Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 1 of 44

I N T H E

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Kevin Hamilton,

Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 12, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-PC-15

Appeal from the Allen Superior Court

The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D06-1903-PC-000025

Opinion by Judge Felix

Judge Crone concurs in part and concurs in result in part with separate opinion.

Judge Brown dissents with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 2 of 44

Felix, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Kevin Hamilton filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 

and that new evidence exists regarding sentencing. When he filed the petition, 

he also filed a motion for change of judge (the “Motion”). The PCR court 

denied both Hamilton’s petition and the Motion. Hamilton appeals those 

denials and presents four issues for our review, which we revise and restate as

the following two issues: 

1. Whether the PCR court clearly erred when it denied the Motion;

2. Whether the PCR court clearly erred when it denied Hamilton’s PCR 

petition.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Trial, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal 

[3] In 2017, a jury convicted Hamilton of murder, robbery as a Level 2 felony, and 

an enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. We have 

previously set out the facts underlying those convictions:

On August 13, 2016, Hamilton and his friend, Devyn Yancey 

(“Yancey”), were exchanging text messages regarding the fact 

that marijuana they had purchased from Brian Quintana 

(“Quintana”) was ten grams short. Hamilton and Yancey 

decided to rob Quintana the next day, during an arranged buy. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 3 of 44

Via text, Yancey assured Hamilton that Quintana would have 

only one person with him, if anyone, and that no one would be 

armed. Hamilton said he would bring his .9–millimeter 

handgun. Referring to the robbery, Hamilton texted, “Sounds 

easy. Let’s do it.” 

On August 14, 2016, Hamilton picked up Yancey, and they 

drove to the parking lot of the Woodbridge Apartments in Allen 

County, where Quintana was waiting in his car. Yancey and 

Hamilton entered Quintana’s car; Yancey sat in the passenger 

seat, and Hamilton, brandishing his gun, sat in the back. Seeing 

the handgun, and understanding that he was being robbed, 

Quintana tried to wrestle the gun out of Hamilton’s hand. 

Yancey went around to the driver’s side door and started hitting 

Quintana. This allowed Hamilton to secure his gun and exit the 

car. As Yancey and Quintana continued to struggle in the front 

seat of the car, Hamilton fired his gun through the back 

windshield, striking Quintana in the right lower chest. Yancey 

grabbed a bag of Quintana’s marijuana, and he and Hamilton 

fled from the scene.

When police arrived at the scene, Quintana told them that 

Hamilton had shot him. Following a search, police tracked 

down Hamilton and arrested him. Quintana died from his 

injuries, and on August 18, 2016, Hamilton was charged with 

murder, felony murder, robbery as a Level 2 felony, and an 

enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. 

A jury trial was conducted from March 7 through 9, 2017. . . . 

Hamilton was found guilty of all charges.

Hamilton v. State, 95 N.E.3d 218, No. 02A03-1704-CR-932, slip op. at ¶¶ 3–5 

(Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2017) (record citations omitted), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 4 of 44

[4] At trial and sentencing, John Bohdan represented Hamilton. At the sentencing 

hearing, Bohdan presented four mitigating factors: (1) Hamilton was a minor—

17 years old—at the time of the offense, (2) Hamilton lacked an adult criminal 

history, (3) the circumstances of the crime were unlikely to reoccur, and (4) 

Hamilton was the father of a young son. In particular, Bohdan argued that 

Hamilton had “an undeveloped juvenile mind,” which resulted in “the tragic 

results of what happened [not being] as foreseeable for” Hamilton. Sent. Tr. 

Vol. I at 6. Bohdan also argued that Hamilton, who was already a father of one 

child, had a “good influence on his child’s upbringing.” Id. The trial court 

heard testimony from Quintana’s father about how much he missed his son. 

The trial court also reviewed Hamilton’s presentence investigation report and 

letters from Hamilton’s mother and girlfriend. 

[5] Hamilton addressed the trial court, as well: 

It doesn’t matter what I say, it will never explain how sorry I am. 

And I don’t expect you to forgive me, I wouldn’t. . . . I never 

had the intention to take your son’s life. . . . I would give my life 

for him to have his back, but I can’t. The only thing I can do 

though is sit in prison for the rest of my life. And if that’s what I 

have to do to make things right then I’ll do it and I’m sorry. . . . 

I don’t want to be defined by what I did when I was a kid. And 

I’m not gonna blame that on me being a kid, I just – I was dumb. 

. . . I’m not innocent, I know I’m guilty. I know I was guilty, I 

just don’t agree with what was brought to me. Murder, I know 

I’m not guilty of murder. I’m not a murdere[r], I’m not a killer. 

I could never. But what I did, someone did die and I know I did 

that. 

Sent. Tr. Vol. I at 11–12. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 5 of 44

[6] The trial court found two aggravating factors: (1) Hamilton’s failed attempts at 

rehabilitation after two informal juvenile adjustments, and (2) the nature and 

circumstances of the offense. The trial court found two mitigating factors: (1) 

Hamilton was a minor at the time of the offense, and (2) Hamilton’s 

incarceration would be an undue hardship for his son. The trial court did not 

consider Hamilton’s lack of an adult criminal history to be a mitigating factor 

because Hamilton had a history of juvenile involvement. The trial court also 

declined to consider as a mitigating factor that the circumstances of Hamilton’s 

offense were unlikely to reoccur. Based on the aggravating and mitigating 

factors, the trial court sentenced Hamilton to a total of 74 years in the Indiana 

Department of Correction: 55 years for murder, 9 years for robbery as a Level 3

felony,

1 and 10 years for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, all to be 

served consecutively. 

[7] On direct appeal, Thomas Allen represented Hamilton. Allen raised three 

issues on Hamilton’s behalf for our consideration: 

I. Whether the trial court erred in merging Hamilton’s felony 

murder conviction with his murder conviction;

II. Whether reducing Hamilton’s conviction from Level 2 felony 

robbery to Level 3 felony robbery for purposes of sentencing 

1 Although Hamilton was convicted of robbery as a Level 2 felony, the sentencing court reduced the 

conviction to a Level 3 felony. The issue of this reduction was addressed in Hamilton’s direct appeal. 

Hamilton, No. 02A03-1704-CR-932, slip op. at ¶¶ 10–17.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 6 of 44

remedied double jeopardy violations under Indiana’s Double 

Jeopardy Clause; and

III. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear 

evidence on the enhancement—use of a firearm in the 

commission of an offense causing death or serious bodily 

injury—at the same time the jury heard evidence on the other 

counts.

Hamilton, No. 02A03-1704-CR-932, slip op. at ¶ 1. We affirmed Hamilton’s 

convictions, id. at ¶¶ 9, 17, 23, 24, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied 

transfer, Hamilton v. State, 97 N.E.3d 236 (Ind. 2018). 

Post-Conviction Proceedings

[8] On March 12, 2019, Hamilton filed a PCR petition, which he later amended. 

In addition to his initial petition, Hamilton also filed the Motion (requesting a 

change of judge) along with an accompanying affidavit by Hamilton (the 

“Affidavit”). The PCR court denied the Motion without hearing because “the 

Affidavit attached does not support a rational inference of personal bias or 

prejudice against the Petitioner.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 27. The PCR 

court also denied Hamilton’s motion to reconsider this issue, as well as 

Hamilton’s subsequent motion to certify these denials for interlocutory appeal. 

