J-S40007-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM MAYS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3225 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 6, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004938-2012

BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 10, 2017

Appellant William Mays appeals the judgment of sentence entered by 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after a jury convicted 

Appellant of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and related offenses. 

After careful review, we affirm.

On April 9, 2011, officers responded to a reported shooting and 

discovered two victims with gunshot wounds near a minivan parked in front 

of 5321 Malcolm Street in Philadelphia. Saquanne Stanford was lying in the 

street and holding onto the door of the minivan. Michael Askew was seated 

in the passenger seat with his head slumped over onto the driver’s seat. 

Both men were bleeding profusely. 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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When medical personnel arrived, paramedics treated Stanford’s 

wounds and rushed him to the University of Pennsylvania Hospital. Although 

Stanford received gunshot wounds to his upper neck and his rear scalp and 

sustained fractures of his skull and his left jaw, doctors noted that Stanford 

was awake, alert, and orientated. Toxicology reports revealed that 

Stanford’s blood contained Benzodiazepines and THC. As Stanford’s injuries 

did not require surgical invention, he was released to a rehabilitation facility.

While Stanford survived his injuries, medical personnel pronounced 

Askew dead at the scene of the shooting. Autopsy results revealed that 

Askew’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the neck and the manner of 

his death was homicide. Based on the extent of Askew’s injuries, Dr. Gary 

Collis, forensic pathology expert, testified that the victim did not die 

immediately from his injuries but instead likely collapsed due to a large loss 

of blood and difficulty breathing. Toxicology results revealed that Askew’s 

blood contained Alprazolam (Xanax), cocaine and ethanol.

Officers investigating the scene of the shooting discovered several 

pieces of ballistic evidence from two different guns. Officers recovered six 

.40 caliber fired cartridge casings outside of the vehicle, three of which were 

found on the sidewalk and three in the grass in front of 5319 Malcolm 

Street. Officers seized two .45 caliber fired cartridge casings inside the 

vehicle, one of which was on the back of the front passenger seat 

underneath Askew and the other on the middle rear passenger seat. In 
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addition, officers discovered two .45 caliber bullet jackets, one on the floor 

near Askew’s front leg and one in a rear bench seat.

Officer William Trenwith employed steel trajectory rods to determine 

the path of the bullets. Although Officer Trenwith could not conclude which 

direction the shooter fired the .45 caliber gun, he ascertained that this gun 

was fired from inside the vehicle. In addition, Officer Trenwith determined 

that a second shooter, who was standing very close to the minivan, fired a 

.40 caliber firearm into the passenger side of the vehicle.

The officers could not find any witnesses to the shooting. Detective 

George Fetters went to the hospital to speak with Stanford, who initially 

claimed that he did not know what happened. After several attempts to 

interview Stanford, Detective Fetters convinced Stanford to give a statement 

on May 9, 2011, but Stanford did not identify the shooters. However, on 

May 12, 2011, Detective Fetters learned from one of Stanford’s family 

members that Stanford had revealed information about the shooting over 

several text messages, in which he claimed to know the identity of one of 

the shooters and the motive for the shooting. Stanford also discussed his 

plan for revenge. Detective Fetters obtained copies of the messages from 

the relative’s phone.

After searching for Stanford, Detective Fetters brought Stanford to the 

homicide unit on February 1, 2012 and confronted him with the text 

messages. Stanford then gave a handwritten statement, identifying one of 

the shooters as a man known as “Will” or “Man Man” and describing where 
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he lived. When presented with a photo array, Stanford circled Appellant’s 

photo and identified him as one of the shooters. 

Stanford revealed that prior to the shooting, he had stolen Appellant’s 

gun while the men were together on Conestoga Street. Appellant had left 

his gun on top of a car tire and went inside his home; Stanford admitted 

taking Appellant’s gun. On the night of the shooting, Stanford called 

Appellant, told him he had taken the gun, and asked to return it. Appellant 

asked Stanford to meet him on Conestoga Street. Stanford agreed and 

brought Askew along with them. When they arrived, Appellant asked 

Stanford to drive him to his cousin’s house on Malcolm Street. Stanford 

drove Appellant to this location and was about to park at the end of the 

block, when Appellant directed Stanford to park between two particular cars. 

