaison with Criminal Division 6 Deploy AUSAs consistent with incident magnitude 7 Ensure that deployed AUSAs know their role and interrelationships 8 Plan for overlapping relief shifts for AUSAs to ensure coverage and smooth transitions 9 Designate a Senior AUSA to handle reassignment of crisis response AUSAS to include contact with court regarding postponing court calendar 

10 Ensure availability of victim/witness resources and service 11 Ensure AUSAs have appropriate equipment (e.g., cell phones, laptops, ACIRG Manual, electronic forms) 12 Ensure availability of accommodations and transportation if event outside USAO area 13 Identify information flow at command post 14 Assign AUSAs at critical information flow points within the command post and the "SAC's Room" 15 Ensure AUSAs know investigative developments in timely manner 16 Designate AUSA(s) to review affidavits and applications for process to ensure advisability, accuracy, consistency 17 Designate case agents 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division

36

 APPENDIX A - Critical Incident Response Plan Content Analysis 

Action 

Item CTS-Recommended Action Items (from 48-Hour Checklist) 

18 Review law enforcement coordination between federal agencies, and state and local authorities 19 Ensure FBI/HQ does not initiate investigative action in other field offices without coordinating with command post 20 Have FBI/HQ take affirmative steps to ensure that other FBI offices do not self-initiate investigative activity without coordination 21 Ensure with SAC/On-Scene Commander that the following are used ONLY with coordination with USAO (e.g., composites, informal immunity, photo identification, search warrants) 22 Review media procedures with SAC/On-Scene Commander (e.g., coordinating public statements with USAO, monitor pretrial publicity for litigation issues) 23 Ensure interviews are coordinated to avoid multiple agency interviews 24 Ensure consistent procedure in conducting/documenting interviews (e.g., one write-up, consistent format across agencies) 25 Preserve crime scene consistent with life-saving requirements 26 Ensure single, coordinated crime scene protocol 27 Ensure orderly presentation of evidence at trial through limited witnesses (e.g., search team leaders) 28 Establish single, unified evidence room and communicate chain of custody procedures 29 General coordination with EOUSA and CTS to ensure USAOs receive instructions on how to proceed 30 Coordinate on issuing grand jury subpoenas 31 Coordinate applications for process, search warrants, arrest warrants, pen registers 32 Coordinate on using photo spreads, lineups, hypnosis, polygraphs, informal immunities 33 Coordinate on issuing public statements 34 Check availability of grand jury 
U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division

37

 APPENDIX A - Critical Incident Response Plan Content Analysis 

Action 

Item CTS-Recommended Action Items (from 48-Hour Checklist) 

35 Assess remaining life of grand jury/juries 36 Coordinate with court concerning special grand jury sections 37 Assess need for voir dire of grand jurors if they are within scope of potential victims 38 Assign paralegal or clerk to log subpoenas provided to law enforcement and to maintain record of disposition 39 If out of district prosecutors involved, obtain necessary grand jury authorizations for official appearances before grand jury and ensure same filed with clerk 40 Check availability of resources/personnel - Rapid Start 41 Check availability of resources/personnel with forensic expertise 42 Check availability of resources/personnel for sketch artist 43 Check availability of resources/personnel – photographer 44 Special Projects Unit to ensure timely initial measurements for potential mock-ups at trial 45 Coordinate concerning availability of grand jury 46 Coordinate procedure for around the clock availability of judges for issuance of process 47 Develop a regional crisis management plan 48 List of contacts at every relevant federal, state, and local agency which may be called on to participate 
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APPENDIX B 

CONTENT OF CMC TRAINING CONFERENCES 

CMC Training Conferences 

The first of two Crisis Management Coordinators’ Conferences (CMC 

Conference) took place on June 17-20, 1997, in Arlington, Virginia. CTS trial 

attorneys, in conjunction with AUSAs assigned temporarily to the EOUSA 

Office of Legal Education (OLE), planned and conducted the training. 

The second CMC Conference took place on October 19-22, 1999, at the 

National Advocacy Center (NAC) in Columbia, South Carolina.50 Presenters 

included officials from CTS, the FBI Crisis Management Unit, EOUSA, USAOs, 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), FBI, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Departments of Defense, 

Energy, and Health and Human Services. 

1997 CMC Conference: 

Presenters included officials from CTS, EOUSA, USAOs, the FBI, the 

Office for Victims of Crime, FEMA, and the ATF who addressed CMCs on 

critical incident response. Topics covered in the training included: 

• coordinating with and supporting the FBI command post, 

• participating in regional FBI crisis response training, 

• recognizing the relationship between intelligence, investigations, and 

criminal prosecutions, 

• coordinating with law enforcement and emergency response agencies, 

• understanding laws combating terrorism, 

• servicing victims and families of victims, 

• dealing with the media, 

• conducting tabletop exercises, and 

• developing a plan. 

 50 EOUSA operates the NAC, which trains federal, state, and local prosecutors and 

litigators in advocacy skills and management of legal operations. 
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1999 CMC Conference: 

Information provided by OLE indicated that the 1999 CMC training 

conference covered: 

• preventing terrorist acts as a departmental priority, 

• preparing for potential chemical, nuclear, and biological incidents on 

a federal, state, and local level, 

• upgrading crisis response capabilities, 

• responding to victim and witness needs, 

• developing and testing Plans, and 

• coordinating intra-district crisis planning. 