[9] At the evidentiary hearing, Hamilton questioned Bohdan about his current 

employment. Bohdan testified that he is the magistrate for the Allen Superior 

Court and that he is employed by all three Criminal Division judges, including 

the PCR judge. Hamilton then renewed the Motion, and the PCR court denied 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 7 of 44

it once again, noting “that the [A]ffidavit does not contain any information, as I 

indicated in my Order, on historical bias against the Defendant.” Tr. Vol. II at 

8. Hamilton then proceeded to present evidence regarding his claims that he 

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he received ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel, and he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on 

newly discovered evidence. After the hearing, Hamilton and the State 

submitted proposed orders. The PCR court ultimately denied Hamilton’s 

petition. This appeal ensued. Additional facts are set forth below. 

Discussion and Decision

1. Denial of the Change of Judge Motion 

[10] Hamilton argues that the PCR court clearly erred when it denied the Motion. 

Hamilton specifically contends that the PCR court’s decision is in violation of 

Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b), Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct 

(“CJC”) Rule 2.11(A), and the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment2

of the United States Constitution. We address each basis in turn. 

a. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b)

[11] Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) provides in relevant part: 

2

In the Motion and on appeal, Hamilton points us to both the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth 

Amendment. The Fifth Amendment deals in relevant part with due process in criminal proceedings. See U.S. 

Const., amend. V. PCR proceedings are civil proceedings, see Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1; Gibson v. State, 

133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019), so the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause is inapplicable to the Motion. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 8 of 44

Within ten (10) days of filing a petition for post-conviction relief 

under this rule, the petitioner may request a change of judge by 

filing an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 

against the petitioner. The petitioner’s affidavit shall state the facts 

and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, 

and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the attorney of 

record that the attorney in good faith believes that the historical 

facts recited in the affidavit are true. A change of judge shall be 

granted if the historical facts cited in the affidavit support a 

rational inference of bias or prejudice.

(Emphases added). A bias is “personal” under Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) “if 

it stems from an extrajudicial source—meaning a source separate from the 

evidence and argument presented at the proceedings.” Pruitt v. State, 903 

N.E.2d 899, 939 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 728 

(Ind. 2001)). Personal bias or prejudice generally “exists only where there is an 

undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the 

controversy before [the court].” Robinson v. State, 218 N.E.3d 17, 29 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2023) (quoting L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018)), trans. not 

sought.

[12] A change of judge pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) is neither 

“automatic” nor “discretionary”; instead, it calls for a legal determination. 

Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939 (quoting Lambert, 743 N.E.2d at 728). In making this 

determination, the PCR court must “examine the affidavit, treat the historical 

facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a 

rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Id. (quoting Lambert, 743 N.E.2d at 

728). We review a PCR court’s ruling on a motion for change of judge under 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 9 of 44

the clearly erroneous standard. Robinson, 218 N.E.3d at 30 (citing Garland v. 

State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. 2003)). We will reverse only upon a showing 

that “leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” Id. (citing Garland, 788 N.E.2d at 433). This is a heavy burden, 

especially because we presume that the PCR judge is not biased against a party 

and because disqualification is not required under Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) 

“unless the judge holds a ‘personal bias or prejudice.’” Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939 

(quoting Lambert, 743 N.E.2d at 728). That is, to overcome the presumption 

that the PCR judge is unbiased, the party requesting the change of judge must 

demonstrate that the PCR judge has an actual personal bias or prejudice against 

him. See id. (quoting Lambert, 743 N.E.2d at 728).

[13] Hamilton’s Affidavit contained only three allegations: 

1. I was charged with multiple offense[s], including Murder, in 

Cause No. 02D06-1608-MR-5. 

2. At the trial level, I was represented by Mr. John Bohdan.

3. I believe he is now an Allen County magistrate working for 

Judge Gull who presided over my case and sentencing.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 19. 

[14] Hamilton does not include any allegations in the Affidavit that would support a 

rational inference that the PCR judge is biased against him for any reason, 

including because of the PCR judge’s alleged employer-employee relationship 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 10 of 44

with Bohdan. Based on our standard of review and the requirements of PostConviction Rule 1(4)(b), we cannot say that the PCR court clearly erred in 

denying the Motion on this ground. 

b. CJC Rule 2.11(A)

[15] CJC Rule 2.11(A) provides that a “judge shall disqualify himself or herself in 

any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned,” including under certain circumstances such as when a judge’s 

family member is a party to the proceeding or the judge served as a lawyer in 

the controversy. We initially observe that an employment relationship does not 

fall within any of the specifically enumerated categories of relationships that 

may give rise to the appearance of impartiality. Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 

2.11(A)(1)–(6). Therefore, Hamilton’s argument falls under the general 

provision of CJC Rule 2.11(A). See Jud. Cond. R. 2.11(A), cmt. 1. 

[16] Before we begin an analysis of the facts of this cases under CJC Rule 2.11(A), it 

is important to note that in Mathews v. State, another panel of this court held 

that CJC Rule 2.11(A) does not create a freestanding right of enforcement by a 

private party. 64 N.E. 3d 1250, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. 

Rather, the obligations of this rule are enforced first by the individual judge 

against herself, id. (citing Voss v. State, 856 Ne.E.2d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2006); 

Tyson v. State, 622 N.E.2d 457 (Ind. 1993)), and finally by disciplinary actions of 

our Supreme Court, id. (citing Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 25(VII)). 

Therefore, we do not independently review a trial judge’s recusal decision in 

light of the CJC Rules, id.; nevertheless, in the alternative, or under an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 11 of 44

abundance of caution, the Mathews court and other panels of this court that

have followed the Mathews holding have engaged in that independent review

anyway, see Mathews, 64 N.E.3d at 1256–57; Abney v. State, 79 N.E.3d 942, 951–

54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. not sought; Cheek v. State, 79 N.E.3d 388, 390–92 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. not sought. Although our Supreme Court has yet to 

expressly address these holdings from the Mathews decision and its progeny, it 

has not granted relief based solely on the CJC Rules absent an independent 

procedural vehicle for bringing a recusal claim, Mathews, 64 N.E.3d at 1255. 

Additionally, when reviewing recusal issues, our Supreme Court has used the 

CJC Rules in analyzing the trial judge’s recusal decision, see L.G., 88 N.E.3d at 

1071–73;3 Lee v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1169, 1171–72 (Ind. 2000). 

[17] Even if we were to undertake an independent review of the PCR judge’s 

decision in light of CJC Rule 2.11(A), Hamilton would not prevail. Because 

Hamilton’s argument regarding CJC Rule 2.11(A) is brought within the context 

of a Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) motion, we analyze it under the clearly 

erroneous standard of review set forth above. And, as previously discussed, 

“[w]e begin with the presumption that a trial judge is unbiased.” State ex rel. 

Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E.3d 206, 217 (Ind. 2024) (citing Smith v. State, 

770 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. 2002)). “To overcome that presumption, the party 

3

In L.G., 88 N.E.3d at 1071–72, our Supreme Court even cited to this court’s decisions in Abney and Cheek; 

however, it did not repeat, approve, or offer any guidance regarding the proposition in Mathews that we 

should not consider Judicial Conduct Rules as an independent basis of relief for motions requesting recusal 

or disqualification, see id. at 1071–73.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 12 of 44

seeking disqualification must identify facts reflecting the judge’s actual bias or 

prejudice.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Smith, 770 N.E.2d at 823). 