Stanford followed this direction and parked the vehicle. As the left door of 

the minivan opened, Appellant started shooting at Stanford and Askew while 

he was seated in the minivan. Stanford gave no information about the 

possibility of a second shooter.

Detective Fetters located Appellant in a Delaware County prison and 

discovered that Appellant was charged with an incident that provided 

evidence of his involvement in the shooting in this case. On July 28, 2011, 

Appellant fled from police who attempted to initiate a traffic stop of his 

unregistered vehicle. After Appellant slowed down at the intersection of 

Chester Pike and McDade Boulevard, his passenger jumped out of the 

vehicle and ran towards a nearby Walgreens. After Appellant drove away at 
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a high rate of speed and collided with two vehicles, he was taken into police 

custody. The police also arrested Appellant’s passenger, Christopher 

Graham, who subsequently gave a signed statement.

About a month later, Walgreens employees notified police that a 

firearm was discovered in a secure storage facility at the location where 

Graham had fled. Officers responded to the store and recovered a stainless 

steel Kimber Target II .45 caliber pistol that was loaded. Officers 

determined that the gun had been stolen from Dwayne Eugene Bale of 234 

East Filbert Street in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Ballistics experts concluded 

that two of the .45 caliber fired cartridge casings and two .45 caliber bullet 

jackets recovered from inside the minivan involved in the shooting were 

fired from the .45 caliber pistol recovered from the Walgreens. 

The police were subsequently contacted by Virgil Pauling, one of 

Appellant’s former cellmates in county prison. Pauling indicated that 

Appellant often spoke about a shooting he committed and gave Pauling 

details that matched Stanford's account of the April 9, 2011 shooting. 

Moreover, Appellant shared with Pauling that police attempted to stop his 

vehicle when he had the murder weapon in his glove compartment so he 

attempted to evade police in a high-speed chase and told his passenger to 

take the weapon and flee.

Based on this evidence, Appellant was arrested for the murder of 

Michael Askew and the attempted murder of Saquanne Stanford. He was 

also charged with carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm in 
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public in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime. On May 6, 

2013, a jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned charges. On the 

same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without 

the possibility of parole along with a concurrent imprisonment term of 281⁄2 

to 57 years. 

On May 9, 2013, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. However, on July 

10, 2013, this Court dismissed the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to file a 

docketing statement pursuant on Pa.R.A.P. 3517. On December 16, 2013, 

Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. On February 5, 2014, the Supreme Court directed the trial 

court to appoint Appellant new counsel. The trial court appointed James 

Anthony Lammendola, Esq. to represent Appellant.

On June 17, 2014, Appellant filed a petition under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act. On October 24, 2014, the lower court reinstated Appellant’s 

appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Atty. Lammendola filed a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal on Appellant’s behalf pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). On January 7, 2015, this Court directed the trial court to conduct a 

hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (1998). On 

January 22, 2015, the lower court concluded that Appellant should be 

allowed to represent himself as he had knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waived his right to counsel. On January 22, 2015, the trial court 

ordered Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) Statement. On February 2, 2015, 

Appellant filed a timely 1925(b) statement and asked for permission to file a 
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supplemental statement upon receipt of his transcripts. On July 17, 2015, 

the trial court filed its first 1925(a) opinion. On October 9, 2015, Appellant 

filed a supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement. On June 27, 2016, the trial 

court filed a second 1925(b) opinion.

Appellant raises numerous claims for appellate review that can be 

condensed into ten arguments. First, Appellant argues that the bill of 

information was defective as it did not properly inform him of the charges 

against him. Although Appellant was charged with murder and attempted 

murder “as a principal or as an accomplice,” Appellant asserts there is no 

evidence to support the accomplice charge.