CMC Manual Topics 

Organization of Federal Resources – Provides telephone list, list of spring 

1999 Attorney Critical Incident Response Group (ACIRG) members, and ACIRG 

organizational overviews (including description of PDD 36 on “Lead Agency 

Authority). 

Practical Tips – Contains the Crisis Incident Checklist for Initial 48 

Hours, information on preserving and cataloging evidence, assisting in trial 

preparation, and cooperating during multi-agency investigations. 

Legal Reference – Contains information on and analysis of domestic 

terrorism offenses, jurisdictional issues, and statutes relevant to terrorism 

incidents. 

Methods for Obtaining Existing Evidence – Contains a discussion of 

proper methods for search and seizure of physical evidence, including the 

proper execution of search and arrest warrants. 

Methods for Developing Evidence – Contains information on proper 

identification of suspects, surveillance techniques, testimonial evidence, and 

witness issues. 

Dealing with the Media and the Public – Contains information on 

releasing information to the media and the public (including coordination with 

the FBI), obtaining information from the media, and denying the public and the 

media access to sensitive information. 
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Special Issues – Contains information on using military resources and 

the use of deadly force. 

Terrorism Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Weapons – Contains information on the federal response to a CBRN 

incident and specialized resources available. 
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APPENDIX C 

CMC SURVEY INSTRUMENT 

Crisis Management Coordinator Survey 

Fill out contact information and check boxes below, unless otherwise noted. 

Please return completed survey as an e-mail attachment to [usdoj.gov]. 

NOTE: Critical incidents include, but are not limited to, acts of terrorism, hostage/barricade

situations, and acts of criminal civil disorder 

Name/Title 

District 

1. Does your office have a Critical Incident Response Plan (CIRP) on file with the Executive 

Office for United States Attorneys? 

 Yes  No  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

2. How many times has your office exercised the CIRP in a simulated critical incident 

since 1996? 

If your office did not exercise the CIRP, skip questions 2a and 2b and go to Question 3. 

 1  2  3  4+  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

2a. Were the exercises effective in preparing for critical incidents? 

 Effective  Neutral  Not Effective  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

2b. Did your office update or revise the CIRP after the exercise? 

 Yes  No  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

3. How many times has your office experienced an actual critical incident since 1996? 

 1  2  3  4+  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

3a. How many times did you activate the CIRP in response to a critical incident? 

 1  2  3  4+  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

3b. How effective was the CIRP in responding to critical incidents? 

 Effective  Neutral  Not Effective  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

3c. Did you update or revise the CIRP in response to actual critical incidents? 

 Yes  No  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

4. Does your office prepare post-exercise or post-critical incident reports? 

 Yes  No  Don’t Know/Not Applicable 

5. If your office does prepare post-exercise or post-critical incident reports, where are 

they kept? ______________________________________________________________________ 

6. Please provide any comments, suggestions, and ideas on CIRPs that you may have. 

Please e-mail completed survey to U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 

Evaluation and Inspections Division. Attn: xxxxxxxxxxxxxi@usdoj.gov 
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APPENDIX D 

CRITICAL INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY: 1988-2003 

December 1988 DOJ Crisis Management Plan. Attorney General issued the DOJ Crisis 

Management Plan. 

October 1989 National Preparedness Programs. Attorney General established the DOJ 

National Security Emergency Preparedness Program and the National Security 

Regional Emergency Preparedness Program. 

August 1992 Ruby Ridge. On a remote ridge in northern Idaho, a week-long stand-off 

between Randy Weaver and federal agents ended in a shootout during which an 

FBI sniper shot and killed Weaver’s wife and infant son. Subsequent 

government reports criticized the critical incident response capabilities of the 

USAO in handling the incident. 

August 1992 Hurricane Andrew. On August 24, 1992, Dade County, Florida, experienced 

the third most powerful storm to hit the United States and the most costly 

natural disaster ever recorded. Property damage exceeded $20 billion and left 

nearly 200,000 Floridians homeless. The disaster resulted in a severe and 

extended disruption of normal activities, including government services, in an 

area of approximately 100 square miles. 

February 1993 World Trade Center Bombing. On February 26, 1993, an explosive device 

detonated on the second level of the World Trade Center parking basement. 

The blast produced a crater approximately 150 feet in diameter and five floors 

deep, killed six people, and injured more than one thousand. Four individuals 

were convicted of the bombing on March 4, 1994. 

February - 

April 1993 

Branch Davidian Standoff. A 51-day standoff at the Branch Davidians’ Mt. 

Carmel compound near Waco, Texas, ended on April 19, 1993, when fire 

consumed the compound, killing the Branch Davidian leader, David Koresh, 

and most of his followers. Subsequent government reports recommended 

evaluating the adequacy of communications among the different elements in a 

crisis, particularly between the negotiating and tactical elements. 

April 1994 Critical Incident Response Group. FBI established the Critical Incident 

Response Group (CIRG) to more effectively deal with hostage-taking and 

barricade situations. 

April 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. On April 19, 1995 a bomb exploded in front of the 

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, destroying 

about one-third of the structure. The explosion killed 168 people. In June 

1997, a jury convicted Timothy J. McVeigh on all counts connected with the 

bombing and sentenced him to death. McVeigh was executed on June 11, 

2001. 

June 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 39. Established critical incident response 

capabilities as a government-wide priority. 

