2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

12-8-2004 

# I n Re: W a r f a r in

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ocke t N o . 02-3603

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/23PRECE DENTI AL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No s. 02-3603, 02- 3755, 02-3757 & 02-3758

IN R E: WARFARI N SODI UM ANTIT RUST L IT IGAT ION

SE YM OU R E AG EL , Appellant

in No. 02-3603

W ILL IE H UT CH IN SO N, J R.; VINC ENT PA LAZZOL A; ALEX GALP ERI N; SHIRLEY BRUCE; M AD ISO N W . O’ KE LL Y, J R.; GAREY L. MCCARTY, Ap pellan ts in No. 02-3755

ALAN SHAP IRO , Appellant

in No. 02-3757

M AR Y C LE US M AN , Appellant

in No. 02-3758

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt

for the District of D elaware (D .C. N o. 98-md-1232 ) Distric t Judg e: The Honorable Sue L. Robinson

Argued October 29, 2003

Bef ore: SCIR ICA , Chief Judge , FUENTES , and SMITH ,

Circuit Judges

.-2- (Fil ed: December 8, 2004)

Paul D. Wexler ( Argued) Brag ar Wex le r Eag el & Morgens te rn, LLP 885 Third Avenue, Sui te 3040 New Y ork, New York 10022

ATTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT SEYMOUR EA GEL
Jeffrey S. Fri edman Silverm an & M cD onald 101 0 No rt

h Ba nc ro ft

Pkwy Suite 22 Wilmington, DE 19085
Edward Cochran (Argued) 20030 Marchmont Road Shaker Heights , OH 44122

Hilton F. Tomlinson Pri tc har d, McCa ll& Jones , LLC 505 North 20th St

reet, Suite 800 Birmingham, AL 35203-2605

Pau l Roth stein 626 N.E. 1st St

reet Gainesvil le, FL 32601

N. A lbert Bach arach, Jr. 115 NE 6th Avenue Gainesvil le, FL 32601
Robert W. Bishop Bishop & Associates 6520 Glenridge Par

k, Suite 6 Louisvil le, KY 40222

ATTORNE YS FOR APPE LLANTS WILL IE HUTCHI NSON, JR. , VI NCENT PALAZZOLA; ALEX GALPERIN; SHIRLEY-3- BRUCE; MADISON W. O’KELLY, J R.; GAREY L. MCCARTY

John J. Pentz (Argued) 2 Clock Tower Place Suite 260G Maynard, MA 01754

ATTORNEY FOR APPE LLANT ALAN SHAPI RO

J. Arn old F itzgera ld Andrew F. Tucker (Argued) 375 Second Avenue Suite 2 Dayton, Tennessee 37321
Sidney Balick Balick & Balick 711 King Street Wilmington, DE 19801

ATTORNE YS FOR APPE LLANT MARY C LEUSMAN

Bernard Pers ky ( Argued) Barba ra J. Hart Va ishali S hetty Goodki nd Lab at on Rudo ff & Suc har ow LLP 100 Park Avenue, 12th Fl oor New Y ork, New York 10017
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES JOHN KUSNERICK, ET AL.; SARA ALTMAN; SAMUEL GORDON TI SCHLER; MARIE A. STECKEL; ROBERT BAREIS S; J OHN CIVATTE, JR.; MAR Y BAN TEN; ARKA NSAS CA RPTENERS’ HEALTH & WELFARE FUND; OPERATI NG ENGINEERS LOCAL 3 12 H EALTH & WEL FARE F UND; UNIT ED FOOD AND C OMM ERCIAL UN ION AND EMPLO YERS M IDWEST HE AL TH BE NE FITS FU ND ; UN ITED WIS CO NS IN SERVI CES, INC ., now kno wn a s COB ALT CORP ORATI ON; LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE AND INDEMNITY-4- CORPORA TI ON do in g bu si ne ss as BLUE CR OSS AND B LUE SHI ELD OF LOUI SI ANA

Willi am R. Kane M iller, Fau cher a nd C affe rty 18th & C herry Stre ets One Logan Square, 17th Fl oor Philadelphia, PA 19103

Alan H. Rolnick Hanzman & C riden 220 Alhambra Circl e, Suite 400 Commercebank Building Coral Gables, FL 33134

Marvin A. Miller M iller, Fau cher a nd C affe rty 30 North LaSall e Street Suite 3200 Chicago, I L 60602
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES JOHN KUSNERICK, ET AL.; SARA ALTMAN; SAMUEL GORDON TI SCHLER; MARIE A. STECKEL; ARKANSAS CARPTENERS’ HEALTH & W ELFAR E FUN D; OPER ATING ENG INEERS L OCA L 312 HEALTH & WE LFARE FUND; UNIT ED FOOD AND COM MERC IAL UNION A ND EM PLOYERS M IDWEST HE AL TH BE NE FITS FU ND ; UN ITED WIS CO NS IN SERVI CES, INC ., now kno wn a s COB ALT CORP ORATI ON; LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE AND INDEMNITY CORPORA TI ON do in g bu si ne ss as BLUE CR OSS AND B LUE SHI ELD OF LOUI SI ANA

Pam ela S. T ikellis Ch imicles & T ikellis One Rod ney Square P.O. Box 1035, Suite 500 Wilmington, DE 19899

AT TO RN EY FO R A PP EL LE ES JO HN KU SN ER ICK , ET AL .;-5- SA RA AL TM AN ; SAM UE L G OR DO N T ISCH LER ; MA RIE A. S TECKEL; ROBERT BAREI SS; JOHN CI VATTE, JR. MARY BANTEN. Richard W. Cohen (Argued) Lowey, Dannenberg, Bemporad & Selinger One North Lexington Avenue The Gateway White Plai ns, NY 10601

AT TO RN EY FO R A PPE LLE E U NIT ED WIS CO NS IN SERVI CES, INC ., now kno wn a s COB ALT CORP ORATI ON

Don ald J. Wo lfe, Jr. Potter , Anderson & Corroon 1313 North Market Street 6th Floor , P.O. Box 951 Wilmington, DE 19899
George D. Rutti nger (Argued) Crowell & Moring 10 01 Pe nn syl va ni a A ve nu e, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2505

ATTORNE YS FOR APPE LLEE DUPONT PHARMACEUT ICA L COMPANY

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

FUENTES , Circuit

Judge

.
Thi s matte r arises o ut of a cons olidate d class action suit seeking injunctive and mon etary reli ef in connection with the sale of Cou mad in , the bra nd n ame for the presc ription d rug w arfarin sodium m an uf ac tu re d a nd m ar ke ted by th e DuPon t1 Formerlyknown as DuPont Merck Pharmaceutica l Com pany (a partne rship between E.I. duPont de Nemour s & Company and M erck & Co mp any).

2 Fixed co-pay

consumers re fer to thos e insur ed consumers who paid the same pri ce for pres cription drugs regardles s of whether the drugs were n ame-bra nd or ge neric. Out-o f-p ocket con sumers refers to individuals w ho paid d iffere nt prices for pres cription drugs depend ing on whether the y were name- brand or generic. Thi rd PartyPayor s refer to thos e enti ties providi ng prescripti on drug coverage and/or pay ing orreimb ursing part or all of the costs of prescription drugs.

-6- Pha rmac eutica ls Com pany (“Du Pont”). 1 Plai nti ffs all ege that DuP ont’s antic ompetitive behavior a nd dissemi nation of false a nd misleadi ng inform ation a bou t a low er-price d, read ily availa ble generi c competit or caused t hem to purchase the highe r-pri ced Co um adin inste ad of the generic product . At is sue in t his appeal is whether the Distri ct Court abused it s discretion i n approving a $44 .5 mill ion nati onwide settlement agreement between DuPont and the fi xe d co-pay consu mers an d out-of-p ocket con sumers (c ol lec tiv ely, the “consumer s”) and T hird Party Payors (“TPPs”) of Couma d in, and a wa rding $10 million in fee s to clas s cou nsel. 2 Several indivi dual consumers and TPPs challe nge the Dist rict Cou rt’s certific ation o f the c lass an d app rova l of the settlem ent. For the rea sons discu ssed b elo w, we conclude that the Distri ct Cou rt did n ot abu se its disc retion in certifying the cla ss or in approving the set

tlement , and acco rdin gly we will affi rm the judg men t of the Distric t Cou rt.

I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Histor y Wa rfarin sodium is a prescripti on oral ant icoagul ant medicati on sold i n table t form that is t aken by more than 2 mill ion Americans to treat

blood-cl otti ng disorde rs. DuPont has been the dominantmanufacturer and suppli er of warfarin s odium under the brand name C oumadin, recording sa les of approximat ely$550 mill ion and $464 m ill ion, respecti vely , in 1998 a nd 1999. Although Du Pon t’s Co um adin paten t expire d in 1 962 , Cou mad in3 When seeking approval from the FD A to market generic drugs, drug man ufac tu rers typically sub mit de tailed inf orm ati on regard in g the equival ence of the gene ric ver sion and the previ ouslyapproved brand nam e vers ion. B ioequ ivalen ce is es tabli shed b y showing t hat the gener ic drug deli vers t o the bodythe same amount of a ctive ingredi ent at the same rate and extent as i ts brand na me cou nterpar

t. Onc e b io eq ui va le nc e i s e st ab li sh ed , and a ft erth e FD A approves th e ma nuf acturin g con trols an d labe ling of the ge neric substi tute, the FDA grants appr oval for relea se of the generic drug to the m arket.
-7- remained the only

warfarin s odium product a v ailable until Ju ly 1997, wh en a g eneric versio n of wa rfarin s odiu m w as relea sed o nto the mark et following approval bythe U.S. Food and Drug Administr ation(“F DA ”). Class action plai ntiff s have alle ged that Du Pon t, in response to the com petition from low er-price d gen eric
wa rfarin sodium, di sseminated false and misleadi ng inform ation to consumers, TPP s, and others abou t the s afetyand equival ence of gene ric wa rfarin s odiu m. A s a resu lt, plaintiff s alle ge t hat DuP ont’s campaign of misrepresent ations and om is sions caused
consum ers and TPPs to buyhi ghe r- pr ic ed, br andname Co um adin inste ad o f the low er-p riced gen eric w arfa rin so diu m. DuP ont’s alle g ed violat ions ar e said to have begun when Barr La bor at or ie s, In c. (“ Bar r” ) f il ed a p etit