This Court has established that:

the purpose of a bill of information or indictment is to inform the 

defendant of the charges against him and to protect him against 

further prosecution for the same crime. In addition, the Rules of 

Criminal Procedure indicate that the issues at trial are to be 

defined by the information. However, pursuant to Pennsylvania 

law, an information is not to be read in an overly technical form. 

Thus, we will arrest judgment only when an error misleads a 

defendant as to the charges against him, precludes him from 

anticipating the Commonwealth's proof, or impairs a substantial 

right.

Commonwealth v. Morales, 669 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa.Super. 1996) 

(citations omitted).

We find Appellant’s claim to be meritless as he does not explain how 

the information misled him as to the charges against him, prevented him 

from preparing his defense or impaired a substantial right. While Appellant 

claims there was no evidence to suggest he committed the shooting with an 
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accomplice, Appellant ignores ballistic evidence that suggests there were two 

shooters firing different firearms from different locations. As a result, the 

trial court did not err in denying this claim.

Second, Appellant argues that his right to confront the witnesses 

against him was violated as he did not have the opportunity to crossexamine Christopher Graham, the man who fled from Appellant’s vehicle and 

discarded the murder weapon after a police chase in Delaware County.

It is well-established that “[w]hether a defendant was denied his right 

to confront a witness under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment is a question of law for which our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Milburn, 72 A.3d 

617, 618 (Pa.Super. 2013). The Confrontation Clause states that “[i]n all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .... to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. Amend. VI.

Appellant did not have the right to confront Graham, who never 

testified at Appellant’s trial. The prosecution offered evidence of their arrest 

of Graham and Appellant in Delaware County to explain their course of 

conduct in finding the murder weapon. In addition, the prosecution 

introduced evidence of their good faith efforts to locate Graham before trial 

to explain to the jury why Graham was not present to testify at trial. As a 

result, Appellant has not shown that his right to confrontation was violated.
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Third, Appellant challenges several remarks made by the prosecutor 

during trial. When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we are 

guided by the following standards:

it is well settled that any challenged prosecutorial comment must 

not be viewed in isolation, but rather must be considered in the 

context in which it was offered. Commonwealth v. Correa,

444 Pa.Super. 621, 664 A.2d 607 (1995). Our review of a 

prosecutor's comment and an allegation of prosecutorial 

misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a defendant 

received a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Commonwealth v. 

Rios, 554 Pa. 419, 721 A.2d 1049 (1998). Thus, it is well 

settled that statements made by the prosecutor to the jury 

during closing argument will not form the basis for granting a 

new trial “unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would 

be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and 

hostility toward the defendant so they could not weigh the 

evidence objectively and render a true verdict.” 

Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 580 Pa. 403, 434–35, 861 A.2d 

898, 916 (2004) (quotation and quotation marks omitted). The 

appellate courts have recognized that not every unwise remark 

by an attorney amounts to misconduct or warrants the grant of a 

new trial. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 528 Pa. 57, 595 A.2d 

28 (1991). Additionally, like the defense, the prosecution is 

accorded reasonable latitude, may employ oratorical flair in 

arguing its version of the case to the jury, and may advance 

arguments supported by the evidence or use inferences that can 

reasonably be derived therefrom. Commonwealth v. Carson,

590 Pa. 501, 913 A.2d 220 (2006); Commonwealth v. Holley,

945 A.2d 241 (Pa.Super. 2008). Moreover, the prosecutor is 

permitted to fairly respond to points made in the defense's 

closing, and therefore, a proper examination of a prosecutor's 

comments in closing requires review of the arguments advanced 

by the defense in summation. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 

Pa. 547, 889 A.2d 501 (2005).

Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615 (Pa.Super. 2016).

Specifically, Appellant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor 

to 1) refer to Appellant as an assassin, 2) reveal details of Appellant’s 
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criminal history, 3) suggest that Stanford’s text messages referred to 

Appellant as one of the shooters, and 4) use Stanford’s “perjured” 

testimony. 