[18] Our Supreme Court has explained that friendship or professional admiration

between a judge and a party or lawyer in a case, without more, may not be 

enough to require the judge’s recusal. L.G., 88 N.E.3d at 1071. Instead, the 

litigant requesting recusal must show that “an objective person, knowledgeable of 

all the circumstances, would have a rational basis for doubting the judge’s 

impartiality.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bloomington Mag., Inc. v. Kiang, 961 

N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). The Court determined that such a rational 

basis did not exist in L.G. v. S.L., where the trial judge presided over a contested 

adoption in which the adoptive parents were represented by an attorney who 

had served as a reference for and had written a recommendation letter on behalf 

of the trial judge. Id. at 1070, 1072–73. There was nothing “unusual” about the 

attorney’s “enthusiastic and flattering” letter nor did the letter “indicate[] any 

sort of special relationship beyond a professional one.” Id. at 1073. Ultimately, 

the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recuse in 

part because “recusal in this instance would not be based on the circumstances 

of the case, but rather on speculation.” Id. at 1072–73. 

[19] In reaching its conclusion in L.G., the Court also considered Justice Massa’s 

Order in Indiana Gas Co. v. Indiana Finance Authority, 992 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. 

2013). There, Justice Massa was asked to recuse himself from the case because 

he had a personal friendship with one of the parties’ project managers, as 

evidenced in part by the project manager’s “flattering” speech at Justice 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 13 of 44

Massa’s investiture ceremony. Id. at 679–80. Justice Massa declined to recuse 

himself, reasoning in relevant part as follows: 

It would be disabling to this Court if we were required to recuse 

every time a ‘friend’ came before us as a lawyer for a party or 

worked as an employee of, or consultant to, a party. . . . If mere 

friendship with these lawyers were enough to trigger 

disqualification, my colleagues and I would rarely sit as an intact 

court of five. 

Id. at 680.

[20] Just as “friendship” or “professional admiration” alone may not be enough to 

require recusal (although it could be in some instances), neither does 

employment always demand recusal. See L.G., 88 N.E.3d at 1073. The party 

requesting recusal must provide more than mere speculation that a judge cannot 

be unbiased toward a party, witness, or counsel based on the existence of an 

employment relationship between the judge and person in question. See id. at 

1072. 

[21] At the PCR hearing, Bohdan testified that he has been the magistrate for the 

Allen Superior Court for three years and is “employed by the three (3) Criminal 

Division Judges,” including the PCR judge. Tr. Vol. II at 7–9. Aside from the 

Affidavit, this was the only evidence presented to the PCR court regarding the 

employment relationship between Bohdan and the PCR judge. Bohdan’s 

testimony and the Affidavit demonstrate that Bohdan has an employment 

relationship with the PCR judge. However, the record is completely devoid of 

any evidence regarding the “circumstances” of this employment relationship. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 14 of 44

For instance, we know nothing about the role the PCR judge played in 

Bohdan’s hiring, how often they work together, how closely they work together,

whether the PCR judge reviews the magistrate’s work, and how many cases the 

PCR judge assigns to Bohdan.

4

 

[22] Because Hamilton does not provide us any information concerning the 

circumstances surrounding Bohdan and the PCR judge’s employment 

relationship and instead relies solely on its mere existence, we cannot say 

Hamilton has overcome the presumption that the PCR judge is impartial such 

that she clearly erred by denying the Motion based on the requirements of CJC

Rule 2.11(A). 

c. Due Process Clause

[23] The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. This 

provision “may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge has no actual 

bias.” Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287 (2017) (alteration and internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 

825 (1986)). “Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of 

actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be 

4 By no means are we suggesting that this is an exhaustive list of factors, that these factors must be considered 

in a recusal analysis, or that any of these factors are dispositive in such an analysis. Rather, we list these 

factors as examples of information that we believe might have proven helpful to evaluate whether an 

objective person would have a rational basis for doubting the PCR judge’s impartiality in this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 15 of 44

constitutionally tolerable.’” Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 

(1975)) (citing Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016)). In other words, 

the court must determine “whether, considering all the circumstances alleged, 

the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Id.

[24] The United States Supreme Court has explained that one circumstance in 

which the risk of bias is constitutionally intolerable is “when the same person 

serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case.” Williams, 579 U.S. at 8. In 

Williams v. Pennsylvania, for example, the prosecutor who sought the death 

penalty against Williams later became a chief justice and adjudicated William’s 

petition to overturn his death sentence. Id. The Court held that the chief 

justice’s failure to recuse himself from Williams’s case created an 

unconstitutional risk of bias because his “authorization to seek the death 

penalty against Williams amounts to significant, personal involvement in a 

critical trial decision.” Id. at 11. 

[25] Additionally, in Bracy v. Gramley, Bracy filed a habeas petition because the 

judge who oversaw his murder case was later convicted of accepting bribes from 

criminal defendants. 520 U.S. 899, 900–02 (1997). Bracy argued that a judge 

who accepts bribes to rule in favor of some defendants would seek to disguise 

that favorable treatment by ruling against defendants who did not bribe him, 

and he sought discovery to support this claim. Id. at 902–903. The United 

States Supreme Court determined Bracy was entitled to discovery “despite the 

‘speculative’ nature of that theory . . . because he had also alleged specific facts

suggesting that the judge may have colluded with defense counsel to rush the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 16 of 44

petitioner’s case to trial.” Rippo, 580 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added) (citing 

Bracy, 520 U.S. at 905–09). 

[26] Here, we are not faced with a scenario similar to those in Williams and Bracy. 

Instead, the only facts alleged here are that an employment relationship existed 

between Bohdan and the PCR judge for approximately three years prior to the 

PCR hearing. Although Hamilton is not required to point to facts suggesting 

the PCR judge was actually biased against him to demonstrate an 

unconstitutional risk of bias exists, see Rippo, 580 U.S. at 287, simply pointing to 

the existence of an employment relationship between a witness and a judge is 

not enough to give rise to a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias. Therefore, 

the PCR judge’s denial of the Motion does not violate the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

2. Denial of the PCR Petition

[27] Hamilton contends that the PCR court erred when it denied his PCR petition. 

As our Supreme Court has explained:

Post-conviction actions are civil proceedings, meaning the 

petitioner (the prior criminal defendant) must prove his claims by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 

1(5); Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013). If he 

fails to meet this burden and receives a denial of post-conviction 

relief, then he proceeds from a negative judgment and on appeal 

must prove “that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and 

unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction 

court’s decision.” Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240 (quoting BenYisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)). When 

reviewing the court’s order denying relief, we will “not defer to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 17 of 44

the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions,” and the “findings 

and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear 

error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 

677, 682 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 

106 (Ind. 2000)).

Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019).

[28] In support of his position that the PCR court’s denial of his petition was clearly 

erroneous, Hamilton raises three main issues for our review: (a) whether the 

PCR court clearly erred when it found Hamilton did not establish that Bohdan 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel; (b) whether the PCR court clearly 

erred when it found Hamilton did not establish that Allen provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel; and (c) whether the PCR court clearly erred when it 

found that Hamilton is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on newly 

discovered evidence.

a. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

[29] To evaluate a defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “we apply the 

well-established, two-part Strickland test.”5 Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 

1280 (Ind. 2019) (citing Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)). 