January 1996 ACIRG. Attorney General established Attorney Critical Incident Response 

Group to provide expert assistance to the Attorney General and USAOs in the 

event of a crisis. 
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March – June 

1996 

Freemen Standoff. The FBI attempted to arrest more than a dozen individuals 

wanted on charges that included circulating $15 billion in bogus checks and 

threatening to kill a federal judge. The attempt resulted in an 81-day long 

armed standoff. On June 13, 16 members of the group surrendered, ending the 

longest federal siege in modern U.S. history. The incident culminated in the 

conviction of 21 defendants in 3 separate trials spanning 15 weeks. 

May 1996 Critical Incident Response Plan. Attorney General established a Critical 

Incident Response Plan that required United States Attorneys to develop 

Critical Incident Response Plans to help ensure “quick and appropriate” 

response. 

June 1997 First CMC Conference. Distribution of first edition of the Crisis Management 

Coordinator Manual developed by the Criminal Division. 

May 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 62. “Protection Against Unconventional Threats 

to the Homeland and Americans Overseas.” Established the National Special 

Security Event (NSSE), which is an event of such national significance that it 

warrants the availability of the full protective and consequence management 

capabilities of the federal government. The three lead agencies for NSSEs are 

FBI, FEMA, and U.S. Secret Service. 

July 1999 USAO Critical Incident Response Plans. Memorandum from Assistant Director, 

EOUSA, to all USAOs asking for submission of their critical incident response 

plans. 

October 1999 Second CMC Conference. 

September 

2001 

September 11, 2001. Terrorists hijacked four airplanes, three of which flew 

into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. More than 3,000 people were 

killed in the attacks. 

September 

2001 

Anti-Terrorism Plan. Attorney General issued the Department’s Anti-Terrorism 

Plan ordering every United States Attorney to implement the plan. The plan 

focused on prevention “by arresting and detaining violators...who participate in, 

or lend support to, terrorist activities [and] use every available law enforcement 

tool to incapacitate these individuals and their organizations.” 

September 

2001 

Anti-Terrorism Task Forces. Attorney General established Anti-Terrorism Task 

Forces (ATTFs) in each USAO that will 1) serve as a conduit of information 

about suspected terrorists, 2) implement an operational plan for the prevention 

of terrorism, and 3) serve as a standing organizational structure for a 

coordinated response to a terrorist incident. 

October 2001 Guidance for ATTFs. Deputy Attorney General issued a seven-page 

memorandum on “Guidance for Anti-Terrorism Task Forces.” 

October 2001 USAO Review of Plans. Memorandum from Director, EOUSA, requesting that 

each USAO review its Critical Incident Response Plan to ensure that it is 

“current, complete, and known by persons...responsible for crisis response.” 

October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT 

ACT) passed by Congress to “to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United 

States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, 

and for other purposes.” 
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October 2001 Anthrax Attacks. Anthrax-contaminated letters mailed to Washington, DC, and 

locations in New York and Florida. 

October 2001 CONPLAN issued. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism 

Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) developed through the offices of six 

primary departments and agencies with responsibilities as identified in 

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39). It was designed to provide overall 

guidance to federal, state, and local agencies concerning how the federal 

government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat that occurs 

in the United States, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction. 

November 2001 

- January 2003 

ATTF Training. Two national 3-day training sessions and six regional 2-day 

training sessions held for Anti-Terrorism Coordinators. 

November 2001 DOJ Strategic Plan. FY 2001–2006 Strategic Plan issued. USAO Critical 

Incident Response Plans are discussed as part of Goal One: Protect America 

Against the Threat of Terrorism. 

November 2001 Blueprint for Change. Attorney General announced the “Blueprint for Change, 

A Plan to Reshape the Department and Its Components to Focus on AntiTerrorism.” 

July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security. President issued National Strategy for 

Homeland Security, which identified three strategic objectives: 1) prevent 

domestic terrorist attacks, 2) reduce vulnerability to terrorism, and 3) minimize 

damage and recover from attacks that occur. 

November 2002 Reorganization of the Criminal Division. Attorney General divided the 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section into the Counterterrorism Section and the 

Domestic Security Section.51

February 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. President outlined a policy to 

prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major 

disasters, and other emergencies. 

February 2003 DOJ Performance Report. Release of Department of Justice, FY 2002 

Performance Report/FY 2003 Revised Final Performance Plan/FY 2004 

Performance Plan, in which Attorney General states: “To effectively address 

international and domestic terrorism, DOJ must concentrate on both 

prevention and response.” 

March 2003 Department of Homeland Security established. 

 51 The Counterterrorism Section is responsible for the design, implementation, and 

support of law enforcement efforts, legislative initiatives, policies, and strategies relating to 

international and domestic terrorism. The Domestic Security Section is responsible for 

prosecutions of border-related crimes such as alien smuggling and international arms 

trafficking. 
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APPENDIX E 

CRIMINAL DIVISION’S AND EXECUTIVE 

OFFICE FOR THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS RESPONSE
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APPENDIX F 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S ANALYSIS OF 

THE CRIMINAL DIVISION’S AND THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE 

FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) sent copies of the draft report to 

the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) and the Criminal 

Division (CRM) with a request for written comments. The Director of EOUSA 

and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division responded to us 

in a joint memorandum dated November 10, 2003. Although EOUSA and CRM 

expressed concerns about several of the report’s conclusions, they concurred 

with nine of the recommendations and partially concurred with the tenth. Our 

analysis of their response follows. 