io n wi thth e FD A i n May 1995 seeking approval to manufacture and distribu te a ge neric
wa rfarin sodium product . In r esponse t o Barr’s pe tition, DuPont file d a petition for sta y with the FD A in October 1996 requesting that th e FD A adopt st

ricter bioequi valence s tandards and postpone approval for all ge ner ic w arfa rin so diu m p rod ucts . T he FDA denie d DuP ont’s petition , how ever, o n the g roun ds tha t the m eth o ds in place fo r d et er mi ni ng b io eq ui va le nc e we re su ff ic ie nt . A t th e s ame time, DuPont filed a

p etit ion with t

he U.S. Pharmacopei al Convention, Inc. ( “USP”) requesting the adoption o f Cou madin’s content un ifor mityspecifi cati ons as the indust ry standar d for warfarin s odium drugs. The USP rejected t his petiti on. In March 1997, the FDA approved a generi c warfar in sod iu m, findin g that it w as the b ioequ ivalen t a nd th erape utic equival ent to Coumadin. 3 The gene ric product was r elease d to the4 “NTI drugs,” or Narrow Therapeuti c Index drugs , are us ed for treat ing severe, life -threateni ng diseases where a patient’s t oleranc e to the drugs are so nar

row that too sma ll a dose can be use less and too large a

dose can be da nger ous to the pa tient’s he alth. W arfarin sodium is designated by t he FDA as an NT I drug.
-8- marketon Ju ly 26, 199 7 at pric es sub stantia llylow er than Coumadin. Plaintif fs alleg e that D uPo nt, in the peri od before and after Barr’s i ntrod uct ion of generic warfari n sodium, publ ished false and mislea ding st atements concerni ng the bioe quiva lenc e, therap eutic sa fe ty, and efficac y of generic warfari n sodium. For inst ance, Du Pon t alleged ly issued a variety of false and mislea ding communi cati ons to convinc e health care profe ssiona ls, governmen t ag e ncies, and the p ublic that Co umad in was sa fer and m ore effecti ve than B arr’s ge neric wa rfarin sodium product . In addi tion, DuPo nt allege dly revis ed its promotional computer software sy stem designedfor heal th care practi tioner s monitoring pat ients using Co um adin to inclu de w arning s abo ut sw itching to gen eric substitutes, and c reate d a sl ide presentation f or health care prof ession als claim ing th at t he generi c drug may not be the equ ivale nt to Co um adin

. DuPont also al legedl y r an a pub l icit y campai gn clai ming that Coumadin had tighter than USP co ntent uniformitystandards. DuPont issued a pres s releas e, wh ich state d that p atie nt s sho uld recei ve ad di ti ona l b lo od tes ts if swi tc he d t o ge ne ri c wa rf arin sodium and accused Barr of focusing on pr oduci ng a cheaper productto save moneywhile DuPont focusedon patie nt safet y and educati on. Furthermore, DuPont allege dly creat ed an organiz ation
nam ed the He alth Allian ce fo r NT I Patien t Safe ty for the purpose of lobb ying state legis latures, formularie s, and pharmacy boar ds to exclude NT I drugs from state generic substi tution laws. 4
Plaintiffs assert that t

he misrepresentat

ions led consumers, TPPs, and others to beli eve that Coumadin was superior to the gene ric equival ents, caused mil lions of prescripti ons to be fi lled wit h C oumadin that

could have been fi lled wit h less e xpensive gene ric drugs, and allow ed D uPo nt to maintai n supracompete tive prices for Coumadin. As e vid ence that D uPo nt’ s misrepr esentat

ions an d c ond uct ha d an a nticom petitive e ffec t,-9- plaint iffs cited e viden ce of the w eak m arket p enetra tion of gene ric
wa rfarin sod ium as c om par ed to Co um adin

. Generall y, about 40- 70% of prescripti ons for drugs avail able fr om multipl e sources are fill ed with les s expensi ve generi c products within one y ear of gene ric avail abili ty . However, more than 75% of prescripti ons for sodium warfa rin were sti ll fi lledwith C oum adin a year after B arr introdu ced its g eneric versi on, and DuPont continued to ma intain
a 67% market share up u ntil the dat e the complai nts i n this matter were fil ed. B. Procedural History Beginni ng in 19 97, cla ss actio n com plaints w ere filed in severalfede ral district c o urts and were consoli dated for pretrial proceedi ngs by the Judici al Pane l on Multidi stri ct Litigati on (“ MDL panel”) before the U.S. Dist rict Court forth e District of Delaware. The class a ctions sought t reble damages and injunc tive
re lief under federal antitr

ust laws on behalf of a nationwide class of consumer and T PP pu rchasers of Co umad in who paid all or part of the purcha se pri ce. In an order dated Decembe r 7, 1998 , the Distri ct Court di smissed t he clai ms on the grounds t hat consumer plaintiffs, as indi rect purchasers of Co um adin, lac ked s tandin g to seek inj unctive reli ef

and tre ble da mag es un der the She rman Ac t. See In re: Warfarin Sodi um Antitrus t Litig. , C.A. No. MDL 98- 1232- SLR, 1998 WL 88346 9 (D. D el. Dec 7, 19 98). This C ourt
revers ed the D istrict Co urt’s de cisio n wi th res pect t o injunct ive reli ef, finding t

hat consumer pl ainti ffs did hav e st anding under federalantitrust

law s. See In re Warfari n Sodium Antitr ust Litig. , 214 F.3 d 39 5 (3 d C ir. 20 00)

. Following our decisi on, several ad di ti ona l c la ss ac ti ons we r e filed in De lawa re D istrict Co urt as w ell as other federal courts by TPP plaint

iffs and a state med icaid a genc y and w ere tran sferre d to the Delaware District Court as tag- along actions pursu ant to t he orderof the MDL panel . A fter di scussi ons among counsel, the parti es nego tiate d and d rafte d a pretrial c ase management orde r (“CM O”), which the District Cou rt entere d on February22, 2001. The CM O e sta bli shed a plai ntiff s’ Executi ve Committee, establ ished procedures for conducting settlement discussi ons, and specifi ed when and how to fi le a co nsoli dated cl ass action
com plaint.5 15 U.S.C. § 26 st ates i n p er ti nen t p ar t: “Anyper son , f irm, corporation, or associ ation s hall be entitled to s ue for and have injunct ive reli ef, i n any court of t he United States havi ng juri sdiction over the parti es, agai nst threate ned loss or damage by
a violat ion of the antitr

ust l aws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of th is ti tl e, when and und erth e s ame conditi ons and pri nciple s as injunctive rel ief against threatened conduct that will cause loss
or damage is granted bycourts of equity, under the r ules governing such proc eedin gs, an d up on th e exe cutio n of proper bond against damages fo r an inj unction i mprovidentl y gr anted and a s howing that the dange r of irre par able loss or d am age is im me diate , a pre limin ary inju nctio n m ay issu e . . . .”

6 15 U .S.C. § 2 states : “Ev ery perso n w ho sh all monopolize , or atte mpt to mon opolize, or com bine or c onsp ir e with anyother person or persons , to mono polize any part of the trade orcommerce among the sever al States, or with foreign nations , shal l be deemed guilty of a felony , and, on conviction thereof, shal l be punished by fine not exceedi ng $100,000,000 i f a corporat ion, or , if any ot

her person, $1,000,000, or by impris onment not exceedi ng 10 year s, or by bo th sa id p uni shm ents , in th e dis creti on o f the cou rt.”

7 15 U .S.C . § 15 stat es in pertinent part: “[A]ny per son who shall be injured in his business or property by r eason of any thing forbidden in the antit

rustlaws may su e there for in any district court of the Unite d States in the di stri ct in whic h the defendan t r esides
or is found or

has an agent , without respect to the am oun t i n
-10- A consoli dated cl ass action complai nt was fil ed in the Distri ct Court on March 30, 2001 by cons umers and TPPs on beha lf of all sim ila rly situa ted U.S. c onsumers who purchased Co um adin at sup racompetitive p ric es andallsimi larlysit uate d U.S. TPPs who paid for the f ulf ill ment of Coumadin prescripti ons for their members or their insureds at s upracompet itiv e price s beginning in Jul y 1997. Plaintiffs s ought an inj unction and other equita ble relief u nder § 16 of the Clayton Ac t, 15 U.S.C. § 26, 5 to remedy DuPont’s viol ation of the fede ral antitrust laws, p articular ly § 2 of th e Sh er man Ac t, 15 U. S. C. § 2

. 6 On behalf of all TPP s, plaint iffs sought t

reble damages pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Ac t, 15 U.S.C. § 15. 7 Plaintiffs also alleged violations o f the D elawareco nt ro ve rsy, and shallrecover t hreefol d the dam ages b y him sustai ned, and th e cos t of su it, includin g a rea sona ble attorney' s fee . . . .”