With respect to Appellant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly 

referred to him as an “assassin,” we find this remark constituted permissible 

oratorical flair in arguing its theory of the case. The Commonwealth 

presented evidence that Appellant directed Stanford to drive his vehicle to 

his cousin’s home and to specifically park between two particular vehicles in 

front of the residence. When Stanford complied, he asserts that Appellant 

started shooting at him and Askew from inside the vehicle. The prosecutor 

also presented evidence that a second shooter was lying in wait for the men 

and began shooting at them from outside the vehicle at that very same 

moment. As the prosecution’s theory is supported by evidence presented at 

trial, we find that the prosecutor’s use of oratorical fair in advancing this 

argument did not render Appellant’s trial unfair.

With respect to Appellant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly 

referred to his criminal history, this claim is meritless as evidence of 

Appellant’s criminal activity in Delaware County shortly after the shooting of 

Askew and Stanford was admissible to show Appellant’s connection to the 

murder weapon.

Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal 

activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in 

conformity with those past acts or to show criminal propensity. 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of prior bad acts may be 

admissible when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such 
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as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, and absence of mistake or accident. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). 

In determining whether evidence of other prior bad acts is 

admissible, the trial court is obliged to balance the probative 

value of such evidence against its prejudicial impact.

Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa.Super. 2010)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009)).

The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in referring to Appellant’s 

July 28, 2011 arrest in Delaware County as this evidence was offered to 

show how police discovered the weapon used in the shooting of Askew and 

Stanford. The evidence showed two months after the shooting, Appellant 

attempted to evade the police and led officers on a high-speed chase. 

During this pursuit, Appellant dropped off his passenger, who subsequently 

fled with the murder weapon and attempted to conceal it at the nearby 

Walgreens store. As the prosecutor properly presented this relevant 

evidence to the jury, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

With respect to Appellant’s claim that the prosecutor committed 

misconduct in telling the jury that the text messages that Stanford sent to 

his relative identified Appellant as the perpetrator, we find this remark 

reflected a fair deduction and inference from the evidence discovered in the 

homicide investigation. When officers confronted Stanford with his text 

messages at the police station, he admitted to police that he was referring to 

Appellant. See Jaynes, supra (stating that the prosecution “may advance 

arguments supported by the evidence or use inferences that can reasonably 

be derived therefrom”). As such, this prosecutorial misconduct claim fails.
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With respect to Appellant’s allegation that the prosecution coerced 

Saquanne Stanford into giving false testimony at trial, we find this assertion 

unsupported by any evidence. Although Stanford had given the police a 

handwritten statement identifying Appellant as the perpetrator and 

explaining the circumstances surrounding the shooting, Stanford recanted 

this identification at trial and claimed that he did not recall giving earlier 

statements to police. As such, the prosecution was permitted to introduce 

Stanford’s prior inconsistent statements to impeach his credibility. See 

Pa.R.E. 613(a) (providing that “[a] witness may be examined concerning a 

prior inconsistent statement made by the witness to impeach the witness's 

credibility”). As it is evident that the prosecutor acted within the bounds of 

the law, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct.

Fourth, Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted a 

mistrial after it discharged one of the jury members.

It is well–settled that the review of a trial court's denial of a 

motion for a mistrial is limited to determining whether the trial 

court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will ... discretion is abused. A trial court may grant a 

mistrial only where the incident upon which the motion is based 

is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing 

and rendering a true verdict. A mistrial is not necessary where 

cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice.
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Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 A.3d 1049, 1056–57 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 612 Pa. 107, 30 A.3d 381, 422 

(2011)).

Our review of the record reveals that during the trial, juror #5 passed 

a note to the trial court indicating that he felt he could no longer fulfill his 

responsibilities as a juror as 1) he feared for his personal safety and the 

safety of his family as he felt Appellant’s family were trying to intimidate 

him, 2) jury service created a financial hardship for his family and 3) his 

absence was preventing his wife from fulfilling her employment obligations. 