 

Response from CRM and EOUSA 

CRM and EOUSA agree that they could have focused more attention on 

certain aspects of the crisis response program. However, they believe that the 

report should more clearly reflect that the Department of Justice (Department) 

is better prepared today to respond to critical incidents than it has been in the 

past. CRM and EOUSA suggest that much of the OIG’s report focuses on 

historical flaws in their process for developing and assessing critical incident 

response plans (Plans), and that readers of the report may misunderstand the 

scope and nature of their past and current response preparation efforts. The 

CRM and EOUSA response provides detailed comments regarding three points 

that they believe deserve greater recognition. We examine each of these points 

in turn. 

Specific Issues 

A. Critical Incident Response Plans

CRM and EOUSA state that the draft OIG report “does not place the 

existence and use of the Critical Response Plans in the appropriate context.” 

They suggest that the quality of a United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) Plan 

is only one part of “answering the broader question of whether USAOs are 

prepared to respond to critical incidents.” CRM and EOUSA state that some of 

the recommended actions on the 48-item checklist “are so second nature to the 

experienced prosecutors drafting and/or implementing these plans that there 

would be no need to specifically list them.” Consequently, they argue that 

examining whether a USAO has included items on the checklist in its Plan is 

not a proper standard for judging the USAO’s preparedness to respond to a 
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crisis. In addition, CRM and EOUSA state that some of the actions on the 

checklist are “primarily under the domain of the FBI [Federal Bureau of 

Investigation] or another law enforcement entity” with the USAOs in a 

supporting role and, therefore, those actions would not need to be addressed in 

the USAOs’ Plans. 

OIG Analysis. We agree that the Plans are only one part of the USAOs’ 

critical incident response preparations. Therefore, in this review we examined 

other Crisis Management Coordinator (CMC) Program activities such as the 

training provided to USAOs’ CMCs, the crisis response exercises conducted by 

USAOs, and the Counterterrorism Section’s (CTS’s) and EOUSA’s support and 

administration of the CMC Program. We found significant deficiencies not only 

in the Plans, but also in those other activities. Consequently, our conclusion 

that USAOs have not prepared adequately is based on a more comprehensive 

review of critical incident response deficiencies than acknowledged by CTS and 

EOUSA. 

We do not agree with CRM and EOUSA’s contention that “some of the 

recommended actions in the 48-item checklist...are so second nature to 

experienced prosecutors” that they need not be included in the crisis response 

Plans. As demonstrated during numerous past critical incidents, even 

experienced personnel may forget obvious actions that are usually “second 

nature.” Further, our interviews with 26 CMCs, all of whom are highly 

experienced prosecutors, confirmed that the 48 items on the checklist should 

be addressed in the Plans and are appropriate actions to take in responding to 

a critical incident.52 

Moreover, while some of the 48 items on the checklist clearly are more 

important than others, our review found that most of the Plans omitted more 

than a few actions that might be considered “second-nature.” Sixty-four of the 

76 Plans (84 percent) addressed less than half of the 48 items and many of the 

missing items represented significant actions in a crisis situation. For 

example, 54 Plans failed to address crime scene protocols and preservation, 

which were identified as problems in the Oklahoma City Bombing after-action 

report. Including all 48 items in the Plans ensures that they will be addressed 

during training, exercises, and when responding to a critical incident. While 

we agree that some of the actions may be “second nature” during routine 

operations, we believe that failing to incorporate all 48 actions in the USAOs’ 

Plans creates a needless risk that some actions will be omitted during a critical 

incident. 

 52 The CTS itself validated the checklist by reissuing it as current guidance in May 

2003 as part of its new “Guide to Developing a Crisis Response Plan.” 
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Regarding CRM and EOUSA’s contention that some of the actions on the 

checklist are “primarily under the domain of the FBI or another law 

enforcement entity,” we acknowledge that many entities may be involved in 

responding to a critical incident. However, the U.S. Attorney is the chief law 

enforcement officer in each federal judicial district, and the 48 action items 

were included on the checklist because the USAOs have a significant interest 

in each activity, even if they are not the lead entity for each item. 

U.S. Attorneys should prepare and train for any aspect of the government’s 

response that will affect their ability to conduct a successful investigation and 

prosecution. 

Finally, as described in the Department’s Performance Plan, one purpose 

of the USAOs’ Plans is to provide a “cross-walk” with the Plans of the FBI and 

other law enforcement entities. In accord with that purpose, addressing all 48 

actions in the USAOs’ Plans is essential for ensuring that the Department’s 

response to a critical incident is coordinated and effective, regardless of 

jurisdictional authorities. 

B. CTS’ and EOUSA’s Efforts After September 11, 2001

CRM and EOUSA state, “The draft report does not clearly acknowledge 

the extensive and comprehensive joint efforts undertaken during the past two 

years to enhance the Department’s overall ability to respond to critical 

incidents.” Further, they state that “the draft report...does not adequately 

reflect the substantial changes that were made in CTS, EOUSA, and the USAOs 

in response to 9/11 to focus attention on critical response to terrorism 

incidents,” such as the revised Strategic Plan and the Anti-Terrorism Advisory 

Council (ATAC).53 Finally, CRM and EOUSA state that the report “faults CTS 

and EOUSA for failing to provide appropriate training and guidance as to 

changes in law and departmental and national policy (Draft report at iii, 18, 

22),” and cite several examples of training that they state “specifically 

addressed crisis response in terrorism and provided updated legal” training to 

improve the ability of the USAOs to respond to a crisis. 