8 Ar iz. R ev. S tat. § 4 4-1 401 , et seq .; Cal . Bus.& Prof. Cod e § 17200 et seq .; D.C . Co de A nn. § 28- 450 2, et seq .; Fl a. Stat. c h. 401; Ka n. S tat. A nn. § 50 -10 1, et seq .; Ky . Rev. St at. Ann. § 36 7.11 0-3 10, et seq .; La . Re v. S tat. A nn. § 51: 137 , et seq .; Me. Rev. Sta t. An n. tit. 1 0, § 1 101 , et seq .; Mas s. Ann . L aws , c h. 93A , et seq .; M ich. C om p. L aw s § 4 45.7 71, e t seq .; Min n. Stat. § 32 5D.49, et seq .; N.J . Sta t. An n. § 5 6:9 -1, et seq .; N.M . Stat. Ann. § 57 -1-1 , et seq .; N.Y . Ge n. B us. L aw § 34 0, et seq .; N.C. Gen. Sta t. § 7 5-1 , et seq .; N.D . Ce nt. C ode § 51 -08 .1-0 , et seq .; S. D. Codified Laws § 37-1, et seq .; Te nn. C ode An n. § 47-25-101, et seq .; W . Va . Co de § 47- 18- 1, et seq .; W is. Sta t. § 1 33.0 1, et seq

. -11- Consumer Fraud Act, 6 Del. C. § 2513; the consumer fraud and decepti ve acts and p ra ctic es statutes of all fifty st ates and t he Distri ct of Columbia; and t he anti trust

stat utes 8 of the “in direct purchase r” states. Finall y, plaint iffs al leged t orti ous int erferenc e with TPP s’ contra c ts with health benefit plan members and pharmacies relating to the subst itution of generic warfari n sodium and alle ged unjust

enrichment

und er the la ws o f all fifty states and the Distric t of C olum bia. T he state action s that are stil l pe nding are inc luded in the p ropo sed se ttlemen t. C. Sett lement

Negoti ati ons and Agree ment Pur suantto the C M O, co -chairs of the Exe cutive Co mm itte e had primary res ponsibilit y for submitting motions to the Dist ri ct Co urt, engaging i n disco ver y, condu cting n egotia tions w ith Du Pon t, and acti ng as the spokespers on for the pl ainti ffs at pretri al conferences. Any settlement discuss ions had t o be att ended by at leastone of the co-chairs, one consumer represe nta tive, and one TPP repres entative, and no settlement offe r could be mad e o r acceptedwithout t

he prior co nsent of al l con sumer and TPP rep rese ntati ves on t he c om mitte e. Settl emen t nego tiations in the fe deral a ctions b egan in March 2000 and conti nued through t he next y ear. The par ties reached an oral a greement on t he basic terms of the propos ed-12- settle ment on April 19, 2001, executed a memorandum of underst anding on May 14, 2001, and entere d into a Stipulat ion of Settl ement and Compromise on Jul y 26, 2001.
Un de r the propos ed settlement, DuPont would pay, for settlementpur pos es o nly, $4 4.5 mil li on t o se ttle th e cl ai ms of the following proposed class:

All consumers or Thi rd Party Pay ors in t he United States w ho p urch ased and/o r paid a ll
or pa rt of the purc hase price o f Co um adin di spen sed pursuant

to pres criptions i n the United States during th e period March 1, 1997 through an d i ncluding August 1, 2001 (“Class Per iod”). Excluded from the Class
are Defendant and anyof its officer s and directors and a ny gov ernm ental e nt ity. “Third Part y Pa yor ” shallmean any nongovernmentalentit

y that is ( i) a par

ty to a contra ct, iss uer of a pol icy , or s ponsor of a plan, wh ich co ntract, policy or plan provides prescripti on drug cove rage t o natural persons, and is also (i i) at ri sk , pursuant to such contra ct, po lic y o r plan, to pro vid e presc ripti on drug benefi ts or to pay or re imb urse all or

part of t

he cost of prescripti on drugs dis pensed to na tural persons covered bysuch contr act pol icyor plan

. Upon final approval of the settlement, all pending actions against DuPont ar is in g f

ro m i ts al le ge d un la wf

ul marketi ng and sale of Coumadin, i.e

. , both f edera l M DL proc eedin gs and r elated state actions, would be dism issed . Du Po nt h as a lread y paid the $ 44.5 mill ion into an e scrow account whic h is earning interest for the benefit of the class. Unde r the al location and dis tri bution pl an, the N e t Settl ement Fun d (“N SF” ) is to be dis tri buted to c lass members who9 The NSF is to be cal culat ed as foll ows: $44.5 mil lion pl us accrued interest, less c ourt- awarded att orney s’ fees , cost s and expens es, less c osts of not ice t o class members, l ess cost s of administering the fund, and less t axes.
-13- file d a pro of o f claim on or before Apri l 30, 2002. 9 The recognize d lo ss for each cl ass member willbe total pay ments made fo r Co um adin (less the amounts received for rei mbursements, discounts, or reb ates ) mu ltiplie d by 1 5%

. Eighteen percent of the NSF is t o be s et asi de for a “Prefe renti al Fund” out of which the recogniz ed losses o f con sum ers w ill be pa id first. If the recognized losses of consumer claimants are fully s atisf ie d from the Pref erenti al Fu nd, the unexpended portion willbe added to the NSF for pay ment of the recognized l osses of the T PP s. If ins tead
consumer losses are not f ully sati sfied, the unsa tisfied a mo unts w ill be paid out of the remaind er of the N SF on a pro-r ata basis w ith TPP claimants. On August 1, 2001, the D istrict Court granted p reliminary approval of the settlem ent an d con ditiona lly certified the settl ement clas s. The order appr oved the pl an for provi ding noti ce t o clas s mem bers about the settl ement terms. In addition, the D istrict Court requir ed any c lass member who wanted to opt- out of the class , or who wished to objec t to t he proposed se ttl ement butnot opt- out of the cl ass, to do so byDecember 17, 2001. D. Notice to Class M embers an d Respo nse to Proposed Se ttl ement Plaintiffs contrac ted with Complete Claim Solutions, Inc. (“CC S”), a nati onally

recogn ized settlem ent ad minis trator, to prepare and imp le ment

a no ti ce p ro gr am. CCS publis hed notic es tar geted at both TP P an d con sum er class -mem bers; se t up a c allcenter to receive telepho ne inquiries; prepa re d, p rinted, and dist ribut ed notice packets f

or consumers and TPPs who responded to the noti ce; and des igned and devel oped a website for cl as s mem bers to revie w a nd ac cess in form ation a bou t the settlem ent. Summary noti ce of the pro posed se ttlement wa s published over a periodof three months beginni ng in August 2001 i n selected publications across t

he country

includi ng USA Today , USA Weekend, and Parade Magazine , as wellas Mod ern Maturity and-14- Readers Dig est, in an effo rt to reach users of Cou madin w ho are gene rally over the a ge of 50. The publi cati ons had a combined circul ationof a ppr oxi ma tely 11 5 m illion peo ple. The not ice was also publis hed in National Unde rwriter and Benefits and Compensation Solut ions

. Th e sum mary no tice info rmed class m emb ers tha t a
se ttle me nt on b ehalf of t he class had been proposed. To make a cl ai m, consum ers were required to submit a form, avai lable on the
we bsite set up by CCS, cont aining c ertai n identi fyi ng information and proo f

concerni ng their

use of Coumadin. ByJanuary2002, there had been over 89, 000 tele phone inquiries made, over 41,803 visits to the websites and 15,127 forms vi ewed and/ordownloaded. An additional 7,273 re ques ts for printed no tice packets w ere recei ved via email . Through June 3, 2002, the adm inistrato r had mailed clai m forms to 90,926 potentia l consu mer class m embe rs and receiv ed an d pro cesse d 48 ,305 c onsu mer c la ims and 1,05 5 TPP claims.The clai ms submitt ed by consumer class members who filed proof of cla im on or before t

he April 30, 2002 deadli ne total ed $ 4.3 mill ion (we ll with in the 18% set asi de for the m in the Pref erenti al Fund ). Attorneys’ fees and expense s were awarded to couns el for the co nsumers and the TPPs in the aggregate amount of $1 0. 8 mi lli on. Approximatel y $2. 2 was spent on notice and administ rati on. This lef

t $27.2 mi lli on i n the fu nd for compensati on of T PP s. In additio n, by the D ecem ber 1 7, 200 1 op tout and obje cti on deadl ine, a tot al of 136 cons umers and 10 TPPs had opted out of

t he pro posed settlement while 11 indi vidual
consum ers and cons umer groups and t wo TPPs had filed objections. Oral argum ents by plaintiffs’ and ob jectors’ c o unsel w ere present ed at a fai rness heari ng h el d on Ja nuary23, 200 2. On August 30, 2002, t

he District Court

issued an ext ensive and detai led Memorandum O pinion an d Order (“Fi nal Approval Order”) certi fyi ng the set tlement class , approvi ng the set tleme nt, and dismis sing the cont entions made by the object ors. Nine of the
consumer obj ec to rs now a ppea l the Final A pprova l Order. Cleusman, Sha piro, an d Ea gel filed individ ual a ppea ls, wh ile Hutchinson, Palazzol a, Galperin, Bruce, O’Kell ey, and McCarthy-15- (collec tively, “Hu tchinso n”) file d a join t appe al.

II
. DIS CUSS ION
We re vi ew the d eci si on o f the Di stri ctCo urt to certi fy t he class and a ppro ve the settlem ent u nder a n abuse of dis creti on standar d. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig. , 264 F .3d 20 1, 231 (3d Cir. 2001) ( “ Cendant ”); In re Prude ntialIns. Co. of Am. Sales Practi ces Liti g. , 148 F.3d 283 , 299 (3d Cir. 199 8) (“ Prudenti al ”)

. An abuse of dis creti on may be fou nd w here the “d istrict court’s decisi on rest s upon a cle arlyerroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusi on of law or an improper appl ication of la w to fact. ” In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pi ck-Up Truck Fuel Tanks Prod. Li ab. Liti g. 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 199 5) (“ Gen eral M otors ”). We have juri sdiction over t

his appealunder 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A. Class Certif

icati on To be certifie d, a cl as s mu st satisfy the f our th resho ld requ ireme nts of Fe deral Rul e of CivilProcedure 23( a): ( 1)
num erosity (a “cla ss [so large] th at joind er of a ll mem bers is impracticable” ); (2) co mm onalit y ( “questi ons of law or fact
common to the c lass” ); ( 3) typical ity (named parties ’ claim s or defenses “are typi cal . . . of the cl ass”); and (4) ad equacy of repres entation (repre sentativ es “w ill fairly and a dequ ately protect the interests of the c lass” ). See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor , 521 U.S. 591, 613 ( 1997). I n additi on to the th resho ld requ ireme nts of Rule 23(a) , parties seeking cl ass certifi cati on must show that the action is main tain able under Rule 23(b) (1), (2), or (3). Rule 23 (b)(3), the provi sion at issue i n this case, provides for so-cal led “opt -out” cl ass actions suits

