NUMBER 13-24-00045-CV 

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

IN THE MATTER OF N.R.W.

 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 156TH DISTRICT COURT

OF BEE COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

We handed down our memorandum opinion and judgment in this cause on August 

15, 2024. On August 29, 2024, the State filed motions for rehearing and en banc 

reconsideration. We hereby deny both motions; however, we withdraw our memorandum 

opinion and judgment of August 15, 2024, and substitute the following memorandum 

opinion and accompanying judgment in their place.
2

Appellant N.R.W.1 appeals the juvenile court’s order modifying his disposition and 

committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). See TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. § 54.05. In one issue, N.R.W. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion 

because there is no evidence supporting the court’s statutory findings and “continued 

probation or further residential treatment” is a “more suitable disposition considering [his] 

needs.” 2 We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

A jury found that N.R.W. engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the felony 

offense of attempting to take a firearm from a peace officer and the misdemeanor offense

of resisting arrest. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 38.03, .14; see also TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. § 51.03 (defining “delinquent conduct”). After a disposition hearing, the juvenile court

committed N.R.W. to TJJD. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (“Disposition Hearing”). It

later granted N.R.W.’s motion to reconsider and vacate disposition and placed him on 

community supervision on the condition that he be admitted to the Judge Mario E. 

Ramirez Jr. Juvenile Justice Center’s Boot Camp Facility (boot camp) until successfully 

discharged or released by the court.

Just over a month later, the State filed a petition to modify disposition alleging that 

N.R.W. was discharged from boot camp for program non-compliance. At the hearing, 

N.R.W. was not asked whether he pleaded true or not true to violating the conditions of 

his community supervision. A stipulation of evidence was filed with the trial court, which 

1 We refer to appellant and his family by their initials as required by statute and to protect their 

privacy. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(j) (“Neither the child nor his family shall be identified in an 

appellate opinion rendered in an appeal or habeas corpus proceedings related to juvenile court proceedings 

under this title.”).

2 The State did not file an appellee’s brief in this matter to assist the Court.
3

N.R.W. refused to sign. The stipulation was not admitted as an exhibit at the hearing. 

However, the stipulation included documentation of his numerous infractions while at boot 

camp. In addition to multiple incidents of refusal to comply with orders and program rules, 

N.R.W. assaulted another juvenile by punching him in the jaw.

James Lill, a probation officer, testified that he is in charge of N.R.W.’s case. He 

prepared a social history which was “received” by the juvenile court.3 Lill stated that 

N.R.W. received a “write-up” on his first day at boot camp and received eight more writeups over the next eleven days. Lill explained that N.R.W. refused to participate in the 

program. He also stated that N.R.W. assaulted another juvenile at the boot camp.

The State recommended that N.R.W. be sentenced to TJJD, while N.R.W. 

requested that he continue on probation in his home. The juvenile court modified N.R.W.’s 

disposition and sentenced him to TJJD.4 This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

The Juvenile Justice Code, codified in §§ 51.01 through 61.107 of the Texas 

Family Code, governs all proceedings in cases involving the delinquent conduct of 

children. In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d 354, 362 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. 

denied) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.01–61.107). A trial court’s modification of a 

juvenile disposition is governed by § 54.05 of the family code. In re W.B.G., 598 S.W.3d 

3 The social history does not appear in the appellate record. According to the court reporter, the 

exhibit was “reviewed by court only; not admitted.”

4 N.R.W. was adjudicated for having committed both a felony and a misdemeanor offense. 

However, his commitment to TJJD is supported by only the felony offense. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 54.05(f); In re C.J.B., 463 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (concluding that committing a 

juvenile to TJJD for violation of a community supervision term relating to a misdemeanor charge is an illegal 

sentence); In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d 481, 490–91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (noting that trial 

court’s order erroneously stated that misdemeanor theft could support TJJD incarceration).
4

367, 371 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05). 

Section 54.05 permits a trial court to modify the disposition and commit a juvenile to TJJD 

when, as here, a juvenile’s prior disposition is based on a finding that the juvenile engaged 

in a felony offense and the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

juvenile violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 54.05(f); see In re C.J.B., 463 S.W.3d 626, 630–31 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). 

Under this section, the trial court is not required to exhaust all possible alternatives to 

commitment before it commits a juvenile to TJJD. In re M.O., 451 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.). But when committing a juvenile to TJJD, the trial court must 

include in its order a determination that:

(A) it is in the child’s best interests to be placed outside the child’s home;

(B) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the 

child’s removal from the child’s home and to make it possible for the 

child to return home; and

(C) the child, in the child’s home, cannot be provided the quality of care and 

level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the 

conditions of probation . . . .