Under that test, “the defendant must prove: (1) counsel rendered deficient 

performance, meaning counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 

5

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 18 of 44

of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., but for counsel’s errors the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Ward v. State, 

969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012)). Failure to satisfy either of the two prongs will 

cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). 

[30] “There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment. Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and 

tactics and these decisions are entitled to deferential review.” Weisheit v. State, 

109 N.E.3d 978, 983 (Ind. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (citing Stevens v. 

State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746–47 (Ind. 2002)). Moreover, “isolated mistakes, poor 

strategy, inexperience and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render 

representation ineffective.” Id. at 984 (citing Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 747). We 

also consider the “legal precedent available to counsel at the time of his 

representation of the accused, and counsel will not be deemed ineffective for 

not anticipating or initiating changes in the law.” Lee v. State, 91 N.E.3d 978, 

987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Sweeney v. State, 886 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008), trans. denied) (citing Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 690 (Ind. 

2005)), trans. denied.

[31] Hamilton alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for (i) failing to object to a jury 

instruction and (ii) failing to conduct a mitigation investigation before 

sentencing. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 19 of 44

i. Failure to Object to a Jury Instruction 

[32] Hamilton first claims Bohdan was ineffective because he did not make certain 

objections to the following final jury instruction (the “Instruction”): 

In Count I, Murder, the formation of the intention to kill may be 

as instantaneous as successive thoughts. 

The intent to kill can be found from the acts, declaration and 

conduct of the Defendant at or just immediately before the 

commission of the offense and/or from the nature of the weapon 

used. 

2017 Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 61–62.6 Hamilton’s trial counsel objected to 

the Instruction as follows: 

MR. BOHDAN: I would object to State’s proposed six as 

adequately covered by the instructions the Court has already 

indicated an intention to give. 

THE COURT: I don’t think it is covered by the Court’s 

anywhere. I’ll give six over objection . . . .

2017 Tr. Vol. II at 156–57. 

[33] Hamilton argues that Bohdan should have objected to the first half of the 

Instruction “on the grounds that the language was erroneously taken from a 

6

In the Argument section of his brief, Hamilton did not provide Bohdan’s verbatim objection to this jury 

instruction as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(e). However, because Hamilton’s noncompliance 

with Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(e) does not substantially impede our review of this claim, we choose to address 

the merits thereof. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 20 of 44

Court of Appeals’ sufficiency review, that it unfairly highlighted the State’s 

theory of the case, invaded the province of the jury, and had the potential to 

mislead and confuse the jury.” Appellant’s Br. at 50. The PCR court 

concluded that Bohdan’s performance was not deficient on these grounds 

because “existing authority would not have supported any of the proposed 

additional grounds for objection . . . , but would (at most) have been potentially 

useful in arguing for an extension of existing general rules to cover that 

instruction.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 168. 

[34] When a petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 

object at trial, the petitioner “must prove that the trial court would have 

sustained the objection” to show prejudice under the second prong of the 

Strickland test. Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 2013) (citing Lowery 

v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1042 (Ind. 1994)). We recognize that our Supreme 

Court has warned against using language from appellate cases for jury 

instructions: “The mere fact that certain language or expression [is] used in the 

opinions of this Court to reach its final conclusion does not make it proper 

language for instructions to a jury.” Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 

2003) (quoting Drollinger v, State, 274 Ind. 5, 25, 408 N.E.2d 1228, 1241 (1980)). 

A jury instruction that uses language from an appellate case is not improper so 

long as it is a correct statement of the law and does not mislead the jury. Keller 

v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1205, 1208 (Ind. 2016). 

[35] Here, the first half of the Instruction was a correct statement of the law. In 

Castellanos v. State, our Supreme Court reiterated a long-standing concept that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 21 of 44

“the formation of the intention to kill and the killing may be as instantaneous as 

successive thoughts.” 477 N.E.2d 279, 281 (Ind. 1985) (citing Brewer v. State, 

253 Ind. 154, 166, 252 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1969)). Although the Castellanos Court 

made this statement in the context of a now repealed murder statute—Indiana 

Code section 35-13-4-1 (repealed 1976)—that required the State to prove 

premeditation, there is no indication that the statement itself is no longer good 

law. To the extent this statement from the Castellanos Court may not be good 

law, Bohdan cannot “be deemed ineffective for not anticipating or initiating 

changes in the law.” Lee, 91 N.E.3d at 987 (quoting Sweeney, 886 N.E.2d at 8) 

(citing Smylie, 823 N.E.2d at 690). Furthermore, Hamilton has not pointed us 

to a single Indiana decision that has found the Instruction or anything similar to 

it to be error. 

[36] Likewise, in Barany v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that language 

similar to the second half of the Instruction was a correct statement of law 

because “[w]e have repeatedly held that the intent to kill may be inferred from 

the use of a deadly weapon; the nature, duration, or brutality of the attack; and 

the circumstances surrounding the crime.” 658 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ind. 1995) 

(citing Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. 1992)). In fact, we recently held 

in Birk v. State that a jury instruction substantially similar to the second half of 

the Instruction was a correct statement of the law. 215 N.E.3d 1090, 1097–98 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Barany, 658 N.E.2d at 65), trans. not sought. 

[37] An instruction misleads the jury when it “unnecessarily emphasize[s] one 

particular evidentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case.” Ludy, 784 N.E.2d at 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 22 of 44

461 (citing Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)). For instance, in 

Ludy v. State, the trial court gave the following jury instruction: “A conviction 

may be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim if 

such testimony establishes each element of any crime charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” 784 N.E.2d at 460. The Indiana Supreme Court 

determined that this instruction was misleading to the jury because it “unfairly 

focuse[d] the jury’s attention on and highlight[ed] a single witness’s testimony”; 

expressly directed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty without 

considering all the evidence, which is a “concept used in appellate review that is 

irrelevant to a jury’s function as fact-finder”; and “us[ed] the technical term 

‘uncorroborated.’” Id. at 461–62. Despite the instruction in Ludy being 

erroneous, the error did not require reversal because it “did not affect the 

defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. at 463.

[38] Here, by contrast, the Instruction focused on the murder charge, but it did not 

emphasize particular evidence; it did not invite the jury to consider less than all 

the evidence; and it did not use technical terms that may confuse a jury. We 

therefore cannot say that the Instruction was misleading. Because the 

Instruction was a correct statement of the law and did not mislead the jury, the 

fact that some of its language came from an appellate case did not render it 

improper. See Keller, 47 N.E.3d at 1208. As such, we cannot say that the trial 

court would have sustained Hamilton’s proffered objections to the Instruction, 

so the PCR court did not clearly err in finding that Hamilton did not establish 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 23 of 44

Bohdan provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the 

Instruction on Hamilton’s proffered grounds. 

ii. Failure to Conduct a Mitigation Investigation

[39] Hamilton next challenges the efficacy of Bohdan’s assistance during the 

sentencing phase of trial. Specifically, Hamilton argues that Bohdan provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate potential mitigating 

factors for sentencing, namely Hamilton’s mental health issues, including 

potential bipolar disorder, and traumatic experiences. On this issue, the PCR 

court concluded only that Hamilton was not prejudiced by Bohdan’s failure to 

present evidence of Hamilton’s potential bipolar disorder. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II at 172–73. The PCR court did not address whether Bohdan provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to conduct a mitigation investigation, 

see id., so we review this issue de novo, Ellis v. State, 67 N.E.3d 643, 646 (Ind. 