. See Amchem , 521 U.S. at 615. Under Rule 23(b)( 3), two ad ditio nal requirements must be met in order for

a class to be certi fied: (1) common questions must “pred om inate over anyquesti ons affecting only ind ividu al members” (the “predominance requirement”) , and (2) clas s resol ution must be “superiorto other avail able methods for the fair and effici ent adj udication of the controver sy” ( the “su perior ity req uire me nt”)

. Ap pellan ts alle g e several errors in the District Cou rt’s certi fication decisi on. Fir st, Appellant s argue that the Rule 23( a)
com mo nality and Rule 23(b)( 3) predominanc e requ ireme nts were10 W e do not unders tand Appell ants as chall enging the Distri ct Cou rt’s findings that the cl ass satisfi ed Rule 23(a)’s numerosi t y req uire me nt.
-16- not sati sfied i n this case becaus e of vari ations in the c lai ms an d injuries of the pl ainti ffs, s pecifi call y between and among the
consum ers and TPPs, as wellas differences in t he laws of

the 50 stat es whi ch form the basis of several of the class’ cl aims. Appellant s als o argue that the c erti fied cl ass does not sati sfy the Ru le 23(a) r equirement of ad equacy of repres entation because of the existen ce of intra-cla ss con flic ts o f inte rest , which rende red class counsel unabl e to represen t the interest s of a single class. After reviewing Appel lan ts’ ar guments, and for the reasons discuss ed below, we find that t he D istrict Co urt did n ot abu se its discr etionin certifying a single nationw ide class of co nsum ers and TPPs. 10
1. Commonalityand Predominance
Ru le 23(a)( 2)’s commonali ty element requires that t he proposed class mem bers share at le ast one ques tion of f act or l aw in com mo n w ith ea ch o ther

. See Bab y Neal e x. rel. Kan ter v

. Casey , 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3 d Ci r. 1994). Ru le 23(b)(3)’s pr edom inance element i n turn r equires that c ommon issues pred om inate o ver issu es aff ecting only individual class members. See Fe d. R . C iv . P . 23 (b )(3 ). W e h av e p re vi ou sly noted t hat the Ru le 23(b)(3) predominance requ ir emen t, which is far m ore demanding, incorpor ates the Ru le 23(a ) com mo nality requ ireme nt. See In re Lif

eUSA H olding, Inc. , 242 F.3d 136, 144 ( 3d Cir. 2001 );
see also Amchem , 521 U .S. at 623-2 4. A ccordingl y, we analy ze the two fa ctors togethe r, wit h parti cular f

ocus on the predomi nance requ irement

. See In re Lif eUSA H olding, Inc. , 242 F.3d at 144. The Distri ct Court f

ound tha t c ommo n questi ons of law and fact
arose from plaintiffs’ complaint , and that such common questions predominat ed over anyissues affec ti ng only indivi dual class members. We agree. As the Supreme Court note d in Amchem , “[p]redominance is a test readily m et in certain cases alle ging consumer [] fraud or violat ions of the an ti trust

laws.” Amchem , 521 U .S. at 62 5. Th is
ca se fal ls squarelyinto t hat cat egory : plai ntiff

s have all eged that11 As th e D istrict Co urt no ted, in o rder to prove a violation of § 2 of the S herm an A ct, plaintif fs m ust esta blish th at DuPont poss essed
mo nop oly power in the warfarin sodi um market and that it w illfully acquire d or maintained that power as di sti nguished from achievi ng grow th or deve lopm ent as a cons eque nce o f a su perior prod uct, business acu me n, or histo ric ac cide nt. See United States v. Grin nell Corp. , 384 U.S. 563, 570- 71 (1966). To prove a viol ation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud st atute , pla inti ffs must show that DuPont committed fr aud or misre present ation in con nectio n w ith the sale of Coumadin; no proof of i ndividualreli ance on the fraud
or m isrep rese ntati on i s req uire d. See Delaw are Co nsum er F rau d Statute, 6 D el. C

. § 25 13; see also S& R A ssoc., L P v. S hell O il Co. , 725 A.2 d 43 1, 44 0 (D el. S upe r. Ct . 199 8).
-17- DuPont engaged in a br oad-basedcam paign , in violat ion of feder al and state co nsum er frau d and antitrust la ws, to deceive consumers, TPPs, health care p rofes siona ls, and re gulato ry bodies into belie v ing that ge neric warfarin sodi um was not an equival ent alte rnati ve to Coumadin. These allegations natural ly r aise several qu esti ons of law and fact c ommon to the entire cla ss and which pred om inate over any issue s related to indiv idual class m embers, includi ng the unlaw fulness of DuP ont’s condu ct under f ederal antitrust laws as w ell as state law, the causal linkage between DuP ont’s cond uct a nd the injurysuffered by the class members, and the nature of the reli ef to which cl ass members ar e enti tled.
Mo reover, proof of

liabilityfor D uPon t’s conduct under § 2 of the S herm an A ct a n d the D elaw are C onsu mer F raud statute depends on evidence whichis common to the class members, such
as evidence t

hat DuPont made misrepres entations abou t Cou mad in and gene ric w arfarin sodium permit ting DuPont to monopoliz e the marketfor w arfarin sodium and charge supracompeti tive prices for Coumadin, while dis cou raging class members to purcha se the lower-priced generic co mpetitor. 11 In other w ords, w hile liability depends on the conduct of DuPont, and whether it conduc ted a nationwide cam paig n of mis rep rese ntati on a nd d ece ptio n, it doe s not dep end on t he c ond uct o f ind ivid ual c lass m em ber s. See In re FlatGlass Antit

rust Li tig. , 191 F.R. D. 472, 483-84 ( W.D. Pa. 1999) (noti ng that t he p redominance test is met in an anti trust case because “c on sid er ati on of th e c on sp ira cy is su e w ou ld , of ne ce ss ity,-18- focus on defend ants’ conduct, not the i ndividualconduct of the putati ve class membe rs”) . Simil arly , proof of l iabil ity does not depend on evidence t

hat DuPont made decepti ve communicati ons to indivi dual class members or of class members’ reliance on those
commu nications; to the c ontrary, DuPont’s all eged dec ep tive conductarose from a bro ad-b ased , nation al cam paig n conduc ted by and directed from corporate headquarters , and indivi dual reli ance on the m isre p rese ntati ons wa s irre leva nt to liabi lity. See In re LifeUSA Holding, Inc. , 242 F.3d at 144-46 (vacating class certi ficati on in part

because pl ainti ffs’ cl aims of deceptive insura nce s ales pr acti ces aros e from indi vi dual an d nonstandar dized presentations b y numerou s indepen dent agen ts). Fi na lly, the fact

that pl ainti ffs allege pure ly an eco nom ic injury as a resul t of DuPont’s c ondu ct ( i.e

. , overp aymen t for w arfarin sodium ), and not anyphysi cal injury, further supports a findi ng of
com mo nality and predominance be cause the re ar e lit tle or no indivi dual pro of

prob lems in this cas e othe rwise com mo nly associ ated wit h ph ysical in jury cla ims

. See Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 315 (noti ng that “ the complexi ty of a case al leging phy sicalinjury
as a result of asbe stos exposu re differs gr eatly fr om a case al leging
econo mic injury as a result of de ceptive sales prac tices”). Ap pellan ts rais e severalobjections t o the Dist rict Co urt’s finding that t

he certifie d class sati sfies the commonali ty and pre dom inan ce re qui rem ents . W e co nsid er ea ch in turn

. First, seve ral A ppella nts argue that the D istrict Court erred when it ce rtif ie d a si ngl e n atio nwi de class of plainti ffs because variat ions in and inconsi stenci es between the state consumer fraud and antitrust la ws o f the f ifty state s defeat the commonali ty and predominan ce requirem ents o f Ru le 23. A ppella nts rely prin cipally
on the Seventh Circuit ’s deci sion i n In re Bri dges to ne/Firestone Inc. , 288 F .3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002 ) (“ Bridgest one ”), a case involvi ng the certifi cati on of a nati onwide class alle ging t or t c la ims aris ing und er the la ws o f all fifty states. Howev er, Bridgest one is disting uisha ble from the insta n t matt er because that c ase concerned certi fication of a clas s for purpos es of lit igati on, nota class solely for purposes of

settlement, which is at

issue i n this case. 288 F. 3d at 1018. The differe n ce is key. In certific ation of litigati on class es-19- for claim s arising und er the la ws o f the f if ty stat es , we have prev iously noted tha t the di stri ct court must determine whether variat ions in st ate l aws pres ent the ty pes of ins uperable obstacl es which render class actio n litig ation unm ana gea ble. See Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 315 ; see also In re Sch. Asbestos Lit ig. , 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986). Thu s, fo r instan ce, w e hav e stated that a dist rict cou rt sho ul d ex ami ne whet her vary ing st ate l aws can be grouped by shared ele ments and appl ied as a uni t in s uch a way that the litiga tion clas s is m ana gea ble. Prudenti al ,148 F.3d a t 315 ; In
re Sch. Asbest os Liti g. , 789 F.2d at 1010. However, when dealing with variations i n state laws, t he same concerns w ith regard s to
case man agea bility that aris e with li tigat ion cla sses are not pres ent with settlement

class es, andthus those vari ations are ir relevant to certi fication of a settle me nt cla ss. See Amchem , 521 U.S. at 620 (in a settlement- only class certi fication, “ a dis tri ct court need not inquire wh ether th e case , if tried, w ould pr esen t intractab le management problems . . . for t he proposal is that there be no trial”). Nonetheless, we recognize t hat prob lems bey ond those of jus t manageabili ty may exi st when a dis tri ct court is aske d t o certi fy a singl e nati onwide class acti on sui t, e ven for settlement purposes, wh en cla ims ar ise un der the subs tantive laws of the fifty states. Although there may be situation s wh ere va riations in state la ws are s o sign ific ant so as to defeat commonality

and predominance even in a settl eme nt c lass c erti fication, t his i s not such a case. We agree with the Dist rict Court that t he fact t hat there ma y be varia tions in the righ ts and reme dies av ailable to injured class members under thevarious laws of the fif ty states in this m atter does not d efeat com mon ality and predom inance. In Prudenti al , we noted that a “findi ng o f co mm onalit y does not require that a ll cl ass members share identical claim s,” 148 F.3d at 310, and we rej ecte d an object or’s contention t hat predomi nance was defeated bec ause claims were subj ectto the laws of fifty st ates, id