The trial court conducted an individual colloquy of Juror #5 and determined 

that the juror had not communicated his feelings or experiences to the other 

jury members. Thereafter, the trial court conducted colloquies of the 

remaining jurors and determined they did not share the same concerns as 

Juror #5.

Although the trial court ultimately dismissed Juror #5, it concluded 

that it was unnecessary to discharge all the jurors as it found Juror #5’s true 

concern was the inconvenience of the trial to his family. Based on the 

colloquies, the trial court determined that the remaining jurors were able to 

perform their duties as fair and impartial jurors. Further, the trial court 

addressed Appellant’s family outside the presence of the jury and cautioned 

them that any misconduct would not be tolerated. We conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror #5 and denying 

Appellant’s motion for a mistrial.
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Fifth, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting crime scene photographs of Askew’s deceased body. Our standard 

of review for evidentiary matters is well-established: “[t]he admission of 

evidence is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 

such a decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court 

abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Rashid, 160 A.3d 838, 842–43 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

In reviewing a challenge to the admission of crime scene photographs, 

this Court has established:

Photographs of a murder victim are not per se inadmissible.” 

Commonwealth v. Cox, 546 Pa. 515, 534, 686 A.2d 1279, 

1288 (1996) [(citation omitted)]. In reviewing a challenge to 

the trial court's admission of photographs, we employ the abuse 

of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 597 Pa. 307, 

327, 951 A.2d 307, 319 (2008) (citation omitted). A trial court 

must engage in the following two-step analysis when considering 

the admissibility of photographs of homicide victims:

First a trial court must determine whether the 

photograph is inflammatory. If not, it may be 

admitted if it has relevance and can assist the jury's 

understanding of the facts. If the photograph is 

inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether or 

not the photographs are of such essential evidentiary 

value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood 

of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors. 

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 574 Pa. 202, 222, 830 A.2d 519, 

531 (2003) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Haney, 634 Pa. 690, 131 A.3d 24, 37 (2015).

In this case, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to admit black 

and white photos of the crime scene and Askew’s deceased body. Even 
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assuming arguendo that the photographs were inflammatory, we agree with 

the trial court’s assessment that the images had essential evidentiary value 

that outweighed any potential prejudice from their admission. The photos 

were necessary to depict the nature of the crime scene, the trajectory of the 

fired bullets, and the location of the recovered ballistic evidence in relation 

to the victim. We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting this 

evidence.

Sixth, Appellant claims that the trial court prevented defense counsel 

from properly cross-examining Stanford in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment. However, Appellant does not point to any specific portion of 

cross-examination where defense counsel’s cross-examination was 

restricted. Appellant’s bald assertion does not entitle him to review on 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Murchinson, 899 A.2d 1159, 1162 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (finding claim to be waived by the appellant's failure to 

develop meaningful argument with specific reference to the record in support 

of his claims). Moreover, the record shows that Stanford was subject to 

extensive cross-examination at trial. Thus, we need not review this claim 

any further. 

Seventh, Appellant alleges that the trial court improperly admitted the 

written statement of Virgil Pauling, who claimed that Appellant had revealed 

details of his involvement in the shooting while the men shared a cell in 

prison. However, this statement was never admitted into evidence, but was 

merely referred to when Pauling testified against Appellant at trial.
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Moreover, Appellant’s claim that he did not have the chance to crossexamine Appellant about the “written deal” Pauling had with federal 

prosecutors is also meritless. Appellant agreed to the following stipulation to 

admit evidence of Pauling’s agreement with federal prosecutors:

[I]f Assistant U.S. Attorney Salvatore Astolfi were to testify, he 

would testify that he first encountered Mr. Virgil Pauling as part 

of an investigation into an unrelated identity fraud matter. Mr. 

Pauling is a witness, not the target of that investigation.

Mr. Pauling has not been charged with any crimes related to that 

investigation. Mr. Pauling was transported to the Federal 

building and interviewed by the Federal authorities.

As part of that interview, Mr. Astolfi, Mr. Pauling, and Mr. 