2017) (citing Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1170 (Ind. 2001)).

[40] Hamilton alleged in his amended PCR petition that a reasonable mitigation 

investigation would have revealed that (1) “Hamilton had a family history of 

bipolar disorder and severe substance abuse,” and (2) Hamilton “experienced 

two traumatic events as a teenager”—“he had shot himself in the head[,] for 

which he received no follow-up mental health treatment,” and “on a separate 

occasion, he witnessed his friend shoot himself.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 

30. Hamilton also asserted in his amended PCR petition that a psychological 

evaluation would have revealed that Hamilton “did suffer from the onset of 

significant mental illness.” Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 24 of 44

[41] Hamilton’s presentence investigation report revealed that he had an eleventhgrade education, was in good physical health, and had not been diagnosed with 

any mental illnesses. Hamilton reported that he was raised by his parents, did 

not suffer any forms of abuse as a child, had a good childhood, and maintained 

good relationships with his family. Hamilton became a father at 14 years old. 

Also according to the presentence investigation report, Hamilton had a history 

of substance abuse. Since he was 15 years old, Hamilton had used marijuana 

daily and consumed alcohol once every other month. Hamilton also “used 

powder cocaine once at age 15, once at 16, and three (3) times at age 17.” Ex. 

Vol. I at 11. Hamilton denied using any other illegal substances. At age 14, 

Hamilton had an informal juvenile adjustment for battery resulting in bodily 

injury. At age 17, Hamilton had an informal juvenile adjustment for possession 

of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana. Hamilton participated 

in substance abuse treatment as part of both informal adjustments. 

[42] Hamilton’s sister Cara Haddix testified at the PCR hearing that they had a 

significant family history of substance abuse and mental illness. Two of their 

paternal aunts died of overdoses and a third paternal aunt was hospitalized and 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder after a suicide attempt. One of Hamilton’s 

sisters struggles with depression and social anxiety, and their paternal 

grandmother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Haddix described their 

father as being emotionally distant, self-isolating, an alcoholic, subject to mood 

swings, and rarely in a positive mood. Haddix believed their father’s behavior 

was indicative of bipolar disorder but noted that he did not have a diagnosis. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 25 of 44

She also stated that their father was verbally abusive, especially to Hamilton. 

Haddix further testified that Hamilton’s behavior began to resemble their 

father’s as he became a teenager; she noted that he had mood swings, isolated 

himself, became obsessive, and abused substances. According to Haddix, 

Hamilton “disengaged” from their family when he used drugs. Tr. Vol. II at 

68. 

[43] Ashley Kraus, a friend of Hamilton, testified at the PCR hearing that when 

Hamilton was 16 years old, he shot himself in the head in a single-person game 

of Russian Roulette. Kraus testified that she watched Hamilton spin the 

chamber of the revolver, point it at his head, and pull the trigger. The bullet 

grazed Hamilton’s head. He was taken to the hospital via ambulance. Leading 

up to the Russian Roulette incident, Haddix observed that Hamilton “was 

much heavier into the drugs. He was more or less just blank. He didn’t really 

care if he lived or died. He was a lot more isolated. The mood swings were so 

much heavier. He was just overall, it felt, in my opinion, unstable.” Tr. Vol. II

at 69. Haddix testified that in the wake of the Russian Roulette incident , 

Hamilton’s parents did not seek any mental health help for him. 

[44] Hamilton’s substance abuse counseling records reveal that Hamilton had 

“disturbing dreams,” Ex. Vol. I at 23; had trouble sleeping; had anxiety, which 

manifested as agitation and anger; had previously blacked out while angry; 

experienced panic attacks; had racing thoughts; witnessed a friend shoot 

himself and was accused by law enforcement of being the shooter; abused 

substances; had previously been expelled from school; had a family history of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 26 of 44

anxiety and depression; and had a family history of drug use leading to health 

problems.

[45] Assuming for the sake of argument that Bohdan was deficient as Hamilton 

alleges here, Hamilton has not demonstrated that Bohdan’s failure to conduct a 

reasonable mitigation investigation prejudiced Hamilton. To determine 

“whether a defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s failure at sentencing to present 

mitigating evidence,” courts must determine “what effect the totality of the 

omitted mitigation evidence would have had on the sentence.” McCarty v. State, 

802 N.E.2d at 968–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 

697, 702 (Ind. 2000)). Because a trial court’s sentencing decision is generally 

given great deference, Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (quoting 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007),

decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)), reh’g denied (Aug. 17, 

2023), we are “hard pressed to conclude there is a reasonable probability that 

the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it been presented with 

additional mitigating evidence that trial counsel should have brought to light,” 

McCarty, 802 N.E.2d at 968. 

[46] Hamilton argues that if Bohdan had presented evidence concerning his 

“traumatic experiences” and family history of mental illness and substance 

abuse, the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence. We cannot agree. 

Hamilton’s “traumatic experiences” actually demonstrate that Hamilton had a 

history of reckless and dangerous behavior. By playing with and possessing 

firearms, Hamilton placed himself in dangerous situations, and associated with 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 27 of 44

others who engaged in harmful behaviors. Yet Hamilton continued to engage 

in reckless and dangerous situations, as evidenced by his decisions to participate 

in robbing Quintana and to ultimately shoot Quintana. See Hamilton, No. 02-

A03-1704-CR-932, slip op. at ¶¶ 3–5. Moreover, the evidence of Hamilton’s 

family history of mental illness and substance abuse would have only served to 

potentially impeach Hamilton’s presentence investigation report in which he 

reported that he had not been diagnosed with any mental illnesses, did not 

suffer any forms of abuse as a child, had a good childhood, and maintained 

good relationships with his family. The same is true of the substance abuse 

counseling records and Haddix’s testimony. We do not believe the trial court 

would have sentenced Hamilton any differently on these facts if the trial court 

had learned that Hamilton’s family members had suffered from either alcohol

or drug abuse, or mental illnesses. 

[47] We also do not believe the trial court would have determined that Hamilton’s 

struggles with anxiety, racing thoughts, and insomnia had much, if any, 

mitigating value. To determine the weight a defendant’s mental illness should 

be given at sentencing, the court considers several factors, including “(1) the 

extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior due to the 

disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration 

of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or 

impairment and the commission of the crime.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 

874 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605, 615 (Ind. 2007)). 

There is no evidence in the record that Hamilton’s anxiety, racing thoughts, or 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 28 of 44

insomnia impaired his ability to control his behavior, limited his functioning, or 

was in any way linked to the offense. 