. at 315. Moreover, rec ent deci sions el sewhere ha ve certifie d nationwide or m ultistate class es under st ate l aws in acti ons all eging
ov e rpay ment for bra nd- nam e pr esc riptio n dr ugs
. See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Anti trust Liti g. , 2 05 F. R. D . 3 69 ( D.D. C. 2002); I n re Sy nthroi d Mktg. Liti g. , 188 F .R.D . 295 ( N.D . Ill. 1999). In certify ing a nationwide set tlement class , the Distri ct12 We also n ote that i t appear s to be an uns ettl ed questi on of law
as to whether Tennes see’s antit rust s tatutes, t

he Tennessee Consumer Protection A ct (“ TC PA ”) and the Trade Pr acti ces Act (“TPA ”), cove r only viola tions o ccurrin g in intra state commerce or extend to cove r violat

ions o ccurrin g in inte rstate co mm erce a s we ll. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc. , 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 51 ( D.D. C. 1999) (“When the challenge d cond uct occurs before the products arri ve in Ten nesse e, the co ndu ct is con sidere d inters tate in nature and the TPA and T CP A sh ould not ap ply.”); see also Richardson v. Av entis , Civil Action No. 02-4586 (Tenn. Ch . Ct, R uth erfo rd C o., May 20, 20 03) (h olding that the TP A w as inten ded to apply to predom inantly intr astate commerce withi n Tennessee and i s thus “not app licable to . . . an interstate . . . price-fixing co nspiracy”).
-20- Cou rt wa s we ll within its discre tion in determi ning that variat ions between the la ws of different states were ins uffici ent to de feat the requir ements of Rule 23. Turning to t

he next a rgum ent, seve ral A ppella nts ob ject to the certifi cation of a single, nationwide class beca use c ertain class
mem bers may be eligible for tr eble damages or puniti ve damages under their st ate antit

rust laws, while othe r class members, such a s those fr om T ennes see, maybe eli gible f or “fullconsider ation” damages. Und er a “full consider ation” stat ute, a consumer can recover the f

ull purchase pri ce paid, as opposed t o recei ving reimburs ement of o nly th e overcharge s. As we explai ned above, how ever, we cannot saythat the Dist rict Court abused i ts di scretion in finding that su ch variations in state law rights and rem edies w ere insuffi cient

to de fe at c om m on ali ty a nd pr edominance. 12 In any
even t, we agree with the District Court that any materi al vari ations could be considered in the context of calcul ating damages as w ell as in as sessing the fa irness o f the se ttlemen t. Appellant

Hu tchinso n arg ues th at the D istrict Co urt erred in when it certif ied a singl e class includi ng both fixe d co-pay
consum ers and out-of- pocket consum ers. Ac cord ing to Hutchinson, because fixed co-payconsumers suff ered no inj ury or di d not suffer the same injuryas out-of-pocket consumers w hos e econ om ic loss va ried w ith th e cond uct of DuPont, t he District Cou rt should ei ther have excluded fixed co-payconsumers fr om-21- the class or otherwise creat ed a se par ate s ub

- cl as s f or t he m. We disagr ee. As the D istrict Court noted, fixed co-pay consu mers did possess vi abl e eq ui tabl e an d co mmon l aw cl ai ms for unjust enrichment

as well as claim s for in junctiv e relief a gains t Du Pon t. Fixed co -pay consum ers theref ore suffered a cognizabl e injur y as a resul t of DuPont’s a llege dly unlawful co nduc t and posed t he
sa me r isk to DuPont as di d out-of- pocket consumer s. Thus, the Distri ct Court did not

err when it i ncluded fi xed co-pay consu mers with out-of-pocket consumers in the same class. Fina lly, several A ppella nts object to the i nclusi on of

TPPs in the ce rti fied cl ass on the grounds that TPPs did not have standi ng to asse rt antitrust c laims, o r in the a lternativ e that th eir cl ai ms were not as s trong as tho se of the consumer plaintiffs. De spite Ap pellan ts’ obje ctions, w e find no er ror in the inc lusi on of TPPs in th e c er tif ied cla ss . N ot ab ly, T PPs, li ke indivi dual consumers, suffered di rect e conomic harm when, as a resul t of DuP ont’s alle ged misrepresentat ions, theypaid s up racompeti tive prices for C oum adin in stead o f pu rchas ing low er-price d gen eric
wa rfarin sodiu m. T hus, th is case is disting uisha ble fr om other productliabil ityclass acti ons, such as Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 W elfare Fun d v. P hilip Morris, Inc. , 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999) (“ Steamf itters ”), and a decisi on o f the S outhern Dis tri ct of New York in In re Rezul in Product s Liabil ity Liti gation , 171 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N .Y. 2001 ) (“ Rez ulin ”), which were cite d by Appellants. See also AlleghenyGe n. H osp. v . Philip Morris, Inc. , 228 F.3 d 42 9 (3 d C ir. 20 00)

. These cases, as with ot her si milar product li ab ilit y cases, involvedcla ss ac tio n c lai m s b y con sum e rs who had suffere d physi cal injuries from defecti ve products , which in turn r esulted in increa sed medical costs of covered insu r eds and increased payments by TPPs. The injuries suf fered byTPPs in those cases, unlike the direc t and in depe nden t harm suff ered b y TPP s in this matter, were derivative of and dependent on the harm suff ered by
consumers. Moreover, we note t hat the Sec ond Circu it, in
revers ing the dis tri ct court ’s deci sion in Rez ulin , recen tly held that whe n insurance companies “a llege an injur y di rec tly to themselve s ” and “the damages–t

he excess money plainti ffs paid def endants for the Rez ulin that t

hey cl aim theywould not have purchase d but for Defe ndant’s fraud–were in no wayderivat ive of da m ages to a-22- third -pa rty,” the ins urance companies have s tanding to directly sue defendants. See D esia no v. Warner-Lambert Co. , 326 F.3d 339, 349 (2d Cir. 2003) (re cognizi ng t h e right o f hea lth ben efit providers to recove r from drug compani es the amount s tha t wer e over paid due to illegal or dece pti ve ma rketing practices). Therefore, Appellants’ sugge sti on that TPPs shoul d have been excluded from the class or catego rized in a sepa ra te subc lass is without me rit , as i t well recognized t hat a purc haser i n a market whe re competition has been wrongfull y r estr ained has s uffered an antit rust i njury, and in this case, TPPs are such purchasers. Mo reover, it shou ld be n oted th at bec ause TP Ps ha ve litigab le cl ai ms against DuPo nt as injured purchasers, their incl usion was a necessary cond ition fo r Du Pon t to ente r into a s ettleme nt. A cc or di ng ly, the i nclu sio n of TPPs in the set tlement creat ed a much larger

settlement fund availabl e to sat isfythe cl aims of
consumer class m emb ers. If T PPs had n ot been incl uded in the sett lement with DuPont, t hey coul d have held back a nd sued
consum ers i n sub roga tion, the reby do ubling the de trimen t to
consum ers resul ting from the exclu sio n of TP Ps. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Li tig. , 264 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2001 ).

2. Typica lity The Dist rict Cour t found that the proposed clas s sati sfied t he requ ireme nts of Rule 23(a) (3), which requires that the cl aims of the named class repres entatives be “ty pi cal of the clai ms . . . of the clas s.” Fed . R. C iv. P. 23 (a)(3). T he typica lity requirem ent “is designedto align the int erests of the clas s and the class repres entatives so tha t the latter w ill work to bene fit the entire cl ass through t he pursui t of

their own goals.” Id . H ow ev er , typ ica lity,
as with com mo nality, does not req uir e “th at all putat ive class members share i dentic al cl aims.” Id.
We find no err or in t

he District Court ’s det er mi nation. N ot ab ly, the cla ims o f the re prese ntati ve plai ntiff s ari se from the
sa me alle ged wrongful conduct on th e part o f D uPo nt, spec ifically the alle ged misrepresentat ion and deception r e garding t he eq uiv alence of generi c warfarin s odium and Coumadin. The cl ai ms also ar ise fro m th e same ge neral l egal theories . As the Distri ct Cou rt noted, the one obvi ous difference among the various class members is t

hat some are consumers and s ome are TPP s.-23- How ever, the n amed class represent ative s incl ude members from each grou p. A ccord ingly, the D istrict Co urt did no t abus e its discr etionin findi ng that Rul e 23’s typi cali ty requirement was sati sfied. 3. Adequacy of Repres entation
Ru le 23 also requires that the representative c lass mem bers “fairly and adequatel y pr otect the interest s of the cl ass. ” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)( 4). We have previ ouslynoted that the adequacy inquiry under Rule 23 “has two com pon ents d esign ed to ensure that absentees’ interests are full y pur sued.” See Georgine v. Amchem Pro ds., Inc. , 83 F .3d 6 10, 6 30 ( 3d C ir. 19 96) , aff’d , Amchem , 521 U.S. at 591. Fir st, the adequacy inquiry “tests t he quali fications of the c ounsel t o repres ent the class .” Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 31 3 (int ernal citations om itted). Se cond , it seeks “ to unco ver co nflicts of interest between named partie s and the class the y seek to rep rese nt.” See id. Several Appel lants argue that t he inte rest s of TPPs, fixed co-p ay consum ers, and out-of -pocket co nsum ers were in confli ct, and accordi ngly class counsel was not in a posi tion to adeq uately repres ent the class in settle m ent negotiati ons. Ap pellan ts theref ore co ntend that the Distric t Cour t shoul d have, at a minimum, ce rti fi ed separate subclas ses for c onsumers and TPPs, or otherwise not certified t he class.
A dm itte dl y, as the District Cou rt noted , class co unse l could have more skil lfull y defi ned the class to recogni ze the di fferences bet ween t he various groups inc luded w ithin the class. How ever, we reject Appellants’ contention that t he interest s of the class
mem bers were in conflict in su c h a w ay that the District Court abused its dis cretion in certifyi ng a single class includi ng several ty pes of injured plainti ffs. As the D istrict Court found, thenamed parti es, who incl uded consumers andTPP s, as well as con sumers from the indire c t purchas er st ates, all s hared the same goal of establ ishi ng the li abili ty of DuPont, suffered the sa me injury resul ting from the overpayment for warfari n sodium, an d sought
essen tially th e s ame d amag es by way of c omp en sati on for overpa yment

. More imp ortantly , contraryto Appellants’ suggesti on, the inc lusi on of fixed co-pay c onsumer s and TPPs neithe r prejud iced o ut-of- pock et con sum ers no r redu ced th eir
se ttle m en t fu nd re co ve ry. All class m emb ers ha d the o ppo rtunity13 Recognized Loss” r efers t o totalpayment s made for C oum adin (less the amounts received for reimburs ements, discount s, or rebate s) mu ltiplied by fif teen p ercen t.