OIG Analysis. As stated by CRM and EOUSA, after September 11, 2001, 

the Attorney General directed that the Department refocus its efforts on 

preventing terrorism. Consequently, CTS, EOUSA, and the USAOs all 

substantially refocused and undertook several major initiatives to prevent 

terrorist attacks. Our report acknowledges some of these initiatives, such as 

the training of 1,600 prosecutors and law enforcement officers, a 4-day antiterrorism teleconference to 25,000 viewers, an anti-terrorism conference 

 53 Attorney General Memorandum to all United States Attorneys, “Responsibilities of 

Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs),” September 24, 2003. The ATACs were formerly 

known as Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (ATTFs). 
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attended by U.S. Attorneys in January 2003, and 6 national security 

conferences attended by prosecutors and FBI supervisors (page 20). However, 

while CTS and EOUSA have taken significant steps to respond to the threat of 

terrorism by improving the Department’s ability to prevent attacks, which we 

acknowledge, there is a significant difference between preventing attacks and 

preparing to handle a crisis if prevention efforts fail. Our review focused on the 

USAOs’ preparations to respond in the event that terrorist attacks – or other 

critical incidents that do not involve terrorism – occur. 

During our review, we examined the training cited by CRM and EOUSA 

and found that it was not complete or effective because it did not sufficiently 

address critical incident response (as opposed to preventing terrorist attacks), 

and few CMC Program staff attended the training. For example, we reviewed 

the two national ATTF training conferences and the six regional training 

conferences and found that the training focused on intelligence gathering and 

information sharing to prevent terrorist attacks, not on preparing to respond 

after an attack or other critical incident. Only the first ATTF conference 

included a session on crisis response and it was only a small part of the 

agenda. 

Moreover, our review of the attendee lists from training events related to 

the ATTF initiative found that few CMCs attended the training. For example, 

the CTS provided us with the rosters from three training events: National 

Security Conferences, May-July 2003; Bioterrorism Conference, April 2003; 

and National Security Conference, September 2003. Based on our most recent 

list of CMCs, we found that 52 of 94 CMCs attended the May-July National 

Security Conference, 14 attended the April Bioterrorism Conference, and none 

attended the September National Security Conference. 

Our conclusion that the training provided to CMCs was inadequate was 

confirmed in our interviews with CMCs, as most (24 of the 26) identified the 

lack of training as the major hurdle they faced in improving the readiness of 

their offices to respond to a critical incident. In particular, all ten of the CMCs 

we interviewed who also hold the ATTF Coordinator position for their USAOs 

told us that the ATTF training they attended was not a substitute for CMCspecific training. 

CRM and EOUSA’s statement that the report “faults CTS and EOUSA for 

failing to provide appropriate training and guidance as to changes in law and 

departmental and national policy (Draft report at iii, 18, 22)” is incorrect. We 

reported a lack of training, but, as is made clear on page 19, it was the USAOs’ 

CMCs who reported to us during interviews that they needed additional 

training on changes in law and departmental policy. Specifically, the report 

states: “the CMCs stated that the training should be revised to include 

changes that have occurred since the last CMC Training Conference in 1999. 
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The changes include the post September 11, 2001, reorganization of the 

Department to focus on counterterrorism; the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act 

and other terrorism-related legislation” and other changes. We included the 

CMCs’ statements so that CTS and EOUSA could consider addressing the 

CMCs’ self-identified needs when developing future training. 

Therefore, while we acknowledged CTS and EOUSA’s significant efforts 

since September 11, 2001, those efforts have been directed predominantly at 

improving the ability of the Department to prevent terrorist attacks. Although 

preventing attacks is of primary importance, the Attorney General’s AntiTerrorism Plan also directs the Department to be prepared to respond when 

terrorist attacks or other critical incidents occur. Despite CTS and EOUSA’s 

efforts, our review of the USAOs’ preparations to respond after attacks and 

other critical incidents found that the Plans were inadequate; that few USAOs 

conducted exercises to test their Plans; and that CTS and EOUSA did not fulfill 

their administrative and support responsibilities to provide guidance and 

conduct crisis response training. These deficiencies existed from the inception 

of the CMC Program in 1996 and still have not been addressed adequately. 

Consequently, we maintain that the USAOs have not effectively implemented 

the CMC Program. However, we acknowledged that CTS and EOUSA have 

begun to address these deficiencies, as they stated in their Action Plan 

included with their response to the report. 

C. CTS and EOUSA’s Efforts Since the Late Fall of 2002

CRM and EOUSA stated that although they could have “done more to 

focus attention on certain aspects of the crisis response program, especially 

between September 11, 2001, and the fall of 2002, [they] have been working 

together since then to provide the necessary focus and training to improve the 

crisis response program.” They cite various collaborative training efforts and 

an October 17, 2003, Departmental memorandum to all United States 

Attorneys to “re-appoint a CMC that will operate under the auspices of the 

ATAC” as evidence “that crisis response efforts are currently being enhanced to 

respond to areas for improvement noted in the OIG report.” 