[48] Hamilton’s alleged omitted mitigation evidence has weak mitigating value at 

best and at worst actually has aggravating value. Additionally, Bohdan did 

present several mitigating circumstances for the court to consider and balance 

against the aggravating circumstances. On this record, we cannot say that the 

trial court would have imposed a mitigated sentence but for Bohdan’s alleged

failure to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation and resulting failure to 

present evidence of Hamilton’s “traumatic experiences” and family history of 

mental illness and substance abuse. Therefore, the trial court did not err when 

it found Hamilton did not prove Bohdan provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

b. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

[49] We also use the Strickland test to evaluate Hamilton’s claim that he received 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Harris v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1182, 

1186 (Ind. 2007) (citing Taylor v. State, 717 N.E.2d 90, 94 (Ind. 1999)). 

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fall into three categories: (1) 

denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present 

issues well. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 724 (Ind. 2013). Hamilton 

specifically claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to 

present two issues on appeal: (i) whether the trial court used improper 

aggravating factors in sentencing Hamilton and (ii) whether Hamilton’s 

sentence was inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 29 of 44

[50] “To show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal, the 

petitioner must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance, and 

judicial scrutiny is highly deferential.” Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 

(Ind. 2006) (citing Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 261). To evaluate the 

performance prong when appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on appeal, 

we apply the following test: (1) whether the unraised issue is significant and 

obvious from the face of the record, and (2) whether the unraised issue is 

“clearly stronger” than the raised issues. Id. (citing Timberlake v. State, 753 

N.E.2d 591, 605–06 (Ind. 2001)). To determine if the defendant was 

prejudiced, we examine whether “the issues which . . . appellate counsel failed 

to raise, would have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for 

a new trial.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 

188, 194 (Ind. 1997)). “Ineffective assistance of counsel is very rarely found in 

cases where a defendant asserts that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on 

direct appeal” because “the decision of what issues to raise is one of the most 

important strategic decisions to be made by appellate counsel.” Id. at 1196 

(citing Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 193).

[51] We initially observe that on appeal, Allen did not challenge Hamilton’s 

sentence directly; rather, Allen focused on Double Jeopardy and bifurcation 

issues. Hamilton, No. 02A03-1704-CR-932, slip op. at ¶ 1. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 30 of 44

i. Failure to Appeal the Trial Court’s Alleged Use of 

Improper Aggravator 

[52] Hamilton first contends that Allen should have challenged his sentence based 

on the trial court’s use of Hamilton’s informal juvenile adjustments as an 

aggravating factor. Hamilton does not argue that Allen should have challenged 

his sentence based on the trial court’s use of the nature and circumstances of 

Hamilton’s offense as the only other aggravating factor. 

[53] It is “completely appropriate for the trial court to consider [a defendant’s] 

criminal history as an aggravating factor.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 

111–12 (Ind. 2016). Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2) specifically states 

that when imposing a sentence, the court may consider as an aggravating 

circumstance the defendant’s “history of criminal or delinquent behavior.” The 

weight of the criminal history may vary “based on the gravity, nature[,] and 

number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense,” id. at 112

(quoting Williams v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind. 2005)), but 

consideration of such criminal history is not an abuse of discretion, id. 

Accordingly, it was not erroneous for the trial court here to consider Hamilton’s 

informal juvenile adjustments as an aggravating factor. 

[54] In addition, on direct appeal, we would have reviewed the trial court’s 

sentencing decision for only an abuse of discretion. See Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 

269 (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490). Even if Allen had challenged only 

the trial court’s use of Hamilton’s informal juvenile adjustments as an 

aggravating factor (as Hamilton argues Allen should have), we would not have 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 31 of 44

remanded for resentencing so long as we could have said “with confidence the 

trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the 

purportedly erroneous aggravators,” Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 269 (citing McDonald 

v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. 2007)). 

[55] Hamilton asserts that the trial court’s statement regarding the nature and 

circumstances of the offenses is insufficient to support his sentence. At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it found “the nature and 

circumstances of the crimes to be aggravators, again all as reflected in the 

Affidavit for Probable Cause and in the information presented to the jury and as 

argued by the State of Indiana.” Sent. Tr. Vol. I at 15. Hamilton argues that 

this statement is similar to the inadequate statement in Wooley v. State, 716 

N.E.2d 919, 929–30 (Ind. 1999).7 We disagree. 

[56] In Wooley, the trial court found as an aggravating factoring that “the defendant 

is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by 

commitment of defendant to a penal facility.” 716 N.E.2d at 929–930 (citing 

I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(3)). The trial court explained that “the defendant has not 

voluntarily attempted any rehabilitative treatment such as counseling while 

incarcerated.” Id. at 930. Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s 

7 We observe that Wooley was decided under the now-repealed presumptive sentencing scheme. However, 

the discussion in Wooley regarding the need for trial courts to sufficiently explain aggravating factors still 

applies. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 32 of 44

“statement is insufficient to support the imposition of an aggravated sentence” 

because 

[e]very executed sentence entails incarceration. The question is 

whether extended incarceration is appropriate. There is no 

evidence to support the conclusion that Wooley is in need of 

treatment beyond the presumptive term. . . . The trial court did 

not provide a specific or individualized statement of reason why 

Wooley was in need of time in a penal institution in excess of the 

presumptive sentence.

Id. 

[57] Here, however, the trial court expressly referenced the Affidavit of Probable 

cause, informations, and the State’s sentencing argument. According to those 

documents, Hamilton and Yancey planned to rob Quintana because Quintana 

allegedly shorted Yancey $10-worth of marijuana in a prior drug deal. When 

Quintana attempted to foil their robbery attempt, Hamilton shot Quintana in 

the back. Hamilton and Yancey then fled the scene and did not attempt to get 

help for Quintana. Again, the trial court did not impose an aggravated 

sentence; instead, the trial court imposed only an advisory sentence on the first 

two counts and a lower mid-range sentence for the enhancement due to the use 

of a firearm.

[58] Hamilton also asserts that the trial court should not have considered his 

informal juvenile adjustments to be aggravating because they were not relevant 

to his convictions for murder and robbery or to the firearm enhancement. 

Hamilton primarily relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. State to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 33 of 44

support this argument, but that case is inapposite on this particular issue 

because it addresses only revision of the defendant’s sentence under Appellate 

Rule 7(B); it does not address whether the defendant’s “lengthy history of 

juvenile adjustments” was an improper aggravating factor. Brown v. State, 10 

N.E3d 1, 5–6 (Ind. 2014). Further, to the extent Hamilton’s argument is an 

invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, we decline as that is something we 

could not have done on direct appeal. See McElfresh, 51 N.E.3d at 108.

[59] We believe that the trial court’s sentencing statement is sufficient and that 

Hamilton has not demonstrated that the trial court would have imposed a lesser

sentence if it had not considered Hamilton’s informal juvenile adjustments. 

Consequently, even if Allen had challenged the trial court’s use of Hamilton’s 

informal juvenile adjustments as an aggravating factor, it was not “clearly more 

likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.” Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 

1195. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in 

finding that Hamilton did not establish Allen provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to raise this issue on appeal.

ii. Failure to Appeal Hamilton’s Sentence Pursuant to 

Appellate Rule 7(B)

[60] Hamilton next argues that Allen should have challenged his sentence under 

Appellate Rule 7(B). The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently 

review and revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 

158, 159 (Ind. 2019) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; McCain v. State, 88 

N.E.3d 1066, 1067 (Ind. 2018)). That authority is implemented through 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 34 of 44

Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is 

“inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Faith, 131 N.E.3d at 159 (quoting App. R. 7(B)).