14 Although we find that the Distri ct Court was not req uir ed to certi fy subc lasses in thi s matter , we pause to note that subclas ses mightnon e thele ss have been us efull y employ ed in thi s case, and
m ay be so employed in future cases, even in the abse nce o f conflicts, t o fore stall the p articular kind of ch alleng e to certi fication present ed here. Of course, the decision whether to use subclas ses is t o b e m ad e o n a ca se by c ase basi s by t he District Co urt, a determinati on which we review foran abuse of discr etion.
-24- to recover100% of th eir “R eco gni zed Lo ss,” 13 and recovery di d not change depending on the number of people i n the cl ass, thereby creating the problem of “spl itting the se ttle ment .” Althou gh s ome cour ts have crea ted subclasses of class action p laintiffs whe re there
are confli cts of i nteres t among clas s member s , see, e. g. , Davis v. We ir , 497 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir . 1974) (noting that sub classes are gene rally utilized to eliminate antag onistic interests within a class); Am

. Fin . S ys. , Inc. v. Harlow , 65 F.R. D. 94 (D. Md. 1974) (encouragi ng com binatio n of subc la s ses into one c lass whe re interest s of class are not antagonis tic) , we do not b elieve that this
wa s requir ed in thi s case. Appellant s have onlyasserted, rat her th an establ ished, an inhere nt confl ict among consumers and between consum ers and TPPs. 14
Mo reover, we agree with the District Court that any potenti al for confli cts of i nteres t between and amo ng con sumers and TPPs that mayhave ari sen pri or to and during the settlement negotiations were adequatel y r epresented by t he presence of sepa rate counse l for c onsum ers and TPPs. The exis tence of sepa rate counsel, as well as the operation of t he Executive Comm ittee, prov ided a dequ ate “stru ctural p rotectio ns to assure tha t di ff erently situated pl ainti ffs negoti ate for their own unique inter ests.” Georgine , 83 F .3d at 631 (findin g inad equa te repres enta tion of differ ent groups of plai ntiff s where no such struc turalprotec tions ex isted); see also Amchem , 521 U.S. at 627-15 App ellant Shapiro also contests the D istrict Court’s fee aw ard
on the gro und s that it ex acerb ated th e intrac lass co nflict b et ween consum ers and T PPs . The Dis tri ct Court s et asi de 22.5% of the total$44 mill ion settlement fund to co ver attorney s fees t o be dividedaccordi ng to the di scretion of theco-ch a irs of the Executive Co mm ittee. Th e D istrict Co urt dis mis sed object ions lodged against

the award as unpe rsuasi ve, expl aini n g that t he dist ribution of an att orney fee award among coun sel is an d sho uld be a “private matter” for t he att orney s to re s o lve amongst themselves. See Spicer v. Chi. Bd. Operations Exch. , 844 F. Supp. 1226, 125 6 (N .D. I ll. 19 93) ; Ne wb erg , AttorneyFee Awards § 2.16 (1986). Shapiro renews his ar gume nts her e, ess entia lly assert ing that consumer counsel would have had an incentive to win a larger settlementfor their cli ents if thei r share of the fees w e re direc tly linkedto their clients’ recovery . Because we find t hat the class was prop erly certi fied, and the Executive Committe e s t ructure adeq uately represented the int erests o f al l cla ss members i n the settlementnegotiations , we see no rea s on to treat TPP and
consumer co uns el as an ta gon is ti c c ons ti tu en ci es wi t hin the settlementclass a nd d eviate from the acce pted practi ce of all owing counsel to apportion fees amongst themselves. See Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 329 n.96 (“[T] he court ne ed not undert ake the difficult task of assess ing counsel s’ rel ative contri butions .”). Furthermore, as the District Cou rt noted, not on ly is t here no reason t o presume that TPP and consu me r counselwill col lect fees in pr oporti on to the amount of recovery

for their respective cl ients , but t he fund is not alloc ated between TPPs and consumers i n such a w ay tha t wo uld
ma ke s uch a div ision eve n po ssib le.
-25- 28. 15 Accordingly , we find that t he Distric t Cou rt did no t abus e its discr etionin findi ng that t he class sati sfied t

he adequacyof repres entation requi rement of Rule 23.

4. Superiority

Requirement
Ru le 23(b)(3) requires t hat “a class a ction [ be] su perior to otheravaila ble m ethod s for th e fair a nd effici ent adj udication of the controver sy. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). The Rule se ts out16 Ru le 23(b )(3) lists the follow in g fact ors for c onsider ation by the co urts:
(A) the inter es t of m emb ers of the cla ss in

in dividu ally control ling t he prosecution or defe nse of sepa rate acti ons; (B) t

he extent

and nature of any litigati on concerni ng the controversy alrea dy commenced by or

against members of the cl as s; (C) the desir abili ty or undesi rabil ity of concentr ating the litigati on of the cl ai ms i n the pa rtic ul arfo ru m; (D) the diffic ulti es l ikely

to be encount ered in t he management of a cla ss action.

-26- severalfactor s rel evant t o the su pe rio rity i nq ui ry. 16 The supe riority requir ement “asks the court to balance, i n terms o f f airnes s and ef fic ien cy, the merits of a class action against those of alt ernati ve availa ble methods of adj udication.” Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 316 (int ernal citations and qu otations om itted). The D istrict Court found that t

he class sa tisfied th e sup eriority requ ireme nts of R ule 23(b)(3) , and we find no er ror i n this determi nation.
No tab ly, there are a pote ntial ly large number of clas s mem bers in this matter , inc luding s ome 2 milli on consumers and p otentia lly thousands of TPPs. However, indi vidual c onsum e r class mem bers h ave little in terest in “indiv iduall y cont roll ing the prosecution or defens e of se parate actions ,” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A ), beca use e ach c onsu mer h as a v ery sma ll claim in relat ion to the c ost of pr osecuti ng a law suit . Thus, f rom the
co nsum ers’ standpoi nt, aclass acti on facil itates sprea ding of the litigati on costs among the numerous i njured par ties and encourages private enforcement of the statut es. See Gen eral M otors , 55 F.3d at 784. As the District Court noted, t his is l ess true fo r TPP
mem bers of the cl ass, some of whom have signifi cant i ndi v idual claims. However, the TPPs had the opt ion to opt -out of t he proposed settlem ent ifit was i n t hei r i nt er es t t o brin g t hei r c la ims sep arate ly.
Mo reover, there w ere a re latively sm all number of indivi dual laws uits pen ding again st Du Pon t in this matte r, which indicated to the Dist rict Co urt that th ere w as a lac k of interest in-27- indivi dual prosecution of claim s. See Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 316;
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). Final ly, the Dist ri ct Court found that it w as de sirable to conc entrate litigatio n in Delaware, whe re Du Pon t had its princi pal pla ce of business and where several initial class acti on lawsuit s had been fi led

. Se e Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 316 ; see also Fed. R . Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C ). B. Fairne ss of

the Cla ss Act ion Settle ment A class acti on may not

be se ttled un der R ule 23(e) without
a determi nation by

the district co urt that th e pro pose d settlem ent is “fair, reasonabl e and adequate .” Gen eral M otors , 5 5 F.3d at 785 (citatio ns and quo tations o mitted ); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A )

. We have on several oc casions stre ssed the importanc e of Rule 23 (e), noting t

hat “the dist

rict court ac ts as a

fiduci ary who must serv e as a gu ard ian o f the righ ts of abs ent c lass m em ber s.” General Mo tors , 55 F.3dat 785 (ci tati ons and quotations o mitted);
see also Amchem , 521 U .S. at 62 3 (no ting tha t th e Ru le 23(e) inquiry “protects unnamed class members from u njustor unf air settlem ents affecti ng their right s when the re pr es ent at iv es bec ome fainthearte d before the acti on is adj udicat ed or ar e able t o secure sati sfacti on of t

hei r i ndi vi dua l c la ims by a compromi se”) ( citations omitted). Ho we ver , in ca ses s uch as th is, w he re settlement negotiations prece de cla ss certif ication, and approval for settlement and certi fication are s ought si multaneousl y, we requ ire di stri ct
cour ts to be e ven “ mo re scru pulo us than usual” when examini ng the fair nes s of the p rop ose d se ttlem ent. See Ge neral M otors , 55 F.3d at 805 . This h eighte ned s ta nd ard is intende d to ensur e that class counsel has engaged in sust ained advocac y throughout t he course of the proceedings, particul arlyin settl ement negotiations, and has pro tecte d th e inte rests of a ll clas s m em ber s. See Prudenti al , 148 F.3 d at 3 17. This Court has i dentif