OIG Analysis. We considered the training and other efforts that CRM 

and EOUSA cited as evidence that improvements are underway. We reviewed 

each of the efforts they described, but found that many were not as effective as 

they could have been for improving the CMC Program (as described in our 

response in section B), or that the efforts had not yet taken place. For 

example: 

• The Anti-Terrorism Conference for U.S. Attorneys in January 2003 

(pages 20-21). This conference was only for U.S. Attorneys and no 

CMCs attended. Consequently, although the conference included a 
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module on crisis response, the training was not presented to the staff 

responsible for planning the response (i.e., CMCs). In addition, the 

CMCs’ responses to our February 2003 survey strongly indicated that 

training was lacking. 

• The March 2003 CMC-specific videoconference (pages 19, 23, and 24). 

We reviewed a videotape of the two-hour teleconference. The training 

included no new information regarding the CMC Program itself. Other 

than citing the need for USAOs to conduct exercises, there was no 

training content directed at conducting crisis response exercises, one 

of the areas of need most consistently cited in our interviews with 

CMCs. Coverage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Bio-terrorism Act of 

2002 consisted of presenting a brief synopsis of the Acts, rather than 

an in-depth discussion of their impact on the CMC Program. 

 

• The development and dissemination of the “Guide to Developing a 

Model Crisis Response Plan” (page 23). We acknowledge that the 

Guide was distributed to USAOs in May 2003. However, during our 

review no USAO Plans were revised based on the Guide and submitted 

to CRM and EOUSA. 

• The establishment of a working group to issue guidelines for USAOs 

security plans (page 15). We acknowledge CRM and EOUSA’s plans to 

create a working group to review integration of the various plans 

required from USAOs. However, their response did not provide us 

with details on the role, responsibilities, and assigned activities of this 

working group. 

• A March 2003 request to place the CMC Program under the auspices 

of the ATAC (page v). This proposal was not approved until 

October 17, 2003, well after the draft report was provided to CRM and 

EOUSA, and the impact of this consolidation is not yet clear. 

Although placed under the ATACs, the CMCs “will remain responsible 

for the creation, implementation, maintenance and exercise of their 

district’s crisis response plan....”54 However, the ATACs are only 

responsible for responding in the event of terrorist attacks, not other 

critical incidents. It is not clear whether the ATACs’ responsibilities 

will be expanded to include non-terrorist critical incidents, or whether 

the CMCs are still responsible for responding to non-terrorist critical 

incidents separately. Until such issues are resolved, we cannot 

 54 Memorandum from Guy Lewis, Director, EOUSA, to All United States Attorneys, 

“Merger and Realignment of Crisis Management Coordinators Program Under Anti-Terrorism 

Advisory Council,” October17, 2003. 
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determine how the realignment of the CMCs may affect the USAOs’ 

ability to respond to critical incidents, especially those that are not 

terrorist-related. 

• Planning for crisis response training at the National Advocacy Center 

in March 2004 (pages 6 and 19). We note in the report that CTS and 

EOUSA are planning CMC training in March 2004. 

Our report also acknowledged that, since we began our review in 

December 2002, CTS and EOUSA increased their attention to the CMC 

Program. Those efforts ultimately could significantly improve the USAOs’ crisis 

response preparations. However, the deficiencies we found in our review of the 

USAOs’ plans and exercises, the training provided to CMCs, and the 

administration and support provided by CTS and EOUSA show that significant 

improvements are still needed. 

D. The Report’s Final Conclusion

CRM and EOUSA state that the report’s final conclusion concerning the 

Department’s overall preparedness “exceeds the scope of an inquiry that was 

limited to a review of critical incident response plans and does not properly 

credit all the steps taken by EOUSA, CTS, and the USAOs.” They assert that 

this is particularly significant because the report does not contain a time frame 

for the inspection, but “includes the finding that the need to prepare for critical 

incidents has not been met.” CRM and EOUSA conclude by stating that they 

will continue to seek to improve preparedness, but believe “that a complete 

review of past efforts, current work, and future plans demonstrates that the 

need to prepare is being properly addressed.” 

OIG Analysis. The CRM and EOUSA response understates the scope of 

our review. As described on page i, “We conducted this review to determine 

whether the USAOs have acted to improve their ability to respond quickly and 

appropriately to critical incidents by developing comprehensive critical incident 

response plans, training staff to carry out the Plans, and exercising the Plans.” 

We also considered all of the past, current, and planned efforts cited by CTS 

and EOUSA as contributing to the USAOs’ preparedness to respond to critical 

incidents. In addition, our survey and interviews with CMCs addressed many 

aspects of the USAOs’ crisis response preparations. We found significant 

shortcomings in each of these areas, which led us to conclude that “[t]he 

failure of the USAOs, CTS, and EOUSA to fully implement the CMC Program 

leaves the Department less prepared to respond effectively when critical 

incidents occur” (page 32) (emphasis added). In our report, we did not 

conclude that the Department was “unprepared” to respond to a critical 

incident. Rather, we concluded that the Department was “less prepared” than 

it could have been – and should be – to respond to critical incidents. 
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That conclusion is warranted because we found that significant 

deficiencies in the majority of USAOs’ Plans have remained uncorrected for 

years, that few USAOs conducted regular crisis response exercises since 1996 

(most conducted no exercises), and that the training provided to CMCs was 

inadequate. Further, notwithstanding current efforts, CTS and EOUSA’s 

support and administration of the CMC Program have not been effective to 

correct the deficiencies.55 The inadequate and incomplete preparations we 

documented contradict CRM and EOUSA’s opinion “that a complete review of 

past efforts, current work, and future plans demonstrates that the need to 

prepare is being properly addressed.” The corrective actions that CRM and 

EOUSA agreed to implement, and have begun to implement in response to our 

review and its ten recommendations (described below), once completed, will 

help ensure that USAOs are better prepared to respond to critical incidents. 