[61] Our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers,” Faith, 131 

N.E.3d at 159–60 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008)), and we reserve that authority for exceptional cases, id. at 160 (citing 

Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017), reh’g denied). When gauging 

inappropriateness under Appellate Rule 7(B), we “focus on the forest—the 

aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number 

of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Brown, 10 

N.E.3d at 8 (citing Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225). Generally, a trial court’s 

sentencing decision prevails unless it is “overcome by compelling evidence 

portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense . . . and the defendant’s 

character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 111–12 (Ind. 2015). In 

conducting this analysis, “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators 

found by the trial court.” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4. Importantly for our purposes 

here, our Supreme Court “has not been hesitant to reduce maximum sentences 

for juveniles convicted of murder.” Id. at 7. 

[62] When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. 

Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, the trial 

court sentenced Hamilton on his convictions for (1) murder, (2) robbery as a 

Level 3 felony, and (3) an enhancement for use of a firearm. First, a “person 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 35 of 44

who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five 

(45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” 

I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a) (emphasis added). Second, a “person who commits a Level 

3 felony . . . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between three (3) and 

sixteen (16) years, with the advisory sentence being nine (9) years.” Id. § 35-50-2-5(b) 

(emphasis added). Finally, 

[i]f the jury . . . finds that the state has proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used 

a firearm in the commission of the offense . . . , the court may 

sentence the person to an additional fixed term of imprisonment 

of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years.

Id. § 35-50-2-11(g). 

[63] The trial court sentenced Hamilton to an advisory sentence for both 

convictions. (Sent. Tr. Vol. I at 15.) The trial court enhanced Hamilton’s 

sentence by 10 years for his use of a firearm. (Id.) The trial court ordered the 

sentences to be served consecutively and executed at the Department of 

Correction, resulting in a total sentence of 74 years at the Department of 

Correction. (Id.) Hamilton argues that his aggregate sentence is an outlier 

when compared to other juveniles convicted of murder who have had their 

sentences reduced by the Indiana Supreme Court. 

[64] For instance, in Brown v. State, 16-year-old Brown was convicted of two counts 

of murder and one count of robbery, and the trial court imposed the maximum 

sentence of 65 years for both murder counts and the maximum sentence of 20 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 36 of 44

years for the robbery count, all to be served consecutively, for a total aggregate 

sentence of 150 years. 10 N.E.3d at 3. Our Supreme Court reduced this 

sentence to “an enhanced sentence” of 60 years for both murder counts, to be 

served concurrently, and “an enhanced sentence” of 20 years for robbery to be 

served consecutively, for a total aggregate sentence of 80 years imprisonment. 

10 N.E.3d at 8. Likewise, in Fuller v. State, concerning the same robbery and 

murders as in Brown, our Supreme Court reduced 15-year-old Fuller’s 150-year 

aggregate sentence to a total aggregate sentence of 85 years imprisonment. 9 

N.E.3d 653, 658–59 (Ind. 2014). Our Supreme Court reduced Brown’s and 

Fuller’s sentences in part because their 150-year sentences “forsw[ore] 

altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8 (quoting Miller, 567 

U.S. 472); Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 658 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. 472). 

[65] Hamilton also points to several cases our Supreme Court decided in the 1990s. 

First, in Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme Court reduced 

14-year-old Carter’s 60-year sentence to 50 years for “the brutal murder of a 

seven-year-old girl.” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 7 (citing Carter, 711 N.E.2d at 836–

37). Likewise, in Walton v. State, our Supreme Court reduced 16-year-old 

Walton’s 120-year sentence to 80 years for brutally beating his adoptive parents 

to death while they slept, to which he pled guilty but mentally ill. 650 N.E.2d 

1134, 1135, 1137 (Ind. 1995). In Widener v. State, our Supreme Court reduced 

17-year-old Widener’s 70-year sentence to 50 years for conspiracy to commit 

robbery and felony murder, to which he pled guilty. 659 N.E.2d 529, 530–31, 

534 (Ind. 1995). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 37 of 44

[66] The defendants in Brown, Fuller, Carter, Walton, and Widener did not have their 

sentences enhanced for using a firearm during the commission of their offenses. 

Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 3; Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 656; Carter, 711 N.E.2d at 836–37; 

Walton, 650 N.E.2d at 1135; Widener, 659 N.E.2d at 530. Further, they all 

received maximum aggregate sentences. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 3; Fuller, 9 

N.E.3d at 656; Carter, 711 N.E.2d at 836–37; Walton, 650 N.E.2d at 1135; 

Widener, 659 N.E.2d at 530. Here, by contrast, Hamilton was found to have 

used a firearm during the offense, which resulted in an enhanced sentence,

8 and 

he did not receive a maximum sentence for any of his offenses; rather, he 

received only the advisory sentences for his murder and robbery convictions, 

and he received a lower-midrange sentence for the firearm enhancement. 

[67] Hamilton next contends that his sentence is an outlier based on credit time. 

“[E]valuation of a defendant’s sentence may include consideration of the 

defendant’s credit time status because this penal consequence was within the 

contemplation of the trial court when it was determining the defendant’s 

sentence.” Sharp v. State, 970 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. 2012). Hamilton primarily 

points to the fact that when Brown and Fuller were originally sentenced, they 

8 Hamilton asserts, without support, that the State did not pursue use of a firearm enhancements for Brown 

and Fuller despite their eligibility therefor. Appellant’s Br. at 33; see App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (“Each contention 

must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal 

relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.”). Prosecutors have broad discretionary power to choose the persons 

whom they prosecute, Cain v. State, 955 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ind. 2011) (citing Corcoran v. State, 739 N.E.2d 649 

(Ind. 2000)), and the charges to bring against those persons, Artigas v. State, 122 N.E.3d 1003, 1006 n.5 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2019) (citing Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2001)). We do not substitute our 

discretion for that of the prosecuting attorney on such matters. Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 683 (Ind. 

1996).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 38 of 44

were entitled to Class I credit time, which is “one (1) day of credit time for each 

day the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or 

sentencing.” I.C. § 35-50-6-3(b) (2012); see id. § 35-50-6-4(a) (2012); see also id. § 

35-50-6-3(c). Thus, after deducting earned good time credit, Brown will 

actually serve approximately 40 years and Fuller will actually serve 

approximately 42.5 years. See Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8; Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 658–

59; I.C. §§ 35-50-6-3(b), -4(a) (2012). 

[68] However, in 2014, after Brown and Fuller were sentenced but before Hamilton 

committed the instant offense, the Indiana General Assembly revised the 

criminal code to increase the actual time served for the most serious offenses. 

Compare I.C. § 35-50-6-3, with I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1. With Class B credit time, 

which is one day of credit time for every three days served, I.C. § 35-50-6-

3.1(b), Hamilton will actually serve approximately 55 years.9 Although 

Hamilton received a total aggregate sentence that is less than Brown’s and 

Fuller’s total aggregate sentences, Hamilton’s actual sentence is greater than 

Brown’s and Fuller’s actual sentences. Our legislature intended such a result 

when it modified Indiana’s credit time scheme. Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400 

(Ind. 2014) (quoting Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. 2001)) (“The best 

evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself . . . .”); compare 

9 Hamilton may actually serve less than 55 years if he earns educational credit pursuant to Indiana Code 

section 35-50-6-3.3. In fact, Dr. Burnett testified that Hamilton has earned his G.E.D. and participated in 

reformative programs since being incarcerated, which will likely result in Hamilton earning educational 

credit, I.C. § 35-50-6-3.3(a)(3)(A), (b)(3)(D), (d)(1), (d)(8), thereby reducing the amount of time he actually 

serves.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 39 of 44

I.C. § 35-50-6-3, with I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1. Due to Hamilton’s additional 

enhancement for use of a firearm and the change in credit time, Hamilton’s 

comparison of his actual sentence to that of Brown’s and Fuller’s is unavailing. 