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(m)(1). 

A trial court has broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a juvenile 

found to have engaged in delinquent conduct, particularly in proceedings involving 

modification. In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Tex. 2004); In re P.E.C., 211 S.W.3d 368, 

370 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it 

acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or without reference to guiding rules or principles. In re 

P.E.C., 211 S.W.3d at 370. No abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court bases its 

decisions on conflicting evidence. In re B.N.F., 120 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. App.—Fort 
5

Worth 2003, no pet.). Likewise, an abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some 

evidence of substantive and probative character supports the trial court’s findings. Id.

However, a juvenile court abuses its discretion if it commits a child to TJJD in the absence 

of evidence to support the findings required by § 54.05(m) of the family code. In re E.K.G., 

487 S.W.3d 670, 675–76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (citing In re K.T., 107 

S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (Stone, J., concurring)).

Here, N.R.W. challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that there 

is “no evidence” supporting the juvenile court’s statutory findings. Evidence is legally 

sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding under 

review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is legally 

insufficient to support a disputed fact finding when (1) evidence of a vital fact is absent, 

(2) rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered 

to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere 

scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 

810. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, indulging 

every reasonable inference that would support it and disregarding contrary evidence 

unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 822.

B. Analysis

We first address N.R.W.’s contention that there is legally insufficient evidence 

supporting the juvenile court’s finding that “the child, in the child’s home, cannot be 

provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to 
6

meet the conditions of probation.”5 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(m)(1)(C). N.R.W. 

asserts that “the juvenile’s parents were present at hearings and there is no evidence 

they refused to accept the juvenile into their home, or that [they] felt unable to control the 

juvenile’s behavior.”

The evidence presented at the modification hearing was minimal and limited to 

establishing that N.R.W. was discharged from boot camp for non-compliance. The State 

presented no evidence concerning the quality of care and level of support and supervision 

provided by N.R.W.’s parents in the home. For instance, there was no evidence that 

N.R.W. was disobedient in the home, that he had a troubled relationship with his parents,

or that he would likely violate his probation conditions in the home. Cf. In re C.J.B., 463 

S.W.3d at 632 (concluding that the trial court’s “quality of care and level of support” finding 

was supported by sufficient evidence where the record demonstrated that the juvenile

had a difficult relationship with parents and struggled with conditions of probation); In re 

J.M.D.D.L.C., 457 S.W.3d 205, 208 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (same where 

juvenile “consistently refused to obey [parents’] orders, acted disrespectful to his mother, 

continued to violate probation restrictions, and continued to use marijuana”); In re K.J.N., 

103 S.W.3d 465, 466 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (same where juvenile was

placed on probation at home under mother’s supervision and reoffended a month later);

see also In re D.L.S.W., No. 04-18-00807-CV, 2019 WL 2518157, at *3 (Tex. App.—San 

5 We note that the juvenile court did not explicitly make this finding, which is a mandatory statutory 

requirement. See In re C.J.B., 463 S.W.3d 626, 631 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.); In re J.M., 287 

S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.). Normally, when a juvenile court does not make 

statutorily required findings, we will not reverse for a new modification hearing, but, rather, remand to the 

juvenile court with instructions to render a proper modification order. See In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d at 489

(citing K.K.H. v. State, 612 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ)). However, for the sake of 

judicial economy, and because N.R.W. does not assign error to the lack of an explicit finding, we will 

address whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support such a finding.
7

Antonio June 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same where the juvenile continued to 

disregard her probation conditions while in the home). Neither was there evidence that 

N.R.W.’s parents were unwilling or unable to care for N.R.W. in the home. See In re

C.J.B., 463 S.W.3d at 632 (noting mother’s unwillingness and inability to care for juvenile). 

Absent any evidence supporting the “level of support” finding, we conclude the trial court 

abused its discretion in committing N.R.W. to TJJD. See In re E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d at 675–

76; see also In re J.S., 993 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) 

(concluding that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing juvenile to TJJD 

where “[t]here was no evidence that [juvenile’s] father could not provide the quality of care 

and level of support and supervision which [juvenile] needed”); In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d 

855, 863 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (same where the only evidence consisted 

of the juvenile’s commission of the underlying offense and violation of his mother’s 

curfew). We sustain N.R.W.’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new disposition hearing. 

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(i).

L. ARON PEÑA JR.

Justice

Delivered and filed on the 

26th day of September, 2024.