Regarding CRM and EOUSA’s statement that the draft report contained 

“no statement concerning the timeframe” of the review, our final report 

includes the beginning and end dates of our review—the review began in 

December 2002 and ended in October 2003.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendation 1: Resolved – Open

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response: CRM and EOUSA agree that 

performance measures should reflect that USAOs have “meaningful plans and 

periodically exercise and revise those plans.” To that end, EOUSA and CTS will 

develop performance measures to assess, exercise, and revise crisis response 

plans by June 30, 2004. However, CRM and EOUSA state, “The establishment 

of performance measures to evaluate overall readiness is a more complex 

matter and exceeds the scope of this review.” 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by CTS and EOUSA – to jointly 

develop performance measures to assess critical incident response plans, as 

well as the USAOs’ exercise and revision of those plans – are responsive to our 

recommendation. Please provide us with a copy of the performance measures 

by July 9, 2004, as well as CTS and EOUSA’s plan to implement and track the 

performance measures. 

The CRM and EOUSA’s objection that measuring the overall readiness of 

USAOs exceeds the scope of the review misconstrues our recommendation. 

 55 In May 2003, CTS issued its new “Guide to Developing a Crisis Response Plan” with 

instructions for USAOs to review and revise their Plans based on the Guide. However, during 

our review no USAO Plans were revised based on the Guide and submitted to CRM and 

EOUSA. 
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Our recommendation was to establish performance measures “to assess the 

readiness of USAOs to respond to critical incidents.” By establishing 

performance measures to assess the significant products and activities 

associated with critical incident response preparedness, which is within the 

scope of this review, CRM and EOUSA will meet the intent of this 

recommendation. 

Recommendation 2: Resolved – Open

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA state that 

USAOs are revising their Plans in accordance with the “Guide to Developing a 

Model Crisis Response Plan” issued in May 2003. CRM and EOUSA further 

state that they are forming a small working group with participation from the 

Attorney General’s Advisory Committee to review the revised Plans and provide 

“individualized feedback to all USAOs.” Lastly, they state that CTS and EOUSA 

have scheduled crisis response training at the National Advocacy Center in 

March 2004, which will include a tabletop exercise to test each USAO’s Plan. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by CTS and EOUSA are responsive to 

our recommendation. By January 15, 2004, please provide us with the charter 

or other instructions for the working group and the criteria developed for 

evaluating the USAOs’ Plans. By July 9, 2004, please provide us with a list of 

USAOs that have submitted revised Plans and received feedback on the revised 

Plans. 

Recommendation 3: Unresolved – Open

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree that 

participation in periodic exercises to test critical incident response plans is 

advisable, but disagree that each USAO should be required to conduct its own 

exercises. CRM and EOUSA state that this requirement may be a burden for 

some offices, particularly smaller offices, and could divert USAOs from other 

equally important duties. With respect to participating in periodic exercises of 

the Plans, CRM states that CTS is enhancing its expertise in designing crisis 

response exercises in order to provide specific guidance to USAOs. Finally, 

CRM and EOUSA state that the agenda for the March 2004 training at the 

National Advocacy Center will include crisis response exercises. 

OIG Analysis. The CRM and EOUSA response does not address our 

recommendation that each USAO follow the standard practice of testing its 

plan for responding in the event of a critical incident.56 While conducting full 

 56 Conducting crisis response exercises is standard practice for emergency response 

programs throughout government. For example, as described on page 16 of this report, the 

FBI requires its field offices to conduct annual crisis response exercises, and the Federal 
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field exercises may be burdensome for some USAOs, the intent of our 

recommendation may be met with exercises that are limited in scope (e.g., 

tabletop exercises) or frequency (e.g., triennial exercises in lieu of annual 

exercises), or that are conducted in conjunction with another agency (e.g., 

another USAO or the FBI). We note that CTS and EOUSA intend to include 

exercises in the agenda for the planned March 2004 training. However, while 

small segments on conducting exercises were included in the 1997 and 1999 

CMC training, over 60 percent (49 of 81) of the USAOs responding to our 

survey still reported that they had conducted no exercises since 1996. 

Therefore, by January 15, 2004, please provide us with an appropriate 

requirement and implementing guidance for USAOs to periodically conduct 

exercises or to participate in exercises led by other organizations. As CRM and 

EOUSA agreed in response to Recommendation 1 to develop performance 

measures to “assess crisis response plans and [the] exercise...of those plans,” 

the exercise requirements should be consistent with the performance 

measures. 

Recommendation 4: Resolved – Open 

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree with 

the recommendation that all United States Attorneys establish workloadreporting procedures to capture the time dedicated to critical incident response 

planning duties, and state that EOUSA is “exploring appropriate means to 

implement this recommendation.” 

 

OIG Analysis. The planned actions are responsive to our 

recommendation. Please provide us with the new workload-reporting 

procedure or a status report on its development by March 31, 2004. 

Recommendation 5: Resolved – Open

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree that 

CTS should provide updated training and guidance to USAOs on how to 

prepare effective and comprehensive Plans. In its response, CRM and EOUSA 

cite ongoing efforts to implement this recommendation, including the May 2003 

Guide, EOUSA and Centers for Disease Control co-sponsored training, 

Department training for prosecutors and investigators on the USA PATRIOT 

Act, and the “broad array of substantive training” provided by EOUSA to 

USAOs and Department attorneys. CRM and EOUSA also state that the 

upcoming March 2004 training at the National Advocacy Center will include 

“additional guidance on changes in legislation, policy and critical incidence 

response practice that have taken place since September 11, 2001.” 