ied nine factor s to be cons idered when determi ning whe thera propo sed class action se ttlement is fair,
reaso nable and adequate. See Girsh v. Jepson , 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975). These f actors are: (1) The complexity, expense, and likel y dur ation of the litigati on; (2) the reacti on of the class to the s ettl ement; ( 3) the stage of the pro ceedings a nd the am ount of d iscovery completed; (4) the ri sks of establ ishi ng liabi lit

y; (5) the ris ks-28- of establ ishi ng damages; (6) the ri sks of maint aining t he cl ass acti on through t he tri al; ( 7) the abi lit y of t he defe ndan ts to withs tand a great er judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the set tlement fun d in light of the best poss ible recovery; and (9) t he range of reasonableness of the set tlement

fun d to a p ossible recov ery in light o f all t h e atte ndant ri sks of li tigat ion. Girsh , 521 F.2d at 156- 57. The “decisi on of whether t o approve a proposed settl ement of a class action is left to the s ound discr etion of the distric t court,” and w e acc ord g reat de feren ce to the dis tri ct
c ou rt’s fac tual f ind ing s. Girsh , 52 1 F .2d at 1 56 . A dd itio na lly, there is an overriding public i nterestin settling cl ass action litigati on, and it s hould therefore be e ncour age d. See General Mo tors , 55 F.3d at 784 (“the la w f avor s settlem ent, pa rticularly in class action s and other c om plex c ases w here s ubsta ntialjudici al
resourc es can be conser ved by avoi ding formal litigati on ”); In re Sch. Asbestos Lit

ig. , 921 F.2d at

1333 (noti ng tha t the c o urt encourages settlementof co mp lex litigatio n “tha t otherw ise cou ld linger for years”). Befo re turnin g to the Dis tri ct Court’ s appli cati on of the Girsh fa ct or s, we r es ol ve a c ha ll en ge ra is ed byAp pel lants as to whether the pro pose d settlem ent is en titled to a p resum ptio n of fairness. We have prev iously directed a dist rict court to applyan initial pres u mption of fai rness when revi ewing a proposed settlementwhere: “(1) the set tlement negotiations occurred at arm’s length; (2) there was suffici ent disco very; (3) the prop onen ts of the set tlement are experienced i n simil ar li tigat ion; and(4) on ly
a sma ll fracti on o f th e class object ed.” Cendant , 264 F.3d at 232 n.18. Based on the reco rd before it, the District Court determi ned that the presum ption of fa irness properl y atta ched because t he settlementresul ted from intens e arms-l ength negotiati ons between expe r ienced counsel, came after over three ye ars of active li tigat ion and discovery, and was object ed to byonly a small f racti on of the purport ed class . SeveralAppellant s argue that ev en if the four fac tors were met, t

he District Court

was stil l not ent

itl ed to app l y a presumpti on of fairne ss because the set tlem ent negotiations preceded the actual certifi cati on of the cl ass, and thus the Dist rict Cou rt could not a ssure i tsel f that the negotiati on s pro ceeded at arm’s length or that c lass co unse l v igor ously prot ected the class’-29- interest s. We disagre e. As dis cussed above, we have sati sfied oursel ves thatthe Rule 23( e) adequacyof repres entation requir ement was met s uch that t he cons umer andTPP p l aintiffs, their respe ctiv e coun sel, as well as the st ructure of the Executive C ommittee pr ot ected t he c la ss ’ i nt er es ts durin g the s et tl eme n t negotiations. Accordingly , we see no re ason in this case to dep art from t he presu mption of fai rness t hat attached t o the propos ed settlementgiven that the D istrict Court found that the four fa ctors
we re m et. We now turn to t

he Girsh factor s, kee ping in mind the heig htened standar d we use when reviewing the fairness of a settlementthat

results from negotiations that preceded formal class certi fication, as w ell as the ini tialpresumpti on of fairne ss that the Distri ct Court found attached to the proposed settlement . For the
reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Dist ric t Cou rt did not abuse its discretion in d etermining tha t the settlement w as fair.

1. C om pl ex ity, Exp ense , and L ikely Duration of Liti gation The firs t fact or “captures the prob able cos ts , i n bo th ti me an d money, of conti nued lit igati on.” Cendant , 264 F.3d at 233 (cit ation omi tted) . We agree with the Distri ct Court’ s conclus ion that this factor

favors se ttl ement because c ontinu ing l iti gation through trial wo uld ha ve re qu ire d a dd itio na l d isc ov er y, extensi ve pretrial mo tions ad dressin g com plex f actua l and le g al questions, and ulti matelya compl ic ated, lengthy tri al. Moreover, it

was inevita ble th at

pos t- tria l m ot io ns an d a ppe al s wo ul d no t only further prolon g the li tigat

ion but al so reduce t

he value of any recovery to the class . In a cl ass action of thi s magnitude, which seeks to pr ovide recov eryfor Coumadi n consu mers a nd TPPs nationwide , t he time and expense l eading up t o tri al would have bee n sig nific ant. See Prudenti al , 148 F.3 d at 3 18.

2. The Reaction of t he Class t o the Settlement The seco n d Girsh factor “att empts to gauge whether
mem bers of the cl ass support the settle me nt.” Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 318 . We agree with th e D istri ct Court that thi s factor also supp orts the propos ed settlement. After prel imina ry approval of the settlement, indivi dual noti ce was mailedt o over 12,000-30- potential TPP class members, and summarynotice was publishe d in ne w sp ap er s a nd m ag az in es lik ely t o b e r ea d b y p ote ntial cl ass mem bers an d wh ic h ha d a co mbi ne d c ircu lati on o f 1 15 m il li on. Of th e 1.8 million potenti al class members, 136 consumers a nd te n TPP claimants opted out of the settlement, and 11 consumers o r groups of cons umers and two TPP cl ai ma nts obj ected t o the proposed settlement. As of June 3, 2002, 48,305 consumer and 1,055 TPP claims had been received and pr oc essed b y the administrator. The Distri ct Court c oncluded t hat the insi gnific ant number of objections fi led weighed i n favor of approvi ng the settlem ent. Although we have previ ouslynoted that the dis tri ct court should be “cautious abou t inferrin g sup port fr om a sm all number of object ors in a sop hist icated sett

lemen t,” Gen eral M otors , 55 F.3d at 812 (citation s om itted), w e agre e w ith the Dist rict Cou rt tha t the sm all num ber o f TP P ob jectors is particu larly tell ing a s theyare sophi sti cated businesses with very l arge potential cl aims.
In addressi ng this second Girsh fa ct or , w e consider a related argumentrais ed by one of the Appell ants. Hutchinson argues that the lack o f con sum er ob jectors re sulted f rom inade quate notice to the consumers, as co mp ared to the no tice pro vided to TP Ps. R ule 23(c)( 2) specifi es that

all members of the cl ass shoul d recei ve “the best notice prac ticable under t he circ umstances, includi ng indivi dual notice to allmembers who can be identi fied through
reaso nable effort. ” The Distri ct Court de termine d tha t this requir ement was sat is fied b y publish ing su mm ary notice in publications likel y t o be read byconsumer claimants al ong with a call -cente r and a website with information a nd d ow nload able forms. Hutchinson, however, argue s that notice to c ons ume r plaint iffs was inadequat e in this cas e as compared t o other l arge class ac tion suits wh ere in div idu al dir ect m ailin g w as u sed

. See, e.g. , In re L oraze pam & C loraze pate A ntitrust L iti g. , 205 F. R. D. 369, 381 (D.D .C. 20 02); Cendant , 264 F .3d at 2 26; In re S ynthroid Mktg. Liti g. , 264 F.3 d at 7 16.
How ever, even in the a bsen ce of any in divid ual no tice via direc t mail i n this matter , we are sat isfi ed that

the Dist rict Cou r t acted with in its discre tion in d eterm ining th at “rea sona ble effo rt”
was made here to pr ovide “ the be st notice practi cable under the circu ms tanc es.” See Fed . R. C iv. P . 23( c)(2 ). In particular, we note that neithe r the pl ainti ffs nor D uPo nt had acce ss to the names and-31- addresse s of

th e mu lti tude of peopl e nati onwide who purchased Co um adin because the ide ntity of ph arma ceutic al purc hase rs is confidential infor matio n that c annot be di sclose d without pat ient
cons ent. In addition, we not e that consumers i n this ca se wh o contact ed the admini strator or visi ted the w ebsit e could requ est a cop y of th e no tice b y direc t ma il.

3. Stage of Proceedi ngs and Amount o f DiscoveryCompleted The thir d Girsh factor “captur es the degre e of case developmentthat c lass c ounsel [had] accomplis he d pr ior to settlement

. T hrough thi s lens, courts can determine whether counsel had an adequate apprec iat ion of the merits of the case before negotiating. ” Cendant , 264 F.3d a t 235 (quoti ng General Mo tors , 55 F.3d at 813) . As the Dis tri ct Court f ound, this litigati on had been pursued by class counsel on s everal fronts for over t hree year s bef ore negoti ation of the set tlement . Pri or to cons olidat ion by the order

of the MDL panel, four se parate feder al acti ons had been file d by cons umer plai ntiff s, and con s umers and TPPs pursued state acti ons in Il linoi s, Cali fornia, Tennessee, New Y ork, Alabama, and Wisconsin. The settlement agreement was reache d afte r a y ear of nego tiations w hich in clude d con sultation s with experts. Con trary to Hutchins on’s ass erti on that the District Cou rt had virt ually nothing to aid it s evaluat ion of the settl ement terms, three y ears of l iti gation and discovery r esulted in hundreds of thousands of documents produc ed by defe ndant, numerous depositions, and consult ations with experts with which the Distri ct Cou rt was f amiliar. Based on the type and amou nt of discov ery undertake n by the parties, t he District Court concluded that cl ass counsel adequ ately appreciated the m erits of the case b efore negotiating, and we agree that this factor strongly favors approval of th e se ttlem ent. See Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 319. 4. & 5. Risks of