[69] Based on the record available to Allen for Hamilton’s direct appeal, Hamilton 

did not show that it was significant and obvious from the face of that record 

that his advisory sentence is an outlier among the sentences of other juveniles 

convicted of murder, robbery, or both, especially in light of his use of a firearm 

enhancement. Similarly, based on the record available to Allen for Hamilton’s 

direct appeal, Hamilton did not show that asking an appellate court to revise his

advisory sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) was “clearly more likely to 

result in reversal or an order for a new trial.” Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1195. As 

such, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Hamilton 

failed to establish that Allen provided ineffective assistance of counsel on this 

ground. 

c. Newly Discovered Evidence

[70] Hamilton contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the basis 

that there is newly discovered evidence concerning his mental health. PostConviction Rule 1(1)(a)(4) states in relevant part that a “person who has been 

convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state” may file a PCR 

petition based on the alleged existence “of material facts, not previously 

presented and heard, that requires vacation of the . . . sentence in the interest of 

justice.” New evidence mandates a new sentencing hearing only when the 

petitioner demonstrates the following: 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 40 of 44

(1) the evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2) it is 

material and relevant; (3) it is not cumulative; (4) it is not merely 

impeaching; (5) it is not privileged or incompetent; (6) due 

diligence was used to discover it in time for trial; (7) the evidence 

is worthy of credit; (8) it can be produced upon a retrial of the 

case; and (9) it will probably produce a different result at retrial. 

Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Taylor v. State, 840 

N.E.2d 324, 329–30 (Ind. 2006)). We analyze “these nine factors with care, as 

the basis for newly discovered evidence should be received with great caution 

and the alleged new evidence carefully scrutinized.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 840 

N.E.2d at 330). 

[71] Hamilton specifically contends that his bipolar disorder diagnosis “is newly 

discovered evidence that should be considered when fashioning a sentence.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 47. Assuming for the sake of argument that Hamilton can 

establish that evidence of his bipolar disorder diagnosis can satisfy the first eight 

factors described above, he has not established that such evidence can satisfy 

the ninth factor. Whereas Dr. Burnett believed within a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty that Hamilton was suffering from bipolar disorder at the time 

of the offense, as discussed above, Dr. Burnett also testified that Hamilton’s 

behavior leading up to the robbery and murder “could be construed to both a 

bipolar episode and/or to youthfulness and/or to substance abuse and/or to 

trauma-related effects.” Tr. Vol. II at 112. Furthermore, Dr. Burnett stated in 

his report that Hamilton’s scores on the MMPI-2 and TSI-2 indicated he was 

exaggerating his symptoms. Because of the minimal value of Dr. Burnett’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 41 of 44

testimony, evidence of this diagnosis is unlikely to produce a different result at 

resentencing. Accordingly, the PCR court did not clearly err in finding that 

evidence of Hamilton’s bipolar disorder diagnosis was not newly discovered 

warranting a new sentencing hearing. 

Conclusion 

[72] In sum, the PCR court did not err by denying the Motion and did not err by

denying Hamilton’s PCR claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and newly discovered evidence. We 

therefore affirm the PCR court’s decisions on all issues raised. 

[73] Affirmed.

Crone, J., concurs in part and concurs in result in part with separate opinion.

Brown, J., dissents with separate opinion.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stacy R. Uliana 

Bargersville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita 

Indiana Attorney General 

Evan Matthew Comer 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 42 of 44

Crone, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in result in part.

[74] I fully concur in the lead opinion’s resolution of issue 2. Regarding issue 1,

however, I believe that Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) controls here and thus it is

inappropriate to undertake an independent review of the PCR judge’s decision

to deny Hamilton’s motion for change of judge under CJC Rule 2.11(A). As the

Mathews court persuasively reasoned with respect to former Indiana Criminal

Rule 12(B),

1 allowing CJC Rule 2.11(A) to serve as “a freestanding mechanism

for relief” would “effectively nullify” Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) and “usurp

the exclusive supervisory authority of our supreme court over judicial conduct.”

64 N.E.3d at 1254, 1255. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) and CJC Rule 2.11(A)

might encompass some of the same considerations regarding judicial bias, but

the standards for evaluating bias under those rules are different, and we should

refrain from stepping into the shoes of our supreme court. Accordingly, I

concur only in result as to issue 1.

1

Former Criminal Rule 12(B) is substantially similar to Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). Effective January 1, 

2024, Criminal Rule 12(B) was amended and renumbered as Criminal Rule 2.4(B).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 43 of 44

Brown, Judge, dissenting.

[75] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that the post-conviction court

did not err in denying Hamilton’s motion for change of judge. “The public

entrusts the judiciary ‘to provide a tribunal as superior to influence as possible,

in which [a] claim might be decided.’” Matter of Guardianship of Garrard, 624

N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6

Wheat.) 264, 382, (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)). “In order to have faith that our

judicial system operates providently, the public must have confidence in the

procedure by which our courts render decisions.” Id. See also Ind. Code of

Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any

proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality[] might reasonably be questioned .

. . .”); Ind. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 cmt. 8(1) (“Because of the

important nature of maintaining confidence in the judiciary, a judge should,

even over the agreement of the parties, disqualify himself/herself in any

situation when reasonable minds with knowledge of all the relevant

circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry would conclude that the

judge’s integrity, impartiality, or independence to serve as a judge is

impaired.”).

[76] Hamilton alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel from

Bohdan based upon multiple allegations. In his affidavit attached to his

Verified Motion for Change of Judge, Hamilton asserted that he was charged

with multiple offenses, including murder, in cause number 02D06-1608-MR-5,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-15 | April 12, 2024 Page 44 of 44

Bohdan represented him at trial, and he believed Bohdan was an Allen County 

magistrate working for Judge Gull who presided over his case and sentencing.

[77] At the December 10, 2021 post-conviction hearing at which Judge Gull

presided, Bohdan testified that he was employed as a magistrate in the Allen

Superior Court, which was the same court that was holding the post-conviction

hearing. He also indicated Judge Gull employed him.

[78] In light of Bohdan’s representation of Hamilton at trial, the multiple allegations

of ineffective assistance asserted against Bohdan, and the relationship between

Bohdan as a current magistrate employed by the post-conviction judge, I

conclude that the facts recited in the affidavit support a rational inference of

bias or prejudice. While I express no opinion on the issues of ineffective

assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, I note that these claims as argued

by Hamilton appear to present close determinations, and I would find that the

appearance of impropriety requires reversal.

[79] For the foregoing reasons, I would find the post-conviction court erred in

denying Hamilton’s motion for change of judge and would reverse and remand

for the issues to be decided by a new judge.