 

Emergency Management Agency’s Federal Preparedness Circulars require all federal agencies 

to exercise annually their plans for maintaining agency operations in the event of catastrophes. 
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OIG Analysis. The ongoing and planned efforts to improve training and 

guidance on preparing to respond to critical incidents are responsive to our 

recommendation. Please provide us with the final agenda for the March 2004 

training conference by April 9, 2004. 

Recommendation 6: Resolved – Open 

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree with 

the recommendation that CRM review all USAOs’ Plans, including revisions, to 

ensure that the Plans cover all critical areas; provide individualized feedback to 

USAOs; and periodically report to the Deputy Attorney General on the status of 

the USAOs’ Plans. As stated in the response to Recommendation 2, CRM and 

EOUSA plan to form a small working group with the Attorney General’s 

Advisory Committee to review, evaluate, and provide feedback to each USAO on 

its Plan. CTS states that it has already drafted proposed criteria for evaluating 

the Plans using the May 2003 Guide and cites the upcoming March 2004 

training at the National Advocacy Center, which will include a tabletop exercise 

“designed to test the crisis response plans of every USAO and provide feedback 

to them.” 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by CRM and EOUSA are responsive 

to our recommendation. The supplemental information we requested for 

Recommendation 2 will suffice to provide the status of actions taken to 

implement this recommendation. 

Recommendation 7: Resolved – Open

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree with 

the recommendation to provide USAOs with training and guidance on how to 

develop and conduct appropriate critical incident response exercises, and plan 

to provide the training and guidance at the March 2004 national conference. 

However, CRM and EOUSA reiterate the objection they raised in response to 

Recommendation 3, i.e., that they do not agree that each office should be 

required to conduct its own exercises. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by CRM and EOUSA are responsive 

to our recommendation. Please provide us with copies of the training materials 

and guidance relevant to exercising critical incident response plans by April 9, 

2004. 

Regarding CRM and EOUSA’s reiteration of their objection to requiring 

each office to conduct its own exercises, in our analysis of the response to 

Recommendation 3 we request that they establish an appropriate requirement 

for USAOs to conduct exercises (field, tabletop, or other) or to participate in 
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exercises led by other organizations. CRM and EOUSA agreed in response to 

Recommendation 1 to develop performance measures to “assess crisis response 

plans and [the] exercise...of those plans.” (emphasis added) At the March 2004 

national training conference, the USAOs should be provided guidance on how 

to develop and conduct exercises and informed how their performance at 

conducting exercises will be tracked. 

Recommendation 8: Resolved – Open

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree that 

they should complete the development of a website containing information on 

critical incident response. They indicate that the website will contain resources 

on crisis response issues; best practices; updates on law, policies, and 

procedures; and other relevant information, as well as links to other existing 

websites with information on crisis response. The CTS is piloting the website 

with several USAOs and is working with EOUSA to make it available to all 

USAOs. The response further indicates that CRM and EOUSA believe that it 

would be more cost effective to augment an existing website (i.e., the website 

being piloted by CTS) than to develop an additional one. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by CRM and EOUSA to develop the 

described website are responsive to our recommendation. By January 15, 

2004, please provide us with access to the website and a copy of the website 

development and implementation plans. 

Regarding CRM and EOUSA’s statement that they intend to augment the 

current pilot rather than develop a new website, that course of action is 

consistent with the intent of our recommendation that they “complete the 

development” of the website now being piloted. 

Recommendation 9: Resolved – Open 

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree with 

the recommendation that EOUSA establish a system for accurately tracking 

and reporting the status of USAOs’ submissions of and updates to their Plans. 

CRM and EOUSA state that they have been working closely together to track 

incoming communications from USAOs and ensure that they both maintain 

consistent records. CRM and EOUSA anticipate that “a similar mechanism 

can be utilized to track submissions of updated crisis response plans.” In an 

Action Plan for Crisis Management Response Planning provided with their 

response, CRM and EOUSA indicate that the target completion date for the 

shared tracking system is November 1, 2004. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by CRM and EOUSA to develop a 

system that will track the Plan submissions and other incoming 
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communications from USAOs and ensure that CTS and EOUSA maintain 

consistent records are responsive to our recommendation. By March 31, 2004, 

please provide us with a status report on the development of the tracking 

system that CRM and EOUSA will use to monitor USAO Plan submissions and 

other communications.

Recommendation 10: Resolved – Open 

Summary of CRM and EOUSA’s Response. CRM and EOUSA agree with 

the recommendation “to the extent that it requests that we ensure that EARS 

evaluations of USAOs include a requirement for USAOs to have a current, 

updated crisis response plan and to periodically test these plans.” 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by CRM and EOUSA – to revise the 

Evaluation and Review Staff (EARS) evaluations to include steps to ensure that 

USAOs have current, updated crisis response plans and that the USAOs are 

periodically testing those plans – are responsive to our recommendation. By 

March 31, 2004, please provide us with the EARS’ review guide that includes 

procedures for evaluating the USAOs’ compliance with the requirement to have 

current, updated Plans and conduct periodic exercises of the Plans.