Pauling’s attorney had what is called a proffer session.

At that session, Mr. Pauling provided information about this 

unrelated investigation. Mr. Pauling provided information 

regarding a murder.

The proffer session had the following conditions: First, that Mr. 

Pauling would be interviewed by Federal investigators. The 

statements provided by Mr. Pauling in this interview could not be 

used directly against him.

Two: The government can and will pursue investigative leads 

from Mr. Pauling’s statements.

Three: If Mr. Pauling is a witness or party at any trial or legal 

proceeding and makes statements that are materially different 

than the information provided at the proffer session, the 

information from the proffer may now be used against Mr. 

Pauling.

This final provision is to assure that Mr. Pauling does not abuse 

the opportunity for a proffer session by making materially false 

statements, commit perjury or offer false evidence.

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 5/2/13, at 33-35. 
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Moreover, the trial court conducted an oral colloquy of Appellant on 

the record in which Appellant agreed to the stipulation and expressly 

acknowledged that he was giving up the right to cross-examine Pauling with 

respect to the agreement. As the trial court found Appellant entered into 

this stipulation knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, we find that 

Appellant waived his right to cross-examine Pauling on this agreement.

Eighth, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the 

jury on 1) evidence of Appellant’s flight from police, 2) attempted murder, 

and 3) accomplice liability. 

When evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court will 

look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated 

portions, to determine if the instructions were improper. We 

further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this 

Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing 

its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the 

law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury 

for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion 

or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error. 

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 269 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted).

Specifically, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion 

in instructing the jury that Appellant’s flight from police in Delaware County 

could be considered evidence of his consciousness of guilt. To reiterate, 

Appellant was arrested after he attempted to evade police in a high-speed 

chase that led to the discovery of the murder weapon used in the shooting of 

Stanford and Askew. Appellant argues that the instruction denied him a fair 
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trial as the criminal information did not inform Appellant that his flight would 

be used against him as evidence of consciousness of guilt.

Appellant offers no authority to support his suggestion that the 

prosecution is required to specifically set forth its entire evidentiary case 

against a defendant in a criminal information. This issue is waived by 

Appellant’s lack of development of the claim. Commonwealth v. 

Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 509 (Pa. 2015) (holding that “[w]here an 

appellate brief fails to ... develop an issue in any other meaningful fashion 

capable of review, that claim is waived. It is not the obligation of an 

appellate court to formulate appellant's arguments for him”). 

Moreover, this Court has held that a trial court may instruct a jury that 

a defendant’s flight from police may be considered as consciousness of guilt. 

“[W]here evidence exists that a defendant committed a crime, knew he was 

wanted, and fled or concealed himself, such evidence is admissible to 

establish consciousness of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Lukowich, 875 A.2d 

1169, 1173–74 (Pa.Super. 2005) (upholding trial court’s instruction on the 

defendant’s flight). In this case, two months after the shooting of Askew 

and Stanford, Appellant led police on a high-speed chase which led to his 

apprehension. During the chase, Appellant’s passenger fled from the vehicle 

and ran towards a Walgreens store, where police subsequently recovered the 

.45 caliber firearm that was used to murder Askew. As there was sufficient

evidence to support a jury instruction indicating that Appellant’s flight could 
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be used as substantive evidence of guilt, we find Appellant’s claim to be 

meritless.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury 

on attempted murder and accomplice liability. However, these claims are 

waived as defense counsel never made a specific objection to these 

instructions and raises these arguments for the first time on appeal. Our 

rules of criminal procedure require that “[n]o portions of the charge nor 

omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific 

objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C). See also Commonwealth v. Pressley, 584 Pa. 624, 

628, 887 A.2d 220, 224 (2005) (holding that “[t]he pertinent rules [of 

Criminal Procedure] ... require a specific objection to the charge or an 

exception to the trial court's ruling on a proposed point to preserve an issue 

involving a jury instruction”). Accordingly, because these claims were not 

preserved for our review, we need not review them further.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/10/2017