Establi shing Liabi lit

y and Damages These factor s surveythe pote ntialri sks and rewards of proceedi ng to litigati on in order to weigh the likeli hood of success against the be nefits of a n im me diate settle me nt. Cendant , 264 F.3d at 237 -39; Pr uden ti al , 148 F.3d at 319. After e valuating sever al poss ible ba r s to plaintiffs’ success a t trial, t he D istrict Court-32- concluded th at on balance, the fourt h and fifth Girsh factors favored set

tlement . We discern no error in that determi nation.
6. Ri sks of Maintaini ng Class Acti on Status Through Trial
Because “the p rospe cts for obta ini ng certi fication have a greatimpact on the range o f recove ry one can expect to reap f rom the [class ] acti on,” Gen eral M otors , 55 F.3d at 81 7, thi s factor
measures t he likeli hood of obtaining and keeping a class certi fication if the a ction w ere to proceed to trial. A district court retai ns the au thority to de certify or m odify a c la ss at anyti me during the li tigat

ion if i t proves to be u nm ana gea ble. Prudenti al , 148 F.3d at 321 . Alt hough Appellant s’ concerns about t he
man agea bility of a m ultistate class of consu mers and TPP s, as we discuss ed above, di d not pose a pr oblem for the certific ation of a settlem ent cla ss, there is a sign ifican t risk that s uch a class w ould create intr actabl e management probl ems if it were to become a litigati on clas s, an d th eref ore be d ece rtifie d. See In re Li fe US A Hol ding, Inc. , 242 F .3d at 1 47; Georgine , 83 F .3d a t 63 0. W e agree with the District

Court that the signifi cant risk that the class
wo uld be decertifie d if li tigat ion procee ded weighs in favor of settle me nt. 7. Abilit y t o Withstand Greater J udgment The seventh Girsh facto r con siders “ wh ether th e def enda nts could with stand a ju dgm ent for a n amount signi ficantly greate r than the [s] ettl ement.” Cendant , 264 F.3d at 240. The Distri ct Cou rt found that

this factor

neithe r favored no r disfavored settlementbeca use o f a la ck of evi dence in the record about DuP ont’s abili ty to payor whether s uch a conside r at ion fact ored into the set

tlement negotiations . Appell ants Cleus man a n d Hutchinson contend that the Distri ct Court s hould have i nquired into D uP on t’s ab ilit y to pay a hig her se ttlemen t amo unt in determi ning whe th erth e s ettl eme ntwas ad eq ua te . A l t hough the plaint iffs do not dis pute that DuPont’s total resources far exceed the settlem ent am oun t, the fact that DuPont could a fford to pay
more does notmean that i t is obligated to payany more t han what the consum er and T PP class m embe rs are enti tled to under the theori es of

l iabil ity that e xist ed at the time t he settlement was reached. Here, the Distri ct Court c oncluded that D uPo nt’s ab ility17 Dr. F rench ’s mo del ass um ed tha t, ab sent DuPont’s alle ged ill egal acts, DuP ont’s share of t he market would have fall en from 100% to 50% from Ju ly 1997 to Sep tember 1999, that ge neric
wa rfar in sodium would have cost 25% less than Coumadin, and that DuPont would have charged 2.5% less fo r Co um adin d ue to competition from the generic product . Dr. Fr ench’s fl oor of $ 7.1 mill ion resul ted from hi s esti mation that DuPont would have vigo rously ch alleng ed the basis f or plain tiffs’ da mag es at trial.
-33- to pay a higher amount was irrelevant to determining the fairness of the set tlement . We see no err or here. 8. & 9. Th e Range of Reas onableness o f

Se ttl ement in Lig ht of B est Po ssib l e Reco very and All Attendant Risks of Liti gation The la st two Girsh factor s evaluate whether the settlement repres ents a good value for a weak case or a poor

value for

a str ong case. The factors test two sides of the same coin: reasonableness in light of the be st poss ible recov ery and re ason ablen ess in light of the risks the parties w ould face if the c ase w ent to tria l. Prudenti al , 148 F.3 d at 3 22. In ord er to assess the rea sonablenes s of a settlementin cases seeking primaril y monetary reli ef, “t he present value of the dam ages plaintiff s wo uld likel y r ecoverif succ essfu l, appr opriate ly discount ed for the risk of not prevai ling, should be compared with the amount of the pr oposed settlement .” Id. (citing Gen eral M otors , 55 F.3d at 8 06). Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Fre nch, e stimate d reco verab le damages to be as l ow as $7.1 mil lion and a s high as $133. 8 mill ion. The District Cou rt described the m ethodolog y utili zed by Dr. French to arrive at

those fi gures and concluded hi s es timat e was reasonabl e. 17 Appellant Hutchinson now clai ms, without the support of expert

evaluation, c itat

ion, or discovery, that maxi mum d ama ges in thi s case shoul d have been estimated at $400 mill ion since Du Po nt m ade $1.6 bill ion in s ales between 1997 and 1999, and t h ere w as a 2 5% diffe rence in cos t betw een g eneric wa rfarin sodium an d Co uma di n. The Dis tric t C our t, af te r r ev ie wi n g the expert report

and supporting materials , concl uded that Dr. Fren c h’s18 Although it is not determi native her e, it i s also wort h noting that wh ile Hu tchinso n claim s the se ttlemen t fund amo unt is to o sma ll, ev ery consumer who file d a clai m on or before April30, 200 2, w ill rec eive 100 % of th eir R eco gni zed Lo ss.
-34- estima te of the range of possibl e damages was reasonable if the
case w ere to g o to trial.
Base d on th e $40 0 m illion fig ure, H utchin son a rgue s th a t
consum ers only recei ved 11% of total e conomic da ma ges, w ell below the 30%-70% damages recovered i n simil ar pharmaceutical industry class acti ons. Accor ding to Dr. Fren ch’s figures, ho wev er, the $4 4.5 m illi on se ttle m en t fu nd is a pp ro xi m ate ly 3 3% o f availa ble dam ages and w ell wit hi n a reasonabl e settlement r ange when comp ared w ith recovery perc ent ages in other class actions. See Cendant , 264 F.3d at 241 ( approving s ettl ement for 36%-37% recovery and noting t

hat typical rec over ie s in securities class acti ons range fro m 1.6% to 14% ). 18 We find no error in the Distri ct Cou rt’s analy sis and hold that these two factors al so favor settle me nt. On balance, and in li ght of the presumpti on of fairne ss that atta ches to the settlement, w e find that the D istrict Court adeq uately addresse d the Girsh fa cto rs, pr op er ly d ischar ged its fiduciary duty to absent class members, and di d not abuse i t s discr etion i n finding t

he settlement t o be fair

and reasonabl e. C. Plan of Allocation Severa l Appe llant s object to the proposed all ocati on of set tlement

funds under the Plan of All ocati on. These ar gum ent s overlap substan tial ly with t hose made w ith respect to class certifica tion, bu t to the ex tent tha t they we re no t addre ssed in our discuss ion above in Part A, we address them here. These additi onal arguments can be characterized into two groups, those objecting to the i nclusi on of TPPs in the Pl an o f Allocation and those objecting to t

he incl usion of fixed co- pay cons umers in t he Plan of Alloc ation. With regards to the first c onten tion, sev eral A ppella nts argue, despit e the fact

that t he District Court

noted the pr iorit y being given to i ndividualconsumers i n the st ructure of the-35- settlem ent, that t

he settlem ent is unfairlyskewed in favor of T PPs. Although TPPs are cert ainly recei ving a larger per centa ge of the fund than are consu mers , th is doe s not tra nslate in to an u nfair alloc ation. As t

he Di stric t Court noted, TPPs paid 67% of Co um adin costs, w hile co nsum ers pa id for 27% , so TP Ps ac tually bear the greater s hare of damages. Moreover, the Dist rict Court stat ed th at the se ttlemen t does not fa vor T PPs . Rath er, it is struc turedto protect cons umers and to cre ate an i ncenti ve for them to sub mit cl aims. The s ettl ement all ows indivi dual consumer s preferent ial access t o t he first 18 % of the Ne t Settlem ent F und to sati sfy consumer claims before TPP cl aimants c an r ecover at all, and if consumer c laims exc eed that am oun t, t

he remainder

of the 82% of the NSF is shared betwe en TP Ps and c onsum ers on a pro rata basis. Because of thi s favorabl e all ocati on, based on t he number of c ons umer

cl ai ms the S et tl eme n t Administ rator has recei ved, all c onsumers who have fil ed clai ms can expect to recei ve 100% of their Re cognized Loss, w hile TPP ’s will re ceive only appr oxim ately 35. 6% of th ei r Re co gni ze d Lo ss . Mo re ove r, we note that ha d the TPPs or a sub class of consumers not been include d in the s ettl ement dist ribution, t

he settlement am ou nt
wo uld have presumably been significantl y smaller as DuP ont
wo uld sti ll have been vulner able t o clai ms from ex clude d purchasers. Con se que nt ly , w e agree with the Distri ct Court t hat the inclus ion of T PPs in the P la n of A llocation wa s not u nfair to individual consumers. As for the s econ d con tention , severa l Ap pellan ts objec t to the inclus ion of fi xed co-payconsumers as e qual sharers i n the proc e eds of settlement. However, by par ticipating i n the settlem ent, all class mem bers, including c onsum ers with fixe d copays, ar e r el eas in g eq ui tabl e an d co mm on-l aw claims for unjust enrichment

seeking di sgorgement of profits from wrongdoers, and cl ai ms for inj unctive reli ef. Although fixed co-pay c onsumers have not suff ered m oneta ry dama ges, it is appropri ate that the y recei ve consider ationfor the release of th e claims they have against Du Pon t. Bec au se th e Pl an of All oc atio n wa s agree d to by
consumer and TPP class representat ives after extensi ve, armslength negotiations , and becaus e al l c ons umer s who fi le d cl ai ms are likely to recei ve 100% of their Recogni zed Losses, the Dist rict Cou rt was persuaded that fi xed co-payconsumers be al lowed t o-36- share equall y i n the dis tri bution of t he settlementfund. We find no
error in thi s determinati on.

II I. CONCLU SI ON
Because the cla ss satisfie s the re quirem ents of F edera l Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 23 and the set tlement is fai r to t

he class, w e w ill affirm the de cision o f the D istrict Co urt.